FILED MARCH 30, 2010 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 137562 

DARRELL WILDER, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 

HATHAWAY, J. 

We granted leave to appeal in this case to consider the limited issue of whether 

third-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4), is a necessarily included lesser offense of 

first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). We hold that third-degree home invasion 

under MCL 750.110a(4)(a) is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home 

invasion because all the elements required to convict defendant of third-degree home 

invasion under that subdivision are subsumed within the elements that would have been 

necessary to convict defendant of first-degree home invasion. Accordingly, we reverse 

the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Opinion Chief Justice: 

Marilyn Kelly 

Justices: 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

Diane M. Hathaway
2

I. Facts and Proceedings 

 Defendant Darrell Wilder appeared uninvited at Denise Carter’s home very early 

in the morning on December 30, 2006. Ms. Carter recognized him as her son’s cousin 

and opened the main door. Defendant opened the outer storm door and entered Ms. 

Carter’s home without permission. Defendant then walked past Ms. Carter and started 

unplugging her television set. While doing so he stated, “Auntee, I love you, but this has 

nothing to do with you. [T]his is because of your son.” When Ms. Carter protested, 

defendant lifted his shirt to display a gun in his waistband. Defendant then took the 

television with the help of a friend and put it into a waiting car. Ms. Carter told her 

grandchildren, who had also witnessed the intrusion, to call the police. 

 Defendant was arrested and charged, as a third-offense habitual offender,1

 with 

first-degree home invasion,2

 being a felon in possession of a firearm3 and possessing a 

firearm during the commission of a felony.4

 The felon-in-possession charge was 

dismissed, and the case proceeded to trial on the first-degree home-invasion and felonyfirearm counts. After a two-day bench trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree 

home invasion5

 and felony-firearm. The trial court summarized its findings as follows: 

 1

 MCL 769.11. 

2

 MCL 750.110a(2). 

3

 MCL 750.224f. 

4

 MCL 750.227b. 

5

 MCL 750.110a(4). 
3

Now the Court heard the testimony of the complainant, and the 

children who were at the house. And there was no question about who the 

person was. 

They never tried to embellish their testimony and said that he broke 

into the house. They never said he pulled a gun, just said that he pulled up 

his shirt. 

They identified him because everybody knew the man, so there isn’t 

much of an argument about identification. 

I think the People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [sic] 

the crime of Home Invasion Third Degree. That he entered without 

permission; he walked right past her, and took property out. 

And when there was any suggestion of resistance, he pulled up his 

shirt and showed that he was armed. And that was that. 

So, the People have to show that the defendant entered without 

permission, for the purpose of committing a misdemeanor, taking property, 

or committing a felony. 

That his body did go in, so he entered without the owner’s 

permission. 

Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, asserting, among other things, that 

his conviction of third-degree home invasion violated his due process rights because that 

crime is a cognate offense, not a necessarily included lesser offense, of the charged crime 

of first-degree home invasion. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and vacated 

his convictions.6

 The Court of Appeals opined that a conviction of third-degree home 

invasion is based on the commission of or intent to commit a misdemeanor. In contrast, a 

conviction of first-degree home invasion is based on the commission of or intent to 

 6 People v Wilder, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 

October 21, 2008 (Docket No. 278737). 
4

commit a felony, an element that it concluded is distinct from the commission of, or 

intent to commit, a misdemeanor.7

 As a result, the Court of Appeals concluded that thirddegree home invasion is a cognate offense of first-degree home invasion and, 

accordingly, the trial court could not convict defendant of the lesser crime.8

 The 

prosecution applied for leave to appeal in this Court. This Court granted leave to 

consider the limited issue of whether third-degree home invasion is a necessarily included 

lesser offense of first-degree home invasion.9

 

II. Standard of Review 

 Whether third-degree home invasion is a necessarily included lesser offense of 

first-degree home invasion is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.10 

Defendant additionally asserts that his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment were violated, which is a constitutional question that this Court also reviews 

de novo.11 

III. Analysis 

 The issue before us is whether third-degree home invasion is a necessarily 

included lesser offense of first-degree home invasion and, consequently, whether 

 7 Id. at 4. 

8 Id.

9 People v Wilder, 483 Mich 922 (2009). 

10 In re Investigation of March 1999 Riots in East Lansing, 463 Mich 378, 383; 

617 NW2d 310 (2000). 

11 Sidun v Wayne Co Treasurer, 481 Mich 503, 508; 751 NW2d 453 (2008). 
5

defendant’s convictions should be reinstated. Our analysis begins with a review of the 

statutory basis for lesser-offense instructions. MCL 768.32(1) provides in relevant part: 

Except as provided in subsection (2), upon an indictment for an 

offense, consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the 

jury, or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of 

the offense in the degree charged in the indictment and may find the 

accused person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that charged in 

the indictment, or of an attempt to commit that offense. [Emphasis added.] 

 In People v Cornell,

12 this Court considered what constitutes an “offense inferior 

to that charged” within the meaning of MCL 768.32(1). In its discussion of inferior 

offenses, the Cornell Court opined that “‘the word “inferior” in the statute does not refer 

to inferiority in the penalty associated with the offense, but, rather, to the absence of an 

element that distinguishes the charged offense from the lesser offense.’”13

On this basis, the Cornell Court concluded that MCL 768.32(1) permits the trier of 

fact to find a defendant guilty of a lesser offense if the lesser offense is necessarily 

included in the greater offense. A lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater 

offense when the elements necessary for the commission of the lesser offense are 

subsumed within the elements necessary for the commission of the greater offense.14 

 12 People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). 

13 Id. at 355, quoting People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich App 411, 420; 564 

NW2d 149 (1997). 

14 Cornell, 466 Mich at 357; see also People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527, 533; 664 

NW2d 685 (2003). 
6

 Necessarily included lesser offenses are distinguishable from cognate offenses. 

Cognate offenses share several elements and are of the same class or category as the 

greater offense, but contain elements not found in the greater offense.15 As a result, a 

cognate offense is not an inferior offense under MCL 768.32(1). Accordingly, the trier of 

fact may not find a defendant not guilty of a charged offense but guilty of a cognate 

offense because the defendant would not have had notice of all the elements of the 

offense that he or she was required to defend against.16 

 In applying these principles to the present case, we must review the home invasion 

statutes to determine whether the elements of third-degree home invasion, MCL 

750.110a(4), are subsumed within the elements of first-degree home invasion, MCL 

750.110a(2). 

 MCL 750.110a(2) sets forth the elements of the crime of first-degree home 

invasion: 

A person who breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a 

felony, larceny, or assault in the dwelling, a person who enters a dwelling 

without permission with intent to commit a felony, larceny, or assault in the 

dwelling, or a person who breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling 

without permission and, at any time while he or she is entering, present in, 

or exiting the dwelling, commits a felony, larceny, or assault is guilty of 

home invasion in the first degree if at any time while the person is entering, 

present in, or exiting the dwelling either of the following circumstances 

exists: 

 15 Cornell, 466 Mich at 345. 

16 Id. at 354-355, 359. 
7

(a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon. 

(b) Another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. 

MCL 750.110a(4) sets forth the elements of the crime of third-degree home 

invasion: 

A person is guilty of home invasion in the third degree if the person 

does either of the following: 

 (a) Breaks and enters a dwelling with intent to commit a 

misdemeanor in the dwelling, enters a dwelling without permission with 

intent to commit a misdemeanor in the dwelling, or breaks and enters a 

dwelling or enters a dwelling without permission and, at any time while he 

or she is entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling, commits a 

misdemeanor. 

 (b) Breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without 

permission and, at any time while the person is entering, present in, or 

exiting the dwelling, violates any of the following ordered to protect a 

named person or persons: 

 (i) A probation term or condition. 

 (ii) A parole term or condition. 

 (iii) A personal protection order term or condition. 

 (iv) A bond or bail condition or any condition of pretrial release. 

 A review of these statutes demonstrates that both first-degree home invasion and 

third-degree home invasion can be committed in several different ways, each of which 

involves alternative elements necessary to complete the crime. 

 The alternative elements of first-degree home invasion can be broken down as 

follows: 
8

 Element One: The defendant either: 

1. breaks and enters a dwelling or 

2. enters a dwelling without permission. 

 Element Two: The defendant either: 

1. intends when entering to commit a felony, larceny, or 

assault in the dwelling or 

2. at any time while entering, present in, or exiting the 

dwelling commits a felony, larceny, or assault. 

 

 Element Three: While the defendant is entering, present in, or exiting the 

dwelling, either: 

1. the defendant is armed with a dangerous weapon or 

2. another person is lawfully present in the dwelling. 

The alternative elements of third-degree home invasion can be broken down as 

follows: 

 Element One: The defendant either: 

1. breaks and enters a dwelling or 

2. enters a dwelling without permission. 

 Element Two: The defendant: 

1. intends when entering to commit a misdemeanor in the 

dwelling, or 

2. at any time while entering, present in, or exiting the 

dwelling commits a misdemeanor, or 

3. while entering, present in, or exiting the dwelling 

violates any of the following ordered to protect a 

named person or persons: 

a. probation term or condition, or 

b. parole term or condition, or 

c. personal protection order term or condition, or 

d. bond or bail condition or any condition of pretrial 

release. 
9

 The Court of Appeals opined that third-degree home invasion cannot be a 

necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home invasion because one or more of 

the possible alternative elements of third-degree home invasion are distinct from the 

elements of first-degree home invasion. In doing so, it failed to confine its analysis to the 

elements at issue in this case; rather, it based its decision on an analysis of alternative 

elements that were not at issue. The Court reasoned that if there could be any instance in 

which the underlying misdemeanor is not subsumed within the predicate felony, then the 

entire crime is a cognate offense. We disagree with this rationale. 

 We conclude that a more narrowly focused evaluation of the statutory elements at 

issue is necessary when dealing with degreed offenses that can be committed by 

alternative methods. Such an evaluation requires examining the charged predicate crime 

to determine whether the alternative elements of the lesser crime committed are 

subsumed within the charged offense. As long as the elements at issue are subsumed 

within the charged offense, the crime is a necessarily included lesser offense. Not all 

possible statutory alternative elements of the lesser offense need to be subsumed within 

the elements of the greater offense in order to conclude that the lesser offense is a 

necessarily included lesser offense. Accordingly, in order to determine whether the 

specific elements used to convict defendant of third-degree home invasion in this case 

constitute a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home invasion, one must 

examine the offense of first-degree home invasion as charged and determine whether the 

elements of third-degree home invasion as convicted are subsumed within the charged 

offense. 
10

 The record in this case indicates that defendant was charged with first-degree 

home invasion for entering the complainant’s home without permission, taking property 

out of the home, and displaying a gun in his waistband. The trial court convicted 

defendant of third-degree home invasion under MCL 750.110a(4)(a) by finding that 

defendant entered the home without permission and committed a misdemeanor (larceny). 

Thus, we need only examine the elements of third-degree home invasion under MCL 

750.110a(4)(a) to determine whether the crime, when committed in that specific manner, 

is a necessarily included lesser offense of the charged crime of first-degree home 

invasion. 

 In the instant case, it is clear that third-degree home invasion under MCL 

750.110a(4)(a) is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home invasion 

because all the elements required to convict defendant of third-degree home invasion 

under that subdivision are subsumed within the elements of first-degree home invasion. 

The elements of first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), as charged in this case 

are: 

Element One: Defendant entered a dwelling without permission. 

Element Two: Defendant, while present in the dwelling, committed a 

larceny. 

Element Three: While present in the dwelling, defendant was armed 

with a dangerous weapon. 

The elements of third-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4)(a), used to convict

defendant were: 

Element One: Defendant entered a dwelling without permission. 
11

Element Two: Defendant, while present in the dwelling, committed a 

misdemeanor. 

 A misdemeanor offense is necessarily included in a larceny offense if all the 

elements necessary to commit the misdemeanor are subsumed within the elements 

necessary to commit the larceny.17 The second element of the lesser crime, commission 

of a misdemeanor while present in the dwelling, is subsumed within the second element 

of the greater crime charged, commission of a larceny while present in the dwelling, 

because every felony larceny necessarily includes within it a misdemeanor larceny. In 

other words, given the charged offense, it would have been necessary for defendant to 

commit third-degree home invasion, by committing the misdemeanor, before completing 

the crime of first-degree home invasion, by committing the larceny. Accordingly, thirddegree home invasion under MCL 750.110a(4)(a) is a necessarily included lesser offense 

of first-degree home invasion.18 

 We next consider whether defendant’s due process rights were violated. Due 

process requires that a defendant be on notice of all the elements of a crime that he or she 

 17 Cornell, 466 Mich at 345. 

18 We note that third-degree home invasion under MCL 750.110a(4)(b) is 

completed when a defendant breaks and enters a dwelling or enters a dwelling without 

permission and, while there or while entering or exiting, violates a term or condition of 

probation, parole, a personal protection order, or bond or bail. Since defendant in this 

case was not convicted under MCL 750.110a(4)(b), the issue of whether third-degree 

home invasion under MCL 750.110a(4)(b) is a necessarily included lesser offense of 

first-degree home invasion is not before us, and we therefore refrain from deciding it. 
12

is charged with and is expected to defend against.19 Because all the elements of thirddegree home invasion are subsumed within the elements required for first-degree home 

invasion in this case, defendant was on notice of all the elements of the crime he was 

required to defend against. As a result, defendant was fully informed of the nature of the 

charges against him and the elements that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a 

reasonable doubt in order to obtain a conviction. Accordingly, we conclude that 

defendant’s due process rights were not violated because he was convicted of a 

necessarily included lesser offense of the crime with which he was charged. 

IV. Conclusion 

We granted leave in this case to consider the limited issue of whether third-degree 

home invasion, MCL 750.110a(4), is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree 

home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2). We hold that third-degree home invasion under MCL 

750.110a(4)(a) is a necessarily included lesser offense of first-degree home invasion 

because all the elements supporting defendant’s conviction of third-degree home invasion 

are subsumed within the elements that would have been necessary to convict defendant of 

 19 See Schmuck v United States, 489 US 705, 717-718; 109 S Ct 1443; 103 L Ed 

2d 734 (1989). 
13

 first-degree home invasion. Further, defendant’s due process rights were not violated 

because he was on notice of all the elements of the crime he was required to defend 

against. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and reinstate 

defendant’s convictions and sentences. 

Diane M. Hathaway 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 137562 

DARRELL WILDER, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 

I join the majority opinion because I agree that third-degree home invasion under 

MCL 750.110a(4)(a) is a necessarily included lesser offense of the charged offense of 

first-degree home invasion. As the majority opinion explains, all the elements required 

for defendant’s conviction of third-degree home invasion are subsumed in the elements of 

first-degree home invasion. 

I write separately only to express continued adherence to my dissenting opinion in 

People v Nyx, 479 Mich 112, 154-179; 734 NW2d 548 (2007). That is, when the 

Legislature itself has formally divided an offense into degrees, MCL 768.32(1) permits a 

fact-finder to convict a defendant of a legislatively denominated inferior degree of the 

charged offense if a rational view of the evidence supports the conviction. Resort to the 
2

Cornell1

 rule of construction for determining whether an offense is inferior is simply 

unnecessary in this situation. 

Nonetheless, because the majority here correctly concludes that the elements of 

third-degree home invasion under MCL 750.110a(4)(a) are subsumed in the charged 

offense of first-degree home invasion, thereby requiring reinstatement of defendant’s 

convictions and sentences, I concur in the majority’s decision. 

Maura D. Corrigan 

 1 People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002). 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 

SUPREME COURT 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v No. 137562 

DARRELL WILDER, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

CAVANAGH, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I concur with the result reached by the majority opinion. I agree with the majority 

opinion that defendant’s due process rights were not violated. Because defendant was 

charged with committing first-degree home invasion on the basis of committing a larceny 

offense, defendant was on notice that he needed to defend each element of a larceny 

crime. I do not, however, join the majority opinion in full because I continue to believe 

that the majority’s interpretation of the word “inferior” in MCL 768.32 is contrary to the 

established definition and historical use of the term. See People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 

527, 548-555; 664 NW2d 685 (2003) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring), and People v Nyx, 

479 Mich 112, 142-143; 734 NW2d 548 (2007) (CAVANAGH, J., concurring in result 

only). 

Michael F. Cavanagh 

Marilyn Kelly