United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Fisheries and Coast Guard, Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation, U.S. Senate 

COAST GUARD 

Condition of Some 

Aids-to-Navigation 

and Domestic 

Icebreaking Vessels 

Has Declined; Effect 

on Mission 

Performance Appears 

Mixed 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-979 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

COAST GUARD

Condition of Some Aids-to-Navigation 

and Domestic Icebreaking Vessels Has 

Declined; Effect on Mission Performance 

Appears Mixed 

Highlights of GAO-06-979, a report to the 

Subcommittee on Fisheries and Coast 

Guard, Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate 

The marine transportation system 

is a critical part of the nation’s 

infrastructure. To facilitate the

safety and efficiency of this system, 

the Coast Guard maintains aids-tonavigation (ATON), such as buoys 

and beacons, and conducts

domestic icebreaking in the Great 

Lakes, St. Lawrence Seaway, and

northeast coast. To conduct these

missions, the Coast Guard has a 

fleet of more than 200 vessels, 

ranging from 225-foot seagoing 

buoy tenders and 140-foot domestic 

icebreakers to 21-foot boats. After

the terrorist attacks of September 

11, 2001, many of these assets took 

on additional responsibilities for 

security patrols and other

homeland security duties. Although

some assets have been recently 

acquired, many others are reaching 

or have exceeded their design

service lives, raising concerns 

about how well and for how much

longer these older assets may be

able to carry out their missions. In 

response, GAO examined 

(1) recent trends in the amount of

time these assets have spent 

performing missions; (2) asset 

condition and its effect on mission 

performance; and (3) the actions 

taken by the Coast Guard to 

continue to achieve the missions of

these assets. 

To conduct this work, GAO

reviewed Coast Guard documents,

interviewed Coast Guard officials,

and made site visits to various 

locations around the country. 

In commenting on a draft of this 

report, the Coast Guard provided

technical comments, which were

incorporated as appropriate. 

Many ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers have operated more hours in 

recent years than in previous years, with the increase coming mainly in 

homeland security missions. Domestic icebreakers are now used more for 

homeland security than for icebreaking, reflecting their availability at times 

of the year when no icebreaking is needed. While not designed for homeland 

security, the assets can perform such duties acceptably, according to the 

Coast Guard. Most ATON vessels are used primarily for ATON activities. 

Newer ATON assets receive the greatest use on other missions, reflecting 

their greater multi-mission capabilities. 

Trends are mixed with regard to asset condition and mission performance. 

Available evidence, such as the amount of maintenance conducted, suggests 

condition is declining for some assets, though not precipitously. Coast Guard 

officials said some assets, while being operated for more hours, are still 

largely being operated within planned limits. Against this backdrop, 

indicators for measuring performance show mixed results: some have 

declined, while others have not. The current measure for asset condition is 

not clearly linked to mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working 

on developing a measure that links the two. 

Actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve the missions of 

these assets include revising maintenance approaches and developing a new 

analytical tool for deciding which projects provide the most capability for 

the dollars invested. The Coast Guard continues to acquire some new vessels 

to replace aging ones, but proposals to rehabilitate or replace other aging 

vessels have not been implemented, largely because of other funding 

priorities. The Coast Guard also studied the feasibility of contracting out 

some activities. While some possibilities for outsourcing were identified in 

the study, the Coast Guard has identified potential disadvantages to 

outsourcing these activities. 

Coast Guard Buoy Tender (left) and Domestic Icebreaker (right) 

Source: Coast Guard.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-979.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Stephen L. 

Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or 

caldwells@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

Icebreaking and ATON Assets Show Significant Increases in Time 

Spent on Homeland Security Missions since 2001 11 

Available Evidence Indicates Condition of Assets Varies Greatly 

and Mixed Impact on Mission Performance 17 

To Continue to Achieve the Missions of Its ATON and Domestic 

Icebreaking Assets, the Coast Guard Has Taken Actions, Made 

Proposals, and Studied Outsourcing Possibilities 28 

Concluding Observations 37 

Agency Comments 39 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 40 

Appendix II Mission Resource Hours of ATON and Domestic 

Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 42 

Appendix III Condition Measure of ATON and Domestic 

Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2000 to 2005 48 

Appendix IV Maintenance Trends of ATON Cutter and Domestic 

Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 51 

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 53 

Related GAO Products 54 

Page i GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Tables 

Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs 

by Mission Area 6 

Table 2: Aids-to-Navigation Assets 9 

Table 3: Domestic Icebreaking Assets 11 

Table 4: Comparison of Features of the 87-foot Patrol Boats and 

Domestic Icebreakers 15 

Table 5: Condition of Domestic Icebreakers and ATON Cutters as 

Measured by Coast Guard’s Standard of 72 Percent or 

More of Time Free of Major Casualties, Fiscal Years 

2000 through 2004 18 

Table 6: Availability of Navigational Aids, Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2005 27 

Table 7: Approaches to Replace or Rehabilitate ATON and 

Domestic Icebreaking Assets under the Integrated ATON 

Platform Modernization Project 34 

Table 8: Resource Hour Usage and Percent, by Asset Type and 

Mission Program, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 42 

Table 9: Percent of Time Free of Major Casualties for ATON and 

Domestic Icebreaking Cutters, Fiscal Years 2000 through 

2004 48 

Table 10: Condition of ATON Boats as Evidenced by POTF and 

Internal Coast Guard Assessment 50 

Table 11: Maintenance Costs for ATON Cutters and Domestic 

Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 51 

Page ii GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figures 

Figure 1: Examples of a Buoy and a Fixed Aid-to-Navigation 8 

Figure 2: Resource Hours for Domestic Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 

2001 through 2005 13 

Figure 3: Resource Hours for ATON Assets, Fiscal Years 2001

through 2005 16 

Figure 4: Domestic Icebreaking Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal 

Years 2001 through 2005 21 

Figure 5: ATON Cutter Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2005 22 

Figure 6: Antiquated Circuit Card Rack, Which Serves as Part of the 

Main Propulsion Control System, on the 140-foot 

Icebreaking Tug 23 

Figure 7: Average Number of Collisions, Allisions, and Groundings, 

Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 26 

Figure 8: Chain-in Haul Winch 32 

Abbreviations 

AOPS Abstract of Operations 

ATON Aids-to-Navigation 

CAMS Capital Asset Management Strategy 

DOD Department of Defense 

ELC Engineering Logistic Center 

OMB Office of Management and Budget 

POTF Percent of Time Free of major casualties 

PWCS Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security

SSMEB ship structure and machinery evaluation boards 

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Page iii GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 22, 2006 

The Honorable Olympia Snowe 

Chair 

The Honorable Maria Cantwell 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Fisheries and Coast Guard, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Olympia Snowe 

Chair 

The Honorable Maria Cantwell 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Fisheries and Coast Guard, 

Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation 

United States Senate 

The marine transportation system, which allows for the transportation of 

people and goods on the water, is a vast and critical part of the nation’s 

infrastructure. The system includes coastal ports and shipping channels; 

25,000 miles of navigable inland and coastal channels and waterways like 

the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Snake rivers; and shipping on

the Great Lakes. Ninety-five percent of the United States’ overseas trade 

tonnage moves by water, and the cargo moving through the U.S. marine 

transportation system contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the 

U.S. gross domestic product. This system also enables the swift 

mobilization and supply of America’s military as well as providing 

recreational value to millions of boaters, fishermen, and cruise passengers. 

The marine transportation system, which allows for the transportation of 

people and goods on the water, is a vast and critical part of the nation’s 

infrastructure. The system includes coastal ports and shipping channels; 

25,000 miles of navigable inland and coastal channels and waterways like 

the Mississippi, St. Lawrence, Columbia and Snake rivers; and shipping on

the Great Lakes. Ninety-five percent of the United States’ overseas trade 

tonnage moves by water, and the cargo moving through the U.S. marine 

transportation system contributes hundreds of billions of dollars to the 

U.S. gross domestic product. This system also enables the swift 

mobilization and supply of America’s military as well as providing 

recreational value to millions of boaters, fishermen, and cruise passengers. 

The Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, providing a safe, 

efficient, and navigable waterway system, and it carries out this role 

through its aids-to-navigation (ATON) and domestic icebreaking missions. 

In its ATON mission, the Coast Guard establishes and maintains over 

53,000 navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons, to assist mariners 

and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. To carry out this mission, the 

Coast Guard uses a diverse fleet of more than 200 vessels ranging from 

225-foot buoy tenders to 21-foot boats that can be transported on trailers 

by truck. In its domestic icebreaking mission, the Coast Guard breaks ice 

in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the northeast U.S. coast.1

This activity is intended to facilitate navigation for commerce, conduct 

search and rescue missions, and prevent flooding. To carry out this 

The Coast Guard is responsible for, among other things, providing a safe, 

efficient, and navigable waterway system, and it carries out this role 

through its aids-to-navigation (ATON) and domestic icebreaking missions. 

In its ATON mission, the Coast Guard establishes and maintains over 

53,000 navigational aids, such as buoys and beacons, to assist mariners 

and prevent disasters, collisions, or wrecks. To carry out this mission, the 

Coast Guard uses a diverse fleet of more than 200 vessels ranging from 

225-foot buoy tenders to 21-foot boats that can be transported on trailers 

by truck. In its domestic icebreaking mission, the Coast Guard breaks ice 

in the Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence Seaway, and the northeast U.S. coast.

 

1

This activity is intended to facilitate navigation for commerce, conduct 

search and rescue missions, and prevent flooding. To carry out this 

1

 The Coast Guard is also responsible for operating and maintaining the nation’s fleet of

polar icebreakers. We did not examine those polar icebreaking assets as part of this review.

Page 1 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
mission, the Coast Guard largely relies on 11 65-foot and 9 140-foot 

icebreaking cutters.2

While some of these vessels have come on line in the past few years, many 

are old and are reaching or have exceeded their designed service lives. 

Their age has raised concerns within the Coast Guard as to how well and 

for how much longer they will be able to carry out their missions. In 

addition, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, many ATON and 

icebreaking vessels took on additional responsibilities for security patrols 

and other homeland security activities. In this context, this report 

examines (1) the recent trends in the amount of time ATON and domestic 

icebreaking assets have spent performing various missions and the impact 

of these trends on their primary missions; (2) the condition of the ATON 

and domestic icebreaking assets and the impact of their condition on 

performing their primary missions; and (3) the actions the Coast Guard 

has taken to continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic 

icebreaking assets. 

To address the first two objectives, we analyzed a variety of Coast Guard 

data and records, focusing on fiscal years 2001 through 2005. We also 

made site visits to assets located on the West and East Coasts, Gulf Coast, 

Great Lakes, and inland rivers and met with the assets’ crews to obtain 

their views on the condition of their assets. These assets were selected to

provide diversity in terms of type, age of asset, and geographic location.

To address the third objective, we met with Coast Guard officials at 

headquarters to discuss recent acquisitions and specific management 

actions they have taken or are in the process of taking. We also obtained 

and reviewed information and documents on the Coast Guard’s plans to 

rehabilitate or replace the assets or study outsourcing to carry out 

missions. More details on our scope and methodology can be found in 

appendix I of this report. We conducted our work between July 2005 and 

August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing

standards. 

 2

 The Coast Guard defines a cutter as any Coast Guard vessel 65 feet in length or greater, 

having adequate accommodations for crew to live on board. Boats are defined as those 

vessels under 65 feet in length that usually operate near shore and on inland waterways. 

Page 2 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Many of the Coast Guard’s ATON vessels and domestic icebreakers saw a 

sharp increase in use for homeland security missions after the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, and while this trend has moderated somewhat, the 

use of some assets in these missions continues well above pre-September

11 levels. This increase was most prominent for domestic icebreakers, 

which continue to be used more for homeland security than for 

icebreaking. Rather than being diverted from icebreaking activities when 

needed for this mission, these icebreakers are basically being operated 

more extensively at other times of the year when no icebreaking needs to 

be done. In some cases, this more extensive use has caused some assets to

be operated at levels exceeding the recommended levels. Coast Guard 

officials said that while these icebreakers are not specifically designed for

security patrols and other homeland security activities, they can perform 

such duties acceptably, though at less than optimal levels. In contrast to 

the icebreakers, most ATON vessels continue to be used primarily for 

ATON activities, reflecting the greater year-round nature of ATON activity. 

ATON vessels have devoted additional hours to other missions and this 

reflects primarily an overall increase in the number of hours the ATON 

vessels are used, especially the larger assets. Newer ATON vessels, which 

generally have greater multiple-mission capabilities than older ATON 

vessels, tend to be the ATON assets used the most for other missions. 

Results in Brief 

Available evidence shows mixed trends with regard to both the condition 

of these assets and the impact this condition has on the Coast Guard’s 

ability to perform its ATON and domestic icebreaking missions. The Coast 

Guard’s current measure of a vessel’s condition—the percentage of time it 

is free of major casualties—is inadequate to link the assets’ condition to 

any degradation in mission capabilities or performance and, therefore, 

may reflect a more positive condition. The Coast Guard is currently 

working on a new measure that should better link condition with mission 

degradation. Other evidence, such as the amount of maintenance 

conducted and anecdotal evidence we gathered, suggests that as these 

assets continue to age, their condition is declining, though not 

precipitously. For example, according to a program official who previously 

served as a commanding officer on an icebreaker, stated that the decline 

in condition of those assets has not been beyond what would be expected 

of assets 20 years or more of age. Our site visits showed that, on these 

older assets, crew members are spending increasing amounts of time and 

resources to troubleshoot and resolve maintenance issues. They indicated 

that because the systems and parts are outdated compared with the 

technology and equipment available today, it can be challenging and time 

consuming to diagnose a maintenance issue and find parts or determine 

what corrective action to take. For example, the propulsion control 

Page 3 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
system on the 140-foot icebreaking tugs uses circuit cards that are no 

longer manufactured and have been superseded by computer control 

systems. While some assets are being operated more extensively than in 

the past to meet additional responsibilities, particularly homeland 

security, Coast Guard officials said that overages can have an impact on 

some assets, especially those with more complex systems and subsystems. 

The officials said that exceeding planned usage limits may leave less time 

to maintain these systems. They said that the deterioration of an asset and

its systems from usage consistently above the limits would be reflected in

periodic engineering assessments of the assets. Against this backdrop, 

performance indicators for the two missions show mixed results. A milder 

winter in 2005 may have contributed to the Coast Guard’s ability to meet 

its primary domestic icebreaking performance target, which aims for 

limiting the number of days critical waterways are closed due to ice to 

2 days during average winters. For the ATON mission, the main 

performance measure (the number of collisions, allisions, and groundings) 

has been declining for the past 5 years, indicating continual improvement, 

while a secondary measure (the percentage of time an aid-to-navigation 

system is performing) has been declining over the same period—a 

negative trend.3

 In previous work, we found that many other factors, such 

as severity of weather, also affected outcome on performance measures. 

To continue to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic icebreaking 

assets, the Coast Guard has taken a number of actions to develop program 

management tools or acquire new assets, made proposals to address aging

assets, and conducted a study of what makes the best business case for 

outsourcing: 

• Actions taken or underway include developing a better measure for 

linking an asset’s condition and its ability to carry out missions, a 

revised maintenance approach for newer assets, and a centralized 

system for tracking the condition and maintenance of smaller ATON 

boats. In addition, to better link asset conditions and funding decisions, 

the Coast Guard has developed a benefit-cost analysis tool to analyze 

the trade-offs involved in upgrading assets or continuing to maintain 

them, thereby helping the Coast Guard decide on the combinations of 

projects that will provide the most capability for the dollars invested. 

The Coast Guard has also acquired some newer assets: in 2004, it 

acquired the last of 30 new buoy tenders to replace older coastal and 

 3

 An allision is a collision between a vessel against a fixed or stationary object. 

Page 4 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
seagoing buoy tenders and in 2005, and it acquired a new icebreaker for 

the Great Lakes. These acquisitions have brought improved features to 

the fleet, such as computerized systems for positioning and propulsion 

control, enhanced multimission capabilities, and improved equipment 

for servicing navigation aids. 

• Proposals made include steps to address the remaining aging assets, 

but these steps have not been implemented, largely because of other 

funding priorities. To determine whether to rehabilitate or replace 

assets, Coast Guard officials stated that they use a process that 

considers things such as the condition of the assets and trends in 

maintenance costs. In 2002, the Coast Guard proposed a project to 

systematically rehabilitate or replace its other aging ATON and 

domestic icebreaking assets. Requests for funding this project have 

been denied or deferred by the Department of Homeland Security or 

the Office of Management and Budget since fiscal year 2004, apparently 

due to competition for limited resources with other Coast Guard 

initiatives, such as the Deepwater project for replacing cutters and 

aircraft used far out at sea. As a result, parts of the project have been 

separated into smaller components with lower funding requirements. 

For example, in 2006, the Coast Guard began acquiring new trailerable 

ATON boats to replace 80 boats currently in use. Of these smaller 

components, only this new boat acquisition has received funding. 

• The study conducted looked at what activities make the best business 

case for being outsourced to the private sector. While recognizing that, 

at the time of the study some ATON activities were being contracted to 

commercial sources on a limited basis, the study suggested that some 

asset classes related to the Coast Guard’s ATON activities might be 

outsourced and merited further examination. However, according to 

the Coast Guard, potential disadvantages to outsourcing exist such as 

reduction of the Coast Guard’s capacity to respond to hurricanes and 

other emergencies and disruption of the Coast Guard’s personnel 

structure and ability to attract and retain personnel. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Coast Guard for review. The Coast Guard provided 

technical comments, which have been incorporated where appropriate. 

Page 5 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
The US Coast Guard is a multimission, maritime military service within the 

Department of Homeland Security. The Coast Guard has responsibilities 

that fall under two broad missions—homeland security and non–homeland 

security.4

 (See table 1.) 

Background 

Table 1: Homeland Security and Non-Homeland Security Programs by Mission Area 

Mission and program Activities and functions of each program

Homeland security missions

Ports, waterways, and coastal

security 

Conducting harbor patrols, vulnerability assessments, intelligence gathering and analysis, and 

other activities to prevent terrorist attacks and minimize the damage form attacks that occur.

Undocumented migrant interdiction Deploying cutters and aircraft to reduce the flow of undocumented migrants entering the 

United States by maritime routes. 

Defense readiness Participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in global military operations, deploying

cutters and other boats in and around harbors to protect DOD force mobilization operations. 

Illegal drug interdiction Deploying cutters and aircraft in high drug trafficking areas and gathering intelligence to 

reduce the flow of illegal drugs through maritime transit routes. 

Other law enforcement (foreign fish 

enforcement) 

Protecting US fishing grounds by ensuring that foreign fishermen do not illegally harvest US 

fish stocks. 

Non-homeland security missions

Search and rescue Operating multi-mission stations, and a national distress and response communication system, 

conducting search and rescue operations for mariners in distress. 

Living marine resources Enforcing domestic fishing laws and regulations through inspections and fishery patrols. 

Aids-to-navigation Managing US waterways and providing a safe, efficient and navigable marine transportation 

system; maintaining the extensive system of navigation aids; monitoring marine traffic through 

vessel traffic service centers. 

Ice operations Conducting polar operations to facilitate the movement of critical goods and personnel in 

support of scientific and national security activity; conducting domestic icebreaking operations 

to facilitate year-round commerce; conducting international ice operations to track icebergs 

below the 48th north latitude. 

Marine environmental protection Preventing and responding to marine oil and chemical spills; preventing the illegal dumping of 

plastics and garbage in US waters; preventing biological invasions by aquatic nuisance 

species. 

Marine safety Setting standards and conducting vessel inspections to better ensure the safety of passengers 

and crew aboard commercial vessels; partnering with states and boating safety organizations 

to reduce recreational boating deaths. 

Source: Coast Guard. 

 4

 The Coast Guard’s homeland security and non–homeland security missions are delineated 

in section 888 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2249 

(2002)). Starting with the fiscal year 2007 budget, however, OMB has designated the Coast 

Guard's drug interdiction and other law enforcement programs as non-homeland security 

missions for budgetary purposes. 

Page 6 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
One of the Coast Guard’s strategic goals is maritime mobility, that is, to 

facilitate maritime commerce, eliminate interruptions and impediments to 

the movement of goods and people, and maximize access to and 

enjoyment of the water. The two non-homeland security missions through 

which the Coast Guard achieves this goal are aids–to-navigation (ATON) 

and domestic icebreaking, which is part of ice operations. 

Aids-to-Navigation Mission Through its ATON mission, the Coast Guard promotes safe waterways and 

an efficient Marine Transportation System. The Coast Guard has statutory 

responsibility to operate and maintain a system of maritime aids to 

facilitate navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and wrecks.5

 To 

fulfill this mission, the Coast Guard operates over 53,000 aids. These aidsto-navigation are like road signs of the waterways and are placed along 

coasts and navigable waters as guides to mark safe water and to assist 

mariners in determining their position in relation to land and hidden 

dangers. These aids consist of both floating aids, such as buoys, and fixed

aids, such as lights or signs mounted on pilings. See figure 1 for an 

example of a buoy and fixed aid-to-navigation. 

 5

 The Coast Guard’s statutory aids-to-navigation authorities include, for example, 

14 U.S.C. § 2, and 14 U.S.C. § 81. 

Page 7 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 1: Examples of a Buoy and a Fixed Aid-to-Navigation 

Source: Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard uses several types of vessels to place and service its aidsto-navigation such as buoy tenders, construction tenders, and boats that 

make up its ATON fleet. These vessels are used to perform both periodic 

routine maintenance of aids and discrepancy response, when, for example, 

a light is extinguished or a buoy is moved from its intended location. The 

assets are shown in table 2. 

Page 8 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Table 2: Aids-to-Navigation Assets 

Asset 

type 

Number 

of 

assets 

Asset 

description

Asset 

photograph 

225-foot 

seagoing 

buoy tenders 

16 The seagoing buoy tenders service and maintain coastal and offshore aids to navigation 

in exposed locations. They have a crew size of 40 to 48, a maximum speed of 15 knots 

and a range of 6,000 nautical miles. They have a lifting capacity of 20 tons and a cargo 

capacity of 75 tons. These tenders were commissioned between 1996 and 2004. 

175-foot 

coastal buoy 

tenders 

14 The coastal buoy tenders service and maintain coastal and offshore aids to navigation. 

They have a planned crew size of 19 to 26 and a maximum speed of 13 knots. They 

have a lifting capacity of 10 tons and a cargo capacity of 40 tons. These tenders were 

commissioned between 1997 and 2000. 

160-foot/ 

100-foot/ 

75-foot inland 

construction

tenders 

13 The inland construction tenders construct, maintain, and remove aids to navigation 

along the Intra-coastal waterway system. They have a planned crew size of 13 to 14, a 

maximum speed of 9 to 11 knots, and a range of 1,300-5,350 nautical miles. The 100-

foot and 75-foot tenders push construction barges. These tenders were commissioned 

between 1944 and 1976. 

75-foot/ 

65-foot river 

buoy tenders 

18 The river tenders push 90-foot to 130-foot barges and maintain short-range aids to 

navigation in the Mississippi River, its tributaries, and other rivers that flow into the Gulf 

of Mexico. They have a crew size of 12 to 13, a maximum speed of 9 to 11 knots, and 

an operating range of 3,000 to 3,500 nautical miles. These tenders were commissioned 

between 1960 and 1990. 

100-foot/ 

65-foot inland 

buoy tenders 

15 The inland buoy tenders service and maintain aids to navigation in remote waterways far 

from readily accessible logistics support. They have a planned crew size of 8 to 18, a 

maximum speed of 9 to 10 knots, and an operating range of 600-1,200 nautical miles. 

The 100-foot cutters have a lifting capacity of 5 tons and a cargo capacity of 56,000 lbs. 

The 65-foot cutter has a lifting capacity of 2 tons and a cargo capacity of 13,500 lbs. 

These tenders were commissioned between 1944 and 1963.

72-foot cable 

laying boat 

11 The cable boat maintains shore power to offshore aids to navigation that cannot be 

powered by solar means. It has a planned crew size of 4, a maximum speed of 11 

knots, and an operating range of up to 225 nautical miles. It has a cargo capacity of 

20,000 lbs. This boat was commissioned in 1953. 

64-foot aidsto-navigation 

boats 

13 The 64-foot boats conduct aids to navigation work on the inland rivers. They have a 

planned crew size of four, a maximum speed of 9 knots, an operating range of 500 

nautical miles, and a lifting capacity of 4,500lbs. The cargo capacity of these vessels is 

30,000 lbs. These vessels were built in 1995.

63-foot aidsto-navigation 

boats 

11 The 63-foot boat is designed to work small floating aids to navigation. It has a planned 

crew size of six, a maximum speed of 15 knots, and an operating range of 300 nautical

miles. It also has a lifting capacity of 14,000 lbs and a cargo capacity of 16,000 lbs. This 

asset was constructed in 1975. 

Page 9 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Asset 

type 

Number 

of 

assets 

Asset 

description

Asset 

photograph 

55-foot aidsto-navigation 

boats 

20 The 55-foot boats service small buoys and service fixed structures. They have a 

planned crew size of 4, a maximum speed of 21.5 knots, and an operating range of 

175 nautical miles. They have a lifting capacity of 2,000/3,000 lbs and a cargo capacity 

of 8,000 lbs. These vessels were constructed from 1977 to 1988. 

49-foot buoy 

stern loading 

boats 

26 The 49-foot boats service buoys on the intra-coastal waterway and in coastal areas. 

They have a planned crew size of four, a maximum speed of 10 knots, an operating 

range of 300 nautical miles, and a lifting capacity of 4,500 lbs. The last boat in this fleet 

completed construction in 2001. 

45-foot buoy 

boats 

12 The 45-foot boats service buoys have a planned crew size of 4, maximum speed of 8.5 

knots, and an operating range of 550 nautical miles. They have a lifting capacity of 

4,000 lbs and a cargo capacity of 20,800lbs. These assets have been in service since 

the 1950s. 

21-foot 

trailerable 

aids-tonavigation 

boat 

80 The 21-foot boats are used to provide discrepancy response in semi-exposed and 

protected waters and to service many of the aids located in shallow water. They have a 

planned crew size of 3 and a maximum speed of 20 knots. They have a lifting capacity 

of 250 lbs and a cargo capacity of 3,500 lbs. These boats were built from 1980 to 1992, 

have an average age of 10-22 years, and have exceeded their original estimated 

service life of 5 to 7 years. 

Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data. Photographs of the 21-foot trailerable aids to navigation boat and inland

construction tender are by GAO. All other photographs are courtesy of the Coast Guard. 

Domestic Icebreaking 

Mission 

Domestic icebreaking is a key component of the Coast Guard’s ice 

operations mission, which facilitates the safe and efficient navigation on 

lakes, rivers, channels, and harbors during the winter season. The Coast 

Guard has statutory icebreaking responsibilities that are additionally 

addressed by an executive order that directs the Coast Guard to break ice

in channels and harbors in order to keep them open to navigation.6

 Like 

plowing snow-covered roads, the Coast Guard keeps areas of water open 

as much as is reasonably possible for commercial traffic in winter. It also 

performs icebreaking for search and rescue and prevention of flooding by 

ice. To conduct this mission, the Coast Guard uses assets that are specially

designed with strengthened hulls. The key icebreaker types the Coast 

Guard uses are shown in table 3. 

 6

 14 U.S.C. § 2; Exec. Order No. 7521, 1 Fed. Reg. 2184 (1936). 

Page 10 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Table 3: Domestic Icebreaking Assets 

Asset 

type 

Number 

of assets 

Asset 

description

Asset 

photograph 

140-foot 

icebreaking 

tugs 

19 The icebreaking tugs are specially configured for breaking ice on the Great Lakes, 

rivers, and coastal waters, and support aids to navigation. They have a crew size of 17 

to 27, a maximum speed of 14.7 knots and an operating range of 4,000 nautical miles. 

Two of these assets are augmented by a 120-foot ATON barge and perform mostly 

ATON mission activities. These vessels were commissioned between 1979 and 1988. 

65-foot small 

harbor tugs 

11 The small harbor tugs perform shallow water icebreaking services and maintain shortrange ATON in rivers and near-shore areas. They also perform port security and 

search and rescue missions. They have a planned crew size of 6, a maximum speed of 

10 knots, and an operating range of 850 nautical miles. These vessels were built 

between 1962 and 1967. 

Source: Developed by GAO from Coast Guard data. Photographs are courtesy of the Coast Guard. 

Note: In June 2006, the Coast Guard commissioned a new 240-foot Great Lakes icebreaker that has 

multi-mission capabilities and will perform both domestic icebreaking and aid-to-navigation as its

primary mission activities. It replaces a 290-foot icebreaker that was commissioned in 1944. Because

the new Great Lakes icebreaker has not yet completed ice trials, we did not include it in this table. 

The Coast Guard classifies its vessel assets, such as those used in the 

ATON and domestic icebreaking missions, as cutters (assets 65 feet long

or longer with adequate accommodations for crew to live on board) or 

boats (assets less than 65 feet in length that usually operate near shore and 

on inland waterways). For purposes of this report, the three main asset 

groups are ATON cutters, ATON boats, and domestic icebreakers. 

Since 2001, the Coast Guard’s domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters 

have experienced significant increases in the time spent conducting 

missions related to homeland security. Most of this increase has come in 

the Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission, which 

involves such activities as conducting security patrols and escorting 

vessels. The increase was greatest for domestic icebreakers, which 

continue to be used more for homeland security missions than for 

icebreaking because of their availability during months when no 

icebreaking is needed. By contrast, ATON cutters and boats still spend 

most of their time on ATON-related activities, reflecting the year-round 

nature of the ATON mission. Some newer ATON cutters with greater 

multi-mission capabilities, however, continue to have a more diverse 

workload. Coast Guard officials said icebreakers and ATON vessels, while 

less than ideal for carrying out security missions, can perform these 

missions adequately. 

Icebreaking and 

ATON Assets Show 

Significant Increases 

in Time Spent on 

Homeland Security 

Missions since 2001 

Page 11 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
During fiscal years 2001 through 2005, the domestic icebreakers divided 

their time between several of the Coast Guard’s 11 missions, but PWCS 

activities accounted for roughly half of all resource hours during fiscal 

years 2002 through 2005.

7

 PWCS activities grew quickly from 15 percent of

total resource hours in fiscal year 2001 to 53 percent in fiscal year 2002, 

and they have remained at 44 percent or more of total hours through fiscal 

year 2005. At the same time, icebreaking hours began at 41 percent in 

fiscal year 2001 and then dropped down to 13 percent in 2002, but ended at 

26 percent in fiscal year 2005. The vast majority of this increase in PWCS 

has occurred in the New York City area with smaller increases in other 

East Coast ports.8

 As figure 2 shows, the increase came about largely by

adding to the total number of hours these assets were operated. The total

number of resource hours for these assets grew from about 12,000 hours

in fiscal year 2002 to a high of about 20,000 the following year. 

Domestic Icebreakers 

Show the Largest Increase 

in Time Spent on 

Homeland Security 

Missions 

 7

 The Coast Guard maintains information, on a program-by-program basis, about how

resources (assets such as ships and boats) are used to conduct its program missions. Each 

hour that these resources are used is called a resource hour. Resource hours do not include 

things such as the time that the resource stands idle or the time that is spent in maintaining 

it. “Support” was also a mission identified by the Coast Guard; however, because this

mission accounted for time spent on non-mission activities such as public affairs and 

training, we did not consider these hours recorded as “Support” to be “resource hours.” 

8

 In addition the Coast Guard also has several icebreakers stationed at locations along the 

East Coast. Of the locations these icebreakers are stationed, the demand for additional 

presence and patrols has been greatest in New York City. Sector New York has a 

requirement of 116 hours per day of PWCS patrols. Other sectors have little or no hours 

required. 

Page 12 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 2: Resource Hours for Domestic Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

Hours

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Fiscal year

All other missions

PWCS

Ice ops

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

The increase in PWCS hours for domestic icebreakers mainly reflects their 

availability during those months when no icebreaking needs to be done.

Icebreaking needs are typically greatest from December 15 to April 15. 

Coast Guard officials said that because icebreakers do not have a primary

summertime mission, using them to conduct PWCS missions during slack 

periods has not limited the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct routine 

icebreaking missions.9

 Icebreaking hours, however, did see some marked 

shifts during this period—most notably a decrease in fiscal year 2002 

followed by a substantial increase in fiscal year 2003. The decrease in 2002

 9

 According to a Coast Guard official, maintenance on the icebreakers is often done during 

the summer period and PWCS missions that occur during this time can result in planned

maintenance being rescheduled. Although the assets have been ready to break ice when

needed so far, the Coast Guard official stated that depending on how much the 

maintenance is delayed as well as whether there are any additional maintenance problems

discovered, the potential exists for the assets not being ready if icebreaking is needed 

earlier than expected. 

Page 13 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
appears related to two main factors: a mild winter, during which the Great 

Lakes region was virtually free of ice throughout December and most of 

January, and a change in the way the Coast Guard accounted for its use of 

icebreakers. The Coast Guard does not record resource hours under two

mission categories simultaneously, and prior to the attacks on September 

11, 2001, resource hours used to break ice while escorting a vessel with 

hazardous cargo would only have been recorded as ice operations. After 

the attacks, these same hours could be logged either as PWCS or 

icebreaking at the discretion of the vessel’s commanding officer. The 

increase in ice operations hours for fiscal year 2003 reflected an unusually 

severe winter in the Great Lakes. 

Increased workloads have placed some icebreakers above the maximum 

number of recommended operating hours for the assets. The maximum 

recommended operating level, called an “underway hours limit,” reflects 

maximum use established from planning documents, missions, and 

maintenance requirements, and historic use. In particular, the 65-foot

small harbor tug fleet exceeded their underway hours limit from fiscal 

years 2001 to 2003 by increasingly more hours, starting with being 

10 hours over the underway limit in 2001 and progressing to nearly 

2,000 hours over the underway limit in 2003. In contrast, the 140-foot 

icebreaking tugs were operated within their underway hours limit from

2001 to 2005. 

Coast Guard officials said domestic icebreakers, while not their vessel of 

choice for maritime security missions, can perform all PWCS missions 

adequately except for shore side patrols.10 The Coast Guard’s 87-foot 

coastal patrol boats are the preferred assets for PWCS missions. 

Commissioned since 1998, these boats can travel at up to 25 knots and 

have a system that allows the crew to launch and recover small boats. 11

Relative to these vessels, domestic icebreakers show both advantages and 

disadvantages (see table 4). Icebreakers are more capable of operating in 

cold weather, and their substantial size provides a significant presence on 

 10 Shore-side patrols typically involve visiting a maritime facility and providing a law 

enforcement presence on land. The patrols are typically conducted by a Coast Guard shore 

unit. 

11 A knot is equivalent to 1 nautical mile per hour, approximately 1.85 kilometers or 

1.15 miles-per-hour. 

Page 14 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
the waterways, but they are slower, less able to launch small boats, and 

pose increased training challenges for training crews in law enforcement.12

Table 4: Comparison of Features of the 87-foot Patrol Boats and Domestic 

Icebreakers 

Feature Patrol boats Domestic icebreakers 

87-foot coastal 

patrol boat 

140-foot 

icebreaking tug

65-foot small 

harbor tug 

Maximum speed 25 knots 14.7 knots 10 knots 

Cold weather capability Limited Yes Yes 

Date commissioned 1998-2006 1979-1988 1962-1967 

Requires additional training of

crew for maritime security 

missions 

No Yes Yes

Source: Coast Guard. 

Increase in Homeland 

Security Missions Is Less 

Extensive for ATON Assets 

ATON assets also experienced an increase in use for homeland security 

missions after September 11, 2001, but to a much lesser degree than for 

domestic icebreakers. Overall, ATON assets were used for several of the 

Coast Guard’s missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005, but ATON 

remained the primary mission, accounting for more than 85 percent of the

fleet’s total resource hours for fiscal years 2001 to 2005. Time spent in 

PWCS activities increased from 4 percent of total resource hours in fiscal 

year 2001 to 10 percent in fiscal year 2002; since then, PWCS mission 

hours have steadily decreased (see fig. 3). Overall, PWCS activities 

accounted for 6 percent of resource hours during the period.

 12 To qualify for these crews, team members and officers must attend training in maritime 

law enforcement, where they are trained in the use of weapons including firearms. 

Page 15 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 3: Resource Hours for ATON Assets, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

Resource hours

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Fiscal year

All other missions

PWCS

ATON

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

When resource hours are analyzed more closely by type of ATON asset, 

there are significant differences in the amount of hours used for the PWCS 

mission. The increase in PWCS resource hours came primarily from 

cutters (vessels ranging in length from 65 to 225 feet). Overall, ATON 

activities account for about 79 percent of total resource hours for the 

cutters, compared with about 90 percent for ATON boats (vessels less 

65 feet in length). ATON boats were the only vessels that did not have as 

much of an increase in PWCS resource hours immediately after the attacks 

on September 11, 2001, though their use in PWCS activities did rise in 

fiscal year 2003. Among the ATON cutters, the newer cutters have greater

multiple mission capabilities and consequently tend to be used more often 

in other missions. For example, ATON cutters acquired between 1944 and 

1976 performed an average of 4 of the Coast Guard’s 11 missions during 

fiscal years 2001 through 2005, while the 225-foot seagoing buoy tender,

which the Coast Guard completed the acquisition of in 2004, was used in 

all 11 of the Coast Guard’s missions in fiscal years 2004 through 2005. 

Page 16 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
The available evidence does not give a consistent picture of how usage 

trends may be affecting the condition of these assets and, ultimately, the 

Coast Guard’s ability to meet performance goals for icebreaking and 

ATON missions. We analyzed three types of evidence related to 

condition—the Coast Guard’s primary measure for reporting asset 

condition, overall trends in maintenance expenditures on each type of 

asset, and a body of anecdotal evidence gathered primarily through 

interviews with Coast Guard personnel and site visits to various 

installations. The Coast Guard’s primary condition measure shows some

assets meeting the operating standard and others falling below it. 

However, the current measure for asset condition is not clearly linked to 

mission performance, but the Coast Guard is working on developing a 

measure that links the two. Trends in maintenance costs and the anecdotal 

evidence we gathered tend to indicate that asset conditions are declining,

though not substantially beyond what Coast Guard officials said they 

would expect for vessels of this age. Performance indicators for the 

icebreaking and ATON missions likewise show mixed results, with the 

Coast Guard meeting some performance goals and not meeting others. In

part, these mixed results can be explained by the many other factors 

besides asset condition, such as the severity of weather in any given year.

Available Evidence 

Indicates Condition of 

Assets Varies Greatly 

and Mixed Impact on 

Mission Performance 

Current Condition 

Measure Is Limited and 

Does Not Show a Clear 

Pattern in Asset Condition 

For icebreaking and ATON cutter assets, the Coast Guard’s key summary 

measure of condition shows mixed results. This measure—percent of time 

free (POTF)—of major casualties has been mixed.

 13 The Coast Guard’s 

standard is 72 percent or better. Measured against this standard for fiscal 

years 2000 through 2004, the various types of icebreakers and ATON 

cutters vary considerably.

14 As table 5 shows, some assets, such as the 

65-foot small harbor icebreaking tugboat and the 65- and 75-foot river buoy 

tenders met the standard nearly every year, while others such as the 

140-foot icebreaking tugboat and the 75-foot, 100-foot, and 160-foot inland

construction tenders met it either not at all or only once during the 5-year 

period. Fiscal year 2004 was the worst of the 5 years, with only two of the 

eight types of cutters meeting the standard. 

 13 A major casualty is a deficiency in mission-essential equipment that causes the major 

degradation of a primary mission or loss of at least one primary mission. 

14 The Coast Guard is in the process of developing a new condition metric and did not have 

fiscal year 2005 data available. Consequently, our analysis covers fiscal years 2000 through 

2004. 

Page 17 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Table 5: Condition of Domestic Icebreakers and ATON Cutters as Measured by

Coast Guard’s Standard of 72 Percent or More of Time Free of Major Casualties, 

Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004 

Asset type 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Domestic icebreakers 

140-foot icebreaking tugs { { { { {

65-foot small harbor tugs z { z z z

ATON cutters 

75-foot river buoy tenders z z z z {

65-foot river buoy tenders z { z z z

65/100-foot inland buoy tenders z z z z {

75/100/160-foot inland construction tenders z { { { {

175-foot coastal buoy tenders z z { { {

225-foot seagoing buoy tenders z { { z {

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

Legend z = Met or exceeded 72-percent standard 

{ = Did not meet 72-percent standard 

The Coast Guard’s condition measure for these assets, while instructive, 

needs to be viewed with some caution. As we have reported in our 

analysis of the condition of the Coast Guard’s legacy deepwater assets, the 

measure captures only major equipment casualties, which degrade mission 

capabilities but does not capture minor equipment casualties that may also 

degrade mission capabilities. 15 As such, this measure may underestimate 

the decline in asset condition. The Coast Guard has acknowledged the 

limitations of this measure and is working on a replacement for it, which 

will better determine specific mission impacts. 

The POTF condition measure applies to cutters; the Coast Guard only 

recently started tracking POTF data for assessing condition trends on 

ATON small boats. During the fiscal year 2000 through 2004 period we 

reviewed, the Coast Guard did not have a centralized system for tracking 

the condition of these boats. Its internal assessment of the condition of the 

boats was based on two approaches, as follows: 

 15 GAO, Coast Guard: Progress Being Made on Addressing Deepwater Legacy Asset 

Condition Issues and Program Management, but Acquisition Challenges Remain, 

GAO-05-757 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005). The Deepwater fleet consists of 186 aircraft 

and 88 cutters of various sizes and capabilities, which play a critical role in all Coast Guard 

homeland and non-homeland security missions. 

Page 18 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
• For standard boats, which are purchased by Coast Guard headquarters 

and have similar capabilities and equipment for all boats of a particular 

type, the Coast Guard assessed condition by determining the boats’ 

remaining service lives through a process referred to as ship structure 

and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB). The SSMEB, which is 

conducted 10 years after a boat is commissioned and is repeated at 

5-year intervals, applied to two of the six types of ATON boats we 

reviewed. 

• For nonstandard boats, which are purchased by individual Coast Guard 

units for individual needs, the Coast Guard’s assessment was based on 

anecdotal information from district boat managers, maintenance 

managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This approach 

was used on four of the six types of boats we reviewed. 

Using these approaches, the Coast Guard characterized most of these 

asset types as in fair to poor condition. By contrast, however, when the 

Coast Guard assembled POTF data for a portion of these boats in fiscal 

year 2005, the data did not support this assessment. The boats analyzed 

had average scores above the Coast Guard’s goal of 72 percent. (App. III 

provides further details on condition measures for each of the ATON and 

domestic icebreaking assets.) 

Increasing Maintenance 

Costs Indicate Possible 

Condition Issues 

For our second measure—trends in maintenance expenditures—the 

picture with regard to condition is more consistent than for our first 

measure: maintenance expenditures for domestic icebreaking and ATON 

cutters are increasing, even after taking inflation into account. We 

analyzed three types of maintenance costs16: 

• Scheduled maintenance costs, which are planned for in advance and 

include such things as repainting the vessel; 

• Unscheduled maintenance costs, which are for unforeseen 

emergencies; and 

 16 We also examined a fourth category—deferred maintenance, which is the amount of 

scheduled maintenance that must be postponed in order to pay for unscheduled repairs.

A previous GAO study found that a drop in this account is not necessarily an indicator that

the condition of the assets are improving but rather a result of the Coast Guard having 

more money to address the maintenance needs. Due to this limitation we did not include 

our analysis of a sub-account within deferred maintenance which indicated a declining 

trend. Data to conduct an analysis on ATON small boats are not available. 

Page 19 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
• Engineering Logistic Center (ELC) costs, which include fleetwide 

projects that require engineering assistance (such as checking for 

watertight integrity) and therefore cannot be handled at the unit level. 

These projects, such as replacing a generator, help sustain capability 

but do not enhance it, according to Coast Guard officials. 

While there are some asset-by-asset variations, total maintenance costs for 

domestic icebreakers and ATON cutters increased during the period we 

examined (fiscal years 2001 through 2005).17 As figure 4 shows, total 

annual maintenance costs for domestic icebreakers nearly doubled, from 

slightly more than $3 million to slightly more than $6 million. The increase 

came primarily in two of the three categories in most years—scheduled

maintenance costs and ELC costs. Although maintenance costs are also 

affected by the amount of funding available in any given year, according to

Coast Guard officials, maintenance managers have discretion to move 

some funds to those assets most in need of maintenance money. Coast 

Guard officials have also said that these costs are indicative of condition 

issues. For example, an ELC official said that the increase in ELC costs 

was related to condition because the money was used for the overhaul of 

domestic icebreakers. In addition to the amount of funding available in

any given year, these maintenance costs can also be impacted by a variety 

of other factors such as the pace of operations. For example, maintenance 

costs can be expected to increase as the pace of operations increases. 

 17 Given the limitations of the Coast Guard data, we could not analyze maintenance costs 

for ATON small boats, and were unable to draw any conclusions about the condition of the 

ATON boats based on their maintenance costs. Starting in fiscal year 2003, the districts 

began shifting responsibility of boat maintenance from the district level to a centralized 

area level. Due to the segregated approach in which boat maintenance was carried out

previously, maintenance data for the period we examined is inconsistent. Further

complicating the analysis of this data is the fact that it is not broken out by scheduled and 

unscheduled costs, which would allow for identification of trends in unplanned 

maintenance and better reflect issues with condition. Finally, the maintenance cost figures 

reflect only half of the costs for standard boats, which is less than 40 percent of the total 

boat fleet. 

Page 20 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 4: Domestic Icebreaking Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years 2001 

through 2005 

0

1,000,000

2,000,000

3,000,000

4,000,000

5,000,000

6,000,000

7,000,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Cost

Fiscal year

ELC

Unscheduled

Scheduled

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Note: The figures presented above have been adjusted for inflation using 2005 dollars. 

Total annual cost increases for ATON cutters showed a similar trend, more 

than doubling from over $13 million to over $32 million during the 5-year 

period (see fig. 5). For ATON cutters, cost increases were greatest in ELC 

maintenance and unscheduled maintenance. As with icebreakers, Coast 

Guard officials considered these expenditures to be related to asset 

condition. 

Page 21 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 5: ATON Cutter Maintenance Cost Trends, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

0

5,000,000

10,000,000

15,000,000

20,000,000

25,000,000

30,000,000

35,000,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Cost

Fiscal year

ELC

Unscheduled

Scheduled

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Note: The figures presented above have been adjusted for inflation using 2005 dollars. 

Evidence Gathered from 

Interviews, Site Visits, and 

Other Records also 

Indicate Condition Issues 

Evidence we gathered during our discussions with maintenance personnel, 

our visits to various Coast Guard installations, and our review of other 

Coast Guard records also pointed to declining condition of a number of 

these assets. However, according a program manager who previously 

served as a commanding officer on an icebreaker, for some of the older 

assets, the decline in condition of those assets has not been beyond what 

would be expected of assets 20 years or more in age. During our 

interviews and site visits, Coast Guard personnel reported to us that crew 

members have had to spend increasingly more time and resources to 

troubleshoot and resolve maintenance issues on older domestic 

icebreaking and ATON assets. They indicated that because the systems 

and parts are outdated compared with the technology and equipment 

available today, it can be challenging and time consuming to diagnose a 

maintenance issue and find parts or determine what corrective action to 

take. For example, the propulsion control system on the 140-foot 

icebreaking tugs uses circuit cards that were state-of-the-art when the tugs 

Page 22 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
were commissioned in the late 1970s to 1980s but are no longer

manufactured today and have been superseded by computer control 

systems (see fig. 6). Coast Guard personnel said the lack of a readily 

available supply of these parts has forced maintenance personnel to order 

custom made parts or refurbish the faulty ones, increasing the time and 

money it takes to address maintenance problems. Finding knowledgeable

individuals to identify problems with outdated equipment is difficult, they 

said, which further complicates maintenance. Crews of other assets we 

visited also confirmed the difficulty of diagnosing problems and obtaining

replacement parts for other critical subsystems such as the main diesel 

engines. 

Figure 6: Antiquated Circuit Card Rack, Which Serves as Part of the Main

Propulsion Control System, on the 140-foot Icebreaking Tug 

Source: GAO.

Since at least 2002, the Coast Guard has been on record as saying these 

assets are in decline. In a mission needs analysis issued that year, the 

Coast Guard concluded that its domestic icebreaking and ATON assets 

were affected in varying degrees with respect to safety, supportability, 

environmental compliance, and habitability, and that addressing these 

Page 23 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
issues would require replacing or rehabilitating the assets. 18 The analysis 

noted that the need to replace or rehabilitate inland buoy tenders and 

45-foot buoy boats had been identified as early as 1993 but had not yet 

been addressed.19 It also noted that the 21-foot trailerable aids-tonavigation boats and the 55-foot aids-to-navigation boats—most of which 

have yet to be replaced—had been extended beyond their projected 

service lives. 

When we asked Coast Guard officials if current usage patterns were 

precipitating the decline of these assets, they said that overages can have

an impact on some assets, especially those with more complex systems 

and subsystems. The officials said that exceeding planned usage limits 

may leave less time to maintain these systems. They said that the 

deterioration of an asset and its systems from usage consistently above the 

limits would be reflected in periodic engineering assessments, known as 

SSMEBs, of the assets. In our site visits, we did learn of one example in 

which increased use of assets for security-related purposes may be 

affecting condition. The example involves the 140-foot icebreakers, which 

currently are being used extensively for security-related activities when 

they are not engaged in icebreaking activity. According to Coast Guard 

personnel, these icebreakers were designed to operate at maximum power 

for icebreaking; however, maritime security missions typically require 

several hours of idling, which is detrimental to the engine. Extended 

periods of idling, they said, causes oil discharge and sludge build up in the 

engine and mufflers. Thus, running assets in ways for which they were not 

designed could result in faster degradation of their condition.

 18 Absent from the analysis were the newer 49-foot stern loading buoy boats, and the 

175-foot and 225-foot seagoing buoy cutters. 

19This need was to be met by acquiring a new 49-foot buoy stern loading boat, but the 

existing 45-foot buoy boat assets were continued in service when the Coast Guard 

determined that the 49-foot boats could not support the needs for all locations across the 

country. 

Page 24 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Against this backdrop of condition indicators, the Coast Guard’s measures 

of performance for domestic icebreaking and ATON missions show mixed

results, with several indicators showing that mission performance has 

been improving or largely unchanging, while at least one other indicator 

indicates a decline. 

Performance Indicators for 

Icebreaking and ATON 

Missions Show Mixed 

Results 

• For domestic icebreaking, the Coast Guard’s performance indicator is 

the number of days that ice leads to closures of waterways in the Great 

Lakes region—the region in which most domestic icebreaking activity 

occurs.20 The Coast Guard’s performance goal is to have 2 or fewer 

closure days during average winters.21 During fiscal years 2001 through 

2005 the Coast Guard met this goal every year but 1. The exception was 

fiscal year 2004, when waterways were closed for 4 days. According to 

Coast Guard officials, however, vessel condition was not a factor in 

waterway closures; instead, they were related to an icebreaker’s being 

diverted to free a stuck vessel and to a response to a commercial 

aircraft crash. 

• For ATON, the Coast Guard’s primary performance indicator is the 

number of collisions, allisions, and groundings. 22 Since these events 

can cause deaths and injuries, environmental and property damage, 

and lead to waterway closures that limit commercial and recreational 

activity, a decline in this measure is an improvement. During fiscal 

years 2001 through 2005, this measure declined—a positive 

development (see fig. 7).

 20 In our recent review of the performance measures for non-homeland security missions, 

we found that although the Coast Guard breaks ice in many East Coast ports and 

waterways, according to Coast Guard officials, the measure focuses on the Great Lakes 

region because it is a large commerce hub where the icebreaking season tends to be longer

and where ice has a greater impact on maritime transportation. Coast Guard program

officials at agency headquarters said that they are in the early stages of developing a new 

primary performance measure that will incorporate domestic icebreaking activities in areas 

beyond the Great Lakes. For more information, see GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland

Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities for 

Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006). 

21 The Coast Guard has a goal of 8 or fewer days during severe winters. 

22 The Coast Guard defines an “allision” as a vessel collision with a fixed object. 

Page 25 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 7: Average Number of Collisions, Allisions, and Groundings, Fiscal Years 

2001 through 2005

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data.

Fiscal year

Target

Actual

• While the Coast Guard’s primary ATON performance indicator was 

showing improvement, however, an important secondary measure was 

showing an adverse effect. This indicator, which measures the 

probability that an aid to navigation or a system of aids-to-navigation is 

performing its specified function at any randomly chosen time and is 

expressed as a percentage of total time, is the leading performance 

measure used in managing the ATON program, according to Coast 

Guard officials.23 This measure has steadily declined since fiscal year 

2002 (see table 6), and since a smaller percentage means fewer aids are 

available, a decline in this measure is an adverse development. Coast 

Guard officials said some of this decline was attributable to the 

condition of ATON cutters and boats for servicing the navigational 

 23 The Coast Guard’s primary indicator—collisions, allisions, and groundings—is the 

measure included in external performance reports, but it reflects many factors outside the

aids to navigation mission, such as weather, dredging, and vessel equipment standards. 

Page 26 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
aids, but they were not able to estimate how much of the decline could 

be attributed to this cause.24

Table 6: Availability of Navigational Aids, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

Fiscal year 

Percent of aids 

available

2001 98.3

2002 98.4

2003 98.2

2004 97.6

2005 97.3

Source: Coast Guard. 

Note: Coast Guard’s goal is 99.7 percent of all aids to navigation available. 

In other work, we have noted that the Coast Guard’s performance 

indicators can be affected by multiple factors and that there are challenges 

to using such measures in linking resources to results.25 The ability to meet 

icebreaking goals, for example, can be affected by the severity of the 

winter. In fact, when the Coast Guard met its goal for waterway closures 

in fiscal year 2005, Coast Guard officials attributed the result in part to less

severe average ice conditions than in previous years. Similarly, the ability 

to keep navigational aids in working order can be adversely affected by

such uncontrollable factors as the severity of a hurricane or winter storm 

season. 

The Coast Guard has launched a number of initiatives designed to address 

challenges in linking resources to results of these missions.26 These 

initiatives followed program assessments conducted by the Office of 

Management and Budget, which completed an assessment of the ATON 

 24 Coast Guard officials also said that, in some cases, the lack of availability was related not

to vessel’s condition but to its use in other missions. For example, seagoing and coastal 

buoy tenders may be called upon to respond to unexpected events like hurricanes, 

precluding their use in fixing navigational aids. 

25 See, for example, GAO, Coast Guard: Relationship between Resources Used and Results

Achieved Needs to Be Clearer, GAO-04-432 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2004). 

26 For more information on these initiatives, see GAO, Coast Guard: Non-Homeland

Security Performance Measures Are Generally Sound, but Opportunities for 

Improvement Exist, GAO-06-816 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 16, 2006).

Page 27 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
program in 2002 and the domestic icebreaking program in 2004.27 For the 

ATON program, the assessment determined that the program did not 

demonstrate results and recommended that the program have specific 

long-term performance goals that focus on outcomes. The assessment of 

the domestic icebreaking program determined that the program was 

effective, but that more ambitious performance targets needed to be set. 

In response to these findings, the Coast Guard has worked to set long-term 

performance targets and develop new measurement frameworks to align 

with OMB’s recommendations. 

The Coast Guard has considered or proposed a wide variety of actions to

continue to achieve the missions that its domestic icebreaking and ATON 

assets perform and is moving ahead with several of them. Actions under 

way include developing new ways to measure asset condition, manage 

boat and cutter maintenance, and make choices about which maintenance 

projects to conduct. The Coast Guard has also acquired some new buoy 

tenders and a new icebreaker, though the bulk of its icebreaking and 

ATON fleet remains at or beyond projected service lives. Coast Guard 

officials stated that to determine whether and when to replace or 

rehabilitate aging assets, factors such as the assets’ condition and trends in

maintenance costs, among other things, are taken into account. Proposals 

to systematically rehabilitate or replace these assets have been denied or 

deferred by DHS or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 

apparently due to competition from initiatives such as the $24-billion 

Deepwater project for replacing or renovating other Coast Guard vessels 

and aircraft. In response, the Coast Guard has separated the proposals into 

smaller parts and is trying to fund some projects from within the Coast 

Guard’s budget. Finally, the Coast Guard studied what mission activities 

make the best business case for outsourcing of functions to the private 

sector, but states that potential disadvantages to outsourcing exist such as

loss of capabilities and inability to retain personnel. 

To Continue to 

Achieve the Missions 

of Its ATON and 

Domestic Icebreaking 

Assets, the Coast 

Guard Has Taken 

Actions, Made 

Proposals, and 

Studied Outsourcing 

Possibilities 

 27 These assessments were done using OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART),

which is a diagnostic rating tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating 

federal programs as part of the executive budget formulation process. It applies 

25 questions to “programs” under four broad topics: (1) program purpose and design; 

(2) strategic planning; (3) program management; and (4) program results (i.e., whether a 

program is meeting its long-term and annual goals) as well as additional questions that are

specific to one of seven mechanisms or approaches used to deliver the program. 

Page 28 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Three main steps to manage assets are under way, and several acquisitions

have been completed in both the icebreaking and ATON fleets. 

The Coast Guard is working on the development of a new measure to 

track an asset’s condition. As mentioned above, the Coast Guard’s 

previous measure, percent of time free of major casualties, did not capture 

the extent to which equipment casualties degraded mission capabilities. 

Called “percent of time fully mission capable,” this new measure is 

intended to more directly link a cutter’s condition to its mission capability. 

Developed after our examination of the condition of deepwater assets, this 

measure will be used for ATON and domestic icebreaking assets as well.28

For the new measure, the Coast Guard is developing codes that rank the 

degree of importance of each piece of a cutter’s equipment to each mission 

that the cutter could perform. The Coast Guard plans to use these codes in 

casualty reports, providing engineers and operators with information 

about the impact of equipment casualties on each possible mission. This 

information will then be used in calculating the condition measure for 

each cutter class and mission. This information would allow Coast Guard 

officials to determine, for example, the degree of icebreaking capability of 

its domestic icebreaking fleet at any given time. Coast Guard officials said

they expect final approval of this measure this year. 

The Coast Guard is implementing a centralized boat maintenance initiative 

to improve the management of its boat fleet, which includes many ATON 

boats. In contrast to the previous approach in which local boat operators

managed boat maintenance and oversaw the spending of maintenance 

funds, the new initiative places management of boat maintenance and 

expenditures with naval engineers. According to the Coast Guard, the key 

advantages of this initiative include standardized maintenance practices 

for the boats, better oversight of maintenance funding, and enhanced 

tracking and analysis of casualties. In addition, it should improve the 

tracking of the condition of the Coast Guard’s small boat fleet, which has 

lacked a centralized tracking system. Known as Centralized Boat 

Maintenance Management, this initiative is expected to be rolled out Coast 

Guard-wide by fiscal year 2008 if adequate resources and personnel are 

available. 

Actions Have Been Taken 

to Manage Assets and 

Acquire Some New Ones 

Coast Guard Is Developing a 

More Robust Condition

Measure 

Coast Guard Is Implementing 

New Approaches to Manage 

ATON Boat and Cutter 

Maintenance 

 28 GAO-05-757. 

Page 29 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Since 2002, the Coast Guard has also been gradually implementing a 

maintenance approach called “condition based maintenance” for select 

subsystems and parts of its newer coastal and seagoing buoy tending 

cutters.29 Under this approach, the condition of a part or subsystem, such 

as the main diesel engine, is evaluated or assessed at regular intervals to 

determine whether it needs to be replaced or have maintenance 

performed. Parts or systems would be replaced or receive maintenance 

only if their condition showed excessive wear or did not perform at an 

acceptable level. Under the previous approach, maintenance occurred at

time-based intervals even if the part showed no excessive wear or 

performed acceptably. The key advantage of the change, according to 

Coast Guard officials, is reduced costs. For example, the Coast Guard 

estimated that it reduced drydock costs related to maintaining newer 

coastal and seagoing buoy tenders $2 million in fiscal year 2005. The Coast 

Guard is considering expanding the use of this maintenance approach to 

other subsystems of the newer buoy tending assets and the new Great 

Lakes icebreaker commissioned in 2006. 

In 2002, we recommended that the Coast Guard develop a long-term 

strategy to set and assess levels of mission performance.30 We found this 

was an important step to take because it links investments to asset 

capabilities and mission priorities so that the Coast Guard can better 

decide how limited budget dollars should be spent. The Coast Guard has 

been working to apply the principles behind such a strategy to (1) better 

prioritize the projects needed to upgrade assets such as aging ATON and 

domestic icebreakers and (2) obtain the greatest overall mix of capabilities 

for its assets within its budget in order to maximize mission performance. 

The tool it is developing is called the Capital Asset Management Strategy 

(CAMS). 

Coast Guard Is Developing a 

Tool to Better Prioritize

Upgrades and Maximize Asset 

Capabilities 

 29 A form of this approach was first adopted by the Navy in the late 1970s and most Coast 

Guard “condition based maintenance” capability is derived from proven Navy programs.

According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard is in the process of evaluating what 

other assets and systems for which such a maintenance approach may be effective. They 

stated that this approach is not a replacement for preventative maintenance work but is 

intended to complement it. 

30 GAO, Coast Guard: Comprehensive Blueprint Needed to Balance and Monitor Resource

Use and Measure Performance for All Missions, GAO-03-544T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 

2003); and GAO, Coast Guard: Strategy Needed for Setting and Monitoring Levels of 

Effort for All Missions, GAO-03-155 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 12, 2002).

Page 30 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
CAMS is designed to analyze the capability trade-offs for upgrades and 

maintenance projects across asset classes, allowing the Coast Guard to 

determine which combination of projects will provide the most capability 

for the dollars invested. These analyses take into account such factors as 

asset condition, the asset’s importance to specific missions, and the 

relative importance of missions. The Coast Guard continues to refine 

CAMS and expects to have it in full use beginning with the budget for 

fiscal year 2009. The recommendations stemming from CAMS are intended

to augment the information currently provided to decision makers in the 

budget development process. 

Since the 1990s, the Coast Guard has been able to replace buoy tenders 

with new assets that represent about 15 percent of its current ATON fleet. 

From 1996 to 2004, the Coast Guard commissioned 14 new 175-foot coastal 

buoy tenders and 16 new 225-foot seagoing buoy tenders to replace an 

aging fleet of 11 coastal and 27 seagoing buoy tenders that were built 

between 1942 and 1971. The new buoy tenders have improved capabilities 

such as the following: 

Coast Guard Acquired Some 

New Assets 

• A computerized positioning system that automates the task of holding 

the vessel in place while working on a navigational aid. Previously, this 

task had to be done manually, requiring the crew to constantly monitor 

and maintain the vessel’s position, sometimes for up to 10 hours at a 

time. The system relieves the crew of this task and reduces safety 

concerns associated with crew fatigue. 

• Bow and stern thrusters to enhance the vessels’ maneuverability and 

improve the crew’s ability to maintain position. 

• Hydraulic chain stoppers and winches to reduce the number of crew 

members required to do the work and enhance safety (see 

fig. 8). 

• Accommodations that allow for dual gender crews, increasing the 

Coast Guard’s ability to allow women to serve on the vessels. 

Page 31 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Figure 8: Chain-in Haul Winch 

Source: GAO.

These and other features also allow the newer buoy tenders to carry out 

other missions, according to a Coast Guard official involved in their design

and acquisition. Their size, stability, and maneuverability are useful for 

such missions as search and rescue, homeland security, and law 

enforcement, and they have specific capabilities for dealing with other 

duties as skimming oil or mounting machine guns for security patrols. 

Page 32 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
With their sizeable fuel tanks and storage capacity, they can also serve as 

logistics support platforms to restock vessels involved in drug interdiction

and other activities. For 7 weeks in 2005, for example, one tender served 

as a supply platform for a Coast Guard vessel conducting drug interdiction 

patrols. According to Coast Guard officials, this enabled the patrol vessel 

to remain on patrol in the area for a longer period of time than it would 

have otherwise with its limited fuel and storage capacities. 

Besides the buoy tenders, the Coast Guard commissioned a new 240-foot

multimission icebreaker in 2006 to replace a 62-year-old icebreaker and an 

aging buoy tender on the Great Lakes. The new icebreaker has enhanced

icebreaking capabilities and the same ATON capabilities as the newer 

seagoing buoy tenders, enabling it to work on navigational aids in ice 

conditions as well as during other times of the year when no icebreaking is 

needed. 

Additional Proposals to 

Rehabilitate or Replace 

Aging Assets Remain 

Largely Unfunded 

Despite the new acquisitions, more than half of the assets in the domestic 

icebreaking and ATON fleet have reached or are nearing the end of their 

service lives. Coast Guard officials stated that they use a process that 

considers information such as how close the assets are to the end of their 

design life, the condition of the assets as determined by periodic 

assessments, and trends in maintenance costs, among other things to 

determine whether to rehabilitate or replace these aging assets. This 

information is used to identify the asset types that are most in need of 

replacement or major maintenance, and therefore should be given greater 

consideration in maintenance planning and budgeting. 

In 2002, the Coast Guard proposed options for systematically rehabilitating 

or replacing 164 cutters and boats in these fleets.31 According to Coast 

Guard officials, these options were proposed after determining that the 

age, condition, and cost of operating these assets would diminish the 

capability of the Coast Guard to carry out ATON and domestic icebreaking 

missions over time without rehabilitation or replacement of some or all of 

the assets. In 2004, it completed a preliminary analysis of four approaches, 

 31 The scope of this proposal considered rehabilitating or replacing the following asset 

types: 21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boats; 45-foot buoy boats; 55-foot aids-tonavigation boats; 63-foot aids-to-navigation boat; 72-foot cable laying boat; 65-foot and 

75-foot river buoy tenders; 65-foot small harbor tugs; the 65-foot and 100-foot inland

tenders; the construction tenders (75-foot, 100-foot, and 160-foot); and the 140-foot 

icebreaking tugs. 

Page 33 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
including the status quo—that is, maintaining the existing fleet. This 

analysis provided an estimate of the total life-cycle costs for each 

approach over a 33-year period from fiscal year 2005 to fiscal year 2037.32

(See table 7 for a description of each approach.) Estimated costs ranged as 

high as $8.5 billion; however, Coast Guard officials emphasized that these 

estimates were preliminary and are not reliable. As a result, we are not 

reporting these numbers in detail. 

Table 7: Approaches to Replace or Rehabilitate ATON and Domestic Icebreaking 

Assets under the Integrated ATON Platform Modernization Project 

Status quo: The existing fleet of ATON and domestic icebreaking assets would receive 

maintenance as needed to maintain current operations.

Rehabilitation: Nearly all existing assetsa would undergo major rehabilitation projects 

whose effect is expected to last 15 years for most vessels after which another major 

rehabilitation would be required. 

Replace: All existing assets would be replaced with a system of new standardized 

assets. 

Rehabilitate/replace: Depending on the condition of certain asset types, the assets 

would be either replaced with new assets or rehabilitated. 

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

a

Under this alternative, trailerable aids-to-navigation boats and the 45-foot buoy boats would be 

replaced. 

No funds have been allocated to pursue this project further, apparently 

due to competing funding requests for replacing or rehabilitating other 

Coast Guard assets. According to a Coast Guard program official, although 

resource proposals to carry out this project were made during the budget 

planning processes for fiscal years 2004 through 2007, the requests were 

either deferred or denied by DHS or the Office of Management and Budget. 

Coast Guard officials involved in the program said they were not aware of

the exact reasons why the requests were terminated or deferred. The 

officials said that the funding demands from other major Coast Guard 

programs already underway (such as the Deepwater program for replacing 

or rehabilitating aircraft and cutters with greater at-sea capability) that 

likely had higher priority in the competition for limited resources 

combined with the large scope and size of the proposed project, may have 

prevented the project from being funded. 

 32 These life-cycle costs include costs associated with planning and design, procurement, 

management and use, and disposal of the assets at the end of their service lives. We did not

assess the reasonableness of the estimates provided in this analysis. 

Page 34 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Without specific funding to move the project forward, the Coast Guard has 

attempted to break the project into smaller components and pursue 

potential funding from within the Coast Guard’s budget, focusing on the 

assets most in need of maintenance or replacement. In February 2006, the 

Coast Guard began a project to replace its fleet of 80 trailerable aids-tonavigation boats with new boats that have enhanced capabilities to do 

ATON work as well as other missions.33 The enhanced capabilities include 

equipment to lift navigational aids out of the water for service, more deck 

space for working on these aids, an elevated work platform for working on 

aids that are high in the water, and faster speeds to reduce transit times. 

The Coast Guard intends for the new boats to be more multimission 

capable. For example, their added speed and deck space will help with 

search and rescue missions, and they will have gun mounts for use in law 

enforcement or maritime security missions. 

According to a Coast Guard official, this acquisition would cost 

approximately $14.4 million if all 80 boats are purchased and would bring 

on new boats over a 5-year period as funds allow.34 The Coast Guard 

official responsible for the project said the Coast Guard intends to make 

the purchases using a funding stream appropriated for the maintenance of 

nonstandard boats that can be allocated to the boats with the most 

pressing maintenance or recapitalization needs. Availability of these funds,

however, depends on the condition and maintenance needs of other 

nonstandard boats; if this funding has to be applied to meet other needs, 

such as unanticipated problems, it may not be available for purchasing 

these boats.

Separate from this effort to acquire new trailerable boats, the Coast Guard 

has made a request as part of the budget process to begin rehabilitating 

aging river buoy and construction tenders. This project, which will focus 

on rehabilitating the systems within the engine rooms of the assets, is 

 33 These boats can be placed on trailers and transported on land by truck.

34 According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard is purchasing these boats under a 

5-year “indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity” contract that allows the Coast Guard to 

order as many boats from the vendor at any given time at a cost of $180,000 per boat. The

official stated that this price includes delivery, spare parts, trailers, and crew training and 

that the Coast Guard’s obligation under the contract was to purchase at least one boat,

which it has already met. Currently, the Coast Guard has 24 more boats on order and 

expects to order a total of 80 over the course of the contract to replace its existing fleet. 

According to a Coast Guard official, the Coast Guard hopes to have all new boats in place 

by 2011. This official also stated that under this contract, other DHS agencies also have the 

option of purchasing up to 20 boats of similar design. 

Page 35 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
estimated to cost approximately $75 million. The Coast Guard plans to 

include this project in future budget requests. Coast Guard officials 

indicated that they were submitting this request because these assets were 

determined to be in the worst condition. 

Study Identified 

Outsourcing Possibilities 

but May Face 

Disadvantages to 

Implement 

In 2004, the Coast Guard examined possibilities for outsourcing missions 

in response to an OMB assessment of the ATON program.35 As a result of 

that assessment, Coast Guard and OMB officials agreed to study which 

ATON activities make the best business case for being performed by 

contractors outside of the Coast Guard with minimal impact on the Coast

Guard’s ability to carry out its other missions.36 The subsequent study, 

completed in April 2004, found that inland construction tenders spent 

most of their resource hours on the ATON mission with minimal impact or 

use in other missions and provided one of the best opportunities for 

further study of outsourcing.37 However, the study did not quantify the 

potential benefits that could be derived from outsourcing these activities. 

In August 2006 the Coast Guard completed an analysis as to whether 

ATON functions could feasibly be outsourced, and which parts, if any, 

were inherently governmental in nature.38 The objective of this analysis 

was to compare the Coast Guard's inland construction and river buoy 

tender operating costs with representative private sector marine industry 

costs and make recommendations regarding the feasibility to 

commercially support and operate the inspection, servicing, and 

contingency response capability of the ATON mission and assets. 

 35 This assessment was done using OMB’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which

is a diagnostic rating tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating federal 

programs as part of the executive budget formulation process. The assessment of the 

ATON program was completed in 2002. 

36According to Coast Guard officials, a limited amount of ATON work is currently 

contracted out in cases where the capabilities are needed only occasionally or the work 

cannot be done by the Coast Guard’s assets. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina, some ATON work was contracted to commercial providers that fixed navigational

aids in waters too shallow for the Coast Guard’s construction tenders to reach. 

37 BearingPoint, United States Coast Guard Aids to Navigation Business Case Analysis, 

April 2004. 

38 This study was commissioned by OMB in July 2006 and directed the Coast Guard to 

provide a conceptual analysis regarding ATON assets operating in the Western Rivers

Waterways System. To accomplish this directive, the Coast Guard conducted an economic

analysis of the Coast Guard's inland construction tender and river buoy tender assets. 

Page 36 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
According to Coast Guard officials, the results will be incorporated into 

future acquisition plans for replacing the current capabilities represented 

by inland construction tenders and river buoy tenders. This Coast Guard 

analysis was finalized after we had completed our audit work. Therefore, 

we were unable to obtain and review the study in time for the final 

preparation of this report. 

Although possibilities for outsourcing were identified, outsourcing also 

carries potential disadvantages, according to Coast Guard program 

officials. Potential disadvantages they mentioned include the following: 

• Outsourcing could lead loss of “surge” capability—that is, the capacity 

to respond to emergencies or unusual situations. In part, this capability 

may be needed within the ATON or icebreaking mission itself, such as 

when a hurricane or ice destroys or damages a large number of 

navigation aids. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, Coast Guard officials 

stated that because the Coast Guard had ATON assets such as 

construction tenders, crews were able to begin working immediately to 

repair damaged aids and get the waterways open to maritime traffic 

again. This “surge” capability may also be needed for other missions, 

such as occurs when ATON assets can be used to support search and 

rescue efforts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, for example, 

some ATON assets provided logistical support for first responders or 

transported stranded individuals. 

• Outsourcing may disrupt the Coast Guard’s personnel structure and 

weaken the agency’s ability to attract and retain personnel. 

Specifically, they are concerned that outsourcing would likely reduce 

opportunities that provide important experience for personnel to 

advance in their careers and eliminate positions that typically have 

more predictable work schedules than positions in some of the other 

Coast Guard’s missions. 

The Coast Guard has been using its domestic icebreaking vessels and its 

ATON assets to a lesser extent, to accommodate the need for additional 

homeland security activities in the post-September 11 environment, and it 

is doing so thus far largely without curtailing ATON or domestic 

icebreaking activities or unduly straining these assets past their designed 

workloads. The available evidence also indicates that despite some decline 

in the condition of some asset types, the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its 

aids-to-navigation and domestic icebreaking missions, as indicated by 

mixed outcomes of its key mission performance measures, has not shown 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 37 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
clear trends of decline. Efforts by Coast Guard personnel to troubleshoot 

operational problems and to take other steps to keep assets operating 

appear to be one reason mission performance has not been further 

affected, and many other factors, such as the harshness of a winter or the 

severity of storm damage on navigation buoys and beacons, can also affect 

performance results. For the present, however, the impact of these 

additional mission responsibilities does not appear to be a cause for alarm. 

That said, the future of these assets bears close watching. The fact that 

many of the assets have or will be approaching the end of their design 

service lives could mean the need for rehabilitated or new assets may 

become more pressing in the future. Another issue is whether current 

operations, both in level and types of usage, are adding to these costs and 

incidents beyond what the Coast Guard would normally expect. For 

example, operating domestic icebreakers beyond their underway hours 

limit—could potentially accelerate the level of decline. If this is the case,

using these assets to meet security missions could be meeting the Coast

Guard’s immediate needs but accelerating the need for replacement or 

rehabilitation. According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard’s 

attempt to systematically rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic 

icebreaking fleet was proposed at a time when competing demands likely 

caused postponements of requests for the needed funds. These competing 

demands, reflected largely in the Coast Guard’s expensive and lengthy

Deepwater asset replacement program, will continue for some time, as will 

other pressures on the federal budget. The Coast Guard is moving to 

improve the process it uses to set budget priorities through actions such as 

its new tool to link asset condition and funding decisions to better identify 

the projects that will provide the most capability with the limited funds 

that are available. Given that many of these actions are recent and need a 

chance to work, it is too early to evaluate their effectiveness. However, 

even as the Coast Guard takes steps to determine how best to replace or 

rehabilitate its assets, limited budgetary resources combined with other 

competing asset replacement programs already in process will likely 

continue to challenge the Coast Guard to find sufficient resources to carry 

out the options identified. 

Page 38 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Department of 

Homeland Security and the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report as 

appropriate.

Agency Comments 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We will then send copies of this report to the 

appropriate congressional committees; the Secretary of Homeland 

Security; the Commandant of the Coast Guard; and other interested 

parties. In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO 

Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-9610 or CaldwellS@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix V. 

Stephen L. Caldwell 

Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

Page 39 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

Methodology 

This report examines the time spent by the U.S. Coast Guard’s domestic 

icebreaking and ATON assets on various missions, the condition of these 

assets, and the actions the Coast Guard has taken to continue to achieve

the missions of these assets. Our work focused on three key questions: 

(1) What are the recent trends in the amount of time these assets have 

performed various missions? (2) What is the condition of the Coast 

Guard’s ATON and domestic icebreaking assets and how has their 

condition impacted the performance of their primary missions? (3) What 

actions has the Coast Guard taken to continue to achieve the missions of 

its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets? 

In identifying trends in the amount of time spent on missions and the 

impact of these trends, we analyzed data from the Coast Guard’s Abstract 

of Operations (AOPS) database, which tracks resource hours for each 

asset. For each asset type within our scope, we examined trends in the 

number of resource hours spent between fiscal years 2001 and 2005 

conducting each of the Coast Guard’s missions.1

 To determine the 

reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the results of previous reliability 

assessments we have conducted of this data for other work and 

(2) confirmed with the AOPS program manager that the data and the 

manner in which it is managed has not changed since the previous 

assessment that would affect its reliability. We determined that the data

was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We supplemented 

our analysis of these resource hours with documentation from interviews 

with asset program managers and crews of ATON and domestic 

icebreaking assets. 

In assessing the condition of the assets during fiscal years 2001 to 2005, we 

analyzed what Coast Guard officials identified as the best available 

condition measures. We obtained concurrence from the Office of Naval

Engineering and the Office of Cutter Forces that the appropriate measures 

to use for the condition of assets were percent of time free of major 

casualties, scheduled/unscheduled/Engineering Logistics Center 

maintenance costs, and estimated deferred maintenance costs. To 

determine the reliability of this data, we (1) reviewed the results of 

previous reliability assessments we have conducted of this data for other 

work and (2) examined responses the Coast Guard provided to a 

questionnaire we sent requesting updated information on the 

administration and oversight of the databases. We determined that the 

 1

 Due to a lack of data, we did not perform this analysis for the 72-foot cable laying boat.

Page 40 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 

supplemented our analysis of these measures with documentation from 

internal Coast Guard reports, as well as from interviews of asset program 

managers at Coast Guard headquarters and crewmembers of the assets 

located in the field. In addition to talking with crewmembers, we directly 

observed the condition of various assets during our site visits to Alameda, 

Calif; Bayonne, N.J.; Buchanan, Tenn; Baltimore, Md; Mobile, Ala; Seattle, 

Wash; Sault St. Marie, Mich; and Atlantic Beach, N.C. These assets were 

selected to provide diversity in terms of type and age of asset and 

geographic location. In addition, we interviewed Coast Guard officials 

with the Area Commands in Alameda, Calif., and Portsmouth, Va., as well 

as in Districts 5 and 13. 

To determine the actions that the Coast Guard has undertaken to continue

to achieve the missions of its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets, we 

interviewed officials with the Coast Guard’s Engineering and Logistics 

Center, Engineering and Logistics Directorate, Office of Naval 

Engineering, Office of Boat Forces, and Office of Cutter Forces. To obtain 

information on newer assets the Coast Guard has acquired, we also made 

site visits to interview personnel and observe the assets in San Francisco,

Calif.; Atlantic Beach, N.C.; Baltimore, Md.; Cheboygan, Mich.; and Mobile, 

Ala. To determine what proposals the Coast Guard has made to 

rehabilitate or replace its ATON and domestic icebreaking assets, we 

reviewed Coast Guard project documents and interviewed officials at 

Coast Guard headquarters. We did not, however, verify the accuracy of the 

cost estimates provided for those proposals. Finally, to determine the 

work the Coast Guard has done to study the outsourcing of ATON and 

domestic icebreaking mission activities and the potential impact of 

outsourcing those activities, we interviewed Coast Guard officials at 

headquarters as well as officials and crew members in the field. We also 

reviewed the completed business case analysis of outsourcing 

opportunities for ATON mission activities. 

We performed our review from July 2005 to August 2006 in accordance

with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 41 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Appendix II provides information on the number of resource hours Coast 

Guard ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent on various Coast 

Guard missions during fiscal years 2001 through 2005. The Coast Guard 

maintains information, on a program-by-program basis, about how 

resources, such as vessels, boats, and aircraft, are used. Each hour that 

these resources are used is called a resource hour. Resource hours are 

accumulated and reported by quarter and represent the time spent by the

Coast Guard’s major assets to conduct its programs. The table 8 shows by 

asset type, the hours ATON and domestic icebreaking assets have spent on

each of Coast Guard’s missions for each fiscal year, from 2001 through 

2005. The percentage of each asset types’ total fiscal year resource hours 

that these hours represent is shown in parenthesis. 

Table 8: Resource Hour Usage and Percent, by Asset Type and Mission Program, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

Fiscal year Non-homeland security Homeland security 

225-foot seagoing buoy tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 80

 (1%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,366 

(61%) 

0

(0%)

447

(6%)

918

(13%)

0

(0%)

171 

(2%) 

58 

(1%) 

948

(13%)

216

(3%)

2002 407

 (4%) 

0 

(0%) 

5,139 

(48%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

1,066

(10%)

0

(0%)

254 

(2%) 

0 

(0%) 

3,547

(33%)

200

(2%)

2003 75

 (0%) 

48 

(0%) 

9,189 

(55%) 

65

(0%)

24

(0%)

1,774

(11%)

0

(0%)

33 

(0%) 

181 

(1%) 

2,113

(13%)

3,170

(19%)

2004 435

 (2%) 

13 

(0%) 

13,039 

(59%) 

746

(3%)

78

(0%)

2,852

(13%)

40

(0%)

293 

(1%) 

1,617 

(7%) 

1,363

(6%)

1,763

(8%)

2005 631

 (3%) 

195 

(1%) 

13,118 

(62%) 

622

(3%)

1,171

(6%)

1,606

(8%)

234

(1%)

765 

(4%) 

175 

(1%) 

618

(3%)

1,962

(9%)

175-foot coastal buoy tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 129

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

12,158 

(87%) 

82

(1%)

35

(0%)

339

(2%)

0

(0%)

56 

(0%) 

3 

(0%) 

1,202

(9%)

7

(0%)

2002 36

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

10,735 

(74%) 

0

(0%)

32

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

216 

(1%) 

10 

(0%) 

3,389

(23%)

21

(0%)

2003 122

(1%) 

28 

(0%) 

12,422 

(78%) 

478

(3%)

17

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

1 

(0%) 

298 

(2%) 

2,345

(15%)

265

(2%)

2004 4

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

13,402 

(85%) 

446

(3%)

16

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

159 

(1%) 

358 

(2%) 

1,341

(9%)

25

(0%)

2005 136

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

14,375 

(90%) 

120

(1%)

30

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

34 

(0%) 

585 

(4%) 

749

(5%)

18

(0%)

Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of 

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 

Page 42 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Fiscal year Non-homeland security Homeland security 

160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 19

(0%) 

1 

(0%) 

12,929 

(99%) 

0

(0%)

3

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

165

(1%)

5

(0%)

2002 4

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

13,430 

(90%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

9 

(0%) 

1,403

(9%)

73

(0%)

2003 2

(0%) 

119 

(1%) 

13,896 

(92%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

97 

(1%) 

1,034

(7%)

8

(0%)

2004 5

(0%) 

41 

(0%) 

13,510 

(90%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,368

(9%)

11

(0%)

2005 1

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

17,272 

(93%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,296

(7%)

12

(0%)

140-foot icebreaking tugs 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 52

(1%) 

57 

(1%) 

2,031 

(28%) 

4,064

(55%)

0

(0%)

316

(4%)

13

(0%)

47 

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

681

(9%)

121

(2%)

2002 93

(2%) 

166 

(3%) 

1,071 

(19%) 

1,174

(21%)

0

(0%)

33

(1%)

0

(0%)

158 

(3%) 

12 

(0%) 

2,849

(50%)

89

(2%)

2003 273

(2%) 

158 

(1%) 

952 

(9%) 

4,770

(43%)

0

(0%)

19

(0%)

0

(0%)

120 

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,695

(42%)

72

(1%)

2004 84

(1%) 

264 

(2%) 

1,081 

(10%) 

3,749

(35%)

0

(0%)

343

(3%)

84

(1%)

283 

(3%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,655

(44%)

93

(1%)

2005 159

(2%) 

116 

(1%) 

732 

(8%) 

2,866

(30%)

0

(0%)

602

(6%)

133

(1%)

27 

(0%) 

7 

(0%) 

4,795

(51%)

22

(0%)

100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 22

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,735 

(99%) 

13

0%

3

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

1

(0%)

2002 5

(0%) 

43 

(1%) 

3,234 

(89%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

363

(10%)

7

(0%)

2003 57

(2%) 

6 

(0%) 

3,336 

(95%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

24 

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

84

(2%)

0

(0%)

2004 4

(0%) 

38 

(2%) 

2,250 

(98%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2005 7

(0%) 

42 

(2%) 

2,364 

(98%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

Page 43 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Fiscal year Non-homeland security Homeland security 

75-foot river buoy tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 9

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

13,325 

(99%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

78

(1%)

2002 31

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

14,406 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

14

(0%)

2003 10

(0%) 

1 

(0%) 

15,022 

(99%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

70

(0%)

17

(0%)

2004 1

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

12,109 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

17

(0%)

2005 4

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

12,448 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

17

(0%)

65-foot river buoy tenders 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 6

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6,389 

(99%) 

2

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

27

(0%)

0

(0%)

2002 8

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6,087 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6

(0%)

4

(0%)

2003 5

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6,385 

(99%) 

9

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

10

(0%)

27

(0%)

2004 1

(0%) 

14 

(0%) 

6,771 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

8

(0%)

3

(0%)

2005 2

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6,671 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

4

(0%)

65-foot small harbor tugs 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 95

(2%) 

365 

(6%) 

1,372 

(23%) 

1,401

(24%)

188

(3%)

94

(2%)

2

(0%)

627 

(11%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,345

(23%)

369

(6%)

2002 77

(1%) 

114 

(2%) 

1,558 

(23%) 

449

(7%)

2

(0%)

10

(0%)

0

(0%)

721 

(11%) 

0 

(0%) 

3,795

(56%)

83

(1%)

2003 80

(1%) 

17 

(0%) 

962 

(11%) 

2,269

(26%)

1

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

800 

(9%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,695

(53%)

28

(0%)

2004 62

(1%) 

64 

(1%) 

755 

(12%) 

1,586

(25%)

0

(0%)

13

(0%)

0

(0%)

978 

(16%) 

0 

(0%) 

2,823

(45%)

22

(0%)

2005 26

(0%) 

598 

(10%) 

1,254 

(21%) 

1,092

(18%)

376

(6%)

260

(4%)

179

(3%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

2,043

(34%)

162

(3%)

Page 44 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Fiscal year Non-homeland security Homeland security 

64-foot aids-to-navigation boats 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,216 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2002 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

635 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2003 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

747 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2004 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

580 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2005 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,109 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

63-foot aids-to-navigation boat 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

199 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2002 7

(6%) 

4 

(4%) 

98 

(90%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2003 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

179 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2004 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

195 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2005 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

197 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

55-foot aids-to-navigation boats 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 100

(2%) 

17 

(0%) 

4,182 

(94%) 

0

(0%)

12

(0%)

53

(1%)

12

(0%)

19 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

75

(2%)

2

(0%)

2002 155

(3%) 

80 

(2%) 

3,985 

(87%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

35

(1%)

0

(0%)

24 

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

301

(7%)

0

(0%)

2003 45

(1%) 

0 

(0%) 

3,820 

(74%) 

0

(0%)

9

(0%)

20

(0%)

0

(0%)

320 

(6%) 

0 

(0%) 

970

(19%)

13

(0%)

2004 45

(1%) 

5 

(0%) 

3,643 

(91%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

211 

(5%) 

0 

(0%) 

89

(2%)

3

(0%)

2005 196

(4%) 

0 

(0%) 

4,338 

(92%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

80 

(2%) 

86

(2%)

0

(0%)

Page 45 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Fiscal year Non-homeland security Homeland security 

49-foot stern loading buoy boats 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 23

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

9,477 

(87%) 

8

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

4

(0%)

17 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,373

(13%)

0

(0%)

2002 18

(0%) 

14 

(0%) 

6,863 

(91%) 

3

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

30 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

638

(8%)

0

(0%)

2003 5

(0%) 

8 

(0%) 

8,079 

(89%) 

11

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

14 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

852

(9%)

94

(1%)

2004 7

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

7,883 

(96%) 

26

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

18 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

283

(3%)

31

(0%)

2005 18

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

6,588 

(96%) 

19

(0%)

9

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

233

(3%)

0

(0%)

45-foot buoy boats

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1,024 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2002 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

494 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2003 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

248 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2004 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

373 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

2005 0

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

526 

(100%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

21-foot trailerable aids-to-navigation boats 

SAR MS ATON Ice ops MEP LMR Drug Other LE Migrant PWCS Defense

2001 48

(0%) 

9 

(0%) 

25,429 

(98%) 

0

(0%)

12

(0%)

1

(0%)

1

(0%)

64 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

401

(2%)

2

(0%)

2002 23

(0%) 

2 

(0%) 

23,798 

(97%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

79 

(0%) 

7 

(0%) 

590

(2%)

0

(0%)

2003 55

(0%) 

4 

(0%) 

20,961 

(96%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

29 

(0%) 

4 

(0%) 

687

(3%)

7

(0%)

2004 52

(0%) 

12 

(0%) 

22,616 

(94%) 

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

0

(0%)

62 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

1347

(6%)

7

(0%)

2005 89

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

20,105 

(97%) 

0

(0%)

5

(0%)

0

(0%)

26

(0%)

0 

(0%) 

0 

(0%) 

407

(2%)

0

(0%)

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

Page 46 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix II: Mission Resource Hours of

ATON and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Notes: Due to rounding, percentages may not add to 100 percent for each fiscal year. 

The Coast Guard’s mission categories are as follows: 

SAR: Search and Rescue 

MS: Marine Safety 

ATON: Aids-to-Navigation 

Ice ops: Ice operations such as domestic icebreaking 

MEP: Marine Environmental Protection 

LMR: Living Marine Resources 

Drug: Illegal Drug Interdiction 

Migrant: Migrant Interdiction 

Other LE: Foreign Fisheries Enforcement 

PWCS: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 

Defense: Defense Readiness 

Page 47 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix III: Conditio

and Do

20

n Measure of ATON

mestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 

00 to 2005

Page 48 GAO-06-979

Appendix III provides information on the condition of the Coast Guard’s 

ATON and domestic icebreaking assets. The Coast Guard’s key summary 

measure of condition—percent of time free (POTF)—of major casualties

shows a mixed picture of condition for ATON and domestic icebreaking 

cutters. However, the measure captures only major equipment casualties, 

which degrade mission capabilities but does not capture minor equipment 

casualties that may also degrade mission capabilities. As such, this 

measure may underestimate the decline in asset condition. The Coast 

Guard has acknowledged the limitations of this measure and is working on 

a replacement for it. Because the Coast Guard is in the process of 

developing a new condition metric and did not have fiscal year 2005 data 

available, our analysis covers fiscal years 2000 through 2004. See table 9 

for individual POTF figures for the ATON and domestic icebreaking cutter 

assets for fiscal years 2000 through 2004. 

Table 9: Percent of Time Free of Major Casualties for ATON and Domestic 

Icebreaking Cutters, Fiscal Years 2000 through 2004 

Fiscal year POTF

225-foot seagoing buoy tenders 

2000 100

2001 16

2002 49

2003 80

2004 55

175-foot coastal buoy tenders 

2000 86

2001 78

2002 64

2003 66

2004 65

160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland construction tenders 

2000 86

2001 53

2002 67

2003 52

2004 59

Condition Measure 

for ATON and 

Domestic Icebreaking 

Cutters 

Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON 

and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal 

Years 2000 to 2005 

Coast Guard
Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON

and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 

2000 to 2005

Fiscal year POTF

140-foot icebreaking tugs 

2000 69

2001 50

2002 67

2003 45

2004 47

100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders 

2000 97

2001 97

2002 91

2003 87

2004 69

75-foot river buoy tenders 

2000 92

2001 86

2002 77

2003 83

2004 71

65-foot river buoy tenders 

2000 100

2001 71

2002 75

2003 90

2004 89

65-foot small harbor tugs 

2000 89

2001 70

2002 83

2003 76

2004 82

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

Page 49 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix III: Condition Measure of ATON

and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, Fiscal Years 

2000 to 2005

The Coast Guard has less data for ATON boats, with POTF figures 

available for only fiscal year 2005. Based on these figures most boats 

appear to be in fair to poor condition. In addition to these figures, the 

Coast Guard has performed an internal assessment of condition using two 

approaches, one for standard and another for nonstandard boats. For 

standard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition through a process 

referred to as ship structure and machinery evaluation boards (SSMEB). 

While, for nonstandard boats the Coast Guard assessed condition by 

obtaining anecdotal evidence from district managers, maintenance 

managers, annual boat inspection reports, and site visits. This internal 

assessment, however, seems to further support our original finding that 

the Coast Guard’s POTF figure may be underestimating condition. As you 

will see in table 10 below, while the 45-foot buoy boat and 21-foot 

trailerable aids-to-navigation boat had POTF percentages above 90

percent, their internal assessment of condition was rated at poor. 

Condition Measure 

for ATON Boats

Table 10: Condition of ATON Boats as Evidenced by POTF and Internal Coast

Guard Assessment 

Asset POTF for FY 2005 

Coast Guard assessment 

of condition 

Standard boats

55-foot aids-to-navigation 

boat 

90.1% Fair

49-foot buoy stern loading 

boat 

88.1% Good

Nonstandard boats

64-foot aids-to-navigation 

boat 

88.6% Good

63-foot aids-to-navigation 

boat 

79.5% Fair

45-foot buoy boat 97.1% Poor 

21-foot trailerable aids-tonavigation boat 90.7% Poor

Source: U.S. Coast Guard. 

Page 50 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix IV: M

Cutter and Do

Fisca

aintenance Trends of ATON 

mestic Icebreaking Assets, 

l Years 2001 to 2005

Page 51 GAO-06-979

Appendix IV provides information on the maintenance costs spent on the 

Coast Guard’s ATON cutter and domestic icebreaking assets during fiscal

years 2001 to 2005. Maintenance cost data for domestic icebreakers and 

ATON cutters shows a consistent increasing trend. The cost figures are 

broken out by scheduled (planned maintenance), unscheduled 

(unforeseen maintenance), and Engineering Logistic Center (ELC) 

(fleetwide projects that require engineering assistance) amounts, which 

allow for a more specific analysis as to the type of increase being incurred. 

Table 11 shows the individual maintenance cost data, adjusted for inflation

using 2005 dollars, for ATON cutters and domestic icebreakers for fiscal 

years 2001 through 2005.

Table 11: Maintenance Costs for ATON Cutters and Domestic Icebreakers, Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005

Cutter Type

Fiscal 

year 

Unscheduled

cost

Scheduled

 cost

ELC 

cost

Total (scheduled, 

unscheduled, 

ELC) cost

2001 $197,500 $2,300,492 $1,057,645 $3,555,637

2002 605,637 3,372,110 2,868,107 6,845,853

2003 798,994 5,167,818 1,625,370 7,592,182

2004 914,750 5,703,552 2,946,798 9,565,099

225-foot seagoing buoy 

tenders 

2005 4,313,387 6,715,405 2,631,631 13,660,422

2001 246,665 3,288,053 294,868 3,829,585

2002 316,694 7,054,995 821,725 8,193,414

2003 806,494 7,490,459 674,800 8,971,752

2004 591,828 5,141,464 495,708 6,229,000

175-foot coastal buoy 

tenders 

2005 555,245 2,672,709 1,014,257 4,242,210

2001 124,735 1,943,315 343,346 2,411,396

2002 366,968 2,889,575 192,786 3,449,329

2003 251,036 3,781,760 1,366,811 5,399,607

2004 356,726 3,966,089 3,318,928 7,641,742

160-foot/100-foot/75-foot inland 

construction tenders 

2005 437,112 2,605,441 8,316,939 11,359,492

2001 39,425 554,900 9,970 604,295

2002 14,219 595,933 6,391 616,543

2003 35,661 813,977 94,620 944,258

2004 94,856 1,168,921 17,748 1,281,525

100-foot/65-foot inland buoy tenders 

2005 81,453 177,082 63,294 321,828

Maintenance Trends 

Appendix IV: Maintenance Trends of ATON 

Cutter and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005 

Coast Guard
Appendix IV: Maintenance Trends of ATON 

Cutter and Domestic Icebreaking Assets, 

Fiscal Years 2001 to 2005

Cutter Type

Fiscal 

year 

Unscheduled

cost

Scheduled

 cost

ELC 

cost

Total (scheduled, 

unscheduled, 

ELC) cost

2001 343,902 1,885,671 192,131 2,421,703

2002 190,010 2,789,443 206,031 3,185,483

2003 225,959 1,748,739 850,783 2,825,481

2004 344,080 2,954,156 1,245,042 4,543,277

140-foot icebreaking 

tugs 

2005 449,911 3,339,509 1,258,332 5,047,752

2001 102,701 2,587,246 0 2,689,947

2002 308,977 1,808,732 0 2,117,709

2003 141,748 1,309,262 0 1,451,010

2004 259,143 1,591,882 6,870 1,857,895

75-foot river buoy 

tenders 

2005 355,520 2,122,927 50,251 2,528,697

2001 77,169 387,648 0 464,816

2002 81,662 2,140,323 3,031 2,225,017

2003 80,862 1,449,003 30,480 1,560,344

2004 127,692 904,538 0 1,032,230

65-foot river buoy 

tenders 

2005 55,117 343,930 69,701 468,748

2001 100,009 724,359 46,244 870,612

2002 36,852 1,086,856 95,173 1,218,882

2003 81,196 1,056,155 136,783 1,274,133

2004 125,441 1,098,967 83,688 1,308,096

65-foot small harbor 

tugs 

2005 110,001 1,136,472 9,919 1,256,392

Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard data. 

Note: The numbers presented in this table have been adjusted for inflation using 2005 dollars. 

Page 52 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Appendix V: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 53 GAO-06-979

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice 

Issues, (202) 512-9610, or CaldwellS@gao.gov. 

In addition to the above, individuals making key contributions to this 

report include Chuck Bausell, Melanie Brown, Steve Calvo, Michele Fejfar, 

Geoffrey Hamilton, Christopher Hatscher, Stephanie Sand, Stan Stenersen, 

Gladys Toro, and Friendly Vang-Johnson. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Coast Guard
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Coast Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are 

Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816. 

Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery

Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Performance, Operations, and 

Future Challenges. GAO-06-448T. Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2006. 

Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges. GAO-05-448T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 17, 2005. 

Maritime Security: New Structures Have Improved Information 

Sharing, but Security Clearance Processing Requires Further Attention. 

GAO-05-394. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Observations on Agency Priorities in Fiscal Year 2006 

Budget Request. GAO-05-364T. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2005. 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain. GAO-05-161. Washington, D.C.: January 

31, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Process for Reporting Lessons Learned from Seaport 

Exercises Needs Further Attention. GAO-05-170. Washington, D.C.: 

January 14, 2005. 

Port Security: Better Planning Needed to Develop and Operate Maritime

Worker Identification Card Program. GAO-05-106. Washington, D.C.: 

December 10, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Better Planning Needed to Help Ensure an Effective

Port Security Assessment Program. GAO-04-1062. Washington, D.C.: 

September 30, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Partnering Could Reduce Federal Costs and 

Facilitate Implementation of Automatic Vessel Identification System. 

GAO-04-868. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2004. 

Maritime Security: Substantial Work Remains to Translate New 

Planning Requirements into Effective Port Security. GAO-04-838. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2004. 

Page 54 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
Related GAO Products 

Coast Guard: Key Management and Budget Challenges for Fiscal Year

2005 and Beyond. GAO-04-636T. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Summary of Challenges Faced in Targeting 

Oceangoing Cargo Containers for Inspection. GAO-04-557T. Washington,

D.C.: March 31, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Target 

Security Inspections of Cargo Containers. GAO-04-325T. Washington, 

D.C.: December 16, 2003. 

Posthearing Questions Related to Aviation and Port Security. 

GAO-04-315R. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2003. 

Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing Maritime 

Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain. GAO-03-1155T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to Be 

Strengthened. GAO-03-760. Washington D.C.: August 27, 2003. 

Container Security: Expansion of Key Customs Programs Will Require 

Greater Attention to Critical Success Factors. GAO-03-770. Washington,

D.C.: July 25, 2003. 

Homeland Security: Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland 

Security in Balancing Its Border Security and Trade Facilitation 

Missions. GAO-03-902T. Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and LongTerm Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2003. 

Port Security: Nation Faces Formidable Challenges in Making New 

Initiatives Successful. GAO-02-993T. Washington, D.C.: August 5, 2002. 

Combating Terrorism: Preliminary Observations on Weaknesses in 

Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports. 

GAO-02-955TNI. Washington, D.C.: July 23, 2002. 

Coat Guard: Non-Homeland Security Performance Measures Are 

Generally Sound, but Opportunities for Improvement Exist. GAO-06-816, 

Washington, D.C.: August 16, 2006. 

(440442) Page 55 GAO-06-979 Coast Guard
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