United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves

RESERVE FORCES 

Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve Readiness for 

21st Century Challenges 

Statement of Janet A. St. Laurent, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 11:30 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, September 21, 2006 

 

GAO-06-1109T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 21, 2006

RESERVE FORCES

Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

Highlights of GAO-06-1109T, a testimony Readiness for 21st Century Challenges 

before the Commission on the National 

Guard and Reserves 

Ongoing operations in Iraq and

Afghanistan have required the 

deployment of large numbers of

Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve personnel. The 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

faces the unprecedented challenge

of sustaining large-scale, longduration operations with an allvolunteer military force. In 

addition, DOD‘s homeland defense 

missions have taken on higher

priority, and National Guard forces 

have state responsibilities for 

homeland security activities as well 

as their traditional roles in 

responding to natural disasters. 

Over the past few years, GAO has 

examined the effects of ongoing

military operations and domestic

missions on the Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve. 

This statement, which draws on 

prior GAO work, focuses on 

(1) challenges in sustaining Army 

reserve component equipment and

personnel readiness while 

supporting ongoing operations and

(2) the extent to which the Army’s 

planned transformation initiatives 

will alleviate equipment and 

personnel shortages and enhance 

readiness. 

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have made significant 

contributions to ongoing military operations, but equipment shortages and 

personnel challenges have increased and, if left unattended, may hamper the 

reserves’ preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions. To 

provide deployable units, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve 

have transferred large quantities of personnel and equipment to deploying 

units, an approach that has resulted in growing shortages in nondeployed 

units. Also, reserve units have left significant quantities of equipment 

overseas and DOD has not yet developed plans to replace it. The Army 

National Guard reports that its units have less than one-third of their 

required equipment, and the Army Reserve reports that its units have about 

half of the modern equipment they need to deploy. These shortages could 

also adversely affect reserve units’ ability to perform homeland defense 

missions and provide support to civil authorities in the event of natural 

disasters or terrorist attacks. The Army also faces shortages of personnel 

trained in some high-demand skills. These readiness challenges have 

occurred because the Army reserve components’ role has shifted from a 

strategic reserve force to an operational force that is being used on an 

ongoing basis. However, DOD has not fully reassessed its equipment, 

personnel, and training needs and developed a new model for the reserves 

appropriate to the new strategic environment. GAO has made 

recommendations that DOD conduct a comprehensive reassessment of 

equipment, personnel, training, and funding requirements given the reserve 

components’ shift to an operational role, but DOD’s progress to date in 

addressing them has been limited. Without a comprehensive reassessment 

of equipment and personnel policies, the Army’s reserve components may 

not be well prepared to deal with future events at home or abroad. 

The Army has begun two transformational initiatives intended to enhance 

reserve units’ ability to conduct 21st century operations and plans to spend 

over $24 billion for equipment over the next 5 years. These initiatives are 

significant, but the extent to which they will alleviate equipment and 

personnel challenges is unclear. The Army faces challenges in managing 

both initiatives’ costs and achieving intended capabilities. First, although 

the Army is making progress in transforming its forces to more flexible 

modular units, it has not provided detailed information on the capabilities, 

costs, and risks of its plans, and reserve units are likely to lack some key

equipment items well into the future. Second, the Army is implementing a 

force generation model through which reserve units’ readiness will be

increased as units move closer to eligibility for deployment. However, the 

Army has not fully determined the equipment, personnel, and training that 

units will require at each stage of the cycle or fully identified the resources

to implement its plans. Without detailed implementation plans, decision 

makers will not have sufficient information with which to assess both DOD’s

progress and performance in transforming the Army reserve components 

and whether investment decisions are being targeted to the highest priority 

areas. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1109T.

To view the full product, click on the link 

above. For more information, contact 

Janet A. St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or 

stlaurentj@gao.gov. 
Reserve Forces

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the work GAO has undertaken 

regarding the changing roles and readiness of the Army National Guard 

and Army Reserve. The Congress has given the Commission on the 

National Guard and Reserves (Commission) a very significant charge, and 

I hope that our work will be useful to the Commission in its deliberations 

on how reserve forces should be structured and equipped for the 21st 

century given new threats to our national security, both overseas and at 

home. Ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the 

involvement of large numbers of reservists, particularly ground forces, and 

the Department of Defense (DOD) now faces the unprecedented challenge 

of sustaining large-scale, long-duration operations with an all-volunteer 

military force. Since 2001, over 500,000 reservists have been mobilized in 

support of ongoing operations, the largest mobilization of reserve forces 

since World War II. The high pace of operations has led to personnel and 

equipment shortages among Army reserve component units. Further, in 

addition to its traditional homeland missions, such as responding to 

storms and fighting forest fires, the National Guard’s homeland missions 

have expanded to include guarding against terrorist threats. 

Over the last few years, we have examined the effects of expanded 

mission requirements on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve, 

including their new operational roles in supporting both large-scale, longduration overseas operations and emerging domestic requirements. My 

testimony today focuses on (1) the Army reserve components’ challenges 

in sustaining equipment and personnel readiness while supporting ongoing

military operations and (2) the extent to which Army’s planned 

transformation initiatives will alleviate the Army reserve components’ 

equipment and personnel shortages and enhance their readiness for 

overseas and domestic operations. 

My testimony draws upon several GAO reports related to reserve 

component personnel and equipment issues, including requirements for 

personnel with high-demand skills to support ongoing overseas 

operations. A list of these reports appears at the end of this statement. 

In preparing these reports, we performed extensive analysis of DOD’s 

documentation on the status of Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

equipment and personnel, focusing primarily on the status of nondeployed 

units. We also reviewed and assessed DOD’s and the Army’s strategies and 

plans for the future including the Army Campaign Plan, key plans related 

to the Army’s transition to a modular force, rotational force management 

Page 1 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

data, equipping and funding plans, and unit readiness reports. We also 

discussed these issues with officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense; the Departments of the Army and the Air Force; the National 

Guard Bureau; the Army Reserve; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff; and the U.S. Joint Forces Command. In addition, we visited 

selected Army National Guard units that had been deployed or were 

preparing to deploy as well as Army Reserve units performing homeland 

defense missions. This work was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. 

We are continuing to conduct work relating to reserve component issues, 

which will enable us to provide more information in the coming months on 

issues of interest to the Commission. For example, we have begun work 

examining reserve pay and compensation issues. We also have ongoing

engagements examining employer support for reservists; emergency 

management assistance compacts among states; reserve deployment 

reporting; and the status of the National Guard’s equipment for its 

domestic homeland defense missions and support to civilian authorities. 

The Army National Guard and Army Reserve have made significant 

contributions to ongoing military operations since September 11, 2001; 

however, equipment shortages and personnel challenges have increased 

over time and could hamper the Army’s reserve components’ preparedness

for future overseas and domestic missions if left unattended. These 

readiness challenges have occurred for two primary reasons. First, the 

Army has provided resources to reserve units based primarily on the 

assumption that they would deploy overseas only in the latter stages of 

major combat operations and would receive additional resources during a 

mobilization phase. However, the Army National Guard’s and Army 

Reserve’s shift to more of an operational role in response to the new 

security environment has led to a situation in which the Army’s traditional 

resourcing strategies for managing personnel and equipment may no 

longer be in balance with how the reserves are being used. Second, 

mobilization authorities, DOD’s policies, and Army deployment practices 

limit the number and duration of reservists’ deployments for ongoing 

operations so that the Army’s reserve components will be challenged to 

involuntarily mobilize and deploy large numbers of personnel with needed 

skills. To provide deployable units for Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army 

National Guard and the Army Reserve have transferred large numbers of 

uniformed personnel and equipment from nondeployed units to deploying 

units. This approach has resulted in growing shortages among 

nondeployed units. Equipment shortages have been further compounded 

because DOD has required reserve units to leave large amounts of 

Summary 

Page 2 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

equipment overseas for use by other forces, and much of this equipment 

has not been replaced. As a result, the Army National Guard reports that 

units have less than one-third of their required equipment, and the Army 

Reserve currently reports that its units have about half of the modern 

equipment they would need to deploy. In addition to creating potential risk

to the nation’s ability to respond to unforeseen events overseas, Army 

National Guard and Army Reserve equipment shortages could also 

adversely affect reserve units’ ability to perform homeland defense 

missions and provide support to civil authorities in the event of natural 

disasters or terrorist events. Moreover, under current policies, the Army is 

challenged to identify and mobilize reserve personnel in some highdemand skills. We have made recommendations to DOD intended to bring 

about a comprehensive reassessment of equipment, personnel, training, 

and funding requirements given the Army reserve components’ shift to a 

more operational role. However, DOD’s progress in implementing these 

recommendations has been limited. Unless such a comprehensive 

reassessment and rethinking of the equipment and personnel policies is 

completed—in other words, unless DOD reaches consensus on a new 

model for the reserves that matches policies and resources with the Army 

reserve components’ expected missions—DOD may find itself ill prepared 

to deal with future events at home or abroad. 

The Army has recently begun two major transformational initiatives that 

are intended to improve the ability of Army Reserve and Army National 

Guard units to respond to 21st century threats; however, the extent to 

which these initiatives will help to alleviate personnel and equipment 

challenges and enhance readiness is unclear. These initiatives include the 

creation of modular units in the active and reserve components and the 

creation of a new model to manage readiness and provide reservists with 

more predictable deployment schedules. Although both these initiatives 

have some merit from a conceptual standpoint, the Army faces significant 

challenges in managing their costs, risks, and performance. Specifically, 

the Army is making progress in transforming its division-based structure to 

more easily deployable modular units, but it has not provided detailed

plans showing the extent to which DOD will be able to fund new 

equipment required by modular units in the reserve components. The 

Army has budgeted $21 billion to improve the Army National Guard’s 

equipment and $3.8 billion for the Army Reserve over the next 5 years; 

however, it has not yet provided detailed information about the types and

amounts of equipment it will buy or described the extent to which this 

funding will provide equipment compatibility with the active component. 

Further, the Army has not provided sufficient information with which 

DOD and congressional decision makers can assess the capabilities, costs, 

Page 3 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

affordability, and risks of the Army’s modular force implementation plans. 

Because the need to equip units deploying overseas is likely to continue to

take priority over nondeployed units for equipment funds, reserve units 

are likely to have shortfalls of some key equipment items well into the 

future. The Army’s second major initiative is the development of a force 

generation model in which units’ readiness for deployment would move 

through phases of increasing readiness as they move closer to deployment 

eligibility—once every 5 to 6 years for reserve forces. However, the Army 

has not yet developed a transparent plan for national-level decision 

makers that identifies the equipment, personnel, and training that will be 

required at each phase of the model nor has it fully identified the 

resources it will need to implement its plans. We reported in 2005 that the 

Army needs to fully define how the reserve components will be integrated 

into its modular force and rotational cycle, and although DOD agreed with

our recommendations, many questions remain about the risks inherent in

the Army’s plans.1

 Until the Army completes such plans and identifies 

funding for its transformational initiatives, the reserve components’ 

preparedness for future overseas and domestic missions is not likely to 

increase and may continue to erode. Moreover, unless the Army completes 

more detailed implementation plans, decision makers will not have 

sufficient information to assess both DOD’s progress and performance in 

transforming the Army’s reserve components and whether investment 

decisions are being targeted to the highest priority areas. 

The Army has two reserve components, the Army National Guard and the 

Army Reserve. Both reserve components are composed primarily of 

citizen soldiers who balance the demands of civilian careers with military 

service on a part-time basis. During the Cold War, it was expected that the

reserve forces would be a strategic reserve to supplement active forces in

the event of extended conflict. However, since the mid-1990s, the reserves

have been continuously mobilized to support operations worldwide, 

including those in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. In today’s strategic environment, the Army’s reserve components 

have taken on a variety of different overseas missions as well as traditional 

and emerging domestic missions. 

Background 

 1

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard Equipment 

Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force Transformation Initiatives, 

GAO-06-111 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 4, 2005) and Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is

Needed to Address Army Reserve Personnel and Equipment Shortages, GAO-05-660

(Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2005). 

Page 4 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

The Army Reserve and the Army National Guard are part of the total Army, 

which also includes the active component. The Army organizes, trains, and 

equips its reserve components to perform assigned missions. The Army 

Reserve is a federal force that is organized and trained primarily to supply 

specialized combat support and combat service support skills to combat 

forces. The Army National Guard is composed of both combat forces and 

units that supply support skills. The Army National Guard, when mobilized 

for a federal mission, is under the command and control of the President. 

When not mobilized for a federal mission, Army National Guard units act

under the control of the governors for state missions, typically responding

to natural disasters and more recently protecting state assets from 

terrorist attacks. Using DOD planning guidance, the Army provides reserve 

units varying levels of resources according to the priority assigned to their 

federal warfighting missions. 

Reserve forces may be involuntarily called to active duty under three 

mobilization authorities. As shown in table 1, two authorities authorize the 

President to involuntarily mobilize forces, but with size and time 

limitations. Full mobilization, which would authorize the mobilization of 

forces for as long as they are needed, requires a declaration by the 

Congress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense implements the 

activation of reservists. 

Table 1: Mobilization Authorities for Reserve Forces 

Statute Provisions

10 U.S.C. 12301(a) 

“Full Mobilization” 

Declared by Congress: 

In time of war or national emergency 

No limit on numbers of soldiers called to active duty 

For duration of war plus 6 months 

10 U.S.C. 12302 

“Partial Mobilization” 

Declared by the President: 

In time of national emergency

No more than 1,000,000 reservists can be on active duty 

No more than 24 consecutive months 

10 U.S.C. 12304 

“Presidential 

Reserve Call-up” 

Determined by the President: 

To augment the active duty force for operational missions 

No more than 200,000 reservists can be on active duty 

No more than 270 days 

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Code provisions. 

Page 5 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

On September 14, 2001, President Bush declared that a national emergency 

existed as a result of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On 

September 20, 2001, DOD issued mobilization guidance that among other 

things allowed the services to mobilize reservists for up to 24 cumulative 

months under the President’s partial mobilization authority. The Army’s 

current guidance is that soldiers should serve 12 months with their “boots 

on the ground” in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 

and Operation Iraqi Freedom in Iraq, not including the time spent in 

mobilization and demobilization activities, which could add several more 

months to the time a reserve member spends on active duty. 

The Army’s reserve components have provided ready forces for ongoing 

military operations since September 11, 2001, but personnel and 

equipment challenges have led to declining readiness and hamper their 

ability to prepare for future overseas and domestic missions. A resourcing 

structure that is inconsistent with the reserve components’ new 

operational role as well as limiting mobilization policies and practices 

have led to equipment and personnel shortages. These shortages have 

required nondeployed reserve units to transfer equipment and personnel 

to deploying units, further degrading readiness. In the absence of a major 

effort to reassess equipment, personnel, and training requirements and 

policies, it will become increasingly difficult for the Army reserve 

components to prepare for future missions. 

Army Reserve 

Components Have 

Significant Equipment 

Shortages and 

Personnel Challenges 

That Hinder 

Readiness for Future 

Missions 

Reserve Components’ 

Transfers of Equipment to 

Deploying Units and 

Equipment Left Overseas 

Exacerbate Existing 

Shortages

Two major issues that have degraded the readiness of Army reserve forces 

are (1) the transfers of equipment among units to deploy ready forces and

(2) the significant amounts of equipment reserve units have left overseas. 

The resulting equipment shortages could adversely affect reserve units’ 

ability to contribute to overseas and homeland missions. 

The Army National Guard and the Army Reserve currently have shortages

in the equipment they need to train and deploy and, in the case of the 

Army National Guard, to respond to domestic emergencies. As noted 

earlier, equipment shortages exist because the Army, following DOD 

planning guidance, has historically equipped Army units, including the 

Army reserve components, according to a strategy known as tiered 

resourcing. Under the tiered resourcing strategy, units expected to deploy

overseas first in a conflict, generally active combat units, receive first 

priority for equipment. Following this approach, the Army accepted some

operational risk by providing lower-priority reserve units with less 

Transferring Equipment to 

Ready Deploying Units Has 

Degraded Nondeployed Units’ 

Equipment Inventories 

Page 6 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

equipment than they would need for their missions, under the assumption 

that there would be time to provide additional equipment to them before 

they would be deployed. For example, the Army National Guard’s 

divisions, which constitute the majority of its combat forces, have been 

maintained with about 65 percent of the equipment they would need to 

perform their missions. In addition, much Army reserve component 

equipment is older and less modern than that of the active Army and is not 

always compatible with active force logistics. The Army National Guard 

reports that units have less than one-third of their required equipment, and 

the Army Reserve currently reports that its units have about half of the 

modern equipment they would need to deploy. 

Despite this tiered resourcing structure, for recent operations, combatant 

commanders have required Army National Guard and Army Reserve units 

to deploy with 90 to 100 percent of the equipment they are expected to

need and with equipment that is compatible with that of active Army units. 

To meet the combatant commander requirements for fully manned and 

equipped units, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have 

transferred equipment to deploying units. For example, when Army 

National Guard’s 30th Brigade Combat Team from North Carolina was 

alerted to prepare to deploy to Iraq in 2004, it had only about 40 percent of 

its deployment requirement of about 8,810 night vision goggles. The Army 

National Guard had to transfer about 5,272 pairs of goggles to fully equip 

the unit, leaving other units with even fewer goggles available for training

and future missions. In another case, to support requirements for highdemand military police skills during 2004 and 2005, the Army tasked the 

Army National Guard to convert 40 non-military police units, including 

field artillery companies, to security units capable of performing selected 

military police missions in Iraq. While a military police company typically 

has 47 humvees in its inventory, field artillery companies have only about

3 humvees that are suitable for this new mission. The Army National 

Guard had already depleted its inventory of armored humvees to prepare 

units that had deployed previously, so the converted units had to obtain 

armored humvees from other units already in Iraq. 

While transferring equipment has enabled the Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve to meet immediate needs, transfers have decreased the 

equipment available to nondeployed units for training and other purposes. 

Early transfers of equipment to deploying units created a cycle of 

additional ad hoc transfers as reserve units that had provided equipment

to deploying forces were themselves alerted for mobilizations. 

Page 7 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

In 2004, we reported that as of May of that year, the Army National Guard 

had transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment to ready units for 

recent operations.2

 We subsequently reported that by July 2005, the 

number of equipment items transferred among Army National Guard units 

had grown to more than 101,000.3

 With respect to some equipment items, 

transfers of equipment to deploying units have completely or almost 

completely exhausted the inventories of many nondeployed Army National 

Guard units. As of July 2005, the Army National Guard reported that 

equipment transfers had largely exhausted its inventory of more than 220

critical items, including some items useful to nondeployed units for 

training and domestic missions. Among the items for which the Army 

National Guard had shortages of over 80 percent of the authorized 

inventory were chemical warfare monitoring and decontamination 

equipment and night vision goggles. 

These continuing transfers have resulted in significant declines in the 

amount of equipment available to nondeployed Army National Guard units 

since the beginning of current overseas operations. As we previously 

reported, the percentage of nondeployed units that reported having the 

minimum amount of equipment they would need to deploy4

 dropped from 

87 percent in October 2002 to about 59 percent in May 2005. (See fig. 1.) 

However, this estimate includes units that have older, less modern 

equipment, referred to as substitute equipment. While these substitute 

items may be useful for training purposes, commanders may not allow 

these older items in the theater of operations because they may not be

compatible with the equipment other units are using and cannot be 

sustained logistically overseas. In addition, this estimate includes units 

that have equipment that is undergoing maintenance after returning from 

deployment or was left overseas, so these items are not readily available

for use. 

 2

 GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future 

Overseas and Domestic Missions, GAO-05-21 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004). 

3 GAO-06-111. 

4

 To meet minimum deployment criteria, a unit must generally have at least 80 percent of

its mission-essential equipment on hand. 

Page 8 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

Figure 1: Percentage of Nondeployed Army National Guard Units Meeting Minimum Equipment Criteria to Deploy 

National Guard officials stated that the number of Army National Guard 

units meeting the minimum criteria to deploy has continued to decline 

since our last report. The National Guard Bureau estimates that when 

substitute equipment items, equipment undergoing maintenance, and 

equipment left overseas for follow-on forces are subtracted, its 

nondeployed units had available only about 34 percent of essential 

warfighting equipment as of July 2005. Senior National Guard officials now 

estimate that the Army National Guard has less than 30 percent of its 

essential warfighting equipment. 

Like the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve is also facing problems 

resulting from equipment transfers to deploying units. According to our 

analysis, from September 2001 through April 2005, the Army Reserve 

transferred about 236,000 pieces of equipment worth about $765 million to

fill equipment shortages among deploying units. The items most 

transferred were (1) individual equipment, such as clothing and boots; 

(2) unit equipment, such as tents, generators, and communications 

equipment; and (3) weapons. 

Page 9 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

In the fiscal year 2007 National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report, 

the Army Reserve reported that it had about 78 percent of the equipment it

requires, but about one-third of the equipment is obsolete and not 

interoperable with the active Army. Therefore, the percentage of 

equipment Army Reserve units have that is acceptable for deployment is 

lower than the overall figure indicates. In addition, the Army Reserve has 

reported that its equipment is aging more quickly than planned because of 

high use and a harsh operational environment. Accordingly, the Army 

Reserve has estimated that as much as 44 percent of its equipment needs 

servicing, including equipment that has been returned from overseas. 

These shortfalls in equipment that could be used to equip deploying forces

or in training for future missions challenge the Army Reserve’s ability to

train and prepare units for future deployments. 

Compounding the degrading effect of equipment transfers on the 

equipment available to nondeployed reserve component units has been the 

requirement that units leave significant amounts of equipment in 

Afghanistan and Iraq for follow-on forces. In July 2005, we reported that 

Army Reserve units had been required to leave some equipment items, 

such as vehicles that have had armor added to them, which exacerbated

shortages in equipment available for training.5

 Moreover, in October 2005, 

we reported that the Army National Guard estimated it had left more than 

64,000 equipment items valued at over $1.2 billion overseas since 2003 to

be used to support ongoing operations.6

 For example, when the North 

Carolina 30th Brigade Combat Team returned from its deployment to Iraq 

in 2005, it left 229 humvees, about 73 percent of its predeployment 

inventory of those vehicles, for other units to use. Similarly, according to 

Army National Guard officials, three Illinois National Guard units were 

required to leave almost all of their humvees, about 130, in Iraq when they 

rotated back from deployment. Moreover, we reported that the Army had 

not fully accounted for this equipment and had not prepared plans to 

replace it as required under DOD policy. DOD Directive 1225.6, Equipping 

the Reserve Forces, issued April 7, 2005, requires a replacement plan for 

reserve component equipment transferred to the active component for 

more than 90 days.7

 However, according to Army officials, the Army did 

Requirement to Leave 

Significant Quantities of 

Equipment in Theater Has 

Further Decreased Equipment 

Available to Nondeployed Units 

 5 GAO-05-660. 

6 GAO-06-111. 

7

 Replacement plans for removed equipment and supplies are not required for transfers in 

support of force restructuring adopted as a result of planning, programming, budgeting,

and execution process decisions approved by the Secretary of Defense. 

Page 10 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

not initially track the Army National Guard’s equipment or prepare 

replacement plans in the early phases of the war because the practice was 

intended to be a short-term measure and there were other priorities. In 

addition, the Army did not have a centralized process to track equipment

and develop replacement plans. Instead, transfers of equipment between 

units were only documented at the unit level in unit property records. 

According to Army and National Guard officials, the Army only planned to 

track certain high-demand equipment items, such as armored humvees, 

that were designated to remain in theater for the duration of the conflict.

The National Guard estimates untracked items, such as cargo trucks, 

rough terrain forklifts, and palletized load trucks, to be about 45 percent of 

all the items its units left overseas. 

In May 2005, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs noted 

that while the exact amount of equipment transferred between the reserve 

and active components was unknown, overall the magnitude of these 

transfers has been significant and was an area of concern. He requested 

that the Army submit a replacement plan for all Army National Guard 

equipment retained in theater by June 17, 2005. In October 2005, we 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Army to prepare 

the replacement plans required by DOD Directive 1225.6.8

 The department

agreed with that recommendation, but the Army still has not completed 

plans for replacing the majority of the equipment. As of June 2006, the 

Army had developed some plans for replacement of Army National Guard 

equipment, but only three plans, which only covered a portion of the 

equipment the Army National Guard units left behind, had been approved. 

In addition to creating potential risk to the nation’s ability to respond to 

unforeseen events overseas, Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

equipment shortages could also adversely affect reserve units’ ability to 

perform homeland defense missions and provide support to civil 

authorities in the event of natural disasters or terrorist attacks. Until 

recently, it has been assumed that the National Guard could perform its 

typical state missions, such as storm relief and firefighting, with the 

equipment it had on hand for its federal missions. However, with the heavy 

use of the Army National Guard in the new security environment, this 

assumption may not be a sound one, especially in the event of nontraditional threats, such as chemical or biological attacks, or pandemic 

disease. Moreover, while DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Equipment Shortages Could 

Adversely Affect Reserve Units’ 

Ability to Contribute to 

Homeland Security Missions as 

Well as Overseas Missions 

 8 GAO-06-111. 

Page 11 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

Defense for Homeland Defense and the U.S. Northern Command, which 

are charged with leading DOD’s efforts in homeland defense, have taken 

some actions to plan DOD’s response to potential threats, they have not 

completed developing requirements or preparedness standards and 

measures for homeland missions in which the National Guard may be 

likely to participate. We have previously reported that some items, such as 

humvees, night vision goggles, and chemical protective suits, which are in

short supply among the Army National Guard’s nondeployed forces, may 

also be extremely useful for responding to domestic events, including 

terrorism.

9

 Although planning for large-scale events, whether natural or 

man-made, is not complete and requirements are not fully known, it is 

likely that at a minimum, National Guard forces—under control of the 

states or the President—will be involved in responding to any large-scale 

threat or catastrophe. Hurricane Katrina, which hit the Gulf Coast in 

August 2005, highlighted the Army National Guard’s and DOD’s key roles 

in responding to catastrophic events as over 50,000 National Guard forces, 

as well as 20,000 additional active duty military forces, participated in 

responding to the devastation the hurricane left behind.10 We reported in 

May 2006 that many challenges that the military faced during Katrina 

pointed to the need for better plans and more robust exercises for disaster 

response and noted that without actions to help address planning and 

exercise inadequacies, a lack of understanding will continue to exist 

within the military and among federal, state, and local responders as to the 

types of assistance and capabilities that DOD might provide in response to 

a catastrophe; the timing of this assistance; and the respective 

contributions of the active, reserve, and National Guard forces. 

Given the National Guard’s role in responding to domestic emergencies, in

November 2004, we recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

(1) establish the full range of the National Guard’s homeland missions, 

including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian 

authorities; (2) identify the National Guard’s capabilities to perform these 

missions and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training that

need to be addressed to perform these missions successfully; (3) develop a 

plan to address any shortfalls including identifying funding; and 

(4) establish readiness standards and measures for the National Guard’s 

 9 GAO-06-111. 

10 GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 

2006). 

Page 12 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

homeland security missions so that the readiness for these missions can 

be systematically measured and accurately reported.11 DOD agreed with 

our recommendations and is now taking a more active role in working 

with its federal and state partners to improve its ability to respond to 

catastrophic incidents. In addition, this year the Army has taken some 

steps to provide equipment to National Guard units in hurricane-prone 

states to temporarily improve their ability to respond to hurricanes. 

Specifically, the Army transferred equipment, such as trucks, floodlights, 

and night vision devices, from its active component units to National 

Guard units. Further, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and 

Readiness has directed that the department begin tracking its readiness for 

some domestic missions in the new Defense Readiness Reporting System. 

Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve Face 

Significant Personnel 

Challenges, Especially in 

Some Critical Skills 

In addition to equipment shortages, other factors have negatively affected 

Army’s reserve components’ personnel readiness: (1) the transfer of 

personnel among units to deploy ready forces, (2) fewer full-time support 

staff than authorized, and (3) the increasing difficulty of identifying trained 

personnel available to deploy for future rotations. 

Under tiered resourcing, Army National Guard and Army Reserve units 

have generally been assigned fewer personnel than they require to perform 

their assigned missions, under the assumption that the shortages could be

filled before the units would deploy. For example, the Army Reserve has 

been assigned about 80 to 85 percent of its required personnel. 

Additionally, some personnel assigned to units may not be deployable 

because of unfulfilled training requirements or for personal reasons, such 

as family situations or health reasons. However, for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, the combatant commander has required that Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve units be deployed with 100 percent of the 

personnel they need for their missions. Therefore, to fill shortages in 

deploying units to support the first rotations of troops to Operation Iraqi

Freedom in March 2003, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve 

had to transfer personnel from units that were not yet alerted to deploy.

Initial transfers worsened existing personnel shortages in non-mobilized 

units and increased the numbers of personnel that had to be transferred 

when additional units were subsequently mobilized. Moreover, transfers 

Personnel Transfers among 

Units to Support Deployments 

Have Led to Shortages in 

Nondeployed Units 

 11 GAO-05-21. 

Page 13 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

are continuing as reserve personnel continue to be deployed to support 

ongoing rotations to Iraq. Shortages of available personnel in nonmobilized units now limit their ability to conduct training for future 

missions and will require them to receive significant infusions of 

personnel from other units if they are alerted for mobilization. Without a 

comprehensive reassessment of its reserve staffing policies, the reserve 

components will have difficulty improving readiness. 

Another significant challenge the Army National Guard and Army Reserve 

face in continuing to provide support for ongoing operations is that they 

have not been authorized all of the full-time support staff units need to 

perform critical readiness duties at home. These personnel play a key role 

in maintaining reserve component unit readiness and participating in 

mobilization/deployment planning and preparation by performing the dayto-day equipment maintenance, administrative, recruiting and retention, 

and training tasks for the Army National Guard and Army Reserve forces.

However, in accordance with the Army’s tiered resourcing strategy, the 

Army’s reserve components have not been authorized all the full-time 

personnel they need to be fully manned. For example, based on a preSeptember 11, 2001, analysis, the Army Reserve identified a requirement 

for about 38,000 full-time support personnel, which equates to about 18.5 

percent of the 205,000 members it is authorized by law. However, the 

Army Reserve is only authorized about 26,350 full-time support personnel, 

or about 68 percent of its requirement. The Army National Guard was 

authorized full-time support equal to only 59 percent of its full-time 

requirement, in contrast with the Air National Guard, which is staffed at 

100 percent of its required full-time support personnel. In 2005, we 

recommended that the Army should reassess the Army Reserve’s 

requirement for full-time staffing support given its new operational role, 

but such a reassessment has not yet been completed.12 Without sufficient 

full-time personnel, critical administrative, maintenance, and training tasks 

may not be completed in a timely manner and unit readiness may suffer. 

Requirements for Full-time 

Personnel to Provide Support 

Have Not Been Fully 

Reassessed in Light of the 

Army’s Reserve Components’ 

Changing Role 

As current operations have continued, under DOD’s current policies, the 

Army National Guard and Army Reserve will be challenged to involuntarily 

mobilize and deploy large numbers of personnel with needed skills. 

Reservists serving in Afghanistan and Iraq have been activated under a 

partial mobilization authority that enables the secretary of a military 

department to involuntarily mobilize reservists for up to 24 consecutive 

Identifying Trained Personnel 

Available to Deploy for Future 

Rotations Is Increasingly 

Difficult

 12 GAO-05-660. 

Page 14 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

months. Limitations imposed by DOD policies implementing the 

mobilization authority have contributed to increasing difficulties in 

identifying reserve personnel, especially personnel trained in some highdemand skills, to fill ongoing requirements. 

Some of the skills in highest demand for current operations are the 

combat support and combat service support skills that reside heavily or 

primarily in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve—sometimes in 

small numbers of critical personnel. Skills that are in high demand include 

military police, engineering, and civil affairs. Because so many of the Army 

reservists in these skills areas have already been deployed and are not 

eligible for future deployment under current policies, DOD has developed 

strategies, such as reassigning and retraining personnel from within the 

Army and the other services according to Army doctrine, to fill combatant

commander requirements. While new recruits are constantly entering the 

Army Reserve and National Guard, training them with specialized skills, 

such as intelligence analysis, takes time. 

As we reported earlier this month, there are various options that DOD can 

consider to make more reserve personnel available for future rotations 

overseas, such as reconsidering its policy of involuntarily activating 

reservists only once for current operations, changing deployment 

durations, and transferring more positions to high-demand areas.13 Each of 

these options has both advantages and disadvantages. However, DOD has 

not conducted a comprehensive, data-driven analysis of its options. 

Without such an analysis, DOD will be challenged to plan effectively for 

future requirements. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense and the Congress

will not have complete information on which to base decisions about the 

size and composition of the force, mobilization and deployment policies, 

and other issues. 

 13 GAO, Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force Identification 

Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for High-Demand Support Forces, 

GAO-06-962 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 5, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

The Army has two major initiatives—the creation of modular units and 

development of a force generation model to provide more predictability to

unit rotations—that are intended to enhance the ability of both active and 

reserve units to conduct 21st century operations; however, 

implementation plans for these initiatives are still evolving, funding plans 

lack sufficient details and could change, and the risks associated with the 

initiatives have not been clearly identified. As a result, the potential impact 

of these initiatives on the reserve components’ sustainability as part of a 

21st century operational force is very uncertain. Further details about how 

both these initiatives will work are critical so that national decision 

makers can make accurate assessments, manage risk, and ensure that the 

initiatives will result in a sustainable model for the reserves that will 

provide adequate levels of readiness commensurate with expected roles 

and missions of the Army National Guard and Reserves. 

Two Major Army

Transformation 

Initiatives Are Under 

Way, But Effect On 

Reserve Component 

Readiness Is Unclear 

Army’s Plans to Transform 

Its Forces into Modular 

Brigades Face Significant 

Personnel and Equipment 

Challenges 

The Army considers its modular force transformation the most extensive 

restructuring it has undertaken since World War II. Restructuring the 

Army from a division-based force to a force of modular brigades that are 

intended to be more rapidly deployable and better able to conduct joint 

operations will require extensive investments in equipment and retraining 

of personnel. The Army currently estimates this initiative will cost 

$52.5 billion, including $41 billion for new equipment. These funds are 

intended to cover the costs for equipping, training, and procuring new 

facilities for active, reserve, and National Guard units—including those 

designed for combat, support, and headquarters functions. The Army 

estimated in June 2005 that it would cost about $15.6 billion to convert the 

Army National Guard’s units. 

We have given testimony that although the Army is making progress in 

creating modular units, it faces significant challenges in managing costs 

and meeting equipment and personnel requirements associated with 

modular restructuring in both the active and reserve components.14

Specifically, we have noted that it is not clear to what extent the Army can 

achieve the expected capabilities of the new modular units within its cost 

estimate and planned time frames for completing unit conversions. As of 

April 2006, the Army had not met its near-term equipping goals for its 

active modular combat brigades, which have traditionally been equipped 

at a higher level than most reserve component units. In both the active 

 14 GAO, Force Structure: Capabilities and Cost of Army Modular Force Remain 

Uncertain, GAO-06-548T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 4, 2006).

Page 16 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

component and Army National Guard, combat brigades will initially lack 

some of the key equipment that Army force design analyses determined 

were essential for achieving their planned capabilities. This will occur 

because the Army’s plans to fund new equipment for its modular force do

not match the schedule for converting units to new modular organizational 

designs. 

In addition, we have also reported that the Army will face greater 

challenges in meeting its modular equipping requirements for its 

28 planned National Guard combat brigades.15 Army National Guard and 

Army Reserve units will start their modular conversions with less and 

much older equipment than most active units. This will add to the 

challenge the Army faces in achieving its plans and timelines for equipping

Army National Guard units at comparable levels to active units. The Army 

plans to spend a total of $21 billion cumulatively over the next few years 

on Army National Guard equipment and $3.8 billion on Army Reserve 

equipment. However, Army National Guard officials believe that even after 

the Army’s planned investment, the Army National Guard will have to 

accept risk in certain equipment, such as tactical wheeled vehicles, 

aircraft, and force protection equipment. 

In the near term, modular conversions will likely exacerbate current 

equipment shortfalls in the Army National Guard. First, according to 

current Army plans, the units are expected to convert to their new designs 

with the equipment they have on hand. However, because of existing 

shortages and the large number of equipment items that deployed units 

left in Iraq or that need repair or replacement because of heavy use, units 

will not have equipment needed for the Army’s modular unit designs. For 

example, converted Army National Guard units initially expect to be 

without some equipment items that provide the basis for the improved 

capability of the new brigades, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, single 

channel ground and airborne radio systems, and Javelin antitank missiles. 

Second, although most Army National Guard units are scheduled to be 

reorganized by 2008, the Army has not planned funding to provide 

equipment to the units until 2011 at the earliest, and equipment for 

ongoing operations may continue to take priority away from replacing

equipment of nondeployed units. The lack of detailed plans for equipping 

Army National Guard units makes it difficult to determine how the Army 

 15 GAO-06-548T. 

Page 17 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

intends to transition these units from the old to the new organizational 

structure effectively. 

Moreover, our work highlighted several limitations to the Army’s cost 

estimate for Army National Guard modular force conversions.16 First, the 

estimate was based on a unit design that is less modern than one the Army 

plans to use in the near term. Second, the estimate does not include costs 

for 10 of the Army National Guard’s support units or military construction 

costs associated with its 40 support units. Furthermore, the cost estimates 

assume that Army National Guard equipment inventories will be at prewar 

levels and available for modular conversions, which may not be a 

reasonable assumption given the large amounts of equipment that units 

have left overseas for which replacement plans have not yet been 

developed. Supplemental funds for repairing and replacing equipment 

worn out overseas could help improve reserve equipment levels; however, 

the amount and duration of the funding that might be allocated to the 

reserve components is uncertain. 

Equipping and Personnel 

Levels Associated with 

Army’s Force Generation 

Model Are Unclear

The Army has adopted a new force generation model that is intended to 

improve units’ readiness over time as they move through phased training 

to prepare for a potential deployment window that would occur once 

every 5 to 6 years for reserve component units. The early phases of the 

cycle would entail formation and staffing of the unit and beginning 

individual and collective training. Figure 2 illustrates the movement of 

units through reset and train, ready, and available phases. 

 16 GAO-06-548T. 

Page 18 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

Figure 2: Army Proposed Force Generation Model 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

In this phase, modular units are 

recovering from operations, restoring

equipment, and undergoing

individual training.

Units have minimal levels of equipment. 

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the Ready phase.

Reset/Train Pool

In this phase, modular units are 

available for deployment for 

operational missions. 

They are provided equipment 

based on operational requirements.

At the end of their available time, 

units return to the Reset/Train phase*

.

Available Pool

(for one year)

In this phase, modular units 

conduct unit-level training

 and mission preparation. 

Units share equipment located 

at training sites.

At the end of this phase, 

units move to the Available phase.

Ready Pool

*The Army’s force rotation model proposes that active component units in the Available phase will be 

available for deployment 1 year in every 3 years, and reserve component units will be available for 

deployment 1 year in every 6 years. 

According to Army officials, providing units increasing amounts of 

equipment as they move through the phases of the model will enable the 

Army to better allocate available equipment and help manage risks 

associated with specific equipment shortages. Under this model, three

types of equipment sets—a baseline set, a training set, and a deployment

set—would be provided to units as they progress through the cycle. The 

baseline set would vary by unit type and assigned mission and the 

equipment it includes could be significantly reduced from the amount 

called for in the modular brigade design. Training sets would include more 

of the equipment units need to be ready for deployment, but the equipment 

would be located at training sites throughout the country and units would 

not have immediate access to the equipment. The deployment set would 

include all equipment needed for deployment, including theater-specific 

equipment. With this cyclical equipping approach, the Army believes it can 

have up to 14 active combat brigades and up to 5 Army National Guard 

combat brigades equipped and mission ready at any time. 

The Army has developed a general proposal to equip both active and 

reserve units according to the readiness requirements of each phase of the

force generation model, but it has not yet fully determined equipping 

requirements for units as they progress through the rotational cycles. 

Specifically, plans do not yet detail the types and quantities of items 

Page 19 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

required in each phase, and the levels of equipment the deploying and nondeploying units would receive are currently not clear. Therefore, it is 

difficult to assess the risks or the ability of units in the earlier stages of the

cycle to respond to unforeseen crises overseas or domestically, if required. 

Such unforeseen crises could include both events overseas requiring a U.S. 

military response or domestic events, such as large-scale natural disasters 

or terrorist attacks. In either case, reserve units may be expected to 

contribute units to conduct homeland defense missions or to support 

civilian authorities. Although the Army has recently worked with the Army 

National Guard to assess equipment needs for some homeland security 

scenarios, it is not clear whether Army National Guard units will have 

sufficient quantities of such equipment during the early phases of the 

Army’s force generation model to respond effectively under each scenario. 

Further, because the requirements for the military to support civilian 

authorities in a national crisis have not been determined, there is no 

yardstick for measuring how ready nondeployed forces are to respond to 

these potential emergencies. 

In 2005 we recommended that the Army define the end state of the units, 

personnel, skills, and equipment the Army reserve components would 

need to fit into the Army’s modular force and rotational cycle.17 Although 

DOD agreed with our recommendations, many questions remain about the 

risks inherent in the Army’s plans. The Army has developed, and continues 

to refine, a plan that will guide the implementation of its modular unit 

designs and force generation model. However, to date, the plan has not 

contained the level of detail needed to define the types and numbers of 

units that will be required, the process for coordinating the 

implementation steps of these two initiatives, or the funding streams 

needed to fully implement them. Until this information is developed, it will 

not be possible to assess the implementation risks and determine whether 

the proposed changes will provide the desired objectives of a more 

capable, flexible, and expeditionary force with reserve components fully 

ready for deployments no more than once in 5 or 6 years. 

While strategies such as transferring large numbers of Army reserve 

component equipment and personnel from non-deploying units to 

deploying units and leaving reserve component equipment overseas have 

met DOD’s immediate needs to support overseas operations, these 

strategies are not sustainable over the long term. Growing equipment and 

Concluding 

Observations 

 17 GAO-05-660 and GAO-06-111. 

Page 20 GAO-06-1109T 
Reserve Forces

personnel shortages in nondeployed units are symptoms of an outdated

model for balancing reserve unit capabilities, costs, and risks. While 

DOD’s strategies for supporting Army reserve component units during the 

Cold War may have been appropriate to that era, significant changes in the 

national security environment have led to greater use of the Army reserve 

components on an ongoing basis and spurred the need for a 

comprehensive reassessment of reserve component equipping, personnel,

and training policies. In the absence of a comprehensive reassessment and 

development of a new model that matches requirements and resources 

with expected roles and missions, trends toward declining equipment and 

personnel readiness could persist well into the future and Army reserve 

component units may not be as well prepared for future overseas and 

homeland security missions as expected. For example, at a time when 

threats to the nation from terrorist attacks have increased, the Army 

National Guard has less equipment than it did in 2002 with which to 

respond to natural or man-made events that could potentially be 

catastrophic. Although DOD and the Army have some initiatives under 

way to enhance Army reserve component readiness, they have not yet fully 

developed a comprehensive model for managing personnel, equipment, 

and training in light of the Army reserve components’ new operational 

role. 

The Army’s key initiatives of building a modular force and establishing a 

cyclical force generation model represent important changes in how the 

reserve components will be organized and will operate in the future. 

However, many questions remain about how these initiatives will affect 

reserve component readiness. Until the Army develops a more detailed 

implementation plan that identifies equipment, personnel, and training 

requirements that are consistent with the Army reserve components’ new 

operational roles, and until funding requirements to provide an acceptable 

and affordable level of readiness are identified, the Army’s reserve 

components will continue to be challenged to support ongoing operations

or prepare for the future. Moreover, until the details of such a plan are 

communicated to a broader audience, national-level decision makers will 

not have sufficient information with which to assess DOD’s progress and 

performance in transforming the Army reserve components. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond 

to any questions you or other members of the Commission may have. 

Page 21 GAO-06-1109T 
For more information regarding this testimony, please contact 

Janet St. Laurent at (202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this testimony. Individuals making key contributions to 

this testimony include Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Alissa Czyz; 

Paul Gvoth; Nicole Harms; Catherine Humphries; David Marroni; Terry 

Richardson; John Van Schaik; and Suzanne Wren.

Contact and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 22 GAO-06-1109T Reserve Forces
Related GAO Products 

Force Structure: Army Needs to Provide DOD and Congress More 

Visibility Regarding Modular Force Capabilities and Implementation 

Plans. GAO-06-745. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Force Structure: DOD Needs to Integrate Data into Its Force 

Identification Process and Examine Options to Meet Requirements for 

High-Demand Support Forces. GAO-06-962. Washington, D.C.: 

September 5, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: Plans Needed to Improve Army National Guard 

Equipment Readiness and Better Integrate Guard into Army Force 

Transformation Initiatives. GAO-06-111. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 

2005. 

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve Estimates and Oversight of 

Costs for Transforming Army to a Modular Force. GAO-05-926. 

Washington, D.C.: September 29, 2005. 

Reserve Forces: An Integrated Plan Is Needed to Address Army Reserve 

Personnel and Equipment Shortages. GAO-05-660. Washington, D.C.: 

July 12, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington D.C.: 

November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Page 23 GAO-06-1109T Reserve Forces (350925) 
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