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26–746 PDF 2006

S. Hrg. 109–616

HURRICANE KATRINA: WHO’S IN CHARGE OF

THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEES?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 15, 2005

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota 

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAVID T. FLANAGAN, General Counsel 

DAVID K. PORTER, Counsel 

JOYCE A. RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Counsel 

ROBERT F. MUSE, Minority General Counsel 

DAVID M. BERICK, Minority Professional Staff Member 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1

Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 4

Senator Voinovich ............................................................................................. 22

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 24

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 37

WITNESSES 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2005

Richard P. Wagenaar, Colonel, Commander and District Engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; accompanied by Alfred C. 

Naomi, Senior Project Manager, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers; and Gerard A. Colletti, Operations Manager for Completed 

Works, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ......................... 7

James P. Huey, former President of the Board of Commissioners of the 

Orleans Levee District ......................................................................................... 12

Max L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District ................................. 16

Edmond J. Preau, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Intermodal 

Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 19

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Colletti, Gerard A.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Hearn, Max L.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 79

Huey, James P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69

Naomi, Alfred C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Preau, Edmond J., Jr.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 19

Wagenaar, Richard P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 63

APPENDIX

‘‘Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?’’, 

PowerPoint presentation submitted by Senator Collins ................................... 49

The American Society of Civil Engineers, prepared statement ........................... 83

Ann K. Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office, prepared statement ............................................... 89

Exhibit 18 ................................................................................................................. 114

(1)

1The PowerPoint presentation appears in the Appendix on pages 49–62. 

HURRICANE KATRINA: WHO’S IN CHARGE OF 

THE NEW ORLEANS LEVEES? 

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Susan M. Collins, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Collins, Voinovich, Coleman, Levin, and Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS 

Chairman COLLINS. The Committee will come to order. 

Today the Committee continues its investigation into the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. The focus of our 

ninth Katrina hearing is on the key government agencies at the 

local, State and Federal levels responsible for operating and maintaining the levees that were supposed to protect New Orleans. 

While the levees were absolutely critical to the survival of the 

city, our November 2 hearing demonstrated that this last line of 

defense was fatally flawed in design, construction, or maintenance. 

The witnesses testified that these flaws resulted in the levees not 

merely being overtopped, but actually crumbling before the onslaught of the storm. 

The people of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes depended on the levees to protect them. It now appears their faith 

had little foundation. Even though the hurricane caused extensive 

damage, it was the flooding from the levee breaches that actually 

destroyed the city of New Orleans. 

Our purpose today is to follow up on that hearing by examining 

which agencies were responsible for operating, maintaining, and inspecting the levees; for preparing for emergencies; and for responding to problems ranging from gradual erosion to sudden collapses. 

The Army Corps of Engineers, the Orleans Levee District, and 

the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development are 

the key players. But they each played their parts in a system fragmented by overlapping obligations and inexplicable past practices. 

On the screen at the side of the room,1 the principal legal obligations of each is set out. 

2

Once the levees have been constructed, the Army Corps of Engineers is expected to: Turn over completed sections to the Orleans 

Levee District; perform an annual inspection with the district; and 

review the semi-annual reports filed by the district. 

The Orleans Levee District is charged by law with: Operating 

and maintaining the levees; conducting a quarterly inspection of 

the levees at least once every 90 days; and filing a semi-annual report with the Army Corps. 

The Louisiana Department of Transportation is obligated by 

State law to: Approve the soundness of the engineering practice 

and the feasibility of the plans and specifications submitted by the 

Orleans Levee District; conduct training of the district’s commissioners; and review the district’s emergency plans. 

All had responsibility for preparing for and responding to emergencies. In addition to the Corps’ responsibilities under the Flood 

Control Act, the National Response Plan designates the Corps as 

the primary agency responsible for public works. Likewise, the 

Louisiana Department of Transportation is tasked with the public 

works emergency functions under Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan. 

In addition to owning the levees, the Orleans Levee District is 

given a supporting role for public works by Louisiana’s Emergency 

Operations Plan. 

Today the Committee will hear from witnesses from all three 

agencies as we examine how those various responsibilities were actually carried out. The laws called for one thing. Today we will 

hear about the reality, about the confusion on issues as fundamental as control, the misunderstandings, and what appear to be 

abdications of responsibility. 

To begin, there was confusion about the basic question of who is 

in charge of the levees. Key officials at the Army Corps and the Orleans Levee District have demonstrated this confusion by telling 

the Committee staff one thing in transcribed interviews, and then 

changing their positions later. 

But that confusion is difficult to understand. There are at least 

18 letters from the Army Corps of Engineers turning over various 

sections of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to the Orleans Levee District. In one such letter, dated 

June 15, 2000, the Army Corps informed the Orleans Levee District that the final inspection had been completed on a section of 

the levees and the Orleans Levee District was now responsible for 

the operation and maintenance of the completed section. The letter 

goes on to explain that maintenance means keeping all completed 

works in first-class condition. 

Responsibility for emergency management was also unclear. For 

example, when asked about the Louisiana Department of Transportation’s levee and flood control repair responsibilities articulated 

explicitly in the State’s Emergency Operations Plan, the Assistant 

Secretary for the Department stated, ‘‘I’m not sure what that 

means, because we don’t have any State flood control works. [The] 

State doesn’t own any flood control works.’’ 

The uncertainty about control, combined with overlapping responsibility for emergency management, affected the repair efforts 

at one of the breach sites after Hurricane Katrina. In a staff interVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Oct 23, 2006 Jkt 026746 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26746.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
3

view, the Commander of the New Orleans District of the Army 

Corps of Engineers described the confusion: ‘‘Who is in charge? 

Where’s the parish president? Where is the mayor? And then the 

State? Who is in charge?’’ 

In addition to this confusion about control and emergency management, there are also cases in which the letter of the law may 

have been observed, but its spirit was mocked. For example, Louisiana State law requires educational training for levee board commissioners. 

However, the former President of the Board candidly described 

the training sessions as follows, ‘‘Once in four years, you know 

what that is? That’s going up to a workshop for the weekend and 

having a crawfish boil up here and hear a couple people talk about 

some things, and they get a little piece of paper, and they honored 

the law.’’

He also described the annual inspections of the levees conducted 

by the Army Corps, the Louisiana Department of Transportation, 

and the Orleans Levee District as largely ceremonial events. . . . 

‘‘They . . . normally meet and get some beignets and coffee in the 

morning and get to the buses, and the colonel and the brass is all 

dressed up. You have commissioners. They have some news cameras following you around. . . . And you have your little beignets, 

and then . . . you have a nice lunch somewhere or whatever. They 

have this stop-off thing or whatever. And that’s what the inspections are about.’’

Finally, although the title of the Orleans Levee District implies 

that the district’s primary function is to operate, maintain, and inspect the levees, the Committee found that the minutes of the 

meetings of the District’s Board of Commissioners showed that the 

majority of the Board’s meetings were actually devoted to other activities. For example, the district owns commercial property that it 

leases to various restaurants, karate clubs, and beautician schools. 

It also owns two marinas, an airport, and it licenses a floating casino. Collectively, based on our review of the minutes, these enterprises consumed the majority of the Board’s deliberating time in recent years. 

The tragedy that unfolded last August to one of America’s most 

vibrant cities was rooted in the failure of the levees. That failure, 

in turn, did not happen by chance, but as a result of fundamental 

flaws in design, construction, or maintenance. Those flowed from 

basic problems with governance. 

Superb engineers and competent contractors can solve some of 

these issues, but until we face up honestly to the issue of governance, we will have failed the citizens of New Orleans and taxpayers 

across America. Confused, overlapping, and imprecise roles, shortcomings in training and qualifications, the focus on unrelated business activities, and complacency as to the vulnerability of the system were the human flaws that Katrina exposed. 

The future of the city of New Orleans is inextricably linked to its 

levee system. The Mayor, business leaders, and the Federal Reconstruction Coordinator have all emphasized to me that the private 

sector will not make significant investments in the city without assurances that the levees will be rebuilt stronger and better. 

4

But that commitment to strengthening the levees must be accompanied by significant reforms. The confusion and chaos that characterized the current regulatory regime can no longer be tolerated. 

Not only must we strengthen the levees themselves, but also we 

must strengthen the oversight of the entire levee system if we are 

truly to protect New Orleans from another catastrophic failure. 

I am very pleased today to recognize Senator Carper, who is 

going to be acting as the Ranking Member today. Senator 

Lieberman, who has been extremely involved in this investigation 

and has a special interest in the integrity of the levee system and 

its oversight, unfortunately is ill today and is unable to join us. He 

has asked Senator Carper to very ably step in to act as the Ranking Member, and I am pleased to call upon him for his opening 

statement. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am honored to 

sit at your right hand and to pinch hit for Senator Lieberman. 

That was quite an opening statement, by the way. I do not know 

that I can add a whole lot to it. I will try to reemphasize a couple 

of points that you have made and maybe add one or two others as 

well. 

To our witnesses today, thank you for joining us, and we look forward to hearing from you. You will get a chance to speak, and 

thank you for your patience in the interim. 

More than a million people in the New Orleans area—that is 

more than the whole State of Delaware, by the way—counted on 

the levees to protect their lives, to protect their homes, and to protect their businesses. We must know why they failed, not the people, not the businesses, not the homes—the levees. It is the key, 

as the Chairman has said, to any rebuilding plan for New Orleans. 

Preliminary evidence from the teams examining the levees suggest at least to us that design flaws contributed significantly to the 

collapse of the levees. Media reports also indicate that there may 

have been failures in the levee maintenance and inspection regime. 

It also appears that there was no plan in place to respond to a 

major breach of these levees that are so critical to the life of this 

city and to the lives of its citizens. 

This morning our Committee will hear from representatives of 

the key agencies at each level of government, Federal, State, and 

local, who have the responsibilities over the levee system. Each of 

you will explain how you viewed your responsibilities for the design, for the construction, for the maintenance of the levees, and 

who responds if they do fail. 

In brief, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for the 

design and construction of the levees, as we have seen and heard. 

The State Department of Transportation and Development provides 

technical support to the levee district, sometimes serving as a local 

sponsor itself. Local sponsors, the levee districts, share the cost of 

constructing the levees and are then responsible for operation and 

maintenance once the levees are completed. Both the State and the 

Corps also have ongoing oversight responsibilities of operation and 

maintenance activities. 

5

That all sounds simple enough, but a closer examination reveals 

a more confused and disturbing picture. The Army Corps says that 

they finished the levees and floodwalls and turned at least most of 

them over to the Orleans Levee Board. At the same time, the Corps 

admits that the levees continue to settle into the earth and has 

continued to ask Congress and the Administration for funding to 

build those levees back up and to maintain them as a Federal responsibility. And also, although Army Corps regulations require 

levee districts to immediately repair damaged or below-grade sections, it often takes months or even years before repairs are made. 

To make matters worse, there is still confusion about what level 

of protection the levees were capable of providing. The Army Corps 

has stated for years that the system was capable of withstanding 

a ‘‘fast-moving Category 3’’ storm, but this system of rating the 

strength of hurricanes, known as the Saffir-Simpson Scale, was not 

invented when these levees and floodwalls were designed. And the 

hypothetical hurricane that the Corps used as a basis for the design of the New Orleans levees, known as the Standard Project 

Hurricane, does not really fit the current definition of Category 3 

hurricane. 

In the case of wind speed, the Standard Project Hurricane would 

be classified, I believe, as a Category 2 storm. In the case of central 

pressure, it would be a Category 4. When Committee staff asked 

for documentation to show how the Army Corps of Engineers arrived at the conclusion that the levee system would protect against 

a Category 3 hurricane, our staff was told that there really was not 

any. 

And finally, we know a lot more about hurricanes in the Gulf of 

Mexico, and we are well aware of changes occurring in the physical 

environment that impact the effectiveness of levees in New Orleans, such as the settling and sinking of the entire region, the loss 

of coastal wetlands, and the widening of the Mississippi River Gulf 

Outlet. 

And despite this, there was no systematic effort at any level of 

government to determine exactly what effect these changes had on 

the level of protection provided by the levees. As a result, there has 

been no chance in the design of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project since the project was authorized, I believe, in 1965. An 

effort begun in 1999 to examine how to improve the levee protection to guard against a Category 4 or Category 5 storm never got 

past the preliminary study phase. 

Finally, the response to the breaches is problematic. Although 

the Army Corps of Engineers and the levee district struggled under 

catastrophic conditions to close off the floodwall breaches in the 

aftermath of Katrina, it is clear that no one had a plan in place 

to deal with this kind of disaster. 

So, Madam Chairman, and to my colleagues, I conclude these remarks really where I started. Over a million people depended on 

these levees for their protection. Billions of dollars worth of property and economic activity lay behind these barriers. And yet, despite their enormous importance, the patchwork of government 

agencies simply failed to ensure that the level of protection the levees were intended to provide was in fact being provided. Federal, 

State, and local leaders are now trying to determine how to rebuild 

6

New Orleans and the surrounding parishes flooded by Hurricane 

Katrina. A critical element of those plans is going to be what level 

of hurricane protection is needed? 

As we will discuss this morning, it is not just a question of building hurricane protection barriers that are high enough to stand up 

to these storms, it is also imperative that we reexamine the roles 

and responsibilities of the government agencies at all levels that 

are responsible for the financing, design, building, and maintenance of the levee system, as well as for responding to emergencies. 

As we have seen in Katrina, the levee system is only as strong as 

its weakest link, and that a critical part of that system is the government agencies that create and maintain it. 

Thanks very much. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I want to thank our two other 

members for coming today. 

I am now going to welcome our witnesses to the hearing. We 

have representatives from the Federal, State, and local government 

agencies that have a role in the design, construction, operation, 

maintenance, and inspection of the levees in New Orleans and in 

preparation for and in response to emergencies involving those levees. 

Colonel Richard Wagenaar is the District Engineer and Commander for the New Orleans District of the Army Corps of Engineers. The Colonel is a 26-year veteran of the U.S. Army with significant command experience both in the United States and abroad. 

Alfred Naomi is the Senior Project Manager for the New Orleans 

District of the Army Corps. Mr. Naomi has over 23 years of experience as either a Project Manager or Senior Project Manager with 

the Army Corps. 

Gerard Colletti is the Operations Manager for Completed Works 

for the Army Corps’ New Orleans District. Mr. Colletti started 

working for the Army Corps in 1977 as a student while attending 

college. He began work for the Corps full time in 1982 and has rotated through several departments at the Corps, including flood 

control, hurricane protection and emergency management, and inspections of completed works. 

Edmond Preau is the Assistant Secretary for Public Works and 

Intermodal Transportation of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development. He is a registered professional engineer and has worked for the Department or its predecessor since 

1968. 

Also, Mr. Preau, I understand that you had to defer some family 

obligations in order to be with us today. I want to thank you very 

much for doing so. I understand that created some hardship for you 

and your family, and I very much appreciate your rearranging your 

schedule. I think your testimony is very important to us, and our 

consideration would have been incomplete without your participation, but I do very much appreciate your being here. 

James Huey served as the President of the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District from June 1996 to October of 

2005. Prior to becoming the Board’s President, Mr. Huey served as 

a Commissioner and Chairman of the Board’s Engineering Committee. In total, Mr. Huey has served the Board for approximately 

13 years. 

7

1The prepared statement of Colonel Wagenaar appears in the Appendix on page 63. 

And finally, Max Hearn is the Executive Director for the Orleans 

Levee District. After serving in the U.S. Air Force for 30 years, Mr. 

Hearn started working for the Orleans Levee District in 1989 as 

the Director of Operations and Maintenance. He became the Executive Director in 1997 and has served in that capacity ever since. 

I would ask that you all rise so that I can swear you in. Do you 

swear that the testimony that you’re about to give the Committee 

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you, God? 

Colonel Wagenaar. I do. 

Mr. NAOMI. I do. 

Mr. COLLETTI. I do. 

Mr. PREAU. I do. 

Mr. HUEY. I do. 

Mr. HEARN. I do. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. It is my understanding that 

Colonel Wagenaar, Mr. Huey, and Mr. Hearn have formal statements and that the other witnesses today will be available to respond to questions. So, Colonel, we will start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD P. WAGENAAR,1 COLONEL, COMMANDER AND DISTRICT ENGINEER, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, ACCOMPANIED BY 

ALFRED C. NAOMI, SENIOR PROJECT MANAGER, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, AND GERARD A. COLLETTI, OPERATIONS MANAGERS FOR COMPLETED WORKS, NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS 

OF ENGINEERS 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Madam Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, I am Colonel Richard Wagenaar. I am the 

Commander and District Engineer of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, one of 45 operating around the world. 

While the district is small in geographic area, it has the most civil 

works staff of any district in the Corps today. 

The primary missions of the district include operating and maintaining navigation on the Mississippi River and other navigable 

waters in South Louisiana, constructing flood and storm damage 

reduction projects, and working with other Federal agencies and 

the State to restore the aquatic ecosystem of Coastal Louisiana. 

I am honored to be testifying before your Committee today on the 

roles and responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers related to storm 

damage reduction in the metropolitan New Orleans area and our 

response prior to, during, and following Hurricane Katrina. 

My statement covers the following topics: The storm damage reduction system for the metropolitan New Orleans area; responsibility for operations, maintenance, and inspection of the system; 

and the role of the Corps of Engineers New Orleans District in responding to Hurricane Katrina. 

In the metropolitan New Orleans area, the Corps has constructed 

two large storm damage reduction projects, the West Bank Louisiana and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project and the Lake 

Pontchartrain and Vicinity Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. 

8

The Corps designed the West Bank project to reduce the risk of 

storm damage on the West Bank of the Mississippi River from 

storm surges coming from Lakes Cataouatche and Salvador and 

waterways leading to the Gulf of Mexico. It covers parts of Orleans, 

Jefferson, and Plaquemines Parishes and includes the Westwego to 

Harvey Canal, and the Lake Cataouatche and East of Harvey 

Canal areas. The Corps designed the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project to reduce the risk of storm 

damage between Lake Pontchartrain and the Mississippi River 

Levee from storm surges coming from Lake Pontchartrain. It covers parts of St. Bernard, Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles Parishes. 

In accordance with Title 33, Part 208.10 of the Code of Federal 

Regulations, operations and maintenance of these two projects is a 

non-Federal responsibility. For the West Bank and Vicinity Project, 

the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development is 

the non-Federal sponsor for construction, and the West Jefferson 

Levee District is the non-Federal sponsor for operations and maintenance. 

For the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project, the Lake 

Borgne Basin and Levee District, St. Bernard Parish, the Orleans 

Levee District, the East Jefferson Levee District, and the Pontchartrain Levee District are sponsors for the work in St. Bernard, 

Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Charles Parishes respectively. 

The levees in the New Orleans area are inspected visually on a 

regular basis by both the Corps and the local levee district, together and independently. Specifically, the Corps has an annual inspection program, with the New Orleans District Engineer and 

with the appropriate design engineers. The local levee districts patrol the system periodically between the annual joint inspections. 

The Corps also completed a joint inspection of the Orleans area 

with both the levee district and the State in June 2005. 

The Corps of Engineers responds in three ways to natural disasters. In all cases, our priorities are to support efforts to save lives 

and find people, to sustain lives through the provision of water and 

shelter, and to set the conditions for recovery, such as cleanup and 

restoring infrastructure and navigation. 

First we respond in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. We also provide engineering assistance, as needed, in 

support of the Department of Defense military forces, who are responding to the disaster. Finally, we act under our own civil works 

mission responsibilities, which in the area impacted by Katrina involved principally our storm and flood damage reduction and commercial navigation missions. 

For example, we conduct surveys of all of the structures in the 

area, both navigation and flood and storm damage reduction, and 

then begin to make repairs. We are also working under our Public 

Law 84–99 authority with the local parishes to repair the levee systems that were damaged during the event. Under this authority, 

we repair structures built by the Corps, as well as non-federally 

built structures that qualify for the Corps Rehabilitation and Inspection Program. 

I took command of the New Orleans District on July 12, 2005. 

Prior to my arrival, the district had participated in an annual hurVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Oct 23, 2006 Jkt 026746 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26746.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
9

ricane preparedness exercise conducted by our regional headquarters, the Mississippi Valley Division. The district also hosted 

a day long hurricane preparedness conference on July 25, in which 

representatives of local, State, and Federal emergency offices attended. Also, prior to Hurricane Katrina, district emergency teams 

reviewed their crisis information and made preliminary plans for 

activation, including prepositioning equipment and supplies. 

About a week prior to landfall in Louisiana, I began monitoring 

the storm as it moved east of Florida. On August 24, we monitored 

Hurricane Katrina’s projections, and I directed that a block of hotel 

rooms be secured in Vicksburg, Mississippi. As provided in our crisis plan, I coordinated the activation and deployment of the Crisis 

Management Team. On August 26, I advised my commander, Mississippi Valley Division Commander Brigadier General Robert 

Crear, that forecasts did not bode well for New Orleans and key 

decisions would be made from my Emergency Operations Center 

(EOC) the following day. 

After an emergency meeting on August 27, I issued an evacuation order for the New Orleans District staff under the Department of Defense Alternate Safe Haven Plan, with teams deployed 

to alternate operations sites. I also ordered the main district building closed for Monday, August 29. The Crisis Management Team 

established a temporary district headquarters in Vicksburg, Mississippi. The District Reconstitution Team deployed to Baton 

Rouge, and other emergency teams deployed to various locations 

with orders to be operational no later than 4 p.m. on August 28. 

Soon after my arrival into my district EOC on August 28, the division conducted a conference call to discuss and assess preparations. Immediately following the call, my Chief of Emergency Management and I visited the Orleans and Jefferson Parish EOCs and 

had short meetings with emergency officials. At 8 p.m., I ordered 

my team to the bunker. Eight district employees and I remained 

at the district to coordinate operations in a bunker designed to 

withstand a Category 5 hurricane. Our goal was to monitor how 

the levee system was faring, talking by phone with local parish and 

city officials, and to provide immediate post-storm assessment to 

the chain of command. 

The biggest challenge both during the storm and its aftermath 

was communications. The Corps and all of its partners have 

redundancies built in to provide backup. However, each time one 

system failed, it seemed as though everyone moved to the next redundancy and then overloaded it. Throughout the night we received numerous reports of overtopped, failing, or breached levees. 

After a few hours of sleep, I was woken up early August 29, Monday, and was told that water was overtopping a levee or that there 

was a levee failure. Many of these reports came from a local radio 

station. Around that time, we also received a call from a district 

employee who reported overtopping of the walls along the Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal. There was little that could be done to investigate at that time since the worst of the storm was upon us. 

By about 11 a.m., the winds had decreased some and the weather 

was beginning to clear. By 2 p.m., we had moved from the bunker 

and reestablished the Emergency Operations Center in the main 

10

district office building. Around this time is when I believe we first 

received a call regarding the breach at the 17th Street Canal. 

We departed the main district building at about 3 p.m. It was apparent as soon as we left the district that New Orleans had suffered catastrophic damage. Due to debris, water, and live electrical 

wires, it took us an hour-and-a-half to get to the Causeway and I–

10 intersection, about three miles from the main district office 

building. Blocked here, we attempted to travel east to get to the 

canal and were stopped at the I–10/610 split where the water levels 

left only treetops exposed. I didn’t know the city all that well, but 

I knew rainwater didn’t cause flooding like this. Based on the 

water height at that location, it was obvious that significant flooding was occurring. 

We also attempted to drive to the canal from another route, but 

the high water, debris, and strong winds kept us from getting 

through to inspect damage to the levee. We made our way back to 

the main district office building in the early evening. It was around 

this time that we heard media reports about how the city had 

‘‘dodged a bullet,’’ but it was clear to us that conditions were very 

bad. Soon after this, I submitted a situation report to my division 

commander. 

Due to the extreme conditions outside, we put together a security 

and escape plan. We continued our attempts to communicate with 

district teams and local officials. We had difficulty calling out, but 

people could call us intermittently. Sometime that evening, Rudy 

St. Germaine, engineer of the New Orleans Sewerage and Water 

Board, joined us. We managed to request a helicopter, and last we 

heard it was supposed to arrive the next day at 7:30 a.m. We 

hunkered down for the night. 

Immediately the following morning, August 30, I dispatched two 

people to the 17th Street Canal, who commandeered a boat to inspect the canal. The helicopter arrived at 9:15 a.m., and Mr. St. 

Germaine and I were able to view the city from above shortly afterwards. I saw the breach at the 17th Street Canal, and then we flew 

over toward the east side of the city. The bridge spans on Interstate 10 were knocked off their foundations or gone completely. 

Devastation was widespread, but it was in the Six Flags area in 

New Orleans East that I first saw hundreds, if not thousands, of 

people on their roofs waiting to be rescued. 

When we flew over the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal we found 

three breaches. It was at this time that we determined that water 

was actually draining out of the Lower 9th Ward area and not into 

the neighborhood area. 

After completing an overflight of the rest of the city, I returned 

to my main district office building at approximately 2:30 p.m. and 

attempted to call the CMT in Vicksburg to initiate coordination. At 

that time I also found two district construction representatives in 

my EOC that reported in voluntarily. We immediately put together 

a plan to initiate operations on the 17th Street Canal in conjunction with the West Jefferson Levee District. 

Throughout the rest of the day and evening, with intermittent 

communications, we worked a plan to repair the breach on the 

canal. The Crisis Management Team in Vicksburg immediately 

began orchestrating the necessary resources and materials to stem 

11

the flow of water. With verbal authorization, Corps contractors responded. 

Normal transportation routes were impassable, complicating 

even small tasks. The security, transportation, communications, 

and living conditions at this point were marginal at best. We were 

working 24 hours a day at this point. 

By August 31, the Corps had begun marshaling resources. Contractors, material, and equipment were arriving at the 17th Street 

Canal site. By that afternoon, 10 large sandbags were dropped into 

the breach in our first attempt to close the breach. The activities 

at the site were chaotic, as three to four different operations were 

being executed with multiple agencies involved. 

By September 1, contractors had begun delivering sand, gravel, 

and large rock to areas on the 17th Street Canal, where an access 

road was being built to reach the breach. Deliveries were also being 

made to the sandbag staging area in the vicinity of the Coast 

Guard station, where thousands of 2- to 5-ton sandbags were being 

prepared. 

The next step at the 17th Street Canal and later the London Avenue Canal was to cut off flow from Lake Pontchartrain. Contractors drove 150 feet of steel piling across the canal to seal it. Meanwhile, Army Chinook and Black Hawk helicopter crews began placing 7,000-pound sandbags, an average of 600 bags each day, into 

the breaches. One breach took over 2,000 sandbags before engineers could see the bags under the water surface. 

Sandbagging operations ran 24 hours a day for 10 days, with 

riggers averaging one to three hookups every 2 minutes during 

daylight hours. We stockpiled 1,500 bags and even more rock to address future repairs. Crane barges were also used to place sandbags, stone, and gravel, especially along breaches on the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, where ground access was nonexistent. Expedient repairs were made to two breaches there. 

A week to the day after Katrina, the 17th Street Canal breach 

was closed. For the next week, which included a rescue of one of 

our employees, I was involved in the formation of Task Force 

Unwatering under the command of Colonel Duane Gapinski and 

accompanied the President during his visit. 

By September 8, I had turned my attention to the reconstitution 

of the New Orleans District. Many of our employees in the New Orleans District lost their homes and belongings, the same as their 

friends and neighbors, but returned to the main district office 

building to work and to help ensure that their fellow citizens were 

able to begin the recovery and rebuilding process. I am immensely 

proud of them for their sense of duty and their selfless service. 

This concludes my statement. Again, I appreciate the opportunity 

to testify today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you 

may have. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Mr. Huey. 

12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Huey appears in the Appendix on page 69. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. HUEY,1 FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE 

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT 

Mr. HUEY. My name is James P. Huey, and I am the former 

President of the Board of Commissioners of the Orleans Levee District, having served as the Board’s President from June 1996 until 

October 2005. 

I appreciate the opportunity this Committee has afforded me to 

testify here today. I want to take this opportunity to thank your 

staff and the delegation investigating this very important segment 

of the flood control system. They have conducted themselves in a 

very professional and courteous manner and have been sensitive 

and courteous in gathering the information and facts that will be 

crucial to this Committee in identifying any weakness and/or problem that may have contributed to the disaster that Hurricane 

Katrina created for the city of New Orleans and the surrounding 

parishes. 

I completely understand the importance of providing the information in a truthful and factual manner, so that this Committee will 

have the best information possible. This is the only way to assure 

that our community will be provided with the appropriate flood 

control system to protect their property and lives. 

In order for our community to rebuild and recover from this catastrophic event, our people must have the confidence that the proper 

solutions will be formulated and that the errors identified are corrected. This can only be accomplished if we all tell the truth and 

provide the facts regardless of our personal and/or self-interest. It 

is with this spirit and understanding that I testify today. 

I appear before this Committee with a sense of the deepest sadness in the wake of the greatest natural catastrophe in American 

history, Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina virtually destroyed 

the great city of New Orleans, where I was raised, grew up, and 

have made my home since boyhood. This hurricane affected me personally. I have been displaced from my home and witnessed catastrophic destruction to the city that is my home. This hurricane 

also resulted in my resignation as President of the Board in late 

October under criticism primarily for actions taken by me immediately after the storm. I am not here to defend those actions or 

take up this Committee’s valuable time debating those issues because they do not concern the important issue and enormous challenge being addressed by this Committee: Understanding how the 

recent catastrophe caused by the flooding of the city of New Orleans can be avoided in the future. 

I also do not appear here as an advocate for any particular cause 

or viewpoint; the issues are of such gravity and stretch beyond the 

realm of personal or partisan interest. I hope, therefore, that you 

will receive what I say solely as the expression of a concerned citizen with one purpose in mind, to assist you in your awesome responsibility of formulating policies for the flood protection of one of 

the greatest cities in our country. And it is at this level of the Congress of the United States that these issues need to be debated and 

policy decisions made because flood control protection for the city 

13

of New Orleans and the Lake Pontchartrain vicinity has been the 

product of national legislation since enactment of the Flood Control 

Act of 1965. 

In your letter to me, dated December 7, 2005, you stated that the 

focus of this hearing would be on the roles and responsibilities of 

the Federal, State, and local government entities for the design, 

construction, operation and maintenance, and inspection of the levees, and the preparation for, and response to, levee emergencies in 

metropolitan New Orleans. You also stated in this letter that I 

would be asked to testify concerning my experiences as President 

of the Orleans Levee Board, particularly with respect to the Orleans Levee District’s operation and maintenance procedures and 

policies, inspection of the levees, and also the financial resources 

available and used to meet the levee district’s primary mission of 

protecting the lives and property of the citizens of Orleans Parish 

by constructing, operating, and maintaining the levees within the 

district’s jurisdiction. I will do so to my very best to share with you 

my understanding of these matters and my experience as a Commissioner and as President of the Orleans Levee Board on how 

these matters were addressed and dealt with by the Orleans Levee 

Board and District. 

The floodwalls and levees that failed during the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the city of New Orleans were constructed by the 

U.S. Corps of Engineers as part of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity High Level Plan. When I was appointed to the levee board 

as a commissioner in 1992, the Board was actively pursuing the 

commencement of the construction of parallel protection for the 

London Avenue, Orleans Avenue, and 17th Street Canals. The role 

and responsibilities of the Orleans Levee District for this project 

was to act as local sponsor and, as such, provide certain assurances 

for this project to the Corps and its consideration of the Corps constructing the project. These assurances by the Board, as local sponsor, were set forth in a number of agreements between the Board 

and the United States of America, by and through the Corps of Engineers, dating back to July 1966. The responsibilities and obligations of the Board, as the authorized local governmental body to 

enter into these agreements under Louisiana law, were set forth in 

detail in these agreements. 

These obligations of the Board as local sponsor, referred to as 

‘‘assurances’’ in these agreements, consisted of the following:

To provide all lands, easements, and right-of-ways, including borrow and spoil disposal areas necessary for construction, operation, and maintenance of the project; 

To accomplish all necessary alterations and relocations 

to roads, railroads, pipelines, cables, wharves, drainage 

structures, and other facilities required for the construction of the project; 

To hold and save the United States free from damages 

due to the construction works; 

To provide 30 percent of the cost for the project through 

cash contributions in lump sum, or in installments paid at 

least annually, in proportion to the Federal appropriation 

for the project, in accordance with the construction schedules as required by the Chief Engineer of the United 

14

States Corps of Engineers; or as substitute for any part of 

the cash contribution, to accomplish, in accordance with 

approved construction schedules, items of work of equivalent value as determined by the Chief Engineer; 

To provide all interior drainage and pumping plants required for reclamation and development of the protected 

areas; 

To maintain and operate after completion of a project all 

features of the project in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Corps; 

To acquire adequate easements or other interest in land 

to prevent encroachment on existing ponding areas, unless 

substitute storage capacity or equivalent pumping capacity 

if provided promptly; and 

To comply with all applicable provisions of the Federal 

law relating to the project, including the Flood Control Act, 

Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In connection with the local cost share for these projects, including the floodwalls for parallel protection on the London Avenue and 

17th Street Canals, the levee district was authorized to identify 

and select engineering consultant firms to participate in the work 

on the parallel protection plan and provide services in accordance 

with the requirements of the Corps. The payments made by the 

levee district to these consultants were an in-kind contribution and 

credited on the 30 percent local sponsor contribution. The levee district did secure the services of engineering firms for the design 

phases of these projects, and their work was subject to the review 

and approval of the Corps. After the Corps approved the engineering work for the project, the Corps then entered into contracts for 

the construction of the project with local contractors. 

These were the responsibilities and duties of the Orleans Levee 

District in connection with the design and construction of 

floodwalls on the outfall canals that failed as a result of the impact 

of Hurricane Katrina. As set forth in the assurances, after these 

projects were completed, the Orleans Levee District’s personnel 

maintained and inspected these projects consisting of 27.8 miles of 

inner levees and floodwalls in the city of New Orleans. In addition, 

the district maintained and inspected some 73.4 miles of front-line 

levees on Lake Pontchartrain and 27.5 miles of Mississippi River 

levees and floodwalls protecting the citizens of the city of New Orleans. In total, the district maintains and inspects a total of some 

128 miles of levees, including 203 floodgates and 102 valves. As required under the assurances, the operation and maintenance of 

these levees is in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the 

U.S. Corps of Engineers. 

During my tenure as Commissioner on the Orleans Levee Board, 

I can tell you that we worked closely with the Corps’ district office 

in New Orleans and had an open and solid working relationship 

with the Corps. Prior to my election as President of the Board, I 

served as Chairman of the Board’s Engineering Committee, and as 

such, I was personally familiar with the parallel protection plan 

authorized and constructed by the Corps. This committee met 

monthly, and a Corps representative updated the district on the 

15

status of the work at each monthly committee meeting. Also, after 

my election as President, the Corps representatives each month attended committee meetings of the Board and briefed the Committees on the status of projects as well as future projects necessary 

to complete the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan. 

I can also inform you that, to my knowledge, there were no complaints by the Corps about the inspection and maintenance of the 

flood protection system by the Orleans Levee District. In addition, 

the recent reports that the system was only inspected biannually 

and only in a cursory manner by levee district and Corps representatives are inaccurate and unfounded. As will be discussed by 

the Executive Director of the District, inspection of the flood control 

system was a daily function of the operations and maintenance departments of the levee district. The Executive Director of the Levee 

District, Max Hearn, well knows the procedures followed since he 

served as the Director of Operations and Maintenance until his 

promotion to Executive Director in 1997. 

The maintenance and inspection of the levee system was also 

conducted under the supervision of the Orleans Levee District Engineering Department. The district has a Chief Engineer, an Assistant Chief Engineer, and a staff that report to the Board each 

month at Committee and Board meetings. Furthermore, while I 

was President over the past 9 years, I was available on a daily 

basis to discuss any needs or concerns of the levee district staff, especially any related to flood control. 

In sum, after serving 13 years on the Orleans Levee Board, I can 

earnestly tell you that it was my understanding that the primary 

responsibility for design and construction of the flood protection 

system of the city of New Orleans rested with the U.S. Corps of Engineers. The Orleans Levee District did not unilaterally initiate 

flood control projects, which were subject to the direction and control of the U.S. Corps of Engineers. I do not say this in any way 

to cast blame for the recent catastrophe on the Corps. I say this 

because this is how things were, and are. This was the reality 

when I was appointed and throughout my tenure on the Board. 

There are good reasons why this was the case. The scope and cost 

of these projects are far beyond the financial capability of local governmental agencies. Simply put, flood protection is a national obligation beyond the capacity of State and local governments. 

The local government entities have obligations, as reflected in 

the assurances, to be provided for the projects, and the Orleans 

Levee District provided these assurances for completion of these 

projects by the Corps. After completion of these projects by the 

Corps, the Orleans Levee District operated, maintained, and inspected these flood protection projects in accordance with the regulations of the Corps. 

During the time I served on the Board, the levee district also had 

a legal department that attended to all of the legal questions confronted by the district, including the Board’s obligations under Federal and State laws relating to flood control. While a member of the 

Board, I cannot recall one instance when we were advised either 

by our in-house counsel or through outside complaints brought to 

our attention that the Board was not fulfilling its legal obligation 

16

1The prepared statement of Mr. Hearn appears in the Appendix on page 79. 

regarding any aspect of the operation, maintenance, or inspection 

of the flood control system that protected the lives and properties 

of our citizens of the city of New Orleans. 

I appreciate the opportunity to make this statement and will do 

my best to answer your questions. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Huey. Mr. Hearn. 

TESTIMONY OF MAX L. HEARN,1 EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

ORLEANS LEVEE DISTRICT 

Mr. HEARN. Senator Collins, Committee Members, thank you for 

inviting me to participate in these hearings. 

I’m Max Hearn, Executive Director of the Orleans Levee District, 

and I’m a resident of Jefferson Parish, just outside the city of New 

Orleans, and live there with my family. My home is within the 

area protected by the flood control structures, and we were impacted, along with our neighbors, by Hurricane Katrina and the 

aftermath. Consequently, both in my capacity as the Director of the 

levee district, as a husband and homeowner, I welcome this Senate 

investigation. 

We citizens of Louisiana and residents of New Orleans share 

your concerns regarding the integrity of the flood control structures 

that protect our city, our homes, and our families. We also share 

your goal to determine what went wrong and to take preventative 

measures to ensure that the loss of life and devastation to property 

never occurs in New Orleans or any other community protected by 

the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection system. 

As stated earlier, I served in the U.S. Air Force from 1959 until 

my retirement from active duty in 1989, after attaining the rank 

of colonel. Beginning in 1989, I was employed as the Director of 

Operations and Maintenance for the Orleans Levee District. I became the Executive Director of the levee district in 1997 and serve 

in that capacity today. In these capacities, I am very familiar with 

the relationships among the various governmental entities involved 

with the flood control systems and the operation and maintenance 

of these systems. 

As you know, a large portion of New Orleans lies below sea level. 

The city is surrounded by water, wetlands, and marsh, and is 

threatened by the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, and the 

Gulf of Mexico. Consequently, flood protection is essential to this 

city. 

As I appreciate the Flood Control Act of 1928, the Federal Government, through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, assumed primary responsibility for the national flood control system. As such, 

the Corps determined where the levees and flood control structures 

were needed, established the criteria for the design and construction of the levees, then assigned the operation and maintenance responsibilities for the levees over to local governmental bodies, like 

the levee district. 

The levee district was created by the Louisiana legislature as the 

State governmental entity charged to coordinate and cooperate 

with the Federal Government with respect to flood control structures built under the National Flood Control Act. The district’s juVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Oct 23, 2006 Jkt 026746 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26746.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
17

risdiction, as Mr. Huey said, includes 73 miles of front-line levees, 

28 miles of inner levees and floodwalls, 28 miles of Mississippi 

River levees, 203 floodgates, 102 valves, and two flood control 

structures. 

Following Hurricane Betsy in 1965, which caused extensive flooding in New Orleans, the Corps of Engineers worked with the levee 

districts in the region to design and build upgrades to the flood 

control system. The floodwalls for the New Orleans outfall canals, 

which are the focus of this Committee’s attention, are part of the 

Corps of Engineers’ Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane 

Protection Plan. The designs for these flood walls were approved by 

the Corps and construction was commenced in the late 1980s. As 

sections of the project were completed, the floodwalls and levees 

were turned over to the levee district for operation and maintenance. 

The levee district’s operation and maintenance procedures are 

conducted in accordance with Federal regulations and under the 

oversight of the Corps. In fact, the levee district was required to 

enter into contracts with the Federal Government assuring that 

the operation and maintenance of the levees constructed under the 

Federal Flood Control Act would comply with the Federal regulations and the Corps of Engineers guidelines. These regulations and 

guidelines set forth specific inspection and operation procedures. 

The levee district maintenance supervisors conduct major inspections prior to the beginning of the hurricane flood season and during high-water events. Additionally, at regular intervals of at least 

a monthly basis, district work crews and supervisors, in conjunction with regularly scheduled maintenance, observe the levee system and the flood control structures within the district’s jurisdiction. 

During any inspection of the levees and floodwalls, the district 

employees check for levee problems including unusual subsidence, 

encroachment by trees, shrubs, or private structures, animal burrows, seepage, sand boils, leaks, caving, erosion, slides, sloughs, 

and for floodwall problems including accumulation of trash or debris, things growing on the floodwall, cracked, unstable, or misaligned floodwalls. Levee district employees are trained to report 

any problems observed during their routine maintenance activities 

to their supervisor for corrective action. 

The Corps conducts annual inspections of the flood control structures within the Orleans Levee District’s jurisdiction and grades 

the levee district on compliance. During my tenure as the Executive Director of the Orleans Levee District, the Corps has always 

evaluated the district’s compliance level as ‘‘Outstanding.’’

The district operates the gates, valves, and other flood control 

structures as appropriate for various high water and storm events. 

In preparation for the approach of Hurricane Katrina, the levee 

district instituted its emergency operations plan, which included 

the activation of the Emergency Operations Center, located at the 

Lakefront Airport Administration Building, and the mustering of 

the Emergency Maintenance Crews. Additionally, the district assured that sufficient food, water, fuel, sandbags, trucks, and equipment were on hand for the emergency response. 

18

Prior to Katrina’s impact, levee district employees closed all of 

the hurricane flood protection gates and valves, along with 13 

floodgates on the Mississippi River. As the hurricane approached 

and as water levels began to rise, district employees monitored the 

water levels and patrolled the flood control system. As weather conditions deteriorated and became unsafe, the district’s employees 

were pulled into sheltered areas to ride out the storm. 

During the storm, 60 levee district employees were staged at the 

Franklin Avenue facility, 19 at the Emergency Operations Center, 

and additionally, 43 district police officers were stationed at various locations. At the height of the storm one of the walls of the 

administration building blew out and the lower floor eventually 

flooded to a depth of about 4 feet. Additionally, one of the buildings 

used as a staging facility for the Emergency Maintenance Crews 

was damaged during the storm. 

On the morning of August 30, conditions had abated such that 

field inspections were possible. District employees immediately inspected flood control structures that were accessible and coordinated with the Corps of Engineers, the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development, and the East and West Jefferson 

Levee Districts, to respond to the 17th Street Canal breach. 

The 17th Street Canal breach was inaccessible to our land-based 

equipment due to flooding. Beginning August 30, and using sandbags and equipment staged by the Orleans Levee District, U.S. 

Army personnel began airlifting sandbags to close the breach. On 

August 31, the Department of Transportation and Development 

began construction of a road to the breach so that land-based repair could be conducted. 

The levee district was requested by the Corps to close the London 

Avenue Canal mouth, and this closure was completed on September 2, 2005. The Corps suggested that we build a ramp across 

the Norfolk Southern Railroad tracks to Jordan Road to allow 

heavy equipment access to Lakeshore Drive. This ramp was completed on September 5. 

The National Guard commandeered the Franklin facility on September 6 to provide additional security and assistance for the area, 

and at that time we relocated to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in accordance with our Business Continuity Plan. 

This concludes my formal statement, and I’ll entertain any questions you may have for me. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much, Mr. Hearn. 

Colonel, when you assessed the scene at the 17th Street Canal 

levee breach, who did you think was in charge of making the repairs? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, my original thought was that it was 

the Orleans Levee District. 

Chairman COLLINS. In your statement this morning you describe 

the situation at that breach as being chaotic. In the staff interview 

you referred to a turf war that you found. Could you describe for 

the Committee the confrontation that you encountered at the 17th 

Street Canal breach? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Yes, Senator. The situation—I mean understanding that there was no communications, the canal was literally 

surrounded by water on all sides, our initial coordination—because 

19

we had no communications with the Orleans Levee District, my 

two construction reps typically work on the West Bank of New Orleans. They were in contact with the West Jefferson Levee District. 

That canal typically is the border between Orleans Levee District 

and East Jefferson Levee District. West Jefferson Levee District 

had the assets to immediately move into the area sandbags and 

some equipment to move to the site to do some work initially. So 

we had three levee districts involved in a repair operation, and the 

Corps really wasn’t initially engaged because it was up to the levee 

district to attempt a repair. 

About 2 days into the repair, the Corps had started bringing resources from around the Southeast of the United States, contractors, many major contractors moving into the area. But—and we 

wanted to engage all of those resources into the repair, however, 

personalities, the situation, hours without sleep, they would not let 

the Corps of Engineers operate in that area to attempt multiple different courses of action to try and stop the water from flowing into 

the city. There were personalities out there that prevented the 

Corps from establishing overall control of the site—and this was 

about day two or three after the hurricane—until Secretary 

Bradbury from the State DOTD and the Director of Civil Works 

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers arrived and directed all 

State entities to work for the Corps of Engineers. There was no direct oversight by the Corps until that time. 

Chairman COLLINS. When the Corps tried to bring in special 

equipment, did anyone try to block that? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, there was a turf war on the site because one project was being done by one entity and the Corps tried 

to bring in all their contractors at one time. We didn’t care who 

was working on what. We just wanted the hole filled. But there 

was an individual from the West Jefferson Levee District that 

wanted exclusive use or construction of the road behind the levee 

wall, and when the Corps tried to get involved in supporting that 

effort, he literally blocked our equipment from operating on the 

bridge. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Preau, who do you think was responsible 

for that repair? 

TESTIMONY OF EDMOND J. PREAU, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY, PUBLIC WORKS AND INTERMODAL TRANSPORTATION, LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

AND DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. PREAU. Originally, the levee districts are supposed to be first 

responders on situations like this. If it is beyond their control, beyond their resources, then it would move up to the State level to 

take over. I think it was beyond the State’s resources at that point. 

We looked towards the Federal Government, who had a lot more 

resources than we did, and who we’ve relied upon in the past to 

do major repairs. 

If you read the project agreements, most major repairs are to be 

undertaken by the Corps of Engineers on Federal projects. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Huey, what is your view on this? Who 

do you see as being in charge? 

20

Mr. HUEY. Well, first of all, I’d like to clarify the fact that this 

is the first I heard of that situation, and I think it’s an excellent 

situation. First of all, you have a levee district who’s from another 

parish, who’s telling a colonel from the Corps of Engineers—I’ve 

never heard of anything of that nature. 

But, first of all, it is unequivocally, I would say, the Corps of Engineers. And again, history and time will prove, and through 

every—I always look at it—and previous colonels that I have met 

may look at it in fact that the levee district is a client, a partner 

with the Corps of Engineers in flood protection. That’s often stated 

from time to time. We are a resource for the Corps of Engineers. 

I look at it from the standpoint, from my level, is that they’re the 

head, they’re the brains. They have the engineering, the design, the 

overall knowledge of how the flood protection system should be constructed, and so forth. 

The levee district provides substantial resources, and as I mentioned in my statement, the various assurances and so forth. We’ve 

provided resources, sandbags, whatever equipment we have available to the Corps. In previous storms, George as being a tropical 

storm, we identified the effects of the coastal erosion from high levels, and we pump our water. We’re one of the few places in the entire world, next to the Netherlands, that I understand, we have no 

gravitational drainage, we’re in a bowl. So those levees are the critical part. 

And our pumping stations are designed to pump the water into 

the river, the lake, or these canals. So the water levels rose to the 

levels of the—where the pumping station basically had no place to 

pump, and we provided and worked with the Corps with providing 

sandbags and things of that nature or whatever. But that is my understanding, the Corps of Engineers. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. I am going to pursue this issue 

in the second round of questions. My time has expired. But I think 

your answers, as well as what happened at that site, demonstrates 

the need for far more clarity in establishing who is in charge and 

when does maintenance, routine maintenance become a major repair. Does that change who becomes responsible? 

Senator CARPER. Thanks, Madam Chairman. 

I have some specific questions, I just want to go back and ask 

our three witnesses who have spoken, just to put in your own 

words, in layman’s terms, the respective responsibilities of each of 

the three entities that we have heard from. I am going to ask each 

of you to describe what you believe to be the Army Corps’ responsibilities, what you believe to be the New Orleans District’s responsibilities, and so forth. 

And then I am going to ask each of you to say whether you agree 

with the other assessments or not, and just words that anybody 

could listen in and sort of understand this. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator Carper, as the District Engineer for 

the New Orleans District, I am responsible for hurricane protection, flood control, navigation, ecosystem restoration, and water resources development projects in southern Louisiana and the metropolitan area of New Orleans. I am responsible for that program of 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 

21

The Hurricane Protection Project, as a comprehensive project, 

the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Project, is a Corps of Engineer 

project, comprehensive. It has multiple different components. When 

viewed comprehensively, the Corps of Engineers is responsible for 

the project as a whole. As components are completed, such as the 

17th Street Canal, the operations and maintenance is turned over 

to the local authorities, the local levee districts or levee boards; 

that is why I believe when the canal—as a separate entity—that’s 

why I believed at the time that the levee board was responsible for 

the immediate action on that canal, pending any request through 

the process of State, Federal, back down to the Corps for support. 

Senator CARPER. Talk to us about the responsibility of the State. 

The Department of Transportation and Development, how do they 

figure into this? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. I can’t give you the specifics. Mr. Preau may 

be able to do that. 

Senator CARPER. Just your understanding. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, my view is, is that they somewhat 

have an overarching command and control structure of the levee 

districts in facilitating mutual support, and we look to the State to 

provide guidance to the levee boards. But that’s about the extent 

of my knowledge in regards to their ability to have oversight over 

those levee boards and districts. 

Senator CARPER. Good, thanks. 

Mr. Huey, the same question, if you will, just in your own terms, 

to where you agree with the Colonel’s interpretation, and just add 

to or take away from that. Your understanding of the relative responsibilities in a situation like this of both the Army Corps, the 

State, and the levee district? 

Mr. HUEY. First of all, you said in my own words. I was sitting 

here reading Orleans Levee District responsibilities basically prepared for me, what-have-you, but from just the day-to-day experience, from the outlook of a commissioner. Understanding the fact 

that our staff works hand-in-glove with the Corps day to day. 

That’s one of the primary, our engineering staff, our people on a 

daily basis, we have a tremendous relationship. 

On the other hand, they attend—Mr. Naomi, who is here, attends virtually every meeting of the Orleans Levee District, both 

committee meetings and board meetings, and that’s who us, as 

commissioners, and the people look to as our experts and people 

who are constructing and building the flood protection system, and 

we’re working hand-in-glove as their support team and assuring 

that it is maintained and serviced properly. 

I think one of the biggest weaknesses here appears to be in an 

emergency situation, who steps up to the plate. First of all, I would 

like to clarify one of the things, that the Orleans Levee District 

was—the only dry area in the city was along Lakeshore Drive. Our 

folks, Mr. Hearn and about 60 of our people, were trapped in this 

facility for 10 days. During that period of time, they were the ones 

bringing the 5,000 pound sandbags from our facility back and forth 

along this particular area. 

As the Colonel said, one of the most frustrating problems was 

communications. We virtually had none. I could only get Max on 

the phone or the radio for a matter of a minute or two, and he was 

22

trying to tell me what was going on there, and vice versa, and I 

had headed to Baton Rouge for the recovery effort. So—but our 

people did join in. We support them. If in fact the situation would 

have been they were out, which Max will tell you, exploring these 

areas, and a lot of the information we were getting was from scattered news media reports, rumors, things of that nature also, but 

again, I disagree from the standpoint of the fact that we look to the 

Corps. 

Now, our people may be responsible for the first ones out there, 

and if we spot a breach or a problem, contact the Corps, get them 

in here because we’re not prepared, we don’t have the helicopters 

or certain things, or the—really, I would have to say the expertise 

of the type of engineers they have to say, ‘‘You have this breach 

coming in here. What do we do?’’

Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. Hearn, your response to the 

same question, if you would, please. What I am trying to get is just 

a lay person’s understanding of the relative responsibilities of the 

three major entities here, Federal, State, and local. 

Mr. HEARN. I think the responsibility for a breach like this is 

above the Orleans Levee District, but we would go to DOTD and 

the Corps to get their support because they can do the contracting 

or get whatever is necessary. I think the confusion—if there is a 

way to explain that—is that it was on the Orleans Levee District 

side. We couldn’t get to it because the depth of the water. East Jeff 

was trying to help out. West Jeff had the riprap. 

And that turf war that occurred, according to the Colonel, over 

on the Hammond Highway Bridge, I think it was just assumed 

that that’s the Orleans Levee District’s responsibility, and we 

couldn’t come anywhere close to it. So, to me, it’s a matter of if the 

Orleans Levee District could handle it, then we would. We would 

go to DOTD and the Corps at the same time, and it’s a partnership 

between the three of us to handle whatever breach we may have. 

Senator CARPER. My time has expired, and I look forward to a 

second round. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Voinovich. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR VOINOVICH 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I thank you 

for these hearings. I think you and Senator Lieberman are doing 

an outstanding job. This is the ninth Katrina hearing, and I think 

that once the investigation is complete you will come back with a 

comprehensive report that delineates the problems and proposes 

good solutions. 

It is obvious to me from the testimony here and from reading 

some of the interviews that there is a real lack of understanding 

about who is responsible for what. It is clear that opinions about 

who should have assumed responsibility vary widely. Madam 

Chairman, as a former mayor and governor, I think that if I were 

sitting at today’s witness table, I would have thought that the 

Chairman had taken me out to the shed for a good tongue-lashing. 

And if you listened carefully to what was said, Madam Chairman, 

today’s witnesses did not do the job they were supposed to be 

doing. I am concerned about that, and I am sure that you are too. 

I think that some of you were not as candid in your testimony here 

23

as you were when you were with the staff. It appears that there 

are some differences in terms of information from the testimony 

and information the staff picked up from their interviews. 

The point I am making is that we have not done the job, Madam 

Chairman, that we should have been doing over the years in terms 

of funding the Army Corps of Engineers and dealing with some of 

the problems that we have in this country. We have been penny 

wise and pound foolish in terms of our human capital and our 

physical capital needs of this agency and, quite frankly, a bunch of 

other agencies. 

The thing that really frustrates me is, is that this Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was first authorized in 1965. This is the 41st year. As of early 2005, the project 

was not expected to be completed until 2015, nearly 50 years after 

it was authorized. Prior to Katrina, the project was estimated to be 

from 60 to 90 percent complete in different areas. It said Federal 

allocations reached $458 million, 87 percent of the Federal responsibility on the project. It was supposed to be $738 million. 

The Corps Project Fact Sheet stated that the project’s fiscal year 

2005 appropriation and the President’s budget request for 2005 and 

2006 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. The 

Corps had the capability to use $20 million. The Corps noted that 

several levees had settled and needed to be raised to provide the 

designed level of protection. 

Madam Chairman, we can criticize these folks, but we do bear 

some of the responsibility, and it is about time that we faced up, 

this Administration, and I am talking about this one and the ones 

before them, and this Congress and Congresses before, that we face 

up to our responsibilities in terms of dealing with the infrastructure problems that are confronting this country. 

I would like to know, Colonel, why have you not been more candid with this Committee in terms of what you need? Have you 

given this information to the person that runs the Army Corps of 

Engineers, and have they made this information available to the 

Office of Management and Budget? Have you come before this 

Committee? I dealt with the Corps back when I was Chairman of 

the Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee as a freshman here. I had it for 2 years. I kept asking the question, ‘‘Do you 

need more money?’’ It seemed like everybody shut up. I am asking 

you, what have you done to try and make sure that we or the Office of Management and Budget know the fact that you did not 

have the money to get the job done? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I believe that the process we use at 

my level—to notify my headquarters to request monies for those 

projects and explain to them our capabilities on construction for all 

of my projects, that information would make it to this Committee 

or to the Congress of the United States. 

But there’s also an understanding at my level that there are national priorities and the Congress does its best to distribute those 

appropriations as possible. I mean every district in the Corps of 

Engineers, I believe, would like increased funding for its projects, 

but we also have a common-sense approach to understanding that 

the Congress is distributing those appropriations based on its priorities, and that’s how we look at it and——

24

Senator VOINOVICH. Let me interrupt you because I am almost 

running out of time. The fact of the matter is, we cannot do that 

unless we have the information that is necessary to make good decisions. 

I want to ask you one other thing. Did you ever tell the Department of Transportation and Development or the Orleans Levee 

Commission that the maintenance on this was not what it should 

be? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Sir, I cannot answer that. One of my experts 

may be able to answer that, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Colletti. 

Mr. COLLETTI. Yes, sir. We’ve dealt with the levee district for 

many years, and their operation and maintenance has been outstanding. So, from the aspect of cutting the grass, making sure that 

the levees are in the condition for what they were designed from 

a visual standpoint, and all the inspections that are done throughout the year, we have felt that they’ve done an outstanding job. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So you did not see any problems there? 

Mr. COLLETTI. No, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. I also want to thank you for your 

leadership on this issue and at these hearings. It is critically important, and you and the Ranking Member have done an outstanding job. 

I have three areas that I want to delve into. One is the construction design, the other is maintenance, and third is reaction. And 

I am like you, Madam Chairman. I also want to say there is a need 

for clarity, whatever comes out of these hearings, and I hope we 

get that. My mom did not raise dumb kids, and I am a little confused as to who has ultimate responsibility here—actually, not responsibility, but when responsibility needs to be transferred. Mr. 

Huey would say that the Corps has the responsibility. The Corps 

would say—and I think the State would agree—that the folks at 

the local level have the first response, and then it is shifted 

through. Who makes that decision? When is it made? And is it 

clear who makes it? Because in times of crisis, if that is not clear, 

you have got big problems. And I think we had problems here. 

I also want to say in regard to the money, I represent a State 

that borders the Mississippi River. We do a lot of work with the 

Corps. We have a lot of needs. And, Colonel, I appreciate your candor in terms of priorities. I think that is the reality that we deal 

with here. It is simply not a matter of money. There are a lot of 

us who would say that a lot of things need to be done. The question 

is how the money is used, and then when it is used, is it used in 

a way in which it is going to maximize what is needed? 

Let me ask you a question about design because there have been 

some questions about floodgates—floodgates at mouths of canals. 

Jefferson Parish has floodgates, and those gates did not fail. My 

folks have raised this question about floodgates, and at least some 

of the feedback I got was that the Orleans Sewerage and Water 

Board opposed floodgates here at the entrance to the Orleans and 

25

London Avenue Canals. I am not sure who is to respond. Would it 

be perhaps Mr. Huey? Can someone provide some insight into the 

opposition to floodgates and whether floodgates would have made 

a difference here? 

Mr. NAOMI. Yes, sir. The way the project was designed, or at 

least after the reevaluation in 1984, the Corps started addressing 

the outfall canals. The outfall canals are the canals that lead far 

into the city, 2 or 3 miles into the city where the pump stations 

are, and those canals connect directly to Lake Pontchartrain. The 

Corps’ preferred plan was to put structures at the mouths of those 

canals where it entered Lake Pontchartrain to keep the storm 

surge from entering those canals. 

The construction of those gated structures was opposed by local 

officials, including the Sewerage and Water Board, the city officials, and such, because they felt that if those gates were constructed, they would not be able to operate the pumping stations 

during a hurricane event. And so those concerns were great in 

their minds, and so they succeeded in obtaining legislation to require the Corps to put parallel protection or put floodwalls along 

those canals in lieu of the floodgates. 

Senator COLEMAN. And in retrospect, the decision to go parallel 

protections versus floodgates, would you conclude that floodgates 

would have been a better course of action? 

Mr. NAOMI. Well, I think that they both would have been designed to the same level of protection, of course, for the Standard 

Project Hurricane. But it is problematic as to what would have 

happened had we had floodgates versus those floodwalls. Certainly 

the floodgates could have had a problem, too, so it is hard to say 

definitively what would have happened. But it certainly would 

have—there wouldn’t have been any floodwalls along those canals 

to fail had we put the floodgates in. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let me ask you about the issue of maintenance. At an earlier hearing, I believe we were told by a number 

of experts that the issue with the failure of the levee system was 

not necessarily the overflow, but it was an erosion underneath. I 

am trying to understand maintenance. Somebody has got to be 

looking at things and seeing erosion. My question is: Are there no 

visible signs of that erosion before this catastrophe? If there should 

have been some way to see that beforehand, who had the responsibility to identify that and deal with it? 

Mr. COLLETTI. Well, from our standpoint, our inspections are visual. They are not subsurface types of inspections. Subsurface investigations are all done at the initial design and construction phases. 

So, the levee district or the Corps is not doing any type of subsurface investigations at any of the levees or floodwalls at this 

point. 

Senator COLEMAN. I want to make it clear. Am I hearing that we 

do not have the capacity to determine whether the kind of structural damage that was occurring over a period of time could have 

been identified and then prevented? Colonel. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I believe that—I mean, from a visual—we typically do visual inspections. I don’t know of any physical inspections that the levee district or the Corps does post-construction. So they look for visible signs of potential problems. At 

26

1 Exhibit 18 appears in the Appendix on page 114. 

that point, based on the problem, is when actions are taken on all 

of the different types of flood control structures in the city. 

Senator COLEMAN. But we heard a lot of testimony that, again, 

erosion occurred. I want to make it clear. Do we not have the capacity to figure out that there is a systemic structural problem 

until a catastrophe occurs? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I do not believe at this point that 

the failure or what caused the failure has been determined. There 

is a significant amount of information being gathered, to include 

removing the sheet pile, which we just did in the last 2 days, and 

we determined that the sheet pile was to the design specifications 

of the Corps of Engineers and it was not shorter than some people 

had hypothesized. 

But I believe that we are gathering all of that information for 

each of those breaches because each one could have had a different 

cause of failure. I will tell you there were over 50 breaches in the 

metropolitan area. Two-thirds of the flooded area would still have 

occurred regardless of whether these walls would have failed. The 

New Orleans East area and the St. Bernard area, those levees were 

severely compromised by the magnitude of Katrina. Their flooding 

had nothing to do with the floodwalls on the 17th Street Canal. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. 

I am going to follow up on the issue that Senator Coleman just 

raised. Mr. Hearn, the Committee received a letter from a retired 

professor of ocean engineering at MIT, Ernst Frankel. It is at Tab 

18 in the exhibit book.1 He has considerable expertise in coastal 

structures, and he wrote to us that it is insufficient to rely solely 

on visual inspections of levees because voids or pockets of water or 

air may develop within the body of the levee. He recommends that 

acoustic and mechanical inspection techniques are normally employed in order to determine whether there are any voids or other 

weaknesses within the levee. 

Did your personnel employ mechanical inspection techniques 

that involved, for example, drilling holes to obtain soil samples 

from within the levee? 

Mr. HEARN. No, Senator, we did not. The task that we have, as 

I gave in my opening statement, is basically looking for sand boils, 

which would indicate some water getting underneath the sheet piling or coming up on the other side. 

The other thing we do is what we call a levee profile, with our 

survey department of each of the levees to find out exactly how 

much subsidence they have in a period of time. We did the 17th 

Street Canal—we do them all, and it takes us about 3 years to do 

all of the levees because of the length. We did the 17th Street 

Canal last year, and the profile was less than half an inch deviation from what it was from the year before, which did not indicate 

any subsidence at all or any problems at all with that particular 

levee. But we do not have the seismic gear. Maybe that is coming 

in the future of a way to test it, but we have not done that in the 

past. 

27

Chairman COLLINS. Professor Frankel also wrote that it is critical to inspect the integrity of the surface layer on the water side 

of the levees, particularly that part which is underwater, which is 

the point that Senator Coleman just raised. Did any of your personnel inspect areas of the levee walls that are underwater, either 

visually or using acoustic equipment? 

Mr. HEARN. No, we did not. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Colletti, as the Army Corps’ operations 

manager, are you aware of any structural or geotechnical review of 

the levees done during the years before Hurricane Katrina and specifically of the levees along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals? 

Mr. COLLETTI. As far as I know, the structural analysis that was 

done along those particular canals was done during the design and 

construction phases. You just asked about scour surveys or investigations. We do those near the structures, but not against 

floodwalls. 

Chairman COLLINS. You stated to the Committee staff that a 

structural re-evaluation is not part of the inspection program. Is 

that correct? 

Mr. COLLETTI. That is standard unless we know of a known problem or it has been brought to our attention or there is a suspicion 

of some type of problem. Then we will go and actually do some type 

of additional evaluation. 

I want to make it clear. The reason we do that is we are responsible for over 1,300 miles of levees and floodwalls. So to just go out 

and actually do random inspections, it may not turn up anything. 

We may miss the spot where there actually was a failure about to 

occur. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Huey, is it accurate that the first time 

that you became aware of the Federal regulation requiring inspections of the levees at least once every 90 days was when our Committee staff read that regulation to you? 

Mr. HUEY. Yes, ma’am. 

Chairman COLLINS. Colonel Wagenaar, the Army Corps regulation requires you as the district engineer to keep informed of the 

levee district’s compliance with the operation and maintenance regulations through ‘‘careful analysis of the semiannual reports submitted by the levee district.’’ Did the Orleans District submit to the 

Corps or submit to you semiannual reports? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Ma’am, I cannot answer that. Mr. Colletti 

may be able to answer that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Colletti. 

Mr. COLLETTI. We do receive operation and maintenance reports, 

semiannual reports on the structures, and on certain features of 

the projects. In the past we did not enforce the semiannual requirement on certain types of projects, particularly those that meet and 

have routine project maintenance along them, on river levees and 

hurricane protection Federal project levees. They are routinely 

maintained, so the levee districts are out there overseeing that 

work. 

Also, we meet semiannually with the Levee Board Association 

and its members, of which the Orleans Levee District and most of 

the other levee districts, as well as DOTD, are all involved. We 

28

meet with them in May of each year at a workshop, and we meet 

again in December. 

In addition to that, we have a very proactive flood control permits program where we evaluate, not just with this levee district 

but with other levee districts, anywhere from 300 to 500 permits 

throughout the year. 

So there is involvement out there that is in addition to just basic 

routine visual inspections, not only by the levee district, DOTD, the 

Corps, landowners, facility owners, stakeholders that have some 

business in those levees that are next to them. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Hearn, in our review of the district’s financial statements, we found that the district’s Special Levee Improvement Fund had a balance of approximately $13 million at the 

end of June 2005, the end of your fiscal year, that was ‘‘available 

for spending for major maintenance and capital improvements of 

the levee system.’’

Was any consideration given to spending that money on more sophisticated levee inspection equipment so that you could do more 

than just a visual inspection and instead have the acoustical and 

mechanical equipment that is recommended by the MIT professor? 

Mr. HEARN. No, ma’am. Until this breach, there was no indication, and I had complete faith in this levee system. You can believe 

that or I would not be in the position I am in today. Before this 

breach, I had heard no mention of seismic or anything else. And 

as we are going to find out as this investigation is completed, the 

seismic indication on the 17th Street Canal said the piling was at 

a certain depth. We pulled them, and they are actually at a different depth. So I don’t think we have refined it to the point and 

did not have the knowledge of the fact that this system could fail 

and it needed inspection from the water side or from seismic. I 

think that will be considered in the future. 

But, yes, we do have the $13 million to do projects with, and, for 

example, on the Marabou Canal Bridge, we gave $1 million to the 

Corps because they did not have enough funding to finish the 

bridge. So I am sure that as this develops, whatever our requirements are for the inspections, then we can use that money to buy 

the equipment that we need. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Huey, I was really surprised to learn 

that the levee district has commercial enterprises. I would have 

thought that the levee district would be concentrating solely on the 

operation and maintenance of the levees pursuant to its agreement 

with the Army Corps. And, in fact, when we reviewed the minutes 

of the board’s meetings, we found that a majority of the meeting 

time was actually spent discussing these commercial enterprises, 

whether it was the licensing of the casino or the operations of the 

airport or the marinas or the commercial leases with the karate 

business and the beauty shop and the restaurants. 

Do you think it is appropriate for the board to be involved in 

these commercial activities? Do those business activities detract 

time and attention from what is truly the mission of the board, 

which is to ensure the safety, the maintenance, and the operation 

of the levees? 

29

Mr. HUEY. Yes and no. First of all, the ‘‘no’’ part is the fact that, 

no, I don’t think it detracts the levee district, and there are numerous instances in which it has been a tremendous help. 

The levee district, I was the first president in the history of the 

levee district—and it was formed in 1890, so over a hundred years. 

In 1996, when I became president, the levee district had a $6 million deficit, the first time in history. So taking the district over, 

looking at the city, very poor city—we are struggling—our chances 

of getting any tax increase or things of that nature was nil to none. 

As a matter of fact, our legislature in their wisdom said, well, go 

out—because they took half the millage away from the Orleans 

Levee District and gave it to the Sewerage and Water Board and 

School Board down the line, so the Orleans Levee District receives 

half the millage of the other levee districts in the State because we 

do have commercial properties. 

I have spent a substantial amount of my time educating our legislators in the State of Louisiana about the entity that they created 

under the Constitution, the Orleans Levee District. With that, the 

Orleans Levee District under the Constitution was so substantially 

different than any other levee district in the State of Louisiana, it 

is a very confusing factor that has complicated a lot of issues in 

this matter, and I was asked whether things should be changed or 

this, that, and the other, or what have you, by the investigating 

committee. And my answer to that is a yes and a no—yes because 

it is confusing, we have got to clarify it to the public because they 

have got the same questions you have asked on their mind. How 

can we focus on flood protection when we are running all of these 

other entities and so forth from that aspect of it? 

But Mr. Hearn and his staff, when I came on board, we started 

running things in more of a businesslike manner, reducing overhead costs. I think the flood-proof bridges that were being built alleviated a big burden off of folks because we used to have to sandbag these, and these were evacuation routes and things of that nature. 

But to get to the bottom line, we utilize a lot of the same resources we have and the folks that operate the equipment and tractors and so forth to close floodgates and things of that nature or 

what have you. Our commercial properties were 50-percent selffunded, and our bond rating from a $6 million deficit to a $21 million surplus, which has been identified in the financial statement, 

was developed with prudent management and with the understanding in the board—that is why a lot of our focus was maximizing our abilities for the assets under our control to generate 

revenue because we knew it was essential to continue to provide 

the level of services that our community has come to expect and 

deserves from the Orleans Levee District. 

Does that need to be changed? I think they are taking a look at 

it in the State at this particular point in time. My only fear and 

concern here is that decisions will be made without the appropriate 

facts and people jumping the gun. 

The previous question, I would like to address that because all 

of a sudden some professor who is supposed to really be good at 

what he does says that the Corps of Engineers only had the sheet 

piles driven down 9, 10 feet and that is what caused this thing, and 

30

it caused commotion in the news media and lawsuits popping out 

all over the darn place because people think this. When they did 

their core sample—and they took it the other day—it was built to 

specifications. I think these folks need to have the opportunity and 

the time to find out what really happened there. 

The second point, could things have been identified without this 

situation? It was brought to my attention by your delegation of the 

Sewerage and Water Board being called by a lady who was on Bel 

Air who found—and was told that it wasn’t their water, it was 

water from the lake. Well, doggone it, if the Orleans Levee Board 

would have known that it was water from the lake in this lady’s 

backyard on the 17th Street Canal, we would have certainly—we 

may not have known where it was at, but we would have known 

there was a problem. Those are the type of issues that we need to 

find out. How was that missed? You know, who didn’t call us or 

somebody, you know? 

Those are things I would like to see focused on, but, yes, we do 

have a lot of additional responsibilities, and the board has focused 

on that, but I think these folks have been working in conjunction 

with the Corps. Our flood protection system, as Mr. Hearn said, we 

have complete confidence in unless we hear otherwise from the experts that we look to in the Corps of Engineers. 

So I think there are going to be some changes made, but I think 

that the type of research and investigation that is being done by 

this Committee to get down to the true facts so that your decisions 

can be based on reality and that the proper things would be done 

is the best way to approach it, not jumping the gun. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. Senator Carper. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

A quick question of Mr. Huey, just a real brief answer, if you 

would. How are the commissioners chosen? 

How is the president chosen to serve on these levee districts? 

Mr. HUEY. The commissioners are made up—there are eight appointees to the board: Two are appointed by the city of New Orleans. That is normally or has been the tradition, basically, that the 

mayor appoints the chief administrative officer and also a council 

person from that particular district that covers the majority of the 

lakefront levee district or council person. The governor selects six. 

Out of those eight members, they elect a president and the officers 

of the board. 

Senator CARPER. And are there specific requirements that are 

spelled out in legislation or statute that say what kind of background the members need to have? 

Mr. HUEY. No, I do not believe there is. 

Senator CARPER. And folks serve a specific number of years? Is 

there a term to their tenure and then they have to be reappointed? 

Or are they term-limited? 

Mr. HUEY. No, no terms limits. We serve at the pleasure of the 

governor. 

Senator CARPER. Fair enough. OK. 

I want to go back to a point that Senator Voinovich made a little 

bit earlier, and we were talking about—in fact, you asked a question. I don’t know that our witnesses had an opportunity to answer 

it. I think what you were saying is if they are sort of in our shoes, 

31

how would they ask questions about whether the Administration 

and the Congress has met its responsibilities. 

In my State—and my guess is it is probably true in Ohio and in 

Maine as well—we meet regularly with the Army Corps of Engineers. Our delegation sort of meets collectively. It is easy in a little 

State like Delaware where you only have three people on your delegation. But we meet regularly with the Army Corps. We talk about 

priorities, theirs and ours, and we develop almost a game plan to 

come to the Administration and to the Congress and lobbying the 

relevant committees, Appropriations and otherwise, to make sure 

that the priorities that we have identified—that we get them funded, and if we don’t get them funded the first year, we go back the 

second year or the third year or the fourth year. 

For anyone who ever visits our beaches in Delaware, you find 

that we try to protect our beaches, our dunes, and the areas behind 

them, and we work very closely with the Army Corps in developing 

those priorities and those projects and trying to get them funded. 

So when we think of the responsibilities here, there is obviously 

the responsibility that the Federal, State, and local agencies have. 

We have responsibilities, too, but also I would add that the delegation, the Federal delegations, House and Senate within a respective 

State, have an opportunity and I think a responsibility to identify 

what their needs are and then just to lobby like heck to get them 

addressed over time. It has been about—what did you say, 41 

years? That is a long lobbying effort, at least in my experience. 

I want to go back to Mr. Naomi, and I don’t want you to leave 

here and feel like you haven’t had a chance to answer a bunch of 

questions, so I will ask you a couple, if I could. The Army Corps 

of Engineers has publicly said that the hurricane protection system 

was designed to protect against a fast-moving or a moderate Category 3 hurricane. The Saffir-Simpson rating scale, as far as I 

know, did not exist when these projects were designed, and they 

were, in fact, designed to a completely different standard. I think 

it is one called the Standard Project Hurricane. And here is my 

question: Mr. Naomi, how did the Corps establish that the projects 

were designed to protect against a fast-moving Category 3 or a 

moderate Category 3? That is the first question. And the second 

question is: What, in fact, was the level of protection this system 

provided during Hurricane Katrina? 

Mr. NAOMI. Well, you are correct, the authorization by Congress 

provides for the Standard Project Hurricane, and that authorization and that level of protection was established long before SaffirSimpson. The problem that we encountered is that when folks, the 

general public, want to know what level of protection we have, 

what kind of category we are protected against, it is very difficult 

to say based on this hybrid type storm. And when you try and explain this to the general public or you have a wind speed of a high 

strength Category 2 and a central pressure of a Category 4 and the 

surge characteristics of a Category 3, it is very hard to explain why 

that is. 

Well, there are some very good scientific reasons why that is, and 

it certainly made sense to the meteorologists and to the folks at the 

Weather Service who gave us that design. But it does not really 

make much sense to the media or the general public. 

32

So when we set out the criteria of what the SPH, the Standard 

Project Hurricane, were and applied them to the Saffir-Simpson 

Scale, you try and draw some general conclusions so that it will 

help people understand the type of protection they have. And so 

when we look at the 11.5-foot storm surge in Lake Pontchartrain 

which the Standard Project Hurricane was designed to protect 

against, that came in in the area of a Category 3 storm, a fast-moving, relatively low strength Category 3 storm. 

And so that is what we generally would say, just to help the public understand the type of protection that they have. So an 11.5-

foot storm surge in the lake is what we have designed to protect 

against. Generally, the lakefront levees are around 17 feet, which 

accounts for a certain amount of wave action and wave run-up. And 

so when we explain to the public what level of protection they 

have, we generally will say a fast-moving Category 3 storm so that 

people can understand better what that relationship is. They seem 

to understand the Saffir-Simpson Scale. They have a harder time 

understanding the Standard Project Hurricane. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thanks. 

Mr. Preau, I would welcome your comments in response to what 

Mr. Naomi has said on this point. Anything, Mr. Preau? 

Mr. PREAU. The Saffir-Simpson Scale is kind of misleading when 

you are talking about hurricane protection projects. We are building projects to protect against wave action, not wind. Hurricane 

Katrina was listed as a Category 5 when it was out in the Gulf. 

There have been people now saying it is a Category 4. Wind speed 

dropped when it hit land, so now it is a Category 4. That storm 

was the biggest storm ever to enter the Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane 

Camille on the Mississippi coast pushed up about 20 to 25 foot of 

surge. Hurricane Katrina put over 30 foot of surge up there. 

Camille was listed as a Category 5 and went down in the history 

books as a Category 5. I think it would be a real disservice to everybody if Katrina goes down in the history books as a Category 

4 because the wind speed dropped at the last minute. 

Winds can drop immediately. Water has, as it has been explained 

by some, a memory to it. When you have a surge up, it does not 

drop as quickly as the wind does. So you have that storm surge 

stays up well after the wind dies. I think if we are telling people 

what type of protection we are providing, it ought to all be based 

on we are providing protection against a storm surge of so many 

feet. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Thank you, sir. 

My next question would be for the Army Corps, and I don’t care 

if—maybe several of you may want to take a shot at this, Colonel 

and Mr. Naomi and Mr. Colletti. There have been a number of 

changes in our understanding of hurricanes in the Gulf since the 

Lake Pontchartrain Project was authorized some 40 years ago, and 

there has been regional subsidence in the entire southern Louisiana area, a significant loss of coastal wetlands, and the Mississippi River Gulf outlet, which I understand acted as sort of a 

channel for Katrina’s surge, has been widened. There has also been 

subsidence of individual levee segments. 

A couple of questions. First, how have these changes affected the 

protection needed for New Orleans? And, second, how has this been 

33

factored into the design of the levee system since it was originally 

conceived some 40 years ago? 

Mr. NAOMI. Sir, the levee was designed back in 1965 when it was 

authorized, and that is a long time ago. I was in high school at the 

time. 

Senator CARPER. So was I. [Laughter.] 

No, that is not true. I was in college at Ohio State. 

Mr. NAOMI. The system was re-evaluated in 1984, and the highlevel plan was instituted back in 1984. So the design back in 1965 

really was changed in 1984 to go to what is called the high-level 

plan. So the plan that we are constructing right now is really from 

1984. And those levees are designed based on certain criteria, and 

certainly the issues of subsidence and coastal land loss are important and changes have occurred. 

It was our intention and in what we had underway at the time 

was, as we completed some rather sophisticated models that have 

been developed in the last 3 to 5 years, we were going to remodel 

the Standard Project Hurricane to see exactly what level of protection was afforded by these existing levees. Unfortunately, we got 

overtaken by events with Hurricane Katrina, and we were not able 

to complete that program. That is even underway now. 

But that is an important factor that we do have to go back and 

re-evaluate, and re-evaluation of projects this size takes quite a 

while and takes quite a bit of money and resources to undertake. 

We do not undertake those things lackadaisically. We take those 

things very seriously. We have to involve our local sponsors and 

the State as well as various other Federal agencies in the environmental consequences of these projects. So certainly re-evaluation is 

called for to look at all these ecological and geographic changes 

that have occurred over the last 40 years and the last 20 years or 

so since the project was re-evaluated the last time. 

Unfortunately, it takes so long to construct these projects, they 

are so massive, that you could re-evaluate one of these projects several times before it is totally completed. 

Senator CARPER. My time has expired. If I could, Madam Chairman, let me just ask if either of the witnesses from the Army Corps 

want to add to that or take away, just briefly. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. The only thing I would add, Senator, is that 

regarding the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet, it is a federally authorized navigation canal, a channel. There is a lot of passion and 

feelings behind what happened with the River Gulf Outlet in regards to the hurricane. I believe, though, that modeling and science 

has to show what actually happened with Katrina and how the 

storm surge overtook the hurricane protection levees along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. 

I believe it is too simple to state that the Mississippi River Gulf 

Outlet was the cause of all of this destruction. I believe the models 

and the science has to prove that out. 

Senator CARPER. All right. Gentlemen, thanks very much. 

Madam Chairman, I am supposed to be in Senator Frist’s office 

right now for a meeting. I am going to slip out, so thanks for letting me sit in here with you today, and see you both later on the 

floor. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

34

Senator CARPER. Again, to our witnesses, thank you very much 

for joining us today. 

Chairman COLLINS. Senator Voinovich. 

Senator VOINOVICH. According to the information that I mentioned earlier, the Corps noted that several levees had settled and 

needed to be raised to provide the design level of protection. Mr. 

Colletti, are you familiar with the levees that settled and needed 

to be raised to provide the design level of protection? 

Mr. COLLETTI. Well, the levee protection and construction and reconstruction is generally handled through Mr. Naomi’s project 

management group. So throughout the years, there are pieces of 

levees that do settle. 

Senator VOINOVICH. The question I have for whoever wants to 

answer it is: Given that several levees had settled and needed to 

be raised to provide the design level of protection, had the appropriate repairs been made, would that have made a difference in 

terms of whether or not the city would have flooded? 

Mr. NAOMI. Senator, I think it would be highly unlikely that 

raising the levees to the degree that we were going to raise them 

would have prevented the significant flooding that was experienced 

due to Katrina. We had no plans to do anything with the floodwalls 

on the outfall canals. There were some levees in Eastern New Orleans and in St. Bernard Parish that needed to be raised, but the 

surge that was encountered at those locations——

Senator VOINOVICH. So what you are saying is it would not have 

made a difference. 

Mr. NAOMI. No, sir, it would not have. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Madam Chairman, one of the things that I 

am still puzzled about is whether Katrina was a Category 5 or a 

Category 3 storm. I understand that the National Science Foundation and the American Society of Civil Engineers both concluded 

that this was actually a Category 3 and that had the levees been 

maintained properly this might not have happened. 

Chairman COLLINS. That is correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH. So I think that there is a significant difference of opinion regarding the strength of the storm. You all 

think this was a Category 4 or 5, and others think it is was a Category 3. Is that right? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, as an example, what we base it on, 

there were many areas of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet levee 

that were 17.5 feet, at the authorized elevation. That levee system 

was completely destroyed by this storm. Completely overtopped, 

completely removed. And it was at its authorized height. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So you believe it was more than a Category 3. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Yes, sir. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. Madam Chairman, do we know yet 

what the plan for rebuilding is? Has that decision been made as 

to whether the levees will be built to withstand a Category 3 or a 

Category 5 storm? 

Chairman COLLINS. It is my understanding that the decision has 

not been made. I would defer to the colonel. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, we are using emergency monies 

right now to re-establish the pre-Katrina levee system to its auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:07 Oct 23, 2006 Jkt 026746 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\26746.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
35

thorized height, which is Category 3 in most areas, and no decision 

has been made on future heights of that levee system. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I will ask you the same question I have 

asked other members of the Corps of Engineers. In preparation for 

upcoming storms, would you do anything differently? With the 

work that you are doing right now to fix what has deteriorated or 

been destroyed, would you make changes to your efforts based on 

whether you were preparing for a Category 3 or a Category 5 

storm? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I guess the easy answer would be 

that if we want to offer a level of protection greater than what was 

there before, then we need to look at this system comprehensively. 

It is not as simple as building a levee 50 or 60 or 70 feet high. It 

also includes water evacuation from the city. It includes coastal 

restoration. We have to look at the system comprehensively. I am 

not sure that has been done in the past. But to offer a level of protection greater than what was there before really is going to take 

a comprehensive approach. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I think somebody ought to get on with 

the question. The decision as to what you do there will impact how 

the town is going to be developed. Major decisions are going to 

have to be made on the basis of that. 

Supplementing Mr. Huey’s description of the annual levee inspection, Mr. Hearn said that, ‘‘The inspection starts at 9 a.m. and 

ends at 12:30 p.m. and covers close to 100 miles of levees. Mr. 

Hearn also said that even though professional engineers work for 

the OLD, they perform nothing more than a visual inspection of 

the levees.’’ Is that true? Is that a visual inspection? 

Mr. HEARN. That is correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. I would like to hear from the colonel or 

from the Army Corps of Engineers. Do you think that the current 

way that these are being inspected is adequate? And does the Orleans Levee District need to become a lot more sophisticated in what 

they are doing? 

Mr. COLLETTI. Well, all of our inspections have been visual, with 

the exception of when we have a known problem. When you have 

in that case over 100 miles of levees, we have a program along the 

Mississippi River called levee monitoring, and you occasionally go 

through reaches and you do some subsurface testing along the 

bank lines and such. It is quite expensive to do that. 

After the fact here in this case, but we have considered possibly 

instituting some type of hurricane protection monitoring program 

which would maybe randomly take samples at certain areas. 

Senator VOINOVICH. OK, here is the deal: You had the hurricane. 

We have operation and maintenance. And according to what I read, 

Madam Chairman, once something is turned over to the Orleans 

Levee District—I have got some previous testimony that says that 

they were not sure whether or not it had been turned over to them 

or not. But the fact is—let’s get back to the original question. Now 

that we have been through this, would you suggest as a professional that in terms of the maintenance and monitoring better 

equipment should be used in order to get the job done at this stage 

of the game? 

36

Mr. COLLETTI. There are better techniques that possibly could be 

utilized, and I think it is going to be possibly a combination of OLD 

as well as the Corps of Engineers. But initially——

Senator VOINOVICH. Having survived this disaster, who do you 

think should be responsible for making sure that the levees are 

being sufficiently maintained? 

Mr. COLLETTI. Operation and maintenance, as it has been, is the 

responsibility of the Orleans Levee District. To go beyond where we 

are at and do structural re-evaluation I believe is going to take 

more than the capabilities of the Orleans Levee District. I cannot 

say for sure what would that be, but it is much more extensive 

when you do structural re-evaluations. 

Senator VOINOVICH. You indicated to me that, as far as you were 

concerned, they were doing a good job in terms of operation and 

maintenance. Is that what you said? 

Mr. COLLETTI. That is correct. 

Senator VOINOVICH. According to, again, staff, ‘‘Mr. Hearn indicated that at least on one example they failed in its operation and 

maintenance. Last year a train damaged a railroad floodgate in the 

East Orleans area. Mr. Hearn agreed that the OLD’s duty to repair 

the floodgate’’—and this may not have anything to do with the 

problem, but were you aware of that? 

Mr. COLLETTI. Yes. As I said, there are over 100 miles of levees 

and floodwalls and such, and you are going to have pieces of 

that——

Senator VOINOVICH. Would you say that they could have done a 

better job? And did you let them know that? 

Mr. COLLETTI. In their defense, in that particular instance, they 

did provide sandbagging of that area. They did take an action, and 

they did show that responsibility. It just so happened that it was 

overtopped at that location. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Preau, what are your responsibilities 

here? I understand that you were responsible for looking at the 

emergency plans. According to Mr. Hearn’s testimony, ‘‘DOTD has 

been slack in performing its duties. Although DOTD is supposed to 

review the levee district’s emergency operation plan, Mr. Hearn 

has never received comments or any indication of approval or disapproval.’’ What do you say to that? 

Mr. PREAU. We do review the emergency operations plans of all 

of the levee districts. If there are no comments to send back, we 

don’t send any comments back. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you ever tell them the plans are approved? Or, if they don’t hear from you, the plans are OK? 

Mr. PREAU. There is nothing in there that says we have to approve it, to my knowledge. It says we review them. All of these operations plans, emergency operations plans, were set up on a template, set up by, I believe, Homeland Security for each levee district. They are put on a template. In my time here, they were put 

together originally back—what was it, Max? About 1985, I think? 

Mr. HEARN. Yes. 

Mr. PREAU. Somewhere around 1985. I have not been involved in 

reviewing them that long. So all I look at is the updates. Every 2 

years they are supposed to update them. We look to see that they 

have the correct names and phone numbers in it. There is nothing 

37

to change on the plan. If there was, it would have been given to 

us by Homeland Security. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I have run out of time, but, Madam Chairman, if I could just ask one for the record. 

Chairman COLLINS. Sure. 

Senator VOINOVICH. This is to you, Colonel. Do you have a record 

of the turnover of completed projects to the local project sponsors 

and the New Orleans District? Is there paperwork on that? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I would have to ask Mr. Colletti to 

respond. 

Mr. COLLETTI. We have provided various pieces of paperwork on 

pieces of the system. I don’t know how many. I think Senator Collins had mentioned 22 or something to that effect. There were various pieces that we have turned over to them. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you have documentation to accompany 

each of those turnovers? In other words, do they know that it was 

turned over to them? 

Mr. COLLETTI. The letters pretty much explain that. Basically 

they state that the project is—the contracts are completed and it 

is now their responsibility for operation and maintenance. 

Senator VOINOVICH. I would like to see the paperwork during the 

last several years. Because according to what Mr. Hearn said to the 

staff people, ‘‘This is partly explained by Mr. Hearn understanding 

that no part of the LP&V HPP has been officially turned over to 

the levee district even though the levee district assumes maintenance responsibilities once the contractor finished the work on the 

section.’’ I would like to know whether or not they know it has been 

turned over to them and they have responsibilities. 

Mr. COLLETTI. Yes, when we send those letters—some of those 

are actually sent by certified letter. So there is a documentation 

there with those. 

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Levin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Madam Chairman, thank you. And I apologize for 

coming so late. I am going to try to ask questions which I believe 

have not either been addressed or have not been addressed clearly 

as far as we can tell. 

The first is, who had the responsibility. Let’s look backwards 

first as to who had the responsibility for operation, maintenance, 

repair, replacement, and rehab for the 17th Street Canal floodwall. 

OK, we will start with you, Colonel. Who had the responsibility for 

the operation, maintenance, repair, replacement, and rehab of the 

17th Street Canal floodwall? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, in regards to the operations and 

maintenance, it is my understanding that the Orleans Levee District was responsible. In regards to repair, rehab, or future construction, it would be a partnership between ourselves, the State 

DOTD as the cost-share sponsor, and the levee district as the local 

sponsor to do that work. 

Senator LEVIN. And that would depend on the size or scope of the 

repair necessary? What would it depend on? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. It would depend on the activity, Senator. 

38

Senator LEVIN. And is that clearly divided as to who would have 

what responsibility for repair, who would have what responsibility 

for replacement, and who would have what responsibility for 

rehab? Is that a clear division line between State, Federal, and 

local? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. I believe it is pretty clear. Mr. Colletti may 

be able to add light to it, but I believe it is clear, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. And was it clear at the time? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. 

Mr. COLLETTI. On the Federal projects, if the project is damaged 

by a flood or coastal storm or hurricane, it is repaired under Public 

Law 99 through the Corps of Engineers. If it is damaged by—such 

as the railroad gate, if it is damaged by a train accident, then it 

is the responsibility of the levee district. 

Senator LEVIN. And where does the State come in? I think the 

colonel said the State also has a role. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. They have oversight, yes, Senator. 

Senator LEVIN. Oversight, but in terms of responsibility to carry 

out and to fund the repair, replacement, and rehab, is there any 

State funding in that? 

Mr. PREAU. No, sir, there is not. The State, unless it is the nonFederal sponsor, would not have any authority in that. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, in terms of operation and maintenance, the 

colonel said that is up to the district? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. The levee district, yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. The levee district. Do you all agree that the levee 

district at the time of these events was responsible for the operation and maintenance of the 17th Street Canal floodwall? Do you 

all agree with that? 

Mr. NAOMI. Yes, I agree with that. 

Mr. PREAU. Yes. 

Mr. HUEY. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Now, in terms of the question of whether or 

not a project is completed or not, was this project considered at the 

time a completed project? 

Mr. NAOMI. The project itself, overall project, was not completed. 

Individual parts of it were, but construction—it was still in the construction general program of the Corps of Engineers and, as such, 

was a project that was deemed under construction. 

Senator LEVIN. And did that have any impact as to who was responsible for operation, maintenance, and repair, the fact that it 

was not in the view of the Corps of Engineers a completed project? 

Mr. NAOMI. Well, the pieces of the projects that were turned over 

were in operation and maintenance, and the only time we get involved actually from the construction standpoint is when we have 

to go out and build something. Generally, when the project pieces 

are finished, we turn them over to the sponsor for maintenance. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. But the fact that the overall project was 

not completed did not then have any effect as to who was responsible for the operation and maintenance of that part of the project. 

Mr. NAOMI. I don’t think so, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. 

39

Mr. HUEY. Could I step in because it also clarifies a question 

asked by Senator Voinovich earlier with the turning over of 

projects. Mr. Hearn and I, in discussions, in talking with Chief Engineer Steve Spencer, I want to clarify the fact that when Mr. 

Hearn made the statement that he has never seen anything—or he 

hasn’t seen anything to turn over a project, that is one of the reasons. We have received, according to Chief Engineer Steve Spencer, 

from the Corps of Engineers letters turning over the various floodproof bridges, for example, as they are completed and so forth. The 

levee systems and other things have been dealt with prior to his 

time, so they had already been turned over. Projects such as the 

17th Street Canal, which is an ongoing project, which was a floodproof bridge in the process of being completed, and things of that 

nature, they will say, hey, look, you need to cut the grass, maintain 

it, take a look at it, because the project is substantially completed, 

but they don’t officially turn it over because it doesn’t fit into the 

project criteria. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, was the 17th Street Canal part of this overall project? Had it been turned over to the district? 

Mr. HUEY. Not officially, but it was clearly understood that we 

maintain and cut the grass and look out for the—all of our normal 

day-to-day activities and looking for things and so forth. And unless I am wrong, Mr. Hearn, we had been taking care of that particular section from the bridge on down that was completed while 

the bridge was being completed. 

Senator LEVIN. So that the operation and maintenance of that 

section was your responsibility regardless of the fact that it had not 

been officially turned over to you? 

Mr. HUEY. Correct. I mean, that is the kind of working relationship we work with the Corps on a day-to-day basis. I think our people communicate on a day-to-day basis on things of this nature, 

and the reason I stepped in there, to make sure it is clarified with 

the fact that Al Naomi attends virtually every meeting. We talk 

about this. The commissioners are aware of what is going on, and 

the staff works on a day-to-day basis. And I know from pretty well 

the time I have been on the board that the levee district had taken 

over maintaining it because the Corps doesn’t do some of the maintenance services we do. They don’t go out with tractors and cut 

grass. 

Senator LEVIN. My major question, though, is the fact that it had 

not been formally turned over did not affect the question of whose 

responsibility it was for the operation and maintenance of that portion. 

Mr. HUEY. Not in my mind. 

Senator LEVIN. Not, apparently, in anybody’s mind. 

Mr. HUEY. If the Corps asks us to do something, we do it. That 

is the way I look at it. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you all agree with that, that the fact that this 

portion of the overall project had not been formally turned over by 

the Corps did not affect the responsibility question for operation 

and maintenance? Would you all agree with that? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Senator, I am not sure that we did not formally turn it over. I would have to look at the documentation. 

40

Senator LEVIN. But if you had not formally turned it over, officially turned it over, would that have had any effect on who was 

responsible for operation and maintenance of that part of the 

project? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. No, sir, and the actions of the levee district 

clearly indicate that they had responsibility for those canals. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. And now the interim turnover question, 

where does that fit? 

Mr. COLLETTI. That essentially is basically a notification that the 

contract is complete. When we go to do a construction contract, we 

get a right of entry for certain limits of the project, and the interim 

turnover per se is to notify them that we are finished in that area 

and that they will go ahead and maintain it. We do not ask them 

to maintain while we are doing construction within the area. 

Senator LEVIN. Does that have any effect as to whether or not 

interim control status had been achieved or adopted or stated? 

Does that have any effect on who is responsible to do the operation 

and maintenance? 

Mr. COLLETTI. No, sir, other than, like I said, in that construction limits, when it is finished, we look at the levee district to do 

that. 

Senator LEVIN. And then once it is finished, in terms of reconstruction, rehabilitation, repair, that depends on very clear and set 

ground rules which you all agree are clear and well defined? Is that 

fair? No, Mr. Preau? Am I pronouncing your name correctly? 

Mr. PREAU. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. You are shaking your head no. 

Mr. PREAU. I am shaking my head no about the whole issue of 

turning over piecemeal pieces of these projects. When a project 

takes 40 years to develop and they start turning loose pieces a little bit at a time, you do not have a completed project. It is supposed to be useful elements. I do not think we even have useful elements. It looks like it is just turned over as the construction contract ends. It is handed to the levee district, and they are told to 

go maintain it. 

Senator LEVIN. What is the relevance? 

Mr. PREAU. The relevance comes down to who is responsible for 

the repair. 

Senator LEVIN. For the repair issue, OK. So there is a question 

here because it was a piece turned over, and not a finished piece 

turned over, as to who is responsible for the repair and rehab of 

that—or of any project? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. PREAU. That is what I am saying, and it is not just for that 

project. That is for all of these Corps projects. They are long-term, 

multi-year projects, and they are done in pieces. 

Senator LEVIN. And that the rule for who is responsible for repair of those projects is not clear when these are turned over, in 

effect, in pieces rather than as larger pieces. Is that what you are 

saying? 

Mr. PREAU. That is what I am saying, and I think that needs 

clarification. It needs it on all of the Corps agreements. It says ‘‘a 

useful element.’’

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you, Senator Levin. 

41

The issue you raised is one that we have spent a great deal of 

time on today, and I really think it is the key issue. Who is in 

charge? Who is responsible when there is a problem? Who responds 

when there is a breach? And having listened to the testimony 

today, having read the staff interviews, I believe it is still unclear, 

and it is imperative that we clearly define the lines of responsibility and authority. 

I would like to pose two brief hypotheticals to try to get at this 

issue a little further. The first is that water is found to be seeping 

up from the ground near the Mississippi River levee, so for that hypothetical, who is responsible for responding? Colonel? 

Colonel WAGENAAR. Depending on who that initial seepage was 

reported to, near the Mississippi River levee, it could multiple different factors. But, for example, if the Sewer and Water Board 

went to investigate it for a potential water main leak or something 

to that effect, they would report that to the levee district and to 

the Corps. That is the process that should occur. If it is in the vicinity of the Federal levees on the Mississippi River, ultimately 

that is a Corps responsibility to analyze and look at that issue and 

potentially effect repair. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Preau, what is your answer to that question? 

Mr. PREAU. I think I would have to agree with that one. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Hearn. 

Mr. HEARN. I agree with that. Normally it would be reported to 

either the Sewer and Water Board or to us. When we go out, we 

find out whether or not it is river water or whether or not it is a 

leaking water pipe. We would call Sewer and Water Board if it was 

a leaky water pipe. We would call the Corps of Engineers and start 

working on the sand boil if it was Mississippi River water. 

Chairman COLLINS. There, again, it depends on who got the report, how big is the problem, what is the cause of the problem. The 

answer varies. 

Second example: Let’s say that an earthquake hits New Orleans, 

and as a result, a portion of the levee system experiences considerable subsidence. In that hypothetical, Mr. Hearn, who is responsible for responding? 

Mr. HEARN. I think if it is an earthquake that caused that subsidence, we would have to come to the Corps of Engineers—it 

would depend upon the amount of subsidence you are talking 

about. If it was small subsidence, then we could take care of it inhouse coordinating with the Corps. Then we would fund it, have it 

repaired. If it is larger than that, we would go to the Corps and 

ask for assistance on the repair. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Preau. 

Mr. PREAU. I would say that if it was an act of God type of occurrence, then it would be the Corps that would be responsible under 

P.L. 84–99. 

Chairman COLLINS. Colonel. 

Colonel WAGENAAR. I believe that if it is an immediate action, 

then the levee district has to respond to it. And then if it exceeds 

their capacity, they request through the State to the Corps for assistance or directly. They can come directly to us. But if it exceeds 

their capability, then the Corps comes in. 

42

Chairman COLLINS. Again, the answers are a little different, and 

once again, really what you are telling me is it depends, and I 

think that is a problem. I think we need to have a clear delineation 

of who does what, and I don’t know whether that requires legislation or regulation or revisions of State law or Federal law. But that 

seems to me to be a problem that we saw in real life, not in a hypothetical, when Colonel Wagenaar discussed the turf war that broke 

out on the 17th Street Canal breach. And that is what we have to 

straighten out. 

Mr. Huey, first of all, I want to thank you for being very candid 

in your staff interview. I really appreciated that because it is important that we understand exactly what happened. You made a 

comment about the qualifications of the people who serve on the 

levee board, and you talked about people coming from special interest groups. ‘‘I have got commissioners, like I said before, who are 

only concerned about DBE’’—is that disadvantaged business enterprises? 

Mr. HUEY. Correct. 

Chairman COLLINS. ‘‘. . . who get the contracts in developing 

New Orleans East. I’ve got them who are only concerned about particular issues, and the least on their mind appears to be flood control because they think that is all done by the Corps. As we have 

said here, they are there for whatever political agendas or personal 

agendas that they have, number one.’’

So I want to ask you two questions. First, I want to go back to 

the issue of whether the board should be involved in business enterprises or whether it would be clearer to those who are appointed 

to the Board what their duty is and what their obligation is if the 

Board only dealt with the levees. So let me ask you that question 

first. 

Mr. HUEY. Yes, I think it would be clearer, and if I could just 

comment quickly on that, the previous board—which I will just 

make a statement here and so forth. It was one of the finest and 

most talented boards in my tenure that I could ever know. It was 

made up with—it was the first time I have been on a board ever 

that we had a retired Corps of Engineers individual, Vic Landry, 

who was vice president, who was able to assure and work with all 

the levee district systems and work with the Corps, and that we 

were focused in the right direction on flood protection. We had a 

Congressional Medal of Honor-winning general, General Livingston, who lent a lot to the board. We had some substantial folks 

who identified some of these complexities, and that is why some of 

the maneuvers had looked to say how can we divest ourselves from 

some of the commercial activities, and we went into the privatization of the lakefront airport, for example. We were looking into the 

formulation of—the board functioned similar to what they do at the 

rate commission in New Orleans where you have a private-public 

type partnership, where you can work or have an entity that focuses on your private-public—commercial development of the area 

and generating of revenues, and the board primarily focused on the 

flood protection and get the benefits of all. 

Where we can continue to utilize the resources we have in people 

who maintain and do the things with the—for the levee system, our 

police department, for example, and things of that nature where we 

43

could utilize them more efficiently. They are like the Marine Corps, 

I used to say. You have them. You need them if a storm comes. You 

want to make sure that your property is secure and things of that 

nature. You hope you never need them in the event of that, but 

they are there. And if they are there, get some use out of them. 

Those type of things. 

So I think the board was moving in a direction to try to clarify 

that issue because it was somewhat complicated, and so to answer 

your question, yes, I do think that some seriousness needs to be 

looked into it, but it needs to be done in the right way, understanding that I had mentioned to you before that the levee district’s funding, 50 percent is self-generating. So I hope in the wisdom of what they do in our local community is addressed with the 

fact that where will that money go. 

Chairman COLLINS. Should there be qualifications to serve on 

the board? For example, should there be a requirement that someone has engineering experience or business management experience? As I understand it, the only qualification right now is you 

have to be a resident of the State. Should there be——

Mr. HUEY. No. Of the district, from what I understand, the governor just appointed an appointee and suspended the rules of the 

State because you have to live in the—vote in the parish you reside 

in for 1 year, and I do not believe that individual qualifies at this 

particular point in time. But if not, that ought to be the governor’s 

choice. But to answer qualification, the past board, when they 

moved on, just said that they hoped in the governor’s wisdom, a 

new governor moving in and so forth, that she would select more 

of the type of business people, the type of people in which you are 

going to look to—because as we saw it and looked at the board, our 

staff and the way they have worked and so forth for so many years 

understands the flood protection system. They work so closely with 

the Corps of Engineers, and we saw our responsibility to assure 

that we are providing the funding necessary and the resources necessary to our folks to continue to grow because as you develop this 

flood protection system we are talking about, you are developing a 

liability—more property to maintain, more grass to cut, more responsibilities and floodgates to open and close, and so forth. And 

we were concerned about our ability to generate it through a tax 

base. So that is why the board focused a lot on the business activities. 

I am sure that some wiser than me can come up with a way that 

maybe all of this could be brought together for an overall good of 

the community. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

Mr. Hearn, my final question is for you. We have been carefully 

reviewing the minutes of the district board meetings as well as the 

minutes of the various committee meetings of the board, and what 

we have found is, in the months before Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans, a number of unfunded projects were identified, and that included fixing the subsidence of a major levee in 

New Orleans East, repairing two pumping stations, floodproofing 

the Hammond Highway Bridge, and repairing bulkheads at the airport and at one of the marinas. 

44

Now, I understand that some of these projects are the responsibility of the Corps, or you could argue that they are the responsibility of the Corps. But some are not, and the fact is that the levee 

board was aware of these needed repairs and had some $21 million 

in the bank, $13 million of which was specifically allocated to leveerelated projects. 

So my question is: Why didn’t the board use some of its millions 

of dollars that it had in the bank to make New Orleans safer 

through these repairs which had been identified? 

Mr. HEARN. The pumping station project, for example, there are two of them, and they are over $10 to $12 million each, if you had 

put that in frontal protection of the pumping station on London Avenue Canal, I don’t think that would have made any difference in 

this particular case. But it is a lack of funding. If you look at that, 

the $13 million, and you see the debt service associated with the 

bonds that we had applied for to get the money to build all these 

other projects, we did not feel that there was enough money in that 

pot to construct these other projects. The New Orleans East, all we 

did was go to all of our Senators—or our delegation, the Louisiana 

delegation, requesting assistance on the funding from the President’s budget. There just was not enough money there to do that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Mr. Huey. 

Mr. HUEY. If I can answer that, and I thank you, Max, for trying 

to not throw the finger anywhere. The board is responsible for 

where the money is spent. What Max’s responsibility should have 

been is to come to the board and say, Hey, board, we have these 

particular projects, and I would like to utilize some funding for 

this. 

The board makes those decisions, and in my entire tenure, in 

order to expend money for flood protection projects, we have always 

dealt with the fact that the Corps of Engineers in that are going 

to put up a certain specific funding, and we have always come up 

with our matching funds. OK? But I want to at least say that these 

folks, the Corps of Engineers, and Al Naomi in particular—and I 

heard it was mentioned here, and I don’t know what the higherups in the Corps of Engineers or who presents things to the Senate 

and so forth, but this man should have presented the case to us, 

and he should have said how bad money was needed, and we let 

loose on that $1 million because we had never heard of the Federal 

Government shutting a project down during the construction and 

hurricane season coming up. And if you check the minutes, you will 

see how we have done that. I have packets of letters we wrote our 

Senators and so forth. But from our budget from the levee district, 

you have a very good question from that end of it. 

Let’s take, for example, we have been criticized for the Mardi 

Gras Fountain, and here I have got before 1983, when he talked 

about the high-level protection plan changing, is the tax referendum where the people—we went to the people. We got authorized for taxing, and what projects along Lakeshore Drive and 

things like that that can be utilized as far as flood protection? And 

we spent $2.5 million in redoing the Mardi Gras Fountain, which 

is a historical entity within the city of New Orleans. The maintenance was becoming phenomenal. It was very old and what have 

you. But in this project, one thing it taught us that I think is going 

45

to save us billions of dollars, the seawall—and I think the Corps 

of Engineers and everybody here will certainly attest to this. The 

seawall certainly showed us where the breakwater—when the 

waves hit, they didn’t even come close to topping some of those 

waves on a consistent basis and how important that seawall is. But 

we have had a serious problem with erosion just on normal storm 

days that are coming back and digging holes behind it, and the 

concern that it is going to collapse into the lake. 

So with it being so costly and our chances of knowing that we 

may not get funded to replace it because it would be in the billions, 

we have come up with some methods, and one of those things in 

conjunction with the Mardi Gras Fountain was to utilize that, build 

that fountain, sheet pile was driven between the seawall and the 

earth, and we built a promenade. So now you have something 

that—and it held up tremendously during Katrina. The board had 

passed a resolution to continue if, in fact, this proved to be an economical fix, to do so much of that each year until we can cover the 

lakefront. 

So those are the kind of things that I think the board looked and 

how it can maximize utilization of its funds in both recreational—

because, again, we are mandated by the legislature to maintain 35 

percent green space. We have swing sets up there we have been 

sued for, and we have had problems over there, and we are not a 

recreational department, but they asked us—we want to do something for the people. There are levees on top. Even the Federal 

Government has authorized the fact they want to see the levees for 

walking and bike paths. And we work through those programs, too. 

So, yes, we do have other responsibilities. I am sure the intent 

is very good and want the people to enjoy, especially when we are 

landlocked and have as much recreational area, and they are trying to use the levee systems and the flood protection system as part 

of that. 

Chairman COLLINS. The point that I want to make is there is no 

doubt that the Army Corps has been underfunded, and underfunded for years, as Senator Voinovich pointed out. But when the 

local levee board has more than $20 million on hand, you would expect that some of that money is being spent to improve the inspection process and to improve the maintenance. So that is hard to understand. It is hard to understand that kind of balance not being 

used for some of these safety-related repairs or to improve your 

ability to detect problems. 

Mr. HUEY. Yes. Well, first of all, that is a wonderful question. I 

am glad you gave me a follow-up on that because I do want to 

make a point. 

Recall the fact that I was the first president in the history of the 

levee district to take over a $6 million deficit. I have been the 

president for 9 years. We were digging out of a hole, and a surplus 

had started to just develop, and it is somewhat of the $21 million, 

it is lower than that due to the fact that the way our taxes and 

our ad valorem taxes are—it drops. So you have to have the cushion money. It will drop during a collection period. You never really 

know how much you are going to collect, for example. So at that 

particular point in time, when the financials were done at $21 million, I am certainly proud to say that, hey, I was able to make a 

46

$27 million difference in the financial condition of the levee district. 

Now, that is why I wanted to explain the Mardi Gras Fountain, 

and there are numerous other cases in which that is done and that 

the levee district has worked on that, but how do you expend 

money on something that the Corps of Engineers, who we look at 

as the experts in this area and that we work with and we pride 

ourselves on working with them, they are expert—you look, you see 

boils, you see breaches, you do this, the various things. They go to 

workshops, they work together and try and identify what is an inspection method. I think the question that arises in my mind: Is 

there any other better way to inspect them? Everybody I have 

talked to so far said no. You mentioned an individual, and it 

sounds like, hey, maybe that is something we need to look into. But 

I am a little discouraged because the last specialist that told the 

city of New Orleans that these folks did not build this thing to 

specification, found out it is built to specifications, he was supposed 

to be an expert, too. 

So I think we need to investigate why his equipment said that 

it was only 9 feet deep, and they had to go dig down there and pull 

it up and find out it was built to—so we are hearing all of these 

things, and it is important to us to get to what are the real issues 

here. And if that is a real issue in flood protection, I will assure 

you, the city of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, we understand flood problems, and we will allocate, and they have never 

failed to come up with our matching funds. If we could better utilize the budget—it is a levee district. It was asked to me by your 

investigative staff how can we use—they are some pretty good people. They know how to get stuff out of you. If we can have a general fund, can we use it for whatever? Yes, we can. The general 

fund is flexible. And had we known these problems and that our 

funds could better be utilized, I think the board would have moved 

to do that. 

Chairman COLLINS. Thank you. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today. You 

really have added to our understanding. I am convinced that we 

need to sort out the lines of authority much more clearly as we proceed to rebuild the levees stronger and better than ever. Before I 

adjourn the hearing, I would like to take a moment to read a few 

excerpts from an Army Corps of Engineers document. 

‘‘The hurricane inundated over 5,000 square miles in Louisiana, 

including highly populated urban areas in Orleans and St. Bernard 

Parishes. Fortunately, advance warning by the U.S. Weather Bureau enabled hundreds of thousands of residents to flee their 

homes before the storm struck. Many others, however, were not so 

fortunate. Rapidly rising water trapped them in their homes, on 

roofs, on tops of cars, in trees, and anything else that stood above 

the water. Extensive flooding was caused by overtopping and 

breaching of existing protection levees. In her trip through Louisiana, the hurricane left 81 dead, over 17,600 injured, and caused 

the evacuation of 250,000 persons to storm shelters.’’

Well, perhaps from the statistics on the number of people who 

lost their lives, it became evident to you that I am not reading from 

a document related to Hurricane Katrina. It is instead taken from 

47

the Army Corps’ after-action report for Hurricane Betsy, and it was 

drafted in September of 1965. 

This is troubling to me, and when you read this report and you 

look at the pictures, one immediately notices that many of the 

same neighborhoods that were devastated by Katrina were also 

damaged and flooded by Hurricane Betsy. The similarities are 

striking. 

Furthermore, Hurricane Betsy led to the initiation of new flood 

control projects, some of which failed the city of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. And I mention this because, as I said earlier, the future of New Orleans is tied to its levee system. If people 

and businesses cannot be assured that the levees are strong, that 

there is effective and efficient oversight of the levees, then we cannot assure them that we are protecting New Orleans from a future 

catastrophic failure. And I feel we simply all have an obligation in 

this regard. The stakes are just too high. And that is why it is important that we do identify what went wrong and make it right. 

We owe that to the people who have lost their lives, their properties, their jobs. We owe it to the city of New Orleans. We owe 

it to the State of Louisiana. And I appreciate your help this morning in giving us a better understanding of what went wrong and 

how we can do better in the future. 

Thank you for your cooperation. This hearing record will remain 

open for 15 days for additional questions and materials. 

This hearing is now adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

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