NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of:

RANDY LEE JONES, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

JENNIFER JEAN JONES, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0448 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FC2016-096729, FC2018-052461

The Honorable Suzanne Scheiner Marwil, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Louis Lombardo PC, Chandler

By Louis K. Lombardo

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Burggraff Tash Levy PLC, Phoenix

By Michael Dinn, Randi Burggraff, Bryan K. Levy

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee

FILED 3-17-2022
JONES v. JONES

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined.

P E R K I N S, Judge:

¶1 Randy Lee Jones (“Husband”) appeals the superior court’s 

ruling finding his financial settlement agreement with Jennifer Jean Jones 

(“Wife”) substantively fair. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 The parties married in October 2006 and share one minor 

child. Husband filed for dissolution in December 2016 and the parties 

appealed the resulting decree. We set out the background facts in an earlier 

decision, and we summarize now only those facts relevant to this appeal. 

See Jones v. Jones (“Jones I”), 1 CA-CV 20-0081, 2020 WL 7587115 (Ariz. App. 

Dec. 22, 2020) (mem. decision). 

¶3 Following a mediation, the parties entered into an Arizona 

Rule of Family Law Procedure 69 financial settlement agreement 

(“Agreement”). The Agreement addressed the division of property and 

debt, spousal maintenance, attorneys’ fees, and insurance payments. The 

superior court denied Husband’s request for a hearing to determine 

whether the Agreement was unfair. The court explained it “already 

determined in February 2019 that it will not revisit a Rule 69 agreement 

negotiated by able counsel at [mediation].” In his post-decree appeal, 

Husband argued the court improperly adopted the Agreement without 

independently evaluating its fairness. He also argued the record lacked 

sufficient evidence to accurately assess the Agreement’s fairness without a 

hearing. Id. at *2, ¶ 8. In Jones I, we vacated the orders denying Husband’s 

requests and remanded for a hearing on the substantive fairness of the 

Agreement. Id. at *4, ¶ 20.

¶4 The superior court held a hearing in May 2021, during which 

it heard testimony from Husband’s expert on his business’s value and 

admitted reports from the parties’ many experts. The experts opined on:

Husband’s ownership interest in his business and the character of 

Husband’s distributions; the accuracy and validity of Husband’s tracing 
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analysis; and Wife’s community lien claims. Husband testified he had full 

knowledge of the character and values of the assets at the time of the 

mediation. But Husband asserted he did not know “how the court would 

rule” on the character of the assets. Husband then admitted he was aware 

of and had access to all relevant information, including expert reports, 

discovery, court filings, and his own analysis of the foregoing, before the

parties negotiated the Agreement. 

¶5 In June 2021, the superior court found the parties’ Agreement 

was not substantively unfair and issued a 31-page ruling detailing the 

evidence on which it relied. The court noted Husband applied the wrong 

legal standard and his argument that the Agreement mischaracterized 

property lacked evidentiary support. The court found Husband had full 

knowledge of the assets comprising the community estate, he knew the

character of those assets when he signed the Agreement, and his arguments 

“lack[ed] credibility.” The court determined the Agreement was not unfair

for three reasons: (1) Husband and Wife received most of the assets they 

claimed as sole and separate property; (2) Husband entered the 

negotiations with full knowledge of the character and value of the property; 

and (3) the equalization payment was reasonable given Wife’s surrender of 

any community lien, transmutation, and spousal maintenance claims. 

¶6 Husband timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 

A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We will uphold a superior court’s distribution of property 

absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Flower, 223 Ariz. 531, 535, 

¶ 14 (App. 2010). A court abuses its discretion when: (1) the record is devoid 

of competent evidence to support its decision, Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 

52, ¶ 19 (App. 2009), or (2) “it misapplies the law or predicates its decision 

on incorrect legal principles.” Hammett v. Hammett, 247 Ariz. 556, 559, ¶ 13 

(App. 2019) (cleaned up). We construe the evidence in the light most 

favorable to affirming the distribution, and we will not reweigh the 

evidence. See Castro v. Ballesteros-Suarez, 222 Ariz. 48, 51, ¶ 11 (App. 2009).

¶8 “To promote the amicable settlement of disputes between 

parties” in a dissolution proceeding, “the parties may enter into a written 

separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of any property 

owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, and support, 

custody and parenting time of their children.” A.R.S. § 25-317(A). “[T]he 

terms of the separation agreement . . . are binding on the court unless it 
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finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any 

other relevant evidence produced by the parties, . . . the separation 

agreement is unfair.” A.R.S. § 25-317(B). Rule 69 agreements are presumed 

valid and a party challenging their validity “has the burden to prove any 

defect,” but the superior court must independently assess their fairness. See

Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 69(c); see also Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 128, 

¶ 1 (App. 2019). 

¶9 To fulfill its independent obligation to ensure fairness, the 

superior court must have before it sufficient evidence to establish the 

parties had full knowledge of the property involved, including “whether 

the property at issue is community or separate.” See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 

132, ¶ 22. Parties may consider their separate property to structure a Rule 

69 agreement if the record establishes they did so with “full knowledge” of

the character of their property. Id. at ¶ 20.

¶10 On remand from Jones I, the superior court held a hearing to 

evaluate the Agreement’s substantive fairness. The record is now replete 

with tax returns, bank statements, pay stubs, appraisals, valuations, deeds, 

and other documents from the parties, detailing the extent of their separate 

and community assets at the time of the Agreement. The record also 

includes testimony on disputed issues from the parties and their experts.

And the court made detailed factual findings to support its conclusion on 

every piece of disputed property.

¶11 Husband now asks us to expand the superior court’s 

obligation beyond an independent fairness determination. He contends the 

court had to engage in a complete property division assessment separate 

from the terms of the Agreement and then compare that assessment with 

the terms of the Agreement. The legislature did not choose to include such 

a requirement in § 25-317(B) and we will not write such a requirement into 

the statute. See Hart v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 183, 187, ¶ 17 (App. 2009) (“[S]tandard 

principles of statutory construction require that we do not judicially impose 

a requirement the legislature has intentionally chosen not to require.”).

¶12 Husband’s other arguments are also without merit as he 

simply asks us to reweigh the evidence. Husband faults the superior court 

for giving less weight to his tracing analysis and for not rejecting the 

Agreement because he believes Wife would have been unsuccessful on her 

community lien claims. Husband misstates the court’s role in a fairness

hearing. See Jones, 1 CA-CV 20-0081, at *2, ¶¶ 9–10 (outlining the five factors 

the court had to consider when determining fairness). And even if the 

record supported characterizing some or all assets as his separate property, 
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the court was free to consider his separate property because Husband 

testified he knew the extent and character of the property included in the 

Agreement. See Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. at 132, ¶ 20.

¶13 Sufficient record evidence thus supports the superior court’s 

ruling, and the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the 

Agreement is not unfair.

¶14 Wife requests attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal. We have 

considered the relative financial resources of the parties and the 

reasonableness of the positions asserted on appeal. In the exercise of our 

discretion, we grant Wife reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal 

upon compliance with ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We affirm.