UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Stephen P. CHATFIELD, Lieutenant Junior Grade 

U.S. Navy, Appellant 

No. 08-0615 

Crim. App. No. 200602256 

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Argued February 5, 2009 

Decided June 26, 2009 

RYAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which EFFRON, 

C.J., and BAKER, ERDMANN, and STUCKY, JJ., joined. 

Counsel

For Appellant: Lieutenant Kathleen L. Kadlec, JAGC, USN 

(argued). 

For Appellee: Captain Geoffrey S. Shows, USMC (argued); Brian 

K. Keller, Esq., and Major Tai D. Le, USMC. 

Amicus Curiae for Appellant: Natasha Nisttahuz (law student) 

(argued); Daniel H. Benson, Esq. (supervising attorney), Clayton 

Hightower (law student), Scott Luu (law student), Eric R. Pace

(law student) (on brief); Charles Pelowski (law student) -- of 

the Texas Tech School of Law. 

Amicus Curiae for Appellee: Jonathon C. Clark (law student) 

(argued); Richard D. Rosen, Esq. (supervising attorney), James 

V. Leito IV (law student); Jared M. Miller (law student), James 

J. Mustin (law student), Courtney G. Stamper (law student) (on 

brief) -- of the Texas Tech University School of Law. 

Military Judge: Daniel E. O’Toole 

 

THIS OPINION IS SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

2 

Judge RYAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 

I. Introduction

This case presents the questions whether the military judge 

properly admitted statements Appellant gave to a civilian police 

officer after being brought to the police station by his 

executive officer (XO), and whether the evidence was legally 

sufficient to support the guilty verdict.1 Under the facts as 

found by the military judge, and credited as not clearly 

erroneous by the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of 

Criminal Appeals (CCA) and this Court, we agree that Appellant’s 

statements were voluntary and properly admitted into evidence. 

Because Appellant was not in custody at any time, he was not 

entitled to receive warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 444 (1966). Further, the record demonstrates that 

Appellant’s statements were the product of his free will and 

thus voluntarily given. Considering these statements along with 

the other evidence presented at trial, there was legally 

 

1

 We granted the following issues: 

I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 

MILITARY JUDGE DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION IN FAILING 

TO SUPPRESS APPELLANT’S STATEMENT TO CIVILIAN 

AUTHORITIES AS INVOLUNTARY. 

II. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 

EVIDENCE WAS LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO AFFIRM APPELLANT’S 

CONVICTION. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

3 

sufficient evidence to support the verdict. The decision of the 

CCA is affirmed.2

II. Background

 On October 13, 2004, Appellant, Ensign (ENS) R, and several 

other servicemembers assigned to the USS Austin went on liberty 

to Jacksonville Beach, Florida. Early the next morning, ENS R 

filed a police report and complaint with the Jacksonville Beach 

Police Department against Appellant for sexual assault. 

Appellant was later interviewed by civilian Detective Amonette, 

of the Jacksonville Beach Police Department. By the end of the 

interview, Appellant had provided oral and written inculpatory 

statements to Detective Amonette. These statements were 

introduced into evidence at Appellant’s general court-martial, 

which ultimately convicted Appellant, contrary to his pleas, of 

committing an indecent assault on ENS R in violation of Article 

134, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 934 

(2000). The convening authority approved the conviction and the 

adjudged sentence of a dismissal. The CCA affirmed, finding 

that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by 

admitting Appellant’s statements. United States v. Chatfield, 

 

2

 Oral argument in this case was heard at the Texas Tech 

University School of Law, Lubbock, Texas, as part of the Court’s 

“Project Outreach.” See United States v. Mahoney, 58 M.J. 346, 

347 n.1 (C.A.A.F. 2003). This practice was developed as part of 

a public awareness program to demonstrate the operation of a 

federal court of appeals and the military justice system. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

4 

No. NMCCA 200602256, 2008 CCA LEXIS 143, at *11 2008 WL 961497, 

at *4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 10, 2008) (unpublished). 

A. Facts

Detective Amonette contacted the USS Austin and spoke with 

Commander (CDR) Landis, the XO, and requested to speak with 

Appellant, if possible.3 CDR Landis told Detective Amonette that 

Appellant was on shore leave, but that CDR Landis would inform 

Appellant when he returned that Detective Amonette wished to 

speak with him. CDR Landis and the commanding officer of the 

USS Austin discussed the allegations, but decided not to pursue 

any action against Appellant under the UCMJ at that time. 

Although CDR Landis spoke with a Naval Criminal Investigative 

Service (NCIS) agent to coordinate the communication with local 

law enforcement, CDR Landis did not ask NCIS to begin a military 

investigation of Appellant. 

 

3

 As a threshold matter, we agree with the CCA’s conclusion that 

the military judge’s findings of fact concerning Appellant’s 

interview are not clearly erroneous, Chatfield, 2008 CCA LEXIS 

143, at *8, 2008 WL 961497, at *3. Consequently, the following 

summary of facts related to Appellant’s statements is largely 

derived from those findings. In his brief to this Court, 

Appellant challenges several of the military judge’s factual 

findings as erroneous and also asserts the military judge failed 

to credit certain testimony given by witnesses at the 

suppression hearing. Contrary to these assertions, we find that 

the factual findings challenged by Appellant are either 

irrelevant to the issues at hand or adequately supported by the 

record. Those disputed findings that bear on the outcome of 

this case are analyzed within the discussion section below. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

5 

When Appellant returned to the USS Austin, CDR Landis sent 

word to him that the Jacksonville Beach Police wished to talk to 

him and that, if Appellant was willing, CDR Landis would arrange 

a way for him to attend the interview. CDR Landis did not speak 

directly with Appellant, but rather sent him the message by way 

of one of two department heads. CDR Landis could not remember 

which department head, Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) Hofheinz or 

Lieutenant (LT) Compton, he instructed to notify Appellant. 

Because the ship was sailing the next day, CDR Landis also told 

the department head that if Appellant wanted to speak with the 

police, the interview would have to take place that day. 

Appellant testified that department head LCDR Hofheinz told him 

to change into civilian clothes and to go to the chaplain’s 

stateroom, without disclosing why. In the stateroom, the 

chaplain informed Appellant of the accusations against him. 

Some time later, CDR Landis received word back that 

Appellant was willing to speak with the police. It is not clear 

whether this word came from LCDR Hofheinz, LT Compton, or the 

chaplain. CDR Landis and LCDR Hofheinz then went to the 

chaplain’s stateroom, where CDR Landis knocked on the door and 

said “Let’s go.” Concerned about not embarrassing Appellant in 

front of the rest of the crew, CDR Landis informed the officer 

on duty that he and Appellant, along with LCDR Hofheinz and the 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

6 

chaplain, were going ashore for dinner. The four then left the 

ship and drove by car to the Jacksonville Beach police station. 

 During the ride to the police station, CDR Landis discussed 

the plan to drop Appellant off for the interview, while the 

other three officers would wait at a nearby restaurant. At no 

point did Appellant object or express resistance to going to the 

police station. Appellant admitted during his suppression 

hearing testimony that CDR Landis “never told him he had to go 

to the police interview and never told him to make a statement 

to the police.” 

 Detective Amonette met Appellant and CDR Landis at the 

police station around 7:00 that evening. As it was a Saturday, 

there were no other police present at the station. When they 

arrived at the police station, CDR Landis and Appellant exited 

the car. Although CDR Landis testified he expected Appellant to 

follow him into the station, CDR Landis did not physically 

escort him in -- CDR Landis did not open the car door for 

Appellant or hold his arm. Once CDR Landis and Appellant were 

inside, Detective Amonette spoke with CDR Landis in the presence 

of Appellant. Detective Amonette stated that the interview 

would only last a few minutes and that CDR Landis could wait at 

the station. CDR Landis answered that he and the others were 

going to have dinner at a nearby restaurant. Detective Amonette 

and CDR Landis exchanged phone numbers with the understanding 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

7 

that Detective Amonette would either drop Appellant off to join 

the others at the restaurant or call CDR Landis to pick up 

Appellant. 

 After CDR Landis and the other officers left, Detective 

Amonette brought Appellant into his office, rather than one of 

the station’s interrogation rooms. This office contained 

typical office furniture and Detective Amonette’s personal 

effects. Appellant was neither handcuffed nor placed under 

arrest at this time. During the interview, Detective Amonette 

sat at his desk, while Appellant sat in a chair across from the 

detective. The office doors were open and Appellant had 

unimpeded access to them. 

 The military judge found the evidence was insufficient to 

show that Appellant was advised of his Miranda rights prior to 

the interview.4 Detective Amonette did not specifically tell 

Appellant that he was free to leave or that he did not have to 

make a statement. After five to ten minutes of questions, 

Appellant made a written statement to the effect that he did not 

 

4

 At the suppression hearing, Detective Amonette testified that 

his usual practice was to give Miranda warnings before 

interviews that involved serious charges, such as the charge in 

this case, but could not recall specifically whether he had 

warned Appellant. At trial, Detective Amonette testified that 

he had consulted his notes and confirmed he had given the 

Miranda warnings prior to the interview. However, this 

testimony played no part in the military judge’s ruling on the 

motion to suppress because it occurred after he issued the 

ruling. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

8 

remember the events on the night in question. Before concluding 

the interview, Detective Amonette mentioned to Appellant that 

the victim had undergone a forensic exam and asked whether 

Appellant’s DNA might be found on the victim. Appellant then 

asked whether DNA could come from a finger. After Detective 

Amonette answered that it could, Appellant admitted that he 

touched the victim “down below” and might have penetrated her. 

Detective Amonette was surprised that Appellant gave a 

statement. Detective Amonette consulted the state attorney and 

then called ENS R to see if she wanted to pursue the matter. 

After the call to ENS R, Detective Amonette was instructed by 

the state attorney to arrest Appellant. The total time that 

elapsed between the start of the interview and Appellant’s 

arrest was less than one hour, and the interview “was conducted 

in a conversational manner without the use of intimidating or 

coercive techniques.” 

B. Appellant’s Motion to Suppress 

At his court-martial, Appellant moved to suppress the 

statements he made to Detective Amonette. Specifically, 

Appellant argued that his confession was obtained in violation 

of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 

This argument was based on Appellant’s assertions that: (1) CDR 

Landis’s actions were tantamount to an order that Appellant give 

Detective Amonette a statement; (2) Detective Amonette failed to 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

9 

give Appellant Miranda warnings despite the fact that he was in 

custody; and (3) the coercive actions of the civilian police 

overbore Appellant’s free will, making his resulting statements 

involuntary. At the suppression hearing, the Government 

presented testimony by Detective Amonette and CDR Landis. The 

defense presented testimony by the department head LCDR Hofheinz 

and by Appellant, who testified for the limited purpose of the 

suppression hearing, pursuant to Military Rule of Evidence 

304(f). Neither the chaplain nor LT Compton testified. 

As relevant to the granted issue regarding the statements 

to Detective Amonette, the military judge’s conclusions of law 

were that: (1) Appellant was not in custody and Detective 

Amonette was not required to administer Miranda warnings before 

the interview; (2) CDR Landis’s actions did not amount to an 

order to Appellant to make a statement to Detective Amonette; 

and (3) the civilian police’s actions were not coercive.5 In 

 

5

 In addition, in response to Appellant’s argument that his 

statements should be suppressed due to CDR Landis’s failure to 

give Appellant warnings under Article 31(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 

§ 831(b) (2000), the military judge found that CDR Landis never 

questioned Appellant. By its terms, Article 31(b), UCMJ, only 

applies when a member of the military “interrogate[s], or 

request[s] any statement from, an accused or a person suspected 

of an offense[.]” Article 31(b), UCMJ. Further, the military 

judge also found that CDR Landis’s actions were not part of a 

military or civilian law enforcement investigation. See United 

States v. Loukas, 29 M.J. 385, 387 (C.M.A. 1990) (holding that 

Article 31, UCMJ, is only triggered when there is a questioner 

acting in an official capacity and the questioning is done as 

part of an official law enforcement investigation). Appellant 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

10 

light of these conclusions, the military judge held that 

Appellant’s statements to Detective Amonette were admissible. 

In support of his ruling, the military judge entered 

findings of fact and made credibility determinations for CDR 

Landis, Detective Amonette, and Appellant. He concluded that 

CDR Landis was “a highly credible witness” who was “forthright 

and responsive in his answers.” Detective Amonette was 

“sincere” and “honest” although also an “ill-prepared witness.” 

Finally, the military judge found Appellant was a “defensive” 

witness with an “aggressive attitude” who was “unconvincing due 

to the manner, tone, and content of his responses.” 

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

A military judge’s denial of a motion to suppress a 

confession is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Pipkin, 58 M.J. 358, 360 (C.A.A.F. 2003). We will not 

disturb a military judge’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous or unsupported by the record. United States 

v. Leedy, 65 M.J. 208, 213 (C.A.A.F. 2007). However, we review 

de novo any conclusions of law supporting the suppression 

ruling, including: (1) whether someone is in custody for the 

 

did not challenge the military judge’s conclusion that no 

Article 31, UCMJ, warnings were required, either before the CCA 

or in his brief to this Court, and we decline to revisit that 

issue here. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

11 

purposes of Miranda warnings, Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 

112-13 (1995); or (2) whether a confession is involuntary, 

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991); United States 

v. Bubonics, 45 M.J. 93, 94 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 

B. Custodial Interrogations 

 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall 

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 

himself[.]” U.S. Const. amend. V. In Miranda, the Supreme 

Court held that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether 

exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 

interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of 

procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against 

self-incrimination.” 384 U.S. at 444. It further held that the 

safeguard must take the form of specific warnings –- “[p]rior to 

any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right 

to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as 

evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of 

an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. Appellant 

argues that his statements should have been suppressed based on 

Detective Amonette’s failure to give him these Miranda warnings 

before the interview began. The Government asserts that 

warnings were not required because Appellant was not in custody 

during his interview. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

12 

In Miranda, the Supreme Court defined custodial 

interrogation as “questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Id.

(emphasis added). To answer the question whether an accused is 

in custody for purposes of Miranda, we consider “all of the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation” to determine “how a 

reasonable person in the position of the [accused] would gauge 

the breadth of his or her freedom of action.” Stansbury v. 

California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325 (1994) (quotation marks 

omitted). The Supreme Court has stated that two inquiries are 

essential to a custody determination: “first, what were the 

circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given 

those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or 

she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 

leave.” Thompson, 516 U.S. at 112. We consider the facts 

objectively in the context of a reasonable person’s perception 

when situated in Appellant’s position. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 

468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (holding that a policeman’s subjective 

belief did not bear on whether an accused was in custody). 

To be considered in custody for purposes of Miranda, a 

reasonable person in Appellant’s position must have believed he 

or she was restrained in a “formal arrest or restraint on 

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

13 

arrest.” California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per 

curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). As an initial 

matter, there is no per se rule that whenever a suspect appears 

at a police station for questioning, the suspect is therefore in 

custody. See id. (“[W]e have explicitly recognized that Miranda

warnings are not required ‘simply because the questioning takes 

place in the station house.’” (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 

U.S. 492, 495 (1977))). The Supreme Court has looked to several 

factors when determining whether a person has been restrained, 

including: (1) whether the person appeared for questioning 

voluntarily; (2) the location and atmosphere of the place in 

which questioning occurred, and (3) the length of the 

questioning. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (finding no custody 

when the appellant voluntarily went to the police station, where 

he was immediately told he was not under arrest, and left after 

a thirty-minute interview). In addition, the federal circuit 

courts of appeals have evaluated the circumstances of an 

interrogation based on a variety of factors, including “‘the 

number of law enforcement officers present at the scene [and] 

the degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect.’” 

United States v. Mittel-Carey, 493 F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(quoting United States v. Masse, 816 F.2d 805, 809 (1st Cir. 

1987) (finding custody where the appellant was physically 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

14 

restrained by eight officers in his home and questioned for 

ninety minutes to two hours). 

We conclude, in agreement with the military judge and the 

CCA, that Appellant was not in custody. Appellant asserts that 

the mere involvement of CDR Landis and other officers created a 

custodial situation from the time he learned from the chaplain 

that civilian authorities wanted to speak to him up to and 

including his interview with the civilian police. However, the 

facts as found by the military judge support the military 

judge’s conclusion that Appellant was not in custody. 

1. Voluntary Appearance

As to whether Appellant appeared for questioning 

voluntarily, we conclude that CDR Landis and the other officers 

did not compel Appellant to go to the police station. First, as 

Appellant himself acknowledged, neither CDR Landis nor any other 

officer ordered Appellant to go to the station or to answer 

questions once he was there. To the contrary, the military 

judge found that CDR Landis gave Appellant a choice whether to 

speak to the civilian police and received word back from 

Appellant that he voluntarily agreed to go. Although Appellant 

testified that he “felt compelled” to go to the station, he did 

not identify any express order from a superior establishing that 

obligation. While Appellant indicated that he felt compelled by 

the circumstances of being taken to the police station by his 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

15 

XO, the military judge found that Appellant’s testimony was not 

credible, and Appellant has not demonstrated on appeal that the 

military judge’s findings of fact related to the alleged 

compulsion were clearly erroneous. United States v. Owens, 51 

M.J. 204, 209 (C.A.A.F. 1999). Second, Appellant was never 

physically restrained, either on board the USS Austin or in the 

car on the way to the police station. Third, the actions of CDR 

Landis and the other officers were designed to facilitate an 

interview prior to the ship leaving if Appellant chose to 

participate and to keep the civilian authority’s interest in 

Appellant confidential; a fair reading of the record is that 

Appellant understood both these things. Finally, we also find 

it telling that much of the communication was made to Appellant 

through the chaplain, who is outside the chain of command and 

normally is not a conduit through which orders are conveyed. 

2. Environment of the Interview

Having concluded that Appellant was not ordered to appear 

at the station, we will look to the environment created by the 

civilian police -- including the location, atmosphere, and 

physical restraint involved in the questioning -- to determine 

whether that environment resulted in a custodial situation. 

Given the other circumstances of the interview, a reasonable 

person in Appellant’s situation would have realized that he was 

free to leave and would not have believed he was subject to a 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

16 

“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). 

At the time of the interview, there were no other police 

officers at the station. In front of Appellant, Detective 

Amonette stated that it would be a short interview. Further, 

Detective Amonette and CDR Landis made plans for returning 

Appellant to the officers for dinner, thereby conveying the 

impression that Appellant would not have to remain at the police 

station indefinitely.6

 Cf. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 (stating 

that Miranda warnings are designed to prevent the “inherent 

pressures” resulting from “an interrogator’s imprecations, 

whether implied or expressly stated, that the interrogation will 

continue until a confession is obtained”). Detective Amonette 

took Appellant to his office rather than an interrogation room. 

They spoke for less than one hour, which included the time 

Detective Amonette spent calling the State Attorney and ENS R. 

The entire interview was conducted with the office door open. 

 

6

 Appellant disputes the military judge’s finding that there were 

plans in place for Appellant to rejoin the other officers for 

dinner. However, this finding is supported by CDR Landis’s 

testimony that during the ride to the police station he “talked 

through the . . . plan to drop [Appellant] off” while “the other 

three of us were going to dinner at a restaurant . . . and that 

when the interview was completed, he could either call us, or if 

we finished dinner, we would come back, pick him up and get him 

something to eat before we went back to the ship.” 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

17 

Appellant was neither handcuffed nor told he could not leave. 

Detective Amonette described the interview as “very relaxed” and 

“casual.” Appellant admitted that Detective Amonette was “not 

accusatory” during the interview. That the interview was not 

coercive is also supported by Detective Amonette’s testimony 

that he was surprised that Appellant made inculpatory 

statements. 

The facts as a whole show that Appellant’s interview, which 

was facilitated by members of his command in a manner designed 

to avoid embarrassment to Appellant, did not contain the 

“inherently compelling pressures” with which the Miranda Court 

was concerned. 384 U.S. at 467. Rather, the atmosphere of the 

interview would have made it transparent to a reasonable person 

in Appellant’s position that he was not subject to “formal 

arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree 

associated with a formal arrest.” Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125. 

C. Voluntariness of Appellant’s Confession

While Miranda warnings provide procedural safeguards to 

secure the right against self-incrimination during custodial 

interrogations, the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments protect an accused generally against the 

admission of any involuntary statements, whether made in or out 

of custody. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433-34 

(2000) (reviewing the Court’s jurisprudence on involuntary 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

18 

statements). Appellant asserts that the actions taken by CDR 

Landis and Appellant’s other superiors were tantamount to an 

order requiring Appellant to give the civilian police a 

statement, rendering Appellant’s subsequent statement 

involuntary. 

When introducing a confession, the Government has the 

burden of showing “the confession is the product of an 

essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.” 

Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95. We review the totality of the 

circumstances to determine whether Appellant’s “will was 

overborne and his capacity for self-determination was critically 

impaired.” Id. The factors to consider include “‘both the 

characteristics of the accused and the details of the 

interrogation.’” Id. (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 

U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). 

This Court has previously found it appropriate to consider 

the accused’s age, education, experience, and intelligence as 

part of the circumstances bearing on the question whether a 

statement was voluntary. United States v. Freeman, 65 M.J. 451, 

454 (C.A.A.F. 2008). In this case, Appellant was a thirty-sixyear-old officer with about twelve years of experience in the 

Navy, including both active and reserve service. Appellant had 

experience with several of his subordinates being investigated 

for crimes under the UCMJ. There is no evidence in the record 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

19 

that Appellant was of low intelligence or had any mental 

disability to prevent him from understanding the investigative 

procedures. Overall, Appellant’s characteristics weigh in favor 

of his statement being found voluntary. 

Turning to the details of the meeting with Detective 

Amonette, the facts of this case do not suggest that CDR Landis 

expressly or impliedly ordered Appellant to give a statement to 

the civilian police. Certainly, it is unclear what exact 

message was communicated to Appellant regarding the interview, 

and the military judge’s findings of fact do not settle this 

particular point. But the military judge expressly found that 

CDR Landis sent a message down to Appellant advising him that an 

interview would be facilitated should he choose to go -- a 

finding supported by the record. In addition, CDR Landis 

testified that he had received word that Appellant had agreed 

voluntarily to speak with the civilian police. The only direct 

communication from CDR Landis to Appellant before leaving the 

USS Austin was to say “Let’s go” when he arrived at the 

chaplain’s office. None of these statements constituted orders 

to Appellant that he was either required to go to the police 

station to be interviewed or that he was required to give a 

statement once there. 

In addition, the military judge specifically found 

Appellant’s testimony that he felt compelled to make a statement 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

20 

was “simply not believable.” We grant deference to this 

determination because “the military judge was in a unique 

position to decide the appropriate weight to give appellant’s 

assertion of an overborne will.” United States v. Martinez, 38 

M.J. 82, 86 (C.M.A. 1993) (“Where, as here, the military judge 

expresses special influence of that unique viewpoint on his 

judgment, that expression must weigh heavily in our reaching our 

own determination.”).7

 

The conclusion that Appellant’s statements were voluntary 

is further buttressed by the lack of evidence of any 

overreaching tactics employed by Detective Amonette. As 

Appellant himself testified, Detective Amonette was not 

accusatory, which supports the military judge’s finding that the 

interview was “conversational” in tone. It was short and 

undertaken with the expectation that Appellant would be free to 

have dinner with the officers after it was over. Indeed, 

Appellant conceded at argument on the suppression motion that 

there were no coercive police tactics employed. 

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that 

neither CDR Landis’s actions in facilitating Appellant’s 

 

7

 In addition, the military judge’s specific finding regarding 

Appellant’s credibility explains why he did not rely on 

speculative answers to defense cross-examination, either from 

Detective Amonette, that he “had the perception that [Appellant] 

had the impression that he had to speak with” him, or from CDR 

Landis, that Appellant “could have” felt compelled to appear for 

the interview. 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

21 

interview nor the interview itself created a situation that 

impaired Appellant’s “capacity for self-determination,” 

Bubonics, 45 M.J. at 95, to an extent that his subsequent 

statements were involuntary. 

D. Conclusion 

 The events leading up to and taking place during Detective 

Amonette’s interview of Appellant created neither a custodial 

situation in which Miranda warnings were required nor a coercive 

setting in which Appellant’s will was overborne. We conclude 

that Appellant’s statements to Detective Amonette were given 

voluntarily, and, as such, the military judge did not abuse his 

discretion by admitting them. 

IV. Legal Sufficiency of Evidence

 In his second point of error, Appellant alleges the 

evidence was legally insufficient for the panel to return a 

guilty verdict. We review questions of legal sufficiency de

novo. United States v. Young, 64 M.J. 404, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2007). 

The test for legal sufficiency is “whether, considering the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

reasonable factfinder could have found all the essential 

elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Dobson, 

63 M.J. 1, 21 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

22 

 The elements of indecent assault under Article 134, UCMJ, 

are that: (1) the accused assaulted a person; (2) the act was 

done to gratify sexual desires; and (3) the conduct was 

prejudicial to good order or of a nature to bring discredit to 

the armed forces. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States pt. 

IV, para. 63.b. (2005 ed.). Appellant specifically asserts the 

second element -- that the act was done with the intent to 

gratify sexual desires -- was insufficiently proved. After 

reviewing the record, we hold that the evidence produced by the 

Government at trial was legally sufficient to prove each element 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

 At trial, in addition to the statements made by Appellant 

to Detective Amonette, the Government offered testimony from ENS 

R that she woke on a bed in the group’s shared hotel room to 

find Appellant behind her and her underwear pulled down around 

her knees. She testified that she felt like she had been 

penetrated. Lieutenant Junior Grade (LTJG) Buckner, who 

witnessed the incident, testified that he saw Appellant grabbing 

ENS R’s breast and saw movement under the covers around ENS R’s 

waist. LTJG Buckner also testified that he saw Appellant turn 

away and button his pants after ENS R awoke. The panel would 

have considered this evidence in conjunction with Appellant’s 

statements to Detective Amonette that he had rubbed ENS R “down 

below” and that he might have penetrated her. Based on the 
United States v. Chatfield, No. 08-0615/NA 

23 

evidence presented, the panel could have reasonably concluded 

that Appellant digitally penetrated ENS R with the intent to 

gratify his sexual desires and that this conduct was prejudicial 

to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit 

to the armed forces. 

V. Decision

 We hold that the military judge did not abuse his 

discretion by admitting Appellant’s statements to Detective 

Amonette and that there was legally sufficient evidence to 

support the panel’s verdict. The decision of the United States 

Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.