U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

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19–006

" HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 107TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2002

107–771

R E P O R T

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ON

H.R. 5132

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

NOVEMBER 4, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House 

on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 


congress.#13
(II)

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado 

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey 

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York 

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

J.C. WATTS, JR., Oklahoma 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JIM RYUN, Kansas 

BOB RILEY, Alabama 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

KEN CALVERT, California 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida 

MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois 

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia 

EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

IKE SKELTON, Missouri 

JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

LANE EVANS, Illinois 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii 

MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam 

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

VICTOR F. SNYDER, Arkansas 

JIM TURNER, Texas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas 

CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia 

ELLEN TAUSCHER, California 

ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey 

BARON P. HILL, Indiana 

MIKE THOMPSON, California 

JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

ROBERT S. RANGEL, Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

Purpose and Background ........................................................................................ 00

Legislative History .................................................................................................. 00

Section-by-Section Analysis .................................................................................... 00

Section 1—Findings Concerning Fiscal Year 2003 End Strengths Needed 

for the Armed Forces to Fight the War on Terrorism ................................... 00

Section 2—Sense of Congress .............................................................................. 00 

Committee Position ................................................................................................. 00

Fiscal Data ............................................................................................................... 00

Congressional Budget Office Estimate ............................................................... 00

Committee Cost Estimate .................................................................................... 00

Oversight Findings .................................................................................................. 00

Constitutional Authority Statement ...................................................................... 00

Statement of Federal Mandates ............................................................................. 00

Record Vote .............................................................................................................. 00

Additional Views of John M. McHugh ................................................................... 00

107TH CONGRESS REPORT " HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ! 2d Session 107–771

EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE 

FISCAL YEAR 2003 END STRENGTHS NEEDED FOR THE 

ARMED FORCES TO FIGHT THE WAR ON TERRORISM

NOVEMBER 4, 2002.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State 

of the Union and ordered to be printed 

Mr. STUMP, from the Committee on Armed Services, 

submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

ADDITIONAL VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 5132] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the bill 

(H.R. 5132) to express the sense of Congress concerning the fiscal 

year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to fight the 

War on Terrorism, having considered the same, report favorably 

thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

The amendment (stated in terms of the page and line numbers 

of the introduced bill) is as follows: 

Page 5, beginning on line 5, strike ‘‘so long as the Nation is at 

war against terrorism’’.

PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND

The purpose of H.R. 5132 is to express the sense of Congress 

that, in light of the global war against terrorism: (1) the increases 

in military personnel end strengths recommended by the Senate 

and House of Representatives in their respective versions of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 are appropriate and justified; (2) the President and Secretary of Defense 

should not reduce end strengths; and (3) the President should support the recommended end strength increases. 

2

H.R. 5132 is a direct outgrowth of the committee’s long-standing 

concerns about the inadequacy of the force structure and strength 

of the Armed Forces for carrying out the national military strategy, 

while also trying to sustain their long-term readiness and viability. 

Such concerns predate the September 11, 2001, commencement of 

the Nation’s global war on terrorism. For example, committee initiatives led to the establishment of minimum end strength levels 

for each of the military services in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Public Law 104–106. More recently, 

a majority of committee Members in an August 2001 letter expressed to the Secretary of Defense their strong opposition to any 

effort to reduce Army force structure. Since the terrorist attack on 

the United States of September 11, 2001, the extent and scope of 

operations undertaken by the Armed Forces in the global war on 

terrorism, the impact of new missions related to Homeland Defense, and the testimony of senior U.S. military commanders have 

convinced the committee that additional military forces and 

strength will be required to adequately carry out the missions assigned to our Armed Forces. In addition, the committee became 

concerned that military manpower reductions were being considered within the Department of Defense as part of the department’s 

overall transformation efforts. As a result, the committee recommended and the House of Representatives adopted, in H.R. 

4546, the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

year 2003, increases in active duty end strength totaling more than 

10,300 above the budget request. The Senate also adopted active 

end strength increases totaling 12,000 more than the budget request as part of S. 2514, its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. 

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. 5132 was introduced on July 16, 2002 and was referred to 

the Committee on Armed Services. On July 18, 2002 the Committee on Armed Services held a mark-up session to consider H.R. 

5132. The committee adopted the bill with an amendment and reported the same favorably by voice vote. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

The following is a section-by-section analysis of those sections of 

H.R. 5132 amended by the Armed Services Committee. 

Section 1—Findings concerning fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to fight the war on terrorism 

This section presents the Congressional findings in support of 

H.R. 5132. Among those findings are that: (1) Prior to September 

11, 2001, the uniformed chiefs of the Armed Forces testified that 

they did not have sufficient military personnel to carry out all their 

operational requirements, and that since September 11, 2001, senior operational commanders have testified that the war on terrorism has further highlighted the insufficiency of the Armed 

Forces to meet operational requirements; (2) The war on terrorism 

has become global in scope, requiring not only thousands of active 

duty personnel but also the mobilization of more than 80,000 reservists; (3) The President has repeatedly stated that the war on 

terrorism will continue for some time; (4) Prosecuting the war on 

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terrorism will require, among other things, increased expenditures 

for military personnel, and in recognition of that both the House 

and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2003 increased the authorizations for military end 

strength above the levels requested by the President; and (5) Press 

reports indicate that the Secretary of Defense has under consideration substantial reductions in military end strengths. 

Section 2—Sense of Congress 

This section would express the Sense of Congress that: (1) the increases in military personnel end strengths recommended by the 

Senate and House of Representatives in their respective versions of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 are 

appropriate and justified; (2) the President and Secretary of Defense should not reduce end strengths; and (3) the President should 

support such increased end strengths. 

COMMITTEE POSITION

On July 18, 2002, the Committee on Armed Services ordered 

H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to the House with a favorable recommendation by voice vote, a quorum being present. 

FISCAL DATA

Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee attempted to ascertain 

annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal year 2003 and 

the four following fiscal years. The results of such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974, which is included in this report pursuant to 

clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to section 402(a) 

of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as follows:

JULY 19, 2002. 

Hon. BOB STUMP, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5132, a bill to express the 

sense of Congress concerning the fiscal year 2003 end strengths 

needed for the Armed Forces to fight the War on Terrorism. 

The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. If you wish further 

details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. 

Sincerely, 

DAN L. CRIPPEN, Director. 

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H.R. 5132—A bill to express the sense of Congress concerning the 

fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to 

fight the War on Terrorism 

CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5132 would have no impact on 

the federal budget. Because the bill would not affect direct spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply. H.R. 

5132 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as 

defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would impose 

no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

H.R. 5132 would express the sense of the Congress that the increases in end-strength authorizations for the armed forces for fiscal year 2003 recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives in their respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 are wholly appropriate and justified by the increased missions and tempo of operations associated 

with prosecution of the war against terrorism. In addition, the bill 

would express the sense of the Congress that the President and the 

Secretary of Defense should not reduce, or seek to reduce, the number of members of the armed forces, and that the President should 

support the increase in end-strength levels for the armed forces 

recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives for fiscal year 2003 because of the demands of the war against terrorism. 

The determination of end strengths for the armed forces will affect spending by the Department of Defense, but this legislation 

would neither authorize nor fund any particular end strength. 

Rather, it affirms Congress’s support for end strengths specified in 

the defense authorization bill. Hence, H.R. 5132, by itself, would 

have no budgetary impact. 

The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for Budget 

Analysis. 

COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE

Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of 

Representatives, the committee generally concurs with the estimate 

contained in the report of the Congressional Budget Office. 

OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, this legislation results from hearings 

and other oversight activities conducted by the committee pursuant 

to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the Congressional 

Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not include any new 

spending or credit authority, nor does it provide for any increase 

or decrease in tax revenues or expenditures. The fiscal features of 

this legislation are addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 

With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee has not received a report 

from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 5132. 

5

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT

Pursuant to clause 3 (d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House 

of Representatives, the committee finds the authority for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution. 

STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES

Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104–4, this legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state, local, and tribal 

governments, nor with respect to the private sector. Similarly, the 

bill provides no unfunded federal intergovernmental mandates. 

RECORD VOTE

In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the committee notes that no roll call 

votes were taken with respect to H.R. 5132. 

The committee ordered H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to the 

House with a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a quorum 

being present. 

(6)

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN M. MCHUGH 

Unlike many things in America today, the debate about military 

manpower does not easily divide itself between pre- and post-September 11, 2001 perspectives. Prior to the terrorist assault on our 

nation, the U.S. Armed Forces, already under resourced, understructured, and undermanned, were struggling to carry out the demanding missions the nation had assigned them. Following the 

start of the war on terrorism, those same forces now are challenged 

to both continue those pre-existing missions and to perform new, 

even more critical ones: Defending the homeland and prosecuting 

a war that is global in scope and, thus far, without foreseeable end. 

H.R. 5132 succinctly addresses this dilemma and the inescapable 

reality regarding the continuing inadequacies of current levels of 

military force structure and manpower. The resolution also challenges the apparent view of some within the Department of Defense that significant reductions in uniformed personnel in the 

middle of a war will somehow contribute to a more efficient, more 

effective, and transformed future military. I reject such a plan and 

fully support H.R. 5132, which not only opposes reductions to current military end strength, but also urges support for reasonable 

increases to active strength—some 10,000 to 12,000 personnel—as 

proposed by both the House and Senate in their respective defense 

authorization bills for fiscal year 2003. 

Prior to September 11, based on years of review, testimony and 

direct observation, the House Armed Services Committee understood very well the disturbing discrepancies and debilitating 

mismatches between a significantly reduced force structure and 

military personnel strength on the one hand, and the growing 

range of new, enduring missions, with an attendant increase in 

personnel and operations tempos on the other. One measure of the 

inadequacy of the active component forces to carry out the full 

range of their assigned peacetime operations is demonstrated by 

the fact that in each of the last several years, reservists have been 

required to serve more than 12 million days on active duty—replacing the equivalent of more than 35,000 active duty personnel. 

In spite of such an environment, the Quadrennial Defense Review and other internal Department of Defense documents of that 

period somehow ignored this reality and concluded that significant 

manpower reductions should be made in the Armed Forces, thus 

exacerbating an already tenuous situation. Such cuts, it was apparently argued, were both permissible and required because technology promised a quantum increase in the operational capabilities 

and lethality of our military forces, and were necessary to finance 

the technological transformation of the services. 

In August 2001, specifically in reaction to reports that the Department of Defense was considering the elimination of two Army 

active duty divisions, 83 House members (including 34 of 60 on this 

7

committee) expressed ‘‘strong opposition’’ to reductions in Army 

force structure. 

September 11 brought with it not only the added requirement for 

the military to fight a global war on terrorism, but also the need 

to address significant new force protection and anti-terrorism 

homeland defense requirements within our borders. To meet these 

immediate requirements, the services today have more than 85,000 

reservists on active duty, as well as thousands of other personnel 

involuntarily retained in service beyond their normal tour end 

through the implementation of so-called ‘‘stop loss’’ initiatives. 

Clearly, those reservists cannot stay on active duty indefinitely, 

and stop loss must end. Therefore, as the committee moved towards mark-up of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, the Army, Navy and Air Force identified their respective active duty manpower needs that were required beyond 

those strength levels requested by the budget. Ultimately, the 

House approved a good portion of those additional manpower figures the military services argued were required for fiscal year 

2003. I believe the House acted judiciously and carefully in approving that increase—a growth of less than one percent in active end 

strength above the requested levels. 

Now, with no foreseeable end to the ongoing commitments and 

requirements for military forces and personnel, reports again have 

been heard of plans within the Department of Defense for significant active end strength reductions, totaling up to 90,000 personnel. 

Such suggestions are not just simply unjustified, they are frightening. The demands placed upon our military both before and since 

the events of September 11 are too stark to be ignored any longer. 

The Secretary of Defense has taken the position that in the long 

term, no end strength increases are likely to be required. He has 

further stated that before any manpower increases are made, the 

services must prove that they have done everything within their 

ability to meet requirements from existing military personnel authorizations. 

I commend the Secretary for this hard-nosed business approach. 

Each service should, indeed, clearly define their needs for longterm growth in manpower requirements. Further, the demonstrated success of advanced technology on the battlefield undeniably underscores the need to pursue the promise that science and 

research have to offer. My concern, however, lies in the fact that, 

too often, arguments in support of transformation have invariably 

called for manpower reductions based solely upon the unfulfilled 

promise that technology, force enhancements, and other reforms 

will someday eliminate or reduce the need for structure and personnel. Moreover, given the range of reforms and reductions that 

each service has already experienced over the past decade, fundamental questions need to be asked about how much more so-called 

manpower transformation can yet be wrung from the military services, especially if the current intensity and scope of the military operations does not abate significantly below pre-September 11 levels. 

I would urge the Secretary of Defense and others in the department to heed the unequivocal message of H.R. 5132: Manpower reductions do not constitute a feasible course of action to transform 

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the military. Additional manpower, not less, will be required to 

sustain the Armed Forces through the global war on terrorism and 

beyond. 

JOHN M. MCHUGH.

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