United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

BEST PRACTICES

Stronger Practices 

Needed to Improve 

DOD Technology 

Transition Processes 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-883 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

BEST PRACTICES

Stronger Practices Needed to Improve 

Highlights of GAO-06-883, a report to DOD Technology Transition Processes 

congressional committees 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

relies on its science and technology

community to develop innovative 

technologies for weapon systems,

spending $13 billion on basic,

applied, and advanced technology

research. Several GAO reports have

addressed problems in

transitioning technologies to the 

acquisition community. This report, 

which was prepared under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to 

conduct evaluations, compares

DOD’s technology transition

processes with commercial best

practices. Specifically, GAO 

identifies technology transition 

techniques used by leading 

companies and assesses the extent 

to which DOD uses the techniques. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD 

strengthen its technology transition

processes by developing a gated 

process with criteria to support

funding decisions; expanding the 

use of transition agreements, 

relationship managers, and metrics; 

and setting aside funding for 

transition activities. DOD generally 

agreed with GAO’s 

recommendations with the 

exception of adopting processoriented metrics and setting aside 

funding for transition. It cited 

ongoing initiatives it believes

address several of the

recommendations. GAO believes 

DOD’s actions to date are 

incomplete and all 

recommendations warrant further

attention. 

Leading commercial companies use three key techniques for successfully

developing and transitioning technologies, with the basic premise being that 

technologies must be mature before transitioning to the product line side. 

• Strategic planning at the corporate level: Strategic planning 

precedes technology development so managers can gauge market needs, 

identify the most desirable technologies, and prioritize resources. 

• Gated management reviews: A rigorous process is used to ensure a 

technology’s relevancy and feasibility and enlist product line 

commitment to use the technologies once the labs are finished maturing 

them. 

• Corroborating tools: To secure commitment, technology transition 

agreements solidify and document specific cost, schedule, and 

performance metrics labs need to meet for transition to occur. 

Relationship managers address transition issues within the labs and 

product line teams and across both communities. Meaningful metrics 

gauge project progress and process effectiveness. 

Not only does DOD lack the breadth and depth of these techniques, the 

department routinely accepts high levels of technology risk at the start of 

major weapon acquisition programs. The acquisition community works with 

technologies before they are ready to be transitioned and takes on

responsibility for technology development and product development 

concurrently, as shown in the following figure. A defined phase for 

technology transition is not evident. These shortcomings contribute 

significantly to DOD’s poor cost and schedule outcomes. 

Path That DOD Follows for Technology Development and Product Development 

Technologies are immature

Acquisition community is responsible for technology

development AND product development

Technology development

Responsibility: Lab community

Technology development

Product development

PROGRAM

START

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

A stark contrast exists between DOD’s and private industry’s environments 

for developing technology. The numerous examples of DOD programs that 

have incurred cost overruns, schedule delays, and reduced performance

serve as reminders that inserting a few best practices and changing the 

mechanics of technology transition processes without changing the 

environment that determines incentives may not produce better outcomes.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-883.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3 

Background 5

Leading Companies Rely on Strategic Planning, a Gated Process, 

and Tools to Transition Needed Technologies 9 

DOD Lacks Breadth and Depth of Techniques That Leading 

Companies Use to Effectively Transition Technologies 22 

Differences in Environment and Incentives Contribute to Different 

Practices and Outcomes 36 

Conclusions 39

Recommendations for Executive Action 40 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 41 

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 46 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 50 

Appendix III DOD Research, Development, Technology, and 

Engineering Budget 54 

Appendix IV DOD Technology Readiness Levels 56 

Related GAO Products 57 

Tables 

Table 1: DOD’s Two Development Phases with Technology-Related 

Activities 6

Table 2: Metrics Used by Leading Companies to Assess Lab 

Projects and Processes 20 

Page i GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figures 

Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2006 Categories for DOD Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget (dollars in 

billions) 7

Figure 2: Average Program Research, Development, Test, and 

Evaluation Cost Growth from First Full Estimate (sample 

of 52 DOD weapon programs) 8 

Figure 3: General Flow of Process Leading Up to Technology 

Transition 10

Figure 4: Generalized Depiction of Deliverables and Funding under 

Gated Process 12 

Figure 5: Linkage between Technology Development and Product 

Development 14

Figure 6: Notional Boeing Technology Maturity Scorecard for a 

Hypothetical Technology 16 

Figure 7: Questions That Should Be Answered in Technology 

Transition Agreements 17 

Figure 8: Communication Flow for Motorola’s Three Levels of 

Relationship Managers 18 

Figure 9: Path that DOD Routinely Follows for Technology 

Development and Product Development 23 

Figure 10: Criteria for DOD Technology Development Phase 26 

Figure 11: Accountability for Management and Funding of 

Technology 29

Figure 12: Excerpts from a Defense Science Board Task Force 

Report on the Manufacturing Technology Program 31 

Figure 13: DARPA, a Success Story 33 

Page ii GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Abbreviations 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DDRE Director, Defense Research and Engineering 

DOD Department of Defense 

RDT&E research, development, test, and evaluation 

S&T science and technology 

TRL technology readiness level 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page iii GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 14, 2006 

The Honorable John W. Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Department of Defense (DOD) relies on the technological superiority 

of its weapon systems and armed forces to protect U.S. interests at home 

and abroad. The DOD science and technology (S&T) community is tasked 

with ensuring that technologies are mature when DOD’s acquisition 

community takes over and integrates the technologies into weapon 

systems. In fiscal year 2006, DOD plans to spend approximately $13 billion1

in its science and technology efforts to develop technologies that are as 

innovative as stealth and global positioning were when they were first 

developed. In doing its work, the S&T community must strike a balance

between meeting the short-term needs of today’s warfighters and the longterm needs of future years’ warfighters. Achieving this balance is made 

more challenging because of the need to keep pace with or exceed the 

pace of innovation and to counter technologies developed by potential 

U.S. adversaries. 

Although the United States has produced the best weapons in the world, 

its acquisition programs often incur cost overruns, schedule delays, and

performance shortfalls that undermine DOD’s buying power. This dilemma 

is due in part to DOD’s difficulty transitioning technologies from a 

technology development environment to an acquisition program. Because 

 1

This represents the amount of money Congress authorized DOD for basic research, 

applied research, and advanced technology development. 

Page 1 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
the acquisition community frequently pulls technologies too early, it takes 

on the additional task of maturing the technologies—an activity that is the 

primary responsibility of technology developers—at the start of an 

acquisition program.2

 The start of a program ushers in a high-cost, 

delivery-oriented phase in which the acquisition community is supposed to 

be focused on integrating subsystems and working on system development 

and demonstration. DOD has continued to allow the acquisition 

community to take over this task before the S&T community considers the 

technologies ready for transition. Numerous GAO reports have addressed 

the problems of proceeding with immature technologies and have 

explained what leading commercial companies do to ward off such 

problems.3

This report examines DOD’s technology transition processes through the 

prism of best practices. Specifically, our objectives are to (1) identify 

techniques that commercial companies use to transition mature 

technologies before the start of product development and (2) assess the 

extent to which DOD is using these techniques. We also describe how the 

environments at private companies and DOD differ with regard to 

technology development. The overall effort to hand off and integrate 

mature technologies is referred to in this report as technology transition. 

Also in this report, the private sector acquisition community is generally

referred to as a product line or business unit. GAO has prepared this 

report under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct evaluations 

on his own initiative as part of a continued effort to assist Congress in 

overseeing DOD’s technology and acquisition investments. 

In conducting our work, we interviewed lab and product line managers at 

four leading commercial companies—Boeing, IBM, Motorola, and 3M—to 

identify processes for successfully transitioning mature technologies. 

These companies develop a variety of products such as the 787 airplane, 

network servers, integrated radio communications and information 

solutions, and fuel cell technology for cars, buses, trains, homes, and 

businesses. We also conducted interviews and collected pertinent 

 2

GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon Programs. 

GAO-06-391 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006). 

3

GAO, Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve 

Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162 (Washington, D.C.: July 30, 1999) and Best 

Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to Better Weapon System 

Outcomes GAO-01-288 (Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2001). Other best practices reports are 

listed in the Related GAO Products section at the back of this report. 

Page 2 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
documents from each of DOD’s military services and the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which is the central 

science and technology organization for DOD. We compared commercial 

and DOD practices to identify potential areas for improvement. Appendix I 

includes additional details about how we performed our review, which 

was conducted from June 2005 to July 2006 in accordance with generally

accepted government auditing standards. 

Successful transition in leading companies starts with strong strategic 

planning followed by a structured technology development process led by 

research labs and supported by tools that pave the way for a smooth 

handoff to the product line. Strategic planning is considered a precursor to 

transition and allows managers to identify market needs so the company 

can quickly adapt its technology portfolios to meet those needs. A gated 

technology development process continually tests for relevancy and

feasibility of technologies and gauges the commitment of product line 

managers to accept them. Once a technology is ready to transition, 

management and funding responsibilities gradually shift from the lab to 

the product line. By the end of transition, but before product development 

starts, the technology is validated as mature enough for use in the 

intended product. Companies highlighted three tools to facilitate 

transition: technology transition agreements, relationship managers, and 

metrics. The agreements put in writing the technology and businessrelated expectations, such as specific cost, schedule, and performance 

characteristics that labs must demonstrate. The agreements also may 

require documenting manufacturing costs or specifying whether certain 

lab scientists will be loaned to the product line to provide continuity in 

technical knowledge. Relationship managers communicate across the labs 

and product lines to address transition issues. Last, metrics gauge the 

effectiveness of the technologies and the process itself. These tools 

require the active involvement of the labs and product lines to ensure 

successful transition of technologies to new products. 

Results in Brief 

Over the past several years, DOD has taken steps to improve its transition 

processes, but it lacks many of the techniques that are hallmarks of 

leading companies’ ability to transition technology smoothly onto new 

products. From a strategic perspective, the department lacks strong 

influence at the corporate level to guide the department’s technology 

investments. In addition, DOD does not use a gated process with criteria 

that would allow lab and program managers to know when a technology is 

ready to transition. Consequently, technologies are often not ready when 

needed and acquisition programs pull the technologies into their programs 

Page 3 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
too early, leading to inefficiency during product development and cost and

schedule increases. We found that DOD has taken some positive steps to 

aid technology transition. They hold promise, but must be accepted, 

improved, and replicated significantly more than currently to have a 

positive impact. For example, each of the military services has established 

boards to select and oversee some of their technology projects and has 

elevated the importance of meaningful metrics. They are also using 

technology transition agreements. However, use of these agreements thus 

far has been low. With regard to improving communication, DARPA is 

using relationship managers to address transition issues. And the Office of

the Secretary of Defense has initiated a number of new programs, 

including the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration program, which 

requires the S&T and acquisition communities to work more 

collaboratively earlier in the acquisition process. 

The environment and incentives of private world-class companies differ 

dramatically from DOD’s. Despite these differences, the practices used by

commercial companies can help DOD make better progress in 

transitioning technologies to weapon programs. Private companies 

operate in a competitive environment that demands speedy delivery of 

innovative, high-quality products to satisfy market needs or the company 

will go out of business. DOD has a variety of “customers” and complex 

relationships that often hinder the chief technology officer at the 

corporate level from providing the type of strategic leadership found at 

successful companies. DOD puts pressure on itself to develop many new 

technologies. And because competition for funding is fierce, the 

technologies described with many superlatives for speed and lethality tend

to get more attention than others do. We previously reported that to 

secure funding, DOD program managers frequently make overly optimistic 

promises to the warfighter about technologies’ cost, feasibility, risk, and 

delivery schedule.4

 The challenge for DOD and congressional decision 

makers lies not only in the “how to” aspects of technology transition but 

also in creating stronger and more uniform incentives that encourage the

S&T and acquisition communities to work together to deliver mature 

technologies to programs. 

We are making recommendations that DOD strengthen its technology 

development and transition processes by developing a gated process that 

 4

GAO, Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers Needed to

Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2005).

Page 4 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
includes a transition phase and identifies criteria that can be used to 

support funding decisions. In addition, we are recommending that DOD 

expand the use of transition agreements, relationship managers, and 

metrics. We also recommend that DOD set aside a portion of research and 

development (advanced component development and prototypes) funds 

for the S&T community to manage the transition of technologies to 

acquisition programs. 

DOD concurred with our recommendations to develop a gated process for 

developing and transitioning technology and to expand the use of 

technology transition agreements, although we do not see its plans as fully 

responsive. DOD partially concurred with the recommendation to include 

additional metrics in technology transition agreements, stating that it 

recently developed metrics to gauge manufacturing readiness and that 

other metrics should be applied on a project-by-project basis. DOD also 

partially concurred with expanding the use of relationship managers, 

stating it already uses written documents to facilitate communication. 

However, DOD agreed that more time should be devoted by staff at the 

execution level on transition activities. We continue to believe that 

additional person-to-person communication needs to take place at all 

levels within the S&T and acquisition communities to supplement the 

written agreements. DOD did not concur with our recommendation to 

adopt more process oriented metrics because it believes that other 

processes it plans to mature over the next 4-5 years will capture these 

metrics. We believe the metrics DOD wants to use will not allow the 

department to analyze its investment portfolio and make adjustments 

appropriately. Finally, DOD did not agree with our recommendation to set

aside a portion of its 6.4 budget activity funding, known as advanced

component development and prototypes funds, for the S&T community to 

manage for the transition of technology. DOD does not believe the S&T 

community should have additional resources to mature technologies to the 

point of successful transition to programs. We found otherwise in the 

commercial world and believe DOD’s approach to funding technology 

development and transition is flawed. 

Mature technologies are pivotal in developing new products. Without 

mature technologies at the outset, a product development program will 

almost certainly incur cost and schedule problems. Effectively managing 

technology as a separate process from product development can improve 

the potential for on-time product delivery at reduced cost. Leading 

companies know this and have established disciplined processes to 

prioritize their technology investments based on market needs, eliminate 

technologies that are not relevant or feasible, balance technology push and 

Background 

Page 5 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
customer pull, and then transition technologies to product development 

efficiently. Overall, effective management of technology facilitates the 

delivery of new, innovative products to the user in less time. While DOD is 

very aware of the need for new advanced technology in its weapon 

systems, it has not always been effective in transitioning mature and 

relevant technologies to product development. 

Development of DOD’s new weapon systems depends on two distinct 

phases: technology development and product development. DOD relies on 

its S&T community to identify, pursue, and develop new technologies that

improve and enhance military operations and ensure technological 

superiority over adversaries. This includes the development of 

technologies for new weapons programs as well as those that will be 

inserted into existing systems. The acquisition community takes these new 

technologies, develops weapon system programs, and delivers the 

products—that is, the weapon systems—to the warfighter. Table 1 shows 

technology-related activities that take place during technology 

development and product development, who performs the work, fiscal 

year 2006 funding, and overall goals.

Table 1: DOD’s Two Development Phases with Technology-Related Activities 

Technology development phase Product development phase 

Activities: identify, fund, develop, and manage new technology 

projects that warfighter needs

Who does the work: government, industry, and academic 

technologists 

2006 funding: about $13 billion

Goal: demonstrate a technology or subsystem in a relevant

environment 

Activities: integrate, demonstrate, support, and upgrade 

technologies on weapon systems 

Who does the work: prime developer, industry supplier, and 

acquisition community’s development lab engineers 

2006 funding: about $58 billion

Goal: develop and deliver weapon systems to the warfighter

Source: DOD (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Note: Activities listed under the product development phase focus solely on technology maturation 

and do not include other activities that the acquisition community is responsible for, such as overall 

design and manufacturing. 

DOD uses research, development, test, and evaluation appropriations to 

fund its technology activities. The budget is divided into categories that 

generally follow a sequential path for developing technologies. Figure 1 

shows the amount of money DOD spends in each category. (App. III 

contains additional details about the budget.) 

Page 6 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 1: Fiscal Year 2006 Categories for DOD Research, Development, Test, and

Evaluation Budget (dollars in billions) 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Basic research,

applied research,

and advanced

technology

Advanced

component

development and

prototypes

System

development and

demonstration

Research,

development, test,

and evaluation

management

support

Operations and

support

$13.9

$19.3

$4.0

$20.6

$13.2

Product

development

Technology

development

The S&T community controls the budget for basic research, applied 

research, and advanced technology development. The budget category of 

advanced component development and prototypes involves testing and 

evaluating prototypes of systems or subsystems in a high-fidelity or 

realistic environment before product development starts. DOD officials 

say it is assumed that either the S&T community or the acquisition 

community could carry out this work, but traditionally the acquisition side 

prevails. After this point, additional technology-related activities are 

completed as part of product development under the authority of the 

acquisition community, namely, the program manager for a weapon 

system. 

Prior GAO reports have said that DOD launches new weapon programs 

with immature technology. We found this inability to mature the 

technology before the start of product development to be a major 

contributor to weapon system cost and schedule growth. In our March 

Page 7 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
2006 review of 52 major DOD weapon programs, we found that 90 percent 

of the programs started with immature technologies5

. More than half of the 

programs were working with immature technologies at design review, 

when DOD acquisition policy expects the design to be stable. And by the 

time production began, one-third of programs still did not have mature 

technologies. 

Not surprisingly, we found that DOD research, development, test, and 

evaluation cost estimates increased dramatically for programs having 

immature technologies at program start. Figure 2 shows the average cost 

growth of DOD programs we reviewed when technologies were mature 

and immature at program start. 

Figure 2: Average Program Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Cost 

Growth from First Full Estimate (sample of 52 DOD weapon programs)

Source: DOD (data as of March 2006); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Mature 

technologies

Immature 

technologies

Maturity level 

34.9

4.8

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Average cost growth, in percent

Programs that started with mature technologies have averaged a modest 

4.8 percent cost growth above the first full estimate, whereas programs 

that started with immature technologies have averaged about 35 percent 

cost growth. Some programs experienced significantly greater cost 

growth. A consequence of this cost growth is that the services typically

deliver weapon systems late, have to reduce quantities to stay within cost 

estimates, shift funds away from other projects to make up for added 

costs, or some combination of the three. For example, the Air Force has 

incurred a 189 percent growth in the cost per aircraft for its F/A-22 tactical 

aircraft program, in large part because of technology maturation issues. In 

response, the Air Force has reduced the quantity of F/A-22 aircraft it plans

to procure by 72 percent from 648 to 183 to offset escalating costs. In the 

case of the Space-Based Infrared System High satellite, technology and 

 5

GAO-06-391 

Page 8 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
design components matured late in development, contributing to research, 

development, test, and evaluation cost growth and four Nunn-McCurdy 

unit cost breaches6

. Instead of purchasing five satellites, the Air Force now 

plans to buy three at a program acquisition unit cost of about $3.4 billion, a 

315 percent increase. 

To successfully develop and transition technologies from their labs to 

their product lines, leading commercial companies depend on three key 

techniques: 

• strategic planning at the corporate level; 

• a gated management review process that ensures a technology’s relevancy, 

feasibility, and transition readiness; and 

• effective tools to solidify commitment, address transition issues, and 

gauge project progress and process effectiveness. 

Overall, corporations are incentivized to follow these critical techniques 

because the opportunity cost of not meeting customer demand is late 

delivery and lost revenues and market share for the company. Through 

rigorous adherence to these practices, leading companies increase 

chances of eventual success because the strategy for developing the 

technology fits the company’s objectives, commitment is strong for 

incorporating the technology, and only after the technology is considered 

mature enough for use in a certain product does product development 

begin. Because the cost of developing new and breakthrough technologies 

can be high, funding typically comes from the corporate level rather than 

from a single product line unit, enabling the company’s product lines to 

manage only product development risk, not technology risk as well. 

The central focus of this report is on how the lab and the product line 

communities work together to solidify the final steps of technology 

transition. Figure 3 depicts the general flow of technology development 

and where technology transition resides in the process. 

Leading Companies 

Rely on Strategic 

Planning, a Gated 

Process, and Tools 

to Transition 

Needed 

Technologies 

 6

10 U.S.C § 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost reports if certain thresholds for 

program costs are exceeded (known as unit cost or Nunn-McCurdy breaches). DOD is

required to report to Congress and, if applicable, certify the program to Congress. 

Page 9 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Page 10 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition 

Figure 3: General Flow of Process Leading Up to Technology Transition 

This report touches briefly on strategic planning, which precedes 

technology development. As the lab community identifies and develops 

high-priority technologies during the technology development phase, 

product line managers develop the business case for a new product by 

identifying the market potential of the new product and using systems 

engineering to set product requirements. This report does not focus on 

these product line activities or on product development.7

Strategic planning—the effort to identify desirable technologies and 

prioritize resources—is an important early step in a company’s ability to 

eventually deliver the highest-priority technologies to various product 

lines. Leading companies organize their research and development 

activities into technological “thrusts”, or competencies that represent the 

core markets of their businesses. 3M and the other companies we visited 

undergo strategic planning at least annually, and this process enables 

corporate management to conduct portfolio analysis, identify long-term 

market needs, and match the projects in each thrust area to market needs. 

Eventually, managers determine which projects appear to be relevant and 

feasible, which ones are applicable for which products, whether the right 

projects are getting the right resources, whether the company wants to be 

first to market, and whether the final products should be released to the 

marketplace as soon as possible or several years down the road. Managers 

may decide to establish new thrust areas as new ideas come to light, rely 

on outside suppliers for some technology, or hire new people to fill 

 7

Numerous GAO reports address issues surrounding product development. See Related 

GAO Products at the end of this report. 

Strategic Planning Is a 

Critical Precursor to 

Successful Transition 

Strategic

planning Explore

Program

start

Develop TRANSITION Product development

Technology development

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of leading companies’ practices.
technology voids. Projects that no longer are relevant or feasible are 

eventually terminated. This type of strategic planning is critical to ensuring

that the right technologies ultimately transition to the right product line in

an economical and timely way. 

Each company we visited funds technology differently, however, all 

ensure that funding for early technology projects is protected at the 

corporate level and not immediately beholden to product lines. 3M, for 

example, has 17 technological thrust areas, and the projects are directly 

funded with seed money from the corporate level. IBM receives the 

majority of its funding from the corporate level. IBM labs also receive and 

manage funding from product lines for specific projects. Both Motorola 

and Boeing require business units to fund a portion of lab costs each year 

based on their historical usage of lab resources, but the labs have freedom 

to use those funds in line with corporate strategy. Decisions are made at 

least annually on the composition of projects in the portfolio so it includes 

the most relevant and feasible projects. 

Leading Companies Use 

Gated Reviews to Validate 

Readiness for Technology 

Transition 

After technology projects are selected for funding, they enter the 

development “pipeline” where a gated process is used to manage and 

oversee technology exploration, development, and transition. At each

gated review, lab managers assess technology progress and ensure that 

certain criteria are met before technologies can enter the next stage of 

development. The final phase is dedicated to technology transition 

activities. The number and names of the gates vary by company, but the

type of information collected and knowledge obtained are similar. For 

example, 3M uses a three-gate process, Boeing has a four-gate process, 

and Motorola has a five-gate process. Regardless of where the funds came 

from—a corporate or a product line unit—labs are responsible for 

managing, overseeing, and using the money to fund technology projects 

until the projects have transitioned to a product line. Figure 4 generally

depicts the technology development gates that companies use, lists types 

of deliverables expected during each gate, and shows who provides 

funding. 

Page 11 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 4: Generalized Depiction of Deliverables and Funding under Gated Process 

Deliverables Deliverables Deliverables

Technology is consistent with technology strategy and other relevant 

strategies

Labs have high degree of confidence 

the technology will work

Product line team agrees that the 

technology will meet its needs

Technical requirements are identified

Cost, benefits, and risks are quantified 

Scalability approach is selected

Strategies for addressing intellectual 

property rights are selected

Technology project complies with 

technology strategy

Technology is sound

Technology meets product requirements

Cost, benefit, and risks are well 

understood

Technology can be scaled to a

magnitude appropriate for practical 

application

Product line team agrees technology is

ready

Intellectual property rights methods

have been pursued

Technology is demonstrated in an 

operational environment

Technical documentation is ready to be

given to product line team

Corporate management funds projects

that are relevant for meeting specific 

product line needs and projects that

lab managers believe are necessary for 

the company to meet future market 

needs

Funding Funding Funding

Corporate management funds projects

that are relevant and feasible; in some 

cases, product lines may provide 

matching funds for labs to develop 

specific technologies

Corporate management funds activities

related to technology transition, including developing a prototype that is

demonstrated in an operational environment; in some cases, product lines

may provide matching funds

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT GATES

Develop

Technology development activities

are underway

Explore

Technology ideas and concepts

are being explored

Technology transition

Technology is ready to transition

from lab to product line team

Review Review

Technology is consistent with overall 

business strategy

Technology is promising and is likely to 

meet needs for potential product lines

Lab identifies potential products where

technology can be used

Key cost, benefit, risk, marketing, 

manufacturing, and life cycle management issues are identified 

Scalability approaches are identified

Technologies considered to be 

intellectual property are identified 

Source: GAO analysis based on Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Motorola, and 3M processes.

Explore gate: Lab technologists turn technology proposals into viable, 

executable projects that ideally will meet future market needs, while lab 

managers determine the amount of resources they need to invest in the 

projects. Funding goes to projects that are deemed relevant. Prior to the 

gated review, technologists deliver to lab managers a preliminary 

assessment of the competitiveness of the technology and a road map for 

completion. Technologists must address key deliverables related to such 

areas as manufacturing, intellectual property, marketing, life cycle 

management, and plans for the next gate. 

Page 12 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Develop gate: Technologists develop prototypes of the project and 

measure performance for relevancy and feasibility on an eventual product. 

Technologists deepen their understanding of the technology, refine the 

technology solution, identify the most attractive market segments for 

introducing the technology, and select a product line that will incorporate 

the technology into a new product. 3M and Motorola require product line 

commitment to transition a technology before the gated review draws 

near. This prevents labs from wasting valuable time and resources 

developing technologies that product lines do not want. Projects that do 

not gain product line commitment will either be terminated or go through 

a different process to demonstrate their relevancy and feasibility. Motorola 

leadership, for example, has a special program called an early stage 

accelerator under which selected projects can obtain funds to build 

additional prototypes to demonstrate the value of technology to product 

line managers or potential customers. Senior lab managers carefully 

monitor these projects through quarterly reviews to determine how they

are progressing. If the project is not making sufficient progress, the project 

is quickly terminated so resources can be spent on other projects. 

Transition gate: Technologists demonstrate a prototype in an

operational environment. The product line maintains a “customer” role 

until managers are confident that the technology will work in the intended 

product. Then gradually, the responsibility for funding and further 

developing the technology shifts from the lab to the product line. This shift 

in responsibility requires up-front and continuous planning by both the lab 

and product line communities to ensure a smooth transition. As shown in

figure 5, companies we visited plan for technology transition to occur 

prior to program start. This provides product line managers sufficient time 

to gain additional knowledge about a technology’s attributes as they are 

maturing it to its final form, fit, and function. Product line managers, who 

concurrently have been working on the business case for the product, are 

able to validate that the technology can be integrated into the preliminary 

product design. In addition, they can develop more reliable product 

development cost and revenue estimates before they are locked into 

needing this technology as a product feature. 

Page 13 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 5: Linkage between Technology Development and Product Development 

Program

start

Labs demonstrate 

technologies in an operational environment and 

then shift funding, management, and technology 

development responsibilities to the product line. 

Product line then works to 

get technology to final 

form, fit, and function prior 

to product start.

Develop

Lab activities

Product line activities

Explore Technology

transition

Product

development

Business

idea

Concept

development

Product

feasibility

Source: GAO analysis based on leading companies’ processes.

During the transition phase, labs and product lines must complete a 

number of activities for transition to go smoothly. For example, labs must 

demonstrate that the technology meets product line cost, schedule, and 

performance requirements. In addition, production costs must be 

identified and acceptable to the product line. According to 3M officials, 

past experience has shown that costly manufacturing is a major reason for 

product line managers deciding not to transition a technology. Labs must 

also address intellectual property concerns, a step that is crucial to the

company’s ability to be a market leader. Product lines must address any 

people or organizational issues, such as the transition of jobs and training 

requirements that may result from using the new technology. They must 

Page 14 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
also work out any agreements with the labs for on-going support. At the 

end of the phase, technical documentation related to the technology is 

transitioned from the labs to the product line. 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes8

 assesses the extent to which these 

activities, as well as others, have been completed to determine whether a 

particular technology is ready to transition. The information is then 

summarized on a scorecard that lab and product line managers can use to 

quickly identify areas that need additional attention. The scorecard is 

updated continually and measures a technology’s readiness from a 

business and production standpoint as well as its technological readiness. 

Boeing’s labs have three phases for technology development, which they 

call discovery, feasibility, and practicality, plus a technology transition 

phase. Each technology is evaluated in 10 readiness categories, and bars 

are plotted horizontally across the scorecard to indicate how much 

objective evidence exists for technology readiness. Once a technology has 

demonstrated full readiness in all 10 categories, it is ready to be 

transitioned. Figure 6 shows a notional picture of a technology’s readiness 

at one point in time. Because the hypothetical technology has reached full

readiness in only five categories and is halfway through transition in one 

category, the technology is not ready for transition. The lab and product 

line would have to address issues involving readiness categories 3, 4, 6 and 

9 before transition can begin or the technology is in jeopardy of not being 

applied to a product. 

 8

Boeing has two primary businesses: Boeing Commercial Airplanes and Boeing Integrated 

Defense systems. Both businesses are supported by the same science and technology lab. 

However, the two businesses have different tools for transitioning technology. 

Page 15 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 6: Notional Boeing Technology Maturity Scorecard for a Hypothetical Technology 

Criteria for readiness

1. Consistency with

 strategy

2. Technical validity

3. Cost, benefit, risk

 assessment

4. Competitive technology 

 assessment

5. Scalability

6. Collateral impact

7. People and organization 

 readiness

8. Product line 

 endorsement

9. Intellectual property 

 protection

10. Technology information

Technology development

Discovery Feasibility Practicality Technology transition

Source: GAO analysis based on The Boeing Company’s scorecard. Technolo

gy readiness

Application readiness

Technology has been assessed for a specific production application

by the technology user and verified as adequate for production

Technology Transition Is 

Bolstered by Formal 

Agreements, Relationship 

Managers, and Metrics 

Companies we visited use three tools to aid transition, including 

technology transition agreements, relationship managers, and metrics. 

Technology transition agreements are formal documents that detail the 

specific cost, schedule, and performance attributes of the technology that 

labs must demonstrate before transition can occur. Relationship managers 

address the details and issues surrounding transition, and metrics allow 

managers to identify the effectiveness of their technology development 

and transition processes and make adjustments when necessary. These 

tools require the active involvement of the labs and product lines to ensure 

successful transition of technologies to new products. 

Labs and product lines use technology transition agreements to facilitate 

each technology’s transition to product development. What the 

agreements specify varies by company but typically consists of specific 

Technology Transition 

Agreements 

Page 16 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
technology and business readiness metrics, such as cost, schedule, and 

performance characteristics that labs must demonstrate for product line 

managers to agree to accept the technology. As figure 7 shows, the 

agreements should answer some basic questions.

Figure 7: Questions That Should Be Answered in Technology Transition 

Agreements 

Is it real? 

Is it relevant? 

Is it marketable? 

Where will it transition? 

Do we have product line support? 

Source: GAO.

These formal agreements may also include identification of product line 

resources needed to transition the technology, such as nonrecurring costs 

to further mature the technology, as well as consideration of recurring 

manufacturing costs associated with integrating the new technology on 

the product. Metrics collected in the agreements are used by product line 

managers to manage technology risk. For example, if the labs cannot 

develop needed technology within cost and schedule parameters or with 

specified performance characteristics, the product lines can terminate the 

agreement and go with an alternative technology.

At Motorola, agreements enable technology project leaders to customize 

their work for a particular product line’s needs. Product lines may request 

that the labs identify alternative technologies for a particular product, 

produce a detailed report about a specific technology, or conduct various

tests to demonstrate the relevancy or feasibility of a technology. Each of 

these items becomes a “deliverable” in the agreement. 3M uses transition 

agreements only for technologies that are expected to go into a product. 

3M’s agreements incorporate many of the same metrics used by Motorola, 

including feasibility, relevancy, and application of the technology. In 

addition, agreements include an assessment of the product line’s ability 

and commitment to transition technology. For example, they evaluate a 

product line’s resource constraints that could inhibit a technology from 

transitioning, such as asking if the technology is too expensive or if 

manufacturing it would be too costly. 3M officials told us that some 

agreements include loaning key lab technologists to the product line for a 

period of time so product line teams can maintain momentum after the lab 

has signed off and moved on to developing technology for other parts of 

the company. 

Page 17 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
3M, IBM, and Motorola use lab and product line relationship managers to 

smooth transition. Relationship managers foster effective transition 

practices by preventing the labs from pushing technologies that product 

line managers do not want and by preventing product line managers from 

pulling immature technologies from the labs. A Motorola official referred 

to relationship managers as the most important communication tool 

because communication occurs more frequently, thus allowing problems 

to be identified and addressed more quickly. 

Relationship Managers 

Motorola designates key people at three different levels in both the labs 

and the product line to serve as relationship managers. As a technology is 

matured and demonstrated, communication intensifies and additional 

levels of relationship managers become involved. Figure 8 depicts how 

Motorola’s relationship managers communicate with each other within the 

lab or product line and with their designated counterparts in the other 

community. 

Figure 8: Communication Flow for Motorola’s Three Levels of Relationship

Managers 

PRODUCT LINE 

COMMUNITY LAB COMMUNITY

Executive managers

Liaisons

Technologists

Executive managers

Liaisons

Technologists

Source: Motorola; GAO (analysis and presentation).

Executive managers in Motorola’s labs and product lines are responsible 

for interfacing with each other on a periodic basis. Altogether, Motorola 

has eight executive managers—four in the labs and four on the product 

line side. Motorola officials told us that this number provides a one-to-one 

match between the labs and the product lines. Lab executive managers are 

responsible for ensuring product line needs are identified and new 

technology projects are started or existing projects are reprioritized to 

meet those needs. Their counterparts have the final word on what priority 

each technology project has with respect to the needs of the product line.

Lab and product line executive managers are required to sign off on key

Page 18 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
technology projects and milestones for the current year. In addition, they 

try to remove any roadblocks within their own units and work with their 

counterparts to address any roadblocks between the two communities. 

Motorola considers liaisons the most critical in the process. Again, there 

are four liaisons in the labs and four on the product line side. They are the 

primary interface for coordination, collaboration, and communication 

during technology development and transition. Liaisons in the lab have 

broad oversight of technologies being developed and share information 

about technology breakthroughs with their counterparts on the product 

line side, and remove roadblocks for lab technologists. These lab liaisons 

work intimately with their product line counterparts to approve 

technology transition agreements and assess technology readiness. The 

lab liaisons oversee 40 to 60 technology transition agreements at any one 

time. Liaisons on the product line side are responsible for providing 

information about the changing needs of the product lines on a more realtime basis. They determine product line needs and priorities during the 

annual planning process and remove roadblocks for technologists on the 

product line side. Lab and product line liaisons are incentivized through 

their annual performance assessments and pay increases to work together

to ensure the successful transition of technologies. 

The most direct and constant communication is between the lab’s 

technologist, who developed the technology, and the product line’s 

technologist, who is responsible for maturing the technology for inclusion 

into the product. These two technologists stay in continuous contact 

because they are the ones who have the most working knowledge about 

the technology. The lab technologist is expected to spend as much time as 

needed to make sure that transition happens as smoothly as possible. 

While the lab technologist does not become an official asset of a product

line, he or she might have to spend a period of time working in the product 

line’s development lab. 

Leading companies use product metrics—such as weight, power, and 

reliability measurements—to assess the readiness of transitioning 

technologies and process metrics—such as profit growth and cycle time—

to gauge the impact of their technology development processes and 

identify areas for improvement. The companies analyze data gained from 

the use of these metrics to evaluate how well they deliver on what is 

promised, better understand the value of their respective science and 

technology activities, and identify cases of inefficient investment in 

technologies or underutilization of lab technologies. Table 2 provides a 

Metrics 

Page 19 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
composite example of metrics used at the companies we visited and the 

value of the metrics to management.

Table 2: Metrics Used by Leading Companies to Assess Lab Projects and Processes 

Categories of 

metrics Examples of metrics Use of the metrics 

Project 

Technology-specific Nonrecurring development costs 

Scheduled delivery 

Recurring manufacturing costs 

Performance characteristics 

• Size 

• Weight 

• Power 

• Reliability 

Head count 

Allows lab and product line managers to assess the status of 

technology development and whether the technology meets 

the needs of the product. If technologies do not meet agreedupon goals, the technology project may be terminated or the 

product line manager may decide to include it on a future 

product. 

Process 

Status Number of ongoing projects 

Number of projects with a technology 

 transition agreement 

Number of projects completed by labs 

Number of technologies transitioned 

Number of projects terminated

Provides lab managers information on how many technology

projects transitioned, were terminated, and are still ongoing.

Companies expect that almost all technologies that make it to 

the final stages of technology development will transition. If 

they experience a lower transition rate than expected, officials 

will examine their processes to determine what changes are 

necessary to improve transition or determine why the project 

was not terminated earlier. 

Timeliness Development cycle time 

Percentage of tasks on time 

Task slippage

Time to market 

Measures the amount of time it takes labs to develop 

technologies. The metrics allow lab managers to identify and 

focus on projects that are moving slower than expected. A lab 

project may be terminated or additional resources may be 

allocated to speed up development. Use of the metrics allows 

product line managers to decide whether a technology will be 

ready in time to include on a given product. 

Impact Number of technologies commercialized 

Number of multiple transitions

Return on investment 

Profit growth 

Market share growth 

Orders captured

Cost reduction

Number of patents/influential papers 

Customer satisfaction 

People rotation

Provides lab and corporate managers feedback on the market 

impact of their technology investments in terms of revenue 

and market share. The metrics also provide information on 

product line satisfaction of lab performance. Satisfaction 

survey results are a useful tool for identifying development

and transition problem areas that need management 

attention. 

Source: Interviews with leading companies (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Motorola’s labs use a suite of metrics, many of which are shown above, to

monitor technology projects and lab performance. For example, the 

company tracks the estimated and actual development time and costs for 

Page 20 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
each project to determine estimation accuracy. In addition, it identifies 

and tracks the number of lab and product line people (headcount) needed 

for development and transition. These metrics are not treated with the 

same rigor as metrics that are used after product development begins. 

Corporate managers understand that technology development must be 

managed with more latitude to accommodate calculated risk taking. In

addition, Motorola asks each product line to fill out satisfaction surveys 

twice a year to assess lab performance. Because relationships are at the

heart of the process, the product line’s perceptions are of paramount 

importance, making internal customer satisfaction a key metric. A 

Motorola official indicated that satisfaction surveys are a ubiquitous part 

of the Motorola culture. Not only do they help the labs improve, but they 

help the company improve overall, the official said. The surveys also 

provide compelling anecdotal information about performance problems 

that need to be addressed by certain labs. 

In addition to technology-specific metrics, Boeing tracks the number of 

technologies that were actually integrated into products. While the intent 

is that all completed technologies will make it into a product, this does not 

always happen because of changes in market requirements, timing, or 

funding constraints. Boeing also has metrics that assess the technology’s 

impact on orders for new airplanes and on its ability to reduce 

manufacturing costs. The labs, for example, have a responsibility for 

improving the way Boeing designs and builds its products. As such, they 

have goals for reducing recurring and nonrecurring costs and cycle time. 

Finally, Boeing uses a metric that encourages the transfer of people, along 

with the technologies, to the product line side. The company tracks the 

rotation of people from its labs to its product lines specifically to improve 

its transition processes and to refresh staff with “program people.” As a 

result, company officials believe they can better align their labs to their 

product lines strategies. 

Company officials also told us that, similar to DOD, they have struggled to

assess return on investment for technologies they develop. This is because 

technology can undergo a metamorphosis after it leaves the labs and can 

be applied to multiple products or altered before going into the intended 

product. Company officials said they are actively trying to track 

technology utilization and the impact their technology investments have 

had on company revenues. 3M has a technology database it uses to track 

each project it funds. The database contains cost, schedule, and 

performance data and summarizes other information, such as how long a 

project took to complete and lab and product line funding used to mature 

the technology. 3M then compares the cost information with worldwide 

Page 21 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
sales, tracked through bar codes, to determine its return on investment for 

a particular technology. Company officials indicated that there are still 

problems with this methodology for estimating return on investment and 

that they are continuing to refine their approach.

DOD has taken some steps over the past few years to improve its 

technology transition processes, but the practice of accepting high levels 

of technology risk at the start of major weapon system acquisition 

programs continues to be the norm. This shortcoming is a major 

contributor to DOD’s poor cost and schedule outcomes. Many of DOD’s 

problems can be attributed to deficiencies in strategic planning for critical 

technologies, processes for technology development and transition, and 

tools that support transition. A recent Defense Science Board report states 

that DOD is not as well positioned as it should be from a strategic 

standpoint to meet the challenges and exploit the opportunities offered by

technology. The report identified several opportunities for improvement at 

the Director, Defense Research and Engineering level (DDRE)9

 to help the 

department jointly identify, prioritize, develop, and deliver the

technologies most relevant and critical to meeting weapon system 

requirements in a timely manner. DOD’s technology development process 

is undisciplined and lacks criteria for maintaining a close connection 

between fledgling technologies and the products that will need them to 

meet the warfighter’s future needs. As a result, technologies are often not 

ready when they are needed, and acquisition programs pull the 

technologies into their programs too early, leading to inefficiency during 

product development and cost and schedule increases. DOD’s process for 

transitioning technologies to product development is funded and managed 

by its acquisition community, the opposite approach to that taken by the 

companies we visited. 

DOD Lacks Breadth 

and Depth of 

Techniques That 

Leading Companies 

Use to Effectively 

Transition 

Technologies 

We identified some initiatives within DOD’s S&T community that emulate 

some of the tools we found in the commercial world. They hold promise, 

but must be accepted, improved, and replicated significantly more than 

currently to have a positive impact. For example, the military services are 

using technology transition agreements and have established boards to 

select and oversee some of its technology portfolio. Also, DARPA uses 

 9

DDRE is the principal staff adviser to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics and the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for research

and engineering matters. DDRE serves as the chief technology officer for the department. 

Page 22 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
relationship managers to expedite the efficient transition of technologies 

to products and DOD has established other programs that institutionalize 

some best practices. The collection and use of meaningful metrics, 

however, remain a problem. 

On the basis of our previous review of 52 major weapons programs, we 

found that DOD’s typical path involves starting programs with immature 

technologies and concurrently working on technology development and 

product development. Figure 9 is a depiction of this path. 

Figure 9: Path that DOD Routinely Follows for Technology Development and Product Development 

Technologies are immature

Acquisition community is responsible for technology development AND product development

Technology development

Responsibility: Lab community

Technology development

Product development

PROGRAM

START

Source: DOD (data); GAO (analysis and presentation).

Strategic Planning Affects 

DOD’s Ability to Meet 

Warfighters’ Needs 

DOD has an annual strategic planning process that involves the 

development of several plans at the corporate level and within the services 

and defense agencies for determining how to invest its S&T funding, which 

amounted to about $13 billion in fiscal year 2006. Despite these efforts, a 

recent Defense Science Board report10 stated that DOD is not as well 

positioned as it should be at the DDRE level (the corporate level) to meet 

the challenges and exploit the opportunities offered by technology. The 

report identified several opportunities for improvement. Until 

improvements are made, it is likely that the there will be strategic gaps and 

overlaps in technology coverage as the services and agencies develop their 

own approaches to meet critical warfighter needs.

 10DOD. Defense Science Board Task Force on The Roles and Authorities of the Director of 

Defense Research and Engineering, (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 2005). 

Page 23 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Similar to private industry, the department goes through an annual 

strategic planning process led by its corporate level. As part of its 

responsibilities, DDRE develops the Defense Science and Technology 

Strategy, which serves as the foundation for DOD’s science and 

technology strategic planning process. The strategy identifies five generic 

technology thrust areas—information assurance, battlespace awareness, 

force protection, reduced cost of ownership, and maintaining basic 

research—that have high priority in the department, and is supported by 

four other documents, including the 

• Basic Research Plan, which presents the DOD objectives and investment 

strategy for DOD-sponsored basic research performed by universities, 

industry, and service laboratories; 

• Defense Technology Area Plan, which presents the DOD objectives and 

the strategies for applied research and advanced technology development 

investments; 

• Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, which takes a joint 

perspective across the applied research and advanced technology 

development plans to ensure that the science and technology program 

supports priority future joint warfighting capabilities; and 

• Defense Technology Objectives, which identify specific technology 

advancements that will be developed or demonstrated, the anticipated 

date of availability, and specific expected benefits. 

Together, these documents, as well as the supporting S&T plans of the 

military services and defense agencies, are supposed to provide the 

framework for decisionmaking throughout the science and technology 

community. 

However, a recent Defense Science Board report states over time there 

has been a relative decline in the influence of DDRE at the corporate level

on strategic matters. In the 1960s and 1970s, the corporate level was more 

proactive and provided high-level direction that drove several decisive 

technological developments, including stealth; standoff precision strike; 

and tactical intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems that 

have transformed U.S. military capabilities. Since the 1980’s DDRE has 

used a decentralized management approach, relying on the services and 

agencies to determine and prioritize the most needed technology projects. 

The report states that as a result, the department is not wellpositioned to 

Page 24 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
implement new operational capabilities needed for future warfighters, 

including 

• identifying and tracking terrorists, 

• addressing commercialization and globalization issues, 

• rapidly evolving technologies such as bio- and nanotechnologies, and 

• identifying the proper mix of short- and long-term projects to work on. 

One of the recommendations included in the report is for the 

Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) to 

develop a strategic technology plan and that DDRE be tasked with 

assuring that all research and development organizations are 

implementing DDRE’s strategic technology guidance. The board also 

believes DDRE needs to be more involved in strategic challenges related 

to (1) gathering and nurturing technology from a variety of sources, 

(2) developing and exploiting technology to enable new disruptive 

capabilities; (3) identifying and countering disruptive capabilities 

developed by adversaries using readily available or advanced technology,

and (4) ensuring an adequate level of long-term research for DOD needs. 

Without effective corporate level leadership, warfighter needs are 

addressed in a decentralized, uncoordinated manner, thereby increasing 

the risk that the department will not fulfill these needs. 

DOD’s 5000 series acquisition policy specifies that technology 

development should be separated from product development and that a 

project shall not exit the technology development phase until the 

technology has been demonstrated in a relevant environment. This is in 

line with the practices we found at leading companies, with the exception 

that the companies require technologies to be demonstrated in an 

operational environment before program start, which is a higher degree of

readiness. However, the department lacks a structured, gated process for 

managing technology development and transition, as well as criteria that 

would allow decision makers to know when technology is ready to 

progress from the technology development environment into an 

acquisition program to begin product development. As a result, the 

services continue to launch new programs with immature technologies, 

and acquisition programs take on technology development 

responsibilities, an activity that is considered too risky for commercial 

companies we visited. The following figure shows where the technology 

DOD Does Not Use a 

Disciplined, Gated Process 

to Test for Relevancy, 

Feasibility, and Transition 

Readiness 

Page 25 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
development phase occurs in DOD’s acquisition process and the entrance 

and exit criteria for that phase. 

Figure 10: Criteria for DOD Technology Development Phase 

Program

start

Concept refinement Technology development

Entrance criteria

• Refined initial concept

• Analysis of alternatives

• Approved technology development

 strategy 

• Funding obtained

Exit criteria

• Technology demonstrated in a

 relevant environment

• Systems requirements documented

• Program cost and schedule base

 lines developed

• Acquisition strategy produced

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of DOD processes and practices.

As shown in the figure above, DOD has two phases prior to program start 

(also referred to in DOD nomenclature as milestone B). The first is the 

concept refinement phase, when acquisition programs refine the initial 

concept and develop a technology development strategy that is supposed 

to guide activities during the technology development phase. According to

the acquisition policy, the strategy should include

• a discussion of the planned acquisition approach, including a summary of 

the considerations and rationale concerning the approach; 

• a discussion of the planned strategy to manage research and development;

• a complete description of the first technology demonstration; and 

• a test plan. 

The policy, however, does not address the role of the S&T community in 

designing or supporting a technology development strategy. And according 

to S&T officials, their role in this phase is minimal. We recently reported 

that DOD skipped a formal milestone meeting that should take place at the 

Page 26 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
end of the concept refinement phase, referred to as milestone A, for 

80 percent of the programs we reviewed.11 This inhibits the S&T and 

acquisition communities’ ability to create a realistic plan for developing

and maturing needed technologies prior to program start and executing a 

plan once the program begins. 

During the technology development phase, the acquisition policy calls for 

DOD to focus on the development, maturation, and demonstration of the 

technologies needed for the capability under consideration. To exit this 

phase, technologies should be demonstrated to be sufficiently mature. 

DOD defines this as demonstrating technologies in a relevant environment. 

(See app. IV for definitions of technology readiness.) 

When comparing the DOD process with that used by commercial 

companies we visited, we identified two major differences. First, although 

DOD policy states that the S&T community “shall enable rapid, successful 

transition ... to useful military products,” there is no defined transition 

phase with criteria to facilitate assessment of a technology’s readiness to 

transition. Instead, the services have senior-level boards that review 

projects on an annual basis to determine if they are on track relative to 

cost, schedule, and performance goals set out for the program and rely on

a technology readiness tool to gauge development progress. The reviews 

do not include a formal assessment of many of the technical and business 

criteria contained in the Boeing scorecard, such as determining if the 

costs, benefits, and risk are well understood and technology is affordable. 

As a result, program managers often pull a technology from technology 

developers before the program manager has the opportunity to validate 

that the technology can be integrated into the preliminary product design 

and to develop good product development estimates prior to the start of 

system development. As stated earlier, commercial companies we visited 

had a dedicated phase at the end of the technology development process 

for shifting technology responsibilities to their product lines. We recently 

reported that almost three-fourths of the programs started since the 

acquisition policy was revised in 2000 began with critical technologies that 

were not ready for product development.12 Seven of the nine programs we 

reviewed more indepth, about 80 percent, were approved to begin 

 11GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and

Schedule Problems under DOD’s Revised Policy. GAO-06-368 (Washington, D.C.: April 13, 

2006). 

12GAO-06-368. 

Page 27 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
development even though program officials reported that technologies 

were below readiness levels required for entering product development. 

This included programs like the Future Combat System and the Joint 

Strike Fighter. 

We found DOD generally views immature critical technologies at the 

beginning of development as an acceptable risk as long as there is a plan

to mature the technologies by the time the program reaches its design 

readiness review. In effect, the department views risk management plans 

as an acceptable substitute for demonstrated knowledge. For example, the 

Navy’s Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft program had none of its critical 

technologies mature at program initiation. Instead of holding the program 

to the acquisition policy criteria for entering development, the decision 

maker simply directed the Navy to work with the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense to implement risk mitigation and technology maturation plans 

during the integration phase of system development. 

Second, under DOD’s current funding structure, the transition of 

technology—which should occur prior to the beginning of product 

development and milestone B—is funded and managed by acquisition 

programs. This contrasts with the approach used by commercial 

companies, where the lab manages and funds these activities. Commercial 

firms find that holding their labs accountable for the management and 

funding of technology as it transitions to a new product forces them to 

deliver more quickly and efficiently and allows the product lines to focus 

on product development and the risks associated with it. Figure 11 

illustrates the difference in responsibility. 

Page 28 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 11: Accountability for Management and Funding of Technology

Leading

companies

PRODUCT LINE’S RESPONSIBILITY

Product

development

Technology

development

Technology

transition

LAB’S RESPONSIBILITY

DOD Product

development

Technology

development

Technology

transition

LAB’S RESPONSIBILITY

ACQUISITION COMMUNITY’S RESPONSIBILITY

Source: GAO analysis and presentation of leading companies’ and DOD practices.

As shown above, in the commercial companies we visited, product 

developers are allowed to act like customers for emerging technologies; 

they are not required to accept, manage, and fund technology risk. This 

significantly improves the chances of their products reaching the market 

quickly, at predictable cost, and with high quality. In DOD, major weapon 

system acquisition programs pull technologies that are not yet ready for a 

product in order to meet that product’s requirements. The S&T 

community, although still called upon to review technology readiness, has 

no funds at stake and is no longer responsible for the risk from technology 

at that point. This is a major contributor to the significant cost overruns 

and late deliveries of major weapon systems to the warfighter in recent 

years. 

DOD Is Adopting 

Transition Tools, but Use 

Is Not Widespread 

DOD is using several tools we found were also being used by commercial 

companies to facilitate the transition of technology to weapons programs. 

For example, the services are using technology transition agreements for 

some of their technology projects, DARPA is using relationship managers 

to address transition issues, the services have established boards to 

oversee and manage a portion of their technology portfolios, and DOD has 

several new programs, including the Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration program to speed a technology’s transition to a weapon 

system. However, because of the newness or small amount of funding 

associated with these tools, widespread use has yet to occur. We also 

Page 29 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
found that DOD is using technology-specific and status metrics, but does 

not have sufficient measures in place to assess the impact of their 

technology investments or technology transition processes. 

The services have recently begun using technology transition agreements 

to formalize technical expectations labs must demonstrate in order for 

acquisition programs to transition technologies into their programs. DOD 

science and technology officials believe the agreements are a useful way 

to hold the technology developers accountable and gauge lab progress 

toward meeting technology specifications. We are encouraged by their use 

of agreements, particularly in the Navy. Agreements we reviewed, 

however, did not contain some of the information or metrics commercial 

companies believe is valuable to track, and use thus far has been limited. 

Technology Transition 

Agreements 

The agreements we reviewed contained some of the same elements 

included in agreements used by leading companies we visited, such as a 

description of the technology project, key technology developer and 

weapon system personnel associated with the project, and specific 

performance characteristics that the lab must meet for transition to occur. 

In addition, they identify the amount of funding acquisition programs will 

have for transition and when that funding will be available. Unlike the 

leading companies we visited, however, these agreements did not typically

require the technology developer to demonstrate cost metrics for the 

technology to be included in a weapons program. Commercial companies, 

for example, include an assessment of manufacturing costs that could be

expected if a technology were to be included on a new product and they 

usually demand prototypes of the technology as demonstration of 

readiness to transition. A recent Defense Science Board Report 

highlighted the importance of addressing manufacturing concerns during 

technology development. Excerpts are shown in figure 12. 

Page 30 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Figure 12: Excerpts from a Defense Science Board Task Force Report on the 

Manufacturing Technology Program

“Immature technologies and manufacturing challenges have a significant impact on 

DOD’s ability to rapidly and affordably transition technology to the war fighter.” 

“S&T program managers often believe that affordability and manufacturing issues are not 

relevant concerns in 6.3 programs, focusing instead on fabrication of test and evaluation 

and prototype articles. But this line of thinking leads to higher costs later in a program, 

when manufacturing concerns are addressed after technical designs are considered 

‘ready.’ “ 

“In order to achieve the objective of lower cost equipment, manufacturing concerns must 

be addressed earlier in the program life cycle. Production and support costs need to 

become a component of key technical design requirements, before the final stages of 

development when technologies are released for prototyping.” 

Source: Defense Science Board study (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

We also found that the services’ use of technology transition agreements 

has been very limited. For example, we found that the services have a 

combined total of 224 applied and advanced technology projects that they

have identified as candidates for transition, of which 146—or about 

65 percent—have technology transition agreements. The Navy accounted 

for the greatest percentage, with 90 of its 115 projects having an 

agreement, almost 80 percent. However, there are hundreds of other 

military services applied and advanced technology research projects that 

were not selected as candidates where agreements may also be useful. As

stated earlier, commercial companies we visited had agreements for nearly

all technology projects. The agreements were updated at least annually or 

sooner if particular tasks were completed. Lab officials use metrics 

included in the agreements, as well as other criteria, to determine if the 

project should be continued. 

It should also be pointed out that while technology transition agreements 

are useful tools for firming weapons program commitment to transition, 

they do not guarantee transition success. For example, a Navy official told 

us that about one-third of the projects that had been expected to transition 

in fiscal year 2005 did not transition for the following reasons: 

• The technology did not meet the cost parameters required for transition to 

occur. 

• Weapon system requirements changed, forcing changes to the original 

agreement. 

• Program offices did not identify dollars in its budget to transition the 

technology.

Page 31 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
• A program office decided the technology was too risky compared with 

current hardware in production. 

Air Force and Army officials told us they do not track information on why 

their technologies do not transition. However, they have experienced 

similar problems as the Navy. They also stated that some lab technologies 

do not transition because prime contractors decide to use technologies 

developed in-house, even though DOD technology developers met the 

metrics included in the transition agreements. Because agreements are 

usually established between the technology developers and program 

offices prior to the selection of prime contractors, there is no assurance 

that the technologies will transition. Even in cases where a prime 

contractor is known, such as for ongoing development programs, the 

prime contractor is not a party in the agreement. 

With the exception of DARPA, DOD does not use relationship managers in 

the same manner as leading private companies. According to an Air Force

lab official, relationship managers market technologies being developed by

the labs or gather data about ongoing projects for senior lab management. 

Most communication about technology transition in DOD takes place 

through integrated product teams or during annual reviews of technology 

projects by the senior-level oversight boards for each of the services. Use 

of relationship managers for these purposes are helpful, but the managers

do not necessarily serve as points of contact within the labs and 

acquisition communities, do not devote time toward efficiently 

transitioning technologies to multiple weapon system programs, and do 

not help identify and address systemic transition problems. 

Within DARPA, senior officers, called operational liaisons, focus on 

marketing and transitioning DARPA-sponsored technologies. According to

the DARPA director, the liaisons have been very helpful with transitioning 

technologies because they are well practiced at using the command chain 

of their respective services and finding the right service contact at the 

right time. The liaisons 

Relationship Managers 

• provide operational advice for planning and strategy development; 

• provide an understanding of service perspectives, issues and needs so that

potential customers can be identified and effective agreements can be 

written; 

• draft and coordinate agreements between DARPA and the services; and 

Page 32 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
• direct technology insertion in the services. 

Figure 13 describes the impact that operational liaisons have had on 

transitioning a DARPA-sponsored program called Boomerang. We believe 

that DARPA’s approach could serve as a model for how the military 

services might establish more formal roles for communication between 

the S&T and acquisition communities. 

Figure 13: DARPA, a Success Story 

The DARPA director credits operational liaisons for the quick transition of the Boomerang, 

an acoustic shot-detection system, from the lab to troops in Iraq. DARPA developed the 

system in response to feedback from Iraq that convoys were being engaged by snipers 

yet remained unaware of sniper attacks until a windshield was broken, a soldier was hit, or 

a vehicle was visibly damaged upon inspection at the end of the convoy mission. 

Within 60 days of an urgent Army request, DARPA fielded the first Boomerang system. 

But DARPA’s director said the system did not hold up well in the extreme weather 

conditions and under wartime conditions. As Boomerang II was being prepared for 

fielding, the director said the operational liaisons helped craft a more realistic concept of 

operations, training package, and logistical support package to ensure that Boomerang II 

not only was technologically ready for combat but was properly supported with spare 

parts, maintenance facilities, maintenance personnel, training, and lessons-learned 

feedback to DARPA and the Army. The liaisons also ensured that the Army acquisition 

community was alerted to Boomerang II’s deployment so product developers would be 

ready to evaluate the final product for movement into the more traditional acquisition 

process. 

Source: DARPA (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

The military services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense have a 

variety of programs to help transition technologies to weapons systems or

directly to the warfighter. These programs, some of which are relatively 

new and others that have been around for several years, have met with 

some success. However, these programs represent a small portion of 

$13 billion DOD spends on science and technology development. As such, 

they cannot single-handedly overcome transition problems, but rather 

demonstrate various ways to ease transition. 

In recent years, each of the military services has established senior-level 

boards to oversee technology programs that include advanced and in some 

cases applied research projects. This includes the Air Force’s Advanced 

Technology Demonstration program, the Army Technology Objectives 

program, and the Navy’s Future Naval Capabilities program. The boards, 

which are comprised of representatives from the lab, acquisition, and 

warfighter communities, are responsible for selecting projects to be 

developed, allocating funding to those projects, and reviewing the 

projects’ progress on an annual basis. The boards emphasize transition 

DOD Programs to Aid 

Transition 

Page 33 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
planning and can address obstacles to successful transition. According to

officials, these programs represent about $1.3 billion of DOD’s S&T 

budget. 

The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program and the newly 

established Joint Capability Technology Demonstration program were 

initiated by DOD as a way to get technologies that meet critical military 

needs into the hands of users faster and at less cost than by the traditional 

acquisition process. Under these programs, military operators test 

prototypes that have already been developed and matured in realistic 

settings. If they find the items to have military utility, DOD may choose to

buy additional quantities or just use the items remaining after the 

demonstration. Fiscal year 2006 was the first year of a 3- to 5-year period 

where the current Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program 

will be phased out in favor of the new Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration program. Department officials believe the new joint 

program offers improvements over the earlier program in that capabilities 

will be demonstrated 1-2 years earlier, there is a greater focus on 

combatant command needs during the selection process, and the Office of

the Secretary of Defense provides significantly more funding during the 

first 2 years of the demonstration project. 

A big difference between the two programs is that the new joint program 

is expected to provide a better path for the transition of technologies 

because it includes funding for both advanced technology development 

and advanced component development and prototypes. The Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration program only includes funding for 

advanced technology development. It must rely on the acquisition 

community to identify advanced component development and prototype 

funding for transitioning the technologies. An additional benefit is that the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense is partnering with the Naval

Postgraduate School to conduct business case analysis for completed 

demonstration projects. This type of analysis is expected to aid decision 

makers in evaluating alternative approaches to the allocation of scarce 

resources competing for transition funds. 

The Manufacturing Technology Program is aimed at quickly identifying 

and solving production problems associated with technology transition. It 

focuses on the needs of weapon system programs for affordable, low-risk 

development and production. For example, one project, which was given 

$730,000, was geared toward improving the reliability and strength of 

large-diameter fasteners used to attach various components on the 

Seawolf and Virginia Class submarines. Corrosion concerns required that

Page 34 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
the existing fasteners be replaced at periodic intervals to preclude 

catastrophic failure. Navy and commercial companies evaluated a wide 

variety of materials for strength and corrosion resistance to determine the

best candidate material and then adjusted the material manufacturing 

process to obtain the required strength and toughness levels to ensure the

fasteners could be produced without extraordinary measures or a 

deterioration of the material properties. Among other things, program 

officials expect the project to result in cost avoidance of $1.1 million per 

fielded submarine per year and improved reliability. 

There are other, smaller programs that also focus on transition. Two of 

these are the Foreign Comparative Testing Program, which focuses on 

identifying, evaluating, and procuring technologies that have already been 

developed and tested in other countries, and the Technology Transition 

Initiative, which focuses on speeding the transition of technologies 

developed by DOD’s S&T programs into acquisition programs. These 

programs received about $37 million and $29 million in fiscal 2006, 

respectively. The Foreign Comparative Testing Program, for example, 

successfully evaluated a South African mine-protected clearance vehicle 

that will protect soldiers from the effects of landmine explosions during 

route clearance operations. As of June 2006, 61 of these vehicles have been

delivered to the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. 

For the most part, the military services track and use only a few of the 

metrics we found at commercial companies. As stated earlier, they have 

some technology-specific metrics in their technology transition 

agreements. In addition, they have status metrics to track some of the 

on-going, completed, and transitioned projects that are funded by the Air 

Force, Army, and Navy S&T communities as well as the number of 

projects with technology transition agreements. However, the services 

have few metrics that would enable them to gauge the impact of their 

investments and the effectiveness of their processes for developing and 

transitioning technology.

DOD officials told us that establishing good, quantifiable metrics to 

measure transition success is difficult to do. Some of the challenges they

face include determining 

Metrics 

• how long to track a technology after it has transitioned, 

• how to track and distinguish transition success when the same technology 

is used on multiple weapons programs, and 

Page 35 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
• how much credit to take when only portions of a technology transition to a 

weapon program. 

Further, DOD S&T officials do not believe that they have enough resources 

to track technology once technology developers finish working on a 

project. They say that it would be very labor-intensive to track long-term 

measures, such as the impact of transitioned technology in terms of cost 

savings and improved performance. Instead, the services rely heavily on 

projected cost, schedule, and performance improvements that are required 

by S&T program management as part of the project selection process. 

Although progress in meeting technology expectations is monitored 

throughout technology development, once technology developers are 

finished working on a technology, little is done to determine if it actually 

went onto a weapon system and if it is being used in the field.

Last year, we reported that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had 

difficulty tracking the impact of three small technology transition 

programs it oversees—the Technology Transition Initiative, the Defense 

Acquisition Challenge Program, and the Quick Reaction Fund.

13

Nevertheless, we pointed out that there may already be readily available

starting points within the department to capture more information 

regarding return on investments. For example, we pointed out that the 

DOD Foreign Comparative Testing Program has established metrics to 

measure the health, success, and cost-effectiveness of the program and 

has a database to facilitate return on investment analyses. Further, a study 

by the Naval Postgraduate School to identify metrics for the Advanced 

Concept Technology Demonstration program may also be useful to the 

military services for assessing transition success and impact. 

There are critical differences between the environments and cultures of 

private world-class companies and DOD that must be recognized before 

tangible progress can be made in establishing more efficient practices for

transitioning technologies to major weapon system acquisition programs. 

Examples from past initiatives serve as reminders that just changing the 

mechanics of technology transition processes, without changing the 

environment that determines incentives, may not produce better 

outcomes. Private companies operate in a competitive environment that 

Differences in 

Environment and 

Incentives Contribute 

to Different Practices 

and Outcomes 

 13GAO, Defense Technology Development: Management Process Can Be Strengthened for 

New Technology Transition Programs. GAO-05-480 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2005). 

Page 36 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
demands speedy delivery of innovative, high-quality technologies and 

products to satisfy market needs. If the company cannot meet those 

criteria, it will cease to exist in that environment. On the other hand, DOD 

operates in an environment with a complex variety of “customers.” These 

complex relationships often hinder the ability of DDRE, its “corporate” 

component, to provide strategic leadership similar to that of the private 

company. Success in this environment is often based on a single service’s 

ability to launch a program to address critical needs and to secure annual 

funding for the program. The challenge for DOD and congressional 

decision makers may not lie so much in the “how to” aspects of technology 

transition as in creating stronger and more uniform incentives that 

encourage the S&T and acquisition communities to work together to 

deliver mature technologies to programs. 

Private firms must continually deliver innovative, reliable products to 

market very quickly to prosper. The delivery-oriented environment that 

private firms live in creates a need for strategic simplicity and directness 

from leadership and forces product lines and labs to measure success in 

terms of lower costs and increased revenue and market share. The ability 

to deliver new, innovative, reliable products of high quality to market as 

soon as possible drives revenue and market share. This environment 

creates incentives to maintain an efficient technology base that is focused

on market needs and can efficiently transition feasible technologies into 

new products, keeping costs down while achieving greater revenues. 

Because commercial firms understand that they do not succeed until a 

new, innovative product is delivered to the customer, they view successful 

transition of technologies to products as a critical part of their value chain. 

The corporation, therefore, insists on accountability from and supports its 

technology developers with a strong strategic process for ensuring that its 

product portfolio is balanced. It does not want too many programs vying 

for scarce investment dollars. 

For example, IBM officials stated that poor strategic planning was one of 

the problems the company had to address after it incurred an 

$8 billion loss in 1992-1993. According to company officials, technologies 

no longer could be developed for the sake of development; they had to be 

aligned with a product line and have market potential to be funded. IBM 

labs now conduct a situation analysis that takes an internal and external 

look at technologies being developed and a gap analysis to determine 

where IBM might be behind in technology development. 

At 3M, meeting market imperatives is critical and senior leadership has set 

a goal to increase sales 5 to 8 percent annually through new products. In 

Page 37 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
this environment, the company has established a companywide initiative

referred to as 2X/3X. Generally, the goal is to double the number of new 

ideas going into the product development pipeline and to triple the market 

success of the products coming out of the pipeline. Lab and product line 

managers are evaluated and held accountable for the success of the 

initiative based upon their ability to meet sales goals and properly 

resource their projects. According to 3M’s 2004 annual report, the 

initiative is producing strong results. 3M officials believe their culture is 

well aligned with this competitive environment. For example, 

technologists participate in companywide technology forums to discuss 

problems and share information. A technology council, comprised of 

about 80 lab and technical directors, meets monthly to share ideas, 

experiences, and best practices among the labs. 

At Motorola, the corporate vision is known as “seamless mobility.” Senior 

leaders have aligned the company’s global resources—including its 

$3.1 billion annual research and development budget and a worldwide 

research network—to help achieve this goal. According to Motorola 

officials, the seamless mobility vision has been instrumental in uniting 

Motorola labs and product lines over the past 3 years toward a common 

goal. 

On the other hand, DOD operates in an environment that often hinders the 

ability of its corporate component—DDRE—to provide strategic 

leadership similar to the private company. Not only must the department 

worry about national security imperatives, it must also answer to Congress 

and its oversight agencies; manage a stove-piped, parochial culture; ensure

the public’s trust that tax dollars are wisely and fairly spent; and 

incentivize an industrial base to deliver cutting-edge, often very risky 

technologies and products. This is a complex set of deliverables by any 

measure. It creates an environment that makes it difficult for DDRE to 

lead and has contributed to an undisciplined strategic planning process. 

Success in this environment is often based on a service’s ability to launch 

a program to address critical needs and to secure annual funding for the 

program. It is characterized by fierce competition among the services to 

win scarce funding to begin major weapon system acquisition programs, 

regardless of the readiness of technologies to meet far-reaching 

requirements. As a result, programs are pressured to distinguish 

themselves from other programs previously developed by promising new, 

enhanced features such as being faster and/or more lethal than anything

else. It is very common for these new programs to include requirements 

for new technologies with overly optimistic assessments of technological 

feasibility, risk, and delivery schedules. This environment and these 

Page 38 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
incentives breed uncertainty and risk and, as a result, cost overruns and 

delivery delays. 

In DOD, delivering mature technologies to weapon system acquisition 

programs at the right time continues to be a challenge. Rather than 

addressing technology issues in a science and technology environment 

before product development starts, acquisition programs carry significant 

technology risk into product development. This brings with it a high risk 

that costs will rise and deliveries to the warfighter will be delayed. In fact, 

there is strong evidence that acquisition programs that start with immature 

technologies encounter significantly poorer acquisition outcomes than 

others. This approach is in sharp contrast to the approach taken in the 

commercial world. High-performing companies solve technology 

challenges in the S&T environment. To do this, they have put in place 

processes and adopted techniques that are pertinent to DOD. Strong 

strategic planning defines critical investment priorities, and a structured 

process defines the path towards a technology’s transition to product 

development. This transition is supported by technology transition 

agreements that hold the research labs accountable for what they must 

deliver. They also include clarification of the responsibilities the product 

developer has in accepting new technologies. Metrics are used to force 

demonstration of relevancy and feasibility at key points in the process and 

gauge the success of individual projects and the process itself. Funding for 

technology development largely comes from the corporate level, with the 

research labs having responsibility for technology development until 

technology is matured and transitioned to the product line. This is critical 

to success, because it allows product developers to play a customer role. 

They are allowed to say no to technologies that are not ready for their 

programs and can focus on their job at hand—product integration, 

supplier management, and quality.

DOD has adopted some of these practices. The department has begun 

using technology transition agreements and relationship managers and has 

initiated programs that place greater emphasis on technology transition 

planning. However, the reach of these initiatives is limited, and there is no

unified, corporate approach to using them at this point. We recognize that 

the environment and incentives for DOD are very different than those of

commercial firms we visited. For commercial practices to work on a broad 

scale, the DOD environment must be conducive for applying such 

practices. DOD senior leadership is a critical factor in providing this 

direction and vision as well as in maintaining the culture of the 

organization. The department must devote greater attention to strategic 

Conclusions 

Page 39 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
planning and technology development processes so that resources are 

spent on technologies that can and will be transformed into capabilities 

for the warfighter. In addition, the S&T and acquisition communities must 

work together to expand the use of technology transition agreements and

relationship managers. Finally, the department should examine the way it

currently funds technology transition. It may benefit from an examination 

of commercial companies’ methods in this regard. They hold their 

technology developers accountable for delivering relevant technologies 

that are ready to be integrated into new products, but they empower them 

to succeed by providing adequate funding to get the job done. 

DOD should take steps to improve its transition of technologies to more 

efficiently deliver capabilities to its warfighters. The Defense Science 

Board has recommended strengthening of DOD’s strategic planning 

function, and we believe this would move the department in the right 

direction. We believe a disciplined, gated approach for technology 

development, supported by technical and business criteria, would provide 

adequate knowledge to acquisition program managers about the risk of 

including particular technologies on specific weapons programs. It would

also provide a more systematic way for the S&T community to continually 

assess the relevancy, feasibility, and potential transition commitment of its 

technologies and make decisions about future investments. DOD’s current 

process lacks specific decision points with “go/no go” decisions. As such, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following actions: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• develop a gated process for developing and transitioning technologies that

establishes a transition phase and defines activities that should occur 

during this phase, and 

• include specific criteria to support continued funding of specific projects 

in that process. 

We also believe greater use of tools, such as technology transition 

agreements, relationship managers, and metrics, could help the 

department improve its ability to deliver mature technologies when 

needed, address transition issues more quickly, and gauge the impact of 

their science and technology investments and lab processes. Therefore, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense: 

• expand the use of technology transition agreements to applied and 

advanced development projects; 

Page 40 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
• include additional metrics in technology transition agreements to provide 

S&T and acquisition program managers demonstrated knowledge about

the manufacturing readiness, producibility, other benefits, and risks of 

including the technology on a weapons program; 

• expand the use of relationship managers by designating people at various 

levels in both the S&T and acquisition communities to address systemic 

transition issues and those related to specific weapon system programs. 

Also, define responsibilities for each level of relationship manager; 

• adopt additional process-oriented metrics, such as the percentage of 

advanced technologies that—once past milestone A of the acquisition 

process—transitioned into a weapons program or were fielded and the 

cycle time from milestone A to milestone B as a way to measure the 

effectiveness of S&T processes and the impact of science and technology 

investments; 

Commercial companies fund technology development and transition 

activities in their labs and hold the labs accountable for delivering mature 

technology to their product lines. As such, we are recommending that the 

Secretary of Defense 

• Set aside a portion of advanced component development and prototype 

funds for the S&T community to manage the transition of technologies to 

acquisition programs. For this funding to be used effectively, it will require 

the discipline provided by corporate leadership in defining priorities, 

processes, and metrics. 

DOD provided us with written comments on a draft of this report. DOD 

generally concurred with the recommendations in our report to improve 

its ability to transition technology to our warfighters. In doing so, it 

emphasized that that commercial industry program managers operate in 

an environment driven by profit and market opportunities, while DOD is 

organized to support our warfighters. We understand the basic differences 

in the environments, but believe there are many lessons that can be 

gleaned from our commercial visits. While it is true that private companies 

are motivated by profit, they can not achieve a profit without being 

focused on the timely delivery of products to the market. We note in this 

and other best practices reports that commercial firms have significant 

pressures on them to deliver cutting edge technologies quickly. They often 

bet their very existence on delivering new products and technologies 

before anyone else does so. In some cases, such as medical systems, their 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 41 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
customers have urgent, life-or-death needs, similar to those of the 

warfighters, that demand very complex technological solutions. The real 

difference between these companies and the department is that they 

understand the futility of promising more than can be delivered to the 

market at any given point. They understand that, in the final analysis, they

only succeed—or survive—only by delivering needed capability. On the 

other hand, the department’s acquisition programs consistently accept 

immature technologies into product development that become a major 

cause of cost increases, schedule delays, and ultimately very late delivery

to the warfighter who needs the equipment. The list of programs that have

delivered late is extensive. 

Rather than focus on the different environment in the commercial world, 

DOD should focus on the practices used in the commercial world that 

allow it to deliver mature technology to product development (then, to the 

user) quickly and efficiently, an outcome woefully lacking in the 

department. 

Specially, of the six recommendations we made, DOD concurred with two

recommendations, partially concurred with two others, and did not concur 

with the final two. DOD’s comments appear in appendix II. 

DOD concurred with the recommendation that called for establishing a 

gated process for developing and transitioning technologies. In its 

response, the department stated that it has a gated process for programs 

that have a formal milestone A decision point and that technology maturity

and technology readiness assessments are used in this process. DOD 

explained that the technology maturity assessments, in particular, often 

lead to risk mitigation plans, which include explicit gates that immature 

technologies must pass through to become qualified for adoption. 

We are not confident that DOD’s implementation plans are fully responsive 

to this recommendation. First, the department does not have a process 

similar to those that we found at commercial companies to actively 

manage and make investment decisions across all technologies and 

determine if an individual technology is ready to transition. In its 

comments, DOD refers to a process for programs beginning at milestone 

A. However, we have reported that 80 percent of the programs we 

reviewed that passed milestone B since 2000 did not have a milestone A. 

Second, we found that even when technology readiness assessments 

indicated that technologies were not ready to be included in an acquisition 

program, DOD often decided to use them anyway. Third, risk mitigation 

Page 42 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
plans used by DOD are subjective engineering judgments and are of 

limited value when evaluating the transition readiness of technologies. 

The department also concurred with our recommendation that it expand

the use of technology transition agreements to applied and advanced 

development projects. However, in its response, DOD did not identify 

specific actions it plans to take to implement this recommendation. 

DOD partially concurred with the recommendation that it include 

additional metrics in technology transition agreements. In its response, the 

department indicated that it has taken steps to incorporate manufacturing 

readiness assessments as a means to improve technology readiness and 

that any additional metrics should be project-specific and included as exit

criteria as part of the technology transition agreement. We are encouraged 

by DOD’s recent development of manufacturing readiness levels and 

believe they should be a mandatory tool for the S&T and acquisition 

program managers to use to assess the manufacturability of a new 

technology. While we agree that the department should develop additional 

metrics on a project-by-project basis, we also believe that a more holistic 

approach, as depicted earlier in the report, is needed to determine the 

transition readiness of a particular technology. Transition readiness is not 

solely dependent upon the technical maturity achieved by S&T, but is also 

dependent upon the readiness of an acquisition program to accept the new 

technology and therefore should include an assessment of other factors 

such as cost, benefit, risk, scalability, and acquisition program 

endorsement. 

DOD also partially concurred with the recommendation to expand the use 

of relationship managers to address systemic transition issues and those 

related to specific weapon system programs. In its response, DOD 

indicated that it relies on written documents—the technology maturity 

assessments and technology transition agreements—to facilitate 

communication between the S&T and acquisition communities, 

particularly at the executive level. As stated earlier, these documents do 

not address many of the factors that could hinder transition. As DOD 

states in its comments, technology transition is referred to as a “bodycontact sport.” We agree, and this is why our recommendation is aimed at

more direct person-to-person communication. Leading companies believe

relationship managers play a key role in their ability to successfully 

transition technology. While DOD did acknowledge that its S&T 

investment would benefit from expanded emphasis by staff at the 

execution levels on technology transition issues, it did not directly address 

the need for midlevel relationship managers. We continue to believe DOD 

Page 43 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
would benefit from the use of midlevel relationship managers. These 

managers provide the back and forth communications between the S&T 

and acquisition communities that help ensure that the right technology is 

being developed in the time frame needed. These managers are also 

uniquely positioned to ensure that technology is applied to multiple 

platforms when applicable and can identify systemic transition problems 

that should be addressed. 

DOD did not concur with the recommendation that it should develop 

additional process-oriented metrics, even though it stated that it is 

installing a process to do this through the use of technology maturity and 

technology readiness assessments. DOD stated that it does not want to 

commit to overly burdensome metrics that may be more oriented to 

measuring the process for the sake of measurement. Like DOD, we do not 

believe the department should develop metrics just for the sake of 

measurement. Rather, we believe DOD should develop and use metrics 

that allow DOD, Congress, and taxpayers to gauge the effectiveness of 

DOD S&T investments, which are expected to reach about $13 billion this

year. The metrics that DOD references—those derived from technology 

maturity and technology readiness assessments—are project-level metrics 

rather than portfolio and process metrics that would allow the department 

to analyze its investment and make adjustments appropriately. 

DOD also did not concur with the recommendation to set aside a portion 

of advanced component development and prototype funds for the S&T 

community to manage the transition of technologies to acquisition 

programs. In its response, DOD stated that acquisition programs are best 

suited for transitioning technology because they have the training and 

discipline to field systems and have the responsibility to ensure a stable 

design, identify a responsive and responsible contractor, manage 

execution, and plan for life cycle support of the system. While DOD 

discusses transition to the warfighter, our recommendation is aimed at 

transitioning technology from S&T to acquisition programs. We found that 

in the commercial world, the training and discipline for transitioning 

technologies to product development is managed by the technology 

development community and is adequately funded. DOD believes its 

current approach of setting aside a small portion of S&T funds for 

transition through programs such as the Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstration program, Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

program, the Technology Transition Initiative, Manufacturing Technology 

program, and the Foreign Comparative Testing program is appropriate. We 

continue to believe DOD’s approach to funding transition is flawed and 

that small pots of money for specific transition activities offer a piecemeal 

Page 44 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
solution to a more systemic problem. DOD currently uses some of its 

advanced component development and prototype funds for S&T activities,

including transition. However, acquisition programs typically carry out 

and fund these activities. We believe the S&T community should be 

responsible for these activities and as such, should be given the 

appropriate level of funding to carry them out. We believe DOD would be 

better positioned to develop and deliver weapon systems more quickly to 

its warfighters if the S&T community was responsible for developing, 

maturing, and transitioning mature technologies to the acquisition 

community and if the acquisition community focused solely on product 

development activities and delivering weapon systems to the warfighter 

That being said, we recognize that the acquisition and warfighting 

communities play critical roles in this process and therefore must continue 

to work toward setting realistic program requirements and establishing an

evolutionary approach for developing new weapon programs. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or need additional information, 

please contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report were 

Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director; Cheryl Andrew; Lily Chin; 

Sameena Ismailjee; and Sean Merrill. 

Michael Sullivan 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 45 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix I: 

Methodology 

Objectives, Scope, and 

Page 46 GAO-06-883

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

This report examines the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to 

improve its technology transition processes, with a focus on identifying 

specific management, funding, and organizational practices that could 

improve technology transition and weapon system outcomes. Specifically, 

our objectives were to (1) identify techniques that commercial companies 

use to transition mature technologies before the start of product 

development and (2) assess the extent to which DOD is using these 

techniques. 

We used a case study approach to compare and contrast DOD and leading 

commercial companies’ practices. Companies were selected on the basis 

of such factors as the amount of money spent on research and 

development activities over the past several years and the percentage of 

change in research and development spending. For the most part, we 

selected Fortune 500 companies that were in the top 100 for research and 

development spending and had not experienced major cutbacks in this 

funding. We also took into account the type of products each company 

develops and selected companies representing several different business 

sectors. Below are descriptions of the four companies featured in this 

report. 

Boeing is a leading aerospace company and the largest manufacturer of 

commercial jetliners and military aircraft combined, with capabilities in 

rotorcraft, electronic and defense systems, missiles, satellites, launch 

vehicles, and advanced information and communication systems. Boeing 

Phantom Works develops advanced systems solutions, such as advanced

homeland security and air traffic management, as well as breakthrough 

technologies, such as advanced avionics and composite materials that are 

intended to significantly improve the performance, quality, and 

affordability of aerospace products and services. We met with research 

officials, as well as product line officials representing both its commercial 

and defense sectors in Seattle, Washington. 

3M is a diversified technology company with a worldwide presence in 

various markets, including consumer and office; display and graphics; 

electronics and communications; health care; industrial; safety, security,

and protection services; and transportation. With more than 55,000 

products, 3M invests more than $1 billion annually in research and 

development and related activities associated with 30-plus core 

technologies. The company was awarded nearly 500 U.S. patents in 2005. 

Boeing 

3M 

 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

We met with research, business unit, and government programs officials at 

3M headquarters in St. Paul, Minnesota. 

IBM is one of the world’s largest technological companies, spending about 

$3 billion annually on research and development activities. It is the largest

supplier of hardware, software, and information technology services and 

pioneered the development and implementation of on-demand business. 

With 3,248 U.S. patents, IBM earned more patents than any other company 

for the 12th consecutive year in 2004. In the past 4 years, IBM inventors 

received more than 13,000 patents—approximately 5,400 more than any 

other patent recipient. We met with research and product development 

officials at the Watson Research Center in Hawthorne, New York. 

Motorola is a Fortune 500 global communications leader that provides 

seamless mobility products and solutions across broadband, embedded 

systems and wireless networks for products in homes, automobiles, and 

workplaces. Motorola spent about $3.5 billion in 2005 on research and 

development activities. Approximately 22,000 professional employees 

were engaged in research activities during 2005. We met with research 

officials and product development officials, as well as partnership 

development managers at its offices in Schaumburg, Illinois. 

For each of the companies, we interviewed senior management officials 

knowledgeable about research and development activities to gather 

consistent information about processes, practices, and metrics the 

companies use to transition technology smoothly. In particular, we 

discussed their (1) strategic planning process for identifying and 

prioritizing customer needs, (2) technology development process used to 

fund and mature technologies required to meet customer needs, (3) tools 

used to facilitate communication between labs and product lines to 

transition technology, and (4) technology transition process, including 

when transition occurs, the organizations involved, and how technology is 

funded throughout the transition phase. We synthesized information from

GAO’s past best practices work about technology and product 

development. 

To determine DOD’s practices for transitioning technology, we met with 

science and technology (S&T) and acquisition officials to discuss the same 

categories of questions listed above that we asked leading commercial 

companies. The following is a list of the organizations we met with: 

IBM 

Motorola 

Page 47 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

• Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Director, Plans and Programs 

• Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Advanced Systems and Concepts 

• Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

• Air Force 

• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 

(Science, Technology, and Engineering), Alexandria, Virginia 

• Air Force Material Command, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 

• Air Force Research Labs, Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio 

• Joint Unmanned Combat Air Systems Program Office, Wright Patterson 

Air Force Base, Ohio 

• Army 

• Assistant Secretary of the Army Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, 

Alexandria, Virginia 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology Chief 

Scientist, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Joint Tactical Radio System Cluster 5 Program Office, Alexandria, 

Virginia 

• Navy 

• Deputy Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research, Development, Test 

and Evaluation, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Office of Naval Research, Alexandria, Virginia 

• Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River Naval Air Station, 

Maryland 

• Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 

• CVN-21 Program Office, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. 

• Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft Program Office, Patuxent River Naval 

Air Station, Maryland 

• Aircraft Launch and Recovery Equipment Program Office, Patuxent 

River Naval Air Station, Maryland 

At each of these locations, we collected appropriate documents that 

describe the various programs, organizations, responsibilities, and 

funding. We obtained examples of key documents, such as technology 

transition agreements or memorandums of agreement that are used to 

solidify agreements made between labs and weapon programs. We 

reviewed DOD and military service strategic plans and research, 

development, test, and evaluation funding documents. In addition, we 

reviewed documents required as part of the selection and oversight 

process for the Air Force Advanced Technology Development program, 

the Army Technology Objectives program, and the Future Naval 

Capabilities program. We relied on previous GAO best practices and 

weapon system reports that highlight cost and schedule impacts of 

Page 48 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 

launching new weapon programs with immature technology. A list of these 

reports can be found at the end of this report. 

Page 49 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 

of Defense 

Page 50 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix III: DOD Research, Development, 

Technology, and Engineering Budget 

Dollars in billions

Name 

Budget 

activity Description

Which DOD community 

controls spending 

Budget (fiscal 

year 2006) 

Basic research 1 Basic research is systematic study directed toward greater 

knowledge or understanding of the fundamental aspects of 

phenomena and of observable facts without specific 

applications towards processes or products in mind. It 

includes all scientific study and experimentation directed 

towards increasing fundamental knowledge and 

understanding in those fields of the physical, engineering, 

environmental, and life sciences related to long-term national 

security needs. It is farsighted high-payoff research that 

provides the basis for technological progress. 

S&T $1.5

Applied 

research 

2 Applied research is systemic study to understand the means 

to meet a recognized and specific need. It is a systematic 

expression and application of knowledge to develop useful

materials, devices, and systems or methods. Applied research 

may translate promising basic research into solutions for 

broadly defined military needs, short of system development. 

Applied research precedes system-specific technology 

investigations or development. 

S&T $5.2

Advanced 

technology 

development 

3 Advanced technology development includes development of

subsystems and components and efforts to integrate them 

into system prototypes for field experiments and/or tests in a

simulated environment. The results of this type of effort are 

proof of technological feasibility and assessment of 

subsystem and component operability and producibility rather 

than the development of hardware for service use. Projects in 

this category have a direct relevance to identified military 

needs. Program elements in this category involve preacquisition efforts, such as system concept demonstration, 

joint and service-specific experiments, or technology 

demonstrations, and generally have technology readiness 

levels (TRLs) of 4, 5, or 6. Projects in this category do not 

necessarily lead to subsequent development or procurement 

phases, but should have the goal of moving out of science 

and technology and into the acquisition process within years 

defense program. Upon successful completion of projects that 

have military utility, the technology should be available for 

transition. 

S&T $6.6

Advanced 

component 

development 

and prototypes

4 Advanced component development and prototypes consists of 

efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies or 

prototype systems in a high fidelity and realistic operating 

environment. These activities include system-specific efforts 

that help expedite technology transition from the laboratory to 

operational use. Emphasis is on proving component and 

subsystem maturity prior to integration in major and complex 

system sand may involve risk reduction initiatives. Advanced

component development and prototypes efforts are to occur 

before an acquisition program starts product 

Acquisition $13.9

Appendix III: DOD Research, Development, 

Technology, and Engineering Budget 

Page 54 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix III: DOD Research, Development, 

Technology, and Engineering Budget 

System 

development 

and 

demonstration

5 System development and demonstration consists of newly 

initiated acquisition programs and includes engineering and

manufacturing development tasks aimed at meeting validated 

requirements prior to full-rate production. Characteristics of 

this activity involve mature system development, integration, 

and demonstration to support a production decision. 

Acquisition $19.3

Research, 

development, 

test and 

evaluation 

management 

support 

6 RDT&E management support includes efforts to sustain 

and/or modernize the installations or operations required for 

general RDT&E. Such efforts may related to test ranges, 

military construction, maintenance support of laboratories, 

operation and maintenance of test aircraft and ships, and 

studies and analyses I support of the RDT&E program. 

Acquisition $4.0

Operational 

system 

development 

7 Operational system development includes development 

efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have 

received approval for full-rate production and anticipate 

production funding in the current or subsequent fiscal year.

Acquisition $20.6

Source: DOD (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Page 55 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Appendix IV: DOD Technology Readiness Appendix IV Levels : DOD Technology Readiness 

Levels 

Technology readiness level Description 

1. Basic principles observed and reported. Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into 

applied research and development. Examples might include paper studies of a 

technology’s basic properties.

2. Technology concept and/or application 

formulated. 

Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be 

invented. Applications are speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to 

support the assumption. Examples are still limited to analytic studies. 

3. Analytical and experimental critical 

function and/or characteristic proof of 

concept. 

Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and 

laboratory studies to physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 

technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative. 

4. Component and/or breadboard. 

Validation in laboratory environment. 

Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. 

This is relatively “low fidelity” compared to the eventual system. Examples include 

integration of “ad hoc” hardware in a laboratory. 

5. Component and/or breadboard 

validation in a relevant environment. 

Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological 

components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be 

tested in a simulated environment. Examples include “high fidelity” laboratory integration 

of components. 

6. System/subsystem model or prototype 

demonstration in a relevant 

environment. 

Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested 

in a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology’s demonstrated

readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment 

or in simulated operational environment. 

7. System prototype demonstration in an

operational environment. 

Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 

6, requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment 

such as in an aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test 

bed aircraft. 

8. Actual system completed and qualified 

through test and demonstration. 

Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In 

almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system development. Examples 

include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 

determine if it meets design specifications. 

9. Actual system proven through

successful mission operations. 

Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as

those encountered in operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the system 

under operational mission conditions. 

Source: DOD (data); GAO (presentation and analysis). 

Page 56 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Major Weapon 

Programs. GAO-06-391. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006. 

Best Practices: Better Support of Weapon System Program Managers 

Needed to Improve Outcomes. GAO-06-110. Washington, D.C.: November 1, 

2005. 

DOD Acquisition Outcomes: A Case for Change. GAO-06-257T. 

Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2005. 

Defense Acquisitions: Stronger Management Practices Are Needed to 

Improve DOD’s Software-Intensive Weapon Acquisitions. GAO-04-393. 

Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2004. 

Best Practices: Setting Requirements Differently Could Reduce Weapon 

Systems’ Total Ownership Costs. GAO-03-57. Washington, D.C.: February 

11, 2003. 

Defense Acquisitions: Factors Affecting Outcomes of Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration. GAO-03-52. Washington, D.C.: December 2, 

2002. 

Best Practices: Capturing Design and Manufacturing Knowledge Early 

Improves Acquisition Outcomes. GAO-02-701. Washington, D.C.: July 15,

2002. 

Defense Acquisitions: DOD Faces Challenges in Implementing Best 

Practices. GAO-02-469T. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2002.

Best Practices: Better Matching of Needs and Resources Will Lead to 

Better Weapon System Outcomes. GAO-01-288. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 

2001. 

Best Practices: A More Constructive Test Approach Is Key to Better 

Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-00-199. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 

2000. 

Defense Acquisition: Employing Best Practices Can Shape Better 

Weapon System Decisions. GAO/T-NSIAD-00-137. Washington, D.C.: April 

26, 2000. 

Page 57 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
Related GAO Products 

Best Practices: DOD Training Can Do More to Help Weapon System 

Programs Implement Best Practices. GAO/NSIAD-99-206. Washington,

D.C.: August16, 1999. 

Best Practices: Better Management of Technology Development Can 

Improve Weapon System Outcomes. GAO/NSIAD-99-162. Washington, 

D.C.: July 30, 1999. 

Defense Acquisitions: Best Commercial Practices Can Improve Program 

Outcomes. GAO/T-NSIAD-99-116. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1999. 

Defense Acquisition: Improved Program Outcomes Are Possible. GAO/TNSIAD-98-123. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998.

Best Practices: DOD Can Help Suppliers Contribute More to Weapon 

System Programs. GAO/NSIAD-98-87. Washington, D.C.: March 17, 1998.

Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon Acquisition Requires

Changes in DOD’s Environment. GAO/NSIAD-98-56. Washington, D.C.: 

February 24, 1998. 

Best Practices: Commercial Quality Assurance Practices Offer 

Improvements for DOD. GAO/NSIAD-96-162. Washington, D.C.: August 26, 

1996. 

(120454) Page 58 GAO-06-883 DOD Technology Transition
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “Subscribe to Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, JarmonG@gao.gov (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Paul Anderson, Managing Director, AndersonP1@gao.gov (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, D.C. 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER