RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS

FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

and

Dr. W. Andrew Terrill

Strategic Studies Institute

U.S. Army War College

January 29, 2003
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ii
RECONSTRUCTING IRAQ: CHALLENGES AND MISSIONS

FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO

Introduction.

By the time Germany surrendered in May 1945, detailed Allied planning for the

post-conflict phase of operations in that nation had been ongoing for 2 years.1 In contrast,

LTG John Yeosock, commander of Third Army in Operation DESERT STORM, could get no

useful staff support to assess and plan for post-conflict issues like hospital beds, prisoners,

and refugees, complaining later that he was handed a “dripping bag of manure” that no one

else wanted to deal with.2 Neither the Army nor Department of Defense had an adequate

plan for postwar operations to rebuild Kuwait, and civilian agencies were even more

unprepared. The situation was only salvaged by the adept improvisations of Army engineers

and civil affairs personnel, and the dedicated efforts of Kuwaiti volunteers and the Saudi

Arabian government.3

Some of the deficiencies in postwar planning for DESERT STORM can be attributed to

the fact that Third Army was the first American field army in combat since the Korean War.

Post-conflict planning historically has been a function of headquarters at echelons above

corps, and continuing problems with more recent operations are at least partly attributable

to the generally small scale of American interventions. Also, U.S. Army leaders and planners

tend to focus on winning wars and not on the peacekeeping or nation-building that comes

afterwards. But national objectives often can only be accomplished after the fighting has

ceased, and it is possible to win a war and lose the peace.

With the winds of war swirling around Iraq, it is time to plan for its post-conflict

reconstruction. To assist such planning, this study proposes a construct for identifying the

postwar missions to be accomplished following a victory over the Hussein regime and

suggests the time phasing for the accomplishment of specific tasks. The interagency

planning for Haiti, which produced a detailed list of post-crisis tasks and responsibilities

well in advance of any possible combat, was an excellent approach. Still, that operation

eventually failed because civilian agencies proved incapable of completing the mission once

military forces left, due to inadequate resources or inflated expectations. Recent experiences

in the Balkans and Afghanistan have demonstrated the potential assistance that can be

provided by international and non-governmental organizations, though coordination with

them can be difficult.

In Iraq it will also be important to lessen military involvement as expeditiously as

possible, so interagency planners must be sure that governmental, non-governmental, and

international civilian organizations are ready to perform assigned tasks when required. The

primary problem at the core of American deficiencies in providing post-conflict capabilities,

resources, and commitment is a national aversion to nation-building. U.S. leaders must

accept this mission as an essential part of our national security and better tailor and fund the

military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish it. This will take

considerable manpower and money.

1
Challenges of a Military Occupation of Iraq.

The military occupation of Iraq will face a number of unique challenges rooted in the

special circumstances and political culture of that country. If the war to defeat Saddam

Hussein is short with limited civilian casualties, that task will be easier. Nevertheless, the

issue of Western domination is of serious concern in the Arab World and a prolonged

occupation of Iraq with U.S. forces may lead to especially acute problems with the Iraqi

population as well as the wider Arab World. Moreover, the more detailed nuances of Iraqi

political, ethnic, and culture activities are not well-understood by even the most informed

U.S scholars, journalists, and officials.

Iraq political institutions have never been well-developed, and Iraq has a strong tradition

of instability and violence in resolving political disputes. The instability was brought under

control and violence institutionalized only after Saddam Hussein achieved power and

established a regime of unprecedented brutality. Pre-Saddam instability may emerge in the

aftermath of the dictator’s removal. In particular, tensions among Iraqi religious, ethnic, and

tribal communities are expected to complicate both the occupation and efforts to build a

viable postwar government. Power-sharing among groups is a new and untested concept in

Iraq that could well be subverted by elite political instincts to struggle for power before rivals

achieve opportunities to consolidate their own gains. Also, while a struggle for power

between civilian and military elites is possible and could contribute to Iraqi fragmentation,

the U.S. should recognize that the military is a national institution and one of the few forces

for unity within the country.

Initial Iraqi gratitude for the destruction of the Saddam dictatorship is likely under most

circumstances, but many Iraqis will nevertheless assume that the U.S. intervened for its

own purposes and not primarily to help them. U.S. forces therefore need to complete

occupation tasks as quickly as possible and must also help improve the daily life of ordinary

Iraqis before popular goodwill dissipates. Even the most benevolent occupation will confront

increasing Arab nationalist and religious concerns as time passes. The possibility of

terrorism being directed against occupation forces probably will increase over time, and even

a small number of terrorists can be expected to create serious problems for an occupation

force. A popular uprising against U.S. troops is much less likely than a terrorist campaign,

but is still possible if the occupation is poorly managed.

Successfully executing the postwar occupation of Iraq is consequently just as important

as winning the war. Preparing for the postwar occupation of the Iraqi political system will

probably be more difficult and complex than planning for combat.

A Mission Matrix for Iraq.

Based on relevant experience and an analysis of the current situation in Iraq, this study

proposes a list of essential missions that must be performed to maintain a viable state and

change the regime. The way such tasks fit in the overall campaign plan for possible

operations in Iraq is illustrated by Figure 1.4 They will be performed during a period of

“Transition” that must begin while “Decisive Operations” are still ongoing. Transition will

take many years, and for purposes of this study has been divided into four distinct phases.

The first will encompass those requirements necessary to provide “Security,” including

separating factions and beginning the repair of vital infrastructure. Functions in this phase

2
will be almost solely the responsibility of coalition military forces, and it will take a few

months to move to the “Stabilize” phase. The timelines on the chart are approximate, and

different mission categories are likely to progress at varying rates.

The next phase for occupying forces will be to Stabilize the country. Security tasks will

continue, but services will expand and begin to incorporate civilian agencies. Their

involvement should become at least equal to that of coalition military forces once they start

to “Build Institutions,” where the basis of the new Iraq will be firmly established. Eventually

military forces will “Handover” all duties to Iraqi and international agencies, and the new

regime will be ready to resume its proper place in the world community.

In the past, no part of post-conflict operations has been more problematic for American

military forces than the handover to civilian agencies. Ideally, the allocation of effort and

process of shifting responsibilities should proceed as depicted in Figure 2,5 but in reality it

normally looks more like Figure 3, where the handover is given directly to the local

government. To limit the potential for any regional backlash from a perceived prolonged

American military occupation, it is essential that civilian and international organizations

assume coalition military responsibilities as soon as possible.

3

• Secure the state

• Separate forces

• Stop the fighting

• Detain resistors

• Round up regime

• Provide emergency

services

• Repair vital infrastructure

• provide humanitarian

assistance

• Establish public

relations

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns

SECURITY STABILIZE BUILD

INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security

• Continue infrastructure

repair

• Continue HA

• Continue public svcs

• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD

• Establish local gov’t

• Process detainees

• Repatriate refugees

• Continue C-M relations

• Establish State-wide

commo

• End sanctions

• Continue state security

• Assist NGO/IO

• Continue military

reorganization

• Complete destruction

of WMD

• Establish police force

• Establish higher

level gov’t

• Encourage investment

• Start jobs programs

• Institute educational

programs

• Handover svcs to

local authorities

• Handover gov’t

• supervision

• to int’l body

• Transition to host

• nation security

• forces

• Begin HN policing

• Begin local gov’t

control

• Redeploy coalition

forces

3-4 Months

All coalition military

6 months – 1 year

3⁄4 coalition military

2 years

1⁄2 coalition military

1-2 years

1⁄4 coalition military

Intl.

Control

Figure 1.

• Secure the state

• Separate forces

• Stop the fighting

• Detain resistors

• Round up regime

• Provide emergency

services

• Repair vital infrastructure

• provide humanitarian

assistance

• Establish public

relations

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns

SECURITY STABILIZE BUILD

INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security

• Continue infrastructure

repair

• Continue HA

• Continue public svcs

• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD

• Establish local gov’t

• Process detainees

• Repatriate refugees

• Continue C-M relations

• Establish State-wide

commo

• End sanctions

• Continue state security

• Assist NGO/IO

• Continue military

reorganization

• Complete destruction

of WMD

• Establish police force

• Establish higher

level gov’t

• Encourage investment

• Start jobs programs

• Institute educational

programs

• Handover svcs to

local authorities

• Handover gov’t

• supervision

• to int’l body

• Transition to host

• nation security

• forces

• Begin HN policing

• Begin local gov’t

control

• Redeploy coalition

forces

3-4 Months

All coalition military

6 months – 1 year

3⁄4 coalition military

2 years

1⁄2 coalition military

1-2 years

1⁄4 coalition military

Intl.

Control

Figure 1.

DETER/

ENGAGE

SEIZE

INITIATIVE

DECISIVE

OPNS

TRANSITION

Starts during

Decisive Opns

SECURITY STABILIZE BUILD

INSTITUTIONS

HANDOVER/

REDEPLOY

• Continue state

security

• Continue infrastructure

repair

• Continue HA

• Continue public svcs

• Assist NGO/IO,

interagency process

• Begin military

reorganization

• Destroy WMD

• Establish local gov’t

• Process detainees

• Repatriate refugees

• Continue C-M relations

• Establish State-wide

commo

• End sanctions

• Continue state security

• Assist NGO/IO

• Continue military

reorganization

• Complete destruction

of WMD

• Establish police force

• Establish higher

level gov’t

• Encourage investment

• Start jobs programs

• Institute educational

programs

• Handover svcs to

local authorities

• Handover gov’t

• supervision

• to int’l body

• Transition to host

• nation security

• forces

• Begin HN policing

• Begin local gov’t

control

• Redeploy coalition

forces

3-4 Months

All coalition military

6 months – 1 year

3⁄4 coalition military

2 years

1⁄2 coalition military

1-2 years

1⁄4 coalition military

Intl.

Control

Figure 1.
While recent experiences in the Balkans and Afghanistan appear to indicate that civilian

agencies are now better prepared to take over transition responsibilities from military forces,

this should not be assumed for Iraq. Years of sanctions and neighbors with restrictive border

policies have severely reduced the number of non-governmental organizations and

international agencies prepared or positioned to enter Iraq. To facilitate participation of such

groups and speed the reintegration of Iraq into the international community, sanctions and

associated licensing requirements need to be removed as soon as possible, probably at the

beginning of “Stabilization.”6

Additionally, the haphazard and ad-hoc nature of civil-military organization and

planning in Afghanistan has made many NGOs and IOs wary and hesitant to deal with the

American military again. Some have been especially critical of what they perceive as the

manipulation of humanitarian aid for political advantage, and a blurring of roles between

NGOs and military civil affairs or special operations forces. The civilian agencies feel that if

they become identified with military agendas their utility will be lessened and their

personnel endangered.

Another factor that could further limit any civilian involvement in Iraq is the threat of

biological or chemical weapons. No governmental, non-governmental, or international

organization is trained or equipped to operate in such an environment, and most will not

even go near an area where the use of such weapons is just rumored.

4

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Indigenous

Organizations

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs U.S. Military w/allies

Figure 2.

Ideal Vision of Transition

Time

Indigenous

Organizations

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs U.S. Military w/allies

Figure 2.

Indigenous Organizations

(very slow rise)

Realistic Vision of Transition

Time

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

U.S. Military, w/allies

Figure 3.

Indigenous Organizations

(very slow rise)

Realistic Vision of Transition

Time

U.S. Civilian Organizations, IOs

U.S. Military, w/allies

Figure 3.
While some UN agencies and aid groups like CARE and the Jordan Red Crescent have

begun to anticipate future requirements, little money will be available until a crisis erupts.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees received a 25 percent budget cut in

2002, and has had great difficulty getting preliminary support or financial commitments for

Iraqi contingencies. Some donors who made pledges to Afghanistan have still not met those

obligations, and the costs of reconstruction there were grossly underestimated. So, military

planners would be wise not to assume too much support from civilian agencies, especially

those outside the U.S. government, for the early phases of Transition.7 The United States

should work to put together the broadest possible coalition to carry out combat operations,

since that group will also inherit the immediate responsibility for Transition.

The Mission Matrix for Iraq (Appendix A) was constructed with these facts in mind.8

The

135 essential tasks are grouped into 21 mission categories and arrayed across the four

phases of Transition described above. Each column lists those agencies that should be

involved in performing that task during a specific phase. The focus is on outside U.S. and

international organizations. While Iraqi participation is not specifically stated except in a

couple cases of special emphasis, it should be understood that local Iraqis will be involved as

much as possible in each activity. That is why quickly establishing an effective personnel

vetting process is so important.

It should also be noted that each task will proceed on a different timeline, determined by

individual measures of success developed by planners. For instance, reestablishing the legal

system in Category 3 might advance quickly into Stabilizing and Building Institutions, while

the major security activities in Category 1 lag behind. Achievements might differ between

regions, as well. Commanders and governors must be aware of the progress achieved in each

task in each part of the country.

While the Mission Matrix appears complicated, the array of activities involved in

rejuvenating Iraq and changing its regime will actually be even more complex. And leaders of

the occupation must keep in mind the dangers of being too successful in supplying services.

The final goal is to create an Iraqi state that can stand on its own, not one dependent on

American or international aid.

While all 135 tasks will have to be accomplished to fully reestablish an Iraqi state, they

are not all of primary concern for the commander of coalition military forces. Thirty-five are

considered “critical.” If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate

emphasis and resources on these activities he risks mission failure. The thirty-two

“essential” tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of coalition

military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks.

However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

The remaining sixty-eight “important” tasks must still be performed to create and maintain

a viable state, but they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the

responsibility of non-military agencies. The rating of these tasks is valid whether there is a

civilian or military governor of Iraq. They will have to be accomplished no matter who is in

charge. We now summarize each Mission Category in more detail, paying particular

attention to military roles. The categories themselves are not prioritized.

5
Major Security Activities. Most coalition combat forces will be occupied with these tasks

for some time, though there will also be plenty to do for specialized units like Military Police.

Considering the political aspects of an Iraqi occupation and the size of the forces required,

military planners should not assume a major UN peacekeeping role. The U.S.-led coalition

might be able to broaden its participation for tasks like training the new Iraqi Army, which

eventually must be able to assume these security responsibilities. Part of this training

program should include bringing selected Iraqi officers to the United States for special

courses on how an army should function in a more democratic state. A long-term solution

also requires creating a trustworthy and transparent new Iraqi government that will live up

to its international obligations concerning weapons of mass destruction and other issues.

Many long-term cautions should be considered in conducting these major security

activities. In separating factions, coalition military forces must avoid the dangers of

unplanned and escalating alienation of ethnic and religious groups such as the Israelis

experienced during their occupation of Lebanon. That example also illustrates the previously noted problems that will grow if an occupation begins to be perceived as permanent.9

Military commanders and forces must be clear from the beginning that they intend to leave

as quickly as possible, they must demonstrate progress toward that end, and civilian

organizations that accept a handover of responsibilities in turn must be clear that they aim

to return control to Iraqi institutions as soon as possible.

Public Administration. First priority in this mission category will be establishing viable

local governments, relying as much as possible on existing institutions. Civil affairs units

will be needed throughout the country to assist this process. Evaluating the trustworthiness

and reliability of indigenous administrators will be important, and the effort should begin

now to gather a body of regional experts, Americans and trusted Iraqis, who can make such

judgments. National government will be developed in later phases of Transition, and while

civil affairs can help with this task, the responsibility primarily will be with other agencies.

All troops need to be aware of the importance of preserving public records, and this must be

emphasized from the beginning of actual military operations.

Legal. While coalition military forces will pick up missions in this category as security is

being established, overall responsibility should be passed fairly quickly to other agencies.

However, commanders should be prepared to provide support for war crimes tribunals for a

while, and depending on what system is decided upon for prosecution, military personnel

might be involved with the actual trials. In regard to quickly reestablishing civilian courts,

judges and lawyers from the Arab League might be available, though coordination for such

augmentation should begin early.

Public Finance. The coalition military commander must be prepared to take necessary

actions to keep the public finance system operating until civilian government agencies can

take responsibility. Again, civil affairs units will be instrumental.

Civil Information. Information will be a key tool in gaining and maintaining the support

of the Iraqi people. Coalition military forces will have to work promptly while security is

being established to restore and maintain mass media to communicate around the nation,

and to coordinate messages with whatever transition government exists. The initial priority

6
for restoring capabilities must be given to government systems with wide range and

newspapers with the largest circulation.

Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services. While it would be best to let the Iraqis control

access to historic and cultural sites, an occupying power assumes responsibility for security

of such places. Particular attention must be paid to religious and historic sites that have

great importance; their damage or disruption could fan discontent or inspire violence, not

just within Iraq but around the region. At the same time public access must be assured,

especially to religious sites. The coalition military commander will have to delicately balance

these competing requirements for security and access.

Public Safety. Coalition military forces will have to include a sufficient number of

military police to perform law and order tasks until an international or trustworthy

indigenous police force can be established in sufficient numbers. This may take some time.

For example, it is estimated that training and deploying a new Afghan police force will take

at least 3 years.10 Iraq does not contain the same density of UN and NGO demining elements

as Afghanistan did, so coalition forces will also have to be prepared to do more of those

missions. Requirements may be reduced if coalition military forces limit their own use of

mines and cluster bombs. The latter can be especially problematic. Human Rights Watch

estimates that more than 12,000 unexploded bomblets remain on the ground in Afghanistan,

and well over 100 civilians have been killed or maimed by them since October 2001.11

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. This is another category that will

require regional experts for vetting and evaluation of personnel. A system resembling the

Fragebogen questionnaires used in postwar Germany might be relevant for this process.12

First priority for coalition military forces will be disarming groups and securing weapons.

Electoral Process for More Participatory Government. Many proposals are being discussed

about the future form of Iraq’s government. American-style democracy is probably not the

ideal model for a Middle Eastern state, but some system with increased popular

participation should be adopted. This will not be a decision for the coalition military

commander to make, but he will be involved in supporting elections, as well as the

constitutional convention and referendum to shape and legitimize the new government.

Disaster Preparedness and Response. Coalition military forces must be prepared to

provide these services until civil capacity can be restored. As with most other categories, the

intensity of the conflict preceding Transition will have a great impact on the timeline leading

to Handover.

Public Works. Iraq’s infrastructure has deteriorated under sanctions, and coalition

military engineers will have to begin repairing key facilities early in the Security phase. This

will be necessary to facilitate their use by the coalition as well as by the Iraqis. This mission

will be much easier if the coalition limits destruction with careful targeting during combat

operations.

Public Utilities. Special concerns for this mission category resemble those for the previous

one. Restoring public utilities quickly will have a significant impact on public health and

sanitation, and help avoid epidemics.

7
Telecommunications and Public Communications. Restoring communication links will

help tie the country together. First priority should be given to broadcasting systems to

facilitate nationwide coalition information operations. Computer networks and Internet

sites also are included in the telecommunications systems to be restored and maintained.

Education. Though this is primarily a category for civilian agencies, some engineer and

civil affairs effort should be dedicated to helping rejuvenate public schools. Iraqi education

has seriously deteriorated under sanctions. Students in schools are off the streets and out of

trouble. It also will be important to quickly implement job training programs for the many

Iraqi unemployed.

Public Health. This is a category where help from international and non-governmental

organizations should be forthcoming fairly quickly, though the limitations mentioned earlier

about access and WMD might have significant impact. Iraqi medical personnel and facilities

should also be available, though sanctions again have had a deleterious effect. Coalition

military support will be especially important early in the Transition to provide and

distribute health-related supplies. Many non-governmental organizations have already

voiced concerns about the potential health and environmental disaster that war could bring

to the whole region, and coalition military forces must contribute to preventing such an

outcome.13

Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief. This will be another mission category of very

high international visibility.14 The coalition military commander and governing authorities

will need to work with UN agencies to exploit the resources and 46,000 distribution centers

of the Oil for Food Program. Again there should be some responsive IO and NGO support for

what could be a massive refugee problem. Caring for and controlling displaced populations

will require extensive and well-orchestrated civil-military cooperation that should have

already started.

Economics and Commerce. First priority in this category for coalition military forces will

be to secure, repair, and maintain oil facilities. If Saddam Hussein burns wells as he did in

Kuwait, military forces will have to provide assistance to fire-fighting organizations.

Managing oil revenues will be very important in rebuilding Iraq and perhaps funding

occupation costs, and coalition military forces will have to coordinate with many agencies on

this complicated issue. Iraqi technocrats should also be available for assistance, though some

vetting will be necessary to insure their reliability.

Labor. This mission category should not be a concern for the coalition military

commander.

Property Control. Though this category is also not directly a coalition military force

responsibility, the military will be preserving the public records as mentioned under Public

Administration. These will provide important documentation to establish ownership

systems.

Food, Agriculture, Fisheries. During the Security phase, coalition military forces will

have some responsibility to insure the availability and flow of food and agriculture. To avoid

famine the coalition commander must be sensitive to the timing of the initial planting and

8
harvest, and might have to provide supporting resources to overcome any post-conflict

disruption.

Transportation. During the Security phase especially, coalition military forces will have

primary responsibility for the operation of Iraqi transportation systems which will be

essential for military as well as civilian organizations. These duties will require many

specialized units which must be available from the beginning of any hostilities. These

systems have deteriorated under sanctions, but the Iraqi technocrats who have maintained

them should be available to help operate them.

As is apparent from the matrix and discussion of mission categories, civil affairs,

engineer, military police, and transportation units will be in high demand. Some of these

specialties have been stretched thin by requirements for the war on terrorism.15 At the same

time a strong combat force will be essential, at least during the Security and Stabilize

phases. It would be advisable for military leaders, and especially the Army, to perform a

detailed analysis of the force requirements for Title X and other missions in a post-conflict

Iraq. The Army Staff could conduct this exercise at the Center for Strategic Leadership of the

U.S. Army War College, which has already developed a concept for a wargame that will

examine such issues. It will involve all major service components, and possibly joint players,

since the impact of requirements for occupying Iraq will have repercussions on force

providers around the world.

While this study has focused specifically on Iraq, these insights will apply to any

important post-conflict operation. The U.S. Army has been organized and trained primarily

to fight and win the nation’s major wars. Nonetheless, the Service must prepare for victory in

peace as well.

ENDNOTES

1. For more on Operation ECLIPSE in Germany, see Kenneth O. McCreedy, “Planning the Peace: Operation

Eclipse and the Occupation of Germany,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. LXV, No. 3, July 2001, pp.

713-739.

2. John J. Yeosock, remarks in “What We Should Have Done Differently,” Part II of In the Wake of the Storm:

Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm, Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000, p. 25.

3. Ibid., p. 29; Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The U.S. Army and the Reconstruction of Kuwait,

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999.

4. This chart is primarily the product of COL Stephen Kidder of the U.S. Army War College.

5. This depiction was developed by Dr. Steven Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War

College.

6. These observations and those in the next two paragraphs came from NGO and IO participants at two

conferences, a Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Project on the Means of Intervention Ground Operations

Workshop held at the Army-Navy Club in Washington, DC, on October 17-18, 2002; and an Institute for

National Security Studies/Naval Postgraduate School Workshop on “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,”

held at National Defense University in Washington, DC, on November 20-21, 2002.

9
7. Moni Basu, “Aid Groups Get Ready for War,” Atlanta Journal and Constitution, December 23, 2002;

James Bone, “UN Chief Issues Secret Orders for War in Iraq,” TimesOnLine, December 23, 2002,

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-522510,00.html; Mukesh Kapila and Karin Wermester, “The

Afghan Job is Bigger Than Expected,” International Herald Tribune, January 14, 2003.

8. For the completion of the Mission Matrix, the authors are indebted to the participants in the Post Conflict

Military Missions Workshop held at Carlisle Barracks, PA, on December 10-11, 2002, and particularly to

Professor William Kiehl, of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute.

9. For further analysis of the Israeli experience in Lebanon, see W. Andrew Terrill, “Low Intensity Conflict in

Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi’ite War,” Conflict Quarterly, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 22-35.

10. Chris Kraul, “In Afghanistan, Guns Hold Sway Over Law,”Los Angeles Times, December 27, 2002, p. 1.

11. Peter Slevin and Vernon Loeb, “Bush Urged to Limit Weapons in Iraq,” Washington Post, December 27,

2002, p. 12.

12. For more on the use of the Fragebogen, see Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany,

1944-1946, Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1975.

13. See, for example June Salvage, Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq,

London: Medact, 2002. Medact is the United Kingdom affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of

Nuclear War.

14. A number of organizations have already raised red flags about the impact of war in Iraq on the whole

region due to refugee flows. See, for example, International Institute for Strategic Studies, “A New Refugee

Crisis in Iraq?” Strategic Comments, Vol. VIII, No. 8, November 12, 2002.

15. Military police have been in especially high demand. Harry Levins, “New Guard Call-Ups Renew

Question of Troop Strength,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 21, 2002.

10
APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

11
12
13

APPENDIX A

MISSION MATRIX FOR IRAQ

C = Critical Task, E = Essential Task, I = Important Task

Task No. Task Security Phase Stabilize Phase Build Institutions Handover Phase

Category 1 - Major Security Activities

1A - C Secure/Destroy WMD CMF CMF,DoS,UNMOVIC DoS,UNMOVIC Transparent Iraq Govt1B - C Stop intra- and inter-factional fighting CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army1C - E Train new Iraqi Army CMF CMF CMF(broadened) US Army1D - C Round Up Regime CMF CMF,CIA,DoJ CMF,CIA,DoJ1E - C Eliminate Pockets of Resistance CMF CMF CMF1F - E Process Detainees/POWs CMF,DoJ CMF,IATF CMF,IATF Iraqi Institutions1G - C Secure Borders CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army1H - C Seize and Secure Oil Facilities CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army1I - C Plan and Conduct Consequence CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army

Management

1J - C Plan and Conduct Theater CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army

Information Operations

1K - C Maintain Freedom of Movement CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army1L - E Regulate Movement CMF CMF CMF,Iraqi Army Iraqi Army

Category 2 - Public Administration

2A - C Establish and Assist Regional and CMF CMF, AID,NED,DoS, IO AID,NED,DoS, UNDP, Iraqi Inst.

Local Governments UNDP, IO

2B - I E&A National Legislative System CMF AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst.2C - I E&A National Executive Office CMF,DoS AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst.2D - I E&A Ministries CMF,DoS AID,NED,DoS,IO,CMF Same as above UNDP, Iraqi Inst.2E - E Preserve & Improve Public Records CMF,DoJ CMF,DoJ Iraqi Institutions

System
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Category 3 - Legal

3A - E Operate Criminal Court System CMF,Iraqi courts AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi Previous + DoS/F AL, Iraqi3B - E Operate Civil Court System CMF,Iraqi courts AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi Previous + DoS/F AL, Iraqi3C - E Establish and Operate System to CMF AID,DoJ.AOUSC,AL Previous + DoS/F AL, Iraqi

Enact & Publicize Laws

3D - E Operate Judicial Administrative System CMF,Iraqi courts AID,AOUSC,DoJ,AL,Iraqi Previous + DoS/F AL,UNDP,ICM,Iraqi3E - E Support & Conduct War Crimes CMF CMF,DoJ,DoS/S/WCI CMF&ICC or Iraqi Institutions

Tribunals Tribunal

3F - I Provide Legal Education AID,USED,AL,NGO AID,USED,AL,NGO AL,Iraqi3G - I Protect Human Rights CMF DoS,AID,CMF,NGO DoS,AID,ICM,NGO ICM,NGO

Category 4 - Public Finance

4A - E Stabilize Currency CMF,Trsy Trsy,AID Trsy,AID,WB,IMF WB,IMF,Iraqi4B - I Maintain & Operate Govt Finance CMF, Trsy Trsy,AID Trsy,AID,WB,IMF WB,IMF,Iraqi

System (Revenues & Distribution)

4C - I Establish Private Financial Institutions Trsy,AID Trsy,AID,WB,IMF WB,IMF,Iraqi4D - I Conduct Foreign Currency Exchange Trsy Trsy,AID Trsy,AID,WB,IMF WB,IMF,Iraqi4E - E Pay Govt Civil & Military Employees CMF AID,DoS,CMF AID,DoS,CMF,WB WB, Iraqi4F - I Collect Customs and Duties CMF Trsy,AID,CMF Trsy,AID,CMF, Iraqi

Iraqi

Category 5 - Civil Information

5A - E Restore and Maintain Newspapers CMF AID,DoS/IIP,CMF AID,DoS/IIP,CMF Iraqi

and Print Media

5B - C R&M Government Radio System CMF AID,BBG,CMF,DoS,FCC Same as previous Iraqi5C - C R&M Government Television System CMF Same as above Same as above Iraqi5D - I Establish Private TV System AID,FCC AID,FCC Iraqi5E - I Establish Private Radio System AID,FCC AID,FCC Iraqi5F - I Develop Censorship and Libel Laws AID,DoJ,CMF,DoS,AL AID,DoJ,CMF, AL,Iraqi

DoS, AL

5G - I Restore & Maintain Cable Systems AID,CMF,DoS AID,CMF,DoS Iraqi
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Catetory 5 - Civil Information (continued)

5H - C Coordinate USG-Iraq Govt Info CMF,DoS/R DoS/R,CMF DoS/R,CMF DoS/R

Category 6 - Historical, Cultural, Recreational Services

6A - I Maintain Art & Cultural Institutions Iraqi DoS/ECA,AID,Iraqi Previous +UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi6B - I Protect Historical Artifacts CMF,Iraqi DoS/ECA,DoJ,AID,Iraqi Previous + UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi6C - I Maintain Sports and Recreational Iraqi AID,DoS/ECA,Iraqi Previous + UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi

Systems

6D - C Protect Religious Sites & Access CMF,Iraqi CMF,Iraqi Iraqi Forces

Category 7 - Public Safety

7A - C Establish & Maintain Police Systems CMF DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, AP,Iraqi

and Operations UNP

7B - I Train Police DoJ,DoS/INL,AP DoJ,DoS/INL,AP, AP,Iraqi

UNP

7C - E Maintain Penal Systems CMF AID,DoJ,CMF,AL AID,DoJ,AL AL,Iraqi7D - I Provide & Support Fire Fighting Systems CMF AID,FEMA,CMF AID,FEMA Iraqi7E - E Conduct Explosive Ord Disposal & CMF CMF,AID,DoS/PM,NGO AID,DoS/PM, UNMAS,Iraqi,NGO

Demining UNMAS,NGO

7F - I Protect Foreign Residents CMF CMF,DoS CMF,DoS,Iraqi Iraqi

Forces

Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

8A - E Demobilize & Reorganize Army/Scty CMF,DoS CMF,DoS CMF,DoS

Forces/militias

8B - I Transfer & Reorient to reintegrate into AID,CMF AID,CMF

civil sector

8C - I Reintegrate Demobilized Persons into AID,DoS AID,DoS

Civil Sector
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Category 8 - Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (continued)

8D - I Restructure & Reorganize New Civil CMF DoJ,DoS/INL,CMF,AP Same as previous AP

Security Forces

8E - E Dismantle Baath Party NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL, Same as previous

CIA

8F - C Disarm and Secure Weapons CMF CMF

Category 9 - Electoral Process for More Participatory Government

9A - I Plan Local Elections CMF NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL Previous+NGO NGO9B - I Plan National Elections Same as above Previous +NGO NGO9C - I Prepare Local Elections CMF Same as above Previous +NGO NGO9D - I Prepare National Elections Same as above Previous +NGO NGO9E - I Assist Conduct of Local Elections CMF Same as above+CMF Previous +NGO NGO9F - I Assist Conduct of Natl Elections Same as above Previous +NGO NGO9G - I Provide Post Local Election Support NED,AID/OTI,DoS/DRL Previous +NGO NGO9H - I Provide Post Natl Election Support Same as above Previous +NGO NGO9I - I Plan for Constitutional Convention Same as above Previous9J - I Assist Conduct of Const Convention Same as above +CMF Previous9K - I Assist Conduct of Constitutional Same as above

ReferendumCategory 10 - Disaster Preparedness and Response

10A - I Provide Emergency Warning Systems CMF AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA Same as previous Iraqi10B - I Provide Emergency Evacuation and CMF AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA Same as previous Iraqi

Treatment

10C - I Provide Post Disaster Recovery CMF AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA Same as previous Iraqi10D - I Conduct Pre-Disaster Planning CMF AID/OFDA,CMF,FEMA Same as previous Iraqi

Category 11 - Public Works

11A - C Repair Roads and Streets CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi
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11B - C Repair Bridges CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi11C - C Repair Port Facilities CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi11D - C Repair Airports CMF AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F Previous,IATA, IATA,UNDP,Iraq

UNDP

11E - C Repair Railroads CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi11F - I Repair Dams CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi11G - I Repair Canal System CMF AID,CMF,DoS/F Previous,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi

Category 12 - Public Utilities

12A - C Restore & Maintain Power Systems CMF AID,DOE AID,DOE,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi12B - C Restore & Maintain Water Systems CMF AID,HHS AID,HHS,UNDP, UNDP,WHO,Iraqi

WHO

12C - I Restore & Maintain Gas Systems CMF AID,DOE AID,DOE,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi12D - C R&M Sewage Systems CMF AID,HHS AID,HHS,UNDP, UNDP,WHO,Iraqi

WHO

12E - E R&M Garbage Collection CMF AID AID,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi

Category 13 - Telecommunications and Public Communications

13A - E Restore & Maintain Telecommunica- CMF AID,FCC AID,FCC,IPU IPU,Iraqi

tions System

13B - C R&M Broadcasting Systems CMF AID,FCC AID,FCC,IPU IPU,Iraqi13C - I R&M Postal System CMF AID,USPS AID,USPS,IPU IPU,Iraqi

Category 14 - Education

14A - E Operate Public School System CMF AID,USED AID,USED,UN,WB UN,WB,Iraqi14B - I Operate Private School System AID,USED AID,USED,UN,WB UN,WB,Iraqi14C - I Provide Adult Education Services AID,USED AID,USED,UN UN,Iraqi14D - I Provide Job Training Programs AID AID,UNDP,NGO AID,UNDP,NGO UNDP,NGO14E - I Provide University Education DoS/ECA,USED,AID Previous+ UNESCO UNESCO,Iraqi
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Category 15 - Public Health

15A - E Provide Emergency Medical Service CMF,IT AID/OFDA,FEMA,IT Prev.+UN,ICRC, UN,ICRC,NGO,Iraqi

NGO

15B - E Operate Hospitals CMF,IT AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT Same as previous WHO,NGO,Iraqi15C - E Provide Doctors and Health CMF,IT AID,HHS,WHO,NGO,IT Same as previous WHO,NGO,Iraqi

Professionals

15D - E Provide and Distribute CMF AID,HHS,WHO,NGO, Same as previous WHO,NGO,Iraqi

Pharmaceutical Supplies CMF

15E - E Provide and Distribute Non- CMF Same as above Same as previous WHO,NGO,Iraqi

Pharmaceutical Medical Supplies

15F - E Dispose of Medical Waste CMF AID,HHS,WHOA ID,HHS,WHO WHO,Iraqi15G - E Provide Vector Control Systems CMF AID,HHS/CDC,WHO AID,HHS/CDC, WHO,Iraqi

WHO

15H - E Provide Garbage Disposal System CMF AID AID,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi15I - E Insure Proper Sanitation CMF AID,HHS,WHO AID,HHS,WHO, WHO,UNDP,Iraqi

UNDP

15J - I Perform Preventive Medicine CMF AID,HHS,WHO,NGO Previous+UNDP WHO,UNDP,Iraqi15K - I Provide Mortuary Services CMF AID,HHS AID,HHS,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi

Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief

16A - I Provide Assistance to Poor CMF AID,USDA,WFP,NGO Previous+UNDP UNDP,WFP,NGO, Iraqi16B - I Provide Emergency Relief CMF AID/OFDA,DoD AID/OFDA,DoD, ICRC,Iraqi

ICRC

16C - I Operate Orphanages CMF AID,HHS Prev.+UNICEF, UNICEF,NGO,Iraqi

NGO

16D - I Provide Care for Aged CMF AID,HHS AID,HHS,WHO, WHO,NGO,Iraqi

NGO

16E - I Provide Psychological Assistance CMF AID,HHS AID,HHS,WHO, WHO,NGO,Iraqi

NGO

16F - C Care for and Relocate Refugees CMF DoS/PRM,CMF,AID,UN Previous, incl. OCHA,NGO,Iraqi

NGO OCHA
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Category 16 - Public Welfare and Humanitarian Relief (continued)

16G - C Care for & Relocate DisplacedPersons CMF,DoS/PRM AID,CMF,DoS/PRM,UN, Previous, incl. OCHA,NGO,Iraqi

NGO OCHA

16H - C Administer Oil for Food Program CMF,UN UN UN16I - C Manage & Distribute Relief Supplies CMF AID,CMF,UN,NGO AID,CMF,UN, UN,NGO,Iraqi

NGO

Category 17 - Economics and Commerce

17A - I Revitalize Commercial Sector AID,DoC,Trsy,IT AID,DoC,Trsy, WB,Iraqi

WB,IT

17B - I Revitalize Industrial Sector AID,DoC,Trsy,IT AID,DoC,Trsy,WB, WB,Iraqi

IT

17C - E Repair & Maintain Oil Facilities CMF, IT AID, DoE, IT AID, UNDP, IT UNDP, Iraqi17D - E Manage Oil Revenues CMF,UN AID,DoS,Trsy,DoE,UN Previous +WB, UN,WB,Iraqi

Iraqi

17E - I Implement Wage and Price Controls AID,Trsy AID,Trsy,WB WB,Iraqi17F - I Maintain Foreign Trade System AID,DoS,Trsy Previous+WB,IMF WB, IMF, Iraqi17G - I Set Customs and Duties DoS,Trsy,DoC Iraqi17H - C Implement Oil Fire Contingencies AID,CMF AID

Category 18 - Labor

18A - I Establish and Provide Employment AID,DoL AID,DoL,ILO ILO,Iraqi

Services & Benefits

18B - I Establish and Maintain System to AID,DoL,DoS/DRL AID,DoL,DoS/ ILO,Iraqi

Resolve Managmnt-Labor Disputes DRL,ILO

18C - I Establish and Monitor Worker Safety AID,DoL,OSHA AID,DoL,OSHA,ILO ILO,Iraq

ProgramsCategory 19 - Property Control

19A - I Establish and Enforce Ownership System AID,DoC,DoJ AID,DoC,DoJ Iraqi

for Real Property
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Category 19 - Property Control (continued)

19B -I Establish and Enforce Ownership System AID,DoC,DoJ AID,DoC,DoJ Iraqi

for Personal PropertyCategory 20 - Food, Agriculture, Fisheries

20A - I Maintain Production System CMF,IT AID,USDA,IT AID,USDA, UNFAO,Iraqi

UNFAO,IT

20B - I Maintain Processing System CMF,IT AID,USDA,IT AID,USDA, UNFAO,Iraqi

UNFAO,IT

20C - I Maintain Distribution System CMF,IT AID,USDA,IT AID,USDA, UNFAO,Iraqi

UNFAO,IT

20D - I Maintain Retail Sales System AID,USDA,DoC AID,USDA,DoC Iraqi20E - I Establish and Execute Inspection CMF AID,USDA/APHIS AID,USDA/APHIS Iraqi

System

20F - I Maintain Irrigation System CMF,IT AID,USDA,IT AID,USDA, UNFAO,Iraqi

UNFAO,IT

20G - E Support Harvest CMF AID,CMF,USDA

Category 21 - Transportation

21A - C Operate Ports CMF,IT AID,CMF,DoT,IT,Dos/F Previous +UNDP UNDP,Iraqi21B - C Operate Rail System CMF,IT AID,CMF,DoT,IT,DoS/F Previous +UNDP UNDP,Iraqi21C - C Maintain Intercity Road Network CMF AID,CMF,DoT,DoS/F Previous +UNDP UNDP,Iraqi21D - E Maintain Municipal Roads CMF AID,CMF AID,CMF,UNDP UNDP,Iraqi21E - C Operate Air System (incl. CMF AID,FAA,CMF,DoS/F Previous +UNDP UNDP,IATA,Iraqi

Airspace Management)

21F - C Operate Pipelines CMF,IT AID,DoE,IT,DoS/F Previous +UNDP UNDP,Iraqi

Task Breakdown:35 Critical Tasks32 Essential Tasks68 Important Tasks
DEFINITION OF TASK CATEGORIES:

Critical – If the commander of coalition military forces does not put immediate emphasis

and resources on these activities he risks mission failure.

Essential – These tasks also require quick attention and resources from the commander of

coalition military forces, though they are generally not as time sensitive as the critical tasks.

However, failure in accomplishing them will have significant impact on the overall mission.

Important – These tasks must still be performed to create and maintain a viable state, but

they are more important in later phases of transition and/or primarily the responsibility of

non-military agencies.

ABBREVIATIONS

AID – U.S. Agency for International Development

AID/OFDA- Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

AID/OTI- Office of Transition Initiatives

AL – Arab League

AP – Arab Police Academy

AOUSC – Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts

BBG – Broadcasting Board of Governors

CIA – Central Intelligence Agency and other U.S. intelligence organizations

CMF – Coalition Military Forces

DoC – U.S. Department of Commerce

DoD – U.S. Department of Defense

DoJ – U.S. Department of Justice

DoL – U.S. Department of Labor

OSHA - Occupational Health and Safety Administration, Dept. of Labor

DoS – U.S. Department of State

DoS/PRM - Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration Affairs

DoS/ECA - Bureau of Educational & Cultural Affairs

DoS/IIP - Office of International Information Programs

DoS/INL - Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

DoS/DHL - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

DoS/F – Future of Iraq Project

DoS/G - Office of the U/S for Global Affairs

DoS/R- Office of the U/S for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs

DoS/CA- Bureau of Consular Affairs

DoS/DRL- Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

DoS/PM – Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

DoS/S/WCI – Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues

DoE – U.S. Department of Energy

FEMA – Federal Emergency Management Agency

HHS – U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

HHS/CDC – Centers for Disease Control

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ILO – International Labor Organization

IATA – International Air Transport Association

IATF – Interagency Task Force

IPU – International Postal Union

ICC – International Criminal Court

ICM – United Nations International Civilian Monitors

ICRC – International Committee of the Red Cross

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IO – International Organizations

IT – Iraqi Technocrats (Indigenous and Expatriate)

NED – National Endowment for Democracy

NGO – Non-governmental Organizations

OCHA – UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

Trsy – U.S. Department of the Treasury

USDA – U.S. Department of Agriculture

USDA/APHIS – Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

UN – United Nations Organizations

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund

UNFAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

UNMAS – United Nations Mine Action Service

UNMOVIC – United Nations Moratorium Verification and Inspection Commission

UNP – United Nations Police

USED – U.S. Department of Education

USG – U.S. Government

UNESCO – U.N. Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

WFP – World Food Program

WHO – World Health Organization

WB- World Bank

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