1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0140n.06 F iled: F ebruary 18, 2009 No. 07-1514 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

MYRON EUGEN E WOOD, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,

v. DOUGLAS VASBI

NDER, Warden, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PE A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AS TE RN DI STRI CT OF MI CHI GAN

B EF OR E: NO RRI S, B AT CH EL DE R, R OG ERS , Ci rc uit Judg e s. ROGERS, Ci rcu i t J udg e. This habe as petition arises f rom petitioner My

ron Wood’s conviction for posse ssing more than 650 g rams of c ocaine and his subsequent sentence to life imprisonment as a habitual drug offe nder. Wood unsucce ssfully soug ht habea s relief

on a number of g rounds in th e d i s t ri ct co u rt. Only the issue of his rig ht to a speedy trial has bee n cer

tified for appea l. Wood has produced state -cour t documents that wer e not par t of the re cord be fore the district court whic h indicate, among other t h i n gs, that he re quested ba il during his pre -trial inca rce ration. He a sk s this c ourt to re mand the c a se , ar g uin g that the dis tr ic t court did no t ful fi ll i ts o bli g a tio n to consider a ll releva

nt portions of the state-c ourt rec ord. B eca use the ne w ev i d en ce wh i ch WoodNo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

Michig an law a llows charg es to be broug ht in a gi v en co u nty wher e the a

rre st was made 1 outside the county

but within one mile of the county ’s borde r. Mich. Comp. L aws § 762.3(1)

. - 2 - pres en t s d o es n o t alter the outc ome of a speedy -trial ana ly sis, we dec line to remand the case and instead deny

the petition. I Petitioner My

ron Wood was ar

rested in Way

ne County , Michig an, on October 23, 1998, as part of a multi-juri s dictional drug investigation. The arr est took place less than a mile fr om the border of Oakland County , Michig an. The office rs rec overe d a handgun, one kilog ram of c ocaine , and $6000. Authorities rele ased Wood from custody afte r striking an ag ree ment under which Wood would not be char g ed if he led a DEA ag ent to te n kilos of coca ine. Wood cooperated with the ag ent for a time, but in November 1998 he broke off c ontact and disc onnecte d his phone. The DE A ag ent iss ue d a wa rr a nt f or Woo d’ s a rr e st in Ma c omb County , M ic hig a n, a nd Woo d w a s a

pp re he nd e d in Marc h 1999. Re lyingon state me nts Woo d ma de a t the tim e of his or ig ina l arr e st, the Sta te a tte mpt e d to prosec ute Wood as part of a drug conspirac y in Macomb County . Wood successfully soug ht to have tho se state me nts su

pp re sse d. Th e pr os e c uti on , re c og nizi ng that it c ou ld no lon g e r pr ov e ve nu e in Macomb County , soug ht a chang e of venue to Oakland County

. At a hea ring on J anuar

y 27, 2000, 1 the da te on

wh ic h th e c a se wa s se t f or tr ia l, Wo od

a c kn ow le dg e d th a t ve nu e wo uld be pro pe r i n Oakland County , and the c ourt g rante d the transf er. The case was set for t rial on Aug ust 31, 2000.No. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

- 3 - I n A ug us t, Wo od ’s c ouns e l r e qu e ste d a po stp on e me nt, a nd

the tr ia l w a s resc he du le d to Dec ember

2000. For

rea sons not clea

r from the record, the case was tra nsfer red to a differ ent cour

t in Dece mber. The parties met in ea rly 2001 and set the t rial date for April 21, 2001. The trial took place as sche duled in April 2001, approximately twenty -six months after Wood was r ear rested a nd char g ed with possession of coc aine. At the opening of the trial, Wood moved to ha ve the case dismiss ed, claiming a violation of his constituti onal rig ht to a speedy trial. Wood acknowledg ed that he w as on par ole for a 1988 drug offe nse at the time of his Mar ch 1999 ar rest, and that he was being held i n state prison as a result of that pa ro le vio la tio n. Wood fur th er ac kn ow le dg e d r e sp on sib ili ty fo r t he po stp on e me nt i n A ug us t 20 00 . T he tr ia l c ourt

de nie d th e mot ion

to dis mis s, fi nd ing that the de fe ns e wa s r e sp on sib le fo r s ome pa rt of the de lay a nd that th e pr os e c uti on

ma de a g oo d f a ithe ff or t to br ingthe c a se to t

ri a l. The jury convicted Wood of possessing more than 650 g rams of c ocaine . Be cause he wa s

a re peat dr

ug offe nder, the court sentenc ed Wood to life imprisonment under Michig an’s mandatory

se nte nc ingstatute. Woo d a pp e a le d h is c on vic tio n to the Mic hig a n Co ur t of Ap pe a ls. I n o rd e r t o evaluate Wood’s speedy

trial claim, the Michig an cour t considere d four factors: “(1) the leng th of the de lay , ( 2) the re a so ns fo r t he de lay , (3) wh e the r the de fe nd a nt as se rt e d his rig ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l, and (4) prejudice to the defe ndant re sulting fr om the delay .” People v . W ood , N o . 2 3 5 5 5 8 , 2 0 0 3 WL 1 5 5 8 2 2 2 , a t * 2 (M i ch C t
. Ap p . M ar . 2 5 , 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Pe op le v . M ac k le , 617 N.W.2d 339, 349No. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

A lt h o u g h th e M ic h ig a n c o u rt c it e d M ic h ig a n p r e c e d e n t f o r th e f o u r f a c to r s u s e d to a n a ly

ze 2 Woo d’ s sp e e dy

tr ia l c la im, tho se fa c tor s p a ra lle l th e fa c tor s art ic ulate d b y the Un ite d Sta te s Su pr e me Court in Barker v . W

ingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). - 4 - (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)). The Michigan court not ed that eig ht months of the twenty -six -month delay 2

we re att ributable to the de fense

. W ood , 2 0 0 3 WL 1 5 5 8 2 2 2 , a t * 2

. T h e c o u rt w e n t o n to say that “althoug h defe ndant maintains that he ‘consistently ’ asser ted his r ight to a spe edy

trial, the re cord is devoid of any evidenc e of a prior re quest.” Id

. I ndeed, “[t] he only time defe ndant appe ars to have

a sse rt e d a ny ri g ht t o a sp e e dy tr ia l w a s o n th e fir st d a y of tr ia l w he n h e mov e d uns uc c e ssf ull y to dismiss the cha

rg es due to the de lay .” Id . Final l y , the cour t concluded that Wood had not been prejudice d, reje cting his argument that the delay preve nted him from locating res g estae witnesses t o h i s ar rest. Id . The Michig an Supreme Court denied leave to appe al. People v . W ood , No. 123888, 2003 WL 22519865 (Mich. Oc t. 3, 2003). Wood sought habe as relief in f eder al court. The district c ourt order ed the State to re spond and to file c opies of “a

ny prior dec ision, pleading , brief a nd/or transc ript neede d to adjudicate the issues prese nted.” The district court denied all of W ood’s claims for relief

. W ood v. Vasbinder , No. 04 -1 00 49 , 2 00 7 WL

90 76 42 (E .D . M ic h. Mar. 23 , 20 07 ). Th e c ourt e ng a g e d in a de ta ile d a na ly sis of the four Barker v. W

ingo fac tors befor e conc luding that the Mic higa n court’s de cision was not contra ry to, or an unrea sonable application of, clea rly established Supreme Court prec edent. Id. at

* 7

- 9

. Wi th

r e g a r d to th e f a c to r in v o lv in g Wo o d ’ s a s s e rti o n o f h is r ig h t, th e d is tr ic t c o u rt s aid, “Althoug h the petitioner c laims that he consistently objected to the de lay , the finding of theNo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

- 5 - Michig an Court of Appe als that the onl y time that the petit ioner asserted his rig ht to a spee dy trial was on the da

y of trial is fully

supported by

the re cord.” Id. at *8. I n c on jun c tio n w iththi s a

pp e a l, Wood su

bmi ts se ve ra l sta te c ourt do c ume nts a nd a sk s th is court to take judicial notice of the m. One is a he aring dispositi on form date d Aug ust 23, 1999, from the Mac omb County

Circuit Court. The portion of the f orm noting tha t the defe ndant was r emande d to custody

includes t h e following handwr itten annotation: “Parties stip to have c ase r eviewe d by Central I ntake on bond. People OBJECT to any lowering of bond.” Wood also submits the St ate’ s mot ion to a dmi t th e state me nts he ma de subs equ ent to hi s 199 8 a rr e st. I n th a t mo tio n, the Sta te attempted to distinguish two Michig an ca ses in which stateme nts made to the police in conjunc tion

w i t h l e n i e n c y a g r e e m e n t s w e r e e x c l u d e d a s i n v o l u n t a r

y. Wood argues t hat t he absence of t he document ref lecting his reque st for bond from the r ecor d befor e the district cour

t undermines the dist ri ct cour t’s speedy trial dec ision and require s remand. Woo d a lso a rgue s th a t th e Sta te ’s mot ion to a dmi t st a te me nts wa s th e on ly basi s f or ve nu e in Macomb County

and wa s based on unc ommonly fee ble ar g uments for a d m i t ting his inculpatory statements, such th at t h e p o rt ion of delay attributable to proc eeding s in Macomb County was not taken in g ood faith. He therefor e asks this court to remand his ca se to the district court so the district court c an conside r these a dditional portions of the state cour t rec ord. I n the alternative, he asks the court t o t ake judicial notice of the e x tra doc uments and to find a violation of his rig ht to a speedy tr ia l. IINo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

This circuit recently held in Br own v . S mi th , No. 06-2295, 2008 WL5411899 (6th Cir. Dec

. 3 31, 2008), that AEDPA de fer ence does not apply to an ea rlier state -cour

t pr o cee ding “ whene ver ne w, substantial evidence supporting a habea s claim comes to lig h t d u ring the proc eeding s in feder al district court.” Id. at *3. I t is not clear whe ther Br own applies to the instant case . Neve rtheless, the re s u l t in this case does not depe nd on the applica bility of Br own , b e c a

u s e t h e r e s u l t i s t he sa me whether we use AEDPA def

ere nce or de novo re view. Whil e F eder al Rule of Appellate Proc edure 10(e) does allow amendment of the r ecor d on 4 appea l in lim ited circ um s t ance s, “the purpose of ame ndment under this rule is to ensure that the appel late r e c o r d

a c c u r a te ly

r e f le c ts th e r e c o r d

b e f o r e th e D is tr ic t C o u rt, n o t t o p r o v id e th is Co urt with new evide nce not befor e the District Court, even if the new evidenc e is substantial.” Adams v. Holland , 330 F.3d 398, 406 ( 6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in orig inal). Ther efor e, whe re ne w statecourt doc uments require full consideration, the case should be rema nded. Id. - 6 - We deny the petit ion beca use, even considering Wood’s additional documents and affor ding the c a s e d e n o v o r e v i e w , W o o d d o e s n o t d e m o n s t r a t e a v i o l a t i o n o f h i s r i g h t t o a s p e e dy tr ia l. 3 Although the situation presented by this case doe s not call for judicia l notice, we c o n s i d er the 4 documents for

the limited purpose of de termining that they do not chang e the outcome of our r eview. The ne w evidenc e which Wood pre sents does not alter the balanc e struck by the state c ourt in any signific ant way . The re levant Supreme Court prec edent, B a r k e r v . W in go , 4 0 7 U. S

. 514 (1972), e stablished a balanc ing test with the following four fac tors: “[l] eng th of delay , the re ason for the de lay , the def

endant’ s assertion of his rig ht, and pre judice to the def

endant.” Id. at 530. The four f actor s toge ther we igh a g ainst Wood. With re g a rd to the fi rs t fa c tor , the le ng th of de lay in Wood ’s c a se wa s lo ng e no ug h to ra ise

a pr e su mpt ion

of vio la tio n o f the ri g ht to a sp e e dy tr ia l, bu t wa s muc h sh or te r tha n that th e de lay

in oth e r c a se s w he re no vio la tio n w a s f ound

. Woo d e xpe ri e nc e d a tot a l de lay

of tw e nty -s ix mon ths ,No. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

Wood now arg ues for

the first time on appe al that he is re sponsible for only four months of 5 de lay . In h is h a

be a s p e tit ion

to the dis tr ic t cou

rt , Wood state d, “ Un do ub te dly , d e fe ns e c ouns e l di d mov e fo r a

n a djo ur nm ent o f t

he pr oc e e din g s, wh ic h w a s d ue to t he un a va ila

bil ity of c ou ns e l. [C itation omit ted.] This m odicum of delay consumed a meag er e ight months.” He thus conce ded responsibility

for e ight months of dela

y . - 7

- eig ht of which the district c ourt attributed to him. The Supreme Court has noted that a de lay of one 5 y ear is ge nera lly

enoug h to trigg er a

n inquiry under Barker

. Doggett v. United States , 505 U.S. 647, 65 2 n .1 (1 99 2) . H ow e ve r, the Court als o no ted th a t pa ssi ng thi s th re sh old do e s n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly indicate pr ejudicial dela

y in a par ticular c ase. Id. The delay found to be pre

judicial in Do gg e tt

lasted eig ht and a ha lf y ear s, id. at 652, a de ci d ed l y longe r per iod than the one at issue in this case . The petitioner in Barker experience d a five -y ear delay , y et the Court did no t find a violation of the rig ht to a spee dy

trial in Barker . 407 U.S. at 533-34, 536. Withre g a rd

to t h e se c on d f

a c tor , Wo od ’s a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e do e s n ot e sta bli shthat th e Sta te delay ed the tria l in bad faith. Wood sug g ests that the State’s motion to admit sta tements he made to the police af

ter his Octobe r 1998 ar

rest re lied o n such meritless ar g uments that it constitut ed ine xcu sa ble de lay . T he Sta te a rgue d tha t, u nd e r t he tot a lity of the c ir c ums ta

nc e s, Woo d’ s st a te me nts

wer e voluntary . The State a lso arg ued that a c hang e in Michig an Rul e o f Evidence 410 ended Michig an’s pr actice of excluding state ments made to police in c onjunction with pr o m i s es of leniency , since the r evised Rule 410 excluded only those statements made t o att orney s for the pr os e c uti ng a

uth or ity . Wh ile the se a rgume nts we re ult imate ly un su c c e ssf ul, the y do no t a pp e a r t o be fr ivolous or made in bad f aith. W o o d c ite s Peo

plev . Co nte , 365 N.W.2d 648 (Mich. 1984), for the pre mise that “aNo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

- 8 - confe ssion induced by

a law e nforc ement off icial’s promise o f leniency is involunt ary

and inadmissible.” Id. a t 66 2. Ye t Con te is a n in tr ic a te we b o f plu

ra lit ie s a nd

c on c ur re nc e s n ot e a sil y

u n d er s t o o d

wi t h o u tt h e b en ef

i to f s u b s eq u en tp re ce d en t
. C o u rt s i n t er p re t i n g Con te have c oncluded that four justices e mbrac ed a totality of the c ircumstance s test, while only three adher ed to the lead opinion. See, e .g. , People v . Givans , 57 5 N. W.2 d 84 , 87 (M ic h. Ct. Ap p. 19 97 ); People v . Gilliam , No. 221164, 2000 W L 33405942, at *2-3 (Mic h. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 2000). An a rg ument that Wood’s statem ent s we re vo lun tary un de r a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s is c on sis te nt w iththe Mic hig a n c ou rt s’ interpre tations of Con te . Subsequent to Con te , the Michig an Supreme Court revised Michig an Rule of Evide nce 410, which deals with statements made in conjunc tion with plea neg otiation. See People v. Dunn , 521 N. W.2 d 2 55 , 2 57 n. 14 (M ic h. 19 94 ). Whe re the pr e vio us ru le re qu ir e d sup pr e ssi on of a ll s ta te me nts made dur ing ple a neg otiations, the a mended rule only suppressed statements made to an attorne y for the prosec uting a

uthority

. Com

pa re id. with Mich. R. Evid. 410. I n an ap peal de cided a fter the

a me ndme nt, the Mic hig a n Su pr e me Court c on te mpl a te d a dist inc tio n be tw e e n sta te me nts ma de to the police a

nd statements made to a

prosec uting attorney
. Dunn , 521 N. W.2 d a t 25 8. Th e Sta te did

no t a c t in ba d f a ithor fo r t he purp os e of

sh e e r d e lay

by purs uin g a n a

rgume nt a lon g tho se lin e s. Wit h reg ard to the thi rd fa ctor, W ood’s sing le re quest for bond doe s not demonstrate a vigor ous asser

tion of the rig ht to a speedy trial. Wood presents one state- court doc ument indicating

a sin g le re qu e st fo r bon d as ev ide nc e that he vig or ou sly a sse rt e d h is r ig ht t o a

sp e e dy tr ia l pr ior

to the a c tua l da

y of tr ia l. Ye t th e c a se law i nd ic a te s th a t mo re is r e qu ir e d b e fo re thi s f a c tor we ig hs inNo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

- 9 - favor of a pe titioner. This court held in Ma ple s v . S te ga ll , 4 27 F .3 d 1 02 0 ( 6th

Cir. 200 5) , th a t a reque st for bail or a reduc tion in bail is a n asser tion of the rig ht to a speedy trial; but the petitioner in Maples made six assertions of the rig ht, a fa r more vig orous ef

fort than the sing le asser

tion at issue in the instant case. See id. at 1029-30. This cour t noted in Un ite d Stat es v . H oly fie ld , 802 F.2d 84 6 (6 th Cir

. 19 86 ), that a sin g le a sse rt ion of the ri g ht c a n be e no ug h to ma ke thi s f a c tor we ig h in a petitioner’ s favor

. Id. at 848. Yet Holy field’s sing le asser tion—an opposition t o a m otion for delay and a sta tement that he wa s prepa red to pr ocee d to tr ial—was signific antly more direc t than Woo d’ s, a nd

thi s c ourt

no ne the le ss f

ound that H oly fi e ld’ s r ig ht to a sp e e dy tr ia l w a s not

violated. Barker , the seminal ca se on the right to a speedy trail, also weig hs ag ainst Wood. I n that case , the petitioner soug ht and re ceive d bond, objected to sev eral continuance s, and asse rted his rig ht to a speedy trial when the trial finally occur red. Barker , 4 07 U. S. at 53 4- 35 . Y e t th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld that the fac tor conce rning Ba rker ’s asser

tion of his right we ighe d ag ain st him, and ult imately

that his right to a spe edy

trial was not violated. Id. at 534-36. Wit h reg ard t o the fourth f actor , Wood does not demonstrate pre judice. Barker

identifies three kinds of prejudice that a def endant mig ht experience : oppressive pr e-tria l incarc eration, anxiety an d co n cern, and impairment of his defense . 407 U.S. at 532. The re cord indicates that Wood was incarc erated bec ause he violated par ole and that his sentenc e for the instant conviction could not be g in to run until the pr evious sentenc e expired. Althoug h Wood may have e x perie nced

a nxie ty wh ile fa c ing ch arges th a t w ou ld l ike ly le a d to lif

e imp ri so nme nt, the str e ng th o f t he c a se ag ainst him makes it just as l ikely that he was retice nt to see the case come to trial. That Wood neverNo. 07-1514

W ood v. Vasbinder

- 1 0 - so ug ht t o b e br ou g ht t o tr ia l ot he r t ha n b y ma kin g on e ini ti al requ est fo r b a il d oe s li ttl e to demonstrates eag erne ss ove r retice nce. Finally , there is no evidenc e that the delay prejudice d Wood’s defe nse. Wood asser ts that the delay

preve nted him from locating witnesses, but he doe s

no t say to wh a t the se wi tne sse s wo uld have te sti fi e d or ho w his de fe ns e wa s pr e judiced by

thei r absenc e. Cf. Re dd v . S

owd e rs , 80 9 F .2 d 12 66 , 12 72 (6 th Cir

. 19 87 ) ( de lay imp a ir e d d e fe ns e be c a

us e alibi witnesses wer e no long er a vailable)

. No ne of the fo ur f

a c tor s w e ig hs str on g ly

in Wo od ’s fa

vo r a nd so me we ig h a g a ins t hi m decide dly . Even c onsidering his additional state-c ourt documents and r eviewinghis claims de novo,

we fi nd no vio la tio n o f Wo od ’s ri g ht to a spe e dy tr ia l. Th e omi ssi on of tho se state -c ourt do c ume nts fr om t he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s re vie w the re fo re a pp e a rs to b e ha

rm le ss. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e judgm ent of the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nyingWoo d’ s p e tit ion is aff irmed.