GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 5, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Subject: Defense Logistics: Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support Should 

Identify Strategies for Addressing Implementation Challenges 

As part of the Army’s ongoing transformation efforts, in October 1999 the Army 

announced the Stryker brigade concept. The Stryker brigade is a unit designed to 

provide the Army with a rapidly deployable force that is capable of operating against 

the full spectrum of military threats. To meet the Army’s requirements for being 

rapidly deployable and combat capable, the Stryker brigade relies on new 

sustainment concepts, such as minimizing the number of personnel and spare parts 

within the brigade and reaching back to assets outside the brigade for support, which 

are not found in other existing Army brigades. In a span of 6 years, the Army 

announced its intention to create a new brigade, chose a vehicle, tested the 

operational concept, and deployed three brigades in support of Operation Iraqi 

Freedom. The Army is also sending one Stryker brigade for a second rotation to Iraq 

and is developing four additional Stryker brigades. 

To support the accelerated development and deployment timeline, the Army relied on 

contractors to support some equipment within the Stryker brigade, such as the 

Stryker vehicle and computer and communication systems. The largest group of 

contractor support within the brigade focuses on the Stryker vehicle, and the duties 

of those contractor personnel include conducting maintenance on the Stryker vehicle 

and managing the Stryker-specific supply chain. An Army official from the office of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology stated 

that at the time the first brigade deployed, the Army did not have the institutional 

capacity to train soldiers on conducting Stryker vehicle maintenance, and it faced an 

immediate need for maintenance personnel to support the deployment. This official 

also stated that the Army has since developed the institutional capacity to train 

soldiers to conduct Stryker vehicle maintenance.

On November 1, 2005, the Army directed changes to Stryker vehicle support. One of 

these planned changes is to replace the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor 

personnel within the brigade with soldiers. Army officials stated that the Army’s 

general preference is to use soldiers instead of contractor personnel, and the specific 

rationale for making this change is to increase the flexibility of the Stryker brigade to 

perform in different combat missions. The Army expects to begin implementing this 

change by fiscal year 2008.

We initiated this work under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to 

conduct evaluations on his own initiative and are providing this report to you because 

of your committees’ oversight responsibility. We reviewed issues related to 

implementing the Army’s planned change to use soldiers, rather than contractors, to 

conduct maintenance on the Stryker vehicle and specifically assessed the extent to 

which the Army’s planned change will achieve the desired outcome when 

implemented. 

To assess the extent to which the Army’s planned change will achieve its desired 

outcome, we reviewed Stryker vehicle maintenance support contracts and 

documents related to the Army’s plan for implementing its proposed changes to 

Stryker vehicle support. We also obtained documentation and met with personnel 

from three Stryker brigades, representatives from the vehicle maintenance 

contractor, and officials at Army Headquarters and from various Army major 

commands. We conducted our review from September 2005 to June 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

The Army’s change from contractor personnel to soldiers conducting maintenance on 

the Stryker vehicle may not fully achieve its intended outcome of increasing the 

brigade’s flexibility to perform in different types of combat operations. We identified 

three potential challenges that may affect the Army’s ability to achieve its intended 

outcome. First, personnel challenges may affect implementation of the planned 

change. Since vehicle maintenance contractors focus solely on the Stryker vehicle 

while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition to maintenance, the Army’s plan 

replaces the existing 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel with 71 

soldiers. Accordingly, to implement its plan, the Army must annually recruit or retain 

497 additional soldiers with specific military specialties to support all seven Stryker 

brigades. As we have previously reported,1

 some of these specialties have been 

 1

GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Action Plan to Address Enlisted Personnel Recruitment and 

Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). Contractors would be replaced

with soldiers from five military occupational specialties. We found that the Army has consistently been 

Page 2 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
consistently underfilled. The Army also may experience difficulties in sustaining

soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, due to the limited 

number of Stryker brigades combined with regularly scheduled transfers of soldiers 

among units. However, the Army’s plan does not include strategies to (1) enable it to 

recruit and retain the soldiers necessary to implement this change or (2) sustain 

soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance. Second, the Army’s 

plan increases the size of the brigade, and transporting the additional personnel and 

their associated equipment may exacerbate the existing difficulties in meeting 

deployment timelines that we have previously reported.2

 Deploying the Stryker 

brigade anywhere in the world within 96 hours is a component of the Stryker 

brigade’s flexibility. However, the Army’s plan does not address the effect of the 

increased logistical footprint on the brigade’s ability to deploy within 96 hours. 

Finally, since the Stryker brigade was designed with a limited ability to perform 

major combat operations, achieving the Army’s desired flexibility requires the Stryker 

brigade to receive additional sustainment support from Army units external to the 

brigade in order for it to perform a major combat operation. However, the Army has 

not addressed this support in its planned change. Until the Army addresses all of 

these challenges as part of its planned change, it may not achieve its intended 

outcome of increasing the Stryker brigade’s flexibility to perform in different types of 

combat operations. 

Accordingly, we are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to direct 

the Secretary of the Army to develop and include, as part of the Army’s planning 

process for changes to Stryker vehicle support, (1) strategies to enable the Army to 

recruit and retain the additional soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of 

existing personnel challenges; (2) strategies to sustain Army skills and knowledge on 

Stryker vehicle maintenance, given the limited number of Stryker brigades; (3) an 

assessment of the effects of an increased logistical footprint, such as the need for 

additional airlift, on the brigade’s deployment timeline; and (4) plans to ensure the 

Stryker brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the brigade can 

participate in major combat operations. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense (DOD) partially 

concurred with our recommendations, but said that no additional direction was 

required because the Army could achieve its missions using existing processes and 

strategies for recruiting and training soldiers and deploying and supporting the 

Stryker brigade. We continue to believe that our recommendations have merit and 

that the Army should identify strategies for addressing these implementation 

challenges. DOD’s comments are reprinted in enclosure I and our evaluation of its 

comments is on page 12. 

 unable to fill one of these specialties. The Army also experienced challenges filling the other four 

specialties in fiscal year 2005. 2

GAO, Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines Needed for Army Stryker Brigades, 

GAO-03-801 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).

Page 3 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Background 

As part of the Army’s ongoing efforts to transform its forces, in October 1999 the 

Army announced the creation of a new brigade that would provide a lighter and more 

rapidly deployable force, capable of operating against the full spectrum of military 

threats, ranging from small-scale contingencies to a major theater war. This brigade—

known as the Stryker brigade—was designed to balance lethality, mobility, and

survivability with the capabilities required for responsiveness, deployability, 

sustainability, and a reduced in-theater footprint. By February 2009, the Army plans 

to create a total of seven Stryker brigades, of which three have been completed and 

deployed to Iraq. These brigades will be stationed inside and outside the continental 

United States. Each of the seven Stryker brigades is expected to have approximately 

320 Stryker vehicles, of which there are 10 variants that use a common vehicle 

platform. A total of 2,559 Stryker vehicles have been funded, and 8 of the 10 Stryker 

vehicle variants3

 have been distributed to Army units. Additionally, Stryker vehicles 

are used by other organizations, such as Special Operations Command, U.S. Army 

Training and Doctrine Command, and Air Force Tactical Air Control Parties.4

Currently, contractors support some equipment within the Stryker brigade, and the 

largest group provides maintenance support for the Stryker vehicle. These 45 

contractor personnel, who are embedded in the Stryker brigade, are centrally 

managed by the Stryker brigade support battalion, and the brigade support battalion 

commander directs the priority of Stryker vehicle maintenance.5

 Army officials stated 

that the Stryker vehicle contractor personnel perform duties associated with several 

Army military occupational specialties,6

 to include conducting maintenance on the 

Stryker vehicle and some subsystems and ordering and tracking Stryker vehicle spare 

parts. Army officials stated that this contracted maintenance support exceeded the 

Army-established performance goal of maintaining a 90 percent operational readiness 

rate.7

 For the first two Stryker brigades that deployed to Iraq, Army officials reported 

operational readiness rates for the Stryker vehicle averaging 96 percent from October 

2003 through September 2005. Contractor personnel were able to exceed the Army’s 

performance goal of maintaining a 90 percent operational readiness rate despite the 

 3

The Stryker vehicle variants are: (1) Infantry Carrier Vehicle; (2) Medical Evacuation Vehicle; (3) 

Reconnaissance Vehicle; (4) Commander’s Vehicle; (5) Mortar Carrier Vehicle; (6) Antitank Guided

Missile Vehicle; (7) Engineer Squad Vehicle; (8) Fire Support Vehicle; (9) Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle; and (10) the Mobile Gun System. The Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle and Mobile Gun System are in various stages of development and 

testing. 4

Other Stryker vehicles are dedicated as Operational Readiness Float (ORF) and Ready-to-Fight (RTF) 

equipment. ORFs are vehicles that are maintained by the brigade and used at the brigade commander’s

discretion. There are approximately 10 ORF vehicles per Stryker brigade. The RTF fleet vehicles are 

used to replenish the ORF. Army officials said that they intend to create three RTF fleets, each with 14

vehicles. 5

There are 30 contractors that provide support to various Army computer and communication systems 

in the Stryker brigade. These contractors are not embedded in the Stryker brigade and are centrally 

managed by brigade logistics support teams that are controlled by the Army Materiel Command. 6

Stryker vehicle contractor personnel perform duties that are similar to five military occupational

specialties: wheeled vehicle mechanic (63B), fire control repair (45G), armament repair (45K),

automated logistics specialist (92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y). 7

The operational readiness rate requirement in the contract is specific to the Stryker vehicle and does 

not include all of the subsystems on the vehicle. For example, the Stryker vehicle maintenance 

contractor is responsible for the engine, chassis, and wheels, but is not responsible for 

communications equipment. 

Page 4 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
5.6 million miles driven by the Stryker vehicle during the first two deployments, 

which Army officials estimated to be 800 percent higher than anticipated peacetime 

usage. 

Army personnel in the Stryker brigades also expressed satisfaction with the 

performance of the Stryker vehicle’s contracted support and provided several 

explanations for the quality of support, noting that the contractors were 

knowledgeable about maintenance issues; were able to deliver parts faster than the 

standard Army supply system; provided the Stryker brigades with information on the 

status of maintenance and repair parts in the frequency and manner requested; and 

focused exclusively on performing Stryker vehicle maintenance tasks. Army officials 

also stated that the use of contractor personnel enabled soldiers to dedicate more 

time to train on soldier skills and perform other missions, such as guard duty and 

convoy escort. Because Stryker vehicle contractors were able to focus on the Stryker 

vehicle, soldiers were able to perform these additional tasks without degrading the 

quality of maintenance on the Stryker vehicle. Additionally, Army officials praised the 

ongoing collaborative relationship between the Stryker brigade and the contractors, 

observing that the contractors worked with the soldiers while in garrison. As we have 

previously reported,8

 contractors deployed with a Stryker brigade to Army training 

centers. This preexisting relationship ensured a working collaboration between 

soldiers and contractors before the brigades deployed to Iraq. 

The Army directed that the Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor personnel 

embedded at the brigade level be replaced with soldiers in order to increase the 

Stryker brigade’s flexibility to perform in different combat operations.9

 Army officials 

stated that the plan to transition to soldier maintenance is based on the Army’s 

preference to minimize the number of contractors in forward locations in order to 

increase flexibility in different combat situations. Based on our review and 

discussions with various Army officials, this decision to transition was not predicated 

on the costs of providing support. Army officials specifically cited the march to 

Baghdad conducted by other Army units during Operation Iraqi Freedom as the type 

of combat operation the brigade could have the flexibility to perform with the 

transition from contractor to soldier maintenance.10 The Army is still developing the 

plan for transitioning from contractor to soldier field-level maintenance, and one of 

its assumptions is that its plan will be properly resourced, to include the necessary 

personnel and funding. The Army intends to begin this transition by fiscal year 2008, 

and is expected to finalize its plan in 2006. 

 8

GAO, Military Transformation: The Army and OSD Met Legislative Requirements for First Stryker 

Brigade Design Evaluation, but Issues Remain for Future Brigades, GAO-04-188 (Washington, D.C.: 

Dec. 12, 2003). 9

The Army’s plan will also reduce the number of contractors that provide support to Army computer

and communication systems from 30 to 17. 10 DOD officials also stated that the transition to soldier maintainers would improve the Stryker 

brigade’s deployability in a broader range of environments and conditions, thereby improving the

brigade’s strategic and operational capability.

Page 5 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Changes to Stryker Vehicle Maintenance Support May Not Achieve Intended 

Outcome 

The Army may be unable to fully achieve the increased flexibility intended by the 

change to Stryker vehicle maintenance support due to three challenges. First, the 

Army’s ability to replace contractor personnel with soldiers may be affected by 

personnel challenges, particularly with respect to the recruitment and retention of 

additional soldiers, as well as sustaining soldier skills and knowledge on Stryker 

vehicle maintenance. Second, the increased size of the brigade resulting from 

additional soldiers may exacerbate the brigade’s existing difficulty in meeting its 96-

hour deployment goal. Third, the planned change does not include additional 

sustainment support from Army units external to the brigade that could enable the 

Army to fully achieve the desired flexibility for the Stryker brigade to perform in

major combat operations. 

Personnel Challenges May Affect Implementation of Change

Two personnel challenges may affect the Army’s ability to implement the change to 

replace the contractors with soldiers. First, recruiting or retaining the additional 

soldiers needed for the planned change is a challenge that could affect 

implementation. According to Army officials, there are currently a total of 45 Stryker 

vehicle maintenance contractor personnel within each Stryker brigade. To implement 

the change and have soldiers fill the functions provided by these contractor 

personnel, the Army plans to add 71 soldiers of different specialties for each Stryker 

brigade, or a total of 497 soldiers for all seven brigades.11 Recruiting these additional 

soldiers may be a challenge because, as we have previously reported,12 the Army 

faced difficulties in meeting its recruiting goals in fiscal year 2005 (92 percent of 

target). With the transition from contractor personnel to soldiers, the maintenance 

and supply tasks currently performed by contractor personnel within the brigade 

would be conducted by soldiers from five military occupational specialties. Army 

officials acknowledged that there is a general shortage in maintenance capability 

across the Army. Additionally, as we have previously reported,13 the Army has 

consistently been unable to fill one of these five specialties. Further, all of these 

specialties were underfilled in fiscal year 2005. If the Army is unable to find soldiers 

in these specialties and assign them to the Stryker brigade, the brigade may not have 

enough people to perform Stryker vehicle maintenance. 

The second personnel challenge is the ability of soldiers to develop and sustain skills 

and knowledge on the maintenance of the Stryker vehicle. Army officials noted that 

the contractor personnel’s exclusive focus on the Stryker vehicle increased their 

expertise on the system, so they became more knowledgeable about maintenance 

issues. In contrast, soldiers usually work on a system for about 3 years and then leave 

the unit because of promotion or a scheduled transfer to another unit. For vehicles 

 11Army officials told us that replacing the contractor vehicle maintenance personnel with soldiers

would require more than a one-for-one swap. As noted earlier, the vehicle maintenance contractors

focus solely on the Stryker vehicle while soldiers perform a variety of tasks in addition to 

maintenance, to include training, guard duty, and other missions. 12GAO-06-134, p. 8. 13GAO-06-134, p. 52. 

Page 6 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
that are common throughout the Army, soldiers can transfer to another unit and then 

continue to perform maintenance and develop skills and knowledge on that same 

vehicle. However, since there will be only seven Stryker brigades, building long-term 

expertise on the Stryker vehicle would require ensuring that the soldiers conducting 

Stryker vehicle maintenance are only transferred among the different Stryker 

brigades. Without long-term personnel management to target soldiers’ transfers, the 

Army may face difficulties in developing and sustaining its skills and knowledge on 

the Stryker vehicle. 

Changes May Exacerbate Existing Difficulties in Meeting Deployment Timelines

The increased size of the Stryker brigade associated with additional soldiers may 

exacerbate the brigade’s existing difficulties in meeting its deployment timelines. 

According to its organizational and operational concept, the Stryker brigade is 

designed as an early entry combat force that is intended to deploy within 96 hours of 

“first aircraft wheels up” and to begin operations immediately upon arrival in theater. 

Army officials told us that the reason for the 96-hour goal is to deter conflict and 

promote peace by getting the brigade into the theater quickly. However, as we noted 

in our earlier report14 on Stryker brigade deployment timelines, airlift shortages 

already preclude meeting the 4-day deployment goal, which would require 

transporting about 15,000 tons of vehicles, equipment, and supplies and about 3,900 

personnel. In its response to that report, DOD stated that the Army continues to 

maintain an overall Stryker brigade program goal of deploying the brigade anywhere 

in the world in 96 hours and is working with other services to address transportation 

constraints. 

Army officials told us that each Stryker brigade would require more soldiers than the 

existing number of contractor personnel they were replacing because contractors 

focus on their specific tasks, while soldiers must perform other activities in addition 

to their maintenance duties. To support these additional soldiers, Army officials 

estimated an 8 percent increase in the amount of equipment and supplies required by 

the brigade. Some items that increase when the brigade adds soldiers include more 

wheeled vehicles to support the new soldiers as well as additional maintenance parts, 

fuel, food, and headquarters personnel. Army officials acknowledged that, as more 

people and their associated equipment are added to the brigade, the logistical 

footprint grows. 

This increase in the Stryker footprint may affect the ability of the brigade to deploy 

within the 96-hour goal. As we have previously reported, the deployment goal of 96 

hours is unrealistic because airlifting a Stryker brigade within that time frame would 

require use of a sizeable portion of available military airlift. Army officials did not 

identify deploying the brigade in 96 hours as a concern, and continued to state that 

the issue is a lack of airlift resources, which is outside of the Army’s control. 

However, the increased size of the Stryker brigade may increase the number of 

aircraft required to deploy the brigade, and these aircraft may not be available when 

needed to support the deployment. Without addressing the effects of the increased 

 14GAO-03-801, p. 6. 

Page 7 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
logistical footprint on the deployment timelines, the Army will continue to face 

challenges in rapidly deploying the Stryker brigade within 96 hours. 

Change Does Not Include Sustainment Support for Major Combat Operations

The Army’s planned change does not include the additional sustainment support that 

would enable the Stryker brigade to achieve the desired flexibility to perform in

major combat operations. The business case analysis the Army is developing focuses 

on the cost of the transition between contractor maintenance personnel and soldiers. 

However, there are other considerations specific to supporting a Stryker brigade in 

major combat operations. The example cited by Army officials as a rationale for 

changing Stryker vehicle maintenance support to allow the brigade to perform in 

different combat operations was the march to Baghdad that occurred during 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. However, the Stryker brigade was not optimized for this 

type of combat operation. According to the Stryker organizational and operational 

concept, the Stryker brigade was optimized for small-scale contingencies instead of 

major combat operations. Unlike other Army units, the logistical footprint for the 

Stryker brigade is smaller, and the brigade is capable of sustaining itself for only 72 

hours. In order to perform in major combat operations, such as a march to Baghdad, 

the Stryker brigade would require significant combat service support augmentation. 

This augmentation would come from Army units external to the brigade, which is 

generally the Army division under which it fights. Army officials stated that if a 

Stryker brigade needed augmentation, the Army would then decide what actions to 

take based on the situation. 

According to the Army, units that participated in the actual march to Baghdad 

experienced some sustainment challenges. Although these Army units were able to 

successfully defeat the enemy and travel across great distances very quickly, these 

successes resulted in Army units not receiving an immediate resupply of spare 

vehicle parts, with some brigades not receiving additional parts for periods greater 

than a month. This sustainment schedule would be difficult for the Stryker brigade, 

but the Army’s planned change does not address the support challenges associated 

with determining how the Stryker brigade would receive the necessary sustainment 

support. Until the Army develops plans to augment the support of the Stryker 

brigade, the change may not be able to provide the Army’s desired flexibility. 

Conclusions 

The Army is focused on implementing the specific change to replace contractors with 

soldiers to allow the brigade to perform in all types of combat operations. However, 

the Army has not addressed challenges that may hinder its ability to achieve this 

intended outcome. By not addressing personnel recruiting and management 

challenges, the Army may be unable to replace contractors with soldiers or build and 

sustain the long-term skills and knowledge necessary to ensure quality Stryker 

vehicle maintenance. Additionally, without addressing the effect of the increased size 

of the Stryker brigade on its deployment timeline, the brigade may face even greater 

difficulty in meeting its 96-hour deployment goal. Finally, if the Army does not plan 

Page 8 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
for how the Stryker brigade will receive additional sustainment support, it may be 

difficult for the brigade to perform in major combat operations such as a march to 

Baghdad. Clear identification of challenges that may limit the Army’s ability to 

achieve the desired outcome of the proposed change, an assessment of the effects of 

these challenges, and development of strategies to address these challenges during 

the planning process could enhance the likelihood that the Stryker vehicle continues 

to receive high levels of maintenance support and meet performance requirements 

after the proposed change is implemented. Because the Stryker brigade concept is 

the bridge between the existing force and the Army of the future, the process by 

which conceptual changes are viewed and implemented determines not only how the 

Stryker brigade operates, but also how the Army plans to address the same issues for 

future brigades. 

Recommendations for Executive Action 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to 

develop and include, as part of the Army’s planning process for changes to Stryker 

vehicle support, (1) strategies to enable the Army to recruit and retain the additional 

soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of existing personnel challenges; 

(2) strategies to sustain Army skills and knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, 

given the limited number of Stryker brigades; (3) an assessment of the effects of an 

increased logistical footprint, such as the need for additional airlift, on the brigade’s 

deployment timeline; and (4) plans to ensure the Stryker brigade can receive 

additional sustainment support so that the brigade can participate in major combat 

operations. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD partially concurred with all four 

of our recommendations. DOD’s comments are reprinted in enclosure I. Regarding 

our recommendation to develop strategies to enable the Army to recruit and retain 

the additional soldiers needed to implement the changes, in light of existing 

personnel challenges, DOD partially concurred, stating that it agreed with the 

importance of recruiting and retaining soldiers. According to DOD, existing processes 

have achieved the Army’s recruiting and retention goals. The department also noted 

that the Army has effective processes for distribution of occupational skills in

support of the total force, which it has used to meet recruiting and retention 

objectives within the Stryker brigade and can use to fully support the incremental 

inclusion of soldier mechanics. The department stated that additional direction is not 

required. We disagree that the existing processes are effective because, as we have 

noted in this report, the Army has not achieved its recruiting and retention goals in 

recent years. While the Army may have met the personnel objectives for the Stryker 

brigade in the past, Army officials have already acknowledged that there is a general 

shortage of maintenance capability across the Army. Further, implementing the 

Army’s planned transition increases the personnel requirement for the Stryker 

brigade in five specific occupational specialties where the Army has been unable to 

meet its recruiting goals. For example, as our report points out, in fiscal year 2005 the 

Army experienced shortages in filling requirements for wheeled vehicle mechanic 

Page 9 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
(63B), fire control repair (45G), armament repair (45K), automated logistics specialist 

(92A), and unit supply specialist (92Y), and has consistently been unable to fill one of 

these five specialties. As a result, we continue to believe that the Army may face 

challenges in recruiting and retaining personnel for the Stryker brigade in current and 

future years, and that the Army should consider strategies to address this issue in its 

planning for changes to Stryker vehicle support. 

In response to our recommendation to develop strategies to sustain Army skills and 

knowledge on Stryker vehicle maintenance, given the limited number of Stryker 

brigades, DOD partially concurred, agreeing that sustaining skills and knowledge is 

essential. The department stated that the Army’s Training and Doctrine command 

(TRADOC) is meeting current requirements for Stryker training and is prepared to 

meet the Army’s timeline for the transition to soldier field-level maintenance. DOD 

said that TRADOC will provide the necessary training base for the soldier mechanics 

and that additional direction is not required. We believe that DOD has misunderstood 

the intent of our recommendation. We are not questioning the Army’s training 

capability for Stryker vehicle maintenance. As we acknowledged in this report, the 

Army has developed the institutional capacity to train soldiers on Stryker vehicle 

maintenance. As this report points out, our concern is about the Army’s ability to 

develop and sustain long-term institutional expertise on the Stryker vehicle. Army 

officials told us that expertise on any vehicle is best developed by continuous use of 

the skill through hands-on maintenance, and that this expertise must be managed 

because soldiers routinely transfer to different units after a 3-year period. These 

officials also acknowledged that building this expertise would take time because the 

Stryker vehicle will not be found in all Army units. In contrast, developing and 

sustaining expertise on other Army vehicles, such as the High-Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle, requires less management because the vehicle is found throughout 

the Army and soldiers are able to continue building expertise after reassignment. 

Since the Stryker vehicle will only be located in the seven Stryker brigades and in a 

limited number of other locales, ensuring that soldiers are assigned to other units 

with Stryker vehicles is necessary to develop and sustain their skills and knowledge 

on maintaining the Stryker vehicle. Accordingly, we continue to believe that our 

recommendation has merit and that the Army should identify strategies to build longterm expertise on the Stryker vehicle. 

The department partially concurred with our recommendation to include in its 

planning process the effects of an increased logistical footprint, such as the need for 

additional airlift, on the brigade’s deployment timeline, agreeing with the importance 

of minimizing the effect of any increased logistical footprint. DOD agreed that the 

structures required to provide the logistics of projecting, moving, protecting, and 

sustaining contract personnel are not included in Stryker’s current structure, but 

noted that the transition to soldier field maintenance includes adding required 

equipment into Stryker’s formal structure and will facilitate accurate planning for 

strategic deployability. According to DOD, the transition from interim contractor 

field maintenance to soldier field-level maintenance will not result in a significant 

increase to the logistics footprint, so additional direction is not required. We disagree. 

Army officials estimate that the transition will require an 8 percent increase in the 

amount of equipment and supplies required for the brigade, which is an increase in 

Page 10 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
the size of the Stryker brigade logistics footprint. Because the amount of equipment 

necessary to support contractors is not formalized, as noted in DOD’s response, the 

Army does not currently have an accurate picture of the assets necessary to deploy 

the Stryker brigade. We are encouraged that DOD is taking steps to facilitate accurate 

planning for strategic deployability of the Stryker brigade. As we have stated in 

previous reports, the existing goal of deploying a Stryker brigade anywhere in the 

world in 96 hours is unrealistic. By implementing the transition, the Army now has 

the opportunity to reexamine the deployment goals for the Stryker brigade. 

Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and that the 

Army, with the data provided by the more formalized logistics structure, should take 

additional action and consider the effects of the increased logistical footprint on the 

brigade’s deployment timeline, to include identifying the number of assets necessary 

to transport the brigade to meet more realistic deployment goals.

With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop plans to ensure the Stryker 

brigade can receive additional sustainment support so that the brigade can 

participate in major combat operations, DOD partially concurred, agreeing with the 

objective of enhancing the Stryker brigade’s capability to participate in major combat 

operations, with augmentation, as a subordinate maneuver component within a 

division or corps, in a variety of possible roles. The department noted that all Army 

units require some level of support based on mission, enemy, terrain, available 

troops, time, and civilian considerations. DOD stated that the transition from interim 

contractor support to a permanent support strategy significantly improves 

operational flexibility and the Army’s ability to employ the Stryker brigade by giving it 

the capability to logistically support a much broader range of military operations. 

DOD said that additional direction is not required. While we agree that using soldiers 

who possess expertise on Stryker vehicle maintenance provides the Stryker brigade 

with improved operational flexibility, as we stated in this report, the Army has not 

developed a plan for how to support the Stryker brigade in a major combat operation. 

Army officials told us that if a Stryker brigade needed augmentation, the Army would 

decide what actions to take based on the situation. The department’s response 

reinforces this point. As we have stated in this report, the Stryker brigade is different 

than other Army units in that it has a smaller logistical footprint, is self-sustaining for 

only 72 hours, and requires augmentation from Army units external to the brigade in 

order to perform a major combat operation. Since the Stryker vehicle is not found in 

most other units, the existing division and corps headquarters that would provide 

combat service support to the Stryker brigade in a major combat operation would not 

necessarily have the support packages and spare parts needed for the brigade. 

Resupply functions in Iraq are currently being performed by contractor personnel, 

and the Stryker brigade is currently operating from forward operating bases. The 

Stryker brigade deployed for the first time to Operation Iraqi Freedom and has yet to 

perform as a subordinate maneuver component within a division or corps in a major 

combat operation and with reduced contractor support. As we have stated in this 

report, other non-Stryker brigades that had an existing relationship with division

support structures still faced resupply challenges while performing major combat 

operations in the march to Baghdad. We believe that waiting to develop a plan based 

on the situation would inhibit the rapid use of the Stryker brigade in major combat 

operations. Therefore, we continue to believe that our recommendation has merit and 

Page 11 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
that the Army should take action to ensure the Stryker brigade can receive additional 

sustainment support so that it can participate in major combat operations. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in the body of 

the report as appropriate. Some of these comments related to the context of the 

report. Specifically, DOD stated that the transition to soldier maintainers will improve 

Stryker’s deployability at all points of deployment—to include theater reception, 

staging, and onward integration in a broader range of environments and conditions—

thereby improving both strategic and operational capability. We do not dispute the 

point that soldiers are more deployable than contractors. Instead, our first 

recommendation focuses on whether the Army can recruit and retain the soldiers 

necessary to accomplish the plan, and our third recommendation focuses on the 

effects on the timelines for deploying the brigade given the overall increase in the size 

of the Stryker brigade’s logistical footprint. DOD further stated that the transition 

from Stryker interim contractor field maintenance to soldier field maintenance may 

not require more than a one-for-one swap. The department noted that while 

contractors may be able to dedicate more time to performing maintenance tasks, they 

are also less deployable than soldiers and require force protection and sustainment. 

While we agree that contractors are less deployable than soldiers, we disagree that 

the transition may not require more than a one-for-one swap. Army officials stated 

that there are currently a total of 45 Stryker vehicle maintenance contractor 

personnel within each Stryker brigade, and these personnel provide functions similar 

to five military occupational specialties. According to the Army plan that was 

provided to us and sent to Army leadership, the Army intends to add 71 soldiers in 

these five specialties to each Stryker brigade, which is greater than a one-for-one 

swap. Based on our interviews with Army officials, a one-for-one swap would likely 

result in a decrease in operational readiness rates for the Stryker vehicle, since 

soldiers perform multiple functions while contractors focus solely on maintaining the 

Stryker vehicle. 

Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which the Army’s planned change to Stryker vehicle 

support will achieve its desired outcome, we reviewed the decision memorandum 

and briefings prepared for the Army Systems Acquisition Review Council’s 

Sustainment Readiness Review and talked with officials at the Program Executive 

Office for Ground Combat Systems. We also reviewed Army documents related to the 

plans for implementing the change and previous GAO reports and reviewed the 

current and most recent contracts for Stryker vehicle maintenance support. We 

collected Army statistics on Stryker vehicle operational readiness rates, and met with 

Army Materiel Command officials to discuss other support for the Stryker brigades.15

Additionally, we met with officials from the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine 

Command’s System Manager for the Stryker vehicle, the Combined Arms Support 

Command, the Project Manager’s office at the Tank-Automotive and Armaments 

 15For this report, we did not address the cost effectiveness of using contractors rather than soldiers to 

perform maintenance on the Stryker vehicle. 

Page 12 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Command, and Army Materiel Command. We also interviewed officials from the 

office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology; personnel from three Stryker brigades; representatives from the 

contractor that provides vehicle maintenance services, operates the Stryker vehicle 

supply chain, conducts new equipment training, and performs reset actions; and 

officials at Army headquarters (Logistics and Force Development), U.S. Army Forces 

Command, and the Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command. We conducted our 

review from September 2005 to June 2006 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees; the 

Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Army; and the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others on request. In 

addition, this report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If 

you or your staff have any questions, please contact me at (202) 512-8365 or 

solisw@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. 

William M. Solis 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Enclosures - II 

 

Page 13 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Enclosure I Enclosure I

Comments from the Department of Defense 

Page 14 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Enclosure I Enclosure I

Page 15 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Enclosure I Enclosure I

Page 16 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
Enclosure II Enclosure II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact William M. Solis, (202) 512-8365 or solisw@gao.gov 

Acknowledgments In addition to the contact named above, major contributors to 

this report were Lawson Gist, Assistant Director; Jim Melton, Karyn Angulo, Renee 

Brown, Julia Denman, Charles Perdue, and John Van Schaik. 

(350742) 

Page 17 GAO-06-928R Defense Logistics 
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