Richard K. Simon, Esq. 

1700 Decker School Lane 

Malibu, CA 90265 

(310) 503-7286 

rsimon3@verizon.net 

Office of the Chief Counsel 

Attention: FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket 

AGC-610 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Ave. S.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20591 

Re: Part 16 Complaint 

~~~~DWiE~ 

OCT 3 0 2014 

PART 16 DOCKETS 

October 30,2014 

National Business Aviation Association, Krueger Aviation, Inc., Harrison 

Ford, justice Aviation, Kim Davidson Aviation, Inc., Aero Film, Yo uri Bujko, 

james Ross, Paramount Citrus LLC and Aircraft Owners and Pilots 

Association v. City of Santa Monica, California 

DocketNos.16-14-04/FAA-2014-05921 

Reply of the Complainants to the Respondent's Answer to the Complaint 

The Complainants, as set forth above, pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 16.23(e) submit this 

Reply to the Answer to their Complaint filed on October 20, 2014 by the City of Santa 

Monica ("Santa Monica," "City," or "Respondent"), sponsor and operator of the Santa 

Monica Municipal Airport ("SMO" or "Airport"). 

Santa Monica's Answer is in two parts: the first, pages 1 to 14, is little more than a 

word-for-word recitation of its August 14, 2014 Motion to Dismiss. It fails to break any 

new ground or even to attempt to address the many errors and deficiencies pointed out in 

the Complainants' August 28, 2014 Answer to the Motion to Dismiss. The second part, 

pages 15 to 22, addresses the merits of this action. It reaffirms, and attempts to defend, the 

City's claim that its federal Grant Assurance-based obligations came to an end on june 29, 

2014. 

The Complainants have already fully responded to the City's Motion to Dismiss, and 

will not repeat that response here. This Reply will briefly summarize the reasons why the 

Motion was- and remains- without merit, and demonstrate again that the relief sought in 

this action is well within the scope of Part 16 and the jurisdiction of the FAA. Those 

1 A copy of the Complaint also has been posted at the regulations.gov website under docket 

nos. 16-14-05/FAA-2014-0538. To the extent applicable, this reply also pertains to those 

dockets. 

1 
conclusions now are underscored by the Answer's unequivocal reiteration of the City's 

position that it is no longer subject to Grant Assurance-based obligations (see, e.g., the 

caption to section IV of its Answer, at 15: "City's Grant Obligations to the FAA Ended on 

june 29, 2014"). 

The Complainants will then respond to the City's criticisms of their merits claims. 

The City now argues that the duration of its grant obligations is purely a matter of contract 

interpretation, in which an FAA administrative determination based on the underlying 

statutory scheme would be entitled to no deference. It also argues that the City's 2003 

acceptance of some $240,000 in additional grant funds should be categorized as no more 

than a bookkeeping adjustment. As will be seen, the City's position ignores controlling 

authorities, which directly reject its "basic" contract law line of argument and which in fact 

require deference be accorded to FAA determinations involving AlP grants and the related 

assurances. The City's argument also relies on an erroneous reading of the grant 

documents it attaches as exhibits and entirely fails to acknowledge that the FAA already 

has determined, in In re City of Santa Monica, California, docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-

15807, Director's Determination, at 13 (May 27, 2008), that the City's Grant Assurance 

obligations extend "until at least 2023." 

ARGUMENT 

1. Background 

Repeating the allegations of its Motion to Dismiss, the City initially argues in its 

Answer that: (i) the FAA lacks jurisdiction in this proceeding because the Complaint seeks 

an "advisory" opinion; (ii) the Complaint fails to assert violation of a specific Grant 

Assurance; (iii) the Complainants have not been "directly and substantially" harmed by any 

City action; and (iv) the Complainants did not engage in a good faith effort at informal 

resolution. 

In reasserting these claims, the City again - and without explanation - continues to 

mischaracterize the relief sought by the Complainants. The Answer to the City's Motion to 

Dismiss clearly demonstrated that the Complainants have not asked the FAA to consider 

proposed lease terms, future violations of Grant Assurances, the City's ongoing studies of 

Airport closure and other options, or any other speculative matters. Rather, the Complaint 

seeks only a determination, consistent with the FAA's prior finding in In re City of Santa 

Monica, California, supra, that: 

[T]he City's Grant Assurance obligations remain binding and effective, and 

that the City must continue to comply with those obligations, until no sooner 

than August 2023. 

The City also continues to argue that it has not yet decided precisely how it will 

exercise its purported freedom from federal obligations, as if that somehow shields it from 

the consequences of the decision it has already made, i.e., that it enjoys such freedom. To 

repeat, this proceeding arises solely from actions already taken by the City, which are 

cognizable under Part 16. 

2 
Moreover, it again must be emphasized that the City has misrepresented the facts 

"on the ground" by providing to the FAA a Staff Report (Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit C) which 

was rejected by the Santa Monica City Council, and nevertheless implying that the City 

Council is likely to renew Airport tenant leases for three years, with one-year options (see 

Santa Monica's Answer, at 2, 8). In fact, as the Complainants previously noted, the City 

Council, in coordination with its Airport Commission, has expressed a lack of interest in 

terms even that long and instead has expressed interest in renewing all Airport tenant 

leases on a month-to-month basis (see Complainants' Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, at 6, 

footnote 4).2 

The FAA must also be cognizant of the fact that the City has for decades used every 

opportunity, and expended enormous resources, to promote and adopt measures to close 

SMO or to impermissibly restrict its operations. As pointed out in the Complaint (at 2), 

among its many other anti-Airport actions, the City to this day has refused to rescind its 

Resolution no. 6296 ("[i]t is the policy of the City of Santa Monica to effect the closure of the 

Santa Monica Municipal Airport as soon as possible ... "). 

The City would obviously prefer that the Complainants' claims be viewed in a 

vacuum, but a sponsor's past actions are always appropriate matters for consideration in a 

Part 16 proceeding: 

The focus is on current compliance, but a necessary part of current 

compliance is a sponsor's actions in carrying out its federal obligations. The 

Respondent's former actions, as well as current actions, shape its airport 

compliance efforts regardless of subsequent developments in tenancy at the 

airport. 

Royal Air, Inc. v. City of Shreveport, docket nos. 16-02-06/FAA-2002-13063, Director's 

Determination, at 17 (January 9, 2004). 

The City's actions, summarized at pages 5-7 of the Complaint, are particularly telling 

when considering its assertion (see Answer, at 7 -9) that it has reached no formal 

conclusions as to future measures concerning the Airport and its tenants. It simply strains 

credulity to accept the notion that, if deemed free from grant obligations, the City will 

reverse course and become a benign steward of SMO; nothing in the experience of the past 

thirty years suggests that it should be given such an opportunity. 

2 As the Complainants also noted, either decision would conflict with the City's obligation to 

offer leases of adequate duration to Airport tenants. See, e.g., Santa Monica Airport 

Association v. City of Santa Monica, California, docket no. 16-99-21, Director's 

Determination, at 22 (November 22, 2000); Skydance Helicopters. Inc. v. Sedona Oak-Creek 

Airport Authority, docket nos. 16-02-02/FAA-2002-13068, Director's Determination, at 32 

(March 7, 2003). 

3 
2. The FAA has Jurisdiction over the Comnlaint 

The Complainants have previously pointed out (in their Answer to the Motion to 

Dismiss, at 4) - and the City has offered no basis for a different view - that the FAA's 

analysis of a sponsor's obligations, whether under Grant Assurances, an instrument of 

transfer, or other federal commitments, is an important component of every reported 

Director's Determination and Final Agency Decision, and is in fact required by § 2.3 of the 

Airport Compliance Manual (FAA Order 5190.6B). As an example, the Complainants 

offered Dart v. City of Corona, California, docket no. 16-99-20, Director's Determination, at 

11 (June 26, 2000), which devoted a large part of its analysis to the issue of the respondent 

sponsor's federal obligations. 

The Complainants also noted (in their Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, at 5) that 

the FAA's authority under Part 16 is broadly defined (e.g., "[t]he provisions of this part 

govern all ... proceedings involving Federally-assisted airports," 14 C.F.R. § 16.1(a)), and in 

particular encompasses, within the definition of "noncompliance," "anything done or 

omitted to be done by any person in contravention of any provision of any Act, as defined 

in this section, as to matters within the jurisdiction of the Administrator." !d.§ 16.3. 

Nothing in the City's current reiteration of its jurisdiction argument suggests that a 

different view should prevail. The City continues to proffer unsupported quasi-legal 

arguments - such as that the Complaint involves the expiration date of a contract (see 

Answer, at 13) - and flat-out misrepresentations, such as that the Complaint seeks an 

opinion as to possible future conduct (see id.)- but offers no support whatever for its claim 

of a lack of jurisdiction. This argument should be rejected. 

3. The Complainants have not Failed to State a Claim 

Again relying on the allegations of its Motion to Dismiss, the City contends that the 

Complaint fails to state a claim because it does not charge the City with the violation of a 

specific Grant Assurance, and because it purportedly seeks an advisory opinion. Both of 

these arguments were fully addressed and disposed of in the Complainants' Answer to the 

Motion to Dismiss (at 4, et seq.), and as recycled in the Answer they still lack merit. 

The City is correct that the Complaint does not address a particular Grant 

Assurance; it arises from the City's now-acknowledged rejection of any and all assurancebased obligations. As discussed in the preceding section, the FAA's Part 16 jurisdiction 

extends to the threshold question of whether a sponsor is federally obligated, and the 

Complaint appropriately pleads that issue. Nothing in any of the pleadings filed by the City, 

and no authority that it cites, supports the contention that a sponsor's blanket rejection of 

the entire Grant Assurance program cannot be considered under Part 16. 

A corollary argument offered by the City is that of ripeness -i.e., that the City has not 

yet taken action to implement its rejection of its federal obligations, and hence that the 

Complaint is premature and seeks an advisory opinion. This reasoning is faulty. The 

Complaint is directed at a specific, completed City action - its determination that its Grant 

Assurance obligations ended on june 29, 2014 - and the Complaint asks the FAA to 

4 
determine to the contrary. The matter at issue is neither speculative nor uncertain, and, as 

the Complainants have demonstrated, is well within the ambit of past FAA determinations 

and its statutory authority (see Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, at 6-7). 

The FAA also has made clear that it may address current practices that are likely to 

result in future violations. See, e.g., jetAway Aviation LLC v. Board of Commissioners, 

Montrose County, Colorado, docket nos. 16-06-01/FAA-2006-25185, Director's 

Determination, at 34 (November 6, 2006); Town of Fairview, Texas v. City of McKinney, 

Texas, docket no. 16-99-04, Director's Determination, at 17 (July 26, 2000). That is 

certainly also the case with the City - but the Complainants stress that the City's declared 

independence from its AlP-based obligations, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for finding 

a violation of Grant Assurances. 

4. The City's Action has a Direct and Substantial Effect on the Complainants 

As with its previous arguments, the City's Answer offers nothing new on the issue of 

the impact of its position regarding its Grant Assurance obligations on Airport tenants and 

users. These individuals and businesses are affected, as this Reply is being written, by the 

uncertainty created by the City's declaration that it is not now, and will not in the future be, 

subject to federal AlP-based obligations. 

The FAA has emphasized that airport tenants and users must be able to plan for the 

future. For example: 

Sponsors must provide aeronautical businesses that meet mm1mum 

standards with the opportunity for occupancy with certainty of associated 

rights to conduct business for appropriate lengths of time, depending on 

investment requirements and associated costs. 

Atlantic Helicopters, Inc. v. Monroe County, Florida, docket nos. 16-07-12/FAA-2008-0250, 

Director's Determination, at 31 (September 11, 2008). The City's position leaves any 

possibility of planning in limbo; not just with respect to lease duration, as the City suggests, 

but in every aspect of Airport operations - e.g., fuel sales, flight schools, even runway 

length.3 The impact on Airport tenants and users, as the clock continues to run down on 

current leases and the obligations separately created by the 1984 Settlement Agreement, 

could not be more obvious or more substantial. 

5. The Complainants have Fulfilled Part 16's Informal Resolution Requirements 

This section of the City's Answer (at 14) is literally cut-and-paste from its Motion to 

Dismiss, and Complainant's response remains the same: Any informal resolution would 

have been futile in light of the City's documented intransigence on the issue of Grant 

Assurance duration and the Complainants' limited powers with regard to that issue. The 

3 See Complaint, Exhibit 6 (City Council Report, March 25, 2014). 

5 
Complainants nevertheless gave negotiation a good faith effort, and were met with no 

meaningful response from the City. They were not required to do more. 

6. The FAA's Previously-Established Position that Santa Monica's AlP Grant 

Assurance Obligations Endure Unti12023 Is Correct and Should Be Maintained 

Not until p. 15 of its Answer does the City actually turn to the substance of the 

Complaint. When it finally does so, the City essentially argues that, based on common law 

principles of contract interpretation, the 20-year obligation period accompanying the AlP 

funds accepted by the City should be understood to run from 1994, when the City initially 

accepted grant no. 3-06-0239-06, rather than from 2003, the date of a modification which 

made additional federal funds available to the City. The Complainants submit that the City 

is in error, both as to key facts and as to applicable law, and that the City's AlP-based 

obligations endure until2023. 

As an initial matter, the City's Answer entirely ignores the fact that this issue already 

has been the subject of an FAA ruling pursuant to Part 16. In In re City of Santa Monica, 

California, docket nos.16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807, the FAA explained: 

In 2003 the City requested, and the FAA approved a grant amendment for 

$240,000, increasing its AlP grant total to $10.2 million .... This was the last 

AlP-funded project at SMO to date. As a result, SMO is obligated under its AlP 

grant assurances until at least 2023. 

Director's Determination, at 13 (May 27, 2008) (emphasis added; footnote and citation 

omitted). The FAA explained that in the 2003 modification "[t]he FAA offered and the City 

accepted an additional $240,000 in AlP grant funds" and that the AlP obligation period 

"does not exceed twenty (20) years from the date of the acceptance of federal funds for the 

project." !d. at footnotes 23 and 24 (emphasis added). Although this issue was not 

addressed in the subsequent final order in docket nos. 16-02-08/FAA-2003-15807, the 

Complainants concur with the FAA's position as stated in the Director's Determination, and 

urge the FAA to maintain that position in this proceeding.4 

4 See also Agency's Response to City's First Set of Interrogatories, docket no. 16-02-

08/FAA-2003-15807 (August 8, 2008), which explained in greater detail: 

Specifically regarding the analysis supporting this argument, 49 USC 47108 

empowers the FAA to amend grants to increase the government's share of a 

grant. The FAA also has the ability to amend grants to change the scope of 

the project, to add or delete work in a grant, and to substitute w0rk in an 

amendment, so long as the work is eligible and is to the benefit of the 

government. The Santa Monica grant agreement AlP 3-06-0239-06 has two 

grant amendments. The grant itself was offered on june 27, 1994 to do a 

variety of airfield work, including perimeter fencing, pavement and blast 

walls. On November 8, 1999, a grant amendment offer was issued by FAA 

[continued .. .) 

6 
To the extent that the City effectively has asked the FAA to reconsider its prior 

position, the Complainants do not believe that the City has stated any valid reasons for the 

FAA to do so. In the City's view, the issue should be resolved in its favor based upon 

ordinary principles of contract interpretation, without deference to agency interpretation, 

and with the agreement construed against the FAA as the drafter. See Answer, at 16. But 

that is not an accurate summation of the authorities relied upon by the City in its Answer, 

nor is it the law. In Westlands Water District v. Patterson, 864 F.Supp. 1536 (E.D.Cal. 1994), 

relied upon by the City (see Answer, at 16) the court stated: 

[G]overnmental contracts should be interpreted against the backdrop of 

the legislative scheme that authorized them, and [the] interpretation of 

ambiguous terms or implied covenants can only be made in light of the 

policies underlying the controlling legislation. 

I d. at 1542, quoting Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799, 807 (9th Cir. 

1990).5 In this case- as in Peterson and Westlands- the broad purposes of the underlying 

and accepted by the City to substitute other airfield work in place of the work 

in the original 1994 grant. On August 27, 2003, Amendment No. 2 was 

executed at the request of the City increasing the amount of the grant. This 

amendment was issued based on formal written request by the City dated 

September 27, 2002 in accordance with the FAA AlP Handbook paragraph 

114l.g. The Airport would be considered obligated for the original 

development project in the original grant agreement for a period of 20 years 

from the date of acceptance of the original grant offer. For the later 

amendments, the Airport is considered obligated for 20 years from the date 

that the amendment offer was accepted. since that is when the Airport 

accepted the offer of additional federal funds for the project. The Airport 

would have been obligated for the original grant project until 20 years after 

june 27, 1994 or 2014. But since the project changed under Amendment No. 

1 to a different project, the 20 year date is calculated from the date of 

Amendment No. 1, (2019) since that was when the Airport accepted the 

federal offer of AlP funds for the project. This is because the FAA grant offer 

in 1994 was an offer of funding for a different project. FAA did not make an 

offer for funding the amended project until it actually issued the Amendment 

No. 1. Amendment No. 2 was an offer for an increase in funds for the 

Amendment No. 1 project. The Airport accepted the second Amendment on 

August 27, 2003 so the Airport is obligated until 2023, since that is 20 years 

from when the airport accepted the last grant offer for federal funds 

pursuant to the City's grant assurances to the United States. 

I d. at 4 (emphasis added). 

5 Likewise, to the extent that Clay Tower Apartments v. Kemp, 978 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir. 

1992) suggested that no deference was due an agency's contractual interpretation, 

(continued .. .) 

7 
statute justify how and why the agency has interpreted the contract. As the FAA is very 

much aware, 49 U.S.C. § 4 7107 - part of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 

(Pub. L. 97-248) -was intended to ensure that the agency retained ongoing supervisory 

authority over airports that had accepted public Iargesse.6 In contrast, the City's position 

potentially would allow recipients of AlP funds to be subject to federal commitments for 

only a brief period of time, far less than the useful life of a funded project, if a modification 

was entered into at a date well after the initial grant date. It is entirely reasonable for the 

FAA to have concluded that such a position is not consistent with the underlying statutory 

scheme, and thus that a grant modification restarts the clock for the 20-year obligation 

period.7 

But it is not even necessary for the FAA to delve into the rationale of these decisions, 

because the Ninth Circuit already dispositively has rejected the very proposition advanced 

by the City here. In City and County of San Francisco v. FAA, 942 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.1991), 

the Court adopted a deferential standard of review for the appeal of an FAA finding that an 

airport has violated a Grant Assurance, explaining that: 

subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have confirmed that Peterson is in fact the line of 

authority to be followed. See, e.g., Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Department of 

Education, 272 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Imperial Credit Industries, Inc. v. 

FDIC, 527 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Clay Tower when agreement 

"included intrinsically regulatory terms of a type that the agency frequently employs its 

expertise in reviewing") (quotation marks and citation omitted). Cf Nat'/ Fuel Gas Supply 

Corp. v. FERC, 811 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C.cir. 1987) ("[a]s this court stated even before 

Chevron, there is room, in review of administrative agencies, for some deference to their 

views even on matters of law like the meaning of contracts, as on the meaning of statutes, 

where the understanding of the documents involved is enhanced by technical knowledge of 

industry conditions and practices") (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

6 See, e.g., Airport Compliance Requirements, FAA Order 5190.6A, § 1-1 (October 2, 1989) 

(AlP "is a program to administer valuable rights obtained for the people of the United 

States at a substantial cost in direct grants of funds and in donations of Federal property. 

Such grants and donations are made in exchange for binding commitments designed to 

assure that the public interest would be served. The FAA bears the important 

responsibility of seeing that these commitments are met"). 

7 Cf 49 U.S. C.§ 47107(d), which requires the obligations accompanying grants to privatelyowned/public-use airports to have a duration of at least 10 years; but the City's position 

potentially would allow modifications of grants to publicly-owned/public-use airports to 

have obligations that endure for less than 10 years. That result would be inconsistent with 

the general intent of there being longer obligation terms for publicly-owned airports than 

for privately-owned airports. 

8 
The conditions Congress imposed on the grant to local airport proprietors of 

money from the Airport and Airway Trust Fund are designed in part to 

insure the maintenance of conditions essential to an efficient national air 

transport system. ... Pursuant to this statutory scheme, San Francisco 

received grant offers .... A grant agreement based on such an offer is not an 

ordinary contract, but part of a procedure mandated by Congress to assure 

federal funds are disbursed in accordance with Congress' will .... While we 

review questions of statutory interpretation de novo, we accord substantial 

deference to the interpretation adopted by the agency charged with 

administering the statute. 

!d. at 1395-96 (emphasis added).S The same standard should be applicable in this case. 

Santa Monica - by virtue of its argument that its obligations expired earlier this year -

effectively has repudiated all of the Grant Assurances, contrary to the statutory scheme that 

the FAA is empowered to enforce, and the FAA's interpretation of the durational 

consequences of the 2003 modification must be made in that context, in which the FAA has 

considerable discretion. See also the Complainants Answer to the Motion to Dismiss, at 4-5. 

Even apart from the broad discretion afforded the agency, to the extent that the City 

argues that certain language in and circumstances surrounding the 1994 grant and 2003 

modification nevertheless support its interpretation of when the 20-year obligation period 

begins and ends, the Complainants do not believe that the City has provided any basis for 

the FAA to reconsider its position. For example, the City looks to language in the 2003 

modification which states that "[a ]II other terms and conditions of the Grant Agreement 

remain in full force and effect." Answer, at 19. This does not mean that the 20-year 

duration period of the 1994 grant was unchanged, but that the incorporated assurances 

continued in effect and attached to the modification. Their duration post-modification, for 

the reasons noted above, remained subject to FAA's interpretation.9 Thus the City's 

s See also Bennettv. Kentucky Department of Education, 470 U.S. 656,670 (1985) ("[u]nlike 

normal contractual undertakings, federal grant programs originate in and remain governed 

by statutory provisions expressing the judgment of Congress concerning desirable public 

policy" and distinguishing U.S. v. Seckinger, 397 U.S. 203, 210 (1970)); Boca Airport, Inc. v. 

Boca Raton Aviation Authority, docket nos. 16-04-02/FAA-2004-17324, Final Decision and 

Order, at 8 (November 29, 2004) ("FAA's interpretation of its grant assurances is entitled 

to substantial deference"). 

9 Additionally, although the Complaint emphasized the 2003 grant modification for the 

purpose of calculating the duration of the City's obligations, as the Answer acknowledges 

(at 5 and Exhibit A), another modification previously was made in 1999. To the extent that 

the City now asserts that the 2003 modification could not have triggered a new 20-year 

obligation period for the reason that it only altered the FAA's "maximum financial 

obligation," see Answer at 19, the City appears to implicitly concede that the 1999 

modification - which was substantive in scope, see supra footnote 2 - could trigger a new 

(continued .. .) 

9 
agreement to accept additional federal monies in 2003 served to extend its obligations 

until 2023, pursuant to the FAA's reasonable reading of the underlying language in light of 

the overall statutory purposes of AlP. See, e.g., Trustees of Southern Cal. IBEW-NECA 

Pension Trust Fund v. Flores, 519 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[w]e interpret written 

terms in the context of the entire agreement's language, structure, and stated purpose"). 

Lastly, the City claims that it would not have entered into the 2003 modification if it 

had understood the modification to restart the 20-year clock of its obligations, given that 

the 1984 Settlement Agreement was due to expire on july 1, 2015. See Answer, at 18. 

Respectfully, the City has a long track record of misinterpreting its Grant Assurance 

obligations, which has necessitated repeated administrative and court proceedings - at 

significant cost and burden to the FAA and third parties -to ensure the City's compliance 

with its federal obligations. See, e.g., City of Santa Monica v. FAA, 631 F.3d 550 (D.C. Cir. 

2011); Bombardier Aerospace Corp. v. City of Santa Monica, docket nos. 16-03-11/FAA2003-15891, Director's Determination (January 3, 2005).1° Even if the City's 

representation in this case is accepted as sincere - despite the lack of any documentary 

support therefor - it provides no basis to now argue that the FAA's interpretation of those 

commitments was out of step with the underlying statutory program, or that the FAA's 

existing position should not be affirmed by this proceeding. See, e.g., Morris v. Redwood 

Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797, 809 (Cal. App. 2005) ("it is reasonable to expect even 

an unsophisticated businessman to carefully read, understand, and consider all the terms 

of an agreement affecting ... a vital aspect of his business"). 

Conclusion 

The FAA has an obligation to.ensure that grants made from the Airport and Airway 

Trust Fund, via the Airport Improvement Program, are used wisely throughout the useful 

20-year obligation period. Thus, even by the City's own reasoning, its grant obligations 

endure until2019. 

1o Unfortunately, the City's Answer in this proceeding appears to include another such 

misunderstanding. The City asserts that the construction of blast walls -the project funded 

by the 2003 modification- in 1994 was anticipated as a "Phase 2." See Answer, at 17. But 

that is not what actually was said in the grant application cited by the City, and most 

recently docketed as part of Exhibit A to its Answer. The City at that time sought funding 

for "Phase II" blast wall construction, to supplement an already completed "Phase !"; as the 

City stated, it previously had "placed walls near the departure run up areas." See Program 

Narrative Application for Federal Assistance, at 1. In other words, the language cited by the 

City did not anticipate multiple phases to the projects funded by AlP grants. In any case, 

even if "multiple Phases" were anticipated as the City asserts (also relying on a reference to 

"future grant amendments" in the 1994 grant), the City has not and cannot explain why 

such an expectation in itself would in any way prevent later modifications from extending 

the duration of the City's obligations, consistent with the issues discussed above. 

10 
life of the project funded. Accordingly it is reasonable for the FAA, in light of its statutory 

responsibilities, to interpret the duration of the assurances that accompany AlP grants to 

run for a 20-year period from the date that a modification is made to such a grant and not 

from the original grant date. For that and the other reasons stated herein, the 

Complainants request that the FAA deny the Respondent's requests to dismiss the 

Complaint, and proceed to issue a Director's Determination specifically finding that the 

Grant Assurances at SMO are effective through August 2023, and take any actions that are 

necessary and appropriate to ensure current and future compliance with those obligations. 

1700 Decker School Lane 

Malibu, CA 90265 

310-503-7286 

11 
Certificate of Service 

I hereby certify that I have this day caused the foregoing answer to be served on the 

following persons by first-class mail with a courtesy copy by electronic mail: 

Rod Gould 

City Manager 

City of Santa Monica 

1685 Main Street, Room 209 

Santa Monica, CA 90401 

rod.gould@smgov.net 

Marsha Moutrie, City Attorney 

joseph Lawrence, Assistant City Attorney 

Lance Gams, Deputy City Attorney 

Ivan Campbell, Deputy City Attorney 

City of Santa Monica 

1685 Main Street, Room 310 

Santa Monica, CA 90401 

marsha.moutrie@smgov.net 

joseph.lawrence@smgov.net 

lance.gams@smgov.net 

ivan.campbell@smgov.net 

Stelios Makrides 

Airport Manager 

City of Santa Monica 

Airport Administration Building 

3223 Donald Douglas Loop South 

Santa Monica, CA 90405 

stelios.makrides@smgov.net 

Dated this 30th day of October, 2014. 

1700 Decker School Lane 

Malibu, CA 90265 

310-503-7286 

12