UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-1221

JAMES A. KODAK, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., in his official capacity as Attorney 

General of the United States, and his employees, agents and 

successors in office, 

 Defendant – Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, Senior District 

Judge. (1:08-cv-02527-WMN) 

Submitted: August 10, 2009 Decided: August 26, 2009 

Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

James A. Kodak, Appellant Pro Se. Larry David Adams, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
PER CURIAM: 

 James A. Kodak appeals the district court’s dismissal 

of his First Amended Complaint against the U.S. Attorney General 

seeking an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the federal 

ban on armor-piercing ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(7), (8) 

(2006), and a declaratory judgment that the ban is 

unconstitutional. Finding no error, we affirm. 

 In his informal brief, Kodak argues that the federal 

ban on armor-piercing ammunition violates the Second Amendment 

because “[i]t strikes at the very core of what the right to keep 

and bear arms is all about; the necessity to provide for an 

effective citizens’ militia.” Kodak contends that banning 

armor-piercing ammunition essentially renders a militia and its 

weapons useless because the enemy will be wearing armor. Kodak 

also contends that armor-piercing ammunition minimizes the risk 

of death when used for self-defense. 

 The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated 

Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the 

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 

infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In District of Columbia v. 

Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008), the Supreme Court held 

that the Second Amendment “guarantee[s] the individual right to 

possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” However, 

that right is not unlimited. Id. at 2816. The Heller Court 

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clarified that “the Second Amendment does not protect those 

weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 

lawful purposes” and that “the sorts of weapons protected were 

those in common use at the time” the Amendment was ratified. 

Id. at 2815-17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Further, the Heller Court acknowledged that: 

It may be objected that if weapons that are most 

useful in military service-M-16 rifles and the likemay be banned, then the Second Amendment right is 

completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as 

we have said, the conception of the militia at the 

time of the Second Amendment’s ratification was the 

body of all citizens capable of military service, who 

would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they 

possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be 

true today that a militia, to be as effective as 

militias in the 18th century, would require 

sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society 

at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of 

small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers 

and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have 

limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause 

and the protected right cannot change our 

interpretation of the right. 

Id. We find that this analysis forecloses Kodak’s argument that 

armor-piercing ammunition is necessary for an effective presentday militia. 

 Additionally, the district court took judicial notice 

that “armor-piercing ammunition is not in common use by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes,” noting that it “has no 

application for hunters” and “is frequently referred to as ‘copkiller bullets.’” Kodak argues that the proper question should 

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be whether armor-piercing ammunition would be common in the 

absence of the federal ban. Even if possession of armorpiercing ammunition would be more common were it not banned, it 

does not necessarily follow that it would be commonly used by 

law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, considering the great 

risk such ammunition poses to law enforcement officers. 

Therefore, we conclude that the federal ban on armor-piercing 

ammunition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(7), (8), does not 

violate the Second Amendment. 

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED