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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

v. ) No. 19-cr-21 (KBJ)

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JEREMY SEARS, )

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Defendant. )

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before this Court at present is Defendant Jeremy Sears’s motion seeking 

compassionate release from prison pursuant to section 3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18 of the 

United States Code. (See Def.’s Mot. for Compassionate Release (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF 

No. 31; see also Def.’s Letter, ECF No. 28.) Sears, who is currently incarcerated at FCI 

Elkton in Lisbon, Ohio, maintains that he has “diabetes mellitus, essential hypertension, 

asthma, and depression,” which increase his risk of serious complications from 

contracting COVID-19, and that the disease is rapidly spreading in the facility in which 

he is housed. (Def.’s Mot. at 2.) 1 And he contends that “the exponential infection rate 

of COVID-19 and high mortality rate for those with pre-existing conditions, coupled

with the proven inability of the [Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”)] to address a surge in 

[COVID-19] cases” constitute “extraordinary and compelling circumstances that 

warrant a sentence reduction in this case.” (Def.’s Mot. at 49.) 

This Court has previously explained its view of the scope of a district court’s

statutory authority to grant a defendant’s motion for compassionate release during the 

 1 Page-number citations to the documents that the parties have filed refer to the page numbers that the

Court’s electronic filing system automatically assigns.
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COVID-19 pandemic. See United States v. Johnson, No. 15-CR-125 (KBJ), 2020 WL 

3041923, at *2–5 (D.D.C. May 16, 2020) (describing the statutory framework for 

motions for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). It has now 

reviewed Sears’s motion, the Government’s opposition thereto (see Gov’t Opp’n, ECF 

No. 33), and Sears’s reply (see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 34) in light of those standards, 

and for the reasons explained below, the Court finds that Sears’s release at this time 

would undermine the purposes of punishment that this Court evaluated when it imposed 

the original sentence pursuant to the factors Congress set forth in section 3553(a) of 

Title 18 of the United States Code. See Johnson, 2020 WL 3041923, at *5 (suggesting 

that the section 3553(a) factors might warrant denial of a motion for compassionate 

release brought under section 3582(c)(1)(A) even if the COVID-19 pandemic and the 

defendant’s medical conditions are extraordinary and compelling reasons to release 

him). Consequently, Sears’s motion for compassionate release must be DENIED. 

I.

In Johnson, this Court detailed its understanding of section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s 

framework for a district court’s consideration of a defendant’s motion for 

compassionate release, see Johnson, 2020 WL 3041923, at *3–4, and that legal analysis 

is incorporated by reference here. In brief and as relevant to Sears’s compassionate 

release motion, under section 3582(c)(1)(A), a court must undertake what is essentially 

a three-pronged inquiry to determine: first, whether the defendant has exhausted his 

administrative remedies, and if not, whether the statutory exhaustion requirement

should be waived; second, whether there are extraordinary and compelling reasons that 

warrant a reduction of the term of imprisonment that the court previously imposed; and 
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third, whether any such reduction is consistent with the factors set forth in section 

3553(a), including and especially the need for the sentence imposed to ensure public 

safety. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). And the Court may only reduce a 

defendant’s term of imprisonment under section 3582(c)(1)(A) if each of these three

inquiries results in an affirmative answer. See Johnson, 2020 WL 3041923, at *3–4; 

see also United States v. Wade, No. 2:99-cr-00257-3, 2020 WL 1864906, at *6–7 (C.D. 

Cal. Apr. 13, 2020).

II.

In the instant case, Sears has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, but 

this Court agrees with defense counsel that any requirement that he do so must be 

excused on futility grounds. (See Def.’s Mot. at 15–16 (explaining that seeking 

administrative remedy is futile because Sears was among 760 inmates at FCI Elkton that 

BOP evaluated in response to a court order and found “did not qualify” for home 

confinement); see also Def.’s Reply at 3 (indicating that Sears’s inmate records show 

that BOP “evaluated him for home confinement on May 25, 2020, and denied him” such 

release).) The Court is also persuaded that Sears has serious underlying medical 

conditions that, when considered in conjunction with the COVID-19 pandemic and the 

prevalence of that disease in the facility where he is housed, qualify as “extraordinary 

and compelling” reasons to justify his release. (See Def.’s Mot. at 34–49; Ex. A to 

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 35, at 8 (medical records showing current conditions of diabetes 

mellitus, essential hypertension, asthma, and depression)); see also Johnson, 2020 WL 

3041923, at *10–11 (finding that the spread of COVID-19 in a jail facility and the

defendant’s “mental and physical health conditions[] constitute extraordinary and 
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compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction for the purpose of section 3582(c)(1)(A)

(internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted)).

Nevertheless, section 3582 requires the Court to consider the section 3553(a) 

factors, to the extent that they are appropriate, prior to ordering the requested sentence 

reduction, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), and this Court does not, and cannot, find that 

a reduction in Sears’s term of imprisonment is consistent with the section 3553(a) 

factors at this time. Specifically, the applicable statutory sentencing factors—

including “the nature and circumstances of the offense[,]” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), “the 

history and characteristics of the defendant[,]” id., and “the need for the sentence 

imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(C)—compel the conclusion that the purposes of punishment would not be 

served if Sears’s sentence was reduced from the 71 months of imprisonment that the 

Court imposed during Sears’s sentencing hearing on May 15, 2019, to the 23 months 

Sears has served up to this point. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 17-CR-00070-

VC-1, 2020 WL 1814616, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020) (finding that, where a 

defendant’s original sentence for possession and distribution of child pornography was 

72 months, an effective sentence of 17 months “would fail to reflect the seriousness of 

the offense and to provide just punishment”).

With respect to “the nature and circumstances” of Sears’s offense, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(1), Sears pled guilty to an information charging him with distribution of child 

pornography, in violation of section 2252(a)(2) of Title 18. (See Minute Entry of Feb. 

21, 2019; Information, ECF No. 13.) As this Court stated during Sears’s sentencing 

hearing, the possession and distribution of child pornography is an extremely serious
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crime because it involves trading depictions of the actual sexual assault of children, and 

the abuse that these child victims endure will remain available on the internet forever. 

As relevant here, on multiple occasions in December of 2017, Sears used the instant 

messaging application “Kik” to send hundreds of videos depicting the sexual abuse of 

teenage and prepubescent minors to an undercover officer, including videos of “female 

children under the age of approximately ten[.]” (Statement of Offense, ECF No. 17, at 

2.) 

Importantly, Sears also admitted to doing more than just possessing and 

distributing generic and graphic depictions of child molestation. In addition, Sears also 

provided photos of his own prepubescent female relative to the undercover officer, to 

verify that he had access to a child and thus encourage his own reciept of pornographic 

images involving child victims. (See Statement of Offense at 5.) 2

 Sears also sent 

similar photos of a friend’s prepubescent child which were taken without the child’s 

knowledge and, again, were distributed to curry favor with someone Sears believed 

would get sexual gratification from such photos. Neither of these sets of photos 

constituted child pornography in and of themselves because both children were clothed, 

and the Government did not bring separate charges related to these particular acts. But 

as the Court previously explained, it is clear that these two young girls were victims 

insofar as Sears was an adult in their lives who intentionally sexualized them by 

recording them without their knowledge and sharing their images with predators. Those 

despicable acts, as well as the hundreds of videos of abuse, degradation, and sexual 

violence against children that Sears possessed and distributed, strongly suggest that 

 2 The Court uses the phrase “female relative” to protect the minor child’s privacy.
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Sears poses a threat to children, and the disturbing nature of his offenses is sufficient to

persuade this Court that a substantial period of incarceration was, and still is, justified.

Sears’s history and characteristics, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), include the fact

that Sears has no prior criminal history and also has an extensive network of family 

support. (See Def.’s Mot. at 54.) The Court took both of these circumstances into 

consideration when it sentenced Sears initially. But the Court also noted that Sears had 

a psychosexual evaluation that indicated that he is at high risk of reoffending without 

treatment (see Presentencing Report, ECF No. 23, ¶ 77), and it appears that Sears has 

not yet received any sex offender treatment while in BOP custody (see Def.’s Reply at 

5). This is problematic primarily because the Court must assess the risk to public safety 

when it evaluates whether or not a defendant is too dangerous to be released 

notwithstanding the fact that there may be extraordinary and compelling reasons to do 

so. See Johnson, 2020 WL 3041923, at *11; see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(A), (2). 

And the evidence presented during Sears’s initial sentencing proceeding plainly 

demonstrated that, in the absence of any sex offender treatment, Sears would continue 

to pose a danger to the community if he is released. 

It is also entirely unclear whether any conditions of release could be fashioned 

that could ensure the safety of the community. Sears has proposed a release plan in 

which he represents that he can live with his mother, but Sears has apparently had an 

estranged relationship with his mother for much of his life (see Def.’s Reply at 7), and 

that circumstance raises the specter of instability with respect to this proposed living 

arrangement. See Coleman v. United States, No. 4:17-CR-69, 2020 WL 3039123, at *5 

(E.D. Va. June 4, 2020) (explaining that defendant’s alienation from family members 
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“cast[s] doubt on whether placement with [defendant’s] mother [was] a suitable postrelease arrangement”). What is more, given the ease with which child pornography is 

accessible in the modern world, Sears’s release is likely to require stringent and 

frequent monitoring. This, too, poses a risk to the community, because the need for 

intensive monitoring in the age of COVID-19 would likely result in “heightened safety 

risks . . . to the probation officers who would be tasked with monitoring his behavior[.]” 

United States v. Lee, No. 19-CR-298 (KBJ), 2020 WL 1541049, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 

2020).

III.

For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that, despite the fact that COVID-19 

and Sears’s medical condition are extraordinary and compelling reasons to grant his 

motion for compassionate release, “section 3553(a)’s purposes of punishment require 

maintenance of the original prison term.” Johnson, 2020 WL 3041923, at *5. 

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release 

(ECF No. 31) is DENIED.

Date: June 16, 2020 Ketanji Brown Jackson u

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge