Jacob Bennett v. Harford County, Maryland , No. 38, September Term, 2022.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – ELIGIBILITY TO BE A HARF ORD COUNTY COUNCIL MEMBER Section 207 of the Harford County Charter, which pr events a Council member from holding employment in the government of the State, Harford County, or any municipality within Harford County, does not preclude a teacher employed by the Harford County Board of Education from simultaneously serving as a membe r of the Harford County Council. Finding Charter § 207 ambiguous concerning whether it applies to employees of the Board, the Court applied a canon of construction favoring candidate eligibility to resolve the ambiguity.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT – INCOMPATIBLE POSITIONS The doctrine of incompatible positions does not pre clude a teacher employed by the Harford County Board of Education from simultaneous ly serving as a member of the Harford County Council.Circuit Court for Harford County

Case No. C-12-CV-22-000857 IN THE SUPREME COURT Argued: April 4, 2023 OF MARYLAND*
No. 38 September Term, 2022

______________________________________

JACOB BENNETT

v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND

______________________________________

Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves,
JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Fader, C.J. Gould, J., dissents.

______________________________________ Filed: August 30, 2023

* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the vot ers of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on Decemb er 14, 2022.Jacob Bennett, the appellant, and Harford County, M aryland (the “County”), the

appellee, dispute whether Mr. Bennett is barred fro m serving as a member of the Harford County Council (the “Council”) because of his emplo yment as a schoolteacher by the Harford County Board of Education (the “Board”). I n the November 2022 general election, Mr. Bennett was elected to the Council. Soon after , a dispute arose between Mr. Bennett and the County concerning whether he is precluded f rom serving simultaneously as a member of the Council and as an employee of the Boa rd by either: (1) Section 207 of the Harford County Charter (the “Charter”), which prohi bits a Council member from holding, among other things, “employment in the government o f the State of Maryland[ or] Harford County”; or (2) the common law doctrine of incompat ible positions. We hold that neither Charter § 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible posi tions bars Mr. Bennett from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council a nd an employee of the Board. First, Charter § 207 does not preclude Mr. Bennett from serving on the Council because his employer, the Board, does not have the character of either a State or County government entity in the context presented. County boards of education can have the character of State, county, hybrid, or independent entities. Which character applies to a particular situation depends on context and applica ble statutory and regulatory provisions. As applied in the context of Charter § 207, a count y board of education does not have a particular character as State, county, hybrid, or i ndependent entity. We therefore turn to our canons of statutory interpretation to discern t he legislative intent underlying the provision. Because the language of § 207 is ambigu ous and legislative history clarifies only part of that ambiguity, we employ a canon of s tatutory interpretation favoring2

candidate eligibility. We ultimately conclude that , for purposes of the applicability of § 207, the Board is an independent entity, neither State nor County, and that § 207 therefore does not preclude Mr. Bennett from simultaneously s erving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board. Second, the doctrine of incompatible positions does not preclude Mr. Bennett’s simultaneous service on the Council and as an emplo yee of the Board because there is no present or prospective conflict of interest between the positions; neither position has a level of supervisory power over the other or the ability to hire, fire, or set the salary of the other; and none of the functions of the offices are “inher ently inconsistent and repugnant.” Hetrich v. County Comm’rs of Anne Arundel County , 222 Md. 304, 308 (1960) (quoting Lilly v. Jones , 158 Md. 260, 266 (1930)). The Council’s limited roles with respect to the budget and membership of the Board are too attenuat ed from Mr. Bennett’s position as a teacher to implicate the doctrine. For those reasons, in a per curiam order issued fol lowing oral argument, we held that Mr. Bennett was not barred from serving on the Council while remaining a schoolteacher employed by the Board, reversed the c ontrary order and declaratory judgment of the Circuit Court for Harford County, a nd remanded the case with instructions to that court to enter a declaratory judgment in ac cord with our order. Bennett v. Harford County , 483 Md. 414 (2023) (per curiam). We now explain the basis for that order.3 BACKGROUND A. The Harford County Charter and the Council Harford County is governed by the terms of a charte r adopted by the eligible voters of the County in November 1972. See Maryland Manual 1973-1974, at 589 (Morris L. Radoff & Frank F. White, Jr., eds., 1974). The leg islative branch of the County government is the seven-member Council. Harford County Charte r § 201. Six members of the Council must, at the time of their elections, reside in one of the County’s six Council districts. Id. § 204. The seventh, who serves as Council Presiden t, is elected at large. Id. Members are elected for four-year terms on the same schedule as the election of state officers. Id. §§ 204,
206. To be qualified to serve as a Council member, a can didate must “have been a resident and a qualified voter of the County for at least two years immediately preceding election or appointment,” and (other than the Counc il President) “a resident of the Council district from which elected or appointed.” Id. § 207. While serving on the Council, a “member shall not h old any other office of profit or employment in the government of the State of Maryla nd, Harford County, or any municipality within Harford County, except a positi on held by virtue of being a Council member.” Id. Members are further ineligible during their term “for appointment to any County office or position carrying compensation” ot her than Council member or the County Executive. Id.4

This dispute centers on the prohibition in Charter § 207 against a member holding “employment in the government of the State of Maryl and[ or] Harford County” while serving on the Council. 1 B. Factual Background Before the circuit court, the parties stipulated to the following facts, among others. Mr. Bennett is a teacher in the Harford County Publ ic Schools, employed by the Board. For the 2022-2023 school year, Mr. Bennett was under contract with the Board to teach wherever the Superintendent of the Harford Co unty Public Schools assigned him. In the November 2022 General Election, the voters o f Harford County Council District F elected Mr. Bennett to serve as the Coun cil member representing that district. Mr. Bennett intends to work as a teacher in Harford County Public Schools while simultaneously serving as a Council member. Mr. Bennett is paid by the Board. As a teacher, Mr . Bennett participates in the State retirement system, with funding that comes from the County. The Board receives substantial funding from the Sta te, some of which comes from federal programs, and the County. Annually, the Bo ard submits a proposed budget to the County Executive and the Council. Since 1972, the County Executive and the Council have fully funded the Board’s proposed budget only four times, three of which were the last three fiscal years. Each year, the Council me ets with Board representatives, considers the Board’s proposed budget and any proposed cuts t o it, and usually approves in part and

1 As no party contends that the Board could be consi dered a government entity within a “municipality in Harford County,” we do no t consider that part of Charter § 207.5

denies in part the proposal. The Council also cons iders and acts on Board requests to transfer funds in the Board’s budget between major categories. In making its funding decisions, the Council allocates County funds among the various agencies and units of government that receive funds from it, including se veral non-County entities. 2 The Board is the largest recipient of County operating budget funds. Annually, the Council approves the allocation of Co unty revenues to the Board, which the Board uses to pay for textbooks and class room supplies; information and communication technology; a fleet of vehicles; and the salaries of its personnel, including teachers. The Council also approves the allocation of County revenues to the Board to pay for debt service on bonds issued to fund Board faci lities, as well as to fund construction of and improvements to Board facilities. Mr. Bennett’s compensation as a member of the Counc il would be $49,000 per year. C. Procedural Background About one month after Mr. Bennett’s election, the C ounty filed this action. In its complaint, the County sought a declaratory judgment that Mr. Bennett was not qualified to serve on the Council while employed by the Board, a s well as an injunction barring him from serving on the Council. Before the circuit co urt, the County argued that the Board was either a State or a County agency and that, in either case, Mr. Bennett’s employment with the Board rendered him unqualified to serve on the Council pursuant to Charter § 207

2 Among the non-County agencies that receive funding from the County, as approved by the Council, are the Sheriff and Sherif f’s office, the Harford County Health Department, circuit court personnel, State’s Attorn ey’s Office personnel, and the Harford Soil Conservation District.6

and the doctrine of incompatible positions. Mr. Be nnett contended that the Board was neither a State nor a County agency and, therefore, he was not precluded from serving on the Council. Mr. Bennett counterclaimed for injunc tive, declaratory, and mandamus relief to force the County to permit him to serve on the C ouncil. In February 2023, after a hearing, the circuit cour t ruled for the County. The court concluded that because the controversy arose from t he Council’s required input on the Board’s annual budget, and budgetary issues are loc al in nature, the Board should be treated as a County entity for purposes of Charter § 207. The court noted that even if the Board were instead treated as a State agency, “the result [would] remain[] the same.” The court accordingly entered a declaratory judgment and orde r in which it: (1) declared that Charter § 207 “applies to public school teachers em ployed by the Harford County Board of Education”; (2) declared that Mr. Bennett, due t o his employment with the Harford County Board of Education, “is not qualified to be a member of the Harford County Council”; (3) ordered Mr. Bennett to “cure his lack of qualification . . . by terminating his employment with the Harford County Board of Educati on”; and (4) enjoined Mr. Bennett from acting as a member of the Council “unless and until he cures his lack of qualification[.]” Mr. Bennett filed a notice of appeal with the Appel late Court of Maryland, 3 and petitioned for a writ of certiorari to this Court b efore action was taken by the Appellate

3 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the vote rs of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the C ourt of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name chang e took effect on December 14, 2022.7

Court. This Court granted Mr. Bennett’s petition a nd the parties’ joint petition for expedited proceedings on March 6, 2023. Bennett v. Harford County , 483 Md. 264 (2023). On April 5, 2023, following oral argument, we issue d a per curiam order reversing the circuit court and declaring that neither Charte r § 207 nor the doctrine of incompatible positions precludes Mr. Bennett from serving on the Council while employed as a teacher by the Board. Bennett , 483 Md. at 416. We therefore remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to enter: (1) a declarator y judgment that Mr. Bennett is qualified to serve as a member of the Harford County Council whi le being employed as a teacher by the Harford County Board of Education; and (2) any injunctive relief that may be necessary and appropriate to implement and enforce that decla ratory relief. Id. We now explain the basis for our order.
DISCUSSION The interpretation of a provision of a county chart er is a legal question, which we review without deference. Prince George’s County v. Thurston , 479 Md. 575, 585 (2022). The application of the doctrine of incompatible pos itions to undisputed facts is also a question of law, which we again review without defe rence. See Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp,
Inc. , 472 Md. 378, 385 (2021).
I. C HARTER § 207 Charter § 207 prohibits an individual from serving as a Council member if, among other things, the individual is employed by the Sta te of Maryland or the County. Mr. Bennett is employed by the Board. The disposit ive question is thus whether the Board, for purposes of the application of § 207, is a Stat e entity, a County entity, or neither. The8

answer is not straightforward. Statutes treat coun ty boards of education as State entities for some purposes, County entities for others, and hybrid or independent entities for yet others. Our decisional law reflects that the chara cter of county boards of education changes depending on the context in which an issue arises. We therefore begin with an exploration of the role of county boards of education as they r elate to the State and the County. A. The Statutory Scheme Article VIII, § 1 of the Constitution of Maryland r equires the General Assembly to “establish throughout the State a thorough and effi cient System of Free Public Schools,” and to “provide by taxation, or otherwise, for thei r maintenance.” The framework the General Assembly has created for that system of fre e public schools is contained in the Education Article (2022 Repl.). Title 2 of the Education Article establishes the St ate Department of Education as a principal department of the State government, with the State Board of Education (the “State Board”) serving as head of the department. Educ. § § 2-101, 2-102. The State Board, which consists of 13 regular members and one student memb er, id. § 2-202(a), is charged broadly with “[d]etermin[ing] the elementary and secondary educational policies of this State,” and “[c]aus[ing] to be carried out those provisions of this article that are within its jurisdiction,” id. § 2-205(b)(1) & (2). The State Board appoints a state superintendent, wh o serves as the chief executive, secretary, and treasurer of the State Board and is charged with “[c]arry[ing] out the educational policies of the State Board.” Id. §§ 2-204(c)(1); 2-302(a); 2-303(c)(1). Through the state superintendent, the State Board “ exercise[s] general control and9

supervision over the public schools and educational interests of this State” and “establish[es] basic policy and guidelines for the program of instruction for the public schools.” Id. § 2-205(g)(2) & (h)(1). The State Board is author ized to “adopt bylaws, rules, and regulations for the administration of th e public schools,” id. § 2-205(c); prepare and send to the Governor, after certification by th e state superintendent, “the annual State public school budget,” which includes State aid to counties, id. § 2-205(j); “explain the true intent and meaning of the provisions of” the Educat ion Article that are within its jurisdiction and the bylaws, rules, and regulations it adopts, id. § 2-205(e)(1); and “decide all controversies and disputes under these provisio ns,” id. § 2-205(e)(2). This Court has described the State Board’s broad authority “as a v isitatorial power of such comprehensive character as to invest [it] with the last word on a ny matter concerning educational policy or the administration of the system of public educa tion.” Donlon v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs. , 460 Md. 62, 81 (2018) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Waeldner , 298 Md. 354, 360 (1984)). Title 3 of the Education Article establishes “a cou nty board of education,” co-extensive with the geographical boundaries of ea ch county in the State, “for each county school system.” Educ. §§ 3-102, 3-103. State law governs the size, composition, and manner of selection of the members of each county b oard of education. See generally id. §§ 3-105–3-1405. In Harford County, the Board cons ists of six elected members: one from each Council district; three members appointed by the County Executive, subject to the advice and consent of the Council; the county s uperintendent of schools (ex officio); and one student member. Id. § 3-6A-01(b), (c) & (d). In the event of a vacanc y of an10

elected member of the Board, the Council is to appo int a qualified individual to serve for the remainder of the term. Id. § 3-6A-01(f)(1). County boards of education are responsible for “edu cational matters that affect the counties.” Id. § 4-101(a). Each county board of education is res ponsible for selecting a county superintendent, who is to serve as “the exec utive officer, secretary, and treasurer of the county board.” Id. § 4-102; see also id. §§ 4-204, 4-205 (setting forth the powers and duties of county superintendents). Upon the writte n recommendation of the county superintendent, each county board is responsible fo r appointing and setting the salaries of “all principals, teachers, and other certificated a nd noncertificated personnel.” Id. § 4-103. Under State law, county boards are required, among other things, to carry out applicable provisions of the Education Article “and the bylaws, rules, regulations, and policies of the State Board”; maintain throughout t heir jurisdiction “a reasonably uniform system of public schools that is designed to provid e quality education and equal educational opportunity for all children”; “determine . . . the educational policies of the county school system”; and promulgate “bylaws, rules, and regulat ions not inconsistent with State law, for the conduct and management of the county public schools.” Id. § 4-108. To carry out those duties, county boards may establish public sc hools that, if approved by the state superintendent, “become[] a part of the State progr am of public education.” Id. § 4-109. Each county board of education must prepare and sub mit an annual budget “[s]ubject to the rules and regulations of the Stat e Board and with the advice of the county superintendent.” Id. § 5-101(a)(1). Although budgets are submitted to county governments, the contents and process for the submi ssion, review, and approval of annual11

budgets is prescribed by State law, which sets out in detail the categories that must be included in the budget for receipts and expenses. Id. § 5-101(b). Notably for our purposes, all “[i]nstructional salaries,” including the salar ies of all teachers, aides, psychological personnel, guidance counselors, and library personn el, constitute a single subcategory of a county board’s budget. Id. § 5-101(b)(2)(iii). In counties with a county executive and council, su ch as the County, budgets are due at least 45 days before the date for levying lo cal taxes. Id. § 5-102(b). The county executive is first charged with identifying in writ ing categories of the budget to deny or reduce “and the reason for the denial or reduction. ” Id. § 5-102(c)(2). The budget then goes to the county council, which may “restore any denial or reduction made by the county executive.” Id. § 5-102(c)(3). The budget must include at least t he minimum amount of funding required by a formula set forth in § 5-235 4 of the Education Article. Id. § 5-103(a). If a county council does not ultimately approve the full amount requested by a county board, the county board must submit to the council, “within 30 days after the adoption of the budget, a report indicating how the alterations to the budget will be implemented, accompanied by reasonable supporting detail and ana lysis.” Id. § 5-103(c)(2). The county council is then obligated to levy property taxes th at, together with other available revenue, “will produce the amounts necessary to meet the app ropriations made in the approved annual budget of the county board.” Id. § 5-104(a). During a budget year, a county board may transfer funds within major budget categories o n its own, but must obtain the county

4 Section 5-103(a) of the Education Article referenc es § 5-202(d)(1)(i), but § 5-202 was renumbered to § 5-235 in 2021. 2021 Md. Laws c h. 36.12

council’s approval to transfer funds between major budget categories. Id. § 5-105(b)(1) & (2). County boards are responsible for employing individ uals necessary to the operation of the public schools in the county, but they may n ot hire anyone as a county superintendent, supervisor, principal, or teacher u nless the individual is eligible to be issued a certificate by the state superintendent. Id. §§ 6-101, 6-201(a)(1). The county superintendent is responsible for nominating, for t he county board’s approval, all professional assistants in the county superintenden t’s office and all principals, teachers, and other certificated personnel. Id. § 6-201(b)(1). The county superintendent is also responsible for the assignment, transfer, and recom mendation for promotion of those personnel. Id. § 6-201(b)(2). On recommendation of the county su perintendent, a county board may suspend or dismiss a teacher on specified grounds. Id. § 6-202(a). An appeal from such a decision may be made to the State Board

. Id. § 6-202(a)(4). As shown by the discussion above, county boards of education are: (1) integral parts of the State system of public education, whic h is established and thoroughly regulated by State law and ultimately presided over by the St ate Board; (2) organized, selected, and funded in significant part on a county level, altho ugh through a process grounded in State law; and (3) in many respects, distinct in their op erations from both State and county entities. The unique status of county boards is reflected in other statutes as well. For example, tort claims against State entities, includ ing the State Board, and related immunity for State personnel, are governed by the Maryland T ort Claims Act, Md. Code Ann., State13

Gov’t §§ 12-101–12-110 (2021 Repl.; 2022 Supp.) & C ts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-522 (2020 Repl.); and tort claims against local government en tities, including all counties and Baltimore City, and related protections for their e mployees, are governed by the Local Government Tort Claims Act, Cts. &. Jud. Proc. §§ 5 -301–5-304. But tort claims against county school boards, including the Board, and prot ections for their members and employees, are governed by a separate tort claim an d immunity regime applicable only to county boards of education. See id. § 5-518; see also Neal v. Balt. City Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs , 467 Md. 399, 422-24 (2020) (contrasting approache s taken under the Maryland Tort Claims Act and Local Government Tort Claims Ac t with Courts and Judicial Proceedings § 5-518). For purposes of tort claims handling, indemnification, and protection of personnel, county school boards are t hus treated both separately and differently from both State entities and local gove rnment entities. Maryland’s Public Ethics Law also treats State enti ties, county entities, and county school boards separately. The Maryland Public Ethi cs Law contains provisions addressing conflicts of interest, financial disclosures, and l obbying that apply generally to State officials and employees. See Md. Code Ann., Gen’l Provs. §§ 5-101–5-716 (2019 R epl.; 2022 Supp.). Separately, “each county and each mun icipal corporation” is required to enact its own regulations governing the public ethi cs of local officials that, although similar to those applicable to State officials and employee s, may be modified to be more relevant “in that jurisdiction.” Id. §§ 5-807–5-810. And separately still, county scho ol boards are required to adopt regulations governing the ethics of their own members and, if they choose, their officials and employees, that, althou gh similar to the State provisions, may14

be modified to be more relevant in “that school sys tem.” Id. §§ 5-815–5-818. Other statutes that distinguish between the State and the various governmental entities within it also further distinguish between counties and count y boards of education, among other subdivisions. See, e.g. , id. § 4-101(j) (defining a “political subdivision” of the State, for purposes of the Maryland Public Information Act, to include a county, a municipal corporation, an unincorporated town, a school distr ict, or a special district); State Gov’t § 10-1301(f)(2) (defining “unit,” as applicable to non-State entities, as including “a county, municipality, bi-county, regional, or multicounty a gency, county board of education, public corporation or authority, or any other polit ical subdivision of the State”). 5 B. Treatment of County School Boards in Caselaw Reflecting the complexity of the character of count y school boards laid out in the Maryland Code, this Court has not adopted a uniform determination of the character of such boards for all purposes. Instead, we have rec ognized that their character can vary based on context. We recently traced the evolution of our caselaw in this area in determining whether a county school board is part o f the executive branch of the State

5 Provisions of the Harford County Code similarly tr eat the Board as an entity separate from the County and the State. See, e.g. , Harford County Code § 235-7(A)(1)(d) (“The applicant shall also state how many channels, what facilities and what services shall be provided free of charge to the County, the schoo l systems and the public[.]”); id. § 235-10(F) (“On the County and educational channel s, the company shall carry or cablecast such programming as designated by the Cou nty or its designated representative and the school system or its designated representat ive, respectively.”); id. § 68-8 (“The government of the county, the County Board of Educa tion and the Board of Trustees of the Harford Community College are hereby exempted from the provisions of this chapter.”).15

government for purposes of the State’s Whistleblowe r Protection Law in Donlon v. Montgomery County Public Schools , 460 Md. 62 (2018).
In Donlon , we rejected the petitioner’s contention that coun ty school boards are State agencies for all purposes. Id. at 79. We acknowledged that several of our prior opinions had “referred to county boards of educatio n as State entities in a variety of contexts,” but concluded that “none [we]re conseque ntial to the present case,” both because the conclusory statements at issue were made in dic ta and because they were not explained. Id. We also observed that courts had uniformly determ ined that county school boards are State agencies for purposes of sovereign immunity. 6 Id. at 80-81. However, we also noted that it was possible for an entity to “qualify as a State agency for some purposes, while being classified as a local agency for other purpos es.” Id. at 83 (quoting Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Phillips , 413 Md. 606, 632 (2010)). 7 Looking to our more recent

6 See, e.g. , Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s County Pub. Schs. , 666 F.3d 244, 248-49 n.5 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing state and federal d ecisions recognizing that Maryland’s county school boards are “instrumentalities of the State” for Eleventh Amendment immunity purposes); Jones v. Frederick County Bd. of Educ. , 689 F. Supp. 535, 538 (D. Md. 1988) (holding, in the context of an employment discrimination claim, that a county school board member, superintendent, and school pri ncipal, when employed by a county school board, are state officials protected by Elev enth Amendment immunity); Bd. of Educ. of Balt. County v. Zimmer-Rubert , 409 Md. 200, 205-06 (2009) (stating, in connectio n with sovereign immunity, that this Court has “long consi dered county school boards to be State agencies”); Norville v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. , 160 Md. App. 12, 62 (2004) (concluding that a county school board was “an arm of the State” and so protected by sovereign immunity), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ. v. Norville , 390 Md. 93 (2005).

7 In Phillips , in the course of concluding that the Washington S uburban Sanitary Commission was a local entity for certain purposes, we determined that the Commission “is a ‘hybrid’ entity, which defies simple and defi nitive categorization as either a ‘State’ or16

cases, including Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel County Boa rd of Education , 358 Md. 129 (2000) and Beka Industries, Inc. v. Worcester County Board of Education , 419 Md. 194 (2011), we concluded in Donlon that county boards of education are agencies whose character can vary based on context. We first summarized our decision in Chesapeake Charter , in which we “elaborated . . . on the hybrid nature of county school boards of education.” Donlon , 460 Md. at 83. The issue in Chesapeake Charter was whether the Anne Arundel County Board of Education is subject to the State’s General Procure ment Law and, therefore, to the jurisdiction of the Maryland State Board of Contrac t Appeals. Id. (discussing Chesapeake Charter , 358 Md. at 134). In resolving that question, we explained that county school boards “are generally regarded as State agencies be cause they are part of the State public education system, are subject to extensive supervis ion and control by the State Board of Education, and exercise a State function[.]” Donlon , 460 Md. at 83-84 (quoting Chesapeake Charter , 358 Md. at 139-40). Nonetheless, we noted that “ from a budgetary and structural perspective, [county school boards] are local in character.” Id. Indeed, we observed that “in terms of their composition, juris diction, funding, and focus, [county school boards] clearly have a local flavor[.]” Donlon , 460 Md. at 84 (quoting Chesapeake Charter , 358 Md. at 135-36). We also found it notable tha t county school boards “retain unique autonomy aspects, irrespective of the [State Board]’s authority,” that weighed

‘local’ agency or instrumentality for any and all p urposes.” 413 Md. at 630 (citation omitted).17

against concluding that they were part of the State procurement system. Donlon , 460 Md.
at 85-86. Ultimately, in the context presented in Chesapeake Charter , we concluded that “the county board’s school bus contracts were not subjec t to the General Procurement Law because the board did not fall within the purview o f the statute.” Id. at 86. We held that “from a budgetary and structural perspective,” coun ty boards “are local in character[,]” and they do not comprise “‘ divisions of or units within ’ the State government.” Id. (quoting Chesapeake Charter , 358 Md. at 139). We next turned to our decision in Beka , which the petitioner in Donlon argued had limited our holding in Chesapeake Charter . We disagreed. Donlon , 460 Md. at 87. The relevant issue in Beka “was whether a county board of education retained its right to sovereign immunity asserted in defense to a breach of contract action under [State Government] § 12-201.” Id. We concluded that our decision in Chesapeake Charter “did not foreclose, in Beka , a different analysis and holding” for purposes of the application of a sovereign immunity waiver. Id. at 87-88. We therefore “reiterated that, for purp oses of Eleventh Amendment/sovereign immunity analysis, loc al boards of education are entities of State government.” Id. at 88. The different answers provided in Chesapeake Charter and Beka concerning whether the county school boards at iss ue were units of State government resulted from the different contexts in which the questions arose. See id. In turning to the facts of Donlon , we observed that “sovereign immunity [wa]s extraneous to the purpose and legislative history o f the [Whistleblower Protection Law].” Id. After noting “the local flavor of a county board of education’s budgeting process,”18

which was central to the outcome of Chesapeake Charter , we observed that “[t]he blend of State, local, and independent characteristics of a county board extends beyond local budgetary concerns,” and that “[p]ersonnel matters are inherently local at their inception.” Id. at 90. Dissecting the relevant provisions of the Education Article, we specifically noted the special authority of county school boards—“dist inct from [the State Board]”—over personnel matters and discipline. Id. at 91. Because the Whistleblower Protection Law i s a law concerning personnel matters and discipline t hat is limited in its application only to State employees, we concluded that it was “not expa nsive enough . . . to cover under its umbrella county boards and their school teachers[.] ” Id. at 94. We therefore held “that a county board of education is not an entity of the S tate . . . for purposes of the [Whistleblower Protection Law].” 8 Id. at 96. As clarified in Donlon , county school boards do not have the same charact er for all purposes. To the contrary, they have a “blend of S tate, local, and independent characteristics,” id. at 90, that, depending on context, could result in a determination that they are of a State, local, or independent characte r for a particular purpose. Which character prevails depends on an investigation of t he particular context and the

8 In Donlon , we went on to observe that during the pendency of that litigation, the General Assembly had expanded whistleblower protect ion to employees of county school boards, but chose to do so by enacting a new whistl eblower protection law applicable only to county school boards, rather than by expanding o r clarifying the reach of the State Whistleblower Protection Law. 460 Md. at 97-102. That is yet another example of the General Assembly treating county boards of educatio n separately from both State and county entities.19

characteristics of county school boards that are re levant to that context. With that understanding, we turn to the present dispute. C. The Character of the Board for Purposes of Chart er § 207 Charter § 207 establishes the qualifications to be a member of the Council. One of those requirements is that the individual may not “ hold . . . employment in the government of the State of Maryland[ or] Harford County.” We must therefore determine whether the Board is of State, county, or independent character in the context of employment with the Board serving as a qualification for public office in the County. The circuit court concluded that the Board is a Cou nty agency for purposes of Charter § 207 because “the issues springing from th e controversy here are born from the Board’s budget and the Council’s role in the Board’ s budget.” Observing that this Court
in Chesapeake Charter

had concluded that county school board budgetary i ssues are local in nature, the circuit court determined that the Bo ard was a County agency for purposes of Charter § 207. If Charter § 207 were a budgetary provision, we wou ld agree with the circuit court’s reasoning. But it is not. Charter § 207 establish es qualifications to hold office as a member of the Council, none of which are either expressly or implicitly tied to budget considerations. They appear in the middle of Artic le II of the Harford County Charter, which is titled “Legislative Branch” and contains p rovisions relating to the personnel, powers, duties, and operations of the Council. Pro visions of the Charter relating to the budget are found in Article V, titled “Budget and F inance.” Our focus must therefore be20

on the character of the Board for purposes of emplo yment with it serving as a qualification (or, here, disqualification) for public office. In relevant part, Charter § 207 bases an individual ’s qualification to become a member of the Council on the individual’s status as an employee (or not) of certain governments, untethered from any role or function o f those governments. Where applicable, the limitation thus applies equally to all employees of the State, the County, or any municipality within the County, regardless of t he roles those employees perform or whether their positions are in any way related to a ny business before the Council. The limitation applies equally to an administrative ass istant employed by the Maryland Department of Labor, a laborer employed by the Stat e Highway Administration, an inspector with the Harford County Liquor Control Bo ard, and the Director of Finance of the Town of Bel Air.
In Chesapeake Charter , Beka , and Donlon , our analyses turned on the character of the role or function of the county board as it pert ained to the issue in dispute: procurement matters, sovereign immunity, and personnel matters, respectively. But where affiliation with the county board is itself the purported disqu alification, there is no applicable role or function of the county board to be analyzed to dete rmine whether it is State, county, or independent in character. If Charter § 207 applies to county boards of education, it does so irrespective of the character of their operation in any particular area. Because there is no necessary character of a county school board for purposes of determining whether its employees are eligible to s erve in the government of a different governmental entity, we are ultimately confronted w ith a question of statutory21

interpretation: whether the framers of the Harford County Charter intended Charter § 207 to render employees of the Board ineligible to serv e simultaneously on the Council. To resolve that question, we turn to our canons of sta tutory construction, which “apply with equal force to the interpretation of a charter prov ision.” Prince George’s County v. Thurston , 479 Md. 575, 586 (2022). As we set forth earlier this term: “Our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intent ion of the legislature and we begin that exercise by reviewing the statutory l anguage itself.” [ Comptroller v. ] Citicorp [ Int’l Commc’ns, Inc. ], 389 Md. 156, 165 [(2005)] (quotations omitted). We read the plain meaning of the language of the statute “as a whole, so that no word, clause, sente nce or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP , 473 Md. 356, 376 (2021) (quoting Koste v. Town of Oxford , 431 Md. 14, 25-26 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)). “Addi tionally, we neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, and we do not construe a statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or exte nd its application.” Wheeling , 473 Md. at 376-77 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker , 412 Md. 257, 274 (2010)) (cleaned up). “If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purp ose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily and we apply the statute as written, without resorting to other rules of construction.” Id. at 377 (quoting Lockshin , 412 Md. at 275). That said, as the Court recently reit erated in Wheeling , [w]e, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legi slature in enacting the statute. We presume that the Legislature inten ds its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious bod y of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s objec t and scope. Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subj ect to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words a re clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become am biguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in ot her indicia,22

including the history of the legislation or other r elevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions

. In every case, the statute must be given a reasonab le interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. 473 Md. at 377 (quoting Lockshin , 412 Md. at 275-76) (internal quotations omitted). Comptroller v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC , 482 Md. 343, 379-81 (2022). We have recognized another canon of statutory inter pretation applicable specifically to provisions relating to candidate qualification: When statutory language is ambiguous, there is “a presumption in favor of the eligibility of one who has been elected or appointed to a public office.” Mayor & Comm’rs of Westernport v. Green , 144 Md. 85, 89 (1923);

see also Abrams v. Lamone , 398 Md. 146, 179-80 (2007) (discussing the presum ption in favor of eligibility). Because county boards of education are not inherent ly of either State or county character, and Charter § 207 does not expressly men tion the Board, the language of the provision sheds no light on whether the Board shoul d be considered a State or County entity, or neither, for purposes of determining the qualifications of a member of the Council. Context provided by other sections of the Charter s uggests that the framers did not view the Board as part of the County government. A rticle IV of the Charter identifies the administrative organization of the County. Section 401 provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Charter or in state law, all agencies of the County government23

shall be subject to the direction, supervision, and control of the County Executive.” (Emphasis added). Section 402 then identifies 11 a gencies as being within the executive branch of the County government, along with “any ot her agencies established by law.” 9 The Board is not among the agencies listed. Indeed , the sole mention of the Board in the Charter is in § 409, which concerns the Harford Cou nty Department of Parks and Recreation. In setting out duties of the Director of that department, § 409(b) requires the Director to “encourage the development of cooperati ve programs and joint use of facilities with the Board of Education[.]” The only mention o f the Board in the Charter is thus a direction that a County department seek to cooperat e with it. The County directs us to Charter § 502, which conta ins definitions “of terms used in” Article V, the Budget and Finance Article. The first definition is: “The term of ‘County’ or ‘County government’ shall include all a gencies and their officers, agents, and employees who receive or disburse County funds.” A s a recipient of County funds, the Board falls squarely within that definition, which the County encourages us to apply as well to Charter § 207. To do so, however, we would have to ignore both (1) the express limitation on the scope of that definition to the p rovisions of Article V and (2) the much different scope of County government agencies ident ified in Article IV. Contrary to the

9 As we observed in Donlon , “§ 8-201 of the State Government . . . Article li sts 19 [now 21] principal departments of the Executive bra nch of State government,” and “county boards of education are not” among them. Donlon , 460 Md. at 82. As we also noted in Donlon , the State Department of Education is not listed i n § 8-201 either, but it is separately identified as a “principal department of the State Government” in Education § 2-101. Id. at 82 n.8. The Board is thus not identified in the laws of the State or the County as a principal department or agency of either.24

County’s view, the decision of the framers of the C harter to expressly limit the applicability of that broad definition of “County” only to the Bu dget and Finance Article suggests that they understood the term to have a narrower—or at l east a different—meaning when used elsewhere in the Charter. Our consideration of “the purpose, aim, or policy” underlying Charter § 207,
FC-GEN , 482 Md. at 380, sheds little additional light on our inquiry. Section 207 does not identify its purpose. It does not state why indivi duals employed by the State, the County, or a municipality in the County are precluded from serving on the Council, nor is that readily apparent from the set of entities included. If the intent underlying the restriction is to avoid a conflict concerning the Council’s budget ing responsibilities, as the circuit court seemed to conclude, it would appear to be both over ly broad (in its application to all State employees) and overly narrow (in its omission of no n-governmental entities that receive or benefit from County funding). An intent to avoid o verlap with governmental entities over which the Council exercises some measure of control also would not explain the inclusion of State government employees. And an intent to av oid entanglement with all other governmental entities, as suggested by the County, seems inconsistent with the omission of the federal government—which, notably, is includ ed in the analogous provision applicable to the County Executive, see Charter § 305—and the governments of neighboring jurisdictions. Nor is it readily appar ent how precluding service by public schoolteachers would further that goal. We are the refore unable to discern a clear legislative purpose underlying Charter § 207 to aid in our interpretation.25

Although context suggests that the framers of the C harter did not view the Board as part of the County government, we do not find that context strong enough to be dispositive. As a result, after considering the plain language, context, and purpose of Charter § 207, we conclude that the provision is ambiguous with respe ct to whether employment with the Board disqualifies an individual from simultaneous service on the Council. We therefore turn to other indicia of legislative intent. The scant legislative history that might reflect on the question before us consists mostly of explanations provided by one member of th e Charter Board during a January 27, 1971 public hearing. During that hearing, in respo nse to comments from the County superintendent of schools, Charter Board member Rob ert J. Carson explained his view that the Board was part of a state education system and, therefore, that the “[s]uperintendent and all the employees underneath of that [position] , I don’t think, will be affected in any way by the charter,” with the possible exception of school construction bonds. He also explained that the County lacked the authority to a lter the manner of selecting members of the Board. And in responding to a different inquir y about why education was not included in the Charter, Mr. Carson stated that was because “the State alone controls the educational system in this State and forbids the Counties passi ng local laws in respect to schools.” He observed, however, that the County pays for a porti on of the education system, as required by State law, and that the County Executive and the Council would scrutinize that part of the budget. To the extent these comments can be un derstood to reflect the understanding26

of the Charter Board as a whole, 10 they are evidence that the framers did not conside r the Board to be an agency of the County government. Al though the same comments indicate that the framers understood the Board to be part of the Statewide system of public education, they do not necessarily suggest that the Charter Board members viewed it as an entity of the State government. That subject simpl y did not come up. Legislative history also strengthens our conclusion that the definition of “County” included in Charter § 502 was not intended to apply outside of Article V of the Charter. In the first draft of the Charter, the term “County” w as not defined in Article V. However, § 910(l), in what was then the General Provisions A rticle, provided: “The word ‘agency’ when used to designate a subordinate element of gov ernment shall be construed as including all offices, departments, institutions, b oards, commissions, and corporations of the County government and, when so specified, all o ffices, departments, institutions, boards, commissions, and corporations which receive or disburse County funds.” In a letter, the County Superintendent of Schools expres sed concern that the definition could be interpreted as applying to the Board and expressed the Board’s view that it would not be “appropriate for us to be considered an agency of C ounty government.” The version of the

10 Ordinarily, the views expressed by one member of t he legislative body would not necessarily provide much insight into the intent of the entire body. State v. Phillips , 457 Md. 481, 488-89 (2018) (“The views expressed by ind ividual members of the legislative (or Constitutional) body as part of the debate may be considered, subject to the critical caveat that those views may not have been shared by anyone else and, to that extent, may be irrelevant.”). Here, however, Mr. Carson was on e of just five members of the Charter Board, and his statements were made without contrad iction while seated with at least three of the other members of the board in responding to questions raised about the draft charter at a public hearing.27

Charter that was ultimately adopted included the de finition of “County” now contained in § 502, perhaps to identify Article V as the “so spe cified” portion of the Charter in which all entities that receive or disburse County funds are to be treated as County agencies. The legislative history of Charter § 207, alongside the plain language and context of the provision, is sufficient to rule out the pos sibility that the framers of the Charter would have viewed employees of the Board as County employ ees for purposes of that provision. It does not, however, resolve whether they would ha ve viewed employees of the Board as State employees. Nor have the parties pointed us t o any other indicia of legislative intent that provide a definite conclusion. Considering the remaining unresolved ambiguity, we reach our resolution of the scope of Charter § 207 as applied to employees of t he Board by invoking the canon of construction establishing “a presumption in favor o f the eligibility of one who has been elected or appointed to a public office.” Green , 144 Md. at 89; see also Abrams , 398 Md. at 179-80. As described succinctly in an Opinion o f the Attorney General: Constitutional and statutory provisions that impose restrictions on the eligibility of a person to hold public office are c onstrued liberally in favor of the eligibility of the person to hold the office. See 63C Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees §53 at pp. 497-98 (observing that the case law generally holds that “[i]f there is any doubt or am biguity in the applicable provisions, such doubt or ambiguity must be resolve d in favor of eligibility”); see also 67 C.J.S. Officers §23 at pp. 175-76 (“The courts have a duty to liberally construe words limiting the right of a pe rson to hold office”). The underlying basis for the presumption of eligibility is to favor the right of the voters to select their public officers. Id. 91 Op. Att’y 99, 103 (2006).28

This Court applied the presumption in favor of elig ibility in Green , in which the Circuit Court for Allegany County had found an indi vidual ineligible to serve as clerk of Westernport, Maryland due to his service in the Gen eral Assembly when, the circuit court found, an increase in the salary for the clerk posi tion “was virtually directed by [a] statute passed [by the General Assembly] during his legisla tive term.” 144 Md. at 87. The circuit court issued a writ of mandamus removing the clerk from office. Id. at 89. This Court disagreed with the circuit court’s interpretation o f the effect of the relevant statute, and then stated: There is a presumption in favor of the eligibility of one who has been elected or appointed to a public office. 22 R. C. L. 400. Before his removal can be compelled by mandamus his constitutional or statuto ry disqualification should be clearly apparent. In this case the alleg ed ineligibility is not sufficiently demonstrated to require us to declare the appointment invalid. It will, therefore, be necessary to reverse the order for the writ of mandamus which directed the office to be vacated. Id. 11 The principle underlying the presumption in favor o f candidate eligibility is that “[t]here is nothing more fundamental to our society than the ability of our electorate to choose its leaders.” Becker v. Dean , 854 So. 2d 864, 869 (La. 2003); see also id. (“The purpose of the election process is to provide the e lectorate with a wide choice of candidates. . . . Thus, the interests of the state and its citizens are best served when election laws are interpreted so as to give the electorate t he widest possible choice of candidates.”);

11 We also discussed the same presumption in Abrams but determined that it was inapplicable there because the constitutional provi sion in dispute was not ambiguous. 398 Md. at 179-80.29

In re Farnese , 17 A.3d 357, 372 (Pa. 2011) (“[T]he Election Code must ‘be liberally construed to protect a candidate’s right to run for office and the voters’ right to elect the candidate of their choice.’” (quoting In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll , 847 A.2d 44, 49 (Pa. 2004))); State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elect ions , 639 N.E.2d 78, 79 (Ohio 1994) (“Words limiting the right of a pers on to hold office are to be given a liberal construction in favor of those seeking to hold offi ce, in order that the public may have the benefit of choice from all those who are in fact an d in law qualified.” (quoting State ex rel. Schenck v. Shattuck , 439 N.E.2d 891, 893 (Ohio 1982))); Sears v. Bayoud , 786 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. 1990) (“We have repeatedly recognize d the principle that constitutional provisions which restrict the right to hold public office should be strictly construed against ineligibility.”). In recognition of the public interest in strictly c onstruing laws limiting eligibility for public office to protect the right of voters to cho ose their elected officials, we continue to adhere to the presumption in favor of eligibility w hen laws imposing restrictions are ambiguous. Applying that presumption here to resol ve the ambiguity in Charter § 207, we hold that it does not preclude Mr. Bennett from ser ving as a member of the Council while maintaining his position as a public schoolteacher employed by the Board.

II. T HE D OCTRINE OF I NCOMPATIBLE P OSITIONS The circuit court also determined that Mr. Bennett is barred from simultaneously serving as a member of the Council and an employee of the Board by the common law doctrine of incompatible positions. Under that doc trine, an individual cannot simultaneously hold two offices that are incompatib le with each other. Lilly v. Jones , 15830

Md. 260, 265-66 (1930); see also Hetrich v. County Comm’rs of Anne Arundel County , 222 Md. 304, 308 (1960). “The fundamental test of incompatibility . . . is whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest, as w here one office is subordinate to the other or subject to supervision by the other, or where th e incumbent of one office has the power to appoint or remove or to set the salary of the ot her.” Hetrich , 222 Md. at 308. Incompatibility is determined by “the character and relation of the offices,” id. (quoting Lilly , 158 Md. at 266), and “whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest,” Hetrich , 222 Md. at 308. If an officer accepts two office s that are incompatible with each other, the officer generally must vacate the first one the officer accepted. Id. Hetrich and Lilly are instructive as to when two offices are incompat ible. In Hetrich , a Board of County Commissioners appointed one of it s members to serve as the Acting County Business Manager. Id. at 307. The trial court concluded that the positi ons were incompatible. Id. at 306-07. This Court agreed, noting that, by stat ute: (1) the Board of County Commissioners had direct authority over the County Business Manager, including the power to appoint, remove, and set the salary fo r the position; and (2) the manager was “responsible to the board of county commissioners f or the proper administration of all affairs of the county[.]” Id. at 308.
In Lilly , this Court held that service on the Baltimore Cit y Service Commission and the Port Development Commission of Baltimore City, both appointments by the Mayor of Baltimore City, were incompatible. 158 Md. at 265- 66. The Baltimore City Service Commission was responsible for classifying all muni cipal offices and positions in the City of Baltimore, including those of the Port Developme nt Commission, and “no appointment31

to any such offices or places [could] be made excep t under the rules of the” Baltimore City Service Commission. Id. at 262. In that way, “[t]he powers and duties of the Port Development Commission in the matter of appointment s [we]re subject to the supervisory powers of the City Service Commission[.]” Id. at 266. The purpose of the division between the classification power of the Baltimore City Serv ice Commission and the appointment power held by the various other entities in the Cit y government was “to provide a merit system of appointment for the City of Baltimore.” Id. at 262. In light of that, we held that “to permit one person to exercise the powers of bot h commissions would not only allow [that person] to exercise powers that are inconsist ent, but would defeat the very object and purpose of the creation of the City Service Commiss ion.” Id. at 266. Returning to the dispute before us, any possible co nflict between the positions of Council member and public schoolteacher is too atte nuated to run afoul of the doctrine of incompatible positions. In Hetrich , we identified two examples of “a present or prosp ective conflict of interest” that would fail the “fundamen tal test of incompatibility”: (1) “where one office is subordinate to the other or subject t o supervision by the other,” or (2) “where the incumbent of one office has the power to appoin t or remove or to set the salary of the other.” 222 Md. at 308. Here, neither position is subordinate to or subject to supervision by the other. A teacher in the Harford County scho ol system is subordinate to and subject to the supervision of the Board, the County Superin tendent, and, presumably, the principal and other administrators in the school in which the teacher is placed. To the extent a teacher has a right to appeal certain decisions of the Boar d, such as those related to discipline, that right of appeal is to the State Board, not the Coun cil. Educ. §§ 6-203, 6-202(a)(4); see,32

e.g. , Donlon , 460 Md. at 70-73. The Council plays no role in a ny aspect of the supervision of Board employees. Nor does the Council have the power to appoint, rem ove, or set the salary of a public schoolteacher employed by the Board. Rather, subje ct to the State Board’s role in setting standards for teachers and certifying them, Educ. § § 2-205(b), (c) & (g), 6-101, 6-202(c)(3), the County Superintendent and the Boar d in some combination hold the power to appoint, id. § 4-103(a), remove, id. § 6-202(a), and set the salary, id. §§ 4-103(a)(2), 6-201(f), of a public schoolteacher. The Council’s role with respect to the Board’s budget is also limited, constrained to approving or reduci ng broad categories of spending, one of which is all

salaries of all teachers, administrators, and othe r personnel in the system. Id. §§ 5-102(b), 5-105(b). If the Council fails to app rove the full amount requested in the Board’s budget, it is for the Board to decide how t o adjust its spending. Id. § 5-103(c). Simply put, the Council’s role concerning the Board ’s overall budget does not provide it with any power to appoint, remove, or set the salar y of an individual teacher. 12 We also do not discern any incompatibility between the Council’s limited role in the selection of members of the Board and employmen t as a public schoolteacher. The

12 The parties included in the record an advice lette r from Assistant Attorney General Kathryn M. Rowe opining that it would not “ violate the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices for a teacher in Carroll County to also serve as a County Commissioner.” Assistant Attorney General Rowe obs erved that “[t]he County Commissioners do not have supervisory authority ove r teachers, do not set policy for the school system, and do not have the authority to hir e or fire teachers.” She further noted that the Commissioners’ limited impact on the schoo l system’s budget, “and thus some possible impact on teachers[’] salaries,” was “too attenuated to create incompatibility between the positions.” At least as applied to the facts here, we agree with that analysis.33

Council must approve of the County Executive’s sele ction of three of the nine voting members of the Board, whether for a full term or to fill a vacancy. Id. § 3-6A-01(d)(1)(ii) & (f)(2). And, in the case of a mid-term vacancy i n any of the six elected seats on the Board, the Council may fill the vacancy “for the re mainder of the term.” Id. § 3-6A-01(f)(1). But neither of those responsibili ties provides the Council with any supervisory authority over a public schoolteacher, or with the ability to hire, fire, discipline, or set the salary of such a teacher. The Council’s role is simply too remote from the position of any individual teacher to violate the d octrine of incompatibility. 13 Nor does any inherent incompatibility arise from th e possibility that a public schoolteacher might favor policy decisions that enh ance education in the County or provide additional funding for it, any more than a similar possibility that a business owner might favor policy decisions that enhance the business cl imate in the County or provide for additional spending on infrastructure that might be nefit that individual’s business. The doctrine of incompatible positions precludes servic e in roles that are specifically incompatible, such as the roles at issue in Hetrich and Lilly . It does not preclude service by individuals who might benefit generally or indir ectly from the roles they fulfill. Indeed, by making residency in one’s Council district a qua lification for election, the Charter ensures the election of Council members who will be able to benefit generally from the Council’s decisions.

13 We offer no opinion concerning whether any applica ble code of ethics would require Mr. Bennett to recuse himself from voting o n any individual issue that may come before the Council during his tenure.34 CONCLUSION In summary, we hold that Mr. Bennett was not barred by (1) Section 207 of the Harford County Charter or (2) the doctrine of incom patibility, from serving as a member of the Harford County Council while simultaneously employed as a teacher by the Harford County Board of Education. For that reason, we rev ersed the declaratory judgment and order issued by the Circuit Court for Harford Count y entered on February 15, 2023 and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of : (1) a declaratory judgment that Mr. Bennett is qualified to serve as a member of th e Harford County Council while being employed as a teacher by the Harford County Board o f Education; and (2) any injunctive relief that may be necessary and appropriate to imp lement and enforce that declaratory relief.Circuit Court for Harford County

Case No. C-12-CV-22-000857 Argued: April 4, 2023 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND*
No. 38 September Term, 2022

__________________________________

JACOB BENNETT

v. HARFORD COUNTY, MARYLAND

__________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves,
JJ.

__________________________________ Dissenting Opinion by Gould, J.

__________________________________ Filed: August 30, 2023

* During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the C ourt of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on Decemb er 14, 2022.The Majority Opinion reaches two conclusions. First , that the Harford County

Charter (“Charter”) section 207 does not preclude M r. Bennett from serving on the Harford County Council (“Council”) because, under the circu mstances here, his employer, the Harford County Board of Education (“Board”), lacks the character or qualities of either a State or County government. Second , that the doctrine of incompatible positions does not preclude Mr. Bennett from serving as both a schoolt eacher and a Council member simultaneously. I respectfully disagree with both conclusions.

The Plain Language of Charter Section 207 Section 207 of the Charter provides: “During the t erm of office, the Council member shall not hold any other office of profit or employ ment in the government of the State of Maryland, Harford County, or any municipality withi n Harford County, except a position held by virtue of being a Council member.” In construing section 207, the Majority focuses on the identity of the entity that employs Mr. Bennett, stating that section 207 “proh ibits an individual from serving as a Council member if, among other things, the individu al is employed by the State of Maryland or the County .” Maj. slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). From that premise, the Majority surveys caselaw that addresses whether cer tain state statutes treat local boards of education as State or County governmental entities. See Donlon v. Montgomery Cnty. Pub. Schs. , 460 Md. 62 (2018) (holding county boards of educa tion are state governmental entities for purposes of Maryland’s Whistleblower P rotection Law, Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. §§ 5-301–5-314 (1993, Repl. Vol. 2015 )); Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 419 Md. 194 (2011) (holding county boards of educ ation are state2

governmental entities for purposes of sovereign imm unity under Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-201 (2014, Repl. Vol. 2021)); Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 358 Md. 129 (2000) (county boards of education ar e not state governmental entities for purposes of the General Procurement La w, Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. §§ 11-101(x), 11-202 (1985, Repl. Vol. 2021)). Res pectfully, whether a particular State statute—which reflects only the intent of the Gener al Assembly—applies to a local board of education tells us little about the meaning and intent behind section 207 of the Charter. In my view, the Majority misconstrues section 207. Section 207 requires us to ask whether Mr. Bennett holds “employment in the government of the State of Maryland, Harford County, or any municipality within Harford County,” (emphasis added), not which entity serves as his official employer. As a teach er in the County public school system, Mr. Bennett clearly holds employment in either the State or County government. That the Board—a creature of State statute that can be viewe d as either a State or County entity depending on the circumstances—cuts Mr. Bennett’s p aycheck is beside the point. Furnishing a free, public education system is a pri mary function of this State’s government. Article VIII, Section 1 of the Marylan d Constitution provides: “The General Assembly, at its First Session after the adoption o f this Constitution, shall by Law establish throughout the State a thorough and efficient Syste m of Free Public Schools; and shall provide by taxation, or otherwise, for their mainte nance.” The General Assembly carried out this mandate by enacting the statutes contained in the Education Article. This Court has previously described the constitutional and sta tutory framework as establishing a “shared responsibility between State and local gove rnments for public school education3

and emphasizing the need for a measure of local con trol and initiative.” Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of Educ. , 295 Md. 597, 630 (1983). Importantly, when we ma de that statement, we relied on sources that predated the 1 972 adoption of the Charter. Id . & n.9 (citing Green Comm’n, Report of Maryland Commission to Re-Study and Re-Evaluate the Philosophy and Practices of the Finances of the Pub lic Schools (1962); Hughes Comm’n, Report of Senate Committee on Taxation and Fiscal M atters (1963); and Hughes Comm’n, Report of the Commission to Study the State's Role in Financing Public Education (1971)). The framers of the Charter presumably understood th e shared responsibility between the governments of the County and the State in providin g for and funding Harford County public schools. The Charter’s various provisions s hould be construed in that light. As a teacher in Harford County’s public school syst em, Mr. Bennett is on the frontlines in executing a specific governmental fun ction for which both the State and County governments share responsibility. That the General Assembly chose to implement its constitutional mandate by creating local boards of education that serve as the official employers of public school teachers does not obscur e the governmental nature of Mr. Bennett’s job as a teacher. The General Assembly c ould change the structure of the public school system at any time, but Mr. Bennett’s role a s a teacher in the governmentestablished and government-funded school system wou ld remain unchanged. One way or the other, Mr. Bennett is employed “in” either the State or County government. The Majority’s exercise in characterizing the nature of the entity that formally employs Mr. Bennett—which is merely an instrument devised by th e General Assembly to implement its constitutional mandate—misses the forest for th e trees.4 Charter Section 502 The Charter certainly treats Mr. Bennett as a Count y employee. Section 502 provides a list of “[d]efinition[s] of terms used i n this article.” There, “County” or “County government” is defined to “include all agencies and their officers, agents, and employees who receive or disburse County funds.” Charter § 5 02(a). It then defines “County funds” as “any monies appropriated or approved by the Coun cil or to which the County may at any time have legal or equitable title.” Charter § 502(b). The Majority acknowledges that “[a]s a recipient of County funds, the Board falls squarely within [section 502’s definition of County government],” but dismisses the relevance of that provision to section 207 because of “both (1) the express limitation on the scope of that definition to the provisions of A rticle V and (2) the much different scope of County government agencies identified in Article IV.” Maj. slip. op. at 23. I respectfully disagree with the Majority on both fronts.
First , nothing in section 502 can be properly characteri zed as an “express limitation on the scope” of the definitions set forth therein. The language on which the Majority relies is found exclusively in the title of section 502, which reads in full: “Section 502. Definition of terms used in this article.” That la nguage does not constitute an “express limitation on the scope” of section 502’s definitio ns. Rather, that language, combined with the definitions that follow in section 502, provide s the reader with interpretive tools to make sense out of words and phrases that are repeat edly used in Article V, which is entitled “Budget and Finance.” Relevant here, “County” or “ County government” is used 65 times5

in the subsequent provisions of Article V. So, it makes sense that the framers saw fit to define those words in that Article. But that doesn’t render irrelevant such definitions for the purposes of section 207. To the contrary, the sweeping breadth of section 50 2’s definition of “County” or “County government” to include any entity or person who rec eives any funding from the County is entirely consistent with the sweeping breadth of se ction 207’s prohibition of Council members from holding “ any other office of profit or employment in the government of the State of Maryland, Harford County, or any municipal ity within Harford County[.]” (emphasis added). Absent express language in eithe r section 207 or section 502 requiring otherwise, these sections of the Charter should be construed in harmony, which means that employment “in” County government under section 207 would include any person considered a County employee under section 502. See O’Connor v. Baltimore County , 382 Md. 102, 113 (2004) (“Local ordinances and charters are interpreted under the same canons of construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes.”); Moore v. RealPage Util. Mgmt., Inc. , 476 Md. 501, 512 (2021) (“The Court presumes that the Legislature intends its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, therefore, attempts to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute’s object and scope.” (i nternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Johnson , 415 Md. 413, 421–22 (2010)). Second , the Majority’s reliance on Article IV is misplace d. Starting from the premise that the Board is an agency, the Majority n otes that section 401 places all agencies of the County government under the control of the C ounty Executive. Thus, according to6

the Majority, if the Board is intended by the Chart er to be a County agency, one would expect to find the Board on the list of the agencie s under executive branch control. The Majority notes that the list of such agencies is fo und in section 402, and the Board is not on it. The Majority reasons that this indicates th at the framers did not intend for the Board to be considered a County agency. The Majority see s this tension between sections 401 and 402—which don’t

include the Board as part of the County government —with the definition of County government in section 502—whic h does include the Board—as an indication that the definitions in section 502 were meant to be cabined to Article V, and not applicable elsewhere in the Charter. The problem with the Majority’s reasoning is that i t doesn’t give meaning to the prefatory words of section 401, which provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Charter or in state law, all agencies of the County government shall be subject to the direction, supervision, and control of the County E xecutive.” The phrase “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Charter or in state law” is critical. It means that, if provided elsewhere in the Charter or otherwise in State law, an agency can be part of the County government even if it is not under the control of the executive branch. And, i n section 502, the Charter does otherwise provide that the Board is part of the Co unty government and that a teacher is employed in the County government . Thus, by the plain language of section 401, any tension between section 401 and se ction 502 is resolved in favor of the latter. Sections 401 and 402 are not, therefore, i mpediments to construing sections 207 and 502 together.7

In sum, when section 207 is read in conjunction wit h section 502, Mr. Bennett’s status as a teacher means that he holds employment in the County government and is thus ineligible to serve as a member of the Council. I would hold, therefore, that so long as Mr. Bennett remains employed as a teacher in the County public school system, he is ineligible to serve as a Council member. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court’s judgment on that basis. The Doctrine of Incompatible Positions The Majority correctly states: Under [the doctrine of incompatible positions], an individual cannot simultaneously hold two offices that are incompatib le with each other. . . . “The fundamental test of incompatibility . . . is w hether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest, as where one offi ce is subordinate to the other or subject to supervision by the other, or where th e incumbent of one office has the power to appoint or remove or to set the sa lary of the other.” . . . Incompatibility is determined by “the character and relation of the offices,” . . . and “whether there is a present or prospective conflict of interest[.]” . . . If an officer accepts two offices that are incompat ible with each other, the officer generally must vacate the first one the off icer accepted. Maj. slip op. at 29-30 (internal citations omitted)

. In my view, the positions of teacher and Council me mber meet this test of incompatibility. As the Majority acknowledges, the Board wields considerable power in appointing, removing, and setting the salaries of t eachers. The Board also has considerable input in setting the Board’s budget. The Council, in turn, has a significant role in choosing the members of the Board. Indeed, the Council has veto authority over three of the nine Board members appointed by the County Executive. M d. Code Ann., Educ. § 3-6A-01(d)(1)(ii) (2008, 2022 Repl. Vol.). Presu mably, the General Assembly8

determined that such veto authority would have a me aningful impact on the constitution of the Board. Because a teacher’s salary and working conditions a re determined in large part by the Board, and the Council plays a material role in the selection of the Board members, it seems obvious that the position of Council member i s incompatible with the position of a teacher. Think of it this way: if each Council mem ber were a teacher in a County public school, those teachers would have a significant rol e in selecting the teachers’ negotiating counterparts in setting teacher compensation. The potential for a conflict of interest is, in my view, readily apparent. As such, I would affirm the circuit court on that basis as well. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.