In count one of the indictment, Cofield is charged with being a convicted felon in possession of 1

3 firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In count two of the indictment, Cofield is charged with

receiving, possessing, and concealing a stolen motor vehicle, specifically a 2003 Dodge Ram 1500 4x4

Truck, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. In count three of the indictment, Cofield is charged with receiving,

possessing, and concealing a stolen motor vehicle,specifically a Honda All-Terrain Vehicle, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2313. The indictment also contains a forfeiture allegation.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v ) CR. NO. 3:06cr208-MEF

)

JASON EDWARD COFIELD )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The defendant, Jason Edward Cofield (“Cofield”), who has prior felony convictions

for possession of controlled substances and trafficking in methamphetamine, is charged in

a three-count indictment with being a convicted felon in possession of firearms in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and receiving, possessing and concealing stolen vehicles in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. His residence and a shed behind his residence were searched 1

pursuant to a warrant issued by a state court judge. During the search of the shed, officers

found firearms and a stolen All-Terrain Vehicle (“ATV”). In the woods behind the shed, the

officers found a stolen pick-up truck. 

On September 29, 2006, the defendant filed a motion to suppress (doc. # 22), in which

he asserts that the search warrant was unconstitutionally deficient because the affidavit filed

in support of the warrant did not establish probable cause. Cofield argues that although the

search warrant authorized the search of Kenny Cofield’s residence, the search warrant did

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 1 of 17
 In his motion to suppress, the defendant asserts that more than one search warrant was issued for

2

the property. It is undisputed that the defendant is challenging the warrant and search executed on January

24, 2006.

 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)

3

2

not authorize the search of his residence. Predictably, United States contends that the 2

search warrant was valid. In addition, the United States argues that, regardless of the validity

of the warrant, United States v. Leon’s good faith exception applies to save the search’s 3

fruits because the officers relied on the state court judge’s determination that the warrant

established probable cause to search Jason Cofield’s residence. The court held an evidentiary

hearing on the motion to suppress on October 27, 2006, and a supplemental evidentiary

hearing on December 11, 2006. Based on the evidence presented to the court and the

argument of the parties, the court concludes that the motion to suppress is due to be granted

in part and denied in part.

FACTS

On January 24, 2006, Lee County sergeant Donnie Surrett (“Surrett”) obtained from

a state Circuit Court judge a warrant to search

The residence of Willis “Kenny” Cofield, alias, Brian Cofield, alias, Jason

Cofield, alias, and Michael Cofield, alias, which is located at 5766 Lee Road

270, Valley, Lee County, Alabama, and any and all vehicles and/or buildings

(above ground and below ground) to include two manufactured homes, which

is located within the curtilage of said property.

(Def’s Ex. 1). 

The address of the Cofield property is 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley, Alabama. The

property consists of 119 acres of contiguous land. (Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 37). The entrance to

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 2 of 17
 At this point, for the sake of simplicity and fluidity, the court will distinguish between the Cofields 4

by using their first names without repeating their last name.

 According to Kenny Cofield, these 31 acres used to belong to his mother but Brian Cofield now 5

owns the land. (Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 9). 

3

the Cofield property is protected by a locked gate. On this property, Kenny Cofield has a

home and a shop in which he makes stained glass windows. (Id. at 9). Kenny Cofield’s

residence and shop is surrounded by fences and is accessed by a driveway appropriately one

eighth of a mile long. 

Several of Kenny Cofield’s sons also live on the property. Traveling from the gate

up the driveway, Jason’s residence is on the right of the driveway approximately 800 feet

4

from Kenny’s house and outside the fencing that separates Kenny’s residence from the

remainder of the property. Jason lives in a mobile home; his address is 5796 Lee Road 270.

(Id. at 7). Brian lives in a trailer located at 5842 Lee Road 270. Brian owns an additional

31 acres of land. (Id.) Kevin lives in a trailer at 5842 Lee Road 270. Michael does not 5

reside on the property. He lives in Opelika, Alabama on Highway 148. (Id. at 7-8). On Lee

Road, each Cofield has his own mailbox with his name and number on the mail box. 

In the affidavit in support of the search warrant, Surrett asserts that 

[d]uring the past six months, the Lee County Sheriff’s Office has received

information that Jason Cofield, alias, Brian Cofield, alias, and Willis “Kenny”

Cofield, alias, were involved in the clandestine manufacture of

methamphetamine, as well as the unlawful distribution of methamphetamine.

It was determined that the Cofields’ address is 5766 Lee Road 270, Valley,

Lee County, Alabama. 

(Id.) 

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 3 of 17
 Jordan testified that Surrett told him that there were multiple residences on the property, and that 6

he was assigned to search Jason’s residence. (Id. at 9).

4

The last sentence of the above quoted paragraph is the only reference in the affidavit

which indicates that the requested authority related to the property of more than one person.

At least four times in the application and affidavit in support of the application Surrett refers

to a single defendant as “Willis ‘Kenny’ Cofield, alias, Brian Cofield, alias Jason Cofield,

alias Michael Cofield, alias.” During the evidentiary hearing, Surrett testified that he

understood the term “alias” meant “nickname,” and he uses the term alias “when there’s

multiple, I guess suspects or Defendants, . . . after the name.” (Supp. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 46-

47). According to Surrett, use of the term “alias” would “cover us if we misspelled the

name. Like it was Michael and there’s a typing error, if we put alias after it it would still

hold up in court because of any errors, it would cover any errors in it.” (Id. at 47). Surrett

testified that when he got the search warrant from Judge Walker, he knew that Jason, Brian

and Michael were Kenny Cofield’s sons, (Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 98), but that he did not convey

that information to Judge Walker. (Supp. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 49-50).

After securing the search warrant, Surrett briefed other law enforcement officers on

the search, instructing them that “there were multiple residences on the property that [they]

would be simultaneously” searching. (Supp. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 8). Investigator Keith Jordan

was assigned to search Jason’s residence. (Id.) Jordan testified that he did not look at or 6

read the search warrant. Rather, it was his “understanding of the warrant . . . that it covered

both the residence of . . .Kenny Cofield, Jason Cofield, and potentially Brian Cofield, all

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 4 of 17
 Jordan testified that the shed was “around 30 yards, maybe 35 yards” away from the residence. 7

(Id. at 12).

5

located on the Cofield property. And their respective sheds or storage buildings with those

residences.” (Id.). According to Jordan, there were three search teams: the Kenny Cofield

team, the Jason Cofield team, and the Brian Cofield team. (Supp. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 10). 

Once the officers arrived at the Cofield property, Jordan went to search Jason’s

residence while other officers searched Kenny’s residence. (Id. at 9). A SWAT team made

entry and cleared the residence before Jordan’s search team entered Jason’s home. (Id. at 9).

After ascertaining that the residence was safe, Jordan testified that he walked away from the

residence to a wooded area to inspect the shed. (Id. at 12). As Jordan approached the shed, 7

he smelled “a strong odor of ammonia.” (Id. at 13). He also noted that the shed had mounted

motion sensors and closed circuit surveillance cameras, and it appeared that there was power

running to the shed. (Id. at 14-15). Finally, behind the shed, Jordan discovered a compressed

gas cylinder tank with corrosion on the value. (Id. at 15-16). According to Jordan,

[o]nce we began smelling the ammonia, found the tank, saw the camera

systems and knew we had power going to the trailer, and that it was – the

standard door was locked from the inside, we weren’t sure what the safest

method would be to breach the door and make entry. I consulted with Mr.

Maddox and he stated that he had a high pressure water cannon system that

they use. They are able to breach windows without detonating anything that

might be attached and then we could use a mirror system to look around the

inside and see if anything appeared booby trapped to the doors.

(Id. at 17).

Using the water cannon, the officers were able to breach the window. (Id. at 24).

After determining that the shed was not booby-trapped, the officers entered the shed and

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 5 of 17
 Because one of the ATVs was stolen in Alabama, it is not the subject of the indictment in this case. 8

 Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides that “[]he right of the people to be secure in their

9

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”

6

seized three firearms, and two stolen four-wheel all terrain vehicles. (Id. at 20-22). 8

After examining the shed, the officers followed “an obvious, well-worn trail” into the

woods, and discovered there a pick-up truck. Visible in the bed of the truck were

compressed gas cylinders and other items used in the making of methamphetamine. (Id. at

23). Locating the vehicle identification number (“VIN”), the officers were able to determine

that the truck was stolen in the state of Georgia. Jason Cofield was subsequently indicted

for being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm and receiving stolen property. 

DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. AMEND. IV. “The Amendment protects persons against unreasonable searches of 9

“their persons [and] houses.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). The Fourth

Amendment further provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and

the persons or things to be seized.” Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when

“there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular

place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); United States v. Brundidge, 170 F.3d

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 6 of 17
7

1350, 1352 (11 Cir. 1999). Evidence seized as the result of an illegal search may not be th

used by the government in a subsequent criminal prosecution. United States v. Martin, 297

F.3d 1308, 1312 (11 Cir. 2002). th

A. Search Warrant

Although it is difficult to discern the exact nature of Jason’s arguments, the court

construes Jason’s position to be that the evidence taken from his shed during the search

conducted on January 24, 2006, should be suppressed because the warrant secured by Surrett

did not authorize the search of his residence or property within the curtilage. In the

alternative, Jason argues that Surrett did not have a warrant to search his property. 

It is undisputed that the search warrant at issue authorized the search of Kenny’s

residence. The question before the court is whether that warrant also authorized the search

of Jason’s residence. The court looks to the four corners of the state court warrant to

determine whether the warrant established probable cause for the officers to search Jason’s

residence. The issuing judge had before him the application for a search warrant and

Surrett’s affidavit. Except for the one mention of the “Cofields” the documents refer to only

a single defendant and a single residence, notwithstanding Surrett’s use of the word “alias.”

Webster’s Dictionary defines the term “alias” as

otherwise called: otherwise known as – used esp. in legal proceedings to

connect the different names of anyone who has gone by or been known by two

or more names; . .. another name; ... an assumed name. 

Webster’s New International Dictionary 53 (3 ed. 1966 unabridged). rd

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “alias” as “[a]n assumed or additional name that a

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 7 of 17
8

person has used or is known by.” Black’s Law Dictionary 79 (8 ed. 2004). Based on these th

definitions and the common understanding of the meaning of the word “alias,” the court must

conclude that a reasonable person in the issuing judge’s position would not construe the

application or affidavit as requesting permission to search the residences of four different

people. The mere fact that the Lee County Sheriff’s department uses the term “alias” to

describe multiple defendants or to protect against typographic errors does not save this

warrant. 

During argument about the warrant, the Assistant United States Attorney opined that

“there’s no question that this warrant will not end up in the warrant hall of fame.” The court

agrees. Surrett testified that he knew that Jason, Brian and Michael were Kenny’s sons. The

affidavit recites that Surrett had probable cause to believe that methamphetamine was being

manufactured at the residence of Willis ‘Kenny’ Cofield. There is nothing in the warrant to

connect the warrant to Jason Cofield’s residence. There is nothing within the four corners

of the affidavit which shows there existed a fair probability that Jason Cofield’s residence

would contain evidence of the crime of manufacturing methamphetamine or that Jason

Cofield’s residence was the object of the warrant. Accordingly, after careful consideration,

the court concludes that the warrant issued for the search of Kenny’s residence did not

authorize the search of Jason’s residence. 

The United States contends that Jason’s residence falls within the curtilage of Kenny’s

home. “What is curtilage is a question of fact.” United States v. Berrong, 712 F. 2d 1370,

1374 (11 Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court has th

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 8 of 17
 See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding 10 th

precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

9

recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and

that the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether

an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated

as the home itself. We identified the central component of this inquiry as

whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of

a man’s home and the privacies of life.’”

. . . 

“[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four

factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether

the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of

the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect

the area from observation by people passing by.” 

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 300-01 (1987) quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,

180 (1984) (internal citation omitted). In this case, Jason’s residence was 800 feet away from

Kenny’s residence and was separated by fencing which enclosed Kenny’s residence. Jason’s

shed stood even further from Kenny’s property, behind Jason’s residence. Moreover, it

hardly seems necessary to point out that another person’s home, even a son’s home, is hardly

a place which harbors the intimate activities of another man’s home and his privacies.

Additionally, it is undisputed that the shed which was searched falls within the

curtilage of Jason’s residence. See United States v. Williams, 581 F.2d 451, 454 (5 Cir.

th

1978) (shed on property falls within the curtilage of residence). See also Walker v. United 10

States, 225 F.2d 447, 449 (5 Cir. 1955) (barn “was a domestic building constituting an th

integral part of that group of structures making up the farm home.”) 

For the reasons as stated, the court concludes that the warrant did not establish

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 9 of 17
10

probable cause for the search of Jason’s residence on the shed within the curtilage.

B. Exigent Circumstances to Search Shed

At the supplemental evidentiary hearing, the United States argued that, in the event

the court found that the search warrant did not authorize the officers to search Jason’s

residence and curtilage, exigent circumstances existed to permit the search of the shed. See,

e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325

(11 Cir. 1983) (A warrantless entry must be justified not only by probable cause but also by th

exigent circumstances).

Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively

unreasonable, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), unless there exists probable

cause and certain, limited exigent circumstances. See, e.g., Warden, supra; United States v.

Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11 Cir. 1983) (A warrantless entry must be justified not only th

by probable cause but also by exigent circumstances). The exigent circumstances doctrine

recognizes several common situations where police need not take time to secure a warrant

as in the case, for example, of a hot pursuit. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43

(1976). “Exigent circumstances” refer to a situation where delay incident to obtaining a

warrant must give way to an urgent need for immediate action such as when resort to a

warrant might endanger the police or the public. See e.g., Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.

433, 447 (1973). For example, in United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520 (11 Cir. 1983), th

officers had a reasonable belief that a house was laden with weapons and occupied by a

number of people. 

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 10 of 17
11

The threat of injury to the neighborhood and arresting officers justified the

avoidance of delay involved in obtaining a warrant. Quick action increased the

likelihood that no one would be injured. “The Fourth Amendment does not

require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so

would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.” Warden v. Hayden,

387 U.S. 294, 298- 299, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1967).

Only by entering the house and searching for persons and weapons could the

agents have control of all weapons which could be used against them or to

effect an escape. The societal costs of delay outweighed the social interest in

resort to a neutral magistrate in this instance. The exigencies of this situation

made the warrantless entry lawful.

Burgos, 720 F.2d at 1526. 

As the Supreme Court constantly reminds us, the principal Fourth Amendment

question is always “reasonableness.” 

Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is

“reasonableness,” the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions.

Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13, 120 S.Ct. 7, 145 L.Ed.2d 16 (1999)

(per curiam); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19

L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). We have held, for example, that law enforcement officers

may make a warrantless entry onto private property to fight a fire and

investigate its cause, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56

L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, Ker v.

California, 374 U.S. 23, 40, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), or to

engage in “hot pursuit” of a fleeing suspect, United States v. Santana, 427 U.S.

38, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). “[W]arrants are generally

required to search a person's home or his person unless ‘the exigencies of the

situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-394, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290

(1978).

Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart,___ U.S.___, ___,126 S.Ct. 1943, 1947 (2006).

In the instant case, Jordan testified that as he approached the shed, he smelled

ammonia. He also observed that the shed had motion sensors, closed circuit surveillance

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12

cameras, and power running to the shed. According to Jordan, the officers were concerned

about the possibility of the shed being booby-trapped.

Once we began smelling the ammonia, found the tank, saw the camera systems

and knew we had power going to the trailer, and that it was – the standard door

was locked from the inside, we weren’t sure what the safest method would be

to breach the door and make entry. I consulted with Mr. Maddox and he stated

that he had a high pressure water cannon system that they use. They are able

to breach windows without detonating anything that might be attached and

then we could use a mirror system to look around the inside and see if anything

appeared booby trapped to the doors.

(Supp. Evid. H’rg Tr. at 17).

The officers were able to use the water cannon to breach the window and determine

that the shed was not booby-trapped. (Id. at 24). Certainly, the potential harm to officers

and others of booby traps is the type of circumstance that permitted the officers to breach the

shed windows with the water cannon. However, once the officers determined that the shed

was not booby-trapped, the exigency ended and there was no reasonable basis for the officers

to continue their intrusion. Accordingly, because there were no exigent circumstances when

they entered the shed and searched, the warrantless search was not justified. In short, all of

the evidence seized as a result of the search of Jason’s shed is due to be suppressed unless

Leon’s good faith exception applies. The court turns to that question now.

C. The “Leon” Good Faith Exception to the Warrant Requirement

The government argues that the evidence seized from the shed is admissible under the

good faith exception established in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). In Leon, the

Supreme Court recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for searches

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13

conducted pursuant to warrants. Observing that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to

deter unlawful police conduct, the Court found that this purpose would not be served, and

the rule should not be applied, when officers engage in “objectively reasonable law

enforcement activity.” 468 U.S. at 918-19. In particular, the Court held that the suppression

of evidence would have no deterrent effect “when an officer acting with objective good faith

has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope.” Id. at

920. Under Leon, searches conducted pursuant to warrants will rarely require suppression;

however, the Leon court did identify four situations in which suppression would still be

appropriate. Id. at 923. These situations are: (1) where “the magistrate or judge in issuing

a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would

have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;” (2) “where the issuing

magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role in the manner condemned in” Lo-Ji Sales, Inc.

v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979); (3) where the affidavit supporting the warrant is “so

lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable;” and (4) where, depending upon the circumstances of the particular case, a

warrant is “so facially deficient – i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or

the things to be seized – that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The first step for the court, therefore, is to determine if any of the four circumstances

exist in this case. The first Leon limitation, whether the magistrate judge in issuing a warrant

was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have

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14

known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth, is not applicable. Cofield

concedes that Surrett did not lie to the magistrate to secure the search warrant. 

To some extent, Cofield appears to argue that Surrett made “misrepresentations by

omission,” by failing to inform the judge that Jason, Brian, Kevin and Michael were Kenny

Cofield’s sons and that the warrant was intended to search multiple residences. Cofield’s

argument fails for the simple reason that he concedes that Surrett’s statements were not false.

Further, Jason Cofield has not shown that these statements were made for the purpose of

misleading the issuing Judge. Next, nothing in this case suggests that the judge who issued

the warrant abandoned his judicial role. Consequently, the first two grounds are inapplicable

here. 

The remaining Leon limitations are whether the warrant is based on an affidavit so

lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable and whether the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officers

cannot reasonably presume it to be valid. The fundamental problem in this case, which the

government cannot overcome, is that Jordan testified that he was the officer tasked with

searching Jason’s residence, and that he never read the warrant or the affidavit.

Consequently, he could not have reasonably and in good faith relied on the warrant or the

affidavit. 

In Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 556 (2004), the Court commented on the opinion

of the court of appeals as follows:

With respect to petitioner, the court read our opinion in United States v. Leon,

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 14 of 17
15

468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), as precluding qualified immunity for the

leader of a search who fails to “read the warrant and satisfy [himself] that [he]

understand[s] its scope and limitations, and that it is not defective in some

obvious way.” 298 F.3d, at 1027. The court added that “[t]he leaders of the

search team must also make sure that a copy of the warrant is available to give

to the person whose property is being searched at the commencement of the

search, and that such copy has no missing pages or other obvious defects.”

Ibid. (footnote omitted).

Concluding that “[i]t is incumbent on the officer executing a search warrant to ensure

the search is lawfully authorized and lawfully conducted,” the Supreme Court explicitly

agreed with the analysis of the court of appeals about the duty of an officer to read and

understand a warrant:

The Court of Appeals’ decision is consistent with this principle. Petitioner

mischaracterizes the court's decision when he contends that it imposed a novel

proofreading requirement on officers executing warrants. The court held that

officers leading a search team must “mak[e] sure that they have a proper

warrant that in fact authorizes the search and seizure they are about to

conduct.” 298 F.3d 1022, 1027 (C.A.9 2002). That is not a duty to proofread;

it is, rather, a duty to ensure that the warrant conforms to constitutional

requirements.

Groh, 540 U.S. at 563 n. 6. Because Jordan did not read the warrant, his reliance on it was

not reasonable or in good faith. The court concludes that Leon does not protect the search

and seizure from suppression in this case.

D. The Pick-Up Truck

After searching Jason’s shed, the officers followed a well-worn path through the

woods, discovering a stolen pick-up truck. The defendant’s argument that the pick-up truck

should be suppressed is without merit. It is undisputed that the truck was hidden in the

woods behind Jason’s resident and was not part of the curtilage. The law is well-established

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 15 of 17
This case is presently set for jury selection on and trial during the trial term that begins on March 11

12, 2007. Consequently, the court shortens the time for filing objections so that the District Judge will have

a reasonable amount of time to consider any objections and to make final disposition of the suppression

motion.

16

that “there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in . . . open fields, even if fenced, unless

they are part of the curtilage, or the immediate appurtenances, of a home.” United States v.

Long, 674 F.2d 848, 853 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 th

(1924) (Fourth Amendment’s protection does not extend to open fields.); United States v.

Hodges, 243 F.2d 281, 283 (5 Cir. 1957) (Fourth Amendment does not protect against th

trespass in an open field). This is so because a person does not have a legitimate expectation

of privacy in open fields. Consequently, the stolen pick-truck was not seized in violation of

the Fourth Amendment. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judgeas follows:

1. That the defendant’s motion to suppress be granted with respect to the evidence

seized in the search of Jason Cofield’s residence and shed. 

2. That the defendant’s motion to suppress be denied with to the stolen pick-up truck.

 It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on

or before March 6, 2007. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in 11

the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party objects. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court.

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17

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge's report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

Done this 23 day of February, 2007. rd

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:06-cr-00208-MEF-CSC Document 41 Filed 02/23/2007 Page 17 of 17