Pur su ant t o Ru le 25 (d ), JohnMc Hu g h h a s b e e n s ub sti tut e d f or F ra nc is J. H arv e y

a s a 1 defe ndant in this action. Although Y ork has na

med the Secr etar

y of the Ar my as a de fenda

nt in the caption of he r 2 Com pla int , h e r C omp la int

and he r s ub se qu e nt f

ili ng s r e fe r t o th e U. S. Army Re se rv e a s th e on ly defe ndant in this action. Be cause the Privacy Act provide s a ca

use of a ction only

ag ainst an ag ency , see 5 U .S. C. § 55 2a (g )( 1) , th e Cou rt sh a ll tre at th e U. S. Army Re se rv e a s th e so le defe ndant in this action. LAWANDA YORK, Plaintiff,
v. J OHN MCHUGH , Secre tary of the Ar my , et al. , De fe nd ants . UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 09–075 (CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION 1 (Mar ch 22, 2010) Plaintiff L awa

nda Yor k bring s this action for an a lleg ed violation of the Privac y Act (the “Ac t”), 5 U.S.C. § 552a, by Def endant U.S. Ar

my Reserve (“U SAR” or “De fenda nt”). 2 Spe c if ic a lly , Y or

k a lle g e s th at r e c or ds c onta ini ngpe rs on a l me dic a l in fo rm atio n w e re imp ro pe rl y disclosed through a shar ed networ k drive a cce ssible to all employ ees in violation of the Ac t’s consent re quirements, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). De fenda nt moves to dismi ss the Complaint under Fe dera l Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6) f or fa ilure to state a c laim upon which re lief ca n be g rante d, arguing that the rec ords wer e not within a “sy stem of re cords” protec ted by the Act, that York ha s failed to alleg e an a ctual disclosure , and that her alleg ed injuries we re not c aused by any such disclosure. A lternatively , Def endant moves f

or summary

judgme nt. Howeve r, theBe cause the Court does not rea ch De fenda nt’s Alternative Motion for Summary 3 Judg me nt, the Court

is l imi te d to c on sid e ri ngthe fa c ts a lle g e d in the c omp la int , a

ny do c ume nts attache d to or incorpor ated in the c omplaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice , and matter s of public re cord. See E EOC v. St. Francis Xavie r Parochial Sch. , 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 2 pa rt ie s h ave no t ye t e ng a g e d in dis c ov e ry , a

nd Yo rk ha s f ile d a mot ion to o bta in d isc ov e ry

in
su pp or t of he r c la im p ur su ant t o Ru le 56 (f ). B e c a us e the Court

fi nd s th at Y or

k h a s st ate d a

c la im fo r r e lie f i n h e r C omp la int and that di sc ov e ry

wi ll a ssi st Y or

k w ithhe r c la im, the Court sh a ll DENY D efe ndant’s [6] Motion to Dism iss, DENY WI THOUT PREJ UDI CE Defe ndant’s [6] Alternative Motion for Summary J udg ment, and GRANT Plaintiff’ s [11] Motion for Discover y Pursuant to Rule 56(f). I. BACKG ROUND Th e fo llo wi ngfa c ts a

re dr awn fr om t he a lle g atio ns in t

he Com pla int and any e xhibi ts
atta c he d th e re to. At

a ll t ime s r e le va

nt t o th e Com

pla int , Pl a int if

f L awa nd a Yo rk wo rk e d a s a 3 Public Affair s Specialist in the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve
. See Compl., Ex . 4 (3/15/2007 email from Yor

k to L TC Gera

rd He aly et al.). O n August 31, 2006, York had a meetingwith the Direc tor of Ar

my Reserve Communi cations, Colonel Dorothy Perkins, and a pe rsonnel mana g er named Sheila B ailey
. See Compl., Ex . 1 (9/1/2006 Memorandum for Record) . The mee ting wa s he ld i n r e sp on se to Y or

k’ s in dic atio n to he r s up e rv iso r t hat sh e wa s h avin gsu ic ida l th ou g hts a s a result of the pr essure beingput on her in the wor kplace
. Id. The de tails of this meeting w ere memorialized by

Col. P erkins in a “ Memorandum f or Recor d” date d September 1, 2006. See id. Th e Me mor and

um f or Re c or d c onta ine d s tate me nts ma de by Yo rk a bo ut h e r m e dic a l tr e atme nt,
an d C o l
. P erk i n s wr o t e t h at“[ t ] h i s i s v i ew edas a v er y s er i o u s - an d

p o t en t i al l y

l i fe -t h re at en i n g - situation and will be dealt with as such.” Id.3

On Marc h 1 4, 20 07 , Y or

k d isc ov e re d th at th e Me mor and um f or Re c or d c re ate d b y

Col
. Perkins, as we ll as other re cords pe rtainingto York’s medic al condition, had bee n place d on a share d network dr ive at her workplac e that wa s acc essible to all employ ees at the ag ency . Compl. ¶¶ 7-11. York a lleg es that “[e]very employ ee w ith acce ss to a computer c an ac cess the files place d on the share d drive. Thousa nds of employees a

re e mploy ed by

the Army

and thus could have seen Mr s. York’s c onfidential information and information conc erningher me dical condition.” Id. ¶ 11. York ha d one of he r collea gues conf irm that she could ac cess the r ecor ds perta ining to Yor

k. Id. ¶ 1 2 & Ex. 3 (3 /14 /20 07 Me mor and um f or Re c or d) ¶ 6 . Imme diate ly
a ft e r Y or k d isc ov e re d th at he r m e dic a l c on dit ion ha d b e e n d isc los e d, sh e le ft wo rk and be c ame phy sically

ill, even vomiting. Id. ¶¶ 13- 14. York c alled her thera pist, who was conc erne d that the improper disc losure would bringabout suicidal thoug hts. Id. ¶ 16. York missed time fr om work a nd was g iven medication. Id. On Marc h 15, 2007, York sent a n email to L TC Gera

rd Hea ly and L TC Rudolph Burwe ll asking that the files be r emoved f rom the shar ed drive immediately
. Id. ¶ 17 & Ex . 4 (3/15/2007 email from Yor k to L TC Gera

rd He aly et al.). II. LEGAL STANDARD Def endant ha s moved for dismissal of Schmidt’s Complaint pursuant to Feder al Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b) (6) a nd has also moved in the a lternative f or summary

judgme nt pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56. A. Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure12( b) ( 6) Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e that a c omp la int

c onta in “ ‘a

sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl.4

Corp. v. Twombly, 5 5 0 U. S
. 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Eric kson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (pe r cur iam). Althoug h “deta iled fac tual alleg ations” ar e not nec essar y to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the

“ g ro un ds ” of

“ e nti tle [me nt] t o r e lie f, ” a pla int if f m us t f ur nis h “ mor e tha

n la be ls a nd c on c lus ion s” or “a formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion.” Id. at 19 64 -6 5; see also Papasan
v . A lla in , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient f actua l matter,
acc epted a s true, to “state a cla im to relief that is plausible on its face .” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to dra

w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , _

_ U. S
. _ _ , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). In e va luatin ga

Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im, the c ourt

mus t
c on str ue the c omp la int

in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll
rea sonable fa ctual infe renc es dra wn from we ll-pleade d fac tual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Em

ployeeBene

fit Plans L itig. , 8 54 F .Su pp . 9 14 , 9 15 (D .D .C. 19 94 ); se eals o Schuler v . United States , 6 17 F .2 d 6 05 , 6 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) (“ Th e c omp la int mus t be ‘l ibe ra lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff,’ who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the f

acts a lleg ed.”) . Howeve r, as the Supre me Court rec ently made c lear , a plaintiff must provide more than just “a sheer possibili ty

that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 50 . Wh e re the we ll- ple a de d f a c ts s e t f or th i n th e c omp la int

do no t pe rm it a

c ourt , draw ing on its judicial experienc e and c ommon sense, to infer mor e than the “ mere possibili ty of misconduct,” the c omplaint has not shown that the pleade r is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950. In evaluating a

motion to di smiss under Rule 12(b)(6) , the Court is lim ited to considering5

the fa c ts a lle g e d in

the c omp la int , a

ny do c ume nts atta c he d to or inc or po ra te d in the c omp la int , matters of which the cour t may take judicial notice , and matter s of public re cord. See E EOC v. St. Francis Xavier Paroc hial Sch. , 1 17 F .3 d 6 21 , 6 24 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) ; see also Vanov er v. Hantman , 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D .C. 1999), aff’d , 38 F. App’ x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“ [W ]here a docume nt is refe rre d to in the complaint and is centra l to plaintiff’s claim, such a document attache d to the motion papers may be conside red w ithout convertingthe motion to one for
s um m ar y j u d gm en t . ”) (c i t i n g Gree nberg v. The Life Ins. Co. of Va. , 177 F.3d 507, 514 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). B. Motion for Summary Judgm ent Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure56 Pursuant to Fede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a par ty is entitled to summ ary

judgme nt “if the ple ading s, the discover y and disclosure materia ls on file, and any aff idavits show that the re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and that th e mov ant i s e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a
matte r o f l aw. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 5 6( c ); see also Tao v. Free h , 27 F.3d 635, 638 ( D.C. Cir. 1994). Under the summary

judgme nt standard, the movingparty bear s the “initial responsibility of informingthe district court of the basis for [its] motion, and identifying those portions of the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admissions on file, toge ther with the aff idavits which [it ] believe[s] demonstrate the absenc e of a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t.” Ce lote xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 4 7 7 U. S
. 3 1 7 , 3 2 3 (1 9 8 6 ). Inre s p o n s e, th e n o n -m o v i n g p arty mu s t“go beyond the pleading s and by [i ts] own af

fidavits, or depositions, answer s to interrog atories, a nd admissions on file, ‘desig nate’ specific fac ts showing that ther e is a g enuine issue f or trial.” Id. at 324 (interna l citations omit ted). Although a

court should dra

w all infer ence s from the supportingrec ords submitted by the6

nonmoving pa

rty , the mere exis tence of a f actua l dispute, by

itself, is insufficient to bar summar y judgme nt. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To be materia l, the fac tual asser

tion mustbe ca

pable of aff ectingthe substantive outcome of the litigation; to be g enuine, the issue must be suppor ted by sufficie nt admissible evidence that a re asonable trier- offac t could find for the nonmoving pa rty . Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 8 13 F .2 d 1 23 6, 12 42 -4 3 ( D. C. Cir . 1 98 7) ; Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 251 (the c ourt must determine “ whether the evidenc e prese nts a sufficie nt disag ree ment to require submissi on to a jury or whe ther it is so one-sided that one par

ty must prevail as a

matter of la

w”) . “I f the e vidence is merely colora ble, or is not sufficie ntly

probative, summar

y judgme nt may

be grante d.” Liberty Lobby , 477 U.S. at 249-50 (interna l citations omit ted). “ Mere alleg ations or denials in the a dverse party ’s pleading s are insufficient to def

eat a n otherwise pr oper motion for summar y judgme nt.” W

illiams v. Callaghan , 9 38 F . Su

pp . 4 6, 49 (D .D .C. 19 96 ). Th e a dv e rs e pa rt y mus t do mor e tha

n s imp ly “show that ther e is some metaphy sical doubt as to the mater ial fac ts.” Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I nd us . Co. v . Ze nit

h R ad io C or p ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, while the movant bear s the initial responsibility

of identifying those portions of the re cord that demonstrate the a bsence of a g e nu ine iss ue of

mate ri a l f

a c t, t he burd e n s hif

ts t o th e no n- mov ant t o “ c ome fo rw ard wi th ‘s pe c if ic fa c ts s ho wi ngthat th e re is a genuine issue for trial .’” Id. at 58 7 ( c iti ngF e d. R. C iv. P. 56(e) ) (e mphasis in origina l). III . D ISC USS ION A. The Privacy

Act The Privac y

Act of 1974 “ safe guards the public f rom unwar

rante d collection, maintenanc e, use a

nd dissemination of persona l information contained in a g ency rec ords.”7

Bartel v. FAA , 7 25 F .2 d 1 40 3, 14 07 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 4) . T he Ac t pr ov ide s th at “ [n]o a g e nc y sh a ll dis c los e any

re c or d whic h is c onta ine d in a sy ste m of

re c or ds by

any me ans of c omm un ic atio n to any person, or

to another a g ency , except pursuant to a wr itten reque st by , or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the recor d perta ins . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). The Act provides exceptions for disclosure to employ ees who have a need f or the re cord in the perf ormanc e of the ir duties, rec ords that must be disclosed under the Fr eedom of

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, and var ious other situations not applicable her e. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)
- (1 2) . T he Ac t de fi ne s a

“ re c or d” a s
any ite m, c oll e c tio n, or

g ro up ingof

inf or matio n a bo ut a n in divid ual that is m ai n t ai n ed by

an ag ency , including, but not limited to, his education, financ ial transac tions, medical history , and cr iminal or employ ment history and that conta ins his name, or the ide ntifying numbe r, sy mbol, or other identifying particula r assigned to the individual, such as a f inge r or voice print or a photograph. Id. § 552a(a )(4) . The Ac t defines a “sy stem of re cords” as “a g roup of a

ny rec ords under

the control of a

ny ag ency from which inf

ormation is retrieve d by

the name of

the individual or by some identifying numbe r, sy mbol, or other identify

ing pa rticular a ssigne d to the individual.” Id. § 552a(a )(5) . The fa ct that re cords a re c ap ab leof beingretrie ved by name or other pe rsonal ide nti fi e r i s n ot s uf

fi c ie nt t o tr ans fo rm

a g ro up of re c or ds int o a

“ sy ste m of

re c or ds ” ; th e re mus t b e e v i d e n c e th atana g e n c y in practicere tr ie ve s in fo rm atio n a bo ut i nd ivi du a ls b y

re fe re nc e to their name s or other ide ntifiers. Henk e v. U .S. Dep’ t of Commerce , 8 3 F .3 d 1 45 3, 14 60 -6 1 ( D. C. Cir. 1996). Th e Pr iva c y

Ac t r e c ognize s a

c ivi l a c tio n f

or an a g e nc y ’s fa ilure to c omp ly wi th a ny of its provisions when the a g ency ’s fa ilure has a n “adve rse e ffe ct on an individual.” See 5 U .S. C. § 5 52 a (g )( 1) (D ); Doe v . Chao , 540 U.S. 614, 619 (2004) (de scribingthe Act’ s “catchall” r emedy8

fo r a ny vio latio n h avin gan a dv e rs e e ff e c t) . T he Ac t pr ov ide s th at in su its br ou g ht u

nd e r t his provision, if the cour t determines that the a g ency acte d in a manner

which wa s intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equa l to the sum of– (A) a ctual dama g es sustained by the individual as a re sult of the ref usal or failure , but in no case sha ll a person e ntitled to recove ry rec eive less than the sum of $1,000; and (B ) the c osts of the ac tion togethe r with rea sonable attorney fee s as de te rm ine d b y

the c ourt . 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g )(4) . The Supreme Court has clar ified that the statutory damag e aw ard of $1000 is available only

to plaintiffs who ca

n establish actua l damag es. See D oe v. Chao , 540 U.S. at 627. A plaintiff pursuinga cla im for improper disc losure must show that (1) the dis c los e d in fo rm atio n is a “ re c or d” wi thi n a

“ sy ste m of

re c or ds ,” ; ( 2) the a g e nc y imp ro pe rl y disclosed the information; (3) the disclosure w as willful or intentional; and (4) the disclosure adver sely aff ecte d the plaintiff, ca

using a ctual dama g es. Runkle v . Gonzales , 391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 238 (D.D.C. 2005). B. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12( b) ( 6) Def endant moves to dismiss York’s Complaint on severa l gr ounds. First, De fenda nt argues that the re cords a lleg edly disclosed ar e not “c ontained in a sy stem of re cords” and thus not protec ted from disclosure under the Act. To de termine whe ther or not a g roup of r ecor ds qualifies as a

“sy stem of re cords,” the Court must determine if ther e is any evidenc e that the ag ency in prac tice re trieves infor mation about individuals by ref ere nce to their

names or othe r persona l identifier. Henk e v. U .S. Dep’ t of Commerce , 83 F.3d at 1461. Although Yor k has attache d some exhibi ts to her Complaint that would aid the Court in determining whether or not9

the files plac ed on the sha red ne twork drive w ere “conta ined in a sy stem of re cords,” the Court fi nd s th at th is i ssu e c ann ot b e re so lve d w ith out r e so rt ingto m atte rs outsi de the ple a din g s. There fore , this iss ue must be re solved in the context of a motion for summary judgme nt under Rule 56 rather

than a motion to dismi ss. See F e d. R. C iv. P. 1 2( d) (“ I f, on a mot ion un de r R ule 12 (b )( 6) or

12 (c ), matte rs outsi de the ple a din g s a re pr e se nte d to and

no t e xclu de d b y

the c ourt , the mot ion

mus t be tr e ate d a s o ne fo r s umm ary jud g me nt u

nd e r R ule 56 .” ); see also Krieger v

. Fa de ly , 211 F.3d 134, 136 ( D.C. Cir. 2000) (holdingthat plaintiff in Privacy Act ca se nee d not identify what re cords a

re disclose d at the plea ding sta g e). Def endant’ s second a

rgument in favor of

dismiss al is that York has f ailed to alleg e in her Complaint t hat there was a n actua l disclosure of the r ecor ds by Def endant. De fenda

nt argues that York a lleg es only

that other USAR employees “ could have seen” York’s r ecor ds on the share d drive. See Def

.’s Mem. at 9 (c iting Compl. ¶ 11). Howe ver, pa ragraph 20 of

York’s Complaint alleg es that “[i] n violation of the Privacy Act, De fenda

nt throug h Def

endant Ma

nag ers, r evea led the contents of those rec ords to other of D efe ndant’s employees who had no re ason to know such information.” Compl. ¶ 20. This is a sufficie nt alleg ation of an a ctual disclosure to survive a mot ion to d ism iss
. Def endant’ s third argument is that York’s alleg ed dama g es do not stem from any actua l disclosure. De fenda

nt claims that York has only alleg ed dama g es that she suff ere d afte r discoveringthat her r ecor ds were acc essible on the shar ed drive , which is not the same a s dama g e s f

ro m an a c tua l di sc los ur e . H ow e ve r, the a lle g atio ns in Y or k’ s Co mpl a int

are no t so limit ed. See Compl. ¶¶ 21-22 (“ The wr ong ful disclosure by the Def endant humiliated and embar rasse d Ms. York, ca

used her g reat emotional distress, sleeplessness, tension and de pression10

and dama g ed her

profe ssional reputation . . . . Plaintiff suffe red the phy sical, psychic, a nd monetary injury . . . beca use of De fenda

nt’s improper disclosure of re cords.” ) More over, the Court does not agree with Defe ndant’s nar row theor y of ca usation. The fa ct that York ma y not have le arne d of any

possible disclosures until the day she discover ed her

files wer e on the sha

red drive doe s not prohibit her from re cover ing f or any adver se ef

fec t cause d by

a disclosure
. Th e re fo re , th e Court

fi nd s th at Y or

k’ s Co mpl a int

c ann ot b e dis mis se d o n th is b a sis
. Finally , Def

endant c ontends that York doe s not state a cla im for an intentional or w illful violation of the Act. The parties ha ve not addr essed in their br iefs the leg al question of whe ther intent or willfulness must be pled in the Complaint or merely proven at trial. Cf. Swi erkie wicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 510-12 (2002) ( explaining that in employ ment discrimination case s under Title VI I , plaintiffs nee d not plead eve ry element of

a prima f acie case of discrimination). Re g ard le ss, ho we ve r, Yo rk ha s sp e c if

ic a lly a lle g e d th at D e fe nd ant “ wi llf ull y or int e nti on a lly disclosed [her] personal medica l information by placingit on the shared dr ive.” See Com pl. ¶ 18. York ha s theref

ore me t her burde n of plea ding a claim under

the Privacy

Act, and the Court sh a ll d e ny

De fe nd ant’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss. C. Mo tio n fo r S

um ma ry J ud gm e nt De fe nd ant h a s a lte rn ativ e ly mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt o n th e same g ro un ds a s it s motion to di smiss. Based on de clar ations attache d to its m otion, Defe ndant ar gues that the
rec ord cle arly

shows that the files alleg edly disclosed did not come fr om a “sy stem of re cords,” that there is no evidence of an a ctual disclosure causingdamag es, and that there is no evide nce of intent or willfulness on the par t of USAR employ ees. Y ork opposes this motion and has filed an opposition wit h her own decla ration in support. In addition, beca use De fenda

nt’s motion was11

fi le d b e fo re dis c ov e ry , Y or k h a s a lso fi le d a

mot ion fo r d isc ov e ry

purs ua nt t o Ru le 56 (f

). Rul e 56 (f ) s tate s th at “ [i]f a

pa rt y op po sin gthe mot ion

[fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt] s ho ws by

a ff ida vit th at , f o r s p e c i f i e d r e a s o n s , i tc ann o tp r e s e n tf a c t s e s s e n t i a l t o j u s t i f

y i t s o p p o s i t i o n , th e c o urtm ay: (1) de ny the motion; (2) order

a continuanc e to ena

ble af fidavits to be obtained, de positions t o be take n, or oth e r d isc ov e ry

to b e un de rt ake n; o r ( 3) iss ue any oth e r j us t or de r. ” F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (f ). Yo rk ’s c ouns e l ha s p ro vid e d a de c laratio n a sse rt ingthat di sc ov e ry is n e c e ssa

ry in o rd e r t o obtain evidenc e re g ardingthe nature of the re cords, their disclosure, a

nd intent or willfulness by De fe nd ant’ s e mpl oye e s. A p art y op po sin gsumma

ry jud g me nt n e e ds a

“ re a so na bleop po rt

un ity” to c omp le te discovery befor e re sponding to a

summary judgme nt motion. Khan v. Parsons Global Servs., Ltd. , 4 28 F .3 d 1 07 9, 10 87 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 5) . “ [I ]nsu ff ic ie nt t ime or

op po rt un ity to e ng a g e in discovery is cause to de fer

decision on the motion.” Id. (quotation marks a nd citation omitted). A par ty suing unde r the Privac y

Act is entitled to the same discove ry permitted under

the Fe dera l Rules of Civil P roce dure a s for a ny other c ause of

action. Laxalt v. McClatchy , 809 F.2d 885, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The D .C. Circuit has previously held in a Privac y

Act ca se that the pla int if f s ho uld be a ff or de d a re a so na ble op po rt

un ity to c omp le te dis c ov e ry

be fo re re sp on din gto the g overnme nt’s summary judgme nt motion. See M cCready v . Nicholson , 4 65 F .3 d 1 , 1 9 ( D. C. C i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Khan , 428 F.3d at 1087). Def endant oppose s the Rule 56(f) motion on the g round that no amount of discove ry will save York’ s claim from dismissal. As expl ained a bove, howeve r, York ha s sufficiently pled a c laim for violation of the Ac t. The Court agree s that York should be entitled to obtain discovery to support her c laim. There fore , the Court shall g rant Y o r k ’ s R u l e 5 6 ( f ) m o t i o nf

o r d i s c o v e r y.12

Rather than hold in abe y ance Def endant’ s Motion for Summary J udg ment pending dis c ov e ry , th e Court

sh a ll d e ny

De fe nd ant’ s mo tio n w ith out pr e jud ic e . D e fe nd ant m ay

re fi le its
m o t i o na f t e r th e c o mp l e t i o no f

d i s c o v e r y. IV . C ON CL USI ON F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e Cou rt sh a ll D EN Y D e fe nd ant’ s [6] M oti on to D ism iss , DENYWI TH OU T PREJUD I CE D e fe nd ant’ s [6] A lte rn ativ e Mo tio n f or Summary

Judg me nt,
and GR AN T Pl a int if

f’ s [11 ] Mot ion

fo r D isc ov e ry

Pur su ant t o Ru le 56 (f

). Th e Court

sh a ll h old an initial schedulingconfe renc e with the par ties to discuss how to procee d with discovery . An appropr iate Or der a ccompa nies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: Marc h 22, 2010 /s/ C O LLE EN K O LLA R
- K O T E LLY Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge