In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 14-1701 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

EUGENE MULLINS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 12 CR 596— Amy J. St. Eve, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 23, 2014 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 3, 2015 

____________________ 

Before POSNER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Eugene Mullins, the former Director of Public Affairs and Communications for Cook 

County, Illinois, was indicted for wire fraud and bribery because he fraudulently arranged service contracts for several 

vendors and accepted over $34,000 in bribes from them. Jurors convicted him of four counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1343, and four counts of bribery, id. § 666. In this appeal 

Mullins challenges the sufficiency of the evidence support-
2 No. 14-1701 

ing his convictions and contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct. Because the evidence was sufficient to 

convict Mullins of wire fraud and bribery offenses and because no harmful prosecutorial misconduct occurred, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Beginning in 2008 Mullins served as Cook County’s Director of Public Affairs and Communications. During his 

time at that post, Cook County used a two-tiered system for 

approving service contracts. Contracts requiring the county 

to spend $25,000 or more had to be approved by its Board of 

Commissioners. Contracts that required the county to spend 

less than $25,000, however, required the approval of only the 

county’s purchasing agent. The government charged Mullins 

and his codefendants—vendors to whom the county awarded contracts—with manipulating this system to their benefit. 

The scheme was as follows. Mullins helped these vendors 

obtain payment under county service contracts, without the 

vendors having to complete any work, and in exchange they 

paid Mullins $34,748 in bribes. Specifically, Mullins helped 

Gwendolyn Moody, Clifford Borner, and Kenneth Demos 

secure contracts that ostensibly promoted census awareness. 

He assisted Gary Render in obtaining a contract that supposedly helped county residents affected by floods in 2008. 

And he aided Michael Peery, who sought a contract designed to promote energy efficiency. 

The prosecution opened its case with the testimony of 

Mullins’s secretary, Annette Goldsmith. She testified that to 

be approved for a contract under $25,000 a vendor must 

provide her with a proposal, an invoice of work, and tax 
No. 14-1701 3

forms so that she could create a justification letter. She explained that Mullins, the purchasing agent, the county 

comptroller, and others would review and sign the forms, 

invoice, and justification letter. Goldsmith testified that the 

county generally paid the selected vendor after the vendor 

had completed the contracted work. But, she testified, this 

procedure was ignored for the contracts awarded to Moody, 

Demos, Render, Borner, and Peery. Goldsmith identified 

Mullins’s initials on the justification letters and invoices for 

their contracts. Mullins, however, later denied that the initials were his, reading them as “LU” rather than “EM.” 

Next to testify were the vendors and codefendants involved in Mullins’s contract scheme—Borner, Demos, 

Moody, Render, and Peery. The government agreed to defer 

prosecution of them, under charges of misprision of felony, 

in exchange for their testimony and admissions of guilt. 

Borner testified about the census contract, which was invoiced at $24,995.00. To prepare to secure that contract, 

Borner testified that he provided Mullins with some paperwork but he did not draft the invoice. Instead, Mullins created Borner’s invoice and attributed contract work to the nonexistent “Clifford Borner and Associates,” a fictitious company to which the contract work was awarded. Borner admitted that before receiving the contract he did not know 

anything about census awareness or reporting. He also conceded that he received over $24,000 for his contract, even 

though he did not do enough work to justify that sum (he 

mainly passed out fliers door-to-door). Borner further testified that Mullins required him to remit $5,000 to a “subcontractor,” which he did by bringing the money to an elevator 

in cash and handing it to Mullins. 
4 No. 14-1701 

Mullins’s lawyer suggested during Borner’s cross examination that Borner was lying. Before trial the prosecution 

had disclosed to Mullins’s lawyer that, as Borner was preparing for trial, he told the prosecution that he recently learned 

that three years earlier a federal agent had threatened to shut 

down his wife’s day care business. That threat supposedly 

came during the government’s investigation into public contracts awarded to her business in 2010. Despite this disclosure, on cross examination Borner denied reporting this 

threat to the prosecution—leading to the suggestion that 

Borner was lying. On redirect examination, Borner clarified 

himself: Although three years earlier he had not known of or 

told the prosecution about the supposed threat, he did report it to the prosecution shortly before trial, when his wife 

mentioned it to him. He also added that, in fact, he believed 

that no threats were actually made to her. 

Demos also testified about the census contracts. He stated that he had not created the invoices (Mullins had) and 

that he had not performed $25,000 worth of work, despite 

the payment from Cook County. Demos recalled that when 

Mullins gave him the check from Cook County Mullins told 

him that he should think of it as a gift. In testimony similar 

to that from Borner, Demos explained that Mullins had instructed him to pay over $8,000 to Mullins so that Mullins 

could pay an unnamed “subcontractor.” 

Next up was Moody, who also testified about a census 

contract. She stated that her initial invoice amount had been 

too high, so Mullins directed her to alter it so that it fell under $25,000. Like the others, she also received a check from 

Cook County before performing any work. (She returned the 

check because of a problem with her business name.) 
No. 14-1701 5

Render testified about the flood-relief grant. He stated 

that Mullins had decided on a final amount for his contract. 

Render also explained that Mullins had wanted him to return $9,000 from the contract award to Mullins. Render gave 

Mullins the cash because he thought Mullins deserved it and 

because he wanted to ensure that he could get future work 

from Cook County. 

Peery testified about the funds he received to do outreach 

work for energy efficiency. He stated that Mullins had 

helped him, too, draft his contract proposal and the accompanying invoice outlining the anticipated work. After Peery 

was awarded the contract, Mullins told him that he would 

need to pay Mullins $12,000 in cash, which Peery did. Peery 

stated that Mullins told him that the money was going to a 

subcontractor but Peery thought that it “wasn’t adding up” 

and that no subcontracts actually existed. 

Mullins presented witnesses in his defense. These included several character witnesses and Karen Crawford, a 

Cook County employee. Crawford testified that Cook County did not have a rule that prohibited vendors from being 

paid before working, but she admitted that in her experience 

prepayment was not the norm. Mullins also testified in his 

own defense. He stated that he had recommended vendors 

but had not chosen them, had arranged for Cook County 

employees to assist vendors who had difficulty completing 

their proposals, and had not created, drafted, or overseen 

any of the contracts at issue in the trial. 

During closing argument, the government emphasized 

that the vendors had all received their payments up front. To 

burnish the point the prosecutor stated that all employees 

from Cook County, including the defense witnesses, “said 
6 No. 14-1701 

the same thing: ‘we don’t pay in advance.’” Mullins objected 

to this statement during closing, calling it a misstatement of 

Crawford’s testimony. The judge then instructed the jurors to 

rely on their own recollection of the testimony. The prosecutor proceeded with the closing argument, re-characterizing 

the previous statement to conform with Crawford’s testimony that upfront payment was not the norm. 

The jury found Mullins guilty of all the charges except 

one count of wire fraud. The district court sentenced him to 

51 months’ imprisonment and this appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

On appeal Mullins makes two arguments. First, he maintains that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of either 

wire fraud or bribery. Second, he contends that the prosecutor suborned perjury, intimidated witnesses, and made improper statements during closing arguments. We discuss 

each argument in turn. 

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Mullins begins by arguing that the government produced 

insufficient evidence to convict him of wire fraud and bribery. Sufficiency challenges are very difficult to win because 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and reverse only if no reasonable jury could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See United 

States v. McClellan, No. 14-2449, 2015 WL 4451052, at *3 (7th 

Cir. July 21, 2015); United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 557 

(7th Cir. 2012). The government alleges that Mullins waived 

arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence, but we 

need not decide whether the government is correct because, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ver-
No. 14-1701 7

dict, we conclude that the record contains abundant evidence to support the convictions. 

To prove wire fraud, the government must establish that 

there was (1) a scheme to defraud in which the defendant 

participated, (2) intent to defraud, and (3) use of interstate 

wires. 18 U.S.C. § 1343; United States v. Sheneman, 682 F.3d 

623, 628 (7th Cir. 2012). Mullins submits that he did not 

scheme to defraud Cook County. He maintains that he simply expedited time-sensitive contracts and broke no county 

rules. And he adds that even if there was a scheme, he did 

not participate in it because he did not personally draft proposals or approve the contracts. The jury had more than sufficient reason to disbelieve these assertions. 

A fraud scheme exists when there is a willful act to receive, deceive, or cheat to cause financial loss to another. See 

United States v. Howard, 619 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir. 2010). Here 

ample evidence establishes that Mullins intended to cheat 

Cook County out of money. According to the witnesses, 

Mullins altered proposals and wrote invoices to fit below the 

$25,000 approval threshold and thereby avoided detection 

by the Board of Commissioners. He then helped the vendors 

receive payments before they completed any work and despite never delivering services commensurate with the county’s payments to them. By helping to arrange for these proposals, invoices, and payments for incomplete work, the 

scheme and Mullins’s participation in it is adequately supported. See Sheneman, 682 F.3d at 629 (finding sufficient evidence where defendant took active role in misleading victim 

bank). Accordingly, the government adequately proved wire 

fraud. 
8 No. 14-1701 

To prove bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) the government must show that a public agent solicited “corruptly 

anything of value” in connection with a transaction of $5,000 

or more. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B); see United States v. Blagojevich, No. 11-3853, 2015 WL 4433687, at *4 (7th Cir. July 21, 

2015); United States v. Robinson, 663 F.3d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 

2011). An agent acts corruptly when he understands that the 

payment given is a bribe, reward, or gratuity. See United 

States v. Hawkins, 777 F.3d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 2015). To attack 

the sufficiency of the bribery conviction, Mullins raises two 

arguments, but they are both meritless. 

Mullins first contends that he did not act corruptly because, he says, other departments requested the work and 

approved the contracts from the vendors. But Mullins himself testified that his input and recommendation were important in choosing vendors. And he used his influence corruptly. As already observed, Mullins altered the invoices to 

remain under $25,000 and kept himself in the approval process. Later, when the vendors received their fees, Mullins required and received cash kickbacks under the ruse, as Peery 

explained, that the kickback payments were for “subcontractors.” In reality the payments were given to Mullins to secure future awards from Cook County, as Render testified. 

Thus, jurors could infer that the cash that Mullins received 

from vendors was a reward—a bribe—for buying his influence in obtaining their contracts. 

Mullins also contends that he cannot be convicted of 

bribery because the government produced no evidence of 

quid pro quo, such as the vendors receiving something in 

return for the bribe. But they did receive something—their 

contracts. In any case, evidence of quid pro quo is not neces-
No. 14-1701 9

sary to establish a violation of § 666(a)(1)(B). See United States 

v. Boender, 649 F.3d 650, 654 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. 

Gee, 432 F.3d 713, 714–15 (7th Cir. 2005). Thus, the bribery 

counts are intact. 

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Mullins next argues that the convictions should be overturned because he identifies three instances of prosecutorial 

misconduct: suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, and 

making improper statements during closing arguments. We 

take these contentions in turn. 

Mullins argues that the prosecutor twice elicited perjured 

testimony at trial. He contends that Mullins’s secretary, 

Goldsmith, testified falsely about his initials on documents. 

And, he maintains Borner lied about whether he had reported to the prosecution any threats to shut down his wife’s 

business. Both arguments are unpersuasive. 

Goldsmith’s testimony was not perjurious. She merely 

testified to her lay opinion that the initials on the proposals 

belonged to Mullins. Whether or not her opinion was correct, her testimony was permissible. See United States v. Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1992) (lay witness may give 

opinion about handwriting); United States v. Binzel, 907 F.2d 

746, 749 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). 

Borner’s situation is more complicated, but his testimony 

was not perjurious either. It is true that during cross examination he denied reporting to the prosecution that anyone 

had threatened to shut down his wife’s day care business, 

even though the prosecution had disclosed before trial the 

fact of his recent report. But the government solicited from 

Borner on redirect the clarification that three years earlier, 
10 No. 14-1701 

when the threats were supposedly made, he had not known 

of or reported them to the prosecution; only when he 

learned about the threats shortly before trial did he report 

them. The prosecution thus properly elicited truthful and 

complete testimony, see United States v. Guadagno, 970 F.2d 

214, 219–20 (7th Cir. 1992), ensuring that the jury had all 

truthful information before it when making its decision. 

Mullins next argues that the prosecution intimidated 

Peery into testifying against him. An allegation of witness 

intimidation requires proof that a witness was persuaded 

into providing false testimony to the court through physical 

force or threats. See United States v. Holt, 460 F.3d 934, 938 

(7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Balzano, 916 F.2d 1273, 1291 

(7th Cir. 1990). During cross-examination Peery said that the 

agent who had questioned him during the pretrial investigation was “gruff” and that the questioning process itself was 

“intimidating.” Peery, however, also stated that he testified 

truthfully and did so to obtain the terms of his deferredprosecution agreement. Given the record as a whole, Mullins 

has not proven that force or improper threats impelled false 

testimony. 

Mullins’s final contention concerns the prosecutor’s 

statements during closing argument. He asserts that the 

prosecution misstated Crawford’s testimony about the 

County’s practice concerning advanced payment before 

completed work. Misstatements of evidence during closing 

argument can be improper, see United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 

1206, 1214 (7th Cir. 2012), but it is rarely reversible error, see 

United States v. Anderson, 450 F.3d 294, 300 (7th Cir. 2006). 

Here the prosecutor argued that every witness had said that 

Cook County did not pay on service contracts in advance of 
No. 14-1701 11

completed work, even though Crawford had testified that 

the County could do so but that the practice was unusual. 

 To determine whether the misstatement prejudiced Mullins and requires reversal we consider whether (1) Mullins 

invited the remark, (2) the judge offered curative instructions, (3) the defense could have rebutted the misstatement, 

and (4) the weight of the evidence against Mullins is nonetheless strong. See United States v. Durham, 766 F.3d 672, 685 

(7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Myers, 569 F.3d 794, 799 (7th 

Cir. 2009). 

Looking at the record as a whole, we are confident that 

the misstatement did not prejudice Mullins. First, the defense immediately objected to the prosecutor’s misstatement. 

Second, the judge promptly issued a curative instruction, 

reminding the jurors that their recollection of the evidence 

controlled. Third, the prosecutor later altered the statement, 

correctly telling the jury that Crawford had testified that it 

was sound practice for Cook County to pay vendors after the 

vendors completed work. Fourth, this misstatement came 

against the backdrop of the abundant evidence showing that 

Mullins solicited bribes for contracts and fraudulently altered vendors’ proposals and invoices through email to 

avoid detection. Thus, this one minor misstatement did not 

infect the trial with unfairness such that a new trial is necessary. See United States v. Johnson, 655 F.3d 594, 599, 602 (7th 

Cir. 2011) (upholding decision not to grant new trial when 

single misstatement, which was immediately corrected, was 

given by the prosecution during opening statement); United 

States v. McMath, 559 F.3d 657, 667–68 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding 

that improper remarks at trial when combined with a curative jury instruction did not affect trial fairness). 
12 No. 14-1701 

III. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court.