1

Filed 12/13/19

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEPHEN DARRELL TAYLOR,

Defendant and Appellant.

E069293

(Super.Ct.No. FSB1502285)

OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Kyle S. Brodie, 

Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.

Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Scott C. Taylor and Charles C. 

Ragland, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is 

certified for publication with the exception of parts I, II, and III of the DISCUSSION.
2

A jury convicted Stephen Darrell Taylor of numerous sex offenses against his 

adopted daughters, Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. In total, the jury convicted him on 12

counts. The trial court sentenced him to prison for a one-year determinate term and an 

aggregate indeterminate term of 165 years to life.

On appeal, Taylor argues that the court erred by admitting expert testimony on 

child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (accommodation syndrome) and instructing 

the jurors that they could use that evidence to evaluate the victims’ credibility. He also 

asserts several sentencing errors. He argues that the court erred by (1) imposing two 

indeterminate terms under the former “One Strike” law (Pen. Code,1former § 667.61, 

subd. (a)) for two offenses that occurred during a single occasion, (2) imposing multiple 

punishments for four counts of aggravated sexual assault and four counts of lewd acts 

arising from the same facts, and (3) imposing a restitution fine and court operations and 

facilities fees without an ability to pay hearing.

We agree that the court erred by imposing multiple punishments on four counts of 

aggravated sexual assault (counts 1 through 4) and four counts of forcible lewd acts

(counts 5 through 8) that arose from the same conduct. Accordingly, we stay Taylor’s 

sentence on counts 5 through 8. We also agree that the court should hold an ability to 

pay hearing, at least as to the court operations and facilities fees. We therefore reverse 

the order imposing those fees and remand for a hearing on Taylor’s ability to pay them. 

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 

indicated.
3

As to the restitution fine, Taylor has forfeited his contention. We otherwise reject 

Taylor’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Offenses Against Doe 1

Doe 1 was 18 years old when she testified at trial. She and Doe 2 are sisters. Doe 

1, Doe 2, and their younger brother and sister were placed in the Taylor household as 

foster children. Doe 1 was in preschool when she was placed with the Taylors. They

adopted her, but she did not recall at what age. She was removed from their home in 

2008, when she was about nine years old.

With respect to Doe 1, the amended information charged Taylor with four counts 

of aggravated sexual assault (rape) of a child (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 269, subd. (a)(1)), one 

count for each year between 2004 and 2008. It also charged him with four counts of 

forcible lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), one count for each year between 2004 

and 2008.

Doe 1 was five years old when Taylor first raped her, and he continued to do so 

approximately once per week until she was removed from his home. He would take off 

his clothes and insert his penis into her vagina. She tried to push him off of her 

sometimes but was unable to do so. She told Taylor that she was going to report his 

sexual abuse. He said no one would help her or believe her because she was a child.

Taylor and his wife physically abused Doe 1 by hitting her with belts, hangers, or 

spoons. Doe 1 told a social worker investigating the physical abuse about Taylor’s 

sexual abuse. The social worker talked to Taylor’s wife about it, and his wife “hit [Doe 
4

1] for that.” Doe 1 was removed from the Taylor household because of the physical 

abuse. 

Years later, in 2013, Doe 1 disclosed Taylor’s sexual abuse to her foster mother. 

In March 2013, a forensic interviewer spoke with Doe 1, and a forensic pediatrician 

examined her. Detective Jason Frey of the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department 

observed Doe 1’s interview with the forensic interviewer. She reported that Taylor 

would remove his clothes, remove her clothes, and insert his penis into her vagina. 

The forensic pediatrician concluded with reasonable medical certainty that Doe 1 

had sustained a penetrating injury to her genitalia. The doctor discovered two 

abnormalities in Doe 1’s genital area. She had a scar and tissue missing from her hymen. 

The abnormalities indicated that Doe 1 had suffered a penetrating injury that tore her 

hymen. Together with Doe 1’s disclosures during interviews, the doctor’s findings were 

“highly suspicious for sexual abuse.” 

In April 2015, Detective Frey called Taylor and pretended to be a counselor who 

was treating Doe 1. The detective had his wife pretend to be Doe 1 on the phone call. 

The detective’s wife confronted Taylor about the sexual abuse. Taylor did not directly 

acknowledge the abuse but did not deny it. When the detective’s wife, acting as Doe 1, 

asked Taylor “if he hated her when he did the sex things to her,” Taylor said that he did 

not hate her, but he hated himself. He apologized to her more than once during the 

conversation. He also told her that he was sexually abused as a young boy, and “it took 

him many years to forgive that person.” He said that forgiving someone meant “‘[t]o 

forgive and never bring it up again.’”
5

In June 2015, Detective Frey and another officer interviewed Taylor at the 

sheriff’s station. Taylor initially denied sexually abusing Doe 1 but then admitted to 

twice penetrating her vagina with his finger and twice penetrating her vagina with his 

penis.

Around this same time, Taylor’s son confronted Taylor about Doe 1’s and Doe 2’s 

allegations of sexual abuse. Taylor said, “some of it was true,” and he specifically 

admitted to “‘penis penetration,’” but would say nothing further.

II. Offenses Against Doe 2

Doe 2 was 19 years old when she testified at trial. Taylor and his wife adopted 

Doe 2 at age five, and she was removed from their home at about age 10. She is deaf and 

learned sign language at age 11, after she left the Taylor household. Taylor and his wife 

did not know sign language. Doe 2 communicated with them using their “home 

language,” which she described as “very basic signs, very gesture-like.”

With respect to Doe 2, the amended information charged Taylor with three counts 

of lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted forcible lewd act on 

a child (§ 288, subd. (b)(1)), all occurring between January 2003 and January 2008. This 

was roughly the five-year period during which Doe 2 lived in the Taylor household.

The prosecutor began by asking Doe 2 what Taylor did “when he touched [her] in 

a sexual way.” Doe 2 replied: “When I would get in my bed in my room he would come 

into bed with me. He would take off my clothes. I would tell him, no, no. And then his 

wife would come out and he quickly—when his wife would come in the bedroom he 

would quickly get out of my bedroom.” The prosecutor asked how many times that 
6

happened, and Doe 2 said twice. She said that he touched her breasts when he took off 

her clothes, and then explained that he did not completely take off her shirt, but just lifted 

it up and “cupped” her breast. He stopped because his wife arrived home. The 

prosecutor asked if she remembered telling an interviewer that Taylor had touched her 

breasts over her clothing. Doe 2 replied that she remembered telling the interviewer that, 

and the incident did occur. She did not remember anything more specific about that 

incident.

On cross-examination, Doe 2 specified that the first time Taylor touched her 

breasts, it happened in his bedroom during the afternoon. Taylor’s wife was not home. 

Doe 1 was outside playing in the yard. Doe 2 was not sure where her two younger 

siblings were. The incident stopped when Taylor’s wife came home. The second time he 

touched her breasts also occurred in his bedroom. It was the afternoon again, and Doe 1 

and her other siblings were in the yard. Again, Taylor’s wife was not home.

Doe 2 initially said that she did not remember Taylor engaging in any other 

“sexual touching” with her. But then the prosecutor asked if she remembered telling the 

interviewer that Taylor tried to make her touch his penis. She recalled telling the 

interviewer that and described the incident. Taylor’s wife was not there on this occasion, 

and Doe 2’s “brother and sister were out and about.” Taylor tried to “force [her] head 

down to him.” His pants were unzipped, but she did not see his penis because she closed 

her eyes. She said, “no,” and went to brush her teeth “because it smelt so bad.”

On cross-examination, defense counsel referred to the “third incident involving 

[Taylor] pushing [Doe 2’s] head” and asked if Doe 2 recalled what year that happened. 
7

She did not recall, but it was probably summer. Doe 1 was at home watching television, 

but Doe 2 was unsure where her younger siblings were. Taylor’s wife was again not 

home.

The prosecutor also asked Doe 2 if she remembered telling the interviewer about 

an incident in which Taylor “called [her] to go to his room and he was not wearing a 

shirt.” They had the following exchange:

“Q Do you remember what happened during that time?

“A Yeah.

“Q What happened?

“A That’s what I was explaining before.

“Q I’m not sure what you mean. You were explaining what before?

“A Yeah, that’s what I was telling you about the first story.

“Q The one where he touched your breasts?

“A When he touched my breasts.

“Q Do you remember also telling the interviewer that he tried kissing you on 

your face?

“A Yeah.

“Q Did that happen?

“A Yeah.”

Detective Frey observed Doe 2’s forensic interview, which took place in 

March 2013, like Doe 1’s interview. According to Detective Frey, Doe 2 described two 

different incidents in which Taylor touched her breasts, once under her clothing and once 
8

over her clothing. He also testified: “Another occasion, she described Mr. Taylor was 

just wearing his boxers. He was not wearing any shirt and was kissing her on her face 

and then at that time, unzipped his zipper.” The prosecutor asked the detective whether 

Doe 2 described “any specific incident that occurred with respect to [Taylor’s] penis.” 

The detective replied that Doe 2 said Taylor tried to put his penis in her mouth, and 

afterward, she went to the bathroom and brushed her teeth.

In 2008, like Doe 1, Doe 2 was removed from the Taylor household because of 

physical abuse. Doe 2 told social workers in 2008 about the physical abuse, but she did 

not report the sexual abuse until 2013. She did not report the sexual abuse initially 

because she was “very scared” and had difficulty trusting people. She tried to tell 

Taylor’s wife about the sexual abuse when she lived in the Taylor household, but his wife 

did not believe her.

III. Accommodation Syndrome Evidence

Dr. Jody Ward is a clinical and forensic psychologist who testified about 

accommodation syndrome. The syndrome is a pattern of behaviors exhibited by many

but not all children who have been sexually abused within an ongoing relationship. It is 

not a diagnosis but a therapeutic instrument to help children and their families understand 

children’s reactions to sexual abuse. Dr. Ward had never met Doe 1 and Doe 2, had not 

read the police reports in the case, had not interviewed Taylor, and had not otherwise 

been provided with the facts of the case. Her purpose in testifying was not to diagnose 

anyone, and she had no opinion on the case. Her purpose was “just [to] help people 

understand children’s behavior better in general.”
9

Accommodation syndrome consists of five elements: (1) secrecy;

(2) helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, unconvincing 

disclosure; and (5) recantation. Not all five elements are present in every case. Secrecy 

refers to children’s tendency to keep sexual abuse a secret when the perpetrator is a 

family member or close friend of the family, even without threats or any direction at all 

from the perpetrator. Helplessness refers to the power differential between children and 

adults. Children are taught to obey adults and are completely dependent on adults for 

material and emotional needs. Entrapment and accommodation refers to the situation 

children find themselves in because of their powerlessness—they cannot provide for 

themselves and escape the adult who is abusing them, so they find other ways to cope 

with the abuse. Some children learn to acquiesce in or go along with the abuse as a way 

to survive, to keep the family together, to get their material and emotional needs met, or 

to protect other children in the home. They disassociate or “put themselves mentally 

somewhere else while the abuse is occurring.”

Delayed, unconvincing disclosure means that many child victims do not report 

sexual abuse until months or years after it happens, and many never report it at all. If 

they do report it, the disclosure initially tends to be hesitant or tentative in nature, and 

then they might disclose more over time, as they become more comfortable with the 

disclosure process. They may disclose the abuse once they are in a new home where they 

feel comfortable.

The last element, recantation, occurs less often than the other four elements. But 

occasionally, children disclose abuse and then later say they do not remember it or recant 
10

the allegations altogether. Some children feel pressure to recant when the disclosure 

causes family ruptures or results in removal from their home, or they have to endure a 

number of intrusive interviews by police officers, social workers, and mental health 

professionals.

DISCUSSION

I. Expert Testimony and Jury Instruction on Accommodation Syndrome

Taylor contends that the court erred by admitting Dr. Ward’s testimony on 

accommodation syndrome. He argues that the evidence was more prejudicial than 

probative under Evidence Code section 352. Relatedly, he argues that the pattern jury 

instruction on accommodation syndrome (CALCRIM No. 1193) erroneously told the 

jurors that they could consider the evidence in determining the victims’ credibility. We 

reject both arguments.

Expert testimony on accommodation syndrome is not admissible “to prove that the 

complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused.” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53

Cal.3d 1289, 1300 (McAlpin).) It is admissible, however, to bolster the credibility of the 

complaining witness “when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the 

incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her testimony claiming 

molestation.” (Ibid.) “‘Such expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly 

held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the emotional antecedents 

of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching behavior.’” (Id. at p. 1301.) Thus, “[t]he 

testimony is pertinent and admissible if an issue has been raised as to the victim’ s 

credibility” (People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1745) because of 
11

“paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a molestation.” (Id. at p. 1744.) 

Moreover, the prosecution may introduce evidence of accommodation syndrome in its 

case-in-chief rather than wait until rebuttal. (Id. at p. 1745.)

Evidence relating to the credibility of a witness is relevant. (Evid. Code, § 210.) 

The court may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially 

outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of 

undue prejudice . . . .” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “The prejudice which exclusion of evidence 

under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a 

defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.” (People v. Karis

(1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) “‘[E]vidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when 

it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the 

information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or 

punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction.’” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45

Cal.4th 390, 439.) We review the court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of 

discretion. (Id. at p. 437.) 

In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dr. Ward’s 

testimony. The evidence was relevant because the victims’ credibility was at issue. 

Doe 1 and Doe 2 kept the abuse secret for years, and after their initial disclosures to 

Taylor’s wife or the social worker investigating physical abuse, they did not disclose the 

abuse again until five years after their removal from the Taylor household. It would be 

natural for the jurors to see this secrecy and the long delay in reporting as inconsistent 

with the victims’ claims of sexual abuse. 
12

Taylor argues that, in general, accommodation syndrome evidence is unduly 

prejudicial because jurors may use “the amorphous and indefinite characteristics of the 

syndrome” to support whatever version of events victims offer. He asserts that the 

evidence is “invariably one-sided and guilt-directed.” In other words, his complaint is 

that such evidence is too favorable to the prosecution. This is not the type of prejudice 

that Evidence Code section 352 protects against. “Evidence is not prejudicial . . . merely 

because it undermines the opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent. The 

ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant.” (Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53 

Cal.App.4th 998, 1008.) Taylor has not identified how the evidence “uniquely tend[ed]

to evoke an emotional bias against” him. (People v. Yu (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 358, 

377.)

Taylor also argues that the jurors could have misapplied the accommodation 

syndrome evidence “because the question of whether the victim’s behavior was typical of 

sexual abuse victims is closely related to the ultimate question of whether sexual abuse 

actually occurred.” He relies on other states’ cases that have found the evidence

inadmissible for all purposes. But as he acknowledges, California courts do not follow 

that approach, and they instead address the problem with a pattern jury instruction setting 

forth the limited purpose of the evidence (CALCRIM No. 1193). (E.g., People v. 

Housely (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 958-959.) The court in this case gave the pattern jury 

instruction, which stated: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Ward regarding child 

sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. [¶] Dr. Ward’s testimony about child sexual 

abuse accommodation syndrome is not evidence that [Taylor] committed any of the 
13

crimes charged against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding 

whether or not [Doe 1’s] or [Doe 2’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of 

someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their testimony.” 

It is settled that the evidence was admissible for the limited purposes identified in the 

instruction, so Taylor’s reliance on out-of-state cases is unavailing. (E.g., McAlpin, 

supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1300; People v. Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744-1745.)

Taylor’s argument that the pattern jury instruction was wrong fares no better.2 He 

contends that CALCRIM No. 1193 erroneously informed the jurors that they could use 

accommodation syndrome evidence to evaluate the victims’ credibility. But the 

instruction correctly states the law in California. According to our Supreme Court’s 

reasoning, the evidence is relevant precisely because it relates to the victim’s credibility. 

(See McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1299, 1302 [expert testimony about parents’ 

common reactions to their child’s molestation gave “jurors information they needed to 

objectively evaluate [the mother’s] credibility,” and “the evidence was clearly relevant” 

in that it “tended to rehabilitate the testimony of [the mother] as a corroborating 

witness”].)

2 We reject the People’s argument that Taylor forfeited this contention by failing to 

object to the instruction in the trial court. “[W]e may review any instruction which 

affects the defendant’s ‘substantial rights,’ with or without a trial objection. [Citation.]

‘Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error affected the substantial rights of the 

defendant necessarily requires an examination of the merits of the claim—at least to the 

extent of ascertaining whether the asserted error would result in prejudice if error it 

was.’” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087.)
14

In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the accommodation 

syndrome evidence, and it correctly instructed the jurors that they could use the evidence 

to evaluate the victims’ credibility. 

II. One Strike Law Sentencing

The court sentenced Taylor under the One Strike law to eleven consecutive terms 

of 15 years to life. This was his sentence for the four counts of aggravated sexual assault 

of Doe 1, the four counts of forcible lewd acts on Doe 1, and the three counts of lewd acts

on Doe 2. For the remaining count of attempted forcible lewd act on Doe 2, he received a 

one-year determinate sentence.

Taylor contends that two lewd acts on Doe 2 necessarily occurred during the same 

encounter. He argues that under a former version of the One Strike law, the court could 

impose only one 15-year-to-life term for all offenses committed during a single occasion. 

Thus, he asserts, we must reverse his indeterminate sentence on one of the lewd act

convictions involving Doe 2. We conclude that the argument lacks merit.

A. One Strike Law Background

The One Strike law, section 667.61, “ensures serious sexual offenders receive long 

prison sentences whether or not they have any prior convictions.” (People v. Wutzke

(2002) 28 Cal.4th 923, 929.) It requires indeterminate life terms for certain sex offenses, 

including lewd act on a child. (§§ 288, subd. (a), 667.61, subd. (c)(8); People v. Hiscox 

(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 253, 257.) Conviction of a One Strike offense alone does not 

trigger the special sentencing provisions. (People v. Wutzke, supra, at p. 930.) The 

People must also plead and prove an aggravating circumstance. (Ibid.) One aggravating 
15

circumstance is the defendant’s conviction of a qualifying offense “against more than one 

victim.” (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) With exceptions not relevant here, a defendant 

convicted of qualifying offenses against multiple victims in the same case should receive 

a sentence of 15 years to life for each qualifying offense. (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(4); 

People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 204, 213.)

The former version of the One Strike law on which Taylor relies was in effect 

from 1994 to 2006. (Former § 667.61, subd. (g), added by Stats. 1994, 1st Ex. Sess.

1994, ch. 14, § 1; People v. Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 355.) Former subdivision (g)

of the law provided that the indeterminate term “shall be imposed on the defendant once 

for any offense or offenses committed against a single victim during a single occasion.” 

(Former § 667.61, subd. (g).) “[S]ex offenses occurred on a ‘single occasion’ if they 

were committed in close temporal and spatial proximity.” (People v. Jones (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 98, 107.) The rule thus “‘result[ed] in a single . . . sentence . . . for a sequence of 

sexual assaults by [a] defendant against one victim that occurred during an uninterrupted 

time frame and in a single location.’” (People v. Jackson, supra, at p. 355.) The 

Legislature abrogated this restriction by eliminating former section 667.61, 

subdivision (g), in the September 2006 amendments to the One Strike law. (People v. 

Rodriguez, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at pp. 213-214.)

B. Application of the Former Version

Taylor contends that the court was required to apply the former version of the One 

Strike law (former § 667.61, subd. (g)) to avoid an ex post facto violation. The People do 

not challenge the premise that the court should have used the former version of the One 
16

Strike law. Instead, they argue that even accepting the premise, the court did not err. We 

agree with Taylor that the former version of the One Strike law applied.

The amended information alleged that all of the offenses against Doe 2 occurred 

between January 2003 and January 2008, and the jury was so instructed. The time period 

straddles the operative date of the 2006 amendments repealing former section 667.61, 

subdivision (g).

The ex post facto clauses of the state and federal Constitutions “protect against the 

later adoption of a statute that inflicts greater punishment than the law in effect at the 

time of the commission of the crime.” (People v. Riskin (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 234, 

244.) The September 2006 amendment to the One Strike law increased the punishment 

for Taylor’s offenses if he committed more than one on a single occasion. He had a right 

to be sentenced under the terms of the law in effect when he committed his offenses. 

(People v. Hiscox, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.) And for the amended law to apply, 

the People had to prove that he committed the offenses after the September 2006 

effective date. (Id. at p. 260.)

The People failed to do this. Doe 2 described how Taylor abused her, but she did 

not specify when the offenses occurred during the 2003 to 2008 time period. 

Consequently, the court was required to apply the former version of the One Strike law,

imposing only one indeterminate sentence “per victim per episode of sexually assaultive 

behavior.” (People v. Jones, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 107.)

That said, the record suggests that the court did apply the former version of the 

One Strike law. At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the court referred to an 
17

in-chambers discussion about the probation report and the recommended sentence. The 

court stated: “Specifically, we discussed some of the details of the basis for the sentence, 

by which I mean the sentence given that these offenses happened some time ago. There 

have been some changes in the law since then so we did some research. Court did some 

research as well regarding the relevant statutes that were in place and that would be 

applicable to the times that these offenses were committed.” Later, when the court began 

to announce Taylor’s sentence, it explained that it was imposing a 15-year-to-life term

under section 667.61, subdivisions (b) through (e), and it asked the prosecutor whether 

that was correct. The prosecutor replied: “That’s correct, your Honor. Back in 2003 it 

was actually [section] 667.61[, subdivision] (e)(5).” So it appears that the court applied 

the 2003 version of the One Strike law, the same former version that Taylor urges us to 

apply.

C. Substantial Evidence of Different Occasions

To impose three indeterminate terms for the three lewd act offenses against Doe 2, 

the court had to find that each of the lewd acts occurred on different occasions. (Former 

§ 667.61, subd. (g).) Taylor does not discuss which standard of review applies to an 

implied finding that the lewd acts occurred on different occasions, nor do the People.

Whether offenses occurred on a single occasion or on different occasions is a 

question of fact. Appellate courts review factual determinations for substantial evidence. 

(People v. Ortiz (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1378.) Accordingly, we ask whether there 

is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the court’s 

determination, and we presume the existence of every fact the court could reasonably 
18

deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.; see also People v. Chan (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 408, 

424 [noting that substantial evidence supported the court’s finding that offenses occurred 

on “separate occasions” for purposes of § 667.6, subd. (d)].) “‘If such substantial

evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or

drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.’” 

(People v. Ortiz, supra, at p. 1378, italics omitted.)

Taylor asserts that the three lewd act offenses consisted of twice touching Doe 2’s 

breasts and once forcing her head toward his penis, and according to her testimony, all of 

those acts occurred during two encounters: On one occasion, he touched her breasts, and 

on another occasion, he touched her breasts and forced her head toward his penis. But as 

the People point out, the incident in which he tried to force oral copulation formed the 

basis for the attempted forcible lewd act count. The court imposed a one-year term for 

that offense, not an indeterminate term under the One Strike law. The court could impose 

a sentence for the attempted forcible lewd act, just not an indeterminate One Strike 

sentence. (Former § 667.61, subd. (g) [“Terms for other offenses committed during a 

single occasion shall be imposed as authorized under any other law . . .”’]; People v. 

Fuller (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1343.) Accordingly, the sentencing for those three 

acts did not violate the “single occasion” rule.

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the determination that Taylor committed 

three lewd acts on three different occasions apart from the attempted oral copulation. 

Doe 2 described two incidents when he touched her breasts, once under her clothing and 

once over her clothing. During one incident Doe 1 was playing in the yard, but Doe 2
19

was unsure where the youngest two siblings were. During the second incident, Doe 1 

and the other siblings were in the yard. (Even Taylor concedes that these two incidents 

did not occur on a single occasion.) The third incident occurred when Taylor was 

shirtless and kissing Doe 2’s face. Doe 2’s testimony, though unclear, suggested that 

Taylor “tried” to kiss her face on an occasion when he also touched her breasts. But

according to Detective Frey’s observations of her forensic interview, she described an 

incident in which Taylor was shirtless and “kissing her on her face,” and this was 

“[a]nother occasion” apart from the times when he touched her breasts. The testimony of 

a single witness constitutes substantial evidence, so long as the testimony is not 

physically impossible or inherently improbable, and Detective Frey’s testimony is 

neither. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) On this record, a trier of fact 

could reasonably conclude that the three acts—twice touching her breasts and once 

kissing her face—occurred on three different occasions.

Taylor does not expressly address the kissing incident. Instead, in response to the 

People’s argument that the three acts occurred on different occasions, he characterizes

Doe 2’s testimony as confusing, declares that only two total encounters occurred, and 

says that we “will need to resolve that factual issue.” We do not resolve factual disputes

or inconsistencies in the evidence. (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) That 

is the province of the trial court, and we determine only whether substantial evidence 

supports the court’s findings. (Ibid.) In this case, it does.

For the foregoing reasons, the court did not err by sentencing Taylor to three 

indeterminate terms for the three lewd act offenses against Doe 2. Although the former 
20

version of the One Strike law permitted only a single indeterminate term for all offenses 

committed on a single occasion, sufficient evidence shows the three lewd acts occurred 

on three different occasions.

III. Section 654

Taylor contends that the court should have stayed his sentence on the four forcible 

lewd act convictions involving Doe 1 (counts 5 through 8). He argues that the four acts 

of rape underlying those counts were also the basis for his conviction and sentence on the 

four aggravated sexual assault counts (counts 1 through 4). He therefore asserts that, 

under section 654, he cannot be punished twice for the same four acts of rape. We agree.

Section 654, subdivision (a), states: “An act or omission that is punishable in 

different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that 

provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or 

omission be punished under more than one provision.” The statute “precludes multiple 

punishments for a single act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 

22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) When it applies, the court should sentence the defendant for each 

count but stay execution of sentence on those counts to which section 654 applies. 

(People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353.)

A defendant’s intent and objective determines whether a transaction constitutes an 

indivisible course of conduct. (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.) “[I]f all 

of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or 

facilitating one objective, [the] defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent 

and therefore may be punished only once. [Citation.] [¶] If, on the other hand, [the] 
21

defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were independent of and not 

merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each statutory violation 

committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations shared common acts 

or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’” (Ibid.)

When it comes to sex crimes in particular, if one sex offense “directly facilitates or 

is merely incidental to the commission” of another sex offense, section 654 bars separate 

punishment. (People v. Madera (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 845, 855; see People v. Perez 

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 553-554 [declining to apply § 654 because “[n]one of the sex 

offenses was committed as a means of committing any other, none facilitated commission 

of any other, and none was incidental to the commission of any other”].) “For example, 

section 654 would bar separate punishment for applying lubricant to the area to be 

copulated” and the copulation itself. (People v. Madera, supra, at p. 855.) In this 

situation, the application of lubricant “directly facilitate[s]” the copulation. (Ibid.)

Whether the defendant harbored a single criminal intent or multiple objectives is a 

factual question for the trial court. (People v. Liu (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1134-

1135.) We will uphold a court’s implied finding that the defendant harbored separate 

intents and objectives if substantial evidence supports it. (Id. at pp. 1135-1136.)

The parties do not dispute that the four aggravated sexual assault convictions were 

based on Taylor’s rape of Doe 1. The amended information charged rape as the 

underlying conduct for those counts, and the court instructed the jury that the People had 

to prove Taylor committed rape to find him guilty on those counts. But while Taylor 

says the four lewd act convictions were based on the same acts of penetration as the 
22

rapes, the People argue that the four lewd act convictions were based on the separate acts

of “removing [Doe 1’s] clothes and getting on top of her” before penetrating her. They 

point out that they argued this theory to the jury.

Even if the jury could separately convict Taylor for undressing Doe 1 and 

climbing on top of her, whether the court could separately punish him for those acts is a 

different question. The court was required to find that Taylor harbored separate and 

independent criminal objectives when he (1) undressed Doe 1 and got on top of her and 

(2) penetrated her. There is no substantial evidence to support such a finding. The first 

two acts facilitated the rape and were incidental to it. No evidence whatsoever suggests 

that Taylor had an intent or objective for doing those things other than committing rape. 

In other words, the sequence of acts—undressing her, climbing on top of her, and 

penetrating her—was one indivisible course of conduct amounting to rape.

Our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589 (Greer), 

overruled on another ground by People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 308, footnote 6, 

is instructive. The Greer court held that the defendant could not suffer separate 

convictions for statutory rape and lewd conduct arising out of the same act of sexual 

intercourse. (Id. at pp. 601-604.) There was “no question” that the same act of 

intercourse formed the basis for both convictions, because “[e]xcept for the rape itself, 

the only act of which [the victim] accused defendant was the forcible removal of her 

underclothing immediately preceding the rape.” (Id. at p. 604.) The court observed: “To 

hold that the removal of the [victim’s] underclothing constitutes an act separate from the 

rape, however, would be artificial in the present context and would permit double 
23

punishment not authorized or contemplated by section 288.” (Ibid.) Similarly, here, the 

People’s attempt to divide the act of rape into two separately punishable acts is 

“artificial.” There is no evidence that Taylor entertained multiple, independent criminal 

objectives when he raped Doe 1.

At oral argument, the People argued that the issue is not whether the sequence of 

Taylor’s acts constituted one indivisible course of conduct. They contended that the four 

forcible lewd acts and the four aggravated sexual assaults represented eight different

occasions of rape, thereby permitting separate punishment for each. (People v. Kwok

(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1253 [acts committed on different occasions are separately 

punishable under § 654].) They relied on Doe 1’s testimony that Taylor raped her

approximately once per week until she left his home. Thus, according to the People, 

Taylor raped her 52 times per year, so there was substantial evidence to separately punish 

him for two rapes per year and eight rapes total. We are not persuaded by this argument.

We must examine the charging instrument, the verdict forms, the prosecutor’s 

closing argument, and the jury instructions. (People v. Siko (1988) 45 Cal.3d 820, 826

(Siko).) If those things allow us to identify the “specific factual basis for a verdict, a trial 

court cannot find otherwise in applying section 654.” (People v. McCoy (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 1333, 1339.) In Siko, for instance, the People argued that the defendant 

could be punished separately for rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct with a child, where the 

lewd conduct consisted of undressing the victim and twisting a handkerchief around her 

neck. (Siko, supra, at pp. 822, 825.) Our Supreme Court found this argument 

“untenable.” (Id. at p. 825.) There was no showing that the jury understood those acts as 
24

the basis for the lewd conduct count. (Id. at p. 826.) Rather, the charging instrument and 

the verdict form both identified rape and sodomy as the lewd conduct at issue. (Ibid.) 

And nothing “in the prosecutor’s closing argument or in the court’s instructions 

suggest[ed] any different emphasis.” (Ibid.)

Our high court reached a similar result in People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at 

page 350. The defendant was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, carrying a 

concealed firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm. (Id. at p. 352.) The People argued that 

the trial court could impose multiple punishments because there were separate acts—the 

defendant possessed the gun at his grandmother’s house for three days, and then he 

carried it in his car, where police found it on the day of his arrest. (Id. at pp. 352, 359.) 

The Supreme Court rejected that attempt to construct two factual bases for the 

convictions. (Id. at p. 359.) The charging instrument alleged that the defendant 

committed all three crimes “on or about May 26, 2008, the day he was arrested,” and the 

verdict forms found him guilty as charged. (Ibid.) In closing argument, the prosecutor 

based the defendant’s guilt on possession of the gun when he was arrested, and the 

prosecutor explained “that there were ‘three different counts for the same exact 

conduct.’” (Ibid.) Thus, “[t]he record establishe[d] that the jury convicted defendant of 

each crime due to his being caught with the gun in the car on May 26, 2008, not due to 

any antecedent possession.” (Ibid.) The court therefore permitted only one punishment 

for the three convictions. (Id. at p. 360.)

As in Siko and People v. Jones, the record establishes that the jury did not 

understand the forcible lewd act counts in the fashion now urged by the People. (Siko, 
25

supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 826; People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 359.) The amended 

information and the verdict forms did not identify the exact date or type of lewd acts 

underlying Taylor’s convictions. The amended information merely charged him with one 

count of forcible lewd act per year from 2004 through 2008, and the verdict forms found 

him guilty as charged. Likewise, the jury instructions merely identified the year-long 

time frame during which Taylor allegedly committed each count. (For example, “Count 

5 is alleged to have been committed between April 30, 2004, and April 29, 2005.”)

But in the prosecutor’s closing argument, she described the aggravated sexual 

assaults (counts 1 through 4) and the forcible lewd acts (counts 5 through 8) as

comprising single instances of rape. At the start, she argued: “And when [Doe 1] 

testified, if you recall, she testified that the abuse occurred to her on pretty much a 

weekly basis. . . . So we’re not asking for 52 counts for a year. We’re asking for one 

count per year. So Counts 1 and 5 would be from ’04 to ’05, Counts 2 and 6 from ’05 to 

’06, Counts 3 and 7 would be from ’06 to ’07, and Counts 4 and 8 would be from ’07 to 

’08 . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] So the first set of counts that you need to look at are the Aggravated 

Sexual Assault on a Child. In order to prove the defendant guilty for these counts, the 

People have to prove that the defendant committed a violation of [section 261], which is 

rape . . . .” After discussing rape, the prosecutor argued: “Counts 5 through 8 are 

Forcible Lewd Act on a Child. This is also where we’re seeking one count per year. The 

defendant willfully touched any part of the child’s body, either on bare skin or through 

clothing. . . . [¶] So essentially [Taylor] touched [Doe 1] by removing her clothes and 

getting on top of her. It’s important to recognize the difference between Counts 1 
26

through 4 and 5 through 8 is that no penetration is required for Counts 5 through 8, 

whereas Counts 1 through 4, penetration is required.” 

The prosecutor did not argue that the jurors should hold Taylor accountable for 

two rapes per year, one during which an aggravated sexual assault occurred, and one

during which a forcible lewd act occurred. Rather, the prosecutor argued that each

forcible lewd act (removing Doe 1’s clothes and getting on top of her) occurred during 

each rape. And importantly, she told the jurors that, while the People could have charged 

him with 52 rapes per year, they were charging him with only one per year. In light of 

the closing argument, the jurors could not have understood that they were being asked to 

convict Taylor for two rapes per year. The factual basis for the jury’s verdict precludes 

the People’s post hoc rationalization for separate punishment.

In sum, section 654 bars punishment for the four lewd act convictions involving 

Doe 1 on counts 5 through 8. We therefore must stay Taylor’s sentence on those counts.

IV. Ability to Pay Hearing

At Taylor’s sentencing hearing, the court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine, 

“given the circumstances of the crime” and “the facts surrounding it,” and $840 in court 

operations and facilities fees. (§§ 1202.4, subd. (b), 1465.8, subd. (a)(1); Gov. Code, 

§ 70373, subd. (a)(1).) In supplemental briefing filed with our permission, Taylor argues 

that the court violated his constitutional rights by assessing those amounts without an 

ability to pay hearing. He relies on People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 

(Dueñas), which another appellate district decided while this appeal was pending. The 

People contend that Taylor forfeited this argument, and even if he did not, there was no 
27

Dueñas error. We conclude that Taylor forfeited the argument as to the $10,000 

restitution fine but not as to the $840 in court operations and facilities fees. With respect

to those fees, we reverse the order imposing them and remand for an ability to pay 

hearing.

A. The Dueñas Decision

Dueñas held that it violates due process under the federal and state Constitutions 

to impose the court operations and facilities fees without first determining the convicted 

defendant’s ability to pay them. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1168-1169.) In 

addition, “to avoid serious constitutional questions” raised by the statutory restitution 

scheme, the court must stay execution of the mandatory restitution fine unless the court

determines that the defendant has the ability to pay it. (Id. at p. 1172.) The same court 

that decided Dueñas has since clarified that, at the ability to pay hearing, the defendant 

bears the burden of showing his or her inability to pay, and the court “must consider all 

relevant factors,” including “potential prison pay during the period of incarceration to be 

served by the defendant.” (People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 490-491

(Castellano) [remanding for an ability to pay hearing]; accord People v. Santos (2019) 38 

Cal.App.5th 923, 934 [on remand, the defendant must show his inability to pay, and the 

court may consider potential prison pay]; People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, 96

(Kopp), review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844 [same].)

Since Dueñas, some courts have criticized Dueñas’s due process analysis and have 

declined to follow it. (E.g., People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, 322, 327-329, 

review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946 [holding that Dueñas was wrongly decided]; 
28

People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 928 [declining to apply Dueñas’s “broad 

holding requiring trial courts in all cases to determine a defendant’s ability to pay”].) 

Other courts have held that Dueñas was wrongly decided under due process principles, 

and that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive fines provides the proper

framework for analyzing an ability to pay challenge. (E.g., People v. Aviles (2019) 39

Cal.App.5th 1055, 1069-1072; see also Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 96-97

[applying Dueñas’s due process analysis to the fees but holding that, on remand, an 

Eighth Amendment analysis should apply to the restitution fine, because it is punitive in 

nature].)

The California Supreme Court will resolve the split in authority, having granted 

review of the issues presented by Dueñas in Kopp, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at page 47. 

The Court will decide whether courts must “consider a defendant’s ability to pay before 

imposing or executing fines, fees, and assessments,” and if so, “which party bears the 

burden of proof regarding defendant’s inability to pay.” (Kopp, review granted, Nov. 13, 

2019, S257844.)

3

Here, the People do not attack Dueñas’s due process analysis, argue that Dueñas

was wrongly decided, or argue that an Eighth Amendment analysis should apply as 

3 The Legislature attempted to codify Dueñas. It passed Assembly Bill No. 927 

(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.), “requir[ing] a hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay fines, fees, 

and assessments.” (People v. Belloso (Nov. 26, 2019, B290968) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, 

[2019 WL 6317269, at p. *7, fn. 9].) The governor vetoed the bill. (Ibid.) In his veto 

message, “he agreed there is a need to ‘tackle the issue of burdensome fines, fees and 

assessments that disproportionately drag low-income individuals deeper into debt,’ but 

noted the issue needed to be addressed in the budget process to ensure adequate funding 

for the courts and victim compensation.” (Ibid.)
29

opposed to due process. Instead, they argue that Dueñas’s due process concerns are not 

“at issue in this appeal,” either because Taylor forfeited the issue or for other reasons 

discussed in the following subparts. Given that no party has argued Dueñas was wrongly 

decided or briefed whether an Eighth Amendment analysis should displace the due 

process analysis, we do not address those issues and instead simply apply Dueñas’s

holding in this case.

B. Forfeiture

This court recently considered and rejected the forfeiture argument in People v. 

Jones (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 1028 (Jones), an appeal that was also pending at the time 

Dueñas was decided. (Id. at p. 1030.) We declined to find forfeiture of a claimed 

Dueñas error “[b]ecause a due process objection would have been ‘futile or wholly 

unsupported by substantive law then in existence.’” (Id. at p. 1033.) We held that 

“[g]iven the substantive law in existence at the time of Jones’s sentencing, Dueñas was 

unforeseeable.” (Ibid.) This conclusion applies with equal force to Taylor’s case, at least 

as to the court operations and facilities fees. He did not forfeit an ability to pay objection 

to those fees.

The restitution fine is a different matter. Even before Dueñas, section 1202.4 

permitted the court to consider Taylor’s inability to pay. (Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1032.) The statute mandates that the court impose a restitution fine “unless it finds 

compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so,” and “[a] defendant’s inability to 

pay shall not be considered a compelling and extraordinary reason.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (c), 

italics added.) However, the court may consider the defendant’s inability to pay “in 
30

increasing the amount of the restitution fine in excess of the minimum fine.” (Ibid.) In 

Jones, the court imposed the minimum restitution fine required by statute—$300 for a 

felony conviction. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1); Jones, at p. 1030.) “Because only the 

minimum amount was imposed, the statute strongly supported the conclusion that the 

trial court had no discretion to take ability to pay into account,” and an objection based 

on inability to pay would have been futile. (Jones, at p. 1032.) Dueñas also involved the 

minimum restitution fine. (Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1162; § 1202.4, subd. 

(b)(1).)

But in this case, the probation officer recommended that the court impose the 

maximum restitution fine of $10,000, and the court did so. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) 

Taylor did not object or request an ability to pay hearing, even though the court could 

have considered the issue under the restitution statute. Jones is thus distinguishable on 

this point. The substantive law in existence at the time of Jones’s sentencing would not 

have permitted the court to consider his inability to pay the minimum restitution fine

(Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032), whereas the law would have permitted the 

court to consider Taylor’s inability to pay the maximum fine. Consequently, Taylor

forfeited the objection that the court failed to consider his ability to pay the restitution 

fine. (People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227 & fn. 22.)

4

4

In his supplemental reply brief, Taylor insists that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance by failing to object to the maximum restitution fine. “[W]e do not

consider an argument first raised in a reply brief, absent a showing why the argument

could not have been made earlier.” (People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1000, 

1005.) Taylor has not made such a showing here. 
31

We essentially approved this reasoning in Jones. There, we suggested that the 

result would have been different if the court had imposed a restitution fine above the 

minimum. (Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033.) We discussed People v. Frandsen

(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1126 (Frandsen), in which another court found a claim of Dueñas

error forfeited, in part because the restitution fine in that case was the maximum $10,000. 

(Id. at p. 1154.) We reasoned that Frandsen “was correct to conclude” that an objection 

to the restitution fine based on inability to pay “‘would not have been futile under 

governing law at the time of his sentencing hearing.’” (Jones, at p. 1033.)

Some courts have suggested that the failure to object to a maximum restitution 

fine necessarily forfeits the Dueñas claim with respect to the court operations and 

facilities fees. Frandsen, for instance, concluded that the defendant “was obligated to 

create a record showing his inability to pay the maximum restitution fine, which would 

have served to also address his ability to pay the assessments.” (Frandsen, supra, 33 

Cal.App.5th at p. 1154.) And “[g]iven his failure to object to a $10,000 restitution fine 

based on ability to pay,” the defendant had “not shown a basis to vacate” $120 in fees. 

(Ibid.; accord People v. Aviles, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1074.) Other courts have 

similarly held a Dueñas objection to fees forfeited because, “[a]s a practical matter,” if a 

defendant does not object to a maximum restitution fine based on an inability to pay, the 

defendant “surely would not complain on similar grounds” regarding the additional fees. 

(People v. Gutierrez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033; accord People v. Jenkins (2019)

40 Cal.App.5th 30, 40-41, review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258729.) 
32

We do not know why Taylor failed to object to the maximum restitution fine, but 

there could have been reasons unrelated to his inability to pay. The defendant’s inability

to pay is just one among many factors the court should consider in setting the restitution 

fine above the minimum. The court should also consider “the seriousness and gravity of 

the offense and the circumstances of its commission, any economic gain derived by the 

defendant as a result of the crime, the extent to which any other person suffered losses as 

a result of the crime, and the number of victims involved in the crime. Those losses may 

include pecuniary losses to the victim or his or her dependents as well as intangible 

losses, such as psychological harm caused by the crime.” (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).) Taylor 

may have concluded that, given the seriousness of his offenses and the psychological 

harm to his two victims, any objection to the maximum fine would have been fruitless. 

Those factors, however, have no bearing on the court operations and facilities fees. 

Under Dueñas, the only question is whether the defendant has an inability to pay the fees, 

and Taylor did not have the benefit of Dueñas at the time of his sentencing. We therefore 

will not construe his failure to object to the maximum restitution fine as a forfeiture of the 

Dueñas claim with respect to the fees.5

For these reasons, Taylor has forfeited his claim of Dueñas error with respect to 

the $10,000 restitution fine but not with respect to the $840 in court operations and 

facilities fees. As to those fees, the substantive law in existence at the time of his 

5 We note that at oral argument, the People expressly declined to take issue with the 

foregoing analysis, which was fully set forth in our tentative opinion.
33

sentencing “would have meaningfully foreclosed the argument he now seeks to advance.” 

(Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1034.)

C. Reversible Error

The court did not determine Taylor’s ability to pay the $840 in fees. Under 

Dueñas, this was error, and we must remand for an ability to pay hearing unless the error 

was harmless. (Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1034-1035.) Dueñas determined the 

error was of constitutional magnitude, so we inquire whether the failure to conduct an 

ability to pay hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 1035.) We will 

find Dueñas error harmless if the record demonstrates, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 

the defendant cannot establish his or her inability to pay. (Ibid.)

The record here does not demonstrate that. According to the probation report, 

Taylor was 70 years old at the time of his sentencing. We have no information about his

income-earning capacity before his conviction, other than the statements in the probation 

report that he has three years of college education and served four years in the Air Force. 

We do not know what jobs he has held or whether he has savings or assets to sell. And 

while the probation officer recommended that the court impose $750 in appointed 

counsel fees, the court declined to do so, finding that Taylor “lack[ed] the ability to pay” 

them. The court also rejected the probation officer’s recommendation that Taylor 

reimburse the probation department $665 in presentence investigation costs. None of that

information forecloses a meritorious inability to pay argument. On the contrary, if Taylor 

lacked the present ability to pay $750 in appointed counsel fees, it stands to reason that 
34

he lacked the present ability to pay $840 in other fees. (§ 987.8, subd. (b) [the court 

determines the “present ability” of the defendant to pay appointed counsel fees].)

Moreover, although the court may consider Taylor’s potential prison wages

(Castellano, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 490), those also do not foreclose an inability to 

pay showing. “[E]very able-bodied” prisoner is required to work. (§ 2700; Cal. Code 

Regs., tit. 15, § 3040, subd. (a).) A prisoner’s assignment to a paid position “is a 

privilege” that depends on “available funding, job performance, seniority and conduct.”

(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3040, subd. (k); accord People v. Rodriguez (2019) 34 

Cal.App.5th 641, 649.) Wages in prison range from $12 to $56 per month, depending on 

the job and skill level involved. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3041.2, subd. (a)(1).) Fifty

percent of Taylor’s wages and trust account deposits will be deducted to pay any 

outstanding restitution fine, plus another 5 percent for the administrative costs of this 

deduction. (§ 2085.5, subds. (a), (e); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3097, subd. (f).) 

We assume for the sake of argument that Taylor will secure a paying position 

earning the minimum monthly prison wage.

6

 Assuming also that the entire $10,000

restitution fine is outstanding, he will have at least $5.40 per month available to settle

$840 in fees. At that rate, he will pay off the fees in 156 months, or 13 years. Taylor’s 

sentence on counts 5 through 8 will be stayed, so he will be serving a one-year 

determinate term plus 105 years to life (minus a credit of 951 days for presentence 

6 At the ability to pay hearing on remand, the parties will have an opportunity to 

litigate the truth of this assumption, if they wish. It is possible, for example, that paid 

positions are relatively rare notwithstanding the statutory requirement that all able-bodied 

prisoners work. The record before us is, of course, silent on this issue.
35

custody and conduct). Taylor was 70 years old at the time of sentencing, however, and 

we know nothing about his health and whether he is capable of earning wages until he is 

83 years old. Given that his ability to earn sufficient prison wages depends on those 

factors, we cannot say that potential prison work forecloses a meritorious inability to pay 

argument.

The People argue that “the record reveals no indication of an inability” to pay, and 

in particular, there is no indication Taylor “would be unable to perform prison work.” 

The argument lacks merit because it misallocates the burden of proof on appeal. On 

remand, it will be Taylor’s burden to show his inability to pay. (Castellano, supra, 33 

Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) But it is not Taylor’s burden on appeal to establish his inability to 

pay when the court did not hold an ability to pay hearing in the first place. (Jones, supra, 

36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1035.) Rather, it is the People’s burden to show that the Dueñas

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Stritzinger (1983) 34 Cal.3d 

505, 520 [the “beneficiary of the error” must prove that it was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt].) They cannot do that on this record, for all of the reasons just 

discussed.

The People further argue that, unlike the Dueñas defendant, Taylor has not 

identified any adverse consequences from nonpayment of the fees. According to the 

People, this “matters because it is the consequences of nonpayment that can potentially 

transform a court assessment into a due process violation.” The argument lacks merit. 

Taylor “need not present evidence of potential adverse consequences beyond the fee or 

assessment itself, as the imposition of a fine on a defendant unable to pay it is sufficient 
36

detriment to trigger due process protections.” (Castellano, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 490.)

In sum, under Dueñas, the court may not assess $840 for court operations and 

facilities fees absent a determination that Taylor has an ability to pay them. The Dueñas

error was not harmless on this record. We therefore must remand for an ability to pay 

hearing.

DISPOSITION

The order imposing the court operations (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and facilities fees 

(Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)) is reversed. On remand, the court shall hold a hearing 

on Taylor’s ability to pay the fees. If Taylor demonstrates an inability to pay them, the 

court shall not impose the fees. If he fails to demonstrate his inability to pay them, the 

court may impose them. (Castellano, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th at p. 491.) In addition,

Taylor’s sentence on counts 5 through 8 is stayed. The court shall prepare an amended 

abstract of judgment and forward a copy to the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

MENETREZ

J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL

J.