IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ELIZABETH LYNNE HUTCHINSON, ) 

) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. CV-06-00700-WHA 

) 

PHENIX CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS AND 

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 Come now the Defendants, Phenix City Board of Education and Larry E. DiChiara, and 

submit the following Narrative Summary of Undisputed Facts and Brief in Support of Motion for 

Summary Judgment, respectfully requesting that the Court enter judgment in the Defendants’ 

favor as to all claims stated by Plaintiff. 

 NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF UNDISPUTED FACTS

 1. The Plaintiff, Elizabeth Lynne Hutchinson (hereinafter referred to as 

“Hutchinson’) is a white female. 

 2. The Defendant, Phenix City Board of Education (hereinafter referred to “Board”) 

is a local agency of the State of Alabama duly constituted pursuant to § 16-11-1 et seq., Ala. 

Code and is charged with the duty and responsibility of employment and dismissal of all school 

personnel subject to state and federal laws. 

 3. The Defendant, Larry E. DiChiara (hereinafter referred to as “DiChiara”) is a 

white male and is currently employed by the Defendant, Board as its Superintendent. 

 4. The employment application which Hutchinson completed contained at the top 

right corner of the first page, the statement “Discrimination on the basis of race, sex, ethnic 

origin, creed or physical disability is prohibited.” (See Exhibit A). 

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 5. Hutchinson was initially hired by PCBOE for the school year 2003-2004, with a 

beginning employment date of July 30, 2003 and an ending employment date of May 19, 2004. 

Her job title was child nutrition program worker (hereinafter referred to as “CNP”) assigned to 

South Girard School. (See Exhibit B) 

 6. The manager of the South Girard Cafeteria for the school year 2003-2004 was 

Beverly Walker, a black female, now deceased. The Assistant Manager for that location and that 

year was Dorothea McKissic, a black female. 

 7. Hutchinson was reemployed for the school year 2004-2005 to continue serving as 

a CNP worker at South Girard School. Her dates of employment were July 2004 through May 

19, 2005. (See Exhibit C). 

 8. The Cafeteria Manager of South Girard School for the 2004-2005 school year was 

Brenda Densel, (hereinafter referred to as “Densel”) a white female. The Assistant Cafeteria 

Manager for that location and that year was Paula Pritchett, (hereinafter referred to as 

“Pritchett”), a white female. 

 9. For the school year 2003-2004, Hutchinson was one of two white CNP workers 

without supervisory duties at South Girard and was supervised by a black Manager and black 

Assistant Manager. 

 10. For the school year 2004-2005, Hutchinson was the sole white CNP worker 

without supervisory duties at South Girard School, and was supervised by a white Manager and 

white Assistant Manager. 

 11. Hutchinson received an injury to her finger on November 9, 2004, while working 

in the cafeteria at South Girard School. She was taken to the Board’s Central Offices by her 

Manager Densel, and was seen by the school nurse; rendered treatment; and returned to South 

Girard School. 

 12. Later in the afternoon of November 9, 2004, Hutchinson returned to the Board’s 

Central Offices with her husband, Will McCart, (hereinafter referred to as “McCart”) and met 

with Penny Passmore, (hereinafter referred to as “Passmore”) a white female, who was the 

Supervisor of CNP Programs and Jeff Adams, (hereinafter referred to as “Adams”) a white male 

(now deceased), who was Assistant Superintendent for Personnel. 

 13. Hutchinson never filed a written complaint detailing her concerns about her job as 

requested by Adams on November 9, 2004. 

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 14. Hutchinson’s employment was not renewed by the Board at its official meeting on 

May 12, 2005. 

 15. Hutchinson’s last day of employment was May 19, 2005. 

 16. Hutchinson was a probationary employee under § 36-26-100 et seq., Ala. Code, 

(also known as the Fair Dismissal Act). 

 17. Hutchinson has not contested the procedure for her non-renewal under the Fair 

Dismissal Act. 

 18. At the end of May or first of June of 2005, following her non-renewal, 

Hutchinson and her husband, Will McCart, went to DiChiara’s office and met with him. 

 19. Board Policy GAAA is entitled “Equal Opportunity Employment” and provides 

that “. . . no person . . .shall, on the basis of . . . race, . . . be denied the benefits of, or be subject 

of discrimination in regard to employment, retention, promotion, transfer, or dismissal. . . .” (See 

Exhibit D) 

ARGUMENT 

I. 

HUTCHINSON CANNOT PROVE A PRIMA FACIE CASE BY 

A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE

 In her Amended Complaint filed on October 13, 2006 (Doc. #14) Plaintiff sets forth six 

Counts as follows: 

 Claim 1 - Race Discrimination in violation of Title VII 

Claim 2 – Race Discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by and through 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Claim 3 – Race Discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 Claim 4 – Retaliation in violation of Title VII. 

 Claim 5 – Retaliation in violation of race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

 Claim 6 – Retaliation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution, by and through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

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 Under Title VII, Hutchinson carries the initial burden of proof of establishing of prima 

facie case of racial discrimination. In a disparate treatment case she must prove discriminatory 

animus as the ultimate issue of whether there was intentional discrimination. Texas Department 

of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct .1089 (1981). Proof of a discriminatory 

motive requires a showing that the employment practice was deliberate and not accidental. 

 Hutchinson must produce either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination. If Hutchinson relies on circumstantial evidence, the burden of proof shifting 

model outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.1817 (1973) is to 

be applied. 

 For Hutchinson to recover under her claims based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, both by and through 42 U.S.C.A. § 

1983, she must prove intentional discrimination. Hutchinson must present either (1) direct 

evidence of discrimination or (2) circumstantial evidence under the burden shifting model of 

McDonnell Douglas v. Green. The courts have held that application of the burden of proof under 

Title VII and under §1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment, both by and through §1983 is the 

same. 

 Direct evidence consists of only the most blatant remarks whose intent could be nothing 

other to discriminate against Hutchinson on the basis of her race. “Evidence of direct evidence is 

rare ....” Norrell v. Waste Away Group, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2003). 

 Direct evidence does not include stray remarks in the workplace by other employees or 

statements by non-decisional makers. Statements by non-decision makers cannot be considered 

direct evidence. Eska v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406 (11th Cir. 1997); 

Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066 (11th Cir. 2003); Norrell, 246 F.Supp 2d at 1225. 

 Hutchinson cannot present any direct evidence of racial discrimination against either of 

the Defendants. In her deposition of March 8, 2007, Hutchinson was asked to identify the 

employees whom she had alleged made racists comments to her. 

 Q. Was Betty the only individual who made comments to you about white people? 

 A. Yes, ma‘am. 

 Q. Did any of the other employees ever make comments to you about white people? 

 A. No, ma’am. 

 Q. The first year? 

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 A. No, ma’am. It was just Betty only. 

 Q. The second year too? 

 A. Yes, ma’am 

 Hutchinson Deposition, p. 92, lines 5-15. 

 (All references to the Deposition of Hutchinson are contained in attached Exhibit E.) 

 Hutchinson is referring to Betty Cliatt, (hereinafter referred to as “Cliatt”), a black 

female, who was a tenured CNP worker at South Girard Cafeteria and a co-worker of 

Hutchinson. By her own testimony in the excerpt quoted above Hutchinson has limited her 

claims for hostile work environment to those of her co-worker, Cliatt. When asked about any 

racial comments made by Cliatt, Hutchinson stated “Betty likes to run her mouth, always 

criticizing the white people; that all white people are nothing but white trailer trash. Hutchinson 

Deposition, p. 78, lines 1-4. These comments by Cliatt are stray remarks in the workplace and 

are statements made by a non-decision maker. The comments do not rise to the level of being 

blatant remarks against Hutchinson which would allow Hutchinson to prove intent to 

discriminate on the basis of her race. 

 Neither of the Defendants knew Hutchinson other than the fact that she was on a list 

supplied by Adams, the Assistant Superintendent of Personnel, to DiChiara and on the 

recommendation of DiChiara to the Board. DiChiara testified that he knew that Hutchinson was 

on a list for non-renewal, but he had never met with Hutchinson or made any effort to find out 

why Hutchinson was being recommended for non-renewal. DiChiara Deposition, p. 47, lines 19-

23; p. 48, lines 1-23; p. 49, lines 1-23; and p. 50, lines 1-7. (All references to the Deposition of 

DiChiara are contained in attached Exhibit F.) Lori White (hereinafter referred to as “White”), 

the Board Vice-President, and Board representative for purposes of this litigation, testified that 

she had no knowledge of Hutchinson prior to the lawsuit in question and that the Board, to the 

best of her knowledge, relied on the recommendation of Defendant DiChiara to non-renew 

Hutchinson’s contract. The Board did not conduct any independent investigation of Mrs. 

Hutchinson. White Deposition, p.24, lines 1-23. (All references to the Deposition of White are 

contained in attached Exhibit G.) 

 Being unable to produce any direct evidence of discrimination, Hutchinson must follow 

the McDonnell Douglas and Burdine burden-shifting framework to establish a prima facie case 

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of racial discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence based on circumstantial evidence. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 802. 

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

 The burden of proof Under Title VII § 1991 and the Fourteenth Amendment for a hostile 

work environment claim requires proof that “the workplace is permeated with discriminatory 

intimidation, ridicule, insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the 

victims employment and create an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, 

Inc., 510 U.S .17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 370 (1993). To establish a hostile work environment claim 

Hutchinson must show that 1) she belonged to a protected group; 2) that she was subjected to 

unwelcome harassment; 3) that the harassment was based on race; 4) that the harassment was 

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment and create a 

discriminatory abusive work environment and (5) that the Board and DiChiara are responsible 

for such an environment under either a theory of vicarious or direct liability. Miller v. Kenworth 

of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d. 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). 

 The Eleventh Circuit in Miller v. Kenworth requires that to fulfill the fourth requirement 

of sufficiently severe or perverse conduct which alters the terms of her employment; Hutchinson 

must prove both an objective and a subjective component. The factors to be considered in 

determining the objective severity of the harassment include 1) the frequency of the conduct; 2) 

the severity of the conduct; 3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating or a 

mere offensive utterance; and 4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the 

employee’s job performance. Id. 277 F.3d. at 1276. When the facts of this case are applied to 

those four requirements, Hutchinson fails to prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the 

objective component. The conduct was not severe; the comments were made by a co-worker 

who not a decision maker; the conduct was not physically threatening and Hutchinson was able 

to perform her job. Densel, the Cafeteria Manager, testified in her deposition on April 10, 2007, 

that Hutchinson was a good employee, always did her job and followed directions. Densel 

Deposition, p.22, lines 3-11. (All references to the Deposition of Densel are contained in 

attached Exhibit H.) Because Hutchinson has failed to prove the objective component, the issue 

of her subjective feelings is mute. 

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RETALIATION

 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the Eleventh Circuit decisions require that 

Hutchinson prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she was engaged in a protected 

activity; (2) that her employer was aware of her engagement in that protective activity; (3) that 

she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that there was a causal connection between 

her engagement in the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Maniccia v. Brown, 

171 F. 3d 1364 (11th Cir. 1999). As to the first required element of proof, this Court has held 

that “[t]he relevant question [is] . . . whether the employee’s communications to the employer 

sufficiently convey the employee’s reasonable concerns that the employer has acted or is acting 

an unlawful discriminatory manner.” Hill v. IGA Food Depot, et al., 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 80455 

(M.D. Ala. 2006). “[T]he employee must, at the very least, communicate [his] belief that 

discrimination is occurring to the employer. It is not enough for the employee merely to 

complain about a certain policy or certain behavior of coworkers and rely on the employer to 

infer that discrimination has occurred.” Id. at *17. Hutchinson cannot produce sufficient 

evidence to satisfy the burden of production by a preponderance of the evidence. Hutchinson has 

testified that she reported the comments of Cliatt to both Densel and Pritchett. Hutchinson 

Deposition, p. 79, lines 2-6. However, when asked specifically if she told Densel that Cliatt 

treated her differently because she was white, Hutchinson replied: 

 “Q. Did you say to Brenda Densel that Betty treats me differently because I’m White? 

 Mr. De Gwek: Object to the form. 

 A. I can’t recall. 

 Q. What did you say, specifically, to Brenda Densel then about Betty’s conduct? 

 A. I had spoke to Brenda about Betty’s comments, about all white people are trailer 

 trash.” 

 Hutchinson Deposition, p. 88, lines 7-18. 

 Densel, in her deposition, testified that Huchinson would come in her office to tell her 

things, but Densel specifically denied that Hutchinson complained to her about having problems 

working with Cliatt. Densel further testified that she had not heard any comments that were racist 

or that referenced “trailer trash.” Densel Deposition, p. 24, lines 1-23; p.25, lines 1-7; and p. 26, 

lines 1-16. 

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 Pritchett testified in her deposition that Hutchinson would complain, but that those 

complaints were mumblings about certain working condition and were not about race. Pritchett 

had never heard about “white trailer trash” or other comments which would be considered racist. 

Pritchett Deposition, p.17, lines 6-23; p. 18, lines 1-23; and p. 19, line1. (All references to the 

Deposition of Pritchett are contained in attached Exhibit I.) 

 Hutchinson cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she engaged in a 

protected activity. 

 The fourth element that Hutchinson must prove in support of her claim of retaliation is 

that there was a causal connection between her engagement in a protected activity and the 

adverse employment action. Defendants deny that Hutchinson engaged in a protected activity, 

but assuming for the sake of argument that she did, Hutchinson cannot prove a causal connection 

between that activity and her non-renewal. As set out in the discussions above, Densel is the 

individual who made the initial recommendation of non-renewal based on “safety reasons” 

resulting from the conduct of Hutchinson’s husband McCart. This recommendation was made to 

Passmore and agreed with by Sparks. Adams made the recommendation to DiChiara, the 

Superintendent. Under Alabama law the Board has the sole authority to hire and non-renew. As 

testified to by Board Vice-President White, the Board relied upon the recommendation of the 

Superintendent, who had relied upon the recommendation of Adams. There is no causal 

connection between the Board’s actions and any comments made by Cliatt. Any comments made 

by Cliatt were “stray comments” made by a “non-decision maker.” “Plaintiff satisfies this 

element if he provides sufficient evidence that the decision-maker became aware of the protected 

conduct, and that there was close temporal proximity between this awareness and the adverse 

employment action.” Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F. 3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999); Hill v. 

IGA Food Depot at *19. 

 Assuming for the sake of argument that Hutchinson has established a prima facie case, 

the burden shifts to the Defendants. In cases involving a black claimant there is a presumption of 

unlawful discrimination once a prima facie case is established. However, in at lease one Circuit, 

the presumption of discrimination does not exist if the claim is by a white plaintiff. Reynolds v. 

School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, et al., 69 F.3d 1523 (10th Cir. 1995). In that case the 

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals modified the requirements of a prima facie case of reverse 

demonstration and held that the white plaintiff did not deserve the presumption of discrimination. 

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“Reynolds does not necessarily deserve the presumption of discrimination afforded to a member 

of an ostensibly disfavored minority class.” Id. p. 1534.

 Defendants to meet their burden of proof must articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory 

reason for the decision to non-renew Hutchinson. Norrell v. Waste Away Group, Inc., 246 F. 

Supp .2d 1213 (M.D. Ala., February 26, 2003). The evidence is undisputed that Densel made the 

initial decision for the non-renewal of Hutchinson at the end of her second year employment 

contract. Densel has testified that the decision to non-renew Hutchinson was her decision. Penny 

Passmore, the CNP Supervisor, and Sparks, the Principal, agreed with her decision. Densel 

Deposition, p. 52, lines 8-21. It is undisputed that the reason Densel gave for Hutchinson’s nonrenewal was “safety reasons”. Densel Deposition, p. 47, lines 1-4. This was because of the 

actions of Hutchinson’s husband, McCart, at the late afternoon meeting of November 9, 2004 

with Hutchinson, McCart, Passmore and Adams. Densel Deposition, p. 47, lines 5-6. On 

November 10, 2004, Passmore came to South Girard Cafeteria and described to Densel the 

actions of McCart the prior afternoon. Densel then expressed safety concerns and made her 

decision that day that she would not recommend Hutchinson for employment for the next year. 

Densel Deposition, p. 51, lines 3-18. The testimony of Passmore who was present at the meeting 

of November 9, 2004 is that McCart was angry and upset at the meeting. Passmore Deposition, 

p. 98. lines 17-19 and 23; p. 99, line 99. Passmore confirms that the decision to non-renew 

Hutchinson was made the next morning based on McCart being a threat. She felt the tone of his 

comments, as well as the comments themselves, during that late afternoon meeting were 

threatening. Passmore Depo. p.101, lines 7-12. (All references to the Deposition of Passmore are 

contained in attached Exhibit J.) 

 Having articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Hutchinson’s non-renewal 

the Plaintiff must now prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons 

offered by Defendants are not true but are merely a pretext for discrimination. Norrell, 246 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1222. Hutchinson cannot rely on conclusory allegations of discrimination. “[T]he 

Plaintiff must come forward with evidence demonstrating ‘such weaknesses, implausibilities, 

inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons 

for its actions that a reasonable fact finder could find them unworthy of credence.’” Combs v. 

Plantation Patterns, 106 F. 3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997); Gaddis v. Russell Corporation, 242 

F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1136 (M.D. Ala. 2003. 

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ARGUMENT 

 II. 

DEFENDANTS ARE NOT LIABLE FOR ACTIONS UNDER THE 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, BY AND THROUGH 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 The United States Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of respondeat superior does 

not apply to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Department of Social Services of 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). In Worthington v. Elmore County Board 

of Education, et al., 160 Fed.Appx. 877, 205 U.S. App. Lexus 28674 (11th Cir. 2005), the 

Eleventh Circuit has applied this finding to the Fourteenth Amendment claim brought pursuant to 

§ 1983. In Worthington, the court goes further to state that to impose liability on a municipal 

government under § 1983 as sought here, a plaintiff must identify the municipal policy or custom 

causing the deprivations of federal rights. Hutchinson has failed to identify any policy or custom 

of the Board which had a causal connection to her non-renewal. Further, Hutchinson must prove 

that the Board acted with deliberate indifference and that such deliberate conduct was the direct 

causal link between the Board’s actions and the allegation by Plaintiff of a deprivation her 

federal rights. Deliberate indifference requires a degree of culpability in addition to the causal 

relationship. Worthington, 160 F. Appx.at 880-881. There is no evidence that either the Board 

or DiChiara had knowledge of the allegations made by Plaintiff and specifically the allegations 

made against the co-employee, Cliatt. The excerpts from the depositions of White and DiChiara 

referenced above confirm that neither knew of Hutchinson other than the fact that she was on the 

non-renewal list. Further, neither Defendant investigated the reason for the non-renewal. 

ARGUMENT 

III. 

HUTCHINSON WAS A PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEE

 WITH NO RIGHT OF CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT

 Hutchinson was a classified employee of the Board and her employment was governed 

by § 36-26-100 et seq., Ala. Code. As set forth in the Narrative Summary of Undisputed Facts, 

Hutchinson was employed for two years pursuant to employment contracts which are attached 

hereto as Exhibits A and B. Upon the end of either contract, Hutchinson had no right to be 

reemployed by the Board. At the completion of the employment contract for the year 2003-

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2004, the Board offered Hutchinson a new one-year contract which Hutchinson accepted. At the 

completion of her second contract, Hutchinson’s employment ended. The Board chose not to 

offer Hutchinson a contract for another year of employment. Therefore, Hutchinson was 

employed by Board for a twenty-four month period. She was not employed for thirty-six months 

as required under § 36-26-101, Ala. Code, to acquire non-probationary status. As a probationary 

employee, Hutchinson’s employment simply terminated at the expiration of the second contract 

on May 19, 2005. Both Hutchinson and Board have fulfilled each of their obligations under the 

contract. 

 Hutchinson was given notice of non-renewal. However, neither the recommendation nor 

the Board approval was required to terminate the employment. 

 Guise v. Morgan County Bd. of Education, 516 So. 2d 692, (Ala.Civ.App. 1987) directly 

addresses the non-renewal of a non-professional public employee. The relevant events in that 

case transpired prior to the enactment of § 36-26-100 et seq., Ala. Code, known as the Fair 

Dismissal Act. Scarlett Guise was a non-professional board employee who was not reemployed. 

She claimed that to be non-renewed required both a recommendation from the superintendent 

and approval by a majority of the board. The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals found that Guise 

was employed for a “fixed term, i.e. the school year as noted in the stipulations.” The Court 

further stated that Guise was correct in her contention that reemployment required both a 

recommendation and board approval. “However, no such statutory requirement exists for nonrenewal of an employment contract for a fixed term.” Because board policy required notice on 

non-renewal prior to the last day of school, Guise was notified under that policy that she was not 

being reemployed. The Phenix City Board of Education does not have a policy requiring that 

notice of non-renewal be given prior to the expiration of a contract. Therefore, while notice of 

non-renewal was given Hutchinson such notice is not required by statute, case law or board 

policy. 

 In the subsequent case of Ray, et al. v. Decatur City Board of Education, et al., 723 So. 

2d 680 (Ala.Civ.App. 1998), the Court of Civil Appeals reaffirmed its prior ruling in Guise. Ray

arose subsequent to the enactment of the Fair Dismissal Act, § 36-26-100, et seq. The Plaintiffs 

in Ray had fixed term contracts and had not attained non-probationary status. The Plaintiffs 

claimed that they had not received the requisite notice of non-renewal within the required time. 

Quoting Guise the Court stated “no statutory requirement exists for non-renewal of an 

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employment contract for a fixed term ....” Id. 683. Each of the Plaintiffs in Ray was found to 

have fixed term contracts and that their contracts terminated on the dates specified in each 

contract when those contracts were not renewed. 

 Hutchinson has no constitutional or statutory right to continued employment with the 

Board. Therefore, her claims based on statutory and constitutional rights are not viable. Board 

and DiChiara are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

 While this theory is discussed in legal treatises on education, the undersigned counsel has 

not located a case on non-renewal having been decided by either the Eleventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals or the United States Supreme Court. 

This 7th day of June, 2007. 

 SMITH & SMITH 

 A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 

 BY: /s/Sydney S. Smith 

 Attorney for the Defendants 

 Phenix City Board of Education and Larry E. 

 DiChiara 

1503 Broad Street 

 Phenix City, Alabama 36867 

 (334) 298-2679 

 SMI 078 

 ASB-4248-T82S 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have served the Narrative Summary of Undisputed Facts and Brief 

in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment upon Plaintiff’s counsel, by electronic filing and 

by email on this 7th day of June, 2007. 

 Joshua D. Wilson, Esq. 

 Rocco C. Alamusa, Jr., Esq. 

 Wiggins, Childs, Quinn & Pantazis, LLC. 

 The Kress Building 

 301 19th Street North 

 Birmingham, Alabama 35203 

jwilson@wcqp.com

rcalamusa@wcqp.com

 /s/Sydney S. Smith 

C-06-042 Narrative Summary & Brief 060707 

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