J-S51016-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN RE: K.E.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: L.M.H., NATURAL MOTHER No. 355 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order dated January 22, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 3862

IN RE: C.L.H., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 

APPEAL OF: L.M.H., NATURAL MOTHER No. 356 MDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order dated January 22, 2014, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, 

Orphans’ Court, at No(s): 3861

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and MUSMANNO, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 07, 2014 

L.M.H. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Centre County involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her 

sons, K.E.H., born in September of 2008, and C.L.H., born in October of 

2006 (collectively, “the Children”).1

 We affirm. 

 The record reveals the relevant factual and procedural history, as 

follows. On April 30, 2012, the Children were placed in the custody of the 

Centre County Children & Youth Services (“CYS”) due to a report of child 

 

1 The orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of E.P.C., 

the biological father of K.E.H., and R.E.K., the biological father of C.L.H., by 

orders dated October 28, 2013. Neither of the biological fathers filed a 

notice of appeal. 
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abuse involving C.L.H. The report alleged that Mother slapped C.L.H. in the 

face leaving her handprint, and that she held C.L.H.’s mouth and nose 

closed, resulting in him being unable to breathe. N.T., 10/28/13, at 84, 86. 

The Children were adjudicated dependent on May 8, 2012. As a result of the 

allegations involving C.L.H., Mother was charged with the crime of simple 

assault. Following a trial, she was convicted of the charge and sentenced to 

a term of incarceration for ninety days, i.e., from January 17, 2013, to April 

19, 2013, after which she was placed on parole. Id. at 84, 141; N.T., 

1/22/14, at 84. 

 Since 2004, CYS had received numerous reports concerning Mother’s 

use of inappropriate physical discipline, Mother’s inappropriate supervision, 

Mother’s drug and alcohol use, and issues concerning Mother’s mental 

health. N.T., 10/28/13, at 50-51. In fact, A.J.H., Mother’s older son and the 

Children’s half-brother, was placed in the custody of CYS on two occasions, 

the second time being in March of 2011, due to allegations that Mother had 

hit him with a board multiple times and, contrary to CYS’s directive, had left 

him temporarily in the care of R.H., her oldest son. Id. at 55-56. At the 

time of the Children’s placement, A.J.H. remained dependent. 

The Children’s initial permanency goal was reunification. CYS 

established the following Family Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives for Mother, 

in part: acknowledge and cease use of inappropriate physical discipline; 

maintain regular contacts and visits with the Children; cooperate with 
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reunification services; attend counseling regularly to work on emotional and 

parenting issues; and attempt to learn and demonstrate in the Children’s 

presence proper ways to provide nurturance and discipline. See id. at 

Exhibit 6, ¶¶ 8-9. By order dated November 27, 2012, the Children’s 

permanency goal was changed to planned permanent living 

arrangement/long-term foster care with a concurrent goal of adoption. See 

id. at Exhibit 24. 

On April 26, 2013, CYS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of 

the parental rights of Mother and the respective biological fathers of the 

Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). In 

addition, CYS filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s 

parental rights to her older son, A.J.H., who is not a subject of this appeal.2

 

An evidentiary hearing was held on October 28, 2013, with respect to A.J.H. 

and the Children, and on January 22, 2014, with respect to the Children 

only. CYS presented testimony from the following witnesses, in relevant 

part: Joshua Martin, a detective at the Ferguson Township Police 

Department; Christie Plazio, a family reunification counselor with the Centre 

County Youth Service Bureau, which was a service provider for CYS; and 

Casie Lea Rockey, a CYS casework supervisor. The Guardian Ad Litem

(“GAL”) presented the testimony of Kyle Jordan, Mother’s probation and 

 

2

 On December 18, 2013, CYS withdrew the petition for the involuntary 

termination of Mother’s parental rights to A.J.H. 
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parole officer. Mother testified on her own behalf, and she presented the 

testimony of R.H., her oldest son, and R.H.’s girlfriend, D.L. 

By orders dated January 22, 2014, the orphans’ court involuntarily 

terminated Mother’s parental rights to K.E.H. and C.L.H. Mother timely filed 

notices of appeal and concise statements of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated 

sua sponte. 

 On appeal, Mother raises one issue for our review: 

I. Did the Court of Common Pleas err by forever terminating the 

parental rights and duties of [Mother] with regard to K.E.H. and 

C.L.H.? 

Mother’s brief at 4.

We review this appeal according to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 

A.3d [567,] 572 [(Pa. 2011) (plurality)]. As has been often 

stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because 

the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion. 

Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 

34 A.3d 1, 51 ([Pa.] 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 

634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id. 

As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying 

an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We 
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observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not 

equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold 

record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during 

the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d 

at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an 

opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and 

termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to 

second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility

determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial 

judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the 

record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of 

Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 165, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–827 (Pa. 2012). 

 Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis: 

Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court 

must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the 

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). 

Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511). The burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted statutory grounds for seeking the termination of 
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parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 

2009). 

Instantly, we conclude that the orphans’ court properly terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which 

provide as follows: 

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

. . . 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

. . . 

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (b); see also In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that this Court need only agree with 

any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), in addition to Section 

2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of parental rights). 
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To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party 

must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following 

elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; 

(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or 

mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 

A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental 

rights under Section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be 

remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties. In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). 

With respect to Section 2511(b), the requisite analysis is as follows: 

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental 

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are 

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” 

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost 

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no 

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super. 

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis 

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case. 

Id. at 63. 

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). 
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On appeal, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in terminating 

her parental rights because the issues involving her harsh discipline of the 

Children have been resolved. In addition, Mother argues that, shortly after 

the order terminating her parental rights, the Children’s foster parents 

“requested the removal of K.E.H. and C.L.H. from their home, resulting in 

the worst possible status for the boys: that of legal orphans.” Mother’s brief 

at 7. Mother argues that the GAL and the orphans’ court “may have reached 

a different conclusion had they known that K.E.H. and C.L.H. would not be 

adopted. . . .” Id. at 8. 

 In its opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), the orphans’ court found 

as follows: 

Despite being offered a plethora of services to guide her away 

from harsh discipline and the use of drugs and alcohol, [Mother] 

rejected services and continued to discount as being untrue any 

of the instances where she tested positive for drugs and alcohol. 

[Mother] was generally uncooperative and denied access to her 

home and refused to provide information regarding the boys’ 

health care and the names of relatives for the Family 

Connections process. [Mother] denied any responsibility for the 

incident involving striking [C.L.H.] on the face and pushed the 

blame onto the authorities for not allowing the child to tell his 

full story. . . . She consistently discounted positive drug tests 

and denied using alcohol or drugs. . . . The Court found no 

desire to change in [Mother]; rather, she demonstrated an 

ongoing refusal to comply with simple rules. 

This Court also took into consideration the opinion of the [GAL] 

. . . who had opportunities to spend time getting to know the 

boys and to evaluate their adjustment in the foster home. [The 

GAL] indicated that both boys wish to stay in the [foster] home 

permanently. [The GAL] supported termination of [Mother’s] 

parental rights. This Court found that [Mother] could not offer 

the [C]hildren stability and concluded that termination of her 
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rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [C.L.H.] and 

[K.E.H.]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/14, at 7-8. The testimonial evidence supports the 

court’s findings, as follows. 

 Christie Plazio, a reunification counselor with the Centre County Youth 

Service Bureau, was involved with this family beginning in December of 

2011, when only A.J.S., the older child, was in the custody of CYS, and 

continuing thereafter, when the Children were also in the custody of CYS. 

Her involvement lasted until November 27, 2012, at which time reunification 

services were ended. Ms. Plazio testified on direct examination as follows: 

Q. What was [Mother’s] approach to the reunification services 

being offered to her? Was she cooperative? . . . . 

A. Overall she was not. [Mother] through the duration of 

services refused to participate in the Family Connections 

process, which is a state mandate.[3]

 She also refused up until I 

believe October of 2012 to participate in random drug testing. 

N.T., 1/22/14, at 12. 

Ms. Plazio testified that her agency provided Mother with “very specific 

expectations” that she had agreed upon, but, by September 13, 2012, she 

had “failed to comply with any of them.”4

 Id. at 13. For instance, Ms. Plazio 

 

3

 Ms. Plazio testified that the Family Connections process involves 

“identifying resources and supports for the family. And you start with

identifying 40 people and then that list gets cut down to 20 that the family 

chooses to contact.” N.T., 1/22/14, at 37.

4

 Ms. Plazio testified that her agency held a status review conference with 

Mother on September 13, 2012. She explained that, “it was laid out that 

[Mother] needed to comply with all of [the] expectations in order for 
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explained that her agency conducted unannounced home visits to Mother, 

and a procedure was established that, if Mother was not home, the 

counselor would leave a business card, and Mother was to place a telephone 

call to the counselor whose name was on the business card. Id. The Youth 

Service Bureau conducted twenty-nine unannounced visits, and Mother was 

home for five them. Id. at 14. Mother placed a telephone call to the 

visiting counselor only one time out of all the missed visits. Id. at 15. In 

addition, Ms. Plazio testified that Mother was to participate in weekly 

sessions with the reunification counselors. Id. at 9. She testified, “[m]any 

times [Mother] either canceled them or [Mother] would ask us to leave 

within about approximately a half hour of being there and sessions typically 

last about an hour.” Id. at 9-10; see also id. at 13. 

 Ms. Plazio testified regarding an incident that occurred between Mother 

and the Youth Service Bureau on June 21, 2012, which the orphans’ court 

aptly summarized as follows: 

Ms. Plazio stated that [Mother’s] behavior was unpredictable and 

erratic. She was observed to be agitated and her eyes rolled 

back and her eye[]lids fluttered quickly. On one occasion during 

a visit with [C.L.H.] and [K.E.H.] at the CYS office, [Mother] left 

the room to use the restroom and upon returning, she appeared 

very agitated and could not be calmed down. [When] [s]he was 

told to pull herself together or the visit would be cancelled, she 

swore and screamed at [the] caseworker[s]. . . . She pushed 

her way past a guard through the secured area. She then 

 

services to continue. She chose not to. So when we had the [permanency 

review] hearing in November [27, 2012], we had requested to end services 

because it was apparent that [Mother] was not going to comply with the 

expectations.” N.T., 1/22/14, at 29.
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dropped her trousers exposing her buttocks and said, “kiss my 

black ass.” [Mother] was escorted out of the office by the 

sheriff’s deputies. Because the incident occurred during a visit, 

the [C]hildren witnessed the incident. 

Trial Court Opinion, 3/24/14, at 3 (citations to record omitted); see also 

N.T., 1/22/14, at 22-25, 47-48.

With respect to random drug testing, Ms. Plazio testified that Mother 

participated in three tests while she was the family’s reunification counselor. 

Id. at 18. Mother participated in the first random drug test on October 5, 

2012, and it was positive for THC (marijuana), alcohol, opiates, and cocaine. 

Id. at 20. The second test was on October 27, 2012, but Ms. Plazio 

explained that CYS “cannot use it due to the fact that the specimen had 

apparently leaked on the way to the lab, and the label was difficult to read, 

and [the lab] misdated it. . . .” Id. Mother participated in the third test on 

November 7, 2012, and it was positive for THC and alcohol. Id. Ms. Plazio 

testified on direct examination: 

Q. Did [Mother] refuse to be tested on occasion? 

A. There were occasions where she did refuse. 

Q. For any particular reason offered? 

A. For many of the occasions it was simply that she stated . . . 

she wasn’t able to produce a sample. Towards the end of

services I believe our last session she told us that she refused to 

[produce a sample] because she didn’t see a point and she did 

not give a damn. 

Id. at 17-18. 

 Finally, Ms. Plazio testified: 
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Q. Do you believe that [Mother] has remedied the situations 

that caused the removal of these children to the point where she 

can take care of [C.L.H.] and K.E.H.]? At least up to the point 

that your agency –

A. I was going to say up to the point where reunification 

services were involved, no. 

Id. at 51-52. 

 Casey Rockey, a CYS casework supervisor, testified on direct 

examination that Mother tested positive most recently “for marijuana, which 

is THC, on January 17, [2014].”5

 N.T., 1/22/14, at 59. Ms. Rockey testified 

as follows on direct examination: 

Q. What is [CYS’s] position of what’s appropriate for [C.L.H.] 

and [K.E.H.] at this point? 

A. Our position remains that [C.L.H.] and [K.E.H.] should be 

freed for adoption by the Court terminating [Mother’s] parental 

rights. . . . 

Our position is that throughout our involvement with [Mother] 

that conditions that warranted the removal of the children 

continue to exist as evidenced by the most recent drug and 

alcohol test. In addition to her drug and alcohol test, she had 

criminal involvement throughout our agency’s involvement and 

has really not been cooperative with our agency, refused access 

to the home, and even was not able to refrain from using 

physical discipline on her children, which resulted in [C.L.H.] and 

[K.E.H.] coming into the care and custody of the agency. 

Id. at 62-63. In addition, Ms. Rockey testified as follows: 

Q. Do you believe that [Mother] can remedy [the conditions 

which led to the Children’s placement]?

A. No, we do not. 

 

5 Kyle Jordan, Mother’s probation and parole officer, testified that his office 

conducted the drug test on January 17, 2014. N.T., 1/22/14, at 84. 
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Q. Are there any services or assistance that [CYS], the Youth 

Service Bureau, or any other agency available in Centre County 

or elsewhere could offer or make available to [Mother] that 

would remedy the conditions which cause[d] both [C.L.H.] and 

[K.E.H.] to be in placement. . . ? 

A. No. In fact, we’ve exhausted all of our services. Even prior 

to reunification, we attempted to provide in-home Family 

Intervention Crisis Services, they have a family preservation 

component, which [Mother] ultimately was uncooperative with, 

not only on a voluntary level but after the Court ordered her 

participation in that program. 

. . . 

Q. So, no services for them that could remedy those conditions 

by any other agency beyond [CYS] that you’re aware of?

A. Not that I’m aware of. Because ultimately, safety has to be 

assured by the [CYS] office and [Mother] has continued to deny 

us access to her home. 

N.T., 10/28/13, at 125-126. 

Kyle Jordan, Mother’s probation and parole officer, testified that 

Mother was paroled on her sentence for simple assault in April of 2013, and 

that her parole term expires in December of 2017. N.T., 1/22/14, at 84, 86. 

Mr. Jordan testified that Mother had two parole violations recently, one was 

the positive drug test on January 17, 2014, and the other was she traveled 

out of state without permission. Id. at 87. Mr. Jordan testified that, as a 

result of these parole violations, Mother “received a verbal warning and was 

referred to outpatient drug and alcohol counseling.” Id. 

 Mother acknowledged on direct examination that her relationship with 

CYS “did become a little bit hostile.” N.T., 1/22/14, at 102. She stated, “I 
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have since learned that in order for my children to be better represented I 

have to take a look at the way how [sic] I’m reacting to what’s their best 

interest.” Id. Mother testified that, as a result of switching therapists, “I 

have started to understand, you know, how my reaction toward certain 

things – how it will be viewed to others, so – meaning, you know, we have 

worked on my tone, the way that I answer things, and overall just my 

mannerism, and I have improved those to better for [sic] my children.” Id. 

at 104. 

Nevertheless, even though convicted by a jury of simple assault 

against C.L.H., Mother continues to dispute that she committed the crime 

during her cross-examination by counsel for CYS. Id. at 127-128. Indeed, 

Mother disputed that she used inappropriate physical discipline with any of 

her children. She testified on direct examination that, 

Not saying that I’m perfect by no means, but I do come from a 

strict background that means you do what you say and you say 

what you mean. So with that being said, I’m very stern with my 

children in the way that I want them to conduct themselves, not 

by physical, but by setting boundaries and moving forward with 

those boundaries. 

Id. at 93; see also id. at 120-121. In addition, Mother denied that she has 

a history of illegal drug use or that she currently has a drug problem. Id. at 

127-128. In fact, Mother testified, “I have used [illegal drugs] once in 10 

years. I don’t consider that a history of it.” Id. at 128. 

 Mother testified on cross-examination by the GAL: 
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Q. So is it your expectation that this judge would say today that 

the [C]hildren are back with you or restart reunification? What 

is it that you want today? 

A. Well, what – I would love for my children to be – to return to 

me today. That would be my hope and that’s what I hold in my 

heart. But I do understand that my previous behavior before 

perhaps has put a little damper on that being just clear set. So I 

am prepared and willing to receive any kind of reunification that 

I am able to participate in to obtain my children. I am willing to 

work towards that, as I have been doing since they have been in 

care. 

Id. at 119. Mother subsequently testified, “I’m not perfect but I do believe 

that I deserve a second chance [to be reunified with the Children].” Id. at 

170. 

Based on the foregoing testimony, we conclude that the orphans’ court 

did not commit an error of law or abuse its discretion in terminating Mother’s 

parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Mother’s repeated and 

continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal to acknowledge her use of 

inappropriate physical discipline and her illegal drug abuse, in addition to her 

lack of cooperation with CYS and reunification services, has caused the 

Children to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for their physical or mental well-being. Further, the causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied within 

the foreseeable future. Indeed, Mother’s request for a second chance at 

reunification is disingenuous when she has already had the opportunity to 

demonstrate that she can provide proper parental care. See In re 

Adoption of M.E.P., supra, 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life simply cannot 
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be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle 

the responsibilities of parenting.” (citation omitted)). 

We next review the termination orders pursuant to Section 2511(b), 

which focuses on whether termination of Mother’s parental rights would best 

serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the 

Children. 

With respect to the bond analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b), our 

Supreme Court confirmed that, “the mere existence of a bond or attachment 

of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the denial of a termination 

petition.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). The T.S.M. Court 

quoted with approval, as follows: 

[A]s Judge Tamilia eloquently observed while speaking for the 

[Superior] court, it is “an immutable psychological truth” that 

“[e]ven the most abused of children will often harbor some 

positive emotion towards the abusive parent.” In re K.K.R.-S.,

958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008). Thus, Judge Tamilia 

cautioned against denying termination of parental rights based 

solely on the fact that a child has an attachment to the parent: 

“The continued attachment to the natural parents, despite 

serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and failure 

to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming 

the children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id. at 535 

(quoting In re Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M., 839 

A.2d 410, 418 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Tamilia, J., dissenting). 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (footnote omitted). Further, the T.S.M. Court 

observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we 

have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts 
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fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” 

Id. at 269. 

In this case, the record demonstrates that the Children may harbor 

some positive emotion toward Mother. See N.T., 1/22/14, at 81; N.T., 

10/28/13, at 146-147, 158-159. However, by the last day of the 

termination hearing, the Children were in a pre-adoptive foster home, where 

they had resided for a short time, since December 3, 2013, and Ms. Rockey, 

the CYS casework supervisor, testified that the Children “continue to do well 

in the home.” N.T., 1/22/14, at 60. Ms. Rockey testified, in part, 

I last visited the home on January 16th, was able to speak with 

[C.L.H.] and [K.E.H.]. They’ve indicated that they want to stay 

in this home. I talked with them about our recommendation and 

used the term forever home and they were comfortable and 

excited. 

Id. She stated that it was in the Children’s best interests to be “freed for 

adoption.” Id. at 62. She further opined, “Our agency believes these 

children are absolutely adoptable whether or not they are adopted by this 

foster family.” Id. at 66. The GAL also expressed support for the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights, stating the Children had indicated a 

desire to remain with their foster family. Id. at 205-206, 208-209. 

In this appeal, Mother asserts that, after the termination orders were 

issued, the foster parents “requested the removal of K.E.H. and C.L.H. from 

their home. . . .” Mother’s brief at 8. Mother argues that that the GAL and 

the court “may have reached a different conclusion had they known that 
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K.E.H. and C.L.H. would not be adopted. . . .” Id. To the extent Mother 

argues that this Court reverse the termination orders because the Children 

allegedly are no longer in a pre-adoptive home, we reject her claim. 

This Court cannot consider that which is not part of the record in this 

matter, nor allegations of events that occurred after the record was closed 

before the orphans’ court. See generally, Jahanshahi v. Centura 

Development Co., Inc., 816 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Pa. Super. 2003); 

Hrinkevich v. Hrinkevich, 676 A.2d 237, 240 (Pa. Super. 1996). See 

also Larson v. Diveglia, 700 A.2d 931, 934 n.4 (Pa. 1997) (“This court has 

consistently maintained that the practice of alleging facts in a brief upon 

which a trial court has not passed is improper.” (citation omitted)).

Therefore, the status of the Children’s foster placement subsequent to the 

termination of parental rights is not a proper consideration of this Court in 

reviewing the termination orders. 

Moreover, the T.S.M. Court noted that, “the Adoption Act specifically 

provides that a pending adoption is not a prerequisite to termination of 

parental rights involving agencies . . . .” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268; see 

also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(b) (providing, “[i]f the petitioner is an agency it 

shall not be required to aver that an adoption is presently contemplated nor 

that a person with a present intention to adopt exists”). Therefore, even if 

the Children were not in a pre-adoptive placement at the time of the 
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termination hearing, it would not necessarily be fatal to CYS’s petitions for 

the involuntarily termination of Mother’s parental rights. 

 Upon careful review, we discern no abuse of discretion by the orphans’ 

court in concluding that the termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

the Children pursuant to Section 2511(b). See In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 

847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that “a parent’s basic constitutional 

right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted, upon the 

failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper 

parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent, healthy, 

safe environment”). Accordingly, we affirm the orders involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) 

and (b). 

 Orders affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2014