Filed 6/4/15 Kempton v. Cooper CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

KIMBERLY KEMP TON & CHARLES KINNEY,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

CAROLYN COOPER et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

and Related Cross-Action. B255794

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC354136)

APPEAL from an order of the Los Angeles Superior Court granting award of attorney fees and costs. Barb ara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed. Charles G. Kinney for Appellant Judith Kempton as personal representative for the Estate of Kimberly Kempton. Amezcua-Moll & Associates, Rosemary Amezcua-Moll, for Appellant Charles Kinney individually and for Judith Kempton as personal representative of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton; Nina Ringgold for A ppellant Charles Kinney as Executor for the Estate of Harriet Kinney. Marcus Watanabe & Dave, David M. Marcus, Eric Chomsky for Respondent

Michele R. Clark.

__________ ____________2 Appeal from a post-judgment award for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred attempting to collect an earlier award of attorneys’ fees and costs. Affirmed. Background 1 On April 17, 2014, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Charles G. Kinney (Kinney), as attorney for nonparty ap pellants Judith Kempton as pe rsonal representative of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton (Kempton), and “non-party Charles Kinney as Executor for the Estate of Harriet Kinney.” A second atto rney of record in this appeal is Nina Ringgold, representing appellant Charles Kinney individually. The appeal challenges the March 5, 2014 order of the Los Angeles Su perior Court, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge, awarding $12,137.50 in favor of respondent Michele Clark, against Kinney individually,

1 This court has granted respondent’s un opposed requests for judicial notice of various published and unpub lished decisions stemming from this and related cases. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd . (d), 459, subd. (a); Taliaferro v. Davis (1963) 216 Cal.App.2d 398, 401.) We take judicial notice of: (1 ) Order of the United St ates Bankruptcy Court filed October 18, 2012, abandoning to debtor Cl ark the estate’s right to recover attorneys’ fees from Kinney and Kempton; (2) Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dated February 25, 2013, denyi ng Kinney’s emergency motion to stay the District Court’s December 19, 2012 order remanding the removed action to the state court; (3) Order of the United States Bankrup tcy Court filed February 27, 2013, denying Kinney’s emergency motion fo r stay; (4) Superior Court of Alameda document filed November 21, 2011, entitled Duties and Li abilities of Personal Re presentative; (5) Decision of Division Tw o of this court in Kempton v. Clark (Sept. 25, 2014, B248713) [nonpub. opn.], affirming award against Ke mpton for post-judgment attorney fees of $167,678.50, with directions to designate Kinney as a judgment debtor; (6) Order dismissing appeal in Kinney v. Clark (Dec. 31, 2014, B253093), from an order denying claim of exemption and allowing levy on fu nds to pay December 15, 2008 award of attorney fees and costs in favor of Clark an d against Kinney. On our own motion we note the published opinion in In re Kinney (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 951, in which Division Two of this court entered a prefiling order ag ainst Kinney, and declared that “Attorney Kinney is using Kempton as his proxy or pupp et in order to continue his career as a vexatious litigant.” ( Id. at pp. 953-954, 960-961.) We disregard, as unsupported, the appellants’ representations at oral argument, th at some or all of these orders are not yet final and are subject to review by this or other courts. We also disregard the parties’ purported in corporations by reference of their briefs and arguments in other appeals. ( Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 294; Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 854.)3 for fees and costs incurred attempting to colle ct a December 15, 2008 fee award against both Kinney an d Kempton (the March 5, 2014 order). The attenuated history of proceedings that give rise to this appeal began in 2006. From earlier published and unpubl ished decisions in this and re lated cases, we glean this abbreviated summary: In 2006, Kinney and Kimberly Kempton purchased residential property in the Silver Lake neighborhood of Los Angeles from Clark. Soon afterward Kinney and Kempton instigated actions and cross-actions against their neighbors, the seller, the seller’s real estate brokers, and the City of Los Angeles (among others), arising from claims of encroachment, nuisance, tr espass, unmerchantab ility, and fraud. ( Kempton v. City of Los Angeles , BC413357; Kempton v. City of Los Angeles, BC363837; Kempton v. Cooper , BC354136; Kempton v. Harris , BC354138; Kempton v. Harris , BC363261; Kempton v. Clark , BC374938.) ( In re Kinney , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 954, fn. 3.) The superior court in case No. BC354 136 dismissed Kinney’s and Kempton’s unmerchantable-title cross-action against Clar k, the seller, on demure r without leave to amend. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. ( Kempton v. Clark (June 30, 2008, B200893) [nonpub. opn.] .) An award of attorneys’ fees to Clark was affirmed on appeal by this court. ( Kempton v. Clark (Feb. 3, 2010, B2133 86) [nonpub. opn.].) 2

2 The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s rulings and judgment in favor of the neighbor, Cooper, and against Kinney and Kempton. ( Kempton v. Cooper (June 4, 2009, B208943) [non pub. opn.].) In Kinney’s and Kempton’s action for en croachment against the neighbor, Cooper, the trial court’s final judgment granted title to the disputed strip to Cooper and enjoined appellants from interfering with her use of it. The judgment was affirmed on appeal. ( Kempton v. Cooper (June 4, 2009, B229912) [nonpub . opn.].) Kinney and Kempton also appealed, unsuccessfully, from a $37,045 award of attorneys’ fees and costs in Cooper’s favor. ( Kempton v. Cooper (Aug. 21, 2009, B2101 14) [nonpub. opn.].) In Kinney’s and Kempton’s action against Clark’s brokers, the trial court entered summary judgment in the brokers’ favor, and this court affirmed. ( Kempton v. Prudential California Realty (Nov. 3, 2011, B227418 ) [nonpub. opn.].) In a separate appeal, the trial court’s award of costs to the brokers was affirmed, and the court imposed sanctions against Kinney and Kempton for a frivolous appeal. ( Kempton v. Prude ntial California Realty (Nov. 16, 2011, B23 1162) [nonpub. opn.].)4 Clark declared bankruptcy in July 2 010, due in part to expenses incurred defending against Kinney’s claims. ( Kempton v. Clark
, supra , B248713, at p. 4.) In March 2011, the bankruptcy court ordered Cl ark to appear and defend against Kinney’s and Kempton’s state court acti on, and in May 2012, the supe rior court in that case declared Kempton to be a vexatious litigant. ( Ibid. ) The trial court dismissed the superior court case with prejudice on June 15, 2012, for Kempton’s failure to post the required bond, and Kinney’s request to appeal the judgment was denied. ( Ibid. ) When the bankruptcy court denied Kinney’s motion to vacate the state court’s dismissal of the case, Kinney removed the case to federal cour t, which remanded it to the state court in December 2012, for lack of federa l jurisdiction. (See fn. 1, ab ove, judicial notice items 1, 2 & 3.) Kinney appealed the remand to th e Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. ( Id. at pp. 4- 5.) 3

Clark moved in the state court for an award of $176,880 against Kinney and Kempton, jointly, for her expenses in defend ing against their litigation in the bankruptcy proceedings. Kinney ar gued in opposition that Clark lack ed standing to claim fees and costs due to her bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court provided Clark with a finding that Kempton and Kinney lacked stan ding to object to the fee reque st, disclaiming any interest of the bankruptcy estate in a fee award to Clark, and ordering that the amount of fees

In Kinney’s and Kempton’s action against the City of Los Angeles, the judgment against Kinney and Kempton on the merits was affirmed in an unpublished opinion by Division Three of this court. ( Kempton v. City of Los Angeles (Dec. 19, 2012, B236973) [nonpub. opn.].)

3 On April 20, 2010, Kempton (represented by Kinney) appealed from a state court order declaring Kinney a vexatious litigant. The appeal was dismis sed on June 10, 2010, for Kempton’s lack of standing. ( Kempton v. Clark, et al. (June 16, 2010, B223850) [nonpub. opn.].) The Supreme Court denied review. ( Kempton v. Clark, et al.
, S184149.) On March 29, 2013, th e United States District Cour t for the Northern District of California denied Kinney’s application for a temporary restraining order, protective order, and preliminary injunction against th e State Bar of California (and a number of judges and justices of the trial and appellate courts) for another de claration of Kinney’s status as a vexatious litigant. ( Kinney v. State Bar of Cal . (Mar. 29, 2013) 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 46022.)5 recoverable by Clark “will be adjudicated in the state court.” ( Kempton v. Clark, supra
, B248713, at p. 5.) On March 13, 2013, the superior cour t awarded Clark attorneys’ fees of $167,678.50 against Kempton in Kempton v. Clark
, supra , LASC No. BC374938, but denied Clark’s request that the fee order be entered against Kinney as well. On May 15, 2013, the court also denied Kinney’s and Ke mpton’s motion to vacate the 2012 vexatious litigant prefiling order against Kempton. In ruling on the fee motion, the trial court rejected Kinney’s contention that the pendi ng federal court appeal barred Clark’s fee request, and the federal courts denied his requ est for a stay of the superior court hearing pending the outcome of the federal appeal. ( Kempton v. Clark
, supra , B248713, at p. 6.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s de nial of the motion to vacate the vexatious litigant prefiling order against Kempton, and also affirmed the fee award in its entirety, modifying it to be payable jointly and se verally by both Kinn ey and Kempton. ( Id. at pp. 8, 15.) Judgment was entered against Kinney and Kempton on their claims against Clark and her brokers, for fraud, and their tw o resulting appeals were unsuccessful. ( Kempton v. Prudential California Re alty—John Aaroe Division (Feb. 25, 2009, 2d Civ. No. B213620) [nonpub. opn.].) Divi sion Two of this district found the second of these appeals to be “insulting.” It affirmed the trial court’s cost award of $8,517.40 against Kempton and imposed sanctions for a frivolou s appeal, finding the appeal to be “a subterfuge,” and “nothi ng but an attempt to reargue the me rits of the trial court’s ruling” on the previously affirmed imposition of su mmary judgment. And it remanded the matter

to the trial court with directions to determ ine and order Kinney and Kempton to pay the respondents’ fees and expenses incurred in re sisting the appeal, as sanctions payable to the Court of Appeal. ( Kempton v. Prudentia l California Realty—J ohn Aaroe Division (Nov. 16, 2011, B2311 62) [nonpub. opn.].) 4

4 Two other appeals challengi ng orders declaring Kinney to be a vexatious litigant were dismissed for Kempton’s lack of standing to challenge the orders. ( Kempton v. Prudential California Rea lty—John Aaroe Division (Feb. 25, 2009, 2d Civ. No.6 On December 9, 2013, Clark filed a mo tion against Kinney for $12,137.50, for additional fees incurred by he r attorneys during their effort s to enforce the December 15, 2008 fee award. Kinney o pposed the motion on his own behalf, on behalf of Judith Kempton (identified as the personal represen tative of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton, who had since died), and on behalf of th e nonparty Estate of Harriet Kinney. 5 Kinney argued that enforcement of the previous fee awards was automatically stayed by various earlier appeals; that Clark had fa iled to establish her right to recover, and had tried to levy on the wrong accounts; and that the federal bankruptcy court had ex clusive jurisdiction over all the state court rulings. On March 5, 2014, the court (Barbara Scheper, Judge) granted the fee motion in its entirety, entering the order from which this appeal is taken. 6

Discussion A postjudgment award of contractual attorney fees is an appealable order. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); Whiteside v. Tenet Healthcare Corp. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 693, 706; Milman v. Shukhat (1994) 22 Cal.App.4t h 538, 540, fn. 2.) Appellants’ opening brief purports to ch allenge the March 5, 2014 fee order on four grounds (and a number of sub-grounds ). Appellants contend: (1) Appellants (including the nonparty appellants) are aggrie ved by the order; (2) the funds subject to Clark’s levy to enforce the underlying order were properly segregated; (3) Clark has not shown a right to collect the le vied funds; and (4) Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 does not apply. The appeal has no merit.

B213620) [nonpub. opn.] and Kempton v. Clark (June 10, 2010, 2d Civ. No. B223850) [nonpub. opn.].)

5 The Certificate of Interested Entities Or Persons filed in this appeal by attorneys Kinney and Ringgold id entifies the Estate of Harriet Ki nney as an aggrieved party and “appellant in companion ap peal w/ same iss.”

6 On September 25, 2014, the trial court made an additional award of attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in Clark’s earlier appeal. ( Kempton v. Clark , B248713, at p. 3.)7 A. Standing To Appeal. We first address the jurisdictional issue of the standing of the purported nonparty appellants in this appeal. The March 5, 2014 order from which the appeal was taken awards Clark additional fees of $12,137.50 against Kinney individually. Kinney , then an attorney, filed the appeal on behalf of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton and th e Estate of Harriet Kinney. 7 Nina Ringgold, an attorney, filed the appeal on behalf of Kinney individually. Appellants Judith Kempton as personal re presentative for the Es tate of Kimberly Kempton, and Charles Kinney as Executor for the Estate of Harriet Kinney, were not parties to the motion in the trial court, a nd the March 5, 2014 order grants no relief against them. Only their iden tification as appellants by Kinney (purporting to act as their attorney) on the notice of app eal and the covers of appellant s’ briefs designates them as parties to the appeal in this court. Appellants’ opening brief, filed Septembe r 10, 2014, argues that the Estate of Kimberly Kempton and the Estate of Harriet Ki nney have standing to challenge the order, because they were aggrieved by the possibility that “some of their money was seized or might be seized” to collect the funds the or der awards. According to appellants’ brief (but unconfirmed by anything in the record) th e challenged order was at some point used, or will at some point be used, to levy on fu nds “for which Kinney was the attorney and which were not Kinney’s pers onal funds but in fact were owned by Kinney’s clients including [Harriet Kinney].” At oral argument counsel for the nonparty estates reiterated these claims, without reference to anything in the record.

7 On December 12, 2014, the State Bar Review Department recommended Kinney’s disbarment and ordered his State Bar enrollment inactive as of December 15, 2014, pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and rule 5.111(D)(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. ( In re Kinney , St. Bar Review Dept. case Nos. 09-O- 18100 & 09-O-18760, Dec. 12, 2014.) The California State Bar Web site identifies Kinney as inelig ible to practice law, as of December 15, 2014. (http://members.calbar.c a.gov/fal/Member/Detail/66428.)8 The appeal is not taken from any levy or threatened levy, however. It is taken only from the order entered March 5, 2014, awarding $12,137.50 in “additional attorneys’ fees and costs” in favor of Clar k—an order to which Kinney’s clients are not parties, and by which, for all the record shows, they are not aggrieved. “‘[O]nly parties of record may appeal ‘(which includes persons who are named as a party to the proceedings be low or who take a ppropriate steps to become a party of record in the proceedings . . . .)’” (Eisenberg, et al., Ci vil Appeals and Writs (2014) ¶ 2:271, p. 2-164, quoting County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 736.) One is “aggrieved” whose rights or interests ar e injuriously affected by the judgment. ( County of Alameda v. Carleson
, supra , 5 Cal.3d at p. 737.) The record reveals no step s by the Estate of Kempton or the Estate of Harriet Kinney to interven e in the trial court motion proceedings to become parties of record with respect to the underlying motion, or to show that they are aggrieved in any way by the challenged order. (See In re Miguel E. (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 5 21, 539 [party of record, with right to appeal, “is a person named as a party to the proceedings or one who takes appropriate steps to become a party of record in the proceedings”]; In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 715 [one who has not become a party of record in the trial court proceeding has no standing to appeal].) 8 Nor has any such effort been made in this court. 9 Appellants mistakenly cite Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnersh ip v. County of San Benito
, supra , 72 Cal.App.4th at pages

8 Code of Civil Procedure section 387 pr ovides, in pertinent part: “(a) Upon timely application, any person, who has an inte rest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, may intervene in the action or proceeding. . . . [¶] (b) If . . . the person seeking intervention cl aims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the acti on may as a practical matter im pair or impede that person’s ability to protect that interest, unless that pe rson’s interest is adequately represented by existing parties, the court shall, upon timely a pplication, permit that person to intervene.”

9 At the time of argument in this appeal, counsel for the nonparty estates orally represented to this court that the absence of notice to the esta tes of the motion in the trial court is shown by the motion’s proof of servi ce. But the record neither indicates any9 13-22, for the proposition (among others) that an order “can be ‘colla terally attacked’ by a stranger ‘who is legally “aggrieved,”’” infere ntially merely by affixing their names to a notice of motion (as the nonparty appellants did in this court). The case actually says that a stranger to the record who is aggrieved by a void judgment “may move to vacate the judgment, and on denial of the motion may have the validity of the judgment reviewed upon an appeal from the order denying the mo tion.” But here, the record reflects no motion by the nonparty appellants to vacate th e order as void; they therefore have not obtained the right to the review discussed in Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of

San Benito , supra . In this appeal, as in earlier proc eedings, Kinney apparently has used Kempton (and her estate) merely “as his proxy or puppet in order to continue his career as a vexatious litigant.” ( In re Kinney , supra , 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 953-954.) As in earlier proceedings, Kinney “filed this appeal on behalf of Appellants—nonparties to this

action who have not demonstrat ed they are aggrieved by the trial court’s order.” ( Kinney
v. Clark
, supra , B253093 [nonpub. Order Dismissing Ap peal] at p. 3.) Although the nonparties are now represented by licensed counsel, their purported appeals must be

dismissed. On this record, both the Es tate of Kimberly Kempton, and the Estate of Harriet Kinney, lack standing to appeal from the Marc h 5, 2014 order. As to them, the appeal

must be dismissed. Kinney is represented by a licensed attorney as an individual appellant. For that reason he is eligible to challenge the award in this appeal despite his identification as a vexatious litigant. 10

reason notice to the estates was required, nor anything indicating an effort seeking relief from the absence of notice in the trial court. In the absence of a motion to intervene in the trial court, simply filing a notice of a ppeal in the estates’ names does not itself constitute an original proceeding for relief in this court, a nd does not confer this court with jurisdiction to h ear their appeal from the challenged order. ( Plaza Hollister Ltd. Partnership v. County of San Benito (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1, 13-22.)

10 In early May 2015, after this appeal was fully briefed but before it was heard and submitted for decision, this court rece ived substitutions of attorney, substituting10 B. Standards Of Review. Because Kinney does not challenge the existence of substantial evidence to support the challenged order awarding fees , we review de novo whether the award satisfies the legal requirements for such an order. ( Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213-1214; Carpenter & Zuckerman, LLP v. Cohen (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 373, 378.) The trial court’s resolu tion of factual issues, express and implied, must be affirmed if supporte d by substantial evidence, resolv ing all conflicts in favor of the respondent and indulging in all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s ruling. ( Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.Ap p.4th 624, 632; Heppler v.

J.M. Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1290.)
C. Kinney’s Contentions On Appeal.

1. Separation of the Levied Funds. Kinney argues that as a trus tee (attorney, executor, or co trustee) for his clients, he had no duty to segregate, labe l, or ortherwise mark the f unds on which Clark levied as subject to trust. We decline to address that question, for it has nothing to do with the validity of the order from whic h the appeal is taken. The order challenged in this appeal is the March 5, 2014 order granting $12,137.50 in additional fees incurred by Clark’s attorneys to enforce a previous award for fees and costs. The appellate record do es not identify any levy , nor does it show how any funds were or were not segregated or labe led. The only issue on appeal—the validity of the March 5, 2014 order—is unaffected by the manner or outcome of any subsequent levy.

2. Clark’s Right to Collect the Funds. Kinney argues that “Clark has failed to show how she or her attorneys have the right to funds under any order in BC354136 [listing three cost orders and two collection

attorney Nina Ringgold, in place of former attorney Charles Kinne y, as attorney for Judith Kempton as personal representative of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton; and substituting attorney Rosemary Amezcua-Moll, in place of former attorney Charles Kinney, as attorney for Charle s Kinney both individually and as Executor for the Estate of Harriet Kinney.11 orders]; or the right to obtain additional a ttorney’s fees and costs for any collection efforts [underscore in original].” For these propositions the opening brief sets forth five subsidiary points: (1) there is exclusive federal jurisdicti on; (2) a separate independent action is required; (3) there was no jurisdiction; (4) this is a violation of the discharge injunction; (5) the trustee has certain exclusive duties. We do not address Kinney’s prime conten tion, that Clark has failed to show her right to funds under any of the listed fee orders . This appeal is about the validity of the March 5, 2014 award. It is not about any other orders, or the collection of funds. Moreover, the burden is Kinne y’s to show error in the Ma rch 5, 2014 award—to show that Clark lacks a right to the award. As re spondent, Clark has no burden to show “how she or her attorneys have the right to funds under any orde r” in the underlying case. ( Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 [appealed order is presumed correct; error must be affirmatively shown].)

Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 provides for an award of reasonable and necessary costs of enforcing a judgment or order, including attorneys’ fees if the underlying judgment includes a fee award. Clark supported her motion for additional fees and costs with a supporting declaration, the sufficiency of which Kinney did not challenge in the trial court and does not challenge on appeal. Kinney has made no

contention that the fees awarde d in the March 5, 2014 order were not necessary, or that their amount was not justified. The other fe e awards to which his argument alludes are not before us in this appeal. We are unable to address Kinney’s sub-pa rt (1) contention, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for its March 5, 2014 order because “there is exclusive federal jurisdiction” based apparently on a bank ruptcy proceeding involving Clark. The argument contains no record citations, the re cord contains no documents identifying the bankruptcy proceeding, and the record cont ains no documents showing the scope of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction in any particular proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellate brief must “support a ny reference to matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”]; Lonely12 Maiden Productions, LLC, v. GoldenTree Asset Management, LP (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 368, 384; Dietz v. Meisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 779-801 [contentions on appeal are forfeited by failure to provide supporti ng record citations]; Liberty Nat’l Enterprises, L.P. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 839, 846 [failure to provide supporting record citations results in court’s disregard of unsupported assertions]; Dominguez v. Financial Indem. Co. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 388, 391 [court

does not consider asserted facts because brief fails to provide supporting record citations].) Kinney’s sub-part (2) argument contends that the appealed order is void because “a separate independent acti on is required.” Again, the argument rests upon supposed facts for which no record citations are provide d, and that apparently have no support in the record. For these reasons we again are unable to address the contention. Kinney contends in sub-part (3) of hi s argument that the appealed order is void because “there was no jurisdiction over in dependent non-judgment debtors.” The contention apparently is that the order is void because one of the appellants was not a party to the order or the motion on which it was based, and therefore that appellant’s funds cannot be subject to levy by Clark. Ab ove, we have determin ed that the nonparty appellants have no standing to ap peal from the order; and we have determined also that this appeal does not challenge any levy that might have followed the challenged order. In sub-part (4) of his argument Kinney contends that the order violated an unidentified discharge injuncti on (apparently of the bankru ptcy court). He cites no discharge injunction, nor does he identify any facts that would support his claim of error. Again, we are unable to address the issue. In sub-part (5) of his argument Kinney asserts that Clark has shown no right to

collect the funds that the a ppealed order awards, becaus e “the trustee has certain exclusive duties.” The argumen t purports to make various points of bankruptcy law, closing with the contention that two contra cts (the 2005 contract for the purchase of Clark’s residence, and Clark’s 2007 retenti on agreement with her attorneys) could be

determined to be void if th ey were not affirmed by the bankruptcy trustee; and the13 assertion that in fact the agreements were not affirmed. But the reco rd provides us with

no basis on which to determine whether the re ferenced contracts are or are not vulnerable to that (or any other challenge), in some fo rum. They are not, however, vulnerable to challenge in this appeal. The identified contracts are not part of the record on appeal. Nothing in the record indicates whether they have or have not been affirmed in any required manner, nor what such an affirmation would entail. We have no basis on which

to address these contentions.
3. Kinney Cannot Use this Appeal to Collatera lly Attack Previous Appealable Judgments or Orders. Kinney contends that Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040 authorizes fee awards (such as the March 5, 2014 order) only if a valid order or judgment underlies the award; and he contends that there is no “v alid” order underlying the March 5, 2014 fee award, because the validity of the order und erlying that award “i s being determined by the prior appeals B248713, B253093, and/or B258399, the BAP appeal, and/or ongoing federal cases.” Kinney is wro ng both as a matter of fact, and as a matter of law. He is wrong as a matter of fact, because he fails to show that the validity of the order underlying the March 5, 2014 fee award remain s to be determined, either in the cited appeals or in any other forum. And he is wro ng on the law, because he fails to show that an appeal in any such case w ould render the trial court unable to enter its March 5, 2014

order.

We take notice of the three state-court appeals on which Kinney relies to show the March 5, 2014 order’s vulnerability. In case No. B248713, a now-final decision of Division Two of this court affirmed the $167, 678.50 award in Clark’s favor for fees and costs, modifying the award to specify that both Kinney and Ke mpton are jointly and severally liable for its payment. ( Kempton v. Clark
, supra , B248713.) 11

11 The decision also affirmed the trial cour t’s denial of Kinney’s motion to vacate an order declaring Kempt on a vexatious litigant. ( Kempton v. Clark
, supra , B248713, at pp. 2, 14-15.)14 The appeal in case No. B253 093 is also final, and canno t fulfill Kinney’s hope that underlying orders will be rendered void and c ontracts will be rescinded. This court dismissed the appeal in case No. B253093 on December 31, 2014, and Supreme Court review was denied (S224323). This cour t’s remittitur issued March 19, 2015. ( Kinney et.
al. v. Clark
, supra , B253093.) 12 Of the three state appeals relied on by Kinney for rescission of the 2005 and 2007 agreements, only case No. B258399 remains pend ing. Kinney’s brief characterizes that appeal as being from a June 20, 2014 order allowing Clark to seize “about $11,354.10” for fees and costs awarded July 31, 2013. Bu t Kinney is not a party to that appeal, nor does he offer any explanation or authority to show how that (or any other) pending appeal could render the March 5, 2014 fee award invalid . Nothing in the record fills that gap. He therefore is again incorrect both on the fa cts and on the law, for his appeal fails to show any way in which the trial court erre d by entering the challenged March 5, 2014

order. Indeed, Kinney’s appeal and argument all but ignores the March 5, 2014 fee award, focusing instead on “improper efforts . . . to collect ” on that award—collection

efforts that are not reflected in the record and are not before us in this appeal. His brief’s statement of conclusion, identifying as “‘void ’ orders” all the cost awards entered after the 2005 purchase contract and Clark’s 2007 retainer agreement with her attorneys, confirms that his appeal is actually intended as a collateral attack on orders going all the way back to the 2008 dismissal of Kinney’s suit against Clark. But despite his assertions that a score of previous judgments, orders, a nd contracts are void, they remain in place; Kinney has not shown how they can or will be set aside.

12 In the trial court Kinney identified only case No. B25 3093 as qualifying for an automatic stay of the court’s po wer to rule on the fee motion. Kinney characterizes that case as an appeal from an orde r for attorneys’ fees and costs of $9,850.00 in favor of Clark and her attorneys. It was in fact an appeal from an order denying Kinney’s claim of exemption and allowing a release of a levy against Kinney’s funds to pay a December 15, 2008 award for fees and costs. ( Charles Kinney et al. v. Clark
, supra , B253093.)15 Nor do pending appeals from earlier orde rs—in either state or federal courts— preclude the court’s authority to enter the Marc h 5, 2014 order. Unless a stay is obtained, bankruptcy and other federal c ourt orders ordinarily are enforceable when issued, despite a pending appeal, and Kinney’s attempts to obtain a stay were unsuccessful. (See fn. 1, above, judicial notice items 2 & 3.) The Nint h Circuit appeal is t hus no impediment. Code of Civil Procedure section 916, s ubdivision (a), on which Kinney relies to argue that collections are stayed pending stat e-court appeals, does not address or affect the trial court’s authority to enter a fee award. Rather, it prov ides that (if and when it is applicable at all) the appea ling party need not post an under taking to stay the order’s enforcement . ( Nielsen v. Stumbos (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 301, 303-304.) 13 The March 5, 2014 order entered a fee award; it did not provide for the award’s enforcement or collection. Kinney’s appeal wholly fails to show that the trial court lacked authority to enter that order. More over, we are bound by previo us rulings in this and related cases, that “[n]eith er Kinney nor Kempton have standing to question Clark’s

consent to the lien in her contract with her a ttorneys, and that the pa rties were ordered by the bankruptcy court to litigate their disputes, including their fee claims, in state court. ( Kempton v. Clark
, supra , B248713, at p. 12.) More to the point, even if Kinney could es tablish that the earlier orders could in

the future be determined to be void, they nevertheless have not been found void. They

are valid until determined otherwise. We agree with Presiding Justice Boren’s

determination in In re Kinney , supra , that notwithstanding his long record of unsuccessful litigation and appeals, Kinney “continues to sue and to appe al, wasting vast quantities of judicial resources and taxpaye r money to process his absurd and unsupported claims.” (201 Cal.App.4th at p. 960.) Nothing in Kinney’s asser tions about void orders reve als any error in the trial court’s entry of the March 5, 2014 order. That is Kinney’s burden on appeal.

13 We express no opinion whether Kinn ey would be entitled to a stay of enforcement of any judgment or order by virt ue of Code of Civil Procedure sections 916 and 917.1, as he has argued he is.16 Conclusion The Estate of Kimberly Ke mpton and the Estate of Harri et Kinney lack standing to appeal from the March 5, 2014 order, and thei r appeals from it must be dismissed. The March 5, 2014 order from which Kinney app eals does not violate any stay imposed by order or statute, and was within the authority of the trial court to enter in Clark’s favor. It

must be affirmed.

We have not been asked to , nor do we, determine whether Kinney’s appeal, or his efforts on behalf of the parties he purports to represent in this appeal, are frivolous, vexatious, or deserving of sanctions.

Disposition The appeals of Judith Kempton as pe rsonal representative of the Estate of Kimberly Kempton, and Charles Kinney as Executor for the Es tate of Harriet Kinney, are dismissed. The March 5, 2014 order of the s uperior court, awarding fees and costs in the amount of $12,137.50, incurred by Michele Clark in connection with her efforts to enforce her judgment against Ch arles Kinney, is affirmed.

Clark is entitled to rec over her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

CHANEY, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

JOHNSON, J.