H.R. 5126, THE TRUTH IN 

CALLER ID ACT OF 2006 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS 

AND THE INTERNET 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 18, 2006 

Serial No. 109-92 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

WASHINGTON : 2006 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 

29-451PDF 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

 Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

 Vice Chairman

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, General Counsel

REID P. F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET 

FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

 (EX OFFICIO)

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

 Ranking Member 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 (EX OFFICIO)

(II)
CONTENTS 

Page 

Testimony of: 

Navin, Tom, Wireline Bureau Chief, Federal Communications Commission.................. 16 

Pies, Staci, Vice President, PointOne Communications, on behalf of Voice on the Net 

(VON) Coalition............................................................................................................. 19 

James, Lance, Chief Technology Officer, Secure Science Corporation ............................ 24 

Rotenberg, Marc, Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information Center ................. 27 

Additional material submitted for the record: 

Sloane, David, Sr. Managing Director, Government Relations and Advocacy, AARP, 

submission for the record.............................................................................................. 41 

(III) 

(1) 

H.R. 5126, THE TRUTH IN 

CALLER ID ACT OF 2006 

THURSDAY, MAY 18, 2006 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m., in room 

2123 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton 

(chairman) presiding. 

 Members present: Representatives Shimkus, Terry, Barton (ex 

officio), Markey, Engel, and Inslee. 

 Staff present: Kelly Cole, Counsel; Jaylyn Jensen, Senior 

Legislative Analyst; Howard Waltzman, Chief Counsel for 

Telecommunications; Anh Nguyen, Legislative Clerk; Johanna Shelton, 

Minority Counsel; and Peter Filon, Minority Counsel. 

MR. UPTON. The witnesses can take their respective chairs. Good 

morning. Now, there was a comment on the floor last night--or I should 

say this morning, that another vote on a certain issue will take place 

tomorrow. I said, it is tomorrow. For those of you that were watching 

C-SPAN, most of us did not get home from votes on the budget until 

pretty close to 2:00 a.m., and I actually thought this hearing was starting 

at 10:00, but I saw that it was at 9:00. And I may be the only Member 

here this morning for the hearing, although I do understand that Mr. 

Shimkus is at a breakfast. I hope they have a lot of coffee. I understand 

that Mr. Engel is en route. I understand that Mr. Markey is en route, but 

I know Mr. Markey well, and there is a stop at Starbucks that he never 

fails to make, so we will see if they have a long line or not with this 

hearing. 

 But I am going to make a unanimous consent--and I did see Mr. 

Chairman Barton. He gave me a big smile, and he said he would be here, 

but I also know that he has been under the weather and under some 

medical assistance with vertigo, and it caused him to not get back from 

Texas until late yesterday afternoon. So we are going to start. I will 

make a unanimous consent that all Member statements will be made part 

of the record without a problem. And I will speak slowly, hoping that 

Mr. Engel will get here as his office is just down the hallway. 

 But anyway, today’s hearing--I am going to have one more slug of 

coffee, it has not kicked in yet--is on H.R. 5126, the Truth in Caller ID 
2

Act of 2006, bipartisan legislation introduced by Chairman Barton and 

Eliot Engel, and I commend both for their leadership. I am delighted to 

be a proud cosponsor of the legislation. Caller ID “spoofing” occurs 

when a caller fakes his caller ID information, so that the number which 

appears on the recipient’s caller ID screen is not the caller’s actual phone 

number. In many cases, such “spoofers” are actually transmitting 

someone else’s caller ID information instead of their own. Apparently, 

some “spoofers” just do it to play practical jokes on their friends, but, in 

fact, there have been reports of much more sinister uses of “spoofing”. 

 In some instances, “spoofing” is being used to trick people into 

thinking the person on the other end of the line is someone from a 

government agency, or some other presumably trustworthy party. For 

instance, in this month’s AARP Bulletin, there is a consumer alert 

describing a prevalent scam where spoofers get the local courthouse’s 

phone number to pop up on people’s caller ID screens, and then they tell 

the recipients of the calls that they are judicial officials in order to get the 

unsuspecting victims to divulge personal information, like Social 

Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, et cetera, while enforcement 

officials are particularly concerned about senior citizens’ susceptibility to 

such scams. 

Another important case involved a SWAT team that surrounded an 

apartment building after police received a call from a woman who said 

she was being held hostage in an apartment. As it turned out, it was a 

false alarm--caller ID was “spoofed” to make it look like it was coming 

from the apartment. Apparently, it was somebody else’s idea of a bad 

prank. 

In other instances, criminals are stealing credit card numbers, getting 

the phone number of the actual cardholder, and then using those credit 

cards to use to get unauthorized wire transfers. In such cases, the 

criminal “spoofs” his caller ID information so that the number which 

pops up on the wire transfer operator’s screen is that of the actual 

cardholder. Because such caller ID information matches the actual 

cardholder’s phone number on record with the credit card company, the 

wire transfer company uses it to authorize the wire transfer. Thus 

“spoofing” enables the crime to be consummated. 

And, of course, many of us are familiar with our own credit card 

companies which may ask us to call from our home phone to authenticate 

and activate those new cards. If the new card is stolen out of the mail, 

then criminals may be able to “spoof” our home phone numbers and 

authenticate and activate our new cards from the convenience of their 

own homes, or motel rooms, or from whatever rock they might decide to 

crawl under. 
3

 While such “spoofing” has been technically possible for some time, 

it used to require specific phone connections and expensive equipment. 

However, with the advent of VoIP, Voice over Internet Protocol, it has 

become easier for callers to transmit any caller ID information that the 

caller might choose. Moreover, there are online companies which offer 

“spoofing” services for just a few bucks to anyone with a phone. 

Unfortunately, nefarious uses of “spoofing” appear to be 

proliferating, and there is no law that actually protects the American 

public from it. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006 would make 

“spoofing” illegal. More specifically, it would make it unlawful for any 

person to cause any caller identification service to transmit misleading or 

inaccurate caller identification information--other than for authorized 

activities of law enforcement agencies--and require the FCC to issue 

implementing regulations within six months of enactment. 

Today we will hear from our witnesses about the problems of 

“spoofing” and their suggestions about how this bill, the Truth in Caller 

ID Act of 2006, might be improved. I look forward to hearing from our 

witnesses. I appreciate you being here on time, and also my colleague 

from Nebraska being on time. Mr. Terry, would you like to make an 

opening statement? 

 [The prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. FRED UPTON, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE INTERNET

Good morning. Today’s hearing is on H.R. 5126, the Truth in Caller ID Act of 

2006, bipartisan legislation introduced by Chairman Barton and Elliot Engel, who I 

commend for their leadership. I am a proud cosponsor of their bill. 

Caller ID “spoofing” occurs when a caller fakes his caller ID information, so that the 

number which appears on a recipient’s caller ID screen is NOT the caller’s actual phone 

number. In many cases, such “spoofers” are actually transmitting someone else’s caller 

ID information instead of their own. 

Apparently, some “spoofers” just do it to play practical jokes on their friends. But 

there have been reports of much more sinister uses of “spoofing”. 

In some instances, “spoofing” is being used to trick people into thinking the person 

on the other end of the line is someone from a government agency -- or some other 

presumably trustworthy party. For instance, in this month’s AARP Bulletin there is a 

consumer alert describing a prevalent scam whereby “spoofers” get the local 

courthouse’s phone number to pop-up on peoples’ caller ID screens and then tell the 

recipients of the calls that they are judicial officials in order to get unsuspecting victims 

to divulge personal information, like Social Security numbers and drivers license 

numbers. Law enforcement officials are particularly concerned about senior citizens’ 

susceptibility to such scams. 

 Another reported case involved a SWAT team surrounding an apartment building 

after police received a call from a woman who said she was being held hostage in an 

apartment. As it turned out, it was a false alarm -- caller ID was “spoofed” to make it 

look like it was coming from that apartment. Apparently, it was someone’s idea of a bad 

prank. 
4

In other instances, criminals are stealing credit card numbers, getting the phone 

number of the actual cardholder, and then using those credit cards to get unauthorized 

wire transfers. In such cases, the criminal “spoofs” his caller ID information so that the 

number which pops-up on the wire transfer company operator’s screen is that of the 

actual card holder’s. Because such caller ID information matches the actual card 

holder’s phone number on record with the credit card company, the wire transfer 

company uses it to authorize the wire transfer. Thus, “spoofing” enables the crime to be 

consummated. 

 And, of course, many of us are familiar with our own credit card companies which 

may ask us to call from our home phones to authenticate and activate our new cards. If 

our new cards are stolen out of the mail, then criminals may be able to “spoof” our home 

phone numbers and authenticate and activate our new cards from the convenience of their 

own homes or motel rooms -- or from whatever rock they crawl under. 

 While such “spoofing” has been technically possible for some time, it used to 

require specific phone connections and expensive equipment. However, with the advent 

of VoIP, it has become easier for callers to transmit any caller ID information that the 

caller chooses. Moreover, there are online companies which offer “spoofing” services for 

a few bucks to anyone with any phone. 

Unfortunately, nefarious uses of “spoofing” appear to be proliferating, and there is 

no law protecting the American public from it. The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006

would make “spoofing” illegal. More specifically, it would make it unlawful for any 

person to cause any caller identification service to transmit misleading or inaccurate 

caller identification information – other than for authorized activities of law enforcement 

agencies -- and require the FCC to issue implementing regulations within six months of 

enactment. 

Today, we will hear from out witnesses about the problem of “spoofing” and their 

suggestions about how the Truth In Caller ID Act of 2006 might be improved. I look 

forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I appreciate them being here with us. 

 MR. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I--not necessarily on 

time by Michigan and Nebraska standards, but getting here at 10 after in 

D.C. is actually early for a meeting. 

 MR. UPTON. I gave a long-winded opening statement just so that 

you could get here. 

 MR. TERRY. Thank you. And I do appreciate you having this 

hearing, and it will be interesting to hear from the panel regarding the 

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006. Needless to say, coming from Omaha, 

Nebraska, where I represent 30,000 people in the 

telecommunications/tele-services business, I am concerned about how 

this Act may affect those companies and their employees. Many Fortune 

500 companies use the tele-services in my hometown and my district in 

lieu of their own call centers and tele-services, so when they make an 

outbound call or an inbound call, they answer it, representing their claim, 

XYZ company. That is not “spoofing” in my mind. That is not 

fraudulent. That is their client and they should have a right to be able to 

speak on behalf of their client. So hopefully there is nothing in the Truth 

in Caller ID Act that prevents legitimate tele-services from doing their 

job on behalf of their clients. It is not fraudulent. 
5

 So I think we need to kind of work through the details here, and that 

is why it is important that we have this type of a hearing. And I want to 

thank our panels for being here today to help us work through the issues 

of what is legitimate, what is fraudulent. None of us want people to be 

able to fake identities, “spoof,” in order to make contact. But on the 

other hand, we do not want to stop legitimate commerce as well. 

 With that, Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing, and I yield 

back the remainder of my time. 

 MR. UPTON. I thank the gentleman for being here. And at this point, 

I make a unanimous consent request that all Members will have their 

opening statements as part of the record. 

 [Additional Statements for the record follow:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. BARBARA CUBIN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 

FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just like our hearing on pretexting a few months back, I’m again shocked about how 

people have conceived such a malevolent business model that appears to be legal. The 

act of “spoofing,” or changing, one’s caller ID information appears to be on the rise, 

which has dangerous ramifications for those who rely on call restrictions to protect 

themselves from estranged spouses or others who may be harassing them. 

Now I’ve learned about a website that not only offers the ability to “spoof” one’s 

caller ID, but also offers tools to change your voice and record the conversation. What 

legitimate business use can one imagine for these features? 

We need to make certain that when someone receives a call, they can trust the caller 

ID information is accurate. That’s why I commend Chairman Barton for his leadership 

on this bill and wish to join as a cosponsor to ensure the caller ID is truthful. 

 I yield back the balance of my time. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. PAUL E. GILLMOR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 

FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Thank you for holding this important hearing. I also would like to commend the full 

committee chairman, Chairman Barton, on his leadership with this important piece of 

consumer protection legislation. 

 Mr. Chairman, the issue of “Caller ID” Spoofing is not a matter to be taken lightly. 

Rather, it is an issue critical to ensuring the safety and privacy of our constituents. In a 

rapidly changing telecommunications environment, Chairman Barton’s bill is a simple 

and straight-forward way in addressing the need to provide accurate caller ID 

information. 

 As an advocate for strong sex offender laws, I fear that erroneous caller ID 

information may be utilized as another tool for predators to locate their prey’s location 

and personal information. Additionally, as a member of the Financial Services 

Committee, I hear all too often about how cases of identity theft have decimated an 

individual’s financial wellbeing. If not prevented, this too could become a tool for 

identity thieves to deprive innocent victims of their nest eggs—especially in areas, such 

as my northwest Ohio district, that have a large concentration of elderly residents. 

 Mr. Chairman, this is an important issue that must be addressed, and I applaud you, 

Chairman Barton, and Mr. Engel for not allowing it to become lost as we deal with 
6

larger, more comprehensive telecommunications reform issues. Finally, I look forward to 

hearing the testimony from today’s panel, and to working with you and Chairman Barton 

to see that all of our constituents are properly protected from the dangers posed by caller 

ID spoofing. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Good Morning. I want to commend Chairman Upton for calling this hearing today 

on legislation addressing “caller ID spoofing”. 

“Spoofing” is when a caller masks or changes the caller ID information of their call 

in a way that disguises the true origination number of the caller. In many instances, a call 

recipient may be subject to pre-texting through spoofing, which can lead to fraud, 

personal ID theft, harassment, or otherwise put the safety of the call recipient in danger. 

It is important that we explore and analyze the use of spoofing to commit crimes and 

otherwise harm the public interest. (We spent time earlier this year on legislation 

addressing these important issues, which disappeared into an intelligence-gathering black 

hole just before it reached the House floor, but perhaps it will re-emerge soon.....) On the 

other hand, lest we think that spoofing always has nefarious aims, we must recognize that 

there may be circumstances when a person’s safety may be put in danger if their true and 

accurate call origination information is disclosed as well. 

What we seek in caller ID policy is balance. This has been the case since we held 

hearings in the early 1990s on caller ID, where this Subcommittee sought to take into 

account emerging caller ID technology in a way that also allowed callers to block their 

origination number on a per call or per line basis. Technology also allowed call 

recipients to refuse to receive calls by anyone who was blocking their caller ID 

information from going through. 

While I believe the intent of the legislation before us today has a noble objective, I 

do not yet believe it adequately strikes the historic balance we have sought to achieve for 

consumer privacy and security. For instance, Members of Congress often have direct 

lines in their offices. In order to ensure that such lines do not become generally public, 

and therefore remain useful to us, it may be necessary to keep such direct numbers 

confidential and have the out-going caller ID information indicate a different number at 

which our offices can be reached for return calls. That gives the recipient a legitimate 

phone number to call back, but keeps confidential lines private. 

There are many doctors, psychiatrists, lawyers, and other professionals who would 

similarly like to keep direct, confidential lines private in this way who have no intention 

of misleading anyone. In addition, there may be instances, for example when a woman at 

a shelter seeks to reach her children, when spoofing is important to safeguard someone’s 

safety. Moreover, informants to law enforcement tip lines or whistleblowers have 

additional reasons for why their calling information should remain private. We should 

not outlaw any of these practices and I think the legislation needs some improvement and 

clarification in these areas. 

Finally, I don’t think the Subcommittee can convene here today and discuss 

spoofing, consumer privacy, and caller ID legislation without addressing the elephant in 

the back of the room. 

We passed a bill addressing consumer phone records unanimously through this 

Committee earlier this Spring after due deliberation and public hearings. That legislation 

was pulled from the House floor apparently because intelligence entities sought changes 

to it. With the recent revelations about the alleged program at the National Security 

Agency to gather up the phone records of tens of millions of Americans, I think this 

Committee needs to investigate those issues in a timely manner as well and I hope the 

Chairman will announce such hearing soon. 
7

Again, I thank Chairman Upton for calling today’s hearing and look forward to 

working with him and our other colleagues on this bill as we move forward. 

MR. UPTON. We have four very good witnesses today: Mr. Tom 

Navin, the Wireline Bureau Chief of the FCC; Ms. Staci Pies, Vice 

President of PointOne Communications in Texas, on behalf of Voice on 

the Net Coalition; Mr. Lance James, Chief Technology Officer of Secure 

Science Corporation; and Mr. Mark Rotenberg, Executive Director of 

Electronic Privacy Information Center here in Washington. We thank 

you all for being here this morning. And before I yield the time, Mr. 

Engel has just made it through the threshold for an opening statement. 

Again, I complemented you on being an original sponsor of the bill with 

Mr. Barton. I appreciate you being here. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I am a 

poor substitute for Mr. Markey today, but I want to thank you for quickly 

scheduling this hearing. I really, as you know, have worked really 

closely with you, and I think you have been an exemplary Chairman, and 

I have no problem saying that publicly and privately as well. 

 I support this bill obviously to combat caller ID fraud, since I have 

added my name as the primary co-sponsor. When we were finding out 

about these things, you and I had had much discussion about it as I have 

with Jim Gordon, and this really seemed like a no-brainer, this 

legislation, that really should be supported by everyone in this Congress. 

I also strongly support regular procedure, our colleagues are due the 

opportunity to learn about the issue as well, and provide their own input. 

The bill is a good bill. We need to continue to work to improve it, and I 

think that we will do that, working across party lines. 

 I have been working with my colleagues for years now on issues of 

privacy and identity theft. On each and every time we plug one hole, 

crafty criminals come up with another way to commit fraud. Recently on 

television, I was asked how come we cannot stay ahead of the curve with 

getting the bad guys. And I said, well, you know, the problem with this 

is they have to commit the fraud, and then we realize the things that they 

are doing, and we always sort of play catch-up with them. I have read 

news reports that criminals are using these technologies to get people to 

give out private information that they would never give out, except that 

they think they are receiving a legitimate call from their bank, or a 

hospital, or even a local courthouse, or even Congress. I have also read 

about our colleague Tim Murphy being a victim in his capacity as a 

Member of Congress, and that I heard that our colleague and committee 

member Heather Wilson has also been a victim. 

 At this point, it became apparent to me that there are people who 

seek to use these technologies to strike at the heart of our democracy. 

They could well be planning to interfere with elections. That is an 
8

assault on the democratic process, obviously. Leaving fake messages 

that are insulting or incendiary on a public person’s voice mail that 

identifies the caller as an elected official or candidate for public office 

can threaten the very nature of our electoral process, and we can see how 

it could be used politically to try to change or subvert the electoral 

process. 

 We have struggled to clean up our campaigns with greater disclosure 

and bans on soft money. We should not let that hard work be destroyed 

by a few unscrupulous acts. So the Truth in Caller ID Act will give us 

another tool to use to combat identity theft and even election fraud. 

 I thank the Chairman for his attention to this matter, and I would like 

to ask unanimous consent to enter into the record a letter from the 

National Network to End Domestic Violence. Protecting victims of 

domestic violence has been a major issue for this Congress, and I agree 

with them that the Truth in Caller ID Act must not cause us to backtrack. 

So I ask unanimous consent for that. 

 MR. UPTON. Without objection. 

 [The information follows:] 
9
10

 MR. ENGEL. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for your 

attention, and look forward to hearing from the witnesses, and yield 

back. 

[The prepared statement of Hon. Eliot Engel follows:] 
11

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. ELIOT ENGEL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM 

THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman – 

I want to thank you for quickly scheduling this hearing. Obviously, I support this 

bill to combat Caller ID fraud – since I have added my name as the primary cosponsor. 

But, I also strongly support regular procedure. Our colleagues are due the 

opportunity to learn about the issue as well and provide their own input. 

The bill before us today is a good bill but I believe there is room for improvement. 

Working together, across party lines, will make this a better bill. 

For years now, I have been working with my colleagues on issues of privacy and 

identity theft. Each and every time we plug one hole, crafty criminals come up with 

another way to commit fraud. 

I’ve read news reports that criminals are using these technologies to get people to 

give out private information that they would never give out except that they think they 

are receiving a legitimate call from their bank or even local court house. 

I also have read about our colleague Tim Murphy being a victim in his capacity as a 

Member of the House. Then I learned our colleague Heather Wilson has also been a 

victim. 

At that point it became apparent to me that there are people who seek to use these 

technologies to strike at the heart of our democracy. They could well be planning to 

interfere with elections. That is an assault on the democratic process. 

Leaving fake messages that are insulting or incendiary on a person’s voicemail that 

identifies the caller as an elected official or candidate for public office threatens the very 

nature of our electoral process. 

We have struggled to clean up our campaigns with greater disclosure and bans on 

soft money. We should not let that hard work be destroyed by a few unscrupulous actors. 

The Truth in Caller ID Act will give us another tool to use to combat identity theft 

and even election fraud. 

I thank the chairman for his attention to this matter, look forward to hearing from the 

witnesses and yield back. 

 MR. UPTON. The gentleman yields back. Again, I thank you for 

your leadership on this issue, and I look forward to working with you, as 

well as with Chairman Barton in moving this legislation quickly through 

our Committee and to the floor. And with that, I recognize the 

distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Barton. 

 CHAIRMAN BARTON. Thank you, Chairman Upton, for calling this 

hearing today on H.R. 5126, the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, 

introduced by myself and Congressman Engel. This bill is necessary to 

shut down the growing problem of manipulating caller ID information. 

Caller ID so-called spoofing occurs when a caller masquerades as 

someone else by falsifying the number that appears on the recipient’s 

caller ID display. 

Everyone is familiar with the caller ID product that provides to a 

consumer the name and number of who is placing an incoming call. 

Unfortunately, caller ID “spoofing” is yet another tool available to 

criminals to hijack the identities of consumers. For instance, the AARP 
12

recently ran a “scam alert” when someone posing to be a courthouse 

employee called a Sterling, Michigan woman claiming that she had 

missed jury duty that week. The caller threatened that a warrant was 

being issued for her arrest, and then asked to confirm her Social Security 

number to verify her identity. This scam can appear even more real 

when the con artist uses a caller ID “spoofing” product which allows the 

con to display the name and number of the courthouse on the caller ID 

box. 

 As with other scams, the internet is making caller ID “spoofing” 

even easier. There are now websites that offer subscribers, for a nominal 

fee, a simple web interface to caller ID “spoofing” systems that let them 

appear to be calling from any number they choose. Some of these web 

services boast that they do not maintain logs, and fail to provide any 

contact information. Some even offer voice scrambling services, which 

make the caller sound like someone of the opposite sex. 

 Callers do not necessarily need to utilize a “spoofing” website to 

manipulate caller ID information. Some providers of Voice over Internet 

Protocol, or VoIP, services allow their customers to tinker with the caller 

ID information. Certainly this may not always be done for a deceptive or 

malicious purpose, but it offers those who wish to do harm an easier way 

to part consumers with their money. 

 I understand that the FCC is currently investigating the caller ID 

“spoofing” problem, but I find it hard to believe that today, there is no 

prohibition against sending false or deceptive caller ID information. 

H.R. 5126, the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006, would remedy that 

problem in short order. 

H.R. 5126 specifically prohibits sending misleading or inaccurate 

caller ID information. It covers traditional telephone service, as well as 

VoIP calls, and provides a specific exemption for authorized law 

enforcement actions. I understand that there may be a need for 

additional exemptions, and I am anxious to hear from our witnesses how 

the exemption issue should be handled as we move toward a markup. 

 Consumers use caller ID services to protect themselves from 

unwanted calls and contact, including from those who may want to do 

them harm. They should be able to rely on the caller ID information 

coming to them on a caller ID box, and H.R. 5126 will do just that. 

 I was one of the Congressmen that, in the mid-'90s, made sure that 

caller ID was legal. There were members of this Committee who did not 

wish to make caller ID a legal service. Thankfully, the majority of the 

committee, then and now, supports caller ID. I think the majority of this 

committee, with Mr. Engel’s leadership, is going to make sure that we 

make caller ID exactly what we intended--that is a truthful identifier of 

who it is that is calling your phone number. 
13

 Thank you, Chairman Upton, for holding this hearing today, and I 

yield back the balance of my time. 

 [The prepared statement of Hon. Joe Barton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

AND COMMERCE

Thank you for calling this hearing today on H.R. 5126, the “Truth in Caller ID Act 

of 2006,” introduced by myself and Rep. Engel. This bill is necessary to shut down the 

growing problem of manipulating caller ID information. Caller ID “spoofing” occurs 

when a caller masquerades as someone else by falsifying the number that appears on the 

recipient's caller ID display. 

Everyone is familiar with the caller ID product that provides to a consumer the name 

and number of who is placing an incoming call. Unfortunately, caller ID spoofing is yet 

another tool available to criminals to hijack the identity of consumers. For instance, the 

AARP recently ran a “scam alert” when someone posing to be a courthouse employee 

called a Sterling, Michigan woman claiming that she had missed jury duty that week. 

The caller threatened that a warrant was being issued for her arrest and then asked her to 

confirm her Social Security number, to verify her identity. This scam can appear even 

more real when the con artist uses a caller ID "spoofing" product which allows the con to 

display the name and number of the courthouse on the caller ID box. 

As with other scams, the Internet is making Caller ID spoofing even easier. There 

are now websites that offer subscribers, for a nominal fee, a simple web interface to caller 

ID spoofing systems that lets them appear to be calling from any number they choose. 

Some of these web services boast that they do not maintain logs and fail to provide any 

contact information. Some even offer voice scrambling services which make the caller 

sound like someone of the opposite sex. 

But a con artist does not necessarily need to utilize a spoofing website to manipulate 

caller ID information. Some providers of voice over Internet-Protocol, or VoIP, services 

allow their customers to tinker with the caller ID information. Certainly, this may not 

always be done for a deceptive or malicious purpose, but it offers those who wish to do 

harm an easier way to part consumers with their money. 

 I understand the FCC is currently investigating the caller ID spoofing problem, but 

frankly, I find it hard to believe that today, there is no prohibition against sending false or 

deceptive caller ID information. H.R. 5126, the “Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006” 

remedies this problem. 

H.R. 5126 specifically prohibits sending misleading or inaccurate caller ID 

information. It covers traditional telephone calls as well as VoIP calls, and provides a 

specific exemption for authorized law enforcement actions. I understand that there may 

be a need for additional exemptions, and I’m anxious to hear from our witnesses how the 

exemption issue should be handled as we move toward markup. 

Consumers use caller ID services to protect themselves from unwanted calls and 

contact, including from those who may want to do them harm. They should be able to 

rely on the caller ID information coming to them on a caller ID box, and H.R. 5126 will 

do just that. 

I want to thank the Chairman Upton for holding this hearing today and I yield back 

my time. 

 MR. UPTON. All right. I thank my Chairman, not only for a 

statement, but also for moving the caller ID legislation a number of years 

ago. There is nothing, and particularly at dinnertime when somebody 
14

calls, to know exactly who it is, so that we as consumers know whether 

we should take that call or whether we are going to have cold food for 

dinner. It is very important. But with that, your statements are made 

part of the record, and we would like you to try and keep your remarks to 

not more than five minutes, at which point, when you are completed--all 

four of you--we will do questions. Again, thank you for your travel to 

get here promptly on time. Mr. Navin, we will start with you. 

STATEMENTS OF TOM NAVIN, WIRELINE BUREAU CHIEF, 

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; STACI 

PIES, VICE PRESIDENT, POINT ONE COMMUNICATIONS, 

ON BEHALF OF VOICE ON THE NET (VON) COALITION; 

LANCE JAMES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, 

SECURE SCIENCE CORPORATION; AND MARC 

ROTENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ELECTRONIC 

PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER 

MR. NAVIN. Good morning, Chairman Upton and members of the 

subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about the 

problem of caller identification, or caller ID, “spoofing”. 

 As we have heard, caller ID services let customers identify who is 

calling them by displaying the caller’s telephone number, or other 

information such as a name or business name, on the customer’s 

equipment before the customer picks up the phone. Caller ID “spoofing” 

refers to a practice in which the caller ID information transmitted with 

the telephone call is manipulated in a way that misleads the call recipient 

about the identity of the caller. The Commission is deeply concerned 

about reports that caller ID information is being manipulated for 

fraudulent or other deceptive purposes, and about the impact of those 

practices on the public trust and confidence in the telecommunications 

industry. We also are particularly concerned about how this practice 

may affect the public safety and law enforcement communities. 

 The Commission addressed caller ID on the Public Switched 

Telephone Network, or PSTN, in 1995, with Commission Rule 64.1601, 

which generally requires all carriers using the Signaling System 7, or 

SS7 protocol, to transmit the calling party number associated with an 

interstate call to interconnecting carriers. This same Commission rule 

also requires telemarketers to transmit accurate caller ID information. 

 The development of Internet and IP technologies has made caller ID 

“spoofing” easier than it used to be. Now, entities using IP technology 

can generate false calling party information and pass it into the PTSN, 

via SS7, with harmful real-life consequences in such areas as public 

safety. For example, as we have heard this morning, the Newark Star 
15

Ledger reported that police in New Brunswick, New Jersey, shut down 

one city neighborhood for hours, evacuating buildings and closing 

streets, as a SWAT team surrounded an apartment house. Police had 

received a call from a girl saying she had been handcuffed and raped in 

an apartment when the call was, in fact, a hoax. This massive police 

deployment occurred because the caller ID had been “spoofed” to make 

the call appear to come from the apartment. Hoaxes like these divert our 

local public safety resources away from where they are so desperately 

needed, responding to real emergencies and real threats to our homeland 

security. 

 I note that the Committee is considering imposing restrictions on 

Voice over Internet Protocol, or VoIP providers, that facilitate hoaxes 

and other harmful practices through caller ID “spoofing”. As you know, 

there are many varieties of VoIP, and the definition of VoIP in this bill, 

as well as other proposed legislation, could be interpreted to exclude 

many of them from the reach of the FCC. As the House of 

Representatives considers legislation affecting VoIP, it should be aware 

that a restrictive definition of VoIP here, or in other legislation, might 

establish a statutory precedent that would restrict the Commission’s 

authority to assist public safety and law enforcement in other contexts. 

 At present, my colleagues in the Commission’s enforcement bureau 

are actively pursuing the issue of caller ID “spoofing”. They have issued 

letters of inquiry or subpoenas to several entities who are apparently 

engaged in marketing and selling caller ID “spoofing” services to 

customers. The enforcement bureau continues to gather and analyze 

information about these companies’ practices, their networks, their 

businesses, and their customers, and other germane information, as well 

as to analyze enforcement options, some of which may be limited to 

entities that are not regulated by the Commission. In addition, the 

enforcement bureau has met with carriers, assembled internal technical 

experts to address the problem, and begun coordinating with the Federal 

Trade Commission regarding its efforts to address this problem. 

 In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID information, 

especially for the purposes of fraud or deception, is a troubling 

development in the telecommunications industry. As Chief of the 

Wireline Competition Bureau at the FCC, I share your concern about this 

practice. I look forward to working with this Committee, other members 

of Congress, Chairman Barton, and the Commission, to ensure the public 

maintains its confidence in the telecommunications industry. Thank you 

for the opportunity to speak here today. 

 [The prepared statement of Thomas J. Navin follows:] 
16

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. NAVIN, WIRELINE BUREAU CHIEF, FEDERAL 

COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Good morning Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey and members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak about the problem of caller 

identification or “caller ID” spoofing. 

As you know, caller ID services let customers identify who is calling them by 

displaying the caller’s telephone number or other information – such as a name or 

business name – on the customer’s equipment before the customer picks up the phone. 

“Caller ID spoofing” refers to a practice in which the caller ID information transmitted 

with a telephone call is manipulated in a way that misleads the call recipient about the 

identity of the caller. The use of Internet technology to make phone calls has apparently 

made caller ID spoofing even easier. The Commission is deeply concerned about reports 

that caller ID information is being manipulated for fraudulent or other deceptive purposes 

and the impact of those practices on the public trust and confidence in the 

telecommunications industry. We are concerned about how this practice may affect the 

public safety and law enforcement communities in particular. 

In my testimony, I will first provide a brief technical background on caller ID 

spoofing. Then, I will describe the Commission’s rules addressing caller ID services and 

the steps the FCC is taking to make sure that providers are fully meeting their obligations 

under the Communications Act and the Commission’s rules and orders. 

As a technical matter, caller ID spoofing happens by manipulating the data elements 

that travel with a phone call. Phone calls on the public switched telephone network, or 

PSTN, are routed to their destinations by means of a specialized protocol called the 

Signaling System 7, or SS7. Among other things, SS7 conveys information with a call 

such as the telephone number of the caller. The SS7 information for a call is provided by 

the carrier that the caller uses to place the call. Caller ID, then, displays that caller’s 

number to the called party. Caller ID spoofing is accomplished by manipulating the SS7 

information associated with the call. 

The Commission addressed caller ID on the PSTN in 1995 with rule 64.1601, which 

generally requires all carriers using SS7 to transmit the calling party number associated 

with an interstate call to interconnecting carriers. The same Commission rule also 

requires telemarketers to transmit accurate caller ID information. 

The development of Internet and IP technologies has made caller ID spoofing easier 

than it used to be. Now, entities using IP technology can generate false calling party 

information and pass it into the PSTN via SS7. In one particularly harmful way, caller ID 

spoofing threatens our public safety. Spoofers can fabricate emergency calls and cause 

local law enforcement and public safety agencies to deploy their resources needlessly. 

The Newark Star-Ledger reported that police in New Brunswick, New Jersey shut down 

one city neighborhood for hours, evacuating buildings and closing streets as a SWAT 

team surrounded an apartment house. Police had received a call from a girl saying she 

had been handcuffed and raped in the apartment, when the call was a hoax. Caller ID had 

been spoofed to make the call appear to come from the apartment. Hoaxes like these 

divert our local public safety resources away from where they are so desperately needed – 

responding to real emergencies and real threats to our homeland security. 

My colleagues in the Commission’s Enforcement Bureau are actively pursuing the 

issue of caller ID spoofing. They have issued letters of inquiry or subpoenas to several 

entities who are apparently engaged in marketing and selling caller ID spoofing services 

to customers. The Enforcement Bureau continues to gather and analyze information 

about these companies’ practices, their networks, their businesses, their customers, and 

other germane information, as well as analyze enforcement options, some of which may 

be limited as to entities that are not regulated by the Commission. 
17

In addition, the Enforcement Bureau has met with carriers, assembled internal 

technical experts to address the problem, and begun coordinating with the Federal Trade 

Commission regarding its efforts to address this problem. 

Finally, I note that the Committee is considering imposing restrictions on voice over 

Internet protocol, or VoIP providers that facilitate caller ID spoofing. As you know, 

there are many varieties of VoIP, and the definition of VoIP in this bill, as well as other 

proposed legislation, could be interpreted to exclude many of them from the reach of the 

Commission. As the House of Representatives considers legislation affecting VoIP, it 

should be aware that a restrictive definition of VoIP here or in other legislation might 

establish a statutory precedent that would restrict the Commission's authority to protect 

life and property in both the public safety and law enforcement contexts. 

In conclusion, the intentional manipulation of caller ID information, especially for 

the purposes of fraud or deception, is a troubling development in the telecommunications 

industry. As chief of the Wireline Competition Bureau at the FCC, I share your concern 

about this practice. I look forward to working with this Committee, other Members of 

Congress, Chairman Martin and the Commission to ensure the public maintains its 

confidence in the telecommunications industry. Thank you for the opportunity to speak 

with you today. 

MR. UPTON. Thank you. Ms. Pies? 

MS. PIES. Thank you, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, 

and members of the subcommittee. My name is Staci Pies. I am Vice 

President of Governmental and Regulatory Affairs for PointOne, a VoIP 

provider, and President of the Voice on the Net Coalition, the VON 

Coalition, which is the voice of the VoIP industry. On behalf of the 

VON Coalition, I thank the Subcommittee for this opportunity to testify 

about this important issue. 

 Before I address caller ID in particular, I would like to commend 

Chairman Barton for his leadership in the committee and subcommittee 

for taking action in the recent COPE bill to accelerate the availability of 

VoIP, and the ability to deliver E911 information along with 911 calls. 

Particularly with respect to members, the creation of a national 

emergency routing number administration will assure that VoIP 

providers can obtain necessary pseudo-numbers in a timely fashion. 

 VoIP providers who have made real strides in leveraging the power 

of caller ID to provide innovative services to consumers support this 

committee’s effort to protect the integrity of caller ID functionality. We 

fully agree that strong action must be taken against those that 

intentionally “spoof” caller ID with the intent to commit fraud, deceive, 

harass, or otherwise create threats to life and limb, as mentioned by Mr. 

Engel. Congress is right to focus its intention on those who would do so. 

 VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with consumers and businesses 

because it can do what plain old telephone service does, but often much, 

much more. VoIP allows consumers to take control over their 

communications experience, to manage how they use those services, and 

to decide when and where they want to receive calls. With VoIP, I can 

direct certain calls to my work phone and others to my home or mobile 
18

phone. I can screen calls and designate some calls at specific times of 

day, for instance, during the family dinner hour, to be sent straight to 

voice mail. Some VoIP services even flash caller ID information on the 

TV screen, making it an easier decision to ignore the call in favor of CSPAN. VoIP providers allow consumers to integrate technologies in 

innovative ways, to bring the power and potential of the Internet to voice 

communications. 

 Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and business users 

depend on accurate and non-misleading identification of the calling 

party. Businesses that use caller ID to call up a customer’s account 

record so that it is immediately available to the customer service 

representative will not find the record very useful if it is the wrong 

record because the caller ID has been “spoofed”. At the same time, VoIP 

often allows users greater control over their personal privacy by allowing 

them to block the caller ID with a click of a mouse. 

 As Congress addresses deceptive “spoofing,” though, we urge you to 

keep in mind that in some legitimate instances, it can be necessary or 

desirable to change caller ID information where the purpose is not to 

mislead or deceive, or where the modification is necessary for a public 

purpose. The bill recognizes, for example, that law enforcement may 

need to mask the true identity of an originating telephone number. This 

is not the only legitimate need to change caller ID information. 

 I would like to share five examples: 

 As referenced by Mr. Terry, the FCC has created specific rules 

regarding what kind of caller ID information telemarketers should send, 

in order to empower consumers to take steps to protect their privacy. 

Barring any change to calling ID information would prohibit compliance 

with this FCC rule. 

 Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is that it can help a consumer 

better protect her own privacy and manage which of her personal 

information she presents to the world, irrespective of which 

communications device she picks up to initiate a call. Calls for different 

purposes, personal versus business, may merit different telephonic return 

addresses, as one might do with ordinary mail. This is not meant, 

however, to sanction masquerading as another. 

 Third, there are also situations in which caller ID information can 

endanger individual safety. Of course, as mentioned this morning, the 

classic situation is battered spouse. In some instances, blocking the 

delivery of caller ID information might be sufficient, but any legislation 

should be careful about presuming that blocking will always be adequate. 

 A fourth example is that in some circumstances, such as with 

forwarded calls, caller ID information needs to be altered to ensure that 
19

the original calling party’s number is transmitted as the caller ID 

information rather than an intermediate number. 

 And, finally, as I referenced at the beginning of my remarks, for 

E911 systems, pseudo-numbers need to be inserted and used, as this 

Committee has recognized in the COPE bill. 

 I would like to close with three additional thoughts. First, that 

“spoofing” of caller ID is not new. Tools have been widely available for 

years to “spoof” caller ID on traditional networks. As Tom mentioned, 

the Commission has already addressed these issues. One website even 

allows the ability to download “spoofing” software from the Internet, and 

then you can just use a common tape recorder to “spoof” the caller ID. 

 Second, fighting misleading and deceptive changes in caller ID is 

only part of the solution. Companies handling sensitive information 

must also make sure they are handling that information with care. 

 And third, misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, 

whether for a prank, or scam, or worse, is unacceptable. This Committee 

is right to focus on those who intend to mislead. At the same time 

though, legislation should not impose liability on traditional carriers or 

VoIP service providers who merely transmit what may turn out to be 

altered caller ID information. When good technology is used for bad 

purposes, we would like to make sure that it is the bad use of the 

technology, not the unknowing technology itself which carries the 

burden. 

 In focusing on those few people who would abuse caller ID 

technology, Congress can address the very real problem of “spoofing” 

effectively, in a cost-efficient manner that protects the proper use of this 

technology. Together, with this committee’s previous efforts to enable 

consumers to take advantage of VoIP benefits, we believe VoIP is in 

position to help make communicating more affordable, businesses more 

productive, jobs more plentiful, the Internet more valuable, and 

Americans more safe and secure. 

 Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions I can. 

 [The prepared statement of Staci Pies follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STACI PIES, VICE PRESIDENT, POINTONE COMMUNICATIONS, ON 

BEHALF OF VOICE OF THE NET (VON) COALITION

Thank you, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the 

Subcommittee. My name is Staci Pies. I am Vice President, Governmental and 

Regulatory Affairs, of Point One, a VoIP provider, and President of the Voice on The Net 

or VON Coalition – the voice for the VoIP industry. On behalf of the VON Coalition, I 

thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify about this important issue. 

 Before I address caller ID in particular, I would like to commend the Committee and 

Subcommittee for taking action in the recent COPE bill to accelerate the ability of VoIP 

to deliver E911 information along with 911 calls. Those provisions, along with what I 

hope will be a liability provision that can be adopted when the bill comes before the full 
20

House, help ensure that VoIP providers can accelerate E911 solutions through access to 

the necessary facilities, databases and numbers required to deliver E911. Particularly 

with respect to numbers, the creation of a national emergency routing number 

administrator will ensure that VoIP providers can obtain necessary pseudo-ANI numbers 

in a timely fashion. Leaders from this committee have written to the FCC suggesting 

they create such an administrator, and so have standards groups, but to date the FCC has 

unfortunately not done so. That makes it important that this committee adopt E911 

legislation this year. 

 VoIP is burgeoning in popularity with consumers because it can do what Plain Old 

Telephone Service does – and often much much more. VoIP allows consumers to take 

control over their communications experience, to manage how they use those services 

and to decide when and where they want to receive calls. With VoIP, I can direct certain 

calls to my work phone, and others to my home or mobile phone. I can specify in what 

order I want my devices to be rung. I can screen calls and designate some calls at 

specific times of the day (for instance, during the family dinner hour) to be sent straight 

to voice mail. Some VoIP services even flash caller ID information on the TV screen, 

making it an easy decision to ignore the call in favor of . . . CSPAN. VoIP allows 

consumers to integrate technologies in innovative ways – it allows them to integrate 

voice mail, text messages, and voice services; to bring the power and potential of the 

Internet to voice communications. 

 These Internet based voice advances are giving consumers new choices, better 

prices, and advanced new features. 

Many of the great benefits of VoIP to consumers and business users depend on 

accurate and non-misleading identification of the calling party. If I program my VoIP 

service to ensure that calls from my son’s school are simultaneously rung on all of my 

phones, I don’t want to answer it and find out that some telemarketer has spoofed the 

number to fool me into believing it is a priority call. And businesses that use caller ID to 

call up a customer’s account record so that it is immediately available to the customer 

service representative won’t find the record very useful if it is the wrong record because 

the caller ID has been spoofed. To protect the usefulness of their services, VoIP 

providers have a strong interest in having Caller ID be accurate and non-misleading. At 

the same time, VoIP often also allows users greater control over their personal privacy by 

allowing them to block their caller-ID with the click of a mouse. 

 Moreover, we fully agree that strong action must be taken against those that 

intentionally spoof Caller ID with the intent to commit fraud, deceive, harass or 

otherwise create threats to life and limb. Media reports about spoofers calling police and 

drawing out SWAT teams are inexcusable and potentially life threatening. A stalker 

spoofing Caller ID to harass victims, or identity thieves pretending to be their victims are 

things every American should care about. Spoofing to deceive, defraud, or harass cannot 

and should not ever be condoned or tolerated. Congress is right to focus its attention on 

those who would do so. 

 As Congress addresses deceptive spoofing, though, we urge you to keep in mind that 

in some legitimate instances it can be necessary or desirable to change caller ID 

information – where the purpose is not to mislead or deceive, or where the modification 

is necessary for a public purpose. The bill recognizes, for example, that law enforcement 

may need to mask the true identity of an originating telephone number. This is not the 

only legitimate need to change caller id information. I’d like to share five examples: 

• First, the FCC has created specific rules regarding what kind of caller ID 

information telemarketers should send. Telemarketers are required to transmit 

as caller ID a number to which a consumer can make a do-not-call request, 

rather than the telephone number from which the call is placed. The FCC did 

so deliberately in order to empower consumers to take steps to protect their 
21

privacy. Barring any change to caller ID information could prohibit compliance 

with this FCC rule. 

• Second, one of the benefits of VoIP is that it can help a consumer better protect 

her own privacy and manage which of her personal information she presents to 

the world, irrespective of which communications device she picks up to initiate 

a call. Consumers may want to direct return calls to a home or business 

landline, rather than a wireless number, for example. Calls for different 

purposes (personal versus business) may merit different telephonic return 

addresses, as one might do with ordinary mail. This is not meant, however, to 

sanction masquerading as another. 

• Third, there are also some situations in which caller ID information can 

endanger individual safety. The classic situation is the battered spouse. In 

some instances, blocking the delivery of caller ID information might be 

sufficient. But any legislation should be careful about presuming that blocking 

will always be adequate. 

• A fourth example is that, in some circumstances, such as with forwarded calls, 

caller ID information needs to be altered to ensure that the original calling 

party’s telephone number is transmitted as caller ID, rather than an intermediate 

number. 

• And finally, as I mentioned at the beginning of my remarks, for E911 systems 

pseudo ANIs need to be inserted and used as this committee has recognized in 

the COPE bill. 

I’d like to close with three additional thoughts. First, spoofing of Caller ID is not 

new. Tools have been widely available for years to spoof Caller ID on traditional 

networks. One website offers the ability to download spoofing software from the Internet 

which then allows a common tape recorder to spoof caller ID. 

Second, fighting misleading and deceptive changes in Caller ID is only part of the 

solution. Companies handling sensitive customer information must also make sure they 

are handling that information with care. While Caller ID can help a business retrieve a 

customer’s account record, as long as Caller ID can technically be spoofed (which will be 

the case even with new legislation) the business needs to handle disclosure of those 

records with the utmost care – making consumer privacy their top priority. 

 Third, misleading people through the misuse of caller ID, whether for a prank, a 

scam, or worse, is unacceptable. This Committee is right to focus on those who intend to 

mislead. At the same time, though, legislation should not impose liability on traditional 

carriers and VoIP services providers who merely transmit what may turn out to be altered 

caller ID information When good technology is used for bad purposes we’d like to make 

sure it’s the bad use of the technology, not the unknowing technology itself, which carries 

the burden. Networks and network service providers may be unable and should not be 

required to become “content police” or to discern legitimate and illegitimate uses of 

network services. Instead, service providers are best able to assist in the efforts to fight 

spoofing by keeping accurate records and making those records available as appropriate 

to proper authorities. In focusing on those few people who would abuse caller ID 

technology, Congress can address the very real problem of spoofing effectively, in a costefficient manner that protects the proper use of this technology. VoIP service providers, 

who have made real strides in leveraging the power of Caller ID to provide innovative 

services to consumers, fully support this Committee’s efforts to protect the integrity of 

caller ID functionality. Together with this committee’s previous efforts to enable 

consumers to take advantage of VoIP benefits, we believe VoIP is positioned to help 

make communicating more affordable, businesses more productive, jobs more plentiful, 

the Internet more valuable, and Americans more safe and secure. 

Thank you very much. I am happy to answer any questions I can. 
22

 MR. UPTON. Thank you. Mr. James? 

 MR. JAMES. Good morning. 

 MR. UPTON. That button. 

MR. JAMES. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Engel, and other 

members of the committee. I want to thank you for giving me the 

opportunity to speak on this topic today, a very important issue. 

 As one of the founders of Secure Science Corporation, an Internet 

security and research company, I personally witness the extent to which 

the abuse and misuse of Caller ID can have. In August of 2004, our 

investigation team discovered that two of the Nation’s largest 

telecommunications providers, T-Mobil and Verizon, were vulnerable to 

a technique known as caller ID “spoofing”. This technique is entirely 

reliant upon the manipulation of caller ID to be successful and enables 

the attacker's access to individual customer’s voicemails without using a 

PIN code, violating both customer privacy and authentication protocols 

to cellular and land-line voicemail networks. 

Similar intrusions, also known as exploits, include unauthorized 

termination of customer accounts, anonymous automatic phone SPAM, 

and the potential to gain full administrative control over a major 

telecommunications network that serves both businesses and residential 

phone lines. This last possibility is one of the greatest concerns in 

conjunction with the inappropriate and unlawful uses of caller ID and 

could even be viewed as a threat to national security in much the same 

way as the destabilization of a utilities plant or traffic control station 

could be. 

 Other exploits employing caller ID “spoofing” have been used by 

criminals who con unsuspecting victims out of money and in many cases 

their identity. These individuals are titled as phishers and the activity is 

phishing, spelled with a p-h. This activity involves the utilization of 

information gained illegally by breaking into a potential victim’s voice 

mail account. This in turn allows the phishers to further victimize 

customers by using, for example, billing information to steal identities 

and garner even more personal information from other sources. 

Conversely, phishers will use caller ID “spoofing” in order to pose as a 

victim’s bank and phish the account via phone. This same method is also 

used to lure wire transfer delivery services, such as Western Union, into 

authorizing fraudulent transfers over the phone. Additionally, phishers 

will verify their access to the stolen accounts by using the victim’s 

contact numbers in an attempt to validate account availability and 

amounts by calling the banks themselves and “spoofing” the caller ID as 

the user of the account. 

 Because of the level and quantity of illegal activities participated in 

by phishers, anonymity is one of their primary objectives. Caller ID 
23

“spoofing” enables them not only to communicate covertly with one 

another, but also provides them with an advantage against law 

enforcement agencies. As a direct result, the phishers continue their 

operations all the while evading subpoena attempts. 

 The aforementioned instances are just some of the many ways in 

which the fraudulent uses of caller ID are being employed today. Our 

company’s research alone demonstrates that more than 75 percent of the 

transactions and/or “spoofed” calls made on providers’ networks were 

with mal-intent. This was actually conducted by--we work a lot with 

Anti-Fraud, with covert calling web services out there--companies that 

do caller ID “spoofing”. And we basically help them try to eliminate the 

fraud. But we are seeing about 75 percent of the activity is actually 

fraudulent. 

 Despite the dark side of caller ID “spoofing,” there are very tangible 

benefits associated with this technique when used in a responsible 

manner. Secure Science Corporation is often called upon to assist 

companies who provided automated caller ID “spoofing” service to 

detect and prevent fraudulent activity on their network. And in order to 

do this successfully, it is not unusual for us to aid law enforcement by 

using caller ID “spoofing” techniques to track down these perpetrators. 

By accessing the very information they attempt to conceal, phishers and 

other criminals are not successful in their evasive actions, thus increasing 

the amount of successful investigations with law enforcement 

involvement brought forth against them. We use a technique that 

actually allows us to track down the phone numbers they are using. And 

we have to use a caller ID manipulation technique to do these type of 

techniques, so there are some very legitimate applications, especially in 

law enforcement. 

 One of the most common reasons for the manipulation of caller ID 

information is executed by the vast majority of Voice over IP companies, 

as well as those businesses which use private branch exchanges, better 

known as PBXs. In this case they appropriately utilize the technique so 

as to provide their telephone communications user with a viable and 

fiscally prudent alternative to traditional long distance services. One 

such legitimate caller ID “spoofing” is the transmission of the caller’s 

home telephone number on a Voice over IP call. 

 With respect to the positive and welcomed uses affiliated with caller 

ID “spoofing” such as research, investigative tactics, and public services, 

it is my recommendation as a representative of the information security 

community that the exemption to this bill be either expanded to include 

the above mentioned uses, or that the term “illicit” be added to the 

general wording of the bill. This way, the legitimate academic and 
24

commercial entities and the law enforcement agencies they aid, will not 

unduly suffer the effects of this proposed Act. 

 The implementation of the Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006 will 

without a doubt prove to be instrumental in the fight against the criminal 

activities in, and the abuse of, our Nation’s telephone communication 

systems. By recognizing this bill as an amendment to the 

Communications Act of 1934, our government will continue to send the 

message of intolerance towards those who seek to take advantage of 

burgeoning technologies for illegal and/or unethical use. 

 Thank you very much. 

 [The prepared statement of Lance James follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LANCE JAMES, CHIEF TECHNOLOGY OFFICER, SECURE SCIENCE 

CORPORATION

The “Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006” is being introduced with the goal of preventing 

criminal activities and/or the obstruction of justice with respect to the manipulation of 

caller identification information. 

As one of the founders of Secure Science Corporation, an Internet security and 

research company, I have personally witnessed the extent to which the abuse and misuse 

of caller ID can have. In August of 2004, our investigation team discovered that two of 

the Nation's largest telecommunications providers (T-mobile, Verizon) were vulnerable 

to a technique known as “Caller-ID Spoofing”. This technique is entirely reliant upon the 

manipulation of Caller ID to be successful and enables the attacker access to individual 

customer's voicemail without using a PIN code, violating both customer privacy and 

authentication protocols to cellular and land-line voice mail networks. Similar intrusions, 

also known as “exploits”, include unauthorized termination of customer accounts, 

anonymous automatic phone SPAM, and the potential to gain full administrative control 

over a major telecommunications network that serves both business and residential phone 

lines. This last possibility is one of the greatest concerns in conjunction with the 

inappropriate and unlawful uses of caller ID and could even be viewed as a threat to 

national security in much the same way as the destabilization of a utilities plant or traffic 

control station would be. 

Other exploits employing Caller ID Spoofing have been used by criminals who con 

unsuspecting victims out of money and in many cases their identity (also called 

“Phishers” and their methods “Phishing”). This activity involves the utilization of 

information gained illegally by breaking into a potential victim's voice mail account. This 

in turn allows the phishers to further victimize customers by using, for example, billing 

information to steal identities and garner even more personal information from other 

sources. Conversely, Phishers will use Caller ID Spoofing in order to pose as a victim's 

bank and phish the account via phone. This same method is also used to lure wire transfer 

delivery services (such as Western Union) into authorizing fraudulent transfers over the 

phone. Additionally, Phishers will verify their access to the stolen accounts by using the 

victim's contact numbers in an attempt to validate account availability and amounts. 

Because of the level and quantity of illegal activities participated in by Phishers, 

anonymity is one of their primary objectives. Caller ID Spoofing enables them to not 

only communicate covertly with one another, but also provides them with an advantage 

against law enforcement agencies. As a direct result, the Phishers continue their 

operations all the while evading subpoena attempts. 
25

The aforementioned instances are just some of the many ways in which the 

fraudulent uses of Caller ID are being employed today. Our company's research alone 

demonstrates that more than 75% of the transactions and/or spoofed calls made on 

providers' networks were with mal-intent. 

Despite the dark side of Caller ID Spoofing, there are very tangible benefits 

associated with this technique when used in a responsible manner. Secure Science 

Corporation is often called upon to assist companies who provide automated Caller ID 

Spoofing services to detect and prevent fraudulent activity on their network. In order to 

do this successfully, it is not unusual for us to aid law enforcement by using Caller-ID 

Spoofing techniques to track down these perpetrators. By accessing the very information 

they attempt to conceal, Phishers and other such criminals are not successful in their 

evasive actions, thus increasing the amount of successful investigations with law 

enforcement involvement brought forth against them. 

One of the most common reasons for the manipulation of Caller ID information is 

executed by the vast majority of Voice-Over-IP companies, as well as those businesses 

which use Private Branch Exchanges, better known as PBX's. In this case they 

appropriately utilize the technique so as to provide their telephone communications users 

with a viable and fiscally prudent alternative to traditional long distance services. One 

such legitimate use of Caller ID Spoofing is the transmission of the caller’s home 

telephone number on a Voice-over-IP call”. 

With respect to the positive and welcomed uses affiliated with “Caller ID Spoofing” 

such as research, investigative tactics, and public services, it is my recommendation as a 

representative of the information security community that the exemption to this Bill be 

either expanded to include the above mentioned uses, or that the term “illicit” be added to 

the general wording of the Bill. This way, the legitimate academic and commercial 

entities (and the law enforcement agencies they aid) will not unduly suffer the effects of 

this proposed Act. 

The implementation of “The Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006” will without a doubt 

prove to be instrumental in the fight against the criminal activities in, and the abuse of, 

our nation's telephone communication systems. By recognizing this Bill as an amendment 

to the “Communications Act of 1934”, our government will continue to send the message 

of intolerance towards those who seek to take advantage of burgeoning technologies for 

illegal and/or unethical use. 

Lance James 

Chief Technology Officer 

Secure Science Corporation 

 MR. UPTON. Five seconds to spare. You did very well. Mr. 

Rotenberg? 

MR. ROTENBERG. Thank you very much, Chairman Upton, Mr. 

Engel, members of the subcommittee. My name is Marc Rotenberg. I 

am Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. We focus on 

emerging privacy issues. We appreciate the opportunity to be before the 

subcommittee again and to testify on the Truth in Caller ID Act, H.R. 

5126. 

 From our perspective, there are two different privacy interests at 

issue here. The first, of course, concerns the privacy interest of the 

person’s telephone number who would be disclosed to the call recipient. 

And there are many legitimate circumstances under which a person 
26

would rightfully not want to have their telephone number disclosed. 

Both Ms. Pies and Mr. James have described instances in their industry 

and their research where they would also see customers who would not 

provide their own telephone number or would, for legitimate business 

purposes, provide someone else’s telephone number. But of course, 

there are also circumstances under which providing a number that is not 

your own can lead to fraudulent activity, can place public safety at risk. 

And so we certainly understand the intent of the bill’s sponsors to ensure 

that misrepresenting a person’s telephone number does not enable any 

type of conduct that is criminal or puts the public at risk. 

 This debate is very similar, in fact, to the debate that took place when 

the caller ID service was originally offered. And as you may recall at 

that time, Congress worked with the FCC and the State public utility 

commissions to establish some privacy safeguards, such as per call 

blocking or per line blocking, to ensure that people who have a 

legitimate reason to withhold the disclosure of their telephone number 

would be protected. 

 So our view regarding this legislation is that it is appropriate to 

protect both privacy interests. And the way to do that would be to 

distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate types of “spoofing” 

that might occur. And I think the simple way that you could accomplish 

this goal would be to add an intent requirement, so that you would make 

the illegitimate “spoofing” of a telephone number, that which occurs 

with the intent to defraud or harass the call recipient. I think that would 

cover virtually all of the circumstances that have been described so far 

and at the same time ensure that the legitimate uses by businesses and by 

residential telephone customers would be protected. 

 I also indicate in the testimony that particularly with the introduction 

of new Internet-based telephone services, such as Voice over IP, where 

people will be providing different types of information in the network 

environment, I think there are actually some First Amendment issues 

where people who might be broadcasting information over Voice over IP 

service would have the right to withhold their identity. And I think that 

is an interest that the Supreme Court has recognized and certainly one 

that Congress would not want to prohibit people from acting upon. 

 So I think in addition to protecting the privacy of telephone 

customers, there are also important free speech reasons why people 

should not be required to dispose their personal telephone numbers, 

unless they intend to cause harm, to engage in fraud, or to harass. There 

are, as you know, Mr. Chairman, statutes that are also available to punish 

those types of activities when hey occur. 

 Finally if I may, I wanted to say just a brief word about our filing 

yesterday at the FCC regarding the recent disclosure concerning the 
27

possibility that the National Security Agency may have established a 

large database on call detail information. I understand that this issue is a 

little bit outside the purview of the Subcommittee, but at the same time it 

is very much related to this issue about the privacy of telephone 

numbers. We have asked the Chairman of the FCC, Mr. Martin, to open 

an investigation into the question of whether Section 222, which was the 

provision of the Communications Act that requires telephone companies 

to protect the privacy of the call record information that they have 

obtained has been violated. We very much hope that the members of the 

Subcommittee will support that effort. We know that Mr. Markey has 

already indicated that he believes that the FCC should undertake an 

investigation in this matter, and Commissioner Michael Cobbs has 

expressed support for that as well. 

 Anyway, these are the main points of my testimony. As I said, I 

think it is important to distinguish between the legitimate and illegitimate 

circumstances where caller ID “spoofing” might occur. And I would be 

pleased to answer your questions. 

 [The prepared statement of Marc Rotenberg follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARC ROTENBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ELECTRONIC 

PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER

Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Markey, and members of the subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on caller ID spoofing and H.R. 5126, the 

Truth in Caller ID Act of 2006. My name is Marc Rotenberg and I am President and 

Executive Director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. EPIC is a non-partisan 

research organization based in Washington, D.C. that seeks to focus public attention on 

emerging civil liberties issues and to protect privacy, the First Amendment, and 

constitutional values. 

 Two separate and important privacy interests meet in the issue of caller ID spoofing. 

First, there is the right of a caller not to have his or her identity broadcast with every 

phone call made. There are many circumstances where it is not necessary for a person’s 

phone number to be disclosed. In fact, in some cases, a person’s safety may be placed at 

risk. Second, there is the right for call recipients to be free from pretexting and other 

fraud that can lead to the loss of their privacy, and the threats of stalking, identity theft, 

and harassment. 

The bill as currently drafted does not adequately protect both interests. EPIC 

recommends that any ban on caller ID spoofing include an intent requirement, so that 

spoofing is only prohibited where it is clear that the person who does not provide 

identifying information intends to cause harm. By adding a requirement that an offender 

act "with the intent to defraud or harass" the call recipient, we believe that H.R. 5126 may 

provide a tool to protect the privacy of both callers and call recipients. We also have 

concerns about the provision that permits law enforcement agencies to possibly 

misrepresent their identities in the context of telecommunications services. 

Telephone Customers Have Legitimate Reasons to Withhold Their Phone Numbers 

 The introduction of caller ID services and the associated Automatic Number 

Identification (ANI) created new risks to privacy. Before these services were offered, 

telephone customers generally had the ability to control the circumstances under which 
28

their phone numbers were disclosed to others. In many cases, there was little need for a 

telephone customer to disclose a personal phone number if, for example, a person was 

calling a business to inquire about the cost or availability of a product or wanted 

information from a government agency. In other cases, there was a genuine concern that a 

person’s safety might be at risk. For example, women at shelters who were trying to 

reach their children were very concerned that an abusive spouse not be able to find their 

location. 

 The state public utility commissions, the FCC, and the Congress all worked to 

establish safeguards so that individuals would have some ability to limit the disclosure of 

their telephone numbers either by means of per-call blocking or per-line blocking. As a 

general matter, privacy advocates favored per-line blocking for all residential telephone 

customers because we did not see the benefit in requiring individuals to disclose their 

phone numbers and we objected to the cost that customers were asked to pay to obtain 

per-line blocking services. 

 In the context of the Internet and the offering of voice services over Internet 

Protocol (VOIP), there are additional concerns about the circumstances under which a 

person may be required to disclose their identity. The Supreme Court has already made 

clear that the Internet is entitled to a high level of First Amendment protection.1

 Anonymous speech is a central facet of the free speech guaranteed by the First 

Amendment. Without it, speakers with minority opinions are subject to the tyranny of the 

majority. The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of protecting anonymous 

speech in a series of cases, including Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of 

Stratton,

2 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,3

 and Talley v. California.

4

 In each of 

these cases, the Supreme Court recognized that, to protect speech, anonymous speech 

needed to be protected. A speaker's decision to remain anonymous, the Court said in 

McIntyre, "like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a 

publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.5 

Caller ID Blocking Does Not Adequately Protect Privacy Interests 

 In order to protect telephone users' right to speak anonymously in the face of caller 

ID, caller ID blocking services were offered. By going through the extra step of dialing 

*67 before making a call, or by paying for permanent blocking, a user can prevent his or 

her number from being disclosed to the call recipient. 

 Despite some of the drawbacks to this system (having to pay for permanent privacy, 

for instance), caller ID blocking may seem like a viable means for allowing callers to 

protect their anonymity while not misleading recipients. However, caller ID blocking is 

not a complete solution. One reason for this is that caller ID is not the only way that a 

caller can be identified. Another system, known as Automatic Number Identification, or 

ANI, will still disclose a caller's identity in many situations, regardless of whether or not 

the caller used call blocking. This means that many businesses, emergency service 

providers, and anyone with a toll-free number can reliably gain the phone number of a 

caller, even if caller ID is blocked. Spoofing services can protect the anonymity of a 

caller's ANI data when calling toll-free numbers and those entities that use ANI 

identification. 

 Another problem with requiring callers to disclose the number they call from is that 

many individuals to protect the have legitimate reasons to report a different number than 

the one presented on caller ID. For example, a person may well wish to keep her direct 

 

1 ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 2

 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 

3

 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 

4

 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 

5 McIntyre, 536 U.S. at 342. 
29

line private when making calls from within an organization. Such an arrangement 

legitimately gives call recipients a number to which they can return a call, but prevents an 

individual person’s phone from being inundated with calls that should be routed 

elsewhere. 

Spoofing Can Create Privacy Risks

 This is not to say that caller ID spoofing is an unqualified good--far from it. Earlier 

this year, EPIC brought to Congress's attention the problem of pretexting consumers' 

phone records.6

 Pretexting is a technique by which a bad actor can obtain an individual's 

personal information by impersonating a trusted entity. For instance, pretexters would 

obtain individuals' phone records by calling phone companies and pretending to be the 

individuals themselves. This tactic of fraud can be used in other situations as well, such 

as obtaining an individual's Social Security number by pretending to be the individual's 

bank or insurance company. 

 Understandably, caller ID spoofing is an important weapon in a pretexter's arsenal. 

Rob Douglas of PrivacyToday.com, with whom EPIC has worked on the pretexting issue, 

noted how fraudsters would use spoofing services in order to fool customers into thinking 

that fraudulent calls were coming from trusted sources.7

 Nor can we ignore the privacy interests of those who decline to accept calls from 

unknown numbers. If an individual has been habitually harassed by calls from a caller-ID 

blocked number, we should not permit the harasser to use spoofing as a means to 

circumvent the individual's screening. At the same time, it is clear that there could be 

prosecution for harassment whether or not additional prohibition on spoofing were 

enacted.8

 

Intent Requirement

Just as we cannot assume that all those who draw their curtains have something to 

hide, we cannot assume that every caller who spoofs their number is a bad actor. Callers 

from within a company might want to keep their direct lines private. Law enforcement 

informants and whistleblowers who call a toll-free tip line have good reason for keeping 

their calling information private. 

 What distinguishes these legitimate uses of spoofing from a pretexter pretending to 

be a bank in order to get account information, or a cyberstalker spoofing in order to 

harass his victim, is the intent behind the spoofing. However, as it currently stands, H.R. 

5126 does not draw a distinction between these intents. 

 We believe that the insertion of a phrase--"with the intent to defraud or harass"--into 

Section 2(e)(1) of the bill will preserve the privacy rights of callers while outlawing fraud 

and harassment assisted by the technology. 

 

6 Protecting Consumers' Phone Records: Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Product Safety, 

and Insurance of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) 

(statement of Marc Rotenberg, President and Executive Director, Electronic Privacy Information 

Center) http://www.epic.org/privacy/iei/sencomtest2806.html; Phone Records for Sale: Why Aren’t 

Phone Records Safe From Pretexting?: Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th 

Cong. (2006) (statement of Marc Rotenberg, President and Executive Director, Electronic Privacy 

Information Center) 

http://www.epic.org/privacy/iei/pretext_testimony.pdf. 7 Phone Records for Sale: Why Aren’t Phone Records Safe From Pretexting?: Before the H. Comm. 

on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Robert Douglas, CEO, 

PrivacyToday.com) http://www.privacytoday.com/HC020106.htm. 

8 See 47 U.S.C. § 223; 47 U.S.C. § 227.
30

Significance of NSA Surveillance Program for Privacy of Call Records 

 Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to comment on the legislation before the Subcommittee 

today without also noting the recent revelation that the National Security Agency may 

have constructed a massive database of telephone toll records of American consumers. 

 Yesterday, EPIC filed a complaint with the Federal Communications Commission in 

which we alleged that section 222 of the Communications Act, which protects the privacy 

of customer record information, may have been violated. We urged the Commission to 

undertake an investigation of this issue. 

 Given the very real possibility that the telephone numbers of American consumers 

may have been improperly disclosed by the telephone companies to the National Security 

Agency without legal authority there is the obvious consideration that some telephone 

customers may choose to take advantage of “spoofing” services to protect their privacy 

against unlawful surveillance. 

 Clearly, the issues raised by the NSA program include some matters that are not 

typically considered by this Subcommittee. But we would urge Members to support 

EPIC’s recommendation that the FCC undertake an investigation of the possibly 

improper disclosure. If the Communications Act was violated, that should be of concern. 

 And it would seem doubly unfair for the Committee to push forward legislation that 

would prevent telephone customers from protecting the privacy of their phone numbers at 

the same time questions have been raised about whether phone records are subject to 

unlawful searches. 

Conclusion

 Spoofing caller ID numbers can create a real risk to individuals who might be 

defrauded by bad actors. However, protecting callers' privacy rights, means that any ban 

on spoofing take into account the intent of the caller. By prohibiting spoofing with an 

intent to defraud or mislead the call recipient, the Truth in Caller ID Act would be 

significantly improved. I will be happy to answer any questions you might have at this 

time. 

 MR. UPTON. Well, thank you. Thank you again for your travel from 

the West Coast and Texas as well. I have a couple of questions and we 

will proceed on our 5 minutes and rotate among Members here. Mr. 

Navin, a couple questions for you. Has the FCC actually gotten 

complaints from folks with regard to “spoofing”? And if so, how many? 

Has it come to your attention? 

 MR. NAVIN. I have consulted with our Consumer and Governmental 

Affairs Bureau and they indicate that they have received approximately 

20 complaints--20 more formal complaints on this and perhaps five times 

that number of inquiries with regard to caller ID “spoofing” in general. 

 MR. UPTON. And you know, when we passed the Do Not Call List a 

couple years ago now, and of course the FTC is where we call to get on 

that list. I do not know if you tried with your counterparts at the FTC as 

it relates to this at all--maybe we should have asked the Chair when she 

was here the other day about that issue. Do you know if there has been 

any communication between the FCC and the FTC in terms of 

complaints that might have gone to them? 

 MR. NAVIN. I understand that our enforcement bureau has reached 

out to the folks at the FTC. I do not know the answer to your specific 
31

question about whether they are doing any investigations themselves. 

But I know that they are fully aware of our activities in terms of the 

companies that we have contacted and our efforts to gather more 

information about this problem. But I cannot speak to what the FTC is 

actually doing. 

 MR. UPTON. I would think that if this legislation were to become 

law tomorrow these companies that are offering their services to “spoof” 

would likely go out of business like that. Would you suspect that that is 

the case? 

 MR. NAVIN. I really could not make a prediction on that. I think that 

to the extent that they are offering this service to mislead or defraud the 

customer, I think that they very well may be captured by the legislation. 

As I understand it, there has also been some debate about adding an 

intent requirement, and that could certainly play a role in the 

Commission’s ability to enforce the legislation. So I could not say for 

sure that everyone would go out of business. 

 MR. UPTON. Okay. I really view this as someone coming to your 

door. I mean, I like caller ID. Got it on my phones, and I know who it 

is. It is going to be for my son or it is going to be for my daughter. It is 

going to be for my wife, me, or whoever it is. And it is very much like 

someone knocks on your door. Often you look out the little window or--

figure out who it is that is coming in. And I do not know if the FCC--

have you all ever thought about--do you think that you have the actual 

rule-making ability to do this without legislation or do you really need 

legislation to try and prevent “spoofing” from occurring? 

 MR. NAVIN. Certainly one of the challenges for the Commission as 

communications have migrated to Internet-based platforms has been the 

nature of the investigative targets. The Commission finds itself calling 

on companies that have not traditionally been regulated by the 

Commission because they are not license holders or entities that have 

been typically or historically regulated by the Commission. So I think 

that there is some concern. There is always some concern on the part of 

the Commission relating to its enforcement authority in the Internet 

context. And I think that the Commission would be particularly 

concerned about any restrictive definitions in the legislation as it relates 

to VoIP service providers. I think that a restrictive definition in this 

context may have unintended consequences for the Commission in other 

contexts, including the public safety context and the law enforcement 

context. 

 MR. UPTON. Thank you. Mr. Engel? 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 Mr. Navin, do you think the authority needs or are there things we 

could possibly add that you think would be helpful? 
32

 MR. NAVIN. I would repeat my comment about the definition of 

VoIP service providers in this bill. The definition of VoIP service 

providers in this bill would seem to limit the Commission’s flexibility to 

expand the definition to include one-way services, for example, or 

services that are not offered for a fee. I know that the Department of 

Justice recently filed with the Commission in another docket--in the 

CALEA docket--its concerns about any definition of VoIP providers that 

is restrictive because of the substitution that is going on between 

communication services today. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. Ms. Pies, I see in your testimony you 

mentioned you think people would ignore the phone to continue 

watching C-SPAN. So my question to you is have you been talking to 

my mother in Florida? Because she is the only one I know who does 

that. 

 MS. PIES. Actually, my father watches C-SPAN all the time and 

calls me and asks why I have not testified yet, so here I am. 

 MR. ENGEL. Well, when I come home my wife says--she sees me 

turning on C-SPAN and she says to me after doing this all day, you come 

home and turn on C-SPAN. You have got to be kidding. But today is 

my anniversary and I have been married 26 years, so something has been 

working. I do not know. Sir, thank you. 

 MR. UPTON. She is watching right now. 

 MR. ENGEL. That is why, you see? Now where are the C-SPAN 

cameras? 

 MS. PIES. That is a nice gift. Congratulations. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thanks. Seriously, though. I want to commend the 

VoIP providers. It is an exciting technology. And many thousands of 

my constituents have started using Cablevision’s Optimum Voice 

Service. But I understand that there is no standard for VoIP providers 

when it comes to caller ID. So I want to ask you. Do most programs let 

someone manually enter any caller ID information they want? 

 MS. PIES. I can’t speak for most VoIP services. I do know that a 

number of residential services that are designed essentially to replace 

your plain old telephone service only permit the user to have the numbers 

that are assigned to them. So for instance, if I could select one number 

or if I can select five, those are my five numbers and I can use any of 

them. They are my numbers. Some services that again may be unlawful 

or illegitimate may not stop that, but I do not actually have knowledge of 

who those providers might be, if that happens at all. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. Is the VoIP industry working toward a 

standard for how to handle this so that it would be uniform? 

 MS. PIES. That is an interesting question. There are a lot of different 

standards that are used to transmit calls that originate to IP. In many 
33

instances, IP-originated calls do not have a standard telephone number 

associated with them. And in those instances, there are no standards but 

international requirements that the provider can use a different code to 

transmit. And that code is, I believe, 000123456. Because VoIP calls do 

not have the same tie to geography that plain old telephone calls have, 

the phone number is in many instances irrelevant. And so rather than 

retrofitting our networks to add a phone number that has no meaning, 

providers often do not engage in any change or manipulation at all. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. James, if you could see one thing 

added, removed, or changed in this bill, what would it be? 

 MR. JAMES. I would honestly focus on the intent behind the bill. 

And the reason I say this is because if you look at other crimes that exist 

on the Internet such as SPAM or phishing--the techniques that are used 

for phishing are very common. An example as layman as possible, I will 

try to be--you can mirror a website. You can set up a “spoofed” email. 

You can then send out the mass mailing. If you look at all three of those 

techniques specifically, all three of those are legal when they are used 

legitimately. You can mirror a website. There is nothing wrong with 

that. You can “spoof” your email if you are showing someone a 

demonstration. People do it all the time when they change their identity 

on their email from multiple mail accounts. They literally are just 

changing their email address, but it is going through a different mail 

server. And on the third one, you can do the same mass mailing with 

bulk mail campaigns for marketing that have opt-in lists and all these 

such things. So there are mainly two things that I would focus on. 

I agree with Mr. Navin on the VoIP definition needs to be 

broadened. And the reason why are we have to also look at successors to 

VoIP in the sense of--smart homes is a good example. Not all of them 

are two-way. What if you are doing a home alert safety system for your 

grandmother and you want to just use VoIP to do the intercom system 

over the Internet and say are you okay? That is a one-way system. So 

VoIP could still be utilized in that and that is one-way. So I think that 

we should open that expansion a little bit. I would recommend going to 

the U.S. Patent Office, looking up if the definitions of VoIP are defined 

there, and start maybe using those types of techniques there. 

Another thing that I would see to expand on the bill possibly is, 

agreeing with Mr. Rotenberg on the legitimacy and the illegitimacy 

concepts. The reason why is--one of the things that I think that might 

want to be added to the clause of illegitimate activity is that teeth need to 

be added to this bill. And what I mean by that is that technology should 

be in place in telecom providers to help detect illegitimate activity so that 

you can actually enforce this. Because caller ID “spoofing” is essentially 

anonymous in many cases and it becomes very difficult to track down. 
34

 MR. ENGEL. If you would just indulge me, Mr. Chairman, I would 

like to ask Mr. Rotenberg the same question. I know you mentioned it in 

your testimony. But if you want to add anything, if you could see one 

thing added, removed, or changed in the bill, what would it be? 

 MR. ROTENBERG. Mr. Engel, I think adding the intent requirement 

is the key addition. And what that effectively does would be to 

distinguish between the people who are “spoofing” with mal intent and 

the people who are “spoofing” with a legitimate business purpose or 

privacy interest. I think virtually all of the witnesses have made a similar 

point, so I hope it is a change that the Subcommittee would make. 

 MR. ENGEL. All right. Well, thank you. Mr. Navin, do you want to 

add anything? I know we talked about the FCC but is there anything else 

that you would want to add about the bill? If you could see one thing 

added, removed, or changed, what would it be? 

 MR. NAVIN. I would emphasize that the Commission will take all 

steps that it can possibly take to implement the legislation however 

Congress determines to pass it, but I think it is important that the 

definition of VoIP services in the bill does not necessarily restrict the 

Commission’s authority as it relates to solving this problem as well as 

other problems that the Commission faces, including 911 and law 

enforcement. Thank you. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

 MR. UPTON. Mr. Terry? 

 MR. TERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will go back to my 

opening statement. I guess the specific question as the bill is written 

now, under this assumption a tele-services company has a contract with 

XYZ Corporation to do outbound calls trying to get them to subscribe to 

more credit card services, let us say, for example. And the telemarketing 

service is located in Omaha, Nebraska. The client is located in New 

York City and uses the general number for their client as the caller ID 

number. So the intent is to use a different number, but one of their client. 

Mr. Navin, and then I will go down the panel, so we have the intent to 

use a different phone number. Is that conduct “spoofing” under this bill? 

And then after that, should it be or should it not be “spoofing”? 

 MR. NAVIN. As I understand it, the focus of the bill is misleading or 

inaccurate caller ID information. Based upon the Commission’s existing 

rules that the Commission adopted in 2003, in the Do Not Call 

proceeding, it does not seem to me that the hypothetical that you gave 

would fall within the definition of inaccurate or misleading information. 

Indeed, under the Commission’s rules, any person or entity that engages 

in telemarketing must transmit caller ID information. Any person or 

entity that engages in telemarketing is prohibited from blocking the 

transmission of caller ID information. The telemarketers may, however, 
35

substitute for the name and phone number used or billed for making the 

call the name of the seller on behalf of which the telemarketing call is 

placed and the seller’s customer service telephone number. So according 

to the Commission’s existing rules, which I think were designed to get at 

the issue of inaccurate or misleading information, I do not think that your 

hypothetical creates a problem. 

 MR. TERRY. All right. So there is nothing in this bill that would 

then, in essence, create an issue of trumping your regulatory language? 

 MR. NAVIN. I do not believe so. Certainly if necessary you could 

specifically make reference to the Commission’s rules and preserve the 

Commission’s existing rules in this regard to ensure that telemarketers 

are not captured by this legislation. 

 MR. TERRY. All right. The other three, I will ask it in a different 

way. And that is just is that a legitimate business practice for a 

telemarketer to use the caller ID number of their client instead of it 

having to come up XYZ Telemarketing? I will just let you go down 

whether that is acceptable or whether that is fraudulent. 

 MS. PIES. Not only is it acceptable, and as Mr. Navin mentioned, 

required by the FCC rules, it is an enabling feature of VoIP technology. 

As you know, it is not just in the telemarketing business, but it allows 

jobs to be in-sourced to rural areas, to people who may not be able to get 

out to a call center. They can actually work from home. Rather than 

their home number showing up, it would be a central phone number that 

shows up. So it is actually a very important feature. I am not sure that 

the legislation as it is drafted today actually gets at allowing it. Probably 

if you went back and included intent language, as we have discussed, that 

would be very helpful. 

 MR. JAMES. The answer to this is it is definitely applicable in 

marketing, whether it is telemarketing or some other. And I will give an 

example of that. Two days ago, I saw a Bank of America email talking 

about their partnership with eHealth Insurance. It was sent by a third 

party but it said it was from Bank of America. But if you go through the 

mail headers, it is not really sent from Bank of America’s system. It is 

actually sent from their marketing third party vendor. So in a case such 

as this, yes, there is a very legitimate use, and I think that I am agreeing 

with virtually everybody as well on this panel that “legitimate” needs to 

be defined. If you look at the bill today, it technically could surpass 

because one would argue misleading. Well, we are not misleading. We 

are calling on behalf of our client, and technically that falls under this bill 

that says, we are not misleading anything, but I would want to clarify 

that further along so that we are not even having to go to a hearing about 

it and debating the issue or going to court on this issue, so that it is more 

defined. 
36

 MR. ROTENBERG. Mr. Terry, I actually disagree with Mr. Navin’s 

assessment about how the language would be interpreted in this bill. He 

is referring to earlier legislation and rulemaking that was explicitly 

enabled by that statute for the FCC to develop regulations and to 

interpret terms. This bill which is before your subcommittee is, first of 

all, more recent in time. Secondly, it doesn’t incorporate the earlier 

definitions. And third, it creates no rulemaking authority for the FCC to 

do so. And, at first impression, if a court looks at the language of this 

statute, this statute prohibits making a call in which misleading or 

inaccurate caller identification information is provided. I think those 

words are fairly straightforward. So in the absence of similar authority 

for the FCC to conduct a rulemaking and interpret those terms, I think it 

would not provide protection for the type of tele-services you have 

described. And I think the better approach would, in fact, be to create an 

explicit intent requirement that would protect businesses that are not 

engaging in fraudulent or harassing activity. 

 MR. TERRY. Very good, thank you. 

 MR. UPTON. Mr. Inslee? 

 MR. INSLEE. Thank you. Mr. Rotenberg, just briefly on the issue of 

surveillance. You indicated that it would be a good idea for Members of 

Congress to weigh in on this. What would you suggest about a strategy 

in that regard? 

 MR. ROTENBERG. Well, Mr. Inslee, we would very much appreciate 

support from the subcommittee members, certainly of both parties, 

encouraging Chairman Martin to open an investigation as to whether 

Section 222 was violated. You know that earlier this year, hearings were 

held on the question of pre-texting, which is the way in which people’s 

personal telephone numbers became available for sale on the Internet, 

and a lot of good work was done in this committee, and Chairman Martin 

testified about the importance of protecting the privacy of those records. 

Very similar issues, but of course on a much larger scope, have arisen 

now in the context of the domestic surveillance program, and we hope 

that Chairman Martin will be encouraged to pursue this investigation. 

 MR. INSLEE. I will join others in doing that. Just so you know, I will 

be bringing in an amendment--a little bit related issue on the Defense 

Department Appropriations Bill that will prohibit the expenditure of 

taxpayer money for electronic surveillance that does not comply with the 

FISA law. So we will be having a debate on the House floor here in a 

few weeks. 

 MR. ROTENBERG. Thank you. 

 MR. UPTON. Mr. Engel, do you have additional questions? 

 MR. ENGEL. Well, I have just one kind of light-hearted question. I 

understand that our computer engineers are working on what is called 
37

Internet-2. I really, to tell you the truth, don’t know a lot about it, but I 

believe it is supposed to be an upgrade, like going from Windows ‛98 to 

XP, and I am sure we will be holding hearings on it. My question is to 

anybody. Do any of you know if Internet-2 will help this situation that 

we are talking about it today, or possibly make it worse? Mr. James. 

 MR. JAMES. If I may? I don’t think that--Internet-2 is technically a 

medium for communication. I was kind of thinking about when I was 

going through this bill about, one of the reasons why I agree with Mr. 

Navin about expanding is we could get into a predecessor scenario of 

VoIP working on an IPX protocol instead of the standard internet TCP/IP 

protocol, and that would basically not be covered by this bill because it 

specifically says TCP/IP. And I was actually thinking if Internet-2 is one 

of the examples, what happens there? Is it going to be using the same 

protocol? Will it be defined in this bill? I don’t think that Internet-2 is 

going to necessarily secure the techniques against caller ID “spoofing”, 

because the problem is at a protocol layer of the actual VoIP--without 

getting technical, it is basically a session initiation protocol. It is 

basically this specific protocol, and that is where the weakness lies. It 

doesn’t really matter what it communicates on. If Internet-2 does buy 

into, like, cryptographic communication per every communication it ever 

makes, an authentication on every little communication your computer 

may make, and so it does accountability and auditing trails and all this. 

There is a very good chance that we could stem it down because of the 

fact that we could track the activity itself. But, unless it does something 

like that, which I don’t believe it does at this time, it is not going to be 

much more effective. 

 MR. ENGEL. Thank you. If we have hearings about it, we should 

call you back again. Anybody else? 

 MS. PIES. Mr. Engel, I just wanted to mention that the committee or 

subcommittee should approach the definition and what it encompasses 

cautiously. Certainly, Congress should want to ensure that any 

legislation enables new technology and the new features that are so 

important for both residential users and businesses rather than stifling the 

technology. And the concern that the VoIP industry has is not, certainly, 

any desire to get out of obligations or to ensure the safety and security of 

our Nation, but it is that we won’t be able to continue to make the 

investments that will bring these transformative technologies to 

consumers. And so it is not a specific request, but just sort of a word of 

caution. 

 MR. ENGEL. Well, thank you. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

 MR. UPTON. Thank you, again, for your leadership on this issue. 

Mr. Navin, I have one last question, and that is if we were to add the 
38

clause or intent to defraud as part of this legislation standard to the bill, 

how would that affect your efforts to enforce the law? 

 MR. NAVIN. I think that, from the Commission’s vantage point, any 

time you add an intent standard, it puts an additional evidentiary burden 

on the Commission in its enforcement process, so I think it would make 

it more difficult to enforce. The Commission would certainly take all 

steps necessary to enforce the law, but I think it would indeed make it 

more difficult. 

 MR. UPTON. And, with that, I will yield to my friend, Mr. Markey-- 

 MR. MARKEY. Thank you. 

 MR. UPTON. --in the nick of time. 

 MR. MARKEY. Thank you so much. Mr. Navin, is it? Navin. In 

your testimony, you note that the Commission addressed caller ID on the 

public switch telecom network in 1995, with a rule which requires all 

carriers using Signaling Systems 7 to transmit the calling party number 

associated with an interstate call to interconnecting carriers. Did the 

recently granted Verizon forbearance petition remove this requirement 

for Verizon? 

 MR. NAVIN. The Verizon forbearance petition sought flexibility 

from certain common carrier regulations. I don’t specifically recall 

whether they enumerated this regulation in their petition. The 

Commission did not deny that petition within the statutorily defined 

period of time and, according to the statute, if the Commission fails to 

take action, the petition is deemed granted. So I don’t know whether 

they specifically enumerated this regulation in their petition. 

 MR. MARKEY. So they did not grant forbearance from all of Title II, 

is that what you are saying? 

 MR. NAVIN. My recollection is that there were certain obligations 

that Verizon carved out of its application, and I know, for example, in an 

ex parte in the beginning of February, they made it plain to the 

Commission that their petition did not include asking the Commission to 

remove the Section 254 obligation, which is the universal service 

obligation. I also know that in one of those ex partes, they restricted the 

scope of the petition to exclude certain special access services that they 

are providing today. So I don’t know if they specifically excluded-- 

 MR. MARKEY. You don’t know. 

 MR. NAVIN. --this. 

 MR. MARKEY. Okay. Did they list Section 222, the CPNI section? 

 MR. NAVIN. In the original petition, they asked for relief from all 

common carrier regulation. Section 222 is within the body of law under 

Title II of the Act, so I think it is certainly arguable that they included, or 

intended to include, this within the scope of the petition to the extent that 

they were seeking to get out from Title II. 
39

 MR. MARKEY. Okay. So many of us are concerned about 

allegations that carriers circumvented the Section 222 Customer Privacy 

rules and gave calling data to the NSA. And yet the FCC recently 

granted Verizon the right to avoid these rules, and many others, when it 

granted through inaction the Verizon forbearance petition. Mr. 

Rotenberg, could you comment on that? 

 MR. ROTENBERG. Well, Mr. Markey, we are honestly concerned if 

the telephone companies are trying to get out from under the Section 222 

obligations, particularly, as you note, in light of the recent allegations. 

We are not familiar with the Verizon forbearance petition, but I will 

point out that this provision of the Communications Act traces its routes, 

actually, to the original passage, back in 1934, when telephone 

companies were asked to ensure that the privacy of their customers 

would be protected. So obviously this would be of great concern. 

 MR. MARKEY. Okay. Mr. Navin, when do you expect to complete 

the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on CPNI? 

 MR. NAVIN. I believe that we have received comments in that 

proceeding, but we have not yet received reply comments. I think that 

we would wait until the record closed before we began the process of 

presenting options to the commissioners. I think that the reply comment 

period closes either later this month or early in June, so I think that we 

will begin to brief the commissioners and present options to them some 

time thereafter. 

 MR. MARKEY. Okay. And I would ask you just, Mr. Rotenberg, if 

you could, just tell me--if you could just summarize the one thing you 

want us to remember about the issue that we are dealing with in the 

hearing today? 

 MR. ROTENBERG. Well, Mr. Markey, on the legislation before the 

committee, we feel very strongly that an intent requirement needs to be 

added to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate uses for caller 

ID “spoofing”. And as for the other issue you raised, we very much 

support the effort to encourage Chairman Martin to conduct an 

investigation to Section 222 and the allegation that information was 

improperly disclosed. 

 MR. MARKEY. Thank you. Well, I have asked the Chairman of the--

I have asked Chairman Martin to give us information as to what exactly 

has taken place in the relationship between the telephone companies and 

the NSA so that we can have more information to determine whether or 

not any privacy laws have been violated, or any other laws that have pass 

by this Committee that may have been violated. So I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman, for this lively and entertaining-- 

 MR. UPTON. I didn’t see a Starbucks cup there. 
40

 MR. MARKEY. --and--which probably means I am not really awake, 

even if I am sitting here, at this point. But I thank you for the hearing, 

Mr. Chairman. 

 MR. UPTON. Thank you all for being here. I appreciate your 

testimony. I would say that it is my understanding that it is likely that we 

will move to a markup relatively soon on this bill before the full 

committee, and I appreciate your input and your thoughts, and we look 

forward to continuing on a bipartisan path. With that, we are adjourned. 

 [Whereupon, at 10:19 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
41

SUBMISSION FOR THE RECORD BY DAVID SLOANE, SR. MANAGING DIRECTOR,

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND ADVOCACY, AARP 

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