SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4894-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GEORGE M. BALLOUTINE,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________________

Submitted September 14, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and DeAlmeida.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 17-03-0497.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for 

respondent (William P. Miller, Assistant Prosecutor, of 

counsel and on the brief; Catherine A. Foddai, Legal 

Assistant, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 5, 2020
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A-4894-17T4

Tried by a jury, defendant George M. Balloutine was found guilty of thirddegree distribution of a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"), specifically 

testosterone propionate, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(13) (count one); thirddegree possession of testosterone propionate, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count 

two); third-degree distribution of another CDS, heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) 

and -5(b)(3) (count 3); and third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

10(a)(1) (count four).

The trial court sentenced defendant on count three to an extended term of 

seven years with a three-year parole disqualifier, and a concurrent term of four 

years on count one. The other counts merged for sentencing purposes. 

In this direct appeal, defendant principally challenges the sufficiency of 

the identification evidence presented by the State, and the incompleteness of the 

charges on identification the court provided to the jury. Defendant also contends

that the trial court prejudicially allowed a testifying detective to convey hearsay 

information from others without an opportunity for those declarants to be crossexamined. 

Lastly, the State points out in its brief that duplicative fines and penalties 

were imposed on the two merged counts, and that the judgment of conviction 

should be amended accordingly. 
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For the reasons that follow, we vacate defendant's convictions and remand

for a new trial because of critical omissions from the jury charge on the pivotal 

identification issues in this case. 

I.

The State's proofs at trial may be summarized as follows. In essence, the 

State's theory of the case was that defendant was a drug dealer who had been 

referred to by a confidential informant as a man named "George." The State 

further established that an undercover officer from the county prosecutor's office 

purchased steroids from a person believed to be "George" on one occasion and 

purchased heroin from the same man five days later. Defendant contended that 

he had been mistakenly identified as the drug-dealing "George," and presented 

three alibi witnesses who testified defendant had been with relatives on the 

evening of the second drug sale.

The State's key witness was the undercover detective who had purchased 

the steroids and heroin. During his testimony, the detective recounted that on 

June 17, 2015, he had "received information" from a confidential informant that 

a person named "George" had been illegally selling drugs, and that the seller 

lived at a certain address on Clark Street in Garfield. The detective was not 

supplied with any additional identifying information at that time. 
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A-4894-17T4

The undercover detective then went with the informant to the Clark Street 

address. He told the informant to contact "George" and let him know a drug 

purchaser was outside. The informant made that call as requested, in the 

detective's presence, and then left the detective's vehicle.

A few minutes later, a man described by the detective in his report as a 

"middle-aged" white male with gray and black hair wearing a hat, emerged from 

the building and got into the detective's car. According to the detective, he told 

the man he wanted to buy steroids from him. The man handed him the steroids 

in exchange for $430. Before the man left the car, the detective told him he 

wanted to buy more drugs from him in the future. 

After this June 17 drug purchase, the undercover detective that same day 

went back to the prosecutor's office to try to ascertain the name of the "George" 

who had sold him the steroids. He conducted what he termed "an in-house 

inquiry," and obtained the names of persons who resided at the Clark Street 

residence. The detective was advised by a Garfield police officer that a person 

named George Balloutine resided there. The detective entered that name into a 

database of driver's licenses, and pulled up a color photograph of George 

Balloutine. According to the detective, the license photo appeared to match the 

person who had sold him the steroids. As we will discuss, infra, in Part II, the 

license photo was not introduced into evidence at trial.
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The detective then arranged a second meeting to purchase a different drug, 

this time heroin. He made the arrangements directly himself by calling a cell 

phone number that subsequently proved to belong to defendant. According to 

the detective, he and the seller agreed to meet on June 22 outside the same Clark 

Street address. This time, the detective was equipped with an audio recorder.

When he arrived for the second meeting, the detective called the cell 

phone number again. According to the detective, the same person who he had 

bought drugs from on June 17 emerged from the building, again wearing a hat. 

The man got into the detective's car. The detective said he wanted to buy a large 

quantity of heroin to sell to others. 

After discussion, the suspect agreed to obtain a sample of heroin for the 

detective. Later that evening on June 22, the detective returned to the Clark 

Street residence, from which the same suspect emerged. The suspect got into 

the detective's car and gave him, without receiving payment, three packets of 

heroin to sample. At that point, the suspect left the car and the detective drove 

away.

The detective returned to his office, where he field-tested the substances. 

He also downloaded the audio recording of his two meetings with the seller that 

day. The detective testified that a voice on the recordings was the same voice 

of the man who had given him the drugs. Laboratory tests by the State Police 
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confirmed that clear liquid in the vials was testosterone propionate, and the 

product in the glassine packets was heroin.

Defendant was subsequently arrested eighteen months later and charged 

with the various CDS offenses we have already noted. 

At the ensuing trial, the State presented testimony from the undercover 

detective, who described his investigation and his interactions with the 

informant and the drug seller. The detective identified defendant in the 

courtroom as the person who had sold him the steroids two-and-a-half years 

earlier on June 17 and the heroin on June 22. The State played the audiotapes 

from June 22 for the jury. The State also presented testimony from a lab chemist 

verifying the nature of the tested substances. The confidential informant did not 

testify.

Defendant did not testify in his own defense. However, he presented alibi 

testimony from his brother, his mother, and a friend. With some slight variations 

of the exact times, they each corroborated that, on the evening of June 22, 

defendant was at his mother's house during the time the State claimed he was on 

Clark Street dealing in the heroin. 

As noted, the jury convicted defendant on all counts of the indictment. On 

appeal, defendant offers the following arguments for our consideration: 
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POINT I

WHERE DEFENDANT MAINTAINED THAT HE 

WAS "FALSELY IDENTIFIED" AND PRESENTED 

ALIBI WITNESSES, THE TRIAL COURT 

COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR BY ALLOWING THE 

STATE TO PROVE THAT THE DETECTIVE MADE 

AN OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF 

DEFENDANT'S PHOTOGRAPH, WITHOUT 

PRODUCING THE PHOTOGRAPH IN COURT, AND 

THEN GIVING AN IDENTIFICATION CHARGE 

THAT PROVIDED NO GUIDANCE ON HOW TO 

EVALUATE THE RELIABILITY OF THE OUT-OFCOURT IDENTIFICATION AND OMMITTED [SIC]

RELEVANT "ESTIMATOR VARIABLES" 

CRITICAL TO DETERMINING THE RELIABILITY 

OF THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION.

POINT II

REVERSAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE THE 

IMPROPER INTRODUCTION OF INADMISSIBLE 

AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL HEARSAY 

VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO 

CONFRONTATION AND HAD THE CLEAR 

CAPACITY TO LEAD THE JURY TO A RESULT IT 

OTHERWISE WOULD NOT HAVE REACHED. 

II.

A.

Defendant argues the trial court erred by allowing the detective to testify 

about his out-of-court identification without producing the photograph upon 

which identification was based. In addition, defendant argues the trial court 

erred by not giving the combined model "out-of-court and in-court"
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identification charge, which includes additional factors for the jury to consider 

when assessing such identifications. 

In approaching these related issues, we are guided by our Supreme Court's 

landmark opinion on eyewitness identification in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 

208 (2011). In Henderson, the Court examined a variety of factors that, 

according to scientific studies, can confound what otherwise might appear to be 

an eyewitness's reliable identification of a criminal wrongdoer. Id. at 218. 

These confounding factors noted in Henderson include so-called "system 

variables" (factors within the control of the criminal justice system, such as 

suggestive aspects of lineup and photo array procedures) and "estimator 

variables" (factors outside of the control of the criminal justice system, such as 

the distance between a victim and an assailant, poor lighting, stress, personal 

characteristics, and memory decay). Ibid. Given these variables, which can lead 

to the conviction of a misidentified innocent person, Henderson instructs that 

"courts must carefully consider identification evidence before it is admitted to 

weed out unreliable identifications, and . . . juries must receive thorough 

instructions tailored to the facts . . . to evaluate the identification evidence they 

hear." Id. at 302. 

In order to address such reliability concerns, the Court in Henderson

prospectively "revise[d] the State's framework for evaluating eyewitness 
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identification evidence." Id. at 287. Among other things, the Court elected to 

modify, see id. at 285-96, the applicable legal standard regarding eyewitness 

identification admissibility, formerly known as the "Manson/Madison" test. See

generally Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (reciting a two-part 

test of impressive suggestiveness and reliability); see also State v. Madison, 109 

N.J. 223, 232-33 (1988) (adopting the federal approach in Manson to guide the 

courts of this State), abrogated by Henderson, 208 N.J. at 208.

In particular, the Court in Henderson discredited three of the 

Manson/Madison reliability factors (the opportunity to view the crime, the 

witness's degree of attention, and the witness's level of certainty at the time of 

the identification) because they are self-reporting elements that can be skewed 

by suggestive police procedures. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 286.

As directed by the Court in Henderson, id. at 219, special model jury 

instructions were adopted in 2012 to guide jurors on these critical concepts for 

both out-of-court and in-court identifications. See Model Jury Charges 

(Criminal), "Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identifications" (2012);

Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In-Court Identification Only" 

(2012); Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Out-of-Court Identification Only" 

(2012).
10 A-4894-17T4

These instructions, which became effective years before the instant trial, 

provide jurors with an enhanced explanation of the scientifically known factors 

that can result in a misidentification. As the Court stated in Henderson, "it is 

essential to educate jurors about factors that can lead to misidentifications." Id.

at 303. The use of enhanced model jury charges on identification in criminal 

trials "is a critical step in the overall scheme." Ibid.

Here, the detective who obtained the drugs from the seller on the two 

occasions in question first ascertained the identity of the seller out of court. He

then reaffirmed the identity of that seller as defendant in an in-court 

identification. The trial court provided the jurors with portions of only the 

model charge on in-court identifications, and did not give them the different 

"combined" model charge that includes guidance on out-of-court identifications. 

That latter model charge includes several components that are important to the 

detective's identification in this case.

First, with respect to "system variables," the omitted model charge 

addresses several facets that can affect whether the out-of-court identification

was "the result of a suggestive procedure." Model Charges, "In-Court and Outof-Court Identifications" at 6. Among other things, the charge asks jurors to 

consider whether the eyewitness who made the identification was exposed to 

"information or influence, that may have affected the independence of his/her 
11 A-4894-17T4

identification." Id. at 6-8. If, as here, the identification involved the viewing of 

a photograph, the jury would be advised of the qualitative differences between 

a single-photo identification procedure, as contrasted with one using a multiphoto array. 

As the Court has more recently observed, a single-photo identification 

procedure is essentially a "show-up," which can be "inherently suggestive." 

State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587, 592 (2018); see also Model Charges, "In-Court 

and Out-of-Court Identifications" at 7 (describing a "showup" as "a procedure 

[that] is suggestive in nature"). In Pressley, the Court noted, for example, that

it would have been preferable if the undercover officer who made a single-photo 

identification of the defendant in Manson after making a controlled purchase of 

drugs had instead been presented with a photo array containing a "reasonable 

number of persons" who looked like the suspect. 232 N.J. at 591 (quoting 

Manson, 432 U.S. at 117).

In this case, the jury could have reasonably found that the single-photo 

procedure used by the detective, based on defendant's driver's license, was 

inherently suggestive. Or at least the jury might have given less weight to the 

probative force of that identification, based on the sequence of events. 

Before making the first drug transaction, the detective had already been 

supplied with hearsay information from the informant that the drug seller at the 
12 A-4894-17T4

location was known as "George." The testifying detective was also told by a 

Garfield detective that a person named "George Balloutine" lived at the Clark 

Street address. The detective also learned that the person in the single driver's 

license photograph he looked at was named "George Balloutine" and resided 

there. The detective had no other basis to believe the suspect he interacted with 

was defendant. Although the jury possibly may have considered this to be a 

reasonable and fair method to identify the seller, it likewise could have found -

- after receiving proper instructions from the court -- that the process was too 

fraught with suggestive aspects to be reliable.

In addition, for reasons that are unclear from the record, 1the trial court 

left out key portions of the charge on in-court identification explaining the 

pitfalls of disguises, changed appearances, and prior descriptions of a 

perpetrator. These unexplained omissions deprived the jurors of learning from 

the court, in an objective manner, about the "estimator variables" that could have 

affected the detective's out-of-court identification. 

1 Unfortunately, the charge conference that apparently took place in the 

afternoon on the next-to-last day of trial on January 18, 2018 was not 

transcribed. The transcribed discussion of the charge that took place the 

following day, January 19, does not reveal why the court and counsel omitted 

the combined model charge on identification, and why the sections of the incourt charge that concern disguises, changed appearances, and prior descriptions 

of a perpetrator were skipped over. 
13 A-4894-17T4

Among other things, the charge would have explained to the jurors the 

perils of such elements as "disguises," "changed appearances," and "prior 

description[s] of the perpetrator." In particular, the jury could have benefited 

from the following passages in the model instruction:

The perpetrator's use of a disguise can affect a witness's 

ability both to remember and identify the perpetrator. 

Disguises like hats, sunglasses, or masks can reduce the 

accuracy of an identification. 

***

Another factor for your consideration is the accuracy of 

any description the witness gave after observing the 

incident and before identifying the perpetrator. Facts 

that may be relevant to this factor include whether the 

prior description matched the photo or person picked 

out later, whether the prior description provided details 

or was just general in nature, and whether the witness's 

testimony at trial was consistent with, or different from, 

his/her prior description of the perpetrator.

[Model Charges, "In Court and Out-of-Court 

Identifications" at 5 (emphasis added).]

These "estimator variables" were highly relevant in this case because, as 

defense counsel argued in summation, the fact that the seller was wearing a hat 

and the fact that the detective included in his police report a rather sparse 

description of the seller's clothing but no description of the seller's physical 

characteristics reasonably suggested the officer did not get a sufficient look at 

the seller to make a positive identification. Without an instruction from the 
14 A-4894-17T4

judge that those factors were relevant and should be considered, the jury could 

have improperly concluded that defense counsel's argument had no merit or was 

not supported by legal or scientific authority.

We are mindful that defendant's trial attorney did not object to the 

omission of the combined model jury charge and these important considerations 

on the reliability of an out-of-court identification. To be sure, the court did read 

some, but not all, of the pertinent portions of the model charge on in-court 

identification. But that did not suffice, particularly given that in-court 

identifications can be influenced by tainted out-of-court identifications made by 

the same eyewitness. 

It is well established that jury charges must provide a "comprehensible 

explanation of the questions that the jury must determine, including the law of 

the case applicable to the facts that the jury may find." State v. Green, 86 N.J. 

281, 287-88 (1981). Thus, "[t]he charge as a whole must be accurate." State v. 

Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012). This is because "[a]ppropriate and proper 

charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial." Green, 86 N.J. at 287. 

More specifically, as is germane here, "[w]hen identification is a 'key 

issue,' the trial court must instruct the jury how to assess the evidence—even if

defendant does not request the charge." State v. Sanchez-Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 

466 (2018). A "missing instruction on identification is reviewed for plain 
15 A-4894-17T4

error[,]" id. at 468, and is evaluated in light of "the strength and quality of the 

State's corroborative evidence rather than on whether defendant's 

misidentification argument is convincing." State v. Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 326

(2005). Under the plain error standard, the error must be "clearly capable of 

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.

We cannot fairly conclude that the absence of the combined model 

instruction on in-court and out-of-court identifications in this case and the 

omission of the portions on disguises, changed appearances, and prior 

descriptions was inconsequential. The case turned entirely on identification. 

Defendant (and, as to the second transaction, his alibi witnesses) contended he 

was not the drug seller and that he had been misidentified. 

There were no third-party witnesses who saw the transactions. The State 

did not offer into evidence a screenshot or copy of the driver's license photo that 

the detective viewed in order to make his identification. We do not know how 

old that photo was, or how much it resembled defendant's appearance as of June 

2015. Although it was not essential for the State to have moved that photograph 

into evidence, its absence further reduces the probative force of the State's 

identification testimony. 

Lastly on this subject, we reject the State's assertion that any defect 

stemming from the omission of the model charge was cured by the arguments 
16 A-4894-17T4

made by defense counsel in summation discussing flaws in the identification 

processes. The words of a lawyer in summation are no substitute for the 

guidance provided from the mouth of a judge. See State v. Adams, 194 N.J. 

186, 207 (2008). Moreover, the jurors were told, as is customary, that they were 

entitled to disbelieve the arguments and statements the lawyers made to them. 

Not so with respect to a judge's instructions, which we presume the jurors must 

and will obey.

Because the omission of this critical model jury charge in this case had a 

clear capacity to lead to an unjust result, R. 2:10-2, that plain error requires a 

new trial. 

B.

Defendant separately argues the trial court deprived him of a fair trial, by 

allowing the detective to convey, through his testimony, various hearsay 

statements made by others. Because defendant's trial counsel did not raise such 

a hearsay objection, our review is guided by the plain error standard. State v. 

Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 353 (2005). We discern no such plain error and are 

unpersuaded any alleged hearsay violations were clearly capable of producing 

an unjust result. 

Defendant argues the prosecution violated the restrictions of State v. 

Bankston, 63 N.J. 263 (1973), by eliciting testimony from the detective that 
17 A-4894-17T4

conveyed information he learned from other people. We disagree. The 

principles of Bankston permit a police officer to testify that he went to a crime 

scene or approached a suspect based "upon information received" in order for 

the State to show the officer had not acted in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 268. 

By contrast, the hearsay rule is violated when an officer becomes more specific 

by repeating what some other person told him, in a manner that suggests or 

implies to the jury that "he possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, 

that incriminates the defendant." Branch, 182 N.J. at 351. 

The detective's testimony about what he had been told by the confidential 

informant did not go into details about the specifics of the alleged drug dealing 

that had been occurring in Garfield, nor the informant's basis of his knowledge. 

At most, the detective related that the informant had told him a person named 

"George" had been distributing drugs in the area. The disclosure was relevant 

to explaining how the police became involved in investigating the matter. The 

detective never stated or implied that the informant was asserting that this 

particular person was the drug seller. Even if the testimony were viewed as 

being offered for its truth, the limited disclosures were not manifestly prejudicial 

to amount to a denial of a fair trial or a material deprivation of the accused's

right to confrontation. The testimony was not unfairly prejudicial under 

N.J.R.E. 403.
18 A-4894-17T4

Additionally, the detective's testimony about conversations between 

defendant and the informant that he overheard does not violate the hearsay rule,

because defendant's own statements are admissible as assertions by a partyopponent. N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). Likewise, out-of-court statements that the 

detective himself made when he was arranging the meetings with the drug dealer 

could appropriately be conveyed to the jury by the detective as part of his own 

narrative, as to which he had personal knowledge. See N.J.R.E. 602. 

The detective's testimony that he learned from another person that a drug 

seller was at the Clark Street address does not require reversal, because the 

detective subsequently gained personal knowledge of drug dealing there by 

taking part in the two drug transfers at that location. Also, there was no hearsay 

violation stemming from the detective's testimony about calling the cell phone 

number to arrange the meetings with the seller, because the number itself is not 

an assertive statement, and the detective's conduct in calling the number is an 

action, not a statement. See N.J.R.E. 801(a) (defining a "statement" to 

encompass only actions that are intended to be assertive).

In any event, even if we were to regard portions of the detective's 

testimony to cross the hearsay boundaries, we are unconvinced those matters, 

which were not objected to by trial counsel, were so prejudicial as to require 

appellate relief. Had the jury been properly instructed on eyewitness 
19 A-4894-17T4

identification principles, we are satisfied there is ample non-hearsay 

incriminating evidence in this record -- including the detective's first-hand 

account of the two drug transfers, the audio recordings, and the CDS itself -- to 

sustain defendant's conviction.2

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

2

 If, hypothetically, a new trial was not required, the judgment of conviction 

must be amended to remove the duplicative fines and penalties, as noted in the 

State's brief.