NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

No. 1 CA-JV 23-0010 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

No. S8015JD202100044

The Honorable Aaron Michael Demke, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Michael & Casey, Your AZ Lawyer, Phoenix

By Robert I. Casey

Counsel for Appellant Mother

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Autumn Spritzer

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

T H U M M A, Judge:

FILED 8-17-2023
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

Decision of the Court

2

¶1 Annalisa H. (Mother) appeals from an order terminating her 

parental rights to T.C., arguing the superior court failed to make necessary 

findings of fact and that the Department of Child Safety (DCS) did not 

provide appropriate reunification services. Because Mother has shown no 

error, the order is affirmed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Mother has a long history of using illegal substances, 

including methamphetamine since she was 14 years old. She admitted she 

cannot get through the week without using drugs. In March 2020, Mother 

gave birth to her first methamphetamine-exposed child, who she gave up 

for adoption.

¶3 Mother admitted using methamphetamine for most of her 

pregnancy with T.C. When born in September 2021, T.C. tested positive for 

methamphetamine. Although Mother resides in Arizona, T.C. was born in 

St. George, Utah, because it was the closest hospital to Mother’s home.1 In 

October 2021, DCS removed T.C. from Mother’s care and filed a petition 

alleging the child was dependent because of Mother’s history of substance 

abuse, domestic violence and mental illness.2 In January 2022, the court 

found T.C. dependent because, among other reasons, Mother’s ongoing 

substance abuse posed a risk to T.C. The court adopted a family 

reunification case plan.

¶4 DCS offered Mother numerous reunification services, 

including substance abuse assessment, testing, education and treatment,

behavioral-health assessment and treatment, and transportation. DCS also 

repeatedly encouraged Mother to participate in inpatient drug treatment. 

Mother made minimal efforts to work on her drug addiction during the first 

nine months of the dependency. Mother refused to consider inpatient 

treatment and generally did not follow treatment recommendations. 

During this time, Mother admitted she was still using methamphetamine 

and continued to test positive for methamphetamine each time she tested.

1 Although involved initially, Utah deferred proceedings as to Mother and 

T.C. to Arizona, and the Arizona superior court concluded Arizona is the 

appropriate forum, a ruling not challenged on appeal.

2 T.C.’s father is not a party to this appeal. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

Decision of the Court

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¶5 Given Mother’s lack of participation and progress, in May 

2022, the court granted DCS’ motion to change the case plan to severance 

and adoption. In June 2022, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental 

rights alleging chronic substance abuse and six-months time-in-care. See 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 8-533(B)(3) & (8)(b) (2023).3 After DCS filed its 

motion, Mother enrolled in a substance abuse class. However, Mother 

continued to test positive for methamphetamine and declined inpatient 

care, even after becoming pregnant with her third child.

¶6 In November 2022, the court held a termination adjudication.

The DCS caseworker testified about Mother’s substance abuse, DCS’ 

reunification services, Mother’s lack of progress towards sobriety and 

Mother repeatedly testing positive for methamphetamine. The caseworker 

testified about T.C.’s current placement and why termination of Mother’s 

parental rights was in T.C.’s best interests, including that T.C. would be at 

risk of severe neglect or worse if returned to Mother’s care. DCS offered 

various exhibits supporting the caseworker’s testimony, which the court 

received without objection. Mother also testified, explaining she loves T.C. 

and is trying to work on her sobriety but it is hard.

¶7 At the close of the evidence, the court granted DCS’ petition

to terminate on both the substance abuse and time-in-care grounds. For the 

substance abuse ground, the court found Mother “has not maintained any 

period of sobriety” and had tested positive for methamphetamine 

throughout this case. The court also found Mother made “very few efforts” 

to maintain her sobriety, that Mother’s substance abuse is an “ongoing 

issue,” and that ongoing use is “likely.” For the time-in-care ground, the 

court found T.C. has been in DCS’ care for more than six months, DCS made 

diligent efforts to provide appropriate reunification services and Mother 

has “substantially neglected and/or willfully refused to remedy the 

circumstances that caused [her] child to be in an out-of-home placement.”

Finally, the court found termination was in T.C.’s best interests “by a 

preponderance of the evidence or even greater.” The court later issued an

order, making corresponding findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

Mother timely appealed. This court has jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 

9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A), 12-120.21(A) and 12-

2101(A), and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 601–03.

3 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

Decision of the Court

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DISCUSSION

¶8 As applicable here, to terminate parental rights, a court must 

find by clear and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground 

articulated in A.R.S. § 8-533(B) has been proven and must find by a 

preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the 

child. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 288 ¶ 41 (2005); Michael J. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 249 ¶ 12 (2000). Because the superior court 

“is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility,”

this court will accept the superior court’s factual findings as long as they 

are supported by reasonable evidence and will affirm its legal conclusions 

unless clearly erroneous. Brionna J. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, CV-22-0158-PR, 

2023 WL 5024023, at *5 ¶¶ 29–31 (Ariz. Aug. 8, 2023) (citations omitted).

This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

superior court’s findings. See Manuel M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 

205, 207 ¶ 2 (App. 2008).

I. The Superior Court Made Sufficient Findings of Fact.

¶9 Mother claims the superior court’s findings failed to “include 

all the facts necessary to resolve the disputed issues.” Mother 

acknowledges the court found she had a history of substance abuse and 

there was reason to believe the substance abuse would continue for a 

prolonged and indeterminate period of time. Mother also acknowledges the 

court found T.C. had been in DCS’ care for six months, DCS had made 

diligent reunification efforts and Mother had “substantially neglected or 

willfully refused to remedy the circumstances” that led to T.C. being 

removed from her care. Nevertheless, Mother argues the court’s ruling

provided “very little support for its termination” and “failed to provide 

sufficient specificity.” Although DCS urges waiver, Mother’s argument 

fails on the merits.

¶10 By rule, the court had to “make specific findings of fact in 

support of the termination.” Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 353(h)(2)(A). The order must 

contain “at least one sufficiently specific finding to support each of the 

court’s conclusions of law.” Logan B. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 

537 ¶ 15 (App. 2018). While the “ultimate facts” necessary to resolve the 

disputed issues are to be included, the court is not required to list every fact 

it relied on in making its findings. Id.; see also Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 451–52 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (requiring courts to state every 

fact it relied on imposes an undue burden). In this case, the superior court’s 

findings are not verbose, but Mother has shown no error. 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

Decision of the Court

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¶11 The substance abuse ground required DCS to prove Mother 

“is unable to discharge parental responsibilities because of . . . a history of 

chronic abuse of dangerous drugs, controlled substances or alcohol and 

there are reasonable grounds to believe that the condition will continue for 

a prolonged indeterminate period.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). The court found 

Mother had a long history of abusing methamphetamine, T.C. was born 

exposed to methamphetamine and Mother previously had a child who was 

methamphetamine exposed. The court also found DCS made reasonable 

efforts to provide Mother with rehabilitative services (listing seventeen

services offered to Mother in its order) but Mother “has only minimally 

participated in these services and has not made any behavioral changes 

sufficient to enable her to safely parent this child.” The trial evidence 

supports the court’s written findings. Because the termination order 

contained sufficient findings of the ultimate facts necessary for the 

substance abuse ground, Mother has not shown the court erred. 

¶12 The time-in-care ground required DCS to prove T.C. was 

under three years old and had been cared for in an out-of-home placement 

for six months or longer pursuant to a court order (showings that are not 

disputed), that DCS had made a diligent effort to provide appropriate 

reunification services and that Mother “has substantially neglected or 

wilfully refused to remedy the circumstances that cause the child to be in 

an out-of-home placement, including refusal to participate in reunification 

services offered by the department.” A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b). In its 

termination order, the court found T.C. was under three years old, was in 

an out-of-home placement for more than six months pursuant to court 

order and that despite DCS’ diligent efforts to provide reunification 

services (which the court listed), Mother had substantially neglected or 

willfully refused to remedy the circumstances by not participating in DCS’ 

reunification services. The court found that Mother “only minimally 

engaged in the services provided to remedy the circumstances and [] fails 

to recognize the need to make behavioral changes to safely parent the 

child.” The trial evidence supports the court’s written findings of these 

ultimate facts. Again, Mother has shown no error. 

II. Mother Has Not Shown the Superior Court Erred in Finding DCS 

Provided Appropriate Reunification Services.

¶13 Mother argues DCS “did not provide appropriate 

reunification services” to justify the termination of her parental rights. 

Mother’s sole argument is it was difficult for her to participate in the drug

testing service because the closest facility (in St. George, Utah) was about 

an hour away from where she lived. Mother claims that participating in this 
IN RE TERM OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO T.C.

Decision of the Court

6

service required her to “move mountains to engage in it” and thus was “not 

a service that [had] a reasonable prospect of success.” 

¶14 Mother is correct that the closest testing facility was about an 

hour from where she lives. However, DCS offered Mother transportation to 

and from the testing facility. Mother rarely used DCS’ transportation, and 

when she did test, she routinely tested positive for methamphetamine. On 

this record, Mother has not shown the superior court abused its discretion 

in finding DCS “made diligent effort[s] to provide appropriate reunification 

services.” See also Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 

(App. 1994) (explaining parent’s refusal to participate in agency’s services 

does not foreclose termination of her parental rights). 

¶15 Moreover, Mother failed to raise the adequacy of services 

with the superior court. Mother’s only testimony during the hearing about 

the drug testing service was that she had difficulty enrolling, not that it was 

too far away. Accordingly, by failing to properly challenge the adequacy of 

services in superior court, Mother waived the right to press such an 

argument for the first time on appeal. See Shawanee S. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 234 Ariz. 174, 179 ¶ 18 (App. 2014); see also Bennigno R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 233 Ariz. 345, 349–50 ¶ 19 (App. 2013) (explaining parent waives 

challenge to the adequacy of reunification services when not argued during 

hearing). Mother has shown no error in addressing the adequacy of 

services. 

CONCLUSION 

¶16 The termination order is affirmed.