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S. HRG. 109–683

KOSOVO: A WAY FORWARD?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 8, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

BARBARA BOXER, California

BILL NELSON, Florida

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois

KENNETH A. MYERS, Jr., Staff Director

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 2

Burns, Hon. R. Nicholas, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department

of State, Washington, DC .................................................................................... 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12

Response to question submitted by Senator Lugar ....................................... 48

Responses to questions submitted by Senator Boxer .................................... 48

Holbrooke, Hon. Richard C., Vice Chairman, Perseus LLC, New York, NY ...... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 35

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1

Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio ............................................. 5

(III)

(1)

KOSOVO: A WAY FORWARD?

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 2005

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m., in room

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar

(chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Voinovich, Martinez,

Biden, Sarbanes, and Bill Nelson.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR

FROM INDIANA

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee is called to order. Today the committee meets to discuss

the future of Kosovo and the American role in bringing stability to

Southeastern Europe.

During 1998 and 1999, the United States and our NATO allies

attempted to stop the escalating violence between ethnic Albanians

and Serb forces in Yugoslavia’s Kosovo Province. These efforts culminated in 1999 in a 78-day NATO bombing campaign against Serbia. In June of that year, former Yugoslav leader Slobodan

Milosevic agreed to withdraw his forces from the province and

since then Kosovo has been administered by a combination of U.N.

and local Kosovar governing structures.

The U.N. mission in Kosovo, known as UNMIK, retains ultimate

political authority in the province and is backed by a NATO-led

peacekeeping force charged with providing a secure environment.

At its inception immediately after the bombing campaign, UNMIK

assumed primary responsibility for promoting substantial autonomy and self-governance in Kosovo and for facilitating a political

process to determine its future status. In 2004 UNMIK introduced

the ‘‘standards before status,’’ policy which described economic, political, and social benchmarks that were to be met in Kosovo before

a final decision on Kosovo’s status was made.

The United States has played a leading role in assisting Kosovo

to meet the standards established by the United Nations. Last

month, based on the assessment provided in a report by the U.N.

Special Envoy to Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council

agreed to move to the next phase of this process in Kosovo. I commend the appointment of former Finnish President Martti

Ahtisaari to head the upcoming talks on the future status of

Kosovo and I wish him well as he seeks to guide the parties to a

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compromise that will secure long-term peace in Southeastern Europe.

A peaceful and secure future for Kosovo lies in building democracy, in respecting human rights, and in fostering ethnic reconciliation. A successful conclusion to Kosovo’s status is crucial to Balkan reintegration into Europe. Much work is left to be done, however. The U.N. report praises Kosovo’s achievements in establishing new political and economic institutions and in developing a

legislative framework. But it also details the challenges that remain, including widespread poverty, limited observance of the rule

of law, a weak judicial system, and continued ethnic tensions.

While many Kosovar Albanian leaders contend that Kosovo

should be granted immediate and unconditional independence,

many Serbian leaders have voiced their view that absolute independence for Kosovo is a nonstarter. Bridging this diplomatic distance will require a compromise among the parties and sustained

commitment from the international community and especially the

United States.

The United States continues to contribute nearly 2,000 troops to

the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Kosovo. Because of the outstanding work of American peacekeeping troops and U.S. support

for the ‘‘standards before status’’ policy, the United States retains

significant credibility in the region. We must work closely with our

European allies to improve the climate for peace.

We are pleased today to welcome two distinguished witnesses

who bring great expertise to our discussion of Kosovo. First, we will

hear from Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Nicholas

Burns, who will update us on U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region.

Then we will hear from Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, one of the

architects of United States policy toward Southeastern Europe, who

will offer his thoughts and recommendations on the future of

Kosovo and the Balkans.

We thank our witnesses for joining us. We look forward to their

insights.

I would like to recognize, now, the distinguished ranking member

of our committee, Senator Joseph Biden.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., U.S.

SENATOR FROM DELAWARE

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Let me begin, Mr. Chairman, by thanking you for convening this hearing. Although there

is a lot of trouble left in Kosovo, I would just—I would like to point

out that our intervention in Kosovo, and before that in Bosnia, has

saved hundreds of thousands of lives in my view, at minimal cost,

although a single American life is difficult to deal with losing, but

with in relative terms a low cost.

I also want to welcome our witnesses, Under Secretary of State

Nicholas Burns and former Ambassador Dick Holbrooke, who

played such a significant role in bringing this carnage to an end

in Bosnia.

But the United States and the people of Southeast Europe, as we

all, I think, would agree, are better off as a result of the efforts of

Ambassador Holbrooke and our Secretary, as well as present and

former administration leaders.

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Mr. Chairman, in 1999 the United States led NATO forces in a

military campaign to protect the people of Kosovo from the pathological belligerence of Slobodan Milosevic. During the 6 years since

that conflict ended, the United States and other countries have devoted billions of dollars and millions of man-hours in pursuit of

progress in Kosovo. On a personal note, my own son, when he was

at the Justice Department, volunteered and was stationed in

Kosovo to try to help rebuild the province’s shattered legal system,

and it was a worthwhile experience for him. But he was one of just

hundreds and hundreds and hundreds and thousands of man-hours

that have gone into trying to provide some stability there.

The international community’s extraordinary investment in

Kosovo I think has few historic parallels. Fortunately, it has produced, I think, very important dividends. In marked contrast to the

chaos of 1999, Kosovo’s institutions are more credible today and

more capable. The province’s citizens have participated in several

free and fair elections. With the tragic exception of last year’s

March riots, Kosovo has been largely free of interethnic violence.

These accomplishments should be recognized, but, as you pointed

out in your statement, Mr. Chairman, they cannot mask the reality

that the current situation in the province is fundamentally unworkable. Kosovo’s economy remains a hostage of the province’s undefined legal status. Until the status issue is resolved, Kosovars legally cannot receive assistance from international financial bodies

such as the World Bank and they will not receive needed foreign

investment.

Ethnic Albanians feel, with some justification, I might add, that

the international community has been kicking the can down the

road on the status issue. They have spent too long struggling to

build a society on a foundation of uncertainty, and I think they

need and deserve a decision.

Earlier this year, Under Secretary Burns said that the status

quo in Kosovo is neither sustainable nor desirable, a statement

with which I agree. Personally, I think both the political and economic situation need an extreme makeover. I believe some form of

independence for Kosovo is the only solution that will allow the

citizens of Kosovo and Serbia to realize a future of stability and

modernity.

The political process designed to resolve Kosovo’s status is under

way, as we know, but in an attempt not to prejudge the outcome

of the talks, officials from the United States and many other interested countries have skirted key issues.

Mr. Chairman, I worry that in doing so we will feed the very instability that we are trying to avoid. Trouble in the Balkans is almost always—I emphasize, almost always—in my experience, and

I think if you look back well beyond my experience, it is almost always the product of false expectations.

Few cases have demonstrated this phenomenon more vividly

than Slobodan Milosevic’s misguided assumption that NATO would

not act decisively to protect the people of Kosovo from his aggression. Kosovars have spent too many years stuck in a political limbo

as a result of that miscalculation and it is time for politicians and

diplomats to start leveling with the citizens of this region.

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Finding a solution in Kosovo is going to require tough compromises on all sides and, unfortunately, few leaders are proving

courageous enough to prepare their people for what lies ahead. To

the extent that we fail to spell out the hard facts, we risk becoming

accomplices in this dereliction of duty. The people of Serbia and

Montenegro must recognize that holding onto Kosovo would be an

act of willful sabotage against the future of their country. Generations of Serbs stand to reap enormous benefits from closer ties to

NATO and the European Union and that will be possible once the

Serb war crimes at The Hague are concluded and Kosovo no longer

serves as a drag parachute on Serbia’s future.

In stark contrast, Serbia, I believe, will find a future of frustration and isolation if it persists in clinging to the territorial artifacts

of its bloody past. Serbia does not have the political stature or

practical ability to govern Kosovo. It is time for the Serb leaders,

in my view, to publicly acknowledge that reality and to stop obstructing progress in Kosovo. Once that happens, I believe it will

be easier to address Belgrade’s legitimate interests, such as the

protection of Serbian heritage sites and minority populations.

At the same time, the people of Kosovo must understand that a

successful outcome to the negotiation process will be virtually impossible unless they and their leadership display substantial flexibility, restraint, and a maturity that I am not certain exists. Unfortunately, many Kosovar Albanians have come to believe that negotiation is a four-letter word. They are wrong. Independence for

Kosovo, when it comes, will come because of Kosovars’ willingness

to seek compromise, not in spite of it.

As a community that spent years as an oppressed minority,

Kosovars should be doubly receptive to the concerns of their own

minorities. Serb cultural ties to the area and concerns over the

safety of Kosovo’s Serb population are not legitimate grounds for

governing Kosovo from Belgrade, but these concerns must be recognized and respected. They are absolute legitimate concerns for Belgrade and should be concerns for all of Kosovo.

Lastly, Kosovo’s large international community should be working overtime to make sure that the Kosovo which emerges from the

status talks is in the best possible shape. That is going to take a

lot of effort. The economy is stagnant, organized crime and corruption are rampant, and the Serb and Albanian communities remain

largely estranged. Those issues will not be resolved before Kosovo’s

status is decided, but UNMIK and relevant NGOs need to use

every ounce of capacity they have now in order to ameliorate these

problems before there is an agreement on Kosovo’s final status. The

long-term success of any status agreement may depend on their efforts as much as anyone else.

Mr. Chairman, I realize that I used some strong words today, but

the stakes in Kosovo are too high to risk failure account of politeness. Notwithstanding the challenges ahead, I am optimistic about

the future of Southeast Europe and I look forward to the time

when the only hearings this committee convenes on the Balkans relate to how we can cooperate with the region’s thriving democracies

to address problems elsewhere in the world, and I really believe we

can get there.

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Pristina is one of the few Muslim cities in the world where the

United States is not only respected, but revered. As my son said:

‘‘Dad, in Kosovo they’re naming streets after American Presidents

and diplomats. Where else in the world is that occurring?’’ If we

get Kosovo right, Muslims around the world will be reminded how

the United States came to the aid of Kosovo’s Muslim population,

helped them build a strong, independent, multiethnic—emphasis,

multiethnic—democracy. That would be a great story, and it is a

story that needs to be told. But it will not happen without a lot

more work on the part of the Kosovars, the Serbs, as well as the

international community.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing the task before us

with our witnesses, two of the most prominent men in this area in

the country. As the title of this hearing would suggest, I look forward to finding a way forward in Kosovo.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel, do you have an opening comment?

Senator HAGEL. No opening comment.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich, you have long been involved

in this area and I know that you have a statement for us.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR

FROM OHIO

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this

hearing and thank you for the opportunity to make some opening

remarks, because, as many here today may know, the future of

Southeast Europe is an issue that is very near and dear to my

heart. I suspect that I have spent more time over there than any

Member of the Senate. I visited Kosovo four times since the end of

the war with Serbia in 1999 and I have followed the Balkans for

most of my career.

What happens there is crucial to our national security and peace

in the world. I cannot tell you how important it is to me that our

administration continues to pay close attention to this part of the

world and lead it on a path to peace, stability, and prosperity.

I want to, as I say, thank you for holding this hearing. It is

timely, as you mentioned, because the status talks are going to

begin. I would like to also thank the chairman and the ranking

member of this committee for cosponsoring my resolution on the future of Kosovo and for helping me get it passed in the Senate. I

particularly appreciate Senator Biden’s support of that because I

know how closely he has been watching the situation there in

Kosovo.

Under Secretary Burns, thank you for your leadership on this

issue and for coming to speak to us today. I could not be more delighted with the team that Secretary Condoleezza Rice has put in

place to deal with the important issues in Southeast Europe: Under

Secretary Nick Burns, with whom I have worked closely during his

time as Ambassador to NATO and who knows these issues very

well; Assistant Secretary Dan Fried, who brings vast experience

from the National Security Council and his strong diplomatic career; and Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosemary DiCarlo, who recently came to brief my staff on the situation in Kosovo. These are

6

people that really understand the region and are not going to have

to be there for a year to figure out the nuances.

I know firsthand that the team gets it. They understand the history of the region, how fragile it is and how necessary it is that

Kosovo gets the attention that it deserves.

I am also pleased that Kofi Annan has appointed Martti

Ahtisaari to head the negotiations on Kosovo’s future. Mr.

Ahtisaari has a prestigious background as the former President of

Finland and a highly regarded U.N. diplomat. I understand that

Mr. Ahtisaari was one of the individuals who negotiated with

Milosevic to end the fighting in Kosovo in 1999 and I believe his

background should make him a good candidate to lead these negotiations.

Clearly, we have a great team and the next important step, of

course, is for Secretary Rice to appoint the right individual U.S.

envoy to help Mr. Ahtisaari get the job done. It sets the tone for

a continued involvement in our commitment to Kosovo, its relationship with Serbia and Montenegro, and the future of Southeast Europe. U.S. leadership in this part of the world is both crucial to the

region and to the credibility of the final outcome. Since 1999, the United States has invested over $817 million in

Kosovo in the form of United States department assistance programs, billions more in United States tax dollars have been invested in the form of military operations and peacekeeping in

Kosovo. Great investment. We must send a clear message to our

partners in the international community, in the Contact Group, the

EU, and throughout the region that we stand by our original commitments to Southeast Europe.

There is no doubt that many of us are disappointed with the

progress rate in Kosovo and hope more would have been accomplished. Kai Eide issued a very fair report, citing the lack of

progress in several critical areas, and I would like to read some

quotes from the report: ‘‘With regard to the foundation for a multiethnic society, the situation is grim’’; ‘‘Kosovo police and judiciary

are fragile institutions’’; ‘‘Property rights are neither respected nor

ensured’’; ‘‘Further progress in standards implementation is urgently required.’’

These are just a few quotes to highlight the fact that the situation is not ideal for status talks and it will call for an even greater

commitment to see the situation through. I think, Mr. Chairman,

that we ought to be very thankful that President or Prime Minister

Kostunica, President Tadic, and Foreign Minister Durazkovic have

all gotten together and agreed that they are going to be a team on

this instead of doing their own thing. They understand that if this

thing is not handled properly it could be exploited by the nondemocratic forces that exist in Serbia-Montenegro today.

I believe that we need to pay immediate attention to the fact that

Kosovo continues to be unsafe for its minorities, their property, and

their cultural sights. I recall that when I first met with Mr. Rugova

and other leaders—at that time he was ‘‘Mr. Rugova’’—and other

leaders in Kosovo at the end of the war, I told them that Kosovo’s

future would depend on their ability to treat their own minorities

in Kosovo the way that they had not been treated by the Serbs in

the past.

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Unfortunately, they did not take my words to heart, although I

reiterated them to President Rugova on at least two other occasions: You treat people the way they did not treat you, you will end

the killing of your children and grandchildren in the future and

you will start a new chapter in Kosovo’s history.

So we need to work on that. I believe it is absolutely critical that

the international community act immediately to protect some of the

cultural sites and the surrounding minority communities that are

most likely to be the targets of destruction and violence in Kosovo.

This is one of the suggestions made by Kai Eide and I believe it

is one of the most important things that the people of Kosovo could

do to build confidence at the outset of these negotiations. In other

words, guarantee that the churches and cultural sites that are important to Serbia and Serbia’s cultural heritage, and they are also

cultural sites of Europe, that they are going to be protected.

I think that people have really not a full appreciation of the impact that the destruction of 30 churches, a year ago last March,

had on the relationship between the Serb people and Kosovo, and

I think it is really important that it be made very clear that those

sites are going to be protected.

Another step that I believe is needed in the near term is to give

the Kosovars more authority and hands-on experience in running

their own institutions and government. It is no secret that UNMIK

has been heavily involved in the process of developing these institutions, often to the detriment of the Kosovars. UNMIK has little

credibility with Kosovo because there has been a strong—there

have not been strong or palpable results. It is time to cut through

the bureaucracy of UNMIK and give Kosovars more freedom to

stand up for their own institutions.

Again, we need to let the Kosovars know that the future of

Kosovo is in their hands. In turn, the Kosovars need to address the

shortcomings of the Eide report and show that their intentions are

to make Kosovo a better place by fulfilling the original standards

of Resolution 1244. I hope that as the talks ensue there will be

some firm benchmarks for achieving these objectives and agreedupon metrics. I think it is really important that there be agreedupon metrics as to whether or not progress is being made, so we

do not start waltzing when we start to get reports on what is going

on there.

In the meantime—and I will finish with this note. In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important that we hold out the

prospect of EU and NATO membership to Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Serbia, and Montenegro. I have long believed that membership in the EU and NATO is the common denominator that can

hold the region together despite their borders and their history. I

think Slovakia—bringing Slovakia and Bulgaria into NATO has

really helped to stabilize that area.

I hope that discussions about EU and NATO membership will be

accelerated in the next year. It is absolutely imperative that the

EU understand that their hope for stability in the region depends

on the prospect of EU membership for all of the countries in the

region. Likewise, it is imperative that Serbia and Croatia make the

greatest efforts to understand that Mladic, Karadzic, and Gorovina

8

have got to go to The Hague and that their refusal is standing in

the way of their economic well-being.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to make this statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Voinovich,

for your statement and for your leadership in this area.

Senator Martinez, do you have a comment?

Senator MARTINEZ. No, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding the

hearing, but I have no comments.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Well, we appreciate—Senator Sarbanes, do you have a comment?

Senator SARBANES. Not at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

We are delighted that you are here. Your statement will be made

a part of the record in full and you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, good morning and thank you very

much for inviting me to be with you today. It is a pleasure to see

you and members of the committee again. I just wanted to thank

all the members who spoke and for the comments that you made.

I must say that I agree very much with what I just heard from you,

Mr. Chairman, from Senator Biden and Senator Voinovich, first on

the fact that we have had a successful Balkans policy for 10 years.

For that, I think we have seen a lot of continuity between President Clinton’s administration and President Bush’s administration.

We have to thank President Clinton and Secretary Christopher,

Secretary Albright, the gentleman seated behind me, Richard

Holbrooke, who did such a brilliant job negotiating the Bosnian Accords 10 years ago this month.

I know that President Bush and Secretary Rice believe that we

now need a renewed and more energetic American policy to see remaining progress in the Balkans be made, specifically on Kosovo,

also on Bosnia.

Could I also thank Members of Congress and specifically your

committee and members here today for your leadership, because I

remember the role that you played in the early days before Dayton

in arguing that we should be involved in seeking peace there, and

certainly the leadership role that Congress played in 1999 in arguing that the Clinton administration ought to go in and stop ethnic

cleansing in Kosovo itself.

It is this kind of bipartisan leadership that we need here in

Washington, we need in our foreign policy, and we have it in the

Balkans. I think it is a great strength of our foreign policy in the

region.

I also agree with what many of you said in that it is time to get

on with final status talks. It has been nearly 7 years since we

fought that war. The hopes of the Kosovo Albanians and the frustrations and hopes of the Kosovar Serbs are evident and they deserve a chance to define their own future. That is what these status talks will be all about.

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Finally, I agree with all of you on the need for U.S. leadership.

We have to be involved. We are an indispensable country in this

equation in the Balkans, and, therefore, our troops have to remain

and our diplomacy has to be very active.

That is the basis of what I wanted to say today, Mr. Chairman.

I will not read my testimony. I just wanted to submit it for the

record. But if I could make a few comments before we go to questions, I would appreciate your listening to those comments.

If you think about our policy post-1989, 1990, in Europe, both

President George H.W. Bush and President Clinton and now President George W. Bush have had one common strategic objective, and

that is to seek a democratic peace in Europe. There has been tremendous progress in seeking that final objective, but the Balkans

is the last finishing piece to the puzzle.

So, in 2006 our administration believes that we have got to turn

our attention to the final status talks. We have to be very active

in trying to find a way to modernize the Dayton Accords in BosniaHerzegovina to create a single Presidency, a stronger Prime Minister, and to help those people break down the Berlin Wall that

have separated them in that country for far too long.

As Senator Voinovich said, we cannot forget the past and the

Balkans cannot really move on to have a democratic future with

the European Union and NATO until the countries arrest Radovan

Karadzic and Ratko Mladic. They were the architects of the greatest war crime in Europe since Nazi Germany at Srebrenica 10

years ago. And General Ante Gotovina of Croatia also has to be arrested, and the three of them have to face trial in The Hague for

war crimes.

Until that happens, we cannot complete this last piece of the

puzzle, we cannot help these countries become fully democratic or

fully integrated into NATO or the European Union. That is a challenge for those countries.

As I said, Mr. Chairman, we are facing final status talks. In fact,

those talks will begin in just a few weeks time. The Albanians and

the Serbs of Kosovo are going to be given a chance to define their

own future. You referred to the Kai Eide report. It is very clear,

and the United Nations has concluded, that it is time to get on

with these talks, that the period of time that we took over the last

several years to try to help the parties meet basic standards of

democratic governance, that has been time well spent, but we now

have to get to the negotiations themselves.

We share your faith in Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of

Finland. We think this is an inspired choice by Secretary General

Kofi Annan. I met with President Ahtisaari last week. I hosted a

dinner for him with members of the Contact Group. I can tell you

he has the full support of the Russian Federation, of the European

countries, and certainly of our Government.

He intends to put together a team in the coming weeks. He will

be based in Vienna. He will probably make two trips before Christmas to the region to begin these talks. Then he thinks in January

2006 the most intensive phase of these talks will begin.

The United States believes that we also need to have an envoy

who will assist. Now, President Ahtisaari will be in the lead representing the United Nations. But the credibility of the United

10

States is such and, frankly, our political weight is such in that part

of the world that we believe an American envoy must also be

present to assist President Ahtisaari.

I know that the President and Secretary Rice are very close to

naming that envoy. I wish I could tell you the name of the person

today, but the final decision has not been made. But when it is, I

know that that person will want to come up here to the Congress

and speak with you and get your advice on the road ahead.

Mr. Chairman, it might be useful just to define the basic elements of what we think a settlement could be. Senator Biden

talked about this. Essentially, if you think about what happened

over the last 61⁄2 years, we fought a war to prevent ethnic cleansing. That war ended successfully for NATO and the United States,

and then the United Nations passed a resolution effectively saying

that at some point there had to be a political process to define

Kosovo’s future. We think that it is now time to answer the question from Resolution 1244 of June 1999: Will Kosovo be an independent state or will it continue under Serb rule with a greater

measure of autonomy?

Those are the two basic options that Kofi Annan posed 2 weeks

ago when he said it was time to go to final status talks. That is

going to be the fundamental argument that these two sides have,

and it will surely be an argument, when they sit down together.

We think it is appropriate, but I would be very happy to talk further with Senator Biden and others about this, we think it is appropriate that the United States, at this point, not support a specific outcome to these talks. It is very important that the parties

themselves define their own future and answer that question that

was first asked back in June 1999: What will the future of Kosovo

be?

But we do have some views, and our views are that the basic

facts of Kosovo today have to help inform the final outcome. Ninety

percent of the people who live in Kosovo are ethnic Albanians and

they were treated cruelly, even viciously, by Slobodan Milosevic.

They certainly deserve to live in peace and security. The Kosovar

Serb population, unfortunately, has been dwindling. There is a net

outflow of Kosovar Serbs from the province and that is continuing

this very day. But they need to be assured that they have a future

in the province and, as Senator Voinovich said, that their church

and religious and patrimonial sites are going to be respected.

I visited a Serb family in Obilic in Kosovo in June of this year,

and they are people who came and made a home in Kosovo 45

years ago. These are elderly people. Their homes were burned

down in March 2004 by an Albanian mob. Those homes were rebuilt with the assistance of the United States and the European

Union, and the people have moved back in. I went to them and I

said: Why are you staying if you feel that you are surrounded now

by the Kosovar Albanian community? They said: This is our home.

We built our lives here. We raised our children here.

There are a great number of Serbs who want to stay in Kosovo

if they feel that their rights can be protected and if they feel that

they are not going to be subject to the kind of attack that we saw

just a year and a half ago by a mob of Kosovar Albanians.

11

So I think that is the fundamental question that we have to

weigh. For the Kosovar Albanians, they have to prove to us, the

international community, that they can govern democratically, that

they can govern effectively, and that they can design a future

Kosovo that will protect the rights of the minority population.

For the Kosovar Serbs, they have to make a commitment to stay,

and the government in Belgrade of Serbia-Montenegro has to allow

them to participate in the political process. You know, the Kosovar

Serbs cannot sit in the Kosovar assembly because Belgrade has

told them not to. They did not run in the last elections.

When I sat down with President Tadic and Prime Minister

Kostunica 3 weeks ago in Belgrade, I said: With all due respect,

and we are just outsiders looking into your political reality, we

think it has been a major miscalculation to essentially have the

Kosovar Serbs boycott the entire political process. They have ceded

the ground politically to the majority population. The views of the

people are not being represented in the political institutions that

we helped to establish.

So there are challenges on both sides of this equation as they sit

down together. The Kosovar Albanians, led by Dr. Rugova, who is

a very courageous man and unfortunately ill as we speak, they

have established a Team of Unity, and that Team of Unity has now

to prove its name. Will it be unified? Will all those various political

leaders on the Albanian side be able to sit down together, subordinate their personal and political rivalries and negotiate one position for the future of the country? They want independence. They

have to prove they are worthy of it. The Kosovar Serbs have to

prove that they are willing to stay and be part of that community.

That is how we see the elements, at least the political dynamics,

of this negotiation. But it is very important that certain principles

be upheld as well; the principles of return of refugees, of decentralization, of respect for minority rights. We do not see partition

in the future. We do not see the creation of some kind of greater

Albanian state in the future. Those principles will be important for

all of these parties to recognize.

So, Mr. Chairman, as we look ahead—and I want to make sure

that we leave lots of time for questions and for members to speak—

those are the political dynamics and some of the questions that we

think are very important. Could I also say, Mr. Chairman, that on

the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Secretary Rice is going to be

hosting a 10th anniversary commemoration of the Dayton Accords

on November 22. We are inviting the political leadership of BosniaHerzegovina to Washington and we have challenged them to say

that they will commit themselves to a political process that will

break down the remaining ethnic divisions left in place necessarily

by the Dayton Accords.

Can they now look toward a more ambitious vision of their own

country by establishing a single state with a single Presidency, a

stronger Prime Minister, and a stronger Parliament? Can they

commit themselves to arresting the war criminals who are still at

large 10 years after the massacres? Can they commit themselves

to police reform and implementing defense reform?

We think those are important goals and we hope they will come

on the 22nd and pledge their unity on those issues when they meet

12

with Secretary Rice. She also will be inviting a large number of

members of the team who put the Dayton Accords together to a

ceremony and a lunch, and, of course, Members of Congress, to

commemorate what we did as a country, the United States, so effectively 10 years ago and that is to provide leadership in the Balkans.

I would just conclude, Mr. Chairman, with one story from my

last trip to the region. In Sarajevo, Pristina, and Belgrade, I met

with young people at every stop. In each of those places, these

young students—they were Bosniacs and Croats and Serbs in Sarajevo and they were Muslims and Christians in Pristina and they

were young Serb students at the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade—they all said to me: We want to see a multiethnic future for

our region; we want to overcome the divisions that our parents put

into place when Yugoslavia splintered.

I was struck by their message because these were very different

kids in three different places; I was also struck by the fact I did

not hear that message from the political leadership. I did not hear

it at all. They were not preaching tolerance of minority rights, at

least not in a convincing way, in every meeting that I had. They

were not saying that the only way forward in Bosnia, Kosovo, and

Serbia was multiethnicity. But these young kids were, and I was

struck by that and I thought that was a great message and a hopeful message for a trip that was an otherwise very difficult trip,

filled with difficult negotiations.

But I want to assure you and the Congress our administration

is dedicated to adding American leadership, American energy,

American diplomatic creativity to this Kosovo final status talks and

to these other questions, and we will rely upon the help and advice

of the Congress as we go forward.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF R. NICHOLAS BURNS, UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLITICAL

AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators, it is a great pleasure for me to appear before you once again today to speak about our hope for a final peace in Kosovo and

our broader American policy in the Balkans region. I addressed the House of Representatives on these issues in May of this year, and I am pleased to have another

opportunity to discuss this important subject with Congress.

President Bush and Secretary Rice have directed a renewed and energetic U.S.

effort to bring peace and security to this troubled region. After a decade of conflicts

which had a devastating impact on every part of the former Yugoslavia, after hundreds of thousands killed and left homeless, we are, at last, seeing real progress on

undoing the evils of the 1990s. United States policy is designed to point the countries of Southeast Europe toward a democratic future as part of NATO and the European Union.

Since the end of the cold war, three American Presidents have had one overarching strategic ambition in Europe—to seek a democratic peace by unifying the

continent in freedom. The Balkans are the finishing piece to this puzzle. That is

why we must use 2006 to attain a final status for the long-suffering people of

Kosovo, and to help Bosnia-Herzegovina modernize the Dayton Accords by building

a more integrated state with a stronger central government. It is why we must send

the despicable war criminals—Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and Ante

Gotovina—to The Hague, as they are responsible for Europe’s worst human rights

abuses since the Nazis. It is why what happens in the Balkans matters to our counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:26 Nov 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 KOSOV1.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
13

try and why we must use our diplomatic power and ingenuity to help the people

of the region chart a new future.

As the history of the last 15 years has demonstrated, the United States has an

abiding interest in the Balkans. Thousands of our finest diplomats and soldiers have

spent years trying to build a peaceful future there. America and Europe have

worked well together—in the 1990s, we ended the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and

our troops have since kept the peace in both places. In 2004, NATO successfully concluded its historic peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. We have also worked intensively

with all the countries of the former Yugoslavia to prepare them for eventual NATO

and EU membership. Without stability in the Balkans, we will never see a united,

peaceful Europe that can be a true partner for the United States in promoting democracy throughout the world. It is now time to finish the job.

The Balkans region will not be stable, however, as long as Kosovo remains in a

state of political suspended animation. The history of the past decade tells us that

the United States is indispensable to stability in the Balkans. We must continue to

play this key role as we look to support the process that will determine Kosovo’s

future status. We also look forward to continued coordination with Members of Congress, noting the valuable support Senators and Representatives, including most notably members of this committee, have given to our efforts.

Two thousand six will be a crucial year of decision for Kosovo and the Balkans.

The U.N.-sponsored Final Status Talks will begin in a few weeks time, and after

more than 6 years of U.N. rule, it is time for the people of Kosovo—Albanian and

Serb alike—to be given a chance to define their future. Our partners in the Contact

Group—the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom—agree with us that the status quo in Kosovo is neither sustainable nor desirable. Earlier this year, the United States led the way to convince the United Nations to initiate a review of its standards, conducted this summer by Norway’s able

Ambassador to NATO, Kai Eide. The report concluded that further progress on

these issues is unlikely until there is greater clarity about Kosovo’s future status.

U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan recommended beginning negotiations to determine Kosovo’s future status, a recommendation the Security Council endorsed on

October 24. Secretary General Annan has announced his intention to nominate

former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari as the U.N. Special Envoy to lead the

process. He is, in our view, a superb choice: An experienced and resourceful diplomat who commands broad respect in the international community.

The Secretary General’s actions have begun the process that will lead to an internationally recognized future status for Kosovo. I hosted a meeting of the Contact

Group with President Ahtisaari in Washington last week to kick off these efforts.

We expect President Ahtisaari will begin his work as soon as the Security Council

endorses his nomination this week. The United States will very soon name a senior

American envoy to assist in the negotiations and be ready to bring U.S. credibility

and influence to bear when and where it can help to promote a settlement.

We understand that diplomatically, this will be tough going. The parties to the

talks—the Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Serbs, and the Government of Serbia-Montenegro—will see their vital interests at stake. We expect them to participate constructively and to restrain more extreme groups from using violence to gain political

ends. Although we will be working for a peaceful settlement, NATO troops will have

to be ready to defuse potentially violent situations.

ELEMENTS OF A SETTLEMENT

After NATO fought and won the 3-month Kosovo war in 1999, we then passed

U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 which called for ‘‘facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status.’’ That resolution left open the

question of what that status would be. Nearly 7 years later, it is time to answer

that question: Will Kosovo, in the future, be independent or will it continue under

Serb rule with a greater measure of autonomy?

The United States will not support a specific outcome at this stage. It is important that we and our allies remain neutral, because the future of the province is

the sole responsibility of the Albanian and Serb people of Kosovo and the Government of Serbia and Montenegro. But the final result should respect the basic facts

of Kosovo today—90 percent of the people are ethnic Albanians who were treated

cruelly, even viciously, by the government of Slobodan Milosevic. They deserve to

live in security and peace. The Kosovo Serb population also needs to be assured that

they have a future there and that their churches and patrimonial sites will be respected.

The negotiations will be difficult. Serb and Albanian positions are likely to be mutually exclusive, held with deep conviction and infused with nearly 1,000 years of

14

history. Kosovo Albanians insist that they can only be secure if they are independent of Serbia. Serbs have promoted a future of ‘‘more than autonomy, but less

than independence’’ as the most they could support.

There is, however, potential for common ground. The aspirations of Serbs, Albanians, and Kosovo’s other ethnic groups are alike in that they all want a future in

which they can live secure lives, participate in democratic government, and enjoy

economic opportunity. There is already agreement that Kosovo will be self-governing

in some form, that it will also remain multiethnic and will protect the cultural heritage of all its inhabitants. The United States will continue to work to ensure these

concepts are incorporated into Kosovo’s future status, because to make a political

determination without these principles would leave the door open to future conflict

and put at risk the war we fought to prevent ethnic cleansing and the strenuous

efforts our diplomats and soldiers have made to keep the peace.

As with any process of negotiation, neither side will get everything it wants. To

reach a lasting result, both will sometimes be required to make compromises that

may seem to violate important interests in the cause of peace. In Kosovo, we face

an unprecedented challenge of trying to build stability after a NATO intervention

led to the end of government structures that had served to repress, rather than protect, the majority of the population. For 6 years, the United Nations has exercised

the functions of a government, but, as foreseen by U.N. Resolution 1244 in 1999,

the time has come to enable Kosovo’s people to govern themselves consistent with

the outcome of the status process to come.

Mr. Chairman, the United States and its European allies have decided on several

guiding principles that must shape the process of determining a future status for

Kosovo and guide the work of the Special Envoy. We have made clear that a return

to the situation before 1999 is unacceptable and that there should be no change in

existing boundaries of Kosovo, and no partition. Other principles for a settlement

include full respect of human rights, the right of refugees and displaced persons to

return to their homes, the protection of cultural and religious heritage, and the promotion of effective means to fight organized crime and terrorism. The Contact Group

agreed to exclude those who advocate violence and that, once begun, the status process must continue without interruption.

We will ensure that the result of the process meets three key criteria:

• First, it must promote stability not only in Kosovo, but throughout Southeast

Europe.

• It must also provide full democratic rights for all people, especially minorities.

• Finally, it must further the integration of the region with the Euro-Atlantic

mainstream.

The United States must remain committed to continued involvement in Kosovo

as a status agreement is negotiated, because we have too much invested in Kosovo

and the Balkans to risk failure by withdrawing prematurely. This is where the

United States, through its participation in the NATO forces in Kosovo, has made

a great contribution. U.S. forces, including National Guard contingents from several

states, have been essential in deterring conflict, and they have made extraordinary

contributions to the communities in which they serve. Our troops have maintained

security in a tense and sometimes violent environment. They have volunteered to

help build schools, establish clinics, and have cemented strong ties between the people of Kosovo and America. Even after a determination of Kosovo’s future status is

made, we will remain committed to peace and stability there. As long as a NATO

force is required, the United States plans to be part of it.

The United States currently has 1,700 troops in KFOR, down from a high of nearly 6,000 in 1999. During the past few years, we have been able to decrease gradually the level of NATO forces and we hope to make further reductions in 2006 as

NATO shifts to a task force organization championed by Supreme Allied Commander General Jones.

OUR MESSAGE TO KOSOVO ALBANIANS

The United States has high expectations for both Serbs and Albanians as we

begin the status process. I want to use this opportunity to repeat our messages to

them.

In October I met with the Kosovo Albanian Team of Unity, established by President Rugova to lead talks. The challenge for the Kosovo Albanian community is for

this team to live up to its name. As late as last week, there were troubling signs

that Kosovo Albanian leaders are anything but unified. In my two trips to the region since June, my strong and repeated advice to them has been to put aside their

political and personal differences. If Kosovo Albanians aspire to independence, this

is their greatest opportunity to make the case to the world that, should they become

15

independent, they will be able to govern effectively and in a way that promotes stability in the region.

I made clear to them that independence must be earned. First, Kosovo must continue to develop a functional, democratic government that can safeguard the rule

of law. Second, there must be generous provisions for the security of minorities, including decentralized authority. Finally, Kosovo must be able to assure its neighbors

that it will not export instability. The U.N. standards define the goals Kosovo

should achieve in preparing for self-government. Kosovo’s progress in implementing

these standards will be the ultimate measure of how well it makes its case.

I also urged the Kosovo Albanian leaders to be ready to compromise. Finding the

right balance between majority rule and minority rights is never easy, but it must

be done. To the south, Kosovo’s Macedonian neighbors have made important

progress in addressing the concerns of their Albanian minority—progress that could

provide some useful examples as Kosovo deals with the similar concerns of Serbs

and other minorities.

Kosovo leaders should act now to create a positive environment for the status

talks and make a convincing case that there would be a secure future for minorities

should Kosovo become independent. They should announce that decentralization of

government will be pursued throughout Kosovo, and that ethnic interests will be

given consideration in drawing municipal boundaries. NATO acted in 1999 to prevent the ethnic cleansing of more than 1 million Kosovo Albanians and it would be

a tragic irony if Albanians themselves now tried to inflict a policy of retribution and

intimidation against their Serb minority. The United States and its allies will simply not tolerate such an outcome. They should also apprehend and punish those responsible for hate crimes committed against minorities in March 2004. They should

state publicly that the independence they seek is only for Kosovo, without any

changes to its present boundaries. No country, including the United States is prepared to support an irredentist ‘‘Greater Albania’’ or an independent Kosovo that

aspires to exceed its present borders.

If Kosovo leaders want to present themselves as worthy of independence, they

must stop all acts of violence and intimidation against minorities. Those responsible

for such acts must understand that they are actually undermining the goals which

they profess to support.

I warned them that an attempt by either side to use violence as a political tactic

during the negotiation will be put down swiftly and firmly by NATO. Whatever the

settlement of Kosovo’s political status, it must remain multiethnic, and Serbs and

Albanians need to work to create conditions under which they will be able to live

together peacefully.

In June, I visited a Kosovo Serb family near Pristina. They had recently returned

after being forced to flee and having their home destroyed in the March 2004 violence. This brave Serb family continues to have concerns for security and their future prosperity in Kosovo. Though their home had been rebuilt, their situation was

still difficult. The Kosovar Albanians must make Serb families like this feel welcome

and secure as a result of the settlement.

OUR MESSAGES TO THE SERBS

The Kosovo Serb community, and indeed the Government of Serbia and Montenegro, must also assume a heavy share of responsibility for successful negotiations.

When I met with Kosovar Serb leaders in October, I urged them to become more

involved politically in Kosovo itself. Serbs have told me they would prefer local autonomy for themselves in Kosovo. If this is so, it is in their own interest to participate in the institutions of local government that will be responsible for a future

Kosovo. By refusing to participate in elections and in the Kosovo Assembly, Kosovo

Serbs are missing a chance to have a say in Kosovo’s future.

Belgrade must also help Kosovo’s Serbs ensure that they will have a place in

whatever political structure emerges. I told Prime Minister Kostunica that his government’s policy of having Serbs boycott elections and participation in the Kosovo

Assembly has been a major miscalculation. The Serb community is losing political

influence in Kosovo and there is now a net outflow of Serbs. As Kosovo will remain

multiethnic, it will retain important connections with Serbia regardless of its political status. Many Kosovo Serbs will remain citizens of Serbia in any case and will

need access to Serbian Government services. Many important Serbian cultural sites,

including some of the most historic Serbian Orthodox churches, are located in

Kosovo. The Serb Government will have to look for means to cooperate with a future

Kosovo to preserve these cultural treasures. Belgrade will also want to engage in

a discussion of security issues to ensure that settlement of Kosovo’s status does not

undermine the fragile stability of the region.

16

Whatever Kosovo’s future will be, Belgrade can best protect the interests of Serbs

by encouraging them to participate in politics and begin to integrate themselves

with their Kosovo Albanian neighbors.

OVERALL AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN THE BALKANS

Mr. Chairman, while Kosovo’s future status is the most serious issue to be resolved in Southeast Europe in 2006, there are three other issues that will also be

important to building the stability and peace we seek for the region.

First, there will be no real peace in the Balkans until the countries of the region

bring the most notorious war criminals to justice. Ten years after the massacre at

Srebrenica, the two Serb leaders directly responsible remain at large. In Belgrade,

I emphasized that those of us who are friends of Serbia want to see it shake off

the remaining burden of the Milosevic era and take its rightful place as a European

country, and keystone of stability and prosperity in the Balkans. The United States

has been clear that Belgrade must comply with its obligations to the International

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Until the government turns over indicted mass murderer Ratko Mladic to the Hague, the United States, will not agree

to Serbia and Montenegro’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. The

Serbs are making efforts to hold those accountable for crimes, but they must do

more. Of course, the United States also remains determined to see Radovan

Karadzic and Ante Gotovina brought to justice in The Hague, and we will continue

pressing all concerned parties to see justice done.

Beyond a settlement in Kosovo and the arrest of the remaining war criminals,

there is another diplomatic hurdle to a peaceful stable Balkans region in the future:

A more unified Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ten years ago this month in Dayton, OH, the

United States negotiated an end to the brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This

was a remarkable diplomatic achievement by President Clinton, Secretary of State

Christopher and its principal architect and negotiator, Richard Holbrooke. The Dayton Peace Accords have provided the foundation upon which the people of Bosnia

and Herzegovina have rebuilt their country and their lives. The Accords have allowed over a million people to return to their prewar homes. On November 21–22,

Secretary Rice and the Bosnia-Herzegovina leadership will commemorate the 10th

anniversary of the Dayton Accords in Washington, DC, Secretary Rice will note the

extraordinary progress that has been made but also focus on the efforts that still

need to be made for Bosnia and Herzegovina to become a fully democratic country.

The Dayton Accords were never meant to be set in stone. The people of Bosnia

and Herzegovina have already recognized the need for reform if they are to join

NATO and the European Union. Just before my visit to Sarajevo in October, the

Bosnian Parliament voted, overwhelming, to create a single, unified army and Defense Ministry—for the 10 years since Dayton, there have been two of each. They

also agreed on the need to reform their police institutions consistent with EU standards, which has enabled the European Union to recommend launching negotiations

on a Stabilization and Association Agreement with Bosnia-Herzegovina this year.

When the Bosnian leadership comes to Washington in 2 weeks, we will be asking

them to embrace an even more ambitious vision—erasing major political divisions

by agreeing to a single Presidency, a stronger prime ministership and a reformed

Parliament. When the Bosnian war stopped in November 1995, the ethnic divisions

in the country were frozen in place. It is now time to remove the Berlin Wall of

separation between Bosnians and strengthen the institutions that will make Bosnia

a true unified state in the future.

There is another issue that demands our attention in the Balkans, the status of

Montenegro. The United States supports the Belgrade Agreement and the Serbia

and Montenegro Constitutional Charter: Documents that present the opportunity for

either republic to hold a referendum on leaving the state union. The United States

will support whatever solution the two republics agree on through democratic

means, whether that is union or independence. Montenegrin officials have indicated

their desire to hold a referendum in 2006 on independence. I told President

Djukanovic last month that any referendum must be held peacefully, and as the result of a process that all sides accept as legitimate. The overarching U.S. goal is

reform and progress toward Europe for both Serbia and Montenegro, in or outside

the state union.

CONCLUSION

The people of the former Yugoslavia suffered through a decade of conflicts brought

on by corrupt and cynical leaders who put their own power, greed, and ethnic

hatreds ahead of the interests of the people. From the ashes of the wars of the

1990s there is now new hope emerging. In my October visit to Sarajevo, Pristina,

17

and Belgrade, I made a point of meeting with students in each city who will soon

be the leaders of their countries and I found these meetings to be extraordinarily

encouraging. In Sarajevo, we met with young Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks who are

working together to break down remaining ethnic differences. In Kosovo, I met with

extraordinarily courageous high school students from Mitrovica. These Serbs and Albanians, separated by the physical bridge dividing their communities, are trying to

create a virtual bridge of computer networks to unite them. I met with young Serbs

at the Faculty of Economics in Belgrade who did not hesitate to express their commitment to justice, peace, and democracy for Serbia and the region. I was struck

by the fact that in each of these three meetings, in three different places, these students, of all the people we met, were the most courageous in putting forward the

proposition that people of different faiths and nationalities should be able to live together in the Balkans of the 21st century. I didn’t hear this message from the political leaders, but I heard it loud and clear from the younger people. I hope that their

voice and their vision of a more just and peaceful region will come to represent the

future for Kosovo, for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for Serbia and Montenegro.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. I look forward to taking your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Burns, for

your testimony.

The Chair will ask that we have a first round with 8 minutes so

that members can have questions and answers. Of course, we want

to respect the fact we have a distinguished witness still to come

and questions of him in due course.

I will begin the questions, Secretary Burns, by combining a twopronged question. The first part is, who should be at the table? In

other words, should the Serbs represent themselves, the Kosovar

Serbs, as opposed to being represented by Belgrade, or should there

be some understanding of who is going to represent the interests

of whom there?

Second, after they get seated at the table, Serbian leaders generally have indicated that independence for Kosovo is a nonstarter,

as I mentioned in my opening statement, but, nevertheless, a fair

number of Kosovar Albanians maintain they will accept nothing

less than independence. Can you sketch roughly how these talks

are likely to go, what sort of threads there are to work with, given

positions that seem to be highly polarized?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I think you have asked the most pertinent political question and that is who is going to be party to these negotiations. It

is still a little bit unclear. I have made two trips to the region in

the last 4 months and in both of my trips, including the one most

recently 3 weeks ago, it is clear to me the Kosovar Albanians will

be there. Now, their challenge is to be unified and not to have a

repetition of Rambouillet, when we saw four or five positions

emerge from one delegation. We have told them that that is their

great challenge if they want to achieve independence, to show that

they have a unified political slate.

The other party at the table will be the Government of Serbia

and Montenegro, obviously, because the big question is, Will

Kosovo remain part of that state, perhaps with greater autonomy,

or will it achieve independence from it?

The third party is the one where I think we are not quite sure

how things are going to work, and that is the Kosovar Serb population. I met with some of the Kosovar Serb leaders in October. A

lot of them would like to be at the table independently to represent

themselves. Others have even suggested it might be good to have

18

a united Kosovar team, Albanian and Serb together. I think the

majority would say they probably ought to sit with the Serb and

Montenegran Government of Prime Minister Kostunica.

But it is a little bit unclear what the configuration of that table

is going to be, and we told President Ahtisaari last week that will

be one of his first challenges.

I think, Mr. Chairman, you have asked another very good question. Your second question is, How is this all going to work? I think

we assume that the international community, President Ahtisaari,

the United States, the European Union, will have to be very actively engaged. While he will likely start with a few trips to the

region in order to meet people and lay down some of the guiding

principles for the talks, it is fairly clear to us that international

ideas, options that we would put on the table as part of the international community, are going to be helpful to them in framing the

choices that they have and also framing the kind of compromises

they are going to have to make as they get closer.

I was struck by something else in both Pristina and Belgrade. I

told the Kosovar Albanian Team of Unity that they had to compromise. Senator Biden suggested this as well. They looked at me

as if I had said something surprising. I said I could not see them

attaining their objective without some compromise.

They have to assure the minority population there is a future for

that minority population. They have to assure them that their historical sites and churches are going to be respected. That was not

the case a year and a half ago in March 2004.

One of the questions will be, If there is going to be a new state,

should it have a military? I think most people would say probably

not. We are probably going to have to see a period of time, whatever the outcome is, for NATO to provide security on the military

side and for the United Nations to provide some kind of civil administration. Most people believe that the negotiations are going to

focus on those issues.

Let me just say, I failed—I should have mentioned this in my

opening testimony. We are very proud of what American forces

have done in Kosovo. We have 1,700 Americans there. They are

mainly from National Guard contingents, currently from California.

They have done a great job providing security. They are also rebuilding schools. They are reaching out to the community. We can

be proud of them.

The American commitment here to keep our military forces in

place through these negotiations is going to be very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Burns, you have mentioned potential

roles for perhaps NATO and even the United Nations. What would

be the role of the European Union in the event that negotiations

progress toward some semblance of a future for the area? Do you

believe the European Union will take a leading role in this situation and offer some continuity in the future, or what do you see the

EU doing?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do think the European

Union intends to play a very vigorous role here. First of all, at the

end of these negotiations we hope that Serbia and Montenegro is

going to be pointed toward future membership in the European

Union. If they can arrest Mladic, we said we would accept them

19

into the Partnership for Peace in NATO the next day. Certainly,

looking far into the future, we see Serbia and Montenegro as the

keystone state in the Balkans and we want them to be a member

of NATO and the European Union.

So I think as the Serbs sit down to calculate their interests at

these negotiations, they need to see the result as serving this interest of EU membership in the future, NATO membership in the future. If they negotiate in the right way, in a constructive way, and

if they are able to compromise themselves, I think that is one of

the great advantages for them.

For the Kosovars themselves, it is to find a way forward toward

self-governance, greater self-governance, and it is to figure out this

question of minority rights balanced by what the majority wants.

So I do see the negotiations focusing on those questions. The EU

has been a major contributor of economic funds for development.

European troops are the majority of troops in the NATO force and

will remain so. The Americans are a slim minority of the force. So

we do count on the active involvement of the European allies.

The CHAIRMAN. Hypothetically, is it conceivable that Kosovo

could, in due course, become a member of the EU or NATO? This

leaps ahead, I suppose, on the independence question or what the

status may be, but is the state large enough? Is it doable? As you

are offering incentives for the Serbs and Montenegro, what do you

offer to the Kosovars?

Mr. BURNS. I think we will have to see what the outcome of the

negotiations is. If the outcome is of an independent state, then, obviously, it should be, in my view, in the interest of both NATO and

the European Union to see all the states of southeast Europe and

the Balkans as tied to, associated with, both NATO and the European Union. The American view is—we are a member of only one

of these institutions—that NATO’s door should remain open and

that our strategic aim—and this has really unified President Bush

41, President Clinton, and President Bush 43—should be to see all

of Europe democratic, peaceful, united, and that these two institutions, NATO and the EU, should be the pillars of this community.

So, yes; no state is too small to come into NATO. Iceland has

280,000 people; they are a member of NATO. Luxembourg has

375,000 people; they are a member of NATO. Both are charter

members of the NATO alliance.

So part of what we have been saying to the parties, the Europeans and the United States Government, is if you negotiate constructively, if you are fair to the other partner, if you look at this

as a win-win for both parties, your future can be association with

the EU and NATO itself.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, I am not being solicitous when I

say I am delighted, as my friend from Ohio said, that the administration has the team it has in place here, number one.

Number two, I do not disagree with anything in your construct

as you laid out how to view this. I would like to focus on two things

that do not lend themselves to clear answers, but maybe you could

give me your instinct. It seems—when I was a kid in grade school,

I was taught by the nuns. Every once in a while I would inapproVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:26 Nov 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 KOSOV1.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
20

priately—I know this will shock everyone—intervene in a dispute

that was going on among my classmates and be told that I should

stay after school for having done so.

The nuns used to make you write on the board 300, 200, 500

times, while they were cleaning up for the day, some saying. One

I used to have to write quite often, when I would say: But, sister,

I was—she would say: Joey, everyone can solve a problem except

he who has it. That is the one I used to have to write 500 times.

It seems to me that the path for the Kosovars, as well as Serbs

within Kosovo, as well as Serbia, is pretty clear if you were to just

sit down and analytically look at it. It is in everyone’s interest, if,

in fact, Belgrade does not insist upon, would support independence,

and it seems it is, obviously, in everyone’s interest if, in Pristina,

the judgment was made there would be ironclad guarantees for minorities. It seems that that would open the door for both countries

in ways that would provide a much, much, much more promising

future for both countries.

But I understand 800 years of history or longer and it is difficult.

So my first question is—and it is going to sound, it will sound

somewhat naive. There has now been a passage of time since the

open and direct conflict. Do you get a sense that there is any softening at all on the part of the leadership, not the young people, on

the part of the leadership, or a recognition that there are greener

pastures if they yield on some things that were unthinkable to

think about yielding on a couple years ago?

I mean, has time made this more difficult or has time opened up

additional opportunities for people to think somewhat differently

about it? I realize that is a very, very broad question and maybe

does not lend itself to a clear answer. But what does your instinct

tell you?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Senator. I think it is a very good question because it really underlines the psychological elements of the

situation there and of any outcome.

I think that the 61⁄2 years that separate them from the Kosovar

war on the attempted ethnic cleansing of 1 million people, I think

they have served to gradually bind up some of the wounds. There

are people in Kosovo on the Serb and Albanian side arguing for a

multiethnic society. There are Serb leaders—President Tadic is one

of them, the President of Serbia, who is arguing for tolerance and

arguing for a sense of modernity as the Serbs look at this question,

and it is good to see that. But I must say there is too little of it.

There is too little of it.

When I sat down with Team of Unity, the five leading Kosovar

Albanian politicians, not only were they arguing amongst each

other, but they were not really willing at this point even to sit

down face to face with the Serb leadership.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you a second question. I am of the

view, because I think it has had an impact, that international pressure—European, American, not just European, but pressure—matters to the parties here; that, given relatively stark alternatives as

to what their future looks like, I think it gets the attention of those

people who have been unwilling to yield sufficiently on the broader

underlying concerns about retribution, what history dictates, what

justice calls for, et cetera, the terminology I always get when I am

21

in the region, although I have not been there—I have been there

I think a dozen times, but I have not been there in the last 2 years.

So, is there an emerging or existing unanimity among the

major—among the EU, the NATO members—and, obviously, we

are included in the NATO piece—the United States, about what

are sort of the basic nonstarters? One is no greater Albania. I

mean, that is off the table. No change in borders if there is independence; ironclad commitment to minority rights that are enforceable; return of refugees. That is our position, the elements of our

position, without dictating what outcome we are looking for.

Is there pretty wide unanimity there or is there a continued existence of a feeling that I have gotten in European capitals, that

an independent Kosovo, even with these guarantees where they do

exist, is a nonstarter? There are a number of—there was and has

been and continues to be—and I wonder what is happening in

France now, whether it exacerbates it—there is, I believe, a European—I was going to say ‘‘bias’’; that may not be the right word—

a sort of a generic concern that exists in most continental European countries about the existence of essentially a Muslim state, a

state that is not Muslim in terms of its constitution, but in terms

of its population. There is this concern that is always expressed

and it is always just beneath the surface, in my view.

So tell me a little bit if you will, Nick, about European attitudes

and how they may or may not differ, without mentioning any specific country, from our sort of bottom line—no greater Albania in

the future, territorial integrity, minority rights enforceable, return

of refugees, among others?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you. Frankly, I think there is a great deal of

international cohesion between the Europeans and the United

States as we approach the negotiations. Just last week, we agreed

on a set of guiding principles for these talks. We sent them to Kofi

Annan, we sent them to President Ahtisaari. I sent them to the

Serb leadership and the Albanian leadership, as we had chaired

the—the United States had chaired the Contact Group meeting.

You mentioned some of them, and there are others, and I can

read them to you. I think that Russia, the European Union, NATO,

and the other members of the Contact Group—Britain, France,

Germany, Italy, the United States—have all agreed on these. That

is a tremendous strength for these negotiations. The parties are not

receiving mixed messages from the international community.

To get to your second point, it is a very strong one. There is no

country that is now saying that independence is a nonstarter.

Countries are being very careful, as is the United States. We are

trying very hard not to try to script these negotiations. We are not

saying, as a government, which outcome we prefer. But we all understand that independence is an option, that continued autonomy

or greater autonomy is also an option, and that it would be probably tactically very ineffective for the Contact Group to take a position at this stage. Better to let the parties argue that out, define

their differences and then common ground. That will be our avenue

to be effective in these negotiations.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Hagel.

22

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Secretary. I would like to follow up on one of

Senator Biden’s questions, Secretary Burns, and you cover it in

your statement that you present to the committee and you have

mentioned it a couple of times this morning. I will read from your

statement: ‘‘In October I met with the Kosovar Albanian Team of

Unity established by the President.’’ It goes on. Then you say: ‘‘As

late as last week, there were troubling signs that Kosovo Albanian

leaders are anything but united.’’

My question is—and again, you have developed that here this

morning to some extent—where then will the openings come?

Where are the prospects for a starting point to get to where they

need to be, as you have laid it out very clearly to them?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Senator Hagel. I think there is some

common ground. All these parties—the Kosovar Serbs, the Kosovar

Albanians, the Government in Belgrade—understand that in its

present state, Kosovo, is not an entity that can support itself.

There is tremendous unemployment. People, young people, are

leaving. There is no opportunity. There is no normal relationship

of the people there with the rest of the outside world in terms of

bank loans or association with the IMF or the World Bank or regional development banks.

I think they all understand that, 61⁄2 years after the war, it is

time to get on and define the future status of this, of Kosovo, so

that there can be some benefits to the people there, so that people

have a sense of who they are and what their future is. That is common ground.

There is also common ground in democracy. When you go to Belgrade and Pristina, they all want a democratic outcome. They do

not want to see this province recede into some type of authoritarian

state. They want to see democracy. I think we can take advantage

of that common ground, we who will help in these negotiations,

along with these guiding principles that we just talked to Senator

Biden about, and I think that does provide some of the opening for

this admittedly rather difficult negotiation, because these parties

are separated and they are not talking to each other right now, and

they are separated by 1,000 years of history and they are separated

by the horrific events of 7 years ago, and they remember them, obviously. So there is a lot of work that needs to be done.

Could I say one more thing about the Kosovar Albanians just in

response to your question, Senator? They need to be unified and

they are not presently unified. They need to be willing to compromise and they have an aversion, they say, to that. Third, there

can be no reverse ethnic cleansing. It would be a tragic irony if,

after we saved, we helped to save, 1 million people from ethnic

cleansing, some of those people and their leaders decide that they

would as a political tactic in the negotiations try to drive the

Kosovar Serbs out of Kosovo.

What we have told them is that NATO is there and that NATO

is going to maintain order and will use force if people use violence

as a political tactic.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

You also note in your statement—and I will read from the statement: ‘‘Until the government turns over indicted mass murder

23

Radko Mladic to The Hague, the United States will not agree to

Serbia and Montenegro’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for

Peace, which you have covered in your opening remarks as well.’’

My question is, Is that the only condition for NATO Partnership

for Peace membership; turning over Mladic?

Mr. BURNS. From the American point of view, yes. Three years

ago, NATO decided—and we were very much a part of this decision, Secretary Powell was—that we just could not see bringing

Serbia and Montenegro into NATO as long as Mladic was at large.

The Serbs will even tell you, the Serb Government will tell you,

that until 2 years ago he was living on a Serb military base near

Belgrade. For 8 years he was protected by the Serb state. Now they

say he is at large.

We think he can be captured or convinced to surrender voluntarily, and once they do that, once that happens, we said we would

support the Serb Government for Partnership for Peace. That does

not mean membership in NATO. It just means, as you know very

well, the beginning stage of a relationship with NATO. That is

their challenge.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Toward the end of your statement, you say: ‘‘There is another

issue that demands our attention in the Balkans, the status of

Montenegro.’’ Then you go on in that paragraph and say: ‘‘Whether

that is union or independence, Montenegran officials have indicated their desire to hold a referendum in 2006 on independence.’’

Could you elaborate and define that for us as to the status and

where you think that is going next year?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Senator Hagel. Yes; one of the complicating factors potentially in these Kosovo negotiations is that Serbia and Montenegro, the State Union, may face a political crisis of

sorts. The Montenegrans, led by President Djukanovic, with whom

I met in Belgrade, say that they want to have a referendum in

2006 on the independence of Montenegro. Now, the State Union

Constitutional Charter does present that opportunity.

I told President Djukanovic the United States does not take a position, does not have a position, we do not want to assert a position

on this issue. This is really a question for Serbia and Montenegro

to work out on its own. But the way you conduct any referendum

if you decide to have one has got to be consistent with international

norms. There has been lots of advice given to them by the Council

of Europe, by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, and

we think they should pay attention to that, so that any referendum, which would be very consequential, about independence

truly reflected the will of the people and was unassailable in terms

of the way that it was carried out.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Back to Kosovo, the question is this. Describe the strengths that

you see currently in the Kosovo Government; within the institution, where are the strengths to build on? We have talked a lot

about weaknesses and conditions. Then, maybe in addition to that,

what additional external forces or assistance might be needed as

these negotiations continue? But I’m particularly, to begin with, interested in your assessment of the strengths that we can work from

that foundation.

24

Mr. BURNS. There are strengths in Kosovar society. There is no

question that the great majority of people have a common vision

of the future. There is no question that they understand that 2006

is the critical year for them. I think Dr. Rugova provides strength.

He is a courageous man. He has said publicly that he has lung cancer. He is undergoing treatment for that cancer, and yet he is still

active politically. We met with him 3 weeks ago in his home. He

is obviously ill.

But it was his idea to form this Team of Unity. Just as at Rambouillet, his position has been that Kosovo cannot achieve, or

should not try to achieve, a solution by violence. It should be by

nonviolence, and there has to be unity. I think there is a chance

that there will be unity.

I have mentioned a lot, today, the need for unity because we are

worried about the political dynamics in Pristina, and this is a very

public way of communicating with them at a hearing like this. But

I believe in the end that the political leaders of the Kosovar Albanian community will understand this is a supreme opportunity for

them to convince the rest of the world that they are ready for selfgovernment. That is what they want to prove and I think they can

do that.

There has also been a lot of very good work done in Kosovo to

promote multiethnicity. There has been some good work done on

refugee return. So there are strengths that we can build on.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I join my colleagues in welcoming you here this

morning. First of all, just some basic facts: What do you now estimate the population of Kosovo to be and how is it divided in ethnic

terms?

Mr. BURNS. Senator, it is a little bit difficult to say exactly what

the population is because of the dislocations of the last 7 years. But

roughly 2 million people and most people assume that roughly 90

percent of the people who currently live there are Kosovar Albanians. Now, that does not take into account the many thousands

of Kosovar Serbs who left after 1999.

Senator SARBANES. So you estimate the current population would

be about 2 million?

Mr. BURNS. Correct.

Senator SARBANES. 1.8 million of them are ethnic Albanians and

200,000 are ethnic Serbs?

Mr. BURNS. And these are very rough estimates, and I would be

happy to follow up in written form and give you even the best specific estimates that we have.

[The information referred to above was not made available before

the printing of this hearing.]

Senator SARBANES. How many Serbs do you estimate have left

Kosovo, that you just mentioned?

Mr. BURNS. Right.

Senator SARBANES. How large is that group?

Mr. BURNS. I would like to get back to you with a written answer

because I do not want to mislead you as to the number. But a sigVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:26 Nov 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 KOSOV1.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
25

nificant portion of the Kosovar Serb community left in 1999 and in

subsequent years until today, and when I was there a few weeks

ago I was told by the Kosovar Serbs that there is still a net outflow

of people from their community leaving Kosovo on a semipermanent or permanent basis.

Senator SARBANES. There is this regional grouping, the Southeast European Cooperation Process, comprised of other countries in

the Balkans, and they not too long ago made a strong statement

about some of the latest things that have happened there, in terms

of attacks on religious institutions and so forth. Should they be involved in this consultative process that is going along?

Mr. BURNS. Yes; and I think they will be. I know that President

Ahtisaari is going to represent the United Nations and so he wants

to draw upon the influence and the ideas, not just of the Contact

Group, the countries that I mentioned earlier, but also some of the

neighbors. Certainly Macedonia has a lot to offer in terms of the

experience that they have had in trying to promote multiethnicity.

Greece is going to be very important and the Greek Ambassador,

in fact, is here today in this room because of their historic involvement and also their trade and investment ties. Albanian is a country that will be important to shaping a final outcome.

So, I think it is correct to assume that President Ahtisaari, and

certainly we in our own capacity, will be reaching out to these

neighbors of Kosovo.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think the Contact Group should consult and meet with the Southeast European Cooperation Process

countries?

Mr. BURNS. I think it is a good idea to stay in touch with those

countries. We do bilaterally. We, the United States, have in fact.

I have had discussions with the Greek Foreign Minister as well as

the Greek Ambassador to the United States about what our strategy is and what our hopes are. We are hoping that these countries

will be involved.

As to whether or not the Contact Group and the Southeast Europe Group should meet, that is a good idea. I have no objection

to it whatsoever. It has not happened to date.

Senator SARBANES. Do you think it might contribute toward

peace and stability in the region?

Mr. BURNS. I think that as we go through these negotiations—

and nobody knows how long they are going to last—it is going to

be important for the neighbors of Kosovo to be involved in giving

their ideas and giving their support to the U.N. Special Negotiator;

yes.

Senator SARBANES. Earlier you spoke about assuring the protection of minority rights. How do you assure the minority that their

rights will be protected?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think one common denominator of these negotiations will be that it is likely that, whatever the outcome, there

will be a continuing need for an international security presence to

provide that kind of assurance to the minority population over

some period of time, that they can live there and not fear that they

will be attacked, that their homes will be burned down, or they will

be killed, as was the case in March 2004.

26

Second, there is going to be some type of international civil administration, whether it is through the European Union or the concept of a high representative or U.N. involvement. I think both of

those—there has to be remaining international institutional involvement beyond any settlement in my view to provide the kind

of assurances to a minority, the Serb population, that they will

need.

Senator SARBANES. The place was under U.N. administration and

backed by NATO forces, right? Is that not the current state?

Mr. BURNS. That is right.

Senator SARBANES. And yet in March 2004 there was this desecration and destruction of all of these religious sites, and those

forces were not able to prevent it. Now, on the basis of that quite

recent history, what are the prospects for assuring that minority

rights will be protected? It seems to me you are starting out on a

path now to try to negotiate a final status. As I understand it, one

of the principles you outlined was the protection of minority rights.

How can you assure that, when very recent history was a clear

demonstration of an inability to do that?

Mr. BURNS. You are correct, Senator, in my view that March

2004 was a travesty. What happened is that the NATO forces

were ordered into the streets to protect the Serb homes and Serb

churches that were under attack. Part of the NATO forces responded, did their job, and protected Serbs. Some stayed in their

barracks.

Why did they do that? Because they had what we call in NATO

bureaucratic parlance, national caveats. The soldiers of certain

NATO allies could not actually deploy until they had orders, not

from the local NATO commander, but from their capitals. It was

the delay in getting those orders, in some cases 24 to 48 hours,

that meant that NATO did not do its job.

That produced a crisis of sorts in NATO. I was at NATO at the

time as Ambassador. We had to undergo a period of introspection

about what went wrong. General Jones has now led over the last

year and a half an effort to reform the NATO forces there, to remove all of those national caveats, and so he now can assure us,

as he did NATO a couple of weeks ago, that if there is any act of

political violence all the NATO troops involved will obey the orders

of the local commander.

So I think it is that credibility that is important, and the key to

that is the presence of American forces and of the United States,

because our credibility is quite high. Our troops, by the way, American troops, did go into the troops in March 2004 and they did their

job.

Senator SARBANES. Let me ask one final question before my time

runs out. The conflict there is seen through the prism of ethnic conflict, but there are extraordinarily difficult economic circumstances,

which some, at least, think also contribute to the confrontation and

the difficulties. What are the economic prospects for Kosovo?

I am told that the unemployment level may be as high as 50, 60

percent. There are differing estimates, but everyone seems to agree

that it is close to a basket case economically. What is going to happen on that front?

27

Mr. BURNS. Oh, I think it is one of the great challenges of these

upcoming negotiations. There is going to have to be a lot of talk

about how a future Kosovo, whatever the outcome is, is going to

survive economically. There is a tremendous amount of lignite

there. There are some raw materials that can be exploited on a

profitable basis.

Very important to increase the trade and investment ties, particularly Greece, which is a leading investor, and some of the other

regional countries, and also some of the countries of the former

Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Slovakia. Germany is going to be very important. This is not going to be easy. There are no easy fixes to cure

the massive economic problems that Kosovo has.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Mr. Secretary. I admire what you are doing in difficult

circumstances, and you bring a priority on this area traveling there

twice recently. So I applaud what you are doing.

My question is, In your prepared statement you said that the

status quo in Kosovo is neither sustainable nor desirable. But Ambassador Holbrooke, if I can steal from his statement, said that

prior to the Dayton Accords 300,000 people had died and over 2.5

million people had been made homeless by the worst war in Europe

in 50 years, but in the 10 years since Dayton not one American or

NATO soldier has been killed or wounded from hostile action. Not

one has been killed or wounded from hostile action.

So why is the status quo not sustainable nor desirable? Where

is the pressure to make changes?

Mr. BURNS. Thank you, Senator. I agree with Ambassador

Holbrooke, the record of American and NATO involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is extraordinary in terms of the NATO peacekeeping effort and the record that he talked about and you just

quoted.

I would say this. The status quo cannot be sustained because the

people of Kosovo will not let it. Kosovo in most people’s view is a

political pressure cooker. Ninety percent of the people say they

want one thing, 10 percent say they want something else.

It is not desirable because we agreed in June 1999 when we

passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 that we had to get

to this issue of what the future is. We decided to put it on ice, to

have things calm down, tempers and passions cool, to work on this

issue of standards, readying themselves for a future.

It has been 61⁄2 years and I think it is the political insight of

nearly everybody with whom I have talked from every country,

whether it is Russia or any European country, that we now have

to—they have to face this question and we have to let them face

this question of what their future is.

We saw an explosion of sorts in March 2004 and that is another

reason why it is not sustainable. NATO, in a very haphazard way

and somewhat ineffectively, was able to keep the peace in March

2004. We do not want to see that kind of violence again. So that

is why we are imbued with this thought that we have to get on

with negotiations to define its future.

28

Senator CHAFEE. It seems as though that—you mention in your

statement that in your trips there you talk about independence.

You say—let us see if I can get it here: ‘‘If the Kosovo Albanians

aspire to independence, this is the greatest opportunity to make

their case to the world that should they become independent they

will be able to govern effectively, in a way that promotes stability

in the region.’’ You go on to say that: ‘‘I made it clear to them that

independence must be earned,’’ and yet it must be a nonstarter for

the Serbs.

So back to my original question, it seems as though any movement forward is hazardous. Would you agree?

Mr. BURNS. Oh, I think these are going to be extremely complicated and divisive and difficult negotiations. There is no question about it. This is about as difficult a set of talks as you can

imagine diplomatically. On the other hand, I think nearly everyone

agrees that if we do nothing, if our message to the Kosovar population was, your situation is going to be frozen for the next decade,

that would produce change on the ground that we would not like

to see. It would most likely produce—I would not want to ever predict this, but most people believe it would produce a period of instability and probably of violence.

So you have these difficult choices about whether or not you go

ahead. What is remarkable—and this gets back to Senator Biden’s

question—is that there is a lot of unity in the international community. I sat with the Contact Group last week. I hosted them here

in Washington. The Russians, the French, the Germans, the British, the Italians, the Americans, NATO, the European Union, and

the United Nations all agree that we now have to let them face this

question of what their future will be and they have to decide it.

Senator CHAFEE. You also talked about the students and your

meeting with the students. I was struck by the fact that in each

of these three meetings in three different places these students, of

all the people you met, were the most courageous in putting forward the proposition that people of different faiths and nationalities should be able to live together in the Balkans in the 21st century. I did not hear this message from the political leaders, but I

heard it loud and clear from the younger people. There is another—

maybe—piece of evidence that maybe if we wait for this new generation to assume leadership roles maybe the status quo is not so

bad.

But I hear what you are saying, that the people of Kosovo just

cannot be put on ice for another 10 years.

Mr. BURNS. There was a striking contrast between our meetings

with these young students in each place and the meeting with the

political leadership, striking, because a lot of these young kids are

able to face squarely the past. A lot of the Muslims and Serbs want

to reconcile with each other. In Mitrovica, which is the great example of the division of Kosovo—it is a divided city, divided by a river

and a bridge, the Serbs on the north side, the Muslims on the

south. The Muslim cemetery is in the north, the Serb cemetery is

in the south. These young kids have taken it upon themselves to

unite to provide security for people who want to visit the cemetery.

So you are a Muslim, you get a Serb person, Serb men, helping you

29

to go and visit the graves of your ancestors on the north side of

town, and vice versa.

They have computer networks. They are the ones leading. They

are showing that multiethnicity can work. The reason I mentioned

that in my testimony is that I think that is the fundamental challenge that the older generation, people our age, people who are in

charge there, face, to understand that there is only one way forward and that is for Serbs and Albanians to live together in

Kosovo.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. BURNS. Thank you very much.

Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of the things that I was impressed with when Ms. DiCarlo

visited our office is that there were certain principles that everyone

has agreed on: There will be no return to the pre-1999 conditions

in Kosovo; there will be no partition of Kosovo; there will be no

changing borders in the region, i.e., Kosovo cannot join Albania,

any advocate of violence will be prohibited from participating in the

status talks, if any participant walks away from the negotiations

for any reason the negotiations will continue without them. So everyone has agreed to that, is that right?

Mr. BURNS. Well, the United States and our international partners agree to that and we hope the parties will agree to it, too. We

cannot see any possibility of a change of borders in the Balkans.

That would establish a precedent that would be quite dangerous for

the future. We cannot see partition as a possibility, either. So those

are the guiding principles that we have put down and we hope very

much that the parties will agree to them.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you really believe that the Europeans understand how important this is to finally integrating southeast Europe into Europe in terms of something that we have talked about?

I mean, I always talk about the Balkans is the barking dog of foreign policy. It barks and people do something about it, and then

things go back to the way they were before, and then it barks

again.

Do they understand this is an absolute wonderful opportunity,

maybe the last opportunity they have got, to really bring these

folks into Europe?

That is one question. The other is, Do they also understand the

fragility of how this has got to be handled? Because if it is done

wrong, as I mentioned in my remarks, you are going to allow the

Serbian nationalists to exploit the situation for their political purposes. I just wonder, do the Europeans understand that and, by the

way, do the Kosovars understand that—that in terms of how this

is handled it is going to have a lot to deal—a lot to do with whether

or not they are going to have the democratic leadership in SerbiaMontenegro, and that if it fails, that these other people are successful, that the situation will be far worse than it is today, because

they will continue this ongoing debate that has gone on for centuries about what happens to Kosovo?

30

Mr. BURNS. Senator, I do think the Europeans understand the

opportunity here. You remember after the failed referenda in the

Netherlands and in France in the spring there was a lot of speculation that Europe would trim its ambitions to enlarge the European

Union. Xavier Solana and Jean-Claude Junker, the Prime Minister

of Luxembourg, came directly, following those referenda, to the

United States and met with President Bush and they said there

are going to be a lot of questions about what Europe is and how

far European Union goes to expand, but that is not about the Balkans. They said: We are convinced that the Balkans are the heart

of Europe and that we in Europe have an obligation to help the

Balkan countries, particularly Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo, and

Bosnia, to become attached to Europe and to the European Union.

So you have seen an association agreement now between SerbiaMontenegro and the European Union just in the last month. That

is very positive. You have seen the EU reach out with lots of money

to underwrite economic development, and in both Bosnia and

Kosovo the EU countries, the European members of NATO, are

providing the vast majority of troops.

But I think you put your finger on something that we have not

talked much about this morning and that is Serbia-Montenegro.

That is the key country in the region. That is the country that is

trying to find its way forward after the assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic toward a better future. And if the result of these

Kosovo talks can be that Serbia-Montenegro is assured a place in

association with the EU and if they can work on their relationship

with NATO by arresting Mladic, this need not be, these negotiations, any kind of defeat for the Serbs or for Serbia-Montenegro. In

fact, it is in our interest to see Serbia-Montenegro strengthened ultimately as a result of all these changes over the last 10 or 15

years in the Balkans, because it is such an important state for the

future unity of the region.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do the Kosovars understand how fragile

these are—these talks are—in terms of the political situation? I

mean, when you come to a negotiation there has got to be some

kind of incentives. What are the incentives to the Kosovars to work

something out? What are the incentives to the Serbs to work things

out? Would one of their incentives be that you would have people

that are committed to democracy in Serbia that want to move forward and enlightened and that if it does not work that you are

going to get bad people? I mean, do they get it? Do you think that

Rugova and the rest of them get it?

Mr. BURNS. I think the enlightened Kosovar Albanian leaders

understand that they have to live next door to Serbia and Montenegro for the whole rest of Kosovo’s history, and so, therefore, there

has to be some kind of rapprochement between the Albanian and

Serb populations in the future.

The incentive for the Kosovar Albanians is they cannot achieve

what they desire until they prove to the international community

that they are capable of the self-government that they say they

want, and that does entail unity. The incentive for the Serb Government should be that they want to have strategically a better relationship with NATO and the European Union. That is what

31

Prime Minister Kostunica has told me and others. That is what

President Tadic has said.

If you build those incentives into these negotiations, then you

can begin to see your way toward a successful negotiation in 2006,

and that is very much a part of the approach that we have, we

Americans, to these negotiations.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you think that the Kosovars understand

how important the religious sites are to the Serbs; it is a symbol,

that if they were guaranteed that these shrine sites would be preserved and not destroyed, how much that would mean in terms of

their ability to move forward with negotiations in terms of their

status?

Mr. BURNS. Well, I think actually this is a very important issue

for the negotiations, the protection of churches, historical sites, and

patrimonial sites, because, obviously, the extremists on the

Kosovar Albanian side want to erase Serb history in Kosovo. That

is why they attacked the churches and burned them down in

March 2004. It is in our self-interest to protect those sites because

we cannot see a future of Kosovo without Serbs living in it.

Senator VOINOVICH. How is the rebuilding coming? We had a

problem there with Bishop Artemije and now the Serbian Orthodox

Church has gotten more involved. Are they moving forward with

the restoration of those churches now?

Mr. BURNS. It is hit or miss, and I would be happy to get you

a written report on this. But there had been some problems in the

wake of the violence in reconstruction. But now we have been able

to reconstruct some of the homes. In fact, I visited one of the homes

in Obelic that had been reconstructed. And we are doing work on

churches, we the international community. It is terribly important

to do that.

Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I wish you good luck and we will certainly do what we can to be supportive.

Mr. BURNS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

I have no further questions. Senator Biden, do you have additional questions?

Senator BIDEN. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. No, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Chafee.

Senator CHAFEE. No, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Voinovich, do you have additional questions?

Senator VOINOVICH. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for your statement and

for your testimony and for your very forthcoming responses to our

questions. It is always great to have you. Thank you, Secretary

Burns.

Mr. BURNS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The chair would now like to call Ambassador

Holbrooke to the table for his statement.

[Pause.]

32

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Holbrooke, it is a privilege to have

you with the committee again. We look forward to your testimony.

As I have indicated to Secretary Burns, your full statement will be

made part of the record. You may proceed as you would wish and

then the committee would like to ask questions of you. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, VICE

CHAIRMAN, PERSEUS LLC, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What a great honor

to be back before this committee, which I first testified before in

1977, and especially to appear today on this very important subject

and before so many friends and associates.

Allow me to begin with a very brief reminiscence. Ten years ago

today I was at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH,

on the 8th day of the 21-day negotiation that brought the war in

Bosnia to an end. I am accompanied here today by several of the

veterans of that negotiation, including the previous witness. The

route to get there had been tortuous and the end came only after

about 300,000 people had been killed, over 2.5 million made homeless by the worst war in Europe in 50 years.

Decisive American action had been slow and two administrations

had failed to take sufficient action to stop the conflict, leaving the

primary responsibility in the hands of the European Union and the

United Nations, both of which had utterly failed in the first significant post-cold-war test.

During that long bleak period, members of this particular committee, including Chairman Lugar and its ranking minority member, Senator Biden, had pressed the case continually for active

American action. I remember especially, Mr. Chairman, coming before this committee for confirmation as Assistant Secretary of State

for European Affairs in 1994. Prior to that hearing I met privately

with Senator Biden in a room off the Senate floor and he delivered

one of those warnings that most of you in this room are quite familiar with. While Senate rules of decorum prevent me from repeating verbatim what Senator Biden said that day, I can tell you

that he was scathing in his denunciation of American inaction and

lack of leadership, he was precise in his description of the situation

on the ground, he was visionary in his prescription of what had to

be done to stop the war, and he was very explicit in his references

to which part of my anatomy I would lose if we did not do something about it.

Dayton ended that war and I think that Senator Biden and the

rest of you should be pleased at your own unique role in that process. One of the many lessons of the negotiation, one that Senator

Biden and you and the rest of you, but especially Senator Biden in

my own experience, was so forceful in putting forward, as he has

done again in Iraq: The absolute necessity of strong American leadership, which Under Secretary Burns just alluded to.

I would also add one lesson from Bosnia and Kosovo that was not

applied in Iraq, with tragic consequences. We took to Dayton a 200-

page peace plan, much of which was drafted by my colleague, Roberts Owen, our legal adviser, who is here with us today. It contained detailed documentation covering every aspect of the postVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:26 Nov 20, 2006 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 KOSOV1.TXT sforel1 PsN: sforel1
33

war period, from giving authority to the military to shoot first and

ask questions later, to 11 detailed annexes on political and economic and social issues. Dayton was not perfect, far from it. But

it ended the war and, as Senator Chafee has already quoted, contrary to every prediction, there were no American or NATO casualties.

Today, out of the 20,000 soldiers we sent to Bosnia in 1996, only

about 150 remain. But they are an essential reminder that we will

remain engaged.

So I want to thank my friend, Senator Biden, you, Mr. Chairman, and my other friends and colleagues on this committee for

their support and their encouragement in the last decade. I hope

you feel that, however imperfectly and belatedly, we achieved the

lofty goals that you set out for us and that Senator Biden did not,

therefore, have to relieve me of any body parts.

I also should make a footnote that my association with Senator

Voinovich did not date to that period, but in a subsequent period

of service we also had extensive talks on these issues, and I am

most grateful to you for your advice and support as well, sir.

On a personal note, 10 years ago today as I was at Dayton my

friend and then colleague, Nick Burns, who was then Secretary of

State Warren Christopher’s spokesman, was flying back to Dayton

with his boss, Warren Christopher, for one of the four trips he

would make to the negotiating site. Nick, whom I consider one of

the outstanding diplomats of modern American diplomacy, was not

only a frequent visitor to Dayton—you can leave now, Nick; that

is the end—was not only a frequent visitor to Dayton, he was also

the only person in Dayton or Washington authorized by all the parties to speak on the record about what was going on.

This experience 10 years ago has been critically important, I believe, in preparing him for the extremely important assignment

that Secretary Rice gave him to oversee American policy toward

the Balkans. I am very pleased, therefore, that Nick Burns has, at

Secretary Rice’s direction, reengaged American policy in the Balkans after 4 years of drift and neglect that was at times hardly benign.

Under their guidance—that is, of Secretary Rice and Secretary

Burns—a plan to mark the 10th anniversary of Dayton, November

21, with a series of improvements on the original agreement has

been put into place. These improvements are long overdue. Police

and military reform, movement to a single Presidency, a reconciliation mission, and others are under way, and they have my full

support, and there is hardly a word in Nick Burns’s testimony that

I would disagree with, although as a private citizen, Mr. Chairman,

I am free to go slightly further than he has in regard to Kosovo.

There, Ambassador Burns has undertaken an even more

daunting task. For if the war in Bosnia is truly over and will not

resume, this cannot be said of Kosovo. War could break out there

at any time and it would be a bloody, bloody event. Tensions between the two main ethnic groups are as high as ever. The loss of

4 years pursuing a failed U.N.–EU–U.S. theory called ‘‘standards

before status,’’ which was really, as Senator Biden said already,

kicking the can down the road, a way of avoiding action, that 4

years is irretrievable.

34

During that time ethnic tensions rose, real opportunities were

missed, and events removed or weakened two of the leading political figures in the region, the late Serbian Prime Minister Zoran

Djindjic, who was assassinated by paramilitary thugs, and Kosovo

President Ibrahim Rugova, who, as you have already heard from

Secretary Burns, is now seriously ill.

Now, ‘‘standards before status’’ has finally been removed as an

obstacle to progress in implementing U.N. Resolution 1244, which

called for these final status talks. The delay was costly, as I have

said, but it is time to get on with it and this hearing today I hope

launches an intense period of effort in that area.

I am pleased that Secretary Kofi Annan has appointed Martti

Ahtisaari as negotiator and I look forward to the appointment in

the near future of an American of comparable rank. It will be a difficult task, but it is essential to start.

Now, official negotiators cannot, of course, proclaim in advance

to the outcome of a negotiation. That violates all negotiating procedures, and I greatly respect and admire the skill with which Secretary Burns dealt with those questions when you asked them. But

I feel that I owe it to you as your friend and as a private citizen

to give views which are only mine, and mine alone, to answer the

questions you have already raised.

In that spirit, let me be clear. I do not see any final status for

Kosovo other, ultimately, than independence. But at the same

time—and this must be stressed equally—this cannot be achieved

without ironclad guarantees for the safety, security, and protection

of the rights of the Serbs who live in Kosovo, the protection of their

magnificent religious and cultural and historic monuments, and all

the other guarantees that they are due.

While I have said this in the past frequently, whenever I have

said it, each side has characteristically quoted only half my statement. So let me repeat: Kosovo’s destiny, in my view, is an independent state, but it will not get there unless its Serb minority can

live in peace with ironclad guarantees with the Albanian majority.

For the long-oppressed Albanian majority, this would finally rectify, in their view, the events of 1911–12. But independence cannot

come simply to replace one form of oppression with another, the reverse ethnic cleansing which Nick Burns already alluded to. Would

independence for Kosovo be accompanied by another bloodbath,

this time of the Serbs? We cannot let this happen.

I said things along these lines in Pristina less than 2 years ago

and repeated them in the Wall Street Journal. I was roundly attacked by the Serbs and the Albanians deliberately ignored the

part of my comments concerning minority rights. This is to be expected in any situation as fraught with history and hatred as

Kosovo. Think of Kashmir, the Middle East, Aceh, Sri Lanka, and

so on.

But there is really no other choice if we are ever to get to the

end of this expensive process without further bloodshed, and there

is really no choice unless we want to have American and NATO

troops in Kosovo indefinitely.

But whatever happens in the negotiations now about to begin, a

residual international security force will be necessary in Kosovo. I

believe that this is an appropriate function for NATO and that any

35

international contingent should include American troops. That is

the lesson of Bosnia and Kosovo over the last decade.

I know that there are those in the United States Government

who have questioned this view, especially given the overwhelming

troop requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. But precisely because

we must show the world we do not abandon our commitments, we

must finish the job. If we do not, the subsequent costs will be even

higher. War could resume and what was done so far will have been

wasted.

One last point, Mr. Chairman: The European Union. The longrange goal, which addresses several questions already asked,

should be the full integration into a unified Europe of the entire

Balkans, including Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro, which I

believe is probably a separate country in the long run, but that is

their decision to make in accordance with the procedures that Secretary Burns discussed, and Macedonia and Croatia.

Nothing would do more for expanding the zone of freedom and

democracy eastward, a historic necessity of the highest order. Vast

economic benefits flow to the region from such events, and I wish

to stress in response to the questions about the economic mess in

Kosovo that these opportunities would proliferate if peace were

brought to the region and the beneficiaries would be first of all Serbia, second Greece, and third all of Southeastern Europe, because

a subunit, a common market, eventually moving to EU membership, would link Greece with the rest of the European Union in a

very productive manner.

But to get there will take time, as it also will with Turkey. And

the European Union should not—I repeat, not—give away movement toward membership for too low a price, as they have sometimes done in the past. The standards of the European Union

should not only be maintained, they should be used as leverage and

incentive for the reforms needed in every one of these countries on

such critical issues as war criminals, especially of course Karadic,

Mladic, and Gotovina, a single Presidency, respect for individual

and group rights, press freedom, viable and transparent governments, and so on.

I hope that the Congress, led as always by this great committee,

will take the lead in supporting American reengagement in the

process and that it will indicate its support for a process that gives

true self-determination, security, and respect for individual and

group rights to all the people of Kosovo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to appear before

you today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, VICE CHAIRMAN, PERSEUS

LLC, NEW YORK, NY

I am deeply honored to be here, before your committee once again, and to appear

before so many friends and associates.

Allow me to begin with a brief reminiscence. Ten years ago today, I was at the

Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, OH, in the 8th day of the 21-day negotiation that brought the war in Bosnia to an end. The route to get there had been

tortuous, and the end came only after almost 300,000 people had died, and over

2,500,000 people had been made homeless, by the worst war in Europe in 50 years.

Decisive American intervention had been slow, and two administrations had failed

to take sufficient action to stop the conflict, leaving the primary responsibility in

36

the hands of the European Union and the United Nations, which had utterly failed

this first significant post-cold-war test. During that long, bleak period, members of

this committee, including its current chairman, Senator Lugar, and its ranking minority member, Senator Biden, had pressed the case for American action. I remember especially coming before this committee for confirmation as Assistant Secretary

of State for European Affairs in 1994. Prior to that hearing, I met privately with

Senator Biden in a room off the Senate floor, and he delivered one of those warnings

that most of you in this room are quite familiar with. While the Senate rules of decorum prevent me from repeating verbatim what Senator Biden said that day, I can

tell you that he was scathing in his denunciation of American inaction and lack of

leadership; precise in his description of the situation on the ground; visionary in his

prescription of what had to be done to stop the war; and very explicit in his references to which part of my anatomy would be lost if I did not do something about

it.

Dayton ended that war, and among the many lessons of that negotiation is the

one that Joe Biden was so forceful in putting forward, as he has done again in Iraq:

The absolute necessity of strong American leadership. I would also add one lesson

from Bosnia and Kosovo that was not applied in Iraq, with tragic consequences: We

took to Dayton a 200-page peace plan, with detailed documentation covering every

aspect of the post-war period from giving authority to the military to shoot first and

ask questions later, to 11 detailed annexes on political and economic issues. Dayton

was not perfect—far from it—but it ended the war, and contrary to almost every

prediction, there were no American or NATO casualties. I repeat: In the 10 years

since Dayton, not one American or NATO soldier has been killed or wounded from

hostile action. Today, out of the 20,000 soldiers we sent to Bosnia in 1996, only

about 150 remain, an essential symbolic reminder that we will remain engaged.

So I want to thank my friend, Joe Biden, and his colleagues, for their support and

encouragement that day and beyond. I hope you feel that, however imperfectly and

belatedly, we achieved the lofty goals you set out for us, and that Senator Biden

did not, therefore, have to relieve me of any body parts.

On another personal note: 10 years ago today, as I was at Dayton, my friend and

colleague, Nick Burns, then the Secretary of State’s spokesman, was flying back to

Dayton with his boss, Warren Christopher, for one of four trips he would make to

our negotiating site. Nick, whom I consider one of the outstanding diplomats of the

current generation, was not only a frequent visitor to Dayton—he was also the only

person, in Dayton or Washington, authorized by all the parties to speak on the

record about what was going on. This experience 10 years ago has been critically

important, I believe, in preparing him for the important assignment that Secretary

Rice gave him when he became Under Secretary of State, to oversee American policy

toward the Balkans.

I am very pleased, therefore, that Nick Burns has, at Secretary Rice’s direction,

reengaged American policy in the Balkans after 4 years of drift and neglect that

was, at times, hardly benign. Under their guidance, a plan to mark the 10th anniversary of Dayton, November 21, with a series of improvements on the original

agreements. These improvements are long overdue, such as police and military reform, movement toward a single Presidency, reconciliation commission—are finally

underway. They have my full support.

In Kosovo, Ambassador Burns has undertaken an even more daunting task. For

if the war in Bosnia is over and will not resume, this cannot be said of Kosovo. War

could break out there at any time. Tensions between the two main ethnic groups

are as high as ever. The loss of four vital years pursuing a failed U.S.–EU–U.N.

theory called ‘‘standards before status’’—which was really a way of avoiding action—

is irretrievable. During that time ethnic tensions rose, opportunities were missed,

and events have removed or weakened two of the leading political figures in the region—the late Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djinjic, who was assassinated, and

Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, who is now ill with a serious disease.

Now, ‘‘standards before status’’ has finally been removed as an obstacle to

progress in implementing U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999, which

called for final status talks. The delay was, as I have said, costly, but now it is time

to get on with it.

Where do we go from here? I am pleased that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan

has appointed Martti Atissari, former President of Finland, as his negotiator to resolve the final status of Kosovo. I look forward to the appointment in the near future of an American of comparable rank to ensure that progress is made.

This will be a difficult task, but it is essential to start. The end result is one that

official negotiators cannot, of course, proclaim in advance; no good negotiator would

do so. But outside observers, especially when appearing before the U.S. Congress,

have an obligation to speak the truth as they see it. In that spirit, let me be clear

37

that I cannot see any final status for Kosovo other than independence, but at the

same time—and this must be stressed equally—this cannot be achieved without

ironclad guarantees for the safety, security, and protection of the rights of the Serbs

who live in Kosovo. When I have said this in the past, each side has, characteristically, quoted only half of my statement. So let me repeat: Kosovo’s destiny is as

an independent state, but it will not get there unless its Serb minority can live in

peace with the Kosovar Albanian majority. For the long-oppressed Albanian majority, this will finally rectify the events of 1911, and this is a historic necessity. But

independence cannot come simply to replace one form of oppression with another.

Will independence for Kosovo be accompanied by another bloodbath, this time of

Serbs? We cannot let this happen.

When I said things along these lines in Pristina 2 years ago, and repeated them

in an article in the Wall Street Journal, I was roundly attacked by the Serbs. And

the Albanians ignored the parts of my comments concerning minority rights. This

is to be expected in any situation as fraught with history and hatred at Kosovo;

think of Kashmir, the Middle East, Aceh, Sri Lanka, and so on. But there really

is no other choice if we are ever to get to the end of this expensive process without

further bloodshed.

Whatever happens, a residual international security force will be necessary in

Kosovo. I believe that this is an appropriate function for NATO, and that any international contingent must include American troops. That is the lesson of Bosnia and

Kosovo over the last 10 years. I know that there are those in the U.S. Government

who have questioned this, especially with the overwhelming troop requirements in

Iraq and Afghanistan. But precisely because we must show the world that we do

not abandon our commitments, we must finish the job. And, if we don’t, the subsequent costs will be even higher, and what was done so far will have been wasted.

One additional point: The European Union. The long-range goal should be the full

integration into a unified Europe of the entire Balkans, including Serbia, Bosnia,

Albania, Montenegro (as, I believe, a separate country, but that is their decision to

make), Macedonia, and Croatia. Nothing would do more for expanding the zone of

freedom and democracy eastward, a historic necessity of the highest order. Vast economic benefits can flow to the region from such events. But to get there will take

time, as it will also with Turkey. And the European Union should not—I repeat,

not—give away moves toward membership for too low a price, as they have sometimes done in the recent past. The standards of the European Union should not only

be maintained, they should be used as leverage and incentive for the reforms needed

in every one of these countries on such critical issues as war criminals (especially,

of course, Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina), a single Presidency, respect for individual and group rights, press freedom, viable and transparent governments, and

so on. I hope that the Congress, led as always by this committee, will take the lead in

supporting American engagement in the process, and that it will indicate its support

for a process that gives true self determination and security to all the people of

Kosovo.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador

Holbrooke.

Let me suggest again a round of 8 minutes. That will take us

very close to the party policy luncheon time. We hopefully will not

have interruptions of rollcall votes and will be spared those interruptions at this point.

I would like to commence the questioning, Ambassador

Holbrooke, by picking up on your point about other countries in the

region. Discuss in the same candor what is likely to happen with

regard to Montenegro and its plans to hold a referendum on independence in 2006 and Bosnia’s ongoing efforts to redefine its structures. Could Macedonia be destabilized by the Kosovo status process as it proceeds now?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. For over a decade, Mr. Chairman, the Balkans

have been paralyzed, and particularly outside negotiators have

been paralyzed, by the fear that action in one area could trigger reaction in another and we would have an August 1914 scenario.

That is because, as we all know, every ethnic group is a minority

38

in one area and a majority in another. You have just mentioned

two of the most critical, Montenegro and Macedonia. We constantly

hear that if Kosovo becomes independent or if Montenegro becomes

independent it will trigger an upsurge of separatism among, in

Srbska, in Bosnia.

I do not share that view, Mr. Chairman, because of history. If the

American Government will take the lead—and today what you

have heard is, I think, some of the most important testimony in the

last 4 years showing that the U.S. Government is now taking the

lead again, and I am so pleased to support them completely in

what they are doing without reservation or any partisanship—I

think that can be avoided.

Now, in regard to Montenegro, a few years ago, under European

Union pressure, Serbia and Montenegro were linked into a country

called Serbia and Montenegro, not Serbia-Montenegro, but Serbia

and Montenegro, in other words a country called ‘‘SAM.’’ This country replaced a country called Yugoslavia, which no longer existed.

SAM exists on paper. One-half of it is 11 million people, one-half

of it is 700,000 people. It has three Presidents, three Foreign Ministers, two currencies, two police forces, internal border control. It

does not exist except on paper.

In my view, it was a mistake to create it, but it happened. They

have the right to decide their future next year. The European

Union has argued that Montenegro, as a separate country, is too

small to survive or be viable, despite the fact that at least three

countries now in the European Union are smaller—Luxembourg,

Malta, and Cyprus—and despite the fact that this creation, SAM,

does not function as a country. The President of Serbia and Montenegro, who is a Montenegran, will tell you that. He will sit in his

office, as he told me, and he will say: I do not really have a job.

So what they do is up to them. I am in favor of self-determination. But my view is strongly that we should not oppose that selfdetermination.

Secretary Burns referred to his meeting with President

Djukanovic of Montenegro, but he did not point out that this was

a major step forward for American policy. Again, they stepped forward from 4 years of supporting this concept which did not work

well. So I congratulate him on making the correct move.

Secretary Albright and I met regularly with Djukanovic, not that

we supported him or did not support it, but because of the history

of the area. Montenegro was an independent country. Why does it

not get the same status as the other former Yugoslav republics?

Finally, if Kosovo were ever to achieve independence there is no

chance that Montenegro would stay inside SAM. Or if they got association within the federation, they would not.

So I think Montenegro should be allowed to go its own way with

the EU’s support. It will be good for their economy as well.

As far as Macedonia goes, the United States played a very good

role under the leadership of Ambassador Jim Pardue in settling a

near-war there a few years ago. I am hopeful that that will continue and I would like to see, as Secretary Burns would like to see,

progress in the right direction.

There are some unresolved problems between Macedonia and

Greece which also have to be dealt with, and that is why officially

39

we still refer to them as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, even though there is no Yugoslavia. So there are some unresolved issues, but most of the issues were dealt with during the

Dayton negotiations, prior to the Dayton negotiations. I have

worked very closely, particularly with Senator Sarbanes, on that

issue.

In the end, this region needs to be stabilized for our national security interest as well as peace and stability in Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador, you mentioned that, frankly, you

thought the outcome should be independence, but at the same time

you listed some very important standards that had to be observed

if that is to work. Now, at the end of the day, what is likely to be

the reaction of the Security Council to that independence, even

with the standards that you have mentioned?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. When you—I would like to make two points,

Mr. Chairman. When you talk about the Security Council, you are

really talking about five countries, the permanent countries. China

does not have a vested interest, so we are down to four. Three of

the four, Britain, France, and the United States, are more or less

in the right ballpark as far as I understand it. Nick may wish to

nuance that.

The fourth of the four, Russia, has a real problem here. They

have always been open about it. There are Serb-Slav ties that

are very historic and important and legitimate, and the Russians

are concerned about precedents. ‘‘Precedents’’ is a codeword for

Chechnya and other autonomous republics within the Russian Federation.

So it will not be easy in the Security Council, but in the end the

Russians, the Chinese, the Security Council, will go along with

what President Ahtisaari negotiates. I am absolutely sure of that.

That is the history of the Balkans over the last decade.

The CHAIRMAN. You have mentioned the importance of a continuing American presence. Perhaps this could be through NATO

in a peacekeeping presence at that point. Is that your idea? In

other words, our presence would come because we are a member

of NATO and NATO would be involved, as opposed to some other

presence outside of that construction?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. That would be my preference, Mr. Chairman.

But it is no secret that there has been a significant disagreement

on this point in regard to both Bosnia and Kosovo over the last 5

years. The Pentagon, under troop pressures and perhaps a different

point of view about the Dayton and Kosovo events, has often shown

a public desire to remove all the troops from the region.

President Bush went to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo in 2002 and

said, ‘‘We came in together, we will leave together.’’ That pledge is

of immense importance in the region and I believe it should transcend the solution, the settlement, of Kosovo’s final status because

of the Serbs. Anyone who has been there, anyone who saw the horrendous, inexcusable destruction of some of the most beautiful religious and cultural sites in Europe in Kosovo by Albanians, knows

that this problem is not over, that the ethnic hatred is so deep that

it must be dealt with with a residual force.

Now, back to the United States, there are two points of view: Let

the Europeans do it and let us be part of it. I, like Secretary Burns,

40

come unreservedly down in the latter camp. Why? Because history

for over a century shows that when the Europeans unaccompanied

by Americans muck around in the Balkans bad things happen. It

is a long historical problem.

The United States remains the dominant moral-political force in

the region. A lot of this has to do with history, long tight ties between people of the Balkans and the United States in States like

my own State of New York, Senator Voinovich’s State of Ohio.

These things matter out there.

We cannot walk away. So yes, sir; I hope it would be a NATO

force with the United States involved and not what they have done

now in Bosnia, which is NATO is replaced by an EU force and the

Americans are set aside in a separate camp. I do not think that

was the right solution, but it is less critical in Bosnia.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for those responses.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have asked three

of the four questions I wanted to pursue and it will not surprise

anyone here, I agree completely with the answers given by the Ambassador.

I also want to—I acknowledge the Ambassador’s very kind remarks, but I am sure no one here thinks I would have been passionate about this issue early on nor threatened in any way the

Ambassador at the time.

Let me skip because, Mr. Ambassador, I really do—every single

thing you have just stated I concur with 100 percent, particularly

NATO and U.S. presence. I think it is—and I was one of the few

who was not happy with the European Union replacing NATO in

Bosnia. I think it was not a good thing.

But, having said all of that, let me—you have answered—you

have spoken of the Security Council, Russia’s particular concern.

You have spoken to the issue of the sort of coalescing of three or

four important domestic issues in Belgrade relating to Montenegro,

relating to Srbska, relating to Kosovo. There is a lot on the plate

there and a lot of the historical tensions among the nationalists of

all stripes have been sort of heightened here. There is a lot going

on. This is the final throes of, in my view, the final throes of the

dissolution of this country called Yugoslavia. It is not done yet.

There are still some spasms left and how it takes place can impact

a lot on what finally happens.

Which leads me to this question. If we are—speaking for myself,

I think if we are to be fair and balanced about this, we have to acknowledge that the present Serbian leadership in Belgrade has

some real pressure on it with all that I have described and we have

talked about happening. And there are a lot of crosscurrents in

Serbia on these issues. So it leads me to this question: How would

you characterize the status and the strength of present leadership

in Kosovo?

These are hard decisions, no matter how you cut it. No matter

even if all the equities are on the other side—and they are not—

this is a very, very difficult political—I sit here as a politician

thinking, OK, I am now, I am leader in Belgrade, and I can sit

down and analytically listen to all these Senators and other people

from around the world saying, look, it is in your interest if there

41

is an independent Kosovo, it is in your interest if you have a different relationship with Montenegro, it is in your interest if you

are able to lead the path to joining NATO and the European Union.

But whoa, getting from here to there is pretty hard politically at

home.

Talk to me a little bit about what you see—and you always have

these arching—this capability, unlike anybody I have known since

Kissinger, to sort of take these disparate pieces and kind of put

them together. Tell me what you think is going on in Belgrade?

What are the political equities and considerations, and what is the

nature of the political leadership, the strength of it, to be able to

do what I think if you dropped in from Mars and said, OK, analytically this is what has to happen? Where are we?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, first of all before I answer your

question, let me state for the record that you did never threaten

me, and I really—I am afraid because we have been friends for so

long I neglected to really make the other point, which is that, for

the record, I would never have been confirmed as Ambassador to

the United Nations without your friendship and support and advice. Everyone else on this panel also was supportive, and I thank

all of you.

But I do want to put the t’s in the context of the facts. You have

asked a very critical question. You asked about the leadership. I

want to say briefly the Albanians and then talk a little more about

the Serbs.

Nick Burns already alluded to the fractious nature of the Albanians. At Rambouillet there were 17 Albanian representatives representing 17 different points of view. I was not at Rambouillet, but

I was in close contact with the group that was. Rugova is the only

Albanian who seems to have overall stature. His illness is a tremendous, tremendous tragedy for the region as well as personally.

They are very fractious people. It comes with their history and

their territory, and it will be, I predict, the single most difficult

issue in the end will not be in Belgrade—I will get to them in a

minute—it will be in Pristina.

In regard to Belgrade, this is extremely difficult for any Serbian,

any Serb politicians. They are well aware of the fact that Kosovo

was lost by Milosevic as part of his progressive process of losing

parts of Yugoslavia. First he lost Slovenia, then he lost Croatia,

then he lost Macedonia peacefully, then he lost Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then he lost Kosovo and then he ended up in The Hague.

But because of the unique place Kosovo has in Serb history and

the sense of the Serb nation, it is virtually impossible for any leading political figure in Belgrade to talk about the possibility that

Kosovo could become an independent country. So the Serbs, what

have had a terrible run of bad luck historically in the last 15 years,

are faced with a cruel dilemma, and I believe it is up to the United

States and the European Union and the United Nations, but the

United Nations is really the vehicle—it is really a United StatesEuropean Union negotiation—to help Belgrade through this process.

The most important aspect of this on the positive side is Brussels, the European Union. In the end, the Serbs in Belgrade will

have to choose between Brussels and Kosovo. It is as brutal as

42

that. If they want to become part of the European Union, they will

have to—they will have to figure out how to let Kosovo gently go

and make sure they get guarantees.

Meanwhile, the Albanians must know that if they do not give the

kind of guarantees that Nick Burns and I have talked about, they

will not get to their desired goal. So you have an extraordinarily

difficult negotiation. It will take a lot of carrots in Belgrade to

make the Serb leadership see the value for them and it will take

some very heavy pressure on the Albanians not to think that they

can just grab Kosovo and then drive the remaining Serbs out of

their ancestral home.

This is going to be one tough negotiation. I have a lot of confidence in Ahtisaari, but he will need strong U.S. backing, because

left to their own devices the Europeans, as a group, will not be able

to create a coherent negotiation.

Senator Biden, I hope that addresses your very complicated

point.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.

Senator Voinovich.

Senator VOINOVICH. I am interested in your stressing the importance of KFOR. Three or four years ago I visited Tusla with several

Members of Congress and they took us around in their jeeps and

we saw the houses being rebuilt and so forth. I asked one of the

servicemen: What happens when you leave? His first response was:

They are going to start killing each other again. My wife asked the

same question and that was the answer that she had.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Was this in Bosnia, sir, or in Kosovo?

Senator VOINOVICH. It was at Tusla.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. At Tusla.

Senator VOINOVICH. Yes, right.

From your point of view, have we supported KFOR to the extent

that we sent a signal out to the Albanians in Kosovo that we are

serious about what we are doing there and have the caveats that

Secretary Burns made mention of been removed to the extent that

they should be, and do they have the training in terms of antiriot

control and the equipment that they need to get the job done?

In other words, I guess the question is, Are they formidable

enough that they send a signal out that if someone thinks that

they can take to the streets that they can get away with it?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. This question goes to the heart of why I believe,

and I think Senator Biden made the point too, that the United

States must remain involved. Technically, yes; they are strong

enough, but there is something missing in the European deployments. Now, Nick Burns alluded to the change in national asset

rules, but I am more skeptical in that. Time and time again, in Sarajevo when the Serb suburb of Gerbovitsa was burned down by

the Bosnian Serbs themselves in March 1996, when the thugs

drove Serb families that had lived in Sarajevo for 3 centuries or

more out of their apartments and houses because they wanted to

destroy moderate community, NATO stood by. Again last year, as

Senator Sarbanes and Senator Biden mentioned, the NATO troops

stood by in Pristina and only the Americans acted.

43

So it is not a question of the ability, the logistics of the armaments. It is a question of will. The United States is just better at

this. I do not want to sound chauvinistic about it. I have just seen

it on the ground. So I hope that KFOR will remain a NATO assignment with a significant American presence, because I truly believe,

Senator, that that is part of the essential way to protect the Serb

minority if and as we move forward.

Senator VOINOVICH. Do you not think it is also a condition precedent for the Serbs at the negotiating table to agree to do certain

things that might give more autonomy to the Kosovars and say,

yes, we are willing to give you. Now, I was there a year ago. They

said: Give us the ball, we will carry it, we will do what we are supposed to do, but we cannot be dealing through the U.N. mission in

Kosovo because we do not have a lot of confidence in them.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. You are talking about the Serbs in Pristina or

in Belgrade?

Senator VOINOVICH. I was talking about when I was in Pristina

talking to the Kosovars. They were saying: We want more authority to get the job done, and give us the ball and we will do it; we

are being held back by the UNMIK folks.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I had the same experience.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. So to the Serbs you say, here is the ball,

we are going to let you carry it, you got it, but there has got to

be some guarantee back in Serbia and in Belgrade that if it does

not work people are not going to get killed and they are not going

to burn down the monasteries and the other patronymic sites. Do

you not think that is a condition precedent for them to move forward in terms of their political situation?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. No question.

Senator VOINOVICH. OK. The next question is this. If this thing

is not handled properly, do you not believe that the Milosevic forces

and the Seselj forces from a political point of view could end up

taking over and we would lose Kostunica and Tadic and that

group?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. There is a risk of that and that is why it is so

important that this negotiation move fast and why I feel it is such

a tragedy that we lost the last 4 years and the life of Zoran Djindjic

and Foreign Minister Slivanovic, both of whom would have wanted

to move faster. That was a tragic—the standards before status concept was just wrong. But now we have the move.

Senator VOINOVICH. The fact of the matter is, I am very critical

of UNMIK. Even with Steiner, I thought he was going to do the

job and they did not dot the i’s and cross the t’s. I think they just

fuzzed it over. Now we have Petersen there. The question is, Once

negotiations are finished who is going to be responsible for implementing what has been negotiated? Is UNMIK going to do it, or

who is going to be the one to do that?

I think the Kosovars will have some real concern about who is

going to make sure that it gets done.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. You are asking me to speculate, so allow me to

just speculate. I believe UNMIK will have to be disbanded when

and if a final status is agreed upon, and I hope it will be succeeded

by a smaller, slimmed down international civilian presence roughly

44

along the lines of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia,

which I would stress to you, Senator, is not a U.N. operation.

When I was at Dayton, we did not let the United Nations come

to Dayton because they had made such a hash of the Balkans and

they were not given the responsibility. Lord Ashdown, Ashdown’s

mission is not a U.N. mission.

Now, I agree with you about UNMIK, and UNMIK made three

or four fatal mistakes. One, they never devolved enough authority

to the local people, as called for in 1244. Two, they created their

own international bureaucracy and did not help with the economic

situation. Three, they got caught up with their own bureaucracy.

And four, they did not implement the final status talks.

So that is all over with now. Ahtisaari is a negotiator and a very

good one. You have already outlined one of the things I think the

Serbs ought to push for, which is a residual security presence including NATO and U.S. troops. The other one is opening the door

toward movement toward European Union membership. Those two

things plus guarantees for the Serbs are necessary.

But in the end they are going to have to still bite the bullet on

a much tougher issue, which is the future status of Kosovo itself,

with all the history that that carries.

Senator VOINOVICH. The last thing I would like to say is that

people have to be incented to do things. I know again a year ago

I spent 3 days, 2 days, in Belgrade, just everywhere I went saying:

You have got to choose The Hague or you have got to choose your

economy.

Do you not believe that some action on the part of the European

Union and on our part to give the Serbian people confidence that

this will move them forward in terms of having a better standard

of living would make also a great deal of difference in terms of

what their leaders are going to be able to do at that table?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir; I do, absolutely, no question.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, thinking back to that troubled region, in early

2004 the President of Macedonia was killed in a plane crash. He

seemed to be something of a consensus-builder. What was his influence on the Kosovo situation?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. He played a very important role in keeping the

ethnic tensions from spreading into Macedonia, which was very

close to a brutal breakup between the Albanians in the southwest

area around Tetovo and the Macedonians up around Skopje. So it

was a tragedy.

But Macedonia has held together and here I think American diplomacy under both President Clinton and the current administration has been a success. Then I should mention—excuse me, Senator—one name that has not been mentioned today, Mr. Chairman,

is my former colleague, Chris Hill, who would be here today except

that he is in Beijing working on the North Korean negotiation.

Chris was with us at Dayton, did a brilliant job, was our first Ambassador to Macedonia, and deserves a lot of credit for what has

happened.

45

Senator BILL NELSON. If the inevitable trend is, as you would

suggest, independence and the economy is in such dire straits right

now with regards to Kosovo, what do you recommend that the

United States should do in this interim until such time that it

might be apparent that independence would include protections of

the minority?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. The first and most important thing for the

United States to do is to reengage in the area after these 4 years

of neglect, and the testimony you have heard today from Under

Secretary Burns speaking for Secretary Rice and President Bush is

dramatic testimony that the 4 years are over and they are moving

in the right direction. That is why I am here today as a bipartisan

witness actually to endorse 99 percent of what Nick said.

The second thing to say is that the United States should not pull

out of the region because history shows when we do, bad things

happen. The specifics, which we have covered in detail, may all

shift, but the United States does have a vital national security interest in stability in Europe. This area lies in the heart of Europe,

with NATO members to its south and east, Turkey and Greece, and

just beyond them the area of maximum danger to the United

States and the whole world, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and so on.

I want to say one other thing, Senator, which I had not mentioned earlier. Had we not acted in Dayton 10 years ago and had

we not written into the agreements that we gave ourselves the unilateral right to use military force to root out foreign elements, foreign freedom fighters—we called them mujahedin then; we had not

heard the name at Dayton ‘‘al-Qaeda’’—we now know that the Dayton agreement and the actions in Kosovo stopped Usama bin Laden

and al-Qaeda from building in the Balkans what they built in Afghanistan that much closer to us and that much closer to the heart

of western Europe.

So I say all that because everywhere you go people are so concerned, legitimately, with Iraq and Afghanistan. They say, well, the

Balkans is yesterday’s news. We came that close to having the war

we are having in Afghanistan in the deep ravines and hills and

caves of the Balkans, which would have been not much fun. As we

all know, 44 Nazi divisions were tied down in Yugoslavia by the

partisans in World War Two.

So this is an area of great importance to the United States and

this committee, as I said already, has played a tremendously important role in keeping interest alive. We just have to keep doing

it, and in this particular case on a totally bipartisan, nonpartisan

basis.

Senator BILL NELSON. All of the military commanders that I

have talked to over the last number of years have expressed their

intent to find these war criminals that are still on the run, and yet

it has not occurred. What would be your recommendation so that

we could be more effective, and what more should we do to bring

them to justice?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator. I am constantly asked,

particularly right now on the 10th anniversary of Dayton, was Dayton a success or a failure? I always say it was a success because

it ended the war and it achieved our goals, even though it was full

of flaws.

46

Then the question you raised always comes up. The basic thing

I would say is this. People when analyzing Dayton confuse the

agreement and its implementation. The agreement provided for the

capture of these men. The implementation did not succeed. This is

critical.

Now, why was not Karadjic, who is the most important of this

group, and Mladic right behind him, captured? The hard sad truth,

as I wrote in my book and have said repeatedly, is that NATO

failed to go after them in the spring of 1996 when Karadjic’s green

Mercedes Benz was parked outside his office in Poli. President

Clinton said later he considered the actions of this admiral insubordination. But at the time the U.S. Government failed to insist.

So Karadjic—in June 1996, I went back to Belgrade as a private

citizen, negotiated with Milosevic the full removal of Karadjic from

his public positions and he went into hiding, where he has been for

9 years. I believe that he has cut off his big dramatic white hair.

He may have grown a beard. I would bet that he is in a monastery

somewhere in the triangle between eastern Bosnia, Serbia, and

Montenegro. It is just a guess—protected by paramilitary thugs,

extreme ultranationalists, and this kind of corrupt mafioso which

has pretended to be Serb nationalist for so long but actually has

cheated and stealed and weakened the Serb people and denied

them their chance for their rightful role in Europe.

Karadjic also actively is undermining the implementation of Dayton whenever he possibly can. Mladic, as Secretary Burns said, was

in a military base, now seems to be somewhere else. Capturing

these two people is essential. It is not just symbolism, although

symbolism is important. They are, particularly Karadjic, are clear

and present dangers to stability in the Balkans.

They will not be captured by sweep operations. You do not capture people by sweep operations in deep ravines with hundreds and

thousands of little villages. I am sure, Senator Voinovich, when you

drove, as I did, from Tusla through the area—I looked at these villages and I said, supposing you had intelligence that Karadjic was

in that village; to seal it off, close it, and search it house by house,

you would tip them off way in advance. You could not do it.

Remember that Saddam Hussein was not captured through a

search operation. They had left that farmhouse when a farmer

said: Take another look. So they looked again and they found his

spider hole. That is the way you capture these people.

There is a very big reward out for these men and we have to redouble the effort. Senator, I never felt we made enough of an effort

under either, the administration I was part of, or the current administration. Now, officials of both administrations will tell you we

have tried. I am just telling you as a private citizen and my obligation to your committee, I do not believe the effort was ever sufficient. But it has to be an inside job. You are not going to do it

through sweep operations.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. And by the way, all of this, what I have just

said, I believe applies equally to Usama bin Laden. We are not

going to find him by searching through the caves in Tora Bora. You

have to get intelligence and somebody turns him in.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

47

Senator Voinovich, do you have additional questions?

Senator VOINOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to emphasize again, you just talked about Karadjic and you think that he

is still someone that we will have to reckon with, and the same

way with Mladic. I do not want to beat a dead horse, but I certainly hope that people understand the political situation in Serbia

and Montenegro today. You have got Kosovo and then you have got

the whole issue of what is going to happen to Montenegro, and you

have kind of a very slim coalition; and that if this should, these negotiations, should precipitate a change in the leadership there,

what a horrible thing that would be for the region and a great setback.

Would you like to comment on that?

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I completely agree with you, and that is why

both Nick Burns and I have said it is going to be a tough, long negotiation. The dilemma is you cannot let yourself be paralyzed by

the risk that action will trigger the collapse. But you do not want

to trigger the collapse, either. And this was true in Dayton, sir. It

is true in all these negotiations. It is true in the Mideast today.

You are always confronted with the internal politics as a factor

that could constrain you.

Therefore, you have to give Tadic—and I share Nick Burns’s

positive assessment of Tadic; I like the man, I have worked with

him. I think he is trying his hardest. You have to give Tadic and

Kostunica, who is a very intelligent man, a serious, serious man

who combines great love of his country and a serious legal mind,

you have to give these leaders enough benefits so that they do not

appear to have betrayed 1,000 years of Serb tradition.

Benefits in the form of guarantees for the safety of the Serb minority in Kosovo, which we have already discussed, and economic

incentives involving the European Union are the two core things.

It will be a tough negotiation, and the United States must be part

of it because, in my view, the Serb really respect the United States

more than any of their European neighbors.

Senator VOINOVICH. And we are the largest investor in Serbia

today of any of the countries. It is interesting. The United States

is the biggest investor in Serbia today than any of the other nations.

Mr. HOLBROOKE. I did not know that.

Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Voinovich.

Ambassador Holbrooke, we thank you again. We appreciate your

underlining the purpose of our hearing, Kosovo, a way forward, and

the thought that this does present another opportunity. We wanted

to hear from the administration, and Secretary Burns has done a

splendid job in outlining that point of view. You have been most

generous in your support, as you say, of 99-percent-plus of this in

a bipartisan way, underlining from your own experience the joys

and the heartaches and the difficulties that are involved.

Senator Voinovich, because of his experience as a committee

member, offered a special testimony in his own way.

We thank you very much for coming. We thank our previous witness, and the hearing is adjourned.

48

[Whereupon, at 12:00 noon, the hearing was adjourned.]

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE NICHOLAS BURNS TO A QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LUGAR

Question. I understand that on January 1, NGOs will no longer be exempt from

taxes in Kosovo. What are the potential implications for the NGO community? What

steps is the United States taking if any, to rectify the matter?

Answer. In general, the United States supports the alignment of Kosovo’s tax

structure with accepted European standards while also facilitating the donation of

goods to the people of Kosovo. The U.S. Agency for International Development in

Kosovo has asked Kosovo’s Minister of Finance and Economy to delay removal of

the tax exempt status for NGOs until June 1 in order to allow more time for the

government and international community to study this issue. We are awaiting the

Kosovo Government’s decision, and will at that time, decide what—if any—further

action is required.

RESPONSES OF UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE NICHOLAS BURNS TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BARBARA BOXER

Question. Mr. Burns, you have said that the status quo of Kosovo’s undefined future is ‘‘not sustainable or desirable.’’ Yet I’m sure that you know, better than perhaps anyone, what we are up against.

In a Washington Post article last month, Ivo Daalder, a Balkans specialist at the

Brookings Institution, said of the upcoming negotiations that ‘‘this has the makings

of classic conflict . . . The American view is to lean toward independence; the European Union will say, ‘Let’s figure out a way not to make that decision’; and the Russians on the opposite side saying, ‘Over my dead body.’ ’’

• What is your response to Mr. Daalder’s claim? • Does he accurately describe the American, European, and Russian perspectives?

If so, how can we forge a consensus that achieves long-term stability in Kosovo

and the Balkans? • What, in your view, should a final political settlement look like? Is there a solution short of full independence that Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians will be able to

live with?

Answer. The United States continues to work closely with the European Union

and Russia throughout the Balkans, particularly within the Contact Group, which

consists of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United States, United Kingdom, and

the European Union. The Contact Group has worked well together over recent years

in support of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and

agreed to the start of Kosovo status talks.

While the Contact Group does not have a preferred status outcome, it did state

in its November 2005 Guiding Principles for Kosovo status talks that any settlement

‘‘. . . must be fully compatible with international standards of human rights, democracy and international law, and contribute to regional security.’’ Additionally,

the partition of Kosovo or its union with any country or part of any other country

is not an acceptable outcome because it would threaten the multiethnicity of Kosovo

and further the efforts of irredentists throughout the region.

At this stage of the status process, the United States believes it would be premature and unhelpful to offer any views on what the outcome of a status settlement

should look like beyond those principles outlined by the Contact Group. The United

States fully support and will lend its weight when needed to the efforts of U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari to bring together both sides to try and reach a compromise solution that furthers the U.S. and international community’s goal of a secure and stable Balkan’s region.

Question. The United States has been involved in the Balkans for more than a

decade, and I would like you to discuss what lessons the United States has learned

in dealing with the ethnic conflict there. I ask this question because it seems to me

that the crux of the conflict in the Balkans—reaching power-sharing and territorial

agreements between the various ethnic and religious groups—is similar, in some respect, to what the United States is facing in Iraq today.

• What should we have learned from Kosovo that we could have applied to our

engagement in Iraq to avoid the quagmire we are in today?

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• What should we take from our involvement in Kosovo—both the good and bad

points—to help us make the right decision when weighing whether to become

involved in future conflicts?

Answer. Establishing democracy and freedom in regions that have only known authoritarian, oppressive rule is a challenging and difficult task, but one that can be

undertaken successfully. While no two conflicts are identical, the United States

joined with its European allies to prevent the further violence and oppression

wrought by Slobodan Milosevic and his corrupt regime in Kosovo and Bosnia and

Herzegovina. Milosevic, like Saddam Hussein, had a lengthy track record of human

rights violations and both leaders presented threats to the overall security and stability of their regions and the world at large. In both cases, the challenge for the

United States and its partners has been to assist in the transition from the politics

of ethnic or religious identity to the politics of issues and interests.

What United States and international efforts in the Balkans and Iraq have demonstrated is that through a continued commitment and partnership with those who

share our goals, progress can be achieved. While sustainable results require time—

as evidenced by the work that is still required in Kosovo—thousands of people once

displaced have returned home in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo and

efforts to slowly incorporate this region into Euro-Atlantic institutions are beginning

to bear fruit.

In Iraq, the political transition laid out in the Transitional Administrative Law

and unanimously endorsed by the U.N. Security Council, has already resulted in

successful national elections, the ratification of a permanent constitution, and the

foundations for elections under the constitution on a more inclusive basis.

Question. It is my impression that greater ties with the European Union and

eventual EU membership holds the most promise for—resolving in a meaningful

way—the long-term instability that continues to plague the Balkans. Yet the failed

referendums on the EU Constitution in Holland and France earlier this year—and

the problems surrounding the potential accession of Turkey into the European

Union—suggest that the EU is not ready to really take on the membership of Balkan countries.

• Short of full membership, how can the EU embrace these countries in a meaningful way? • Is there any hope that their membership can be considered within a reasonable

timeframe?

Answer. Despite the outcome of the votes in France and the Netherlands, the European Union continues to view the prospective membership of the Balkan countries

very seriously. In addition to Turkey, on October 3, the EU granted candidate status

to Croatia. Also on October 10, the EU began Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro. In addition, the European

Commission on November 9 recommended that the European Council provide candidate status to Macedonia and that formal accession negotiations could commence

as soon as Macedonia met certain membership criteria. The European Union has

also opened SAA negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina on November 25. Pursuant to the 2003 Thessaloniki Agreement, the EU is committed to advancing the candidacies of the countries in the Balkans as EU Member States as they complete extensive membership criteria.

Question. Although I strongly believe that the international community is entering into the upcoming status negotiations on Kosovo with the best of intentions,

there remains the very real possibility that tensions within Serbia and Kosovo could

become worse instead of better as a result. Again, we are dealing with two diametrically opposed entities, and one party is not going to get everything that it wants.

• For instance, what would full independence for Kosovo mean for Serbs in the

region? • And how would full independence for Kosovo impact neighboring areas with

sizeable Albanian populations, such as Macedonia and Montenegro? • Could we see a push for a greater Albania? • Is the international community prepared to respond if problems in the region

become worse as a result of our efforts?

Answer. As noted in Norwegian Ambassador Kai Eide’s October 2005 report on

the political situation in Kosovo, ‘‘There will not be any good moment for addressing

Kosovo’s future status. It will continue to be a highly sensitive political issue. Nevertheless, an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to

commence this process.’’ Following the release of Ambassador Eide’s report, the U.N.

Security Council agreed with the general conclusions of the Eide report and supported U.N. Secretary General Annan’s launch of a political process to determine

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Kosovo’s future status, as called for in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 (June

1999).

Regardless of the status outcome, it is important that Kosovo’s future political status contribute to regional security and ensure sustainable multiethnicity in Kosovo.

As part of any settlement agreement, the rights of all communities in Kosovo must

be protected and those individuals and families that continue to live in displacement

must be afforded the opportunity to return home. An important component to creating sustainable multiethnicity in Kosovo is devolving more responsibilities to local

governments. While the United States is encouraged with the start of several decentralization pilot projects earlier this year, Kosovo officials must do more.

The Contact Group has clearly stated ‘‘There will be no changes in the current

territory of Kosovo, i.e., no partition of Kosovo and no union of Kosovo with any

country or part of any country.’’ A final status outcome that enhances rule of law

and stability in Kosovo, while upholding the inviolability of regional borders, will

improve security for all of Kosovo’s neighbors and the wider region. Meanwhile,

Macedonia is making its contribution to regional peace, security, and stability by

having completed the legislative implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework

Agreement and moving forward on related democratic reforms that are bringing it

closer to eventual, full Euro-Atlantic integration.

In Montenegro, the United States continues to work closely with our allies, especially the European Union, to support democratic developments and further

Montenegro’s integration with the region and the European Union. Developments

in Montenegro remain separate from the Kosovo status process, but the United

States has encouraged leaders in Montenegro to continue to ensure that any referendum in Montenegro enhance regional stability and not interfere with the

Kosovo status talks.

Additionally, there is no connection between a Kosovo status process and the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While some may seek to draw parallels between

Kosovo and the Republika Srpska entity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and

Herzegovina’s international borders have been clearly defined by the Dayton Peace

Accords and the U.N. Security Council.

While extremist elements may try to use the status talks as a platform to further

their political aims, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), which includes approximately 1,700 U.S. troops, is prepared to respond to any unrest in Kosovo. The international community has also made clear that individuals who use or condone the

use of violence will have no role in the status talks. We will continue to encourage

all governments in the region to remain vigilant and to take appropriate action

when necessary to prevent any possible extremist violence from affecting the status

talks.

Question. Shortly after 9/11, the State Department launched a public diplomacy

campaign aimed at reaching out to the Muslim world. One of the highlights of the

campaign was to point out that the United States intervened on behalf of Muslims

in both Bosnia and Kosovo. Yet, it appears as though highlighting our efforts on behalf of Muslims in the Balkans failed. Today, the disapproval rating toward the

United States remains staggeringly high within the Muslim world.

• Why do you think our efforts in the Balkans on behalf of Muslims had so little

impact on the wider Muslim world?

Answer. America’s relationship in the Muslim world is broad and complex, influenced by history, policy, and personal relationships between our peoples. With so

many factors influencing the way we view one another, it would be difficult to pinpoint precisely why the story of our success in freeing the people of Bosnia and

Herzegovina and Kosovo has not had a larger impact. We do, however, believe it

is an excellent example of America’s will to act in support of freedom for all people,

and will continue to highlight it in the Muslim world and elsewhere.

As you know, under the direction of Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and

Public Affairs, Karen Hughes, the administration is moving forward with an aggressive public diplomacy strategy highlighting our efforts to support freedom and democracy for all people. Engaging Muslim populations, particularly its youth, remains an important objective in our overall public diplomacy effort.

Question. If Kosovo’s borders remain unchanged, and Kosovo is granted full independence or some type of conditional independence, what are the prospects for a

peaceful coexistence between ethnic Albanians and Serbs within Kosovo?

If a final status agreement is reached, will Kosovo’s Serb population need continued protection from the international community or from a regional peacekeeping

force?

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Answer. Any settlement on Kosovo must provide effective constitutional guarantees that ensure the protection of all its people. A key component to creating sustainable multiethnicity in Kosovo is empowering local governments, including

minority communities, by giving them greater control over issues such as health,

education, police and justice.

In addition to these constitutional guarantees, the international community recognizes that a continued NATO presence and a follow-on international civilian mission

will be needed in Kosovo to ensure implementation of the settlement agreement and

protection of minority rights. The nature and time line for both missions will be discussed during the status talks.

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