alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
PART 713—SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITION PROCEDURES       Authority:                            Sec. 621, Pub. L. 87–195, 75 Stat. 445, (22 U.S.C. 2381) as amended; E.O. 12163, Sept. 29, 1979, 44 FR 56673; 3 CFR 1979 Comp., p. 435.          Source:                            61 FR 39091, July 26, 1996, unless otherwise noted.                                       713.000 Scope of part.                                          713.001 Definitions.                                          Subpart 713.1—Procedures.                                                         713.106-370 Partner vetting.    **Parent topic:** SUBCHAPTER C—CONTRACTING METHODS AND CONTRACT TYPES713.000 Scope of part.       The simplified acquisition threshold applies to the cost of supplies and services, exclusive of the cost of transportation and other accessorial costs if their destination is outside the United States.713.001 Definitions.       *Accessorial costs* means the cost of getting supplies or services to their destination in the cooperating country (and the travel costs of returning personnel to the U.S. or other point of hire). It does not include costs such as allowances or differentials related to maintaining personnel at post which are to be considered as part of the base costs within the simplified acquisition threshold.Subpart 713.1—Procedures.    713.106-370 Partner vetting.       If an acquisition is identified as subject to vetting, see (48 CFR) AIDAR 704.70 for the applicable procedures and requirements.
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY

ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Eye Care centers of America, Inc. (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 27, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, David L. Holmberg, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the
Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                  |  |                        
|----------------- |  | -----------------------
|November 10, 2008 |  | /s/ David L. Holmberg  
|                  |  | David L. Holmberg      
|                  |  | Chief Executive Officer

A SIGNED ORIGINAL OF THIS WRITTEN STATEMENT REQUIRED BY SECTION 906 HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO EYE CARE CENTERS OF
AMERICA, INC. AND WILL BE RETAINED BY EYE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA, INC. AND FURNISHED TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION OR ITS STAFF UPON REQUEST.
1501.000 Scope of part.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation System brings together, in title 48 of the Code of Federal

Regulations, the acquisition regulations applicable to all executive agencies of the Government. This

part establishes a system of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acquisition regulations,

referred to as the EPAAR, for the codification and publication of policies and procedures of EPA

which implement and supplement the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).

Parent topic: PART 1501 - GENERAL
#### In the Matter of Terence M. Wilson, Petitioner, v Vincent L. Tofany et al., Respondents.

Determination unanimously confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed. (See *Matter of Van Sickle v Melton,*64 AD2d 846.) (CPLR art 78 proceeding transferred by order of Erie Supreme Court.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Cardamone, Schnepp, Doerr and Witmer, JJ.
Exhibit 10.28


 


AMENDMENT TO 


THE AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF BIOLOGISTEX CCM,LLC


 


This Amendment to the
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement (this “Amendment”), effective as of the date of last signature below, hereby
amends that certain Amended and Restated Operating Agreement, dated December 31, 2016 (the “Agreement”), of biologistix
CCM, LLC, (“JV”) and its members Savsu Technologies, LLC, (“Savsu”), and BioLife Solutions,
Inc. (“Company”). Terms not defined herein have the meanings ascribed to them in the Agreement.


 


The Parties agreed
previously agreed to Article I “Definitions”. The Parties now desire to amend the Definition of “Profits Percentage(s)
within Article I as follows:


 


		1.	The Definition of “Profits Percentage(s)” in Article I of the Agreement, shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced
with the following:



 


“Profits Percentage(s) mean a
Member’s share of the Company’s Profits and Losses. Commencing on December 31, 2017, the Profits Percentages of the
Members shall be sixty-five (65%) percent to Savsu and thirty-five (35%) percent to BioLife, prior to giving any effect to the
dilutive effect of any new contributions made by existing or new members from January 1, 2017 onward. The shares shall be calculated
at year end and agreed upon by all Members.


 


This Amendment has been executed by the parties on the dates
written below.


 





	biologistex CCM, LLC	 	BIOLIFE SOLUTIONS, INC.
	 	 	 	 	 
	By:	 	 	By:	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Name:	 	 	Name:	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Title:	 	 	Title:	 
	 	 	 	 	 
	Date:	 	 	Date:	 
	 	 	 	 	 


 


Savsu Technologies, LLC


 


	By:	 	 
	 	 	 
	Name:	 	 
	 	 	 
	Title:	 	 
	 	 	 
	Date:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000759440
<NAME> BIG RIVER PRODUCTIONS LTD PARTNERSHIP

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         29,463
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  29,463
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              845
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      28,618
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    29,463
<SALES>                                         42,467
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                42,467
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    4,196
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 42,467
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    38,271
<EPS-BASIC>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
§ 920.64 Proceeding after termination. ( a ) Upon the termination of the provisions of this part, the committee shall, for the purpose of liquidating the affairs of the committee, continue as trustee of all the funds and property then in its possession, or under its control, including claims for any funds unpaid or property not delivered at the time of such termination.
( b ) The said trustees shall: ( 1 ) Continue in such capacity until discharged by the Secretary;
( 2 ) From time to time account for all receipts and disbursements and deliver all property on hand, together with all books and records of the committee and of the trustees, to such persons as the Secretary may direct; and
( 3 ) Upon the request of the Secretary, execute such assignments or other instruments necessary or appropriate to vest in such person, full title and right to all of the funds, property, and claims vested in the committee of the trustees pursuant thereto.
( c ) Any person to whom funds, property, or claims have been transferred or delivered, pursuant to this section, shall be subject to the same obligation imposed upon the committee and upon the trustees.
#### Elaine Hansen et al., Appellants, v Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc., et al., Respondents.

In a products liability action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, entered August 6, 1979, in favor of the defendants, upon dismissal of the complaint at the close of the plaintiffs’ case. Judgment modified, on the law, by deleting therefrom the provisions in favor of defendant Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc. As so modified, judgment affirmed, and as between plaintiffs and defendant Coca-Cola Bottling, action severed and new trial granted with costs to abide the event. Trial Term erred in excluding the bottle and cap offered into evidence by plaintiffs since a sufficient foundation for their admissibility was laid. The record contains testimony that the bottle and cap were the ones in question, and also that their condition was basically the same as it was at the time of the happening of the incident. The weight given to this evidence and the credibility of the authenti-. eating witness were matters for the jury to consider (see *Wessel v Krop,*30 AD2d 764). Moreover, the trial court.unduly restricted the plaintiffs from eliciting expert opinion as to the cause of the breaking of the bottle. Since the trial court’s errors prevented the plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case against defendant Coca-Cola Bottling Company of New York, Inc., they are entitled to a new trial. However, the judgment is affirmed with respect to Edlund Co., Inc., the manufacturer of the bottle opener, since the trial court’s errors did not affect .the presentation of plaintiffs’ case against that defendant and plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of liability on its part. Gibbons, J. P., Gulotta, Margett and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
AAM-10-186-E 

March 12, 2010 

 Exemption No. 10020 

 Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2010-0237 

Ms. Kathy Blankenship 

InterState Helicopters, Inc. 

5809 Philip J. Rhoads, Hangar #4 

Bethany, OK 73008 

Dear Ms. Blankenship: 

This letter is to inform you that we have granted your request for exemption. It transmits our 

decision, explains its basis, and gives you the conditions and limitations of the exemption, 

including the date it ends. 

The Basis for Our Decision 

By letter dated February 24, 2010, you petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

on behalf of InterState Helicopters, Inc. (InterState Helicopters), for an exemption from part 

120 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations. That exemption, if granted, would allow 

InterState Helicopters, which is operating under separate parts of the regulations, to cover its 

safety-sensitive employees under one testing program. 

The FAA has determined that good cause exists for not publishing a summary of the petition 

in the Federal Register because the requested exemption would not set a precedent, and any 

delay in acting on this petition would be detrimental to InterState Helicopters. 

The FAA has issued a grant of exemption in circumstances similar in all material respects to 

those presented in your petition. In Grant of Exemption No. 9703 (copy enclosed), the FAA 

found that Solid Edge’s § 91.147 air tour operations were closely connected to its part 135 

operations. The FAA also found that combining the petitioner’s two testing programs into 

one would be in the public interest and would maintain an equivalent level of safety to that 

provided by the current regulations. Thus, the FAA concluded it was unnecessary to burden 

the petitioner by requiring it to conduct two separate testing programs. 
2 

Having reviewed your reasons for requesting an exemption, I find that— 

• they do not differ materially from those presented by the petitioner in the enclosed grant 

of exemption; 

• the reasons stated by the FAA for granting the enclosed exemption also apply to the 

situation you present; and 

• a grant of exemption is in the public interest. 

Our Decision 

Under the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. 40113 and 44701, which the FAA Administrator 

has delegated to me, I hereby grant InterState Helicopters, Inc., an exemption from part 120 to 

the extent necessary to allow InterState Helicopters, which is operating under separate parts 

of the regulations, to cover its safety-sensitive employees under one testing program, subject 

to the conditions and limitations described below. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. Employees of InterState Helicopters are subject to the drug and alcohol regulations 

at all times while conducting operations under part 135 or part 91. 

2. The drug and alcohol testing program must be implemented under the auspices of 

the InterState Helicopters part 135 operation, not under part 91. 

This exemption terminates on March 31, 2012, unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Sincerely, 

/s/ 

Dr. Frederick E. Tilton, M.D. 

Federal Air Surgeon 

Enclosure
#### Beverly E. Brennan v. Tully & Di Napoli, Inc.

Motion for leave to appeal as a poor person denied as moot in view of the decision on Motion 696 [Case No. 17]. Concur—McGivern, J. P., McNally and 'Steuer, JJ.; Nunez, J., ¡dissents in a memorandum. I dissent. Appellant is being penalized for her lack of financial resources and consequent inability to timely perfect the appeal in this death case. In response to the motion to dismiss, appellant has submitted her affidavit explaining why she was unable to perfect the appeal, and her attorney’s affidavit showing merit. The grounds urged as error are the trial court’s improper refusal to admit evidence of prior accidents at the same location, and refusal to allow counsel for appellant to select his own jury. The merits are thus proffered and it cannot be said, at this point of the proceeding, that the appeal is without any basis. 'Simply put, the reason for the delay is alleged to be appellant’s inability to timely perfect the appeal due to lack of funds. In this regard her affidavit is quite candid. Appellant is the wife and administratrix of the decedent’s estate. While she has remarried, her husband does not earn sufficient to help her with the appeal; her meager income is used for the maintenance of her four minor children of the prior marriage to the decedent. I believe - this affidavit is sufficient to show the appellant’s status as being entitled to poor person relief, and to excuse her delay in prosecuting the appeal. The facts of this case, the nature of the cause of action, and the asserted merit to the appeal, all indicate that the reason for the delay in perfecting the appeal is as appellant claims. For these reasons, I would deny the motion to dismiss and permit the cross-application for poor .person relief to the extent requested, and extend time to perfect the appeal to the September 1969 Term of this court.
#### § 906.12 Container.

*Container* means any box, bag, crate, hamper, basket, package, bulk carton, or any other type of receptacle used in the packaging, transportation, sale, or other handling of fruit.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 13** 
**- 7323** 

BOBBY R. KNOX ,
Plaintiff

- Appell ant ,

v.
ARTHUR DAVIS, Doctor; MS. COLDSMITH, Supervisor of Nurses; MS. SIMMONS, Head Nurse; SUSAN COLLIER, Administrative Programs; KEITH A. KUHNE, Doctor; MS. L. GALLAWAY, Nurse ,
Defendant s
- Appell ees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Raleigh

. James C. Fox , Senior District Judge. ( 5 :1 1

- c t

- 0 3266

- F )

Submitted : December 17, 2013 Decided: December 20, 2013

Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.

Dismiss ed by un published per curiam opinion

.

Bobby R. Knox, Appellant Pro Se

.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circui t.2 PER CURIAM:
Bobby R. Knox seeks to appeal the district court’s
order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (20 12 ) for failure to state a claim. On
direct appeal, this court affirmed the district court’s order.

Knox v. Davis , 516 F. App’x 287 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 12

- 8149)

. In August 2013, Knox filed another notice of appeal of the
district court’s order. However, b ecause we have previously
affirmed the district court’s judgment, we dismiss the appeal as
duplicative and untimely. We also deny Knox’s pending motions,
including his motions for protective order, motion to appoint
counsel, and motion for transcripts at the government’s expense.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
1 In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________ N O . 09

- 23

- 00176

- CV

__________________ DANIELLE GUAJARDO , Appellant

V.

OSCAR CASTILLO , Appellee

__________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 23

- 33180

__________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION

On J une 5 , 2023, Danielle Guajardo appealed from a final judgment

in Trial Cause Number 2 3

- 33180 . After perfecting her appeal, however,

Guajardo failed to file a brief.

On September 27 , 2023, we notified the parties that Guajardo had

not filed a brief and that her appeal would be submitted without briefs

unless, by October 9 , 2023, she filed a brief supporting her appeal with a2 motion explaining why the Court should extend the appellate timetable

that applies to the deadlines for filing briefs. We also warned G uajardo

that her appeal could be dismissed for want of prosecution if the Court

submitted her appeal without a brief.

On October 23 , 2023, we notified the parties that the Court would

submit the appeal on November 13, 2023, without briefs and without oral

argument. See Tex. R. App. P. 39.8. On October 2 4 , 2023, the a ppellee,

Oscar Castillo, filed a motion to dismiss the app eal for want of

prosecution.

In the absence of a brief assigning error for our review, we grant

Castillo’s motion to dismiss . Accordingly, t he appeal is dismissed for want

of prosecution. See id . 38.8(a)(1); id . 42.3(b), 43.2(f).

APPEAL DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on November 13, 2023 Opinion Delivered November 16, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Wright, JJ.
(June 9, 1970)

#### In the Matter of Vander L. Beatty, Respondent, v. John L. Phillips, Jr., Appellant, et al., Respondents.

In a proceeding to invalidate petitions designating appellant as a candidate in the Democratic Party Primary Election to be held on June 23, 1970 for nomination for the public office of Member of the Assembly for the 54th Assembly District, Kings County, the appeal is from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered June 4, 1970, which declared said petitions invalid. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to Special Term, Part I, of the Supreme Court, Kings County, for determination on the merits of the objections. The questions of fact have not been considered on this appeal. In our opinion, the service of the order to show cause was adequate to confer jurisdiction. We remit for a hearing on the merits of the objections. Special Term should not have sustained the objections without hearing proof. Christ, P. J., Hopkins, Martuscello, Brennan and Benjamin, JJ., concur.
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You havereached the Federal Depository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC)Archive. This archive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC.Access to publications in the archive is available through GPO's suite ofcataloging and locator services, including the Catalog of U.S. GovernmentPublications.  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the eventthat publications are no longer available from the original publishing agencysite. (Historical purposes)
**Title:Landslides and debris flows in Ephraim Canyon, central Utah**** 
SuDocNumber:I19.3:1842-C
ItemNumber: 0620
CGPsystem Number:000594797
 
Report
Plate
 
 **
#### § 987.6 Crop year.

*Crop year* means the 12-month period beginning October 1 of each year and ending September 30 of the following year.

[43 FR 4250, Feb. 1, 1978]
Exhibit 31.1
 CERTIFICATION
  1.
    
    I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 27, 2009
of Insteel Industries, Inc.;2.
    
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the
period covered by this report;3.
    
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information
included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,
results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;4.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)
and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act
Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
     5.
    
    The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants
auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons
performing the equivalent functions):
    /s/ H. O. Woltz III

     H. O. Woltz IIIPresident and Chief Executive Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

 ______________________________

MARVIN KURT NATION, #141 669 *

Plaintiff, *

v. * 2:06-CV-693-ID

(WO)

WILLIE AMBERS, et al., *

Defendants. *

 __________________________________

ORDER ON MOTION

Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel. A plaintiff

in a civil case has no constitutional right to counsel. While an indigent plaintiff may be

appointed counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a court retains broad discretion in

making this decision. See Killian v. Holt, 166 F.3d 1156, 1157 (11 Cir.1999). th

Here, the court finds from its review of the complaint that Plaintiff is able to articulate

adequately the facts and grounds for relief in the instant matter without notable difficulty.

Furthermore, the court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint is not of undue complexity and

that he has not shown that there are exceptional circumstances justifying appointment of

counsel. See Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 193 (11 Cir. 1993); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d th

1210, 1216 (11 Cir. 1992); see also Fowler v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1088, 1096 (11 Cir. 1990). th th

Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the court shall deny Plaintiff's request for

Case 2:06-cv-00693-ID-TFM Document 12 Filed 09/26/2006 Page 1 of 2
2

appointment of counsel at this time. The request may be reconsidered if warranted by further

developments in this case.

Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Doc. No. 9), is

DENIED.

Done, this 26th day of September 2006.

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00693-ID-TFM Document 12 Filed 09/26/2006 Page 2 of 2