IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community :

Development Coalition, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Philadelphia Redevelopment :

Authority, : No. 213 C.D. 2022

Appellant : Submitted: March 17, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: June 27, 2023

The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (PRA) appeals from the 

Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) October 22, 2021 order1

(October 22, 2021 Order) terminating the Philadelphia Community Development 

Coalition, Inc.’s (PCDC) Petition for the Appointment of Conservator (Petition), 

lifting the lis pendens,

2

and permitting PCDC to file a Petition for Costs. PRA 

1 The trial court’s order was entered on November 4, 2021. In its Notice of Appeal, PRA 

also appealed from the trial court’s October 22, 2021 order denying PRA’s Motion to Dismiss for 

Lack of Jurisdiction; however, PRA abandoned that appeal in its brief to this Court. See PRA Br. 

at 2. Therefore, this Court affirms that order. See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912 

n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the 

appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”).

2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

A lis pendens is the jurisdiction, power, or control which courts 

acquire over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of 

the action, and until its final judgment thereon. The existence of a

lis pendens merely notifies third parties that any interest that may be 

acquired in the res pending the litigation will be subject to the result 

of the action and is not therefore an actual lien on the property. An 

order lifting a lis pendens during the course of an equity action fixes 
2

presents four issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the October 22, 2021 Order 

is appealable as of right under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule)

311(a)(2) or, in the alternative, as a collateral order under Rule 313(a); (2) whether 

PCDC is precluded from recovering fees and costs relating to the Petition’s 

preparation and filing, where a third party abated the conditions on the subject 

property prior to a hearing on the merits; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing

to dismiss the action as moot, where the conditions complained of in the Petition 

were abated by an independent third party prior to a hearing on the merits; and (4) 

whether the American Rule,

3

controlling Pennsylvania case law, and the statutory 

language of Section 5(f) of the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship 

Act (Act),

4 preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees. After review, this Court affirms.

Facts

On April 13, 2021, PCDC filed its Petition pertaining to a building on 

PRA’s property located at 3110 West Berks Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 

(Property). Therein, PCDC alleged that the building on the Property (Building) met 

the conditions for conservatorship under the Act. On May 7, 2021, the trial court 

scheduled a June 23, 2021 status hearing on the Petition. On May 11, 2021, the 

City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I) deemed the Property 

neither rights, duties, nor liabilities between the parties, puts no one 

out of court, and does not terminate the underlying litigation by 

prohibiting parties from proceeding with the action. Accordingly, 

the requisite “finality” is not present when a lis pendens is lifted and 

the order, therefore, is interlocutory.

U.S. Nat’l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. 1985) (citations omitted).

3

“The American Rule states that a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse 

party unless there is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the parties[,] or some 

other established exception.” Richard Allen Preparatory Charter Sch. v. Dep’t of Educ., 161 A.3d 

415, 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), aff’d, 185 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2018).

4 Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. § 1105(f). 
3

imminently dangerous. On May 13, 2021, L&I issued a demolition permit and, that

same day, the City hired a contractor that demolished the Building.

5 On May 27, 

2021, PRA answered the Petition and raised affirmative defenses, including that the 

Building’s demolition rendered the Petition moot. On June 15, 2021, PCDC filed 

its answer to PRA’s new matter and affirmative defenses. 

On August 4, 2021, following oral argument, the trial court concluded

that the demolition rendered the matter moot and dismissed the Petition. On August 

17, 2021, PCDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Post-Trial Relief 

(Motion for Reconsideration), requesting the trial court to vacate its August 4, 2021 

order. On August 30, 2021, PRA submitted its response to the Motion for 

Reconsideration. On September 2, 2021, the trial court granted the Motion for 

Reconsideration and vacated its August 4, 2021 order. 

The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 22, 2021,

to determine whether PCDC met the conditions for conservatorship on the Petition’s 

April 13, 2021 filing date. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, on September 28, 2021, 

PRA filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Motion to Dismiss).

6 The 

trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on October 22, 2021. At the hearing’s

conclusion, the trial court held that PCDC proved that the Property met the 

conservatorship conditions on the Petition filing date, and terminated the Petition 

because the Building’s demolition remediated the Property’s blighted condition. 

5 The Property is now a vacant lot.

6 On October 19, 2021, PCDC filed its response to PRA’s Motion to Dismiss. 
4

The trial court declared in the October 22, 2021 Order:

1. The [trial c]ourt finds that [PCDC] has satisfied its 

burden to show that the conditions of conservatorship have 

been met as of the date of filing of the Petition under 

Section [5(d) of the Act], 68 P.S. § 1105(d);

2. The [trial c]ourt further finds that, [because] the City [] 

having demolished the building on the [] Property 

subsequent to the filing of the [P]etition, the conditions 

alleged in the Petition and proven by [PCDC] have 

subsequently been remediated and no longer exist;

3. The Petition is accordingly TERMINATED and the lis 

pendens LIFTED.

4. [PCDC] may, no later than thirty (30) days from the 

docketing of this [October 22, 2021] Order, file a Petition 

for Fees and Costs to recover such fees and costs 

authorized under the Act.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 250a. The trial court also denied PRA’s Motion to 

Dismiss.7 

PRA appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On February 7, 

2022, the appeal was transferred to this Court. On March 18, 2022, PCDC filed a 

motion to quash the appeal (Motion to Quash) in this Court, alleging therein that this 

Court lacks jurisdiction because the trial court’s orders are not final orders. On May 

2, 2022, PRA filed its answer to the Motion to Quash. By May 10, 2022 Order, this 

Court directed that the Motion to Quash be decided with the appeal’s merits.

7 On November 15, 2021, PRA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, renewing its request to 

dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. On November 19, 2021, PCDC filed a Petition for 

Statutory Costs and Fees. On December 3, 2021, PCDC filed its response to PRA’s Motion for 

Reconsideration. On December 9, 2021, the trial court concluded that the Notice of Appeal 

rendered PRA’s Motion for Reconsideration moot. On that same day, PRA filed its response to 

PCDC’s Petition for Statutory Costs and Fees. On December 6, 2021, the trial court ordered PRA 

to file a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b)

Statement). On December 22, 2021, PRA filed its Rule 1925(b) Statement. 
5

Discussion

Motion to Quash

Preliminarily, because PCDC’s Motion to Quash is dispositive, this 

Court will address it first. PCDC argues that the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order 

is not appealable, and, therefore, the instant appeal should be quashed.

8

 PRA 

contends that it may appeal from the October 22, 2021 Order as of right under Rule 

311(a)(2) or, in the alternative, as a collateral order under Rule 313(a).

Rule 311(a) provides, in pertinent part:

General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right and 

without reference to [Rule] 341(c) [(relating to 

determinations of finality)] from the following types of 

orders:

. . . .

(2) Attachments, etc. An order confirming, modifying, 

dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an 

attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar 

matter[9]affecting the possession or control of 

property . . . .

8

“In order to appeal to this Court as a matter of right, a party generally must take an appeal

from a final order as defined by [Rule] 341.” Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment 

Appeals, 709 A.2d 928, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (footnote omitted). Rule 341(b) states:

A final order:

(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties;

. . . .

(3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of 

this rule; or

(4) is an order pursuant to subdivision (f) of this rule

[pertaining to post-conviction relief].

Pa.R.A.P. 341. The parties do not dispute that the October 22, 2021 Order was not a final order.

9

In Philadelphia Community Development Coalition v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 11, 12, 

268 C.D. 2019, filed August 4, 2019), this Court concluded that an appeal from a proceeding under 

the Act fell within Rule 311(a)(2). This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited 

“for [their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the 

Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Isabella is cited 

herein for its persuasive authority.
6

Pa.R.A.P. 311(a).

Notably,

[the Act] authorizes a court to appoint a conservator to 

rehabilitate a deteriorating building, thereby incurring 

debt that ultimately may be the owner’s responsibility. 

The conservator is responsible for bringing buildings into 

municipal code compliance when owners fail to do so.

Section 2 of [the Act], 68 P.S. § 1102, authorizes the filing 

of a Petition for the Appointment of a Conservator with 

the court of common pleas by certain named interested 

parties who seek the appointment of a conservator to take 

possession of the property, undertake its rehabilitation 

and, as appropriate, ultimately sell the property unless 

reclaimed by the owner(s).

In re Conservatorship Proceeding in Rem by Germantown Conservancy, Inc., 995 

A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). PCDC argues that the trial court’s October 22, 

2021 Order is not appealable because, although the trial court found that conditions 

existed for a conservator’s appointment under the Act, the trial court did not appoint 

a conservator, and it dismissed the action after the Building’s demolition removed 

the blight. Thus, PCDC asserts that the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order did not 

“affect[] the possession or control of property,” and it is not an appealable 

interlocutory order under Rule 311.

PRA retorts that “[a] conservatorship proceeding is a ‘similar matter,’

akin to an attachment, custodianship, or receivership invoking Rule 311(a)(2).” 

PRA Br. at 12. Citing Triffin v. Interstate Printing Co., 515 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 

1986), PRA equates the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order “granting conditional 

relief but not appointing a conservator” as “a refusal to confirm a conservatorship[.]” 

PRA Br. at 14. In Triffin, a secured creditor sought to execute his judgment by 

attaching the debtor’s bank accounts. The trial court denied the creditor’s motion 

for entry of judgment on the pleadings, and the creditor appealed. 
7

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered its jurisdiction 

pursuant to Rule 311(a)(2), reasoning:

Rule 311(a)(2) authorizes appeals from interlocutory 

orders that either do or refuse to modify, confirm[,] or 

dissolve attachments or similar matter[s] affecting the 

possession or control of property. The [b]ank asserts that 

the order of the trial court did not accomplish any of the 

results contemplated by Rule 311(a)(2). [The 

Pennsylvania Superior Court] find[s] that the [b]ank’s 

assertion is incorrect.

To comply with Rule 311(a)(2), [the creditor] sought 

judgment on the pleadings which, if granted, would have 

confirmed [the creditor’s] attachment.

In opposing [the creditor’s] motion for judgment on the 

pleadings, the [b]ank was seeking to have the trial court 

refuse to confirm the attachment by not entering 

judgment against the garnishee [b]ank. This was the 

heart of the dispute that the [trial] court’s order 

resolved against [the creditor] and the court did so only 

after permitting discovery of the facts pertinent to 

whether the . . . accounts could be attached. There was 

no further action required by the [trial] court. The [trial] 

court had all relevant facts before it when it denied [the

creditor’s] judgment on the pleadings, thereby 

refusing to confirm the attachment. [Rule] 311(a)(2).

Therefore, [the creditor’s] appeal from the [trial]

court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings falls 

squarely within [Rule] 311(a)(2), as an action refusing 

to confirm an attachment.

[10]

Triffin, 515 A.2d at 957-58 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 

Unlike in Triffin, which involved an attachment, the instant matter 

involves a conservatorship “to take possession of the property, undertake its 

10 In Foulke v. Lavelle, 454 A.2d 56 (Pa. Super. 1982), the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

held that a trial court order, which denied a motion to set aside or stay a writ of attachment, “has 

final aspects since it has the result of ‘affecting the possession or control of property.’ It therefore 

falls within the class of orders which are appealable as o[f] right under [Rule] 311(a)(2).” Foulke,

454 A.2d at 58. 
8

rehabilitation and, as appropriate, ultimately sell the property unless reclaimed by 

the owner(s).” Germantown Conservancy, Inc., 995 A.2d at 453. Nonetheless, both 

Triffin and the instant matter involve “an order . . . affecting the possession and 

control of property[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a). Although the Building was demolished, 

the purpose of the trial court’s hearing was to determine whether the conservatorship 

conditions were met as of the Petition’s filing date, i.e., whether to confirm a 

conservator, or refuse to confirm a conservator.

Further, the Act provides for a petitioner to recover fees and costs if the 

petitioner meets the conditions for conservatorship. The PCDC alleged in the 

Petition that “the Property is a vacant, three[-]story residential building . . . .” R.R. 

at 33a. Section 3 of the Act defines “building” as, “[a] residential, commercial or 

industrial building or structure and the land appurtenant thereto, including a vacant 

lot on which a building has been demolished.” 68 P.S. § 1103 (emphasis added). 

The fact that the building had been demolished does not alter the fact that the trial 

court’s order denying the conservatorship affected the Property by declining to direct 

that a conservator “take possession of the property[.]” Germantown Conservancy, 

Inc., 995 A.2d at 453. It “was the heart of the dispute that the [trial] court resolved 

. . . .” Triffin, 515 A.2d at 958. Accordingly, because the instant appeal “falls 

squarely within [Rule] 311(a)(2),” id., this Court denies the Motion to Quash.

Fees and Costs 

PRA contends that PCDC is precluded from recovering fees and costs 

under the Act relating to its preparation and filing of the Petition because the 

conditions on the Property were abated by a third party before a hearing on the 

merits. See Section 10 of the Act, 68 P.S. § 1110. PRA further argues that fees and 

costs may not be awarded under Section 5(f) of the Act, entitled “Conditional relief,”

68 P.S. § 1105(f) (Conditional Relief Provision).
9

Section 5(f) of the Act states:

(1) If the court finds after a hearing that the conditions 

for conservatorship set forth in subsection (d) [(pertaining 

to conditions for conservatorship as of the date of the 

petition’s filing11)] have been established, but the owner 

represents that the conditions, violations or nuisance 

or emergency condition will be abated in a reasonable 

period, the court may allow the owner to proceed to 

remedy the conditions.

(2) If the conditions set forth in paragraph (1) have been 

satisfied, the court shall enter an order providing that, in 

the event that the violations or nuisance or emergency 

conditions are not abated by the owner by a specific date 

or that other specified remedial activities have not 

occurred by a specific date or dates, an order granting the 

relief requested in the petition shall be entered.

(3) The court shall also require the owner to post a bond in 

the amount of the repair costs estimated in the petition as 

a condition to retaining possession of the building.

(4) Upon a finding that:

(i) the petition states conditions for 

conservatorship; or

(ii) the owner elects to either:

(A) remedy all violations and nuisance or 

emergency conditions; or

(B) sell the property subject to the 

conservatorship,

the owner shall reimburse the petitioner for all costs 

incurred by the petitioner in preparing and filing the 

petition in accordance with the requirements of 

[S]ection 4 [of the Act] and the conservator’s or 

developer’s fee.

11 Section 5(d) of the Act states, in relevant part: “If a petition is filed under [S]ection 4 [of 

the Act], the court may appoint a conservator if all of the following apply as of the date of filing[,]”

and lists relevant conditions thereunder. 68 P.S. § 1105(d) (emphasis added).
10

68 P.S. § 1105(f) (emphasis added). 

Section 10 of the Act, which addresses conservatorship termination, 

similarly provides:

Upon request of a party in interest or the conservator, the 

court may order the termination of the conservatorship if 

it determines:

(1) the conditions that were the grounds for the petition 

and all other code violations have been abated or 

corrected, the obligations, expenses and improvements 

of the conservatorship, including all fees and expenses 

of the conservator, have been fully paid or provided for

and the purposes of the conservatorship have been 

fulfilled;

(2) the owner, mortgagee[,] or lienholder has requested the 

conservatorship be terminated and has provided adequate 

assurances to the court that the conditions that constituted 

grounds for the petition will be promptly abated, all 

obligations, expenses and improvements of the 

conservatorship, including all fees and expenses of the 

conservator, have been fully paid or provided for[,] and 

the purposes of the conservatorship have been fulfilled;

(3) the building has been sold by the conservator and the 

proceeds distributed in accordance with [S]ection 9(d) [of 

the Act, 68 P.S. § 1109(d)]; or

(4) the conservator has been unable, after diligent effort, 

to present a plan that could be approved under [S]ection 

6(b)(3) [of the Act, 68 P.S. § 1106(b)(3)] or to implement 

a previously approved plan or, for any reason, the purposes 

of the conservatorship cannot be fulfilled.

68 P.S. § 1110 (emphasis added).

The Act’s language clearly represents the General Assembly’s intent 

that, where a petition states conditions for conservatorship under the Act, fees and 

costs should be awarded both when a conservator need not be appointed under the 
11

Conditional Relief Provision, see Section 5(f) of the Act, and when a conservator is 

appointed. See Section 10 of the Act.

PRA asserts that the Conditional Relief Provision applies only if, “after 

a hearing[,]” 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(1) (emphasis added), the owner “elects[,]” 68 P.S. § 

1105(f)(4)(ii) (emphasis added), to either remedy all violations or to sell the property 

subject to the conservatorship. Here, PRA describes that PRA made no such 

election; rather, L&I, by contractor, demolished the Building on the Property before

the hearing. PRA expounds:

There is no provision in the Act providing for payment of 

costs and developer’s fees to a petitioner where an 

independent third party, here L&I, with the undisputed 

authority to do so, demolishes the [p]roperty prior to a 

hearing. The PRA, as owner here, never made any 

election or representation under the Conditional Relief 

[P]rovision . . . , either to remedy any alleged conditions 

or to sell the Property. Nor could it have done so, because 

of L&I’s intervening action that led to the [Building] being 

demolished. Accordingly, Section 5(f) of the Act is 

simply not applicable.

PRA Br. at 20-21.

Contrary to PRA’s contention, the Conditional Relief Provision’s plain 

language provides for payment of costs and fees when either the petition states 

conditions for conservatorship or the owner elects to either remedy the violations or 

sell the property. See 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(4); see also Francisville Neighborhood Dev. 

Corp. v. Est. of Moore, 174 A.3d 1193 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).

In Francisville, a neighborhood organization petitioned for 

appointment of a conservator. In its answer to the petition, the owner noted that the 

property was listed for sale. At a hearing, the parties agreed to allow the property to 

be sold. Following the property’s sale, the trial court held a hearing regarding fees 
12

and costs. The trial court granted fees and costs and a conservator’s fee and the 

owner appealed. This Court stated:

We recognize that “[t]he object of all interpretation and 

construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). 

“Every statute, shall be construed to give effect to all of its 

provisions.” Id. (emphasis added). In ascertaining 

legislative intent, it is presumed that the General Assembly 

did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Further[,] it is presumed that the 

General Assembly intends that the entire statute be 

effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2).

Under the clear language of [the Conditional Relief 

Provision] there are two alternate findings which 

would require a trial court to award fees and costs to a 

petitioner . . . : 1) a finding that “the petition states 

conditions for conservatorship;” or 2) the owner makes 

certain elections, including to “sell the property subject to 

the conservatorship.” 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(4).

Francisville, 174 A.3d at 1199-1200 (bold emphasis added). The Francisville Court 

also rejected the property owner’s argument that a conservatorship fee should not be 

paid to the petitioner because it was not appointed conservator, stating: “Section 

[]5(f) of the Act expressly requires the conservatorship fee to be paid to the petitioner 

. . . if the trial court makes a finding satisfying one of the alternate statutory bases 

for award of fees and costs.” Francisville, 174 A.3d at 1200.

PRA attempts to distinguish Francisville on the basis that, therein, the 

property owner elected to sell the property after the hearing, and such circumstances 

fall squarely within the Conditional Relief Provision, thereby authorizing an award 

of fees and costs. In contrast, PRA argues that, in the instant matter, “by the time of 

the first status hearing . . . , the [Building] had been completely demolished by a 

contractor selected by L&I.” PRA Br. at 20.
13

However, notwithstanding that PRA did not explicitly make an election 

to “remedy all violations and nuisance or emergency conditions[,]” 68 P.S. §

1105(f)(4)(ii)(A), such was not necessary for PCDC to be awarded fees and costs. 

As the Francisville Court noted, one of the “two alternate findings which would 

require a trial court to award fees and costs to a petitioner . . . [is] a finding that ‘the 

petition states conditions for conservatorship[.]” Id. at 1200. Here, the trial court 

expressly found that “the conditions of conservatorship ha[d] been met[.]” R.R. at 

250a. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that PCDC was not precluded from 

recovering fees and costs under the Act related to the Petition’s preparation and 

filing.

Mootness

PRA next argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the action 

as moot, where the conditions described in the Petition were abated by an 

independent third party before a hearing on the merits.

This Court has explained:

Generally, courts do not decide moot issues. A case is 

moot if there exists no actual case or controversy, and the 

controversy must continue at every stage of a judicial 

proceeding. Mistich v. Commonwealth, 863 A.2d 116, 119 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). This Court has described “actual case 

or controversy” as follows:

(1) a legal controversy that is real and not 

hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that 

affects an individual in a concrete manner so 

as to provide the factual predicate for a 

reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal 

controversy with sufficiently adverse parties 

so as to sharpen the issues for judicial 

resolution.

Id. A case is moot when a determination will not have any 

practical effect on the existing controversy. Butler v. 
14

Indian Lake Borough, 14 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2011).

Szabo v. Commonwealth, 212 A.3d 1168, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citation 

omitted).

Following the trial court’s August 4, 2021 order determining that the 

demolition rendered the matter moot, the trial court granted PCDC’s Motion for 

Reconsideration based on the Act’s requirement that the trial court evaluate whether 

conditions exist to appoint a conservator as of the date of the Petition’s filing. Upon 

reconsideration, the trial court ruled that the matter was not moot because the issue 

before the trial court was whether the conditions existed as of the Petition’s filing

date, rather than the hearing date. The subsequent remediation by the Building’s 

demolition did not dispose of that issue. The trial court was required to conduct a 

hearing in order to comply with the Act’s provisions and to consider whether the Act 

required PRA to pay fees and costs. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted 

reconsideration and refused to dismiss the case for mootness.

12

Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, the Motion to Quash is denied, and the 

trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order is affirmed.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

12 PRA also contends that the American Rule, controlling Pennsylvania case law, and the 

statutory language of Section 5(f)(4) of the Act, preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees absent 

statutory authority. Because this Court concluded herein that the Act provided for the award of

fees and costs, PRA’s contention is without merit.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community :

Development Coalition, Inc. :

:

v. :

:

Philadelphia Redevelopment :

Authority, : No. 213 C.D. 2022

Appellant :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2023, the Philadelphia Community 

Development Coalition, Inc.’s Motion to Quash is DENIED and the Philadelphia 

County Common Pleas Court’s October 22, 2021 orders are AFFIRMED.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge