IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-30975

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

EDUARDO GUERRERO, 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana 

USDC No. 3:15-CR-57-1 

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Eduardo Guerrero pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and to 

possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine 

or 500 grams or more of a mixture containing methamphetamine, and he was 

sentenced to 120 months of imprisonment, to be followed by five years of 

supervised release. Guerrero’s guilty plea was conditional, as he reserved the 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 24, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 16-30975 Document: 00513925162 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/24/2017
No. 16-30975

2 

right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from a truck 

registered to him that was driven by Raul Tuda. 

Guerrero argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the evidence seized from the truck. He contends that there was no 

reasonable suspicion to justify a prolonged detention. Additionally, Guerrero 

challenges the voluntary nature of Tuda’s consent to search the vehicle and the 

use of a canine. When reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we 

review “factual findings for clear error and the ultimate constitutionality of 

law enforcement action de novo.” United States v. Robinson, 741 F.3d 588, 594 

(5th Cir. 2014). 

Tuda and the passenger were traveling as unlicensed drivers in a vehicle 

that was not registered to them. They exhibited nervous behavior and were 

unable to tell Trooper Justin Stephenson their intended destination. After 

conferring with the passenger, Tuda stated that Jackson was his destination 

but then changed his answer to Atlanta. The vehicle had visible modifications, 

including a rerouting of the exhaust pipe and a new fuel filter on one of the fuel 

tanks. These factors, when taken together, demonstrate that the continued 

detention after the issuance of the traffic citation was supported by reasonable 

suspicion. See United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 361 (5th Cir. 2010); United 

States v. Fishel, 467 F.3d 855, 856 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brigham, 

382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). 

Challenging Tuda’s consent to the search of the vehicle, Guerrero 

contends that the language barrier prevented Tuda from understanding that 

he was consenting, that there was no evidence of verbal consent, that the 

written consent form was not presented as evidence, that there was no 

evidence that the consent form was read and explained to Tuda, and that there 

 Case: 16-30975 Document: 00513925162 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/24/2017
No. 16-30975

3 

was no evidence that Tuda was informed of his Miranda1 rights. The 

voluntariness of consent is a factual finding reviewed for clear error. United 

States v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002). 

Trooper Stephenson was polite throughout the encounter and did not 

exhibit coercive behavior. Tuda was cooperative and complied with Trooper 

Stephenson’s requests. Trooper Stephenson provided Tuda with a Spanishlanguage written consent to search form, and the document contained 

information on the right to refuse consent. Moreover, the record does not 

indicate that Tuda’s intelligence level was diminished or impaired in any 

manner. Finally, given how well the drugs were hidden in the fuel tank, Tuda 

could have believed that no incriminating evidence would be found. Moreover, 

“[t]here is no ‘Miranda requirement’ attending a simple request for permission 

to search.” United States v. Arias-Robles, 477 F.3d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Under the totality of the circumstances, the district court’s finding of voluntary 

consent is not clearly erroneous. See Solis, 299 F.3d at 436.

Guerrero also argues that Tuda’s consent was not an independent act of 

free will. As Tuda’s consent was not given during an illegal detention, we need 

not consider this prong of the consent inquiry. See United States v. 

Khanalizadeh, 493 F.3d 479, 484 (5th Cir. 2007). 

Citing to Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), Guerrero 

argues that the use of a canine to perform an open-air sniff prolonged the 

detention without providing reasonable suspicion. Rodriguez is inapplicable 

to the facts of the instant matter because, as discussed above, Trooper 

Stephenson had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the 

detention and Tuda had consented to a search of the vehicle. Cf. Rodriguez, 

135 S. Ct. at 1614. 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

 Case: 16-30975 Document: 00513925162 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/24/2017
No. 16-30975

4 

Guerrero fails to show that the district court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

 Case: 16-30975 Document: 00513925162 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/24/2017