alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5th CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the

limited circumstances set forth in 5th CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-31207

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAUL ENRIQUE MATUS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(97-CR-50014-1)

November 20, 1998

Before JOHNSON, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Raul Enrique Matus appeals his guilty plea conviction of possession

with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana.

Specifically, Matus argues that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the drugs found in his vehicle because (1) the

officer did not have probable cause to stop the defendant, (2) the

officer exceeded the scope of the traffic stop by asking to search the

vehicle, and (3) the defendant’s consent to search was not given

voluntarily. 

This Court reviews a “district court’s findings of fact for clear
2

error and its conclusions of law de novo, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, unless inconsistent with the

trial court’s findings or found to be clearly erroneous after

considering the evidence as a whole.” U.S. v. Zucco, 71 F.3d 188, 190

(5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 144

(5th Cir. 1995). Whether consent was given voluntarily is a question

of fact which will only be reversed if clearly erroneous. See Zucco,

71 F.3d at 191; United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 438 (5th Cir.

1993). When the evidence includes credibility assessments, the standard

is applied even more deferentially. See Zucco, 71 F.3d at 191.

Matus first contends that he was stopped in violation of the Fourth

Amendment because the officer did not have probable cause. After a

careful review of the transcript from the suppression hearing, we hold

that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that the

officer had probable cause to believe that Matus had executed an illegal

lane change. 

Matus next argues that the officer exceeded the scope of the stop

by requesting to search the vehicle. The record shows that this request

was made while the detention was still justified by the facts justifying

the initial stop. See Zucco, 71 F.3d at 190-91; Shabazz, 993 F.2d at

438.

Finally, Matus contends that the district court erred in denying

the motion to suppress because his consent was not voluntarily given.

Specifically, Matus argues that he did not freely consent because he

could not understand English, and was not presented with an explanation

in Spanish. The record shows that in making a credibility assessment
3

based on oral testimony given at the hearing, the district court found

that Matus could understand English. Under the clearly erroneous

standard articulated by this Court in matters of credibility, the

district court did not err.

AFFIRMED.
This submission is without oral argument. Should the court determine that oral 1

argument is necessary, a hearing will be scheduled. If the nonmoving party fails to

respond, a final judgment may be entered without further notice or trial. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e). The moving party's evidence may be accepted as true if it is not

contradicted by the opposing party. Id. The contradiction must be supported by

evidence which may include, but is not limited to, affidavits and depositions. Any

evidence, and in particular deposition testimony, must be cited to with specificity and

particularity. Id. If deposition testimony is submitted and relied upon, the parties shall

direct the court to specific testimony which either does or does not "set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. Summary judgment may be

granted for either party if the evidence filed with the court shows that there is no material

question of fact and that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

RICHARD MARSHALL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:06-CV-701-ID

)

CHRIS WEST, in his individual )

capacity, LASHUN HUTSON, in his )

individual capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the court are Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Chris

West and Lashun Hutson on February 12, 2008. (Doc. Nos. 30-31.) Plaintiff Richard

Marshall is DIRECTED to file a response to said Motions on or before February 27,

2008. Defendants may file replies, if desired, on or before March 5, 2008. Thereafter,

Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment, and all pleadings and evidence filed in

support of or in opposition to said Motions, shall be DEEMED submitted to the court.1

Case 2:06-cv-00701-ID-CSC Document 34 Filed 02/13/2008 Page 1 of 2
2

Pleadings submitted beyond the submission date will not be considered by the

court absent compelling exigent circumstances.

CONSIDERED and ORDERED this 13 day of February, 2008. th

 /s/ Ira DeMent 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00701-ID-CSC Document 34 Filed 02/13/2008 Page 2 of 2
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</TABLE>
#### Mizell & Brother *v.*Satilla Turpentine Company.

May 15, 1913.

Equitable petition. Before Judge Parker. Charlton superioi court. March 5, 1912.

*J. L. Sweat*and *W. M. Olliff,*for plaintiff.

*Wilson, Bennett & Lambdin,*for defendant.

Hill, J.

The evidence submitted in behalf of the plaintiff failing to make out a prima facie case, a nonsuit was properly granted.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
SUBPART 8.4 – FEDERAL SUPPLY

SCHEDULES

Parent topic: PART 8 –– REQUIRED SOURCES OF SUPPLIES AND SERVICES

8.404 Use of Federal Supply Schedules.

(h)(3)(ii)(A) A determination and findings is not required for time-and-materials or labor-hour CLINS

utilizing Order Level Materials (OLM) under GSA Schedules. The cumulative value of the OLM

CLIN/SLINs shall not exceed 33.33% of the total value of the order or BPA, not including travel.

8.405 Ordering procedures for Federal Supply Schedules.

8.405-5 Small business.

(S-90) For orders against the federal supply schedule exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold,

small business programs are the preferred method when market research has indicated that there is

at least two or more small business schedule contractors that offer services which will meet the

agency’s needs. The socioeconomic small business contracting programs shall be considered first

before considering a small business set-aside.

8.405-6 Limiting sources.

(S-90) Refer to DARS PGI 8.405-6(S-90) for the J&A template for FAR/DFARS/PGI Parts 8

acquisitions.

(S-91) See DARS 6.303-90 for requirements for modified justifications.
#### § 945.31 Expenses.

Committee members and alternates shall be reimbursed for reasonable expenses necessarily incurred by them in the performance of their duties and in the exercise of their powers under this subpart, and may receive compensation at a rate determined by the committee, and approved by the Secretary, for each day or portion thereof, spent in conducting committee business.

[53 FR 3189, Feb. 4, 1988]
#### § 987.77 Personal liability.

No member or alternate member of the committee, or any employee or agent thereof, shall be held personally responsible, either individually or jointly with others, in any way whatsoever, to any handler or any other person for errors in judgment, mistakes, or other acts either of commission or omission, as such member, alternate member, agent, or employee, except for acts of dishonesty, willful misconduct or gross negligence.
COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-10-00400-CV

IN RE CAROL ANN GIBBONS

AND VIRGINIA FLOYD

RELATORS

------------

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

------------

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

------------

The court has considered Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and 

emergency motion for stay and is of the opinion that all relief should be denied. 

Accordingly, Relators’ petition for writ of mandamus and motion for stay are 

denied. 

Relators shall pay all costs of this original proceeding, for which let 

execution issue.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, J.; LIVINGSTON, C.J.; and DAUPHINOT, J.

 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4., 52.8(d).
2

DELIVERED: November 4, 2010
Editorial Note on Part 1
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 78 FR 34247, June 7, 2013.

§ 1.37 Office of Small Business and Civil Rights. The Office of Small Business and Civil Rights— ( a ) Develops and implements an effective small and disadvantaged business program in accordance with the Small Business Act, as amended, and plans and implements NRC policies and programs relating to equal employment oppportunity and civil rights matters as required by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM);
( b ) Ensures that appropriate consideration is given to Labor Surplus Area firms and Women Business Enterprises, and conducts an outreach program aimed at contractors desiring to do business with NRC;
( c ) Maintains liaison with other Government agencies and trade associations;
( d ) Coordinates efforts with the Director, Division of Contracts, and Directors of other affected offices;
( e ) Develops and recommends for approval by the Executive Director for Operations, NRC policy providing for equal employment opportunity in all aspects of Federal personnel practice;
( f ) Develops, monitors, and evaluates the agency's equal employment opportunity efforts and affirmative action programs to ensure compliance with NRC policy;
( g ) Serves as the principal contact with local and national public and private organizations to facilitate the NRC equal opportunity program; and
( h ) Coordinates all efforts pertaining to small and disadvantaged business utilization and equal employment opportunity with Office Directors and Regional Administrators.
[52 FR 31602, Aug. 21, 1987, as amended at 59 FR 63882, Dec. 12, 1994]
157 So.2d 234

#### Succession of Thomas Charles MULQUEENY.

No. 46991.

Nov. 12, 1963.

In re: Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Mulqueeny Prieto applying for certiorari, or writ of review, to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, Parish of Orleans. 156 So.2d 317.

' The application is denied. ■ There appears no error of law in the judgment complained of.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 17

- 3666

_____________________________
D AVID L EE M ASON , J R

. , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County

. Edward P. Nickinson, III , Judge

. June 4, 2019

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

. B.L. T HOMAS , C.J., and R OBERTS and W INOKUR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla . R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kevin P. Steiger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody , Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley , Assistant Attorney General, Tallaha ssee , for Appellee.
Filing# 117740970 E-Filed 12/07/2020 11 :28:02 AM 

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST WDICIAL CIRCUIT 

IN AND FOR OKALOOSA COUNTY, FLORIDA 

JOSEPH POPP, 

Plaintiff, 

-vsMJW REAL ESTATE, LLC. 

Defendant. 

-------------I 

TO: MJW REAL ESTATE, LLC 

c/o Registered Agent 

Lindsay J. Builder, Jr. 

CIVIL ACTION 

SUMMONS 

IMPORTANT 

271 West Canton Avenue, Suite 2 

Winter Park, FL 32879 

CASE NO.: 2020 CA 003668 F 

-------

A lawsuit has been filed against you. You have twenty (20) calendar days after this summons is 

served on you to file a written response to the attached complaint with the clerk of this Court. A 

phone call will not protect you. Your written response, including the case number given above 

and the names of the parties, must be filed if you want the court to hear your side of the case. If 

you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case, and your wages, money, and property 

may thereafter be taken without further warning from the court. There are other legal 

requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you 

may call an attorney referral service or a legal aid office (listed in the phone book). 

If you choose to file a written response yourself, at the same time you file your written response 

to the court you must also mail or take a copy of your written response to the "Plaintiff/Plaintiffs 

Attorney" named below. 

IMPORT ANTE 

Usted ha sido demandado legalmente. Tiene 20 dias, contados a partir del recibo de esta 

notificacion, para contestar la demanda adjunta, por escrito, y presentarla ante este tribunal. Una 

Hamada telefonica no la protegera. Si usted desea que el tribunal considere su defensa, debe 

presentar su respuesta por escrito, incluyendo el numero del caso y los nombres de las partes 

interesadas. Si usted no contesta la demanda a tiempo, pudiese perder el caso y podria ser 

despojado de sus ingresos y propiedades, o privado de sus derechos, sin previo aviso del tribunal. 

Existen otros requisitos legales. Si lo desea, puede usted consultar a un abogado immediatamente. 

Si no conoce a un abogado, puede Hamar a una de las oficinas de asistencia legal que aparecen en 

la guia telefonica. 

EXHIBIT A

Case 3:21-cv-00042-MCR-MJF Document 1-1 Filed 01/06/21 Page 1 of 5
Case 3:21-cv-00042-MCR-MJF Document 1-1 Filed 01/06/21 Page 2 of 5
Case 3:21-cv-00042-MCR-MJF Document 1-1 Filed 01/06/21 Page 3 of 5
Case 3:21-cv-00042-MCR-MJF Document 1-1 Filed 01/06/21 Page 4 of 5
Case 3:21-cv-00042-MCR-MJF Document 1-1 Filed 01/06/21 Page 5 of 5
ARMED SERVICES BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS Appeal of

-- Task Source/MPSC FEPP, LLC Under ContractNo. H98210-15-C-0005 APPEARANCES FORTHE APPELLANT: ) ) ) ) )

APPEARANCES FORTHE GOVERNMENT: ASBCANo. 59951

Steven J. Koprince, Esq. Matthew T. Schoonover, Esq.

Koprince Law LLC Lawrence, KS Hattie R. DuBois, Esq. William C. Moorhouse, Esq.

Associate General Counsel Carolyn T. Howell, Esq.

General Counsel Defense Human Resources Activity Alexandria, VA ORDER OF DISMISSAL Appellant earlier filed a '"Notice ofVoluntary Dismissal," purporting to dismiss this action without prejudice. Because our rules do not provide for a unilateral dismissal without prejudice, wetreatedthe filing as a motion to which the governmentwas afforded the opportunity to respond. We also permitted appellant the opportunity to considerwhether it would dismiss this matter withprejudice ifthat were the choice otherwisepresented to it. The government respondedby requesting thatthe case be dismissed with prejudice or, in the alternative, thatthe appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction orbecause the contract at issue was allegedly void 

### ab initio due to fraud. In response, appellant states that it has no objection to its casebeing dismissed with prejudice. Accordingly, appellant has effectively made an unopposed motion to dismiss with prejudice, and the government's motion to dismiss is effectively withdrawn because it was only made in the alternative to appellant's case being dismissed withoutprejudice.

# ..

We thus grant appellant's unopposed motion and deem the government's motion to be withdrawn. The appeal is dismissed with prejudice. Dated: 2 February 2016

# J~ Administrative Judge Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals I certify that the foregoing is a true copy ofthe Order ofDismissal ofthe Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals in ASBCA No. 59951, Appeal ofTask Source/MPSC FEPP, LLC, rendered in conformance with the Board's Charter. Dated:

2 

### JEFFREY D. GARDIN Recorder, Armed Services Board ofContract Appeals
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<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2000 and is qualified in
its entirety by reference to such financial statements.

</LEGEND>

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# U n i ted S t a te s C o u r t o f A ppe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 20-5212 September Term, 2020 1: 20-c v -014 77-UNA Filed O n: March 3, 20 21 Leo n S nipe s, App ellant
v . T anya S. Chut kan, District of Colum bia District Court Jud ge, et al.,

App ellees
ON A PPE A L FROM THE UNITED STA TES DIS TRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BEFORE: T ate l and Millett, Circuit Jud ges, an d S ent elle, S enio r Circuit Judge J U D G M E N T T his ap pea l w as co nside red o n th e reco rd f rom the United Sta tes District Cou rt for th e District of

Colum bia a nd on the brief f iled b y ap pellan t. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P

. 34(a )(2); D.C. Cir. Rule 34 (j). Upon consid eratio n o f the foregoing an d th e m otion for recon siderat ion, it is ORDERED tha t th e m otion for recon siderat ion b e d enie d. It is FURTHER ORDERED A ND A DJUDGED tha t th e d istrict court’s o rder f iled Ju ne 16, 20 20, be af

f irmed . T he district cou rt prop erly con clude d th at t he com plaintw as f rivolou s, see 28 U.S.C. § 1 915 (e)(2)(B)( i); Neitz ke v. W illiams, 4 90 U.S. 3 19, 32 5 (198 9) (“[A] co mp laint .

. . is f rivolou s w here it lacks a n a rg uab le ba sis eithe r in law or in fact.”); Crisaf i v . Hollan d, 6 55 F.2d 13 05, 13 08 (D.C. Cir. 1981 ) (“An in forma pa upe ris com plaintis prop erly

dism issed a s f rivolou s . . . if it is clea r f rom the face of the plea ding tha t th e n am ed defend antis ab solute ly imm une f rom suit o n th e claim s asserte d.”), an d th at t he court lacked au tho rity to rev iew

de cisions o f

oth er fede ral courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 1 294 (1). Furth ermo re, a ppe llant h as n ot d em onst rated tha t th e district cou rt ab used its discret ion in de nying his m otion s for ap poin tm entof cou nsel and for a prelimin aryinjun ction. Se e In re Navy Chap laincy, 697 F.3d 11 71, 11 78 (D.C. Cir. 201 2) (district cou rt’s ultima te d ecision to d eny prelimin aryinjun ctiv e relief is rev iew ed for ab use of

discretio n); Ga v iria v . Reynolds,

# U n i ted S t a te s C o u r t o f A ppe a l s F OR T HE D IS TRICT OF C OLUM BIA C IRCUI T

___ ___ ___ ___ 

## No. 20-5212 September Term, 2020
476 F.3d 94 0, 9 43 (D.C. Cir. 2007 ) (district court’s d ecision den y ing app ointm entof coun sel is reviewed for ab use of discretio n). Pursua nt t o D.C. Circuit Ru le 36 , th is dispo sition will no t be pu blished . T he Clerk is directe d to w ithho ld issua nce of the m and ate he rein u ntil seven d ays af ter reso lution of an y tim ely petition for rehe aring or pe tition for rehe aring en ban c. S ee Fed. R. Ap p. P. 4 1(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41

. Per Curiam FOR THE COURT: Mark J. La nger, Clerk BY: /s/ Daniel J. Reidy Depu ty Cl erk

Page 2
#### § 993.85 Separability.

If any provision of this subpart is declared invalid or the applicability thereof to any person, circumstance, or thing is held invalid, the validity of the remainder of this subpart or the applicability thereof to any other person, circumstance, or thing shall not be affected thereby.