United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

DEFENSE TRAVEL 

SYSTEM 

Estimated Savings Are 

Questionable and 

Improvements Are Needed 

to Ensure Functionality and 

Increase Utilization 

Statement of McCoy Williams, Director 

Financial Management and Assurance 

Keith A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist 

Applied Research and Methods 

Center for Technology and Engineering 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST 

Thursday, November 16, 2006 

 

GAO-07-208T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 16, 2006

DEFENSE TRAVEL SYSTEM 

Estimated Savings Are Questionable and 

Improvements Are Needed to Ensure 

Functionality and Increase Utilization 

Highlights of GAO-07-208T, a testimony to 

the Permanent Subcommittee on

Investigations, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate 

In 1995, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) began an effort to

implement a standard 

departmentwide travel system. The 

Defense Travel System (DTS) is

envisioned as DOD’s standard endto-end travel system. This 

testimony is based on GAO’s 

September 2006 related report. 

Today’s testimony highlights GAO’s

key findings with regard to the 

following objectives: (1) Were the 

two key assumptions made in the

September 2003 economic analysis

reasonable? (2) Was DOD taking

action to ensure full utilization of 

DTS and gathering the data needed

to monitor DTS utilization? and 

(3) Has DOD resolved several

functional problems associated

with weak system requirements 

and testing? To address these 

objectives, GAO (1) reviewed the 

September 2003 DTS economic

analysis, (2) analyzed DTS 

utilization data, and (3) analyzed

DTS flight information. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO made four recommendations 

aimed at improving the 

management of DTS, including 

periodic reports on DTS utilization

and resolution of inconsistencies in 

DTS’s requirements. DOD

generally agreed with the 

recommendations and described

efforts to address them. DOD also 

strongly objected to the finding

that the reported personnel savings 

were unrealistic. However, DOD

provided no new data that were

counter to GAO’s findings.

GAO’s analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that the 

two key assumptions used to estimate annual net savings were not based on 

reliable information. Two cost components represent the majority of the 

over $56 million in estimated net savings------personnel savings and reduced 

commercial travel office (CTO) fees. In regard to the personnel savings, 

GAO’s analysis found that the $24.2 million of personnel savings related to 

the Air Force and the Navy were not supported. 

• Air Force and Navy DTS program officials stated that they did not 

anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel, but rather the shifting 

of staff from the travel function to other functions. 

• The Naval Cost Analysis Division stated that the Navy will not realize any

tangible personnel cost savings from the implementation of DTS. 

In regard to the CTO fees, the economic analysis assumed that 70 percent of 

all DTS airline tickets would either require no intervention or minimal 

intervention from the CTOs, resulting in an estimated annual net savings of 

$31 million. However, the sole support provided by the DTS program office 

was an article in a trade industry publication. The article was not based on 

information related to DTS, but rather on the experience of one private 

sector company. Furthermore, the economic analysis was not prepared in 

accordance with guidance prescribed by OMB and DOD. 

• DOD guidance stated that the life-cycle cost estimates should be verified 

by an independent party, but this did not occur. 

• The economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of 

the uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs. Because 

an economic analysis uses estimates and assumptions, it is critical that 

the imprecision in both the underlying data and assumptions be 

understood. Such an assessment is referred to as a sensitivity analysis. 

DOD acknowledged that DTS is not being used to the fullest extent possible, 

but lacks comprehensive data to effectively monitor its utilization. DOD’s 

utilization data are based on a model that was developed in calendar year 

2003. However, the model has not been completely updated to reflect actual 

DTS usage. The lack of accurate utilization data hinders management’s 

ability to monitor progress toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard 

travel system. GAO also found that the military services have initiated 

actions that are aimed at increasing the utilization of DTS. 

Finally, GAO found that DTS still has not addressed the underlying problems 

associated with weak requirements management and system testing. While 

DOD has acted to address concerns GAO previously raised, GAO found that 

DTS’s requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting. For example, DTS 

displaying up to 25 flights for each inquiry is questionable because it is

unclear whether this is a valid requirement. Until DOD improves DTS’s 

requirements management practices, the department will not have 

reasonable assurance that DTS can provide the intended functionality. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-208T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-9095 or Keith Rhodes 

at (202) 512-6412. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our recent report1

 related to 

problems encountered by the Department of Defense (DOD) in its efforts 

to successfully implement the Defense Travel System (DTS). As you know, 

DOD envisions DTS as the department’s standard end-to-end travel 

system.2

 The department estimates that DTS will be fully deployed at all 

11,000 intended locations during fiscal year 2007.3

 The September 2003 

economic analysis noted that DTS, when fully implemented, would result 

in annual net savings of over $56 million. The economic analysis noted that 

savings would be realized by the department during fiscal years 2009–2016. 

In December 2003, the department’s Chief Information Officer approved a 

DTS funding level of approximately $564 million. Of this amount, the 

contract for the design, development, and deployment of DTS was for 

about $264 million. The remaining costs are associated with areas such as 

the operation and maintenance of DTS, operation of the Program 

Management Office-Defense Travel System (PMO-DTS), the voucher 

payment process, and management and oversight of the numerous 

contracted commercial travel offices (CTO). 

My testimony today is based on our September 2006 report,4 which 

followed up on our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report.5

One of the major findings in our previous work was that DOD did not have 

 1

GAO, Defense Travel System: Reported Savings Questionable and Implementation 

Challenges Remain, GAO-06-980 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2006).

2

DOD expects DTS to perform all functions related to travel or ensure that other systems 

are provided with adequate information to provide this functionality. For example, 

obligating funds associated with travel is a necessary function, and DTS is expected to 

(1) make sure that adequate funds are available before authorizing travel either through 

information contained in its system or by obtaining the necessary information from another 

system, (2) obligate funds through issuance of approved travel orders, and (3) provide

DOD’s financial management systems with the necessary information so that those systems 

can record the obligation. Since DTS is required to ensure that all travel-related 

functionality is properly performed, DOD commonly refers to DTS as an “end-to-end travel 

system.” 

3

As of September 2005, the department had estimated that DTS would be fully deployed 

during fiscal year 2006. 

4

GAO-06-980. 

5

GAO, DOD Business Transformation: Defense Travel System Continues to Face 

Implementation Challenges, GAO-06-18 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2006), and DOD 

Business Transformation: Preliminary Observations on the Defense Travel System, 

GAO-05-998T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-07-208T 
reasonable assurance that flight information was properly displayed for 

DOD travelers because the department failed to properly test the system 

interfaces through which the data are accessed for display. We further 

noted that the continued use of the existing legacy travel systems at 

locations where DTS has been deployed results in underutilization of DTS 

and reduces the envisioned savings. 

Today, I will highlight three key findings from our September 2006 report:

• Two key assumptions related to the estimated cost savings in the 

September 2003 DTS economic analysis were not reasonable. DOD 

strongly objected to this finding, and I will discuss why we continue to 

believe that our finding is accurate. 

• The department did not have quantitative metrics to measure the extent to

which DTS is actually being used. 

• DOD still has not addressed several functional problems associated with 

weak requirements management and system testing. 

Finally, I will discuss our recommendations to improve the department’s 

management and oversight of DTS. 

Our work focused on the validity of the assumptions that were the 

principal drivers of DOD’s net annual estimated savings of over 

$56 million. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for this

purpose. We did not review the accuracy and reliability of the specific 

dollar amounts shown in the September 2003 economic analysis. To 

address our objectives we also (1) reviewed the September 2003 economic 

analysis and met with cognizant officials, (2) analyzed DTS utilization data 

and obtained an overview of the method and data used by DTS program 

officials to report the rate of DTS utilization for the various DOD 

components, and (3) analyzed DTS flight information. Our work was 

performed from October 2005 through July 2006 in accordance with U.S. 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Further details on our 

scope and methodology are included in our September 2006 report.6

 6

GAO-06-980. 

Page 2 GAO-07-208T 
Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two 

key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable 

information. Two primary areas represented the majority of the over 

$56 million of estimated annual net savings DTS was expected to realize—

personnel savings of $24.2 million and reduced CTO fees of $31 million. 

The $24.2 million estimated annual personnel savings were attributed to 

the Air Force and Navy.

7

 However, Air Force and Navy DTS officials stated

that they did not anticipate a reduction in the number of personnel with 

the full implementation of DTS, but rather the shifting of staff to other 

functions. Further, the Naval Cost Analysis Division has stated that the

Navy will not realize any tangible personnel cost savings from the 

implementation of DTS. In written comments on a draft of our report, the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), strongly objected 

to our finding that the estimated personnel savings are unrealistic and 

stated that recognizing fiscal constraints, the department continues to 

identify efficiencies and eliminate redundancies to help leverage available 

funds. As noted in our report, DOD officials responsible for reviewing 

economic analyses stated that while shifting personnel to other functions 

is considered a benefit, it should be considered an intangible benefit rather 

than tangible dollar savings since the shifting of personnel does not result 

in a reduction of DOD expenditures. Because none of the military services 

could validate an actual reduction in the number of personnel as a result 

of DTS implementation, and DOD’s comments did not include any 

additional support or documentation for its position, we continue to 

believe that the estimated annual personnel savings of $54.1 million are 

unrealistic. 

In regard to the estimated annual savings of $31 million attributed to lower 

CTO fees, we requested, but the PMO-DTS could not provide, any analysis 

of travel data to support the assumption that 70 percent of all airline 

tickets would be considered “no touch”—meaning that there would be no

or minimal intervention by the CTO, thereby resulting in lower CTO fees. 

We found that the 70 percent assumption was based solely upon an article 

that appeared in a travel industry trade publication. Further, the economic

analysis assumed that the Navy would save about $7.5 million, almost 25 

percent, of the total savings related to CTO fees once DTS is fully 

deployed. Again, this figure was based on a reduction in the fees the Navy 

would pay for “no touch” transactions. However, the Navy paid a flat

Summary 

 7

The economic analysis identified annual savings of $11.3 million and $12.9 million for the 

Air Force and Navy, respectively. 

Page 3 GAO-07-208T 
management fee that was the same regardless of the involvement of the 

CTO—therefore, the reduced “no touch” fee would not apply.

In addition, the economic analysis was not prepared in accordance with 

guidance prescribed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and 

DOD. Both sets of guidance require that an economic analysis be based on 

facts and data and be explicit about the underlying assumptions used to 

arrive at future benefits and costs. DOD guidance also states that life-cycle 

cost estimates should be independently validated. An independent review 

is intended, in part, to provide program management some degree of 

assurance that the life-cycle cost estimates are reasonable and the cost 

estimates are built on realistic program assumptions. However, an 

independent validation was not performed. 

Our analysis also found that the department did not have quantitative 

metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used. The 

reported DTS utilization rates were based on a methodology that was 

developed using estimated data, and PMO-DTS program officials 

acknowledged that the model had not been completely updated with 

actual data as DTS continued to be implemented at the 11,000 sites. As a 

result, the PMO-DTS continues to rely on outdated information in 

calculating DTS utilization rates that are reported to DOD management 

and the Congress. Additionally, while the military services have initiated 

actions to help increase the utilization of DTS, they pointed out that 

ineffective DTS training is a contributing factor to the lower than expected 

usage rate by the military services. 

Finally, DOD still has not addressed several functional problems 

associated with weak requirements management and system testing. 

Requirements represent the blueprint that system developers and program 

managers use to design, develop, test, and implement a system. Because 

requirements provide the foundation for system testing, they must be 

complete, clear, and well documented to design and implement an 

effective testing program. Adequately defined and tested requirements are 

one of the key elements to help reduce a project’s risks to acceptable

levels.8

 Our February 2006 analysis disclosed that DOD still did not have 

 8

Acceptable levels refer to the fact that any systems acquisition effort will have risks and 

will suffer the adverse consequences associated with defects in the processes. However, 

effective implementation of disciplined processes, which includes project planning and 

management, requirements management, risk management, quality assurance, and testing, 

reduces the possibility of the potential risks actually occurring and prevents significant 

defects from materially affecting the cost, timeliness, and performance of the project. 

Page 4 GAO-07-208T 
reasonable assurance that the flight information was being properly 

displayed to DOD travelers. We identified 246 unique GSA city pair flights 

that should have been identified on one or more DTS flight displays 

according to the DOD requirements. However, 87 of these flights did not 

appear on one or more of the required listings. While the PMO-DTS has 

taken action to address our concerns, these actions do not fully address 

the fundamental problems we found during this audit and on which we 

have previously reported.9

 For example, the DTS requirements we 

reviewed were still ambiguous and conflicting. 

Our September 2006 report includes four recommendations to the 

Secretary of Defense aimed at improving the department’s management 

and oversight of DTS. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense 

(1) evaluate the cost effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the CTO 

management fee structure, (2) update the DTS Voucher Analysis Model to 

report DTS actual utilization rates, (3) require the PMO-DTS to provide 

periodic reports on the utilization of DTS, and (4) resolve inconsistencies 

in DTS requirements. DOD generally agreed with the recommendations 

and described its efforts to address them. 

In September 2003, DOD finalized its economic analysis for DTS in 

preparation for a milestone decision review.10 The highlights of the 

economic analysis are shown in table 1. In December 2003, the DOD Chief 

Information Officer granted approval for DTS to proceed with full 

implementation throughout the department. 

Validity of DTS 

Economic Analysis 

Questionable 

 9

GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

10The September 2003 economic analysis is an addendum to the July 2003 DTS economic 

analysis. 

Page 5 GAO-07-208T 
Table 1: Summary of DTS Estimated Annual Net Savings Reported in the September 

2003 Economic Analysis

Constant fiscal year 2003 dollars in millions 

Cost components Estimated annual net savings

Records management $19.8

Centrally billed accounts 1.7

CTO acquisition and administration 2.4

CTO services 31.0

Voucher process and compute 54.1

Voucher pay 0

Legacy systems 14.5

PMO (8.8)

Help desk/DTA (36.8)

System operations (21.5)

Total net savings $56.4

Source: September 2003 economic analysis provided by the PMO-DTS. 

Note: In arriving at the estimated annual net savings of over $56 million, the economic analysis took

into consideration the estimated costs of over $2.1 billion, which covers fiscal years 2003-2016. The 

estimated costs included the costs that are estimated to be incurred by the PMO-DTS, the Army, the 

Navy, the Air Force, and the defense agencies. 

Our analysis of the September 2003 DTS economic analysis found that two 

key assumptions used to estimate cost savings were not based on reliable 

information. Consequently, the economic analysis did not serve to help

ensure that the funds invested in DTS were used in an efficient and 

effective manner. Two primary areas—personnel savings and reduced 

CTO fees—represented the majority of the over $56 million of estimated 

annual net savings DTS was expected to realize. However, the estimates 

used to generate these savings were unreliable. Further, DOD did not 

effectively implement the policies relating to developing economic 

analyses for programs such as DTS. Effective implementation of these 

policies should have highlighted the problems that we found and allowed 

for appropriate adjustments so that the economic analysis could have 

served as a useful management tool in making funding decisions related to

DTS—which is the primary purpose of this analysis. While the 

department’s system acquisition criteria do not require that a new 

economic analysis be prepared, the department’s business system 

investment management structure provides an opportunity for DOD 

management to assess whether DTS is meeting its planned cost, schedule, 

and functionality goals. 

Page 6 GAO-07-208T 
The economic analysis estimated that the annual personnel savings was 

over $54 million,11 as shown in table 2. 

Table 2: Summary of Estimated Annual Personnel Savings 

Personnel Savings Are 

Unrealistic 

Constant fiscal year 2003 dollars in millions 

DOD component Estimated annual savings

Army $16.0

Navy 12.9

Air Force 11.3

Marine Corps 5.8

Defense agencies 6.3

Permanent change of station 1.8

Total savings $54.1

Source: September 2003 economic analysis provided by the PMO-DTS. 

As shown in table 2, approximately 45 percent of the estimated savings, or

$24.2 million, was attributable to the Air Force and Navy. The assumption 

behind the personnel savings computation was that there would be less 

manual intervention in the processing of travel vouchers for payment, and

therefore fewer staff would be needed. However, based on our discussions 

with Air Force and Navy DTS program officials, it is questionable as to 

how the estimated savings will be achieved. Air Force and Navy DTS 

program officials stated that they did not anticipate a reduction in the 

number of personnel with the full implementation of DTS, but rather the 

shifting of staff to other functions. According to DOD officials responsible 

for reviewing economic analyses, while shifting personnel to other 

functions is considered a benefit, it should be considered an intangible 

benefit rather than tangible dollar savings since the shifting of personnel 

does not result in a reduction of DOD expenditures. Also, as part of the 

Navy’s overall evaluation of the economic analysis, program officials 

stated that “the Navy has not identified, and conceivably will not 

recommend, any personnel billets for reduction.” Finally, the Naval Cost 

Analysis Division (NCAD) October 2003 report on the economic analysis 

noted that it could not validate approximately 40 percent of the Navy’s 

total costs, including personnel costs, in the DTS life-cycle cost estimates 

because credible supporting documentation was lacking. The report also 

 11During fiscal years 2009 through 2016. 

Page 7 GAO-07-208T 
noted that the PMO-DTS used unsound methodologies in preparing the 

DTS economic analysis. 

The extent of personnel savings for the Army and defense agencies, which

are reported as $16 million and $6.3 million respectively, is also unclear. 

The Army and many defense agencies use the Defense Finance and

Accounting Service (DFAS) to process their travel vouchers, so the 

personnel savings for the Army and the defense agencies were primarily 

related to reductions in DFAS’s costs. In discussions with DFAS officials, 

they were unable to estimate the actual personnel savings that would 

result since they did not know (1) the number of personnel, like those at 

the Air Force and Navy, that would simply be transferred to other DFAS 

functions or (2) the number of personnel that could be used to avoid 

additional hiring. For example, DFAS expects that some of the individuals 

assigned to support the travel function could be moved to support its 

ePayroll program. Since these positions would need to be filled regardless 

of whether the travel function is reduced, transferring personnel from 

travel to ePayroll would reduce DOD’s overall costs since DFAS would not 

have to hire additional individuals. 

DOD strongly objected to our finding that the personnel savings are 

unrealistic. In its written comments, the department stated that it is facing 

an enormous challenge and continues to identify efficiencies and eliminate 

redundancies to help leverage available funds. We fully recognize that the 

department is attempting to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its 

business operations. The Comptroller General of the United States 

testified in August 2006 that increased commitment by the department to 

address DOD’s numerous challenges represents an improvement over past 

efforts.12

The fact remains, however, that the results of an economic analysis are 

intended to help management decide if future investments in a given 

endeavor are worthwhile. In order to provide management with this 

information, it is imperative that the underlying assumptions in an 

economic analysis be supported by valid assumptions. The September 

2003 economic analysis noted that personnel savings of $54.1 million 

would be realized by the department annually for fiscal years 2009 through 

 12GAO, Department of Defense: Sustained Leadership Is Critical to Effective Financial 

and Business Management Transformation, GAO-06-1006T (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 3,

2006). 

Page 8 GAO-07-208T 
2016. However, based on our review and analysis of documentation and 

discussion with department personnel, we found that the underlying 

assumptions in support of the $54.1 million were not valid, particularly in 

regard to the amounts estimated for the Navy and Air Force. For example, 

we agree with the statements of DOD officials who indicated that the 

shifting of personnel to other functions cannot be counted towards 

tangible dollar savings, since such actions do not result in a reduction of 

DOD expenditures. Moreover, the department did not provide any new 

data or related documentation in its comments that were counter to our 

finding. As a result of these factors, we continue to believe that the 

estimated annual personnel savings of $54.1 million are unrealistic. 

According to the September 2003 economic analysis, DOD expected to 

realize annual net savings of $31 million through reduced fees paid to the 

CTOs because the successful implementation of DTS would enable the 

majority of airline tickets to be acquired with either no or minimal 

intervention by the CTOs. These are commonly referred to as “no touch” 

transactions. However, DOD did not have a sufficient basis to estimate the 

number of transactions that would be considered “no touch” since the 

(1) estimated percentage of transactions that can be processed using the 

“no touch” was not supported and (2) analysis did not properly consider 

the effects of components that use management fees, rather than 

transaction fees, to compensate the CTOs for services provided. The 

weaknesses we identified with the estimating process raise serious 

questions as to whether DOD will realize substantial portions of the 

estimated annual net savings of $31 million. 

DOD arrived at the $31 million of annual savings in CTO fees by estimating 

that 70 percent of all DTS airline tickets would be considered “no touch” 

and then multiplying these tickets by the savings per ticket in CTO fees. 

However, a fundamental flaw in this analysis was that the 70 percent 

assumption had no solid basis. We requested, but the PMO-DTS could not

provide, any analysis of travel data to support the assertion. Rather, the 

sole support provided by the PMO-DTS was an article in a travel industry 

trade publication.13 The article was not based on information related to 

DTS, but rather on the experience of one private sector company. 

Savings Associated with 

Reduction of CTO Fees 

Are Unknown 

“No Touch” Transaction 

Volume Estimates Are Not 

Supported 

 13American Express News Releases: American Express’ Interactive Travel Update, (New

York, N.Y.: Aug. 11, 2003), http://corp.americanexpress.com/gcs/cards/us/ni/pr/081303.aspx. 

Page 9 GAO-07-208T 
The economic analysis assumed that DOD could save about $13.50 per “no 

touch” ticket. Since that analysis, DOD has awarded one contract that 

specifically prices transactions using the same model as that envisioned by 

the economic analysis. This contract applies to the Defense Travel Region 

6 travel area.

14 During calendar year 2005, the difference in fees for “no 

touch” transactions and the transactions supported by the current process 

averaged between $10 and $12, depending on when the fees were incurred 

because the contract rates changed during 2005.15 In analyzing travel 

voucher data for Region 6 for calendar year 2005, we found that the 

reported “no touch” rate was, at best 47 percent—far less than the 70

percent envisioned in the economic analysis. 

PMO-DTS program officials stated they are uncertain as to why the 

anticipated 70 percent “no touch” was not being achieved. According to 

PMO-DTS program officials, this could be attributed, in part, to the DOD 

travelers being uncomfortable with the system and with making 

reservations without using a CTO. Although this may be one reason, other 

factors may also affect the expected “no touch” fee. For example, we were 

informed that determining the airline availability and making the 

associated reservation can be accomplished, in most cases, rather easily. 

However, obtaining information related to hotels and rental cars and 

making the associated reservation can be more problematic because of the 

limitations in the data that DTS is able to obtain from its commercial 

sources. Accordingly, while a traveler may be able to make a “no touch” 

reservation for the airline portion of the trip, the individual may need to 

contact the CTO in order to make hotel or rental car reservations. When 

this occurs, rather than paying a “no touch” fee to the CTO, DOD ends up

paying a higher fee, which eliminates the savings estimated in the 

economic analysis. 

 14Defense Travel Region 6 includes the Air Force and defense agencies in the states of 

Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, 

South Dakota, and Wisconsin. The contract also applies to Army activities in 8 of the 11

states (excluding Kentucky, Missouri, and Nebraska). As discussed later, the Navy uses a 

management fee contract, and is therefore not included in the Defense Travel Region 6

contract. 

15According to DTS officials, these savings are consistent with the DTS contracts that have

been awarded to small businesses. The average savings per “no touch” ticket under these 

contracts is about $12.88. Because the contractors are paid these fees directly by the

traveler, they are unable to determine the percentage of transactions that are actually paid 

using the “no touch” rate. 

Page 10 GAO-07-208T 
The economic analysis assumed that (1) DOD would be able to modify the 

existing CTO contracts to achieve a substantial reduction in fees paid to a 

CTO when DTS was fully implemented across the department and (2) all 

services would use the fee structure called for in the new CTO contracts. 

The first part of the assumption is supported by results of the CTO 

contract for DOD Region 6 travel. The fees for the DTS “no touch” 

transactions were at least $10 less than if a CTO was involved in the 

transactions. However, to date, the department has experienced difficulty

in awarding new contracts with the lower fee structure. On May 10, 2006, 

the department announced the cancellation of the solicitation for a new 

contract. According to the department, it decided that the solicitation 

needed to be rewritten based on feedback from travel industry 

representatives at a March 28, 2006, conference. The department 

acknowledged that the “DTS office realized its solicitation didn’t reflect 

what travel agency services it actually needed.”16 The department would 

not say how the solicitation would be refined, citing the sensitivity of the 

procurement process. The department also noted that the new solicitation 

would be released soon, but provided no specific date. 

The economic analysis assumed that the Navy would save about $7.5 

million, almost 25 percent, of the total savings related to CTO fees once 

DTS is fully deployed. The economic analysis averaged the CTO fees paid

by the Army, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps—which amounted to 

about $18.71 per transaction—to compute the savings in Navy CTO fees. 

Using these data, the assumption was made in the economic analysis that

a fee of $5.25 would be assessed for each ticket, resulting in an average 

savings of $13.46 per ticket for the Navy ($18.71 minus $5.25).17 While this 

approach may be valid for the organizations that pay individual CTO fees, 

it may not be representative for organizations such as the Navy that pay a

management fee. The management fee charged the Navy is the same 

regardless of the involvement of the CTO—therefore, the reduced “no 

touch” fee would not apply. 

We were informed by Navy DTS program officials that they were 

considering continuing the use of management fees after DTS is fully 

implemented. According to Navy DTS program officials, they paid about 

$14.5 million during fiscal year 2005 for CTO management fees, almost $19 

Navy Impact of CTO 

Management Fees Not 

Adequately Considered 

 16“DOD Retracts Solicitation for Travel Agency Services,” FederalTimes.com (May 16, 

2006), http://www.federaltimes.com/index.php? (downloaded June 14, 2006). 

17These savings translate to about 572,000 tickets annually. 

Page 11 GAO-07-208T 
per ticket for approximately 762,700 tickets issued. Accordingly, even if 

the department arrives at a new CTO contract containing the new fee 

structure or fees similar to those of Region 6, the estimated savings related 

to CTO fees for the Navy will not be realized if the Navy continues to use 

the management fee concept. 

Effective implementation of DOD guidance would have detected the types 

of problems discussed above and resulted in an economic analysis that 

would have accomplished the stated objective of the process—to help 

ensure that the funds invested in DTS were used efficiently and effectively. 

DOD policy18 and OMB guidance19 require that an economic analysis be 

based on facts and data and be explicit about the underlying assumptions 

used to arrive at estimates of future benefits and costs. Since an economic 

analysis deals with costs and benefits occurring in the future, assumptions 

must be made to account for uncertainties. DOD policy recognizes this and 

provides a systematic approach to the problem of choosing the best 

method of allocating scarce resources to achieve a given objective. 

A sound economic analysis recognizes that there are alternative ways to 

meet a given objective and that each alternative requires certain resources 

and produces certain results. The purpose of the economic analysis is to 

give the decision maker insight into economic factors bearing on 

accomplishing the objectives. Therefore, it is important to identify factors,

such as cost and performance risks and drivers, that can be used to 

establish and defend priorities and resource allocations. The DTS 

economic analysis did not comply with the DOD policy, and the 

weaknesses we found should have been detected had the DOD policy been 

effectively implemented. The PMO-DTS had adequate warning signs of the 

potential problems associated with not following the OMB and DOD 

guidance for developing an effective economic analysis. For example, as 

noted earlier, the Air Force and Navy provided comments when the 

economic analysis was being developed that the expected benefits being 

claimed were unrealistic. Just removing the benefits associated with 

personnel savings from the Air Force and Navy would have reduced the 

overall estimated program cost savings by almost 45 percent. This would 

have put increased pressure on the credibility of using a 70 percent “no 

touch” utilization rate. 

Effective Implementation 

of Existing Policies Should 

Have Identified Problems 

with the Economic 

Analysis 

 18DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking, November 7, 1995. 

19Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-94, Guidelines and Discount Rates for

Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Revised Jan. 18, 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-07-208T 
Specific examples of failures to effectively implement the DOD policy on 

conducting economic analyses include the (1) DTS life-cycle cost 

estimates portion of the economic analysis was not independently 

validated as specified in DOD’s guidance20 and (2) September 2003 DTS 

economic analysis did not undertake an assessment of the effects of the 

uncertainty inherent in the estimates of benefits and costs, as required by 

DOD and OMB guidance.21 Because an economic analysis uses estimates 

and assumptions, it is critical that a sensitivity analysis22 be performed to 

understand the effects of the imprecision in both underlying data and 

modeling assumptions. 

Our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report23 noted the 

challenge facing the department in attaining the anticipated DTS 

utilization. While DOD has acknowledged the underutilization, we found 

that, across DOD, the department does not have reasonable quantitative 

metrics to measure the extent to which DTS is actually being used. 

Presently, the reported DTS utilization is based on a DTS Voucher Analysis

Model24 that was developed in calendar year 2003 using estimated data, but

over the years has not been completely updated with actual data. While 

the military services have initiated actions to help increase the utilization 

of DTS, they pointed out that ineffective DTS training is a contributing 

factor to the lower than expected usage rate by the military services. 

DTS Remains 

Underutilized by the 

Military Services 

 20Department of Defense Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 

May 12, 2003. 

21Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis of Decisionmaking, (Nov.

7, 1995), and Office of Management and Budget Revised Circular No. A-94, Guidelines and

Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs (Oct. 29, 1992). 

22Sensitivity analysis refers to changing the value of a given variable in a model to gauge the

effect of change on model results. 

23GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

24DOD developed a model in calendar year 2003 that compares the expected usage against 

the actual usage. The expected usage is obtained by using historical data, such as ticket

counts, to determine the expected number of vouchers processed by a given location. For 

example, if a location had 1,000 vouchers as its expected number of vouchers per the

model, but now processes 750 actual vouchers through DTS, then the PMO model 

considers that that location has achieved a 75 percent utilization rate. It then takes the 

individual computations for each DTS location and “rolls them up” to determine the total 

utilization for individual service performance on a monthly basis.

Page 13 GAO-07-208T 
The DTS Voucher Analysis Model was prepared in calendar year 2003 and 

based on airline ticket and voucher count data that were reported by the 

military services and defense agencies, but the data were not verified or 

validated. Furthermore, PMO-DTS officials acknowledged that the model 

has not been completely updated with actual data as DTS continues to be

implemented at the 11,000 sites. We found that the Air Force is the only 

military service that submits monthly metrics to the PMO-DTS officials for 

their use in updating the DTS Voucher Analysis Model. Rather than 

reporting utilization based on individual site system utilization data, the 

PMO-DTS continues to rely on outdated information in the reporting of 

DTS utilization to DOD management and the Congress. We have 

previously reported25 that best business practices indicate that a key factor

of project management and oversight is the ability to effectively monitor 

and evaluate a project’s actual performance against what was planned. 

In order to perform this critical task, best business practices require the 

adoption of quantitative metrics to help measure the effectiveness of a 

business system implementation and to continually measure and monitor 

results, such as system utilization. This lack of accurate and pertinent 

utilization data hinders management’s ability to monitor its progress 

toward the DOD vision of DTS as the standard travel system, as well as to 

provide consistent and accurate data to Congress. With the shift of the 

DTS program to the Business Transformation Agency (BTA),26 which now 

makes DTS an enterprisewide endeavor, improved metrics and training 

are essential if DTS is to be DOD’s standard, integrated, end-to-end travel

system for business travel. 

DTS’s reported utilization rates for the period October 2005 through April 

2006 averaged 53 percent for Army, 30 percent for Navy, and 39 percent 

for Air Force. Because the PMO-DTS was not able to identify the total 

number of travel vouchers that should have been processed through DTS 

Metrics to Measure DTS 

Utilization Are Inadequate 

 25GAO, Financial Management Systems: Additional Efforts Needed to Address Key 

Causes of Modernization Failures, GAO-06-184 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2006), and

Financial Management Systems: Lack of Disciplined Processes Puts Implementation of

HHS’ Financial System at Risk, GAO-04-1008 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2004). 

26In October 2005, DOD established BTA to advance DOD-wide business transformation 

efforts, particularly with regard to business systems modernization. BTA operates under 

the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, who is the vice chair of the Defense Business Systems

Management Committee—which serves as the highest ranking governing body for business 

systems modernization activities. 

Page 14 GAO-07-208T 
(total universe of travel vouchers), these utilization rates may be over- or 

understated. PMO-DTS program officials confirmed that the reported 

utilization data were not based on complete data because the department 

did not have comprehensive information to identify the universe or the 

total number of travel vouchers that should be processed through DTS. 

PMO-DTS program and DTS military service officials agreed that the 

actual DTS utilization rate should be calculated by comparing actual 

vouchers being processed in DTS to the total universe of vouchers that 

should be processed in DTS. The universe would exclude those travel 

vouchers that cannot be processed through DTS, such as those related to

permanent change of station travel. 

The Air Force was the only military service that attempted to obtain data 

on (1) the actual travel vouchers processed through DTS and (2) those 

travel vouchers that were eligible to be processed through DTS, but were 

not. These data were site-specific. For example, during the month of 

December 2005, the PMO-DTS reported that at Wright-Patterson Air Force 

Base, 2,880 travel vouchers were processed by DTS, and the Air Force 

reported that another 2,307 vouchers were processed through the legacy 

system—the Reserve Travel System (RTS). Of those processed through 

RTS, Air Force DTS program officials stated that 338 travel vouchers 

should have been processed through DTS. DTS Air Force program officials 

further stated that they submitted to the PMO-DTS the number of travel 

vouchers processed through RTS each month. These data are used by the 

PMO-DTS to update the DTS Voucher Analysis Model. However, neither 

the Air Force nor the PMO-DTS have verified the accuracy and reliability 

of the data. Therefore, the accuracy of the utilization rates reported for the 

Air Force by the PMO-DTS is not known. 

Because Army and Navy DTS program officials did not have the 

information to identify the travel transactions that should have been 

processed through DTS, the Army and Navy did not have a basis for 

evaluating DTS utilization at their respective military locations and 

activities. Furthermore, Navy DTS program officials indicated that the 

utilization data that the PMO-DTS program officials reported for the Navy 

were not accurate. According to Navy DTS program officials, the Navy’s 

primary source of utilization data was the monthly metrics reports 

provided by the PMO-DTS, but Navy DTS program officials questioned the 

accuracy of the Navy utilization reports provided by the PMO-DTS. 

Page 15 GAO-07-208T 
Although the military services have issued various memorandums aimed at 

increasing the utilization of DTS, the military service DTS program 

officials all pointed to ineffective training as a primary cause of DTS not 

being utilized to a far greater extent. The following examples highlight the 

concerns raised by the military service officials: 

DOD Has Taken Steps to 

Improve DTS Utilization, 

but Further Action Is 

Needed 

• Army DTS program officials emphasized that the DTS system is complex 

and the design presents usability challenges for users—especially for firsttime or infrequent users. They added that a major concern is that there is 

no PMO-DTS training for existing DTS users as new functionality is added 

to DTS. These officials stated that the PMO-DTS does not do a good job of

informing users about functionality changes made to the system. We 

inquired if the Help Desk was able to resolve the users’ problems, and the 

Army DTS officials simply stated “no.” The Army officials further pointed 

out that it would be beneficial if the PMO-DTS improved the electronic

training on the DTS Web site and made the training documentation easier

to understand. Also, improved training would help infrequent users adapt 

to system changes. The Army officials noted that without some of these 

improvements to resolve usability concerns, DTS will continue to be 

extremely frustrating and cumbersome for travelers. 

• Navy DTS program officials stated that DTS lacks adequate user/traveler 

training. The train-the-trainer concept of training system administrators 

who could then effectively train all their travelers has been largely 

unsuccessful. According to Navy officials, this has resulted in many 

travelers and users attempting to use DTS with no or insufficient training. 

The effect has frustrated users at each step of the travel process and has 

discouraged use of DTS. 

• Air Force officials stated that new DTS system releases are implemented 

with known problems, but the sites are not informed of the problems. 

Workarounds are not provided until after the sites begin encountering 

problems. Air Force DTS program officials stated that DTS releases did 

not appear to be well tested prior to implementation. Air Force officials 

also stated that there was insufficient training on new functionality. PMODTS and DTS contractor program officials believed that conference calls 

to discuss new functionality with the sites were acceptable training, but 

Air Force officials did not agree. The Air Force finance office was 

expected to fully comprehend the information received from those 

conference calls and provide training on the new functionality to 

users/approvers, but these officials stated that this was an unrealistic 

expectation.

Page 16 GAO-07-208T 
As discussed in our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report,27

the unnecessary continued use of the legacy travel systems results in the 

inefficient use of funds because the department is paying to operate and

maintain duplicative systems that perform the same function—travel. 

Our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 report noted problems 

with DTS’s ability to properly display flight information and traced those 

problems to inadequate requirements management and testing. DOD 

stated that it had addressed those deficiencies, and in February 2006, we 

again tested the system to determine whether the stated weaknesses had 

been addressed. We found that similar problems continue to exist. Once 

again, these problems can be traced to ineffective requirements 

management and testing processes. Properly defined requirements are a 

key element in systems that meet their cost, schedule, and performance 

goals since the requirements define the (1) functionality that is expected 

to be provided by the system and (2) quantitative measures by which to 

determine through testing whether that functionality is operating as 

expected. 

We briefed PMO-DTS officials on the results of our tests and in May 2006 

the officials agreed that our continued concerns about the proper display 

of flight information were valid. PMO-DTS officials stated that the DTS 

technology refresh, which was to be completed in September 2006, should 

address some of our concerns. While these actions are a positive step 

forward, they do not address the fundamental problem that DTS’s 

requirements are still ambiguous and conflicting—a primary cause of the 

previous problems. Until a viable requirements management process is 

developed and effectively implemented, the department (1) cannot 

develop an effective testing process and (2) will not have reasonable 

assurance the project risks have been reduced to acceptable levels. 

In our earlier testimony and report,28 we noted that DOD did not have 

reasonable assurance that the flights displayed met the stated DOD 

requirements. Although DOD stated in each case that our concerns had 

been addressed, subsequent tests found that the problems had not been 

corrected. Requirements represent the blueprint that system developers 

and program managers use to design, develop, and acquire a system. 

Previously Reported 

DTS Requirements 

Management and 

Testing Deficiencies 

Have Not Been 

Resolved 

Providing Complete Flight 

Information Has Been a 

Continuing Problem 

 27GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

28GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

Page 17 GAO-07-208T 
Requirements should be consistent with one another, verifiable, and 

directly traceable29 to higher-level business or functional requirements. It is 

critical that requirements be carefully defined and that they flow directly 

from the organization’s concept of operations (how the organization’s dayto-day operations are or will be carried out to meet mission needs). 

Improperly defined or incomplete requirements have been commonly 

identified as a cause of system failure and systems that do not meet their 

cost, schedule, or performance goals.

Requirements represent the foundation on which the system should be 

developed and implemented. As we have noted in previous reports,30

because requirements provide the foundation for system testing, 

significant defects in the requirements management process preclude an

entity from implementing a disciplined testing process. That is, 

requirements must be complete, clear, and well documented to design and

implement an effective testing program. Absent this, an organization is 

taking a significant risk that its testing efforts will not detect significant 

defects until after the system is placed into production. Our February 2006 

analysis of selected flight information disclosed that DOD still did not have 

reasonable assurance that DTS displayed flights in accordance with its 

stated requirements. We analyzed 15 U.S. General Services Administration

(GSA) city pairs,31 which should have translated into 246 GSA city pair 

flights for the departure times selected. However, we identified 87 flights 

that did not appear on one or more of the required listings based on the 

DTS requirements. For instance, our analysis identified 44 flights 

 29Traceability allows the user to follow the life of the requirement both forward and 

backward through these documents and from origin through implementation. Traceability 

is also critical to understanding the parentage, interconnections, and dependencies among

the individual requirements. This information in turn is critical to understanding the impact

when a requirement is changed or deleted. 

30See, for example, GAO-04-1008 and Army Depot Maintenance: Ineffective Oversight of 

Depot Maintenance Operations and System Implementation Efforts, GAO-05-441 

(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

31GSA awards contracts to airlines to provide flight services between pairs of cities. This is

commonly referred to as the GSA city pair program. Under this program (1) no advanced

ticket purchases are required, (2) no minimum or maximum length of stay is required, 

(3) tickets are fully refundable and no charges are assessed for cancellations or changes, 

(4) seating is not capacity controlled (i.e., as long as there is a coach-class seat on the

plane, the traveler may purchase it), (5) no blackout dates apply, (6) fare savings average 

70 percent over regular walk-up fares, and (7) fares are priced on one-way routes

permitting agencies to plan for multiple destinations. We selected the first 15 city pairs that 

were provided by DOD to GSA in support of a GSA study on accuracy of flight displays and

fare information by DTS and the GSA eTravel providers. 

Page 18 GAO-07-208T 
appearing on other DTS listings or airline sites that did not appear on the 

9:00 am DTS listing even though those flights (1) met the 12-hour flight 

window32 and (2) were considered GSA city pair flights—two of the key 

DTS requirements the system was expected to meet. 

After briefing PMO officials on the results of our analysis in February 2006, 

the PMO-DTS employed the services of a contractor to review DTS to 

determine the specific cause of the problems and recommend solutions. In 

a March 2006 briefing, the PMO-DTS acknowledged the existence of the 

problems, and identified two primary causes. First, part of the problem 

was attributed to the methodology used by DTS to obtain flights from the 

Global Distribution System (GDS). The PMO-DTS stated that DTS was 

programmed to obtain a “limited” amount of data from GDS in order to 

reduce the costs associated with accessing GDS. This helps to explain why 

flight queries we reviewed did not produce the expected results. To 

resolve this particular problem, the PMO-DTS proposed increasing the 

amount of data obtained from GDS. Second, the PMO-DTS acknowledged

that the system testing performed by the contractor responsible for 

developing and operating DTS was inadequate and, therefore, there was 

no assurance that DTS would provide the data in conformance with the 

stated requirements. This weakness was not new, but rather reconfirms 

the concerns discussed in our September 2005 testimony and January 2006 

report33 related to the testing of DTS. 

While DOD’s planned actions, including a recent technology upgrade, 

should address several of the specific weaknesses we identified related to

flight displays, they fall short of addressing the fundamental problems that 

caused those weaknesses—inadequate requirements management. DTS’s 

requirements continue to be ambiguous. For example, DOD has retained a 

requirement to display 25 flights for each inquiry. However, it has not 

determined (1) whether the rationale for that requirement is valid and 

(2) under what conditions flights that are not part of the GSA city pair 

program should be displayed. For example, we found that several DTS 

DOD’s Planned Corrective 

Actions Will Not Address 

Fundamental 

Requirements Management 

Problems 

 32A flight window is the amount of time before and after a specified time and is used for 

determining the flights that should be displayed. DTS uses a 12-hour flight window for

domestic flights and a 24-hour flight window for foreign flights. The system is also

expected to display up to 25 flights for the flight window. 

33GAO-05-998T and GAO-06-18. 

Page 19 GAO-07-208T 
flights displayed to the user “overlap”34 other flights. Properly validating 

the requirements would allow DOD to obtain reasonable assurance that its 

requirements properly define the functionality needed and the business 

rules necessary to properly implement that functionality. As previously 

noted, requirements that are unambiguous and consistent are fundamental 

to providing reasonable assurance that a system will provide the desired 

functionality. Until DOD improves DTS requirement management 

practices, it will not have this assurance. 

Our recent report35 included four recommendations to improve the 

department’s management and oversight of DTS. We recommended that

DOD (1) evaluate the cost effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the 

CTO management fee structure versus adopting the revised CTO fee 

structure, once the new contracts have been awarded, (2) develop a

process by which the military services develop and use quantitative data 

from DTS and their individual legacy systems to clearly identify the total

universe of DTS-eligible transactions on a monthly basis, (3) require the

PMO-DTS to provide periodic reports on the utilization of DTS, once 

accurate data are available, and (4) resolve inconsistencies in DTS 

requirements by properly defining the functionality needed and business 

rules necessary to properly implement the needed functionality. DOD 

concurred with three and partially concurred with one of the 

recommendations. In regard to the recommendations with which the 

department concurred, it briefly outlined the actions it planned to take in

addressing two of the three recommendations. For example, the 

department noted the difficulties in obtaining accurate utilization data 

from the existing legacy systems, but stated that the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) and BTA will evaluate 

methods for reporting actual DTS utilization. 

Additionally, DOD noted that the Defense Travel Management Office 

developed and implemented a requirements change management process 

Recommendations to 

Improve DTS 

Management and 

Oversight 

 34For example, DTS displayed a GSA city pair flight between Washington, D.C., and Atlanta,

Georgia, that departed at 10:05 a.m. and arrived at 1:50 p.m. This flight “overlapped” two

other GSA city pair direct flights that were available and required less travel time. One

flight left at 10:05 a.m. and arrived at 12:02 p.m. while another left at 11:05 a.m. and arrived 

at 12:56 p.m. Furthermore, DTS displayed a non-GSA city pair flight that left at 9:20 a.m.

and arrived at 1:05 p.m. This flight did not meet any of the acceptable criteria for not using 

a GSA city pair flight. 

35GAO-06-980. 

Page 20 GAO-07-208T 
on May 1, 2006. In commenting on the report, the department stated that 

this process is intended to define requirements and track the entire life 

cycle of the requirements development process. While we fully support the 

department’s efforts to improve its management oversight of DTS’s 

requirements, we continue to believe that the department needs to have in

place a process that provides DOD reasonable assurance that 

(1) requirements are properly documented and (2) requirements are 

adequately tested as recommended in our January 2006 report.36 This 

process should apply to all existing requirements as well as any new 

requirements. As discussed in this report, we reviewed in May 2006 some 

of the requirements that were to have followed the new requirements 

management process and found problems similar to those noted in our 

January 2006 report. Although we did not specifically review the new 

process, if it does not include an evaluation of existing requirements, the 

department may continue to experience problems similar to those we 

previously identified. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation to evaluate the cost 

effectiveness of the Navy continuing with the CTO management fee 

structure. However, DOD’s response indicated that the Defense Travel 

Management Office is currently procuring commercial travel services for 

DOD worldwide in a manner that will ensure evaluation of cost 

effectiveness for all services. If DOD proceeds with the actions outlined in

its comments, it will meet the intent of our recommendation. 

Effective implementation of these recommendations as well as those 

included in our January 2006 report37 will go a long way towards improving 

DTS functionality and increasing utilization. Furthermore, the shift of DTS 

to the BTA, which makes DTS an enterprisewide endeavor, should help in 

making DTS the standard integrated, end-to-end travel system for business 

travel. Management oversight is essential for this to become a reality. As I 

stated previously, in written comments on a draft of our report, the Under 

Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), strongly objected to our 

finding that the estimated personnel savings included in the economic 

analysis are unrealistic. Because none of the military services could 

validate an actual reduction in the number of personnel as a result of DTS 

implementation, and DOD’s comments did not include any additional 

support or documentation for its position, we continue to believe that the 

 36GAO-06-18. 

37GAO-06-18. 

Page 21 GAO-07-208T 
estimated annual personnel savings of $54.1 million are unrealistic. 

Although the department’s criteria do not require that a new economic 

analysis be prepared, the fiscal year 2005 defense authorization act38

requires the periodic review, but not less than annually, of every defense 

business system investment. If effectively implemented, this annual review 

process provides an excellent opportunity for DOD management to assess 

whether DTS is meeting its planned cost, schedule, and functionality goals. 

Going forward, such a review could serve as a useful management tool in 

making funding and other management decisions related to DTS. 

In conclusion, overhauling the department’s antiquated travel management 

practices and systems has been a daunting challenge for DOD. While it 

was widely recognized that this was a task that needed to be accomplished 

and savings could result, the underlying assumptions in support of those 

savings are not based on reliable data and therefore it is questionable 

whether the anticipated savings will materialize. Even though the overall 

savings are questionable, the successful implementation of DTS is critical

to reducing the number of stovepiped, duplicative travel systems 

throughout the department. We have reported on numerous occasions that 

reducing the number of business systems within DOD can translate into 

savings that can be used for other mission needs. As noted above, 

management oversight will be an important factor in DTS achieving its

intended goals. Equally important, however, will be the department’s 

ability to resolve the long-standing difficulties that DTS has encountered 

with its requirements management and system testing. Until these issues 

are resolved, more complete utilization of DTS will be problematic. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. We would be happy 

to answer any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee 

may have at this time. 

For further information about this testimony, please contact McCoy 

Williams at (202) 512-9095 or williamsm1@gao.gov, or Keith A. Rhodes at 

(202) 512-6412 or rhodesk@gao.gov. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

 38Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 

108-375, § 332, 118 Stat. 1811, 1851-56 (Oct. 28, 2004) (codified, in part, at 10 U.S.C. §§ 186, 

2222). 

Page 22 GAO-07-208T 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. In addition to the 

above contacts, the following individuals made key contributions to this 

testimony: Darby Smith, Assistant Director; J. Christopher Martin, SeniorLevel Technologist; F. Abe Dymond, Assistant General Counsel; Beatrice 

Alff; Harold Brumm, Jr.; Francine DelVecchio; and Tarunkant Mithani. 

Page 23 GAO-07-208T (195104) 
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