Radiofrequency Use and Management:

Impacts From the World Administrative

Radio Conference of 1979

January 1982

NTIS order #PB82-177536
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 82-600502

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents,

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This study responds to a request from the Senate Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation to evaluate the impacts on the United States of key

decisions taken at the general World Administrative Radio Conference

(WARC-79) and to consider options for preparation and participation in future

international telecommunication conferences. It reflects congressional concern

for the adequacy of existing machinery and procedures for U.S. policymaking

and preparation for such conferences.

WARC-79 and related international conferences and meetings demonstrate

that contention for access to the radio spectrum and its important collateral element, the geostationary orbit for communication satellites, presents new and

urgent challenges to vital U.S. national interests. The growing differences

among nations over the use of the radio spectrum and related satellite orbit capacity are reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79 which will be submitted to the

U.S. Senate in January 1982, for advice and consent to ratification.

Given the complexities of spectrum management in a changing world environment and the increased importance of telecommunications to both developed

and developing nations, it is unlikely that traditional U.S. approaches to these

issues will be sufficient to protect vital U.S. interests in the future. Problems require strategies not yet developed or tested.

OTA acknowledges with thanks and appreciation the advice and counsel of

the panel members, contractors, other agencies of Government, and individual

participants who helped bring the study to completion.

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

///
Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the

World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Advisory Panel

Thomas E. Nelson, Chairman

Former Director, Office of International Telecommunications Policy, Department of State

Ambassador Jacob Beam

Head of the U.S. Delegation to the 1973

Plenipotentiary Conference of the

International Telecommunication Union

Nolan Bowie

Former Executive Director

Citizens’ Communications Center

Paul Dembling

Former General Counsel

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

John M. Eger

Former Acting Director

Office of Telecommunication Policy

James C. Fletcher

Former Administrator

National Aeronautics and Space

Administration

Walter R. Hinchman

Former Chief

Common Carrier Bureau

Federal Communications Commission

Harvey J. Levin

Professor, Department of Economics

Hofstra University

Edgar T. Martin

Former Engineering Manager

Broadcasting Service

U.S. Information Agency

Ithiel De Sola Pool

Professor, Department of Political Science

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Raymond E. Spence

Former Chief Engineer

Federal Communications Commission

M. Jon Vondracek

Director of Communications

Center for Strategic and International

Studies

Georgetown University

Grover M. Yowell

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Retired)

Former Manager

Navy Space Project of Naval Electronic

Systems Command

NOTE:: The Advisory Panel provided advice and comment throughout the assessment, but the members do not necessarily

approve, disapprove, or endorse the report for which OTA assumes full responsibility.

Iv
Radiofrequency Use and Management: Impacts From the

World Administrative Ratio Conference of 1979

Project Staff

John Andelin,

Science, Information,

Assistant Director, OTA

and Natural Resources Division

Stephen E. Doyle* and Sam Hale,** Program Manager

Communication and Information Technologies Program

Raymond B. Crowell, Project Director

Administrative Staff

Jeanette Contee Liz Emanuel Shirley Gayheart

Contractors

J. D. Barnla Kappa Systems Inc.

Philip S. Cook John J. Kelleher

Future Systems Inc. Susan Stocker

William Hatfield Telecommunications Systems

OTA Publishing Staff

John C. Holmes, Publishing Officer

John Bergling Kathie S. Boss Debra M. Datcher Joe Henson

*Program Manager until March 1981.

** program Manager after March 1981.
Acknowledgments

Many individuals have assisted in various aspects of this study, each making a valuable contribution to the information and analyses assembled and presented here. Participation does not necessarily

reflect agreement with the entire report or any particular aspect of the report. Contributors include:

Contractor Support

Linda Bower Jack W. Herbstreit Leonard R. Raish Robert Tomkins

J. Russell Burke Heather E. Hudson John Rheinhardt H. E. Weppler

Ronald S. Eward Michael Jeruchim Reinhard Stamminger

Richard Gould Nicholas Marzella John A. Stein

George Hagn Harley Radin Michael Stoil

Reviewers

Leo Buss Stephen J. Lukasik Arthur I.. Freeman

George Codding Carl Matthews Jonathan Gunter

William J. Cook Richard Parlow Wendell Harris

Robert L. Cutts Samuel E. Probst Edward R. Jacobs

Arlan K, van Doom A. R. Rasmussen Donald Jansky

Lou Feldner Anthony M. Rutkowski David Leive

Agencies Providing Information and Reviews

Congressional Research Service, Federal Communications National Telecommunications

Library of Congress Commission and Information

Department of Defense National Aeronautics and Administration

Department of State Space Administration U.S. General Accounting Office

Richard E. Shrum

David P. M. Struba

William R. Torak

Charles K. Watt

Participants in the OTA Survey

Perry G. Ackerman

William Adams

Allen Anderson

Dexter Anderson

Lucian L. Arnone

Earl S. Barbely

Jerome D. Barnla

Richard Barth

George Bartlett

Jacob Bean

Martin W. Bercovici

John Paul Berry

Robert S. Black

Herbert T. Blaker

William Berman

Nolan Bowie

Lewis Bradley

Anne Branscomb

Dan Brenner

Russell Burke

Leo Buss

Paul E. Carroll

Anna L. Case

William Cooke

Anthony M. Corrado

Cullen M. Crain

Robert L. Cutts

Satyendranath Das

Wilfred Dean

Thijs DeHaas

Willis D. DeHart

Ithiel de Sola Pool

Wilson Dizard

Charles Dorian

A. James Ebel

John M. Eger

Harry A. Feigleson

Charles D. Ferris

Milford R. Fink

Arthur L. Freeman

L. S. Gallemore

Henry Geller

John Gilsenan

E. Merle Glunt

Abilio Gomez

Robert E. Greenquisit

Wendell Harris

Mervin L. Harrison

William Hatfield

Jack W. Herbstreit

Roger Herbstritt

Walter R. Hinchman

Earl J. Holliman

David Honig

Gordon Huffcutt

Marion Hayes Hull

Charles L. Hutchinson

Karyl A. Irion

Eugene Jackson

Edward Jacobs

George Jacobs

Donald Jansky

Michael C. Jeruchim

Raymond Johnson

Harold Kassens

Wayne Kay

John J. Kelleher

John W. Kiebler

Harold Kimball

Emmett Jay Kitchen

Alex C. Latker

Robert E. Lee

Stanley Leinwoll

Maury Lisann

Ray Livesay

Lloyd G. Ludwig

Stephen J. Lukasik

William A. Luther

James B. McElroy

James C. McKinney

Neal McNaughton

George Mansur

Richard B. Marsten

Edgar T. Martin

Sidney Metzger

John E. Miller

Robert P. Moore

Sharon Nelson

Thomas E. Nelson

John O’Boyle

General James D. O’Connell

James E. ogle

Lawrence Palmer

Vernon Pankonin

Edwin Parker

Richard Parlow

Paul Phillips

Neal Pike

James B. Potts

Wilbur Pritchard

Samuel E. Probst

Joseph P. Rawley

Alvin Reiner

Glen Robinson

John T. Robinson

Anthony Rutkowski

Peter Sawitz

Kalmann Schaefer

John Serafin

Richard Shrum

Hillyer Smith

Neil M. Smith

Raymond E. Spence

Ronald F. Stowe

David P. M. Struba

William R. Torak

Robert Tompkins

Phillip G. Tremper

Calvin G. Tuggle

Thomas Tycz

Arlan K. van Doom

R. J. Van Winegarten

F. W. Voege

Constantine Warvariv

James C. Warwick

Walter E. Weaver

Hans Weiss

H. Edward Weppler

Howard A. White

Clay T. Whitehead

Harold Wigren

Francis K. Williams

Elizabeth L. Young

Admiral Grover M. Yowell

vi
Contents

Chapter Page

1. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among

Nations for Use of the Radiofrequency Spectrum. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

3. Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum 37

4. WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

5. Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies . . . . . . . . . ...........107

6. Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...129

Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...147

Selected Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............157

vil
Chapter 1

Summary
Contents

—

Background of Study. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Principal Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

General Observations and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management

and International Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination and

Accountability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Need for New Strategies To Address Spectrum and Related Satellite

Orbit Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Impacts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Improving U.S. Spectrum Management and Preparation for

International Telecommunications Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. .

Withdrawal From IT.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Revised ITU Voting Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Increased Regionalization of ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Better Coordination and Planning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Common-User System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

“A Priori" Allotment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Options Regarding the Final Acts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

3

4

5

6

6

7

9

12

14

15

15

16

17

18

19

20
Chapter 1

Summary

Background of Study

The Final Acts of the General World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-79)

are to be submitted to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Issues vital

to U.S. interests in continued efficient use of

the radiofrequency spectrum—including satellites operating in geostationary orbit–were addressed at WARC-79 and will be

addressed at future, more specific conferences of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation requested that the

Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) determine the impacts on the United States of

decisions negotiated at the general World

Administrative Radio Conference (WARC79), and consider options for preparation and

participation in future international telecommunication conferences. The request reflects

congressional concern for the adequacy of

existing machinery and procedures for U.S.

telecommunication policymaking and preparation for international telecommunication

conferences. It also reflects an awareness of

the vital and growing role that telecommunication plays in our society and our dependence on the radiofrequency spectrum.

The purpose of this study was to examine

WARC-79 in a comprehensive way–describing U.S. preparations and involvement, and

the impact of the conference. However, no

attempt was made to examine all issues and

aspects of WARC-79, but rather to focus on

certain important ones and analyze their

consequences for the United States. The

study considered alternative structures, procedures, and strategies to improve frequency

spectrum planning and management to assure the United States of continued satisfaction of its commercial, Government, and national security requirements for frequency

spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit

locations.

WARC-79 was convened by ITU in an effort to reach global agreement on the revised

international arrangements necessary for efficient and interference-free use of the radiofrequency spectrum. The Final Acts of the

conference will constitute the “radio regulations, Geneva, 1979” and enter into force on

January 1, 1982 for those countries that

have formally adopted the Final Acts. The

1959 Radio Regulations, as partially revised

by subsequent specialized administrative radio conferences, will be superseded. WARC79 was of special importance because of the

broad scope of its agenda, which included

most of the major arrangements relating to

radio, and because it was the first general administrative radio conference since 1959 and

therefore included many developing countries that had won their independence in the

intervening two decades.

The telecommunication systems of the

United States are the most sophisticated, efficient, and all-encompassing in the world.

These systems are a vital element of our economic strength and security; they are an essential part of our culture. Other nations,

recognizing the key role that telecommunications play in national and international affairs, are constantly striving to gain access

to telecommunication technology. Highly industrialized nations seek to surpass the

United States in technological inventiveness

and in the practical exploitation of the many

telecommunication subsystems that make

up a modern “information society. ”

As a leader in communication technology,

the United States has been able to develop domestic telecommunication systems in

large measure apart from the activities of

other countries. At the international level,

3
—

4 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the United States has played a leading role

in shaping an essentially benign and passive

mechanism within ITU for allocating radio

spectrum to certain specified purposes, and

assuring spectrum users the right to operate

free from harmful interference by others.

This international regime, which has succeeded in avoiding chaos in the use of radiofrequencies, is coming under considerable

stress as the result of sharply increased demand for communication services and resulting congestion in economically attractive

parts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 and

related international conferences and meetings demonstrate conclusively that contention for access to the radio spectrum and its

important collateral element, the geostationary orbit for communication satellites, presents new and urgent challenges to vital U.S.

national interests. The growing differences

among nations over the use of the radio spectrum and related satellite orbit capacity are

reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79.

Given the complexities of spectrum management in a changing world environment

and the increased importance of telecommunication to both developed and developing

nations, it is highly unlikely that traditional

U.S. approaches to these issues will be suffiPrincipal

The most significant findings of the OTA

study are the following:

1.

2.

There is an urgent need for higher level

attention to Government policy coordination and accountability for international telecommunication issues generally and for spectrum management issues and international negotiations specifically.

Streamlined processes, coordinated

Government policies, and sufficient resources on a continuing basis are essential to effective and timely preparation

for the several major international concient to protect U.S. vital interests in the

future.

From the U.S. standpoint, the results of

WARC-79 are mixed. The proceedings of an

administrative conference of ITU are generally geared toward arriving at decisions and

adopting provisions that are acceptable to

all nations with certain exceptions identified;

an ITU member country is entitled to take a

reservation indicating that it will not be

bound by specific unacceptable decisions of

the conference. Therefore, finding a useful

way to measure success and to evaluate a

country’s relative standing following an administrative conference is not easy. Comparing specific U.S. proposals submitted in advance to the conference with the language of

the Final Acts of the conference is not a

straight-forward exercise. While such a comparison is important, it does not reflect the

underlying reasons and motives for particular decisions, the problems encountered,

or any apparent trends important in evaluating results of an administrative radio conference. It is important to understand the intervening events that underlie decisions, compromises, reservations, and postponements;

not only to evaluate the results of WARC-79,

but to prepare for the many future conferences important to U.S. interests.

Findings

ferences of ITU now scheduled to occur

over the next 7 years.

3. New U.S. approaches are necessary to

address radio spectrum and related satellite orbit issues in a changing world environment. Solutions to satellite orbit

allocation and spectrum reallocation issues as envisioned by the Third World

nations require strategies not yet developed or tested.

4. WARC-79 resulted in the loss of some

U.S. flexibility in certain key spectrum

areas—particularly those affecting national defense—and enhanced opportunities in many other areas.
Ch. 1—Summary ● 5

5.

●

Operating costs will increase for certain tive costs will need to rise to adequately

radio services; interference protection implement WARC-79 decisions and prewill become less certain; and administra- pare for future radio conferences.

General Observations and Trends

The world environment for telecommunications has changed significantly in recent years; two-thirds of the 155 member nations of ITU can be classified as developing

or Third World countries. There were 65 nations and seven groups of colonies present at

the 1947 Atlantic City Conference, 80 nations and five groups of colonies at the 1959

WARC, and 142 nations (no colonies) at

WARC-79.

● There are basic differences between the

United States and Third World countries

over the principles that should govern the

allocation and use of the radio spectrum and

related satellite orbit capacity. There is increasing need to identify and assess options

to reconcile the sometimes sharply divergent

goals of developing and developed countries.

• Third World countries are increasingly

able to influence and shape international

communication policies in international

forums.

● The United States must maintain its

technological leadership and expand its influence if future actions in a “one-nation,

one-vote” forum like ITU are to be favorable

to U.S. positions.

● There has been a gradual shift toward

recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical

factors such as political and cultural interests and values in ITU deliberations. In

other international forums, Third World

countries here raised related issues under

concepts of the New World economic order

and New World information order.

● U.S. requirements for access to the frequency spectrum and geostationary satellite

orbit locations are expanding with the explosive growth in telecommunication/information technology, the growing use of satellites, and the increasing dependence on radio

and satellites for military and national security purposes.

● The disparity between nations in their

ability to use the spectrum is growing; this

leads to growing disagreement over the allocation and use of specific frequency bands

for specific services.

• Spectrum decisions arrived at as a result of voting within ITU, as opposed to the

commonly practiced consensus approach,

will tend to be increasingly adverse to the

United States.

● International telecommunication development is entering a phase in which regional

and domestic needs and policies will predominate, as opposed to more general global facilities expansion. The thrust will be on intraregional communications and the development or enhancement of interregional

communication routes.
6 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for

Spectrum Management and

International Strategies

Need for High-Level Government

Policy Coordination and

Accountability

● The responsibility for spectrum management and policymaking is divided among

several Federal agencies with coordination

conducted on a structured, but often informal basis without clear responsibility and accountability for policy at a high level of

Government.

● The United States does not have a consistent and coordinated national telecommunication policy because of a lack of appreciation and concern at the top levels of

Government and industry, a lack of highlevel policy coordination for international

telecommunication negotiations, and a failure to assign sufficient importance to international telecommunication matters, including spectrum management and the State Department’s role in international negotiations.

● The United States is not adequately

equipped to provide comprehensive assessments required to effectively plan for the

future use of the radio spectrum, to forecast

future requirements, to assess the costs and

benefits of shifts to new technology, or to

evaluate alternative strategies to deal with

international issues regarding allocation and

use of the radio spectrum and geostationary

orbit.

● Within the U.S. telecommunications industry there has been significant growth and

change over the past 15 years that have produced more competing domestic interests

with conflicting demands for spectrum use.

• The U.S. permanent spectrum management analytical mechanisms are not adequately equipped to review and verify all the

stated requirements of Government and

nongovernment spectrum users and to adjust needs consistent with national policy

objectives. The United States lacks an effective ongoing means of collecting data and developing and adjusting guidelines to evaluate the merits of one spectrum use over any

other.

● The State Department’s International

Communications Policy Office is not at a

high enough level in the Department’s organization to prepare adequately for all the important upcoming international conferences

of ITU and make its influence felt in the upper echelons of Government and industry.

● Experts warn that lack of high-level concern has led to a shortage of trained and experienced spectrum management personnel

to replace those retiring from Federal Government service; there has been insufficient

attention to the need for personnel with supplementary diplomatic, language, negotiating, economic, and legal skills.

● The rather general wording of Executive

Order No. 12046 establishing the National

Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous as

to how far NTIA can go in its coordinating

role with respect to U.S. international telecommunications policy, particularly when

that mandate risks encroachment on the

general regulatory responsibilities of the

Federal Communications Commission.

● The schedule of 10 major international

conferences over the next 7 years to consider

a number of issues vital to U.S. interests underscores our concern that the United States

reform its policymaking mechanisms and

streamline the cumbersome and time-consuming procedures for developing U.S. proposals for international telecommunication

conferences.
Ch. 1—Summary ● 7

• A mechanism is needed for collecting

and evaluating information on the perceived

needs of other nations for spectrum and

orbit resources; their receptivity to intraregional and/or common-user systems, and

other factors.

Need for New Strategies To

Address Spectrum and Related

Satellite Orbit Issues

● There are critical years ahead for ITU.

For the most part, communication activities

have been conducted by telecommunication

experts and international diplomacy has

avoided debate on ideology and politically

motivated objectives. The trend towards

basing decisions on factors other than economic and technical matters, and demonstrated need is challenging ITU to provide

mechanisms for resolving differences among

nations without a further shift toward the

polemical norms common to international

political debate.

• ITU is a political organization that performs both political and technical functions.

However, while there is a primarily technical

focus for most ITU activities, there has been

a gradual shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical factors, such as political and cultural interests and values. The

United States must recognize this shift and

develop strategies to use its technology

more broadly as a tool for resolving international issues that are not subject to technical

solutions.

• The success of ITU has been due in large

measure to the willingness of its members to

adhere voluntarily to commonly arrived at

agreements and regulations. The inherent

flexibility in ITU processes has also enhanced its effectiveness. Reservations and

footnotes offer escape for individual countries from disagreeable decisions of the majority. However, excessive use of these exceptions by a sufficient number of countries—or by a few large users—serves to

reduce the value of the agreements and regulations for all users. Almost 500 footnotes to

the International Table of Frequency Allocations, and 83 protocol reservations taken at

WARC-79, reflect increasing difficulty in

reaching consensus.

● Many of the nontechnical issues raised

in ITU—like those concerning reallocation of

spectrum and guaranteed access to the geostationary satellite orbit—are among the

many issues raised by Third World countries

in other international forums under the principles propounded by the New World economic order and New World information

order.

● The administrative regulations of ITU

serve the desirable objective—without the

use of sanctions for noncompliance—of

avoiding the interference, incompatibilities,

and chaos that would ensue if these or simular regulations were not followed.

• Developing countries will continue to

seek changes in the existing mechanism for

vesting rights in the use of frequencies and

access to the geostationary orbit. They seek

a shift away from the current notification

and coordination procedure on a “first-come,

first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plan

developed on an a priori basis.

● Third World countries are likely to

resist drastic changes in ITU rules and procedures that operate on the principle of "onenation, one-vote” and that provide them

with increasing influence and power. They

will continue to seek technical assistance

from the developed countries while pursuing

ITU policies favorable to their own interests.

. Third World countries will continue to

advocate changes in rules and procedures

that help guarantee their access to the spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit. They

do not wish to rely on the “good efforts, ”
8 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrate Radio Conference of 1979

promises, and technical ability of the developed countries to “engineer-in” future systems on a case-by-case basis, as needed.

● ITU administrative radio conferences

attempt to produce results that all nations

can accept. Reservations, footnotes, and

other means to reduce negative consequences allow each nation to more or less

view the results as favorable. This approach

supports the perception of having all winners and no losers. However, because of

growing differences among nations these

procedures are beginning to produce diluted

and cumbersome results that may render existing mechanisms to regulate use of spectrum less and less meaningful.

• Because of competing interests and

growing differences over use of the spectrum

there will be winners and losers in the future as a result of the ITU decisionmaking

process.

● WARC-79 showed the increasing influence of the Third World as a political force in

ITU. The struggle for influence between the

developed and developing nations will continue at future ITU conferences. At the present time, the developing countries derive

their power from their collective numbers;

the developed countries from their technical

competence, know-how, and leadership. The

influence of the developing countries can

most effectively be exploited in ITU legislative forums; the developed nations’ through

ITU technical administrative organs.

● The preeminence of U. S technological

leadership and technical ability served the

United States well in international spectrum

negotiations when decisions were primarily

based on technical matters, but more and

more U.S. problems with other countries involving the radio spectrum are influenced by

political and economic considerations.

● The developed countries are expanding

their use of spectrum to higher frequency

bands as lower, more economical, bands become congested. They rely on technology to

provide solutions to problems of accommodating new demands in the future. It is

becoming increasingly difficult for the developing countries to accept the proposition

that they will have access to spectrum on an

interference-free basis at some future date as

their needs materialize. The outlook is that

the radiofrequency spectrum and the geostationary orbit will become more congested in

the lower, more economic and desirable frequency bands even though use of frequencies by one country does not necessarily

preempt those same frequencies from use by

other countries.

● Certain U.S. spectrum requirements

(e.g., for military radars) are not of interest

to the majority of other countries. The difficulty that faces the United States in seeking

to convince a majority of the 154 other ITU

member countries to adopt regulations that

accommodate U.S. radars in conflict with

other possible uses by other countries is real

and was demonstrated at WARC-79.

. Frequencies and satellite locations allocated to individual nations are not vested indefinitely under current ITU procedures,

and changes in operating parameters require

recoordination and registration. This creates

uncertainty for present satellite system operators. The risks may increase that spectrum and orbit will not be available to provide for continuity of service from the present to the next generation of satellites. Moreover, this problem is not overcome by the

adoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allotment plan to assure future access, since such

a plan would tend to freeze technology and

accommodate only those new or second generation satellites that fit the original technical scheme.

● The growing lack of agreement among

nations over which specific frequency bands

should be allocated for which specific ITU

radio service classification (e.g., radiolocation, fixed-satellite, broadcasting) strongly

suggests that mechanisms other than service classifications should be examined.
— .

—

. The voluminous, complex, and detailed

provisions of the international radio regulaCh. 1—Summary ● 9

tions are becoming more burdensome and

less meaningful to individual users.

The Impacts of WARC-79

The specific consequence of WARC-79

decisions on U.S. interests regarding particular services can best be treated in terms

of how the conference dealt with specific

technical issues created by some significant

trends in telecommunications. These trends

include the following:

● The increasing demand for high frequency (HF) spectrum by the more developed

countries to meet maritime and international broadcasting needs conflicts with

the desires of the less developed countries to use HF for inexpensive domestic

communications. The reduction in the

use of HF (3 to 30 MHz) by international

fixed point-to-point operations as

satellite and cable use expands is not

sufficient to offset this increasing demand.

● The rapid growth in very high frequency

(VHF) (30 to 300 MHz) and ultrahigh

frequency (UHF) (300 to 3000 MHz)

land-mobile operations in the face of

continuing vital U.S. military requirements, and the heavy use of these bands

for TV broadcasting, now necessitates

greater sharing of frequencies, e.g., by

radiolocation-sharing with radionavigation and with other services, and by

land-mobile sharing with TV broadcasting.

● There has been rapid growth of both domestic and international fixed satellite

requirements in the super high frequency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrum

coupled with growth in microwave radio

relay, space research, and Earth-exploration satellite services, and the continuing need to protect important radioastronomy operations. These requirements are being pressured by new demands to accommodate mobile, navigation, and broadcasting satellites (and

their feeder links) in increasingly

crowded orbits. Most of these satellite

spectrum uses have military as well as

civil applications. In addition, there is

the continuing use of the SHF spectrum

for terrestrial systems.

The actions of WARC-79 with respect to

these operational trends, and the technical

issues they raised, either closely reflected

U.S. proposals or were acceptable to the

United States with certain important exceptions. However, this judgment hardly does

justice to the overall results of WARC-79,

particularly the future implications to the

United States. The long-term trends may be

running against the United States in the

sense that more problems without apparent

solutions are foreseen. The United States

finds itself increasingly in a defensive mode,

trying to minimize losses rather than seeking significant changes to improve its longterm posture.

For example, at the same time that significant amounts of spectrum were added to the

allocations for the fixed-satellite service

(FSS), generally consistent with U.S. objectives, the conference also adopted a resolution that calls for a space planning conference to plan space services using the geostationary satellite orbit that was not consistent with U.S. objectives. The technical

rules that affect the design and operation,

and hence the cost, of satellite systems were

in general agreement with U.S. positions,

but the ability to implement new technologies and offer new services via satellite in

the future depend in part on the decisions to

be made at the space planning conferences in

1985 and 1987 and the broadcasting satellite

conference scheduled for June 1983, to plan
10 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

broadcasting satellite service (BSS) in region

2 (the Americas) in the 12-GHz band.

There is a significant difference between

the approach advocated by the United

States for using the geostationary satellite

orbit and any rigid a priori allotment and

planning approach that may be advocated

by some developing nations. The United

States, as well as many other countries, has

consistently favored a flexible approach that

assigns orbit locations and satellite frequencies on a case-by-case basis, often referred to

as “first-come first-served. ” The U.S. approach seeks to accommodate needs as required and relies, at least in part, on technological advancements and good engineering

practices to “engineer-in” the next satellite

and accommodate all users. Such an approach is consistent with existing practice

under ITU procedures for the notification,

coordination, and assignment of radiofrequencies generally.

Many developing countries, on the other

hand, see a detailed negotiated plan that assigns specific frequency channels and orbital

positions to each country under a rigid a

priori allotment plan as a means to guarantee them future access. This approach

does not depend upon advances in technology or new engineering techniques to assure

accommodation of newcomers, but neither

does it provide for technological improvements that might accommodate growing requirements. The developed countries already

have the economic and technological means

of launching and utilizing domestic satellite

systems; most developing countries do not,

even though many do make use of joint-user

systems like the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)

global satellite system. The developing nations are concerned that as the “later comers” to ITU (hence later served) there will be

little or no way to accommodate their domestic requirements.

Both a posteriori (the case-by-case approach usually relying on a notice and recordation procedure) and a priori (the collective subdivision approach usually relying on

a negotiated plan) have won past acceptance

at conferences of ITU. Over the last 75 years

one or the other approach has been advocated and used by nearly all nations to allocate spectrum, both internally and internationally. On a domestic level, the a posteriori

approach is often coupled with an adjudication procedure for deciding among competing applicants, as is the case in the

United States. On the international level, adjudication is almost impossible because of

sovereignty claims. Most nations have been

unwilling to allow an international body to

determine whether they can or cannot use a

radio channel or satellite position. Where

channels become limited, the recourse in the

recent past has been to adopt an a priori

method. However, for the allocation of radio

bands and services, like FSS, which are affected by rapidly changing technology, or

which are fraught with political controversy,

a priori methods tend to promote too rigid technical specifications or exaggerated

claims for channels. Much of the controversy

at WARC-79, and likely to emerge at future

conferences, arises from the question of the

appropriate administrative arrangements to

determine rights to the use of frequencies

free from harmful interference.

Several countries made planning proposals

at WARC-79, ranging in scope from planning all space services in all frequency bands

allocated to space services, to planning only

FSS in bands newly allocated to that service

below 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSS

was the main target of these proposals. Developing a plan of this nature is an enormous

undertaking and would not have been possible at WARC-79; however, acceptance of

the principle of “planning” was a major goal

of the developing countries.

The U.S. delegation worked to prevent any

decision to convene a “planning” conference.

When it became clear that such a conference

would be approved, the United States argued successfully to keep the terms of reference rather broad. The first session of
“WARC on the Use of the Geostationary

Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space

Services Utilizing It,” scheduled for July

1985, will consider which services and which

frequency bands to “plan.” Further, the

meaning of “plan” will be decided, and will

not necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type.

The operative thought in determining the

type of planning is to provide “in practice

equitable access’ to the geostationary orbit.

The second session of the conference, scheduled for September 1987, will meet to enact

the decisions of the first.

It has been the official position of the

United States, shared by a number of other

countries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS is

bad planning and bad engineering; that it is

likely to inhibit technological innovation,

result in inefficient use of the orbit and spectrum, and have a major adverse impact on

U.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, the

United States faces a significant challenge

over the next few years to develop compelling arguments against a rigid a priori approach and to carry that message convincingly to all parts of the world well before

these conferences convene; or to find alternatives acceptable to all parties. Some possible alternatives are considered in the report

and summarized below.

The adoption of the space planning conference resolution is a vigorous reminder

that the effective management of orbit and

spectrum utilization on both a worldwide

and a regional basis is a continuing process

that is becoming increasingly more difficult

and complex. The achievement of U.S. objectives at ITU conferences is no longer a matter of reaching painstaking agreement on

technical solutions to problems of frequency

coordination and multiple usage of spectrum. It will also require sophisticated,

political negotiations; imaginative, innovative approaches; and long, hard bargaining.

No immediate changes in operations using

the radio spectrum or geostationary satellite

orbit are required in the United States as a

result of WARC-79. However, there are

longer range impacts that require prompt attention: increased operating costs, reduced

operating flexibility, uncertainty surrounding important pending issues, and the need

for thorough preparations to address issues

at future conferences.

There is no immediate cost impact imposed by WARC-79 regarding national

security systems, largely because of the frequency flexibility of existing U.S. equipment, the success of the U.S. delegation at

WARC, and reservations taken by the

United States to counter adverse conference

decisions. However, there will be future

undetermined costs associated with frequency management, the development and

procurement of more sophisticated equipment, compatibility studies, and coordination to prevent interference with competing

users of the spectrum.

Department of Defense (DOD) interests

were impacted by losses of exclusivity for

radiolocation (radar) operations and by increased sharing with other services in many

of the radiolocation bands. For example,

demands that radar operations be discontinued in certain bands to accommodate expanded FSS operations led to considerable

acrimony, which was only eased by a nonbinding U.S. commitment in a formal

declaration to try to accommodate FSS in

those bands. The status of radiolocation was

retained but the pressure from competing

fixed-satellite interests will certainly continue.

As an indication of concern for security interests, the United States took a reservation

indicating that this country, in the operation

of radars in certain bands, will not guarantee

protection to, nor coordination with, other

radio services. The action was necessary because so many countries took footnotes stating their intention to operate fixed and

mobile radio stations in bands hitherto used

exclusively by radars. Radars are designed

to operate in the presence of interference,

either purposeful or accidental. The degree

to which these counterinterference techniques will have to be improved and used depends on how extensively other countries in-
12 ● Radiofequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

troduce fixed and mobile services in these

bands.

U.S. objectives for the fixed-satellite service and the mobile-satellite service (MSS),

including DOD airborne, shipborne, and

ground-transportable Earth station systems, were achieved in large measure. Significant amounts of spectrum were added to

allocations of the FSS and no operational or

economic dislocations were imposed on any

existing FSS system. No major burden appears to be placed on the U.S. Government

or private operating entities in complying

with the decisions of WARC-79 regarding

FSS. However, the differences between the

United States and many developing countries over approaches to use of the geostationary satellite orbit, to be resolved by

future conferences, leaves the impact on FSS

uncertain.

The U.S. objective to maintain the status

quo for MSS in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band

used for U.S. Naval Fleet satellite communications was partially achieved; however, coordination provisions (article N13A)

were added which included a condition that

stations in MSS not cause harmful interference to those of other services operating, or planned to be operated, in accordance with the table of allocations. The

United States found this condition unacceptable, and together with most of its North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies

entered a formal reservation in the final protocol.

While WARC-79 largely eliminated frequency-sharing between FSS and BSS in the

Americas, the latter must now share frequencies with the terrestrial fixed service, including private microwave systems widely

used in the United States. This sharing could

result in interference to BSS Earth station

receivers operating in the same area as fixed

station transmitters. The private microwave

users are concerned that sharing with directbroadcasting satellites is not feasible and

that they may be forced to vacate the band.

This concern is reinforced by footnote 37870

of the Final Acts of WARC-79 that places

terrestrial services on a noninterference

basis to BSS operating in accordance with a

plan to be prepared at the 1983 region 2

broadcasting satellite conference. How this

conflict will be resolved within the United

States is a current matter before the FCC.

A U.S. objective at WARC-79 was to gain

more frequency allocations for HF broadcasting (e.g., the Voice of America). This

could only be done at the expense of the

fixed service and was therefore opposed by

many developing countries that use HF,

shortwave radio for internal domestic communications. The HF broadcasting allocations were increased conditioned on the successful outcome of a specialized HF broadcasting conference to be held in the mid1980’s to “plan” for more efficient and

equitable use of the broadcasting bands.

While the conference agenda will be relatively broad and open, it was apparent at

WARC-79 that the United States and the developing countries have significant differences as to the type of planning to be undertaken.

Improving U.S. Spectrum Management and

Preparation for International

Telecommunication Conferences

Consistent with the findings of past study ment and participation in international telcommissions and task forces going back to excommunication conferences is inadequate.

1950, this study finds that the present U.S. Primarily, the problems stem from the abGovernment structure for spectrum manage- sence of high-level Government attention to
effective policy development and coordination on a consistent and continuing basis

with centralized accountability.

At least four options are available to the

Congress in addressing this issue: 1) maintain the status quo and make no changes;

2) maintain the present structure, but raise

the level of attention and accountability

within the responsible agencies; 3) establish

a mechanism—such as a task force of highlevel Government officials—to develop, examine, and make recommendations on structural and procedural improvements, or;

4) establish a permanent board, council, or

interagency committee of high-level Government officials to be responsible and accountable for international telecommunication policy coordination and the preparations for international conferences.

Certain shortcomings in spectrum management could be corrected without any fundamental change in the structure of FCC or

NTIA. Assigning spectrum management a

higher priority, particularly within FCC, and

using resources more efficiently would make

a significant difference. For example, FCC

could improve its data base for spectrum

management with the help of its own computer and spectrum experts.

The validation of spectrum requirements,

and the apportioning of spectrum between

Government and nongovernment users,

Needs closer scrutiny. A mechanism using

analytical tools to help evaluate needs and

assess priorities among competing users of

the spectrum would provide decisionmakers

with basic information and data for use in

establishing policies and reviewing requirements. While Federal spectrum requirements are reviewed by the Interdepartment

Radio Advisory Committee and its Spectrum Planning Subcommittee, this function

needs to be strengthened and broadened to

effectively consider longer range impacts.

Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lotteries, spectrum fees, resale of frequency

assignments, etc.) should be considered, at

least on an experimental basis, to provide

guidance on the consequences of different

Ch. 1—Summary ● 13

spectrum allocation decisions and the introduction of newer technology. These

should include techniques for evaluating the

relative economic viability of alternative

radio uses, as well as radio v. nonradio communication systems. Experience with economic techniques could be gained by limited

application to certain selected services and

frequency bands.

There have been problems in the timely

formation of U.S. delegations for ITU conferences arising from the need for the early inclusion of experts from industry and other

nongovernment organizations. Preparations

for international telecommunications conferences could be improved by replacing the

ad hoc approach with an ongoing conference

preparatory structure with a focal point for

high-level responsibility and accountability

and involving all the concerned Government

and nongovernment telecommunication interests. These problems could be addressed

and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in

international telecommunications meetings

improved by the following additional steps:

1.

2.

3.

Industry and other nongovernment delegates could again be permitted to participate fully as U.S. representatives at

international telecommunication conferences and take any assignments on the

delegation for which their skills and experience qualify them. Legislation to accomplish this passed both Houses of the

96th Congress. However, the legislation

to which it was added was vetoed by the

President for reasons unrelated to the

exemption.

Consideration could be given to finding

means to comply with due process requirements under the Administrative

Procedures Act and still name industry

and other nongovernment representatives to delegations on a timely basis.

Guidelines and implementing mechanisms could be established for naming the

chairman and individual members of

U.S. delegations. The qualifications required, the distribution of skills needed,

and type of representation desired could
14 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

be determined at an early stage of con- in the preparatory effort. Whatever speference preparation. Individuals chosen cial Government assistance is required

to serve on the delegation could be se- to assure particular representation

lected from the best candidates avail- could be made available in the early

able, especially those who participated stages of conference preparations.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International

Spectrum Issues and ITU

U.S. participation in ITU faces new and

difficult challenges. Having started in 1865

as a relatively noncontroversial organization

of 20 nations concerned with the interoperability of their telegraph systems, ITU has

evolved into a tendencious assembly of 155

nations that look to ITU to solve fundamental issues of resource allocation increasingly

vital to economic growth and development.

The ITU structure, which was well suited

to the analysis of interference between radio

communication systems, and to achieving a

consensus on noncontroversial matters

among a small number of broader issues, is

sorely tested by the demands of numerous

countries exhibiting the widest possible

range of technical, economic, cultural, and

political backgrounds. An organization that

has traditionally been concerned with technical and operating standards for radio

equipment and administrative mechanisms

that give a country the right to operate radio

stations free from harmful interference from

others is being asked to satisfy the demands

of developing countries for “guaranteed access” to an equitable share of the radio spectrum and satellite locations that many of

them have no immediate capacity to use.

It is increasingly questionable whether

U.S. negotiating skills and technological proficiency can secure essential U.S. goals and

objectives in a forum that employs a “onenation, one-vote” decisionmaking formula

and in which the United States and the other

industrial countries are greatly outnumbered by the less industrialized member

countries.

From a strategic standpoint, the United

States has a wide range of options. At one

extreme, the United States could conclude

that the drawbacks of continued participation in ITU outweigh the benefits, and withdraw from the organization or decline to participate in its deliberations. At the other extreme, the United States could decide to

avoid controversy within ITU and simply

yield to other nations on controversial matters. Between these extremes are a number

of alternatives. One that requires no structural or procedural changes in ITU would be

better coordination of U.S. views and objectives with other nations in advance of ITU

meetings, and better U.S. planning based on

improved understanding of other nations’

views.

Another strategic option would be for the

United States to seek to remove the most

controversial issues from the ITU forum and

attempt to solve them in other ways. A current example would be to respond to the

demands of developing countries for “guaranteed access” to radio spectrum and satellite locations by developing the institutional

arrangements to ensure domestic communication services to qualifying nations. This

could be a common-user satellite system

either building upon the present INTELSAT

structure or creating a separate system for

domestic services.

From a -structural standpoint, assuming

that ITU can be changed, a number of options may be available. The United States

could seek to revise the voting formula of

ITU to one more fair to the United States,
Ch. 1—Summary ● 15

perhaps by giving added voting weight to

those countries that contribute most heavily

to the United Nations budget. A more modest proposal would be to increase the number

of ITU regions beyond the present three so

that regional issues could be dealt with by a

smaller number of countries most directly

concerned.

Withdrawal From ITU

Would withdrawing from ITU guarantee

the United States unhindered use of the

spectrum allocation or frequency assignments the United States needs? Probably

not. ITU members rely on the organization

to avoid interference from the radio signals

of others and to achieve interoperability of

certain mutually used systems, such as radionavigation. The assignment of a particular frequency is of little value if others

feel free to use it for purposes that cause interference. There are no effective international sanctions to force compliance with

ITU decisions. Therefore, the United States

relies, as do all nations, on the voluntary

agreement and cooperation of other nations

to refrain from interfering with its use of the

spectrum.

For applications that are vulnerable to interference, U.S. preemption of spectrum (i.e.,

use what we wish to use) would be ineffective

because any nation that chose to interfere,

whether for a valid need or by intentional

jamming, could greatly reduce the value to

the United States of the preempted spectrum. Any preemption for uses that were

invulnerable to interference (e.g., high-power

radar systems with electronic countermeasure capacity) would likely result in retaliation by other nations in areas where the

United States is vulnerable.

It is conceivable that the United States

could abandon ITU and establish a more

congenial grouping of developed countries as

a forum for coordination to avoid radio interference, and simply ignore other countries. Coordination and information exchange would become less certain, but still

fairly effective. However, it is likely that

ITU would disintegrate if the principal developed countries abandoned it. Overall, the

lack of a central spectrum allocation and coordination authority with global participation would probably lead to a more fragmented use of the spectrum, with fewer common worldwide channels, less standardization, and possible difficulties with interoperability of certain common systems, and

a general increase in interference problems

between services.

Revised ITU Voting Formula

As an option less drastic than withdrawal

from ITU, the United States might join with

other industrial nations to force a revision of

the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decisionmaking formula toward one that would reflect the dominance of these nations in the

actual use of the spectrum. If successful,

this option would greatly reduce the ability

of the Third World nations to block or force

changes in U.S. positions.

A revised voting formula might reduce the

contention over spectrum allocation matters

at ITU; make ITU more efficient; help to

make spectrum use more efficient by precluding the adoption of unworkable allocation schemes; and be no less fair than the

voting practices used in a number of other

international bodies that benefit Third

World nations without being controlled by

them. The stimulus for concurrence of Third

World nations with such a proposal would be

the possibility that, were it rejected, the developed countries might withdraw from ITU

and render it essentially irrelevant.

The reaction of Third World nations is difficult to predict, but it seems most likely

that they would bitterly resist any reversal

of their recent successful trend toward fuller

participation and refuse to make any concession on ITU voting formulas. From a general

foreign policy standpoint, it is important to

consider how much support the United

States might obtain from other developed

countries, many of which do not feel the
16 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

...— —

spectrum problems as acutely as the United

States. The United States must also consider whether it wishes to take an assertive

policy stance toward ITU apart from a generally more assertive stance toward Third

World nations.

It may not be necessary that the proposed

change in voting arrangements apply to all

ITU spectrum decisions, but just to those

allocations that might qualify as major matters. The latter case is equivalent to establishing a new, separate forum with revised

voting arrangements and routing major matters to that forum rather than to ITU.

Objectively, it would seem that the interests of the developing countries lie with

the continued existence of ITU and with continued technical and economic aid from the

developed countries. If this choice were

clearly and convincingly drawn, the Third

World nations would probably come to realize that these benefits outweigh such hypothetical advantages as satellite orbital slots

that many do not have the capability to use.

Whether they would ultimately decide the

matter on objective grounds is difficult to

predict. In any event, it appears unlikely

that a change in voting within ITU is possible under the present structure.

Increased Regionalization of ITU

At present, ITU divides the world into

three geographic regions and many issues

that can be treated separately and effectively in a single region are considered in this

way. (Region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R.,

Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa. Region 2 covers North, Central, and South Americas, the

Caribbean, and Greenland. Region 3 covers

South Asia, Australia, New Zealand, and the

Pacific.) Regional administrative radio conferences are scheduled on a variety of specific issues, allowing WARCs to “spinoff”

certain controversial matters. One option

would be to extend this process of regionalization on a geographic basis to smaller

subregions, and/or on an issue basis to include only those nations directly affected by

the particular issue. The purpose would be to

reduce the number of nations debating or

voting on issues that do not affect them

directly, thus reducing unnecessary contention.

WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations.

Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisors

met for 11 weeks and considered nearly

17,000 proposals (more than 900 from the

United States), and held more than 900 meetings. Surely any approach that might help

limit further WARCs to more modest proportions would be worthy of study. More importantly, when nations vote on issues that

do not directly affect them the opportunities

to trade votes at no cost to themselves, but

which help others to sustain confrontations.

Large meetings also tend to encourage bloc

voting, which has already begun to emerge

at ITU. Thus, subdividing ITU into smaller

units, either on the basis of geographic subregions or on the basis of particular issues,

would divide the Third World bloc into

smaller, less dominant groups.

Decentralized decisionmaking does not

guarantee that the U.S. position will prevail.

Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no more satisfying than being outvoted by 154 to 1. However, it is easier to bargain in detail with 10

nations than 154, and if a quid pro quo must

be offered, the total cost is likely to be lower.

The mechanics and economics of increasing substantially the number of conferences

is also important to consider. The limited

U.S. professional staff available to prepare

for and attend spectrum conferences is already stretched thin, and if the United

States does not wish simply to skip many

of the meetings—a risky proposition—this

staff would need to be considerably augmented. The developing countries would find

it even more difficult to prepare for a heavy

schedule of meetings.

Increased decentralization of ITU could, in

principle, lead to greater fragmentation in

the use of the spectrum, with the same bands

being used for different purposes in different

regions to a much greater extent than is now
Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 7

the case. While this may be acceptable in the

short run, the long-term implications are

worthy of study. If, for example, a new service were proposed that would be global in

character, obtaining the necessary global

spectrum allocation might require changes

in the allocations to many different services

in many different locales. At the least, it

might be necessary to create an institutionalized system for coordinating decentralized

decisions.

Better Coordination and Planning

As a relatively conciliatory approach, the

United States could mount a major effort to

develop long-term plans for spectrum use

that would take into account the spectrum

requirements of developing nations, to aid

them in understanding the realistic options

available to meet their short- and long-term

needs, to offer such technical and economic

assistance as might be needed to enable

them to participate actively in the planning

process, and to seek their concurrence with

fair, objective, and realistic proposals.

To a significant extent, the confrontations

initiated by Third World nations in ITU are

based on suspicion and mistrust of developed countries. Perhaps this is based on a

lack of understanding of the true potential of

technology to create the spectrum resources

they will need in the future. But many Third

World nations also question whether they

will be able to take advantage of that technology and they question the good faith of

the developed countries to share the benefits

of advanced technology.

The fact remains that there is adequate

spectrum for all nations at the present and

that technology will very likely expand the

effective utility of the available spectrum to

satisfy future needs. The problem for the

United States is to convince other nations,

particularly the developing countries, that

spectrum and orbit capacity will be available

and that their needs for service can be satisfied. Technical assistance can be very useful

in this regard, and economic assistance can

help make the benefits of technology a reality. Creating a role for the developing countries in cooperative planning efforts is likely

to make them more receptive to the positions

and plans that are forthcoming.

Long-range planning of spectrum utilization is presently inadequate and not easily

accomplished in an area where technological

rate of change is rapid and in a competitive

system like that in the United States where

policy makers are more likely to be responding to problems than to be developing longrange plans. However, better long-range

planning for telecommunication services and

spectrum needs is clearly necessary to cope

effectively with the ITU allocation process.

Developing and sharing planning techniques

and data with other countries would not

make a new planning process vastly more

difficult or costly, and might make it more

reliable in the long run.

It is also necessary to know the extent to

which developing countries’ positions at

ITU are based on their own vital interests

rather than on misunderstandings and politics; it is unlikely that they would compromise vital interests for the sake of comity. A cooperative planning process would

tend to expose true interests and clarify the

negotiations.

As a practical matter, the majority of the

developing countries cannot now make use

of advanced communications technology

without technical and economic assistance

from technologically advanced countries. If

the majority of nations were to vote to adopt

rules that limit or preclude the use of advanced technology to which they do not have

independent access, communication capability would suffer and costs would increase in

the long term for all users. Thus, the cost of

assisting other countries in using advanced

technology must be balanced against the

cost to the United States of not being able

to take full advantage of such technology

ourselves. This equation deserves close analysis.

Cooperative planning has worked in the

past; the United States was a leader in coop-
18 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

erative planning for INTELSAT and the International Maritime Satellite Organization

(INMARSAT). The exact mechanism for cooperative planning is an important and complex matter, made more difficult by divided

responsibility in the United States for communications policy in general and spectrum

planning in particular. However, it should be

possible to graft onto the existing structure

a sufficiently comprehensive mechanism

with high-level responsibility to assure effective long-range planning and to foster cooperation with other nations.

As an alternative, ITU could be invested

with a planning staff to undertake longrange coordination, analysis, and planning.

Such a “neutral” planning expertise might

be less likely to be mistrusted by Third

World nations, and perhaps more capable of

defusing potential disagreements. Naturally,

the United States would participate in the

process and perhaps may more easily influence a planning process in which the measure of power is technical expertise, rather

than influence an ITU conference in which

the measure of power is votes. The United

States has consistently opposed any increase in the power of ITU, particularly, efforts to expand the planning role of the International Frequency Registration Board.

A broader, more extensive, and more conciliatory approach to international spectrum

planning would be required under this option

and could have a real chance of success,

given some major changes in the U.S. approach. In the long run it could be the least

expensive and most effective option available to this country.

Common-User System

As an alternative to contention for satellite slots on the geostationary orbit, the

United States and other developed countries

could enter into a joint venture with developing countries to construct, launch, and operate a common satellite system to meet domestic needs for telecommunication and/or

broadcast services. The developed nations

would provide the private capital and technological resources necessary to construct

and launch the system, and would operate

and manage it in conjunction with other

using nations. All nations in the joint venture would have the option of purchasing a

share of the common enterprise, up to their

actual percentage of use of the system, and

sharing proportionately in any profits. Such

an arrangement would be similar to that governing the INTELSAT global satellite system used for international telecommunications. High-capacity satellite systems

employing technology to make a commonuser system economic and operationally attractive to developing countries for domestic

services could be part of the existing

INTELSAT structure or a separate structure established for this purpose.

Many developing nations are concerned

that the satellite orbit locations are being occupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served”

basis, and that by the time they are in a position to use satellite systems there will be no

desirable orbit locations left for them. It

seems clear that the requirements of developing countries will be for satellite service

and not for satellite orbit locations that they

may not be able to use. This option would

provide service without allocating dedicated

orbit locations for individual users.

Moreover, the cost of developing and

launching a dedicated satellite system is

very high, well beyond the capability of most

developing countries for the foreseeable

future. This option could provide satellite

service well in advance of the time these

countries could afford their own systems,

and much more cheaply. No large initial

capital investment would be required from

user nations, and there would be little risk.

While this policy option does not address

the full range of problems before ITU, it does

offer the prospect of relieving the pressure

on a particularly important and contentious

issue. If low cost and technically attractive

domestic satellite capacity is made available

through an international organization that

accommodates the sovereignty interests of
Ch. 1—Summary ● 1 9

each country, many developing countries

could come to see access to orbital slots and

satellite frequencies as a side issue with

availability of service being the main objective. Increasing adoption of the INTELSATtype alternative would free up orbital slots

for those major developing countries that

continue to desire their own separate domestic systems whether for political reasons, or

because requirements justified such a system economically.

A common-user system need not require

any Government funding by the United

States. Sufficient capital and technical resources exist in the private sector in the

United States, and within Europe and

Japan, to construct such a system as a commercial venture with expectations of future

markets for follow-on equipment and services. Alternatively, such systems could conceivably be initiated with World Bank loan

guarantees.

“A Priori” Allotment

The United States could agree to participate with other nations in the development of a long-range plan for the utilization

of satellite orbit locations to serve participating nations’ domestic communications requirements. This plan would assure that orbital slots would be available for the use of

all nations when needed. In exchange for this

agreement, the developed nations would likely insist that the plan be based on sound operating principles and be updated regularly

to take account of the latest, most efficient

technology available.

A priori allotment of satellite orbit slots

has been a cause celebre among developing

countries. At WARC-79, a resolution was

adopted to consider this issue at a two-part

space planning WARC in the mid-1980’s.

The United States has opposed a priori allotment plans for satellite service as wasteful

and inhibiting to technological advancement. Although this option goes a long way

toward accommodating the position of the

developing countries, it maintains a substantial degree of flexibility important to the

United States, including the key qualification of a requirement for regular technological updating that would help to avoid the

worst consequences associated with rigid allotment schemes.

As far as the United States is concerned,

certain types of a priori allotment plans

would not be as objectionable as others.

Plans based on sound engineering and operational parameters might be workable internationally, at least on a regional basis. Indeed, U.S. domestic satellite operations are

based more or less on an a priori approach.

In the long run the United States may have

enough satellite capacity, made possible by

advanced technology, to meet domestic

needs even if the orbit and system available

to the United States is reduced. In the short

run, the United States already has substantial numbers of operational satellites with

additional satellite systems planned for operations in the near future.

In addition to the possible advantages

that may result from improvements in technology, there are two factors that may help

reduce the impact of a priori allotment plans

on the United States. One is advanced technology, including cellular satellite technology, already on the drawing boards, which

will permit the construction of a large, wideband satellite that can provide very large capacity from a single orbit slot. The other factor is the particular geography of region 2

(North and South America). From the standpoint of using the geostationary satellite

orbit, region 2 is naturally divided into two

parts–those nations located in the Northern

Hemisphere and those in the Southern Hemisphere. A second geographic factor that

serves to separate the hemispheres is the displacement in longitude of the nations in the

Northern and Southern Hemispheres. Also,

those nations closer to the Equator enjoy the

widest possible visibility of the orbit and

have the greatest flexibility in positioning

satellites. Moreover, the North American

Continent consists of three countries with

very large land areas that made the use of
20 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

advanced technology using shaped-beam antennas attractive.

Although an a priori plan is implied in the

approach, it could be implemented without

the adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plan

such as adopted at the 1977 WARC. If this

approach is possible, then an a priori allotment to one country would not include using

the same allotment for others if certain

technical and operational guidelines were

followed.

There may even be some benefits to the

United States from adopting an a priori allotment plan. At present, there is considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the

1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Administrative Radio Conference and the space

planning conferences in the mid-1980’s. If a

decision is postponed, the uncertainty would

continue. A situation would then be perpetuated in which any existing domestic satellite orbit slot may be withdrawn in the future. Moreover, no satellite system designer

could plan the logical evolution of a proposed

system with confidence that the required additional allotments would be available. This

would force designers to plan their systems

on the basis of short-term recovery of investment.

It is also important to examine the tactical

aspects of agreeing to an a priori allotment

policy. By participating in the development

of a plan, the United States would be in

a position to influence the type of pla n

adopted and possibly gain concessions on

other issues of importance to the United

States.

In short, the linkages and tradeoffs among

these and other possible approaches to

future use of the geostationary satellite orbit

cast each U.S. policy option in a different

light. Careful review in each case is needed

for sound policy formulation. Rather than rejecting a priori allotments as inherently

wasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to examine the practical effects, to examine the

possibility of a quid pro quo, and if the result

looks acceptable, to-work with

ing countries to implement the

the developplan.

U.S. Options Regarding the Final

Acts of WARC-79

As the largest and most technically advanced user of the radio spectrum on a

worldwide basis, the United States approached WARC-79 with the greatest stake

in reaching agreement on a new table of frequency allocations and a revised set of related technical and administrative regulations.

While the Department of State has indicated official U.S. satisfaction with the outcome of WARC-79, the United States ultimately took six reservations in the final protocol to the Final Acts of WARC-79, helping

to bring the overall total to 83. Two of the six

were directed at political issues, but the remaining four were directed at decisions that

could have a direct impact on U.S. telecommunications operations.

The Final Acts of WARC-79 will ultimately come before the U.S. Senate to be considered for ratification as a treaty. There are

several options available:

1. The United States can ratify the Final

Acts without delay. Completing the ratification process prior to January 1, 1982

when the 1979 radio regulations enter

into force will indicate to other nations

our goodwill and determination to abide

by our international obligations. The

Final Acts constitute the “radio regulations, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the
Ch. 1—Summary ● 21 — . — —

2.

3.

4.

1959 regulations as partially revised by

the administrative radio conferences

held in 1963, 1966, 1971, 1974, and 1978.

The Final Acts also incorporate the provisions of the 1977 broadcast satellite

WARC as modified by WARC-79.

The United States can ratify the Final

Acts with conditions, thereby underscoring and making explicit the reservations taken at Geneva. In particular, the

United States could reiterate the reasons for taking reservations in the protocol to the Final Acts to emphasize

U.S. concern regarding the issue raised.

The United States can ratify the Final

Acts with additional reservations that

either state U.S. refusal to acquiesce to

particular decisions taken at WARC-79,

beyond those cited in earlier U.S. protocol statements, or set forth U.S. policy

with respect to future actions by ITU or

specific implementation of the WARC79 Final Acts. While it is not uncommon

for the U.S. Senate to attach conditions

to a resolution of ratification of a bilateral international agreement, which the

other party can readily accept or reject

through its own ratification processes,

attaching conditions to a multilateral

agreement raises difficulties.

The United States can ratify the Final

Acts in part, specifically withholding

5.

6.

ratification of those provisions (which

would have to be listed in precise detail)

where the United States chooses to remain bound by the provisions of existing regulations previously ratified

(which would also have to be listed in

precise detail).

The United States can withhold ratification of the Final Acts pending the outcome of several important international

conferences dealing with telecommunications issues. This would deny FCC

and the current administration any legal

basis for implementing decisions taken

at WARC-79, many of which were

strongly advocated by the United

States and fought for by the U.S. delegation and which are scheduled for implementation by other ITU members on

January 1, 1982. The most immediate international telecommunications conference of great importance to the United

States is the September 1982 plenipotentiary. The actions taken at this conference to revise the ITU convention will

be basic to all future conferences of ITU.

The United States can reject the Final

Acts of WARC-79 in their entirety and

announce that we intend to abide by

the preexisting radio regulations, as

amended. The consequences would be

similar to those cited above.
Chapter 2

The Changing Requirements,

Influences, and Motivations

Among Nations for Use of the

Radiofrequency Spectrum
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Can the United States Disregard the Motivations of Other Nations? . . . . . . 27

How Dependent is the United States on the Radiofrequency Spectrum

Including Use of the Geostationary Satellite Orbit?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

How Different From Other Countries is the United States in Its Need

and Use of the Radio Spectrum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Why Is It Necessary To Coordinate Radiofrequency Use Internationally?. 30

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed in the United States?. . . . . 31

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed Internationally? . . . . . . . . . 32

Issues Addressed in the OTA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The

Chapter 2

Changing Requirements,

Influences, and Motivations

Among Nations for Use of the

Radio frequency Spectrum

Introduction

By any measure, the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-79) was a

complex international event. The facts are

deceptively simple. For 11 weeks in the

autumn of 1979, between September 27 and

December 5, the nations of the world met at

Geneva as a legislative organ of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a

specialized agency of the United Nations

(U.N.). The conference produced a 984-page

document–the Final Acts of WARC-79–

which sets forth regulations, resolutions,

and recommendations for radio communication worldwide. For most nations of the

world, those Final Acts will represent a multilateral treaty and a basic source of public

international law. The U.S. Senate must give

its advice and consent to ratification before

the United States becomes a party to the

treaty.

These simple facts, however, do not begin

to explain why hundreds of thousands of

staff-hours, millions of dollars, and tens of

millions of pages were expended in preparation for, and conduct of, this conference.

They also do not explain why so many telecommunication specialists and policy makers

around the world have focused on and analyzed this conference and the events surrounding it. The purpose of this report is to

examine WARC-79 in a comprehensive

way—describing U.S. preparations and involvement, and the impact of the conference.

However, no attempt was made to examine

all issues and aspects of WARC-79, but

rather to focus on certain important results

and analyze their consequences for the

United States.

WARC-79 was held to reach global agreement concerning the international arrangements necessary for efficient and interference-free use of the radio spectrum. ITU

brings nations together almost continuously

at meetings and conferences necessary for

coordinating the use of all telecommunications (conveying information by wire, radio,

fiberoptic, etc.). WARC-79 was special because of the broad scope of its agenda, which

included most of the major arrangements relating to use of the radio spectrum. These arrangements are of two major types: 1) technical and operational standards; and 2) administrative mechanisms that give member

countries the right to operate particular

radio stations free from harmful interference

from others. Governments around the world

have their own national arrangements for

this, and devise necessary international arrangements through ITU. This activity is

often referred to as “spectrum management.

The first function, relating to technical

and operational standards, consists of establishing specifications concerning the way

radio equipment should perform, the way it

should be operated (particularly in emergency situations), and which portion of the spectrum should be reserved for particular kinds

of radio uses. This last function is usually accomplished by defining certain kinds of radio

25
—

26 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

.—

“services’ such as broadcasting, mobile,

radiolocation, etc., and setting forth a “table

of allocations” indicating which frequency

bands are reserved for particular services.

Both in the United States, and in ITU, much

work usually surrounds the preparation of

the table of allocations. Indeed, much of the

work at WARC-79 was devoted to this task.

The second major management function,

determining rights in operating radio stations is not always easily accomplished to

everyone’s satisfaction. Whether domestically or internationally, when radio channels

become limited, and the possibility of stations interfering with each other on the same

frequency becomes likely, some kind of administrative arrangement must be established for deciding which country has the

right to operate a radio facility free from

harmful interference in a given geographical

area. In the domestic situation, a government agency simply devises and enforces

methods of doing this. On the international

level, the matter is more complicated because every nation regards itself as absolutely sovereign, unwilling to be governed by

the dictates of any other nation or an international organization. As a practical matter,

however, the desire to maintain interferencefree radio communication has led most nations to follow arrangements fashioned at

conferences of ITU.

The role of communications within a country depends on its political system, the state

of economic development, access to technology, and the nature of its society. No two

countries are exactly the same and the use of

communication varies greatly among the

countries of the world. On a broad basis,

distinctions are generally made among three

groups: the more highly developed industrial

democracies; the varying stages of development in the East bloc countries; and the developing countries of the Third World. While

these distinctions are significant, there are

also many important differences within each

of these broad categories.

The United States, for example, is unique

in many ways. While most countries have

placed the ownership and operations of telecommunication systems in government or

public hands, the United States supports

private ownership and commercial operations. Government ownership and operation

of communication systems are reserved for

those cases where commercial systems are

either not available, or inappropriate, as in

the case of some military operations. Even

so, a large part of U.S. military communications are handled by commercial systems.

The United States is dedicated to the principle of free enterprise with private and public

access to the radio spectrum.

The differences between the Western nations and the East bloc countries have been

reflected in world forums like the United Nations for many years. However, the most

basic change in the distribution of influence

in the world has been the emergence of over a

hundred developing nations since World

War II. Even more significant is that these

nations are increasingly organized around

their common plight of underdevelopment

and they have exercised increasing influence

and power in international arenas where

votes are cast on the basis of “one-nation,

one-vote. ” This does not mean that there is

solidarity among Third World countries on

all communication and radiofrequency spectrum matters. On the contrary, there are

many and varied differences among such

diverse nations as India and Indonesia,

Nigeria and Tanzania, or Brazil and Cuba.

Nevertheless, on matters of broad principle

and approaches to the use of world resources

and management of the radio spectrum and

the geostationary satellite orbit, the focus of

world politics has shifted towards the Third

World. There are many questions and issues

surrounding the Third World call for redistribution of the world’s resources, for technology transfer, and for changes in the way

world news and other information is disseminated. The United States is dedicated to the

principles of free flow of information and
Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 27

freedom to express ideas.* In many countries the media are government controlled or

financed and alternative sources of private

capital are limited. These and other issues

are encompassed under the general titles of

*While the United States is dedicated to the principles of

free flow of information and freedom to express ideas, it

should be noted that both in practice and in theory these principles are not absolute. For example, information is not free;

Can the United

the Motivations

The United States, like all other nations of

the world, can ill afford to have its vital communications disrupted by interference from

radio transmissions of other countries. Consequently, it must be aware of other nations’

motivations for frequency utilization and

cooperate within reasonable limits. There is

an underlying incentive among all nations to

avoid interference to their individual domestic operations; to communicate among one

another using international facilities on an

interference-free basis; and to cooperate generally to minimize differences in the allocation and use of frequencies. There are also

many diverse interests and each country

seeks to maximize its own position in the

“New World economic order” and “New

World information order” now under debate

in world institutions like the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO). —. — first amencinwn~ rlght~ ha~e restrictions, and there is no

right to access to media other than the limited rights u rider

the Fairness I)octrine’s equal time pro~isions and right to

repl~’ LO persona I attacks.

States Disregard

of Other Nations?

give and take of international compromise.

The complexities have multiplied and efforts

to cooperate and achieve a measure of uniformity among nations in their use of the

radio spectrum and geostationary satellite

orbit have become more difficult. This is not

unexpected given the increasing reliance of

both the developed and developing worlds on

use of the radio spectrum and geostationary

satellite orbit; the growing disparity among

nations over particular needs and existing

investments in various parts of the spectrum; and the philosophical differences becoming more evident with the growing influence of the Third World.

How Dependent is the United States on the

Radiofrequency Spectrum Including Use of the

Geostationary Satellite Orbit?

The United States and other highly developed countries like Canada, Japan, and those

of Western Europe are moving from the industrial age to the information age. This

means that a large and increasing share of

the gross national product (GNP) of these

countries arises from information-related

services as opposed to agricultural and manufacturing activities. The GNP of the United

States is approaching $3 trillion. Almost half

of all U.S. economic activity is a result of the

collection, organization, analysis, and dissemination of information and informationrelated services. Much of this is now handled

via microwave radio relay or domestic satellites. Thus, the United States has an everincreasing dependence on the radiofrequency spectrum and the geostationary orbit.

Since the 1940’s, the United States has

been the acknowledged world leader in the

telecommunication field. Supporting technologies range from transistors, semiconductors, and chip technology to microproc-
28 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

essors; and from microwave and coaxial

cable to satellite and fiberoptic. The productivity of the U.S. telecommunication industry has grown more than twice as fast as productivity for the U.S. economy overall since

1950. The result has been that within a single generation the communication and information industry has become one of the most

productive and vital in the world. Current estimates place the market for world telecommunication, electronic, and computer equipment and services at $250 billion per year.

The United States has a 45-percent share of

this market that is growing at an annual rate

between 10 to 15 percent. Worldwide revenues from telecommunication services alone

exceeded $170 billion in 1980.

Advances in technology have revolutionized the supply of telecommunication equipment and services. The economic and social

structure of the United States is tied directly

to the availability of the radio spectrum and

the geostationary satellite orbit to support

the high growth telecommunication/information industry. U.S. defense systems, vital to

our national security and that of our allies,

depend on the radio spectrum and satellite

orbit availability. Defense operations are

making increased use of both space and terrestrial systems that use the radio spectrum

and every element of the defense structure

must continue to have timely and flexible access to the radio spectrum to carry out its

mission for national security.

The number and variety of users and services continue to expand in an information

society. The commercial, private, public, and

government telecommunication users all

compete for use of the radio spectrum. Other

industries like transportation, entertainment, banking, trade, and the news media

place increasing demands on telecommunication services. Airplanes don’t fly, TV programs aren’t aired, financial transactions

cease, orders go undelivered, and important

world events go unreported without modern

communications. Growth in traditional and

new telecommunication services has created

new demands for spectrum/orbit availability. For example, before 1965 and the launch

of the first commercial communications satellite (Early Bird) there was no demand for

satellite frequencies and concerns over parking slots on the geostationary orbit were

nonexistent. Today, close to 100 communication satellite systems, with several satellites

each, are in operation or in the planning

stage. The issues over use of the geostationary satellite orbit are growing more intense and the potential consequences are far-

-reaching both nationally and internationally.

Four U.S. domestic satellite systems are

operational and three additional systems are

being planned. Some 25 U.S. commercial

satellites providing a range of domestic communication services from basic telephone circuits to direct-to-home entertainment may

be operating within the next 5 years. International decisions about use of the spectrum/orbit will have great bearing on the

future of commercial satellite service and on

U.S. military satellite systems.

At the same time that new services expand, the traditional uses of the spectrum

like AM, FM, and TV broadcasting grow.

Almost 70 percent of the national telephone

network (circuit miles) is composed of radio

relay systems using microwave frequencies

to carry long-distance communications.

Business, industrial, public, and individual

usage of radiofrequencies range from taxis

and CB radios to oil pipeline management,

and search and rescue operations.

The Federal Government is by far the

heaviest single user of the radio spectrum

and the Department of Defense (DOD) uses

more spectrum than any other agency. This

includes early warning defense systems of

ground and airborne radars, Navy fleet command and communication systems, air navigational aids, enemy detection and location

devices, and modern electronic weapons that

use communications as an integral part of

their operations. DOD has also produced

much of the new technology that has led to

broader uses of the radio spectrum.

Some additional examples of Government

use of the radio spectrum help illustrate the
Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 29

reliance that a developed nation, like the

United States, places on interference-free

operation of the radio spectrum. The Federal

Aviation Administration provides navigational and air traffic control service to commercial, civil, and Government aircraft representing about 35 million flights a year. The

Department of Justice is a major user of

radio for law enforcement, crime prevention,

and detection activities. The National

Weather Service operates weather radars,

balloon stations, and meteorological satellites for forecasting land and sea weather.

Without access to the radio spectrum there

could be no space exploration program and

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) would have no reason

to exist.

How Different From Other Countries is the

United States in Its Need and Use

of the Radio Spectrum?

The United States and other developed

countries with sophisticated communication

infrastructures focus much attention on

their need to apply new technology, offer a

variety of advanced services, and support

military and other Government functions

and services. Generally these objectives go

far beyond a basic need to communicate.

They involve the complexities of satisfying

the competing and often conflicting requirements that come from a host of business,

social, political, national, and institutional

objectives.

The developing world, on the other hand, is

much more preoccupied with the need to establish a basic capability, gain self-reliance

and control over their own communciations,

and harness the powers of communciations

for educational, social, and economic development. These differences in the stage of

development and basic needs are reflected in

disputes over specific frequency spectrum

allocations as well as disagreements over

fundamental principles that govern allocation and use of this unique resource. For instance, many developing nations took a

strong position at WARC-79 to allocate high

frequency (HF) radio bands (HF radio) for

fixed services that they need in order to

develop basic domestic telephone and other

services. While not reliable, HF radio is

relatively inexpensive and easy to establish.

The United States uses microwave frequencies domestically and has replaced most of

its HF radio with more reliable satellite and

submarine cable circuits for international

telephone and other services. Therefore, the

U.S. position at WARC-79 was to use HF

radiofrequencies for international broadcasting, mobile services, and other growing services important to the United States, but not

the services of comparable interest to many

of the developing countries. It should be

noted however, that developing countries

are taking an increasing interest in international broadcasting and exercised a key role

in decisions affecting this service in the HF

radio bands.

A current and particularly important issue

that serves to illustrate a difference in basic

principle between the United States and the

Third World concerns the geostationary satellite orbit. The Third World countries have

expressed concern that the developed countries may proceed to launch satellites until

the capacity of the orbit is used-up before the

developing countries are able to use it. To

protect against this eventuality, the Third

World advocates a principle of distribution

of orbit locations among nations under an a

priori allotment approach. They believe such

an approach would guarantee them future

access since it would allocate orbit locations

on a preplanned, negotiated basis. The
30 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

United States, on the other hand, has immediate needs and regards such an a priori

allotment as wasteful and undesirable. Under the present ITU approach, the United

States as well as other nations, can take account of the advances in technology and operating techniques to “engineer-in” the next

satellite and fulfill requirements as necessary on an “as-needed” basis.

The differences among countries regarding

the radio spectrum cover a broad range. Conflicts occur between nations no matter what

the stage of development simply because nations are not uniform in their present use or

future plans for this resource. Unlike most

other nations, the United States places great

emphasis on personal communication and

private use of the spectrum (e.g., CB radios

and mobile radio for private use, large number of amateur radio operators, etc.). The

United States has global military commitments with diverse military spectrum requirements, a large concentration of scientific uses of spectrum including space

research and radioastronomy. The United

States is also a major exporter of telecommunication equipment.

Under international regulations, countries

need not coordinate frequency use unless

there is a potential of interference with

another country. In other words, those domestic radio operations that do not send signals across national boundaries that could

cause interference are not of international

concern. A TV broadcast station in the middle of the United States does not require

coordination with any other country. However, a TV broadcast station close to the

U.S.-Canadian border requires coordination

because its signal crosses into Canada. This

geographical proximity of two countries

gives rise to many potential conflicts that require resolution. The United States and

Canada and the United States and Mexico

have a continuing need to coordinate use of

the radio spectrum.

There is considerable flexibility in the international radio regulations for countries to

use the radio spectrum independently for different services. However, there are mitigating factors, like the need to coordinate use at

border areas between countries that argue

for uniformity in use. This doesn’t mean that

the coordinating problems go away, but only

that they become more manageable. Other

factors like producing, selling, and operating

radio equipment in different world markets

provide incentives for uniform and sometimes nonuniform technical and operating

standards. Certainly there must be a certain

measure of uniformity or international communications could not occur between countries. Indeed, many services are global in

nature requiring international agreement for

spectrum allocation and protection against

interference. Such services include aeronautical, maritime, and satellite services. An

airplane making flights internationally must

be able to navigate and communicate as it

flies in different parts of the world. The International Telecommunication Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) global satellite system with 106 member countries is an example of an international common-user system

that requires uniform radio spectrum allocations. Thus, the necessity to reach agreements and coordinate spectrum use among

nations goes far beyond the basic need to

avoid radio interference.

Why Is It Necessary To Coordinate

Radiofrequency Use Internationally?

Electromagnetic radio waves behave dif- Many factors determine the behavior of parferently depending on the particular part of ticular frequencies. Whether or not interferthe spectrum or frequency range being used. ence will occur depends on many factors in
Ch. 2—The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 31

addition to the particular frequencies used.

The transmitter power, type of receiver, and

geographical separation between receivers,

and type of terrain over which the signal

travels are examples. The Earth’s atmosphere has different effects on different parts

of the radio spectrum. Different layers of the

ionosphere reflect or absorb radio energy differently depending on the frequencies used,

time of day, time of year, and period of the

sunspot cycle. Frequencies lower in the spectrum tend to travel or propagate along the

ground and follow the curvature of the

Earth. This so-called “groundwave” becomes less important as the frequency range

increases and the “skywave” or reflections

from the ionosphere become more important.

To achieve effective communications, one

must choose frequencies from the band

whose propagation characteristics are best

suited for the intended use.

Using today’s technology, most of the

world’s radio communication systems operate at frequencies between 10 kHz and 40

GHz (between 10,000 and 40 billion cycles

per second). Over this range of frequencies,

some 40 different radio services are internationally allocated certain segments or

“bands of frequencies” within which to

operate. For example, AM radio broadcast

stations operate in the so-called medium frequency (MF) part of the spectrum (300 kHz

to about 3 MHz) and are allocated the band

535 to 1,605 kHz. An individual AM station

located in the United States is assigned a

specific center frequency and a 10-kHz bandwidth by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Since the geographical area of

coverage of an AM station is determined in

part by the power of the transmitter, FCC

limits the amount of power stations can use.

Different classes of AM stations are authorized different power limits and thus have different coverage areas. Through such domestic regulatory decisions, FCC can increase or

decrease the number of station assignments

available in the United States independent

of international decisions. However, international decisons bear directly on domestic

issues in several ways. For example,

WARC-79 decided to increase the amount of

radio spectrum available for AM broadcasting by extending the frequency range to

1,705 kHz. While the United States had proposed to expand allocations to the broadcasting service, the conference results were

not the same as the U.S. proposal. In any

event, new AM radio receivers will need to be

manufactured to receive this extended range

of frequencies, and the future result will be

more AM radio stations. Recently, the issue

of reducing the channel spacing used by AM

stations from 10- to 9-kHz spacing has been

a subject of attention both within the United

States and internationally. It appears that

the U.S. position will be to maintain the

10-kHz channel spacing.

There are many examples to illustrate the

complexities of spectrum management and

policymaking regarding use of the radio

spectrum. Almost any decision regarding

radio spectrum and satellite orbit availability has many and varied consequences within the United States and internationally.

Chapter 4 of this report discusses some of

the major decisions negotiated at WARC-79

and their possible consequences for the

United States.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed

in the United States?

Government policymaking and spectrum government telecommunications. This inmanagement responsibilities are divided. eludes spectrum management and the licensCongress enacted the Communications Act ing of radio facilities except those operated

of 1934, which created the FCC and gave it by the Federal Government. The 1934 act

responsibility and authority to regulate non- gave the President responsibility and au-
—.

32 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

thority over spectrum management matters

and operation of radio facilities of the Federal Government—both civil and military.

The management of Government use of the

spectrum has been delegated by the President to the National Telecommunications

and Information Administration (NTIA) in

the Department of Commerce, aided by the

Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). IRAC consists of representatives of the major Government agencies

making use of the spectrum and includes a

liaison representative from FCC.

The Department of State, consistent with

its responsibilities for U.S. foreign policy,

performs a central role in U.S. preparations

for and participation at international conferences concerning the radiofrequency spectrum. The Department of State heads U.S.

delegations that negotiate with foreign governments at conferences called by ITU.

Other bilateral or multilateral dealings with

foreign countries about spectrum management matters come under the general province of the State Department.

Congress has both general and specific

oversight responsibilities for these agencies

and their conduct of spectrum management.

Moreover, the U.S. Senate must give advice

and consent to ratification before the President can sign international agreements that

bind the United States in a treaty with other

nations. The Final Acts of WARC-79 will

form the international radio regulations that

have treaty status and thus require Senate

action.

The Federal Government is responsible

for, and engaged in, many activities under

the broad term of spectrum management.

The Government function of evaluating

needs and sorting priorities for access to the

radio spectrum among the many competing

and often conflicting interests within the

United States is a complex process. The expanding telecommunication industry adds

more and more participants and, to a lesser

extent, public interest and single interest

groups are entering the spectrum management process.

The radio spectrum is allocated, operational rules are set, and specific frequency

assignments are made by two Federal agencies—NTIA and FCC. NTIA does it for the

executive branch of the Federal Government

and FCC does it for the private sector and

for the State and local governments. Dealings with foreign countries about the radio

spectrum, including negotiation at international conferences, are the responsibility of

the Government. In addition to their role as

spectrum manager, the agencies of the executive branch use more radio spectrum

than any other single user. They have access

to almost half of the radio spectrum allocated in the United States. Most of the allocated spectrum is available to both Federal

Government and private and nongovernment users on a shared basis.

How Is the Radiofrequency Spectrum Managed

Internationally?

The primary world forum for international

cooperation and coordination for use of telecommunications of all kinds is ITU with 155

member nations. ITU acts as the world’s

clearinghouse for telecommunication matters, and members of the Union undertake a

treaty relationship for use of the radiofrequency spectrum as a party to the International Telecommunication Convention and

to the radio regulations.

ITU is one of several specialized agencies

of the U.N. However, ITU long predates the

U.N. itself. ITU, which was founded in 1865,

joined with the International Radiotelegraph Convention signatories in 1932 to

become ITU.
Ch. 2— The Changing Requirements, Influences, and Motivations Among Nations ● 33

ITU does not have a permanent constitution, but rather operates under the International Telecommunication Convention that

is revised periodically at ITU plenipotentiary conferences. While basic to every function of the Union, the convention is relatively brief. Details delineating ITU’s activities

and the responsibilities of membership are

spelled out in four other documents known

as the administrative regulations: the telegraph regulations, the telephone regulations,

the radio regulations, and the additional radio regulations–each of which enjoys treaty

status in its own right (the United States is

not a party to the additional radio regulations that were ultimately suppressed by

WARC-79 and will pass into history on January 1, 1982). WARC-79 was convened to revise the radio regulations. Although several

world and regional specialized radio conferences were held in the interim, the last conference to consider the full range of radio

regulations was held in 1959.

In the world arena, ITU is the focal point

for spectrum management. Its role in telecommunications, however, is much broader

Issues Addressed .

The OTA study examines broad aspects of

spectrum management within the United

States and internationally. The present Government structure and decisionmaking processes for spectrum management are reviewed. Possible changes and improvements

to existing processes are discussed and alternative policymaking mechanisms are presented in the study.

A review of the WARC-79 conference and

the major decisions taken are addressed in

than spectrum matters and includes technical standards, operating practices, accounting and rate issues, as well as matters

relating to wire communications. Just as

ITU’s influence is broader than spectrum

consideration, so are international influences

on spectrum issues broader than ITU. Indeed, there are no less than a dozen international organizations concerned with telecommunication/information matters and they

impact directly and indirectly on the issues

of spectrum management, as illustrated

later in this report. Such organizations include the Universal Postal Union; the World

Intellectual Property Organization; the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; the International Civil Aviation

Organization; INTELSAT: the Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics; the Inter

American Telecommunication Conference;

the Organization for Economic Cooperation

and Development; the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization; and other groups of the U.N.

family, particularly UNESCO and the U.N.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer

Space with its Working Group on Direct

Broadcasting Satellites.

in the OTA Study

terms of possible consequences for the

United States. The present and future roles

of ITU are considered with a range of alternative approaches for future U.S. participation in ITU. The study discusses alternative

strategies for dealing with current and

future issues that will be raised at several

important conferences within the next few

years.
Chapter 3

Domestic and International

Management of the

Radiofrequency Spectrum
Contents

Page

The Structure of Spectrum Management for the United States. . . . . . . . . . . 37

The Role of NTIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Role of the FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

The Department of State’s Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

The Public Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Past Critiques of U.S. Telecommunication Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Prospects for the Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

International Management of the Spectrum – the ITU.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

ITU Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Political Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Future of ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

The Changing ITU Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Other International Organizations Involved in Telecommunications . . . . . . 54

U.S. Preparations for WARC-79 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

TABLE

Table No. Page

l. U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 by Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

l. Federal Communications Commission Structure-August 1981 . . . . . . . . 39

2. Actors Involved in FCC Rulemaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3. 0rganizational Chart of ITU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Chapter 3

Domestic and International

Management of the

Radio frequency Spectrum

From the earliest practical utilization of

radio for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communications in the early 1900’s it was apparent that international agreements were required to coordinate use of the electromagnetic spectrum and avoid interference. For

full and effective use of radio communications there had to be common standards for

equipment design and mutually consistent

operating techniques. Most of all, there had

to be agreement on ways to achieve interference-free, compatible use of the radiofrequency spectrum by radio systems whose

radiated energy may overlap in various

other characteristics of electromagnetic

radiation.

Without such agreements radio communications would be chaotic. Mutual interference would make radio reception so unreliable as to be virtually useless. The history of

spectrum management has been marked by

increasingly complex mechanisms for the rational and economical exploitation of increasingly congested channels of communication. The success of these arrangements is

a tribute to man’s commonsense and ingenuity.

dimensions of space, time, frequency,

The Structure of

for the

and

Spectrum Management

United States

Telecommunication is an essential element

in the economic and social life of the United

States and a vital factor in the effective functioning of virtually every department and

agency of the Federal Government. Yet, despite the nationwide and worldwide importance of rapid, reliable, responsive telecommunications, the United States does not

have a centralized means to oversee and coordinate national policy decisions.

There is no single U.S. Government organization responsible for overall frequency

management, policies, and processes. Instead, there are several governmental organizations having key roles and responsibilities with the National Telecommunications

and Information Administration (NTIA), the

Federal Communications Commission (FCC),

and the Department of State being the principal agencies. The procedures followed are

both formal and informal, and there are an

increasing number of diverse constituencies.

Spectrum management in the United

States, including the development of policy,

is divided, depending on whether the spectrum user is a Government or nongovernment entity. The Communications Act of

1934 assigns to the President the responsibility for management of the electromagnetic spectrum used by agencies and departments of the Federal Government. FCC is responsible for managing all nonfederal government use.

It is the status of the user, not the frequencies employed or the particular category of

service, that determines whether the President (or his agent) or FCC has jurisdiction.

37
—

38 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

For example, spectrum use by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the individual

military services is under the jurisdiction of

the President, while spectrum use by common carriers such as AT&T and the Communications Satellite (COMSAT), by State

and local governments, and by citizens and

amateur radio operators, is the responsibility of FCC.

The Role of NTIA

Under Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1977

and Executive Order No. 12046, of March

26, 1978, President Carter transferred his

authority to assign frequencies to the Secretary of Commerce, who further delegated it

to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for

Communications and Information (who is

also the Administrator of NTIA).

Assisting the Administrator of NTIA is an

advisory body called the Interdepartment

Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC). IRAC

has been in continuous existence since 1922,

having been established even earlier than

the Federal Radio Commission, which preceded the present FCC. It has performed

essentially the same functions for the past

59 years, although the organization and

structure of the executive branch, and the office, or department, or administration in

which IRAC has been housed have been

changed many times.

IRAC is made up of representatives of 20

Federal agencies and departments. FCC participates through a liaison representative appointed by FCC. The functions of IRAC include assisting NTIA in the development of

the national table of frequency allocations,

the assignment of frequencies to stations

owned and operated by the U.S. Government, and in the development and carrying

out of basic policies, procedures, programs,

and technical matters pertaining to the management and employment of the radiofrequency spectrum.

IRAC has a secretariat that provides general support to all committee activities and a

variety of specialized subcommittees and ad

hoc or special working groups to deal with

particular matters, such as frequency assignments, international notification, and

preparations for international conferences.

The subcommittees are concerned with ongoing activities whereas ad hoc groups deal

with specific-term subject matter.

The Role of the FCC

As noted earlier, FCC, which is an independent Federal agency reporting directly to

Congress, is charged with regulating interstate and foreign communications by means

of radio, wire, and cable. This charter encompasses both economic regulation and the

management and licensing of users of the

radio spectrum.

The seven commissioners of FCC are appointed by the President with the advice and

consent of the Senate. They supervise all

FCC activities, with delegation of responsibilities to boards and committees of commissioners, individual commissioners, and

staff units. The commissioners are aided by

a staff of some 2,000 regular employees,

about a fourth of whom are engaged in field

operations (see fig. 1).

There are five operating bureaus, reflecting the functional basis of FCC: broadcast,
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 39

I

■

,<., . .

-.

0

W3
—

40 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Irnpacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

cable television, common carrier, field operations, and private radio. In addition, there

are six staff offices, including the Office of

Science and Technology (OST), which is the

focal point within the Commission for Spectrum Management, and the Office of Plans

and Policy (OPP).

Broad policy questions, having some spectrum management or frequency allocation

aspects (e.g., the use and status of the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) portion of the spectrum or the investigation of interim provisions for broadcasting satellites, often referred to as direct broadcasting satellites)

have been the subject of studies by OPP.

The primary focus for domestic spectrum

management at FCC is in the spectrum management division within OST. This division,

which is responsible for, among other things,

the National Table of Frequency Allocations,

obtains the views of the public (and corporate representatives) through publication

of notices of inquiry (NOIS), advisory committees, and from the bureaus responsible

for the several radio services. The table is

amended after coordination with IRAC

where necessary and issuance of notices of

proposed rulemaking (NPRMs) (see fig. 2).

Once a frequency band has been allocated

to a particular radio service, the bureau responsible for that service will develop rules

for its use on the basis of information gathered through NOIs, NPRMs, and other FCC

procedures.

Spectrum management matters before international organizations (for example, proposals of the United States for changes to

ITU radio regulations) are the responsibility

of OST. This office works closely with the

operating bureaus and other offices in FCC

concerned with spectrum management matters. Moreover, the FCC liaison representative to IRAC is from OST. FCC’s views and

policies regarding its responsibilities for the

private sector use of the spectrum are reflected within IRAC by this representative.

The Department of State’s Role

It can be seen that policy for international

telecommunication, including the orderly

use of the radiofrequency spectrum, cannot

be considered the exclusive concern of any

single executive department or agency of the

Federal Government. Nevertheless, telecommunications negotiations and agreements,

both bilateral and multilateral, remain an important part of the foreign relations of the

United States and therefore fall within the

jurisdiction and responsibility of the State

Department.

The Department of State, with recommendations from NTIA, FCC, and others, names

delegations to international telecommunication meetings, whether sponsored by international organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) (and

its permanent bodies, the International

Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), the

International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), and the International Frequency Registration Board

(IFRB), or by regional bodies, such as the

Inter-American Telecommunications Conference (CITEL) of the Organization of American States. The State Department can designate another agency or commission to represent the United States at a particular

meeting or for a specified purpose. Thus, for

example, FCC has been designated as the organization that transmits notifications and

advance publication information required by

the radio regulations to IFRB of ITU. Similarly, the Commission conducts bilateral

meetings with Canada regarding nongovernment frequency use near the border, and

DOD participates directly in the communications negotiations of the North Atlantic
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 41

Figure 2.—Actors Involved in FCC Rulemaking

Y“- 4

‘ “h

Executive Public Congress Judicial

Branch Branch

.

Opinion

and Order

Denying

Petition

(MO&O)

Notice

of

Inquiry

(NOI)

I Comments I

Report

and Order

Adopting

Change

(Editorial

changes only)

r 1 I I Additional I

Report and

Orders

Petition for

Reconsideration 4 I

Memorandum

Opinion and Order

SOURCE FCC Communicator. September 1975

Treaty Organization (NATO) and its subordinate bodies, such as the Allied Radio

Frequency Agency.

Typically, U.S. delegations to international meetings in general, and ITU and its bodies in particular, have included individuals

from Government agencies, and nongovernment organizations. As in the case of other

specialized, highly technical international

conferences and negotiations (meteorology,

world health, agriculture, etc. ) the State Department looks to other Government agencies, private sector organizations and companies, and individuals having knowledge of

each field. In the case of international

telecommunications, the State Department

relies heavily on FCC, NTIA, and the na-
42 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

tional committees for CCIR and CCITT, as ministration (NASA), and the Department of

well as on individual agencies such as DOD, Transportation, as well as experts from the

the National Aeronautics and Space Ad- private sectors.

The Public Role

The Department of State may establish an

advisory committee for specific conferences,

as it did in the case of WARC-79. The public,

including representatives of industrial

groups and organizations, participate as individual members of such a State Department body. The public, industry, and private

interests may participate in the decisionmaking process by filing comments and

views with FCC through its public NOIS and

NPRMs and in Government/industry advisory committees set up by FCC prior to

many of the individual conferences. This

public process to decide spectrum issues for

the nonfederal government use of the spectrum is in contrast to the NTIA/IRAC nonpublic process to decide Federal use of the

spectrum. Finally, individuals from industrial, scientific, research, manufacturing, and

public interest organizations may be appointed to the U.S. delegations to such

meetings.

U.S. international communication policy

must reflect a coordinated balance of foreign

and domestic policy considerations. Moreover, effective negotiations in the telecommunications field, including spectrum coordination, requires a combination of U.S. policymaking authority embodying essential

features not easily combined. For example,

there must be cooperation among missionoriented Federal departments and agencies,

extensive public and congressional participation, continuity over the years, and an overall sense of direction and purpose.

Past Critiques of U.S. Telecommunication

Policymaking

These elements have not always been successfully brought together. A Communication Policy Board reporting to President

Harry S Truman in 1951 identified five specific issues as being basic to the Nation’s

telecommunication problems. These were:

1. How shall the United States formulate

policies and plans for guidance in reconciling the conflicting interests and needs of

Government and private users of the spectrum space–that is, for guidance in making the best use of its share of the total

spectrum?

2. How shall the United States meet the recurrent problem of managing its total telecommunications resources to meet the

changing demands of national security?

3. How shall the United States develop a national policy and position for dealing with

other nations in seeking international telecommunications agreements?

4. How shall the United States develop policies and plans to foster the soundness and

vigor of its telecommunications agreements?

5. How shall the United States Government

strengthen its organization to cope with

the four issues stated above?

The policy board report emphasized spectrum usage, national security, and the maintenance of a sound industry as key subjects

to be borne in mind when considering the

issues quoted above. With regard to “inter-
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 43

national agreements, ” the same report

stated:*

Just as the United States has no clear policy for dividing its share of spectrum space,

so it has lacked satisfactory means of determining policy as a basis for negotiations

with other nations for the world division of

the spectrum. The United States, in preparing positions for international negotiations,

has in effect asked Federal and other

claimants to state their needs, and then

presented the total as the United States requirement. In those portions of the spectrum

where these totals have been small enough

to fit within the world complement, our

delegations to conferences have had a negotiable position. In some cases, however, the

total stated requirements have exceeded not

merely those which could reasonably be put

forward as the proper United States share,

but have actually exceeded the total physical content of the bands. Furthermore, there

is no permanent mechanism by which the

stated requirements of the United States

users could be adjusted with equity and safety. The imperative need for means of making

such adjustments hardly requires elaboration.

Sixteen years later in 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson sent a message to Congress

advising that a “Task Force on Communication Policy” was being established to examine a number of major questions in the

communications policy area. While most of

the thrust of the task force was aimed at the

use of satellite and space technology, it was

apparent that the problems identified in

1951 by President’s Truman’s Policy Board

remained unresolved.

In chapter 9 of its report–entitled “The

Roles of the Federal Government in Telecommunications, the task force stated:**

A. Traditionally, government has viewed

telecommunications primarily as a

mission-support function, rather than a

*See Telecommunications—A Program For Progress, a

report by the President’s Communications Policy Board,

dated March 1951, Irvin Stewart, Chairman.

**See Final Report of the President ‘S Task Force On c’ommurzications Policy, Dec. 7, 1968.

focus for public policy. The result has

been that policy has evolved as a patchwork of limited, largely ad hoc responses

to specific issues, rather than a cohesive

framework for planning. Government

organization for the formulation and implementation of communications policies

reflects this evolution.

—

—

—

Early government involvement in telecommunications often involved ad hoc

responses to individual problems as

they appeared.

The framework established by the

Communications Act of 1934, although

combining the broadcasting and common carrier regulatory functions, remains limited in scope.

The post World War I I period has been

characterized by the growth of communications activities and a series of narrowly focused studies and limited organizational changes.

B. The patchwork nature of the present

structure is not conducive to optimum

performance of the telecommunications

activities and requirements of the Federal

Government.

—

—

—

—

Existing organizational arrangements

make effective spectrum management

difficult.

The absence of a central focus possessing the requisite technological and economic skills makes more difficult the

development of a sound and forwardlooking international telecommunications policy.

The policy coordination necessitated

by the plethora of government telecommunications roles is inadequately performed by a multiplicity of committees.

Recent events have underscored the

lack of an effective government capability for long-range telecommunications policy planning.

Thus, the 1968 report reiterates the issues

raised earlier by President Truman’s Communications Policy Board, and the reiteration is particularly applicable in the areas of

Government organization and spectrum

management. In January 1980, the U.S.

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,

and Transportation requested the Chairman

of the Office of Technology Assessment
44 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Board to address the following two questions:*

(1) In view of the original United States positions, what will be the probable impact of

the decisions made at WARC-79 on the

U. S.? How should the U.S. adjust its

preparation and participation in future international telecommunications conferences in order to more effectively accomplish its objective?

(2) Should the United States modify its

allocations procedures and tables in order

to respond to the WARC-79 decisions?

What are the major U.S. spectrum needs

likely to be during the next twenty years

and how will they be accommodated?

The request reflects a continued concern

for the existing machinery and procedures

for U.S. telecommunications policymaking

and preparation for international telecommunications conferences. Similar expressions of concern in the past did lead to structural changes but with little apparent result.

President Eisenhower eliminated the office

of the “Telecommunications Advisor to the

President” and replaced it with an “Assistant Director for Telecommunications” in the

Office of the Director of Defense Mobilization. The duties assigned were focused on

telecommunications policies and standards

—— *See joint letter signed by Senators Cannon, Packwood,

Hollings, Goldwater, and Schmitt to the Hon. Morris K.

Udall, Chairman, Office of Technology Assessment, dated

Feb. 11, 1980.

for the executive branch and the President’s

responsibilities for spectrum management.

Over the years, the job of “Assistant Director for Telecommunications Management” became, in 1970, the Director of the

Office of Telecommunications Policy and

then, in 1978, the entire telecommunications

function was transferred out of the Executive Office of the President to the Department of Commerce (DOC) where the present

NTIA is now located.

In the final analysis, one may conclude

that, despite its worrisome deficiencies, the

U.S. telecommunications policymaking and

management machinery has worked. How

well, and how efficiently, are matters of dispute. The good results rest on the fact that

over the years highly dedicated, competent,

career personnel made the system work.

Since spectrum is the common denominator

in all uses of radio, coordination has been

essential for the various radio services to

function in a compatible manner. It is this

coordination, which over the years has

become a very specialized and sophisticated

function, that frequently bears directly on

the policy decisions. The United States has

been extremely fortunate in that, in the past,

it has been able to send to international conferences representatives who were experienced and competent to deal with what have

been essentially technical rather than political and economic matters.

Prospects for the Future

But today, more than ever, telecommunications encompasses far more than just

spectrum management, and U.S. policy formulation in advance of international negotiations involves more than just those issues

forced by the need for frequency coordination. The existing U.S. structure is inadequate in that the permanent, ongoing spectrum management mechanisms are not adequately equipped to review all stated requirements of Government and nongovernment spectrum users and objectively verify

and adjust needs consistent with national

policy objectives. There is no ongoing effective means of collecting data and developing

guidelines to judge the merits of one spectrum use over any other.

In an international negotiating environment that has become increasingly political,

U.S. spectrum management specialists have

been called on to anticipate U.S. telecom-
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 45

munications requirements far into the future

without adequate long-range analysis. The

absence of such a strategic, long-term planning approach reflects the absence of concern for telecommunications issues at the

highest levels of Government and hampers

the effectiveness of U.S. negotiators.

Lack of high-level concern has also led to a

shortage of trained and experienced engineering personnel to replace those retiring

from Federal Government service. Nor has

there been sufficient awareness of the need

for personnel with supplementary economic,

legal, and diplomatic skills, as well as foreign

language proficiency.

The three principal players in conducting

telecommunication negotiations are the Department of State, DOC (through NTIA),

and FCC. Thus, within the executive branch

there is a built-in fragmentation of telecommunications policy. The Department of

State is clearly the focal point for the conduct of foreign relations but its Office of International Communications Policy is lightly

manned and well down in the State Department’s organizational structure. It is not in a

strong position to make its influence felt in

the upper echelons of Government and industry.

Under Executive Order No. 12046, NTIA

is assigned functions that include developing and setting forth, in coordination with

the Secretary of State and other interested

agencies, plans and programs that relate to

international telecommunications. From a

practical standpoint, NTIA lacks sufficient

resources and “clout” to fully carry out its

mandate effectively. Moreover, the rather

general wording of the Executive order

leaves it ambiguous as to how far NTIA can

go in its coordinating role, particularly when

that mandate risks encroachment on the

general regulatory responsibilities of FCC.

In his testimony before the Subcommittee

on International Operations of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee on July 31, 1980,

Glenn O. Robinson, who was chairman of the

U.S. delegation to the 1979 WARC, said he

did not regard the fragmentation of U.S. policymaking to be a matter of great significance in preparing for future WARCs. Yet he

went on to say:

Of course, it is necessary to have some

locus of final decision making; there must be

some place, where in Truman’s words, the

“buck stops.” So far as international policy

is concerned the answer seems reasonably

clear: the Secretary of State speaking for the

President has, and must retain, the ultimate

responsibility.

The State Department’s role extends beyond mere final review and approval of international policy positions. It also has a role to

play in shaping policy positions—to ensure

that international policy concerns are properly integrated into the policy making process from its inception and not merely layered

on top of it at the point of final decision.

An important element of future preparation will be developing appropriate linkages

with other elements of international communications policy. Obviously radio spectrum

use and management does not stand apart

from other aspects of international communications and communications policy. Despite the highly specialized technical character of radio spectrum management which

sets it apart from, say, U.N. or UNESCO

debates over free-versus-balanced-flow of information or development assistance programs, the issues are often related.

As a first step some permanent mechanism for intra-Departmental and interagency coordination is appropriate. Such a mechanism was developed in 1978 as a first attempt to bring together some of the major

strands of international communications

policy. Thereafter coordination was pursued

more or less informally as part of the

WARC-79 preparations. For the future, however, policy review and development ought

not to be dominated by some specific major

event such as WARC. The “big event” is

probably of diminishing importance in international diplomacy. The process of continuing negotiations through a series of conferences has become predominant in almost all

aspects of international affairs, including international communications policy. It

follows that too great an emphasis on single
46 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

events, such as future WARCs, as a focal

point for policy coordination could lead to a

distorted perspective on policy issues and

objectives.

As to what organizational structure might

be needed to carry out the future role of coordinating international communications policy I have no specific recommendations. I do

not think a large new office is required to

handle the task, but the responsibility must

be clearly recognized and given stature commensurate with its high importance.

Thus, the expressions of concern over the

lack of permanent mechanisms for coordinating U.S. international communication

policy persist to the present time. The present structure is not adequate to develop telecommunication policies, to effect long-range

planning, and assure the achievement of

U.S. goals.

International Management of the Spectrum –

the ITU

ITU is the principal international institution for achieving agreement and cooperation among nations on the use of telecommunications. It is a unique organization that

has managed to bring the merits of technical

collaboration to a level where participating

governments feel a vested interest in the

agreements reached.

Adherence to ITU agreements is voluntary and cannot be enforced by higher authority. There are no sanctions to compel an

ITU member to abide by ITU rules. However, membership in ITU entails a treaty

obligation to conform to the collective decisions of its members. Its activities might be

described by systems analysts as a nonzero

or positive-sum game in which there are no

winners or losers and where all the participants benefit. The mechanisms of ITU are

designed to achieve the maximum utilization

of the electromagnetic spectrum by the

widest range of users, and to avoid a situation where one user is accommodated at the

expense of another.

ITU was created in 1932 by the merger of

two existing groups-the International Telegraph Union (founded in 1865) and the International Radiotelegraph Convention signatories. It has grown in breadth and scope

over the years—surviving two world wars

and the unprecedented diversification of

communications technology.

An international agreement-making and

rulemaking organization whose members adhere to many varied legal systems, it has

avoided legal doctrine. Its fundamental governing principles are contained in the ITU

Convention, a constitution first adopted in

1932 that remains subject to periodic revision. According to this convention the purposes of ITU are:

1.

2.

3.

to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunications of all

kinds;

to promote the development of technical

facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving the efficiency of telecommunications services,

increasing their usefulness and making

them, so far as possible, generally

available to the public; and

to harmonize the actions of nations in

the attainment of those ends.

The activities of ITU are organized for the

attainment of specific objectives, the most

important of which are:

• allocation, registration, and coordinated

utilization of the radiofrequency spec-
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 47

●

trum to avoid harmful interference be- ●

tween radio stations of different countries;

planned development of telecommunications facilities, particularly those using space techniques. Creating, develop- ●

ing, and improving telecommunication

equipment and networks in developing

countries;

promoting collaboration in setting telecommunication rates as low as possible,

while maintaining efficiency of services

and independent financial administration; and

conducting studies, collecting and publishing public information, adopting resolutions, and formulating regulations on

matters relating to telecommunications.

ITU Structure

The ITU structure combines conferences,

or policymaking bodies, and permanent

organs. The plenipotentiary conference is

the supreme body of ITU. It consists of the

delegations of member countries meeting

every 5 to 9 years to formulate general

policies, establish budget guidelines, elect

members and top officials, and conclude

agreements between the ITU and other international organizations. Only the plenipotentiary conference can amend or revise the

ITU Convention. The next such conference

is scheduled for September 1982 in Nairobi,

Kenya (see fig. 3).

Administrative conferences are convened

to consider specific telecommunication matters as the need arises. They may be either

worldwide or regional in scope and participation. (ITU divides the world into three regions—region 1 covers Europe, the U. S. S. R.,

Turkey, Mongolia, and Africa; region 2

covers North, Central, and South Americas,

the Caribbean and Greenland; region 3

covers South Asia, Australia, New Zealand,

and the Pacific. ) Conference agendas may

concern all radio communications services

and all frequency bands or may be restricted

to a particular band and one or more services. Among the administrative conferences

held in the 1970’s were those dealing with

space, maritime and aeronautical radio communications, satellite broadcasting, and

WARC-79. The Final Acts of such conferences become treaties following ratification

by ITU members.

In the intervals between plenipotentiary

conferences, the administrative council acts

on behalf of the entire membership in formulating policy and overseeing the work of

ITU. First instituted in 1947 with 18 members (ITU then had 73 member states and an

annual budget of 4 million Swiss francs), the

council now has 36 members. (ITU has

grown to 155 members and has a budget of

67 million Swiss francs, or approximately

$31 million). Meeting each spring in Geneva,

the council approves the annual budget,

determines the size and grading of the staff,

sets salaries and allowances, and determines

the schedule of conferences and meetings

and their agendas. It has become a forum for

discussion of certain political issues such as

the question of South Africa, Rhodesia, the

Portuguese colonies in Africa, and the Middle East.

The council has also contended with the

issue of the languages to be provided in interpretation and document translation at

conferences. Interpretation and translation

are provided in French, English, and Spanish, plus Chinese and Russian for all official

documentation. In addition, there is interpretation in Arabic at plenipotentiary and

administrative conferences.

The general secretariat has grown in size

and responsibilities over recent years. Since

1965, the Secretary General of ITU has been

chosen from among candidates from developing countries. The present Secretary Gen-
48 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

Figure 3.—Organizational Chart of ITU

.

v

I

1

1

Secretariat

b

SOURCE International Telecommunication Union

eral, Mohammed Mili of Tunisia, assisted by

his deputy, Richard Butler of Australia,

coordinates and supervises the day-to-day

activities of ITU. He employs a multinational general secretariat staff to support

the other permanent organs of XTU–IFRB

and the two technical committees: CCIR and

CCITT. The secretariat includes a technical

cooperation department that assists developing countries, using funds provided by

the United Nations Development Program

(UNDP). (The current members of IFRB are

from the U.S.S.R, Canada, Morocco, Japan,

and the United Kingdom.)

Unlike other international organizations in

which sole executive direction resides in a

I

1

I

secretary general, there is a diffusion of authority among ITU’s permanent organs

leading to what is sometimes described as

ITU’s “Federal structure. ” No one element

of ITU’s secretariat has overall responsibility for the operation of ITU. The Secretary

General cannot dictate the registration of

frequencies by IFRB nor does he have technical responsibilities for the activities of

the International Consultative Committees

(CCIs). Also, IFRB cannot dictate the technical findings of CCIs. Nevertheless, the Secretary General, IFRB, and CCIs are required

to work together to meet the needs of the

members. This sharing of executive power

has given rise to certain conflicts and

rivalries.
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 49

Led by five officials elected by the plenipotentiary conference, IFRB records the date,

purpose, and technical characteristics of frequency assignments by member countries

with a view to achieving international recognition. IFRB also records orbital positions

assigned to geostationary satellites. It examines each frequency notification received

for conformity with the international radio

regulations and for the possibility of harmful

interference. If the examination is favorable,

the frequency assignment is entered in the

master register; if not, it is returned to the

notifying country with suggestions regarding a solution to the difficulty. Through reference to the master register and the board’s

weekly circulars, operators worldwide have

access to a listing of all registered frequency

assignments.

CCIR, which is currently headed by an

American, and CCITT, whose director is

French, are ITU’s best known permanent

organs. All member countries and certain

private operating companies, scientific and

industrial organizations can participate in

their work. The ITU Convention prescribes

the duties of CCIR as the study of technical

and operating questions relating to radio

communications and the issuing of recommendations. The CCITT members are to

study and make recommendations regarding

technical, operating, and tariff questions

related to telegraphy and telephony.

The work of CCIs is conducted by a number of study groups whose members include

experts in each of the specialized areas of interest to the study groups. The product of

these study groups is the basis for standards

and specifications that are generally accepted by all administrations and users.

Political

At various times, member nations of ITU

and signatories to the convention have been

excluded from ITU conferences for political

In practice, CCIs have studied, issued reports on, and made recommendations concerning communication systems operations

and advanced technologies as they have

been developed. The member nations of ITU

look to CCIs for information and guidance on

the use of these techniques and their reports

and recommendations are respected and generally accepted by member nations in the

planning, design, and operation of telecommunication systems.

The responsibilities of ITU to lend assistance to developing countries and to study

their special problems is a challenge to an

organization whose principal purpose is

agreement-making. The rationale is simple

enough. For agreement-making to be effective, all participants must be in a position to

participate and cooperate. The less developed countries need help in extending their

telecommunications services and in developing appropriate administrative and technical

skills. Thus, technical assistance promotes

better global communications generally.

The challenge to ITU lies in extending this

assistance without overtaxing its limited resources. The extraordinary growth of telecommunication technologies and services

has already strained ITU’s capacity to produce effective international agreements on a

timely basis. Furthermore, ITU must compete with other organizations for the services of telecommunications specialists that it

would like to assign to assist developing

countries. The costs of ITU’s administration

of UNDP aid programs must be met by contributions from developed countries that

may prefer to see ITU concentrate on its

agreement-making functions.

Issues

reasons. For example, this happened to

Spain in 1947, and Rhodesia, South Africa,

and Portugal were excluded from a 1973 con-
50 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

ference. There have also been occasions

when efforts to exclude nations have failed

to win approval of the membership.

In other instances, the structure of ITU

has been flexible and pragmatic enough to

assign country codes for worldwide automatic telephone dialing to nations that, at the

time, were not members of ITU (e.g., East

Germany, the Peoples Republic of China).

Unfortunately, ITU is not always successful at agreement-making. For example, in

the postwar years three incompatible standards for color TV broadcasting were adopted

in several parts of the world to the obvious

detriment of international coordination and

standardization. As a result, European TV

set manufacturers must provide parallel circuitry to accommodate the different standards and international program exchange is

seriously burdened by the conversion of

standards at switching points.

A similar problem developed in the search

for a standardized digital transmission system. European countries were able to select a

single system from among almost 20 competing designs but North American interests, committed financially to a different design, were unwilling or unable to be accommodating enough to find a compromise single standard.

Overall, the achievements of ITU are impressive considering its inherent weaknesses

and the complexity of its structures and procedures. Modern states are clearly unwilling

to cede substantial power to any international organization. Yet, ITU has managed to

maintain order in an environment that could

easily have been chaotic. The growing needs

for maritime and aeronautical communications have been met. Efficient international

telegraph and telephone service would have

been difficult without ITU or similar organizations. Despite the strong economic interests of national equipment suppliers,

there was sufficient collaboration within

CCITT to accomplish the shift from operator-assisted international phone service to

automatic dialing, routing, and switching.

The Future of ITU

Whether ITU can continue to function effectively in the future is another question.

The influx of “new” nations to membership

in ITU in recent years has brought a different set of values and concerns to the organization. The new members have brought a

heightened demand for programs of aid and

technical assistance to developing nations.

They have fostered regionalism and, most

important, they have increasingly demanded

equitable access and usage of spectrum and

orbital slots for geosynchronous satellites.

The needs of these developing nations are

often at odds with those of the developed

world. For example, industrialized countries

need considerable amounts of radio spectrum to support sophisticated worldwide radionavigation and radiolocation systems

considered vital to their national security

and safe international air

countries have limited

“radar” systems. By the

is contention between the

travel. Developing

need for these

same token, there

developed and less

developed countries over the use of high frequency (HF) bands. The developing countries depend on HF for domestic point-topoint communication in large measure

whereas the developed countries are more

likely to use the same frequencies for

international broadcasting, mobile, and

other services.

The principal issue of contention has been

the so-called “first-come, first-served” principle used by ITU member countries to register radiofrequency assignments. Basically,

“first-come, first-served” has meant that

whoever develops a use for a given frequency

first and notifies IFRB of this intended use
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radio frequency Spectrum . 51

has established a claim to protection from

harmful interference. This has meant that

the bulk of the frequency assignments have

been assigned to the developed countries.

Moreover, some of those assignments, particularly those used for HF fixed (point-topoint) services, have been abandoned by the

developed countries in favor of microwave

and satellite systems but, it is charged, have

not been given up for reassignment. (It

should be pointed out that to a large degree

the radio spectrum is reusable. This means

that a frequency assignment made to one

country does not necessarily preclude its use

by another country.)

The developing countries, therefore, fear

that when they are finally prepared to use

radio services not needed at their present

stage of development, the spectrum space

will no longer be available. They have translated this fear into a demand for “equitable

and/or guaranteed access” to the frequency

spectrum. The developed countries have responded by insisting that the fears of the developing nations are groundless, that new

technology will free up certain frequencies

while allowing other frequencies to be shared

by a greater number of stations and services.

However, frequency-sharing usually requires more sophisticated and expensive

equipment and increases the need and complexity of coordination to avoid interference.

Most developing countries lack trained

engineers sufficiently competent in frequency management to carry out complicated coordination procedures and also lack

the required sophisticated and expensive

equipment to avoid interference.

“Equitable access” also refers to communications satellites and the newer members

of ITU frequently cite the 1967 U.N. Treaty

on Outer Space that recognized the common

interest of all nations, regardless of the

degree of their economic or scientific

development, in the uses of outer space and

in the “nonappropriation” of outer space by

any one nation. While each state has the

right to the free and peaceful utilization of

space, the treaty is viewed as implying a corresponding obligation of nations to avail

themselves of these uses without prejudice

to the interests of other nations.

Claims of the developing nations to “equitable access” were further underscored by

Resolution No. Spa 2-1, adopted by the 1971

WARC (and included in the Final Acts of

WARC-79), dealing with space telecommunications, which states:

. . . considering that all countries have equal

rights in the use of both the radio frequencies allocated to various space radio communication services and the geostationary satellite orbit for these services;

. . . taking into account that the radio frequency spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources and

should be most effectively and economically

used;

. . . having in mind that the use of the allocated frequency bands and fixed positions in

the geostationary satellite orbit by individual countries or groups of countries can start

at various dates depending on the requirements and readiness of technical facilities of

countries;

1.

2.

3.

Resolves

That the registration with the ITU of frequency assignments for space radio communication services and their use should

not provide any permanent priority for

any individual country or groups of countries and should not create an obstacle to

the establishment of space systems by

other countries;

That, accordingly, a country or a group of

countries having registered the ITU frequencies for their space radio communication services should take all practicable

measures to realize the possibility of the

use of new space systems by other countries or groups of countries so desiring;

That the provisions contained in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this resolution should be

taken into account by the administrations

and the permanent organs of the Union.

This 1971 position was reinforced at ITU’s

Malaga-Torremolinos Plenipotentiary Conference in 1973 that amended the ITU Convention to include article 33, which reads:
52 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

In using frequency bands for space radio cally so that countries or groups of countries

services members shall bear in mind that ra- may have equitable access to both in confordio frequencies and the geostationary satel- mity with the provisions of the radio regulalite orbit are limited natural resources, that tions according to their needs and the techthey must be used efficiently and economi- nical facilities at their disposal.

The Changing ITU Environment

It is clear that the developing countries

have also succeeded in establishing a resource management philosophy designed to

protect their interests. Although ITU may

remain a viable institution, there have been

some subtle and important changes in the institutional framework under which the technical functions and work of ITU are carried

out. Moreover, WARC-79 clearly showed the

power of the Third World as a political force

in ITU. Although the collective objectives of

the developing countries were limited, they

were generally achieved.

The struggle for power between the developed and the less developed nations must be

expected to continue at future ITU conferences. In the most basic sense, the developing countries derive power from their collective numbers via the “one-nation, onevote” principle. The developed countries derive their power from their technical competence, know-how, and leadership. The developing countries’ power can most easily and

usefully be exploited in the ITU legislative

forums; the developed nations’ through the

technical administrative organs.

The developed country strength lies in the

permanent organs of ITU and the delegation

of authority and work efforts within that

structure. Control, in the sense of inclusion

or exclusion of issues and agenda items, and

in the handling of budgetary matters, is

most easily exercised here. It is natural for

the developing countries to seek to change

these administrative organs to advance their

own interests and objectives. The 1982 plenipotentiary meeting could well see a furthering of this effort.

The success of ITU, as noted earlier, has

been due in large measure to the willingness

of its members to adhere voluntarily to commonly arrived at agreements and regulations. There is no compulsion to comply, except common usage, custom, and a perceived

stake in international order. The inherent

flexibility granted ITU members has also

enhanced its effectiveness. Subject to a vote

of disapproval by fellow members, any nation may serve notice through a footnote

that it intends to allocate a particular frequency to some usage beyond that specified

by other countries, or to specify a usage as

primary or secondary. A member country

may also take a reservation indicating that it

cannot protect a particular spectrum allocation approved by an ITU conference.

The common desire of most countries to

minimize the number of footnotes and exceptions to the international table of allocations

was not realized at WARC-79. Eighty-three

statements, representing reservations, were

included in the final protocol of the

WARC-79 Final Acts. The United States

took six reservations. The remaining 77

statements, some of which bear the names of

several countries (up to 20, in one case), can

be grouped in three categories: general reservations, political reservations, and specific

reservations.

Thirty-five reservations were “general” in

that they were intended to reserve a government’s right to take whatever steps it considered necessary to protect its radio communication services should other ITU members fail to observe the radio regulations.

Other reservations were “political” in that
——

Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 53

they related to territorial disputes or sovereignty claims that had little impact, if any,

on the ITU or on spectrum use for radio communication purposes.

The remaining reservations of other countries were addressed to specific issues, principally the allocation of HF bands among the

broadcasting, fixed, and mobile services.

Some dealt with localized problems associated with UHF band use.

It would be going too far to say that the

taking of numerous reservations at WARC79 signaled a sharp decline in ITU effectiveness. But it should be noted that the reservations, when coupled with the widespread use

of footnotes to denote unwillingness to protect a particular frequency allocation in a

particular locale, resulted in degrading of the

table of allocations and thus makes future

coordination more difficult.

Throughout the 1970’s, repeated efforts

were made both within and outside ITU to

assess the competing demands being made

on the radio spectrum. In addition to the

various CCIR study groups that addressed

the growing requirements of different services, there was a CCIR plenary assembly in

Kyoto, Japan and the CCIR interim working

party (4/1) in Tokyo; both met in 1978, the

latter being directed primarily toward fixed

satellite service considerations. In October/

November 1978, the WARC special preparatory meeting (SPM) was held in Geneva.

Among some Third World countries there

was a feeling that SPM was dominated by

the developed countries because of its technical nature, and therefore was to be treated

with some suspicion. It was natural, then,

that other preparatory meetings should take

place outside the framework of these traditional ITU entities. One of these was a May

1979 gathering of the nonalined movement

(NAM) in Yaounde. Two specific resolutions

produced at this gathering called for a future

satellite planning conference and specified

working arrangements for WARC-79. The

vice-chairman of this meeting was Dr. M. K.

Rao of India, the country selected to coordinate satellite issues for NAM.

The NAM Yaounde meeting was a clear indication that these countries will be preparing for future conferences on a collective

basis, seeking to make the most of their bloc

voting strength.

There were only a few collective objectives

sought by the Third World at WARC-79:

control of the selection of the conference

chairman;

a large allocation of HF frequencies to

the fixed service;

satellite planning and HF broadcasting

planning conferences;

a bar to the encroachment of land mobile

and other services into frequencies

reserved for broadcasting at UHF in

region 1; and

continued technical assistance.

These goals were generally achieved with

the exception of the first; after a week of

disagreement, the conference had to settle

for a compromise chairman from Argentina

who was not a candidate of either the developed or less developed nations. Overall,

WARC-79 did demonstrate the increasing influence of the Third World in ITU.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey*

shows that 74 percent of the U.S. delegates to

WARC-79 and 67 percent of the nondelegates responding to the survey believe that

the relative influence of the Third World

countries at ITU conferences has increased

*The OTA-sonsored survey consisted of a questionnaire

of 51 questions mailed to 169 individuals involved directly or

indirectly with preparations for WARC-79, and/or with implementation of the results of WARC-79. A total of 110 questionnaires were completed and returned: 55 from U.S. delegates to WARC-79: 29 from nondelegate Government personnel; 18 from nondelegate members of the advisory committee

to the U.S. delegation; 26 from nondelegate industry personnel; and 41 from nondelegate individuals in the private sector.

In addition, 20 in-depth face-to-face interviews were conducted with 13 Government officials and 7 industry officials.

The results of the survey and an analysis of the answers and

information received through the survey and interviews are

presented in the report prepared by Kappa Systems, Inc.,

under contract to OTA. The report can be found in app. A to

this report.
54 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

greatly over the past 5 years. Another 23

percent of those responding believe there has

been only a slight increase in the influence of

the Third World countries. During the same

time, 51 percent of the U.S. delegates and 59

percent of the nondelegates surveyed believe

there has been some decrease in U.S. influence, though only 12 percent and 18 percent

of the delegates and nondelegates, respectively, saw this as a major decrease. Looking

ahead, the respondents see U.S. influence

from now through 1985 remaining about the

same (39 percent) or slightly decreasing (45

percent). Some increase in U.S. influence is

foreseen by some respondents (14 percent),

while a major decrease is foreseen by only a

small number (2 percent).

The interests that guide many of the less

developed countries in their approach to international telecommunications issues are ik

quite different, and often hostile, to those of

P

F

the United States. As traditional advocates i

of the free flow of information, the United i

States is opposed to prior censorship of

either television or radio broadcasts. Therefore, the United States rejects the idea that

any country should obtain prior consent before broadcasting a radio or TV signal to

another country. The issue has not been

raised for HF radio broadcasting because so

many countries engage in international

broadcasting. The added impact of television, however, has kept the issue of prior

consent at the forefront of debate on international communications within the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the U.N. Committee on

the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Other International Organizations Involved

in Telecommunications

U.S. national interests in telecommunications are interwoven with a broad range of

specialized international organizations. In

addition to ITU, they include, UNESCO, the

U. N., the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the Universal Postal Union

(UPU), the Intergovernmental Bureau of Informatics, the Intergovernmental Maritime

Consultative Organization (IMCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO), CITEL, and the Organization for

Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD).

UNESCO’s jurisdiction is extremely broad

and the organization has taken an active interest in communications through the adoption of resolutions, by publishing studies,

and by sponsoring and attending specialized

seminars and conferences. It has participated at ITU conferences in an observer

status, for example, in an effort to promote

shortwave broadcasting as a means of

furthering international peace and understanding.

More recently, UNESCO has become involved in studying the potential uses of

direct broadcasting satellites and has

adopted a set of norms regarding their use.

Within the past few years, UNESCO’s International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (commonly known as

the MacBride Commission because of its

chairman Sean MacBride) has focused attention on the so-called “New World information order” and Third World complaints

about the imbalance in news flowing in and

out of less developed countries and the need

to develop a communications infrastructure

in the Third World.

U.N. involvement in communications

issues has surfaced most prominently within

COPUOS and the Working Group on Direct

Broadcasting Satellites. COPUOS and its
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 55

subcommittees on legal, scientific, and technical matters have been significant forums

for the discussion of guidelines to govern the

use of the geostationary orbit for radio communication. A conference on the peaceful

uses of outer space is scheduled for 1982 and

will consider and discuss means to resolve

such issues as whether there need be prior

consent obtained before one nation uses satellites in space to broadcast a signal which

extends beyond its own borders into other

countries. The United States opposes prior

consent in principle. It is technically impossible to avoid some “spillover” when broadcasting to one’s own country via space satellite. If prior consent were to be strictly enforced, it would be impossible for the United

States to develop a domestic system for

direct broadcasting by satellite without the

prior consent of its neighbors (e.g., Cuba).

Increasingly, the United States finds itself

at odds with Third World and other countries that seek to impose restrictions on the

flow of information across national frontiers

and on the information-gathering activities

of journalists. The “New World information

order” being demanded by many less developed nations within UNESCO appears to

many in the United States to be adverse to

commercial information gathering and dissemination that is not under tight government control.

WIPO administers a number of international conventions intended to protect the intellectual property rights of the authors of

information that is stored, disseminated, or

displayed through electronic systems. In recent years, WIPO and UNESCO have jointly sponsored working groups to study satellite program distribution, cable TV, and national copyright and patent legislation for

developing countries.

UPU was established in 1874 and is the

second oldest existing international organization. It has become embroiled in communications issues because of the rapid evolution

of electronic information and communication

systems, including “electronic mail.” UPU is

also involved in the controversial issue of the

subsidization of costly mail delivery systems

through high tariffs on electronic communication systems. This cross-subsidization,

which is common among countries that have

integrated government administration of

postal, telephone, and telegraph systems,

has impacted severely on transnational corporations heavily dependent on international

communications.

The Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics is a Rome-based organization, outside

the U. N., which holds periodic conferences to

consider broad policy and legal questions related to transborder data flows and related

electronic information issues. It is influential

among developing countries and its resolutions have wide impact.

IMCO has several components that consider telecommunications issues relating to

maritime navigation and ICAO does the

same with respect to air navigation. The

most important regional organization in

which the United States deals with communications matters is CITEL which seeks regional agreements and develops a consensus

on common positions for Western Hemisphere countries prior to meetings of ITU.

OECD, though largely oriented toward

Europe, seeks to harmonize the differing

views of all industrialized countries on such

controversial communications issues as control of transborder data flows.

U.S. representation to these organizations

comes from many levels of Government,

both within and outside the Department of

State. Within the department, two bureaus

play major roles in the determination of international communications policy: the Bureau of International Organization Affairs

and the Bureau of Economic and Business

Affairs. Other State Department components that play ancillary roles are the Under

Secretary for Security Assistance, Science

and Technology, the policy planning staff,

and the Legal Advisor’s Office.
——

56 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

For 30 years there has been mounting concern in the United States over Government

procedures for developing telecommunications negotiations. The absence of centralized management and policy coordination

has frequently been noted and it would appear that the United States was fortunate to

preserve its essential interests up to and

through WARC-79. The question remains—

will the procedures, mechanisms, and processes that gave a margin of success in the

past continue to work in the future?

The United States spent approximately 5

years formulating the proposals and position

papers for WARC-79. Some 800 people were

involved in one way or another. It is estimated that the State Department alone

spent about $1 million in preparing for

WARC-79 and this amount does not include

the expenses of other Government agencies

involved, nor of private industry organizations. By its very nature, this was a complex

and time-consuming process. With the large

number of international telecommunications

conferences and meetings scheduled for the

1980’s and 1990’s, it is clear that a more expeditious procedure for the preparation, coordination, and adoption of U.S. proposals

and positions is needed.

U.S. Preparations for WARC=79

The 20-year period between the previous

general World Administrative Radio Conference in 1959 and WARC-79 was one of vast

change. The number of nations belonging to

ITU almost doubled–from 87 to 155. There

were tremendous advances in telecommunication technology, including the development of satellite communications. Worldwide demands for improved communications

had greatly increased. As an added incentive

to convene a general WARC, it was widely

recognized that inconsistencies had developed in the general regulations having application to more than one of the individual

radio services. The fact that a number of

specialized radio conferences had been held

since 1959 resulting in decisions not entirely

consistent with each other also suggested

the need for a comprehensive conference.

The United States expected WARC-79 to

take place in a contentious atmosphere. The

rising economic aspirations of the developing countries, coupled with their perceived

requirements for a fair share of the radio

spectrum and the geostationary satellite

orbit made confrontation appear inevitable.

The decision of ITU in 1973 to follow U.N.

General Assembly precedent and grant observer status to the Palestine Liberation

Organization, and the rhetoric at the NAM

conference in Havana immediately prior to

WARC-79 generated further concern that

telecommunication and spectrum issues

were to be politicized.

As noted earlier, ITU, like the U.N. General Assembly, operates on the principle of

“one-country, one-vote.” The United States

and other, large developed countries have no

more voting power than Haiti or Vatican

City. However, in practice, ITU attempts to

resolve technical issues and reach decisions

by consensus and reverts to voting only

when a consensus cannot be obtained. Therefore, the United States embarked on an early

effort to direct the focus of the conference to

the major technical issues and away from extraneous political matters.

U.S. preparatory work for WARC-79 proceeded under the following broad guidelines:

Flexibility.—The primary goal was to

maintain flexibility to meet the future

needs of users in telecommunication

matters within the framework of the international radio regulations.

Minimal change. –The preparatory efforts should result in proposals for only

those changes to the radio regulations
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 57

that were absolutely required in order to

meet the needs of users.

● Defensible positions. —The proponents

of new requirements should be in a position to defend the required revisions of

the radio regulations, including allocations, using sound and fully developed

technical arguments, including accurate

and current listings in the master international frequency list.

● Accommodate world needs. –The preparatory work should take into account

the proposals for changes to the radio

regulations advanced by other nations

and should resist only those that might

impede our national flexibility to an unacceptable degree.

. Point of no retreat. — Where it was apparent that proposed U.S. changes to

the radio regulations, including modified, allocations, are likely to be opposed, the preparatory work must develop, in advance of the conference, final

fall-back positions.

U.S. preparations involved broad participation by Government agencies, the telecommunication industry, and the public.

There was active U.S. participation in planning sessions held under the auspices of such

international organizations as CCIR, as well

as in multilateral forums such as NATO, the

Conference of European Post and Telecommunication Administrations, and CITEL.

Within the United States, FCC, as the

body responsible for the regulation of nongovernment uses of the radiofrequency spectrum, established docket 20271 as early as

January 1975 to develop the nongovernment

U.S. proposals for the conference. NTIA,

through IRAC established Ad Hoc Committee 144 to develop the proposals of the

United States affecting Government users

of spectrum. IRAC also participated in Ad

Hoc Committee 144. Eventually, FCC issued

nine NOIs that drew comments from many

segments of the telecommunication industry

and the public. Through this process FCC

developed and adopted the proposals for

commercial, private, and non-federal government use of the spectrum.

Ad Hoc Committee 144 of IRAC had representation from all Federal agencies with a

major interest in radio communications and

spectrum use. It was responsible for developing recommended U.S. proposals for WARC79 concerning Government use of the spectrum. Both FCC and NTIA staff experts

were involved in commenting on the proposals of other administrations and developing

position papers for the delegation to the conference, including compromise or fall-back

positions.

Recommended U.S. proposals adopted by

FCC (nongovernment) and NTIA (Government) were fully coordinated and submitted

to the Department of State which was itself

aware of the proposals as they were being

developed through participation in FCC and

NTIA processes. Therefore, the State Department was knowledgeable about large

areas of agreement as they were reached, as

well as the fewer areas of disagreement. Almost all the differences concerning the proposals to be made by the United States were

successfully resolved between FCC and

NTIA. Only one issue (proposed allocations

for international broadcasting in the HF

bands) was carried to the President through

the National Security Council.

Industry proposals and views or those of

nongovernment service suppliers or organizations are treated within the FCC mechanism. FCC, barring appeals to the courts,

has the final responsibility and authority for

regulating the nongovernment use of the

spectrum. Therefore, FCC develops nongovernment proposals under the open and

due process procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act. FCC must decide

among competing and often conflicting proposals advocated by various segments of the

communication industry, other commercial

users, private and public users, as well as

State and local government users.

84-591 0 - 82 - 5
58 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Advance preparations for WARC-79 got

underway at the State Department as early

as 1975 when it began work on obtaining

funds for the delegation, the selection of the

head of delegation and of other members. In

1977, the State Department sought information on the views of other governments and

the positions likely to be taken by them. Requests for information were cabled to U.S.

embassies abroad but the results were not

satisfactory for several reasons. The United

States has- only one telecommunication attaché (based permanently in Geneva). Embassy personnel in many posts apparently

lacked the necessary expertise to discuss the

subject with responsible foreign officials and

effectively gather information. The reporting task was rendered even more difficult by

the fact that many proposals of the Third

World countries were not fully developed until shortly before the conference began.

In 1978, the State Department established

a public advisory committee for WARC-79

consisting of 38 members from industry and

the general public. Several public interest

groups, researchers, educators, and minority

interests were represented. The purpose of

the advisory committee was to advise the

State Department and the head of the

WARC delegation in all areas related to the

conference and to help develop positions and

negotiating strategies. There was some criticism of the role of this advisory committee

from both members and nonmembers. Some

of its members felt that their views had little

or no impact.

Beginning in 1977, the State Department

arranged for international consultation to

communicate and explain the U.S. views and

proposals as they were being developed for

the conference. Bilateral discussions were

held in 48 countries by teams of U.S. experts

involved in the preparation process. In addition, the United States participated in multilateral forums. Proposals of interest to the

U.S. military were also described and coordinated through NATO and its Allied Radio

Frequency Agency.

CCIR and other ITU activities also provided an opportunity for the United States

to discuss its views in international forums.

CCIR held an SPM in 1978 to prepare a technical base for the guidance of the conference

and for administrations then preparing their

own proposals. ITU itself held three seminars (in Kenya, Panama, and Australia).

These seminars were primarily for the benefit of the developing nations—to acquaint

them with the issues they would face in the

conference and with the technologies that

had been developed most recently in the

radio-telecommunication field.

In January 1978, Glenn O. Robinson, professor of law at the University of Virginia

and a former FCC commissioner, was named

head of the U.S. delegation to WARC-79.

Professor Robinson was given the rank of

Ambassador for the duration of the conference. This limited appointment by the President did not require Senate confirmation.

This raised some concern about the general

question of the selection process for the head

of U.S. delegations to international telecommunication conferences. More specifically,

there was concern expressed by several Senators over U.S. preparedness for the conference, especially focused on the question of

the U.S. ability to counter effectively the expected demands of the less developed countries for a greater share of frequency allocations and for changes in ITU procedures.

The submission of Professor Robinson’s

name for Senate confirmation as Ambassador to the conference may have provided an

effective opportunity to explore those concerns.

Subsequent to Robinson’s designation, an

initial delegation of 20 representatives from

Government agencies was formed and eventually the full delegation of 67 persons was

named. In addition, some 30 individuals

were named to a U.S. technical support

group that worked first in Washington, D. C.,

and later in Geneva.

Traditionally, U.S. delegations to telecommunication conferences are made up largely
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum • 59

of spectrum managers and technical experts

from Government agencies and industry.

Theoretically, representation on the delegation should not be necessary to protect the

particular interests of an agency, industry,

company, or other organizations or groups

because the delegation is committed to work

for the U.S. proposals adopted during the

preparatory process described above. Not

only are the U.S. proposals adopted and submitted to ITU before a conference convenes

(in this instance, by January 1979), but compromise positions are likewise agreed to

within the United States before the conference.

However, during a conference—and

WARC-79 was no exception—new compromises and new alternate proposals are often

required when previously agreed U.S. proposals are not accepted by other administrations. At such times, the delegation, in consultation with higher echelons of Government in Washington, must develop and then

agree on the new positions. In such circumstances, U.S. delegations almost without exception strive for compromises that will win

general acceptance and that are as close as

possible to the original U.S. proposals and

thoroughly consistent with U.S. goals

agreed to prior to the conference.

Proposals - to modify the international

table of allocations are based largely on the

requirements or desires of individual countries to operate particular radio services in

particular bands. Needs differ among countries. Decisions are driven in many cases by

such nontechnical arguments as economic

and national importance of one service vis-avis another. On the other hand, allocation

decisions may be dictated by technical considerations, particularly those allocations involving the sharing of frequencies between

two or more services. The arguments supporting these latter allocations are based on

complex technical factors: acceptable interference levels and noise, power flux densities, antenna patterns, etc. For these allocations, the conclusions of the technical committee of a conference on the feasibility of

and conditions for sharing often determine

the successful adoption of the proposed allocation. In such discussions, obviously, the

participation of the technical experts on the

delegation is essential. Often such technical

experts are not spectrum managers but work

for Government or nongovernment organizations which operate communication facilities

or other radio facilities. In the case of Government agencies this includes NTIA,

NASA, the Federal Aviation Administration, DOD, FCC, and others. In the case of

nongovernment organizations, it includes

employees of companies that provide telecommunication systems and services, such

as AT&T and COMSAT, and equipment

manufacturers such as Hughes Aircraft Co.

and the Harris Corp. The role of these nongovernmental experts is of great importance

to the work of the delegation.

Since 1959, an average of 33 percent of the

U.S. delegations to the eight ITU conferences held during that period were engineers

and scientists from nongovernment organizations. For example, at the broadcasting

satellite WARC held in 1977, 41 percent of

the U.S. delegation was nongovernment. The

U.S. delegation to the WARC-79 conference

was predominately Government. Only 27

percent of the delegates were nongovernment including 18 percent from the telecommunication industry (see table 1).

Delegations from other developed countries include spectrum managers from the

government ministries of telecommunication

(often referred to as PTT’s; postal, telegraph,

and telephone authority) and engineers, scientists, and technical experts involved with

the design, development, and operation of

telecommunication systems and other radio

equipment. Unlike the structure in the

United States, most other countries place

the operation of “commercial,” as well as

government, communication facilities in the

hands of the government, or with an entity

owned or controlled by the government.

Therefore, the composition of foreign delegations is predominately government with
60 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 1 .–U.S. Delegates to WARC-79 by

Organization

Organizational affiliation

Federal Government:

FCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . .

NTIA (and other Commerce Department)

Department of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Department of State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NASA* ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

International Communications

Agency* * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Department of Transportation. . . . . . . . .

National Science Foundation , . . . . . . . .

Office of Science and

Technology Policy (White House) . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Private Corporations:

COMSAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

AT&T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hughes Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Motorola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rockwell International . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Satellite Business Systems. . . . . . . . . . .

Western Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Industry associations , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

All other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Number of

delegates

18

8

6

6

4

2

2

1

1

48

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

9

3

7

67

Percent of

delegates

26.5%

12

9

9

6

3

3

1.5

1.5

71.5 %

4.5%

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

1.5

13.5%

4.5

10.5

100 %

*Includes Systematics General Corp. representatives.

**Includes Board of international Broadcasting.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment.

some representation from manufacturers of

communication equipment.

When it comes to a discussion of technical

issues, such as system design capabilities

and sound operating practices, the experts

on other delegations expect their proposals

to be discussed by similarly knowledgeable

experts from the United States. Over the

years, U.S. delegations to international telecommunication conferences have included

industry and private sector experts involved

in the day-to-day operations of communication systems. This is a natural result of the

U.S. structure whereby the ownership, operations, and management of commercial and

private communication systems are functions performed by private enterprise subject to Government regulation. U.S. telecommunication companies, and not the U.S.

Government, are responsible for negotiations with foreign entities for the construction and operations of international telecommunication facilities. These companies undertake the financial obligations and own the

U.S. share of the commonly operated international facilities with foreign entities. For

example, AT&T and the several U.S. international record carriers own and operate submarine cables between the United States

and Europe under contractual agreements

with European telecommunication authorities. COMSAT owns and operates the U.S.

share of the satellites operating in the global

International Telecommunications Satellite

Organization (INTELSAT) system together

with 106 other countries.

The U.S. Government conducts negotiations on telecommunication matters of a foreign policy nature including U.S. participation in ITU conferences. In forming U.S.

delegations to ITU conferences, the Government has looked to the U.S. operating companies and equipment manufacturers to provide expertise not generally available within

the Government. A delegation of Government and industry representatives reflects

the split responsibility for telecommunication activities in the United States. The inclusion of industry experts on U.S. delegations was brought into question in 1978 as a

result of an apparent conflict of interest in

an international conference dealing with an

entirely different subject (the renegotiation

of the international coffee agreement during

which representatives from coffee companies

participated as members of the U.S. delegation). Following that incident, the Department of State, acting on the advice of the

Department of Justice, adopted new guidelines based on the conflict of interest provisions of the U.S. Code (sees. 203, 205, 207,

and 208 of title 18) that effectively limited

participation of nongovernment delegates to

international conferences. Although the

guidelines permitted nongovernment delegates to address technical points, they prevented such delegates from addressing policy issues or serving as spokesperson for

U.S. proposals.

These restrictions were first imposed during the highly technical 1978 SPM of CCIR

in preparation for the WARC-79 conference.
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum “ 61

An amendment to a State Department appropriation bill (Public Law 96-60) introduced by Sen. Harrison Schmitt, and passed

by the 96th Congress, exempted WARC-79

from these guidelines. However, the exemption came only shortly before the conference,

leaving the role of nongovernment delegates

uncertain until late in the preparatory effort.

This may account, in part, for the low percentage of industry delegates to WARC-79.

Legislation to exempt all international

telecommunication conferences from the restrictions of the State Department guidelines was enacted in the 96th Congress. However, the legislation to which it was added

was vetoed by the President (the reason for

the veto was unrelated to the exemption).

The Senate again passed the exemption provision, but the House did not consider the

measure before adjournment.

Another issue concerning the makeup of

U.S. delegations was highlighted in preparing for WARC-79. In formulating proposals

for nongovernment use of the spectrum,

FCC must evaluate needs and sort arguments among competing commercial and private interests vying for spectrum allocations. This process follows FCC guidelines

for rulemaking under the Administrative

Procedures Act. Basic issues about the fairness of this process were raised by the timing of establishing the U.S. delegation.

The benefits derived from early creation of

a U.S. delegation to prepare for the conference were recognized for WARC-79. However, conflict of interest and violation of due

process were also recognized as possible consequences of naming industry representatives to the delegation before the FCC process of adopting U.S. proposals was complete.

The concern was that individuals named to

the delegation would be in a position to advocate the proposals of their companies in

FCC’s decisionmaking process better than

those companies without representatives on

the delegation. Moreover, delegates were

likely to have access to information not generally available to nondelegates, giving credence to the argument that those companies

with representatives on the delegation would

have an advantage in supporting positions

before FCC over those companies not represented and who might be taking contrary or

conflicting positions in the FCC process.

This problem was avoided by naming only

Government representatives to the WARC79 delegation during the time of the FCC deliberations. Following adoption of proposals

and the conclusion of the FCC process, industry and other nongovernment representatives were named to the delegation. This

may also account, in part, for the relatively

small number of industry representatives on

the delegation. Also, some industry and

Government officials have argued that the

addition of industry experts to the delegation at such a late stage (spring of 1979)

reduced their role and effectiveness.

An additional issue concerning the formulation of the delegation resulted from the

real or perceived need to include individuals

with differing viewpoints, to add representatives from public and consumer interest

groups, and provide adequate participation

by minorities and by women.

This, together with the pressures from

Federal agencies, various elements of industry, public, and special interest groups to be

represented on the delegation made the

selection and functioning of the U.S. delegation a perplexing exercise open to criticism.

On the one hand, these problems can be dismissed as a reflection of the times and the increased importance of telecommunication in

all sectors of society. The stakes are high

and the need to be represented is perceived

to be important. On the other hand, the problems may reflect the absence of a clear Government policy regarding the selection and

approval of individuals to serve on delegations to telecommunication conferences.

Adding representatives to the delegation

with no apparent role other than to fulfill

some nonspecific requirement to include special interest, racial, or sexual representation
62 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

proved to be frustrating for all concerned

with no apparent benefits. There were four

delegates funded by the Department of

State under the “Biden amendment.”* At

least two of those delegates have stated publicly that their role was never defined nor did

they provide any substantive contribution

to the deliberations of the delegation. Other

members of the delegation were also apparently unsure of the role of the Biden amendment delegates. One of the Biden amendment delegates reported that other delegation members seemed to treat the Biden

delegates as though they had not earned the

right to be on the delegation.

As stated above, the function of the U.S.

delegation at international telecommunication

conferences is to seek agreement on U.S. proposals submitted to the conference. These

proposals are developed under U.S. domestic

procedures and laws. Any shortcomings in

these procedures regarding participation of

concerned and interested parties are unlikely

to be corrected by last minute measures to

add to or adjust the membership of U.S. delegations. The process of preparing for international conferences should include the natural selection of the most qualified individuals

to serve on U.S. delegations with the range

of skills and disciplines required to negotiate

the U.S. proposals. Representation on U.S.

delegations cannot overcome any perceived

deficiency in U.S. domestic processes.

Clear guidelines for the type of representation to be included are necessary and measures to ensure that the right combination of

skills are represented by the individuals

selected to serve on U.S. delegations are

essential. That individuals with these skills

will be available when needed should not be

left to chance. Specific action to develop and

train individuals and assure that U.S. delegations are equipped with these skills would

*According t.o a amendment sponsored by Senator Joseph

Biden, which became sec. 113 of Public Law 95-105, the State

Department is authorized to reimburse individuals or organizations for their costs of participation in State Department

activities if such persons represent an unrepresented or

underrepresented interest in the proceedings and otherwise

could not afford to participate.

help alleviate the problems encountered in

preparing for WARC-79.

The OTA-sponsored survey on WARC-79

preparations and impacts asked respondents

to list the four or five most important qualifications an “ideal” member of a U.S. delegation to a WARC-type conference should

have. While no human being could meet all of

the qualities listed by all of the respondents,

a U.S. delegate who conformed to the most

frequently repeated qualifications would require the following attributes:

Personality

● good communicator, adept at self-

●

●

●

●

expression;

mature, “diplomatic” personality;

international reputation in some field;

willing to accept advice from technical

experts;

able to exert independence from parochial interests;

willing to compromise; and

willingness and ability to work hard.

●

●

Experience:

● negotiating experience, particularly at

ITU meetings;

● spectrum management experience; and

● operational experience in at least one

radio service.

Knowledge:

●

●

●

●

●

●

broad understanding of telecommunications, including technical competence

and an understanding of the societal impacts of telecommunication technology;

ability and understanding necessary to

support and explain U.S. positions at

the conference;

knowledge of present and planned spectrum management requirements of U.S.

users;

knowledge of ITU history and procedures;

a “feel” for international politics, or at

least a personal world view; and

fluency in at least one foreign language,

usually cited as French or Spanish.

Sensitivity:

● sensitivity to Third World positions and

cultural differences;
Ch. 3—Domestic and International Management of the Radiofrequency Spectrum ● 63

● sensitivity to U.S. national security concerns; and

● sensitivity to users’ and consumers’

needs, and the ability to relate these

needs to spectrum allocations.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey

also show that a majority of the respondents

chose “selection of the most effective delegation possible” as the number 1 goal of the

preparatory process from a list of 12 goals.

However, less than half (48 percent) of the

respondents felt that the process was moderately effective in achieving that goal.

Another 25 percent felt that the effectiveness of the process was low and another 12

percent said it was totally ineffective in

achieving that goal. Only 14 percent of the

respondents rated the degree of effectiveness of the process high in achieving the goal

of selecting the most effective delegation

possible.

Possible actions to address the problems

of industry participation and broader representation of interests and skills are discussed in chapter 5 of this report.
Chapter 4

WARC-79 Overview,

Actions, and Impacts
Contents

Page

The U. S. Role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

How WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

The Impacts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Key Conference Decisions and Their Consequences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

The Fixed-Satellite Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

The Fixed Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

The Land-Mobile Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

The HF Broadcasting Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

National Security Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Military-Related Issues and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Fixed Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Resolutions, Recommendations, Reservations, and Declaration . . . . . . . . 99

The Impacts of WARC-77. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

LIST OF TABLES

Table No. Page

2. Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3. Distribution of the HF Band Before WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

4. Distribution of the HF Band After WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

5. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed

Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

6. Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on Mobile

Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

7. Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

8. Comparison of WARC Radiolocation Allocations and U.S. Proposed

Allocations Above 40 GHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

9. Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and

Mobile-Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Chapter 4

WARC-79 Overview,

Actions, and Impacts

From the point of view of a developing

country burdened with poverty, illiteracy,

and disease, access to modern telecommunications is every bit as vital as it is to the

United States. Conversely, whether the Department of Defense (DOD) can communicate with a missile submarine at sea or a

high-flying jet bomber over Alaska is of

much less consequence to the leader of a

Third World country than whether he can

send a simple radio message to a doctor or

village administrator 100 miles outside his

capital city.

The gap between the modern “information

society" —with its computers, microprocessors, and multichannel satellite systems—

and the developing nations struggling to

harness basic, unsophisticated radio systems to the task of economic development is

growing wider. At today’s pace, a villager in

central Africa is likely to watch an American

film on a community television set long

before he has an opportunity to use a telephone.

The gap in priorities is equally wide. It is

difficult, for example, to persuade a representative of a developing country to give up

certain radiofrequencies that provide him

with a rudimentary telephone system in

order that the Voice of America can broadcast more clearly. The task of persuasion is

made no easier by suggesting that a satellite

or a microwave system would provide the developing country with better phone service

with more efficient use of the spectrum

when, in fact, such systems may be too costly for many developing countries.

When the technically advanced, industrial

nations get together with Third World countries to discuss telecommunications and

spectrum management, their needs and priorities are so different that their negotiating

goals and objectives are far apart. Viewed

against this background, and the mounting

frustrations of the developing countries,

U.S. delegates to the World Administrative

Radio Conference (WARC-79) that convened

in Geneva in September 1979, had reason to

be wary. It was the first general administrative radio conference in 20 years and was unquestionably the largest and most significant intergovernmental meeting on radio

communications in more than a decade.

There had been tremendous advances in

telecommunications since the last WARC,

held in 1959. Worldwide demand for improved communications had greatly increased, together with a sharp rise in the demand to use the radio spectrum. Inconsistencies had developed in the general regulations having to do with more than one of the

individual radio services. A number of specialized radio conferences had taken place

since 1959 resulting in decisions that were

inconsistent with one another, thus adding

to the urgency of convening a general conference.

The U.S. Role

As the largest and most technically ad- in reaching agreement on a new table of frevanced user of the radio spectrum on a quency allocations and a revised set of reworldwide basis, the United States ap- lated technical and administrative regulaproached WARC-79 with the greatest stake tions. At previous WARCs, the United

67
68 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

States had been a strong advocate of compromise and had tried to set an example by

not taking reservations that would indicate

refusal to abide by a particular decision of

the conference.

A determination to avoid needless controversy and to arrive at mutually acceptable

compromises continued to guide the U.S.

delegation at Geneva in 1979. The goal of the

United States was to ensure that whatever

changes were made in International Telecommunication Union (ITU) regulations governing the allocation and use of radio spectrum were made in light of current U.S. economic, social, and technical requirements.

The United States would support incremental change, but not wholesale shifts in

spectrum allocations or in ITU procedures.

Because of the rapid and frequently unforeseen changes in communications technology,

the United States was committed to the general principle of flexibility so that any decisions made at WARC-79 would permit future accommodation to new circumstances.

The United States was on record as supporting, in principle, changes in international spectrum allocations and related frequency management procedures that would

accommodate the needs of other nations,

consistent with its own interests and with

the essential requirements and sound principles of international spectrum utilization.

How

WARC-79 was

WARC-79 Differed From WARC-59

vastly different from any

previous ITU administrative radio conference, both in size and complexity. Membership in ITU stood at 154. Almost half the nations eligible to attend WARC-79 did not

even exist in 1959.

These new nations brought rising expectations that increased demand for telecommunication services worldwide. New communication technologies that made increasing use

of different forms of telecommunications

had come into being including satellites.

Other techniques made it possible for

radiofrequencies to carry more information

than ever before. Coordination and avoidance of interference procedures were more

highly developed.

While the countries of the developed world

introduced these improvements as a matter

of choice, developing nations often could not

afford to abandon less expensive and less sophisticated equipment and procedures even

though these were not technically efficient in

their use of spectrum. They had to be content with older, less sophisticated telecommunication systems while the industrialized

nations pursued new technologies and services vital to their growing information economies. * The developed countries, for example, could seriously consider shifting some

broadcasting services out of the radio spectrum entirely and onto cable to make room in

the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) and very high

frequency (VHF) bands for new mobile services. Most Third World countries could not

conceive of such a move.

WARC-79 differed from WARC-59 in that

demands on the radio spectrum had significantly increased; more countries were making greater use of spectrum for a greater variety of purposes. Moreover, the conference

sessions, while still highly technical in

nature, were influenced to a greater extent

than in the past by political and economic

considerations that can best be understood

within the context of a confrontational

North-South relationship and the so-called

“New World economic order. ” This new relationship is characterized by more sharply

defined demands of the less developed nations for a redistribution of the world’s

*lt should be recognized that technically inefficient uses of

spectrum may nonetheless be economically most efficient at a

particular stage of development for a developing country.
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 69

wealth and resources, and for an end to what

they regard as exploitation by the industrialized nations. It is also marked by a

growing awareness among developing countries that in many international fora where

the “one-nation, one-vote” principle prevails

they enjoy an advantage in numbers.

There is a long history of international cooperation in radiofrequency matters, but

there were forces at work that made agreements difficult to reach at Geneva in 1979.

The developing countries were guided by a

set of general principles aimed at gaining

preferential treatment for themselves (e.g.,

an Algerian proposal to give priority to developing countries in the use of 70 percent of

the high frequency (HF) fixed bands). They

demanded guaranteed access to certain congested frequency bands and to the geostationary satellite orbit. They refused to

accept the vital importance for national security and financial investment of some advanced U.S. communications systems. Moreover, there was an unwillingness on the part

of many developing countries to accept package deals in which a U.S. concession in one

area was linked to a developing country concession in another.

WARC-79 also differed in that there were

recognizable ideologies in spectrum matters

that were associated with particular countries or groups of countries. For example,

those countries that already had extensive

telecommunication systems were most interested in pursuing expensive efforts to get

the most out of spectrum and to identify

those frequencies that were not being fully

utilized. Countries that were still developing

their telecommunication services were anxious to prevent the more sophisticated users

from preempting their potential use of large

portions of the radio spectrum and geostationary satellite orbit space before they,

themselves, could determine their own future needs.

This is not to say that there was unanimity

among the Third World nations. They differed sharply in their goals and interests.

For example, Brazil was anxious to develop

its own satellite communications system and

disputed the claims of Colombia and other

equatorial nations to sovereignty over the

space above their territories where geosynchronous satellites could be parked.

Nor did the developed countries always

share the same sense of priority. Other

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

members gave only lukewarm support for

certain U.S. military requirements for spectrum and the United States and Canada split

over some important issues.

The United States has found it necessary

in the past to take reservations and other actions at ITU conferences to protect its interests. The United States took a substantive

reservation at the 1937 WARC, refused to

sign the Final Acts of the 1950 Mexico City

WARC, and did not become a party to the

additional radio regulations. However, as

noted earlier, the United States has been a

strong advocate of compromise and has for

the most part refrained from using the accepted practice of taking a reservation on a

particular clause or section of the Final Acts

of a conference to indicate that the provision

would not be considered binding. The only

substantive reservation dealing with radio

communication taken by the United States

in recent years was at the 1974 maritime

WARC.

At WARC-79, the U.S. delegation found it

necessary to deviate from this policy of setting an example for resolving differences

within the conference. The United States

ultimately took six reservations, helping to

bring the total to 83. Two of the six were

directed at political issues but the remaining

four have a direct impact on U.S. telecommunication operations. In one of these, the

United States rejected the terms of a footnote to the ITU radio regulations that could

jeopardize the continuing use of U.S. military mobile satellite systems in the UHF

band.
70 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

The Impacts of WARC-79

Finding a meaningful way to measure success and evaluate results of an administrative radio conference is not as simple as comparing specific U.S. proposals submitted to

the conference with the Final Acts of the

conference. While such a comparison is important, it does not reflect the underlying

reasons and motives for particular decisions,

the problems encountered, or any apparent

trends important in evaluating results of an

administrative radio conference. It is important to understand the intervening events

that underlie decisions, not only to evaluate

the results of WARC-79, but to prepare for

the many future conferences important to

U.S. interests.

The specific consequences of WARC-79 decisions on U.S. interests regarding particular

services can best be treated in terms of how

the conference dealt with specific technical

issues created by some significant trends in

telecommunications. These trends include

the

●

●

●

following:

A reduction in the use of HF (3 to 30

MHz) by international fixed point-topoint operations as satellite and cable

use expands, coupled with the increasing demand for HF spectrum by the

more developed countries to meet maritime and international broadcasting

needs, conflicts with the desires of the

less developed countries to use HF for

inexpensive domestic communications.

The rapid growth in VHF (30 to 300

MHz) and UHF (300 to 3000 MHz) landmobile operations in the face of continuing vital military requirements and

the heavy use of these bands for TV

broadcasting now necessitates greater

sharing of frequencies, for example, by

radiolocation sharing with radionavigation and with other services, and by

land-mobile sharing with TV broadcasting.

There has been rapid growth of both domestic and international fixed-satellite

requirements in the super high frequency (SHF) (3 to 30 GHz) spectrum

coupled with growth in microwave radio

relay, space research, and Earth-exploration satellite services, and the continuing need to protect important radioastronomy operations.

These requirements are being pressured

by new demands to accommodate mobile,

navigation, and broadcasting satellites (and

their feeder links) in increasingly crowded orbits. Most of these satellite spectrum uses

have military as well as civil applications. In

addition, there is the continuing use of the

SHF spectrum for terrestrial systems.

The actions of WARC-79 with respect to

these operational trends and the technical

issues they raised either closely reflected

U.S. proposals or were acceptable to the

United States with certain important exceptions. However, this judgment hardly does

justice to the overall results of WARC-79,

particularly the future implications for the

United States. The long-term trends may be

running against the United States in the

sense that more problems without apparent

solutions are foreseen. The United States

finds itself increasingly in a defensive mode,

trying to minimize losses rather than seeking significant changes to improve the longterm posture of the United States.

For example, significant amounts of spectrum were added to the allocations for the

fixed-satellite service (FSS) in general accordance with U.S. objectives. The technical

rules that affect the design and operation,

and hence the cost, of satellite systems were

generally in agreement with U.S. positions.

Where U.S. desires were not precisely met,

no significantly adverse repercussions resulted. No immediate or significant changes

in the structure or operation of U.S. fixedsatellite telecommunication services will

result from conference decisions. No operational or economic dislocation was imposed
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 71

on any existing FSS system, and no major

burden appears to be placed on the Government, or private operating entities, in

order to comply with the decisions of

WARC-79 regarding FSS.

However, the conference also adopted a

resolution that calls for a space planning

conference to be held in two sessions to plan

space services using the geostationary satellite orbit. The first session, to be held in

1985, will define the type of planning and determine which services and which frequency

bands should be planned. The second session, scheduled for 1987, will do the actual

planning. The space conference, as well as

the previously scheduled broadcasting satellite conference set for June 1983 to plan

broadcasting satellite service in region 2 (the

Americas) in the 12-GHz band, are of vital

importance and concern to the United

States. The ability to implement new technologies and offer new services via satellite

in the years ahead depend in part on the decisions taken at these future conferences.

There is a significant difference between

the approach advocated by the United

States for using the geostationary satellite

orbit and any rigid a priori allotment and

planning approach advocated primarily by

some developing nations. The United States,

as well as other countries, has consistently

favored a flexible approach that assigns

orbit locations and satellite frequencies on a

case-by-case basis, often referred to as “firstcome, first-served. ” The U.S. approach seeks

to accommodate needs as required and relies,

at least in part, on technological advancements and good engineering practices to

“engineer in” the next satellite and accommodate all users. Such an approach is consistent with existing practice under ITU procedures for the notification, coordination,

and assignment of radiofrequencies generally.

Many developing countries, on the other

hand, see a negotiated plan that assigns specific frequency channels and orbital positions to each country under a rigid a priori allotment plan as a means to guarantee future

access. This approach does not depend upon

advances in technology or new engineering

technologies to assure accommodation of

newcomers, but neither does it provide for

technological improvements that might be

necessary to accommodate growing requirements. The developed countries already have

the economic and technological means of

launching and utilizing domestic satellite

systems; most developing countries do not,

even though many do make use of joint user

systems like the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT)

global satellite system. The developing nations are concerned that as “late comers”

(hence later served) there will be little or no

way to accommodate their domestic requirements.

Both a posteriori (the case-by-case approach usually relying on a notice and recordation procedure) and a priori (the collective

subdivision approach usually relying on a negotiated plan) have won past acceptance at

conferences of ITU. Over the last 75 years

one or the other approach has been advocated and used by nearly all nations to allocate spectrum, both internally and internationally. On a domestic level, the a posteriori

approach is often coupled with an adjudication procedure for deciding among competing applicants, as is the case in the United

States. On the international level, adjudication is almost impossible because of sovereignty claims. Most nations have been unwilling to allow an international body to

determine whether they can or cannot use a

radio channel or satellite position. Where

channels become limited, the recourse in the

recent past has been to adopt an a priori

method. However, for the allocation of radio

bands and services like FSS, which are affected by rapidly changing technology, or

which are fraught with political controversy,

a priori methods tend to promote too rigid

technical specifications or exaggerated

claims for channels. Much of the controversy

at WARC-79 and that likely to emerge at

future conferences, arises from the question
72 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

of the appropriate administrative arrangements to determine rights to the use of frequencies free from harmful interference.

Several countries made planning proposals

at WARC-79, ranging in scope from planning all services in all frequency bands to

allocated space services, planning only FSS

in bands newly allocated to that service

below 10 GHz. However, it is clear that FSS

was the main target of these proposals.

Developing a plan of this nature is an enormous undertaking and would not have been

possible at WARC-79; however, acceptance

of the principle of “planning” was a major

goal of the developing countries.

The U. S. delegation worked to prevent

any decision to convene a “planning” conference. When it became clear that such a conference would be approved, the United

States argued successfully to keep the terms

of reference rather broad. The first session of

the “WARC on the Use of the Geostationary

Satellite Orbit and the Planning of Space

Services Utilizing It,” scheduled for July

1985, will consider which services and which

frequency bands to “plan.” Further, the

meaning of “plan” will be decided, and will

not necessarily be a rigid “a priori” type.

The operative thought in determining the

type of planning is to provide “in practice

equitable access” to the geostationary orbit.

The second session of the conference, scheduled for September 1987, will meet to enact

the decisions of the first.

It has been the official position of the

United States, shared by a number of other

countries, that a rigid a priori plan for FSS is

bad planning and bad engineering; that it is

likely to inhibit technological innovation,

result in inefficient use of the orbit and spectrum and have a major adverse impact on

U.S. telecommunication systems. Thus, the

United States faces a significant challenge

over the next few years to develop compelling arguments against a rigid a priori approach and to carry that message convincingly to all parts of the world well before

these conferences convene; or to find alternatives acceptable to all parties. Examples of

such alternatives are discussed in chapter 5.

The adoption of the space planning conference resolution is a vigorous reminder that

the effective management of orbit and spectrum utilization on both a worldwide and a

regional basis is a continuing process that is

becoming increasingly more difficult and

complex. The achievement of U.S. objectives

at ITU conferences is no longer a matter of

reaching painstaking agreement on technical

solutions to problems of coordination and

multiple usage of spectrum. It will require

sophisticated, political negotiations; imaginative, innovative approaches; and long,

hard bargaining.

Perhaps an acceptable compromise will be

found regarding the satellite orbit planning

issue prior to the 1983 region 2 conference.

Nevertheless, the mechanism to develop and

test a possible solution before the meeting is

not now apparent, and the task of shaping a

compromise during the meeting may prove

too difficult. While there is no certainty that

the majority of the region 2 countries will

favor a rigid orbital and frequency allotment

plan like the one adopted for regions 1 and 3

at WARC-77 for broadcasting satellite service (BSS), the United States must be prepared for such a prospect nevertheless. According to the OTA survey cited in chapter

3, only 8 percent of the respondents believe

that a compromise between the United

States and the Third World positions on a

priori allotment is impossible; an additional

15 percent believe that a compromise is possible, but undesirable. A majority of the respondents, 68 percent, believe that a practical compromise is possible and desirable,

although relatively few have any specific

concept of the form such compromise could

take. The remaining 9 percent expressed no

opinion.
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 73

Key Conference Decisions and

Their Consequences

The Fixed-Satellite Service

FSS is defined as “a radio communication

service between Earth stations at specified

fixed points when one or more satellites are

used; in some cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links, which may also be effected in the intersatellite service; FSS may

also include feeder links for other space radio

communications services.”

This definition fails to convey fully both

the diversity of applications that already exist, and those that are expected to be accommodated in FSS in the future. The emergence of the wide variety of applications for

fixed-satellite service stems in a major way

from the properties of a natural phenomenon

known as the geostationary satellite orbit.

This orbit is circular, some 165,000 miles in

circumference, and in the plane of the

Equator approximately 22,300 miles above

the Earth’s surface. At this altitude, a

satellite in orbit rotates about the Earth’s

axis at the same rate as the Earth (one revolution per day) and appears to be stationary

when viewed from a point on the Earth. This

special characteristic of the geostationary

orbit allows an Earth station antenna to

point at a geostationary satellite without the

need for expensive antenna-tracking equipment. Earth stations in the intended coverage area and a geostationary satellite are

continuously visible to each other in contrast

to a satellite in any other orbit. These unique

characteristics have caused the member nations of ITU to view the geostationary orbit

as a “natural resource.” The ITU convention

recognizes the geostationary satellite orbit

as a limited natural resource.

With consideration only for avoidance of

physical collisions between satellites, the

number of satellites that can be placed in the

geostationary orbit is nearly unlimited.

However, the current ITU convention recognizes that satellites operating in a commonfrequency band must be sufficiently separated to avoid harmful interference. For example, U.S. communication satellites currently operating in the 4- to 6-GHz frequency

bands and serving the same or adjacent coverage areas are presently required by the

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

to be separated by 4°. It is important to note

that the required separation between satellites operating in the same frequency band

could be greatly reduced if the coverage

areas are separated geographically. For example, satellites operating in FSS with

proper antennas could be essentially colocated in the geostationary orbit when one

satellite serves the United States while the

second satellite serves a South American

country.

A second limitation to the capacity of the

geostationary orbit occurs as a consequence

of geometric considerations. Only a portion

of the geostationary orbit is visible from a

particular coverage area on Earth. To illustrate, table 2 shows the portions of the geostationary orbit “available” to the various

countries in region 2.

Sharing of the geostationary orbit in a particular frequency band is principally a problem of sharing between adjacent countries.

For the United States, the sharing problem

is largely with Canada and Mexico. The dimensions and capacity of the geostationary

orbit available to the United States, assuming an appropriate international coordination approach, is essentially independent of

the use of the orbit by countries in regions 1

85-591 0 - 82 - 6
74 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 2.—Service Arc of Geostationary Orbit

Visibility arc for

minimum elevation

angle of 100

World (degrees in west

region Coverage range longitude)

North Canada, including Yukon

America and Northwest Territories

Canada, Vancouver to

Halifax. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

USA, including Hawaii,

Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

USA, CONUS only. . . . . . . .

USA, CONUS and Hawaii. .

Latin Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

America Columbia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Chile/Argentina. . . . . . . . . .

Total regional coverage . . .

Mexico/Caribbean . . . . . . .

114-116

61-128

133-134

61-134

91-134

0-109

10-143

10-130

10-109

46-143

SOURCE: Telecommunications Systems Inc.

or 3, or in South America. Conversely, the

use of the geostationary orbit by countries in

North America should not significantly limit

the availability of the orbit for countries in

the other regions or in South America.

Again, this assumes an appropriate international coordination approach.

In summary of the points made above, the

capacity of the geostationary orbit for a particular country operating in a given frequency band is determined primarily by four

factors. These are:

1. the dimensions of the available arc

as determined by geometric considerations;

2. the characteristics of individual satellites at each orbital position;

3. the separation between satellites operating in that band as required to avoid

harmful interference; and

4. the number of adjacent countries planning to operate in the same frequency

band.

The usable capacity of the geostationary

orbit available to a particular nation may be

increased under three of the limiting factors

enumerated above. First, the capacity at

each orbital position may be increased

through application of technology improvements. Frequency reuse, higher satellite

power, more efficient and higher gain antennas, and lower noise receivers are examples.

The required separation between satellites is

a second category of improvement possible

through improvements in technology. Interference-resistant modulation methods and

improved antenna sidelobe performance are

examples. In the third category, the dimensions of the available orbit arc may be extended through the application of intersatellite links. As a first approximation, the available arc may be increased by the latitude extent of the service area. For the United

States, the use of intersatellite links might

more than double the available arc.

The ability of a country to make these improvements depends on its own level of technological advancement, ability to pay for

such improvements, and the sociopolitical

needs and trends within the country. Also,

the extent to which a country can take advantage of these improvements is determined in part by the actions of other countries. Again, appropriate international coordination and cooperation are required. Chapter 5 discusses alternative approaches for coordinating use of the geostationary satellite

orbit.

During the last decade many countries

have taken advantage of the telecommunication capabilities offered by the orbit/spectrum resource. As a result there are many

domestic satellite systems in operation and

being planned, as well as international systems (e.g., INTELSAT) shared by many

countries throughout the world. These systems support a variety of services, including

broadcasting and maritime-mobile. The specific functions rendered by these established

services, and those being planned or foreseen, include:

●

●

●

Domestic and international point-topoint connections for trunk telephony

and television distribution.

“Thin-route” telephony and instructional television to remote areas.

Data transmission and computer-tocomputer communication.
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 75

● Facsimile, teletext, videotext (viewdata), and electronic mail.

• Interoffice connections for teleconferencing, inventory control, and the like,

for large organizations.

Central to the utility and the economic attractiveness of satellite systems is their

almost unlimited “connectivity” or flexibility; i.e., the possibility of mutually connecting a large number of Earth terminals

through a single satellite. Thus, many nations believe that many of their future telecommunication needs can be satisfied by

geostationary satellite systems, whether

wholly owned or jointly operated by regional

entities. This is true for both advanced and

developing countries but particularly the latter who hope through the use of satellites to

leapfrog many of the problems and much of

the time and expense required to install conventional terrestrial communication systems.

At WARC-79, the United States sought to

expand the allocations to FSS for both domestic and international use. There was a

particular need for frequencies below 10

GHz and this requirement gave rise to considerable controversy throughout the conference. The United States was determined

to preserve the status of the radiolocation

service in the 3400- to 3600-MHz band, now

used by important military radar systems.

The band has long been shared with FSS,

and in order to facilitate use of FSS systems,

particularly INTELSAT, some delegations

proposed to downgrade radar to secondary

status. A compromise was ultimately

worked out that restored primary status for

radars subject to a footnote provision

urging, but not mandating, ITU members to

phase out of the band and to take practicable

steps to protect FSS. The United States and

several other countries formally declared

their intention to accommodate FSS when it

is feasible to do so. (This topic is covered in

greater detail in a later section.) Allocations

to FSS were also made in the 4- and 6-GHz

bands.

In other actions, WARC made additional

uplink allocations acceptable to the United

States, including those at 6425 to 7175 MHz

and 17.3 to 18.1 GHz. The former band was

allocated to provide the uplink for fixed

satellite service in the bands 3400 to 3700

and 4500 to 4800 MHz. Both bands (6425 to

7175 MHz and 19.3 to 18.1 GHz) were

needed for feeder links to satellites in other

services such as broadcasting and maritimemobile satellites. Still other downlink frequencies were allocated to FSS in the band

10.7 to 11.7 GHz as the United States had

proposed. These frequencies will also be

used for the increasing requirements of

INTELSAT.

A major objective of the United States

was to resolve the difficult sharing situation

in region 2 between FSS and BSS in the

1000-MHZ bandwidth at 12 GHz. The conference agreed with the U.S. proposal to separate the two services by allocating the 12.1-

to 12.7-GHz segment to the BSS and the

11.7- to 12.3-GHz segment to the FSS. Although the frequency-sharing between the

space services was thus largely eliminated

(12.1 to 12.3 GHz remains a shared band, but

sharing may be completely eliminated by the

1983 regional conference), BSS must now

share with the terrestrial fixed service including private microwave systems widely

used in the United States. This sharing could

result in interference to BSS Earth station

receivers operating in the same area as private microwave fixed-station transmitters.

The private microwave users are concerned

that sharing with direct-broadcasting satellites is not feasible and oppose sharing in the

12-GHz band. The concern is that home receivers for direct-broadcasting satellites

would receive interference from terrestrial

microwave transmitters. As a practical matter, the microwave users anticipate the

burden to resolve any resulting interference

problems will be placed on them. This concern is reinforced by footnote 3787D of the

Final Acts of WARC-79, which places terrestrial services on a noninterference basis to

BSS operating in accordance with a plan to
76 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

be prepared at the 1983 region 2 broadcasting satellite conference. How this conflict

will be resolved within the United States is a

current matter before FCC.

Existing FSS allocations at higher frequencies were maintained. In general, all

U.S. objectives were met in the bands above

40 GHz (to 275 GHz). These bands will be

used in future years as advanced technology

is developed and as communication requirements continue to grow.

Apart from the decision to convene a space

WARC to “plan” use of the geostationary

orbit and related spectrum, WARC-79 will

have some longer range impacts on FSS. For

example, new allocations to FSS are likely to

motivate system designers to exploit these

frequencies, especially in the 4- to 6- and

11- to 14-GHz bands where bandwidth was

more than doubled. In order to take advantage of this increased capacity, a spacecraft

payload built on current technology would

have to double in size, weight, and power requirements. To keep these at a minimum we

may see renewed efforts at material development, to build, for example, lighter weight

filters, more efficient solar cells and spacequalified solid-state amplifiers. The availability of the U.S. Space Transportation

System (Shuttle) will have increasing impact

on the capacity and costs of satellite systems, particularly when the shuttle attains

full capability to locate spacecraft in geostationary orbit. The large bandwidth available

may also create opportunities in traffic

routing flexibility not possible with smaller

bandwidths. This may stimulate spacecraft

switching technology and the associated

satellite-switch logic, as well as the development of shaped spot beams.

Generally speaking, the impact of

WARC-79 on the availability and cost of

FSS systems was favorable because substantial increases were granted in the

“lower” frequency bands where technology

is well developed and relatively economical.

WARC also reaffirmed the FSS allocations

near 20 and 30 GHz where the next generation of domestic communication satellites is

now under development. When this new generation of satellite systems becomes operational, in a decade or more, there are likely to

be lower costs and higher availability both in

new types of services and in number of users,

particularly those in remote areas.

U.S. operating practices for planning, allocating, managing, and using the spectrum

allocated to FSS have not been altered as a

result of WARC-79 decisions. The expansion

of allocations would seem to mitigate some

policy conflicts that might have existed

before. For example, the guiding U.S. policy

for commercial FSS systems has been to permit any financially and technically qualified

entity to compete in the marketplace. The

decision to allocate separate bands to FSS

and BSS about 12 GHz serves to alleviate, at

least temporarily, a potential problem area.

The results of WARC-79, insofar as FSS is

concerned, do not impose any hardships on

the Government to comply with the demands contained in the Final Acts. Some effort will be required to amend the existing

documentation, manuals, and computer programs to reflect the new regulations and

modifications to the old ones, but this is a

one-time effort.

A related obligation concerns technical assistance to developing countries. WARC-79

adopted a series of resolutions and recommendations that call on the industrialized

nations to give additional help to the Third

World in telecommunciations. FSS is the

service that developing countries look to for

satisfying many of their needs. These resolutions and recommendations are basically in

line with the U.S. approach to technical

assistance since they regard the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) as the

primary source of financing. They do not call

for the establishment of either mandatory or

voluntary funds for technical cooperation.

But the question arises as to whether, and to

what extent, it is desirable or necessary, as

an extension of U.S. foreign policy, to offer

unilateral assistance to developing countries
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 77

with a view to influencing their attitudes on

FSS “planning” and other issues. The potential benefits of using U.S. technology and expertise to provide assistance and develop

closer coordination and planning activities

with developing countries are discussed in

chapter 5.

The Fixed Service

The fixed service above 1 GHz supports

communication systems that are more commonly known as microwave, radio-relay systems and widely used in the United States

by common carriers, Government agencies,

and business.

Substantial frequency allocations between

1 and 40 GHz were made to the fixed service

by the 1959 WARC. Those allocations (particularly those between 1 and 15 GHz) have

been used extensively and considerable effort has been expended on the design of

radio-relay equipment and field engineering

methods. As a result, the available allocations have been used very efficiently. Increasingly large volumes of communication

have been squeezed into each radio channel

and there has been careful planning of adjacent systems to avoid excessive interference.

Because of the highly efficient use of existing allocations, there were few proposals at

WARC-79 for changes. Those changes that

were adopted by the conference consisted

mainly of attempts to aline the allocations

among the three regions and, by means of

footnotes, to accommodate the specific

needs of individual countries.

More significant for the fixed service were

new allocations made to the space services

that will permit additional use by those services, on a coequal basis, of bands already allocated to the fixed service. Such sharing

was first included, on a limited basis, in the

allocation table of 1963 as a means of accommodating the new concept of communication

satellites. At that time technical criteria

were introduced to control the amount of interference each service might impose on the

other.

Sharing is not without cost, but these penalties have been felt to be in the interest of

overall efficient use of the spectrum by all

services in order to permit additional use of

the frequency bands. There is a price paid in

the practical use of radio-relay systems in

the shared environment because of the need

to shorten repeater spacings and to undertake complex route engineering to avoid interference to or from satellite Earth stations.

This can result in the need to build more expensive repeater sites or even the addition of

extra repeater stations to bypass a problem;

it can also require a shift in frequency bands

or, in extreme cases, switching to cable for

some route segments.

With new provisions for sharing in additional bands, and with additional types of

space services, the pressure on radio relay

system design will be increased. The conference recognized this as a complex problem

and identified several aspects of sharing on

which further consideration and refinement

are needed and asked the International

Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR) to undertake appropriate studies.

The decisions of WARC-79 affecting the

use of microwave radio relay systems do not

mandate any drastic reconsideration of U.S.

practices in allocating and managing the

spectrum. The principal new allocations are

those between 40 and 275 GHz, which open

up a number of new, wide bands for the fixed

service that are shared with several other

services. There will be decisions to be made

on whether any of these bands is to be limited domestically to an individual service instead of being shared broadly as provided in

the international table, and whether any

should be identified exclusively for U.S.

Government or nongovernment use.

In order to simplify the administrative

process for certain countries which otherwise might need to coordinate with a number

of neighboring states, the radio regulations

were revised and simplified at the risk of creating future interference problems. The

changes were opposed by the United States,

Canada, and others as counterproductive.
78 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Potential policy conflicts involving the

fixed service arise from WARC decisions on

the shared use of frequency bands with

space services. Such sharing requires accommodation or even sacrifices on the part of

each service. How much sharing will be

allowed, and the degree to which one service

will be affected in order to facilitate the

other, become policy determinations that are

little appreciated at present.

The most conspicuous case that will require action in the near future is the treatment of the 12.1- to 12.7-GHz band. There,

BSS will now share with private microwave

systems. The use of sensitive receiving installations in BSS coupled with the necessity

to locate them at any place within the service

area of the satellite, essentially precludes

radio-relay operation within the coverage

area of a broadcasting satellite on any radiofrequency channel to be used for satellite

broadcasting. Hence, the extent to which

channels and areas are reserved for broadcasting, to the exclusion of private microwave systems, is under study in the United

States and will be a major policy determination.

Another area of potential conflict is the

sharing of frequency bands by the mobilesatellite service (MSS) and FSS. MSS is a different category of service than the discrete

services like maritime MSS or land MSS. It

was developed primarily for military satellite

communications use, wherein the Earth station may be located from time to time anywhere within a defined area (and even operated in moving vehicles such as aircraft and

ships), rather than being limited to a fixed,

predetermined location. So far there has

been little practical experience of this type,

but the idea that a small essential area

around the radio-relay station would be protected, while a large area would be reserved

for the convenience of the mobile-satellite

Earth station is a concept not fully understood or accepted. Because of these concerns, the conference made only very limited

allocations to MSS.

As noted earlier, the provisions for space

systems to share frequency bands with the

fixed service tend to complicate, make more

expensive, and even inhibit the growth of

radio-relay systems, but in the past this has

not resulted in the dislocation of existing

services or systems.

The new allocations for broadcasting satellites to share in the 12.2- to 12.7-GHz band

may well cause dislocations to private microwave systems. Frequency sharing will be

quite a different problem from that in other

“shared” bands. In fact, licenses being

issued now for private microwave stations

bear a warning to the effect that continued

operation is not assured.

Distribution of television by terrestrial

radio-relay systems may also suffer dislocations, depending on the ultimate decisions

on sharing conditions. The 6.425- to

6.525-GHz band, which is the principal band

used by common carriers for service to

broadcasters and for closed-circuit uses such

as medical demonstrations and sporting

events, and the band 6.875 to 7.075 GHz,

which is heavily used by the broadcasters,

are now to be shared with satellites.

The Land-Mobile Service

For the past 20 years, land-mobile has

been one of the fastest growing radio services. Not only has use of land-mobile radio

systems increased for local governments,

businesses and for other specialized uses,

but land-mobile use as part of the terrestrial

telephone network has increased greatly.

Further growth can be expected with the advent of cellular public telephone systems and

the increase of private radio requirements.

The United States has already added landmobile to portions of the UHF television

band 470 to 890 MHz in the U.S. domestic

table of allocations, an action permitted

under the ITU’s radio regulations, provided

no interference is caused to stations of other

countries operating in those frequencies. The
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts

United States proposed at WARC-79 that

most of the band 470 to 960 MHz be allocated to the land-mobile service, sharing on a

primary basis with broadcasting in the lower

part, and with fixed and radiolocation services in the upper part. This would permit

each country in region 2 to determine which

of the internationally allocated primary services would be implemented in their own

areas.

WARC only partially accepted these proposals. The mobile service was added to the

bands 806 to 902 MHz on a primary basis,

but on a secondary basis in the bands 470 to

512 MHz and 614 to 806 MHz. A footnote

raises mobile to primary status in the United

States, with the provision that such use is

subject to the coordination procedures of article 14 of the radio regulations. The United

States submitted a protocol statement rejecting the article 14 procedure, however, the

requirement for coordination, coupled with

the continued use of 470 to 512 MHz in

Canada for broadcasting, and the use of

band 614 to 806 MHz in both Canada and

Mexico for the same purpose, makes our use

of these bands for the mobile service problematic. A similar situation prevails regarding U.S. proposals for the 902- to 960-MHz

band where the United States, Canada, and

Mexico use the same segments for competing services and where coordination in

border regions may be difficult.

The United States must determine its

policies and means to follow through on

this declaration. There are no FSS Earth stations currently operating in the 3.4- to

3.6-GHz band. In its declaration, the United

States agreed not to withhold support if

INTELSAT decided to undertake FSS in

that band. If such a decision was implemented, the United States would be under

strong pressure to restrain radar operations

that might interfere with international satellite operations.

● 79

The HF Broadcasting Service

In recent decades, growing numbers of

countries have turned to HF (shortwave)

broadcasting to carry news, entertainment,

comment, and propaganda to audiences beyond their own borders. The potential effectiveness of these broadcasts has been hampered by two factors: 1) the congestion of the

shortwave frequency bands by more and

more stations with ever-higher transmitter

power, resulting in unintentional interference; and 2) jamming—the deliberate interference with broadcast signals.

WARC-79 offered the first opportunity

since 1959 for the international community

to attempt to alleviate the present congestion in HF broadcasting and the United

States went to the conference seeking a substantial expansion of spectrum allocated to

this service. The United States did not win

approval for all its proposals but the overall

outcome was satisfactory from both the

technical and political standpoints. As a

result of WARC-79, congestion and interference should be reduced considerably by the

end of the 1980’s and reception of HF broadcasts should be clearer. For the United

States, this will benefit the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

(RFE/RL), the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, and several private organizations engaged in HF broadcasting.

To reduce interference and congestion, the

conference agreed to an increase of 850 kHz

in the HF broadcasting bands between 9 and

21 MHz, including the creation of a new

13-MHz band. This represents an overall increase of 33 percent in the allocation for HF

broadcasting. The United States had proposed a 46 percent increase, while the Soviet

Union asked for no increase at all. The compromise was the result of an initiative by

nonalined countries and it was especially

welcomed because the allocation will ulti-
80 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

mately become exclusive, although it remains shared until the fixed service operations now using it can be reaccommodated.

Despite appeals by the United States and

other countries, proposals to expand the important 6- and 7-MHz bands failed by very

narrow margins, largely because many developing countries claimed a continued need for

these bands for other forms of communication.

WARC-79 also agreed to convene a specialized HF broadcasting conference in the

mid-1980’s to plan for the more efficient and

equitable use of the broadcasting bands, and

it tied the bringing into force of the new allocations to the effectiveness of this conference. The United States initially opposed

this follow-on conference but switched to

support the idea when it became apparent

that WARC was running behind schedule

and that U.S. interests might suffer substantial damage in the atmosphere of frustration

that prevailed.

The United States achieved one goal by

keeping open the scope and character of the

follow-on conference; the agenda will be open

and the meeting does not constitute an assignment or allocation conference. Nevertheless, there are potential problems with this

follow-on conference. Political issues, such as

“prior consent,” could prove troublesome.

Also, as noted above, the increased allocations to HF are dependent upon success in

accommodating the fixed services that were

ousted from the spectrum given to international broadcasting. For this reason, the

United States, together with the United

Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, and Zambia in a multinational protocol statement, reserved the

right—in the absence of an adequate plan—

to take the necessary steps to meet the needs

of the HF broadcasting services. Similar independent reservations were made by 17

other countries. (Three host countries

for RFE/RL transmitters–West Germany,

Spain, and Portugal–were among those taking reservations.)

In an effort to deal with the continued

problem of deliberate jamming by the Soviet

Union and other Communist bloc countries,

the United States made the following protocol statement at the conclusion of the conference:

Administration of the United States of

America, calling attention to the fact that

some of its broadcasting in the high frequency bands allocated to the broadcasting

service are subject to willful, harmful interference by administrations that are signatory to these Final Acts, and that such interference is incompatible with the rational

and equitable use of these bands, declares

that for as long as this interference exists, it

reserves the right with respect to such interference to take necessary and appropriate

actions to protect its broadcasting interests.

In so doing, however, it intends to respect

the rights, to the extent practicable, of administrations operating in accordance with

these Final Acts.

Other smaller countries, like Iran, also

complained of Soviet jamming which, although not directed at them, interfered with

their broadcasting. Neither the Soviet Union

nor any of the other Eastern bloc nations

that currently jam U.S. broadcasts submitted an official statement to answer the

U.S. complaint.

U.S. delegation representatives who dealt

with HF broadcasting issues reported that

the nonalined movement countries generally

supported or opposed U.S. positions on

the basis of their own interests and not for

ulterior political motives. Some of the

strongest opposition to U.S. proposals came

from Latin America, especially on the issue

of fixed services v. broadcasting. Brazil and

Costa Rica proved to be more influential

than Cuba in controlling the Latin American

delegations.

The Soviet Union, which often operates

HF broadcasting stations “out of band,” i.e.,

using frequencies allotted to some other

service, did not request additional HF

broadcasting frequencies. However, this
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 81

may be explained by the fact that the Soviet

Union entered a protocol statement in the

Final Acts of the 1959 General Administrative Radio Conference regarding HF frequency bands and thus the Soviet Union

does not consider their operations “out of

band.”

National Security Systems

This report deals at length with the consequences to U.S. national security of decisions reached at WARC-79. The extensive

treatment is not intended to disparage the

importance of WARC for other U.S. interests. It arises, rather, from the peculiar

nature of DOD communications requirements and their broad-ranging use of satellites and radiofrequency spectrum.

The Final Acts of WARC-79 represent a

generally acceptable compromise that satisfied most U.S. national security needs but

will require some significant changes in the

coming years. Greater numbers of different

operations will have to make use of the same

frequency bands; systems will need greater

frequency flexibility to cope with competing

users of the spectrum. The magnitude and

cost of these changes cannot be known for

some time; they will be determined in part by

the manner in which the new radio regulations agreed on at WARC-79 are actually implemented worldwide.

Without being pessimistic, it should be

noted that most of the major reservations

that the U.S. delegation took at WARC-79

involved national security considerations.

This fact by itself justifies a thorough look

at the short- and long-term consequences for

U.S. security of decisions reached at the conference.

Military systems must be prepared to operate anywhere in the world, and geographical restrictions on some bands generate additional requirements for frequency flexibility—sometimes demanding costly increased

design and operational complexity.

The problem of “universality” is partly

solvable through bilateral and multilateral

agreements, but there is still a significant

impact on system planning and operation.

Some military systems are fielded in a less

advanced state of development than their

civil counterparts. As a result, they must be

adjusted more. They are also used in field

tests and exercises, and the frequency coordination is an important component of the

planning. Nevertheless, advanced technology developments can provide some solutions.

Military-Related Issues and Objectives

The security of the United States depends

on economic health as well as defense posture. The following discussion, however,

focuses on the major military-related issues

and objectives that were identified going

into WARC-79:

● Radiolocation (radar)

– Minimize encroachment of radar

bands, below 1000 MHz, especially in

the 400- and 800-MHz bands, and at

3.4 and 5 GHz.

● Satellites (radionavigation)

– Provide for NAVSTAR Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) at 1,227 and

1,575 MHz.

● Satellites (communications)

– Recognize and provide for MSS.

– Obtain reasonable sharing criteria for

MSS.

– Avoid any a priori plans that would

allocate or preposition geostationary

orbit spacing.

● High frequency (HF)

— Insure adequate HF allocations for

non-line-of-sight (NLOS) nonsatellite

strategic communications, beyond

line-of-sight (LOS) tactical communications.

– Avoid regulatory limitations that

would inhibit over-the-horizon (OTH)

radars.

. Fixed and mobile (terrestrial)

– Maintain status quo in the 4400- to
82 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

4900-MHz band, pertinent to NATO

requirements.

– Retain the 14.5- to 15.35-GHz bands

for fixed and mobile systems pertinent to NATO requirements, and

minimize the growth of the space

services in these bands.

● Intelligence

– Avoid any regulations that limit or

reduce flexibility of operation.

One part of the U.S. preparation strategy

was to participate in and strengthen the International Radio Consultative Committee

(CCIR) of ITU as a technical forum. Toward

that end, DOD participated actively in the

work of CCIR study groups, the CCIR XIV

Plenary held in Kyoto, Japan (June 1978),

and in the CCIR special preparatory meeting

(SPM) for WARC-79 held in Geneva in October 1978. DOD prepared substantial documentation for SPM in the following technical

areas:

● G P S

● Mobile-satellite systems

— Sharing criteria

– Coordination areas

● Radiolocation

– Sharing

— Signal characteristics

● Mobile sharing with fixed service (HF

band)

● Spread-spectrum techniques

● Techniques above 50 GHz.

The documents prepared for the CCIR plenary and SPM by DOD were in most cases

adequate technically to support the DOD positions at WARC; however, the decisions ultimately taken at WARC-79 did not necessarily turn on technical data. It should be

recognized that CCIR work is a continuing

program and future active U.S. and DOD

participation is essential.

The results of WARC-79 are provided in

the Final Acts, and the overall results as

they pertain to the United States have been

summarized by Ambassador Robinson and

the members of the delegation. The national

security impacts have been considered in a

report to the Air Force, and DOD has provided a national security assessment to the

Senate that will consider the Final Acts for

ratification as a treaty. The DOD consensus

is that with some exceptions, the WARC-79

outcome did not degrade the national security of the United States. However, it is recognized that costs must increase in the future. Some of the results and an estimate of

their impact on national security were apparent immediately after the conference. For example, our national security posture was improved when the United States:

●

●

Obtained provisions in the allocation table that accommodate the NAVSTARGPS on a worldwide basis; and

Obtained provisions for the operation of

mobile-satellite terminals at 7 and 8

GHz (although the specific frequency

bands are not consistent with the current design and channelization plans for

the DSCS [Defense Satellite Communications System] III).

While the United States as an entity minimized its losses due to conference actions,

DOD (as a major U.S. international user of

the radio spectrum) did bear the brunt of the

loss of flexibility for use of the spectrum

(e.g., radiolocation). The United States took

six reservations, four of which dealt directly

and one of which dealt peripherally with decisions that could adversely affect national

security.

It should be recognized that the total impact of WARC-79 will take some time to

assess due to the interdependence with implementing actions of other nations, particularly those with whom the United States

is allied militarily.

Spectrum Availability for

National Security

Major national security questions are:

“What portions of the radiofrequency spectrum are available for DOD use, and what

was the effect of WARC-79 allocation actions on DOD’s capability to perform its mission?” There is no simple, single answer to
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts “ 83

these questions. However, one method of

gaining some perspective is to examine the

status of the major radio bands and services

employed by DOD in the revised table of allocations developed by WARC-79 and compare it with the existing table. The bands

below 27.5 MHz and above 15 GHz are

treated on a band basis; whereas, between

27.5 MHz and 15 GHz the changes are

treated on a service basis for the fixed, mobile, radiolocation and fixed-satellite and mobile-satellite services. All of these bands and

services are vital to U.S. national security.

They are used: for example, for command,

control, and intelligence systems; for radionavigation; for military weapon systems

that use radiosignals for guidance and targeting; for early warning and all forms of

communication. Moreover, they must operate in all parts of the world under various

conditions of competing spectrum use.

Bands Below 4 MHz

The following changes were made in the

bands below 4 MHz:

• The radionavigation service in the very

low frequency (VLF) and low frequency

(LF) bands was expanded. This was a

U.S. proposal for protection of nongovernment and military operations.

● The medium frequency (M F) spectrum

for AM broadcasting was expanded to

1605 to 1705 kHz.

● Fixed and mobile operations between 2

and 4 MHz were maintained; however,

footnotes and power limitations were

specified in an attempt to reduce interference.

The HF Band (4 to 27.5 MHz)

The United States proposed to reduce allocations to the fixed service by 18 percent and

reallocate these frequencies to the maritimemobile, broadcasting, radio astronomy, amateur, and mobile (except aeronautical-mobile)

services. While there was only a 14-percent

reduction in HF spectrum available to DOD,

the exclusive bands were reduced by over 65

percent. The shared use of bands by service

was greatly increased. The conference made

significant reallocations to maritime (including several new bands above 10 MHz) and to

international broadcasting operations. This

led, in part, to U.S. reservations. The aeronautical-mobile service bands were not

changed. A detailed reaccommodation procedure, whereby services displaced would be

provided for elsewhere in the spectrum, was

a part of the revised HF allocation agreement. The conference action lessened the

number of assignments that may be affected. The time frame for completion of the

changeover as specified by the conference

further reduces the overall impact on DOD

and other HF users. The immediate procedure is for each administration to review

all the HF fixed service listings in the international frequency list as furnished by the

International Frequency Registration Board

(IFRB). This review will:

●

●

●

Delete entries not required.

Identify remainder by category, regular

operational use, standby, occasional use

on a reserve basis.

Determine hours of operation.

IFRB was to be advised by March 1981 of

the administrations’ findings. Then, beginning in July 1984, administrations will be required to effect the changeover from the old

assignment to a new assignment. For bands

above 10 MHz the changeover will be completed by July 1, 1989, and for bands below

10 MHz by July 1, 1994. (Tables 3 and 4

show the distribution of the HF band before

and after WARC-79.)

The 20-, 30-, 40-GHz Bands

In the bands at 20, 30, and 40 GHz, virtually all U.S. requirements for FSS and

MSS were met, though in certain instances

the sharing with other services as agreed by

the conference may not prove to be feasible.

The MSS proposals in these bands were companion to MSS proposals in the 7- to

8-GHz bands. The successes achieved will

strengthen military communications by satellite.
84 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Table 3.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) Before WARC-79

—

Exclusive Shared Total

Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent

Fixed service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,157 43.2% 4,348 18.5% 14,505 61.7%

Maritime mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,850 16.4 2,202 9.4 6,052 25.8

Land mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . — — 4,177 17.7 4,177 17.7

Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,350 10.0 300 1.3 2,650 11.3

Aeronautical fixed and mobile . . . 1,795 7.6 50 0.2 1,845 7.8

Amateur. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 900 3.8 – – 900 3.8

Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 0.5 – – 116 0.5

SOURCE. H A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No. 3, August 1981, draft

Table 4.–Distribution of the HF Band (4000 to 27,500 kHz) After WARC-79

Exclusive Shared Total

Service kHz Percent kHz Percent kHz Percent

Fixed service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,704

Maritime mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,650

Land mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Other mobile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . —

Broadcasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,930

Aeronautical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,815

Amateur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300

Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

15.8%

19.8

—

—

12.5

7.7

5.5

0.8

8,191

158

2,120

6,442

250

80

50

66

34.9%

0.6

9.0

27.4

0.1

0.3

0.2

0.2

11,895

4,808

2,129

6,442

3,180

1,895

1,350

266

50.7%

20.5

9.0

27.4

12.6

8.0

5.7

1.0

SOURCE: H. A. Feigleson, “High Frequency in the Future,” IEEE Trans. EMC, vol. 23, No, 3, August 1981, draft.

Fixed Service

Table 5 is a summary of WARC-79 gains

and changes in status on fixed allocations

between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz as reflected

in the allocation tables. Between 15 to 40

GHz there were no changes to the fixed service allocation tables; and, above 40 GHz, the

gains were extensive—virtually assuring frequency support for DOD fixed requirements

above 40 GHz. The table does not show

those fixed bands that were unchanged, but

does give a measure of the gains made by the

fixed service. However, between 1 and 15

GHz, the fixed service gains were made by

sharing with the radiolocation and FSS.

Some gains in spectrum allocations for the

fixed service are not in DOD’s best interests,

though the results were expected at the conference. The 420- to 430-MHz and 440- to

450-MHz bands contain important DOD radiolocation systems that are expected to

have a long lifetime. These systems will now

have to share with the fixed service. The allocation changes imposed by WARC will have

a significant effect on the operation of these

systems. The allocation of the fixed service

on a primary basis to the 7250- to 7300- and

7975- to 8025-MHz bands was also expected

(but not welcomed) by DOD. DSCS operates

uplinks in the 7900- to 8400-MHz band and

downlinks in the 7250- to 7750-MHz band.

Airborne satellite communication operations

are planned for the 7975- to 8025-MHz band,

which was an exclusively allocated satellite

band in most of the world prior to WARC-79,

although this “exclusivity” was already

diluted significantly by footnotes. Coordination of airborne satellite operations in a band

with existing fixed systems within the

United States has been very difficult. The

proliferation of fixed communication systems will exacerbate this problem.

The band 4400 to 4990 MHz, is in heavy

use by the military service for tactical communications, including tropospheric scatter

operations; and in NATO Europe it has been

designated a military band. In 1963, a
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 85

Table 5.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed Allocations

Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Bandwidth MHz

Frequency band (nearest tenth) Change Prior major use

(MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band

27.5-28 MHz

41.015-47

54-68

68-72

74.6 -74.8

75.2 -75.4

76-88

136-138

146-148

174-216

220-225

230-235

420-430

440-450

470-512

470-610

614-890

1435-1525

1530-1535

1660.5-1670

2300-2450

3300-3400

3400-3500

4990-5000

5850-5925

7250-7300

7975-8025

10-10.45 GHz

10.5-10.55 GHz

14.3 -14.4 GHz

1

1

2

2

2 and 3

2 and 3

2

All

3

2

2

1

2 and 3

2 and 3

2

3

2

2

1 and 3

All

2 and 3

2

2 and 3

2

2

All

All

1 and 3

2 and 3

1 and 3

0.5

6

0.2

0.2

2

5

5

10

10

140

84

90

1.6

150

100

10

75

50

50

450

50

100

14

4

12

2

42

42

192

10

7.9

100

+ 0.5

6

14

4

+ 0.2

+ 0.2

12

+ 2

+ 2

42

+ 5

5

+ 10

+ 10

+42

+ 140

+ 276

90

10

+ 9.5

150

+ 100

+ 100

+ 10

+ 75

+50

+50

+ 450

+50

+ 100

Met aids

BC

BC

BC

Aero nav

Aero nav

BC

Space research

AM

FX MO BC

AM RL

Aero nav

RL

RL

BC

BC and Rnav

BC

MO

Space OPS

Met aids

RL

RL

RL and FX satellites

Radio astronomy

RL

FX satellite

FX satellite

RL

RL

FX satellite and nav

satellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report

U.S.S.R. proposal for the inclusion of FSS,

Earth-to-space on a primary basis in the

band 4400 to 4700 MHz was accepted as

part of a conference compromise among the

United States, United Kingdom, and the

Union of Soviet Socialists Republics. To date

there is no known satellite use of this band;

however, the INTELSAT intentions to use

this band became apparent at WARC-79.

This desired use became coupled to negotiations related to the band 3400 to 3700 MHz.

In order best to protect current known

operations in the band, FSS was shifted to

4500 to 4800 MHz (sharing with the fixed

and mobile services), and its direction was

changed to space-to-Earth. The bands 4400

to 4500 MHz and 4800 to 4990 MHz remain

primarily fixed and mobile, except that in

the subbands 4825 to 4835 MHz and 4950 to

4990 MHz the aeronautical-mobile service is

excluded.

Mobile Service

The summary of WARC-79 gains, losses,

and changes in status on mobile allocations

between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz is given in

table 6. As can be noted, the differences between tables 5 and 6 are minor, and many of

the comments concerning the fixed service

changes apply to the mobile service. While

the mobile service has several reductions in

the status of the service, it suffered no loss

of a band.

Radiolocation (Radar)

In the United States, the radiolocation

service provides the spectrum support for
86 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

Table 6.—Summary of WARC Gains, Losses, and Changes in Status on Mobile

Allocations Between 27.5 MHz and 15 GHz

Frequency band Bandwidth MHz Change Prior major use

(MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band

27.5-28 MHz

41.015-47

54-68

68-72

74.6 -74.8

75.2 -75.4

76-88

100-108

136-138

146-148

174-216

220-225

230-235

420-430

440-450

470-512

470-610

614-980

862-960

1660.5-1670

2300-2450

3300-3400

3400-3500

3400-3600

4990-5000

5850-5925

7250-7300

7975-8025

10-10.45 GHz

10.5-10.55 GHz

11.7 -12.5 GHz

11.7 -12.1 GHz

14.3 -14.4 GHz

0.5

6

0.2

0.2

8

2

5

5

10

10

140

110

98

1.6

150

10

75

50

50

450

50

100

14

4

12

2

42

42

236

7.9

100

100

200

800

400

+ 0.5 Met aids

6 BC

14 BC

4 BC

+ 0.2 Aero nav

+ 0.2 Aero nav

12 BC

–8 BC

+ 2 Space research

+ 2 AM

42 FX MO BC

+ 5 AM RL

5 Aero nav

+ 10 RL

+ 10 RL

+42 BC

+ 140 BC and Rnav

+ 346 BC FX RL

+98 BC FX

+9.5 Met aids

150 RL

+ 100 RL

+ 100 RL and FX satellites

200 FX and FX satellites

+ 10 Radio astronomy

+75 RL

+50 FX satellite

+50 FX satellite

+ 450 RL

+50 RL

800 FX BC and BC satellites

400 FX FX satellite BC satellite

+ 100 FX satellite nav satellite

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979,” final report,

certain Government operations—principally

military radars. Frequency management for

this service, including assignments, coordination, etc., is under the jurisdiction of the

National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) but operational

responsibility is with DOD and the Federal

Aviation Administration. As such, radiolocation proposals and associated position

papers were generated in DOD with the aims

of national security in mind. It should be

noted that radar systems for different purposes and with different technical characteristics and operational requirements are used

by many other telecommunication services

and are administered by other agencies.

Thus, radionavigation radars generally fall

under the operational purview of the Department of Transportation, meteorological

radars under the Department of Commerce,

and Earth exploration satellite radars with

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Nongovernment radar users are

regulated by FCC.

It should be noted further that not all systems in the radiolocation service are radar

systems. These other systems include highly

accurate, position-fixing systems similar in

principle to the Loran and Omega hyperbolic

radionavigation systems. Used for surveying purposes such as offshore oil exploration,

these systems are technically navigation devices but have been traditionally operated in

the radiolocation service, using its frequency

allocations and subject to its technical
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 87

standards. The existing allocation for

radiolocation (and the proposals to retain

them) have a firm foundation in the technical

aspects of radio wave propagation and radar

system missions.

During the preparation for WARC, problems were foreseen in three major areas involving seven different bands. Problems in

the UHF band were deemed particularly important because this is the frequency range

best suited for the long-range, air-surveillance mission. Prior to WARC-79, a worldwide primary allocation existed for radiolocation in the band 430 to 440 MHz, while in

regions 2 and 3 it extended from 420 to 450

MHz. It was known that there would be intensive pressure for allocation of these bands

to the fixed and mobile services. The U.S.

position, therefore, was to retain at least the

existing worldwide primary allocation and

acquiesce to secondary status in the adjoining bands, if necessary. WARC did, in fact,

arrive at this result along with a reduction to

secondary status in the 890- to 942-MHz

band. By country footnote, the United

States retained a primary allocation for itself

in those bands where the status had been reduced. It is the position of DOD that the

radar system using these bands have sufficient flexibility to perform their mission. All

of the systems involved have some modes of

operation that could create undesirable interference. However, the retention of primary status in the United States will provide sufficient training opportunities to

maintain operator proficiency in these

modes. The WARC results fell reasonably

within the U.S. fall-back position in these

bands until the fixed and mobile footnotes

started mounting up. Unable to control the

flood of countries participating in these footnotes, the United States entered the reservation contained in Protocol Statement No. 38.

Of the three bands noted as problem areas

in the fixed-satellite and radar sharing area,

only the 3.5-GHz band was a serious problem. The 17.5-GHz band will require further

study but raises no immediate hardships,

and the anticipated problems at 5.5 GHz

never materialized. The U.S. proposal contained provisions to meet the well recognized

need for additional bandwidth for FSS in the

frequency bands below 10 GHz. At the same

time, the United States was committed to retaining spectrum support for major military

radar systems in the 3.4- to 3.6-GHz band.

Predictions of pressures to turn this band

over to FSS were indeed fulfilled at WARC.

The intensive, and sometimes acrimonious,

negotiations included at one time the submission of a proposed footnote by the United

States that would exclude FSS in the United

States from operating in the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz

band. The final result was a compromise; a

compromise achieved by the removal of any

mandatory requirement to stop radar operations in the band. In addition to the allocation status defined in the table of allocations

and the footnotes, a declaration was signed

by several members of INTELSAT (the

United States included) that says, in part,

“they shall make reasonable effort to accommodate FSS.” Thus the status of radiolocation was retained, but with the foreknowledge that the pressure from the fixedsatellite community, both internal and external to the United States, would continue.

In the 17.3- to 17.7-GHz band, the secondary status for radiolocation was part of the

U.S. fallback position because of the very

limited current use of the band by radar systems. By footnote, WARC-79 decreed that

the band could be used for broadcast satellite uplinks, and this action was acceptable

to the United States. With such usage, further study may show that radiolocation operations are possible with an acceptably low

probability of interference.

The United States was well aware of the

spectrum crowding occurring in the radionavigation bands and had made several proposals to alleviate it. Proposals from other

countries sought to temper the problem by

combining radionavigation and radiolocation into a common service—radio-determination—or by adding radionavigation as a

coequal sharing partner with the radiolocation service. In addition to adopting some of
88 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

the U.S. proposals for beacons, transponders

and the like, WARC opted for making radionavigation an equal partner. However,

WARC came painfully close to defining aeronautical and maritime radionavigation as

safety services, an action that would have included these services in the regulation regarding harmful interference to safety services. This action may be interpreted to give

preferential status to the radionavigation

service and bodes ill for the equality of the

partnership. The U.S. recognition of this

state of affairs is contained in the reservations taken in the affected bands in Protocol

No. 38.

The radiolocation portion of the U.S. proposals to the WARC sought the following

four major items:

1. retain radiolocation allocations in all existing bands except 216 to 225 MHz;

2. provide adequate provision for radiolocation above 40 GHz;

3. include allocations for space radar; and

4. provide worldwide primary allocations

for high-accuracy, position-fixing radiolocation systems between 1615 and 3400

kHz.

In a strictly literal sense, all four objectives

were met. From a practical point of view,

however, only items 2, 3, and 4 can be

claimed as truly successful. Concerning the

first point, the existing radiolocation allocations were indeed retained, but the addition

of other services on a primary basis will have

a significant effect on the design, development, performance and operations of radiolocation systems operating between 400 MHz

and 40 GHz.

Item I.–Table 7 compares the status of

the radiolocation allocations between the existing radio regulations and those created by

the Final Acts of WARC-79, indicating in

the final column the changes that were made

in the table of allocations. It is seen that the

status of radiolocation was reduced in six

bands. In all of these bands, pre-WARC negotiations had indicated that pressure for reductions was likely to be heavy. Consequently, fallback positions were prepared and,

with one exception, adhered to during

WARC. The one exception was in the 890-to

942-MHz band where radiolocation was reduced to a secondary service in region 2.

This reduction was mitigated by the addition of footnote 3669A, which provides primary status to this service in the United

States. The footnote was weakened by

Canada’s insistence on making the footnote

subject to the procedures of article N13A.

This amendment was unacceptable to the

United States and formed the basis for a portion of the bands covered by the reservation

noted in paragraph 4 of Protocol Statement

No. 38 (which deals with the larger band 890

to 960 MHz). Thus, the objective of retaining

radiolocation allocations has been met and,

as such, continues to make available the frequencies required for the development and

operation of radiolocation systems in the

United States.

Not apparent from table 7, however, is a

host of key decisions with respect to four

other services that will greatly affect the

radiolocation service. These four services are

the fixed and mobile services (which will be

discussed as a pair), the radionavigation

services (including the aeronautical and

maritime radionavigation service), and FSS.

The decisions made for the fixed and mobile service involved inserting these services

by footnote in virtually every radiolocation

band (as well as in bands for other services)

between 420 MHz and 36 GHz. The footnotes are the so-called “country footnotes”

in which each country claims band usage for

a service that is in addition to or alternative

to the service stated in the table of allocations itself. On the average, about 25 percent

of the member nations of ITU are involved in

these footnotes; however, over 40 percent of

the member countries are involved in the

band 430 to 440 MHz. A precedent for these

country footnotes did exist in the previous

radio regulations but the number of countries involved was small, generally less than

10 in a given band. These few exceptions

were quite manageable in terms of worldwide
Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 89

Table 7.—Pre- and Post-WARC Radiolocation Allocations

Bandwidth - MHz

Frequency Primary Secondary

band Region Old New Old New Change

216-225 1 — — — NOC

MHz 2 ‘9 – – 9 1 9

3 — — 9 7 - 2

t 420-450 1 10 10 20 20 NOC

MHz 2 30 10 – 20 1 20

3 30 10 – 20

t 890-942 1 — — 52 52 NOC

MHz 2 52 – – 52 l 52

3 — — 52 52 NOC

1215-1400 1 135 135 50 50 NOC

MHz 2 135 135 50 50 NOC

3 135 135 50 50 NOC

2300-2500 1 — — 200 200 NOC

MHz 2 200 200 – – NOC

3 200 200 – – NOC

2700-3400 1 300 300 400 400 NOC

MHz 2 300 300 400 400 NOC

3 300 300 400 400 NOC

3400-3700 1 — — 200 200 NOC

MHz 2 300 (200) + – 300 i 300

3 300 (200) + – 300 I 300

t 5250-5925 1 300 300 300 300 NOC

MHz 2 375 300 300 375 1 75

3 300 300 375 375 NOC

t 8.5-10.0 1 1100 1100 400 400 NOC

GHz 2 1100 1100 400 400 NOC

3 1100 1100 400 400 NOC

t 10.0-10.68 1 500 500 180 180 NOC

GHz 2 550 550 130 130 NOC

3 550 550 130 130 NOC

t 13.4-14 1 600 600 – – NOC

GHz 2 600 600 – – NOC

3 600 600 – – NOC

t 15.7 -17.7 1 2000 1600 — 400 ! 400

GHz 2 2000 1600 – 400 i 400

3 2000 1600 — 400 1 400

24.05-24.25 1 200 200 – – NOC

GHz 2 200 200 – – NOC

3 200 200 – – NOC

t 33.4-36 1 2600 2600 – – NOC

GHz 2 2600 2600 – – NOC

3 2600 2600 – – NOC

t U S reservation

— Lost bandwidth

i Status reduced

+ See text

NOC No change

SOURCE Telecommunications Systems Inc.
90 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

operations. Now, however, the exceptions

can become extremely difficult with the expected proliferation of the fixed and mobile

services. The difficulty will be particularly

severe for airborne radar operations because

the large LOS distances these signals travel

when aircraft are at high altitudes can cause

interference over large areas extending into

other countries.

Because of this incompatibility between

the fixed and mobile services on the one

hand and radiolocation service on the other,

the United States entered reservations to

the Final Acts in Protocol Statement No. 38

for the frequency bands 430 to 440 MHz,

5650 to 5850 MHz, 8500 to 8750 MHz,

10,000 to 10,500 MHz (where the fixed and

mobile services were added as a primary

service in the table of allocations rather than

by footnote), 13.4 to 14 GHz, 15.7 to 17.3

GHz, and 33.4 to 36 GHz. Fixed and mobile

footnotes were also included in the bands

1215 to 1300 MHz and 3300 to 3400 MHz,

but some mitigating circumstances precluded the need for U.S. reservations.

In the band 1215 to 1300 MHz, one-third

of the countries present in the fixed and mobile footnote are also represented in a radionavigation footnote for the same frequency

band. It was felt that the fixed and mobile

usage would not be so severe as to warrant a

U.S. reservation. In the 3300- to 3400-MHz

band a clause was inserted in the footnote

that negates the primary status of the fixed

and mobile services in the regions around the

Mediterranean Sea. It was felt that this was

sufficient to obviate a need for a reservation

in this band.

A second key decision was made in connection with the radionavigation services. The

decision here was to add maritime radionavigation as a primary service in the radiolocation bands 8850 to 9000 MHz and 9200 to

9300 MHz, and to add radionavigation as a

primary service in the band 9500 to 9800

MHz.

The third key decision concerned FSS in

the band 3400 to 3700 MHz. The existing

radio regulations showed that the radiolocation and FSS would share this band equally

at least in regions 2 and 3. In the U.S. national table of allocations, the band was

alloted to (and in use by) the radiolocation

service. Studies conducted in preparation for

WARC showed that the specific systems being used by these services could not share

the band. On the basis of the radar system

usage, the U.S. position was to retain radiolocation as a primary service with the provision that a part of the band could be made

available to support fixed-satellite communications.

This position was steadfastly maintained

through a protracted period of intense negotiations at WARC. The final result did, indeed, reduce radiolocation to a secondary

service in the table of allocations, but, by

footnote, primary status was restored in regions 2 and 3 over the band 3400 to 3600

MHz. The footnote contains a directive for

administrations to take all practical steps to

protect FSS after 1985 along with a nonbinding plea for radiolocation systems to cease

operations by the same year. As part of the

compromise, a formal declaration was signed

by the United States, Canada, the United

Kingdom, the Netherlands, Australia, and

Belgium vowing to make reasonable effort to

accommodate FSS in the band. The national

table of allocations, currently under development jointly by FCC and IRAC, will make

limited allowance for FSS in the band 3600

to 3700 MHz with the remainder of the band

being retained in the radiolocation service.

In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry concerning implementation of the Final Acts of

WARC-79 (Docket 80-739), the FSS allocations in the bands 3.7 to 3.7 GHz and 4.5 to

4.8 GHz are proposed to be limited to international satellite systems and excludes domestic satellite systems. According to the

third notice of inquiry, the expectation is

that no more than one Earth station on each

U.S. coast can be successfully coordinated

with stations operating in the radiolocation

service.
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts . 91

Item 2.–WARC-79 presented the first opportunity to allocate the frequency bands

above 40 GHz to terrestrial services. The

U.S. radiolocation position in this frequency

range was to obtain four primary bands and

three secondary bands primarily in the regions of reduced atmospheric absorption,

the so-called “propagation windows. ”

WARC allocated six primary bands and four

secondary bands. A comparison of the U.S.

proposals with the WARC action is shown in

table 8. It is clear that there is adequate frequency support for radiolocation system development in these bands.

Item 3.—Prior to WARC-79 there was no

provision for spaceborne radars in the radio

regulations. The matter has been rectified by

the WARC-79 action of permitting spaceborne radars in every radiolocation band between 1 and 36 GHz as well as the band 78 to

79 GHz. The U.S. proposal was to accommodate space radars on a secondary basis in the

bands below 14 GHz and on a primary basis

above 14 GHz regardless of the service that

was employing the radar systems. The actual wording in the WARC-79 footnotes provides secondary status to space radiolocation systems in all the radiolocation bands

from 1 to 14 GHz and in the band 35.5 to

35.6 GHz it has primary status. Radars used

in the Earth-exploration satellite service

have primary status in the bands 35.5 to

35.6 GHz and 78 to 79 GHz, with secondary

status in all the radiolocation bands from 1

to 24.25 GHz. Thus, the status of spaceborne

Table 8.—Comparison of WARC Radiolocation

Allocations and U.S. Proposed Allocations

Above 40 GHz

Bands in U.S. proposal Bands allocated

(G Hz) (GHz)

—

76-81 Primary

92-95 Primary

95-101 Secondary —

142-150 Secondary

165-170 Primary

221-229 Secondary

240-250 Primary

59-64 Primary

76-81 Primary

92-95 Primary

95-101 Secondary

126-134 Primary

134-142 Secondary

144-149 primary

241-248 primary

SOURCE. Telecommunications Systems Inc.

radiolocation systems is considerably enhanced from that which existed prior to

WARC-79.

Item 4.–It was the U.S. objective to obtain more substantial frequency support for

the accurate position-fixing systems in the

MF band. While WARC did not provide a

common, worldwide band for these nonradar

radiolocation systems, it did provide primary status over 30 kHz in region 1, 245

kHz in region 2, and 193.5 kHz in region 3

coupled with secondary status over 80 kHz

in region 2 and 200 kHz in region 3.

Reservations

The U.S. reservations on radiolocation

matters, noted above, were contained in the

initial set of reservations filed by various administrations in the Final Protocol of December 3, 1979. About 20 of the 51 reservations

submitted contained a statement by the submitting government that it would take the

steps necessary to protect its interests in the

event of noncompliance with or reservations

to the Final Acts by other administrations.

The following day, 32 additional reservations were entered, 24 of which contained

similar statements. Three of those twentyfour made specific mention of the U.S. Reservation No. 38.

The reservation by the United States contained in paragraph 4 of Protocol Statement

No. 38, relating to the 890-to 960-MHz band

will, in all probability, cause a problem along

the U.S. borders primarily relating to nongovernment operations. The issue will become one of the many topics for discussion

and negotiation in the future U.S. bilateral

meetings on telecommunication matters

with Canada, Mexico, and other nearby

countries. The reservation merely places

these countries on notice that the United

States will coordinate its usage of the band

but will not seek agreement prior to making

assignments. Although radar users must

protect nongovernment operations in this

band, one reason agreements will not be

sought is that U.S. radiolocation usage in-
92 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

volves the newest long-range surveillance

radar in operation by the Navy, as well as

another Navy surveillance radar now in the

advanced development stage.

The reservations involving the bands

where radionavigation was added as a primary service along with radiolocation (8500

to 9000, 9200 to 9300, and 9500 to 9800

MHz) can, if not forestalled, result in longterm, worldwide problems. Radar usage by

the radiolocation service is extremely heavy

in the radiolocation bands between 8500 and

10,000 MHz. The addition of the radionavigation service and the multicountry fixed

and mobile footnotes in this band have taken

900 MHz of virtually exclusive radiolocation

in the current radio regulations and added

one or more primary services over the entire

band. Technical and administrative solutions must be sought if radiolocation is to retain its effectiveness. Some effective technical solutions were proposed to the 1978

CCIR special preparatory meeting by the

United States and the United Kingdom.

Study of the technical solutions to radiolocation-radionavigation sharing needs to be pursued in CCIR. A more immediate solution,

albeit partial, could be found administratively.

The U.S. International Radio Advisory

Committee (IRAC) has shown no inclination

to add radionavigation to the national table

of allocations. IRAC might examine the matter more thoroughly and develop a set of

recommendations for use by the State Department in discussions with other countries. The recommendations should propose

an orderly introduction of radionavigation

on an “as-needed” basis rather than throwing the bands open to any and all navigation

use. The intent would be to buy time for the

introduction of technical solutions. In the

absence of such a planned introduction, the

radiolocation service may soon find itself

having a de facto secondary status because

of the safety-of-life aspects of the radionavigation service.

The insertion of multiple country fixed

and mobile footnotes into the table of allocations threatened chaos for many services.

Through strenuous efforts by the United

States, Brazil, and other countries, the situation was eased for some “passive” services

(Earth-exploration satellite, space research,

and radio astronomy) and the meteorological

aids service. Radiolocation did not fare as

well. Although many countries deplored

these footnotes as being counter to the development of a rational table of allocations,

the United States was the only country to

act on them. The action noted in paragraph 3

of Protocol No. 38 indicated that the United

States, in the operation of radiolocation stations, will not guarantee protection to, nor

coordination with, other services. The action

was necessary because the existence of the

fixed and mobile footnotes in every radiolocation band between 1 and 40 GHz jeopardized all radars operating to serve national

defense. Straightforward as it is with regard

to the interference radars might cause to

other services, the U.S. reservation contains

the implicit statement that the radars can

operate in the presence of interference from

fixed and mobile emitters. All radars are

designed to be operated in the presence of interference, either purposeful or accidental.

The degree to which these interference rejection techniques will have to be improved and

used depends on how extensively other countries introduce fixed and mobile services in

these bands.

This implementation is not expected to occur equally in all the bands to which the footnotes have been added primarily due to economic considerations. However, early implementation is expected in the bands around 1

GHz and below where economical hardware

already exists for fixed and mobile applications.

The U.S. reservations in Protocol No. 38

contain the only specific reference to the radiolocation service. Of the remaining protocol statements, a few are political, many deal
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts • 93

with specific bands and services, and the majority contain protective clauses indicating

that the country or countries submitting the

protocol will take necessary action in the

event that other signatories abrogate the

Final Acts. Only three protocol statements

mention No. 38 and even in those cases the

concern seems to be more with the 6- and

7-MHz bands than with radiolocation. Thailand, in Protocol No. 60, notes that it will

allocate the band 435 to 438 MHz to the

mobile, except aeronautical-mobile, service

on a primary basis. Thus, while there is no

specific threat to the radiolocation service,

the mechanism is in place for electronic and

political harassment should any country

decide on this course of action.

Radar Spectrum Availability

and Costs

The availability of spectrum for the radiolocation service had been significantly increased below 200 MHz and above 40 GHz

and has remained virtually intact between

these two frequencies. The principal benefit

is that the new table of allocations (including

the footnotes to the table) in the radio regulations continue to provide basic allocations

for radiolocation service in all the currently

used bands as well as some new bands.

Of equal importance is the retention in the

United States of a primary status (by footnote) for radiolocation in the bands 420 to

430, 440 to 450, and 890 to 942 MHz. It is in

these bands, which were reduced to secondary status in the table of allocations, that the

United States has, and is developing, sophisticated surveillance radars. While these

radars have operational modes suitable for

worldwide use in a secondary status, the

footnotes will provide the opportunity for exercising all modes of operation at U.S. training sites. The results of WARC have, therefore, done little to reduce the spectrum available for radar operations.

Adequacy of spectrum availability notwithstanding, the costs of radar development and operation must increase as a result

of WARC-79. The increased costs will be associated with additional needs for operational frequency flexibility, development,

and procurement of hardware for interference-free operation while retaining existing

performance, and increased participation in

international forums such as CCIR.

Frequency management is a continuing

task, occupying staff people at the headquarters and unit level. Internationally, frequency managers ensure equitable allocations for

various services as dictated by national

needs; at the national level, they allot the

allocated frequencies as appropriate to national usage; at the unit level, they assign

frequencies in accordance with the local conditions. At all levels there is the need to deal

with the incidence of interference. It is clear

that all of these functions as applied to the

radiolocation service will increase because

of the additional services added by WARC to

the radiolocation bands.

New coordinating activities must now take

place between the radiolocation service and

the fixed, mobile, Earth-exploration satellite,

space research, radio astronomy, aeronautical radionaviagation, maritime radionavigation, radionavigation, and FSS. These activities are expected to be particularly heavy

as the allowed usage in the fixed, mobile, and

radionavigation bands are implemented. Significant numbers of interference incidents

are also expected in these bands entailing

the development of techniques to eliminate

or reduce this interference.

As noted earlier, all military radars are designed to operate in the presence of intentional (jamming) and unintentional (interference) signals. Numerous electronic counter-countermeasure (ECCM) techniques are

incorporated into systems to reduce the effects of unwanted electromagnetic emissions. However, ECCM is not a panacea for

interference problems. In this regard, a few

comments on radars, ECCM, and interference are in order.

First, radar performance is measured in

terms of a clear radiofrequency environment
—

94 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

with no interference present. Most ECCM

techniques involve some performance degradation. For this reason, a particular ECCM

should be used only when it is needed. Of

course, when interference is present, ECCM

will improve system performance but will

generally not bring it back to its clear environment performance. Second, ECCM techniques are largely signal-specific. Thus, a

radar will have several techniques to be able

to continue to operate in a changing radiofrequency environment. Not all techniques are

compatible so that use of one may preclude

the use of another. When multiple techniques are used, the performance degradation due to each is cumulative. And third,

radar emissions, which generate interference

into other services, are seldom considered as

part of an ECCM package.

These factors when coupled with the expected proliferation of radiolocation band

usage by other services means that radiolocation systems will spend more time with

ECCM circuits operating and, through their

radiofrequency emissions, be interfering

with more systems in other services. In the

short term, the need for extensive modifications to existing systems is not anticipated.

However, planning should begin now for necessary modifications to radars operating in

the frequency bands where the United

States took a reservation. In the long term,

development work on new and existing systems will have to be increased to ensure mission-fulfilling performance in the presence of

increased interference. This additional development work should concentrate both on

keeping unwanted signals out of the receiver

and on reducing the level and direction of unnecessary (“spurious”) emissions coming

from the radar. This represents more than

just an incremental increase in the ECCM

budget of radar development, since performance in the presence of the “friendly” interference should equate to the current performance in a clear environment. The increase may range from 5 to 15 percent depending on the type of radar and the proliferation of the other services in the radar

bands.

The third cost increase derives from a need

for radar developers to expand their participation in CCIR. This expansion is extremely

important in light of the many new sharing

situations created by WARC. Prior to

WARC, CCIR participation was considered

relatively unimportant by radiolocation

users since there was little sharing or interaction with other services. During preparations for WARC, it became apparent that

the many exclusive bands employed by the

radiolocation service would be reallocated or

shared. Because of this likelihood, representatives of the radiolocation service participated in the IRAC preparing for the

WARC-79 AD Hoc 144 and CCIR study

group activities, served as members of the

SPM delegation, and were part of the U.S.

delegation to WARC.

This representation should continue at

CCIR in order to establish a sound and consistent technical background for radar topics

in the reports of CCIR plenary meetings (the

CCIR Green Books). The absence of this

technical basis may have been part of the

reason that radiolocation received little

support at WARC-79. The representation

should consist of not only headquarters policy personnel but also scientists and engineers from Government laboratories and

from Government contractors. Perhaps

CCIR participation should become a “line

item” in the budget of every radar system

development. And CCIR should not be the

only involvement. Future ITU conferences

dealing with specific services and specific

regions will continue to have an effect on

radiolocation matters. It would be prudent

to have radar expertise at these meetings as

well.

Fixed-Satellite and

Mobile-Satellite Services

Table 9 provides a summary of WARC-79

gains and changes in status on fixed and

mobile satellite allocations above 27.5 MHz

as reflected in the allocation tables. The data

in the bandwidth and change columns illustrates that all the changes in the FSS and
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 95

Table 9.—Summary of WARC Gains and Changes in Status on Fixed- and Mobile.

Satellite Allocations Above 27.5 MHz

Type of Frequency band Bandwidth MHz Chang e Prior major use

satellite (MHz or GHz) Region(s) Primary Secondary MHz of the band

608-614 MHz

1544-1545

5850-5925

6425-7075

10.7-10.95 GHZ

11.2-11.45

12.1 -12.3

12,75-13.25

14.5 -14,8

17,3 -17.7

19.7 -20.2

27-27.5

29.5-30

30-31

37.5 -39.5

39.5 -40.5

42.5 -43,5

43.5-47

47.2 -50.2

50.4 -51.4

66-71

71-74

74-75.5

81-84

95-1oo

134-142

149-150

152-164

190-200

202-217

235-236

238-241

252-265

2

All

2

All

All

All

2

All

All

All

All

2 and 3

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

All

A l l

All

1

75

650

250

250

200

500

300

400

500

1000

2000

2000

1000

3500

3000

5000

3000

1500

3000

5000

8000

1000

12000

20000

15000

1000

3000

13000

M O

M O

FX

FX

FX

FX

FX

FX

FX

FX

M O

FX

M O

FX

FX

FX and MO

FX

M O

FX

M O

M O

FX and MO

FX

FX and MO

M O

M O

FX

FX

M O

FX

FX

FX

M O

SOURCE Systematics General Corp., “The World Administrative Radio Conference 1979, ” final report, volS I and II

6 + 6

+1

+ 75

+ 650

+ 250

+ 250

+ 200

+ 500

+ 300

+ 400

500 + 500

+ 500

500 + 500

+ 1000

+ 2000

+ 2000

+ 1000

+ 3500

+ 3000

1000 + 1000

+ 5000

+ 3000

+ 1500

+ 3000

+ 5000

+ 8000

+ 1000

+ 12000

+ 20000

+ 15000

+ 1000

+ 3000

+ 13000

BC

Aero mobile satellite

R L

FX MO

FX MO

FX MO

FX MO and BC

FX MO

FX MO

R L

FX satellite

FX and MO

FX satellite

FX satellite

FX and MO

FX and MO

BC satellite

Various MO satellites

Not allocated

FX satellite

Various MO satellites

Not allocated

Not allocated

Not allocated

Various MO satellites

Radio astronomy

Various MO satellites

Not allocated

Various satellites

Not allocated

Radio astronomy

Radio astronomy

Various satellites

MSS allocations were positive and generally

provided primary service status. The impression that everything went well for FSS and

MSS (and for DOD satellite interests) does

not reflect the full implications of WARC-79

decisions. There may be problems in satisfying the DSCS requirements in the 7- to

8-GHz band. DOD’s WARC-79 initial goal

for satellite operations was to increase the

two partially exclusive 50-MHz FSS bands

to 125 MHz for both fixed-satellite and

mobile-satellite communications, and to add

mobile-satellite as a secondary service in the

two 500-MHz FSS bands 7250 to 7750 MHz

and 7900 to 8400 MHz. Footnote 3764B was

added to the table of allocations that authorized the bands 7250 to 7375 MHz (space-toEarth) and 7900 to 8025 MHz (Earth-tospace) for use by MSS (subject to agreement

obtained under the procedure set forth in article N13A)—a major gain. An additional

footnote 3762B does not permit aircraft stations to operate in the 8025- to 8400-MHz

band in region 2. So, although the goal of 125

MHz for up and downlinks for fixed-satellite

and mobile-satellite communications was

achieved, this meant that the partial exclusivity that existed for FSS was lost in the

two 50-MHz bands (7250 to 7300 MHz and

7975 to 8025 MHz). The DOD plans for use

of ground-mobile forces (transportable) and

airborne satellite terminals in the United

States, NATO countries, and in selected

areas of the Pacific must take account of the

WARC-79 decisions. Frequency support for

these types of DSCS operations will require

long lead times to coordinate with host administrations.

The coordination requirements for mobilesatellite use in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band

have become more complex due to WARC-
96 “ Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

79. Previously, under footnote 3618/308A,

the use and development of this service was

only subject to the agreement among the administrations concerned and those having

services operating in accordance with the

table, which may be affected. Now the modified 308A (3618) requires two conditions to

be fulfilled:

. Agreement must be obtained under the

procedure set forth in article N13A.

– Under this article agreement among

administrations now becomes more

complex due to increased data to be

furnished–and adding IFRB to the

coordination process.

● Stations in MSS do not cause harmful

interference to those of other services

operating (or planned to be operating) in

accordance with the table.

The United States and most NATO countries took a reservation in the final protocol

against this second provision on the basis

that this imposes a condition of noninterference that could lead to a request to cease operation of a previously coordinated satellite

system in the case where an administration,

despite having agreed to such a satellite

system, puts into service (or merely plans)

a system that might receive harmful interference.

Costs Pertinent to National Security

Costs have been discussed earlier in this

report. Summarized here are the cost impacts of WARC-79 from the standpoint of

national security. There is no major immediate cost impact of WARC-79 regarding national security systems. No heavily used

equipment must be moved to another band

or phased out and no expensive retrofits are

required to existing DOD equipment because of WARC-79 actions. Three reasons

explain this lack of immediate cost impact:

● frequency flexibility of existing U.S.

equipment;

● success of the U.S. delegation at

WARC-79; and

● reservations taken by the United

States.

It should be emphasized that there will be

future costs resulting from the actions at

WARC-79. The nature of these costs are

varied. The military, in particular, is affected

by the number of footnotes (about 500) to the

table of frequency allocations that make it

impossible in some cases to know which

countries will use which frequency bands for

which services. Attempting to design military systems and plan operations on a worldwide basis with such uncertainty will increase system costs and decrease operational flexibility. This means, among other

things, that system planners will need to

design military systems that have the flexibility to operate in several different frequency bands. The extent of the changes and

the magnitude of the costs associated with

WARC-79 decisions will not become clear for

some time. Discussions between the United

States and other countries–particularly our

NATO allies—about implementation plans

will help clarify the future operating environment.

WARC-79 resulted in a large number of future conferences and DOD should actively

participate in the preparation for national

and international meetings pertinent to

these conferences—including the activities

of CCIR—to ensure that DOD spectrum

needs are accommodated and that our national security interests are protected. DOD

should also provide technically knowledgeable, experienced (and, to the extent possible, multilingual) members to the U.S. delegations. Of the three world conferences and

seven regional conferences recommended in

the Final Acts of WARC-79, the most important from a national security standpoint are:

●

●

World Administrative Radio Conference

on the Geostationary Orbit and the

Planning of Space Services (1985 and

1987); and

World Administrative Conference for

Mobile Services (1983).
—-

Ch. 4— WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 97

Mobile services were popular with the developing nations, and, with little regard for

the technical aspects of sharing between different radio services, many additions were

made to the table of frequency allocations in

support of these services. The conference

added many provisions impacting radar and

weapon system frequency bands, both for

terrestrial and satellite operations.

The overall DOD impact of these and other

changes related to sharing will be a greater

need for U.S. planners, managers, equipment

suppliers, and operational forces to be aware

of frequency band limitations, and a need to

ensure better system development review to

understand how U.S. systems can live with

those of other countries. These changes add

up to one thing for DOD—increased costs.

These include: costs associated with additional needs for operational frequency management; costs associated with the development and procurement of the more sophisticated equipment (e.g., increased tunability)

needed to permit interference-free operations

with other services in the same band; and

costs associated with proving the system is

compatible, such as electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) studies. And there will be

increased costs of coordination with our

allies. Other costs may become apparent

over time (e.g., as the HF reaccommodation

takes effect in the coming years).

Summary of the National Security

Impact of WARC-79

The major DOD-related issues and objectives were enumerated earlier. Here is a summary of the major impacts on those issues

and objectives. Before beginning a more detailed summary, however, it should be reiterated that in general the national security

interests of the U.S. were not endangered by

WARC-79 actions. Nevertheless, continued

active participation by DOD in the planning

and conduct of future discussions and conferences will be required to ensure that

follow-on actions to WARC-79 do not jeopardize national security. This will require

adequate budget support.

Radiolocation (Radar) .-The service retained almost all of its allocations above 200

MHz; the only actual reduction of allocation

to the radiolocation service occurred in the

216- to 230-MHz band in region 3. This occurred when 9 MHz of a secondary allocation

(216 to 225 MHz) was reduced to 7 MHz (223

to 230 MHz). When considering the magnitude of spectrum allocated for radiolocation

use, this reduction of 2 MHz is minor. Consistent with the U.S. proposals, radiolocation was reduced to a secondary service—except that in region 2 (the Americas) it

will be on a primary basis until 1990 after

which no new stations are to be authorized.

However, significant loss in radiolocation

status resulted from WARC-79 in certain radiolocation bands below 20 GHz. This loss of

status plus the movement of other users into

the bands combined to force the United

States to take a reservation (No. 38) affecting certain radiolocation bands.

Although there was little actual loss of

allocations, the provisions for radar were

probably changed more by WARC-79 than

for any other single radio operation. For example, in the band 3400 to 3600 MHz, there

are provisions for radar to operate worldwide, but radar users must afford some

measure of protection to satellite and radio

relay operators. The United States operates

the Airborne Warning and Control System

(AWACS), the Navy’s AEGIS, and several

other systems of importance to DOD (e.g.,

missiles, air traffic control, air surveillance,

etc. ) in the band 2900 to 3700 MHz, and their

operations may be affected through the need

for added planning coordination. If there is

extensive implementation of satellite communications in this band below 3600 MHz,

then the problems mentioned above would

be compounded–especially in Europe. The

radiolocation service lost some exclusivity in

the band 8500 to 10,000 MHz where DOD

operates navigation, air search, fire control

radars, and various airborne systems. When

footnotes are considered, radiolocation effectively lost exclusivity over the whole band

(8500 to 10,000 MHz). This could eventually
98 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference Of 1979

place constraints on radar operations and increase demands on system designers. Shortterm relief is provided by Protocol Statement No. 38, and intermediate term relief

can be negotiated with U.S. allies through

bilateral and multilateral agreements outside of the radio regulations. Nevertheless,

radar as it currently operates will become increasingly unwelcome in many parts of the

world, and new design and operational

strategies will be needed before the end of

the century.

Radionavigation.–The U.S. objective of

providing two bands (1215 to 1240 MHz

and 1559 to 1610 MHz) for space-to-Earth

navigation signals to accommodate the

NAVSTAR/GPS was achieved. NAVSTAR/

GPS is the cornerstone of future DOD high

accuracy global navigation. It can also provide for improved civil navigation.

Satellite Communications.—The U.S. objective to maintain the status quo for MSS

in the 235- to 399.9-MHz band used by the

Naval Fleet Satellite Communication System (FLTSATCOM) was partially achieved;

however, coordination provisions (article

N13A) were added that included a condition

that stations in MSS not cause harmful interference to those of other services operating, or planned to be operated, in accordance

with the table of allocations. To forestall the

potential negative impact, the United States

and most of its NATO allies, took a reservation in the Final Protocol.

A major U.S. objective was achieved

through the recognition of MSS. The bands

7250 to 7750 MHz and 7900 to 8400 MHz

had been allocated to FSS (DSCS I, II, III,

NATO SATCOM). Now, the MSS can operate on a primary basis in the bands 7250 to

7375 MHz and 7900 to 8025 MHz; however,

there was a corollary loss of the partial exclusivity for FSS in two 50-MHz bands (7250

to 7300 MHz and 7975 to 8025 MHz). There

was a net gain for national security objectives through these changes, although

deployment of satellite systems without

causing interference to radio relay systems

in some areas will become increasingly difficult.

All U.S. objectives were met in the 20-,30-,

and 40-GHz bands that may be used by future generation military satellite systems

(e.g., DSCSs), including provisions for

commodating MSS.

The United States sought to avoid

possible future loss of system design flex

ity and orbit locations associated wit

acthe

bil-

 a

rigid a priori allocation plan for satellites in

the geostationary orbit. While no plan was

adopted at WARC-79, plans were made for a

future conference on space systems to be

held no later than 1985–with a follow-on

conference about 18 months later. These

space conferences will probably result in

some form of orbit spectrum planning that

could inhibit technological development. The

impact on all future DOD space systems is

potentially very large. Proper preparation

for these conferences is essential, including

adequate budget allocations.

High Frequency.–The U.S. objectives of

providing for the increasing requirements of

international broadcasting (e.g., Radio Free

Europe, Voice of America, etc.) and maritime

operations (while limiting the loss of HF

spectrum for DOD operations) were met, although the United States took reservations

below 10 MHz for both of these services. The

net reduction of only 14 percent in HF spectrum available to DOD should not adversely

affect U.S. strategic networks, which rely increasingly on satellites, and the available

spectrum should accommodate our tactical

and other HF national security requirements.

Fixed and Mobile (Terrestrial) .-The U.S.

objective of maintaining the status quo in

the important NATO band of 4400 to 4990

-MHz was not met. The band is heavily used

by the military for tactical communications

(primarily radio relay and troposcatter systems). Although the present and past allocations provided for FSS in this band, there is

no known satellite system operating as such.
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 99

In order to provide some protection, the

fixed-satellite was changed from uplink to

downlink and shifted from 4400 to 4700

MHz to 4500 to 4800 MHz, which is shared

with fixed and mobile. (The aeronauticalmobile service is excluded from 4825 to 4836

MHz and 4950 to 4990 MHz by footnote.)

The band 14.5 to 15.35 MHz was also designated by NATO as a primary military band

for fixed and mobile services. WARC-79 included the FSS (Earth-to-space) in the band

14.5 to 14.8 MHz shared equally with fixed

and mobile. By footnote, FSS would be limited to the broadcast feeder links and would

be reserved for countries outside Europe.

The effect is that, if satellite service is instituted, the military systems would have to

be located and operated in a manner that

would not cause interference. Analyses of

potential interference might lead to the requirement for sharing sensitive military

technical data with civil administrations.

The impact of these changes cannot be fully

determined until after discussions with our

NATO allies.

Intelligence, –The impact of WARC-79 on

U.S. intelligence systems is not discussed in

this report.

Resolutions, Recommendations ,

Reservations, and Declaration

Many of the important consequences of

WARC-79 derived from resolutions and recommendations approved by the conference

and from reservations and declarations by

individual countries indicating a refusal to

be bound by a particular decision of the conference or agreeing to undertake certain actions in order to conform to a decision.

A total of 87 resolutions and 90 recommendations were adopted by WARC-79. Many of

the resolutions referred certain topics for

study by CCIR or proposed the convening of

world or regional administrative radio conferences. In addition, the developing countries introduced several resolutions seeking

increased assistance in the following areas:

technical cooperation in maritime telecommunications, especially by providing technical advice and by assisting in

training personnel;

technical cooperation in national radio

propagation studies in tropical areas

designed to improve and develop the

developing countries’ radiocommunications;

development of national radio frequency

management within the developing

countries through such means as regional seminars and training;

transfer of technology in telecommunications for the purpose of developing

services and attaining social, economic,

and cultural objectives of the developing countries; and

use or role of telecommunications in

rural development.

Those resolutions look to UNDP as the

primary source of funding. However, the

United States will be expected to participate

directly or indirectly in the areas described.

Some decisions must be made how the

United States should respond to requests for

assistance.

Many of the resolutions and recommendations relating to the CCIR study topics have

to do with such highly controversial subjects

as the use of the geostationary satellite orbit

and the planning of space services utilizing

it; the convening of a WARC for the planning of the HF bands allocated to the broadcasting service; and, the convening of a regional administrative radio conference for

this detailed planning of the broadcastingsatellite service in the 12-GHz band and associated feeder links in region 2.

About 2 dozen specialized world or regional administrative radio conferences were proposed at WARC-79, many of which can affect U.S. interests. The conference recommended that three world conferences and

seven regional conferences be held. (The recommended conferences and their projected

dates are listed at the end of chapter 6.)
100 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

A reservation, as noted earlier, is a formal

statement, as part of a protocol, wherein an

ITU member indicates that it will not abide

by a particular decision of a conference.

These reservations are called protocol statements in the Final Acts of WARC-79 and

this time the United States took a total of

six. (Reservations generally provide a means

by which countries can accept the majority

of decisions reached by a WARC without

being bound by a particular decision.)

Two of the six were rebuttal statements in

which: 1) the United States rejected a Cuban

complaint that U.S. use of radiofrequencies

at our Guantanamo Naval Base was an impediment to Cuba’s communication services

and Cuban sovereignty; and 2) the United

States joined with 22 other countries in

noting that the claims of equatorial countries to sovereignty over segments of the

geostationary orbit were not germane to the

work of the conference. Such rebuttal statements are common in conferences such as

WARC-79 to indicate that political rhetoric

should not be confused with international

agreements.

A third U.S. reservation called attention to

the fact that our international broadcasting

in the HF bands was being intentionally

jammed by other ITU members and reserved the right to take “necessary and appropriate action” to protect U.S. broadcasting interest. The statement was included primarily to put the jamming problem on the

record inasmuch as the subject was not mentioned during the course of the conference,

although Israel made a reference to jamming

in its statement for the final protocol.

None of these three reservations will impact on telecommunications operations directly; however, all three are likely to resurface at future conferences.

The remaining three U.S. reservations

dealt directly with spectrum matters. In Protocol No. 32, the United States participated

in a joint NATO statement rejecting the

terms of a footnote affecting the operation of

MSS in the bands 235 to 322 MHz and 335.4

to 399.9 MHz. The NATO countries agreed

that they could meet the prescribed coordination procedures called for in the footnote. However, they rejected an additional

provision of this footnote imposing a condition of noninterference. The concern was

that this condition could lead to a request to

cease operation of a previously coordinated

satellite system when another country merely planned a system that might receive

harmful interference from a MSS operating

in the band. A separate reservation of

Canada supported the U.S. view that future

or planned terrestrial systems should not

jeopardize existing MSS.

In Protocol No. 36, the United States

joined the seven other countries in protesting the inadequate provision for HF

broadcasting–particularly at 6 and 7 MHz.

Fourteen other countries individually took

reservations on this same matter. They all

expressed concern that the forthcoming HF

broadcasting conferences (1984 and 1986)

will be hampered by the lack of adequate allocations, and reserved the right to take the

necessary steps to meet the needs of their

HF broadcasting services.

The United States took a major reservation in Protocol No. 38 that was submitted in

five parts. The first two parts referred to

Protocol Nos. 36 and 32. The third part

stated that the United States could not

guarantee protection to or coordination with

other services that experienced interference

from radars operated on a primary basis in a

variety of specified bands. The fourth part

stated that the United States reserves the

right to operate fixed, mobile, and radiolocation services in the bands 470 to 806 MHz

and 890 to 960 MHz without the required coordination procedures specified in footnotes

pertaining to these bands. The United States

agreed to coordinate its usage of such services with neighboring countries that are affected, but not with all the other countries

that might, for no apparent good reason, request coordination under article 14.

Part five of the reservation addresses the

failure of the conference to provide adequate
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts ● 101

allocations for the maritime-mobile service

below 12 MHz. In this reservation, the

United States indicated that allocations to

the mobile service below 10 MHz would be

used to satisfy maritime mobile requirements.

The U.S. reservations contained in Protocol Statement 38 represent a conscious decision to take whatever steps are necessary to

protect vital U.S. national interests. They

cannot be regarded simply as a failure by the

U.S. delegation to get what it wanted at

WARC-79. This is no more valid than listing

the hundreds of U.S. proposals that won approval and thereby claiming overall success.

Foreign Reservations

The remaining 77 reservations, some of

which bear the names of several countries,

can be grouped in three categories:

● general reservations;

. political reservations; and

● specific reservations.

Some 35 reservations can be categorized

as “general” in that they were merely statements of a country’s intent to do whatever is

necessary to protect its radio-communication services should other ITU members fail

to observe the radio regulations or take

other detrimental measures.

Another 17 reservations are “political” in

that they relate to territorial disputes

(United States and Cuba over Guantanamo;

Great Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands; Chile and Great Britain over

the Antarctic). two others relate to sovereignty claims to the geostationary orbit.

Finally, 28 reservations address specific

issues. Of these, 19 are concerned with the

allocation of HF among the broadcasting,

fixed, and mobile services. The majority of

these were entered by developing countries

and state that they may not be able to satisfy their fixed and mobile service requirements with the reduced allocations and they

reserve the right to continue using these

frequencies for those services. The large

number of reservations on this single subject

shows that the issue of HF allocations is far

from settled. Continuing difficulties are likely, including actual interference with existing services, the inability of some countries to satisfy their requirements, and a

troublesome time at future scheduled broadcasting conferences.

This leaves nine specific foreign reservations on all other subjects. Of these nine,

four deal with the UHF band. All are related

to localized problems, none of which greatly

affect the United States. The remaining five

are as follows:

●

●

●

●

Belgium warned that it will use the band

100 to 104 MHz for a new network of

broadcasting stations. Since the band is

now, and has been, allocated for this

service, the reservation addresses the

question of allotments or assignments

in a region 1 broadcasting plan, a subject outside the agenda of WARC-79.

Japan said in another statement that it

will continue to use the band 130 to

526.5 kHz for aeronautical radio-beacons. If region 1 broadcast stations continue to cause interference in the band

190 to 285 kHz, Japan will reallocate to

protect itself.

Nigeria claimed that the allocation of 14

to 14.8 GHz for feeder links to broadcasting satellites is not acceptable. This

reservation is apparently intended to indicate that 14.0 to 14.5 GHz will be used

for INTELSAT satellite services in Nigeria leaving only 300 MHz for feeder

links to broadcasting satellites. However, sharing arrangements between

those services should help assure adequate spectrum for feeder links.

In a joint reservation, France and Switzerland objected to high-power broadcast stations below 5000 kHz and above

41 MHz. Brazil expressed opposition to

a WARC resolution establishing the period of validity of frequency assignments to satellites prior to the 1985 and

1987 space planning conferences, arguing that the resolution would prevent
—

102 Ž Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the planning conferences from deciding

on other distributions of frequency and

orbit allotments. However, the resolution specifically stated that its application should not prejudge decisions of the

planning conferences.

. Finally, a Thailand reservation extended its allocation to the mobile service (except aeronautical-mobile) to the

entire band 430 to 440 MHz. The effect

is minimal because of the many other

services and countries already included

by footnotes.

Declaration

The United States signed a formal declaration of intent together with other countries

at the WARC-79 conference as part of the effort to resolve the controversy surrounding

use of the band 3.4 to 3.7 GHz.

In ITU regions 2 and 3 (the Americas,

Oceania, and Asia) this band is allocated on

an equal basis to both the fixed satellite and

radiolocation services. Based on studies

showing that it is not feasible for these two

services to share the same band, the United

States has not implemented FSS, but has

carried on important military radar operations in this band. Commercial satellite systems—both the global INTELSAT system

and U.S. domestic systems—operate in the

adjacent band 3.7 to 4.2 GHz. The U.S. proposal to the WARC-79 was to maintain the

status quo and retain radiolocation as a

primary service in the 3.4 to 3.7 GHz band.

While the United States was prepared to

make some provision for FSS to use a part of

the band, other countries, particularly from

the developing world, insisted that the entire

band be made available to expand satellite

service.

From the viewpoint of the satellite operator, this proposal represents a logical and

cost effective expansion into a band contiguous with existing operations. The problem

for the United States, of course, is that it has

large investments in radar equipment that is

vital to national security and these radars

would interfere with satellite operations in

the same band.

Negotiations were intense and a compromise was found late in the conference.

The final result did, indeed, reduce radiolocation to a secondary service in the International Table of Allocations. However, by a

footnote to the table of allocations, primary

status was restored to the radiolocation

service in regions 2 and 3 for the bands 3.4 to

3.6 GHz. The footnote includes a directive

for ITU members to take all practical steps

to protect FSS after 1985 with a nonbinding

appeal for radiolocation systems to cease operations by 1985. The compromise was made

possible by the removal of any mandatory requirement to cease radar operations in the

band. As part of the compromise, a declaration was signed by the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,

Australia, and Belgium vowing to make reasonable effort to accommodate FSS in the

band.

The United States will determine how to

implement the intent of the declaration

through its domestic processes. There are no

FSS Earth stations currently operating in

the 3.4- to 3.7-GHz band. However, the

United States agreed not to withhold support if INTELSAT decided to undertake

FSS operations in that band. If such a decision was made, the United States would be

under strong pressure to restrain radar operations that might interfere with international satellite operations.

In the FCC’s third notice of inquiry concerning implementation of the Final Acts of

WARC-79 (General Docket 80-739) FCC proposed that only limited use be made of the

FSS allocations in the 3.6- to 3.7-GHz and

4.5- to 4.8-GHz bands. The FCC’s notice proposes a limitation on the use of these bands

to international satellite systems (specifically the INTELSAT global system) and excludes domestic satellite systems. FCC expects, according to its third notice of in-
Ch. 4—WARC-79 Overview, Actions, and Impacts c 103

quiry, that no more than one

on each coast of the United

Earth station successfully coordinated with stations operStates can be ating in the radiolocation service.

The Impacts of WARC-77

The 1977 World Administrative Radio

Conference for broadcasting satellites was

convened to plan the use of the 11.7- to

12.2-GHz band that had been allocated in

1971 on a primary basis to the broadcasting

satellite service, the fixed service, broadcasting service, and (in region 2 only) FSS.

The decisions reached at WARC-77 are

superseded by the Final Acts of WARC-79,

but the manner in which these decisions

were reached, and their longer term consequences, deserve some discussion.

Because the broadcasting satellite service

was in an early stage of development, the

United States produced elaborate technical

arguments in advance against the adoption

of a detailed geostationary orbit and channel

allotment plan, believing that such a plan

would waste orbit and spectrum and hinder

technological advances. The United States

proposed instead that the conference approve certain actions that would encourage

planning that was evolutionary and flexible,

rather than detailed and restrictive, and

would make adequate provision for FSS in

region 2 (the Americas).

The conference ignored the U.S. technical

arguments and embraced the concept of detailed planning for two basic reasons:

● the majority of developing countries

wanted to be assured of guaranteed access to specific orbital slots and channels and were convinced that a detailed

a priori plan offered them that assurance; and

• a number of European countries believed that the adoption of an a priori

plan would permit them to proceed with

development of terrestrial services in

the 11.7- to 12.2-GHz band.

Neither of these two goals would have

been helped by adoption of an evolutionary

plan that was subject to change. Moreover,

the United States, Canada, and Brazil were

the only countries planning use of the band

for FSS and therefore concerned with problems of sharing between broadcasting satellites and FSS. Also, the United States and

Canada had unilaterally ruled out primary

domestic use of the band for terrestrial

services.

The U.S. delegation made extensive efforts to find fallback positions, or supporting

technical documentation, which, while encompassing U.S. views, would meet the concerns of other countries. These efforts were

unsuccessful. The United States failed to

forestall the adoption of a detailed plan for

regions 1 and 3, but succeeded in putting off

detailed planning for BSS in region 2 until

1983.

It can be argued that the United States

prepared for the wrong conference in 1977.

The delegation was thoroughly armed with

technical arguments based on experimental

operation of ATS-6 and CTS, satellites with

broadcasting capabilities. The United States

sent representatives to a series of regional

ITU seminars and held bilateral discussions

with a number of countries, including West

Germany, Japan, the U. S. S. R., and the

United Kingdom. Reports from these meetings made it clear that the U.S. position was

shared by very few countries and was more

than likely doomed to failure from the start.

Thus, in spite of a major U.S. effort, the

principle of a “negotiated plan” for the space

services was established and fully accepted

by a large majority of ITU members at

WARC-77, and the “planning” adopted was
104 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

detailed planning including specifications of proaches that will satisfy renewed demands

national orbital positions, channel assign- for “guaranteed access” for all countries and

ments, service areas, and a variety of de- still permit the introduction of advanced

tailed technical characteristics. There is no technology to increase the capacity of the

reason to assume that this approach will not geostationary orbit and related spectrum to

be advocated for other space services, such meet increasing requirements.

as FSS, in future conferences.

A major challenge for the United States

will be to develop alternate planning ap-
Chapter 5

Alternative Structures,

Procedures, and Strategies
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

A More Restrictive Global Information Environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Renewed Focus on Regional Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

A More Active and Stronger Government Presence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

U.S. Government Communications Policy and Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

U.S. Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

Possible procedural and Structural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Procedural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Structural Improvements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With International Spectrum Issues and ITU. . 114

Policy Option No. l: Withdrawal From ITU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITU Voting Formula . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Policy Option No.3: Increased Regionalization of ITU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

Policy Option No. 4: Better Coordination and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

Policy Option No. 5: Common-User System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Policy Option No.6: “A Priori" Allotment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure No. Page

4. Displacement in Longitude for Countries in the Northern and

Southern Hemispheres. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

5. Available Geostationary Arc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Chapter 5

Alternative Structures,

Procedures, and Strategies

Countries

growth of

Introduction

planning for the extension and

their telecommunications networks and improvements in communications

generally have to set out a reasonably longterm strategy since a number of very important factors (resources, investments, sociopolitical needs and trends, international relations, technological possibilities and threats)

must be considered concurrently.

Communications and information systems

technology has reached the stage where concepts such as the “information-based society” are the subject of intense national and

international discussion. High technology

systems of advanced computer-communications including digital/switched facsimile,

computer polling systems, packet switching

data networks, distributed processor-controlled switching, and multiple-access satellite systems are appropriate to the needs of

both developed and less developed countries.

The use of such technology can greatly reduce costs for important services; they can

extend service to rural or remote points; they

can give these countries fast and convenient

access to the best and most advanced information banks in the world. Many nations are

beginning to grasp these implications. As a

result, telecommunications is increasingly

viewed as a “tool for development” and as a

key to greater information capacity and

power. This suggests that national communication and telecommunication planning

must take account of broader considerations

than were once considered necessary.

The telecommunication planner faces a

new and potentially explosive situation. The

facilities and services now being considered

create a new infrastructure—an electronic infrastructure that makes possible and promotes electronic information transfer that

will have significant, often radical, effects on

the structures of cities, transportation,

economics, education, banking, postal services, the nature and control of information

media, the privacy and security of citizens,

as well as general lifestyles. Changing political, sociological, and economic needs or constraints will, in turn, strongly influence the

range, tariffs, and structure of the telecommunications facilities and services. The future environment is considerably more uncertain than the present volatile scene. It is

also more political and characterized by a

growth in the “communications consciousness” of people.

There is growing recognition that electronic and telecommunication technologies

and their application to new integrated

systems are an important source of economic

stimulus. The importance of these technologies in social and economic development,

national security, cultural diffusion, and influence over popular thinking combine to

create a strong bias and argument for promoting and protecting national information

industries and U.S. electronics manufacturing capability.

Information power is being increasingly

recognized and used by the nations of the

world to increase and enhance their economic and political power. Telecommunications is a key resource in the creation and exploitation of information capacity and

power. As nations realize and appreciate the

pivotal role and importance of information

and information power, telecommunication

policies will be viewed as strategic means for

increasing national sovereignties and reordering world affairs.

107
108 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

A More Restrictive Global

Information Environment

Information exchange between and among

nations is essential if nations of the world are

to function as viable societies in a multipolar, information interdependent world.

The global flow of information is essential to

the sustenance of the current level and pattern of the world’s collective intelligence and

economic production, development, and

growth. The underlying principles of freedom of information and freedom of expression have given rise, in some countries, to

the doctrine of free flow of information. For

30 years, the idea, given legitimacy at the

United Nations, was that no barriers should

prevent or distort the flow of information

among nations. This doctrine is presently

under serious attack.

The absence of, or loss of confidence in

freedom of information rights or privileges

in many of the Third World nations, as well

as the Communist countries, is a fundamental threat to the global flow of information.

In conjunction with the indirect barriers imposed by other international information

issues and concerns, namely transborder

data flow, the potential regulation of information imports and exports (contained in national policies for patents, advertising technology transfers, direct investment, appropriate technology, etc.), the protection of domestic electronics and information industries, and the global patterns of information

power, the future suggests a much more restrictive global information environment.

On the way to this new global information

infrastructure, the United States and other

nations will face a broad range of major problems and issues including:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

international technical operating standards and procedures;

privacy and other considerations affecting transborder data flows;

international marketing rules;

reconciliation of national differences

concerning service availability and accessibility, information availability and

accessibility, sociocultural variations,

frequency assignments and management, national telecommunications and

information policies;

impacts on national sovereignty;

influence and control of information on

world events, attitudes, and outcomes;

and

the benefits of information imports v.

the cost of information dependency.

Many of the developing countries are already evidencing an awareness of the linkages among these issues and of the interplay

and interdependency that exists with radio

spectrum matters.

Renewed Focus on Regional

Telecommunications

The 20 years ranging from about the mid- tablishment of international satellite com1950’s to the mid-1970’s can be com- munication facilities and institutions (e.g.,

sidered the global expansion phase in the de- INTELSAT). The thrust was towards intervelopment of international telecommunica- continental connections and national access

tions. This was dominated by the initial lay- to the global satellite network. Dramatic deing of undersea telephone cables and the es- creases in international satellite communica-
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies • 109

tion costs and a corresponding increase in

demand reflected and characterized this

global expansion period.

We are presently in a phase in which

regional needs and policies will predominate.

Nations will become more interested in specific connectivity of external communication

routes in support of national and regional

political and economic goals and information

policies as contrasted with the more general

nature of global facilities expansion. The

thrust will be on intraregional communications along with focused development or

enhancement of specific interregional communication routes.

Corresponding to this shift in needs and

opportunities will be a change in institutional influence. Regional bodies such as the

European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administration (CEPT), the

Arab satellite consortium (ARABSAT), and

entities that support regional policies of

political and economic integration (such as

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN) will grow in influence relative to

such bodies as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which will be compelled to accommodate these pressures and

make strategic changes.

A More Active and Stronger

Government Presence

Without doubt, governments around the

world will become increasingly involved in

the development, management, and control

of communications technologies, products,

and applications. They will seek to utilize

and manipulate telecommunications, including frequency matters, in furtherance of national and international goals.

In most of the world, telecommunication

services are provided by a state-sanctioned

monopoly, that whether state owned or not,

is likely to be a government or quasi-government institution. This is not the case in the

United States and it is a factor that assumes

added importance as computer and communications services continue to converge,

eroding the boundaries between the private

and public sector in communication and information goods and services.

U.S. Government

and

Communications Policy

Structures

How is the United States likely to fare in

this new environment? While it can be argued that the present structure of the U.S.

Government and its policymaking processes

in the telecommunication areas have protected and sustained our vital national interests to date, the question is whether it will

be adequate for tomorrow. Since spectrum

is the common denominator in all uses

of radio, coordination is essential for the

various services to function in a compatible

manner. It is this coordination, which has

over the years become a very specialized and

sophisticated art, that frequently bears

directly on policy decisions. Much of the

ITU-sponsored negotiations relate to spectrum use. Because of this, spectrum management in the United States has been scrutinized many times, sometimes criticized, and

sometimes praised, down through the years.
110 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Starting at least 30 years ago there has

been concern over the effectiveness of the

government structure to cope with the international aspects of telecommunications—

particularly the negotiation of agreements

within ITU and other United Nations (U. N.)

organizations. Most of the international negotiations have been motivated by technical

considerations, primarily radio spectrum

issues, without the advantage of a clearly

stated overall national telecommunication

policy.

The United States has done well in most of

these negotiations but with each international conference the maneuvering room has

decreased and thus the preparation and actual negotiating have become more difficult.

As we go into the decade of the 1980’s, the

international aspects of telecommunications

are becoming more preeminent than ever. No

longer can fundamental telecommunication

policy issues be avoided by relying on technical agreements, motivated by technical

considerations, and negotiated on the presumption that only technical issues need

resolution. Unfortunately, the present Federal Government structure, while responding to the technical aspects of international

communications negotiations, has not developed a mechanism or procedure for developing comprehensive policy.

There are three fundamental weaknesses

1. The lack of appreciation at the top decision levels of the Federal Government

and industry as to the vital role of telecommunications in the international

and domestic political, economic, and

private affairs of the United States, and

the need for policy coordination.

2. There is a lack of centralized policy coor3

dination and guidance for international

telecommunication negotiations at a

high enough level in the Federal Government to be effective.

The State Department’s Office of International Communications Policy is

neither staffed nor institutionally organized to carry out effectively all of the

functions involved in international telecommunications negotiations.

These structural weaknesses are a direct

reflection of the lack of clear U.S. policy for

telecommunication matters including spectrum management issues. Moreover, the

U.S. permanent spectrum management

mechanisms are not adequate to review all

stated requirements of Government and

nongovernment spectrum users objectively

or to verify and adjust needs consistent with

national policy objectives. The United

States also lacks an effective means of collecting data and developing guidelines to

judge the merits of one spectrum use over

any other.

in the present structure:

U.S. Structure

Spectrum

and Processes

Management

The planning and management of the spec- agency develops its requirements for spectrum in the United States is handled by-the

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

(as manager for nongovernment users) and

by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) (as man- .

ager for Federal Government agencies requiring spectrum for their radio-communication systems). Each executive branch

trum and orbit use and-these are discussed

and coordinated through the mechanisms of

the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC) and its several subcommittees. The nongovernment requirements of

commercial public and private users are developed through the FCC notice of inquiry

(NOI) process often with the aid of advisory
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies “ 111

committees. NTIA and FCC coordinate to

resolve differences and together with the

State Department develop a single set of

U.S. proposals for ITU administrative radio

conferences such as WARC-79.

NTIA and FCC must agree on the bands

that are proposed for individual services and

this requires agreement on the eventual domestic allocation of each band: whether for

Government use, nongovernment use, or

shared use. The State Department serves as

ombudsman in resolving disagreements, if

any, over U.S. proposals to international

radio conferences and the President acts as

final artiber if the State Department cannot

resolve the problem. Depending on the portion of the spectrum involved, shared use

ranges from about 20 percent for the region

between 100 and 1000 MHz to 100 percent

for the band 10 to 100 kHz. The working

level forum for the generation of Government proposals and coordination between

them and the nongovernment proposals is

usually a special ad hoc committee of IRAC.

Such ad hoc committees include participation by FCC liaison representatives who present the nongovernment view.

Consensus between NTIA and FCC on the

division of spectrum between Government

and nongovernment users does not necessarily ensure the most efficient use of spectrum.

Moreover, IRAC is an advisory committee to

NTIA and it can recommend but cannot

compel spectrum-efficient design or technology on large, powerful agencies like the

Department of Defense (DOD). The power

and resources of NTIA to successfully challenge spectrum decisions of such agencies

are limited.

Possible Procedural and

Structural Improvements

Procedural Improvements

Improvements needed in the present procedures for managing and planning Government and nongovernment use of the spectrum include better means to provide adequately for:

●

●

●

●

validation of requirements, giving particular attention to current spectrum

usage, technology and development

trends, and sharing opportunities between competing users of the spectrum;

inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficient

techniques and technology in system design of both Government and nongovernment systems;

apportionment of frequency spectrum

between Government and nongovernment services based on national priorities;

effective planning for future spectrum

and orbit needs;

● efficient and timely preparation for and

participation in ITU conferences; and

● effective management of existing services and users on a continuing basis.

Some of these shortcomings could be corrected without any fundamental change in

the structure of FCC or NTIA. Assigning

spectrum management a higher priority and

using resources more efficiently would help

improve the present situation. For example,

FCC should be able to improve its data base

for spectrum management with the help of

its own computer and spectrum experts. The

establishment of deadlines for inclusion of

licensing information in FCC master files

can be accomplished by FCC action. A more

fundamental procedural change would be to

place all incoming applications for licenses,

construction permits, authorizations, etc., in

FCC computer on receipt. In other words,

FCC could institute an information and data

processing system approach to aid its spectrum management activities.
112 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

The validation of spectrum requirements,

and the apportioning of spectrum between

Government and nongovernment users,

should receive closer scrutiny. A mechanism

using analytical tools to evaluate needs and

assess priorities among competing users of

the spectrum would provide decisionmakers

with basic information and data for use in

establishing policies and reviewing requirements. Federal spectrum requirements are

reviewed by IRAC and its Spectrum Planning Subcommittee, but this function needs

to be strengthened and broadened to effectively consider longer range impacts. FCC

needs to be better equipped to assess future

spectrum requirements of the private sector,

including the use of new technology.

Economic techniques (e.g., auctions, lotteries, spectrum fees, resale of frequency

spectrum assignments, etc.) should be considered, at least on an experimental basis, to

provide guidance on the consequences of different spectrum allocation decisions and the

introduction of newer technology. These

should include techniques for evaluating the

relative economic viability of alternative

spectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradio

communication systems. The use of economic techniques in spectrum management

might require legislative action. FCC,

perhaps with the aid of a task force, other

Government agencies that have studied the

question, industry groups, and private experts, could select a few services for detailed

analysis of the prospects of using one or

more economic techniques. FCC could then

present its recommendations for the experimental application of a selected technique, or

techniques, to one or a limited number of

services and frequency bands to Congress

for its information and action, if necessary.

Problems relating to forming a U.S.

delegation for WARC-79 could be addressed

and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in

international meetings could be improved by

several steps: 1) industry and other nongovernment delegates could again be permitted

to participate fully as U.S. representatives

at international telecommunication conferences and take any assignments on the delegation for which their skills and experience

qualify them. Legislation to accomplish this

passed both Houses of the 96th Congress.

However, the legislation to which it was

added was vetoed by the President for reasons unrelated to the exemption. The measure was again passed by the Senate and reported by the responsible House committee,

but the House of Representatives did not

consider it before adjournment; 2) consideration could be given to finding means to

comply with due process requirements under

the Administrative Procedures Act and still

name industry and other nongovernment

representatives to delegations on a timely

basis; and 3) establish guidelines with an implementing mechanism to name the chairman and individual delegates to the U.S. delegation. Qualifications required, distribution

of various skills needed, and type of

representation desired would be selected

from the best candidates available, especially those who participated in the preparatory

effort. If special Government support is necessary to assure certain representation, then

that support should be available early in the

preparatory stages.

Structural Improvement s

Chapter 3 discussed the present structure

within the Federal Government to perform

spectrum management and participate in international telecommunication conferences.

Consistent with the findings of past commissions and task forces going back to 1950,

this study also finds that structural improvements are necessary. Primarily, the

problems stem from the absence of high-level

Government attention to effective policy

coordination. Accountability for spectrum

management issues and international negotiations is difficult to assign under the present structure.

Congress could consider ways to improve

the present structure or examine possible

changes in the structure. A detailed analysis

of alternatives is beyond the scope of this

study that concentrates on the results of
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 113

WARC-79. However, at least four options

are available to Congress:

1.

2.

3.

4.

maintain the status quo and make no

changes;

maintain the present structure, but

raise the level of attention and accountability within the responsible agencies;

establish a mechanism—such as a task

force of high-level Government officials—to develop, examine, and make

recommendations on structural and procedural improvements; or

establish a permanent board, council, or

interagency- committee of high-level

Government officials to be responsible

and accountable for international telecommunication policy coordination and

the preparations for international conferences.

Option 1: Status Quo.

The relatively low priority given to spectrum management issues within the Government will likely continue under the status

quo as discussed in this report. This reflects

the relative lack of appreciation and attention at a high level of Government to telecommunications generally. Even with the

unprecedented number of upcoming conferences of ITU and the direct importance of

these conference decisions to the United

States, the State Department, particularly,

will find it difficult to raise the priority of

radio spectrum issues vis-a-vis other nontelecommunication foreign policy issues. Moreover, FCC is unlikely to assign a higher priority to spectrum management in light of

other pressing regulatory policy issues.

Option 2: Raise the Level of Attention

Within the Present Structure.

Congress could take steps through its

oversight activities to focus attention on

ways to improve coordination and develop

coherent policies and strategies for international telecommunication matters generally

and spectrum issues in particular. Congress

could require special reports from responsible agencies on steps taken to improve the

status quo spectrum management throughout the Government. Several possible procedural measures were discussed earlier. In

addition to those, it may be beneficial to

establish a more formal and continuing conference preparatory mechanism within the

existing structure of divided responsibilities

among several Government agencies. This

would replace the more “ad hoc” approach

followed in the past. If such a mechanism

was not justified when ITU conferences were

held at infrequent intervals, it appears

necessary now when over a dozen conferences are scheduled over the next 7 or 8

years. Complex issues of vital concern to the

U.S. with direct consequences for both international and domestic telecommunications

are on the agendas of these meetings. Developing and recommending skilled delegates

for U.S. delegations could be made a part of

this process. Formal training in negotiating,

language, and diplomatic skills could also be

included.

Option 3: Create a Task Force To Examine

and Make Recommendations on Structural

Changes.

Congress could mandate that an interagency task force of high-level officials

from responsible Government agencies be

established. This task force would examine

alternative structural changes, assess the

pros and cons of each, and report to the

President with recommendations. The President, in turn, could make a report to Congress with specific proposals where legislation is required. Because of the divided responsibilities and direct influences of several

Government agencies, the task force might

include representatives from the following

agencies: Department of Commerce—including NTIA, Department of State, FCC, DOD,

Department of Justice, Office of Management and Budget, and possible representation from the Office of the U.S. Trade

Representative.

Option 4: Establish a Permanent Board or

Other Mechanism.

Congress could consider the establishment

of a permanent board, council, or inter-
114 . Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

agency committee to coordinate international telecommunication policy. Spectrum

management issues and international negotiations would be key elements of the work of

this body. Such a board could be charged

with the continuing responsibility to: coordinate international telecommunication policy; plan and direct strategies to achieve policy objectives; assess the need for personnel

and other resources within the Government

to conduct an effective international program including ways to use resources more

effectively; - and prepare for international

conferences and meetings.

Depending on the specific mandate for

such a board, the present structure for spectrum management within the Government

would be altered to a greater or lesser extent.

For example, the present structure could be

left intact with the board providing the centralized point of coordination. However, the

●

board could be made accountable for seeing

that policies and actions are coordinated and

that a coherent and effective program for

U.S. international telecommunication matters is maintained. As a part of its functions,

the board would assure that the necessary

linkages are made among the various elements within Government agencies, between

agencies, between Government and industry, and among the international forums concerned with telecommunication matters.

Bills have been introduced in the Senate

and House recently to establish a mechanism aimed at improving the U.S. posture for

international telecommunication matters.

Also, in recent years, other legislation has

been introduced that would alter the present

Government structure for telecommunication matters. These and other approaches

could be considered under options 2 and 3

above.

U.S. Strategies for Dealing With

International Spectrum Issues and ITU

The United States may have reached a

crossroads in its relationship with ITU. Having started in 1865 as a relatively noncontroversial organization of 20 nations concerned mainly with the interconnection of

their telegraph systems, ITU has evolved

into a contentious assembly of 155 nations

that look to the Union to solve fundamental

issues of allocation and regulation of radio

spectrum resources.

The ITU structure, which was well suited

to the analysis of interference between radio

communications systems, and to achieving

a consensus on noncontroversial matters

among a small number of broader issues, is

sorely tested by the demands of numerous

countries exhibiting the widest possible

range of technical, economic, cultural, and

political backgrounds. Many of these issues

did not originate at ITU, but have ended up

there, often argued by delegates unschooled

in the technical language that has been the

sine qua non of ITU. Thus, the mechanism

that brought together highly trained engineers to consider abstruse issues of interference between sophisticated communications systems is becoming a focal point for

broader policy issues with political posturings by delegates to further national and

political objectives. ITU structure, procedures, and mechanisms have not changed,

but the problems have changed enormously.

The ITU must now develop greater flexibility if it is to function effectively in a new and

dynamic environment.

The radio spectrum is essential to the communications infrastructure of the United

States, and it is not an easy matter for the

United States to concede its vital national interests to satisfy the demands of many nations that repeatedly assert their “equal

right” to the radio spectrum even though
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies . 115

.

they have no immediate need or capability to

use additional allotments for the foreseeable

future. U.S. officials must ask themselves

whether this nation can continue to accept

these same structures, procedures, and

mechanisms in an important, essentially allocative forum as are routinely tolerated in

other situations that are more abstract or

political in nature, and less concerned with

vital U.S. interests. Will U.S. negotiating

skills and technological proficiency enable us

to achieve our essential goals and objectives

in a forum that employs a “one-nation, onevote” decisionmaking formula and in which

the United States and the other developed

countries are greatly outnumbered by the

less developed member countries?

The answer is not readily apparent. What

is apparent is that our technically oriented

approach that has served so well in negotiating the technical issues of the past two or

three decades, is simply not sufficient for the

broader issues of today. The United States

must make some policy decisions, reflecting

changes in U.S. strategy or in the structure

or procedures of ITU, and then augment the

scope and training of the responsible U.S.

personnel consistent with those decisions.

The United States has essentially two

alternatives: it can seek various improvements in the present means for solving spectrum allocation problems within ITU as it is

now constituted, or it can seek to alter the

existing structure, procedures, or mechanisms of ITU itself. The policy options considered here may be divided into two broad

categories, strategic and structural.

From the strategic standpoint, assuming

no significant changes in ITU, the United

States has a wide range of options. At one

extreme, the United States may conclude

that the drawbacks of continued participation in ITU outweigh the benefits, and withdraw from the organization or decline to participate in its deliberations. At the other extreme, the United States could decide to

yield to other nations on controversial matters and play a passive role within ITU. Between these extremes there are a number of

alternatives. One that requires no structural

or procedural changes in ITU would be a

serious attempt at better coordination of our

views and objectives with other nations in

advance of ITU meetings, and better U.S.

planning based on improved understanding

of other nations’ views.

Another strategic option that might help

to achieve U.S. objectives even if ITU remained essentially unchanged would be for

the United States to seek to remove controversial issues from the ITU forum and attempt to solve them in other ways. A current

example would be to respond to the demands

of developing countries for “guaranteed access” to radio spectrum and satellite locations by developing the institutional arrangements to ensure domestic communication services to these nations. This could be

a common-user system either building upon

the present INTELSAT structure or creating a separate system for domestic services.

Such a solution would offer each nation all of

the satellite services or capability it could

realistically use, without allocating to small

nations significant amounts of satellite spectrum and orbit locations that might then remain unused for the foreseeable future.

From the structural standpoint, assuming

that ITU can be changed, a number of options are available. One relatively extreme

example would be to seek revision in the

voting formula of ITU to one that was more

advantageous to the United States, perhaps

by giving added voting weight to those countries that contribute most heavily to the

U.N. budget. A more modest option would

be to increase the number of ITU regions

beyond the present three so that regional

issues could be dealt with by a smaller

number of countries most directly concerned.
116 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Policy Option No. 1: Withdrawal

From ITU

Would withdrawing from ITU guarantee

the United States unhindered use of the

spectrum allocation or frequency assignments we need? Probably not. Member nations of ITU rely on the organization to

avoid interference from the radio signals of

others and to achieve interoperability of certain mutually used systems. Avoidance of interference is the essence of spectrum allocation or frequency assignment processes. The

assignment of a particular frequency is of little value if others feel free to use it for purposes that cause interference. There are no

effective sanctions to force compliance with

ITU decisions. Therefore, the United States,

as do all nations, relies on the voluntary

agreement and cooperation of other nations

to refrain from interfering with its use of the

spectrum.

Abrupt withdrawal from an ITU in which

the United States was unable to have its own

way could well intensify the risk of interference. For applications that are vulnerable to

interference, it seems clear that preemption

of spectrum would be ineffective. Any nation

that chose to interfere, whether due to a

valid need for the particular frequency band

or by intentional jamming, could greatly

reduce the value to the United States of the

preempted spectrum.

There are some important spectrum uses

that are relatively invulnerable to interference (e.g., high-power radar systems with

electronic countermeasures capability), but

any preemption of spectrum by the United

States would likely result in retaliation by

other nations in areas where it was vulnerable. There might also be spill-over into

nonspectrum relationships with other nations, such as transborder data flow or

telecommunication equipment trade matters. Extreme forms of retaliation, such as

refusal to interconnect telephone or telex

systems with the United States, would be

unlikely since these services are probably as

much in the interest of many other nations

as in our own.

What would happen to the generally

friendly process of coordination to avoid

harmful interference? The bulk of our coordination takes place with the developed

countries that are fewer in number and with

whom the United States has fewer fundamental differences than with the Third

World nations that have recently begun challenging and, in some cases, outvoting the

United States. It is conceivable that the

United States could abandon ITU and establish a more congenial grouping of developed

countries as a forum for coordination to

avoid interference, and simply ignore other

countries. Coordination and information exchange would become less certain by the

omission of the majority of nations, even if

their spectrum use is relatively limited, but

would still be fairly effective. We could also

continue to coordinate with many of them informally, since that would also continue to

be in their interest. Eventually they might

even seek to join the coordinating forum of

the developed countries, although the terms

of reference and voting basis might be much

different from ITU.

It seems likely that ITU–or that part that

deals with radio matters, as opposed to telephone and telegraph-would disintegrate if

the principal developed countries abandoned

it. A major mechanism for technical assistance to developing countries would disintegrate with it, leading perhaps to negotiations for a new mechanism. Probably these

negotiations would be conducted on a basis

that would more nearly reflect the relative

technical and economic strengths of the

various nations involved, rather than the

ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” formula.

In the resulting “free-for-all” atmosphere,

large nations and organizations would probably get whatever spectrum they needed,

subject only to coordination among themselves. In the short run, smaller nations

could take whatever spectrum they wanted.
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 117

But in the long term, if the larger nations developed technology and systems for their

own purposes, rather than for common

usage, the smaller nations could find spectrum unavailable, or perhaps limited to those

frequencies that are complicated and expensive to use.

Overall, the lack of a central spectrum

allocation and coordination authority would

probably lead to a more fragmented use of

the spectrum, with fewer common worldwide

channels, less standardization, and possible

difficulties with interoperability of certain

common systems, and a general increase in

interference problems between services. In

short, the result of spectrum preemption and

withdrawal from ITU would lead to a relatively less organized mechanism for spectrum management having significant disadvantages for both developed and developing countries. Whether these disadvantages

would at some time be outweighed by the

benefits of increased access to frequency

bands vitally needed by the United States

would depend on the specifics of those needs

and the degree of conflict present in ITU at

that time.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey

show that a clear majority of the survey

respondents would strongly oppose, or even

consider U.S. withdrawal from ITU. Nearly

two-thirds of the respondents strongly disagree with the suggestion that the United

States view withdrawal from ITU as an option even under hypothetical “worst case”

conditions. And 18 percent of the respondents agreed or agreed strongly with the suggestion that the United States consider withdrawal from ITU.

Policy Option No. 2: Revised ITU

Voting Formula

As an option less drastic than withdrawal

from ITU, the United States might join with

other developed nations to force a revision of

the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote” decisionmaking formula toward one that would reflect the dominance of the developed nations

in the actual use of the spectrum. If successful, this option would greatly reduce the ability of the Third World nations to block or

force changes in U.S. positions.

One possible formula for revised voting is

a combined weighting factor based on land

area and population. Another possibility is

the proportion of present use of telecommunications, or investment in telecommunications, which would clearly favor the developed countries in the short run. A third formula might be based on the relative proportion of overall contributions to the United

Nations and its various specialized agencies.

There are numerous precedents for unequal voting arrangements in international

organizations. In the INTELSAT board of

governors, voting is in proportion to investment in the system (which is in turn proportional to utilization of the system), and

voting in the World Bank is in proportion to

contributions. There are, of course, a number

of agencies and conferences which adhere to

the “one-nation, one-vote” principle. Examples are the United Nations Educational

Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the Law

of the Sea Conference. None of these is an

operational organization, and none is especially well known for reaching accommodations efficiently and expeditiously.

A revised voting formula might reduce the

contention over spectrum allocation matters

at ITU; make ITU more efficient; help to

make the use of the spectrum more efficient

by precluding the adoption of unworkable

allocation schemes; and be no less fair than

the voting practices used in a number of

other international bodies that benefit Third

World nations without being controlled by

them. The stimulus for concurrence of Third

World nations with such a proposal would be

the possibility that, were it rejected, the

developed countries might withdraw from

ITU and render it essentially irrelevant.

The reaction of Third World nations is difficult to predict but it seems most likely that

they would bitterly resist any reversal of
118 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

their recent successful trend toward assertiveness and refuse to make any concession

on ITU voting formulae. From a general foreign policy standpoint, it is important to

consider how much support the United

States might obtain from other developed

countries, many of which do not feel the

spectrum problems as acutely as the United

States. The United States must also consider whether it wishes to take an assertive

policy toward ITU apart from a generally

more assertive stance toward Third World

nations. Should spectrum and communications policy be the “leading edge” of a new

U.S. posture of asserting our interests vigorously? This issue needs to be faced early,

in the broadest possible forum, since the

answer will be one of the key factors in the

selection of any policy option.

It can also be asked whether the proposed

change in voting arrangements should apply

to all ITU spectrum decisions, or just to

those allocations that might qualify as major

matters. The latter case is equivalent to establishing a new, separate forum with revised voting arrangements and routing the

major matters to that forum rather than to

ITU.

Objectively, it would seem that the interests of the developing countries lie with

the continued existence of ITU and with continued technical and economic aid from the

developed countries. If this choice were

clearly and convincingly drawn, the Third

World nations would probably come to realize that these benefits outweigh such hypothetical advantages as satellite orbital slots

that they may never use. Whether they

would ultimately decide the matter on objective grounds is difficult to predict. In any

event, it seems unlikely that a change in the

voting formula within ITU will occur given

the present structure of ITU.

Policy Option No. 3: Increased

Regionalization of ITU

At present, ITU divides the world into

three geographic regions and many issues

that can be treated separately and effectively in a single region are considered in this

way. Regional administrative radio conferences are scheduled on a variety of specific

issues, allowing the World Administrative

Radio Conferences to “spinoff” certain controversial matters. One option would be to

extend this process of regionalization on a

geographic basis to smaller subregions,

and/or on an issue basis to include only those

nations directly affected by the particular

issue. The purpose would be to reduce the

number of nations debating or voting on issues that do not affect them directly, thus reducing unnecessary contention.

WARC-79 was attended by 142 nations.

Approximately 1,670 delegates and advisors

met for 11 weeks (one week more than scheduled), considered nearly 17,000 individual

proposals (more than 900 from the United

States), and held more than 900 meetings.

Surely any approach that might help limit

further WARCs to more modest proportions

would be worthy of study. More importantly, when nations vote on issues that do not

directly affect them, opportunities for trading votes arise at no cost to themselves, but

which help others to sustain confrontations.

Large meetings also tend to encourage bloc

voting, which has already begun to emerge

at ITU. Thus, subdividing the ITU into

smaller units, either on the basis of geographic subregions or on the basis of particular issues, would divide the Third World

bloc into smaller, less dominant groups.

There are numerous precedents for this.

In addition to the three ITU spectrum regions, there are five International Telegraph

and Telephone Consultative Committee regions, three ocean basin groups within

INTELSAT, and a North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, which coordinates broadcasting in the United States,

Canada, and Mexico.

While a potentially useful approach, and

one ITU has tried to some extent (e.g., the

forthcoming WARCs on Mobile Services,

high frequency planning, and the geostationary satellite orbit), decentralization is
.

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 119

not applicable to all problems. Some services

cannot be considered separately from others

with which they interfere. Frequency bands

in which signals propagate for many thousands of miles cannot be considered on a

regional basis, and some issues (e.g., interoperability of aircraft communications

systems) are fundamentally global in character. The key is to define a spectrum problem

in a way which leaves significant numbers of

nations unaffected. For example, the ultrahigh frequency TV and microwave fixed

(radio relay) service, which use signals of

limited propagation range, might be treated

on a subregional basis.

Decentralized decisionmaking does not, of

course, guarantee that the U.S. position will

prevail. Being outvoted by 10 to 1 is no more

satisfying than being outvoted by 153 to 1.

However, it is easier to bargain in detail with

10 nations than 153; and if a quid pro quo

must be offered, the total cost is likely to be

lower.

The mechanics and economics of increasing substantially the number of conferences

is also important to consider. The limited

U.S. professional staff available to prepare

for and attend spectrum conferences is already stretched thin, and if the United

States does not wish simply to skip many of

the meetings (a very risky proposition) this

staff would need to be augmented. The developing countries would find it even more

difficult to prepare for a heavy schedule of

meetings.

Developing countries tend to have very

few professionals available to consider spectrum matters; a few key people might decide

spectrum policy for an entire country. Also,

in some cases even the key individuals lack

sufficient expertise to comprehend the needs

and technical requirements of their own

country, let alone understand and appreciate

the complex spectrum problems of the

United States. Assuming that this effect

overbalances any possible advantage to the

United States from keeping them in ignorance, it may be in our interest to assist these

nations in their planning and conference

preparation.

One way to assist the Third World nations

would be on a regional basis. This could take

the form of providing special regional rapporteurs; of educating and assisting key

countries, which would in turn assist others

or act on their behalf; or of establishing and

supporting a joint planning capability for a

group of nations in a region. Apart from the

regional approach, we could assist certain

country blocs in their planning and preparation.

Increased decentralization of ITU could, in

principle, lead to greater fragmentation in

the use of the spectrum, with the same band

being used for different purposes in different

regions to a much greater extent than is now

the case. Advanced technologies may increase the opportunity for regions and

subregions to operate reasonably independent of one another. While this may be acceptable in the short run, the long-term implications are worthy of study. If, for example, a

new service were proposed that would be

global in character, obtaining the necessary

global spectrum allocation might require

changes in the allocations to many different

services in many different locales. At the

least, it might be necessary to create an institutionalized system for coordinating decentralized decisions.

Policy Option No. 4: Better

Coordination and Planning

As a relatively conciliatory approach, the

United States could mount a major effort to

develop long-term plans for spectrum use

that would take into account the spectrum

requirements of developing nations, to aid

them in understanding the realistic options

available to meet their short- and long-term

needs, to offer them such technical and economic assistance as might be needed to enable them to participate actively in the planning process, and to seek their concurrence

with fair, objective, and realistic proposals.
120 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administration Radio Conference of 1979

The acceptance at WARC-79 of U.S. proposals for new spectrum allocations devoted

to remote-sensing activities offers support

for the view that advance coordination and a

concerted effort to explain and justify requirements can have a significant impact on

countries that might otherwise be skeptical

or indifferent. The delegation of Senegal

came to WARC-79 with specific instructions

to support U.S. remote-sensing proposals,

thanks to a special effort by the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), backed by the State Department, to

enlist the help of U.S. embassies overseas in

lobbying appropriate authorities in their

host countries. A NASA slide presentation,

with tape-recorded commentary in English,

French, and Spanish drew appreciative audiences from delegations at the conference

itself. Of the some 50 remote-sensing proposals made by NASA for both passive- and

active-sensing programs, all were accepted

by the conference to a greater or lesser

degree and, contrary to expectations, there

was no opposition to U.S. proposals that

could be traced to political motivations.

To a significant extent, the confrontations

initiated by Third World nations in ITU are

based on suspicion and mistrust of developed countries, perhaps based on a lack of

understanding of the true potential of technology to create the spectrum resources they

will need in the future. But many Third

World nations also question whether they

will be able to take advantage of that technology and they question the good faith of

the developed countries to share the benefits

of advanced technology.

The fact remains that there is adequate

spectrum for all nations at the present and

that technology will very likely expand the

effective utility of the available spectrum to

satisfy future needs of all nations. The problem for the United States is to convince

other nations, particularly the developing

countries that spectrum and orbit capacity

will be available and that their needs for

service can be satisfied. Technical assistance

can be very useful in this regard, and economic assistance can help make the benefits

of technology a reality. Creating a role for

the developing countries in cooperative planning efforts is likely to make them more

receptive to the positions and plans that are

forthcoming, even though they benefit both

the developed nations and themselves.

Long-range planning of spectrum utilization is presently inadequate and not easily

accomplished in an area where technological

rate-of-change is rapid and in an open competitive system like that in the United

States where policy makers are more likely to

be responding to problems than to be developing long-range plans. However, better

long-range planning for telecommunication

service and spectrum needs is clearly necessary in order to cope effectively with the

ITU allocation process. Developing and

sharing planning techniques and data with

other countries would not make a new planning process vastly more difficult or costly,

and might make it more reliable in the long

run.

It is also necessary to know the extent to

which developing countries’ positions at

ITU are based on their own vital interests

rather than on misunderstandings and politics; it is unlikely that they would compromise vital interests for the sake of comity. A cooperative planning process would

tend to expose true interests and clarify the

negotiations.

As a practical matter, the majority of the

developing countries cannot now make use

of advanced communications technology

without technical and economic assistance

from technologically advanced countries. If

the majority of nations were to vote to adopt

rules that limit or preclude the use of advanced technology to which they do not have

independent access, communications capability suffer and costs increase in the long

term for all users. Thus, the cost of assisting

other countries in using advanced technology must be balanced against the cost to the

United States of not being able to take full

advantage of such technology ourselves.

This equation deserves close analysis.
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 121

It can also be argued that giving technical

and economic assistance to the Third World

nations will simply provide them with the

sophistication they need to challenge our

own positions more effectively in the future.

While not invalid on its face, this argument

ignores our ability to live in relative harmony with dozens of highly developed nations, and to avoid excessive contention in

spectrum allocation matters with some of

these nations that are sworn enemies. We

have more to lose from ignorance than from

true disagreement.

It is useful to recall what can happen in the

absence of cooperative planning. As preparation for the 1977 Broadcast Satellite WARC,

the United States developed comprehensive

data and explanations to show that a technologically based “first-come, first-served”, or

evolutionary approach, would assure adequate access to the geostationary satellite

orbit for all nations. However, other nations

were intent on adopting a rigid a priori plan

and simply were not interested in the U.S.

arguments. Most of the U.S. preparatory

work was of little value and the U.S. delegation was thus forced to develop alternative

positions on an ad hoc basis, during the conference.

This experience serves as a reminder that

it is no longer feasible to go to an ITU conference with a well-documented technical

solution to a problem and expect other nations to embrace the U.S. position. A certain

degree of advance coordination is necessary,

as a minimum, and probably was one of the

reasons that the United States achieved certain objectives at WARC-79. The prior coordination undertaken by NASA on U.S. remote-sensing proposals is a case in point.

Cooperative planning has worked in the

past; the United States was a leader in

cooperative planning for INTELSAT and

INMARSAT. The exact mechanism for cooperative planning is an important and complex matter, compounded by divided responsibility in the United States for communications policy in general and spectrum

planning in particular. It should be possible,

however, to graft onto the existing structure

a sufficiently comprehensive mechanism

with high-level Government responsibility to

assure effective long-range planning and to

foster cooperation with other nations.

As an alternative, ITU could be invested

with a planning staff to undertake longrange coordination, analysis, and planning.

Such a neutral planning expertise might be

less likely to be mistrusted by Third World

nations, and perhaps more capable of defusing potential disagreements. Naturally, the

United States would participate in the process and perhaps could more easily influence a

planning process, in which the measure of

power is technical expertise, rather than an

ITU conference, in which the measure of

power is votes. The United States has consistently opposed any increase in the power

of the ITU, particularly efforts to expand the

planning role of the International Frequency

Registration Board (IFRB).

A broader, more extensive, and more conciliatory approach to international spectrum

planning would be required under this option

and could have a real chance of working,

given some major changes in the U.S. approach. In the long run it could be the least

expensive and most effective option available to this country.

Policy Option No. 5: CommonUser System

As an alternative to contention for geostationary satellite orbit slots, the United

States and other developed countries could

enter into a joint venture with developing

countries to construct, launch, and operate a

common satellite system to meet domestic

needs for telecommunication and/or broadcast services. The developed nations would

provide the private capital and technological

resources necessary to construct and launch

the system, and would operate and manage

it in conjunction with other using nations.

All nations in the joint venture would have

the option of purchasing a share of the com-
. .

122 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

mon enterprise, up to their actual percentage

of use of the system, and sharing proportionately in any profits. Such an arrangement would be similar to that governing the

INTELSAT global satellite system used for

international telecommunication. High-capacity satellite systems employing technology

to make a common-user system economic

and operationally attractive to developing

countries for domestic services is needed to

make a common-user system for domestic

services viable. Such a system could be part

of the existing INTELSAT structure or a

separate structure established for this purpose.

Many developing nations are concerned

that the satellite orbit locations are being occupied rapidly on a “first-come, first-served”

basis, and that by the time they are in a position to use satellite systems there will be no

desirable orbit locations left for them. It

seems clear that the requirements of developing countries will be for satellite service

and not for satellite orbit locations that they

may not be able to use. This option would

provide service without allocating dedicated

orbit locations for individual users.

Moreover, the cost of developing and

launching a dedicated satellite system is

very high, well beyond the capability of most

developing countries for the foreseeable future. This option could provide satellite service well in advance of the time these countries could afford their own systems, and

much more cheaply. No large initial capital

investment would be required from user nations, and there would be little risk. The

technical expertise required to use such a

system is far less than is needed to construct

one.

This is not a new concept. The precedent for such an initiative is the global

INTELSAT satellite system. Today 106

countries, the great majority of them developing, share in the management and operation of the satellites that have been optimized for international usage.

A further indication of INTELSAT’s success, and of the developing countries’ stake

in the INTELSAT organization has been

that organization’s evolution towards playing a larger role in provision of domestic

satellite services. In 1974, Algeria proposed

to lease spare INTELSAT capacity for enhancement of its domestic telecommunication network. Since then a total of 20 countries have leased capacity from INTELSAT

for domestic services and an additional 15

countries have expressed interest in leasing

capacity in the next 2 years. By mid-decade,

the total number of clients could easily grow

to 50 countries.

INTELSAT has responded to this demand

by committing itself to include planned domestic capacity, as opposed to relying solely

on preemptible, spare capacity, in future

generations of satellites and has also sought

to develop higher powered satellites to be

compatible with the small ground stations

that have proven to be the most economical

for domestic services.

While this policy option does not address

the full range of problems before ITU, it does

offer the prospect of relieving the pressure

on a particularly important and contentious

issue. If low cost and technically attractive

domestic satellite capacity is made available

through an international organization that

accommodates the sovereignty interests of

each country, many developing countries

could come to see access to orbital slots and

satellite frequencies as a side issue with

availability of service being the main objective. Adoption of the common-user system

alternative would free-up orbital slots for

those major developing countries that continued to desire their own separate domestic

systems whether for political reasons, or

because requirements justified such a system economically.

A common-user system need not require

any Government funding by the United

States. Sufficient capital and technical

resources exist in the private sector in the
—

Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 123

United States, and within Europe and Japan

to construct such a system as a commercial

venture with expectations of future markets

for follow-on equipment and services. Alternatively, such systems could conceivably be

initiated with World Bank loan guarantees.

In summary, to the extent that developing

countries can be persuaded to evaluate their

needs for domestic satellite service apart

from political considerations, they may come

to believe that a common-user system can

serve many of these needs at an early date

and more cheaply than can dedicated systems, which could be many years away.

Whether operated by INTELSAT or by a

separate organization, whether financed

with public or private funds, such a commonuser system could relieve the pressures now

creating the international tensions over use

of the geostationary satellite orbit. And

while not a precedent in any specific way for

dealing with the broader range of ITU spectrum problems, a successful common-user

system might at least show that difficult

problems can in some cases be removed from

ITU for separate treatment.

Policy Option No. 6: “A Priori”

Allotment

The United States could agree to participate with other nations in the development

of a long-range plan for the utilization of

satellite orbit locations to serve participating nations’ domestic communications requirements. This plan would assure

that orbital slots would be available for the

use of all nations when needed. In exchange

for this agreement, the developed nations

would likely insist that the plan be based

upon sound operating principles and updated regularly to take account of the latest,

most efficient technology available. Technical planning assistance would be provided.

A priori allotment of satellite orbit slots

has been a cause celebre among developing

countries and at WARC-79 a resolution was

adopted to consider this issue at a two-part

space WARC in the mid-1980’s. The United

States and others have opposed a priori allotment plans for satellite service as wasteful

and inhibiting to technological advancement, Although this option goes a long way

toward accommodating the position of the

developing countries, need not be adverse to

U.S. interests. It maintains a substantial

degree of flexibility important to the United

States including the key qualification of a requirement for regular technological updating that would help to avoid the worse consequences associated with rigid allotment

schemes like the one adopted at WARC-77

for regions 2 and 3.

As far as the United States is concerned,

certain types of a priori allotment plans

would not be as objectionable as others.

Plans based on sound engineering and operational parameters might be workable internationally, at least on a regional basis. Indeed, U.S. domestic satellite operations are

based more or less on an a priori approach.

In the long run, the United States may have

enough satellite capacity made possible by

advanced technology to meet domestic

needs even if the orbit and spectrum available to U.S. satellites is reduced. In the short

run, the United States already has substantial numbers of operational satellites with

additional satellite systems planned for

operations in the near future.

In addition to the possible advantages

that may result from updates to presently

unforeseen technology, there are two factors

that may help reduce the impact of a priori

allotments on the United States. One is advanced technology including cellular satellite technology, already on the drawing

boards, which will permit the construction of

large, wideband satellites that can provide

very large capacity from a single orbit slot.

The other factor is the particular geography

of region 2 (North and South America). As

far as the geostationary orbit is concerned,

region 2 is naturally divided into two

parts—those nations located in the Northern

Hemisphere and those in the Southern Hemisphere. A second geographic factor that

serves to separate the hemispheres is the dis-
124 ● Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

placement in longitude of the nations in the

two hemispheres (see figs. 4 and 5). Moreover, those nations situated close to the

Equator enjoy the widest possible visibility

of the geostationary satellite orbit from

within their borders and have the greatest

flexibility in positioning satellites in that

orbit.

Limitations on the number of satellites

that can be placed in the geostationary orbit

is the fundamental factor that must be addressed to arrive at a solution to equitable

access for all nations in region 2. The capability of the geostationary satellite orbit is primarily limited by the need to separate satellites operating in the same frequency band.

When serving the same or adjacent coverage

areas are not in close proximity, the required

separation between satellites serving these

areas may be significantly reduced. For example, current U.S. requirements for separation between satellites in the fixed-satellite

service serving a common coverage area is 4

to 5 degrees. However, a satellite serving the

United States and another one serving a

South American country, if properly designed, could be essentially colocated

without harmful interference.

Figure 4.— Displacement in Longitude for Countries

in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres

. \ 1

\ \ 1

SOURCE Off Ice of Technology Assessment

A plan could be devised to take advantage

of the geographic and technological factors

discussed above, which would serve to isolate the capacity of the geostationary satellite orbit into subregional areas. Specifically, it is technically feasible and could be

operationally practical for the geostationary

orbit to be used by nations of North America

essentially independent of the use of the orbit to be used by nations of South America.

Moreover, the North American Continent

consists of three countries with very large

land areas that make the use of advanced

technology using shaped-beam antennas attractive. Except for some possible coordination problems near the border areas, it may

be possible to reuse the entire orbital arc separately for each of the three countries.

The implications of this approach and its

linkage to the policy options discussed above

are as follows:

1. This solution will require both coordination and planning by the member nations of region 2 (Policy Option No. 4).

2. This solution would essentially lead to a

subdivision of region 2 into two parts

(Policy Option No. 3).

3. The practical use of a common-user system would be enhanced by this approach

(Policy Option No. 5).

Although an a priori plan is implied in the

approach, it could be implemented without

the adverse limitations of a rigid a priori plan

such as adopted at WARC-77. If this approach is possible, then an a priori allotment

to one country would not preclude using the

same allotment for others if certain technical

and operational guidelines were followed.

There may even be some benefits to the

United States from adopting an a priori allotment plan. At present, there is considerable uncertainty about the outcome of the

1983 Region 2 Broadcasting Satellite Administrative Radio Conference and the

Space Planning Conference in the mid1980’s. If a decision is postponed, the uncertainty would continue. A situation would

then be perpetuated in which any existing
Ch. 5—Alternative Structures, Procedures, and Strategies ● 125

Figure 5.—Available Geostationary Arc

(Southern) Alaska North America

(Southern) Greenland

(Southern) Canada

115 95 I Territorial I

United States (Continental 48 States) limits

I 1

I

130 114 82 63 56 Visible arc above

Mexico 20° elevation

t

I 1

163 157 147 Central America 61 49 43

Guatemala {

Honduras !

El Salvador I

i

Costa Rica I

Panama t

Caribbean Area

Bahamas Barbados I

t

Dominican Republic

i

Grenada I

South America 10

Venezuela I

Colombi a

Guyana i

Surinam i

French Guiana i

1 Brazil

112 1 I 1

I

\

I

Ecuador {

10 3 –2

Bolivia

Paraguay i

30 17 8

130 121 37

SOURCE J D. Barnia
—.

126 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

domestic satellite orbit slot may potentially

be withdrawn in the future. Moreover, no

satellite system designer could plan the logical evolution of a proposed system with confidence that the required additional allotments would be available.

It is also important to examine the tactical

aspects of agreeing to an a priori allotment

policy. By participating in the development

of a plan, the United States would be in a position to influence the type of plan adopted

and possibly gain concessions on other

issues of importance to the United States.

In short, the linkages and tradeoffs among

these and other possible approaches to future use of the geostationary satellite orbit

cast each U.S. policy option in a different

light. Careful review in each case is needed

for sound policy formulation. Rather than rejecting a priori allotments as inherently

wasteful, it may be in the U.S. interest to examine the principle, to modify it to avoid its

worst aspects, to examine the practical effects, to examine the possibility of a quid pro

quo, and if the result looks acceptable, to

work with the developing countries to implement the plan.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey

show that the majority (68 percent) of the

respondents believe that a practical compromise is possible and desirable between

the evolutionary approach and a rigid a

priori plan for use of the geostationary orbit.

Another 15 percent of the respondents think

that a compromise is possible but undesirable from a U.S. standpoint. Only 8 percent

of the respondents said that a practical compromise is impossible.
Chapter 6

Findings, Conclusions,

and Observations
Contents

Page

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Principal Findings of the OTA Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

General Observations and Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for Spectrum Management

and International Strategies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Need for High-Level Government Policy Coordination and

Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Need for New Strategies to Address Spectrum and Related Satellite

Orbit Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Strategies to Address International Issues and Deal With ITU. . . . . . . . . . 136

Strategic Approaches—Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

Structure of ITU—Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

Consequences of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

General Observations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138

Major Decisions and Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Options Regarding Ratification of the Final Acts of WARC-79. . . . . . . . . . . 141

Future Conferences and Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

1982 Plenipotentiary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

Space Planning Conference.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ,. 142

HF Broadcasting Conference. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

1983 Broadcasting Satellite Conference for Region 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

Other Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Chapter 6

Findings, Conclusions,

and Observations

The

United

ficient,

Introduction

telecommunication systems of the

States are the most sophisticated, efand all-encompassing in the world.

These systems are a vital element of our economic strength and security; they are an essential part of our culture. Other nations,

recognizing the key role that telecommunication plays in national and international affairs, are constantly striving to surpass the

United States in technological inventiveness

and in the practical exploitation of the many

telecommunication subsystems that make

up the modern “information society. ”

As a leader in technology, the United

States has been able to proceed with its domestic telecommunication programs more or

less independent of international concerns.

The United States has played a major role in

shaping what has been essentially a benign

and passive international mechanism responsive to the task of providing order to the

key element in 20th century communications—the radiofrequency spectrum.

This international regime is coming under

considerable stress as the result of sharply

increased demand for new communication

services and resulting congestion in key

parts of the radio spectrum. WARC-79 and

related international conferences and meetings demonstrate conclusively that contention for access to radio spectrum and its imo

portant collateral element, the geostationary

rbit for space satellites, presents new and

urgent challenges to vital U.S. national interests.

Given the complexities of spectrum management in a changing world environment

and the increased importance of telecommunication to both developed and developing

nations, it is highly unlikely that traditional

U.S. approaches to these issues will be sufficient to protect U.S. vital interests in the

future. The growing differences among

nations over the use of the radio spectrum

and related satellite orbit capacity are

reflected in the Final Acts of WARC-79.

Overall, the results of WARC-79 are

mixed. Generally, the proceedings of an administrative conference of the International

Telecommunication Union (ITU) are geared

toward arriving at decisions and adopting

provisions that are acceptable to all nations.

It is expected that all nations will report

favorable results with certain exceptions

identified. Even then, a country is free to

take a reservation and not be bound by specific unacceptable results. Therefore, finding

a useful way to measure success and evaluate a country’s relative standing following

an administrative radio conference is not

easy. Comparing specific U.S. proposals submitted to the conference with the Final Acts

of the conference is not a straightforward exercise. Too many events intervene to color

the comparison between the preconference

position and the ultimate result on many important issues. While such a comparison is

important, it does not reflect the underlying

reasons and motives for particular decisions,

the problems encountered or any apparent

trends important in evaluating results of an

administrative conference.

It is important to understand the intervening events that underlie decisions, not only

to evaluate the results of WARC-79, but to

prepare for the many future conferences of

consequences for the United States. As a

highly developed user of spectrum and a

129
130 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

world leader in telecommunication tech- and much to lose in the international process

nology, the United States has much to offer of establishing rules and regulations.

Principal Findings of the OTA Study

The most significant findings of the study

are the following:

1.

2.

3.

●

There is an urgent need for higher level

attention to Government policy coordination and accountability for international telecommunication issues gener- 4. ally and for spectrum management issues and international negotiations specifically.

Streamlined processes, coordinated

Government policies and sufficient re- 5. sources on a continuing basis are essential to effective and timely preparation

for the several major international conferences of ITU now scheduled to occur

over the next 7 years.

New U.S. approaches are necessary to

address radio spectrum and related satellite orbit issues in a changing world environment. Solutions to satellite orbit allocation and spectrum reallocation

issues as envisioned by the Third World

nations require strategies not yet developed or tested.

WARC-79 resulted in the loss of some

U.S. flexibility in certain key spectrum

areas—particularly those affecting national defense—and enhanced opportunities in many other areas.

Operating costs will increase for certain

radio services; interference protection

will become less certain; and administrative costs will need to rise to adequately

implement WARC-79 decisions and to

prepare for future radio conferences.

General Observations and Trends

The world environment for telecommunications has changed significantly in recent

years; two-thirds of the 155 member nations

of ITU can be classified as developing or

Third World countries.

● The United States must develop approaches to use its technology and expand

its influence if future actions in a “onenation, one-vote” forum, like ITU, are to be

favorable to U.S. positions.

● There has been a gradual shift toward

recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical

factors such as political and cultural interests and values in ITU deliberations. In

other international forums, Third World

countries have raised related issues under

concepts of the New World economic order

and New World information order.

● There are basic differences between the

United States and Third World countries

over the principles that should govern the

allocation and use of radio spectrum and related satellite orbit capacity. There is increasing need to identify and assess middle

range options to reconcile the sometimes

sharply divergent goals of developed and developing countries.

● The disparity between nations in their

ability to use the spectrum is growing; this

leads to growing disagreements over the allocation and use of specific frequency bands

for specific services.

● Third World countries are increasingly

able to influence and shape international

communication policies in international

forums.
Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 131

● Spectrum decisions arrived at as a

result of voting within ITU, as opposed to

the commonly practiced consensus approach, will tend to be increasingly adverse

to the United States.

• U.S. requirements for access to the frequency spectrum and satellite orbit locations are expanding with the explosive

growth in telecommunication/information

technology, the growing use of satellites,

and the increasing dependence on radio and

satellites for military and national security

purposes.

● International telecommunication development is entering a phase in which regional

and domestic needs and policies will predominate, as opposed to more general global facilities expansion. The thrust will be on intraregional communications and the development or enhancement of interregional

communication routes.

U.S. Policymaking Structure and Processes for

Spectrum Management and

International Strategies

Need for High-Level Government

Policy Coordination and

Accountability

● The responsibility y for spectrum management and policymaking is divided among

several Federal agencies with coordination

conducted on a structured, but often informal, basis without clear responsibility and

accountability for policy at a high level of

Government.

• The United States does not have a consistent and coordinated national telecommunication policy because of a lack of appreciation and concern at the top levels of Government and industry, a lack of high-level policy

coordination for international telecommunication negotiations, and a failure to

assign sufficient importance to international

telecommunication matters, including spectrum management and the State Department’s role in international negotiations.

● The United States is not adequately

equipped to provide comprehensive assessments required to effectively plan for the

future use of the radio spectrum, to forecast

future requirements, to assess the costs and

benefits of shifts to new technology, or to

evaluate alternative strategies to deal with

international issues regarding allocation and

use of radio spectrum and the geostationary

satellite orbit.

● Within the U.S. telecommunication industry there has been significant growth and

change over the past 15 years, which has

produced more competing domestic interests

with conflicting demands for spectrum use.

● The United States’ permanent spectrum

management mechanisms are not adequately equipped to review and verify all the

stated requirements of Government and

nongovernment spectrum users and to adjust needs consistent with national policy

objectives. The U.S. lacks an effective ongoing means of collecting data, developing

and adjusting guidelines to evaluate the

merits of one spectrum use over any other.

● The State Department’s International

Communications Policy Office is not at a

high enough level in the Department’s organizational structure to be in a position to prepare adequately for all the important upcoming conferences of ITU and make its influence felt in the upper echelons of Government and industry.

● Lack of high-level concern has also led

to a shortage of trained and experienced
132 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

spectrum management personnel to replace

those retiring from Federal Government

service; there has been insufficient attention

to the need for personnel with supplementary diplomatic, language, negotiating, economic, and legal skills.

● The rather general wording of Executive

Order 12046 establishing the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) leaves it ambiguous as to

how far NTIA can go in its coordinating role

with respect to U.S. international telecommunications policy, particularly when that

mandate risks encroachment on the general

regulatory responsibilities of the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC).

● The schedule of 10 major international

conferences over the next 7 years to consider

a number of issues vital to U.S. interests underscores the fact that the United States

must reform its policymaking mechanisms

and streamline the cumbersome and timeconsuming procedures for developing U.S.

proposals for international telecommunication conferences.

● A mechanism is needed for collecting

and evaluating information on the perceived

needs of other nations for spectrum and

orbit resources; their receptivity to intraregional and/or common-user systems, and

other factors.

Need for New Strategies to

Address Spectrum and Related

Satellite Orbit Issues

● There are critical years ahead for ITU.

For the most part, the manner in which activities have been conducted by telecommunication experts and international diplomacy

has avoided debate on ideology and politically motivated objectives. The trend toward

basing decisions on factors other than economic and technical matters, and demonstrated need is challenging ITU to provide

mechanisms for resolving differences among

nations without a further shift toward the

polemical norms common to international

political debate.

● Third World countries are likely to

resist drastic changes in ITU rules and procedures that operate on the principle of “onenation, one-vote” and that provide them

with increasing influence and power. They

will continue to seek technical assistance

from the developed countries while pursuing

compromises favorable to their own interests.

● The developed countries are expanding

their use of spectrum to higher frequency

bands as lower, more economical bands become congested. They rely on technology to

provide solutions to problems of accommodating new demands in the future. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the developing countries to accept the proposition that

they will have access to spectrum on an interference-free basis at some future date as

their needs materialize. The outlook is that

the radiofrequency spectrum and geostationary orbit will become more congested in the

lower, more economical and desirable frequency bands even though use of frequencies by one country does not necessarily preempt those same frequencies from use by

other countries. It seems increasingly clear

that the United States will need to explore

new strategies and policy options to reconcile Third World interests with the objectives of the United States.

● WARC-79 showed the increasing influence of the Third World as a political force

in ITU. The struggle for influence between

the developed and developing nations will

continue at future ITU conferences. At the

present time, the developing countries

derive their power from their collective numbers; the developed countries from their

technical competence, knowhow, and leadership. The influence of the developing countries can most effectively be exploited in the

ITU legislative forums; the developed nations through ITU technical administrative

organs.
Ch. 6—Findings, Cone/us\ons, and Observations ● 133

● The success of ITU has been due in large

measure to the willingness of its members to

adhere voluntarily to commonly arrived at

agreements and regulations. The inherent

flexibility in the ITU processes has also enhanced its effectiveness. Reservations and

footnotes offer escape for individual countries from disagreeable decisions of the majority. However, excessive use of these exceptions by a sufficient number of countries—or by a few large users—serves to

reduce the value of the agreements and regulations for all users.

● Existing ITU procedures that vest

rights in the use of spectrum to countries on

an “as needed, first-come, first-served basis”

are viewed by developing countries as not

serving their objectives and they now seek

to alter those procedures.

● The growing lack of agreement among

nations over which specific frequency bands

should be allocated for which specific radio

services (the International Table of Frequency Allocations) strongly suggests that

mechanisms other than service classifications should be examined.

● ITU is a political organization that performs both political and technical functions.

However, while there is a primarily technical

focus for most ITU activities, there has been

a gradual shift toward recognizing the legitimacy of nontechnical factors, such as political and cultural interests and values. The

United States must recognize this shift and

develop strategies to use its technology

more broadly as a tool for resolving these

broader international issues that are not subject to technical solution.

● Many of the nontechnical issues raised

in ITU—like those concerning reallocation of

spectrum and guaranteed access to the geostationary satellite orbit—are among the

many issues raised by Third World countries

in other international forums under the principles propounded by the New World economic order and New World information

order. Those countries seek to alter the ageold pattern and structure of trade, communication, and information flow by developing

and using telecommunication infrastructure

themselves.

● Developing countries will continue to

seek changes in the existing mechanism for

vesting rights in the use of frequencies and

access to the geostationary orbit. They seek

a shift away from the current notification

and coordination procedure on a “first-come,

first-served” basis, toward a negotiated plan

developed on an a priori basis. This is expected to reduce the uncertainties they fear

in gaining access through the current approach, albeit at the expense of a possible

“freezing” of technology.

● The administrative regulations of ITU

serve the desirable objective—without the

use of sanctions for noncompliance—of

avoiding the interference, incompatibilities

and chaos that would ensue if these or similar regulations were not followed.

• The voluminous, complex, and detailed

provisions of the international radio regulations are becoming more burdensome for the

world and less meaningful to individual

users.

. Third World countries will continue to

advocate changes in rules, regulations, and

procedures that help guarantee their perceived right of access to the spectrum and

geostationary satellite orbit. They do not

wish to rely on the “good efforts, promises,

and technical ability of the developed countries to “engineer-in” future systems on a

case-by-case basis, as needed.

● ITU administrative radio conferences

seek to produce results that all nations can

accept. Reservations, footnotes and other

means to reduce negative consequences

allow each nation to more or less view the

results as favorable. This approach supports

the perception of having all winners and no

losers. However, because of growing differences among nations, these procedures

are beginning to produce diluted and cumbersome results that may render existing

mechanisms to regulate world spectrum use

less and less meaningful.
134 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

● Because of competing interests and

growing differences over use of the spectrum

there will be winners and losers in the future

as a result of the ITU decisionmaking

process.

● The preeminence of U.S. technological

leadership and technical ability served the

United States well in international spectrum

negotiations when decisions were primarily

based on technical matters. But more and

more U.S. problems with other countries involving spectrum use are nontechnical.

● Certain U.S. requirements to use spectrum, such as radars for military purposes,

are not of interest to the majority of other

countries which prefer to have this same

spectrum allocated to services they need or

desire. The difficulty that faces the United

States in seeking to convince a majority of

the 155 other ITU member countries to

adopt regulations that accommodate U.S.

radars that conflict with other possible uses

by other countries is real and was demonstrated at WARC-79.

● Rights to frequencies and satellite locations to individual nations are not vested indefinitely under current ITU procedures,

and changes in operating parameters require

recoordination and registration. This creates

uncertainty for present satellite system operators. The risks may increase that spectrum and orbit will not be available to provide for continuity of service from the present to the next generation of satellites. Moreover, this problem is not overcome by the

adoption of a negotiated rigid a priori allotment plan to assure future access, since such

a plan would tend to freeze technology and

accommodate only those new or second generation satellites that fit the original technical scheme.

Options

Possible Structural Improvements

There are three fundamental weaknesses

in the present Federal Government policymaking structure:

1.

2.

3.

The lack of attention at the top decision

levels of the Government and industry

as to the vital role of telecommunications in the international and domestic

political, economic, and private affairs

of the United States and the need for

policy coordination;

There is a lack of high-level centralized

policy coordination and guidance for international telecommunication negotiations at a high enough level in the Government to be effective.

The State Department’s International

Communications Policy Office is neither

staffed nor institutionally organized to

carry out effectively all of the functions

involved in international telecommunication negotiations.

Congress could consider ways to improve

the present structure or examine possible

changes in the structure. A detailed analysis

of alternative structures was beyond the

scope of this study, which concentrates on

the results of WARC-79. However, at least

four options are available to Congress:

1.

2.

3.

4.

maintain the status quo and make no

changes;

maintain the present structure, but

raise the level of attention and accountability within the responsible agencies;

establish a mechanism—such as a task

force of high-level government officials—to develop, examine, and make

recommendations on structural and procedural improvements; or

establish a permanent board, council, or

interagency- committee of high-level

Government officials to be responsible

and accountable for international telecommunication policy coordination and

the preparations for international conferences.

Possible Procedural Improvements

● Improvements needed in the present

procedures for managing and planning Government and nongovernment use of the spectrum include better means to provide adequately for:
Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 135

— evaluation and validation of spectrum

requirements, giving particular attention to current spectrum usage, technology and development trends, and sharing opportunities between competing

users of the spectrum;

— inclusion of spectrum and orbit efficient

techniques and technology in system

design of both Government and nongovernment systems;

— apportionment of frequency spectrum

between Government and nongovernment services based on national priorities;

— effective planning for future spectrum

and orbit needs;

— efficient and timely preparation for and

participation in ITU conferences; and

— effective management of existing services and users on a continuing basis.

● Many of these shortcomings could be

corrected without fundamental changes in

the Government structure.

The validation of spectrum requirements,

and the apportioning of spectrum between

Government and nongovernment users,

needs closer scrutiny. An enhancement of existing mechanisms using analytical tools to

help evaluate needs and arrange priorities

among contentious users would provide better information for decisionmakers. Military

requirements are reviewed by the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee

(IRAC) and its Spectrum Planning Subcommittee, but this function needs to be

strengthened and broadened to be more effective in the future.

● Economic techniques should be considered, at least on an experimental basis, to

provide guidance on the consequences of different spectrum allocation decisions and the

introduction of newer technology. These

should include techniques for evaluating the

relative economic viability of alternative

spectrum uses, as well as radio v. nonradio

communication systems.

● FCC, perhaps with the aid of a task

force including other Government agencies

that have studied the question, industry

groups and private experts, should select a

few services and frequency bands for detailed analysis of the prospects of using one

or more economic techniques. The Commission could then present its recommendations

for the experimental application of a selected

technique, or techniques, on one or a limited

number of services and frequency bands to

the Congress for its information and action,

if necessary.

● Problems relating to forming a U.S.

delegation for WARC-79 could be addressed

and the effectiveness of U.S. participation in

international meetings could be improved by

several steps:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

industry and other nongovernment

delegates could again be permitted to

participate fully as U.S. representatives

at international telecommunication conferences and take any assignments on

the delegation for which their skills and

experience qualify them;

consideration could be given to finding

means to comply with due process requirements under the Administrative

Procedure Act and still name industry

and other nongovernment representatives to delegations on a timely basis;

permanent guidelines to name the chairman and individual delegates to the U.S.

delegation could be established;

qualifications required, distribution of

various skills needed, and type of representation desired could be determined at

an early stage of preparation for conferences;

individuals chosen to serve on U.S. delegations could be selected from the best

candidates available, especially those

who participated in the preparatory effort; and

any special Government support necessary to acquire particular representation on the delegation could be available

early in the preparatory stages.

● Preparations for international telecommunication conferences could be improved
136 ● Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

by replacing the ad hoc approach with an ongoing conference preparatory structure with

a focal point for high-level responsibility and

Strategies to Address

and Deal

The United States must make some policy

decisions reflecting changes in U.S. strategy

or in the structure or procedures of ITU, and

then augment the scope and training of the

responsible U.S. personnel consistent with

those decisions.

The United States has essentially two alternatives: 1) it can seek various improvements in the present means for solving spectrum allocation problems within ITU as it is

now constituted; or 2) it can seek to alter the

existing structure, procedures, or mechanisms of ITU itself. The policy options considered here may be divided into two broad categories, strategic and structural.

Strategic Approaches – Options

● From the strategic standpoint, assuming no significant changes in ITU, the

United States has a wide range of options.

At one extreme, the United States may conclude that the drawbacks of continued participation in ITU outweigh the benefits, and

withdraw from the organization or decline to

participate in its deliberations. At the other

extreme, the United States may decide to

yield to other nations on controversial matters, accept all decisions taken within ITU,

and play a passive role in its deliberations.

Between these extremes there are a number

of alternatives.

1 Seek to remove the most controversial

issues from the ITU forum and attempt

to solve them in other ways. A current

example might be to respond to the

demands of developing countries for

“guaranteed access” to radio spectrum

accountability involving all the concerned

Government and nongovernment telecommunication interests.

International Issues

With ITU

2.

3.

4.

and satellite locations by developing the

institutional arrangements to ensure domestic communication services to qualifying nations. This could be a common

user satellite system either building

upon the present INTELSAT structure

or creating a separate system for domestic services. Such a solution would offer

each nation a role and stake in the

system with satellite services or capability it could realistically use. This could

avoid the issue of allocating to small nations significant amounts of the radio

spectrum and satellite orbit locations

which might then remain unused for the

foreseeable future.

Develop a comprehensive program with

necessary resources to better coordinate

U.S. views and objectives with other nations, in advance of ITU meetings, and

adjust U.S. proposals based on improved understanding of other nations’

views.

Develop a range of options for “planning” the use of the geostationary satellite orbit–between the evolutionary approach advocated by the United States

and any rigid a priori allotment plan

that may be advocated by some developing countries—and consider these options informally with key countries prior

to ITU conferences.

Seek to raise the level of technical competency among ITU member states and

raise the level and quality of communications and information capabilities accessible to them through educational

and technical assistance programs.
Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 137

Structure of ITU – Options

● From the structural standpoint, assuming that ITU can be changed, a number of

options are available. One relatively extreme

option would be for the United States to

withdraw from ITU. Another option would

be to seek to revise the voting formula of

ITU to one more advantageous to the United

States, perhaps by giving added voting

weight to those countries that contribute

most heavily to the U.N. budget. A more

modest option would be to increase the

number of ITU regions beyond the present

three so that regional issues could be dealt

with by a smaller number of countries most

directly concerned.

1. Withdrawal from ITU—Member nations

of ITU rely on the organization to avoid

interference from the radio signals of

others and to achieve compatibility of

interconnected telecommunication systems. Avoidance of interference is the

essence of spectrum allocation or frequency assignment processes of ITU.

Withdrawal from ITU could well intensify the risk of interference. It seems

clear that preemption of radio spectrum

by the United States would be ineffective and that U.S. radio services would

be vulnerable to interference without recourse to the protections provided under

the international radio regulations. Any

nation that chose to interfere, whether

due to a valid need for a particular frequency band or by intentional jamming,

could greatly reduce the value to the

United States of the preempted spectrum. Withdrawal from the ITU organization would not eliminate the mutual

desirability for the United States and

other countries to coordinate spectrum

use as well as other telecommunication

activities now performed through ITU.

2.

3.

Revised ITU voting formula–As an option less drastic than withdrawal from

ITU, the United States might join with

other developed nations to force a revision of the ITU’s “one-nation, one-vote”

decisionmaking formula toward one

that would reflect the dominance of the

developed nations in the actual use of

the spectrum. If successful, this option

would greatly reduce the ability of the

Third World nations to block or force

changes in U.S. positions. But those nations are likely to resist such revisions

vigorously and given their current voting strength it is difficult to see how any

weighted voting scheme could be forced

in ITU short of amassing pressure in

many other areas.

Increased regionalization of ITU–At

present, ITU divides the world into

three geographic regions and many issues that can be treated separately and

effectively in a single region are considered in this way. Regional administrative radio conferences are scheduled on

a variety of specific issues, allowing

the World Administrative Radio Conferences to “spinoff” certain controversial

matters (and incidentally, to delay their

consideration). One option would be to

extend this process of regionalization on

a, geographic basis to smaller subregions, and/or an issue basis to include

only those nations directly affected by

the particular issue. The purpose would

be to reduce the number of nations

voting on issues that do not affect them

directly, thus reducing unnecessary contention and possibly reducing costs and

time of reaching a multilateral agreement.
138 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

Consequences of WARC-79

General Observations

● ITU administrative radio conferences

are difficult to rate in terms of success or

failure. The box score approach, which measures proposals submitted against the conference Final Acts, is inadequate and misleading because it fails to take account of the importance and consequences of particular decisions. The underlying trends and the bases

for decisions and compromises, which have

important future consequences, are not captured in the win, loss, and tie columns.

● WARCs are conducted and apply mechanisms that allow each member-nation to

perceive that most of its needs are met no

matter how unfortunate the results may be

for the collective international community.

● In general and apart from any specific

proposal or action, the members of the informed community responding to the OTAsponsored survey perceived WARC-79 as

producing results that were either somewhat

better than expected or about what was anticipated before the conference. However, expectations may have been colored by the

growing concern over possible confrontation

with the Third World that preceded WARC79.

● The OTA-sponsored survey found that

most individuals responding to the questionnaire believe that WARC-79 had a favorable

impact on both U.S. national interests (53

percent) and their own organization (58 percent). The major exception to this view is

found among a minority of individuals mainly in the private sector, who maintain that

WARC-79 had a net unfavorable impact on

their organizations’ operations (15 percent).

A substantial number of respondents (33

percent) said that the results of WARC-79

were neither favorable or unfavorable to U.S.

national interests.

● The 1977 broadcasting satellite WARC

was of great importance for the United

States because it demonstrated conclusively

that the developing countries could unite to

pursue a collective goal. In this case, the goal

was consistent with the objectives of the

Western European countries goal (albeit for

different reasons), but inconsistent with U.S.

(and others) proposals and efforts to adopt a

different approach based on technical arguments to support the U.S. position. It also

showed that the perceptions and priorities of

the developing countries differed from ours

and that technical arguments could not be

counted upon to win out over political considerations.

● At WARC-79, there was too much to do,

too little time to do it, and too many conflicting interests to deal effectively with many of

the issues. Therefore, the conference made

use of the several vehicles available to an administrative conference to proceed without

forcing agreements or attempting to resolve

difficult issues that could be postponed. Taking footnotes to the allocation table; adopting resolutions; postponing issues to future

conferences; and taking reservations are vehicles that have always been available, but

at WARC-79 ITU members found it necessary to use them more than ever before.

● No immediate changes in operations

using the radio spectrum or geostationary

satellite orbit are required in the United

States as a result of WARC-79. However, the

longer range impacts in terms of increased

operating costs, reduced operating flexibility, uncertainty surrounding important

pending issues, and the need for thorough

preparations to address issues at future conferences require immediate attention.

● The radio regulations serve essentially

two functions: 1) to establish technical

standards and regulations about what kinds

of services can use what parts of the spectrum under given conditions; and 2) to establish procedures for countries to acquire operating rights and protection from interfer-
Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations ● 139

ence. Developed countries participate in

WARCs with a strong focus on improving

and elaborating on technical standards and

procedures to protect existing spectrum

users; developing countries want to focus on

underlying principles, alternative ways to

vest rights in the use of frequencies, and

ways to make ITU more responsive to their

needs.

● INTELSAT, as a world organization of

106 member countries, had significant influence at WARC-79 on fixed-satellite service

(FSS) matters.

• The nonalined nations played a significant role at WARC-79, frequently operating

as an effective force.

● WARC-79 adopted several resolutions

and provisions that call for increased assistance in various forms to developing countries.

● The conference resolutions calling for a

number of future conferences, including

those to “plan” space services and the international broadcasting service, demonstrate

that the achievement of U.S. objectives at

ITU conferences will no longer be a matter of

reaching agreement on technical solutions to

problems of spectrum allocations and frequency coordination; it will require imaginative approaches, with political negotiations involving long, hard bargaining.

Major Decisions and Consequences

● There is no major immediate cost impact imposed by WARC-79 regarding national security systems, largely because of

the frequency flexibility of existing U.S.

equipment, the success of the U.S. delegation at WARC, and reservations taken by

the United States. However, there will be

future, undetermined costs resulting from

actions at WARC-79—costs associated with

frequency management, the development

and procurement of more sophisticated

equipment, compatibility studies, and coordination to prevent harmful interference

with competing users of the spectrum.

● Department of Defense (DOD) interests

were impacted by losses of exclusivity for

radiolocation (radar) operations and by increased sharing with other services in many

of the radiolocation bands. For example,

demands that radar operations be discontinued in certain bands in order to accommodate expanded FSS operations led to considerable acrimony, which was only eased by

a nonbinding U.S. commitment in a formal

declaration to try to accommodate FSS in

those bands. The status of radiolocation was

retained but the pressure from FSS interests

will certainly continue.

● Radar usage by the radiolocation service is extremely heavy in the radiolocation

bands between 8500 and 10,000 MHz. The

addition of the radionavigation service and

the multicountry fixed and mobile footnotes

in this band have taken 900 MHz of virtually

exclusive radiolocation allocations in the current radio regulations and added one or more

primary services over the entire band. Technical and administrative solutions must be

sought if radiolocation is to retain its effectiveness. IRAC, in particular, could develop

a set of recommendations for use by the

State Department in discussions with other

countries with a view to encouraging the

orderly and restrained introduction of radionavigation on an “as needed” basis in order

to buy time for the development of technical

solutions to sharing problems. In the

absence of such a planned introduction, the

radiolocation service may soon find itself

having a de facto secondary status because

of the safety-of-life priorities accorded the radionavigation service.

● The United States took a reservation indicating that the United States, in the operation of radars, will not guarantee protection

to, nor coordination with, other services. The

action was necessary because the existence

of the fixed and mobile services footnotes in

every radiolocation band between 1 and 40

GHz jeopardized radar operations to serve

national defense.

● Notwithstanding the fact that WARC79 did little to reduce the total spectrum
140 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

available for radar operations, and also, that

U.S. military radars are now required to

operate worldwide in a secondary status, the

costs of radar development and operation

must increase as a result of decisions taken

at WARC. New coordinating activity must

now take place between the radiolocation

service and a number of other services that

will share the same frequency bands, particularly the fixed, mobile, and radionavigation services. A significant number of interference incidents can be anticipated in

these bands. In the long term, modifications

of existing systems and development of new

ones must be increased to guarantee the performance of military radars in the presence

of increased interference. A further added

cost derives from the need for radar developers to expand their participation in CCIR in

order to lay a better foundation for U.S. proposals concerning radars at future conferences.

● U.S. objectives for FSS and the mobilesatellite service (MSS) (including DOD satellite interests) were achieved in large measure. The DOD goal of adding 125 MHz for

up- and down-links for the two services was

achieved, but this meant that the partial exclusivity that existed for FSS was lost.

There may be problems in satisfying some

DOD satellite communication requirements

in the 7- and 8-GHz bands. Also, the United

States and most NATO countries took a

reservation regarding language in the Final

Acts that requires that stations in MSS operating in the band 235 to 399.9 MHz not

cause harmful interference to those of other

services operating, or planning to operate, in

accordance with the table of allocations.

● Significant amounts of spectrum were

added to allocations for FSS, in general accordance with U.S. objectives. The technical

rules that affect the design, operation, and

cost of satellite systems were generally in

agreement with U.S. positions. Where U.S.

desires were not precisely met, no significantly adverse repercussions resulted. No

immediate or significant changes in the

structure or operation of U.S. fixed-satellite

telecommunication services will result from

conference decisions. No operational or economic dislocation was imposed on any existing FSS system. No major burden appears

to be placed on the U.S. Government or private operating entities in order to comply

with the decisions of WARC. However, the

differences between the United States and

many developing countries over approaches

to use of the geostationary satellite orbit, to

be resolved by future conferences, leaves the

impact on FSS uncertain.

• While, based on U.S. proposals,

WARC-79 largely eliminated frequency sharing between FSS and broadcasting-satellite

services (BSS) in the Americas, BSS must

now share with the terrestrial-fixed service.

This sharing could result in interference to

BSS Earth-station receivers operating in the

same area as fixed-station transmitters. This

could have a negative impact on private

microwave systems that use the band 12.3 to

12.7 GHz. These private systems are widely

used in the United States by a variety of

users. If required to vacate the band to protect BSS and move to a higher frequency

band, there would be economic and operational consequences.

● WARC-79 made substantial increased

allocations to FSS in the “lower” frequency

bands where technology is well developed

and relatively economical. WARC-79 also

reaffirmed the FSS allocations near 20 and

30 GHz where the next generation of domestic communication satellites is now under

development. This new generation of satellites is likely to offer a greater variety of

services to more users and lower costs.

• Because of the highly efficient use

already being made of existing allocations

for the fixed service, the changes adopted at

WARC-79 consisted mainly of attempts to

aline the allocations among the three regions

and, through footnotes, to accommodate the

specific needs of individual countries.

● The decisions of WARC-79 affecting the

use of microwave radio relay systems do not
Ch. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations . 141

mandate any drastic U.S. changes in spectrum allocation and management.

● In order to simplify the administrative

process for certain countries which otherwise might need to coordinate with a number

of neighboring states, the radio regulations

were revised and simplified at the risk of

creating future interference problems. The

changes were opposed by the United States,

Canada, and others that felt that sound technical judgments should not be eroded by political or administrative considerations.

• The U.S. objective to gain more frequency allocations for high frequency (HF) broadcasting could only be done at the expense of

the fixed service, and was therefore opposed

by many developing countries. The HF

broadcasting allocations were increased conditioned on the successful outcome of a

specialized HF broadcasting conference to

be held in the mid-1980’s to “plan” for more

efficient and equitable use of the broadcasting bands. While the conference agenda

will be relatively broad and open, it was apparent at WARC-79 that the United States

and the developing countries have significant differences as to the type of planning to

be undertaken. Also, political issues, such as

“prior consent,” could prove troublesome, at

this conference.

Options Regarding Ratification of the

Final Acts of WARC-79

1. The United States can ratify the Final

Acts without delay with the normal clarification of U.S. statements in the Final Protocol.

Completing the ratification process prior to

January 1, 1982, when the 1979 radio regulations enter into force will indicate to other

nations our goodwill and determination to

abide by our international obligations. The

Final Acts constitute the “Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979, ” which replace the 1959

regulations as partially revised by the administrative radio conferences held in 1963,

1966, 1967, 1971, 1974, and 1978. The Final

Acts also incorporate the provisions of the

1977 broadcast satellite WARC as modified

by WARC-79.

2. The United States can ratify the Final

Acts with conditions, thereby underscoring

and making explicit the reservations taken

at Geneva. In particular, the United States

could reiterate the reasons for taking reservations in the Final Protocol to emphasize

U.S. Government concern regarding these

issues.

3. The United States can ratify the Final

Acts with additional reservations that either

state U.S. refusal to acquiesce to particular

decisions taken at WARC-79, beyond those

cited in earlier U.S. protocol statements, or

set forth U.S. policy with respect to future

actions by ITU or specific implementation of

the WARC-79 Final Acts. While it is not uncommon for the Senate to attach conditions

to a resolution of ratification of a bilateral international agreement, which the other party can readily accept or reject through its

own ratification processes, attaching conditions to a multilateral agreement raises difficulties.

4. The United States can ratify the Final

Acts in part, specifically withholding ratification of those provisions (which would

have to be listed in precise detail) where the

United States chooses to remain bound by

the provisions of existing regulations previously ratified (which would also have to be

listed in precise detail).

5. The United States can withhold ratification of the Final Acts pending the outcome

of several important international conferences dealing with telecommunication issues. This would deny FCC and the current
142 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

administration any legal basis for implementing decisions taken at WARC-79, many

of which were strongly advocated by the

United States and fought for by the U.S. delegation, and which are scheduled for implementation by other ITU members on January 1, 1982. The most immediate international telecommunication conference of great

importance to the Unites States is the September 1982 plenipotentiary. The actions

taken at this conference to revise the ITU

convention will be basic to all future conferences of ITU.

6. The United States can reject the Final

Acts of WARC-79 in their entirety and announce that we intend to abide by the preexisting radio regulations, as amended. The

consequences would be similar to those cited

above.

Future Conferences and Issues

1982 Plenipotentiary

● This conference provides the United

States with an opportunity to propose

changes in the structures and procedures of

ITU, and to resist changes proposed by

others that are not in the interest of the

United States. It is vital that the United

States make thorough preparations for this

meeting and to anticipate fully the proposals

that may be put forward by other ITU

members.

● The basic principles contained in the

ITU convention will be reviewed and modifications made in accordance with the will of

the majority. The convention serves to guide

international cooperation for use of telecommunications of all kinds, and governs the

functioning of ITU itself. Changes in the

convention will be fundamental to future

meetings of ITU. For example, any change

in article 33 of the convention concerning use

of the spectrum and the geostationary

satellite orbit would have a direct bearing on

the WARC scheduled to plan space services

using the geostationary orbit.

● The United States should give careful

consideration to the future role of ITU vis-avis international information policy issues

and the New World information order demands of Third World countries.

The results of the OTA-sponsored survey

shows that more than 80 percent of the respondents agree that the conflicting positions and approaches between the United

States and other countries for use of the

radio spectrum and the geostationary satellite orbit are issues for the 1982 ITU plenipotentiary conference and justify a major

U.S. effort to prepare for the conference.

Space Planning Conference

. This specialized WARC on the use of the

geostationary satellite orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it will have

two sessions—July 1985 and September

1987. It poses a serious threat to potential

U.S. use of space communications because it

could result in a form of “planning” contrary

to U.S. interests. The extent to which a flexible and efficient method of planning space

services can be devised and “sold” to the

conference represents a challenge to the

United States.

● The conference will also determine

which frequency bands used for space services are to be planned. U.S. efforts to have

the conference concentrate on those higher

frequency bands that are unoccupied, or little used, will collide with the demands of

developing countries to have the conference

concentrate on planning the use of the more

economical, lower frequency bands. The

United States must determine its own readiness to incur the expense of moving to

higher frequencies and its readiness to

understand the motivations and deal effec-
tively with the pressures to plan a broad

range of frequency bands.

HF Broadcasting Conference

● This conference, to be held in two sessions starting in January 1984, is to plan the

efficient and equitable use of the HF broadcasting bands. Active U.S. participation and

careful preparation will help ensure that the

increased allocations to HF broadcasting

made at WARC-79 are not jeopardized by

failure to accommodate the fixed services

that were removed from the international

broadcasting bands, but must be reaccommodated in other parts of the spectrum.

• Rapid developments in direct broadcasting from satellites are likely to rekindle

debate on such political issues as “prior consent” at the HF planning conference. The

United States will need to be prepared to

dress this and other current issues over

question of the free flow of information.

1983 Broadcasting Satellite

Conference for Region 2

adthe

● To prepare for the 1983 region 2 conference, the United States will need to develop

its detailed requirements for broadcasting

satellite channels and submit them to ITU a

year in advance of the meeting. Also, the

desired satellite coverage areas are required

to be submitted. A U.S. position will need to

be taken on the total bandwidth to be allocated to broadcasting satellites as opposed

to satellites operating in the fixed satellite

service in the 12 GHz band.

● The United States could be faced with

the prospect of a majority of region 2 countries voting for a rigid orbital and frequency

allotment plan such as the one adopted for

regions 1 and 3 at the 1977 WARC for BSS.

According to the OTA-sponsored survey, a

majority of the respondents, 68 percent,

believe that a practical compromise is possible and desirable, although relatively few

have any specific concept of the form such

compromise could take; an additional 15 perCh. 6—Findings, Conclusions, and Observations • 143

cent believe that a compromise is possible,

but undesirable; only 8 percent of the respondents believe that a compromise between the United States and the Third

World positions on a priori assignment is impossible; another 9 percent expressed no

opinion. This underscores the need to identify and analyze specific strategies and options which might provide the basis for such

a compromise.

• WARC-79 made allocations for BSS

from 12.3 to 12.7 GHz and for FSS from 11.7

to 12.1 GHz. Left to be resolved at the 1983

conference is the band 12.1 to 12.3 GHz

allocated in 1979 to both services. Decisions

surrounding the 1983 conference bear directly on the future growth of domestic satellite

service. FSS and BSS both will be affected

by these decisions. Domestic issues involving direct broadcasting satellites planned for

operation in the 12-GHz band must be addressed as a part of the overall policy considerations by the United States.

Other Conferences

● The 10 additional administrative radio

conferences to be held over the next 7 years

include some that will be as important, if not

more so, than WARC-79 itself. (Scheduling is

tentative and some could be delayed by action of the ITU’s administrative council

and/or the 1982 plenipotentiary conference.)

Some of these conferences offer the United

States an opportunity to reopen the question

of allocation proposals that were not accepted by WARC-79 (e.g., WARC for the mobile services in 1983).

● These future conferences offer a forum

for the United States to reiterate the importance of the radiolocation service and to help

resolve coordination problems arising from

the sharing of bands with the fixed and

mobile services.

. The following is a list of the future ITU

conferences currently scheduled:

November 1981,6 weeks, region 2, MF-BC

RARC, second session;
144 • Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

August 1982, 4 weeks, region 1, FM-BC

RARC, first session;

September 1982, 6 weeks, ITU Plenipotentiary Conference;

February 1983, 31⁄2 weeks, Mobile Services

WARC;

June 1983, 5 weeks, region 2, Broadcasting Satellite RARC;

January 1984, 5 weeks, HF-Broadcasting

WARC, first session;

October 1984, 6 weeks, region 1, FM-BC

RARC, second session;

July 1985, 6 weeks, Space Services

WARC, first session;

January 1986, 7 weeks, HF-Broadcasting

WARC, second session;

September 1986, 4 weeks, region 2, HFBroadcasting RARC (New Bands);

January 1987, 4 weeks, African VHF/

UHF-Broadcasting RARC;

September 1987, 6 weeks, Space Services

WARC, second session;

March 1988,6 weeks, region 3, VHF/UHF

Bands RARC; and

September 1988, 6 weeks, Mobile Services

WARC.
Acronyms, Abbreviations,

and Glossary
Acronyms and Abbreviations —

AFNAVSAT

AM

ARFA

AWACS

BSS

C-E

CCIR

CCIs

CCITT

CITEL

COMSAT

COPUOS

C

3

I

DNS

DOD

DSCS

ECAC

EHF

EIRP

EMC

FAS

FCC

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Air Force Navigation Satellite

amplitude modulation

Allied Radio Frequency

Agency (NATO)

Airborne Warning and

Control System

broadcasting-satellite service

communications-electronics

(DOD parlance)

International Radio

Consultative Committee of

the International

Telecommunication Union

reference to both the CCIR

and CCITT

International Telegraph and

Telephone Consultative

Committee of the

International

Telecommunication Union

Inter-American

Telecommunication

Conference of the

Organization of American

States

Communications Satellite

Corp.

The United Nations

Committee on the Peaceful

Uses of Outer Space

command, control,

communications, and

intelligence (DOD parlance)

The Department of Defense

Navigation Satellite system

Department of Defense

Defense Satellite

Communication System

Electromagnetic

Compatibility Analysis

Center (DOD), Annapolis,

extremely high frequency

to 300 GHz)

Md.

(30

effective isotropically radiated

power (measured in watts)

electromagnetic compatibility

Frequency Assignment

Subcommittee of the

Interdepartment Radio

Advisory Committee

Federal Communications

Commission

FLTSATCOM

FM

FMAC

FSS

FX

GHz

GPS

HF

Hz

IBI

ICA

ICAO

IFL

IFRB

IMCO

INMARSAT

INTELSAT

IRAC

ITU

kHz

LF

LR

MF

MHz

MO

MR

NASA

NATO

NTIA

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Fleet Satellite Communication

System (Naval)

frequency modulation

Frequency Management

Advisory Committee to the

National Telecommunications

and Information

Administration

fixed satellite service

fixed service

gigahertz (1 billion cycles per

second)

global positioning satellite

(sometimes NAVSTAR/GPS)

(DOD)

high frequency (3 to 30 MHZ)

hertz (one cycle per second)

International Bureau of

Informatics

International

Communications Agency

International Civil

Aeronautical Organization

International Frequency List

International Frequency

Registration Board

Intergovernmental Maritime

Consultive Organization

International Maritime

Satellite Organization

International

Telecommunications Satellite

System

Interdepartment Radio

Advisory Committee

International

Telecommunication Union

kilohertz (1000 cycles per

second)

low frequency (30 to 300 kHz)

radiolocation service (fixed)

medium frequency (300 to

3000 kHz)

megahertz (1 million cycles

per second)

mobile service

radiolocation service (mobile)

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

North Atlantic Treaty

Organization

National Telecommunications

147
——.

148 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

RARC

RL

RO

SHF

UHF

U.N.

UNDP

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

and Information

Administration

Regional Administrative

Radio Conference

radionavigation service (fixed)

radionavigation service

(mobile)

super high frequency (3 to 30

GHz)

ultrahigh frequency (300 to

3000 MHz)

United Nations

United Nations Development

Program

UNESCO – United Nations Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural

Organization

UPU – Universal Postal Union

VHF — very high frequency (30 to

300 MHz)

VLF — very low frequency (3 to 30

kHz)

WARC – World Administrative Radio

Conference

WIPO – World Intellectual Property

Organization
.

Glossary

A priori planning—procedure by which frequencies and orbital locations are allotted to individual countries according to a plan negotiated by member-nations and implemented by

ITU,

Aeronautical mobile service-a mobile service between aeronautical stations and aircraft stations, or between aircraft stations, in which

survival craft stations may participate; emergency position-indicating radiobeacon stations may also participate in this service on

designated distress and emergency frequencies.

Aeronautical mobile-satellite service-a mobilesatellite service in which mobile Earth stations are located onboard aircraft; survival

craft stations and emergency position-indicating radiobeacon stations may also participate in this service.

Aeronautical radionavigation-satellite service-a

radionavigation-satellite service in which

Earth stations are located onboard aircraft.

Aeronautical radioavigation service—a radionavigation service intended for the benefit and

for the safe operation of aircraft.

Allocation (of frequency band) –entry in the table

of frequency allocations of a given frequency

band for the purpose of its use by one or more

terrestrial or space radiocommunication services or the radio astronomy service under

specified conditions. This term shall also be

applied to the frequency band concerned.

Allotment (of a radio frequency or radio frequency channel) —entry of a designated frequency channel in an agreed plan, adopted by

a competent conference, for use by one or

more administrations for a terrestrial or

space radiocommunciation service in one or

more identified countries or geographical

areas and under specified conditions.

Amateur service-a radiocommunication service

for the purpose of self-training, intercommunication, and technical investigations carried out by amateurs, i.e., by duly authorized

persons interested in radio technique solely

with a personal aim and without pecuniary interest.

Analog transmission—a technique that transmits the signal in a continuous electrical

waveform. The information context of the signal is conveyed by the value or magnitude of

some characteristics of the signal such as the

amplitude, phase, or frequency of a voltage.

Assigned frequency–the center of the frequency

band assigned to a station.

Assigned frequency band–the frequency band

within which the emission of a station is authorized; the width of the band equals the necessary bandwidth plus twice the absolute value of the frequency tolerance. Where space

stations are concerned, the assigned frequency band includes twice the maximum

Doppler shift that may occur in relation to

any point of the Earth’s surface.

Assignment (of a radiofrequency or radiofrequency channel) —authorization given by an

administration for a radio station to use a

radiofrequency or radiofrequency channel

under specified conditions.

Band–in radio, frequencies that are within two

definite limits and are allocated for a definite

purpose or service, e.g., the standard AM

broadcast band.

Broadcasting-satellite service–a radio-communication service in which signals transmitted or

retransmitted by space stations are intended

for direct reception by the general public.

Broadcasting service–a radio-communication

service in which the transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general

public. This service may include sound transmissions, television transmissions, or other

types of transmission.

CCIR–International Radio Consultative Committee, a permanent organ of ITU where

member-nations and recognized private operating agents formulate recommendations

concerning technical and operational radio

matters.

CCITT–International Telegraph and Telephone

Consultative Committee, a permanent organ

of ITU where member-nations and recognized

private operating agents formulate recommendations concerning technical, operational, and tariff aspects of telecommunication.

CCIR SPM–special preparatory meeting of

CCIR convened in 1978 by the Secretary General of ITU to provide technical support to

WARC-79.

dBW–a measure of power, decibels referened to

1 watt,

Digital transmission—a technique that transits

the signal in the form of one of a diswe

number of codes. The information content

the signal is concerned with discrete state

84-591 f) - 82 - 11
150 “ Radiofrequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

the signal, such as the presence or absence of

a voltage, a contact in the open or closed position, or a hole or no hole in certain positions

on a card.

Earth exploration-satellite service–a radio-communication service between Earth stations

and one or more space stations, which may include links between space stations, in which:

1) information relating to the characteristics

of the Earth and its natural phenomena is obtained from active sensors or passive sensors

on Earth satellites; 2) similar information is

collected from airborne or Earth-based platforms; 3) such information maybe distributed

to Earth stations within the system concerned; and 4) platform interrogation may be

included. This service may also include feeder

links necessary for its operation.

Emission–radiation produced, or the production

of radiation, by a radio transmitting station.

Evolutionary planning approach–procedure by

which frequency assignments and orbital locations are notified by member-nations and

recorded by ITU on a more or less first-come,

first-served basis without any rigid a priori

plan.

Facsimile–a form of telegraphy for the transmission of fixed images, with or without halftones, with a view to their reproduction in a

permanent form.

Feeder link-a radio link from an Earth station at

a specified fixed point to a space station, or

vice versa, conveying information for a space

radio-communication service other than for

the fixed-satellite service.

Fixed-satellite service-a radio-communication

service between Earth stations at specified

fixed points when one or more satellites are

used; in some cases this service includes satellite-to-satellite links, which may also be effected in the intersatellite service; the fixedsatellite service may also include feeder links

for other space radio-communication services.

Fixed service–a radio-communication service between specified fixed points.

Footnote– in the international table of frequency

allocations a “footnote” conveys special

information and often is a means by which an

ITU member-nation may claim frequency

band usage for a service that is in addition to

or alternative to the service stated in the

cable of allocations.

Frequency allocation table (international)–a

table in the radio regulations allocating bands

for frequencies, in the usable portion of the

radio spectrum, to radio-communication services.

Frequency allocation table (national)–a table in

the FCC Rules and Regulations allocating

bands of frequencies, in the usable portion of

the radio spectrum, to radio-communication

services.

Geostationary satellite–a geosynchronous satellite whose circular and direct orbit lies in the

plane of the Earth’s Equator and which thus

remains fixed relative to the Earth; by extension, a satellite that remains approximately

fixed relative to the Earth.

Geostationary satellite orbit–the oribit in which

a satellite must be placed to be a geostationary satellite.

Geosynchronous satellite–an Earth satellite

whose period of revolution is equal to the

period of rotation of the Earth about its axis.

Harmful interference–interference that endangers the functioning of a radionavigation

service or of other safety services or seriously

degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts

a radio-communication service operating in

accordance with these regulations.

HF broadcasting—high frequency, or shortwave

broadcasting, used primarily for governmentsponsored information services (e.g., Radio

Moscow, Voice of America), and for domestic

broadcasting in many developing countries.

IFRB–International Frequency Registration

Board, a permanent organ of ITU with five

officials elected by the plenipotentiary conference, examines notifications of frequency assignments from member-nations for conformity with the radio regulations.

INTELSAT– International Telecommunication

Satellite Organization with 106 membernations that own and operate the satellites in

the Global Communication Satellite System.

Interference–the effect of unwanted energy due

to one or a combination of emissions, radiations, or inductions upon reception in a radiocommunication system, manifested by any

performance degration, misinterpretation, or

loss of information that could be extracted in

the absence of such unwanted energy.

International frequency list-a listing of all the

frequencies in use in the world, as notified by

administrations to the International Telecommunication Union.

IRAC–Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee; a body of 20 Federal agencies and de-
Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 151

partments that assists NTIA in the development of the National Table of Frequency Allocations, the assignment of frequencies to

stations operated by the Federal Government

and other spectrum management functions.

IRAC Ad Hoc 144–the ad hoc group established

within IRAC to develop recommended U.S.

proposals for WARC-79 pertaining to the

Federal Government use of the spectrum and

to comment on U.S. position papers.

ITU—International Telecommunication Union;

the U.N. related organization with responsibilities in the field of international telecommunications including spectrum management; present membership of 155 nations.

ITU Convention–the governing instrument of

ITU that sets forth the structure and activities of the Union; only the plenipotentiary

conference of ITU can amend or revise the

Convention; it last met in Malaga-Torremolinos in 1973.

Land mobile-satellite service-a mobile-satellite

service in which mobile Earth stations are located on land.

Land mobile service—a mobile service between

base stations and land mobile stations, or between land mobile stations.

Maritime mobile-satellite service–a mobilesatellite service in which mobile Earth stations are located onboard ships; survival craft

stations and emergency position-indicating

radiobeacon stations may also participate in

this service.

Maritime mobile service-a mobile service between coast stations and ship stations, or between ship stations, or between associated

onboard communication stations; survival

craft stations and emergency position-indicating radiobeacon stations may also participate in this service.

Maritime radio-navigation-satellite service—a

radio-navigation-satellite service in which

Earth stations are located onboard ships.

Maritime radionavigation service-a radionavigation service intended for the benefit and

for the safe operation of ships.

Meteorological aids service—a radio-communication service used for meteorological, including hydrological, observations and exploration.

Mobile-satellite service—a radio-communication

service: 1 ) between mobile Earth stations and

one or more space stations, or between space

stations used by this service; or 2) between

mobile Earth stations by means of one or

more space stations.

Mobile service—a radio-communication service

between mobile and land stations, or between

mobile stations.

Orbit–the path, relative to a specified frame of

reference, described by the center of mass of a

satellite or other object in space subjected

primarily to natural forces, mainly the force

of gravity.

Permissible interference–interference at a higher

level than that defined as permissible interference and which has been agreed upon between two or more administrations without

prejudice to other administrations.

Permitted service-a class of allocation. Permitted and primary services have equal

rights, except that in the preparations frequency plans, the primary service should

have prior choice of frequencies (printed in

“grotesque light” type in the ITU table of

allocations. )

Plenipotentiary conference–the supreme body of

ITU that has the power to amend or revise

the ITU convention.

Power flux density—a measure of the power

radiated by a transmitter, used as a constraint on certain services to protect other

services in a shared band.

Primary service–a class of allocation. Stations in

a primary service may not cause harmful interference to stations in the same, or another

primary service, and can claim protection

from interference from stations in primary,

permitted, and secondary services. Printed in

solid capitals in the ITU table of allocations.

Private operating agency–any individual or company or corporation, other than a governmental establishment or agency, which operates a

telecommunication installation intended for

an international communications service or

capable of causing harmful interference with

such a service.

Radar-a radiodetermination system based on

the comparison of reference signals with radio

signals reflected, or retransmitted, from the

position to be determined.

Radiation–the outward flow of energy from any

source in the form of radio waves.

Radio–a general term applied to the use of radio

waves.

Radio astronomy service–a service involving the

use of radio astronomy.

Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979–the Final Acts
—

152 . Radio frequency Use and Management Impacts From the World Administrative Radio Conference of 1979

of WARC-79 will constitute the Radio Regulations, Geneva, 1979 and enter into force on

January 1, 1982, for those countries that have

formally adopted the Final Acts.

Radio waves or hertzian waves–electromagnetic

waves of frequencies arbitrarily lower than

3000 GHz, propagated in space without artificial guide.

Radio communication–telecommunication by

means of radio waves.

Radiocommunication service-a service involving the transmission, emission, and/or reception of radio waves for specific telecommunication purposes.

Radiodetermination–the determination of the

position, velocity, and/or other characteristics of an object, or the obtaining of information relating to these parameters, by means of

the propagation properties of radio waves.

Radiodetermination-satellite service–a radiocommunication service for the purpose of radiodetermination involving the use of one or

more space stations.

Radiodetermination service–a radio-communication service for the purpose of radiodetermination.

Radiolocation—radiodetermination used for purposes other than those of radionavigation.

Radiolocation service—a radiodetermination

service for the purpose of radiolocation.

Radionavigation-radiodetermination used for

the purposes of navigation, including obstruction warning.

Radionavigation-satellite service–a radio-determination-satellite service used for the purpose of radionavigation.

Radionavigation service—a radiodetermination

service for the purpose or radionavigation.

Recognized private operating agency–any private operating agency, as defined above,

which operates a public correspondence or

broadcasting service and upon which the obligations provided for in article 44 of the convention are imposed by the member in whose

territory the head office of the agency is situated, or by the member that has authorized

this operating agency to establish and operate a telecommunication service on its territory.

Regions of ITU–for the allocation of frequencies,

the world has been divided into three regions

by ITU. Exact boundaries of the regions are

given in the radio regulations; a general description follows: region I—Europe, Africa,

the U. S. S. R., Turkey, the Territory of the

Mongolian People’s Republic, and areas to

the north of the U. S. S. R.; region 2–North,

Central, and South Americas, the Caribbean,

and Greenland; and region 3—Asia, Oceania,

Australia, and New Zealand.

Safety service—a radio-communication service

used permanently or temporarily for the safeguarding of human life and property.

Satellite-a body that revolves around another

body of preponderant mass and that has a

motion primarily and permanently determined by the force of attraction of that other

body.

Satellite link-a radio link between a transmitting Earth station and a receiving Earth station through one satellite.

Satellite system—a space system using one or

more artificial Earth satellites.

Secondary service—a class of allocation. Stations

on a secondary service may not cause interference to stations in a primary or secondary

service, and may not claim protection against

interference from stations in a primary service existing or subsequently installed. Printed

in upper and lower case in the ITU table of allocations.

Services—a functional use of the radio spectrum

where designated frequency bands are allocated for particular uses, e.g., broadcasting

service, radiolocation service.

Space-radio communication—any radio communication involving the use of one or more space

stations or the use of one or more reflecting

satellites or other objects in space.

Space research service—a radio-communication

service in which spacecraft or other objects in

space are used for scientific or technological

research purposes.

Space system–any group of cooperating Earth

stations and/or space stations employing

space-radio communication for specific purposes,

Telecommunications—any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing,

images, and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, radio, optical, or other electromagnetic systems.

Telegram—written matter intended to be transmitted by telegraphy for delivery to the addressee. This term also includes radiotelegrams unless otherwise specified.

Telegraphy–a form of telecommunication that is

concerned in any process providing transmis-
Acronyms, Abbreviations, and Glossary ● 153

sion and reproduction at a distance of documentary matter, such as written or printed

matter or fixed images, or the reproduction at

a distance of any kind of information in such

a form. For the purposes of the radio regulations, unless otherwise specified therein, telegraphy shall mean a form of telecommunication for the transmission of written matter by

the use of a signal code.

Telephony–a form of telecommunication set up

for the transmission of speech or, in some

cases, other sounds.

Television—a form of telecommunication for the

transmission of transient images of fixed or

moving objects.

Terrestrial radio communication—any radio communication other than space-radio communication or radio astronomy.

WARC-77—a specialized World Administrative

Radio Conference that met in Geneva in the

winter of 1977 to plan for the broadcastingsatellite service in the band 11.7 to 12.5 GHz.

WARC-79–a General World Administrative

Radio Conference that met in Geneva in the

fall of 1979 to revise the international radio

regulations of ITU.
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