COURT OF CHANCERY

OF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

417 S OUTH S TATE S TREET
J OSEPH R. S LIGHTS

, III D OVER

, D ELAWARE 19901

V ICE C HANCELLOR T ELEPHONE : (302) 739

- 4397

F ACSIMILE : (302) 739

- 6179

June 29, 2016

Via File & Serve Xpress

and First Class Mail Mr. Weih Steve Chang Gary H. Kaplan, Esquire 122 Pumpkin Patch Lane Marshall Dennehey Warner Hockessin, DE 19707 Coleman & Goggin

1007 Nort h Orange Street, Suite 600 Wilmington, DE 19801

Kevin S. Mann, Esquire Cross & Simon, LLC 1105 North Market Street, Suite 901 Wilmington, DE 19801

Re: Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VC S

Date Submitted: June 8, 2016

Dear Counsel and Mr. Chang:

I have reviewed the many motions and other filings made in this case. I am

aware that the parties are in the process of briefing a motion to dismiss. T hat work

should continue according to the schedule that was previously entered by the

Court. This letter addresses three motions recently filed by Plaintiff, Weih Steve

Chang: (1) Motion to Re

- Open Jane Doe 30 vs. Earl B. Bradley (CA No. 10C

- 05

-Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 2

023) By Granting Joinder of Persons/Parties (“Moti on to Reopen”); (2) Motion to

Recuse; and (3) Motion to Stay.

1. Motion to Reopen

The nature and bases for this motion are difficult to discern. It appears that

Plaintiff seeks to add additional defendants to this lawsuit and thereby reopen a

class action against Earl B. Bradley, M.D. that was litigated and then settled in the

Superior Court of Delaware (the “Bradley litigation”). The new parties Plaintiff

seeks to add as defendants were either parties or lawyers involved in the Bradley

litigation. Accord ing to Plaintiff, the Bradley litigation settlement was procured by

fraud. For the reasons that follow, the motion must be denied.

While the motion is extremely difficult to follow, it appears that Plaintiff is

seeking to amend his complaint to add new p arties and perhaps new claims. While

motions to amend are liberally granted in this Court, the Court will deny a motion

to amend on futility grounds when it is clear that the proposed amendment wouldChang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 3

not survive a motion to dismiss. 1 Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile for

several reasons.

First, Plaintiff offers no basis upon which this Court could exercise its

jurisdiction to “reopen” a case that has been litigated and settled in the Superior

Court. I also am un aware of any ground upon which t his Court could enter such

an order. Moreover, it is not at all clear to me that Plaintiff has standing to seek to

reopen the Bradley litigation in any event. He has made no allegation that he was a

party to the Bradley litigation or that he or anyone he purports to represent was a

member of the class that was certified in that litigation. Nor has he made an

attempt to justify an order allowing him to intervene, pursuant to Court of

Chancery Rule 24, in order to challenge the Bradley litigation settlemen t assuming,

arguendo , that this Court had the authority to grant such relief (which it does not). 2

1 FS Parallel Fund, LP v. Ergen , 2004 WL 3048751 , at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004), aff’d

, 879 A.2d 602 (Del. 2005) (TABLE)

.

2 See In re MC

A, Inc. S’holders Litig. , 774 A.2d 272, 276

– 78 (Del. Ch. 2000) (denying motion to intervene in order to challenge settlement approved by the court seven years prior to the attempted intervention).Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 4

Second, to the extent the proposed amendment is grounded in th e Court’s

authority to provide relief from judgment under Court of Chancery Rule 60(b),

Plain tiff has failed to set forth any basis upon which this Court could provide relief

from a judgment entered by the Superior Court. Even if t he Court could provide

such relief, Plaintiff has failed to identify any evidence that would meet the “high

Rule 60(b ) standard, ” which requires “ the most egregious conduct involving a

corruption of the judicial process itself.’” 3 Plaintiff’s “[s]inister suspicions and

‘dark imaginings’ [of “duplicitous” conduct ] are not enough” to sustain this heavy

burden. 4

3 MCA, Inc. v. M

atsushi t a Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

, 785 A.2d 625, 638 (Del. 2001) ( quoting
In re MCA, Inc. , 774 A.2d at 280) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. See also id

. at 639 (“A party seeking to vacate a n order on the ground that his or her opponent effectuated a fraud on the court bears a heavy burden

. ”).

4 In re MCA, Inc. , 774 A.2d at 280 (holding that to state a claim that a settlement should be set aside because of fraud on the court the plaintiff not only must plead the fraud with particularity under Court of Chancery Rule 9(b), but also must stat e a factual basis to support a reasonable inference that the approving court was somehow “duped” into blessing the settlement )

.Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 5

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen is DENIED. To the

extent the Motion to Reopen seeks an order for leave to amend the complaint to

name additional defendants related to the Bradley litigation , that motion is likewise

DENIED.

2. Motion to Recuse

P laintiff asserts that I must recuse myself from this case since I was the

judge who presided over the Bradley litigation when I served on the Superior

Court. He is correct that I presided over the Bradley litigation from its inception

through its conclusi on with a class action settlement that I approved. My role as

presiding judge in that case, however, provides no basis for me to recuse myself

from this case.

Under Delaware law, a judicial officer must recuse himself if there is “ any

reasonable basis to question [ his ] impartiality.” 5

When faced with a claim of personal bias or prejudice ... the judge is required to engage in a two

- part analysis. First, he must, as a matter of subjective belief, be satisfied that he can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Second, even if the judge believes he has no bias, situations may arise where, actual bias

5 Weber v. State , 547 A.2d 948, 952 (Del. 1988)

.Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 6

aside, there is the appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge’s impartiality. 6

Here, Plaintiff argues that I will likely be a witness in his effort to set aside

the Bradley litigation settlement. As I have de nied Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen,

there is no reason for me to be involved in this case, or any other related case, as a

witness. With this in min d, I have considered on a subjective level whether I can

“proceed to hear [this case ] free of bias or prejudice” and I am satisfied that I can. 7

Likewise, Plaintiff has provided no reasonable basis upon which I can conclude

that there is or will be an “ ap pearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to [my]

impartiality.” 8 My involvement as the presiding judge in the Bradley litigation

cannot reasonably be viewed as a disqualifying event that would justify my recusal

from this separate action.

6 Los v. Los

, 595 A.2d 381, 384

– 85 (Del. 1991).

7 Id.

8 Id

. at 385.Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

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June 29, 2016 Page 7

In denyin g this motion to recuse, I am mindful of my “duty to sit.” 9 “A trial

judge has a duty to hear cases assigned to him unless some reasonable factual basis

to doubt his impartiality or fairness is shown by some kind of probative

evidence.” 10 As this Court ha s correctly observed, “judges who too l ightly recuse

shirk their official responsibilities, impos ing unreasonable demands on their

colleagues to do their work and risk ing the untimely processing of cases.” 11

Although my service on this Court has spanned al l of t hree months, I have already

come to appreciate that the Court’s docket is crowded and its judges are, to put it

mildly, very busy. While I have no particular desire to hear this matter, which

involves disturbing allegations of child abuse, I would be “ abrogating my

responsibility” 12 if I forced one of my colleagues to take over this case based on

9 Stat e v. Desmond , 2011 WL 91984, at *8

– 9 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (discussing at length the so

- called “benign” version of the “ duty to sit” and denying a motion to recuse).

10 In re Will of Stotlar

, 1985 WL 4782, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 1985) (denying m otion to recuse).

11 R eeder v. Del. Dept. of Ins. , 2006 WL 510067, at * 17 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2006).

12 Stotlar

, 1985 WL 4782, at * 1.Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 8

Plaintiff’s vague allegations and misguided attempt to reopen litigation that was

resolved in another court years ago.

The Motion to Recuse is DENIED.

3. Moti on to Stay

The M otion to S tay is based, in part, on the fact that the M otion to R ecuse

should be decided before this litigation proceeds. That motion has now been

decided. Plaintiff also seeks a stay of this litigation so that he may “re

- prior itize

his focus on pending litigations in the district court” and “re

- direct his time and

other resources to his employment and his business obligations

. ” 13 This Court’s

rules of procedure impose an obligation on parties who file cases in this Court to

pro secute those cases. 14 Defendants who are brought before this Court have a right

to expect that the plaintiff will prosecute the case against them “diligently” or face

the consequence of dismissal. 15 While I appreciate that the costs and burdens of

13 Mot

. to Stay, Tr. ID 59116993.

14 Ct. Ch. R. 41(a), (e).

15 Yancey v. Nat’ l Trust Co., Ltd. , 1993 WL 155492, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 7, 1993 ) (dismissing a case for plaintiff’s failure to prosecute), aff’d

, 633 A.2d 372 (Del. 1993) (TABLE).Chang v. Children’s Advocacy Center of Delaware, Inc.

C.A. No. 11632

- VCS

June 29, 2016 Page 9

litigati on can, at times, be difficult to bear, particularly for pro se parties, Plaintiff

has chosen to initiate this litigation and has failed to demonstrate any justifiable

reason why the Court should allow him to park this case here indefinitely w hile he

atten ds to matters elsewhere.

The Motion to Stay is DENIED.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Joseph R. Slights, III