U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Sherwin-Williams

Paint Warehouse Fire

Dayton, Ohio

With Supplement on Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire

Basel, Switzerland

USFA-TR-009/May 1987

Homeland

Security

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T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

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www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse Fire

Dayton, Ohio

With Supplement on

Sandoz Chemical Plant Fire

Basel, Switzerland

Investigated by: Tom D. Copeland

 Philip Schaenman

This is Report 009 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

OVERVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FACILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CODE COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

LIABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

LESSONS LEARNED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Supplement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Facility. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Incident. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Aftermath. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Lessons Learned. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Appendices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appendix A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Appendix E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

1

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS PAINT WAREHOUSE FIRE

Dayton, Ohio

May 27, 1987

Local Contacts: Chief Glenn Alexander 

District Chief Paul Hemmeter 

District Chief Gary Douglas 

District Chief Jim Dunham 

Dayton Fire Department 

300 N. Main Street 

Dayton, Ohio 45402 

(513) 443-4200 

Mark Chubb, Plans Examiner 

Douglas Hall, Water 

Department 

OVERVIEW 

The Dayton, Ohio Fire Department avoided a double disaster by not attempting to extinguish a 

massive fire in a paint warehouse. The fire started on May 27, 1987, and completely destroyed the 

Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse. The dollar loss was $32 million, but only one employee was 

seriously injured and one firefighter sprained his leg. The noncombustible, sprinklered warehouse 

contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and other products and was located over the aquifer 

from which wells provided the water supply for about one-third of the area’s 400,000 people. 

Uncontained water and chemical run-off from firefighting could have contaminated this water supply and caused a greater loss than the fire itself, as occurred in Switzerland after the Sandoz Chemical 

Warehouse fire in 1986 contaminated the Rhine.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES 

Issues Comments

Cause Spark from lift truck ignited spilled contents of cans. 

Industrial Firefighting Ineffective; could not stop initial fire. 

Sprinkler Systems Overwhelmed

Helped save office building adjoining warehouse. 

Question whether standard is adequate for this occupancy. 

Firewall Failed. 

Incident Command Highly effective. 

Quick, appropriate decision by first arriving district chief not to let crews in close. 

Courageous decision by Chief Glenn Alexander not to vigorously attack fire with water 

precluded environmental disaster to aquifer and city water supply. 

Insurance To be paid despite decision not to extinguish. 

Municipal Liability None apparent in this case but cannot generalize. 

Prefire Plan Did not address threat to aquifer. 

Environmental Pollution Apparently little to none. 

Tradeoff of air versus water pollution considered early, unlike Swiss Sandoz fire. 

Air and water experts on the scene early. 

Firefighter Safety A major factor in decision not to fight in close. 

Only one firefighter slightly injured in four-day fire. 

Employee Safety Difficulty in accounting for employees who escaped. 

Only one employee seriously injured.

THE FACILITY 

The Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was a large one-story building with an attached office building. An adjoining roofed-over area was used for drum storage. Trailers, some loaded, were located 

at the docks and within the fenced-in area of the facility. Direct exposure to properties outside the 

storage complex was minimal. (For a diagram of the site see Figure 1 in Appendix B.)

The main building’s outside walls were of “tilt-up” concrete construction with a fire division wall of 

similar construction dividing the warehouse into two areas. The roof was supported by unprotected 

steel bar joists and columns. The facility was built in 1977 and contained about 190,000 square feet 

with walls about 33 feet high.

The building had a sprinkler system and diesel fire pump. The 2,500 gpm fire pump was located in 

a small detached building. Fire department connections to supplement the system were located on 

the warehouse side of the pumphouse.

The pump was supplied by a 12-inch line connected to a 16-inch public water main. The pump supplied a 10-inch loop around the site with connections to various sprinkler risers, external exposure 
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 3

sprinklers along the outside wall at the drum storage, fixed monitors for the drum storage area, and 

private hydrants. Water flow alarms were monitored by a central station. The ceiling sprinklers had a 

reported design density of 0.32 gpm per square foot over 4,000 square feet.

The warehouse contained over 1.5 million gallons of paints and related flammable liquids mostly 

in small containers up to 5-gallon sizes. There was also considerable storage of aerosol cans. Drums 

were stored outside under the canopy area. Trailers contained additional products. The warehouse 

had extensive rack type storage, up to four tiers of pallets high. Approximately 30 employees were 

working at the time of the fire.

THE WATER SYSTEM 

The public water supply for Dayton, Ohio and surrounding areas is drawn partly from an aquifer 

over which the Sherwin-Williams Paint Warehouse was built. The warehouse was within a major 

well field with wells on and adjacent to the site. (See Appendix D for map of wells.)

Chemicals can migrate down from the surface and contaminate the water. This was a concern when 

the industrial park where the warehouse was located was first developed. No detailed plans had 

been made by the fire department to deal with a threat to the water supply, although the threat was 

anticipated and discussed several years before the fire.

THE FIRE

During the evening of May 27, 1987, a workman using a motorized lift truck accidentally knocked 

over and spilled several cans of flammable liquid in the east portion of the warehouse. The liquid 

probably was ignited by a spark from the electric motor of the truck. The lift truck operator received 

serious burns and was helped by other employees to put out his flames and escape. The employees 

quickly decided that the fire was beyond their ability to extinguish, and all evacuated without further 

injuries. They credited company training for knowing what to do.

The Dayton Fire Department received the alarm automatically from the fire alarm central station 

when the plant’s sprinklers activated, along with many calls from the public and employees. Three 

engines, one truck, and a district chief were dispatched at 2107. While responding, the district chief 

quickly decided to request a second alarm at 2108. This resulted in four additional engines, two 

additional trucks, and another district chief. The first engine on the scene reported complete building involvement at 2113. The first-in district chief requested a third alarm as he arrived on the scene 

at 2114.

A total of 84 Fire Department personnel responded with ten engines, five trucks, and twelve other 

vehicles. Most of the equipment was staged and not actually used.

The fire was through the roof, and the east half of the warehouse was totally involved when the first 

units arrived. Aerosol cans were raining on the crews and hurtling for distances. The initial concerns were for protecting the drum storage, office, and other exposures, and for fire fighter safety. 

The district chief quickly decided not to let his fire fighters hook up to the sprinkler supply of the 

pumphouse, which was close to the wall of the warehouse and exposed to intense heat, danger from 

exploding and the hurtling cans, and the threat of a wall collapse. Also, it was thought that the sprinkler system was probably compromised already. The initial attack was directed at the office, drum 

storage, and loaded trailers in the docking and parking areas.
4

The fire spread past the fire wall and was involving the west half of the warehouse before plans could 

be implemented to cut the fire off at the wall. At 2132, the dispatcher was advised that the building 

would be a total loss. (The fire ultimately did destroy the main warehouse, and 17 trailers also were 

heavily or totally damaged. The office, its records, and the outdoor drum storage were saved.)

The warehouse sprinkler system was overwhelmed almost immediately and had little impact on the 

main fire. Water was observed discharging from broken sprinkler piping early in the fire. Sprinklers 

did apparently contribute to saving the office building. The fire pump supplying the sprinklers was 

manually shut down at about 2235 or 2245.

Automatically opening plastic vents almost directly over the incipient fire operated early and may 

have released heat that otherwise would have built up quickly and caused more sprinkler heads to 

go off, suggested Dayton Chief Glenn Alexander. In any event, the sprinkler system design was not 

adequate for controlling this fire.

Chief Alexander assumed incident command early on and ordered that no water be applied to the 

fire in the warehouse. Water was to be used only to protect exposures and to extinguish fires where 

the run off could be monitored on paved areas. Because of his concern about the water supply well 

field, Chief Alexander called the director of the water department prior to responding and requested 

the director to meet him at the scene.

The contents of the warehouse, the problem of air pollution versus water pollution, and other conditions were considered. In addition to local water authorities, state air and water pollution experts 

were on the scene the first day. It was agreed that it would be best not to increase the threat to the 

water system by applying water to the warehouse fire. The smoke was not causing a direct life safety 

exposure and was described as being similar in hazard to diesel exhaust.

Douglas Hall, Environmental Protection Manager for the Dayton Water Department, said the early 

decision not to put water on this fire was clear cut. The decision was made easier due to the knowledge that there were no highly toxic materials present and no residential areas close-by. If it had 

not been for the threat to the underground water supply, they probably would have recommended 

applying water to the fire and controlling run-off. Although the fire department avoided applying 

much water to the warehouse itself, the sprinkler system’s 2,500-gpm fire pump did operate for a 

while and there also was runoff from the initial attack. Thus some contaminated water reached the 

nearby Miami River. On day one of the fire, paint solvents were skimmed and pumped from the 

river. A water containment dike was started on the fourth day of the fire in preparation for the final 

extinguishment operation. Since the fire, numerous test and recovery wells have been dug. There is 

some ground contamination, but the contamination apparently is being managed and has not yet 

affected the water supply.

The fire was reported contained at 0012 hours on May 28, 1987, but not under control until 1004 

hours on June 2, 1987, almost six days after it started.

CODE COMPLIANCE

The warehouse was in compliance with the Ohio Building Code, as best could be determined. That 

code allowed unlimited space in the warehouse so long as it was fully sprinklered. No performance 

standards or guidelines are provided in the code as to what constitutes adequate sprinklering for 

such a facility.
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 5

There is some question as to what would be the most cost-effective fire protection design that would 

comply with the code for a warehouse such as this, full of highly flammable liquids.

One alternative is to subdivide the building into many compartments, each with a high flow sprinkler system--practically like preparing to flood a magazine compartment on a ship. Another is to 

build large open spaces with few firewalls, lower flow sprinkler system that may handle some fires 

(such as cardboard cartons igniting or a small spill) but not one such as occurred. A third approach--

not in compliance with most codes--is to build a lightweight, “disposable” building or shed (such as 

was involved in the Swiss Sandoz Chemical Warehouse fire discussed in the supplement) but built in 

a safe, remote environment (unlike the Sandoz fire) where it could be allowed to burn. Containment 

ponds and dams can be built-in to catch water runoff if water pollution could be a problem. Further 

fire protection studies are needed to examine the various other options for such warehouses.

LIABILITY 

Was the fire department exposed to liability suits by deciding not to extinguish the fire? Do insurance 

companies have to pay insurance in these cases? In this case, the answers were largely moot because 

the building was judged to be on its way to becoming a total loss when the decision was made, and 

the insurance company tentatively agreed to pay the loss without protest. Here is a synopsis of the 

liability situation, but this is no substitute for seeking legal advice for your own area.

1. The fire department has very broad rights to take action in an emergency. It even can destroy 

property to save other property; for example, during the San Francisco earthquake of 1906, 

rows of buildings were dynamited to provide a fire break to stop the fire. The owners, however, 

can seek indemnification from the city for destroying their property. The insurance company 

also can sue.

2. The fire department and the city can be liable for negligence (unreasonable actions) unless state 

statutes limit that liability or unless the cities have “sovereign immunity.” Most states no longer 

recognize the latter. States vary in their liability laws. Liability questions need to be answered 

state by state.

3. Most states have laws that limit the liability of a fire department for negligence or poor judgment. The limit may be zero as in California. In Minnesota, it is $300,000 or the limit of negligence insurance it carries, whichever is greater.

4. If a fire department decides to let a building burn that could have been saved in order to protect 

a greater loss to the community, they could be sued by any party--the property owner, insurance 

company, public, etc., if found negligent, then 2) applies. If not, they are home free--except for 

legal expenses.

5. The insurance company usually has to pay for the loss regardless of the fire department actions. 

Although the insurance company reasonably expects the fire department to fight a fire if their 

insured property burned, it is their hard luck if the fire department does not fight the fire. 

However, knowing this possibility exists may cause premiums to go up for properties that 

could cause pollution if they burn. Also, the insurance company might claim that the building 

owner did not reveal all hazards, and try to hold back a part or much of the insurance, or delay 

payment.
6

6. The insurance company might have to pay for environmental damage up to the limit of the 

policy as part of fire losses. It depends on the details of the policy and/or the details of the 

situation.

7. This is all on the edge of a new area legally, environmentally, ethically, and from fire fighting 

points of view. It needs further exploration. Fire departments should discuss the issue with local 

city attorneys. The fire department, while it generally appears to be safe, may fall into some 

loophole or have an adverse interpretation of the law in light of the new circumstances.

LESSONS LEARNED 

1. Risk Management--The most important lesson learned because of this fire is not simply that 

some fires should be allowed to burn but that the consequences of all actions and “inactions” 

must be knowledgeably considered.

Chief Alexander describes today’s fire chiefs as “risk managers.” This is a good application of 

the term and broadens a chief’s role and responsibility. Risk management of such fires as this 

involves the consideration of:

 Characteristics of materials and chemicals involved

 Air versus water pollution

 Wind and weather conditions

 Capability to extinguish or control the fire;

 Ability to contain run-off

 Short-term versus delayed hazards

 Life safety and property exposure 

 Evacuation problems. 

2. Water Pollution--In this fire, the decision not to apply water to the warehouse fire resulted 

in far less contamination to the ground water and little if any difference in property loss. State 

and local air and water pollution experts were brought to the scene early to consult. The Swiss 

Sandoz Chemical Plant fire, which polluted the Rhine, demonstrated what can happen when 

water run off is not considered. (A summary of that fire is presented below.) However, it may 

not always be possible to allow such fires to burn when there is a high exposure hazard or an air 

pollution problem. Applying water to avoid a fire or air pollution catastrophe may be the lesser 

evil at times; it depends on the situation. Containment of water runoff should be a consideration 

both in prefire planning and in planning fire protection systems for a structure or complex 

which has significant amounts of hazardous materials.

3. Insurance and Law Suits--According to Chief Alexander, the insurance company for the warehouse said it will not sue the Fire Department for not applying water to extinguish the warehouse fire. A key factor here was that the warehouse building was essentially a total loss at the 

time the decision to stop applying water was made by the Chief. If the building could have been 

saved, the same finding might not have been made.

The liability of the city might have been much greater if the water supply had been damaged, let 

alone the adverse local and national publicity that would surely have ensued. Nevertheless, fire 

departments that plan ahead of time to let a fire burn because of environmental considerations 

should one occur on a particular property need to discuss that possibility beforehand with the 

city attorney and the property owner as part of pre-fire planning.
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 7

4. Sprinkler Systems--Two important fire safety features provided in this warehouse failed: the 

sprinkler system and the firewall. Apparently, the sprinkler system was quickly overwhelmed 

and could not provide the necessary water density. This may have been affected by the venting 

system releasing heat directly above the incipient fire and stopping heat build-up that might 

have triggered other heads quickly. The system was considered in compliance with current standards and the Ohio codes; Chief Alexander has called for a reexamination of the standards for 

such high-risk occupancies.

Turning off the fire pump and then the water supply to the warehouse was a calculated risk 

primarily in regard to the office area. The warehouse was not being affected by the sprinkler 

system, but the office area had been saved to that point by several heads that operated. It was felt 

that the threat to the aquifer outweighed the potential loss of the office building. However, after 

the fire, the office building was found to have received very little damage.

5. Firewall--The fire wall did not withstand the rapid fire build-up and intense exposure. A hole 

developed in it. Chief Alexander stated that the fire doors in the firewall did close except in one 

case where only a door on one side of the wall closed. The opposite door was jammed by debris. 

The opening was protected by the door from one side. Again, standards for firewalls in such 

high-risk facilities need to be reexamined.

6. Firefighter Safety--It was remarkable and a tribute to Dayton’s Incident Command and fire 

fighters that they sustained only one minor injury in the course of this fire. (It was a strained 

leg from lifting hose.) As it should be, fire fighter safety was considered right from the early 

decisions not to supply the sprinkler system and to pull units well away from the walls.

7. Land Development Decision--The threat to the aquifers would not have existed if the paint 

storage facility had not been allowed to be built amidst the water well field. The city had had 

second thoughts about allowing development on this land and had stopped the full development originally planned. Environmental impacts need to be and often are a major factor in land 

development decisions. Potential impacts from fires are not always considered in these studies, 

and fire departments should try to make sure that they are where appropriate.

8. Employee Training--A Sherwin-Williams employee accidentally started the fire. Whether such 

fires can be totally prevented is debatable, and may not be economically feasible (e.g.; not allowing equipment that can produce sparks anywhere near flammable liquids should there be breakage and a spill.)

The employees were well trained to evacuate quickly and rendezvous, and to extinguish the 

flames on the clothes of the lift truck driver. However, the place they were to rendezvous at 

was being barraged by exploding canisters, so the employees did not stay together, and a head 

count could not be taken to ensure all had escaped. Unnecessary time was spent tracking them 

down and ensuring that no one was missing. Employees should be instructed to go to a meeting 

place that, as far as can be determined in advance, will be safe and/or to check in after a disaster 

occurs.

9. Incident Reporting--Training is needed to ensure consistent and accurate reporting of fire incidents. In this case, for example, the sprinkler systems operated, but were not so reported. With 

understandable intent, the fire officer filling out the report noted that the sprinkler performance 

was “other--not described above” because the sprinklers were overwhelmed. In analyzing this 

data across many fires, this clear case of sprinkler system failure would not have been counted.
8

10. Incident Command--The fire was a near textbook example of the use of a good incident command system. Higher level chiefs smoothly took over as incident commander as the alarms built 

up. There were no major communications problems. The dispatchers did a good job of coping 

with a large number of callers who reported the fire or asked about its risk. The incident command helped hold casualties and losses down.

*****

Because historically the objective of firefighters has been to extinguish hostile fires, it is hoped that 

a review of this fire will make it apparent that risk management is a higher objective and that it is 

necessary to make decisions that result in the lowest possible immediate and long-term loss even if 

that means letting the fire burn.

It is instructive to compare the results of the Sherwin-Williams fire with the 1986 fire in the Sandoz 

Chemical Plant in Basel, Switzerland, which is described in the following supplement.
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 9

Supplement

Pollution of Rhine River Due to Runoff from Sandoz 

Chemical Plant Fire in Basel, Switzerland1

T

hirty tons of toxic material washed into the Rhine River with water firefighters used to fight a 

warehouse blaze at a riverside Sandoz Chemical Plant and Storage Facility near Basel, Switzerland 

in the early morning hours of November 1, 1986. 

By the time the chemicals, mostly pesticides, had traveled 500 miles down the winding scenic river, 

half a million fish were dead, several municipal water supplies were contaminated, and the Rhine’s 

ecosystem was badly damaged with virtually all marine life and a large proportion of microorganisms wiped out.

The approximately 25-mile-long chemical slick drifted slowly downstream from the 

Swiss border to the North Sea. It contained about 30 tons of insecticides, herbicides, and mercurycontaining pesticides, and threatened the North Sea’s winter cod harvest. Environmental groups 

called for a boycott of Sandoz products.

In the weeks following the fire, citizen protest rallies occurred, the Swiss government as well as 

Sandoz Corporation received damage claims from other countries, and Switzerland had to respond 

to strong criticism for its handling of the emergency from France, West Germany, the Netherlands, 

Luxemburg, and the Common Market Commission.

The Facility

The warehouse where the fire started was built in 1967. It was part of a large Sandoz chemical 

complex in Schweizerhalle, a small community six miles east of Basel on the Rhine’s left bank. The 

warehouse was about 295 feet long by 82 feet wide, with an adjoining second half another 82 feet 

wide separated from the first by a wall down the length of the building. It had no sprinklers because 

the risk of a fire was considered low. The building in effect was a light shed intended to provide shelter from rain and extremes of temperature, rather than being a solid warehouse. Its height ranged 

from 26 feet to a peak of 39 feet. 

The half of the building where the fire started was stacked with about 1,250 tons of chemicals in 

barrels four pallets high, somewhat like the Sherwin-Williams storage. The chemicals stored were 

mainly flammable liquids, including pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides, some with 30 degrees C 

flashpoint. Among these were phosphoric acid and organic mercury compounds. Among additional 

raw materials present were ferric ferrocyanide, which may have been a key factor in the ignition 

sequence. The other half (82 foot width) of the building had mostly harmless chemicals.

1

The following sources were used in this supplement: Associated Press stories following the fire; a presentation by Hans Wackerlig, Fire Prevention 

Service, Zurich Switzerland at the NFPA Fall Meeting, Portland, Oregon, November, 1987; personal discussion between Wackerlig and Philip 

Schaenman, November, 1987, “The Lessons Learned From the Sandoz Fire,” Hans Wackerlig, 1987.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The Incident

In response to simultaneous reports by a police highway patrol alarm and the plant night watchman 

at 0019 on November 1, 1986, three Sandoz plant brigade fire fighters and the chief responded to 

the warehouse. Flames were shooting from the roof when the fire was first noticed. Upon arrival, the 

chief immediately realized that he could not cope with the situation alone and called for an all-out 

alarm. By 0045, 200 fire fighters were in action at the scene.

The cause of the fire has not been positively determined. It might have been started by the ignition 

of the ferric (ferrocyanide in the warehouse) by a butane-powered machine used to shrink-package 

chemicals in plastic films. The ferrocyanide was being packaged earlier in the day. This chemical has 

the insidious property--discovered only after the fire--of smoldering without releasing any smoke 

or odor, and then suddenly breaking into almost explosive burning. Ironically, the packaging of the 

chemicals was started by a zealous employee who wanted to tidy up the storage. While this seems 

the likely cause, arson has not been ruled out.

Because the fire was not discovered until it was already large and being fed by a warehouse full of 

highly flammable chemicals, it was accepted from the start that the warehouse would be a total loss. 

Attention was focused on stopping exposure fires, no mean task since barrels of flammable chemicals 

were hurtling through the air. At first the fire fighting was defensive, but then the chief decided to try 

to extinguish the fire with massive amounts of water to stop the fire spread and avoid a catastrophe 

to the nearby city and three major chemical complexes nearby. There also was a great deal of attention given to the risk from the possibility of toxic clouds of gases being generated and whether the 

nearby populations in Switzerland, France, and Germany would have to be evacuated.

More than 3,000 gallons of water a minute was being pumped from the Rhine to fight the fire and 

keep it away from neighboring warehouses and outdoor storage. The peak pumping rate reached 

8,000 gpm.

A 12,000-gallon catch basin into which both water and chemicals collected began overflowing 

into the river. Flames rose to 200 feet above the warehouse. Steel drums of chemicals exploded like 

bombs in the intense heat; gas and smoke spread towards the outskirts of Basel. At 3:30 a.m., a hastily convened regional crisis staff declared an emergency. No evacuation was needed. The fumes were 

not thought to be toxic but included mercaptans, one of the most malodorous chemicals known to 

man, one which causes people to feel sick and fearful that they are being poisoned. Area sirens were 

sounded and radio announcements urged the population to close windows and stay indoors. (Many 

sirens were down for routine maintenance and could not be used.)

Public transport into the area was halted, and gas masks were prepared at the civil defense arsenal. 

Officials ended the emergency 90 minutes later when readings showed no dangerous concentrations 

of toxicity in the air. No one was hurt and calm returned to Basel.

But slowly the massive run-off began moving down the Rhine. The management of the Sandoz 

Chemical Plant sent telexs to all municipal water systems along the 520 miles of river between 

Basel and the Dutch North Sea port of Rotterdam, urging tests on pollution levels. It listed eight 

toxic chemicals, most of them used in pesticides, that may have washed into the river. A number of 

West German water systems were shut down and populations supplied with drinking water by tank 

trucks. Dutch authorities ordered services closed to keep contaminated water out of Rhine estuaries. 

Most of the water applied to the fire flowed off through storm drains to the Rhine. By 4:30 a.m. 

the fire was under control. Incredibly, however, no serious thought seems to have been given to the 

potential water pollution. It was not the immediate and present danger.
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 11

Aftermath

The full extent of the ecological damage was not evident for a few days. West Germany’s Parliament 

was told that half a million fish were killed and aquatic life had ended in large stretches of the river. 

Fisheries officials said new fish for breeding probably would not be introduced for several years and 

it might be ten years before the river recovers. Heavy metal pollutants which sank to the bottom 

continued to be stirred up, sending out additional waves of pollution. It was especially tragic because 

the fishlife had only recently returned to the Rhine after massive clean up operations in the previous 

years.

But the predictions were overly pessimistic: life appears to be returning to the river today, one year 

after the disaster caused by man. 

The warehouse where the fire originated and its adjoining twin (the double width) were destroyed, 

but none of the others nearby nor the open air storage were destroyed. Though the Rhine was seriously polluted, it could have been a much worse, more toxic fire had it spread further to other nearby 

warehouses. There were no injuries, though about 150 civilians and fire fighters were given blood 

tests to see if they had elevated mercury levels or other problems of the blood. They are still being 

monitored to see if any long-term effects appear, but none have so far.

Lessons Learned

The Swiss View

There were many lessons learned from this fire. The largest and most important lesson was that water 

pollution has to be considered in fire fighting, along with other environmental factors. Fires may 

need to be allowed to burn. “Whereas fire prevention and environmental protection were previously 

regarded as two completely independent fields with some slight overlap of common interest... the 

interface is now realized to be much more important than had been assumed.” However, it is still 

thought that it was necessary to extinguish the fire to keep it from spreading.

How to contain the water runoff needs to be considered in planning fire protection, especially where 

toxic chemicals or things that produce toxic chemicals when burned are present.

A third major lesson was the need for greater security around warehouses. Fifty percent of warehouse 

fires in Switzerland are from arson, they report. Even if this fire had not been started intentionally, 

the potential was there. Plant security was deemed far too lax. This was especially so for a chemical 

industry under political attack, as was Sandoz at the time of the fire.

A fourth lesson was the need to better label toxic substances as to fire hazard, personal hazard, and 

environmental hazard. A set of new symbols has been proposed for Common Market use by a working group organized to study the fire’s implications.

A fifth lesson was that fire prevention and built-in fire protection for chemical warehouses need to 

be rethought. Present planning has proven inadequate.

13

Appendices

A. Dayton Fire Department Photographic Slides (with master file copy at U.S. Fire 

Administration). 

B. Photographic Slides from Investigator (with master file copy). 

C. Fire Incident Report 

D. Map of Wells near Sherwin-Williams Plant (with master file copy). 

E. Transcripts from Fire Department Telephone, Radio, and PA. 

F. Newspaper Articles with Map of Site Reprinted with permission of the Dayton Daily News and 

Journal Herald. (Additional articles are with the master file copy at USFA.) 

15

Appendix A 

SHERWIN-WILLIAMS WAREHOUSE FIRE

Description of Slides

DAYTON FIRE DEPARTMENT PHOTOGRAPHIC SLIDES

1D. View of large flame mass from west (?) side of warehouse. 

2D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View toward east with south side 

of building to right and west side to near left. 

3D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. View to west side of warehouse. 

4D. Aerial view of fire scene on Friday after Wednesday night fire. Southwest corner of building in 

foreground. Note concrete tilt-up outside walls still standing at east end of south wall. 

5D. View of remains after fire. Note paint cans and twisted steel columns. 

6D. View of sprinkler head and pipe fallen amid debris of aerosol cans in area of fire origin. 

7D. View of remains of fallen, reinforced concrete “firewall” after fire. 

8D. View of north end of north/south firewall. Note large spalled hole through wall. 

9D. View of water discharging from broken sprinkler risers on west side of firewall. (Note hole in 

firewall for reference.) Fire pump believed to have been shut off prior to this photograph and 

water flow is from bypass around pump. 

10D. View of 55-gallon drum storage under canopy at east end of warehouse. 
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)
17

Appendix B
18

Appendix C
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 19

Appendix C (continued)
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 21

Appendix C (continued)
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 23

Appendix C (continued)

Fire-building approximately 180,000 square feet, one-story tilt-up construction on slab. Steel bar 

joist roof on center steel post supports, approximately 30 feet high. Building used for warehousing 

auto paint finishes, with thinners, additives, etc. Exposure on east: approximately 1,400 drums of 

thinners-lacquers-paints stacked two-three high on pallets. One-story office area also on east side of 

warehouse.

ADT alarm on initial dispatch; also dispatcher reported several phone calls. Second alarm staged at 

Wagner Ford when large column of black smoke visible from Keowee Street. Upon arrival had third 

alarm staged.

On arrival, flame showing through roof and entire east half of building involved. Engine 12 on 

hydrant and supplied Engine 8 deck gun to protect office and drum storage on east side. Engine 21 

on hydrant in front of structure; supplied Engine 14 and Truck 14 to protect trailers in dock and 

parking areas. Aerosal cans raining on crews. Decision not to supply sprinkler system: severe exposure hazard so close to building with sprinkler connections facing fire building--especially since 

sprinkler piping already probably compromised.

Truck 11 assigned to east sector, under command of Central 2. West 2 assigned as planning sector. 

Unmanned monitors set up on east exposures as fire progressed.

Tactical decision to attempt to stop fire at north-south firewall in center of structure. However, planning sector found heavy extension into west side before any actual company assignments could be 

made.

Occupants of structure, approximately 30, reported an employee injury to arriving firefighters, and 

Engine 4 assisted Medic 4 with lift--truck operator burned seriously on legs. Engine 4 later assigned 

as brand patrol.

At approximately 2150 Chief 1 took command, made Chief 3 operation sector. Chief 1’s strategy was 

to maintain streams on exposures--which were all on drained concrete pad--but to throw no water 

on burning structure. The building sits directly over city wellfields, and possible contamination of 

water supply from run-off became first priority.

Warehouse area of structure a total loss. Drum storage never involved in fire, though some damage 

later as walls collapsed. Offices sustained some minor water damage, but records preserved and 

recovered. Seventeen truck trailers on scene heavily or totally damaged; dozens of others not damaged and later removed from parking area.

Injury to firefighter minor (pulled muscle). 

Fire officially contained at 0012 on 5-28-87, and under control at 1004 on 6-2-87. 

REMARKS: 

Fire allowed to burn freely until self-extinguished: Goal to not contaminate water supply: 

Thursday (28th): Met with Sherwin-Williams and OEPA, RAPCA, other interested parties, to determine effect of fire on environment, while developing plan to continue protection of exposures on 

east side of building. Fire still free burning. Flare up caused staging of a 2nd alarm assignment at 

site. Run-off to Miami River contained and solvents skimmed and pumped off. Basic operation still 
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

geared around protecting well field. Command trailer installed. Valuables in office area turned over 

to Sherwin-Williams representatives.

Friday (29th): Met with federal and state EPA and RAPCA to secure site safety plan. Smoke and fire 

diminishing, but still visible throughout complex. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove 

undamaged semis and trailers.

Saturday (30th): Sherwin-Williams contracted with O-H Material to be prime clean up contractor. 

Environmental monitoring showed no contamination of groundwater, but some of ground in site 

and river near drains. Sherwin-Williams given permission to remove all items in the office area. Dave 

Tabar of Sherwin-Williams removed inventory sheet from command post. Total inventory as of 5-16-

87 in excess of 1.7 million gallons.

Sunday (31st): Removal of trailers next to building. Walls dismantled. Fire down to 5-6 spots, glow 

with light smoke. Site safety plan supposed to be developed by O-H Material for review by fire 

department. Containment dike for runoff under construction.

Monday (1st): Containment dike completed. Fire still smolders--some hot spots and vapors. Some 

barrels removed from east side--removal of trailers. Site safety plan in place. Clean up to start at No. 

1 door at front loading dock. Work during daylight only. Reduced fire department to one engine and 

one truck at night. Barrel removal halted until proper forklift is at site.

Tuesday (2nd): Fire placed under control and loss established. 

Appendix C (continued)
25

Appendix E

TELEPHONE BOARD #1 

Dispatcher: 2105 

Yeah, Fire Box No. 455 goes to Sherwin-Williams, 3671 Dayton Park Dr. 

Dispatcher: What was that, 30 what

Caller: 3671 Dayton Park Road 

Dispatcher: 455

Caller: Right

Dispatcher: OK, are you going to have a runner enroute

Got one enroute now

Dispatcher: OK, we’ll get them on the way

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department

Caller: I want to report a fire at the Sherwin-Williams Warehouse on Dayton Park Drive 

Dispatcher: We got them on the way sir

Caller: OK, you might want to send some ambulances

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: Yes, I’m an employee of B & O Railroad, there’s a fire at Dayton Industrial Park, 

has there been a report

Dispatcher: At Sherwin-Williams 

Caller: Ah, I guess I’m not sure where it’s at

Dispatcher: There on Dayton Park Road, we got them on the way sir 

Caller: All right, thank you 

Dispatcher: Thank you 

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yeah, there’s a fire out here, I’m at Troy and Stanley.

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am we’ve got them on the way.

Caller: Thank you.

Dispatcher: 2108 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes I have an emergency, need ah fire, we have a fire at 3671 Dayton Park Drive 

(employee)
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Dispatcher: They’re on their way ma’am

Caller: Thank you very much.

Dispatcher: Bye. 

Dispatcher: Yeah, Dispatch 

Caller: There is a fire, I think it is right in front of North Lake Hills but I can’t tell from 

where I’m standing

Dispatcher: Over by Chuck Wagon Lane, over in that area

Caller: North Lake Hills, Old Troy Pike

Dispatcher: Yeah, we’ve got them on the way ma’am

Caller: OK, thank you 

Dispatcher: OK

FD Dispatcher calling Police Dispatcher 

Dispatch (Police) 

FD Dispatcher: We need a little assistance out at Wagoner Ford and Needmore

PD Dispatcher: Uh huh, do you need any traffic control there today

FD Dispatcher: Ah, probably going to

PD Dispatcher: OK.

FD Dispatcher: It’s on Dayton Park Road is where the fire is Dayton Park Road. OK

PD Dispatcher: OK, thank you

FD Dispatcher: Dispatch 

Company #2 Ah, Rescue 1 is back in quarters, at Co. 2’s and I’ve got four guys if you want 

me to man an Engine 2, or I’ve got four guys however you want me to do, the 

truck crew my engine crew went ahead and put the truck in service and took 

that

FD Dispatcher: OK, you might as well put the engine in service then 

Company #2 OK, we’ll be in service with Engine 2

FD Dispatcher: OK, thanks.

Dispatcher: 2117 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yeah, this is Mr. speaking, have you got a report of a fire off Troy Street

Dispatcher: Yes we do sir, we’ve got them on the way 

Caller: OK, that’s really smoking

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 27

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, I’m sure you’re aware there’s a fire at Sherwin-Williams on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we are.

 Caller: OK, now we’re directly across the street from there, is there any danger to my 

people working there

Dispatcher: As far as I know, at this time sir, I can’t say, but if there is apparently any danger, 

I’m sure that they will evacuate

Caller: OK, I can leave my people working

Dispatcher: As far as I know

Caller: OK

Dispatcher: We’ve got people out there working, you know, if they see if things are dangerous, they’ll get them out

Caller: OK

Dispatcher: 2118 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yeah, could you tell me are paramedics or ambulance on the way to 3671 

Dayton Park Drive 

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am

Caller: OK, cause we got a guy burning, and I didn’t know if the ambulance had -

Dispatcher: They’re on the way

Caller: OK, thanks 

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes sir, we’re up on Earnst and North Main is there a fire burning on the other 

side of Riverside somewhere

Dispatcher: Yes sir, there is, and I’m too busy to talk to you at this time sir

 Caller: OK, thank you 

Dispatcher: Yes sir.

Caller: Has anybody reported a fire out here on Brandt Pike

Dispatcher: Yes 

Caller: OK, thanks

Dispatcher: 2120 Dayton Fire 

Caller: I don’t know if anybody’s called or not, I live at 2329 Troy St. 

Appendix E (continued)
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Dispatcher: Yeah.

Caller: And, ah behind the trailers back here, there’s something burning back here

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we’re aware of it, they’re on the scene 

Caller: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yes, I live at 104 Delaware looking out my back door, toward Main Street, 

there’s a huge _____ of black smoke and

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, we’re well aware of that, we have fire equipment on the scene there

Caller: Oh, OK

Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, we have a fire here off of Troy Street, have you gotten that

Dispatcher: Yes, ma’am, they’re there

Caller: OK, then, I didn’t hear the fire trucks, I thought I better call

Dispatcher: Thank you ma’am

Caller: Thank you.

Dispatcher: 2121 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, I live out around 202 and I’m in an apartment building and see flames 

coming above the apartment building, I’m not quite sure how far over it is, but 

I know it’s on Route 202

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, we’ve got fire crews on the scene over there

Caller: Already?

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am

Caller: Thank you, bye bye 

Dispatcher: 2122 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Has anybody reported a fire across the street from the ________________

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, they have 

Caller: OK, thank you 

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, I’m ________on St. Adalbert across from the Sohio Oil thing, and it’s on fire

Dispatcher: There’s a fire out there, yes ma’am, we’ve got equipment on the scene

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 29

Caller: OK, with me living this close, should I leave

Dispatcher: At this time ma’am, I would say no

Caller: OK, ah, will we be contacted if we should 

 Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, you will be 

Caller: OK, thank you 

Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, bye 

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, I live on Vermont Street, and I can see that flames and I was wondering 

 Dispatcher: Yes ma’am, we’ve got crews out there now

Caller: Well everybody on the street is taking off, and I was 

Dispatcher: Well, I’m sorry ma’am, I really don’t have time to talk to you, as far as I can tell 

at this time you’re in no danger

Caller: Oh, can you tell me what it is

 Dispatcher: It’s a building out there burning, ma’am

Caller: Is it chemicals or 

Dispatcher: Ma’am I don’t know, I’m not there, I’m sorry I’m curt with you but I’m awfully 

busy right now

Caller: We’re in no danger

Dispatcher: No ma’am

Caller: All right, thank you 

Dispatcher: 2125 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Ah, yes I want to report a possible fire in the, in the 200 block of Baltimore Street

Dispatcher: 200 block of where 

Caller: Baltimore Street 

Dispatcher: Beckmore? I’ll I

Caller: B-A-L-T-I-M-O-R-E 

Dispatcher: Oh, Baltimore 

Caller: Right across from the park, Patterson Park 

Dispatcher: Ah, do you have any idea what’s burning

Appendix E (continued)
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Caller: No, I don’t know, I just see smoke up in the air and there’s a bunch of flames 

shooting down there, I don’t know what it is but I live in the 100 block and 

some of the neighbors next door went up that way, and I said well I’ll go head 

and call

Dispatcher: Well, we have a fire out that way, we’ve got crews on the scene

Caller: Oh, do you, Oh, I didn’t know, then I was just making sure someone knew 

about it

Dispatcher: OK, thank you 

Caller: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: 2125 Dayton Fire

Caller: Hi, this is Joe ________ night supervisor at Earnst Enterprises on Wagoner 

Ford Road 

Dispatcher: Yes, sir.

Caller: I was wondering if I should get my men out of here or not 

I noticed that fire down there at AGA or whatever it’s at

Dispatcher: Well, all I can tell you at this time sir, is they haven’t said anything to us about 

any evacuations 

Caller: OK 

Dispatcher: I’m sure if it gets to the point that somebody should be evacuated they will do it

Caller: All right 

 Dispatcher: 2126 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Hello, I was wondering if you have any information about a fire on Wagoner 

Ford Road

Dispatcher: No sir, I have no information at this time

Caller: You don’t know what it is that’s burning there

Dispatcher: No sir, and I don’t have time to talk about it

Caller: OK

Dispatcher: Thank you

 Dispatcher: 2126 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yeah, this is Greg from Preston Trucking, we’re pretty close to that fire that is 

down the street, ah is that that chemical place

Dispatcher: Ah, Sherwin-Williams Paints

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 31

Caller: Sherwin-Williams

Dispatcher: Yeah

Caller: Is there going to be any evacuation

 Dispatcher: Ah, at this time we haven’t heard anything about any anticipation of it

Caller: OK, cause we’re pretty close

Dispatcher: Well, I’m sure if they feel that it’s necessary, they will evacuate the other people 

in the area sir

Caller: Thank you very much

Dispatcher: Yes Sir

Dispatcher: 2126 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Yes, are you aware of the fire at Sohio

Dispatcher: It’s not Sohio sir, and yes we have equipment out there

Caller: Is it should we leave the area

Dispatcher: Ah, at this time I would say no sir, they have not been any alarm for evacuation

Caller: And it’s not Sohio

Dispatcher: No it’s not

Caller: OK

Dispatcher: Sir, I’m sorry I don’t have time to talk to you I’m really busy

Dispatcher: 2127 Dayton Fire

Caller: OK, I live at 3801 South Shore Drive, in Dayton, and there’s a fire over the 

apartment across from my window I didn’t know if anyone had called

 Dispatcher: Are you sure it’s coming from the apartment or are you looking over the top of it 

Caller: I’m looking over the top of the apartment across the yard from me

Dispatcher: OK, and you’re seeing an extreme amount of smoke and flames

Caller: I ‘m seeing flames and smoke, yes black smoke

Dispatcher: OK, could that fire you’re looking at be over ah off Wagoner Ford Road

Caller: I don’t think so, I think it’s right here in this housing development, cause it’s 

the only thing I can see from where I’ m at

Dispatcher: 3801 South Shore

Caller: Yeah, that’s my address, I don’t know what that address is over there but if you 

come around here, you’ll see it yourself

Appendix E (continued)
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

 Dispatcher: Well we’ve got a big fire down on Needmore Road there and the flames may be 

what you’re looking at

Caller: I don’t know

 Dispatcher: What’s your phone number

Caller: My phone number here is 237-XXXX

 Dispatcher: OK, have you attempted to walk over to that building and see

Caller: No my family lives there and I told them to call the Fire Department and they 

ran out of the house so I thought I’d call, I don’t know, maybe I’m just being an 

alarmist maybe you’re right, you know, but 

Dispatcher: 38 across from 3801 South Shore, we’ll get somebody to check it out

Caller: OK, thank you

Dispatcher: 2129 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yeah, this is Jerry over at Andy’s, you got a report on this fire over here

Dispatcher: Oh, yes sir

Caller: Where’s that at over here, I can see flames

Dispatcher: Over off Needmore Road

 Caller: Off of Needmore, all right 

Dispatcher: 2129 Dayton Fire 

Caller: Ah, hi, I live at 606 Brandt, which is right across the street from all the gas and 

oil tanks, has anybody reported a fire

Dispatcher: They sure have ma’am

Caller: Oh, OK, ‘cause we haven’t seen any action yet, OK, thanks Right

Dispatcher: 2129 Dayton Fire

Caller: Do you have anything about a fire on Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: Yes sir we do

Caller: Is there any point in anybody being evacuated at this time

 Dispatcher: Not at this time no sir

Caller: Well, OK, we live close to it and I’m just wondering if we should be out or 

anything breathing it

Dispatcher: No, I don’t know of any reason for alarm at this time

Caller: OK, thank you

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 33

Dispatcher: 2130 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yes sir, that fire’s that’s on the east end, can you tell me if that’s some that’s coming from that is toxic or not

Dispatcher: No

Caller: You don’t know

Dispatcher: As far as I can tell you at this time, we have no reason for alarm

Caller: OK, I just wanted to check, I had some kids out playing and 

Dispatcher: Right I can understand that sir

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended)—2130 Hours

Appendix E (continued)
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

TELEPHONE BOARD #2 

Dispatcher: 2106 Dayton Fire Department

Caller: Ah, yeah I don’t know if there’s been a report but there’s a fire at the SherwinWilliams Warehouse at on Dayton Park Drive

Dispatcher: They’re on the way sir

Caller: OK, ah you might want to send some ambulances down there too

Dispatcher: Where’s that

Caller: The same place

 Dispatcher: Why’s that, are there a lot of people still there

Caller: Oh, yeah, they’re working

Dispatcher: Do they know it’s on fire

Caller: They’re out of the place but it’s burning bad

 Dispatcher: OK 

Caller: Thank you

Dispatcher: Thank you 

Dispatcher: 2107 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: Yeah, this is Ted ___________ at Kittyhawk Golf Course, there’s a big explosion

Dispatcher: Yeah, we’ve got them on the way, Sherwin-Williams

Caller: Yeah, right off Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: Yeah, we got them on the way

Caller: OK

 Dispatcher: Thank you sir 

Dispatcher: 2109 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: Ah, yes we need a fire truck out on Troy Pike, Troy Street you know where 

North Lake Hills is, right across the street from North Lake Hills, they have a 

great big old bundle of fire

 Dispatcher: What’s burning

Caller: I have no idea, my husband just went over there to find out 

Dispatcher: Now we’ve got a fire over on Dayton Park Drive, is that what he’s seeing 

Caller: Dayton Park Drive, is that close to Troy Street

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 35

Appendix E (continued)

Dispatcher: Well yeah, you can see it from there, it would be over there by the golf course, 

is it a building 

Caller: I can’t tell we just see big black smoke coming up in the air 

Dispatcher: OK, that would be over there at that Dayton Park Drive, we’ve got a second 

alarm fire over there and from where you’re at you can see straight through 

Caller: OK, I just wanted to make sure 

Dispatcher: OK, thank you

(Several calls from residences--interrupted on transcription by hearing Radio and PA conversation) 

Dispatcher: 2112 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: I know you’re busy, Yes, this is Patty from Huber Heights Fire, do you have a fire 

in the area of Needmore and Wagoner Ford. 

Dispatcher: Yeah, up there on Chuck Wagon Lane 

Caller: Bye 

Dispatcher calling Chief 3 

Chiefs son: Hello 

Dispatcher: Yeah, Paul, we’ve got, Paul 

Chiefs son: No, this is his son I don’t know where he is right now 

Dispatcher: OK, if you can get a hold of him, tell him we have a third alarm fire at Dayton 

Park Drive 

Chiefs son: Dayton Park, all right 

Dispatch: We’ve got a third alarm at Sherwin-Williams over on Dayton Park Drive,

I’m on my way 

Dispatch calling Chief 1 

Chief’s Wife: He’s on the other phone, he’ll be with you in a minute 

Chief 1: Send 15’s on up will you please 

Dispatcher: Chief 

Chief 1: Just send 15’s on up I’m hearing it 
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Dispatcher: OK 

Chief 1: Thank you 

Dispatcher: 2116 

Caller: Ah, yes sir, anybody called in for that fire over 

Dispatcher: Yes they have, they’re already over there

Caller: All right, thank you

 Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: Yeah, there’s a fire over on, I think it’s Commerce Park 

Dispatcher: Yeah, we’ve got a third alarm fire going ma’am

Caller: Better hurry 

Dispatcher: They’re there, they’re there 

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department

Caller: I’m calling from 150 Jenny Road

Dispatcher: Yeah, we’ve got crews on the scene for a big fire over there

Caller: OK, I called to make sure 

Chief 1: What companies do you have

 Dispatcher: Hold on just a second 

Dispatcher: Coleman Yeah, Chief

Chief 1: What companies do you have in reserve

 Dispatcher: Ah, the way it looks right now we don’t have anybody left

Chief 1: No, no what reserve apparatus, what companies have reserve apparatus

(Call transferred to Supervisor’s position in Dispatch Center - not recorded on Dispatch Log Tape)

Dispatcher: 2119 Dayton Fire Department 

Caller: Ah, yes I live off of Valley Street, looking from Valley over toward Brandt you 

have a big fire

Dispatcher: Yeah, we’ve got a third alarm fire going sir 

Caller: Oh, sorry 

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire Department

Caller: Yes, have you been called about the fire on _______________

Dispatcher: Yes we have

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 37

Appendix E (continued)

Caller: OK, thank you 

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yeah, I live on Vermont Street and I can see the flames and I wondered 

Dispatcher: Hung up 

Dispatcher: 2124 Dayton Fire

Caller: Yeah, we’re at R & R over on Valley have you got a report of a fire

 Dispatcher: Yeah, it’s over on it’s by the Golf Course

Caller: Golf Course

Dispatcher: Dispatch 

Co. 15: Chief 1 just come to 15’s and told us to call and tell you that Engine 15 is sitting here in the barn 

Dispatcher: Well they shouldn’t be

Co. 15: Well it is 

Dispatcher: Huh 

Co. 15: They told him he called down there they said they you guys told somebody that 

we weren’t that there was nobody here we have not been dispatched, we’re still 

here 

Dispatcher: OK, thanks 

(Tape Transcription from Dispatch Log Tape Ended)--2126 Hours 

RADIO AND PA 

Dispatcher: Box 455 that will be at Sherwin-Williams Paints, 3671 Dayton Park Road 

That’s Box 455, that will be Sherwin-Williams Paints, 

3671 Dayton Park Road, we’ve received a couple calls on this, 

Chuck Wagon Lane will be your cross 

That will be Engines 12, 21, 8, Truck 14 and the East Chief 

Engines 12, 21, 8 14, Truck 14, and the East Chief

OK, Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14, East Chief 

All Clear 

2107 Bowersock 
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Dispatcher: Dispatch to East 2 we’re still receiving numerous calls, says there’s an explosion 

and quite a bit of fire at Sherwin-Williams 

East 3: Clearly, there’s a large amount of smoke in the area, go head and dispatch me 

a full second alarm, stage them to the entrance there by the Kittyhawk Golf 

Course 

Dispatcher: 2108 

East 2: East 2 Dispatcher, go head and start me that second chief, make sure you notify 

Chief 3 

Dispatcher: 2108 

Central 2: Central 2 Dispatcher, Central 2’s responding 

Dispatcher: OK, Central 2, 2109 

Dispatcher: All companies, we’re on master, we have a fire at Sherwin-Williams Paints, 3671 

Dayton Park Road, first alarm response is enroute we’re dispatching Engine 14, 

4, 2, Engine 18, Truck 2, Truck 11, Central Chief

Dispatcher: That’s Engines 14, 4, 2, 18, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief 

OK, Truck 2, Truck 11 you clear on the air 

Dispatcher: Dispatcher, Engine 14 is clear and responding 

OK Engine 14, 4, 2, 18’s, Central Chief clear, 

Truck 11 are you clear on the air?

2110 Bowersock 

Dispatcher, Truck 2 is out of service, you can place Rescue 1 back in service 

That’s clear Truck 2, 2111 

Engine 9’s in service 

Truck 2 dispatcher, Truck 2 is in service, Engine 2 is out of service, Truck 2 is 

responding

Engine 9’s in service 

OK, Engine 9, 2111, Clear 

Paramedic 2 is in service, I’ll be enroute to the other scene, 2111

Paramedic 2: Do you have a medic unit responding over there

Dispatcher: Not yet, 2111 

Clear 

Engine 18 Dispatcher, give us a repeat on the address

That will be 3671 Dayton Park Road 

18 clear

2111 

Dispatcher: Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond 

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 39

Appendix E (continued)

Car calling repeat 

Medic 4 to Dispatch, we can respond to that fire 

Dispatcher: OK, Medic 4 respond to 3671 Dayton Park 2112 

4’s clear 

West 2’s in service 

2112 

Truck 2 Dispatcher, we’re responding on that, Engine 2 is out of service 

Dispatcher: Engine 8’s on the scene, we have a whole building completely involved 

2113 

East 2 Dispatcher, I’m on the scene, we’ve got a large building, about 200 by oh 

possibly 300, pretty well fully involved. Stage me a third alarm make sure the 

third alarm response stays out on Wagoner Ford Road. I’ll also need dispatch the 

foam truck, I’ll be Sherwin-Williams Command. 2114

Dispatcher: Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16, Truck 15, and the West Chief 

respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive, that will be Sherwin Williams, that’s a third 

alarm 

Dispatcher: Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16, Truck 15 and the West Chief 

OK, Truck 15, Engine Truck 16, Engine 9 you clear 

Clear 

Dispatcher: Engine 11 (responding)--Companies on the scene you’re on master 

You’re on Channel 1 

Dispatcher: Engine 11 you clear 

Clear 

West Chief 

West Chief Clear

All clear 2116 

Dispatcher: Paramedic 2 to dispatcher, would you have all the medic crews use their telemetry channel 9 to your communication, so they don’t mess up our radio traffic 

out here

Ok, Paramedic 2

All Medic companies are you clear on that, use your telemetry instead of the 

radio channels

East 2: We’ll need one, two medics here on the fire scene, as soon as you can get them 

here, we do have injuries also, give me rundown of the second alarm response 

you’ve got staged out there on Wagoner Ford.

Truck 11 on the scene 

2118
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

East 2: Command to Dispatcher, tell me again what was my second alarm 

dispatch.

Dispatcher: OK, command your second alarm response was Engine 14, 4, 2,18, Truck 

2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief

Chief 3 to dispatcher, we’re going to need a lot of traffic control on Wagoner 

Ford, this is a huge building fully involved, and we have gawkers taking up all 

of Wagoner Ford

2120

Command to Dispatcher, quote, listen carefully, I need a run down of the first 

alarm, second alarm, third alarm companies, give it to me slow so I know 

exactly what I’ve got here, what you dispatched.

Dispatcher: OK, Command, first alarm - Engine 12, 21, 8, Truck 14

Clear so far

Dispatcher: Standby a second. OK. Command your second alarm

Engine 14, 4, 2, 8, Truck 2, Truck 11 and the Central Chief

Clear, third alarm

Dispatcher: Third Alarm - Engine 9, 11, 16, Truck 16 and Truck 15

Chief 1 dispatcher, responding

Dispatcher: 2127

Chief 1: Are you aware there is somebody at 15’s, Engine 15

We are now

Medic 15 to the dispatcher, we’re in service from Good Sam 

Do you want us to report to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Standby at this time, Medic15

Clear standing by

Medic 4 removing one to the Valley, burn victim

Dispatcher: 2118

4’s is clear

16’s in service from St. Elizabeth

Engine 16’s in the staging area

2129

Chief 3: Command to Dispatch, this entire structure it is a very large 1 story structure 

full of flammables. It is completely involved and it will be a total loss. 

2132

Chief 3: As far as possible, I’m going to commit no more resource to the area, our position right now is one of standing by in a very defensive posture

2133

Clear

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 41

Dispatcher: Engine 2, made an investigation in the 2000 block of Troy Street, we don’t 

know if that’s a separate fire or if the people are seeing the fire over on Dayton 

Park Drive but we’re getting a lot of calls about, I have no other information 

except it’s in the, gentleman called from 2050 Troy and he said across the street 

from him there was a large amount of smoke, your cross street will be Jergens

OK, Engine 2, 2135 West

Medic 8’s in service from Good Sam, do you want us to report to the fire scene

Ah, standby in the area Medic 8

Clear

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command

Go ahead

Dispatcher: Do you need any medic units over there....Dayton Park Command, were you 

clear on that?

Command to Dispatcher, ah hold that, we have two medic units on the scene 

that we are aware of, Medic 10 and Box 21 is on the scene, that will be sufficient for the time being 

Very good, thank you much, we need them

Inspection 1 is on the air and heading out for the scene

2137

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 in service

2137

Chief 1 on scene

Engine 2 dispatcher, this call that was called in on Troy Street is part of the 

large third alarm fire, you can place Engine 2 in service

Dispatcher: OK, that’s what I thought, 2142

Engine 2 clear

Chief 3 to Dispatch, Chief 3 to all units on the fire scene

Chief 1 will be Incident Command, Chief 3 will be Operations Command, 

please address us by those titles, I want all Sector Officer go to Channel 3, are 

you clear on that dispatch

Dispatcher: OK, Chief 3, you are Operations

That’s clear

Chief 1 is

Chief 1 will be Incident Command

Dispatcher: Incident, OK, and what was the rest of it then?

All Command Officers to Channel 3, Chief 1 will be Dayton Park Command

2144

Clear

Appendix E (continued)
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Investigator 8 Dispatcher, I’m in the area at the scene

2145

Chief 1 Dispatcher, I’m taking command of the fire, Command Post remains 

at the northwest corner of the building, this is a 200 by 100’ 20’ single story 

building, totally involved probably total loss, will casualties, two we know of, 

one reported missing. I also have exposures to trailers. 

Long time on this operation

Dispatcher: Thank you 2146

Clear

Dispatcher: Car calling, repeat

West 1 dispatcher, what is the address of the third alarm fire

3671 Dayton Park Drive, that runs off Chuck Wagner Lane which is a street that 

goes into, ah, off Wagoner Ford Road

Clear

2149

Dayton Park Command dispatcher, I’ll need police assistance on the scene, we’re 

starting to get infiltration of spectators

Dispatcher: Police have been notified about this

I need them on the scene

2150

Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command, I informed the Police of the situation and 

asked for as big as task force as I could possibly muster 2151

That’s clear, we’re going to have a tremendous problem with the crowd overrunning this fire scene and it is exploding and still detonating in and around 

the fire, we cannot guarantee anybody’s safety, let along ours

I’ve asked for a battalion (interruption by sounding signal)

(conversation ended)

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 responding to Station 15

That’s clear, 2152

Investigator 1 on the air

2155

Clear

Dayton dispatcher Kettering 4 out at Station 15

Chief 1: Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a run down of what 

we’ve got in protecting the rest of the city in terms of Chief Officers and 

equipment

Dispatcher: Ok, at this time we have Engine 10, we have at Co. 2’s, 15’s at Co. 4’s, Madison 

truck and a Moraine engine at Co. 11’s

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 43

Appendix E (continued)

We got Engine and Truck 13 in quarters, Harrison Township has a truck and an 

engine at Co 14’s, Kettering engine and truck at 15’s and Engine 17. We’re well 

covered as far as the city’s concerned.

Chief 1: Do you have Chief Officers in three districts?

Dispatcher: There’s some enroute now

Chief 1: Take your first 3 chief officers that report on the air and assign them districts, 

send the next chief officers to this fire. I do not need chief officer support more 

than I need them to protect the city

Dispatcher: That’s clear, we have Chief 4 at Headquarters also

Dispatcher to East 1, Dispatcher West 1

East 1: Go ahead, East 1

Dispatcher: Yeah, are you enroute to quarters now

I’m enroute to 2’s to pick up a driver

Dispatcher: That’s clear, then you’ll take the East side Chief then

East 1 clear

Dispatcher to West 1

West 1, I’ve been given assignment by Operations Command

I’m nearly on the scene of the fire now

Chief 1 Cancel that, this is Incident Command, go run the district 

We’ll get you something else

Dispatcher: West 1 you’ll be West Side Chief

West 1 clear

2159

Investigator 4 on scene

2204

Dispatcher to Incident Command, have any removals been made to area 

hospitals

Dispatcher: We have an indication that we have 1 removal but I don’t know where the individual was removed to

That’s clear 2204

Medic 4 to Dispatch that removal was made by us to the Valley 

2205

4’s is in service and clear

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, has the City Manager been notified of this incident?
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Dispatcher: Could you repeat your message please

Has the City Manager been notified of this incident?

We’re notifying him now

Thank you

2205

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Chief 1: Command go ahead

Dispatcher: We’re getting a lot of calls, has there been any talk about evacuation out there

Chief 1: No, evacuation at this point is not necessary, we have a fire that is essentially 

isolated with the exception of an exposure of trailers around the building, the 

closest other structures are at least 100 feet away, there is a considerable amount 

of exploding and evolving fire, a this point however, does not need evacuation

Dispatcher: That’s clear, 2209

Dispatcher: Chief 1, the Assistant Manager is concerned with the reclamation fields out 

there as far as water tables, is there any concern there, does he need to contact 

anybody?

Chief 1: We have made contact with the Water Department, they’re enroute and we also 

have the Environmental Specialist from the Water Department on scene monitoring that situation

You can assure him that we’re taking a close look at it and we’ll make whatever 

decisions we need to secure the water system

Dispatcher: He requested that we contact him if there is any significant changes, so if you 

want to relay that through us, we can handle it. 

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Incident Command

Command go ahead

Dispatcher: Yes sir, we have the names of six employees from out there and when this incident occurred they fled the scene, but we do have six names here if you need any

Chief 1: I would like to confirm if all six are able to talk to you, we’ve made one 

removal, if you can talk to the other five or talk to someone who has, I’d like to 

know that, we’re treating it as though we have victims

Dispatcher: OK, each one of these people on the list have been confirmed

Chief 1: So, in other words, all six have been confirmed as alive 

Dispatcher: That is correct, 2212

One injury

Dispatcher: We’ve have Medic call us when they get back with the injury and get a report

Thank you

2212

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 45

Investigator 1 Dispatcher why don’t you contact Investigator 7 have them stop 

by the Valley and let him talk to that person

Dispatcher: 2213, Investigator 7

Go ahead

Dispatcher: Would you stop by the Valley and talk to the person removed from Wagoner 

Ford

I couldn’t copy you

Dispatcher: Would you stop by Miami Valley Hospital and talk to the individual who was 

removed from Wagoner Ford Road

That’s clear sir

Dispatcher: That’s per Investigator 1 at 2213

Command to Dispatcher, could you confirm whether or not you talked to Joe 

Crone

Dispatcher: No, we that’s not one of the names we have sir

That’s the one we’re hunting

2213

Inspector 4 in service

2213

Inspector 4 clear

Training Center responding to the fire on Dayton Park

2214

Clear

Chief 1 Command to Dispatcher, were you able to contact the Public Information 

Officer

Dispatcher: We’re working on that now

Thank you

Dispatcher Dayton Fire Command

Chief 1: Command go ahead

Do you have a Medical Sector there, we need to know what medics we have on 

the scene

Chief 1: I’ll get back with you in just a second, we do have Chief 5 

yes, Chief 5 is Medical Sector

2217

Investigator 1 is on the scene

2218

Appendix E (continued)
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Command to Dispatcher, we have Medic 4 and Medic 10 along with Harrison 

Township Medic, and a Box 21 Unit assigned to this, make that Medic 8 and 

Medic 10

Dispatcher: Thank you, 2218

That’s clear, we’ll hold those by the way

Dispatcher: That’s clear, 2218

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, do you have any other day off chief officers responding to this fire

Dispatcher: That’s negative

None available

Dispatcher: We have them in the district we can send out

I’m asking you were they contacted and they did not respond

Dispatcher: Command, every chief we got a hold of is responding

Chief l: I can’t hear you

Dispatcher: Every chief we got a hold of is responding

Chief 1: That’s clear, now I’m going to ask you again, do you have enough that your 

districts are filled and a surplus of chief officers are coming to the fire scene

Dispatcher: We have no surplus at this time

That’s clear

Dispatcher: The districts are covered

All three districts are covered

Dispatcher: Affirmative

Thank you

2220

Investigator 7 I’ll be at the Valley

2223

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher can we get some kind of a canteen out here, we’ve got 

some people that are getting pretty thirsty and dehydrated, Box 21, Red Cross, 

somebody would help

Dispatcher: I believe Red Cross is enroute and Box 21 also

Chief 1: That’s clear

Command to Dispatcher, have you been able to contact anybody from the 

Training Center

They’re on their way out there

Chief 1 Clear, thank you

2227

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 47

Investigator 5 on the scene

2232

Dispatcher: Dispatcher to Dayton Park Command

Chief 1: Command go ahead

The man that you were looking for, Joe Crone, he is home

Chief 1: Clear, thank you

230

Garage 4 Dispatch

Go ahead

Garage and Garage 2 are on their way to the scene on the air 

2234

Maintenance 3 Dispatch

Go ahead

Maintenance 3 and 4 we’re enroute to the scene with fuel

Dispatcher: Would you repeat your message please

Maintenance 3 and 4 enroute to the scene with diesel fuel

2237

Maintenance 3: Do you go off Wagoner Ford Road

Would you repeat your message

Is the location off Wagoner Ford Road

Dispatcher: At Dayton Park Drive

Clear

2237

Dispatcher: Incident Command, have the site management people from that company contacted you at the scene

Yes they have

Dispatcher: Clear they have a liaison established at the Radisson 

They were contacting us to make sure you had people on the scene

Yes plant manager’s been here

Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, can you give me a rundown on the time 

of alarm, and calls for equipment

Dispatcher: OK, Incident Command at 2107 we sent the first alarm at 2110 we sent a second alarm response, and then at 2116 a third alarm response was sent

Chief 1: That’s clear, thank you

2249

Command to Dispatcher, has EPA been notified of this fire

Not at this time

Appendix E (continued)
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Chief 1: Ah, call their office and at least make them aware of what’s happening

2253

Clear

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Go ahead

Dispatcher: Did you say you did have a fatality out there

Chief 1: We are unable to determine that at this time

Ok, so you won’t be needing the chaplains or anything out there

We will notify you

Dispatcher: That’s clear 2255

Dispatcher to Incident Command, EPA has been aware of the situation

Chief 1: That’s clear

2257

Investigator 7 cleared from Miami Valley enroute to the scene

2304

Medic 14 Dispatcher

Go ahead

We’re in service with the medic

2306

Command to Dispatcher, I understand you had an inquiry about the need for a 

chaplain

Yes we did

Chief l: I don’t think we’ll need them for anybody in the normal sense here, we believe 

we’ve got everybody accounted for

ah, and short of some kind of injury to personnel here or breakdown by management here, I don’t think we’ll need any of the chaplains assistance at this 

point

Dispatcher: 2316

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Chief 1: Incident Command Dispatcher, go ahead

Dispatcher: Ok, Wright Pat called us on the phone and said if there is a need for foam that 

they do have a foam truck available

Chief 1: That’s clear, we’ll keep that in mind as a resource, we’re still trying to determine whether or not we should make an application of an extinguishing agent 

because of the possible contamination of the wellfield

2327

Chief 1: Thank you

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 49

Medic 18 Dayton Dispatcher, Medic 18 will be in service 

Medic 18 2328

Medic 18 clear

Dispatcher: Medic 18 come down to fill in at 4’s

Clear

2328

Dispatcher: Medic 18 fill in at 13’s

Clear

2329

Medic 18, Dispatcher to Medic 18

Go ahead

Are you a two person crew right now

Affirmative

Medic 18, go by Co. 14’s pick up 1 paramedic there and you’ll be running with 

3 paramedics

That’s clear we’ll be enroute to Co. 14

Dispatcher: That’s clear 2333

Inspection 3 enroute to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 did you say you’re enroute to the fire scene

Inspection 3, that is correct

Dispatcher: Maintenance 3 you’re breaking up cannot copy

Inspection 3 is enroute to the fire scene

Dispatcher: That’s Inspection 3?

That’s correct

2335

Investigator 1 to Dispatcher, do you have a location as to where the employees 

went to meet

Dispatcher: They’ve been calling in from all over

They didn’t go to meet at one place or location

Dispatcher: Not that I know of

Clear

Dispatcher: 2336

Dispatcher to all companies, if you have all unassigned personnel in quarters, 

call 3316

That’s dispatcher to all companies, if you have any unassigned personnel in 

quarters at this time, call 3316.

2340

Appendix E (continued)
50 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix E (continued)

Dispatcher to Investigator 1

Investigator 1 Dispatch

Go ahead

You called me

Yes sir, we have a report that a few of the employees from there are up at the 

restaurant on Webster and Wagoner Ford 

At Webster and Wagoner Ford

That’s correct

Clear thank you

2342

Medic 18 to Dispatch, we have our third person enroute to Co. 13’s

2347

Dayton Dispatcher, Kettering 4 leaving Station 15 enroute to quarters

Dispatcher: Thank you, Kettering 2347

May 28, 1987

Dayton Park Command to Dispatcher, this fire is essentially confined, not under 

control, we will probably have crews here throughout the night, but I do want 

to indicate that it is no longer in such a mode that it is continuing to expand, 

but what we got will burn for a considerable length of time

Dispatcher: Thank you command 0012

Thank you

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Chief 1: Command go ahead

Dispatcher: Will you be needing anymore Garage personnel out there, they have 3 at the 

Garage at this time

Chief 1: I don’t know, we’re going to have a fueling problem that kind of problem 

over a long hall operation, these crews will be here all night and probably into 

tomorrow.

Dispatcher 0018

Command to Dispatcher, would you have the Central Chief get his explosive 

meter and run it out here, if he’s not sure as to the operating condition of the 

explosive meter, poll the chief officers on duty, get one that works, get it out to 

me as quick as we can, please.

Dispatcher: 0038

Clear

Dispatcher to Incident Command
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 51

Appendix E (continued)

Chief 1: Clear

Ok, Central Chief is on his way to 11’s to pickup that explosive meter, they’ll be 

enroute to your location 

That’s clear

0045

Command to Dispatcher, can you give me the time that I indicated this fire was 

confined

Dispatcher: That time will be 0012

Thank you

Dispatcher 052

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Chief 1: Incident Command, go ahead

Have you got a mechanic there that you can release to go to Miami Valley 

Hospital, Medic 15 will not start 

Chief 1: We got a mechanic running around here, we’ll relay the message

134

Dispatch, this is Garage 4

Dispatcher: Go ahead

Ah, we’re enroute to pick up some more diesel, you want us to swing by the 

Valley and check it out

Dispatcher: Yes sir you can do that, you going to go before you get the diesel?

Ah yeah, we can stop by before we fill up

Dispatcher to Incident Command

Command, go ahead

Do you have an urgent need for diesel fuel at the scene there

Chief 1: I haven’t been made aware of any

Dispatcher: That’s clear, 135

Dispatcher: Ok, Garage 4 continue on to the hospital

Ah, that’s a roger, we’re enroute right now

Dispatcher: 135

Dispatcher to Medic15

15’s go ahead

Dispatcher: Garage 4 is enroute to your location at this time

Clear

136
52 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Incident Command, Dispatcher, would you send us your closest engine with an 

AP and we’ll release one of your staged engines, we’ve got some brush fires that 

we need to deal with out here, we’ll need a four wheel drive vehicle

Dispatcher: 156

Clear

Dispatcher: What do you actually have in staging at this time?

Chief 1: We have Engines 9, 11, 16, Truck 15 and Truck 16 and Engine 18

We’ll release Engine 18

Dispatcher: That is clear

Dispatcher: Engine and AP 15 respond to the fire scene, that will be 3671 Dayton Park Drive

That’s Engine and AP 15 respond to 3671 Dayton Park Drive

That’s at the fire scene

Ok, Engine 15 and AP 15 158 Coleman

Engine 18 Dispatcher, we’re in service from the fire scene enroute to quarters

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, can you tell me what we’ve got staffing our stations 

right now and where they’re located

Dispatcher: Co. 2’s we have Engine 10; Co. 4’s we have Engine 110 and Medic 4; Co. 8’s we 

have Engine 108, Co. 11’s we have Engine 111 and Truck 111; Co. 12’s we have 

Huber Heights Reserve and standby personnel; Truck 13 at 13’s, Engine 13 at 

13’s; Engine 116, Truck 113 at Co. 14; Engine 118 at Co.’s 15; Engine and AP 17 

at Co 17’s; Engine 18 enroute to Co. 18’s; Engine 2, Truck 102 at the fire scene 

at 115 Samuel; that’s it for now.

Chief 1: Thank you, it looks like we’re still in pretty good shape

Dispatcher: That’s true, and we do have a chief for each district at this time

Chief 1: Thank you

206

Engine 15’s on the fire scene

214

Investigator 1 Dispatcher, all investigators have been released from the fire scene

217

Clear

Investigator 1 Dispatcher, when Investigator 6 clears the scene on Samuel would 

you inform him that you can send him home

Dispatcher: That’s clear, Investigator 6 are you clear on that message?

Appendix E (continued)
USFA-TR-009/May 1987 53

Appendix E (continued)

Dispatcher to Investigator 6

228

Investigator 6 clear of Samuel, and out to the fire scene

Dispatcher: Ah, per Investigator 1, you are released to go home

Ok, Investigator 6 is clear, thank you

236

Investigator 7 I’ll be off the air

241

Medic 10 dispatcher we’re released by Incident Command we’ll be remaining 

out of service, going to the Valley for equipment

256

Medic 10’s clear

Chief 1: Incident Commander to Dispatcher, I’m going to be releasing Engine 9, 11, 16, 

Truck 15, Truck 16 and Truck 2 and you can release all day-off personnel when 

they go in service

Dispatcher: That’s clear, 257

Chief 1: For all intensive purposes, this fire will continue to burn throughout the night 

into the morning, part of the day tomorrow I guess, we’re gong to continue to 

let this burn and the companies that are on scene will be evaluated as to what 

will be kept and released when I shift command over.

Dispatcher: 257

Clear

Truck 16’s in service from the fire scene

302

Truck 16 clear

Truck 2’s in service from the fire scene

303

Truck 2 clear

Paramedic 2 in service

303

Paramedic 2 clear

Truck 15 in service leaving the fire scene

303

15 clear

Engine 9’s in service

303

Clear
54 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Chief 1: Command to Dispatcher, command of this incident is being transferred to Chief 

3, Chief 1 will be in service, these crews, again, will be here most of the night, 

in fact, all night.

Dispatcher: 304

(Tape Transcription Ended from Dispatcher Log Tape)

Appendix E (continued)
55

Appendix f
56 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix F (continued)