China’s Industrial and Military 

Robotics Development 

by

Jonathan Ray, Katie Atha, Edward Francis, Caleb Dependahl, 

Dr. James Mulvenon, Daniel Alderman, and Leigh Ann Ragland-Luce

Research Report Prepared on Behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 

Commission

October 2016
i

Disclaimer:

This research report was prepared at the request of the Commission to support its deliberations.

Posting of the Report to the Commission's website is intended to promote greater public 

understanding of the issues addressed by the Commission in its ongoing assessment of U.S.-China 

economic relations and their implications for U.S. security, as mandated by Public Law 106-398 

and Public Law 113-291. However, it does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the 

Commission or any individual Commissioner of the views or conclusions expressed in this 

commissioned research report.
ii

About Defense Group Incorporated

Defense Group Inc. (DGI) performs work in the national interest, advancing public safety and 

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About CIRA

This project was conducted within DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (CIRA), 

the premier open source and cultural intelligence exploitation cell for the U.S. intelligence 

community. Staffed by an experienced team of cleared analysts with advanced language skills, 

CIRA’s mission is to provide cutting-edge, open source, and cultural intelligence support to the 

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of achieving national strategic objectives. CIRA accomplishes its mission through the conduct of 

objective, independent, and relevant research and analysis under strict quality guidelines.

Comments may be sent to the vice president of the Intelligence Division, Dr. James Mulvenon.

Dr. James Mulvenon

Vice President, Intelligence Division

Director, Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (CIRA) 

Defense Group, Incorporated

2650 Park Tower Drive, Suite 300

Vienna, VA 22180

TEL: 571-421-8359

Email: James.Mulvenon@defensegp.com 
iii

Acronyms

Acronym Full Name

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial

ACTUV Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel

AFM Atomic Force Microscopy

AGIC Asia-Germany Industrial Promotion Capital

AI Artificial Intelligence

AIP Air-Independent Propulsion

AMP Advanced Manufacturing Partnership

ARV Autonomous and Remotely Operated Vehicle

ASBM Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

AUV Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

AVIC Aviation Industry Corporation of China

AWS Amazon Web Services

BAT Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent

BINN Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing Institute of Nanoenergy and Nanosystems

BIS Bureau of Industry Security

BIT Beijing Institute of Technology

BUAA Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

CAA Chinese Association of Automation

CAAI Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence

CAC Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group

CADI Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute

CAE Chinese Academy of Engineering

CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences

CASIC China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

CAST China Association for Science and Technology

CCF China Computer Federation

CCW Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

CMIF China Machinery Industry Federation

CMS China Military Science

CNC Computer Numerical Control

COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls

CRIA China Robot Industry Alliance

CSIC China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DLMU Dalian Maritime University

DOJ United States Department of Justice

DSV Deep Sea Submergence Vehicle

EMW Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare

EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal

FYP Five Year Plan

GAD General Armament Department

GM General Motors

GPS Global Positioning System

GPU Graphics Processing Unit

GSD People’s Liberation Army General Staff Department

HEU Harbin Engineering University

HIT Harbin Institute of Technology

HRG Harbin Institute of Technology Robot Group
iv

IFR International Federation of Robotics

IIM Institute of Intelligent Machines

IPR Intellectual Property Rights

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

IT Information Technology

ITA International Trade Administration

LAWS Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems

MEMS Microelectromechanical Systems

MHC Meaningful Human Control

MIIT Ministry of Industry and Information Technology

MLP National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology

MOST Ministry of Science and Technology

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDRC National Development and Reform Commission

NORINCO China North Industries Group Corporation

NSFC Natural Science Foundation of China

NUAA Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

NUDT National University of Defense Technology

NWPU Northwest Polytechnic University

OS Operating System

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLARF People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force

PLC Programmable Logic Controller

PRC People’s Republic of China

R&D Research and Development

RI Research Institute

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

RMB Renminbi

ROUV Remotely Operated Underwater Vehicles

ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle

S&T Science and Technology

SADI Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute

SASAC State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

SASTIND State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence

SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SEAD Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses

SIA Shenyang Institute of Automation

SMS Science of Military Strategy

SMU Shanghai Maritime University

SVAIL Baidu Silicon Valley AI Laboratory

TCAIPR China Computer Federation Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition Committee

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UCAV Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle

U.S. United States

USD United States Dollar

USITC United States International Trade Commission

USV Unmanned Surface Vehicle

UUV Unmanned Underwater Vehicle

VC Venture Capital
v

WFOE Wholly Owned Foreign-Owned Enterprise
vi

Contents

About Defense Group Incorporated............................................................................................ ii

About CIRA................................................................................................................................... ii

Acronyms......................................................................................................................................iii

Executive Summary...................................................................................................................... 9

Recommendations....................................................................................................................... 12

Scope and Limitations ................................................................................................................ 14

Introduction................................................................................................................................. 15

Chapter One: Industrial Robotics in China ............................................................................. 17

History and Political Support for China’s Industrial Robots............................................. 18

History of Industrial Robots in China................................................................................... 18

Chinese Leadership Openly Supports Industrial Robotics ................................................... 21

Chinese Policies for Industrial Robots are Equally Ambitious ............................................ 22

Overall Trends in China’s Adoption of Industrial Robots ................................................. 26

Characteristics and Leading Industries of China’s Robotics Market.................................... 27

China’s Robotics Industry Remains Comparatively Underdeveloped ................................. 29

Problems in China’s Industrial Robotics Industry and Research...................................... 30

Lack of Elite Talent .............................................................................................................. 31

Lack of Balance between Basic and Applied Research........................................................ 31

Poor Quality of Domestically Produced Systems................................................................. 32

Intense Competition among Chinese Companies................................................................. 32

Chinese Consumers Not Using Robots Made in China ........................................................ 32

Dependency on Imports for Key Components and Technologies........................................ 33

Chinese Robotics Software Development ............................................................................. 33

Impact on Chinese and Global Labor Markets ................................................................... 34

Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Industrial Robot Exporters ................................. 35

Leading Industrial Robot Companies and R&D Entities................................................... 37

Siasun (沈阳新松机器人自动化股份有限公司) ................................................................ 37

Harbin Boshi Automation (哈尔滨博实自动化设备有限责任公司) ................................. 38

Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry (北京机械工业自动化所)

............................................................................................................................................... 39

Shougang Motoman Robot Co. Ltd. (首钢莫托曼机器人有限公司) ................................. 40

China Robot Industry Alliance (中国机器人产业联盟)...................................................... 40

Chapter Two: Service Robots in China .................................................................................... 42

Policy Guidance Specific to the Service Robot Sector......................................................... 43

Service Robot Economic Trends............................................................................................ 44

Chinese Organizations Involved in Service Robot Research and Development............... 45

Chapter Three: China’s Military Robotics and Unmanned Systems.................................... 48

Chinese Assessments and Choices for Unmanned Systems ................................................ 49

Chinese Leadership and Policies Supporting Unmanned Systems....................................... 49

A “New Stage” in the World Revolution in Military Affairs............................................... 50
vii

“Remote-Controlled Warfare”: Chinese Assessments of U.S. Unmanned Systems Experience 

and Applications ................................................................................................................... 52

Chinese Reaction to the Third Offset.................................................................................... 55

Is “Unmanned” Unethical? Chinese Considerations for Unmanned Systems...................... 56

Applications for China’s Unmanned Systems...................................................................... 59

Research and Production of Chinese Military Robotics..................................................... 62

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles................................................................................................... 62

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles.......................................................................................... 65

Unmanned Surface Vehicles................................................................................................. 68

Unmanned Ground Vehicles................................................................................................. 70

Chinese Countermeasures against U.S. Unmanned Systems.............................................. 72

Chapter Four: Artificial Intelligence ........................................................................................ 75

Global and Chinese Interest in Artificial Intelligence ......................................................... 75

Chinese Government Support for AI Research ................................................................... 76

AI Trends in China ................................................................................................................. 78

Chinese AI Academic Research and Publications ............................................................... 80

Leading AI Companies, Professional and Research Associations, and Academic and 

Research Institutes.................................................................................................................. 80

Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence (CAAI; 中国人工智能学会)..................... 80

China Robot Industry Alliance (CRIA; 中国机器人产业联盟).......................................... 82

Turing Robot (图灵机器人) ................................................................................................. 82

HIT Robot Group (HRG), Intelligent Cloud Robot Business Unit (哈工大机器人集团智能

云机器人事业部) ................................................................................................................. 83

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Institute of Intelligent Machines (IIM; 中国科学院合

肥智能机械研究所) ............................................................................................................. 84

Military AI Applications ........................................................................................................ 85

Partnerships with U.S. Companies........................................................................................ 86

Baidu Silicon Valley AI Lab (SVAIL; 百度美国硅谷研发中心)....................................... 86

Dell and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS; 中国科学院)........................................ 87

Chapter Five: Nanorobotics....................................................................................................... 89

Trends in Nanorobotics Research and Applications ........................................................... 89

Chinese Government Support for Nanorobotics Research................................................. 90

Military Applications for Nanorobotics................................................................................ 92

Leading Chinese Nanorobotics Professional Associations, Research Institutes, and 

Companies ............................................................................................................................... 92

CAS Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA; 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所) ............... 92

Chapter Six: China’s Acquisition of Foreign Robotics Technology ...................................... 95

Illicit Technology Acquisition ................................................................................................ 95

Cyber Intrusions.................................................................................................................... 95

Export Control Violations..................................................................................................... 96

Informal Knowledge and Technology Transfers................................................................. 98

Open Source Collection ........................................................................................................ 98

Talent Acquisition............................................................................................................... 101

Academic Exchanges and Professional Conferences ......................................................... 102
viii

Formal Technology Acquisition and Investments ............................................................. 104

Haiyin Capital ..................................................................................................................... 104

AGIC Capital ...................................................................................................................... 105

Midea Group ....................................................................................................................... 105

Other Recent Acquisitions and Investments....................................................................... 106

Chapter Seven: Implications and Recommendations for the United States ....................... 107

Appendix I: Leading Industrial and Service Robotics Manufacturers, Research Institutes, 

and Professional Associations in China .................................................................................. 112

Appendix II: Leading Chinese Research Institutes and Producers of Military Robotics and 

Unmanned Systems................................................................................................................... 116

Appendix III: Leading Artificial Intelligence Companies, Professional Associations, and 

Research Institutes in China.................................................................................................... 124

Appendix IV: Leading Chinese Nanorobotics Institutions................................................... 130
9

Executive Summary

China’s commercial and military robotics industries are rapidly growing in size and quality as the 

country upgrades its manufacturing sector and military capabilities. In 2013, China surpassed 

Japan to become the world’s largest market for industrial robots, and by 2018 will account for over 

a third of the industrial robots installed worldwide. China’s military is also fielding larger numbers 

of increasingly capable unmanned systems in the air, land, and sea domains that may bolster its 

anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. To support both commercial and military systems, 

China is investing heavily in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and 

nanotechnology that will fundamentally change the capabilities of these systems.

The growth of China’s robotics industry presents opportunities and challenges to U.S. economic 

and security interests. Chinese demand for industrial robots and high-end robotic components as 

well as U.S.-China bilateral investment in AI research all present market and collaboration 

opportunities for the United States. However, industrial robots may also improve the 

competitiveness and quality of China’s manufacturing sector, erode U.S. competitive advantages, 

and contribute to China’s defense industrial capabilities. The Chinese military’s deployment of 

increasingly capable unmanned systems may provide A2/AD capabilities that degrade the U.S. 

military’s ability to operate freely in the Western Pacific. Chinese countermeasures against 

unmanned systems are also an under studied subject that may complicate the U.S. military’s 

increasing deployments of such weapons as part of the Third Offset strategy.1 China’s persistent 

acquisition of foreign technologies through illicit, informal, and formal means extends to robotics

and may jeopardize many U.S. technological advantages. 

To support the needs of analysts and policymakers, this report assesses the history, current status, 

and trends of China’s robotics industries and unmanned systems. It characterizes the policies, 

leading entities, and the economic and technical challenges they face. Analyses of different sectors 

also consider how foreign developments shape China’s choices on robotics, such as global 

developments in advanced manufacturing, U.S. deployments of unmanned systems, and advances 

in AI. The key findings of this report are the following:

Industrial and Service Robotics:

 Since 2010, China’s industrial robotics demand, research, and production have surged and 

are likely to continue to do so for the foreseeable future. From 2010 to 2014, China’s 

demand for industrial robots increased by approximately 40 percent annually. Despite this 

rapid growth in demand, China’s supply of industrial robots met less than 30 percent of 

domestic demand until 2015. In the past, China’s automobile industry led industrial 

robotics development, but demand in other industries such as “3c” (computers, 

communications, and consumer electronics) is on the rise.

 

1 The Third Offset Strategy is a U.S. Department of Defense initiative to offset adversaries’ anti-access and area 

denial capabilities with U.S. advantages in technology areas including human-machine collaboration, humanmachine combat teaming, assisted human operations, and network-enabled, cyber-hardened weapons, each of which 

will likely utilize unmanned systems and robotics.
10

 Chinese definitions of industrial robots are congruent with U.S. terms, and include any 

robot deployed in a manufacturing setting. Their primary roles include welding, transport, 

assembly, processing, and spraying. These functions make them inherently dual-use 

technologies, as these capabilities may support commercial production of cars and aircraft 

or military production of tanks and fighter jets.

 Since 2006, at least six major Chinese state plans have supported and set targets for China’s 

industrial robotics sector. Made in China 2025 is the most ambitious to date, and aims to

comprehensively upgrade China’s manufacturing sector. This plan promotes the use and

production of industrial robots, and aims to address long-standing challenges such as

China’s dependence on imports for key components and technologies, the poor quality of 

domestically produced systems, and a lack of elite talent. 

 While these policies indicate strong leadership and industry support for industrial robots, 

challenges remain. In June 2016, a leading Chinese official commented that the country’s 

industrial robotics industry is “plagued by low quality, overinvestment and too much 

duplication.” Some Chinese robotics industry experts argue that the country is behind 

global leaders such as Germany, Japan, and the United States by twenty years. There is no 

consensus among these experts concerning the impact of robotics technology on Chinese 

and global labor markets.

 Within China, the service robotics sector has grown rapidly over the past ten years. Service 

robots assist people with completing tasks other than production and manufacturing. 

Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers are at or near international 

standards for industrial, commercial, and recreational consumer drone systems. There is 

significant Chinese research into driverless vehicles, led by the Chinese Internet firm Baidu. 

Other focal points of Chinese service robot development include public security, medical 

and rehabilitation, and educational and personal assistant robots.

Military Robotics and Unmanned Systems:

 Chinese military leaders and strategists believe that the nature of warfare is fundamentally 

changing due to unmanned platforms. High-level support and generous funding for 

robotics and unmanned systems R&D have led to a myriad of institutes within China’s 

defense industry and universities (both civilian and military) conducting robotics research. 

 China’s military UAV industry is robust and growing rapidly. A market analysis from 2014 

predicts that from 2013 to 2022, Chinese demand for military UAVs will grow 15 percent 

annually on average, increasing from USD 570 million in 2013 to USD 2 billion in 2022. 

Unmanned ground and sea (underwater and surface) vehicles are making technical progress 

and appear more frequently in military exercises, system tests, and industry competitions.

 There are no available authoritative comparisons of Chinese and U.S. unmanned military 

systems, as both countries closely guard the related technical data and performance 

parameters. However, Chinese language and other materials provide insights into broader 

trends of this competition. First, Chinese manufacturers and their customers appear to 
11

emphasize lower price points and quantity over increased technical capabilities. Second, 

Chinese scientists and U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reporting on espionage cases 

indicate that technologies for propulsion, autonomous operation, advanced sensors, and 

data links will be critical for China to close the technological gap between U.S. and Chinese 

unmanned systems.

 China’s unmanned systems will likely improve A2/AD capabilities by providing 

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to long-range precision strikes and 

anti-submarine warfare capabilities. For example, one Chinese analyst claims that the Soar 

Dragon UAV could provide guidance for the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile.

 Chinese strategists consider the U.S. military to be increasingly dependent upon unmanned 

systems, making countermeasures against these weapons a necessity. Chinese military 

researchers publish extensively on “soft-kill” countermeasures that blind, confuse, or jam 

unmanned systems and force them to return to their bases of operations. As the U.S. 

military emphasizes unmanned systems in its Third Offset strategy, China’s 

countermeasure development and deployments will likely intensify.

Artificial Intelligence and Nanorobotics

 China’s leaders consider the field of AI as an opportunity to become more globally 

competitive in technological capabilities and commercial production, and have labeled AI

research as a national priority. 

 Leading Chinese AI research institutions and professional associations demonstrate close 

ties between civilian and military research in this field, raising questions about the national 

security implications of U.S.-China AI research partnerships in Silicon Valley and China.

 Chinese journals and other media identify promising civilian applications for 

nanotechnology in medicine (such as diagnostics), computing, energy, the environment 

(such as oil spill remediation), and industry, while defense applications could include 

advanced sensors, UAVs, and “micro spy” robots. Scientists in China have made major 

research accomplishments on nanorobotics technologies, including nanomanipulators, 

nanomotors, and nanogenerators.

Acquisition of Foreign Robotics Technology

Illicit Technology Acquisitions: 

 China’s cyber espionage against the U.S. Government and companies reportedly includes 

multiple manufacturers of military unmanned systems and their component technologies. 

Media coverage of Operation Beebus, the reported hack of QinetiQ North America, and 

cyber intrusions facilitated by Su Bin all indicate an active and coordinated campaign 

against leading suppliers of unmanned systems.
12

 Numerous individuals in the United States have attempted to illegally export unmanned 

systems and their relevant high-end components and materials to China. In some cases, coconspirators in China directed U.S. residents on which items to target.

Informal Technology and Knowledge Transfer:

 China actively acquires U.S. technology through informal means that are extralegal, or not 

clearly defined and regulated by current legislation. These means include a vast open 

source intelligence apparatus, recruitment of leading talents from around the world, and 

academic exchanges.

Formal Technology Acquisitions and Investments:

 Chinese state-owned conglomerates, companies, and venture capital firms are actively 

acquiring and investing in AI and foreign robotics technologies companies, particularly in 

Europe. National plans seem to guide these acquisitions by enumerating which advanced 

technologies Chinese firms should acquire.

Recommendations

Based on these findings, this report puts forth the following recommendations to ensure that the 

United States both enjoys the benefits of China’s surging robotics industries and safeguards its 

own economic growth and national security.

1. The U.S. Government should promote advanced manufacturing and robotics technologies 

by implementing the recommendations of the AMP2.0 Steering Committee Report and by 

supporting initiatives and expansion of the National Network for Manufacturing 

Innovation (NNMI).

2. U.S. defense planners should monitor and account for Chinese advances in unmanned 

systems and electronic countermeasures that may improve A2/AD capabilities such as 

long-range precision strike and anti-submarine warfare.

3. The U.S. Government should conduct an interagency review with economic, scientific, and 

regional experts to assess U.S.-China cooperation and bilateral investments in AI to ensure 

that such arrangements do not put the United States at a disadvantage in AI research, 

breakthroughs, and applications. 

4. The U.S. Government should increase awareness among federal agencies, defense 

contractors, and research universities that Chinese research institutes actively collect their 

published materials, designs, specifications, and graphics to assess U.S. military systems 

and guide Chinese research.

5. The U.S. Government should fully implement the Cybersecurity National Action Plan 

(CNAP) and incorporate input from companies and research institutes that develop 

unmanned systems, robots, and their relevant technologies.
13

6. To help counter Chinese espionage against unmanned systems and other sensitive 

technologies, the U.S. Government should better exploit China’s state plans, procurement 

practices, defense plans, and other Chinese language materials. Such sources identify 

technologies that the PRC is seeking to acquire, and would provide advance warning to

U.S. law enforcement.

7. To address informal technology transfers, U.S. Government sponsors of academic 

exchanges and research in emerging technologies should consider requirements to more 

thoroughly vet foreign participants for military or other undisclosed defense affiliations.

8. The U.S. Government, in particular the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 

States (CFIUS), should monitor and when necessary investigate China’s growing foreign 

investments in robotics and AI companies, and consider the security implications of 

transactions and acquisitions involving emerging technologies such as AI and nanorobotics. 
14

Scope and Limitations

This report is an open source investigation of China’s industrial, service, and military robotics, as 

well as China’s AI and nanorobotics research. It extensively utilizes Chinese language materials,

including academic publications, corporate websites, news media, and other online content. The 

tremendous scale and rapid development of China’s robotics industry make any full cataloguing 

of companies and products beyond the scope of this report. Instead, this report highlights key 

entities, broader trends, challenges, and other information that is most useful for U.S. stakeholders.

The industrial and service robotics chapters emphasize broader trends and highlights. This focus 

accounts for resource constraints and a lack of reliable data at a more granular level. The corporate 

profiles provided in the chapters and appendices are for the reader’s reference. The military 

robotics and unmanned systems chapter discusses China’s systems in the land, air, and sea (surface 

and underwater) domains. Because unmanned aerial vehicles have received considerable attention 

in other English-language analyses, this report provides additional emphasis and original reporting 

on the other domains. Where possible, this report includes Chinese and other reporting on any 

comparisons between PRC and U.S. unmanned systems. The discussions of Chinese military 

strategy, ethics, and other considerations for unmanned systems draw from journals and 

publications that DGI analysts deem to be the most authoritative and credible based on over a 

decade of experience analyzing Chinese language materials. When necessary, footnotes provide 

details on publications for the reader’s reference.
15

Introduction

Speaking in June 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of science and 

innovation to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” as well as the growing importance of 

robotics and unmanned systems. Xi said he had read reports that the “robotics revolution” (机器

人革命) promised to become the “Third Industrial Revolution,” and that people around the world 

regard industrial robots as the “jewel in the crown of manufacturing” (制造业皇冠顶端的明珠). 

He added that “military unmanned aerial vehicles, self-driving cars, and housekeeping robots are 

already a reality,” and that key enabling technologies for these systems such as artificial 

intelligence (AI) are advancing rapidly.2

Xi’s comments are not surprising, as China is experiencing a period of rapid growth in its research, 

production, and use of intelligent systems and robotics. China was a late entrant into the robotics 

market in the 1970s, but as of 2013 China has become the largest market for industrial robots. 

High-level support from China’s leaders and government planning will likely sustain this demand 

and drive China’s own production of robotics and unmanned systems. Chinese leaders consider 

these technologies to be essential for China’s economic growth as the world enters “Industry 4.0” 

that emphasizes automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies. This surge in 

industrial robotics could have profound impacts on China and the world’s economy as changes in 

China’s manufacturing model influence domestic and global production and labor markets.

China’s leaders also consider robotics as imperative for national security as the “world revolution 

in military affairs” proceeds to a new stage that emphasizes unmanned systems. The vast research, 

development, and deployment of China’s military unmanned systems is fueling concerns in the 

United States that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could “rapidly close the technology gaps 

and become a formidable global competitor in unmanned systems.” 3 These weapons and 

countermeasures against such systems will also pose new challenges for the U.S. military as it 

increasingly emphasizes the role of unmanned systems in its Third Offset strategy.

To assess these trends and their implications systematically, this report utilizes taxonomies found 

in Chinese literature. Major categories of robotics include industrial robotics (工业机器人) and 

service robotics (服务机器人). Industrial robots include any robot deployed in a manufacturing 

setting, and their primary functions entail welding, transport, assembly, processing, and spraying. 

Service robots encompass any robot not used in a manufacturing setting, and leading areas for 

them are household assistance, entertainment, and general assistance such as elderly care. 

Specialized service robots (特种服务机器人) include advanced unmanned systems that can be 

used for civilian and military purposes. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles can assist with land 

surveys or contribute to a military’s ISR and strike capabilities. This category also includes 

military robots (军用机器人) such as ordnance disposal robots.

 

2

“习近平:把关键技术掌握在自己手里” [Xi Jinping: Grasp Key Technologies in Our Own Hands], 新华网

Xinhua Net, June 9, 2014, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/09/c_126597413.htm.

Note: Throughout this report, brackets indicate unofficial English translations provided by the authors, and 

parentheses indicate official English translations and English translations provided by the source.

3 Defense Science Board, U.S. Department of Defense, “The Role of Autonomy in DoD Systems,” (Washington, 

DC: July 2012), 71.
16

Chapter 1 assesses China’s industrial robotics industry, including the history, policies, and 

challenges that have led to the country becoming the largest market, as well as those influencing 

the industry’s future. Chapter 2 analyzes how the rapid growth in demand and applications for 

service robots could lead to even faster growth for this sector in China.

Chapter 3 explains how in the military domain, Chinese strategists see robotics as one of the major 

technologies causing revolutionary changes in military doctrines and operations. China has long 

followed U.S. development and deployment of unmanned systems, studied their features and 

characteristics, and researched countermeasures. This interest will likely continue and increase as 

the United States implements its Third Offset strategy, which relies on technologies like robotics 

and unmanned systems to counter strategic advantages held by China and Russia.

AI is a key emerging technology for all robotics systems and will determine their ability to learn 

and operate autonomously. Chapter 4 assesses the widespread AI research underway in numerous 

Chinese research institutes and companies, as well as the structure and implications of Chinese 

partnerships with U.S. entities to jointly research AI. As nanotechnology progresses and the use 

of nanorobots becomes increasingly widespread, China is investing in these technologies and 

exploring their applications, as described in Chapter 5.

Chapter 6 addresses China’s active pursuit of foreign technologies through illicit acquisitions, 

informal knowledge and technology transfers, and formal transfer arrangements. Through means 

ranging from cyber intrusions to academic conferences to foreign investments, China is actively 

addressing local deficiencies in robotics with foreign technology and expertise.

Chapter 7 presents the opportunities and challenges of China’s robotics revolution for the United 

States and puts forth policy recommendations for relevant stakeholders. With these 

recommendations, the United States can advance and protect its economic interests and national 

security.
17

Chapter One: Industrial Robotics in China

China’s leaders consider industrial robotics as essential for the future of the country’s 

manufacturing sector and numerous other industries. Industrial robots (工业机器人) include any 

robot deployed in a manufacturing setting, and their primary functions are welding, transport, 

assembly, processing, and spraying. While China is already the world’s largest market for 

industrial robots, it is still dependent upon foreign (particularly European and Japanese) companies

to supply advanced industrial robots and key components. In 2014, Chinese companies made only 

28 percent of the over 57,000 industrial robots installed in the country.4 U.S. industrial robot 

exports account for a small percentage of China’s imports (less than three percent), but innovations 

in applications and components may provide commercial opportunities.5

Chinese leaders and national plans clearly want China to become the world’s largest producer of 

industrial robots and to master technologies for key components, a longstanding challenge for 

China’s robotics industry. This chapter assesses the history of Chinese industrial robotics from its 

“cradle period” to its status today as the world’s largest market and the government policies 

guiding that process. It also assesses the current features of China’s industrial robotics industry, 

such as the sectors leading their adoption and the challenges the industry faces. Finally, it assesses 

the impact of the industry on China and the world’s labor markets and profiles China’s leading 

industrial robotics companies.

The key findings of this chapter are as follows:

 Since 2011, China’s industrial robotics demand, research, and production have grown 

rapidly and are likely to continue to do so. The Chinese industrial robotics market became 

the world’s largest in 2013 and continues to be the fastest growing market worldwide.

Chinese industries are fueling this demand because of requirements to reduce labor costs, 

increase productivity, and ensure quality control. Despite this demand, until 2015 China’s 

robotics companies supplied less than 30 percent of industrial robots, making the country 

overwhelmingly dependent on foreign suppliers, namely European companies.

 President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang openly discuss the importance of robotics to 

China’s economy and “national rejuvenation.” Numerous state plans include financial

support, policy incentives, and output targets for China’s industrial robotics sector, the 

most of ambitious of which is Made in China 2025. This initiative heavily emphasizes the 

adoption of robotics across China’s entire manufacturing sector to improve 

competitiveness, innovation, technology, quality, reliability, and “green-ness.”

 China’s automobile industry has historically been the leading driver behind China’s 

industrial robotics market, but there is rising demand from industries including “3c” 

(computers, communications, and consumer electronics), machinery, electrical and 

electronics industries, rubbers and plastics, food industries, and logistics.

 

4

“Industrial Robot Statistics,” International Federation of Robotics, accessed June 21, 2016,

http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/.

5

“深度: 从进出口数据看我国工业机器人发展情况” [In Depth: Looking at the Development Situation of China’s 

Industrial Robots from Import Export Data], 高工机器人 GG Robot, June 22, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, 

http://gg-robot.com/asdisp2-65b095fb-57048-.html.
18

 Despite its rapid growth, China’s robotics industry remains comparatively underdeveloped 

because of lower degrees of industrial automation.

 China’s industrial robotics industry faces numerous challenges, including a lack of elite 

talent, an overemphasis on basic R&D and designs, the poor quality of domestically 

produced systems, a lack of coordination among Chinese companies, and a long-standing 

dependence on imports for key components and technologies.

 There is not yet a consensus among analysts regarding the expected impact of increases in 

China’s use of industrial and service robots on the Chinese and global labor markets. 

Optimists argue that robotic automation will make Chinese manufacturers more 

competitive, enhance China’s position within the global manufacturing industry, and raise 

living standards. Pessimists fear that robots in the manufacturing and service sectors will 

diminish opportunities for blue collar jobs and lead to widespread unemployment.

History and Political Support for China’s Industrial Robots

From the 1970s to today, China’s industrial robotics field has progressed from non-existent to the 

largest market in the world. These trends are likely to continue as Chinese industries require robots 

to reduce labor costs, increase productivity, and ensure quality control. Recent policies and

programs under President Xi Jinping are the culmination of these historical trends, and will likely 

sustain the growth in this industry. 

History of Industrial Robots in China

Since the 1970s, China’s industrial robotics industry has gone through five phases, and it is poised

to accelerate in growth. From the 1970s to 2000, China’s production and installation of industrial 

robots was negligible. As of 2000, China only marketed 380 platforms. Since 2000, China’s market 

for industrial robots has grown rapidly, and by 2013 China became the largest market for industrial 

robots. 6 Key factors for this growth have been government plans, foreign suppliers and 

partnerships, and China’s growing economy. These phases in the history of China’s industrial 

robotics industry provide context and insight into current features and policies.

1970s: “Budding Period” of Exploring Basic Technologies

 

6 Cai Zixing 蔡自兴, “中国机器人学 40 年” (Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years), Science & 

Technology Review 科技导报 , no. 21 (2015): 23. 

“...our country will become the largest market for robots, but can our technology 

and manufacturing capabilities respond to this competition? We not only must 

raise our standards for robotics, but also as much and in as many areas as 

possible hold the market. These types of new technologies and new fields are still 

numerous; we must take stock of the situation, comprehensively consider it, pay 

special attention to plans, and make solid progress.”

- Xi Jinping, June 9, 2014
19

Chinese robotics industry and academic experts consider the 1970s to be the “budding period” (萌

芽期) or “cradle period” during which China first conducted basic research on industrial robots.7

China began researching industrial robots in 1972, 20 years after the United States and five years 

after Japan.8 Because the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)

restricted exports of advanced technologies by Western countries to China,9 China’s initial imports 

were limited.10

1980s: “Opening Up and Theoretical Research Period” of Importing and Exploring Basic 

Designs

In the 1980s, China imported and explored basic designs for industrial robots, leading some to call 

it an “Opening Up Period” (开发起期) or a “Theoretical Research Period” (理论研究阶段).11

Along with other high-technology fields, China’s robotics technology development and research 

began to receive national and government attention and support. Two new expert committees were 

formed and met annually or biennially to help set program development plans for the Seventh and 

Eighth Five Year Plans(FYPs, covering 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 respectively). They also helped

create relevant technical standards and advised on robotics-related development plans for the 863 

Program.12 China initiated the High-Technology Research and Development Plan (863 Program) 

in March 1986 to support the development of advanced sciences and technologies in strategic areas 

deemed necessary for China’s economic competitiveness and national security. The 863 Program 

was and continues to be a key source of funding for Chinese research on industrial and intelligent 

robots.13

During China’s Seventh FYP, the government promoted industrial robots research and 

development (“工业机器人开发研究”) as one of 76 national key technology breakthrough 

 

7 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 23; Cao Xiangkang 曹祥康 and Xie Cunxi 谢存禧, “我国

机器人发展历程” [The Process of Development of China’s Robots], Robot Technique and Application 机器人技术

与应用, no. 5 (2008): 44.

8 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 23; Li Weiling 李伟岭, “中国工业机器人发展的前景分

析与研究” [Prospects Analysis and Research on China’s Industrial Robotics Development], no. 6 (2015): 22-23; 

Cai Zixing 蔡自兴 and Guo Fan 郭璠, “中国工业机器人发展的若干问题” [Development and Basic Problems of 

China’s Industrial Robotics Development], Robot Technique and Application 机器人技术与应用, no. 3 (2013): 9.

9 The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), was an informal multilateral 

organization that coordinated national controls for exports of strategic materials and technologies to Communist 

countries. COCOM ceased to function in 1994. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional 

Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar Arrangement) succeeded COCOM, and includes some 

robots with advanced processing capabilities, robots specifically designed for underwater and military use, and 

unmanned aerial and underwater vehicles.

10 Cao and Xie, “The Process of Development of China’s Robots,” 44.

11 Zhao Jie 赵杰, “我国工业机器人发展现状与面临的挑战” (Development and Challenge of Chinese Industrial 

Robot), Aeronautical Manufacturing Technology 航空制造技术, no. 12 (2012): 27-28.

12 Cao and Xie, “The Process of Development of China’s Robots,” 44.

13 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 24; Zhang Kun 张坤 and Cui Yongyang 崔永样, “我国

工业机器人发展状况以及未来发展战略” [Current Development Situation and Future Development Strategy of 

China’s Industrial Robotics Development], Journal of Henan Science and Technology 河南科技, no. 6, (2014): 130; 

Cao and Xie, “The Process of Development of China’s Robots,” 44.
20

programs ( 国 家 重 点 科 技 攻 关 项 目 ). 14 During this time, China researched fundamental 

technologies and components, different types of structures, and application engineering for 

industrial robots.15 Research institutes made progress on technologies for spraying, spot welding, 

arc welding, and transport robots.16 For components, China developed technologies and structures 

for industrial robotics systems including mechanical arms, control systems, propulsion 

transmission units, and designs for testing and manufacturing systems. While research institutes 

and companies produced these systems on a small manufacturing scale, China’s achievements 

were largely limited to prototypes and grasping basic technologies.

17

1990-2000: “Prototype Development Period” of Initial Designs and Limited Production

During the mid-1990s, China prioritized R&D of the engineering applications of welding robots 

and in the late 1990s laid the foundation for the commoditization of domestically produced robots 

and the promotion of industrial robots.18 By the end of the 1990s, China had invested in or started 

nine robot industrialization bases and seven R&D bases. 19 China also made progress in key 

technologies and equipment for computer numerical control (CNC) lathes, relevant technologies 

for excavation and tunneling robots, and assembly automation robots.20 During this time, some of 

China’s leading robotics manufacturers emerged, including Shenyang Siasun (沈阳新松机器人

自动化股份有限公司), Harbin Boshi Automation (哈尔滨博实自动化设备有限责任公司), and 

the Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry (北京机械工业自动化所).21

2001-2010: “Initial Industrialization Stage” of Applying and Incorporating Industrial Robots

Chinese authors refer to the 2000s as the “initial industrialization stage” (初步产业化阶段) when 

Chinese companies began to debut indigenous industrial robots for wider consumption.22 In 2001,

the 863 Program, under the Tenth FYP (2001-2005), focused on helping China get closer to 

international standards in robotics and other related fields, which included equipment self-design 

and manufacture, major complementing equipment systems integration and development, and 

mass production and application of high-capability components.23

The Tenth FYP also focused and made progress on key technologies including deep sea manned 

submersible tools, high-precision cutting digital control processing equipment, hazardous 

assignment robots, counterterrorism ordnance disposal robots, and human-like and bionic (仿人

仿 生 ) robots. Progress on technologies for five-axle joint movement, quiet pressurized 

 

14 Cao and Xie, “The Process of Development of China’s Robots,” 45; Zhang and Cui, “Current Development 

Situation and Future Development Strategy of China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 130.

15 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 23.

16 Li, “Prospects Analysis and Research on China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 22-23.

17 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 23.

18 Ibid.

19 Rui Gongye 睿工业 and Liu Peng 柳鹏, “我国工业机器人发展及趋势” [Development and Trends of China’s 

Industrial Robotics], Robot Technique and Application 机器人技术与应用, no. 5 (2012): 21.

20 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21.

21 Ibid.

22 Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese Industrial Robot,” 27.

23 Cao and Xie, “The Process of Development of China’s Robots,” 45.
21

transmissions, and high-speed and high-precision processing only partially satisfied industrial and 

defense demands.24

For the Eleventh FYP (2006-2010), development foci included advanced industries, structures and 

propulsion, sensors and information fusion, and key technologies for intelligent controls and 

human-robot interaction. This FYP also called for increased development of bionic, disaster relief, 

medical, and public security systems. There was also greater emphasis on robotics and automation 

technologies for industries including integrated circuits, ships, automobiles, light fabrics, 

household electrical appliances, and foodstuffs.25

2011 to Today: “Surging Development and Application Period” for China’s Industrial Robotics 

Industry

Since 2011, China’s purchases, production, and applications for industrial robotics systems has 

surged. In 2013, China overtook Japan to become the world’s largest market for industrial 

robotics.26 Rising labor and materials costs led electronics and other labor-intensive industries to 

become more automated in order to increase work efficiency and decrease costs. Different 

industries and major companies operating in China publicly announced their investments in 

robotics, such as in 2011 when the CEO of the Taiwan firm Foxconn (manufacturer of the iPhone) 

announced the “One Million Robot Plan” to install a million robots over three years.27 Rising labor 

and materials costs have led electronics and other labor-intensive industries to become more 

automated to increase work efficiency and decrease costs.28 China’s drive to expand its use and 

indigenous development of robotics has been fueled by clear political support and—for the first 

time—comprehensive economic plans specifically focused on China’s robotics industry. 

Chinese Leadership Openly Supports Industrial Robotics

In June 2014, Xi Jinping spoke to the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the China

Academy of Engineering Physics on the importance of science and technology, including robotics, 

to China’s “national rejuvenation.”29 Some analysts consider the speech to be the “first time Xi 

had espoused a new vision for upgrading and transforming China's manufacturing sector.”30 Xi’s

subsequent Made in China 2025 initiative is an implementation of this vision. Leading industrial 

countries such as the United States and Germany have previously launched initiatives to promote 

advanced manufacturing technologies such as robotics and automation, but China’s initiative is 

considerably larger in scale.

In the speech, Xi said he had read reports that the “robotics revolution” (机器人革命) would 

become the “Third Industrial Revolution” (第三次工业革命), and that people around the world 

 

24 Ibid., 46.

25 Ibid.

26 “Global Robotics Industry: Record Beats Record,” International Federation of Robotics, accessed August 12, 

2016, http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/.

27 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 20.

28 Ibid.

29

“习近平:把关键技术掌握在自己手里” [Xi Jinping: Grasp Key Technologies in Our Own Hands], 新化网

Xinhua Net, June 9, 2014, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/09/c_126597413.htm.

30 Lu Kuo-chen “Made in China 2025: Decoding Beijing’s Intentions,” CommonWealth, no. 573, June 5, 2015, 

accessed July 1, 2016, http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=14946.
22

people regard industrial robots as the “jewel in the crown of manufacturing” (制造业皇冠顶端的

明珠).31 The following year, Premier Li Keqiang made similar remarks to a State Council meeting, 

and both leaders wrote welcome letters to the 2015 World Robot Conference that emphasized the 

importance of robotics to China and the world. This annual international conference attracts

robotics leaders from around the world. It is cohosted by the China Association for Science and 

Technology (CAST), MIIT, and the Beijing municipal government.32

Chinese Policies for Industrial Robots are Equally Ambitious

The ambition, scope, and goals reflected in China’s state-directed plans match Xi’s rhetoric. Made 

in China 2025 is the most ambitious program to date, and it is the culmination of multiple plans 

that have sought to address longstanding problems in China’s robotics industry, especially its 

dependence upon imports for key high-precision components. Previous plans, detailed below, 

included robotics as a priority industry, but their achievements have generally been lackluster. 

Given China’s growing emphasis on robotics, the success of Made in China 2025 and other recent 

plans such as the Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) will be critical for China’s 

robotics industries. Key state plans guiding China’s industrial and service robotics industries since 

2006 include the following:

National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-

2020) (国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要 (2006—2020 年))

In February 2006, the State Council announced the National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for 

the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020) (MLP) with the goal of increasing 

China’s innovation, economic growth, and military security.33 The MLP laid out China’s longterm vision to become a world leader in innovation and emphasized the supply side by defining 

fields for increased R&D.34 The plan called for China to become a global leader by 2020 in fields 

including biology, information industry, materials technologies, and advanced manufacturing 

technology.35 The MLP included intelligent robotics under the category of information technology 

but did not provide any additional emphasis on robotics.36

 

31

“习近平:把关键技术掌握在自己手里” [Xi Jinping: Grasp Key Technologies in Our Own Hands], 新化网

Xinhua Net, June 9, 2014, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-06/09/c_126597413.htm.

32

“李克强主持国务院专题讲座 讨论加快发展先进制造与 3D 打印等问题” [Li Keqiang Leads a State Council 

Special Topic Discussion: Discusses Accelerating the Development of Advanced Manufacturing, 3D Printing, and 

Other Issues], Chinese Government Network 中国政府网, August 23, 2015, accessed July 1, 2016, 

http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-08/23/content_2918394.htm; “习近平致信祝贺 2015 世界机器人大会在京开

幕 李克强也作出批示表示祝贺” [Xi Jinping Wrote Congratulations to the 2015 World Robot Conference in 

Beijing, Li Keqiang also Wrote Comments Expressing Congratulations], Xinhua Online 新华网, November 23, 

2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/1123/c64094-27845750.html.

33 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要 (2006-2020)” 

(National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)), accessed 

July 7, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm.

34 Sylvia Schwaag Serger and Magnus Breidne, “China’s Fifteen-Year Plan for Science and Technology: An 

Assessment,” Asia Policy, no. 4 (July 2007): 135–164.

35 State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of 

Science and Technology (2006-2020).”

36 Ibid.
23

While the MLP has been an important guideline for China’s S&T development since 2006, its 

results have been mixed, and support for the plan has waned under Xi Jinping. In 2012, a highlevel review of the MLP found that duplication of activities and a deeply fragmented bureaucracy 

led to chronic waste and poor implementation of supporting plans. With the retirement of the plan’s 

chief architect, Premier Wen Jiabao, in 2013, Xi’s administration has emphasized Made in China 

2025 and initiatives such as Internet Plus.37

Twelfth Five Year Plan for Intelligent Manufacturing (智能制造科技发展“十二五”专项规划)

In 2011, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) released this plan, which stated that 

China was overly dependent upon imports for both high-end equipment and key components for 

domestically produced high-end equipment. 38 It also identified a lack of fusion between

“industrialization” and “informatization.” To address these deficits, the plan called for China’s 

manufacturing to be more automated (such as using robots) and intelligent (or incorporating 

information technology). The plan called for developing specific technologies, including robotics, 

sensors, industrial communication networks, and controllers, while also seeking to improve 

reliability, equipment manufacturing techniques, digital controls and digitized manufacturing, 

complex manufacturing systems, and intelligent information management technology. 39 No 

analysis could be found crediting this plan with China’s success in robotics, but 2011 is widely 

considered the beginning of a “surge” in China’s demand, development, and application of 

robotics, and in 2013 China surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest robotics market.40

Guideline on Promoting the Development of the Industrial Robot Industry (关于推进工业机器

人产业发展的指导意见)

In 2013, MIIT announced its “Guideline on Promoting the Development of the Industrial Robot 

Industry” (关于推进工业机器人产业发展的指导意见) to address weaknesses in China’s 

industrial robotics industry and promote the adoption of industrial robots.

41 The guidance 

document identifies four key weaknesses in China’s industrial robotics industry. The first is that 

the industrial base is weak and relies on imports for key components. Second, China’s common 

service platforms, standards, and personnel need to be improved. Third, the market 

 

37 Tai Ming Cheung, Thomas Mahnken, Deborah Seligsohn, Kevin Pollpeter, Eric Anderson, and Fan Yang, 

Planning for Innovation: Understanding China’s Plans for Technological, Energy, Industrial, and Defense 

Development, report prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2016): 30-34.

38

“智能制造科技发展“十二五”专项规划” [Twelfth Five Year Plan for Intelligent Manufacturing), Ministry of 

Science and Technology 科技部, accessed July 1, 2016, 

http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201204/W020120424327129213807.pdf.

39

“解读智能制造科技发展“十二五”专项规划” [Interpreting the Twelfth Five Year Plan for Intelligent 

Manufacturing], Ministry of Science and Technology 科技部, May 7, 2012, accessed July 1, 2016, 

http://www.most.gov.cn/kjbgz/201205/t20120507_94189.htm.

40 “Global Robotics Industry: Record Beats Record,” press release from the International Federation of Robotics, 

accessed August 12, 2016, http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/.

41

“工业和信息化部关于推进工业机器人产业发展的指导意见” [Guiding Suggestions from MIIT on Promoting 

the Development of the Industrial Robotics Industry], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology 工业和信

息, as posted at Sina 新浪, December 30, 2013, accessed July 1, 2016, 

http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/y/20131230/170417797233.shtml.
24

competitiveness of China’s own brands of industrial robots is weak. Fourth, market competition is 

intensifying, making duplication more evident. The guideline calls for improving technologies, 

personnel, service platforms (such as design and testing platforms), and coordination between 

industries. The guideline outlines goals for China to reach by 2020, including to: develop three to 

five globally competitive robot manufacturers; create eight to ten industrial clusters for the 

industry; reach 45 percent domestic market share for Chinese high-end robots; and increase robot 

penetration to 100 per 10,000 workers. 42 No commentary could be found discussing the 

effectiveness of this plan, but given that China announced the Made in China 2025 and the 

subsequent Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) two years later, it may be assumed 

that these plans have supplanted this original MIIT guideline.

Thirteenth Five Year National Economic and Social Development Plan (2016‒2020) ( 国 民

经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要)

The Thirteenth FYP (2016-2020) calls for numerous developments related to robotics, and 

includes “robotics equipment” (机器人装备) in a section of eight areas for “high-end equipment 

innovation, development, and engineering” (高端装备创新发展工程). The section calls for the 

large-scale development of industrial robots, service robots, surgical robots, and military-use 

robots, as well as encouraging the development of China’s own high-precision reducers, highspeed and high-capability controllers, and high-capability electrical servomotors and drivers. This 

section also promotes the commercial use of AI in these areas. It calls for breakthroughs in 

advanced information and networking technologies, including big data and cloud computing, 

autonomous controllable operation systems, high-end industries and large scale management 

software, and AI.43 Some Chinese observers note the Thirteenth FYP is the first FYP to use the 

term “artificial intelligence,” indicating its growing importance.44 In January 2016, Wan Gang, 

Minister of China’s Ministry of Science & Technology (MOST), listed “intelligent manufacturing 

and robots” as one of the Science & Technology Innovation 2030 – Mega Projects (科技创新

2030——重大项目). Wan said the Party Central Committee and the State Council determined 

these priorities, which also include aero-engines, quantum communications, deep space and deep 

sea probes, major new materials, and neurosciences.45 Xi Jinping previously listed these same 

technologies as priorities at the Fifth Plenum of the Eighteenth Communist Party Congress in 

November 2015.46

 

42 Ibid.

43

“中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要” (The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan for National 

Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China), Xinhua Net 新华网, March 17, 2016, 

accessed July 1, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-03/17/content_5054992.htm.

44 Qu Ting 屈婷, Liu Wei 刘伟, and Yang Dingmiao 杨丁淼, “‘十三五’:中国开启人工智能商用新纪元” [The 

Thirteenth FYP: China Starts a New Era of Commercial Use for Artificial Intelligence], Xinhua Net 新华网, March 

8, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-03/08/c_1118271033.htm.

45

“万钢:面向 2030 遴选启动航空发动机等一批科技创新重大项目” [Wan Gang: Facing 2030, Choices on 

Launching Aero-Engines and Other Science & Technology Innovation Megaprojects], Xinhua Net 新华网, March 8, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-01/11/c_1117739527.htm.

46

“习近平 关于”中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议”的说明” [Xi Jinping: 

Explanation of the ‘Recommendations of the Party Center on the Thirteenth Five-Year National Economic and 

Social Development Plan’], Xinhua, November 3, 2015, accessed July 7, 2016,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-11/03/c_1117029621.htm.
25

Made in China 2025 (中国制造 2025)

In May 2015, China’s State Council announced Made in China 2025, a major initiative to improve 

the competitiveness, innovation, technology, quality, reliability, and “green-ness” of China’s 

manufacturing sector.47 This plan differs from previous state plans because it focuses on the entire 

manufacturing sector and processes, not just specific industries. The plan calls for intelligent 

manufacturing that uses information technology tools for production and draws inspiration from 

Germany’s “Industry 4.0” plan, the U.S. Advanced Manufacturing Initiative, and the French 

Nouvelle France Industrielle.48 It addresses what Miao Wei, minister of MIIT, called a “double 

press” (双重挤压), where China needs to compete with both developed countries using advanced 

technologies and developing countries with cheaper labor. Miao identified industrial robots as one 

of the key technologies that can increase quality and reliability in China’s manufacturing sector.49

This plan is also likely influencing China’s foreign acquisitions and investments in robotics 

companies, particularly in Europe as discussed on page 104. One scholar characterizes this plan 

and another as a “shopping list” for foreign investment targets that could help China acquire key 

technologies and licenses to improve its own industries.50

Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) (机器人产业发展规划(2016-2020 年))

In April 2016, China’s MIIT, Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform 

Commission jointly released the Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) (机器人产业

发展规划(2016-2020 年)), calling for advances in China’s industrial and service robotics 

industries. The plan states that since the international financial crisis of 2008, other countries have 

made robotics a strategic priority, and finds that China is overly dependent upon imports for key 

components including high-precision reducers, servomotors, and controllers. The plan calls for 

China to produce 100,000 industrial robots and 50,000 industrial robots with six-axis movement 

or greater annually, a robotic density of 150 robots per 10,000 employees, and RMB 30 billion 

(USD 4.49 billion) in sales of service robots (including applications in medicine and elderly care)

by 2020.

51 Some analysts criticized the plan for focusing on existing technologies and components 

instead of AI, which is considered the key enabling technology for robotics in the long term.52

 

47

“国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025》的通知” [State Council Releases “Made in China 2025” Announcement], 

May 8, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm.

48 Scott Kennedy, “Made in China 2025,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 1, 2015, accessed June 

1, 2016, https://www.csis.org/analysis/made-china-2025); Miao Wei 苗圩, “世界制造业发展趋势和我国装备制造

业状况” [World Manufacturing Industry Development Trends and the Current Situation of China’s Manufacturing], 

Shishi Baogao (Dangwei Zhongxinzu Xuexi) 时事报告 (党委中心组学习), no. 1 (2016): 33.

49 Miao Wei 苗圩, “中国制造 2025:建设制造强国的行动纲领” [Made in China 2025: An Action Plan for 

Building a Manufacturing Great Power], 理论参考 Journal of Theoretical Reference, no. 7 (2015): 40.

50 Sebastian Heilmann, “Europe Needs Tougher Response to China’s State Led Investments,” post at Financial 

Times, June 9, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2016/06/09/europe-needs-tougherresponse-to-chinas-state-led-investments/.

51

“机器人产业发展规划(2016-2020 年)发布” [Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) Release],

accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201604/t20160427_799898.html.

52 He Huifeng, “China’s Five-Year Plan to Transform Its Robotics Industry,” South China Morning Post, April 6, 

2016, accessed July 1, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1934071/chinas-five-yearplan-transform-its-robotics-industry.
26

Overall Trends in China’s Adoption of Industrial Robots

Statistics from the International Federation of Robotics (IFR), a Germany-based professional 

nonprofit organization established in 1987, show that robotics markets are growing rapidly, both 

internationally and within China. Global industrial robot sales increased 29 percent from 2013 to 

2014, reaching 229,261 units, an annual increase that the IFR described as “by far the highest level 

ever recorded for one year.” Approximately 16,000 units, or 28 percent, were from Chinese 

suppliers, while the rest were from foreign companies, primarily in Europe.53 Figure 1 depicts 

annual global industrial robot sales totals from 2002, showing rapid growth in sales since 2011.

There is better data available for industrial robots than for service robots, due in part to the relative 

maturity of the industrial robot market, which is more established than the service robot market.

Figure 1: Estimated annual global industrial robot sales, 2002-2014. Source: IFR (World Robotics 2015 Report).54

The robotics industry within China is growing especially quickly, even compared to positive 

international market trends. In 2014, 57,096 industrial robots were sold in China, an increase of 

56 percent over 2013.55 This gain is apparent in Figure 2, which shows annual robot sales in China 

from 2005 to 2014. IFR notes that China is now the world’s largest market for industrial robots, 

comprising 25 percent of the global market, and that it is also the fastest growing market 

worldwide. 56 From 2010 to 2014, U.S. demand for industrial robots doubled, while China’s 

quadrupled.57 From 2010 through 2014, China’s total supply of industrial robots increased by 

approximately 40 percent annually on average.58

 

53 “Industrial Robot Statistics,” International Federation of Robotics.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 “China Enforces Historic Robot Boom,” International Federation of Robotics, accessed August 29, 2016,

http://www.ifr.org/news/ifr-press-release/china-enforces-historic-robot-boom-776/.

58 Industrial Robot Statistics,” International Federation of Robotics.
27

Figure 2: Estimated annual industrial robot sales within China, 2005-2014. Source: IFR (World Robotics 2015 Report).59

Characteristics and Leading Industries of China’s Robotics Market

Chinese industry reports, government plans, and news media consider the following to be the main 

characteristics of China’s industrial robotics market:

1. Since 2000, China’s automobile industry has driven development of the industrial robot market. 

China’s auto industry entered a rapid period of growth, becoming an industry that emphasizes 

automation and is both capital and technology intensive.60 In 2008, China’s annual production 

reached 9.5 million vehicles, nearly eight times its production in the mid-1990s, making it the 

largest automobile manufacturer in the world.

61 In 2014 and 2015, annual production continued to 

grow to 23.7 and 24.5 million vehicles respectively, over twelve million more vehicles than the 

United States, the second largest producer.

62 These trends have made the industry a key driver in 

the growth of industrial robotics and their application in China. According to IFR, the robot density 

in China’s automotive industry is still moderate and will increase as firms modernize. Numerous 

applications such as assembly, painting, and welding will likely drive this demand. To emphasize

the importance of the automobile industry for China’s robotics, it is worth noting that Miao Wei (

 

59 Ibid.

60 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 20; Shen Xuming 沈绪明 and Dong Peng 

董鹏, “我国机器人发展现状、需求及产业化探讨” [An Investigation of China’s Robotics Development Situation, 

Requirements, and Industrialization], Logistics Technology (Equipment) 物流技术 (装备版), no. 22 (2012): 69-70.

61 Rachel Tang, The Rise of China’s Auto Industry and Its Impact on the U.S. Motor Vehicle Industry (CRS Report 

No. R40924) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 3, accessed August 17, 2016, 

https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40924.pdf.

62 “World Motor Vehicle Production by Country and Type (2014-2015),” Correspondents Survey by the 

International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), accessed August 17, 2016,

http://www.oica.net/wp-content/uploads//Total-2015-Q4-March-16.pdf.
28

苗圩) was an automobile executive before heading MIIT and becoming one of the premier voices 

for the Made in China 2025 initiative.63

2. Other industries with increasing demands for industrial robots include “3c” industries 

(computers, communications, and consumer electronics), machinery, electrical and electronics 

industries, rubbers and plastics, food industries, logistics, and manufacturing.64

Analysts believe that industries including automobiles, electronics and household appliances, 

tobacco, new energy batteries, and others will annually require more automated production lines, 

which will fuel China’s continued demand for industrial robots.65 This trend is in accordance with 

international trends, according to the IFR, as the supply of industrial robots has increased from 

2012 to 2014 in the automotive; electrical/electronics; metal, chemical, rubber, and plastics; and 

food industries.66 According to the IFR, much of the increase in industrial robotics sales in 2014 

went to the Chinese and Taiwanese electronics industries and automotive electronic parts 

suppliers.67

3. Coastal economically developed districts are the primary markets for industrial robots.

Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Beijing, and other coastal regions are China’s leading 

manufacturing hubs and account for over half of China’s industrial robots.68 The Pearl River Delta 

region’s application market is growing the most quickly. China’s robot manufacturing base is 

growing most rapidly in Shenzhen, Changzhou (Jiangsu province), Tangshan (Hebei province), 

Chongqing, and Jincheng (Shanxi province).69

4. Wholly owned foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs) and foreign joint venture enterprises have 

traditionally been the primary customers of industrial robots. 

Foreign enterprises and joint ventures have higher automation rates, and in turn have higher 

demands for industrial robots.70 In contrast, many Chinese companies and industries are slower to 

adopt robots because their production models are inflexible. While some cite relatively cheap labor 

as another obstacle for domestic industries, this calculus may be changing, as explained below.

71

 

63

“工业和信息化部部长、党组书记 苗圩” [MIIT Minister and Party Secretary Miao Wei], Ministry of Industry 

and Information Technology 工业和信息化部, accessed July 1, 2016,

http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146347/n1147601/index.html.

64 Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese Industrial Robot,” 26.

65 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21.

66 “Industrial Robot Statistics,” International Federation of Robotics.

67 Ibid.

68 Shen and Dong, “An Investigation of China’s Robotics Development Situation, Requirements, and 

Industrialization,” 69-70.

69 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21.

70 Shen and Dong, “An Investigation of China’s Robotics Development Situation, Requirements, and 

Industrialization,” 69-70.

71 Zhang and Cui, “Current Development Situation and Future Development Strategy of China’s Industrial Robotics 

Development,” 129.
29

5. Rising labor costs are encouraging the entry of industrial robots into various industries, 

especially labor-intensive ones.72

Labor costs and other demands are rising as the costs of purchasing industrial robots decline.73

Since 2001, hourly manufacturing wages in China, which are set by provincial governments, are 

reported to have increased 12 percent each year.74 In 2016, Guangdong announced it would freeze 

minimum wage increases for two years.75 In 2015, in a survey of 300 manufacturers in the Pearl 

River Delta (a key manufacturing hub that includes Guangdong), 85 percent of respondents 

thought that labor shortages were not improving, and that minimum wages would continue to 

climb.76 Forty-five percent of those surveyed indicated that investments in automation was a main

strategy to address these rising labor costs.77

6. China’s rapidly growing industrial robotics market attracts many of the world’s leading robot 

manufacturers.

Numerous foreign companies are selling industrial robots to China and investing in China’s 

indigenous industry. Companies set to export more to China include Germany’s KUKA, Japan’s 

Yaskawa (安川电机), and Swedish-Swiss multinational corporation ABB. Yaskawa announced 

in 2012 that it would build an industrial robot manufacturing plant in Changzhou, Jiangsu province 

to produce welding robots for China’s and other Asian countries’ automobile plants by 2013.78 In 

2013, company representatives explained that China had a fraction of the number of robots of 

Japan, the United States, or Germany, and (correctly) predicted China would become the largest 

market for industrial robots.79

China’s Robotics Industry Remains Comparatively Underdeveloped

Despite these trends of rapid growth in China’s robotics industry, significant room for expansion 

remains. In 2014, China, Japan, the United States, South Korea, and Germany were the five leading 

markets in terms of industrial robot sales, accounting for 70 percent of total industrial robot sales 

worldwide. The relative maturity of the robotics industries in the other four markets, besides China, 

can be illustrated by comparing these markets’ robotic density, a measure equal to the number of 

industrial robots in use per 10,000 persons employed in the industry.

 

72 Shen and Dong, “An Investigation of China’s Robotics Development Situation, Requirements, and 

Industrialization,” 69-70.

73 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21.

74 Jiaxing and Yangon, “A Tightening Grip: Rising Chinese Wages Will Only Strengthen Asia’s Hold on 

Manufacturing,” The Economist, March 14, 2015, accessed August 14, 2016,

http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21646180-rising-chinese-wages-will-only-strengthen-asias-holdmanufacturing-tightening-grip.

75 “Wages and Employment,” China Labour Bulletin (中国劳工通讯), accessed August 18, 2016,

http://www.clb.org.hk/content/wages-and-employment.

76 “Higher Wages in China Show Better Productivity,” China Daily (Europe edition), May 23, 2015, accessed 

August 14, 2016, http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2015-05/23/content_20798291.htm.

77 Ibid.

78 Cai and Guo, “Development and Basic Problems of China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 10-11.

79 Pang Lijing 庞丽静, “争夺中国机器人” (The Fight for China’s Robots), The Economic Observer 经济观察报, 

September 4, 2013, accessed August 15, 2016, http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0913/249730.shtml and 

http://www.eeo.com.cn/2013/0904/249353.shtml.
30

Robotic density gives an indication of the degree to which an industry has incorporated robots into 

its processes as a replacement for manpower; a higher robotic density signifies a higher degree of 

industry automation. It is useful when comparing the use of robots in markets or countries with 

significantly different population sizes or manufacturing sector sizes.

As of 2015, the average global robot density was estimated at approximately 66 industrial robots 

installed per 10,000 manufacturing industry employees. South Korea, Japan, and Germany were 

the highest-ranking countries in terms of robotic density. South Korea’s robotic density was 

estimated at 478 in 2014, followed by Japan with a robotic density of 314, and Germany with a 

robotic density of 292. The United States had a robotics density of 164 in 2014.80

China’s robotic density was much lower, at approximately 33 installed robots per 10,000 

employees, placing it well below both global and Asian averages. This data is summarized in Table 

1.

81

Table 1: Robotic density per 10,000 employees in key markets, 2014. Source: IFR.82

Market Robotic Density

South Korea 478

Japan 314

Germany 292

United States 164

Global Average 66

Average within Asia 54

China 33

Problems in China’s Industrial Robotics Industry and Research

Despite this rapid growth in China’s demand for industrial robots, its production and quality still 

lag behind. Until 2015, Chinese companies produced less than 30 percent of the industrial robots 

installed in China, and 60 percent of the industrial robots produced were considered low-end 

models. These problems led MIIT Vice Minister Xin Guobin to comment in June 2016 that despite 

the growth of China’s demand for industrial robots, the industry is “plagued by low quality, 

overinvestment and too much duplication.”83

The consensus of Chinese academics is that China’s industrial robotics industry is not as advanced 

as those of the United States, Japan, and Germany, but they differ on how far behind China lags. 

Some scholars, such as Professor Zhao Jie at the Harbin Institute of Technology, argue the current 

 

80 International Federation of Robotics, “Statistics.”

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Mandy Zuo, “China’s Robot Industry ‘Plagued by Low Quality, Overinvestment and Too Much Duplication’,” 

South China Morning Post, June 17, 2016, accessed August 29, 2016,

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1976825/chinas-robot-industry-plagued-low-qualityoverinvestment-and-too; “工信部副部长辛国斌:机器人已有投资过剩隐忧” [MIIT Vice Minister Xin Guobin: 

Worries that Robotics Already Has Surplus Investment], Sina 新浪, June 16, 2016, accessed August 29 2016,

http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2016-06-16/doc-ifxtfrrc3709815.shtml.
31

state of the industry is similar to these countries in the 1990s,84 while others argue that China is 

closer to the 1980s because of a lack of high-precision machinery, low efficiency in processes, and 

continued dependence on foreign imports for key components.85 In sum, these authors assess the 

foundations of China’s robotics industry as still relatively weak, technological levels as relatively 

backward, and the disparity with other countries as still large. One expert summarizes these 

problems with the following themes:86

“Heavy on imitation and light on brands.” Chinese brands of industrial robots imitate 

international brands, and consequently China lacks recognized national brands. The 

exception to this trend may be welding robots.

“Heavy on following and light on innovation.” Chinese companies are not innovating 

new designs and applications, and consequently are lacking on intellectual property.

“Heavy on prototypes and light on markets.” Chinese entities are proficient at producing 

prototypes of equipment but not competitive for mass production of indigenous products.

“Heavy on equipment and light on talent.” Chinese robotics research institutes and 

companies lack elite talent.

The following are more detailed descriptions and assessments of challenges that hinder China’s 

robotics industry. While the list focuses on industrial robotics, some issues (such as dependence 

on foreign imports for key components) are prevalent in China’s service robotics industry as well. 

Lack of Elite Talent

China has not cultivated local expertise and does not have sufficient educational opportunities for 

its robotics industry. Chinese researchers consider the U.S. educational system to be adapting more 

quickly to the needs of the growing robotics industry.87 They claim that since 2013, opportunities 

and training for robotics experts have been growing in the United States, and the number of 

undergraduate, graduate, and PhD holders is expected to double before 2030.

88 A major problem 

for China will be how its education system can adapt and respond to the market demand for AI 

and robotics experts. In addition to subject matter expertise, these researchers argue China’s 

robotics industry lacks personnel for management, operations, and sales, though it is unclear why 

this industry in particular lacks such talent in China.

Lack of Balance between Basic and Applied Research

China’s investment in robotics research has emphasized basic research at the expense of applied 

research. Basic research includes robotic arms and controllers that could be used in various 

 

84 Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese Industrial Robot,” 28.

85 Cai and Guo, “Development and Basic Problems of China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 10; Sun Yingfei 

孙英飞 and Luo Aihua 罗爱华, “我国工业机器人发展研究” (Development Research on China’s Industrial Robot), 

Science Technology and Engineering 科学技术与工程 12, no. 12 (April 2012): 2915.

86 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 26.

87 Ibid., 28; Zhang and Cui, “Current Development Situation and Future Development Strategy of China’s Industrial 

Robotics Development,” 129.

88 Ibid. No authoritative statistics could be located to corroborate this claim.
32

industries and designs, while applied research would focus on components and functions specific 

to the end-user and industry. To illustrate the disparity, one analysis claims that China has 

numerous entities for basic research for general machine designs, but has fewer institutes for

research on key components, likely including high-precision reduction drives, servo (small electric 

motor) electrical machinery, and controllers (discussed below). Consequently, China’s industrial 

robotics R&D base lacks breakthroughs in key core technologies and is not competitive. One 

symptom of this larger problem is the small number of Chinese industrial robots and key 

components with their own IPR.89

Poor Quality of Domestically Produced Systems

According to some analyses, a lack of quality in China’s robotics and fierce competition among 

producers curtail growth in the industry. Because many firms lag behind global standards, the 

reliability of nationally produced industrial robots is lower than those from international 

competitors. Specifically, Chinese companies have had difficulties producing precise, fast, and 

efficient key components.90 Poor quality or precision for components can reduce the service life 

of robotics systems and make higher quality foreign brands more attractive.

Intense Competition among Chinese Companies

According to one criticism, China has too many manufacturing parks that fiercely compete and do 

not coordinate efforts. This competition leads them to blindly manufacture and import robotics, in 

contrast to the successful robotics industries in other countries, where there are only a couple of 

leading entities for robotics, instead of many.91 According to CRIA, China has built or started 

construction on 40 new robot industrial parks since 2014.

92 The problem, according to some 

commentators, is failing to encourage the rapidly increasing number of companies to identify 

market niches and not blindly compete over the same robot types or industries.93

Chinese Consumers Not Using Robots Made in China

The quality of many Chinese robotics manufacturing brands is considered low enough that Chinese 

companies investing in automation continue to prefer imported robots. For example, while the 

automobile industry has been a major impetus for China’s industrial robotics industry, as of 2012,

Chinese analysts write that the industry still widely preferred leading foreign brands such as ABB 

and FANAC, which hinders the development of domestic brands. Over the past 10 years, the cost 

of imported robots has drastically declined, making Chinese firms unable to compete with 

imported basic robots.94

 

89 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 26.

90 Ibid.

91 Ibid., 27.

92 Mandy Zuo, “China’s Robot Industry ‘Plagued by Low Quality, Overinvestment and Too Much Duplication’,” 

South China Morning Post, June 17, 2016, accessed August 29, 2016,

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1976825/chinas-robot-industry-plagued-low-qualityoverinvestment-and-too.

93 Ibid.,“工信部副部长辛国斌:机器人已有投资过剩隐忧” [MIIT Vice Minister Xin Guobin: Worries that 

Robotics Already Has Surplus Investment], Sina 新浪, June 16, 2016, accessed August 29 2016, 

http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/gncj/2016-06-16/doc-ifxtfrrc3709815.shtml.

94 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 26; Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese 

Industrial Robot,” 28; and Sun, Wang, and Zhang, “On the Development Status and Tendency of Industrial Robots,” 

62.
33

Dependency on Imports for Key Components and Technologies

Despite advancements in industrial robotics, China lags in core technologies such as high-precision 

reduction drives, servo (small electric motor) electrical machinery, controllers, and other key 

components. China still primarily relies on imported industrial robots and these key components

from Japan, Sweden, Germany, Italy, and the United States; the primary companies include 

FANUC, YASKAWA, ABB, COMAU, KUKA, and Staubli. 95 Until 2014, foreign suppliers, 

namely European companies, supplied China with over 70 percent of its industrial robots.

96 Some 

argue that basic research receives the most support, while insufficient support for research on key 

components leaves them in the experimental stage.97 Consequently, Chinese industrial robotics 

companies rely too heavily on foreign imports, especially in high-precision manufacturing. For 

example, by 2012 the Chinese automobile manufacturer Chery had designed its own robots, but it 

still needed to import a more advanced Japanese reduction drive.98

In addition to components for industrial robots, China also lags in key technologies for controlling 

them. Notably, China remains behind international standards in programmable logic controller 

(PLC) and changing frequency controls products. 99 Other technology areas considered to be 

behind international standards include multiple sensor information fusion control technology, 

remote control plus local autonomous system remote control robots, intelligent assembly robots,

and robotized machinery.100

Chinese Robotics Software Development

Chinese military researchers have led the country’s development of robotics software, leveraging 

open source software and demonstrating the inherent dual-use nature of this technology. The 

country’s initial efforts at robotics software started in 1994 under the 863 Program to support the 

development of robotic reconnaissance capabilities.101 This program funded efforts at Tsinghua 

University, Dongnan University, Harbin Institute of Technology, CAS SIA, and CAS Hefei 

Intelligence Institute. In 1996, efforts expanded to the General Staff Department's Beijing Defense 

Research Institute, supported by a National Defense Pre-Research Fund, and later to Shanghai 

Jiaotong University and Beihang University.102

 

95 Chen Shaofei 陈韶飞, “我国工业机器人发展问题分析及对策研究” [Analysis and Recommendations Research 

on Problems with China’s Industrial Robotics Development], Technology Innovation 科技创新, no. 31 (2015): 81; 

Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21; Sun, Wang, and Zhang, “On the 

Development Status and Tendency of Industrial Robots,” 62; and Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese 

Industrial Robot,” 29.

96 Zuo, “China’s Robot Industry ‘Plagued by Low Quality, Overinvestment and Too Much Duplication’,” South 

China Morning Post, June 17, 2016; “MIIT Vice Minister Xin Guobin: Worries that Robotics Already Has Surplus 

Investment], Sina 新浪, June 16, 2016.; “Industrial Robot Statistics,” International Federation of Robotics, accessed 

June 21, 2016, http://www.ifr.org/industrial-robots/statistics/.

97 Cai, “Robotics in China Daring [sic] the Past 40 Years,” 25; Zhao, “Development and Challenge of Chinese

Industrial Robot,” 29.

98 Zhang and Cui, “Current Development Situation and Future Development Strategy of China’s Industrial Robotics 

Development,” 129; Sun and Luo, “Development Research on China’s Industrial Robot,” 2916.

99 Rui and Liu, “Development and Trends of China’s Industrial Robotics,” 21.

100 Cai and Guo, “Development and Basic Problems of China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 10-11.

101 Cao Xiaosong 曹小松, “危险品探测移动机器人平台的研制” [Research and Development of Hazardous 

Material Probing Mobile Robotic Platforms], master’s thesis submitted to Yangzhou University on April 1, 2009, 7-

8, accessed September 30, 2016, http://wk.baidu.com/view/1b8fc4f34693daef5ef73d20?pcf=2#1.

102 Ibid.
34

To develop “indigenous” dual-use military and civilian software for robotics, the National 

University of Defense Technology (NUDT) often modifies open source software. Previously, 

NUDT researchers modified the open source computer operating system FreeBSD, developed at 

the University of California at Berkeley, and named it Kylin. In the area of robotics, NUDT is 

leveraging the open source software Robotics Operating System (ROS), developed by the U.S. 

Open Source Robotics Foundation. NUDT professor Xiao Junhao (肖军浩) teaches this operating 

system to students and hosts a translated developers guide on the NUDT official website.103

The PLA also provides funding to civilian academics to develop robotics software, further 

demonstrating the dual-use nature of these technologies. The PLA General Staff Department 

funded the Nanjing University of Science and Technology’s Cai Yunfei (蔡云飞), who served as 

chief engineer on a GSD robotics software project (“总参 xxx 型号机器人软件总师”).104 A 2016 

NUDT forum on the development of robotics and AI software included experts from both civilian 

and military robotics circles. One such expert, Xu Ying (许莹), participates in projects for the 

Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council of the United Kingdom, while also working 

on what she describes as “GSD military industry projects” (总参军工项目) and 863 Program 

projects.105

Impact on Chinese and Global Labor Markets

There is not yet a consensus among analysts regarding the expected impact of increases in China’s 

use of industrial and service robots on the Chinese and global labor markets. Optimistic voices 

argue that robotic automation will compensate for changing worker job expectations driven by 

improving education levels, raising average living standards, making Chinese manufacturers more 

competitive, enhancing China’s position within the global manufacturing industry, and providing

necessary support for China’s aging population.106

Supporters of the optimistic viewpoint tend to focus on the demand-side factors that encourage 

Chinese manufacturing and service businesses to improve their automation capabilities through 

the use of robotics. China’s push for industrial automation is arguably a natural response to higher 

employee wages and education levels that have come as a result of the country’s economic 

development. An October 2015 report by analysts at Credit Suisse, for example, notes that 

“[Workers’] education has improved significantly from those of their fathers or older brothers. 

 

103 VolodjaNiu [username], “Subject: 机器人操作系统(ROS)浅析--我校肖军浩博士新书免费下载” [Subject: 

Introduction to Robotics Operation System (ROS)—Free Download from Our School’s Dr. Xiao Junhao], discussion 

forum on NUDT’s website, October 9, 2015, accessed September 30, 2016, 

http://micros.nudt.edu.cn/ros/forums/3/memos/425.

104

“蔡云飞” [Cai Yunfei], profile on website of the School of Computer Science and Engineering at Nanjing 

University of Science and Technology, September 2, 2013, accessed September 30, 2016, 

http://cs.njust.edu.cn/_s62/25/7c/c1734a9596/page.psp.

105

“CCF YOCSEF 长沙将举办“AlphaGo 对 IT 产业的影响”专题报告会与 Club” [CCF YOCSEF Changsha 

Will Host a Special Topic Lecture and Club on “The Influence of AlphaGo on the IT Industry], accessed September 

30, 2016, http://www.yocsef.org.cn/sites/yocweb/changsha.jsp?contentId=2921522701877.

106 Vincent Chan, et al, “Young China,” Credit Suisse Securities Research & Analytics, Asia Pacific/China Equity 

Research,” October 28, 2015, accessed June 21, 2016, https://doc.research-andanalytics.csfb.com/docView?sourceid=em&document_id=x664312&serialid=3g3x0rbHmtcamHop4hXBySkZeWP

Aws2edmUg8RKDmiw%3d.
35

Therefore, it will be increasingly difficult to find enough labor for jobs that are exposed to high 

temperatures, danger and a poisonous environment, and such vacancies will naturally need to be 

replaced by robots and automation systems.” 107 Liu Yunhui, a professor of mechanical and 

automation engineering at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, similarly observes, “In the Pearl 

Delta area such as Zhejiang and Jiangsu, it’s very hard to find workers.” 108 Leading policy 

guidelines and plans such as Made in China 2025 also claim benefits of increased quality and 

capabilities to manufacture high-end items.109

Other analysts note that it can be challenging for Chinese companies to manage blue collar 

employees because of low loyalty and retention rates. By one estimate, some factories experience 

turnover rates of up to 80 percent following the annual Chinese Lunar New Year holidays, when 

workers who return home elect not to return to their previous employers. This pattern diminishes 

production efficiency, introduces scheduling uncertainties, and raises costs associated with hiring 

and training new staff.110 All of these problems could theoretically be addressed by replacing or 

supporting more workers with robot systems.

Conversely, pessimists fear that adding robots in the manufacturing and service sectors will 

diminish opportunities for blue collar jobs and will lead to widespread unemployment. In late May 

2016, for example, the South China Morning Post reported that Taiwanese component 

manufacturer Foxconn had laid off 60,000 employees in Kunlun (a mainland China manufacturing 

city in Jiangsu province) and replaced them with industrial robots.111 Xu Yulian, a public relations 

official for Kunlun, added that additional companies are expected to follow suit.112 The cuts 

amounted to only a small fraction of Foxconn’s remaining 1.2 million employees, and a Foxconn 

official stated that the company plans to maintain a significant workforce in China. However, the 

story was widely reported by domestic and international media, reflecting keen public interest and 

concern. In June 2016, the New York Times reported that the Chinese government had updated its 

censorship lists applied to online media platforms (such as Tencent’s WeChat mobile messaging 

app) to ban discussions of rumors regarding robots taking over industries and displacing 

workers.113

Opportunities and Challenges for U.S. Industrial Robot Exporters

The U.S. market share of industrial robots in China is much smaller in comparison to European 

and Asian exporters, but there appear to be opportunities for innovation in components and 

 

107 Ibid.

108 Lucinda Shen, “This is the Future of China,” Business Insider Finance, November 16, 2015, accessed June 21, 

2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/robotics-in-china-2015-11.

109

“国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025》的通知” [State Council Releases ‘Made in China 2025’ Announcement], 

May 8, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm.

110 Ibid.

111 Mandy Zuo, “Rise of the Robots: 60,000 Workers Culled from Just One Factory as China’s Struggling 

Electronics Hub Turns to Artificial Intelligence,” South China Morning Post, May 21, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016,

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/economy/article/1949918/rise-robots-60000-workers-culled-just-one-factorychinas.

112 Jane Wakefield, “Foxconn Replaces ‘60,000 Workers with Robots,’” BBC News, May 25, 2016, accessed July 7, 

2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-36376966.

113 Javier C. Hernandez, “China Censors WeChat Rumors, Including the One About Robots Taking Over,” The New 

York Times, June 24, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/what-in-theworld/china-wechat-censor-rumors.html?_r=0.
36

applications. According to an analysis of Chinese trade data, in 2015 the leading countries of origin 

for China’s industrial robots were Japan (78.36%), Germany (5.38%), South Korea (3.77%), and 

Sweden (2.79%), leaving the United States with a negligible share of the market.114 Despite the 

small percentage of market share, data from the International Trade Administration (ITA) of the 

U.S. Department of Commerce shows that since 2011 China has been the third- or fourth-largest 

market for U.S. exports of multi-purpose industrial robots.115 Exports to Mexico and Canada are 

consistently between two and four times as large, while China and Germany alternate as the thirdand fourth-largest export destinations.

116

Figure 1: U.S. Industrial Robot Exports by Destination, Amount, and Year. Source: International Trade 

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

According to a trade memo from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) in 2014, the 

United States itself sources its own industrial robots from imports and from foreign producers 

operating in country.117 Commercial leaders of the industrial robotics industry are predominantly 

based in Europe and Japan. Major foreign suppliers with U.S. plants and subsidiaries include 

Japanese firms Fanuc, Kawasaki, and Yaskawa-Motoman; the German company Kuka; and 

Switzerland’s ABB and Stäubli. Similar to their operations in China, these companies are investing 

in the United States to maintain a closer presence to their customer bases.

Instead of completed robots, half of the value of U.S. exports and 26 percent of U.S. imports of 

industrial robots are parts.118 These numbers indicate that the United States is not a significant 

 

114

“深度: 从进出口数据看我国工业机器人发展情况” [In Depth: Looking at the Development Situation of China’s 

Industrial Robots from Import Export Data], 高工机器人 GG Robot, June 22, 2016, accessed September 30, 2016, 

http://gg-robot.com/asdisp2-65b095fb-57048-.html.

115 Trade data from TradeStats Express, hosted by the International Trade Administration of the U.S. Department of 

Commerce, http://www.tse.export.gov, accessed October 2, 2016.

116 Additional research may parse the numbers of U.S. exports to China by company, company ownership (U.S. 

company or multinational), application, and fully assembled robot versus components.

117 Michael Stanton-Geddes and Dennis Fravel, “U.S. Manufacturing Companies Are Global Leaders in Industrial 

Robot Consumption,” USITC Executive Briefing on Trade, May 2014.

118 Ibid.
37

producer of completed industrial robots for the global market, including China, but rather a part of 

global supply chains for the industry. While it is unclear what parts are included in this analysis, 

China’s dependence upon imports for advanced components could present an opportunity for U.S. 

exporters.

The United States can also be a leader in finding new applications for industrial robots, as well as 

in innovating how operators use them. For example, SoftWear Automation Inc., an Atlanta-based 

robotics startup, has developed robots that can sew garments, the first of their kind.119 Rethink 

Robotics, whose founder helped produce the iconic Roomba at iRobot, introduced Baxter in 2012 

to create a new category of automation called collaborative robotics.120 While European and Asian 

manufacturers are established leaders and were the first to commercialize traditional industrial 

robots, U.S. innovations may be the first of their kind and generate interest in international markets, 

including China. 

In an industry analysis report in April 2016, ITA identified market access and content localization 

as two barriers that may affect U.S. exports of industrial automation equipment, including robots, 

to China.121 ITA regularly engages with trade partners, including China, to lower tariffs and make 

U.S. products more competitive. The ITA also monitors all calls for content localization, such as

Made in China 2025, to assess for their effects on U.S. exports. 

Leading Industrial Robot Companies and R&D Entities

Based on market analyses, state plans, and corporate information, the following entities are 

considered the most influential for China’s industrial robotics industry. Leading entities receive 

longer introductions and analysis below, while all other important identified entities are included 

in Appendix I: Leading Industrial and Service Robotics Manufacturers, Research Institutes, and 

Professional Associations in China.

Siasun (沈阳新松机器人自动化股份有限公司)

Shenyang Siasun is a market-listed high technology company administratively subordinate to the 

CAS. The company specializes in robotics technology, particularly digital smart manufacturing 

equipment. It advertises one of the world’s most complete robot product lines and claims to be 

China’s largest robot industrialization base. It operates campuses in Shenyang, Hangzhou, and 

Qingdao, subsidiaries in Beijing and Shenzhen, and an international headquarters in Shanghai. The 

company currently has more than 1,600 personnel in its research teams, and claims to be the 

world’s third largest company by total market value in its industry.122

Siasun was established on the basis of work performed at the CAS Shenyang Automation Research 

Institute. It currently operates under a “one core, two wings, three feet” development model, where 

the CAS is the core, the company’s industrial bases in Hangzhou and Shenyang are its wings, and 

three major research centers in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen are the feet. Currently Siasun’s 

 

119 James Hagerty, “Meet the New Generation of Robots for Manufacturing,” The Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2015.

120 “About,” Rethink Robotics, accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.rethinkrobotics.com/about/.

121 Andrew Moyseowicz, “2016 Top Markets Report Industrial Automation: A Market Assessment Tool for U.S. 

Exporters,” International Trade Administration, April 2016, 10.

122

“企业介绍” [Introduction to the Company], Siasun 新松, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.siasun.com/about/Introduction.htm.
38

chairman and president are affiliated with the CAS Shenyang Automation Research Institute.123

The intertwined history and corporate leadership strongly suggest that the private enterprise’s 

objectives are also in line with state-directed policies and programs.

The company’s four main business groups focus on robot components, robot product series, 

industrial systems solutions, and “Industry 4.0.” Robot product lines include industrial robots, 

mobile robots, cleaning robots, specialty robots, and service robots, and the company offers a total 

of more than 80 types of robot products. Among these, industrial robot performance is said to have 

reached international standards, and the company claims to be China’s only product and solution 

provider for cleaning and maintenance robots, having made headway in a market long dominated 

by foreign products from Japan, Korea, and Europe. Siasun’s mobile robots reportedly hold a 

market share of greater than 90 percent within China’s automotive and electrical power markets 

and they have been mass-produced for export abroad. Service robots are said to be a major point 

of growth for the company. Two-thirds of the company’s customers are foreign-invested 

enterprises in China.

124

Siasun was named one of General Motor’s suppliers in 2007, which greatly increased the 

company’s international sales. Ha Enjing, Siasun’s director of global branding, said that the GM 

deal “radically changed China’s domestic robot industry, which until then had only imported 

robots and not exported them.” 125 The company has supplied automated guided vehicles to 

Shanghai General Motors and exported 42 automated guided vehicle robots to GM’s U.S.

headquarters in 2010.126

The Siasun website provides an extensive catalog of the company’s robotics and smart 

manufacturing products. Robotics products include industrial robots, parallel robots, room 

cleaning robots, automated guide vehicles, smart service robots, and mechanical processing 

automation systems. Smart manufacturing products include smart logistics, automated assembly 

and testing production line, laser equipment, energy saving and environmental protection 

equipment, rail and transport systems, and energy industry equipment.127

Harbin Boshi Automation (哈尔滨博实自动化设备有限责任公司)

Harbin Boshi Automation’s products are used in petroleum, chemical, fertilizer, salt chemical 

engineering, coal chemical engineering, metallurgical, port logistics, precise chemical 

engineering, food product, and animal feed product industries. 128 It develops robots for oil 

 

123 “Brand Story,” Siasun 新松, accessed May 26, 2016, http://www.hzsiasun.com/en/brand.php.

124

“企业介绍” [Company Introduction], Siasun 新松, accessed May 10, 2016, 

http://www.siasun.com/about/Introduction.html.

125 Liu Ce, “Innovation Brings Rewards for Siasun,” China Daily, April 7, 2015, accessed May 26, 2016, 

http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-04/07/content_20016379.htm.

126 “China’s Siasun Expands to Seize More of The Domestic Market,” robotics business review, October 8, 2012, 

accessed May 26, 2016, 

http://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/article/chinas_siasun_expands_to_seize_more_of_the_domestic_market/Ch

ina. More recent statistics could not be located.

127

“企业介绍” [Company Introduction], SIASUN 新松, accessed May 10, 2016, 

http://www.siasun.com/about/Introduction.html.

128

“博实” (Boshi), accessed May 11, 2016, http://www.boshi.cn/.
39

exploration and extraction and has been expanding into the agricultural automation and 3D printing 

fields. The company was established in September 1997 with Harbin Institute of Technology (a 

leading Chinese engineering university) as its main shareholder. In addition to its headquarters in 

Harbin, the company operates branches in Beijing, Shanghai, Shandong, Lanzhou, and Xinjiang.129

Harbin Boshi Automation is a major provider of Chinese-made equipment for the Chinese oil 

industry. It is a tier-one supplier enterprise to Sinopec and its products are used by other major 

Chinese oil companies. Its offerings range from single products and systems products to full sets 

of equipment. Its products have also been exported to Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and ten 

countries including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Thailand.130

Harbin Boshi Automation was listed at No. 34 on the Forbes China’s Top 100 Publicly Traded 

Small Businesses for 2014.131 China International Capital Corporation estimated in 2014 that 

Boshi’s revenues would rise by 39.7 percent to RMB 1.07 billion (USD 160.49 million) by 2015.132

Boshi’s products have been sold within China as well as internationally to customers in more than 

10 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa.133

Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry (北京机械工业自动化所)

The Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry (the Beijing Automation 

Institute) was established in 1954 as a comprehensive research institution under the former 

Ministry of Machine Industry. It was reorganized in 1999 and is now a large science and 

technology enterprise under the State Council’s State-owned Assets Supervision and 

Administration Commission (SASAC).134

The Beijing Automation Institute has made a number of notable contributions to the development 

of China’s engineering technologies. It produced China’s first hydraulic servomotor painting robot, 

stereoscopic warehouse, high power electric direct linear accelerator, indigenously developed 

RMP II software, MIC series of programmable controllers, and other high technology products. It 

has completed more than 500 official research achievements and thousands of national key projects 

and custom equipment engineering projects for business customers. It performed ground 

simulation vibration testing for China’s first manmade Earth satellite and it was involved in the 

Three Gorges Dam project. It developed smart electrical transformer systems for the T3 terminal 

 

129 “Harbin Boshi Automation Equipment Co., Ltd.” Global Companies, accessed May 26, 2016, 

http://www.companiess.com/harbin_boshi_automation_equipment_co_ltd_info1841828.html.

130

“博实:机器人及智能装备‘排头兵’” [BOSHI: Robots and Intelligent Equipment ‘Frontline Troops’], Boshi 博

实, accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.boshi.cn/News_More.aspx?ID=1514.

131 Russell Flannery, “Forbes China's Top 100 Publicly Traded Small Businesses for 2014 (Full List),” Forbes, 

January 7, 2014, accessed August 31, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2014/01/07/forbes-chinastop-100-publicly-traded-small-businesses-for-2014-full-list/#50687f9217a2.

132 Yue Wang, “China Automation Companies Advance as Beijing Pledges New Policy Support,” Forbes, 

November 3, 2014, accessed May 26, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2014/11/03/china-automationcompanies-advance-as-beijing-pledges-new-policy-support/#1cd7ceeb7854.

133

“博实:机器人及智能装备‘排头兵’” [BOSHI: Robots and Intelligent Equipment ‘Frontline Troops’], Boshi 博

实, accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.boshi.cn/News_More.aspx?ID=1514.

134

“北京机械工业自动化所简介” [Introduction to the Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery 

Industry], Beijing Research Institute of Automation for Machinery Industry, accessed May 12, 2016, 

http://www.riamb.ac.cn/html/Page/101/101.html.
40

at Beijing Capital Airport as well as China’s first robot painting production line. It produced what 

was at the time the world’s largest glass fiber production line. It also developed a flexible, 

automated production line for automotive engines that reached international standards.135

The company’s website indicates that the company has developed welding robots, cutting robots, 

coating robots, handling robots, palletizing robots, assembly robots, smart robots, and specialized 

robots of many types. It has created robotic production lines for businesses in many industries 

including the automotive, machinery, home appliance, metallurgy, aerospace, defense, and 

biotechnology industries.136

Shougang Motoman Robot Co. Ltd. (首钢莫托曼机器人有限公司)

Shougang Motoman Robot Co., Ltd. is a joint venture between China-based Shougang Group (中

国首钢(集团)总公司), Japan-based Yaskawa, and Japan-based Iwatani Co. (岩谷产业株式会

社) set up in Beijing’s Economic and Technology Development Zone as China’s first company 

specializing in production robot products. It has USD 7 million in registered capital and is currently 

one of China’s largest and most advanced robot production enterprises, capable of manufacturing 

800 robots and systems annually. 137 Shougang Motoman mainly engages in technology 

development, production, and sales of robots, robotic workstations, and large-scale robotic 

automated systems for welding, assembly, painting, handling, cutting and grinding operations used 

in the automotive, motorcycle, engineering machinery, chemical engineering, home appliance, and 

construction industries. It also provides peripheral equipment and components and technology 

services for its customers.138

Shougang Motoman makes industrial robots in China to service the national market and establishes

its own technology standards. The “SG-MOTOMAN” robot products incorporate the latest SKseries robot technologies from Yaskawa and are identical to international-grade Yaskawa 

Motoman robot products in function and quality.139 The company’s SG-MOTOMAN-SK series of 

industrial robots, including the SK120, SK16, and SK6, are used for arc welding, point welding, 

transport, painting, and assembly applications.140

China Robot Industry Alliance (中国机器人产业联盟)

The China Robot Industry Alliance (CRIA) is a nonprofit national industry association for China’s 

robotics industry, including educational and research institutions as members as well as robotics 

users and other interested parties. The alliance was formed in April 2013 and now has 152 member 

organizations. The CRIA’s secretariat is set up at the China Machinery Industry Federation, and 

the CRIA also uses the CMIF as its headquarters.141

 

135 Ibid.

136 Ibid.

137 "Shougang Motoman Robot Co. Ltd." [首钢莫托曼机器人有限公司], accessed May 16, 2016, 

http://etc.gdut.edu.cn/source/amt/PART3/sg-motoman/.

138 Ibid.

139 Ibid.

140

“机器产品” [Robotic Products], Shougang Motoman Robot Co. Ltd, accessed May 16, 2016, 

http://etc.gdut.edu.cn/source/amt/PART3/sg-motoman/product2.htm.

141

"联盟简介" [Alliance Introduction], China Robot Industry Alliance 中国机器人产业联盟, accessed May 23, 

2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/gylm.asp.
41

The CRIA follows both national industrial policies and market trends and seeks to upgrade the 

research and development, production and manufacturing, integrated application, and maintenance 

service levels of its members. It seeks to expand the application of robotics technology in all fields 

and to improve national robotics industry chains. It endeavors to promote the healthy development

of China’s robotics industry and enhance its competitiveness.142

The Alliance’s main objective is to carry out national industrial policy; promote exchange among

its members in terms of technology, markets, and intellectual property; encourage partnerships 

between research, industry, and academia; promote industry self-governance; and coordinate to 

avoid overlap within the industry. It develops and sets up platforms for robot industry information 

exchange, application promotion, educational training, and exhibitions to promote the effective 

use of resources. It works to encourage partnerships between the robotics industry and other 

Chinese industries and to accelerate the popularization of robot technology and products.143 

 

142 Ibid.

143 Ibid.
42

Chapter Two: Service Robots in China

The International Robotics Federation (IRF) defines service robots as partially- or whollyautonomous robotic devices that assist people with completing tasks other than production and 

manufacturing. Service robots are generally divided further into professional service and domestic 

use categories. Professional service robots complete work in particular work settings and include, 

for example, nuclear power plant inspection and emergency response robots, deep sea and space 

exploration robots, counterterrorism and counter-explosion robots, military robots and unmanned 

autonomous vehicles, and search and rescue robots. Domestic service robots assist people with 

tasks related to life and home management. Examples include elder and handicapped caretaker 

robots, medical rehabilitation robots, cleaning robots, nursing robots, surgery robots, and 

entertainment and education interactive robots.144

Within China, the service robot sector has grown rapidly over the past ten years. While sectorspecific data is not available due in part to the sector’s broad definition and the expanding inclusion 

of new applications, Chinese officials have indicated that they expect the sector to continue to 

grow and become more prominent within the overall robotics industry in the future. China’s aging 

population is expected to increase demand for service robots as the number of elderly dependents 

within China increases. Improving living standards are also increasing demand for service robots, 

which can offer comparatively inexpensive domestic services and serve as a status symbol for 

members of the growing middle class. 145 New service robot applications are also driven by 

technology “push” factors, such as the advent of improved AI and cloud computing technologies 

that greatly enhance service robot sophistication and their ability to act independently. Smart 

autonomous vehicles, logistics systems, and medical service robots are expected to continue to 

improve due to these advances.

The key findings of this chapter are as follows:

 Chinese companies and research institutes are actively developing and marketing service 

robots for a broad variety of applications essentially spanning the entire service robot sector. 

The service robot sector appears to be growing more rapidly than other robotics industry 

sectors.

 Chinese Internet and information technology firms such as Baidu, Alibaba Group, JD.com, 

Lenovo, and LeEco play a relatively important role in the service robot industry compared 

to the industrial robot industry due to their AI, cloud computing, and big data resources. 

Due to the comparative newness of service robot technologies that combine information 

technologies with robotic hardware, there is significant innovation within the sector.

 Chinese UAV manufacturers are at or near international standards for industrial, 

commercial, and recreational consumer drone systems. Note that this finding does not 

express an assessment of Chinese military UAV technology or its competitiveness with 

U.S. systems, which are addressed in a separate section of this report.

 

144

“《服务机器人科技发展“十二五”专项规划》解读” [Explanation of Service Robot Technology Development 

Twelfth Five Year Plan Special Program], China Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, May 7, 

2012, accessed June 25, 2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=1550.

145 Melanie Ehrenkranz, “This Rich Chinese Guy Traveling with 8 Robot Maids is Redefining Luxury,” Tech.Mic,

April 20, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016, https://mic.com/articles/141369/this-rich-chinese-guy-traveling-with-8-robotmaids-is-redefining-luxury.
43

 Other focal points of Chinese service robot development include public security, medical 

and rehabilitation, and educational and personal assistant robots.

Policy Guidance Specific to the Service Robot Sector

Chinese service robots have attracted attention recently as increasingly intelligent automated 

devices have entered the market with greater frequency and as Chinese-made service robots enter 

higher profile applications. Recent gains have not occurred spontaneously, however, and a review 

of Chinese science and technology policies shows that service robots have been a focus of 

government-sponsored research and development efforts for at least the past decade. Looking 

ahead, the Thirteenth FYP (2016-2020) briefly mentions service robots, while the Guideline on 

Promoting the Development of the Industrial Robot Industry sets ambitious targets for the industry.

China’s National Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-

2020) includes service robots specifically as a focal point of development, calling for China to , 

“...focus on service robot application requirements [and] research common basic technologies 

including design methods, manufacturing techniques, and smart manufacturing and application 

systems.”146

Services robots were the focus of a special development program (《服务机器人科技发展“十二

五”专项规划》) put forward by China’s Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) during the 

Twelfth FYP period, which ran from 2011 through 2015. A MOST document explaining the 

program noted that Chinese developers made advances in service robot technology during the 

Eleventh FYP (2006-2010), such as achievements related to public security robots, bio-mimetic 

robots, and medical and rehabilitation robots. For example, Chinese security officials used 

counterterrorism robots (such as ordnance disposal robots) for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games 

and the 2010 Asia Games, and firefighters used fire-fighting and disaster relief robots in more than 

20 provinces throughout China. Medical and surgery robots entered clinic use, and “smart pill” 

ingestible robots entered mass production.147 MOST said that during the Twelfth FYP, research 

efforts would focus on public security robots, bio-mimetic robots, medical and healthcare robots, 

and component modularization. In terms of public security robots, priority projects included robots 

for public safety, resource protection, and emergency rescue. Military-civilian dual-use robot 

systems were also listed in the development program, with “large, high-speed, all-terrain mobile 

robot platforms,” “large, variable structure, sea and aircraft platforms,” and “nuclear, biological, 

and chemical defense and operations robot platforms” included within this category.148 

Looking toward 2020, the Thirteenth FYP mentions service robots, but the Guideline on Promoting 

the Development of the Industrial Robot Industry treats the industry in greater detail. The 

Guideline notes the growing applications of service robots in various spheres and sets development 

 

146

“国家中长期科学和技术发展规划纲要 (2006-2020)” [National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the 

Development of Science and Technology (2006-2020)], State Council of the People’s Republic of China, accessed 

July 7, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm.

147

“《服务机器人科技发展“十二五”专项规划》解读” [Explanation of Service Robot Technology Development 

Twelfth Five Year Plan Special Program], Ministry of Science and Technology of the PRC, accessed June 25, 2016,

http://www.most.gov.cn/kjzc/zdkjzcjd/201205/t20120504_94140.htm.

148

“服务机器人科技发展“十二五”专项规划” [Service Robot Technology Development Twelfth Five Year Plan 

Special Program], China Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, July 29, 2013, accessed June 25, 

2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3&f=2.
44

targets for China’s indigenous industry. By 2020, China aims to sell over RMB 30 million (USD 

4.5 million) worth of service robots annually and to achieve small-scale production of service 

robots for elderly and disabled care as well as healthcare applications. It also calls for China’s 

service robots to achieve international standards in the industries of healthcare, home service, 

counterterrorism and ordnance disposal, disaster relief and rescue, and scientific research.

Service Robot Economic Trends

Due in part to the wide range of applications for service robots and the broader array of 

organizations involved in their development and sales, statistics regarding sales and production 

trends for service robots are harder to determine compared to the industrial robot industry. At an

April 2016 press conference for MIIT’s release of its Robot Industry Development Plan 2016-

2020, Song Xiaogang (宋晓刚), the acting director and secretary general of the China Robot 

Industry Alliance (CRIA), said that specific data has not yet been compiled regarding the Chinese 

service robot sector. Song instead pointed out that global industrial robot sales reached 

approximately USD 10.7 billion in 2014 and that global service robot sales in 2014 were USD 6 

billion, and said that the ratio within Chinese industry was likely approximately the same.149

Despite the lack of firm figures, evidence points to the growing importance of service robots within 

the overall Chinese robotics industry and a possible shift in the industry’s focal point towards 

service robots even as the industrial robot sector also grows. In December 2015, for example, 

CRIA, China’s main government-sponsored robotics industry association, formally established a 

service robot expert committee (服务机器人专业委员会) in order to oversee and promote the 

healthy development of the service robot sector.150

International and Chinese analysts have pointed to China’s aging population as a key reason to 

encourage the domestic service robot industry and why there is strong potential for growth in the 

Chinese service robot market. CRIA recently cited data showing that China as of 2016 has over

221.82 million citizens aged 60 years old or older, amounting to 16.15 percent of the total 

population.151 The CRIA article notes that international standards for whether a country has an 

“aging society” include a population of 60 years old or older amounting to at least 10 percent of 

the total population, or a population of 65 years old or older amounting to at least 7 percent of the 

total population, standards China already meets. These numbers are set to grow. The United 

Nations predicted in 2015 that 44.5 percent of China’s population will be 60 years or older by the 

year 2050.152 As China’s society ages, the ratio of elderly citizens who must rely on employed 

 

149

“《机器人产业发展规划(2016-2020 年)》新闻发布会文字实录” [Record of Press Conference for Robot 

Industry Development Plan 2016-2020], China Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, May 11, 

2016, accessed June 25, 2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3418.

150

“中国机器人产业联盟成立服务机器人专业委员会筹备小组” [China Robot Industry Alliance Sets Up Small 

Group for Service Robot Expert Committee], China Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, 

December 10, 2015, accessed June 25, 2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3107.

151

“质疑和虚火 中国服务机器人不需要” [Doubts and False Fire – Chinese Service Robots Not Needed), China 

Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, April 27, 2016, accessed June 25, 2016,

http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3369.

152 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (Population Division), World Population Prospects: 

Key Findings & Advance Tables (2015 Revision), ESA/P/WP.241 (2015): 27, accessed August 19, 2016, 

https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf.
45

workers for support must increase. Robots are thought capable of addressing this problem by 

increasing manufacturing productivity (in the case of industrial robots) and by freeing up service 

personnel from work related directly or indirectly to elder care to engage in more productive 

endeavors (in the case of service robots).153

Another CRIA report notes that as of 2016, China has approximately 60 million handicapped 

citizens who are either limited in their capabilities or who require nursing care, affecting

approximately one in ten Chinese households.154

Quality of life improvements brought about by China’s developing economy are also leading to 

increasing demand for service robots. On the one hand, there are reports that fewer employees are 

willing to perform very low-end menial or difficult tasks now that education levels are increasing 

and opportunities for other types of work are more apparent. On the other hand, higher living 

standards, wages, and more leisure time are increasing interest in service robot technologies that 

can make life more comfortable or entertaining such as robotic vacuum cleaners, intelligent 

laundry machines, and smart toys.

155

Educational demands are also cited as a reason for growth in service robot demand. Robots are 

seen as an entertaining and innovative way of improving education for early, pre-school learners, 

and educational robotics systems are also considered a way to improve training at research 

universities.156

Other factors contributing to China’s interest in service robotics include problems with the 

environment.157 Service robots can help identify and clean pollution, reduce amounts of pesticides 

required for farming, and assist operators in dangerous environments.

Chinese Organizations Involved in Service Robot Research and 

Development

While the broader Chinese robotics industry still lags behind the United States, Japan, and

European countries, the gap within the service robot industry is thought to be comparatively 

smaller. A CRIA article states that Chinese companies are five to ten years behind international 

competitors in terms of key components. For reference and benchmarking, CRIA considers global 

 

153

“三大国内服务机器人需求分析” [Analysis of Three Major Domestic Service Robot Needs], China Robot 

Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, March 1, 2016, accessed June 25, 2016, 

http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3282.

154 Ibid.

155 Ibid.

156 Ibid.

157

“质疑和虚火 中国服务机器人不需要” [Doubts and False Fire – Chinese Service Robots Not Needed], China 

Robot Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, April 27, 2016, accessed June 25, 2016,

http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3369.
46

leaders to be the U.S. companies iRobot and Remotec and German entities German Aerospace 

Center (DLR) and KUKA.158

One advantages U.S. firms have in the services robotics industry is their brand recognition as the 

original pioneers of products and applications. For example, iRobot receives substantial attention 

from Chinese media as an innovator for service robots because of its broad scope of products, the 

use of their products in disasters that garner media attention, and their original applications for 

these systems. Examples include the global popularity of the Roomba vacuum cleaning robot, U.S. 

researchers’ use of iRobot’s unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) Seaglider to assess the Deep 

Horizon Oil Spill in 2010, and Japanese rescue workers’ deployment of PackBot robots during the 

Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011.159 China is determined to develop its own indigenous brands 

with the same international brand recognition.

One of China’s leading service robot research institutes is the State Key Laboratory of Robotics 

and System at HIT (profiled in Appendices I and IV), which develops a number of fundamental 

technologies that can be used throughout China’s service robotics industry.

160 Its research 

directions for service robots include structure design and optimization, propulsion and control 

methods, and components such as sensors and controllers. The lab is also a leading researcher of 

technologies for human-machine interaction, and remote and network controls.161

Leading manufacturers of China’s service robots include Shenyang Siasun, one of China’s most 

established robotics companies (profiled in Chapter One as an industrial robotics leader and in 

Appendix I). Siasun released one of its leading products in 2012, an unmanned helicopter that can

carry out aerial inspections of powerlines under difficult conditions such as thunderstorms, heavy 

rain, or heavy electro-magnetic interference. The unit weighs 120 kg (264.56 lbs), has a rotor 

diameter of 3.29 m (10.79 ft) and a maximum speed of 100 km/hour (62.14 miles/hour). Siasun

developed the system in response to a series of winter storms that resulted in large-scale power 

outages throughout China in 2008.162

In addition to traditional robotics industry firms and research institutions, Chinese Internet and 

information technology enterprises are increasingly active in the service robot sector. Large 

Internet companies such as Baidu, Alibaba Group, JD.com, Lenovo, and LeEco are all investing 

in robotics startups or internal projects spanning a full spectrum of service robot applications. 

These firms have advantages in terms of AI, cloud computing, and big data resources that give 

 

158

“三大国内服务机器人需求分析” [Analysis of Three Major Domestic Service Robot Needs], China Robot 

Industry Alliance Web 中国机器人产业联盟网, March 1, 2016, accessed June 25, 2016, 

http://cria.mei.net.cn/news.asp?vid=3282.

159

“给力高交会开启机器人家居新时代” [The Awesomeness of iRobot Will Start a New Era for Robotic 

Households], China Finance 中国财经, November 18, 2011, accessed September 29, 2016, 

http://finance.china.com.cn/roll/20111118/262674.shtml.

160 Ibid. It is unclear, however, to what extent or how the laboratory shares these advancements with commercial 

entities.

161

“研究方向” [Research Directions], Harbin Institute of Technology State Key Laboratory of Robotics and 

System, accessed August 29, 2016, http://robot.hit.edu.cn/75/dc/c279a95708/page.htm.

162 “SIASUN UAV,” Rundae, accessed May 26, 2016, 

http://www.rundae.com/docs/automobiles/automotive%20styling%20features/vehicle%20design/aircraft%20configu

rations/rotorcraft/helicopters/military%20helicopters/unmanned%20helicopters/siasun%20uav/.
47

them an edge in developing autonomous devices. In addition to producing consumer electronics, 

e-commerce firms see opportunities to increase their operating efficiency by automating delivery 

and logistics systems with service robots.
48

Chapter Three: China’s Military Robotics and Unmanned Systems

Chinese military leaders and strategists believe that the nature of warfare is changing 

fundamentally and relying more heavily upon robotics and unmanned systems. These weapons are 

appearing in all domains—land, air, and sea (both surface and underwater)—and necessitate that 

China develop its own systems. High-level support and generous funding for robotics and 

unmanned systems R&D have created a myriad of research institutes within China’s defense 

industry and numerous universities, both civilian and military. Rapid deployments of increasingly 

capable systems present challenges to U.S. military forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region, 

particularly as U.S. defense planners implement the Third Offset strategy.

The U.S. Third Offset strategy will invest in and incorporate breakthroughs in fields including 

robotics, autonomous systems, miniaturization, big data, and advanced manufacturing, including 

3D printing. It continues the U.S. military’s tradition of leveraging technological advantages 

against previous adversaries’ numerical or other advantages. The “First Offset” strategy began at 

the start of the Cold War in the 1950s when the Communist bloc countries enjoyed numerical and 

geographical advantages over Western Europe. U.S. defense planners offset these advantages with 

nuclear superiority. After the Soviet Union caught up with its own nuclear forces, the U.S. “Second 

Offset” strategy in the 1970s and 1980s leveraged precision-guided weapons, stealth technology, 

and space-based military communications and navigation to again counter the Soviets’ numerical 

advantages. The most recent Third Offset strategy, though still under development, aims to counter 

Russian and Chinese advancements in those technologies, cyber and electronic warfare, and other 

A2/AD capabilities. The new technology areas emphasize the role of unmanned systems and 

robotics and include deep-learning systems, human-machine collaboration, human-machine 

combat teaming, assisted human operations, and network-enabled, cyber-hardened weapons.163

This chapter assesses the drivers behind China’s interest in military robotics and unmanned 

systems, with emphasis on its views of the U.S. military. This report treats unmanned systems and 

robotics systems together based on taxonomies in Chinese texts.164 It assesses the trends, status, 

leading entities, and challenges of China’s own systems in the land, air, and sea domains. Its key 

findings are as follows:

 China’s defense planners and military analysts consider robotics and unmanned systems to

be part of an ongoing revolution in military affairs that increasingly relies on long-range, 

precise, smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons platforms.

 Chinese analysts have paid considerable attention to U.S. deployments of unmanned 

systems in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Libya. 

 Chinese analysts believe the U.S. Department of Defense is investing in and placing greater 

emphasis on unmanned systems. They posit that key drivers for this trend include stresses 

on U.S. defense budgets, the advantages of the systems themselves, and the demands of 

the U.S. rebalance to Asia and Third Offset strategy.

 

163 Katie Lange, “3rd Offset Strategy 101: What It Is, What the Tech Focuses Are,” DoDLive, March 30, 2016, 

accessed August 18, 2016, http://www.dodlive.mil/index.php/2016/03/3rd-offset-strategy-101-what-it-is-what-thetech-focuses-are/.

164 This chapter also discusses the role of autonomy of these systems, which will largely depend upon advances in 

AI, as discussed in this chapter and Chapter Four.
49

 China’s defense industry and military research institutes are actively publishing on “softkill” countermeasures that blind, confuse, or jam unmanned systems and force them to 

return to their bases of operations. This research often cites U.S. systems such as the X47B and Global Hawk unmanned combat aerial vehicles.

 No authoritative comparison of Chinese and U.S. unmanned systems could be located, but 

two trends are noteworthy. First, Chinese manufacturers and their customers (both 

domestic and abroad) appear to emphasize lower price points and quantity over increased 

capabilities. Second, Chinese scientists and DOJ reporting on espionage cases indicate that 

technologies for propulsion, autonomous operation, advanced sensors, and data links will 

be critical for China to close the technological gap between U.S. and Chinese unmanned 

systems.

Chinese Assessments and Choices for Unmanned Systems

China has made tremendous strides in military robotics technologies in recent years. Consider that 

in 2009 a robotics expert with the Beijing Institute of Technology commented that the defense 

industry lacked a plan or strategy, needed to break through technologies for key components, 

lacked standardized systems (such as standardized software, platforms, and protocols that would 

facilitate modularization), had research results that could not be used within their limited scope or 

application, and relied on imports for some components.165 Nonetheless, as of July 2016, China 

has tested or fielded advanced unmanned systems for the air, sea (underwater and surface), and 

land domains. 

Chinese Leadership and Policies Supporting Unmanned Systems

Chinese leaders and policies strongly support the development of unmanned systems for the PLA. 

In November 2015 Xi Jinping told the State Council at a meeting on military reform that the 

Chinese military must “stand in strategic commanding heights of future military 

competitions.”166Although he did not specify any technologies or “high grounds,” many PLA

officers consider unmanned systems to be one of these new strategic technologies.167 One of the 

PLA’s original instructors for UAVs claimed that Xi Jinping told a group of soldiers at the 2016 

National People’s Congress, “Unmanned aerial vehicles are an important combat force for modern 

battlefields. You all must carry out your responsibilities well, and develop good talent.”168

 

165 Huang Yuancan 黄远灿, “国内外军用机器人产业发展现状” [The Current Development Situation of Foreign 

and Chinese Military Robotics Industries], Robot Technique and Application 机器人技术与应用, March 30, 2009, 

25-31.

166

“习近平:全面实施改革强军战略 坚定不移走中国特色强军之” [Xi Jinping: Fully Implement Reforms to 

Strengthen Military Strategy, Unflinchingly Walking the Road of a Strong Military with Chinese Characteristics], 

Xinhua Net 新华网, accessed July 8, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-11/26/c_1117274869.htm.

167

“解放军大校:军队改革要抢占未来战争制高点” [PLA Senior Colonel: Military Reforms Must Seize the High 

Ground of Future Wars], Sina 新浪军事, accessed July 8, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-11-

27/1447845072.html; “李银祥:新型作战力量——未来战争制高点” [Li Yinxiang: New Type of Combat 

Strength--Controlling the High Ground of Future Wars], Guancha 观察者, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.guancha.cn/LiYinXiang/2015_11_27_342799.shtml.

168

“解放军金牌无人机操控手:向习近平立军令状” [PLA Gold Medal UAV Controller: Following Xi Jinping's 

Military Orders], China Daily 中国日报, accessed July 8, 2016, http://cnews.chinadaily.com.cn/2016-

04/04/content_24270271.htm.
50

Chinese plans and directives for military robotics have deepened “military-civilian fusion” (军民

融合), in which military, commercial, and academic entities are encouraged to jointly develop and 

share breakthroughs in technologies.169 Robotics is an ideal use of this “fusion” as commercial 

companies are outpacing their military counterparts in technologies such as autonomous operation 

and navigation, AI, and advanced components. In China, military robotics R&D has historically 

received support from numerous government plans and funding programs, including the 2006-

2020 National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 

(2006-2020), the 863 Program, “State Council Suggestions on Accelerating the Invigoration of 

Equipment Manufacturing,” the National Natural Science Foundation of China, and defense 

preliminary research programs. 170 Most recently, the Thirteenth FYP (2016-2020) also lists 

military robotics, as discussed on page 24.

Due to strong political and financial support, numerous Chinese companies and universities, both 

civil and military, are establishing research centers for unmanned systems and robotics. For 

example, after the MLP and 863 Program included a “high-capability quadrupedal bionic robot” (

高性能四足仿生机器人), nearly ten universities and research institutes conducted research on 

that type of technology.171 One of China’s challenges will be sustaining this support and balancing 

the vast output from so many entities with the actual demands of its military.

A “New Stage” in the World Revolution in Military Affairs

China’s defense planners and strategists consider robotics and unmanned systems to be part of a 

broader trend in the nature of warfare becoming more precise, long-range, and networked. Articles 

featured on China’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) website and authoritative texts like the Science 

of Military Strategy (战略学, SMS) emphasize the growing importance of long-range, precise, 

smart, stealthy, and unmanned weapons platforms. 172 China’s 2015 Defense White Paper on 

“National Security Situation” claims the “...world revolution in military affairs (RMA) is 

proceeding to a new stage. Long-range, precise, smart, stealthy and unmanned weapons and 

equipment are becoming increasingly sophisticated.”173

 

169 For more on “military-civilian fusion” and China’s civil-military integration (CMI) policies, see Daniel 

Alderman, Lisa Crawford, Brian Lafferty, and Aaron Shraberg, “The Rise of Chinese Civil-Military Integration” in 

Tai Ming Cheung (ed.), Forging China’s Military Might: A New Framework for Assessing Innovation (Baltimore, 

MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 109-135.

170 Huang, “The Current Development Situation of Foreign and Chinese Military Robotics Industries,” 30.

171 This research could be in response to the “BigDog” rough-terrain quadrupedal robot developed by U.S. company 

Boston Dynamics. See “BigDog–The Most Advanced Rough-Terrain Robot on Earth,” Boston Dynamics, accessed 

July 7, 2016, http://www.bostondynamics.com/robot_bigdog.html; and Zhang Peng 张鹏 and Peng Kuang 彭况, “军

网记者亲身体验中国军用机器人” [Chinese Military Network Reporters Personally Experience China’s MilitaryUse Robots], China Military Network 中国军网, February 27, 2015, accessed July 7, 2016,

http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.

172 Xiao Tianliang 肖天亮, “顺应军事变革潮流把握改革主动” [Adapting Military Affairs with the Changing Tide 

and Taking Initiative in Reforms], Liberation Army Daily 解放军报, January 5, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2016-01/05/content_4635280.htm.

173 “National Security Situation,” Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China, accessed July 8, 

2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2015-05/26/content_4586688.htm.
51

An analysis in China Military Science (中国军事科学, CMS) in 2015 argued that unmanned 

systems are as revolutionary as steam engines, tanks, airplanes, missiles, and the Internet.174 The 

authors, all senior analysts at NUDT, believe weapons are becoming more precise, smarter, 

stealthier, and unmanned. 175 The most recent edition of SMS elaborates that “...intelligent

technology, unmanned technology, stealth technology, and other types of new concept technology 

are integrating together, and will perhaps give future warfare “unmanned, intangible, and silent” 

characteristics.”176 

Chinese analysts view this trend towards unmanned systems as affecting all strategic domains 

and as attractive to militaries around the world. Across the world, militaries are increasingly 

utilizing unmanned systems with intelligent technology, nanotechnology, and micromechanical 

technology in the land, sea, air, and space domains. Concurrent advances in stealth, blinding, 

jamming, trajectory alteration, and other technologies make unmanned systems even more 

difficult to detect and defend against, and in turn even more attractive to defense planners.177 By 

one estimate, over 70 countries have military robotics plans, and there are over 4,000 types of 

UAVs on the global market.178 The 2013 SMS notes that part of Russia’s military modernization 

plans includes increased weapons research and development on “future aviation (including 

unmanned) systems.”179 Other analysts follow developments in unmanned systems, particularly 

UAVs, in Israel, the United Kingdom, India, and others.180

Key trends identified by Chinese analysts include the following:181

 Control technology for unmanned operational systems is changing into intelligence fusion, 

and full autonomous control.

 

174 Zhu Qichao 朱启超, Liu Jifeng 刘戟锋, and Zhang Huang 张煌, “科技革命视野中的军事战略创新” (Military 

Strategic Innovations from the Perspective of Scientific and Technological Revolution), China Military Science 中

国军事科学 3, no. 135 (2014): 75-81, 92. The textbook Science of Military Strategy and the journal China Military 

Science are both produced by the staff of the Academy of Military Science, the PLA’s highest-level research and 

education institute. Both texts represent officially endorsed (or at least sanctioned) views of military affairs and of 

developments in international security and science and technology. Both the textbook and the journal are used as 

primary source materials in the instruction and education of the PLA’s senior officer corps.

175 Ibid

176 Shou Xiaosong 寿晓松, 战略学 (The Science of Military Strategy) (Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 

2013), 97-98.

177 Ibid.

178 Pang Hongliang 庞宏亮, “智能化军事革命曙光初现——从美‘第三次抵消战略’解读军事技术发展轨迹” 

[The Smart Military Revolution Is Dawning–Interpreting the Track of Military Technology Development from the 

U.S. “Third Offset Strategy”], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 28, 2016, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-01/28/content_4637961.htm. 

179

 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 54.

180 Tao Chuanhui 陶传辉, “各国军队竞相发展无人作战平台 已渗入陆海空等空间” [Every Country's Military 

Competing in Development of Unmanned Combat Platforms Has Already Entered Land, Air, and Sea Spaces], 

National Defense Reference 国防参考, May 27, 2014, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2014-

05/27/content_4512254_2.htm; “深度:印度无人机差点飞中国 传回图像让印军不敢信” [Depth: India's UAV 

Short of Flying to China, Returning Images Cause India's Military to Not Dare], Sina 新浪军事, May 10, 2016, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-05-10/doc-ifxryhhh1873725.shtml.

181 Ibid.
52

 Single platform operations are transitioning to joint manned and unmanned systems, as 

well as multiple unmanned systems.

 New emphasis on integrating multiple platforms in operations over improving the 

capabilities of individual platforms.

 Platforms are becoming more standardized and interchangeable. 

“Remote-Controlled Warfare”: Chinese Assessments of U.S. Unmanned Systems Experience 

and Applications

Chinese authors have paid considerable attention to U.S. experience and applications for 

unmanned systems in warfare, and have long anticipated increasing U.S. investments, applications, 

and deployment of them. As U.S. defense officials laid out the Third Offset strategy and 

emphasized the role of unmanned systems, the Chinese reaction has not been surprise but rather a 

confirmation of their assessments of U.S. military trends and that such systems are aimed at China. 

This section evaluates China’s analyses and perspectives on U.S. experience, strategy, and future 

plans for unmanned systems.

Chinese military strategists and officers have closely followed the U.S. deployment of UAVs in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya. One history of military UAVs by a PLAAF senior colonel 

and senior engineer examines the U.S. use of UAVs from the first Gulf War to Afghanistan. During 

Desert Storm, the Pioneer UAV was one of the first unmanned systems to complete missions that 

formerly required manned aircraft. Later in 2001, U.S. strikes in Afghanistan using RQ-1A 

Predator UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles were the first of their kind, and their success helped 

set the priorities and discussions for future use of military UAVs.182 More recently, the 2013 SMS

notes that the U.S. military employed UAVs to implement precision strikes in conjunction with 

multiple other weapons platforms in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Libya.183

Chinese analysts consider the United States to be a leader in the application of unmanned ground 

systems as well. In addition to the over 8,000 UAV systems (especially the Global Hawk and 

Reaper UAVs) deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, they point out the U.S military possesses over 

12,000 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) total, and reportedly deployed over 5,000 UGVs to the 

two countries.184 Analysts also follow and consider military roles for systems such as the Scorpion 

Small UGV, SWORDS armed system, Packbot, and Big Dog.185 For the future of UGVs, a vice 

president at the PLA National Defense University sees the potential for these systems to serve as 

 

182 Chen Guichen 陈贵春 (Ed.), Min Zengfu 闵增富, and He Yuesheng 何月生 (Asst. Eds.), 军用无人机 [Military 

Unmanned Vehicles] (Beijing: PLA Publishing House, 2008), 202-205.

183 SMS (2013), 97-98.

184 Pang Hongliang 庞宏亮, “智能化军事革命曙光初现——从美‘第三次抵消战略’解读军事技术发展轨迹” 

[The Smart Military Revolution Is Dawning–Interpreting the Track of Military Technology Development from the 

U.S. “Third Offset Strategy”], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 28, 2016, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-01/28/content_4637961.htm; Tao Chuanhui, [Every Country's Military 

Competing in Development of Unmanned Combat Platforms Has Already Entered Land, Air, and Sea Spaces], May 

27, 2014.

185 Lu Tiange 陆天歌, Hu Yajun 胡亚军, Wu Meng 武萌, “军用机器人迎来发展机遇期” [Military-Use Robots 

Forging Ahead in a Period of Favorable Development], Liberation Army Daily 解放军报, December 2, 2015, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://news.mod.gov.cn/tech/2015-12/02/content_4631281.htm; Tao Chuanhui [Every 

Country's Military Competing in Development of Unmanned Combat Platforms Has Already Entered Land, Air, and 

Sea Spaces], May 27, 2014.
53

mechanized paratroopers that can land in a hostile environment and conduct search and rescue, 

surveillance, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) missions, as well as transmit video back to 

command centers and even conduct combat operations with personnel.186

Chinese analysts see the U.S. military as accelerating its adoption of unmanned systems as it 

transitions from Afghanistan and Iraq, copes with cuts to military spending, and rolls out the Third 

Offset strategy. In their view, by 2040 robots will outnumber people in the U.S. military.187 In the 

“post-Afghanistan” era, three trends will be prevalent—innovation of new operational concepts, 

greater integration of technology and manpower (including unmanned systems), and decreasing 

support structures while optimizing force construction.188 Following the U.S. budget debates of 

2012 and sequestration cuts of 2013, Chinese analysts concluded that these budget cuts would 

increase the U.S. military’s emphasis, if not dependence, upon its technological advantages. In 

2012 Li Daguang, a senior colonel and theorist at NUDT specializing in technology and warfare, 

commented that even if the U.S. military budget decreases, it is still vast and the priority will be 

diminishing the number of personnel and traditional systems. In terms of capabilities, Li predicted 

“...national defense funds will flow to unmanned systems, stealth fighters, and electromagnetic 

interference systems in order to counter “anti-access challenges,” and to emphasize carrying out

“non-contact” operations.”189 Any decreases in budgets and personnel will only accelerate these 

trends.190

Looking towards the future, Chinese analysts consider the U.S. Navy as both leading the 

development of unmanned systems as well as the most dependent upon them. In 2012 Li Daguang 

cited the Navy’s plans to develop large-scale long-deployment autonomous unmanned 

submersibles (USVs), the X-47B, and ship-launched unmanned aerial surveillance and attack 

systems.191 By 2020 he estimated the U.S. military will have over 1,000 USVs, constituting an 

enormous underwater fleet. He and numerous other analysts track the U.S. Navy’s development 

of UUVs and USVs, such as the Remus-600, GhostSwimmer, and Knifefish.192 With these changes 

and other plans, Li predicted “remote-controlled warfare” (遥控战争) to be a distinct possibility, 

with unmanned systems drastically changing the nature of modern warfare.193

 

186 Xiao Tianliang 肖天亮, “顺应军事变革潮流把握改革主动” [Adapting Military Affairs with the Changing Tide 

and Taking Initiative in Reforms], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 5, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2016-01/05/content_4635280.htm.

187 Hu Yiming 胡一鸣, “剑指未来,“白头鹰”再掀革新风暴” [Sword of the Future, “Bald Eagle” Raising a Storm 

of Innovation Again], PLA Daily 解放军报, February 27, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-02/27/content_4645032.htm.

188

“后阿富汗战争时代—— 美国陆军进一步加快改革” [After the Afghanistan War Era -- U.S. Army Takes One 

Step Further in Accelerating Reform], PLA Daily 解放军报, July 31, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2015-07/31/content_4612091.htm.

189 Li Daguang 李大光, “A Strategic Analysis of US Future Defense Orientation” [美国未来防务走向战略分析], 

China Military Science 中国军事科学, no. 5, 2012, 142.

190 Ibid.

191 Ibid.

192 Qiang Dong 钱东, Tang Xianping 唐献平, and Zhao Jiang 赵江, “UUV 技术发展与系统设计综述” (Overview 

of Technology Development and System Design of UUVs), Torpedo Technology 鱼雷技术 22, no. 6 (December 

2014): 401-414.

193 Li Daguang 李大光, “A Strategic Analysis of US Future Defense Orientation” [美国未来防务走向战略分析], 

China Military Science 中国军事科学, no. 5 (2012): 147.
54

Discussing U.S. deployments of such systems as the X-47B and MQ-8C Fire Scout,194 one analyst 

claims the U.S. military is rapidly upgrading and replacing systems with stealth combat robots in 

order to meet requirements of the “pivot” and “rebalance” to Asia. These new types of robots 

change the deterrence and attack methods at the U.S. military’s disposal, particularly for coastal 

states. The concern is that these machines can operate stealthily in surveillance mode, using GPS, 

radar guidance, infrared and laser sensors, but then at the flip of a switch use small caliber guns or 

other weaponry on board. Underwater robots are also becoming a “favorite” of the U.S. Navy that 

can operate stealthily and carry torpedoes and missiles. The author worries that this integration of 

air, surface, and underwater machines is a way for the U.S. Navy to implement Air-Sea Battle195

deterrence and attacks.196

China also follows U.S. developments for unmanned surface vehicles (USVs), in particular the 

ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program funded by the U.S. Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).

197 The ACTUV system is a “vessel optimized to 

robustly track quiet diesel electric submarines.” 198 In April 2016 DARPA unveiled the first 

ACTUV system, Sea Hunter, which is undergoing tests. 199 Numerous Chinese research and 

military institutes (such as the PLA Navy Equipment Department and CSIC 719 Research 

Institute) have tracked the system’s development with the assumption that it is designed to track 

China’s diesel attack submarines.200

Other U.S. Navy concepts being followed include Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW), 

formally announced in 2015 as a concept to blend “fleet operations in space, cyberspace, and the 

electromagnetic spectrum with advanced non-kinetic capabilities to create warfighting 

 

194 The MQ-8C is an unmanned autonomous helicopter designed for the U.S. Navy to provide reconnaissance, 

situational awareness, aerial fire support, and precision targeting support.

195 Air Sea Battle was a U.S. integrated battle doctrine for countering A2/AD threats, and in 2015 was renamed Joint 

Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC). See Sam LaGrone, “Pentagon Drops Air Sea 

Battle Name, Concept Lives On,” USNI News, January 20, 2015.

196 Li Jie 李杰, ““山姆大叔” 大力发展无人机欲重返亚太” [“Uncle Sam” Is Rapidly Developing UAVs as it 

Looks to Return to Asia], National Defense Reference 国防参考, May 21, 2014, accessed June 15, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2014-05/21/content_4510641.htm.

197 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a DOD agency responsible for developing 

emerging technologies for use by warfighters. The agency has sponsored projects that made technological 

breakthroughs in unmanned system technologies, battlefield robotics, computer networking, and artificial intelligence 

among many others.

198 Scott Littlefield, “Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV),” Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency, accessed June 1, 2016, http://www.darpa.mil/program/anti-submarinewarfare-continuous-trail-unmanned-vessel.

199 Rick Stella, “Ghost Ship: Stepping Aboard Sea Hunter, the Navy’s Unmanned Drone Ship,” Digital Trends, 

April 11, 2016; 

“人艇作战使用分析” [Analysis of U.S. Anti-Submarine Unmanned Surface Vehicles Operations and Uses], Ship 

Electronic Engineering 舰船电子工程, no. 8 (2012).

200 Wang Chuan 汪川, “DARPA: 美军战略优势的技术创新支柱” (DARPA: The Technological Innovation 

Backbone of the U.S. Military’s Strategic Advantages), Military Digest 军事文摘 (June 2015): 51-54; Tian Jun 田

军, She Yajun 余亚军, and Cai Long 蔡龙, “针对持续性跟踪无人艇的探测技术” (Research on Detection 

Technology on ACTUV), Ship Science and Technology 舰船科学技术 35, no. 4 (2013).
55

advantages.” 201 Systems for these operations could include the EP-3 signals reconnaissance 

aircraft, MQ-4C Triton UAV, and MQ-8B/C Fire Scout UAVs for better ISR, connectivity, and 

flexibility in the electromagnetic domain.202

Chinese Reaction to the Third Offset

In November 2014 then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced the Defense Innovation 

Initiative that would develop into the Third Offset strategy.203 To date, Chinese analysts have 

primarily concerned themselves with describing and parsing out the offset strategy, but some are 

beginning to assess strategic choices China must make in response to it, including in relation to 

unmanned systems. Chinese media covered Hagel’s speech, as well as subsequent ones by Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Bob Work, who is leading the initiative, and are aware of this history.204 In 

articles appearing on China’s MOD website, analysts write that using technological innovation to 

offset important strategic advantages of adversaries has been the U.S. military’s “time-tested 

method since the end of World War II.” 205 In their view, the U.S. advantages include innovation, 

cutting edge systems, contributions from independent think tanks, and a strong military-civilian 

integrated national defense industrial base.206 They also assess that challenges to this innovation 

include pressures on defense budgets, weakening economic strength relative to other countries, the 

lack of “home field advantage” as the U.S. military must project forces farther, and more complex 

and multi-faceted challenges.207

Discussions of how China should respond to the Third Offset are limited but primarily focus on 

management of China’s defense industry. Li Jian, a retired PLA Lieutenant Colonel and current 

Director of China’s Knowfar Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies, proposes that as China 

understands the U.S. strategy, it should also work to improve efficiency, governance and 

 

201

“Forward, Engaged, Ready A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (Washington, DC: Department 

of the Navy, 2015), 21.

202 Zhang Yueliang 张岳良, Wu Qirong 伍其荣, and Zhu Dan 朱丹, “An Analysis of the ‘All-Domain Access’ 

Concept of the US Navy” [美国海军“全域进入”概念探析], China Military Science 中国军事科学, no. 4 (2015):

138.

203 “Secretary of Defense Speech, Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote, As Delivered by Secretary of Defense 

Chuck Hagel, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA, Nov. 15, 2014,” U.S. Department of Defense, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606635.

204 Wang Weihua 王卫华, “美国第三次“抵消战略”呼之欲出” [America’s Third “Offset Strategy” Is on the Verge 

of Coming Out], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 16, 2016, accessed May 11, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2015-01/16/content_4565007.htm; “美第三次“抵消战略”述评” [Discussion on the 

U.S. Third ‘Offset Strategy’], Guangming Daily 光明日报, March 2, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016 as posted at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2016-03/02/c_128767225.htm.

205 Wang Weihua, [America’s Third ‘Offset Strategy’ Is on the Verge of Coming Out], PLA Daily 解放军报, 

January 16, 2016. 

206 Ibid; Chen Hanghui 陈航辉, “智库:美国军队的‘最强外脑’” [Think Tanks: The U.S. Military’s “Strongest 

Outside Minds”], PLA Daily 解放军报, November 20, 2015, accessed May 11, 2016, 

http://www.mod.gov.cn/opinion/2015-11/20/content_4629292.htm.

207 Wang Weihua, [America’s Third “Offset Strategy” Is on the Verge of Coming Out], PLA Daily 解放军报, 

January 16, 2016.
56

management of its own defense policies and industries. Otherwise, the government and military 

will not be able to implement any strategy Chinese leaders decides upon.208

Zhang Xiaobin, an author affiliated with the State Administration for Science, Technology and 

Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), presents a more detailed response, arguing that the 

offset strategy presents three challenges and three solutions for China.209 The first challenge is that 

the United States is making it increasingly difficult for China to match U.S. leaps in innovation. 

The United States uses DARPA to leverage technological, industrial, and military revolutions 

together, leading to rapid advances in technologies such as electromagnetic rail guns and lasers. 

These types of “technological surprises” (技术突袭) can increase the disparity between U.S. and 

Chinese military technologies. Second, the offset puts pressure on China’s national defense 

industry to develop weaponry and equipment. Specifically, unmanned combat and underwater 

combat can be asymmetric advantages for the United States that increase the gap between U.S. 

and Chinese equipment. Third, the offset strategy complicates China’s decisions on core 

capabilities for its national defense industrial base. As a warning, he cites the financial stress on 

the Soviet Union in the 1980s in response to the second offset and the “Star Wars” program.210

To respond to these challenges, the author suggests first that China focus on the effectiveness of 

core capabilities and equipment that can effectively counter the U.S. military. Second, he proposes 

that China allow innovation to drive the development of strategy and seek technological 

advantages in key areas and counter those of the United States. Finally, he proposes strengthening 

defense planning to raise the standards of designs by the national defense industry.211

Is “Unmanned” Unethical? Chinese Considerations for Unmanned Systems

Chinese military analysts have published few opinions on the morality of unmanned and lethal 

autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), which may decide independently whether to use lethal 

force on a target. Discussions on the deployment of controlled unmanned systems in combat center 

on sovereignty, include ample criticism of U.S. deployments of UAVs against targets in Pakistan, 

and rarely touch on ethical considerations for PLA units. Chinese military authors are largely silent 

on the use of LAWS, in sharp contrast with a robust debate in the United States. The PRC’s arms 

control diplomacy, however, suggests that the PLA’s capabilities do not warrant such discussions 

yet, and that strategists are more concerned with lagging behind U.S. capabilities.

Chinese military writings condemn U.S. strikes with UAVs as violations of other countries’ 

sovereignty, but recent events may challenge China’srestraint from taking similar actions. In 2014,

Chinese law experts wrote in China Military Science on international law and the ethics of UAV 

operations, using U.S. UAV operations in Pakistan as a case study. They speak positively of the 

advantages of these systems, namely their stealth and tracking capabilities, the lack of international 

 

208 Li Jian 李健, “新抵消战略:美国以技术优势谋求持续军事优势的老套路和新思考” (New Offset Strategy: 

An Old Means with New Thinking for the U.S. to Maintain Military Dominance), Air & Space Power 空天力量杂

志 (simplified Chinese version) 9, no. 2 (2015): 96.

209 SASTIND is the government agency in charge of defense industrial policy in China.

210 Zhang Xiaobin 张晓斌, “美国‘第三次抵消战略’对国防科技工业的挑战与应对” (The Challenge Imposed by 

the Third U.S. Offset Strategy on the Development of Defense Science and Technology Industry and 

Contermeasures [sic]), National Defense Science & Technology 国防科技 36, no. 6 (December 2015): 74-76.

211 Ibid.
57

laws governing their use (making it easier to use them), their advantages in hazardous 

environments, and the lack of casualties for pilots. They criticize the strikes based on sovereignty, 

claiming that the United States conducts such attacks in Pakistan without that country’s approval. 

The authors question whether UAV operators are subject to international laws governing warfare, 

and conclude that U.S. UAV operations in Pakistan, a state that is not at war with the United States, 

constitute war crimes.212

These views may change as China faces more transnational threats, and weighs the same 

advantages of UAVs and other unmanned systems. A relevant case study is China’s pursuit of 

Naw Kham, a Burmese drug trafficker accused of killing thirteen Chinese sailors in 2011. 

According to media reports, one plan was to kill Naw using “an unmanned aircraft to carry twenty

kilograms of TNT to bomb the area.”213 Relevant authorities rejected the plan and an operation 

later captured Naw alive in 2012. Some reporters claimed leaders rejected the UAV strike option

because of concerns it would spark international controversy akin to U.S. strikes in Pakistan, while 

others claimed China’s UAV technologies may not have been advanced enough to carry out the 

mission.

214

Chinese public opinion has been largely opposed to such strikes but this attitude may also be 

changing. According to a global survey, from 2012 to 2014 between 52 and 62 percent of the 

Chinese public opposed the U.S. use of UAVs to conduct missile strikes against extremists in 

countries such as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.215 However, the proportion approving of the 

strikes has increased from 25 percent to 35 percent. As China’s interests abroad grow and its 

capabilities mature, the likelihood of and support for Chinese UAV operations abroad could 

increase. The Chinese public’s support for the PRC’s territorial claims in the East and South China 

Seas could also translate into support for UAV operations in the region.

At least one article discusses the humane considerations for UAV strikes, arguing that the increase 

in precision does not make the weapons more “humane.” In 2013, NUDT scholars wrote in China 

Military Science on the “paradox” of wars increasingly revolving around “surgical strikes” with 

unmanned systems. On the one hand, these systems make the operators more detached from the 

war itself, dehumanize adversaries, and lower the threshold for use. On the other hand, the 

advantages of unmanned systems such as stealth, precision, and low risk to operators can reduce 

 

212 Xie Dan 谢丹 and Ming Chenyan 明晨燕, “无人机作战的国际法问题研究”, China Military Science 中国军事

科学 3, no. 135 (2014): 139-145.

213

“中国抓糯康难度超猎杀拉登 曾欲派无人机斩首” [China Catching Nuo Kang Was More Difficult than Killing 

Bin Laden, Previously Desired to Use a UAV to Behead], Global Times Online 环球网, February 18, 2013, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/paper/2013-02/3650584.html; Liu Chang, “Manhunt for Deadly Drug 

Kingpin” Global Times, February 19, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/762449.shtml.

214

“China Considered Drone Strike on Foreign Soil in Hunt for Drug Lord” South China Morning Post, February 

19, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1153901/drone-strike-was-option-huntmekong-drug-lord-says-top-narc; Jane Perlez, “Chinese Plan to Kill Drug Lord with Drone Highlights Military 

Advances” New York Times, February 20, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/21/world/asia/chinese-plan-to-use-drone-highlights-military-advances.html?_r=0.

215

“Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America's Image, Many in Asia Worry 

about Conflict with China” Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2014/07/2014-07-14-Balance-of-Power.pdf.
58

collateral damage and protect military personnel. The authors conclude these weapons do not make 

war more “humane” (慈化) because the fundamental problems and suffering continue.216

No analysis could be found considering problems with escalation control using unmanned systems.

As unmanned systems become more advanced, and AI enables more rapid and autonomous 

responses to different scenarios, it will be important for military leaders to take risks of escalation 

into consideration. The only evidence of Chinese thinking on the matter is an article reposted to 

the Ministry of Defense’s website that states unmanned intelligent systems may “change escalation 

control avenues.”217 This lack of literature may indicate a need for international dialogue on the 

implications of unmanned systems in crisis situations.

Leading military publications and journals are also largely silent on the issue of an autonomous 

system independently determining to kill a target. This silence contrasts sharply with the in-depth 

analysis by U.S. defense planners, think tanks, and media on the definitions, benefits, ethical 

dilemmas, and other aspects of increasingly autonomous systems. One of the leading challenges 

for U.S. and other defense planners is deciding whether or not to allow autonomous unmanned 

systems to independently use lethal force, an issue no PLA strategist or technical expert appears 

to discuss in open source publications.218 The lack of authoritative Chinese discussions may reflect 

either ongoing internal debates among PLA leadership or that China’s unmanned systems are not 

developed enough to necessitate decisions on the roles of autonomous weapons systems.

China’s diplomatic positions on LAWS also suggest Chinese leaders are ambivalent on the use of 

LAWS or concerned with a gap between U.S. and Chinese capabilities. In 2013 China, the United 

States, and numerous other countries agreed to discuss LAWS within the framework of the 1980 

United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). 219 These discussions, 

namely the Meetings of Experts on LAWS, seek to define and set norms for the use of LAWS. 

There is a consensus that there is no agreed upon international definition, and the military 

advantages and possibilities for these systems are growing. One analysis puts United States and 

China into two separate “groups” with separate narratives on LAWS. The U.S. group of 

“established ‘Western’ military powers” 220 does not want the CCW discussions to preclude 

technological developments, and is hesitant to discuss meaningful human control (MHC). A 

separate group of “other established military powers” (most notably, China, India, and Russia) 

also values increasingly autonomous systems, but they “fear that an arms race on LAWS would 

widen the capability gap between them and the USA.” Given that China’s opening and closing 

 

216 Zhang Huang 张煌, Zhu Qichao 朱启超, Li Po 李坡, “信息化战争阈下武器演进的伦理悖论” (The Ethical 

Paradox of the Evolution of Weapons against the Backdrop of Informationized Warfare), 中国军事科学 China 

Military Science 5, no. 131 (2013): 140-146.

217 Xiao Tianliang 肖天亮, “顺应军事变革潮流把握改革主动” [Adapting Military Affairs with the Changing Tide 

and Taking Initiative in Reforms], Liberation Army Daily 解放军报, January 5, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/intl/2016-01/05/content_4635280.htm.

218 For example, see Jim Garamone, “DoD Studies ‘Terminator’ Weapons Conundrum, Selva Says,” DoD News, 

August 26, 2016, accessed August 29, 2016, http://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/927792/dod-studiesterminator-weapons-conundrum-selva-says; and Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy 

in Weapon Systems, Working Paper for the Center for a New American Security, February 2015.

219 Vincent Boulanin, “Mapping the Debate on LAWS at the CCW: Taking Stock and Moving Forward,” NonProliferation Papers no. 49, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, March 2016.

220 These countries include Australia, Canada, France, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States.
59

statements for these meetings are not available online (unlike other countries), it is difficult to 

verify this narrative. 221 If accurate, China’s public stance has been to acknowledge the 

humanitarian and legal concerns of other countries and seek to curtail U.S. development of such 

systems.

Applications for China’s Unmanned Systems

Chinese military analysts and strategists agree that unmanned systems can enhance the capabilities 

of individual services and address key deficits. This section examines discussions by Chinese 

military strategists and analysts of applications and missions for China’s unmanned systems. It 

then follows with examples of unmanned system missions observed to date.

Applications and Roles under Discussion

Chinese analysts see tremendous utility and advantages of unmanned systems. Some repeat the 

“DDD” (dull, dirty, and dangerous) discussion found in U.S. literature. 222 In other words, 

unmanned systems can operate for long periods of time doing mundane tasks (dull), go into 

unpleasant environments (dirty), and take risks in place of the human operator (dangerous). 

Additionally, at least one author claims that an UAV can have a greater capability than its human 

counterpart, as it can withstand up to 20G of pressure, over twice that of a manned aircraft, giving 

it much greater agility. Finally, designers can customize the size and capabilities of unmanned 

systems to use less power or achieve greater flexibility for different roles and missions.

223

The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) includes UAVs in its priorities for future military systems. In the 

2013 SMS, authors write the PLAAF should focus on building the following capabilities, all of 

which can utilize or incorporate UAVs:224

 Integrated information systems for surveillance, early warning, and command and control 

platforms;

 Medium and long-range precision strike systems that extend PLA strike capabilities to the 

second island chain and deny adversary attacks; and 

 Develop systems for combat that include platforms such as fourth-generation aircraft, 

aerial refueling aircraft, long-range reconnaissance aircraft, early-warning and command 

aircraft, and UAVs, as well as guided munitions such as air-launched cruise missiles and 

anti-radiation missiles.

The PLAAF is already working on defenses against UAVs. The 2013 SMS calls for improved 

defenses against UAVs in addition to stealth fighters and missile threats.225 The air force has 

already set up a specialized unit dedicated to detecting and countering small unmanned aircraft, in 

particular slow-moving drones flying at altitudes of less than 1,000 meters. According to official 

 

221

“2016 Meeting of Experts on LAWS,” The United Nations Office at Geneva, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/37D51189AC4FB6E1C1257F4D004CAFB2?OpenDocument.

222 Dai Hao 戴浩, “无人机系统的指挥控制” (Command and Control for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), Journal of 

Command and Control 指挥与控制学报 2, no. 1 (March 2016): 5-7.

223 Pang Hongliang 庞宏亮, “智能化军事革命曙光初现——从美‘第三次抵消战略’解读军事技术发展轨迹” 

[The Smart Military Revolution Is Dawning–Interpreting the Track of Military Technology Development from the 

U.S. “Third Offset Strategy”], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 28, 2016, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-01/28/content_4637961.htm. 

224 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 223-224.

225 Ibid., 224.
60

news media, “the unit performs drills against a squadron equipped with multiple types of drones 

to simulate reconnaissance, infiltration or strike operations.” The unit’s commander said his men 

have been closely following developments in the international aviation industry and keep 

improving their drone database.226

Unmanned systems could also vastly improve ISR and attack capabilities of the PLA Navy 

(PLAN). The 2013 SMS calls for development of “naval (surface, underwater, and aerial) 

unmanned operation/combat platforms.” 227 As recently as 2015, an article in China Military 

Science bemoaned that while China has strategic level guidance on systems combat, at an 

operational level, implementation and practice are insufficient. Operations in the electromagnetic 

and network domains, reconnaissance and early warning, and command and control all face 

challenges of being “unable to see far” (“看不远”), “unable to distinguish clearly” (“辨不清”), 

“unable to connect (“联不通”), and “unable to maintain” (“稳不住”).228 UAVs can contribute to 

ISR capabilities and solutions for each of these challenges.

The PLAN is pursuing underwater robotics that can increase its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 

capabilities. A Chinese article from 2015 calls for an “undersea Great Wall” (水下长城) and 

discusses China’s “undersea monitoring system” (水下观测系统).229 Such a monitoring network 

can detect both natural disasters such as typhoons and adversary underwater systems. Pictures on 

Chinese social media claim that UUVs would play a leading role in maintaining this network and 

detecting adversary submarines. Some Chinese media reports claim that UUVs would provide 

offensive and defensive capabilities for this system.230 If true, such a network could help improve 

China’s ASW capabilities, long considered a weakness of the PLA.

Applications to Date of Chinese Unmanned Systems

Counterterrorism

 During Peace Mission 2014, an anti-terror drill held by the Shanghai Cooperation 

Organization (SCO), an unnamed UAV fired missiles at targets.231 The exercise included 

troops from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

 

226 Zhao Lei, “PLA Air Force Sets Up Anti-Drone Unit,” China Daily, February 19, 2016.

227 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 213.

228 Zhang et al., “An Analysis of the ‘All-Domain Access’ Concept of the US Navy,” 135-142.

229

“构建我国海洋水下观测体系的思考” (Thoughts on Building China’s Ocean Undersea Monitoring System), 

China Ocean News 中国海洋报, December 2, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.oceanol.com/keji/ptsy/yaowen/2015-12-02/53812.html.

230

“深度:中国列装水下监视系统 美潜艇无处藏只能上浮” [In Depth: China Sets Up Underwater Surveillance 

System, U.S. Submarines Have Nowhere to Hide and Have to Surface], Sina 新浪军事, June 7, 2016, accessed July 

8, 2016, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/jssd/2016-06-07/doc-ifxsvenx3546265.shtml.

231 “China Unveils Most Advanced Drone at 2014 Peace Mission Drill,” CCTV English 央视网, August 27, 2014, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://english.cntv.cn/2014/08/27/VIDE1409091365559432.shtml.
61

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

 According to news outlets, satellite imagery shows the deployment of the Harbin BZK-005 

long-range reconnaissance UAV on Woody Island, which is also claimed by the Republic 

of China (Taiwan) and by Vietnam.232

Long-Range Precision Strikes

 According to one market analysis, the “Soar Dragon” High Altitude Long Endurance 

(HALE) UAV is ideal for surveillance and could be used for guidance for the DF-21D antiship ballistic missile (ASBM).233

Military Exercises

 A Chinese military exercise, FIREPOWER 2015, simulated enemy attacks on Chinese air 

defense units in a complex electromagnetic environment with systems including UAVs.234

Border Patrol

 In October 2015 an unspecified PLA unit from the Shenyang Military District 

demonstrated a few prototype UGVs with a mounted rifle, described as the first prototype 

test in its R&D cycle. 235 The coverage indicated the system could be ideal for 

reconnaissance and monitoring, fire attacks, logistics assurance, logistics support, and 

unmanned alert and protection assignments. The UGV could conduct such operations in 

harsh environments. The users and program manager noted that mobility, stealth, 

survivability, agility, and endurance were all key advantages for such systems. 

 In February 2016, border defense units in Xinjiang organized a training exercise for using 

UAVs to improve ISR capabilities.236

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

 In April 2016, China’s State Council and Central Military Commission authorized a third 

campaign for removing mines on the Sino-Vietnamese border, operations that will include 

EOD robots. The previous two campaigns were conducted from 1992 to 1994 and 1997 to 

 

232 Ankit Panda, “South China Sea: China's Surveillance Drones Make it to Woody Island” The Diplomat, June 1, 

2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/south-china-sea-chinas-surveillance-drones-make-it-towoody-island/; Imogen Calderwood, “Satellite Image Reveals China Has Begun Using Drones with Stealth 

Capabilities in the South China Sea,” Daily Mail Online, May 27, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3613173/Satellite-image-reveals-China-begun-using-drones-stealthcapabilities-South-China-Sea.html.

233 Feng Fuzhang 冯福章, “无人机行业进入快速发展期” [The UAV Industry Is Entering a Period of Rapid 

Development], 证券研究报告 · 行业深度 [Securities Research Report · Industry in Depth], China Securities 中信

建设证券 ̧ September 15, 2014, 14.

234 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of 

China 2016,” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2016), 5.

235

“解放军单兵机器人亮相中朝边境 射击弹无虚发” [PLA Single Soldier Robot Makes Appearance at ChinaKorea Border, Fires Munitions without False Fire], Sina 新浪军事, October 30, 2016.

236 Guo Fahai 郭发海, Xiong Zhenxiang 熊振翔, Sun Liwei 孙力为 (Ed.), “‘无人机’飞进边关哨所助力边防管控” 

[“UAV” Flies at Border Station Post and Assists in Border Defense Control], Ministry of Defense Online 国防部网, 

February 29, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.mod.gov.cn/hdpic/2016-02/29/content_4645198.htm.
62

1999 respectively. The new campaign will commence in August 2016 in border counties 

in Guangxi and Yunnan Province, and use EOD robots.237

 In July 2015, the Armored Force Engineering Institute (装甲兵工程学院) unveiled a sixwheeled robot for rough terrain that can become the basis for future EOD disposal 

robots.238

Combat Support 

 In October 2015 The Global Times website posted a photo of PLA special forces using new 

types of equipment including a hand-launched UAV.239

Research and Production of Chinese Military Robotics

China’s investments into unmanned systems are considerable and will likely yield larger numbers 

of increasingly capable platforms. Vast support through government programs has led numerous 

universities, companies, and research institutes, civilian and military, to establish centers for work 

on unmanned systems. This section addresses the research, development, and deployment of 

UAVs, UUVs, USVs, and UGVs. No authoritative comparison of Chinese unmanned systems to 

U.S. systems could be located, but Chinese scientists and DOJ reporting on espionage cases 

indicate that technologies for propulsion, autonomous operation, advanced sensors, and data links 

will be critical for China to match U.S. capabilities.240

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

China has invested considerable resources into the research, development, and deployment of 

UAV capabilities. Though no official estimates of the PRC’s spending on UAVs was found, one 

market analysis from 2014 predicts that from 2013 to 2022, Chinese demand for military UAVs 

will grow 15 percent annually on average, increasing from USD 570 million in 2013 to USD 2 

billion in 2022. 241 Many U.S. analysts are closely following this sector and have published 

authoritative analyses on the organizations tasked with developing UAV mission requirements, 

design and R&D institutes, the production infrastructure, and specific systems.242 More recently, 

analysts are assessing the personnel behind China’s UAV capabilities, including their education, 

 

237

“解放军机器人中越边境执行任务:越南乐开花” [PLA Robot Conducts Mission on China-Vietnam Border: 

Vietnam is Happy], Sohu 搜狐, April 25, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://m.sohu.com/n/446034214/?wscrid=32576_2.

238 Yang Ru 杨茹, “解放军部队列装新六轮机器人 可轻松上下楼梯” [PLA Troops Fielded Six New Robots that 

can Easily Go Up and Down Stairs], Xinhua, July 27, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/mil/2015-07/27/c_128061364.htm.

239

“解放军特种部队单兵无人机曝光” [PLA Special Forces Single Soldier UAV Exposed], Global Times Online

环球网, October 22, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/photo_china/2015-10/2806047.html.

240 Zhao Lei, “Foreign Buyers Eye Chinese Drones,” China Daily USA, June 20, 2013; Department of Justice, 

“Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and Embargo-Related Criminal 

Cases (January 2010 to the present: updated June 27, 2016),” June 2016 accessed July 1, 2016, 4, 

https://www.justice.gov/nsd/files/export_case_list_june_2016_2.pdf/download.

241 Feng Fuzhang [The UAV Industry Is Entering a Period of Rapid Development], China Securities ̧ September 15, 

2014, 14.

242 Ian Easton and L.C. Russell Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: 

Organizational Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” report by the Project 2049 Institute, March 11, 2013; and 

Kimberly Hsu, Craig Murray, and Jeremy Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” U.S.-China 

Economic and Security Review Commission, June 13, 2013.
63

training, and organization.243 Then and today, the roles and numbers of UAVs are expanding under 

the PLAAF, PLAN, PLAA, and the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).

Trends and Challenges

Chinese defense companies have demonstrated different models of unmanned combat aerial 

vehicles (UCAVs), but their status remains unclear. UCAVs are ideal systems for high-risk 

missions such as suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). China’s UCAVs seen to date include 

Lijian (利剑 / Sharp Sword), which completed taxi tests in May 2013; the Anjian (暗剑 / Dark 

Sword), which is reported to be capable of supersonic speeds and carry air-to-air weapons; and the 

Zhanying (战鹰 / Warrior Eagle), designed for SEAD missions.244 The general trend is that 

defense companies will display models at air shows (such as the Zhuhai Air Show) that bloggers 

and reporters photograph, and then low-quality images of an actual system test eventually follow. 

The actual technical parameters, capabilities, and status of these programs are difficult to discern 

from open sources. In general it appears that Chinese manufacturers and its customers (both 

domestic and abroad) emphasize lower price points over increased capabilities, especially 

compared to the more expensive and capable U.S. systems.245

While China’s deployment of UAVs is increasing in scope and application, technical challenges 

appear to hinder their development. In 2013, Wang Yangzhu, deputy director of the Unmanned 

Aircraft System Institute under Beihang University, gave Chinese UAVs a “5 or 6” on a ten-point 

scale for automation capabilities. He elaborated that China's efforts to develop advanced drones 

are consistently running into problems with engines and data links, noting that the country's 

aviation industry has yet solve many technical challenges. Wang also said data links and airborne 

electronic devices used on Chinese drones still lag behind those of their U.S. counterparts, leaving 

models such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk and the forthcoming X-47B as the top designs.246 Other 

articles from an author with the Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute cite DARPA work as evidence 

that China must develop more advanced materials such as high grade carbon fiber.247 Although 

those calls are dated (2005), in April 2016, U.S. authorities arrested an individual attempting to 

acquire high-grade carbon fiber used in aerospace and military applications.248

 

243 Elsa Kania and Kenneth Allen, “The Human and Organizational Dimensions of the PLA’s Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicle Systems,” China Brief 16, no. 8 (May 11, 2016): 10-17.

244 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 10.

245 Adam Rawnsley, “Meet China’s Killer Drones,” Foreign Policy, January 14, 2016, accessed August 29, 2016,

http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/14/meet-chinas-killer-drones/.

246 Zhao Lei, “Foreign Buyers Eye Chinese Drones,” China Daily USA, June 20, 2013.

247 Chen Shaojie 陈绍杰, “Composite Materials and UAVs” [复合材料与无人飞机], Hi-tech Fiber & Application

高科技纤维与应用, no. 2 (2003); and Chen Shaojie 陈绍杰, “Brief Discussion of Shaping Technologies for 

Composite Structures” [浅谈复合材料整体成形技术], Aeronautical Manufacturing Technology 航空制造技术, 

no. 9 (2005).

248 Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and 

Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” 7.
64

Leading Research and Production Entities 

Northwest Polytechnic University (西北工业大学)

Northwest Polytechnic University (NWPU) is a leading technical university that conducted 

China’s first research into UAVs in the 1950s.249 Currently, NWPU’s 365th Research Institute (

西北工业大学第365研究所), also known by its commercial name Xi’an ASN Technology Group 

(西安爱生技术集团公司), is one of China’s leading UAV design and manufacturing entities.250

The NWPU 365th RI’s work includes design optimization, system integration and controls, takeoff 

and landing, and comprehensive performance tests.251 It is reported to be China’s largest UAV 

production company and R&D base, and designed all three of the UAVs featured in China’s 60th

National Day Military Parade in 2009.

252 The RI hosts the Key Laboratory of UAV Special 

Technology (无人机特种技术重点实验室), as well as a provincial level laboratory dedicated to 

advanced air layout and controls aviation technologies.253

Beihang University (北京航空航天大学)

Beihang University (formerly the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics/BUAA) is 

the PRC’s first university dedicated to air and space, and is directly under MIIT.254 In 1959 it tested 

China’s first UAV, and in 1962 established the UAV Institute (无人机所 or 无人驾驶飞行器设

计研究所), China’s first UAV R&D center.255 The institute is vast and includes laboratories or 

design centers for vehicle design and integration center, testing, simulations, and electronics and 

countermeasures. The institute is responsible for the BZK-005 UAV and Changying (长鹰) UAV 

programs.

256

 

249 Li Caixiang 李彩香 and Liu Yinzhong 刘银中, “探访西北工业大学无人机事业发展之路” [Looking at 

Northwestern Polytechnical University's UAV Development Road], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西北工

业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1091/6411.htm.

250 Wang Fanhua 王凡华 and Guo Youjun 郭友军, “我校研制生产的无人机参加国庆阅兵载誉归来” [UAVs 

Developed and Manufactured by Our School in the National Day Troop Review], Northwestern Polytechnical 

University 西北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1091/4169.htm.

251

“无人机特种技术重点实验室” [UAV Special Technology Key Lab], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西

北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1266/12808.htm.

252 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 8; “学校简介” [School 

Introduction], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/xxgk/xxjj.htm; Wang and Guo, “UAVs Developed and Manufactured by Our School in the 

National Day Troop Review.”

253

“无人机特种技术重点实验室” [UAV Special Technology Key Lab], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西

北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1266/12808.htm; “西北工业大学重点实验室一

览表” [Northwestern Polytechnical University Key Lab -- Table], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西北工业

大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1157/9868.htm.

254

“学校简介” [Introduction to the University], Beihang University, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.buaa.edu.cn/bhgk/index.htm#1.

255

“北京航空航天大学无人驾驶飞行器设计研究所简介” [Beihang University UAV Design Research Institute 

Introduction], Beihang University 北京航空航天大学, November 14, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://wrjs.buaa.edu.cn/zxgg/49517.htm.

256 Easton and Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project,” 6; “北京航空

航天大学无人驾驶飞行器设计研究所简介” [Beihang University UAV Design Research Institute Introduction], 

Beihang University 北京航空航天大学, November 14, 2013, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://wrjs.buaa.edu.cn/zxgg/49517.htm.
65

Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (南京航空航天大学) 

Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) has specialized in tactical UAVs 

since its founding.257 Its UAV Institute (南京航空航天大学无人机研究院) is reported to be 

responsible for designing the Changkong (长空) and BZK-002 UAV series, as well as unmanned 

helicopters.258

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

Since the 1980s China has developed UUV technologies, beginning with remote operated vehicles 

(ROVs) and improving to the Zhishui (智水) series of UUVs that are reportedly in service with 

the PLAN. This report uses UUVs as an umbrella term encompassing China’s civilian and military 

remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs/ROUVs), autonomous underwater vehicles 

(AUVs), and autonomous and remotely operated vehicles (ARVs). As China’s UUV systems have 

matured, so have their capabilities to travel farther and deeper, and perform more complex tasks 

and missions. China has made drastic progress on UUV technologies, as evidenced by increases 

in the numbers of teams working on the relevant technologies at major research institutes and 

universities, increased funding (mainly from the PLA), and recent technological breakthroughs.259

UUVs, deep sea submergence vehicles (DSVs), and other underwater robotics systems are useful 

for commercial activities such as laying and repairing undersea cables that facilitate global 

exchanges of information, and exploring natural resources. In 2016, Chinese UUVs carried out 

exploration missions in the southwest Indian Ocean searching for sulfide deposits and precious 

metals.260 Countries may also, however, use these vehicles to wiretap, disrupt, or sever undersea 

cables, as well as deploy them for anti-submarine warfare applications.

China is actively exploring newer concepts for UUV designs and technologies. In 2014, the School 

of Mechanical Engineering (天津大学机械工程学院) and the National Ocean Technology Center 

in Tianjin completed a sea trial for the Haiyan (海燕) AUV in the northern area of the South China 

Sea.261 This AUV is an underwater glider, which uses small changes in buoyancy and its wings to 

convert vertical motion into horizontal motion. This system is slower but more energy efficient, 

enabling longer surveillance and exploration missions.

China has also made considerable advances in technologies for manned and unmanned DSVs. The 

Jiaolong manned DSV has made over one hundred dives to date, reaching depths of more than 

 

257 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 8.

258 Easton and Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project,” 7.

259 Michael S. Chase, Kristen A. Gunness, Lyle J.Morris, Samuel K. Berkowitz, and Benjamin S. Purser III, 

“Emerging Trends in China’s Development of Unmanned Systems,” (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 3.

260 “Chinese Submersible Explores Indian Ocean for Precious Metals,” Economic Times, March 24, 2016, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinese-submersible-exploresindian-ocean-for-precious-metals/articleshow/51542348.cms; “China may build seabed 'space station' to help hunt 

for minerals in South China Sea,” Japan Times, June 8, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/08/asia-pacific/china-may-build-seabed-space-station-help-huntminerals-south-china-sea/.

261

“天津大学研发水下滑翔机技术创多项国内纪录” [Tianjin University Developed Underwater Glider 

Technology and Created Multiple Units in Domestic Record], CERNET China Education and Research Network 中

国教育和科研计算机网, May 26, 2014, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.edu.cn/cheng_guo_zhan_shi_1085/20140526/t20140526_1119599.shtml.
66

seven km (4.35 miles).262 This depth lags behind the world records set by the Australian DSV 

Deepsea Challenger and Italian DSV Trieste at approximately 11 km (6.84 miles), but China is 

keen to catch up.263 Shanghai Ocean University, a leading developer of manned and unmanned 

submersibles, is working on the Rainbow Fish (彩虹鱼), which aims to reach a depth of 11 km

(6.84 miles) in 2016 and will have a manned and unmanned lander.264 If this vehicle is successful 

and can conduct experiments (such as sample collection), China will be on par with world leaders 

on DSV technology.

The Zhishui series of AUVs is poorly documented in open sources but may currently be in service 

with the PLA Navy. Zhishui is likely a shortened version of 智慧 (zhihui, intelligent) and 水下机

器人 (shuixia jiqiren, underwater robot). According to a military enthusiast website, the Zhishui

III entered service with the PLAN in 2000, and is a large 2,000 kg UUV with twin propellers and 

two cross-tunnel thrusters for maneuvering.265 According to authors with Harbin Engineering 

University (HEU), in 2003 the university’s Underwater Intelligence Robot Technology Laboratory 

(水下智能机器人技术实验室) had recently completed the “Zhishui-IV” underwater robot. The 

design incorporated a large number of more advanced sensors, including ones for depth, elevation, 

GPS, compasses, velocity, collision avoidance sonar, 3D imaging sonar, and TV.266

Strengths, Trends, and Weaknesses

China’s progress to date on UUVs demonstrates both increasingly sophisticated designs and 

steadily improving performance parameters such as maximum depth and duration of operation.

Although no authoritative comparison of U.S. and Chinese UUVs was found in the open source, 

academic publications and recent espionage cases suggest that the U.S. military maintains an 

advantage in UUV technologies, particularly with advanced software, autonomous operation, and 

sensors. These activities also indicate, however, that China is actively improving these capabilities 

and seeking to close any gap with U.S. systems. Recent Chinese technical publications indicate 

that technologies under development focus on software components, greater autonomous 

operation, and navigation. Some representative article titles include the following:

 “Training and Examining System About Military UUV Support”;267

 “Comparative Study on the Propulsive Performance of Underwater Bionic Thrusters With 

Different Transmission Methods”;268

 

262 Zhang Xin 张 欣, “‘彩虹鱼’:中国深潜新利器” [“Rainbow Fish”: China's New Deep Submersible Weapon], 

People's Daily Overseas Edition 人民日报外版, March 26, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.people.gov.cn/rmrbhwb/html/2016-03/26/content_1664324.htm.

263 “Deepsea Challenge,” National Geographic, accessed August 29, 2016, http://www.deepseachallenge.com.

264 Zhang Xin [“Rainbow Fish”: China's New Deep Submersible Weapon].

265

“Zhishui,” NavalDrones, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.navaldrones.com/Zhishui.html.

266 Zhao Jiamin 赵加敏, Xu Yuru 徐玉如, and Lei Lei 雷磊, “用于水下机器人智能路径规划的仿真器的建立” (A 

Simulator for the Test of Intelligent Path Planning of AUV), Journal of System Simulation 系统方针学报 16, no. 11 

(November 2004): 2448-2450.

267 Li Jing 李婧, Chen Hao 陈浩, “军用 UUV 保障训练考核系统” (Training and Examining System about Military 

UUV Support), Ordnance Industry Automation 兵工自动化 31, no. 11 (2012): 1-5.

268 Xu Haijun 徐海军, Pan Cunyun 潘存云, Zhang Daibing 张代兵, Xie Haibin 谢海斌, “不同水下仿生推进器性

能影响的比较” (Comparative Study on the Propulsive Performance of Underwater Bionic Thrusters with Different 

Transmission Methods), Machine Design and Research 机械设计与研究 26, no.1 (February 2010): 93-96.
67

 “AUV Fault-Tolerant Technology Based on Inertial Navigation and Underwater Acoustics 

Assisted Navigation System”;269 and

 “The Research Status and Progress of Cooperative Navigation for Multiple AUVs.”270

A recent espionage case could also indicate a need for more advanced components and electronics. 

As discussed on page 97, in June 2016, Yu Amin, AKA Amy Yu, pleaded guilty to acting in the 

United States as an illegal agent of a foreign government and obtaining systems and components 

from U.S. companies for marine submersible vehicles, likely including UUVs.

271 According to the 

indictment, one of Yu’s co-conspirators was a professor and agent of HEU, and beginning in 2002 

served as “...the Chief Technology Expert of a key PRC national research project concerning the 

development of an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).” From at least 2002 to approximately 

February 2014, Yu purchased and re-exported items to HEU, including underwater acoustic 

locator devices, underwater cables and connectors, PC104 computer processing units, 907 

multiplexers, underwater pressure sensors, and control sticks and button strips.272

Leading Research and Production Entities 

Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Shenyang Institute of Automation (中科院沈阳自动化研究所)

The Chinese Academy of Sciences’ Shenyang Institute of Automation (CAS SIA,中科院沈阳

自动化研究所) in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, is a leading research institute and publisher on 

UUVs. Its Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Laboratory (自主水下机器人技术研究室) conducts 

research on all aspects of UUV technologies, including complicated environment recognition and 

pattern establishment, and advanced intelligence and autonomous behavior. It also researches 

platform designs (including analysis of designs, simulations, hydrodynamics, and structures), 

controller technologies, and various types of AUVs and USVs. It was responsible for China’s first 

UUV, the CR-01, to reach a depth of 6,000 m.273

Harbin Engineering University (哈尔滨工程大学)

HEU’s College of Shipbuilding Engineering (船舶工程学院) is home to the National Defense 

S&T Key Laboratory of Military-Use Underwater Intelligent Vehicle Technology (军用水下智

能机器人技术国防科技重点实验室).274 HEU was formerly known as the PLA Military 

 

269 Zhang Tao 张 涛, Xu Xiaosu 徐晓苏, Li Yao 李 瑶, and Gong Shuping 宫淑萍, “基于惯导及水下声学辅助系

统的 AUV 容错导航技术” (AUV Fault-Tolerant Technology Based on Inertial Navigation and Underwater 

Acoustics Assisted Navigation System), Chinese Journal of Inertial Technology 中国惯性技术学报 21, no. 4 

(August 2014): 512-516.

270 Xu Bo 徐博, Bai Jinlei 白金磊, Hao Yanling 郝燕玲, Gao Wei 高伟, and Liu Yalong 刘亚龙, “多 AUV 协同导

航问题的研究现状与进展” (The Research Status and Progress of Cooperative Navigation for Multiple AUVs), 

Acta Automatica Sinica 自动化学报 41, no. 3 (March 2015): 445-459.

271 Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and 

Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” 4.

272 “United States of America v. Amin Yu,” United States District Court Middle District of Florida Orlando 

Division, accessed July 8, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/file/843506/download.

273

“自主水下机器人技术研究室” [Independent Underwater Robot Technology Research Lab], Shenyang Institute 

of Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.sia.cn/jgsz/kyxt/zzsxjqrjsysj/.

274 The college’s website describes the lab as “军用水下 xx 重点实验室” (Military-Use Underwater XX Key 

Laboratory), but author affiliations on articles include the full name of the lab. For example, see Ju Lei 鞠磊, Su 
68

Engineering Institute, established in Harbin in 1953, and is currently an R&D base for China’s 

shipbuilding industry, naval armaments, and ocean development and exploitation.275 It has seven 

research institutes and multiple laboratories dedicated to shipbuilding and ocean engineering, and 

recruits leading foreign experts in these fields through China’s 111 Plan, described in more detail 

in the Talent Acquisition section on page 102.

276 Key systems developed by HEU include the 

Zhishui series of AUVs, discussed on page 66.

Unmanned Surface Vehicles

Although some Chinese research institutes have made progress on USV systems, military 

strategists appear to have minimal interest in such systems. An explanation for this lack of interest 

could be China’s maritime militia forces, an understudied component of Chinese naval forces.

277

This militia force comprises a large reserve of civilian mariners whom China can mobilize for a 

variety of missions. With this militia, China can deploy large numbers of smaller and distributed 

units which have, in the words of a garrison commander, “low sensitivity and great leeway in 

maritime rights protection actions.”278 China’s maritime militia can conduct “support the front” (

支前) missions, including medical rescue and retrieval of casualties, emergency repairs or refitting 

of vessels, cover and concealment operations, mine warfare, blockades, and in the future 

information and electronic warfare.279 The U.S. Navy has already encountered this force in the 

2009 Impeccable incident, during which a Chinese maritime militia unit harassed a U.S. 

surveillance ship. Assuming that this militia force can successfully continue to distribute more 

lethality, swarm and harass targets, and advance China’s territorial claims, USVs will likely be 

viewed as a ‘boutique’ and redundant accessory.

Despite the lack of need for USVs, China has made advancements in this field, most notably with 

its Jinghai (精海) series. In July 2016 Xinhua reported on the progress of Jinghai-series models, 

developed under the leadership of Shanghai University’s Unmanned Vessel Engineering Institute 

(上海大学无人艇工程研究院).280 These activities included the following:

 In 2013 the Jinghai-1 USV accompanied a Chinese coast guard vessel around the Paracel 

and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, completing topographical and hydrological 

surveys.281 Prior reporting was limited to a 2013 report on an unnamed vessel in which the 

Ministry of Transportation was inspecting a “surface unmanned intelligent surveying 

 

Yumin 苏玉民, Zhao Jinxin 赵金鑫, Liu Yebao 刘业宝, and Cui Tong 崔桐, “船桨干扰定常空化性能数值模拟” 

(Steady Interaction Numerical Simulation of Cavitating Turbulent Flow between Ship Hull and Propeller), Journal 

of Ship Mechanics 船舶力学 6, no. 16 (2012).

275

“学院简价” [College Introduction], College of Shipbuilding Engineering 哈尔滨工程大学船舶工程学院, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://heusei.hrbeu.edu.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=2.

276 Li Xiaohua, “China to Undergo Brain Gain through Plan 111,” China Internet Information Center 中国网, 

September 14, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/181075.htm.

277 Andrew S. Erickson and Conor M. Kennedy, “China’s Maritime Militia,” unpublished paper hosted by the Center 

for Naval Analyses (CNA), accessed July 8, 2016, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/Chinas-Maritime-Militia.pdf.

278 Ibid., 1.

279 Ibid., 5. 

280

“无人艇:在江河湖海中展露身手” [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/07/c_1119182583.htm.

281 Ibid; “Unmanned ships deemed helpful in survey and patrol of South China Sea,” Global Times 环球网, July 8, 

2016, accessed July 9, 2016, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/993071.shtml.
69

platform engineering prototype.” The prototype reportedly could chart a course, had 

advanced stabilization features, and had a maximum of 18 knots.282

 In 2014 the Jinghai-2 accompanied the “Snow Dragon” (雪龙) on China’s 31st expedition 

to the South Pole, conducting topography surveys. Shanghai University, the Donghai 

Navigation Safety Administration, and Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co., 

Ltd. jointly developed the model.283

 The Jinghai-3 uses a highly modularized design and the most advanced “intelligent 

obstacle avoidance guidance systems.” Shanghai University developed the model and will 

deliver it to the State Oceanic Administration.284

Leading Research and Production Entities 

Shanghai University Unmanned Vessel Engineering Research Institute (上海大学无人艇工程研

究院)

Founded in 2010, this research institute is China's first research organization to focus on USVs 

and integrate the fields of machinery, control, communications, mechanics, materials, and 

computers.285 The research institute produces the “Jinghai” series of USVs which include multiple 

different models, and it is currently working on development of the Jinghai-7.286

China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC) 701st Research Institute (中国船舶重工集团公

司 701 所 or 中船重工 701 所)

Also known as the China Ship Research and Design Center (中国舰船研究设计中心), the CSIC 

701st Research Institute is the premier institution focusing on the research and design of warships 

and other naval vessels, and is a leader in air-independent propulsion (AIP) research.287 The CSIC 

701st Research Institute is one of several Chinese organizations competing in the manufacture and 

development of USVs.288 Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. (青岛北海船舶

 

282 Shen Wenmin 沈文敏 and Wang Shaoming 王绍明, “我国自行研发首艘无人测量艇诞生” [Our Country's 

Independently Developed First Unmanned Survey Vessel is Born], People’s Daily 人民日报, June 5, 2013, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2013/6/278700.shtm.

283

“无人艇:在江河湖海中展露身手” [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/07/c_1119182583.htm.

284 Ibid.

285 [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 2016. 

286Xie Yao 谢姚, “不经历风雨怎么见彩虹” [If You Don't Go Through the Storm, How Will You See the 

Rainbow], School of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation 机电工程与自动化学院, December 31, 2016, 

accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://old.auto.shu.edu.cn/Default.aspx?tabid=12022&ctl=Detail&mid=59127&Id=172263&SkinSrc=[L]Skins/jizi1/

jizi1; [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 2016. 

287

“首页” [Homepage], China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 中国船舶重工集团公司, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.csic.com.cn/.

288 [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 2016.
70

重工有限责任公司), a CSIC subsidiary, jointly develops the Jinghai series of USVs with 

Shanghai University.289

Unmanned Ground Vehicles

Unmanned ground systems (UGVs) are a priority in China’s defense plans, but their deployment 

to date appears limited. UGVs encompass numerous vehicles that operate on land with a human 

operator or autonomously. They can execute military missions including combat, ordnance 

disposal, and transport. U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan used UGVs such as TALON and 

Warrior “...to detect and defeat roadside bombs, gain situational awareness, detect chemical and 

radiological agents, and increase the standoff distance between Soldiers and potentially dangerous 

situations.”290

Numerous Chinese civilian and defense companies, universities, and research institutes are 

developing UGVs and other unmanned ground systems. R&D on intelligent guidance for

unmanned ground platforms is reported to receive support from China’s 973 and 863 programs for 

high-technology development, as well as the Twelfth FYP of the General Armament Department

(GAD).

291

To spur these systems’ development, in September 2016 the Chinese military will host the “2016 

Leap Over Treacherous Paths” (跨越险阻 2016) contest. The contest will host five competitions 

for unmanned ground systems to simulate battle operations in different terrains and missions. The 

competition areas are rough terrain battlefield reconnaissance, rough terrain battlefield marching 

in formation, urban battlefield reconnaissance and search, transport in mountainous regions by 

bionic unmanned platforms, and transport in mountainous regions by non-bionic unmanned 

platforms. In 2014 the former GAD hosted the first such competition, which featured 21 vehicles 

from over ten research institutes. Teams from NUDT came in first and second place, a team from 

BIT came in third place, and a team from the PLA’s Military Transportation University (军事交

通学院) came in fourth place. It is unclear who will host the 2016 competition.292

Leading Entities and Trends

China North Vehicle Research Institute (中国北方车辆研究所)

In June 2014 the China North Vehicle Research Institute (中国北方车辆研究所), directly 

subordinate to the NORINCO Group, established the Weapons Unmanned Ground Vehicle R&D 

 

289

“北船承制无人艇获工博会创新金奖” [Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Manufactured 

Unmanned Vessel and Awarded Engineering Innovation Gold Medal], China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 中

船重工, December 28, 2015, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.csic.com.cn/zgxwzx/zgcydt/314027.htm.

290 Robert Karlsen and Bob Van Enkenvoort, “Heftier Unmanned Ground Vehicle Offers More Lifting, Hauling 

Strength,” U.S. Army news item, June 4, 2013, accessed August 19, 2016, https://www.army.mil/article/104710. For 

more on TALON and other UGVs, see Peter W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 

Twenty-First Century, (New York: Penguin, 2009), 26-30.

291

“北理工杨毅老师被授予第八届海淀区“十大杰出青年”称号” [Beijing Institute of Technology Professor Yang 

Yi Awarded the Eighth Haidian District “Ten Outstanding Youth” Title], Beijing Institute of Technology, accessed 

July 7, 2016, http://www.bit.edu.cn/xww/mtlg/105218.htm.

292

“跨越险阻-2016”地面无人系统挑战赛等你来战!” [The 2016 Leap over Treacherous Paths Ground 

Unmanned Systems Competition Welcomes You to Come Compete!], China Military Network 中国军网, June 14, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.
71

Center (兵器地面无人平台研发中心). The center develops UGVs for military, police, security, 

defense industry, and commercial clients.293 NORINCO Group’s Deputy General Manager Yang 

Zhuo (杨卓), who spoke at the center’s opening, said NORINCO was already working on a variety 

of unmanned ground vehicles for civilian and military use, and saw the center as a means to 

accelerate this work.

294

The Weapons Unmanned Ground Vehicle R&D Center is reported to be developing the Chinese 

version of Big Dog, a rough-terrain robot with four legs developed by Boston Dynamics. Formally 

called the “Mountainous Four-Legged Bionic Mobile Platform” (山地四足仿生移动平台), the 

system can carry out transport, reconnaissance, attack, and search and rescue operations. Chinese 

media also colloquially refers to the system as “Big Dog” (大狗).295

Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT / 北京理工大学)

Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) was established in 1940 focusing on science and technology, 

and is currently located in Beijing. One of BIT’s missions is to support “national strategic needs” 

such as aerospace engineering, information technology, and mechanical engineering and 

automation. BIT is directly subordinate to MIIT and is part of China’s national 211 and 985 

projects, which are aimed at strengthening China’s S&T capabilities at its universities.296

While no designated UGV program could be located for BIT, its success in the Leap Over 

Treacherous Paths contest and recent publications indicate a robust research program. Recent 

publications appear to focus on situational awareness and vision, operation when GPS signals are 

disrupted, and general autonomous operation in urban environments. Representative article titles 

include the following:

 “Research of Reconnaissance Technology about Reflector Based Vision for Unmanned 

Platform;”297

 

293 Chen Yu 陈瑜,“兵器地面无人平台研发中心成立” [The Weaponry Ground Unmanned Platform R&D Center 

Is Established], Science and Technology Daily 科技日报, June 28, 2014. 

294

“中国兵器工业集团成立地面无人平台研发中心 为解放军研制无人作战车辆” [NORINCO Establishes 

Ground Unmanned Platform Research & Development Center to Develop Unmanned Combat Vehicles for the 

PLA], Guanchazhe 观察者, July 3, 2014, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/militaryaffairs/2014_07_03_243289_s.shtml.

295

“BigDog–The Most Advanced Rough-Terrain Robot on Earth,” Boston Dynamics; and Zhang Peng 张鹏 and 

Peng Kuang 彭况, “军网记者亲身体验中国军用机器人” [Chinese Military Network Reporters Personally 

Experience China’s Military-Use Robots], China Military Network 中国军网, February 27, 2015, accessed July 7, 

2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.

296

“学校简介” [School Introduction], March 26, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.bit.edu.cn/gbxxgk/gbxqzl/xxjj/index.htm; “Welcome to Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT)” May 18, 

2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://english.bit.edu.cn/AboutBIT/GeneralInformation/index.htm.

297 Wang Jian 王健, Zhang Zhenhai 张振海, Li Kejie 李科杰, Zhang Donghong 张东红, Li Jian 李剑, and Liu 

Xinyu 柳新宇, “无人车反射式全景视觉感知技术研究” (Research of Reconnaissance Technology about Reflector 

Based Vision for Unmanned Platform), China Science Paper 中国科技论文 10, no. 10 (May 2015): 1170-1173, 

1183.
72

 “Window Constrained Markov Localization for Unmanned Ground Vehicle;”298 and

 “System Design of Self-Driving in Simplified Urban Environments.”299

National University of Defense Technology (NUDT / 国防科技大学)

NUDT is under the dual leadership of the MOD and the Ministry of Education. The university was 

original founded as the Military Engineering Academy at Harbin in Heilongjiang Province, moved 

to Changsha, Hunan Province, and changed its name to NUDT in 1978. NUDT has numerous 

laboratories dedicated to technology development. 300 NUDT’s College of Mechatronic 

Engineering and Automation (机电工程与自动化学院) has a Department of Automatic Control 

(自动控制系), which conducts research on robotics, including guidance and controls.301

EOD Robotics Companies 

Numerous Chinese defense companies and RIs have developed explosive ordnance disposal 

robots, including the Lingxi (灵蜥 or “quick lizard”) by the CAS Shenyang Institute of 

Automation, the Raptor EOD robot by the Beijing Bochuang Group (北京博创集团), the Snow 

Leopard-10 (雪豹-10) by China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), and the 

uBot-EOD series by Shanghai HRSTEK Co., Ltd (上海合时智能科技有限公司).302 It is unclear 

which of these models is in service.

Chinese Countermeasures against U.S. Unmanned Systems

As the United States pursues the Third Offset strategy and increases the use of unmanned systems 

in military operations, Chinese countermeasures against such systems are of particular concern. 

As China researches and deploys unmanned systems, military research institutes and the defense 

industry are also researching countermeasures against such systems. Authors of the 2013 SMS call 

for innovating countermeasures against UAVs, stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, carrier formations, 

and space-based platforms, as well as defenses against reconnaissance and surveillance, precision 

strikes, network attacks, outer space attacks, and new types of attacks. 303 Ongoing Chinese 

research into such countermeasures routinely use U.S. systems as examples and targets.

To counter U.S. unmanned systems, numerous publications assess ‘soft kill’ technologies, or nonkinetic means such as jamming and electronic countermeasures to degrade the system without 

destroying it. A consistent view is that if the unmanned system, such as a UAV, loses 

communications, guidance and navigation, different sensors, radar, and/or data link capabilities, it 

 

298 Hu Yuwen 胡玉文, Jiang Yan 姜岩, Gong Jianwei 龚建伟, Xiong Guangming 熊光明, “应用于地面无人车辆

的窗口约束马尔可夫定位” (Window Constrained Markov Localization for Unmanned Ground Vehicle), 

Transactions of Beijing Institute of Technology 北京理工大学学报 34, no. 4 (Apr. 2014): 353-357. 

299 Jiang Yan 姜岩, Zhao Xijun 赵熙俊, Gong Jianwei 龚建伟, Xiong Guangming 熊光明, and Chen Huiyan 陈慧

岩, “简单城市环境下地面无人驾驶系统的设计研究” (System Design of Self-Driving in Simplified Urban 

Environments), Journal of Mechanical Engineering 机械工程学报 48, no. 20, (October 2012): 103-112.

300

“学校概况” [Summary of the University], National University of Defense Technology 国防科技大学, accessed 

July 11, 2016, http://www.nudt.edu.cn/introduce.asp?classid=4.

301

“自动控制系” (Department of Automatic Control), National University of Defense Technology, 国防科技大学, 

accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.nudt.edu.cn/ArticleShow.asp?ID=22.

302

“排爆机器人” [Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robots], 百科 Baike, accessed July 7, 2016, 

http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E6%8E%92%E7%88%86%E6%9C%BA%E5%99%A8%E4%BA%BA.

303 Shou, Science of Military Strategy, 101.
73

will abort the mission and return to its base of operations. Spoofing the system (using false signals 

to confuse the system’s radar) or concealing targets would have a similar effect.304

One of the most specific examples of this research is an article titled “Analysis of X-47B UCAS 

and Electronic Counter Measures,” appearing in Aerospace Electronic Warfare, China’s leading 

journal on electronic warfare that is published by CASIC’s 8511 Institute. The authors assess the 

advantages and weaknesses of the system, the former including stealth technology, flexibility in 

operations it can execute, and the ability to carry out long-range precision strikes. The fundamental 

weakness, they argue, is that if the X-47B loses contact with controllers and/or is confused, its 

default is to return to base. Hence the proposed countermeasures include electronic interference to 

negate information collection capabilities, and deception and camouflage for targets. They also 

propose kinetic countermeasures such as air-based intercepts or obstacles (such as balloons), early 

warning aircraft and fighters with look-down/shoot-down capabilities, 305 and preemptively 

attacking the launch platform (such as an aircraft carrier).306 If deployed, the totality of such 

countermeasures could test and severely degrade the ability the U.S. military’s UAVs to operate 

in a contested environment, and the explicit proposal to attack launch platforms would risk 

escalation in any conflict.

Other publications discuss the vulnerability of U.S. systems, manned and unmanned, to losing 

GPS guidance, a capability targeted by other units in the PLA. Some analysts consider the U.S. 

Navy to be most vulnerable to the loss of space assets such as GPS satellites, claiming the loss of 

such systems would render an aircraft carrier “a turtle in a jar” (瓮中之鳖).307 Another article in 

Aerospace Electronic Warfare from 2013 also argues that if satellite communications are lost, 

systems such as the Global Hawk would be unable to complete missions and be forced to return to 

base.308

These countermeasures are not just academic and could challenge the U.S. military’s operations 

in the Western Pacific. In 2015 a U.S. press report claimed the PLA attempted to electronically 

jam a Global Hawk UAV operating over the South China Sea. 309 In 2014 Chinese authors 

emphasized the importance of network-electronic warfare with the example of Iran downing a U.S. 

 

304 Wu Xiaofang 吴晓芳, Tian Zhongcheng 田中成, and Liang Jingxiu 梁景修, “X-47B 无人空战系统及其对抗途

径分析” (Analysis of X-47B UCAS and Electronic Counter Measures), Aerospace Electronic Warfare 航天电子对

抗, vol. 29, no. 5 (2013): 11-13.

305 Look-down/shoot-down radar systems can detect, track, and guide a weapon at a target below the horizon seen by 

the radar. This technology is difficult because a radar pointed near the Earth’s surface produce a large reflection that 

may overwhelm human operators and computing systems.

306 Ibid.

307 The Chinese equivalent of a “sitting duck.” See Chen Baoquan 陈保权, Yang Guang 杨光, and Li Xuefeng 李学

锋, “空间电子攻击的体系作战效用及发展对策” (Research on System Combat Effects and Develop Policy of 

Space Electronic Attack), Aerospace Electronic Warfare 航天电子对抗 28, no. 1 (2012): 11-13, 22-23.

308 Wu Zhijian 吴志建, Fang Shengliang 方胜良, and Wu Fuxiang 吴付祥, “高空无人机载 GPS/INS 系统干扰效

能及对策研究” (Research on Interference Effectiveness Analysis of High-Altitude UAV Airborne GPS/INS 

System), Aerospace Electronic Warfare 航天电子对抗 2, no. 29 (2013): 16-19.

309 Gertz, Bill. “Chinese Military Using Jamming Against U.S. Drones–Global Hawk Targeted Over Disputed South 

China Sea Islands,” Washington Free Beacon, May 22, 2015.
74

unmanned system by gaining access to the aircraft’s navigation system.310 With the increasing 

importance of UAVs and other unmanned systems to the U.S. military, Chinese research and 

capabilities for countermeasures will likely increase.

The emphasis on soft-kill or non-kinetic weapons and measures could indicate the strong desire of 

China’s military planners to neutralize U.S. capabilities while avoiding escalation. Jamming and 

spoofing may achieve the operational effect of denying access to U.S. systems while avoiding 

crossing kinetic thresholds that may escalate into a broader conflict. U.S. defense planners should 

expect to see continued non-kinetic countermeasures against UAVs and other unmanned systems 

in peacetime, especially in regions such as the East and South China Seas.

 

310 Wang Haoyu 王灏宇, Fan Hongshen 范宏深, and Zhao Guowei 赵国伟, “The Function Demand of Spacecraft 

by the Integration of the Net Electric for Space Warfare” (空间作战融合网电力量对航天器的功能需求), 

Aerospace Electronic Warfare 航天电子对抗, no. 5 (2014): 24-27.
75

Chapter Four: Artificial Intelligence 

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is the computational science field of research that focuses on machine 

learning and smart decision-making. It is a major component of robotics R&D. This includes 

contributions from fields such as machine learning, natural language processing, pattern 

recognition, cluster algorithm improvement, and agent technology. China has seen the emerging 

field of AI applications as an opportunity for commercial start-ups and international partnerships.

The development of AI technologies has broad applications for the manufacturing and service 

industries, and will largely determine the military effectiveness of unmanned systems.

311

The key findings of this chapter are as follows:

 China is poised to enter a “golden age” for AI development based on government support 

for this research, growing public and commercial entity participation, and global 

partnerships that leverage the expertise of U.S. companies.

 China sees the developing field of AI as an opportunity to become more globally 

competitive in technological capabilities and commercial production, and the government 

has made developing these technologies and applications a national priority.

 Although Chinese researchers have published journal articles and news articles speculating 

on the likely uses of AI for enabling autonomous combat, there is little evidence of AI 

being applied to military-use systems. Even so, Chinese military institutions such as NUDT 

have invested in research on intelligent robotics.

 The development of AI products in China has been associated with the design of cloud 

computing platforms to support big data collection and processing.

Global and Chinese Interest in Artificial Intelligence

Recent developments have increased global interest in the progress and future prospects for AI, 

including in China. In March 2016, AlphaGo, an AI system designed by DeepMind (an AI lab in 

London owned by Google), made history by defeating the world’s leading champion at the game 

Go. AlphaGo won four games to champion Lee Sedol’s one, a feat not expected for another decade. 

The victory drew renewed international attention to AI, including in China, and established 

Google’s reputation as a leader in AI development. Chinese media followed the event, and hinted 

at displeasure that it was a Western company and not a Chinese company that mastered the game 

invented in ancient China.

312

 

311

“《智能制造装备产业‘十二五’发展规划》正式发布” [“Intelligent Equipment Manufacturing Industry 

‘Twelfth Five Year Plan’ Development Plan” Formally Released], Wayrise Intelligent Tech. Co., Ltd. 上海维锐智

能科技有限公司, November 19, 2012, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://wayrise.com/index.php?_m=mod_article&_a=article_content&article_id=95.

312

“从 AlphaGo 和百度‘四岁大脑’看人工智能未来” [Looking at the Future of AI from AlphaGo and Baidu’s 

“Four Year Old Brain”], Beijing Morning Post 北京晨报, March 15, 2016, accessed August 19, 2016,

http://www.nsfc.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab92/info51906.htm; Du Yueying 杜悦英, “后 AlphaGo 时代”的中国人工

智能路线图” [China's Artificial Intelligence Roadmap After the AlphaGo Era], China Development Observation 中

国发展观察, accessed July 8, 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0607/c83865-28417972.html; and Cade 

Metz, “In Two Moves, AlphaGo and Lee Sedol Redefined the Future,” Wired, March 16, 2016.
76

After AlphaGo’s victory, the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSF), a leading 

government organization that funds Chinese scientific research in areas including AI, reposted a 

news article that posits three levels of AI: “weak person” (弱人) AI that can process specific tasks; 

“strong person” (强人) AI that can comprehensively simulate humans’ thought processes; and 

“superhuman” (超人) AI that can quickly study, adapt, and surpass humans in all settings. Google 

has won the race towards the first benchmark of “weak person” AI by mastering a defined game 

with set parameters. Baidu founder and CEO Robin Li made clear that China is focused on the 

second level of AI, and claims that Baidu’s AI has reached the capabilities of a three- or four-yearold child. Although that may not sound impressive, Li believes the capability to be state of the art, 

and that the next 5 to 10 years will be “a golden age for China’s AI development.”313

Chinese Government Support for AI Research

China’s AI research receives support at the highest levels of Chinese leadership and policies. 

China’s National Medium- to Long-Term Science and Technology Development Plan (2006-

2020) lays out the government’s priorities for S&T development for the future, and the section on 

robotics highlights the need for R&D of AI for use in intelligent robotics. This document 

emphasizes the need for technological development of personalized intelligent robots, robothuman interaction, and intelligent service robots.314 The National Basic Science Development Five 

Year Plan (国家基础研究发展“十二五”专项规划) released in 2011 proclaimed brain and 

cognitive sciences, including AI, as a frontier science research priority for the following five 

years.315 The growing number of AI research labs and partnerships (profiled below) indicate strong 

financial and political support, but major technical achievements of this plan could not be 

discerned.

The prioritization of state funding for AI research in China is done through its several national 

S&T programs, including the 863 Program, the 973 Program, and the NNSF. It is difficult to 

quantify specific funding amounts devoted to AI research within these programs, but the number 

of programs supporting this research indicate strong political and financial support. The scientists 

on the 863 Intelligent Robotic Technology Topic Expert Committee (智能机器人技术主题) guide 

the state-level research funding for the program, and this group is led by Zhao Jie (赵杰), the 

director of HIT Institute of Robotics (哈尔滨工业大学机器人研究所).316 Other members of the 

expert committee are affiliated with BIT Key Laboratory of Intelligent Control and Decision of 

 

313

“从 AlphaGo 和百度“四岁大脑”看人工智能未来” [Looking at the Future of AI from AlphaGo and Baidu’s 

“Four Year Old Brain”], Beijing Morning Post 北京晨报, March 15, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://bjcb.morningpost.com.cn/html/2016-03/14/content_390988.htm.

314

“五、前沿技术” [5. Front Line Technology], Xinhua 新华社, February 9, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787_5.htm.

315

“国家基础研究发展‘十二五’专项规划” [National Basic Research Development “Twelfth Five Year Plan” 

Special Programs], Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China and the National Natural 

Science Foundation of China 中华人民共和国科学技术部 国家自然科学基金委员会, February 2012, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201206/W020120608514402969801.pdf.

316

“关于聘任“十二五”863 计划专家委员会和主题专家组专家的通知” [Notification Appointing "Twelfth Five 

Year Plan" 863 Program Experts Committee and Subject Experts Group Experts], Ministry of Science and 

Technology of the People's Republic of China, March 30, 2012, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201203/t20120330_93456.htm.
77

Complex Systems (复杂系统智能控制与决策实验室 ), CAS SIA, Shanghai Jiao Tong 

University, and Hunan University.

317

National-level initiatives have also guided Chinese research toward advances in AI and cognitive 

science. The China Brain Project (中国脑计划) illustrates the Chinese government’s emphasis on 

further understanding the human brain and how to imitate it through research on cognitive sciences 

such as AI, with applications for cognitive computing, robotics, and medicine.318 The project was 

formed in 2015 as a response to U.S. and European national neuroscience and cognitive science 

initiatives and the need for China to gain competitiveness in the growing field.

319

The Chinese government has recently made AI even more of a priority as a frontier technology to 

be developed indigenously through innovation and entrepreneurship. Premier Li Keqiang wrote 

welcoming remarks for the World Robot Conference (世界机器人大会) in Beijing in 2015, 

emphasizing the need to develop AI technologies through collaboration, entrepreneurship, and 

innovation. 320 As previously discussed on page 24, in November 2015, Xi Jinping listed 

“intelligent manufacturing and robotics” as one of the key priorities for China to achieve by 

2030.321 In January 2016, MOST Minister Wan Gang codified this research field as one of the 

“Science & Technology Innovation 2030 – Mega Projects” (“科技创新 2030——重大项目”).322

 

317

“黄强教授” [Professor Huang Qiang], Beijing Institute of Technology Key Laboratory of Intelligent Control and 

Decision of Complex Systems 北京理工大学复杂系统智能控制与决策国家重点实验室, November 7, 2013,

accessed June 9, 2016, http://csicdgz.bit.edu.cn/xzdw/jq/27374.htm; “韩建达简介” [Han Jianda Introduction], 

Shenyang Institute of Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所, July 6, 2009, 

accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.sia.cas.cn/yjsjy/dsjj/bsds/mssb/200907/t20090706_2012286.html; “师资队伍概

况” [Teacher Ranks Summary], School of Mechanical Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University 机械与动力工

程学院, accessed June 9, 2016, http://me.sjtu.edu.cn/sz_minglu/showDetail.aspx?cid=1&id=32; and "王耀南" 

[Wang Yaonan], College of Electrical and Information Engineering Hunan University 湖南大学电气与信息工程学

院, November 30, 2013, accessed June 9, 2016, http://eeit.hnu.edu.cn/index.php/dsce/dcse-doctorial-tutor/24-2013-

11-29-16-39-50.

318 Cui Xueqin 崔雪芹 and Huang Xin 黄辛, “‘中国脑计划’酝酿启动 将从三大方向展开” [‘China Computer 

Plan’ Starts Brewing, Will Launch from Three Major Directions], ScienceNet 科学网, March 17, 2015, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlnews/2015/3/315217.shtm.

319

“中国‘脑科学计划’即将引领人工智能方向” [China “Computer Science Plan” On the Eve of Leading in the 

Direction of Artificial Intelligence], Sina Science and Technology 新浪科技, December 1, 2015, accessed July 8, 

2016, http://www.shandongbusiness.gov.cn/public/html/news/201512/359272.html; “‘中国脑计划’即将启动” 

[“China Computer Plan” About to Launch], People's Daily 人民日报, June 29, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb//html/2015-06/29/nw.D110000renmrb_20150629_3-12.htm.

320

“习近平致信祝贺 2015 世界机器人大会在京开幕李克强也作出批示表示祝贺” [Xi Jinping Wrote 

Congratulations to the 2015 World Robot Conference in Beijing, Li Keqiang also Wrote Comments Expressing 

Congratulations], Xinhua Net 新华网, November 23, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2015/1123/c64094-27845750.html.

321

“习近平 关于“中共中央关于制定国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划的建议”的说明” [Xi Jinping: 

Explanation of the ‘Recommendations of the Party Center on the 13th Five-Year National Economic and Social 

Development Plan’], Xinhua, November 3, 2015, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-

11/03/c_1117029621.htm.

322

“万钢:面向 2030 遴选启动航空发动机等一批科技创新重大项目” [Wan Gang: Facing 2030, Choices on 

Launching Aero-Engines and Other Science & Technology Innovation Megaprojects], Xinhua Net 新华网, March 

8, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-01/11/c_1117739527.htm.
78

The announcement called for an emphasis on “intelligent manufacturing and robotics” (智能制造

和机器人) research.

323

In May 2016, the National Reform and Development Commission (NRDC) announced the 

“Internet Plus” AI Three Year Implementation Plan (“互联网+”人工智能三年行动实施方案), 

which sets up Chinese rapid development of AI technologies and big data integration with cloud 

computing networks.324 Foundational research areas promoted in this document include computer 

vision (计算机视觉), natural language processing (自然语言理解), intelligent decision control (

智能决策控制), biometric recognition (生物特征识别), and intelligent voice processing (智能语

音处理).325 AI is also included as a central project in the Thirteenth FYP that guides S&T 

development until 2020.326

AI Trends in China

Cloud robotics (云机器人) is an emerging field that connects AI, data science, and computing 

technologies. The ability of AI to improve depends on the scalability of big data technology and 

cloud computing, which is an evident priority for China in the development of intelligent robots. 

Cloud service integration with robot data and software systems would allow intelligent robots to 

utilize remotely-stored data platform services. Simultaneous development of high-performance 

computing systems such as the Tianhe-2 and the Sunway TaihuLight supercomputers along with 

robotic mechanical manipulation give AI the potential to unleash smarter robotic devices that are 

capable of learning as well as integrating inputs from large databases.327 Chinese start-up AI 

companies are integrating cloud services into their products in order to enhance the intelligent 

learning capabilities and human-machine interface of these devices. Examples of this in China 

include the three biggest IT companies in China—Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent (collectively, 

“BAT”)—and the development of cloud computing platforms to support each of their AI 

systems.328

 

323 Ibid.

324

“‘互联网+’人工智能三年行动实施方案印发” [“Internet+” Artificial Intelligence 3 Year Operation 

Implementation Program Published], People's Post and Telecommunication 人民邮电报, May 26, 2016, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/info/2016-05/26/c_135390662.htm; Du Yueying (杜悦英), “后 AlphaGo 时

代”的中国人工智能路线图” [China's Artificial Intelligence Roadmap after the AlphaGo Era], China Development 

Observation 中国发展观察, accessed July 8, 2016, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0607/c83865-

28417972.html; “How Baidu, Tencent and Alibaba are leading the way in China's big data revolution,” South China 

Morning Post, August 25, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/tech/innovation/article/1852141/howbaidu-tencent-and-alibaba-are-leading-way-chinas-big-data.

325 “Internet Plus” Artificial Intelligence Three Year Implementation Plan,” [互联网+”人工智能三年行动实施方案

], Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the PRC, accessed June 15, 2016,

http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146290/n1146392/c4808445/part/4808453.pdf.

326

“‘中国脑计划’急需定好方向” [“China Computer Plan” Urgently Needs to Set a Good Direction], Shanghai 

Municipal Science and Technology Committee 上海市科学技术委员会, June 20, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.stcsm.gov.cn/xwpt/kjdt/344990.htm.

327 Xing Linan 邢立楠, “中国超级计算机速度世界第一 军方参与芯片研制” [China Supercomputer Speed is 

World’s First, Military Participated in Chip Development], China.com 中华网, June 22, 2016, accessed July 8, 

2016, http://military.china.com/kangzhan70/zhjw/11173869/20160622/22920401_all.html.

328 “BAT 决战人工智能:百度全面开花,阿里注重赋能,腾讯闲敲棋子” [BAT Decisive Battle Artificial 

Intelligence: Baidu Fully Blossoms, Alibaba Emphasizes Formation, Tencent Leisurely Hits the Chess Pieces], IT 

Times Online IT 时代网, June 27, 2016, accessed July 9, 2016, http://www.ittime.com.cn/news/news_11662.shtml.
79

A major barrier to deep learning and AI is access to high-power computers and processors that are 

able to handle these tasks.329 China is making tremendous investments, acquisitions, and progress 

in both capabilities that may facilitate its future breakthroughs in AI technology. In 2015 Baidu’s 

Minwa supercomputer trained machine-learning software that set a new record for image 

recognition, beating previous records set by Google and Microsoft. 330 In June 2016 China’s 

Sunway TaihuLight, which uses Chinese-designed processors, surpassed the Tianhe-2, a Chinese 

supercomputer with Intel chips, to become the world’s fastest system at 93 petaflops. That same 

month, China also surpassed the United States to have the most supercomputing facilities in the 

world at 167, compared to 165 in the United States. 331 China’s computing leaders are also 

aggressively seeking joint ventures with U.S. high-tech firms that facilitate technology transfers 

necessary for China’s computing industry. Tsinghua Unigroup, China Electronics Technology 

Group Corporation (CETC), China Electronics Corporation (CEC), and the CAS enjoy Chinese 

political support and are signing deals with U.S. firms including HP, IBM, and Microsoft. Such 

deals facilitate China’s access to expertise in mobile technology, storage, networking, ARM 

processors, and likely x86 chip technology.332 These domestic improvements in supercomputing, 

combined with China’s aggressive pursuit of foreign technology for its entire computing industry, 

may provide China with the hardware necessary for major advances in AI.

One of the major trends evident in the commercialization of AI technologies in China is the 

emergence of start-up companies that market AI household devices and chat platforms that are 

accessible to developers. These companies include Turing Robot, DFRobot, and Horizon Robotics, 

as well as companies focused on natural language processing and Chinese semantic processing 

such as iFLYTEK.

333 Chinese companies have shown a desire to become leaders in AI robotic 

technology to compete with Google and its AlphaGo AI system and Amazon’s Web Services 

(AWS) Platform.334 This competition has led to a push toward investment in existing companies 

abroad in addition to conducting their own R&D. In July 2015, Alibaba and Taiwanese firm 

 

329 Du Yueying (杜悦英), “后 AlphaGo 时代”的中国人工智能路线图” [China's Artificial Intelligence Roadmap 

after the AlphaGo Era], China Development Observation 中国发展观察, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0607/c83865-28417972.html.

330 Baidu researchers admitted that the team’s submission procedures were not in accordance with the ImageNet 

Challenge guidelines, making a direct comparison to Google’s and Microsoft’s results more difficult. See Tom 

Simonite, “Baidu’s Artificial-Intelligence Supercomputer Beats Google at Image Recognition,” MIT Technology 

Review, May 13, 2015 (updated June 1, 2015), accessed August 19, 2016,

https://www.technologyreview.com/s/537436/baidus-artificial-intelligence-supercomputer-beats-google-at-imagerecognition/.

331 The leading U.S. supercomputer, Titan, has achieved 17.59 petaflops/s. See “Press Release: June 2016,” Top 500, 

June 2016, accessed August 19, 2016, https://www.top500.org/news/new-chinese-supercomputer-named-worldsfastest-system-on-latest-top500-list/.

332 Michael Kanellos, “With AMD Deal, China Has Everything It Needs In High Tech,” Forbes, April 22, 2016, 

accessed September 2, 2016, http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkanellos/2016/04/22/with-amd-deal-china-haseverything-it-needs-in-high-tech/#2b8c02d9333e.

333 Eva Yoo, “You'll Have At Least One Robot by 2020: China Robotics Leaders” Technode, June 16, 2015, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://technode.com/2015/06/16/entrepreneurs-look-robotics/.

334 Catherine Shu, “Alibaba’s Cloud Computing Group Says Its New Artificial Intelligence Platform Is China’s 

First” TechCrunch, August 25, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/25/aliyun-ai/.
80

Foxconn jointly invested 14.5 billion Yen in SoftBank, the major producer of Japanese robots.335

Since this exchange, SoftBank’s humanoid robot products have been expanded to the Chinese 

market by authorized distributor Tektronix.336 Chinese semantic and natural language processing 

start-ups such as Xiaoi Robot and Turing Robot have started marketing products that integrate 

these robots with their own Chinese-language AI platforms.

Chinese AI Academic Research and Publications

In response to the government’s recent initiatives to support AI R&D and commercialization, a 

broad range of Chinese national laboratories, university institutes, and companies have engaged in 

researching AI technologies and applications. The number of published Chinese journal articles 

increased from 1,834 in 2010 to 1,996 in 2012, and surged to 2,613 in 2015.

337 This upward trend 

matches global trends on AI publications, which reportedly have increased by 50 percent every 

five years from 1995 to 2010.338

Leading AI Companies, Professional and Research Associations, and 

Academic and Research Institutes

Based on market analyses, state plans, and corporate information, the following entities are 

considered the most influential for China’s artificial intelligence industry. Leading entities receive 

longer introductions and analysis below, while all other important identified entities are included 

in Appendix III: Leading Artificial Intelligence Companies, Professional Associations, and 

Research Institutes in China.

Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence (CAAI; 中国人工智能学会)

The main academic society for AI in China is the Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 

(CAAI; 中国人工智能学会).339 CAAI is the only national-level professional society focused on 

scientific fields of research relating to AI in China.340 It promotes academic exchange, publication, 

education, and research exhibition for the purpose of AI development in China.341 CAAI was 

established in 1981 and is affiliated with Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.342

Current CAAI leadership consists of experts from Chinese and foreign institutions, companies and 

 

335 Emiko Jozuka, “Pepper, the ‘Emotional Robot,’ Sells Out in Under a Minute in Japan” Motherboard, June 22, 

2015, accessed July 8, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/read/pepper-the-emotional-robot-sells-out-in-under-aminute-in-japan.

336

“公司介绍” [Company Introduction], NAO Robotics (NAO 机器人), accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.naorobotics.com/aboutus.asp.

337 Information accessed at CNKI online academic journal database with subject search “人工智能” on July 11, 

2016.

338 Luke Muehlhauser and Jonah Sinick, “How Big is the Field of Artificial Intelligence? (initial findings),” blog 

post for the Machine Intelligence Research Institute, January 28, 2014, accessed September 6, 2016,

https://intelligence.org/2014/01/28/how-big-is-ai/.

339

“首页” [Home Page], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.caai.cn/.

340

“中国人工智能学会简介” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Introduction] Chinese Association for 

Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/index/id/2.html.

341 Ibid.

342 Ibid.
81

military organizations, including the emerging Chinese AI start-up Horizon Robotics (地平线机

器人科技有限公司), the PLA General Staff Department (GSD), NUDT, National Defense 

University, and telecommunications corporation ZTE.343

CAAI established the China Intelligence Expo (中国智能博览会) and China Intelligent Industry 

Forum (中国智能产业高峰论坛), leads the National Intelligent Robot Innovation Alliance (全国

智能机器人创新联盟), and organizes several academic competitions and other activities.344 The 

society also sponsors the academic journal CAAI Transactions on Intelligent Systems (智能系统

学报) and the Robotics and Artificial Intelligence (机器人与人工智能) book series.345

CAAI has 40 subcommittees focused on different fields within AI. These subcommittees include 

intelligent robotics, machine learning, natural language processing, discrete mathematics, 

intelligent control and management, knowledge engineering and distributed intelligence, smart 

medicine, intelligent agriculture, pattern recognition, bioinformation and intelligent life, and 

neural networks and computational intelligence. The subcommittees are chaired by expert 

scientists from a range of Chinese institutions, including universities, key laboratories, and 

government research institutes.346

CAAI is led by automation and AI expert Li Deyi (李德毅). English-language sources describe 

him as an academic and professor, but Chinese-language profiles also note that he is a Major 

General in the PLA. Author biographies in English-language textbooks co-authored by Li, as well 

as profiles on conference websites state that Li is affiliated with Tsinghua University in China, a 

member of the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE), and a member of the Euro-Asia 

International Academy of Science.347 Chinese-language sources, however, include the fact that Li 

is a Major General (少将军衔), and deputy director, researcher, and doctoral advisor at the GSD 

61st Research Institute (总参第六十一研究所), a PLA research organization that develops 

military training equipment including UAVs and simulation systems.348 Li has worked on national 

 

343

“中国人工智能学会第七届理事会负责人名单” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Seventh Board 

Member Leadership Name List], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 

9, 2016, http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/85.html; “中国人工智能学会 2016 副秘书长名单

” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 2016 Vice-Secretary Name List], Chinese Association for 

Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会. http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/114.html.

344

“中国人工智能学会简介” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Introduction] Chinese Association for 

Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/index/id/2.html.

345 Ibid.

346

“中国人工智能学会分支机构--览表” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Branch Organizations -

Table], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/index/id/43.html.

347 Li Deren, Li Deiyi, and Wang Shuliang, Spatial Data Mining: Theory and Application, Springer-Verlag Berlin 

Heidelberg, 2015: xxvi; Li Deyi and Du Yi, Artificial Intelligence with Uncertainty, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2008; 

“Plenary Speech,” 3rd CIS & RAM on Cybernetics and Intelligent Systems Robotics, Automation, and 

Mechatronics, an IEEE conference, September 21-24, 2008, accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.cisram.org/2008/ple-spe.html. 

348

“中国人工智能学会第七届理事会全体理事名单” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Seventh

Board Member Full Board Name List], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed 
82

defense electronics key engineering development projects, is deputy director of the All-Army 

Informatization Work Office (全军信息化工作办公室), and has been a member of the General 

Armament Department (GAD) Science and Technology Committee (总装备部科技委).349

China Robot Industry Alliance (CRIA; 中国机器人产业联盟)

Founded on April 21, 2013, CRIA is a non-profit organization consisting of 104 members that 

include companies, manufacturers, universities, research institutes, robotics associations, and 

government-sponsored organizations. The goal of CRIA is to serve as a cooperation platform for 

the industry, and thereby strengthen members' R&D capabilities, manufacturing, integration, 

application, customer services, education and training. It also organizes exhibitions and 

conferences, and works to expand robot applications in China. These goals are pursued with 

China's state industrial policies in mind, and CRIA tries to help organizations avoid redundant 

projects, facilitate the efficient use of resources, and popularize the application of robot 

technologies and products.350

There are 22 leading member organizations in CRIA, consisting of two director-level 

organizations, and 20 deputy director-level member organizations. Siasun (沈阳新松机器人自动

化股份有限公司) and the China Machinery Industry Federation (CMIF; 中国机械工业联合会) 

lead CRIA, and the remainder are various tech and robotics companies, several of which are the 

China branches of foreign firms.351 CRIA also has an experts committee (专家委员会). Including 

the director and three deputy directors, the experts committee consists of 25 members.352 CRIA is 

headquartered at the China Machinery Industry Federation (CMIF; 中国机械工业联合会) in 

Beijing.

353

Turing Robot (图灵机器人)

Turing Robot is a Chinese start-up that has developed and marketed AI products including robots, 

voice assistance, and chat robots. Turing Robot claims to have developed the leading Chinese 

 

June 9, 2016, http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/16.html; “学会领导” [Association Leader], 

Chinese Institute of Command and Control 中国指挥与控制学会, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://www.c2.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=21&id=87; “总参第六十研究所” [General 

Staff Department 61st Research Institute], YingJieSheng.com 应届毕业生网, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.yjbys.com/mingqi/c8866.html.

349

“学会领导” [Association Leader], Chinese Institute of Command and Control 中国指挥与控制学会, accessed 

June 9, 2016, http://www.c2.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=21&id=87; “专家介绍——李

德毅” [Expert Introduction—Li Deyi], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed 

9 June 2016, http://caai.cn/contents/108/1711.html.

350 ”Introduction” China Robot Industry Alliance, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://cria.mei.net.cn/English/introduction.asp.

351

“中国机器人产业联盟成员” [China Robot Industry Alliance Members], China Robot Industry Alliance 中国机

器人产业联盟, accessed June 9, 2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/hyzx.asp.

352

“专家委员会” [Experts Committee], China Robot Industry Alliance 中国机器人产业联盟, accessed June 9, 

2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/zjzl.asp.

353 Ibid.
83

semantic language processing platform, Turing OS, which was developed in November 2015.354

The platform boasts an accuracy rate as high as 95.1 percent and the company has provided 

services to over 150,000 developers and customers by publishing an open API platform.355 Turing 

Robot uses cutting-edge natural language processing and semantic language analysis intelligent 

technologies to create robotic devices that are “friendly AI solutions.”356 Turing Robot sells the 

“Nao” robot, which the company markets as the world’s most advanced humanoid robot.357 Turing 

Robot also developed the “Hidi” voice assistant for HTC mobile phones, household robots, a QQ 

chat robot, and smart voice integration with Bosch vehicles.

358

When Turing Robot came out with the “Xian’er” Buddha robot in early 2016, global media took 

note of the success of its AI platform that was able to converse with people.359 Chinese media 

states that this robot and the Turing OS uses the Tianhe-2 supercomputer to integrate massive 

databases for its intelligent learning and processing system.360 The growth in speed and capacity 

of China’s supercomputers will likely enable more companies to create more capable AI platforms 

like “Xian’er.” 

According to Turing Robot founder Yu Zhichen (俞志晨), the application of AI to household 

robots is a real opportunity for China, since these types of products are only now starting to be 

commercialized globally.361

HIT Robot Group (HRG), Intelligent Cloud Robot Business Unit (哈工大机器人集团智能云

机器人事业部)

362

Founded in December 2014, HRG is a high-tech firm jointly established by the Heilongjiang 

provincial government, the Harbin municipal government, and the Harbin Institute of 

Technology.363 HRG's focus is industrial robots, service robots, specialized robots, intelligent 

 

354

“关于我们” [About Us], Turing Robot 图灵机器人, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://www.tuling123.com/html/doc/About_us.html; "Turing OS" Baidu Encyclopedia 百度百科, accessed June 9, 

2016, http://baike.baidu.com/item/Turing%20OS.

355

“图灵机器人发布 Turing OS:有情感 会思考 能交流” [Turing Robot Issued Turing OS: Has Emotion, Can 

Think, Capable of Communication], Global Times Online 环球网, November 11, 2015, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://www.chinanews.com/cj/2015/11-09/7613545.shtml; “关于我们” [About Us], Turing Robot 图灵机器人, 

accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.tuling123.com/html/doc/About_us.html.

356

“Turing Robot” 图灵机器人, accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.tuling123.com/.

357 Ibid.

358 Ibid.

359

“龙泉寺贤二机器人成网红:第二代正在研发中” [Longquan Temple Xian Er Robot Goes Viral Online: 

Second Generation is in Development Now], Sina 新浪科技, April 21, 2016, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://tech.sina.com.cn/it/2016-04-21/doc-ifxrpvcy4246627.shtml.

360 Song Yelei 宋业磊, “图灵机器人发 Turing OS 操作系统推儿童机器人玩具” [Turing Robot Issued turing OS 

Operating System Promoting Children's Robot Toy], Phoenix 凤凰网科技, November 6, 2015, accessed June 9, 

2016, http://tech.ifeng.com/a/20151106/41502786_0.shtml.

361 Zhao Tingting, “Startup aims to place smart robots in every home” The Telegraph, December 7, 2015, accessed 

June 9, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/china-watch/business/12033684/turing-home-robot-ceointerview.html.

362

“智能云机器人事业部” [Intelligent Cloud Business Unit], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 

8, 2016, http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/product/pro_list/6.

363

“哈工大机器人” [HIT Robots], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/en/about?#about_02.
84

cloud robots, emerging intelligent equipment, intelligent plant projects and related technology 

transfer, and technical consulting and technology services.364 HRG is headquartered in Harbin, has 

regional centers in Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, business bases in nine additional Chinese 

cities, and five overseas offices.365 HRG has six business units: Smart Factory Business Unit, 

Industrial Robot Business Unit, Service Robot Business Unit, Special Robot Business Unit, 

Intelligent Equipment Business Unit, and Intelligent Cloud Business Unit. HRG uses five “brand” 

product lines to market the robots created by its business units: NOBODY, EVERYBODY, 

ROBOHIT, ZIWIROBOT, and E FLY. 366 HRG also has a ten-person consultant group of 

scientists, spanning what HRG claims to be the top Chinese scientists in robot research. They 

include academics, Changjiang scholars, Thousand Talents Plan finalists, and winners of various 

other premier science and technology-related awards.

367

HRG's Intelligent Cloud Business Unit focuses on cloud computing applied to a wide variety of 

uses, including networking, Internet services, big data, artificial intelligence, pattern recognition, 

electromechanical integration, embedded data and information, physics fusion, service-oriented 

computing, robot motion control, power control, machine vision, location services, algorithm, data 

collection and analysis, and the identification and treatment of core control platforms.368 Currently, 

its primary products are an Internet Plus product quality remote detection system, an intelligent 

flying robot for high-risk environments, and an intelligent cloud-based robot remote fault diagnosis 

system. 369 Established in March 2015 and located in Harbin, the division consists of 20 

researchers, including one associate professor, four graduate students, and six doctoral students.

370

Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) Institute of Intelligent Machines (IIM; 中国科学院合肥

智能机械研究所)

371

CAS IIM was founded on October 8, 1979, and is located on the eastern portion of Science Island 

in the Hefei Scientific Research Base. IIM's predecessor organization was the CAS East China 

Institute of Components and Instruments for Automation (中国科学院华东自动化元件及仪表

 

364 Ibid.

365 Ibid.

366

“哈工大机器人” [HIT Robots], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/en/about/service?#service_02.

367 Ibid.

368 Ibid.

369 “Intelligent Cloud Business Unit,” HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/en/product/product_show/11.

370

“‘互联网+机器人’产生中国的智能云质量检测系统” [’Internet + Robots’ Produced Chinese Intelligent Cloud 

Quality Inspection System], Science & Technology Review 科技导报, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://html.rhhz.net/kjdb/20152125.htm; “智能云质量检测系统:“互联网+”理念再造 3000 万劳动力” 

[Intelligent Cloud Quality Inspection Systems: “Internet +” Idea Reuses Labor Force of 3000], HIT Robot Group 哈

工大机器人集团, November 23, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/product/pronews_show/26.

371

“所况简介” [General Introduction], Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://www.iim.cas.cn/skjs/skjj/.
85

研究所), established in 1962. IIM employs 213 personnel372 and 24 research fellows,373 focuses 

on artificial intelligence and sensor technology, and consists of four research branches: the 

Research Center for Biomimetic Sensing and Control, the Research Center for Biomimetic 

Functional Materials and Sensing Devices, the Research Center for Intelligent Information 

Systems, and the Research Center for Information Technology of Sports and Health.374 IIM also 

stresses the importance of technology transfer and states that it “is the center source of the 

transformation and industrialization of the research products.”375

IIM further boasts its dedication to “national critical scientific areas” that include biomimetic 

sensing, information acquisition, digital agriculture intelligence system, intelligent detection and 

control and micro-nano technology. It has completed nearly one thousand research projects 

through funding from the Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), the National 863 and 973 

Programs, and the International Science and Technology Cooperation Program, and has won 

numerous awards for this work.

376

IIM also collaborates with the University of Science and Technology of China, the Hefei Institute 

of Physical Science, and Anhui University, currently supporting 200 students pursuing graduate 

degrees in Pattern Recognition and Intelligent Systems, Instrumentation Technology and 

Automatic Devices, Precision Instrument and Machine and Information Acquisition and 

Control.377

Military AI Applications

AI has many potential applications for the military, including smart weapons, intelligent unmanned 

vehicles, and autonomous robotic soldiers. Much of the Chinese academic literature discussing 

military possibilities for AI technology has been largely abstract and speculative, and a majority 

of it references or focuses on DARPA’s activities. The literature focusing on U.S. AI development 

ranges from forward looking pieces that cite U.S. academics in deep learning and AI,378 to claims 

that the superiority of Chinese radar systems is forcing DARPA to create AI technologies to 

 

372 “Faculty and Staff,” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://english.iim.cas.cn/pe/fs/.

373 “Research Fellow,” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://english.iim.cas.cn/pe/as/.

374 “Brief Introduction,” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://english.iim.cas.cn/au/bi/.

375 Ibid.

376 Ibid.

377 Ibid.

378 Li Mi 李宓, “展望 2016,人工智能会做哪些事” [2016 Outlook, What Artificial Intelligence Will Do], PLA 

Daily 解放军报, January 4, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0104/c172467-

28006683.html.
86

counter it,379 to prospective developments of AI in smart missile applications,380 to a detailed 

analysis of the role AI will play in U.S. military strategy.381

An article published by NUDT in January 2016 titled “The Dawn of a Military Revolution in 

"Intelligentization" - Deciphering the Military Technology Development Trajectory in the U.S. 

"Third Offset Strategy"” includes a detailed survey of U.S. military AI applications, noting that 

the U.S. focus and investment into military applications for AI is rapidly increasing. From this 

survey and analysis, the author speculates that as a result of these developments, AI technologies 

will inevitably replace IT as the leading technology in military development. This is attributed not 

only to the fact that AI and IT are both widely used technologies in society, but because the 

development of AI is built on the foundation of IT and is vastly superior.

382

Partnerships with U.S. Companies

Leading Chinese tech companies are making a concerted push to learn from the U.S. in the field 

of AI through strategic partnerships and initiatives. In 2011, Baidu founded its Baidu Silicon 

Valley AI Lab (SVAIL; 百度美国硅谷研发中心). In November 2015, the CAS formed its 

Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Computing Joint Lab (人工智能与先进计算联合实验室) 

with Dell. Located in Sunnyvale, CA, SVAIL focuses on fundamental research into nextgeneration infrastructure that will enable AI researchers to express their networks in computer 

code and train them on clusters of GPU’s, with support from Baidu’s Deep Learning Lab in 

Beijing. Similarly, the Beijing-based CAS-Dell AI lab focuses on developing advanced 

technologies relating to cognitive systems and deep learning.383 Both partnerships are detailed 

below.

Baidu Silicon Valley AI Lab (SVAIL; 百度美国硅谷研发中心)

Baidu has expanded its AI research into California’s Silicon Valley, giving its lab access to leading 

personnel with experience at top U.S. technology firms. Founded in 2011, the Baidu Silicon Valley 

AI Lab (SVAIL; 百度美国硅谷研发中心) is one of three research labs under Baidu Research, 

along with the Beijing Deep Learning Lab (百度深度学习实验室), formerly known as the 

Institute of Deep Learning, and the Beijing-based Baidu Big Data Lab (百度大数据实验室).384

 

379

“解放军让 F22‘摸瞎’后美国红了脸:将用人工智能对抗中国雷达” [U.S. Blushing after the PLA F22 

“Fumble”: Using Artificial Intelligence to Counter China's Radar], NetEase 网易, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://dy.163.com/wemedia/article/detail/BH3MQLPU05158T9V.html.

380 Guan Shiyi 关世义, “导弹智能化技术初探” (Some Discussions about Smart Missile), Tactical Missile 

Technology 战术导弹技术, no. 4, (July 2004), 1-7.

381 Pang Hongliang 庞宏亮, “智能化军事革命曙光初现——从美‘第三次抵消战略’解读军事技术发展轨迹” 

[The Smart Military Revolution Is Dawning–Interpreting the Track of Military Technology Development from the 

U.S. “Third Offset Strategy”], PLA Daily 解放军报, January 28, 2016, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.mod.gov.cn/wqzb/2016-01/28/content_4637961.htm.

382 Ibid.

383 Jack Clark, “Dell Expands in China with Venture Group, Creates AI Lab,” Bloomberg Technology, September 9, 

2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/dell-expands-in-china-withventure-group-creation-of-ai-lab; Mark Hanrahan, “Dell Inc Announces $125B Investment In China, Including 

Artificial Intelligence Lab,” International Business Times, September 10, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.ibtimes.com/dell-inc-announces-125b-investment-china-including-artificial-intelligence-lab-2090481.

384 Baidu, Inc., “Baidu Opens Silicon Valley Lab, Appoints Andrew Ng as Head of Baidu Research”, PR Newswire, 

May 16, 2014, accessed June 24, 2016, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/baidu-opens-silicon-valley-lab-
87

SVAIL is led by Andrew Ng, chief scientist and head of Baidu Research, and co-founder and 

chairman of the board of Coursera.385 Ng previously worked on deep learning at Google, giving 

him experience working on AI applications at a top corporation. 386 Kai Yu of Baidu’s Deep 

Learning Lab has stated that SVAIL’s purpose is to focus on fundamental research, while the Deep 

Learning Lab will continue to target applications of deep learning to new and existing Baidu 

products.387 Statements from key personnel in a promotional video for the lab reveal more details 

on what SVAIL would like to accomplish:388

Bryan Catanzaro, Systems Research Scientist: “We're focused on building the next generation 

infrastructure that will help AI researchers productively express their networks in computer code, 

and then efficiently train them on clusters of GPU's. So we're using technologies like MPI and 

CUDA to make that happen.”

Carl Case, Machine Learning Research Scientist: “In particular, we're focusing on a class of 

techniques known as deep learning. These are models that take advantage of a huge amount of 

data and a lot of computing power to give much better results than people have seen before.” 

Baidu stated in May of 2014 that it will invest USD 300 million in the Silicon Valley lab over five 

years. The staff had grown to 100 personnel as of 2015.

389

Dell and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS; 中国科学院)

In September 2015, Dell announced that together with the CAS it would jointly establish the

“Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Computing Joint Lab” (人工智能与先进计算联合实验室

). The plan accompanied Dell’s announcement that it would “invest $125 billion in China over the 

next five years, contributing $175 billion to imports and exports, sustaining one million jobs 

through the ecosystem and demonstrating its long-term commitment to the Chinese market.”390. 

The Dell-CAS lab will focus on developing advanced technologies relating to cognitive systems 

 

appoints-andrew-ng-as-head-of-baidu-research-259539471.html; Di Wenting 翟文婷, “起底百度美国研发中心,” 

[Breaking Ground on the Baidu-U.S. R&D Center], Sina S&T 新浪科技, February 3, 2015, accessed June 24, 2016, 

http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-02-03/doc-iawzunex9713856.shtml.

385 Tammy Parker, “Baidu's Silicon Valley R&D center targets deep learning,” FierceWirelessTech, May 18, 2014, 

accessed June 24, 2016, http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/baidus-silicon-valley-rd-center-targets-deeplearning/2014-05-18.

386 Ibid.

387 Ibid.

388 “Welcome to SVAIL” Baidu Research, accessed June 24, 2016, http://research.baidu.com/silicon-valley-ai-lab/.

389 Paul Mozur and Rolfe Winkler, “Baidu to Open Artificial-Intelligence Center in Silicon Valley: Former Stanford, 

Google Researcher Will Lead Efforts at $300 Million Facility,” Wall Street Journal, May 16. 2014, accessed June 

24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565950123054242;

Di Wenting 翟文婷, “起底百度美国研发中心” [Breaking Ground on the Baidu-U.S. R&D Center], Sina S&T 新浪

科技, February 3, 2015, accessed June 24, 2016, http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-02-03/doc-iawzunex9713856.shtml;

and Tammy Parker, “Baidu's Silicon Valley R&D center targets deep learning,” FierceWirelessTech, May 18, 2014, 

accessed June 24, 2016, http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/baidus-silicon-valley-rd-center-targets-deeplearning/2014-05-18.

390

“Dell Announces Its New “In China, For China” Strategy to Support Job Creation; Propel Entrepreneurship and 

Innovation,” press release by Dell, September 10, 2015, accessed September 29, 2016, 

https://www.dell.com/learn/us/en/vn/press-releases/2015-09-14-dell-announces-its-new-in-china.
88

and deep learning.391 Michael Dell, founder and chief executive officer of Dell, left no room for 

speculation as to what this partnership will mean and likely accomplish for the PRC, having stated 

at the investment announcement that, “Dell will embrace the principle of ‘In China, for China’ and 

closely integrate Dell China strategies with national policies in order to support Chinese 

technological innovation, economic development and industrial transformation.”392

The lab quickly announced the creation of an “enterprise-level deep learning computing and 

service platform” (人工智能与先进计算联合实验室).393 Speaking to this, Xu Bo (徐波), director 

of the CAS Institute of Automation (中国科学院, 自动化所), said, “CAS has built an artificial 

intelligence ecosystem, including theoretical innovation, core science and technology, and 

technology to application transfer, achieving a series of breakthroughs in recent years,” and that 

“Dell has provided CAS R&D with an advanced computing platform.”

394

On the progress of the joint lab, Huang Chenhong (黄陈宏), president of Dell China, told reporters 

in May 2016 that the joint lab is operating extremely well, and that “Dell and CAS creating the 

deep learning platform together is only the first step. Next, we will bring new technologies and 

new algorithms to businesses.”

395

 

391

“戴尔大中华区总裁黄陈宏:未来五年,戴尔将在中国投入 1250 亿美元” [Dell China Regional President 

Huang Chenhong: Next Five Years Dell Will Invest $ 125,100,000,000 in China], Global Times Online 环球网, 

March 12, 2016, accessed June 24, 2016, http://china.huanqiu.com/article/2016-03/8694357.html;

Mark Hanrahan, “Dell Inc Announces $125B Investment In China, Including Artificial Intelligence Lab” 

International Business Times, September 10, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.ibtimes.com/dell-incannounces-125b-investment-china-including-artificial-intelligence-lab-2090481; and Jack Clark, “Dell Expands in 

China With Venture Group, Creates AI Lab” Bloomberg Technology, September 9, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/dell-expands-in-china-with-venture-group-creation-of-ai-lab.

392 Jack Clark, “Dell Expands in China With Venture Group, Creates AI Lab” Bloomberg Technology, September 9, 

2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/dell-expands-in-china-withventure-group-creation-of-ai-lab.

393

“中国科学院与戴尔开拓智能科技研发新领域” [Chinese Academy of Sciences and Dell Break New Territory 

in Intelligent S&T R&D], China News 中国新闻, May 26, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.chinanews.com/it/2016/05-26/7884607.shtml.

394 Ibid.

395 Ibid.
89

Chapter Five: Nanorobotics

China has prioritized nanotechnology on the national level through national plans and governmentsupported research funding, leading to considerable research on nanorobotics. Nanorobotics 

focuses on the construction and manipulation of automated devices on the nanoscale (10-9

meters).396 This definition covers automated functional machines called nanorobots or nanobots (

纳米机器人), nanomachines (纳米机械人), molecular robots (分子机器人), and nanoscale 

mechanical manipulation to construct devices (纳米操作).397 Nanorobots can be composed of 

multiple types of materials, most frequently carbon nanotubes, graphene, or other molecular 

components such as DNA. Nanorobot components can include microelectromechanical systems 

(MEMS) such as piezoelectric nanogenerators (压电式纳米发电机) that would provide selfsustaining power to nanoscale devices, and nanoscale biosensors that can be used to detect 

environmental variables.398

The key findings of this chapter are as follows:

 Chinese scientists have made major research accomplishments on nanorobotics 

technologies. Starting with the development of China’s first nanomanipulation system in 

2005, Chinese researchers at academic and government institutions have developed 

molecular nanorobotics systems and devices.

 Chinese journals and other media identify promising civilian applications for 

nanotechnology in medicine (such as diagnostics), computing, energy, environment (such 

as oil spill remediation), and industry, while defense applications could include advanced 

sensors, UAVs, and “micro spy” robots.

 There is very little evidence of the Chinese military applying nanorobotics technologies.

Trends in Nanorobotics Research and Applications

The global market for nanorobots is expected to reach USD 75 billion by 2020, according to recent 

estimates by NewGen Capital, a venture capital firm based in Silicon Valley. 399 The main 

application for these types of devices is for drug delivery and manufacturing and medical 

procedures, as well as nanoscale molecular motors for powering and mobilizing these devices.400

In 2004, the 863 national funding program supported the development of the “OMOM” nanorobot 

endoscopy capsule, a camera device designed for internal medical imaging.401 Chinese researchers 

 

396 “Nanorobotics,” Suzhou Institute of Nano-Tech and Nano-Bionics (SINANO), April 1, 2011, accessed July 11, 

2016, http://english.sinano.cas.cn/rs/psk/201104/t20110401_67216.html.

397 Often written as “奈米机器人” in Taiwan.

398 Han Bingchen 韩秉宸, “安装在鞋底的纳米发电机有望成为现实” [Nanogenerator Installed at Sole Promising 

Turn into Reality], People’s Daily 人民日报, July 29, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://scitech.people.com.cn/n/2013/0729/c1007-22357576.html.

399

“硅谷 VC 重心转向前沿科技:纳米机器人市场 2020 年将达 758 亿美元” [Silicon Valley VC Shift to 

Cutting-Edge Technology: Nanorobot Market Will Reach 75.8 Billion USD by 2020], Eastmoney.com 东方财富网, 

June 27, 2016, accessed July 11, 2016, http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/1670,20160627637199290.html.

400

“纳米机械人——展望未来医疗” [Nanomachines—Future Outlook for Medicine], Chinese Academy of 

Sciences, March 13, 2002, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.cas.cn/xw/zjsd/200906/t20090608_640243.shtml.

401

“纳米机器人钻进肚子治病 技术全球领先” [Nanorobot Gets into Stomach for Treatment, Treatment is First in 

the World], Luohe Central Hospital 漯河市中心医院. http://www.lhzxyy.com.cn/View.aspx?BillID=2179.
90

have also worked on nanorobot applications for oil spill remediation. 402 Another promising 

application for nanorobots is their use in nanoscale computing.403

One of the major challenges faced by developers of nanorobots is the construction of advanced 

sensors and electrical components that are able to function at nanoscale. 404 In addition, 

nanorobotics research is often partnered with research on the application of cloud computing 

technologies that are able to synthesize information from multiple sources and allow swarms of 

nanorobots to act accordingly. 405 The field of nanorobotics for medicine brings together 

developments in AI and DNA sequencing and assembly technology.406 Similarly, the expansion 

of network technologies is key to the advancement of nanorobotics.407 In addition, nanoscale 

power generation through nanogenerators has wide applications in the self-powering of nanobots 

in the body for medical purposes, and research addresses the technical challenges of energy storage 

and generation for nanoscale devices.408

Chinese Government Support for Nanorobotics Research

Many facets of Chinese nanorobotics research have been guided by national strategic plans. The 

Medium- to Long-Term Plan emphasizes nanotechnology strategic developments including 

nanorobotics-related fields such as nanomanipulation and nanodevices, intelligent materials and 

nanofabrication, and assembly technologies. 409 The National 863 Foundation has designated 

committees of experts to guide the prioritization of research funding. The Twelfth FYP included 

expert groups for both micro/nano-manufacturing technology (微纳制造技术) and nanomaterials 

and device technology (纳米材料与器件技术), led by some of the top Chinese experts on MEMS, 

sensors, and nanomaterials.410

 

402

“纳米机器人 (小型机器人)” [Nanorobot (Small-Scale Robot)], Baidu Encyclopedia 百度百科, accessed July 

11, 2016, http://baike.baidu.com/subview/95093/16805167.htm; “发展机器人产业 布局中国制造‘工业 4.0’” 

[Development of Robotics Industry Lays Out Made in China “Industry 4.0”], China Trade News 中国贸易新闻网, 

December 1, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://shengwuyiliao.juhangye.com/201512/news_4711067.html.

403

“纳米技术” [Nanotechnology], Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), July 24, 2001, accessed July 11, 

2016, http://www.most.gov.cn/kxjspj/gzkp/200702/t20070201_40778.htm.

404

“发展机器人产业 布局中国制造‘工业 4.0’” [Development of Robotics Industry Lays Out Made in China 

“Industry 4.0”], China Trade News 中国贸易新闻网, December 1, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://shengwuyiliao.juhangye.com/201512/news_4711067.html.

405 Ibid.

406

“硅谷 VC 重心转向前沿科技:纳米机器人市场 2020 年将达 758 亿美元” [Silicon Valley VC Shift to 

Cutting-Edge Technology: Nanorobot Market Will Reach 75.8 Billion USD by 2020], Eastmoney.com 东方财富网, 

June 27, 2016, accessed July 11, 2016, http://finance.eastmoney.com/news/1670,20160627637199290.html.

407

“发展机器人产业 布局中国制造‘工业 4.0’” [Development of Robotics Industry Lays Out Made in China 

“Industry 4.0”], China Trade News 中国贸易新闻网, December 1, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://shengwuyiliao.juhangye.com/201512/news_4711067.html.

408 Wang, Zhong Lin, “Self-Powered Nanotech,” Scientific American, January 2008, accessed July 11, 2016, 

https://www.cs.virginia.edu/~robins/Self_Powered_Nanotech.pdf.

409

“五、前沿技术” [5. Front Line Technology], Xinhua 新华社, February 9, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787_5.htm; “六、基础研究” [Basic Research], part of “国家中长

期科学和技术发展规划纲要 (2006-2020)” [National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of 

Science and Technology (2006-2020)], State Council of the People’s Republic of China, accessed July 6, 2016, 

http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787_6.htm.

410

"关于聘任“十二五”863 计划专家委员会和主题专家组专家的通知" [Notification Appointing "Twelfth Five 

Year Plan" 863 Program Experts Committee and Subject Experts Group Experts], Ministry of Science and 
91

The Chinese government has placed high priority on the indigenous development of 

nanotechnology, and this emphasis has influenced nanorobotics research due to its promising 

applications for medicine, computing, energy, environment, industry, and defense.411 As part of 

this strategic push for development of the industry, China has established nanotechnology regional 

research centers, science parks, and R&D platforms.412 Nanotechnology was singled out in the 

Twelfth National Basic Science Development Five Year Plan (国家基础研究发展“十二五”专项

规划) in 2011413 and as a key scientific research area in the Nano Research National Key Major 

Scientific Research Plan (纳米研究国家重大科学研究计划"十二五"专项规划) in 2012.414

These plans also highlighted the important applications for nanotechnology and called for research 

in related areas including MEMS, sensors, and nanodevices and nanosystems.415

While the Made in China 2025 initiative does not specifically target nanorobotics as a field of 

strategic research and technology development, it does cover some of the common components of 

nanorobotics and nanomanipulation systems such as nanomaterials, sensors, and control 

systems.416 Likewise, the Robotics Industry Development Plan 2016-2020 (机器人产业发展规划

) does not specifically target the nanorobotics subfield, but lists research priorities such as sensors 

and high-performance control systems.417

 

Technology of the People's Republic of China 中华人民共和国科学技术部, March 30, 2012, accessed July 8, 

2016, http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201203/t20120330_93456.htm; “陈大鹏” [Chen Dapeng], Hefei University of 

Technology School of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering 合肥市合肥工业大学化学与化工学院, accessed July 

12, 2016, http://hgxy.hfut.edu.cn/website/index.php/cn/about-us/classmate/item/95; “黄庆安” [Huang Qing’an], 

Southeast University 东南大学, July 25, 2007, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://www.seu.edu.cn/20/8a/c76a8330/page.htm; “刘胜 简介” [Liu Sheng Introduction], Chinese Journal of 

Sensors and Actuators 传感技术学报, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://j.chinatransducers.com/Web/BwJianJie.aspx?id=24; “陈建峰——纳米材料专家” [Chen Jianfeng—

Nanomaterials Expert], China Science & Technology Innovation Net 科技创新网, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://www.zgkjcx.com/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=14051.

411

“纳米研究国家重大科学研究计划‘十二五’专项规划” [Nano Research National Scientific Research Project 

“Twelfth Five Year Plan” Special Project Plan], Bioon News. June 21, 2012, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.bioon.com/trends/law/526288.shtml.

412 Ibid.

413

“国家基础研究发展‘十二五’ 专项规划” [National Basic Research Development “Twelfth Five Year Plan” 

Special Project Plan]. Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201206/W020120608514402969801.pdf.

414

“纳米研究国家重大科学研究计划‘十二五’专项规划” [Nano Research National Scientific Research Project 

“Twelfth Five Year Plan” Special Project Plan], June 21, 2012, Bioon News, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.bioon.com/trends/law/526288.shtml.

415 Ibid.

416

“国务院关于印发《中国制造 2025》的通知” [State Council Releases “Made in China 2025” Announcement], 

May 8, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-05/19/content_9784.htm.

417

“机器人产业发展规划(2016-2020 年)发布” [Robotics Industry Development Plan (2016-2020) Release], 

accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbghwb/201604/t20160427_799898.html.
92

Military Applications for Nanorobotics

For years, Chinese media has speculated on the military applications of micro and nanoscale 

robots, but little evidence of progress toward these cutting-edge technologies can be found. News 

outlets have followed press releases from U.S. organizations such as NASA and DARPA, 

announcing the investments made and research developments.418 Although Chinese researchers 

from military organizations have published research on the promises of nanorobots for medical 

applications, there has been little visible progress. Suggested military applications in popular 

media include “smart dust” nanosensors, nanoscale UAVs, medical nanorobots, and nanoscale 

“micro spy” robots.419

Leading Chinese Nanorobotics Professional Associations, Research 

Institutes, and Companies

Many academic and government research institutes have investigated the design and construction 

of nanorobotics devices and related components. The organizations publishing the most in Chinese 

academic literature since 2010 include Hefei University of Technology, CAS Shenyang Institute 

of Automation (SIA), and CAS Institute of Intelligent Machines (IIM). 420 These research 

organizations frequently publish in international journals and collaborate with researchers abroad.

Below is a profile of CAS SIA, while information on other leading Chinese institutions for 

nanorobotics may be found in Appendix IV: Leading Chinese Nanorobotics Institutions.

CAS Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA; 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所)

SIA has made the most significant research progress in micro- and nanorobotics and 

nanomanipulation in China. Founded in 1958, SIA is a government-funded institution that is a 

leader in advanced research on fields of robotics, automation, and electronics.421 SIA has ten 

research departments and ten key laboratories and engineering centers and over 800 employees.422

Its website asserts that it has made “significant contributions to society, the economy and national 

security.”423 SIA was responsible for creating China’s first underwater robot, welding robot, laser 

processing robot, and industrial robots, and has made major accomplishments in wireless sensor 

network technology.424

 

418

“军警新科技:纳米机器虫部队” [New Technology for Military: Nano Machine Insect Army], MEMS 

Information Network MEMS 资讯网, January 20, 2010, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://www.mems.ac.cn/xinwenzixun/2010/0120/军警新科技纳米机器虫部队.html; “美军纳米机器人的发展现

状” [Current Situation of U.S. Military Nanorobot Development], November 29, 2011, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://mil.sohu.com/20111129/n327284531.shtml.

419 Ibid.

420 Search of CNKI academic journal database on 1 June 2016 for “纳米” (nano) and “机器人” (robot), “纳米操作” 

(nanomanipulation), or “纳米马达” (nanomotor) subject search.

421 “Brief Introduction of SIA,” Chinese Academy of Sciences Shenyang Institute of Automation, December 30, 

2013, accessed July 11, 2016, http://english.sia.cas.cn/au/bi/201312/t20131230_115083.html.

422 Ibid.

423 Ibid.

424

“王越超:纳米操作机器人正在成为现实” [Wang Yuechao: Nanomanipulation Robots are Becoming a 

Reality], October 23, 2007, accessed July 11, 2016, Enorth.com.cn 北方网. 

http://news.enorth.com.cn/system/2007/10/23/002198104.shtml; “Brief Introduction of SIA,” Chinese Academy of 

Sciences Shenyang Institute of Automation, December 30, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://english.sia.cas.cn/au/bi/201312/t20131230_115083.html.
93

SIA and its subordinate laboratories and research groups, such as the Micro and Nano Robotics 

Group (微纳米自动化实验室 / 微纳米课题组) under the State Key Laboratory of Robotics (机

器人学国家重点实验室), have focused their research on technology for manufacturing and 

manipulating devices in the nanoscale, with many applications for medical treatment. In 2005 SIA 

researchers established China’s first nanorobotic operation and manipulation system, and were 

able to inscribe “China 863” with dimensions of 1x2 micrometers on a silicon surface by using a 

carbon nanotube robot.425

Since this accomplishment in 2005, the institute’s subordinate labs have made progress in research 

on nanorobotics manipulation systems and have increased collaboration both at home and 

abroad.426 In 2009 the State Key Laboratory of Robotics started collaboration with the PLA 307th

Hospital to develop nanorobotics to manipulate molecules to improve targeted lymphoma drug 

delivery treatment.427 In 2012, SIA’s Micro-Nano Group worked with Xi Ning (席宁) at Michigan 

State University428 and published a paper in Applied Physics Letters on their research using 

graphene to manipulate nanorobots with atomic force microscopy (AFM).429 In 2013, the same 

team manipulated a 3-D virus structure with AFM technology. 430 Also in 2013 State Key 

 

425

“纳米机器人治疗癌症取得新进展” [Nanorobot Cancer Treatment Achieve New Developments], Bioon.com, 

November 17, 2011, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.bioon.com/3g/id/6532511/; “我国成功研制纳米操作机器

人” [China Succeeds in Developing Nanomanipulation Robot], Xinhuanet 新华网, April 14, 2005, accessed July 11, 

2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-04/15/content_2834613.htm.

426 “State Key Laboratory of Robotics” [机器人学国家重点实验室]. Chinese Academy of Sciences Shenyang 

Institute of Automation State Key Laboratory of Robotics 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所机器人学国家重点实验

室, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.rlab.ac.cn/.

427

“‘纳米操作机器人在癌症靶向治疗中的应用研究’取得新进展获权威刊物封面刊载” [“Nanomanipulation 

Robot Research Applications in Targeted Cancer Therapy” New Development Published on Journal Cover], 

November 16, 2011, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.sia.cn/xwzx/kydt/201111/t20111116_3396890.html;

“Drug-Induced Changes of Topography and Elasticity in Living B Lymphoma Cells Based on Atomic Force 

Microscopy,” Sciencenet.cn 科学网, May 29, 2012, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://doc.sciencenet.cn/DocInfo.aspx?id=11470; Wei-Jing, Zhang, “纳米操作机器人治疗淋巴瘤获进展” 

[Nanomanipulation Robot Lymphoma Therapy Developments], Sciencenet.cn 科学网, May 29, 2012, accessed July 

11, 2016, http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlpaper/201252915252947924670.shtm; Chinese Academy of Sciences, “沈

阳自动化所利用纳米操作机器人靶向治疗淋巴瘤获进展” [Shenyang Institute of Automation Uses 

Nanomanipulation Robots for Lymphoma Therapy Development], May 28, 2012, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.cas.cn/ky/kyjz/201205/t20120525_3585654.shtml. Editorial office of Acta Physico-Chimica Sinica, 

“Drug-Induced Changes of Topography and Elasticity in Living B Lymphoma Cells Based on Atomic Force 

Microscopy,” accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.whxb.pku.edu.cn/EN/abstract/abstract28019.shtml.

428

“席宁:机器人产业发展需要新技术推动和新应用拉动” [Xi Ning: Robotics Industry Development Needs 

New Technology Push and New Applications], November 23, 2015, accessed July 11, 2016,

http://www.worldrobotconference.com/cn/news/xingyexinwen/2015/1123/1173.html.

429

“中科院利用纳米操作机器人可控加工石墨烯获新成果” [Chinese Academy of Sciences Uses 

Nanomanipulation Robot to Manufacture with Graphene in New Accomplishment], December 20, 2012, accessed 

July 11, 2016, http://www.robot-china.com/news/201212/20/2901.html, “Graphene-Control Cutting Using an 

Atomic Force Microscope-Based Nanorobot,” May 27, 2012, Science China Press, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2012-05/sicp-gcu052112.php.

430

“沈阳自动化所纳米机器人完成单分子病毒三维空间自由操作” [Shenyang Institute of Automation 

Nanorobot Completes Single Molecular Virus 3D Space Independent Manipulation], Chinese Academy of Sciences, 

May 30, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.cas.cn/ky/kyjz/201305/t20130530_3853262.shtml; “单分子病毒
94

Laboratory of Robotics researchers published research on using voltage changes in cell membranes 

to power nanorobots, as well as published research on using AFM to determine cutting forces of a 

nanobot on graphene surfaces.431

SIA researchers have continued this progress on nanorobotics and nanomanipulation in recent 

years and have continued to lead the research field in China. In early 2015, SIA scientists used a 

programmable system of AFM manipulation to construct a nanorobot using DNA nanotubes.432

Later that year, SIA researchers developed a set of nanorobots that ranged from 500-1,000 

micrometers and could move at 5 millimeters per second.433 This nanobot has applications for 

medical treatment opportunities such as automated remotely-operated activities in the 

bloodstream. Researchers also manipulated nanoparticles and carved the letters “SIA” with 

dimensions of 10x10 micrometers onto a layer of silicon.434

 

三维可控操作方法” [Method of controllable 3d manipulation for single virus], China Science Bulletin, accessed 

May 20, 2016, http://csb.scichina.com:8080/EN/abstract/abstract511091.shtml.

431 Zhang C L, Li P, Xie Y P, et al. “Nanorobot Synchronously Tracking Voltage-Induced Changes of Membrane 

Character” [纳米操作机器人同步追踪电压诱导膜特性改变], China Science Bulletin 科学通报, 2013, 58: 187–

193; Zhang Y, Wang Y C, Zhou L, et al. “基于纳米操作机器人的石墨烯切割力各向异性研究” (Cutting Force 

Anisotropy Dependence on Lattice Structures of Graphene Based on Nanorobot”), China Science Bulletin 科学通报

, 2013, 58: 181–186.

432 Li Longhai 李龙海, Liu Lianqing 刘连庆, Dong Zaili 董再励, “面向可控自组装的 DNA 纳米管可编程 AFM 

操作” (Programmable AFM Manipulation for DNA Nanotubes with the Controlled Self-Assembly),” 

Micronanoelectronic Technology 微纳电子技术, 2015, vol. 52, no.4, 240-245.

433

“微纳米机器人” [Nanorobots], Chinese Academy of Sciences Shenyang Institute of Automation, November 16, 

2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.sia.cas.cn/kxcb/kpwz/201511/t20151116_4465141.html.

434

“未来的体内纳米机器医生” [Future of Nanomachines Doctors Inside the Body], Suzhou Institute of Nano-Tech 

and Nano-Bionics (SINANO), October 23, 2014, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.sinano.cas.cn/kxcb/kpwz/201410/t20141023_4229456.html.
95

Chapter Six: China’s Acquisition of Foreign Robotics Technology

China is actively acquiring components, technologies, and materials from abroad for its robotics 

systems and unmanned systems. With these acquisitions, China can not only improve its own 

industrial, service, and military robotics systems, but also develop countermeasures against foreign 

military systems.435 This report categorizes these efforts into three sections for analysis:

Illicit Technology Acquisition – This section discusses the illegal means through which China 

acquires key technologies from abroad, such as cyber intrusions and export control violations.

Informal Knowledge and Technology Transfers – These informal transfers refer to China’s 

acquisition of foreign technologies via open source collection, talent recruitment, and academic 

exchanges. 

Formal Technology Acquisition and Investments – These transfers involve Chinese 

companies acquiring or investing in foreign robotics companies or other entities to acquire 

relevant technologies.

Illicit Technology Acquisition

China actively seeks U.S. technology through illicit means, including cyber intrusions into 

sensitive U.S. defense contractors and suppliers, as well as by directing efforts to circumvent U.S. 

export controls. China’s cyber campaign against the United States is well-documented, and details 

from specific cases demonstrate a targeted effort to steal U.S. designs for unmanned aerial and 

ground systems. The illegal export of sensitive equipment and technologies to China is a regular 

occurrence. What makes one case unique, however, is that the plea agreement explicitly states the 

defendant worked “at the direction of co-conspirators working for Harbin Engineering University 

(HEU), a state-owned entity in the People’s Republic of China.”436

Cyber Intrusions

China’s cyber espionage against U.S. Government entities, companies, and universities includes 

manufacturers of military unmanned systems and their component technologies. In 2013 a U.S. 

cybersecurity company reported on a massive two-year operation dubbed Operation Beebus by 

Chinese hackers to steal U.S. designs and relevant technologies for UAVs.437 Of the 261 attacks 

uncovered, 123 of them are reported to have targeted U.S. drone companies.438 According to a 

manager of the investigation, “We believe the attack was largely successful.”439

 

435 For more information on how China pursues emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, see Dan 

Alderman and Jonathan Ray, “Best Frenemies Forever: Artificial Intelligence, Emerging Technologies, and SinoU.S. Strategic Competition.” Paper presented at the 2016 IGCC Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Competition in 

Defense Technological and Industrial Development, San Diego, California, July 2016.

436 Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and 

Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” 4.

437 Edward Wong, “Hacking U.S. Secrets, China Pushes for Drones,” The New York Times, September 20, 2013. 

438 Alex Pasternack, “Hackers Are Helping China Build Cheap Clones of America’s Drones,” Motherboard, 

September 23, 2013, accessed July 6, 2016, https://motherboard.vice.com/blog/hackers-are-helping-china-buildcheap-clones-of-americas-drones.

439 Dunn, John, “Chinese malware targeted US drone secrets, security firm alleges,” TechWorld, February 4, 2013.
96

Other targets include companies such as QinetiQ North America, a major supplier of drones, 

satellites, helicopters, military robotics, and other systems for the U.S. military.440 According to 

news reports, the hackers first targeted QinetiQ’s drone and robotics technologies. In April 2012, 

the PLA displayed a bomb disposal robot similar to QinetiQ’s Dragon Runner, likely reflecting 

the use of this stolen data.441

Most recently, in March 2016 Su Bin, a Chinese national, pleaded guilty to participating in a yearslong conspiracy to hack into the computer systems of major U.S. defense contractors, namely 

Boeing.442 According to U.S. media, Su transferred over 65 gigabytes of data, with Boeing’s C-17 

military cargo plane as the primary target.443 Given Boeing’s vast portfolio of unmanned air, sea, 

and space systems, it is possible that this massive amount of stolen data included information on 

unmanned systems.

Chinese cyber espionage also targets U.S. universities, though no known campaign against 

robotics research was discovered. In August 2015 the University of Virginia that it had reported a 

cyber intrusion originating from China, an attack that may be motivated by a university’s ties to 

U.S. defense and intelligence agencies.444 Previously in 2013 U.S. media reported that Chinese 

cyber campaigns increasingly target U.S. research universities, who receive thousands of patents 

and comprise some of the robust centers of information exchange in the world. According to Tracy 

Mitrano, the director of information technology policy at Cornell University, detection of the 

intrusions is “probably our greatest area of concern, that the hackers’ ability to detect 

vulnerabilities and penetrate them without being detected has increased sharply.” 445 The 

compromise of cutting-edge robotics research at U.S. research universities could jeopardize gains 

in these fields, and allow China to take advantage of U.S. time and resources invested into these 

technologies.

Export Control Violations

According to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Bureau of Industry Security (BIS) at 

the U.S. Department of Commerce, numerous individuals in the United States have attempted to 

illegally export unmanned systems and their relevant components and materials to China. Certain 

robotics for industrial purposes and materials processing are subject to the Export Administration 

Regulations (EAR), while unmanned aerial, ground, and water vehicles are subject to International 

Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).446 In many cases Chinese end-users directed the individual 

 

440 Riley, Michael and Elgin, Ben, “China’s Cyberspies Outwit Model for Bond’s Q,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2013.

441 Ibid.

442 U.S. Department of Justice, “Chinese National Pleads Guilty to Conspiring to Hack into U.S. Defense 

Contractors’ Systems to Steal Sensitive Military Information,” Justice News, March 23, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, 

https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-pleads-guilty-conspiring-hack-us-defense-contractors-systemssteal-sensitive.

443 Matt Apuzzo, “Chinese Businessman Is Charged in Plot to Steal U.S. Military Data” New York Times. July 11, 

2014.

444 Shane Harris and Alexa Corse, “Chinese Hackers Target U.S. University with Government Ties,” The Daily 

Beast, August 21, 2015, accessed August 26, 2016, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/08/21/chinesehackers-target-u-s-university-with-government-ties.html.

445 Richard Pérez-Peña, “Universities Face a Rising Barrage of Cyberattacks,” The New York Times, July 16, 2013.

446 As the Obama Administration’s Export Control Reform Initiative enters its final phase in 2016, additional 

research may be conducted to determine specific controls over component technologies for these systems. See 

“Deemed Exports Webinar,” presentation by the U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security, 
97

residing in the United States to acquire specific items. Since 2010, DOJ reporting includes six 

cases in which China has sought to acquire U.S. unmanned systems and their technologies.447

These cases include the following:

1. Systems and Components for Marine Submersible Vehicles – On June 10, 2016, Amin Yu,

AKA Amy Yu, pleaded guilty to acting in the United States as an illegal agent of a foreign 

government without prior notification to the Attorney General.448 According to the plea 

agreement, Yu obtained systems and components from U.S. companies for marine 

submersible vehicles (such as UUVs). She then illegally exported the components to the 

PRC. She acted at the direction of co-conspirators working for Harbin Engineering 

University, profiled on page 67. According to the indictment, Yu illegally exported the 

following technologies:449

 Underwater acoustic locator devices

 Underwater cables and connectors, including AWQ/XSL and MSSK/MINL 

Marine Cables

 PC104 computer processing units for mission, motion and video guidance 

computers 

 907 Multiplexers for digital signal transmission through fiber optics

 Underwater pressor [sic] sensor, conductivity and temperature sensor

 Control sticks and button strips

2. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle – On June 10, 2016, Wenxia Man, AKA Wency Man, was 

convicted by a federal jury of conspiring to export fighter jet engines, a UAV, and related 

technical data to the PRC. The defense articles included the General Atomics MQ-9 

Reaper/Predator B Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, capable of firing Hellfire Missiles, as well 

as Pratt & Whitney F135-PW-100 engines used in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, Pratt & 

Whitney F119-PW-100 turbofan engines used in the F-22 Raptor fighter jet, and technical 

data for each of these defense articles.450

3. High-Grade Carbon Fiber – On April 13, 2016, Fuyi Sun, AKA Frank Sun, was arrested 

in connection with a scheme to illegally export to China, without a license, high-grade

carbon fiber that is primarily used in aerospace and military applications. The targeted 

Toray type M60JB-3000-50B carbon fiber (“M60 Carbon Fiber”) has applications in 

UAVs and other government defense applications.451

4. Drone, Missile and Stealth Technology – In January 2015, Hui Sheng Shen, AKA Charlie 

Shen, and Huan Ling Chang, AKA Alice Chang, were sentenced after pleading guilty to 

 

August 29, 2007, accessed August 26, 2016, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/387-

intermediate-deemed-exports-pdf; Robert Levinson, “Obama Administration Still Pushing on Export Control 

Reform,” Bloomberg, December 1, 2015.

447 Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and 

Embargo-Related Criminal Cases.”

448 Ibid.

449 United States of America v Amin Yu, Case No. 6:16-cr-23-Orl-37GJK, (FL, United States District Court, Middle

District of Florida, Orlando Division March 26, 2016), accessed on July 6, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/usaomdfl/file/843506/download.

450 Department of Justice, “Summary of Major U.S. Export Enforcement, Economic Espionage, Trade Secret and 

Embargo-Related Criminal Cases,” 4.

451 Ibid., 7.
98

count of conspiracy to violate the Arms Export Control Act and one count of conspiracy to 

import illegal drugs. Shen and Chang were interested in UAVs including the RQ-11b 

Raven, a small, hand-launched UAV used by the U.S. Armed Forces. They intended to 

export to China manuals for RQ-11b Raven and RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs (provided by 

undercover FBI agents), and were arrested soon after.452

5. Military Gyroscopes – On April 17, 2013, Kevin Zhang, AKA Zhao Wei Zhang, was 

sentenced after pleading guilty for his role in a conspiracy to export defense articles from 

the United States to China without a license. The item he attempted to export, G-200 

Dynamically Tuned Gyroscopes, can be used in tactical missile guidance systems and 

UAVs. 453

6. Military Technical Data and Trade Secrets – On March 25, 2013, Sixing Liu, AKA Steve 

Liu, was sentenced for exporting sensitive U.S. military technology to China, stealing trade 

secrets, and lying to federal agents. While working as a senior staff engineer for Space & 

Navigation, a New Jersey-based division of L-3 Communications, Liu stole thousands of 

electronic files detailing the performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, 

rockets, target locators, and UAVs. Prior to his arrest, Liu traveled to China and made 

presentations on the technologies at several Chinese universities, the CAS, and conferences 

organized by government entities.454

In addition to DOJ reporting, BIS reports that between 2007 and 2008, Yaming Nina Qi Hanson 

and her husband Harold Dewitt Hanson illegally exported miniature UAV autopilots to Xi’an 

Xiangyu Aviation Technical Group in China. Such components are controlled for export to China 

for national security reasons.455

Informal Knowledge and Technology Transfers

China actively acquires U.S. technology through informal means that are extralegal, or not clearly 

defined and regulated by current U.S. legislation. These means include leveraging a vast open 

source intelligence apparatus, recruitment of leading talents from around the world, and academic 

exchanges. These means are not properly defined and regulated by existing U.S. legislation, but as 

one analysis states, “There is a thin line between stealing secrets and informal technology transfer, 

and China pursues the latter to the limit.”456

Open Source Collection

China leverages a vast open source collection and exploitation system to spot, study, and acquire 

data concerning foreign technologies that China has not yet been able to develop on its own.457

This system is rooted in the Chinese legacy of “tiyong” (体用) or “importing what is useful and 

 

452 Ibid., 32-33.

453 Ibid., 60-61.

453 Ibid., 60-61.

454 Ibid., 61-62

455 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Don’t Let This Happen to You: Actual Investigations of Export Control and 

Antiboycott Violations,” Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Enforcement, July 2015 Edition, 45-46.

456 William C. Hanas, James Mulvenon, and Anna B. Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition 

and Military Modernization, (London: Routledge, 2013), 2.

457 Ibid., 18-49.
99

keeping China’s essence.” In short, China takes what is useful from Western concepts for 

applications while keeping the essence of Chinese culture. China’s open source collection raises 

this concept to a science, or formally “information/intelligence science” (情报学 qingbaoxue). 

The Chinese term qingbao can be translated as both information and intelligence because it 

includes both the input of original information and the output of processed intelligence.458

In practice this system features institutions that monitor foreign technical developments, 

disseminate information to relevant Chinese institutions, and model foreign R&D for domestic 

programs. The first of these institutions appeared in 1956, and in the 1960s contributed to Chinese 

advances in nuclear weapons, satellite launches, and computers. By 1985 60,000 Chinese workers 

were engaged in data processing, database mining, benchmarking, and reverse engineering. By 

2005, over 50,000 networks hosted and distributed S&T information among 353 institutes, 

servicing 27 million “users” to obtain foreign S&T material.459

In the field of UAVs, a leading collection institute is the 310th RI under CASIC, a major defense 

conglomerate and manufacturer of UAVs. Also known by its civilian name, the Beijing Haiying 

Science and Technology Information Institute, the 310th RI closely follows research and 

development plans, technical specifications, tests, operations, technologies, materials, and 

techniques of UAVs, aircraft, and missiles in foreign countries. Its periodical, Aerodynamic 

Missile Journal (飞航导弹), “introduces intelligence on relevant foreign flying missiles, and 

advances the rapid development of China’s flying missile industry.” 460 In 2015, the 310th RI also 

co-hosted a meeting for the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems of China, attended by 

commercial, defense industry, and military representatives. 461 In publications and events, the 

institute’s mission clearly is to distribute advances in foreign S&T research to relevant end-users.

Research and collection institutes such as the 310th RI regularly cite unmanned system 

“roadmaps” by the U.S. Department of Defense. These include the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Roadmap 2002-2027, Unmanned Aircraft System Roadmap 2005-2030, Unmanned System 

Roadmap 2007-2032, and Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038.

462 Such 

publications provide insights into U.S. plans, advances, and operations with unmanned systems.

This coverage of U.S. strategy and intent extends to contracts and programs for systems, such as 

UCAVs. As early as 2000, Chinese authors followed the U.S. Navy’s request for UCAV 

 

458 Ibid.

459 Ibid.

460

“飞航导弹” (Aerodynamic Missile Journal), Wanfang Data Periodical Profile, accessed May 11, 2016, 

http://c.wanfangdata.com.cn/PeriodicalProfile-fhdd.aspx.

461

“发展历程” [Process of Development], Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems of China 中国无人系统产

业联盟, accessed May 13, 2016, http://www.auvsc.com/?p=487.

462 Zhang Yilin 张翼麟, Zhang Shaofang 张绍芳, and Li Pengfei 李鹏飞, “2012 年世界军用无人机发展动向及评

述” [Trends and Commentary on Global Military UAVs in 2012], Aerodynamic Missile Journal 飞航导弹, no. 7 

(2013); Wen Suli 文苏丽, Zhang Dongqing 张冬青, and Jiang Qi 蒋琪, “美国军用无人机的作战使用” 

[Operations and Use of U.S. Military UAVs], Aerodynamic Missile Journal 飞航导弹, no. 11 (2009); and Zhang 

Yilin 张翼麟, Guo Chaobang 郭朝邦, and Guan Shiyi 关世义, “军事转型背景下的国外陆军飞航武器发展” 

[Foreign Army Flying Weapons Development in the Context of Military Transformation], Tactical Missile 

Technology 战术导弹技术, no. 4 (2013).
100

technologies, and the subsequent awards to Northrop Grumman and Boeing to develop relevant 

systems.463 Chinese authors also took note of relevant subcontractors. In 2005 an article noted the 

software firm that Boeing had selected for the real-time embedded operating system (RTOS) in its 

X-45C design.464 

As DARPA sponsored initial development of UCAVs from 2000 to 2006, Chinese researchers 

discussed the strategic and technical challenges of the necessary technologies. For example, 

authors at Northwest Polytechnical University (NWPU, which hosts the China’s largest UAV 

production and R&D base the Xi’an ASN Technology Group) discussed UCAV objectives and 

technologies such as navigating a path that accounts for different threats, and challenges of 

communication delays between UCAVs and ground control. 465 For China’s own UCAV 

development, authors from the Shenyang Aircraft Design Institute cite these DARPA models as 

evidence of China’s need for indigenous materials to build similar systems.466

Other Chinese researchers utilize publicly available images and data on U.S. programs, likely to 

advance their own research and to develop countermeasures. For UCAVs, Chinese researchers 

have modeled the X-47A prototype’s slot-shaped inlet,467 discussed the designs in context of 

decreased infrared signatures,468 and simulated configurations and drag effects of what appears to 

be the X-45A’s weapons bays.469 For the X-47B system that will enter deployment, in 2013 

researchers published “Analysis of X-47B UCAS and Electronic Counter Measures,” an 

assessment of the X-47B’s advantages and potential weak points for Chinese countermeasures.470

 

463 Liu Wensheng, “评析美军无人作战系统的发展” (Discussion and Analysis of the Development of U.S. 

Unmanned Combat Systems), Conmilit 现代军事, no. 12 (2000).

464 Shi Zhaofeng 时兆峰, “X-45C 联合无人作战飞行器将配备实时操作系统” (X-45C UCAS Will Be Outfitted 

with Real-Time Embedded Operating System), Aerodynamic Missile Journal 飞航导弹, vol. 3 (2005).

465 Gao Xiaoguang 高晓光 and Yang Youlong 杨有龙, “ 基于不同威胁体的无人作战飞机初始路径规划” (Initial 

Path Planning Based on Different Threats for Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles), Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica 

Sinica 航空学报, vol.24, no. 5 (2003), 435-438; and “无人作战飞机通信延时仿真” (Research on the Simulation of 

Communication Time Delay for Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles), Fire Control and Command Control 火力与

指挥控制, August 2005.

466 Representative articles include Chen Shaojie 陈绍杰, “Composite Materials and UAVs” [复合材料与无人飞机], 

Hi-tech Fiber & Application [高科技纤维与应用], (Issue 2, 2003); and Chen Shaojie 陈绍杰, “Brief Discussion of 

Shaping Technologies for Composite Structures” [浅谈复合材料整体成形技术], Aeronautical Manufacturing 

Technology [航空制造技术], no. 9 (2005). 

467 Zhang Hang 张航, Tan Huijun 谭慧俊, and Li Xiangping 李湘萍, “类 X-47 狭缝式进气道的流动特征与工作

性能” [Flow Structure and Performance Characteristics of X-47-like Slot-shaped Inlet], Acta Aeronautica et 

Astronautica Sinica 航空学报 (December 2009), 2243-2249.

468 Xu Xingguo 徐顶国, Sang Jianghua 桑建华, and Luo Mingdong 罗明东, “Research on Application of UAVS’ 

Infrared Stealth Technology” [红外隐身技术在无人机上的应用研究], Infrared and Laser Engineering 红外与激

光工程 (December 2012).

469 Feng Qiang 冯强 and Cui Xiaochun 崔晓春, “Study on Integrated Flow Control for Weapons Bay of Flying 

Wing Configuration Aircraft” [飞翼布局飞机弹舱综合流动控制技术研究], Acta Aeronautica et Astronautica 

Sinica 航空学报 (May 2012).

470 Wu Xiaofang 吴晓芳, Tian Zhongcheng 田中成, and Liang Jingxiu 梁景修, “X-47B 无人空战系统及其对抗途

径分析” (Analysis of X-47B UCAS and Electronic Counter Measures), Aerospace Electronic Warfare 航天电子对

抗, vol. 29, no. 5 (2013): 11-13.
101

Talent Acquisition

In order to boost Chinese indigenous R&D in critical technologies where China has not yet caught 

up to global leading standards, China actively recruits Chinese and foreign experts living abroad 

to work in China. This effort is organized and guided at the central government level, with active 

participation at lower levels. One of its leading programs is the Thousand Talents Program (千人

计划). Launched in December 2008, the Thousand Talents Program recruits individuals outside 

China to work in China’s major scientific development organizations, including key laboratories, 

companies, and research centers.471 The goal of this national strategic plan is a five to 10 year push 

to target the indigenous development of cutting-edge technologies and bring 2,000 innovative and 

high-level talented individuals to China to lead its enterprises, laboratories, and S&T parks.472

These recruits are experts in a range of fields, including medicine and biotechnology, energy and 

environment, economics, finance, and management, engineering and materials, chemical 

engineering, math and physics, information sciences, and high-technology industries.473 As of 

May 2014, the program had introduced ten rounds of recruits to China, totaling over 4,180 

individuals.474

There are several types of Thousand Talent recruits—long-term (长期), short-term (短期), foreign 

experts (外专), young scientists (青年), and entrepreneurs (创业).475 These separate programs 

have different requirements of education and experience, and offer different levels of incentives 

to conduct research in China. Experts receive start-up funding for research and entrepreneurship 

once they begin positions at Chinese institutions.

Thousand Talent recruits maintain their positions overseas as they join academic and research 

teams in China, and their recruitment often leads to collaborative scientific research and 

publication with researchers from Chinese and overseas institutions with which the Thousand 

Talent is affiliated. This is evident in the field of robotics research, and many of China’s top-level 

experts on robotics and related technologies are Thousand Talent professors at Chinese research 

institutes, laboratories, and centers with concurrent affiliations outside of China. In the case of 

robotics, many of these Thousand Talent recruits have educational and work experience outside of 

China in top-tier research institutions in Germany, Japan, and the United States.

Selected examples of Thousand Talent experts making major achievements in robotics in China 

include:

 

471

“千人计划介绍” [The Recruitment Program of Global Experts], accessed June 8, 2016, 

http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/section/2?m=rcrd#.

472 Hao Xin 郝炘, “中国:用高价从海外引进人才的做法引起极大不满” [China: The Method of Using High 

Prices to Attract Talent from Abroad Is Creating Discontent], Science, accessed June 8, 2016, 

http://www.sciencemagchina.cn/talentabroad.aspx.

473

“人物库” [Characters library], Thousand Talent Plan, accessed July 12, 2016,

http://www.1000plan.org/wiki/index.php?category.

474 “History and Background,” Thousand Talent Plan, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://www.1000plan.org/en/history.html.

475 Chinese Academy of Sciences Tianjin Institute of Industrial Biotechnology, “National Thousand Talents Program 

Recruitment,” accessed July 12, 2016, http://english.tib.cas.cn/ju/ju/; Thousand Talent Plan, “2016 年国家‘千人计

划’申报工作的通知” [2016 National “Thousand Talents” Declaration of Work Announcement], May 30, 2016, 

accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/65766; Thousand Talent Plan, “The Recruitment 

Program for Innovative Talents (Long Term),” accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.1000plan.org/en/.
102

 Nanomanipulation expert from Japan working at Beijing Institute of Technology476

 Nanorobotics scientist affiliated with State Key Laboratory of Robotics after working as a 

professor at Michigan State University477

 Two nanorobotics lead researchers concurrently professors at Georgia Institute of 

Technology and major Chinese universities478

 Intelligent robotics scientist from German Aerospace Center working at HIT Robotics 

Research Institute with establishment of joint laboratory479

 Robotics scientist with experience at Japanese University and construction corporation 

affiliated with Tianjin University, HIT, and CAS SIA480

Another notable talent recruitment program is Plan 111 (高等学校学科创新引智计划 / 111 计

划), jointly organized by the Ministry of Education and State Administration of Foreign Experts 

Affairs to attract leading experts.481 For example, HEU, a leading university for military-use UUVs 

discussed on page 67, has a National Plan 111 Innovation and Attracting Talent Base (国家“111”

创新引智基地).482 Under this program HEU hosts leading international experts in submersibles 

technologies.

Academic Exchanges and Professional Conferences 

Chinese research institutes and universities actively participate in and host international 

conferences on key technologies such as robotics and artificial intelligence. Although most of 

China’s participation is likely benign in nature, some attendees participate on behalf of Chinese 

defense firms and military research institutes. For example, CAAI, as discussed on page 80, is a 

leader in promoting academic exchange, publication, education, and research exhibition for the 

 

476 “[Lecture] Toshio Fukuda Professor Lecture,” [[讲座] Toshio Fukuda 教授讲座], Northwest Polytechnic 

University, accessed 9 June 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1007/14666.htm.

477 “University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, “Individual Introduction,” [个人简历], accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://people.ucas.ac.cn/~lianqingliu.

478 Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing Institute of Nanoenergy and Nanosystems, “王中林----中国科学院北京

纳米能源与系统研究所” [Wang Zhonglin—Chinese Academy of Sciences Beijing Institute of Nanoenergy and 

Nanosystems], accessed July 12, 2016, http://sourcedb.binn.cas.cn/zw/zjrck/yszj/201206/t20120608_3594969.html;

Georgia Tech School of Civil and Environmental Engineering “Faculty Profile,” accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://ce.gatech.edu/people/Faculty/1201/overview; Georgia Tech School of Civil & Environmental Engineering, 

“About Dr. Chen,” accessed July 12, 2016, http://nanotech-sustainability.ce.gatech.edu/about; “南开大学陈永胜教

授” [Nankai University Professor Chen Yongsheng], May 18, 2009, Polymer.cn 中国聚合物网, accessed July 12, 

2016, http://www.polymer.cn/scholar/scholar150.html; “天津留学服务中心” [Tianjin Study Abroad Service 

Center], Tianjin Comprehensive Service Center for Talents 天津市人才综合服务中心, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://www.tjlx.gov.cn/news/news.aspx?id=D496C280BDE91A56&lb=89F20989967E95DC8D26C800DAAC4EA.

479

‘千人计划’专家刘宏:让机器人拥有灵巧的“手” [“‘Thousand Talent Plan’ Expert Liu: Let's Have a Dexterous 

Robot ‘Hand’”], Recruitment Program of Global Experts, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/61037.

480 “‘Thousand Talent plan’ expert Ma Shu-gen: Tangshan Robotics Industry Flourishes,” [‘千人计划’专家马书根

”: 让唐山机器人产业枝繁叶茂], accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.1000plan.org/qrjh/article/64789; “English 

Home Page of Dr. Shugen MA,” accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/~shugen/ePage/shugenE.html.

481 Li Xiaohua, “China to Undergo Brain Gain through Plan 111,” China Internet Information Center 中国网, 

September 14, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/181075.htm.

482

“学院简价” [College Introduction], College of Shipbuilding Engineering, accessed July 8, 2016, 哈尔滨工程大

学船舶工程学院. .http://heusei.hrbeu.edu.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=2.
103

purpose of AI development in China.483 CAAI participants, however, include the former PLA 

GSD, National University of Defense Technology, and National Defense University. 484

Furthermore, CAAI’s leader is Li Deyi (李德毅), whom English-language sources describe as an 

academic and professor, but Chinese-language credentials openly state is a major general in the 

PLA. Author biographies in Li’s own co-authored English-language textbooks as well as profiles 

on conference websites describe Li as a professor at Tsinghua University in China, a member of 

the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and a member of the Euro-Asia International Academy of 

Science.485 Chinese-language sources, however, include the fact that Li is a major general (少将

军衔), and deputy director, researcher, and doctoral advisor at the 61st Research Institute of the 

former GSD (总参第六十一研究所), a PLA research organization.486 Li has worked on national 

defense electronics key engineering development projects, is deputy director of the All-Army 

Informatization Work Office (全军信息化工作办公室), and has been a member of the former 

General Armament Department’s Science and Technology Committee (总装备部科技委).487

Li’s military affiliation is an example of the tight relationship the Chinese AI academic and 

commercial community has with the PLA. Important for U.S. interests, however, is that individuals 

such as Li do not disclose their military affiliations in English materials. If military researchers 

obfuscate their military credentials and affiliations, they may gain access to events, conferences, 

publications, and above all knowledge sources that might otherwise be denied.

 

483

“中国人工智能学会简介” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Introduction], Chinese Association 

for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/index/id/2.html.

484

“中国人工智能学会第七届理事会负责人名单” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Seventh Board 

Member Leadership Name List], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 

9, 2016, http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/85.html; “中国人工智能学会 2016 副秘书长名单

” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 2016 Vice-Secretary Name List], Chinese Association for 

Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/114.html; “公司概况” [Company Summary], Horizon 

Robotics, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.horizon-robotics.com/company_cn.html.

485 Li Deren, Li Deiyi, and Wang Shuliang, Spatial Data Mining: Theory and Application, Springer-Verlag Berlin 

Heidelberg (2015): xxvi; Li Deyi and Du Yi, Artificial Intelligence with Uncertainty, Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2008; 

“Plenary Speech,” 3rd CIS & RAM on Cybernetics and Intelligent Systems Robotics, Automation, and 

Mechatronics, an IEEE conference, September 21-24, 2008, accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.cisram.org/2008/ple-spe.html. 

486

“中国人工智能学会第七届理事会全体理事名单” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Seventh

Board Member Full Board Name List], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed 

June 9, 2016, http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/detail/id/16.html; “学会领导: 李德毅” [Association

Leader: Li Deyi], Chinese Institute of Command and Control 中国指挥与控制学会, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://www.c2.org.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=21&id=87.

487 Ibid; “专家介绍——李德毅” [Expert Introduction—Li Deyi], Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence 中

国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016, http://caai.cn/contents/108/1711.html.
104

Formal Technology Acquisition and Investments

Chinese state-owned conglomerates, companies, and venture capital (VC) firms are actively 

acquiring or investing in foreign AI and robotics companies. According to one U.S. financial 

advisory firm, Chinese investors are “poised to target artificial intelligence deals in [the] U.S.,”488

and a recent Chinese investment in a U.S. AI firm illustrates some of these risks. Robotics is the 

latest trend of major Chinese investments in high-tech European companies. After China’s Five 

Year Plan in 2011, “Chinese firms are following an edict to acquire advanced technology and highquality brands from abroad that the government laid down.” From 2010 to 2014 Chinese 

investment and acquisition deals in Europe rose nine-fold from USD 2 billion to USD 18 billion.489

While China’s AI investments are more recent, its robotics investments trend are accelerating, as 

there has been a drastic increase of Chinese companies and VC firms trying to acquire or invest in 

European robotics companies. A benign explanation is that Chinese companies are investing 

capital abroad to acquire good investments. With Made in China 2025 and other state plans 

emphasizing robotics, these investments appear more targeted. One analysis characterizes the 

plans as a “shopping list” for foreign investment targets that could help China acquire key 

technologies and licenses to improve its own industries.490

Recent AI and robotics deals since 2015 include the following:

Haiyin Capital

In June 2016, Haiyin Capital invested $1.2 million in Neurala, a maker of AI software that will 

soon be integrated into UAVs, self-driving cars, and toys.491 The software is capable of navigation 

as well as identifying, classifying, tracking, and avoiding obstacles. This software could benefit 

military end-users as the AI software in military UAVs must accomplish all these functions. As of 

2014 Neurala has contracts with NASA and the U.S. Air Force to develop smart learning systems, 

which may support collision avoidance systems for UAVs and autonomous navigation systems for 

robots on Mars.

492 In October 2015 NASA awarded Neurala a $250,000 grant to commercialize 

autonomous navigation, object recognition, and obstacle avoidance technology in UGVs and 

UAVs.

493 Chinese investment in Neurala potentially poses at least two risks for the United States. 

 

488 “Chinese Investors Poised to Target Artificial Intelligence Deals in U.S.,” blog post by Vasari Capital, January 

30, 2016, accessed September 6, 2016, http://www.vasaricapital.com/chinese-investors-poised-to-target-artificialintelligence-deals-in-u-s/.

489 “Chinese Firms in Europe: Gone Shopping,” The Economist, March 28, 2015, accessed May 1, 2016, 

http://www.economist.com/news/business/21647331-more-european-businesses-are-coming-under-chineseownership-gone-shopping?fsrc=rss.

490 Sebastian Heilmann, “Europe Needs Tougher Response to China’s State Led Investments,” post at Financial 

Times, June 9, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2016/06/09/europe-needs-tougherresponse-to-chinas-state-led-investments/.

491 Sara Castallanos, “Chinese Investors Bet on Boston AI Tech for Drones, Toys, Self-Driving Cars,” Boston 

Business Journal, June 2, 2016, accessed September 6, 2016,

http://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/startups/2016/06/chinese-investors-bet-on-boston-ai-tech-for-drones.html.

492 Dennis Keohane, “Tim Draper Backs Boston Robot Software Company Neurala,” The Boston Globe, December 

10, 2014, accessed September 6, 2016, http://www.betaboston.com/news/2014/12/10/tim-draper-backs-bostonrobot-software-company-neurala/.

493 “Neurala Receives $250,000 NASA Grant to Bring Autonomous Software to Self-Driving Cars, Home Robots 

and Drones,” Neurala press release, October 23, 2015, accessed September 6, 2016, http://www.neurala.com/nasaphase-iie/.
105

One is that Chinese access to source code and underlying technologies behind Neurala systems 

could benefit PLA end-users. Another is that it is unclear if China’s access to Neurala will prevent 

U.S. end-users from taking advantage of the company’s technology, effectively wasting the 

original U.S. seed capital.

AGIC Capital

In 2015 Henry Cai, who is regarded as the “godfather of the China capital markets,” cofounded 

Asia-Germany Industrial Promotion Capital (AGIC). The purpose of this private equity firm is to 

invest in European companies and facilitate greater sales to China of advanced technologies 

including robotics, high-end systems and components, and advanced materials and 

technologies.494 In June 2016 Cai and other Chinese financial leaders said that with economic 

globalization and the internationalization of industries, the attractiveness of foreign assets to 

Chinese industries is increasing daily, and that Chinese companies should conduct foreign 

acquisitions. Such acquisitions would allow firms to expand markets, acquire resources, and 

introduce foreign technology. 495

In June 2016 AGIC announced it would acquire a majority stake in Gimatic, a leading Italian 

supplier of end-of-arm tools for industrial automation and robotic applications.496 The deal is 

reported to be worth USD 113 million. 497 These tools are ideal for industrial robots in the 

automotive, plastics, electronics, food, and pharmaceuticals industries, among others. 

Before this acquisition, in January 2016 AGIC partnered with China National Chemical Corp. and 

Guoxin International Investment Corp. to acquire KraussMaffei Group for USD 1.045 billion, 

which to date is the largest investment by a Chinese company in a German one.498 KrausMaffei is 

a leading producer of linear, industrial, and side-removal robots.499

Midea Group

In February 2016, Midea Group, a major Chinese producer of home appliances, began increasing 

its shares in the leading German robot manufacturer Kuka AG, and by July 7th held a majority 

stake in the company.500 KUKA has been a leading supplier of industrial robotics for Chinese 

companies for a long time.501 According to one analysis, this acquisition raises questions on 

 

494 “About Us,” AGIC, accessed July 6, 2016, http://www.agic-group.com/about-us/; “EY Strategic Growth Forum 

China Speakers,” Ernst & Young Global Limited, accessed July 6, 2016,

https://webforms.ey.com/CN/en/Services/Strategic-Growth-Markets/EY-strategic-growth-forum-china-2016-

speaker-henry-cai.

495 Lin Jianwei 林建伟, Zheng Qize 郑淇泽, and Zhang Chaoyan 张朝妍, “湖北举办企业国际并购培训会 为企业

“走出去”建言献策” [Hubei Hosts an International Business Merger and Acquisition Training Session; Provides 

Suggestions for Industries “Going Abroad”], Hubei Daily 湖北日报, June 28, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, 

http://www.tcgyxx.gov.cn/Details.aspx?topicid=1095.

496 “AGIC Capital Announces Acquisition of Gimatic Srl,” press release by AGIC, June 13, 2016, accessed July 6, 

2016, http://www.agic-group.com/agic-capital-announces-acquisition-of-gimatic-srl/.

497 Eugene Demaitre, “China Continues to Invest in European Industrial Automation,” Robotics Business Review, 

June 13, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, https://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/china-continues-invest-europeanindustrial-automation/.

498 Ibid

499 Ibid.

500 “Midea, Kuka and the Rise of China’s Robots,” The Economist, July 12, 2016.

501 Cai and Guo, “Development and Basic Problems of China’s Industrial Robotics Development,” 10-11.
106

technology transfers, because KUKA is a supplier for the European defense industry, including 

robots used in the construction of the Eurofighter. 502 Leading German officials, including 

Chancellor Angela Merkel herself, were skeptical or opposed the deal, arguing that KUKA should 

remain an independently German brand, and that China must “level the playing field” for foreign 

investors in China. 503 The deal could draw scrutiny from the U.S. Committee on Foreign 

Investment (CFIUS), because KUKA has subsidiaries and customers in the United States, 

including defense company Northrop Grumman Corp.504 To date, however, it does not appear that 

CFIUS has reviewed or commented on Midea Group’s acquisition of KUKA.

Other Recent Acquisitions and Investments

Since 2015 Chinese companies and venture capital firms acquired or invested in other robotics 

ventures in the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, including the following:

 In 2015 the Beijing-based company Ninebot acquired its U.S. rival Segway after securing 

USD 80 million in funding from investors including Xiaomi, Sequoia Capital, and Shunwei 

Foundation.505

 In 2015 Cybernaut Investment Group, one of China’s largest VCs, announced a strategic 

partnership with the Skolkovo Foundation in Moscow. Cybernaut will invest USD 200 

million to develop IT, space, telecommunication, and robotic products that can be 

manufactured and marketed in China.506

 In 2015 Zhuzhou CSR Times Electric, a subsidiary of state-owned conglomerate China 

South Rail, acquired the UK-based SMD. SMD is a provider of underwater ROVs and 

ROV systems, tractors, and trenchers for laying cable, sub-sea mining and oil and gas 

operations.507

 

502 Sebastian Heilmann, “Europe Needs Tougher Response to China’s State Led Investments,” post at Financial 

Times, June 9, 2016, accessed July 1, 2016, http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2016/06/09/europe-needs-tougherresponse-to-chinas-state-led-investments/.

503 Arne Delfs and Patrick Donahue, “Merkel Confronts China Ambitions in Clash Over Robot Maker Kuka,” 

Bloomberg Technology, June 10, 2016, accessed August 29, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-

06-10/merkel-confronts-china-ambitions-in-clash-over-robot-maker-kuka; and Amie Tsang, “Midea of China Moves 

a Step Closer to Takeover of Kuka of Germany,” The New York Times, July 4, 2016.

504 Kane Wu, Eyk Henning, and Christopher Alessi, “China’s Midea Offers $5 Billion for German Robot Maker 

Kuka,” The Wallstreet Journal, May 18, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-mideagroup-announces-bid-for-germanys-kuka-1463556160.

505 Catherine Shu, “Beijing-based Ninebot Acquires Segway, Raises $80M From Xiaomi And Sequoia,” 

Techcrunch, April 15, 2015, accessed July 6, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2015/04/15/ninebot-segways-into-thefuture/.

506 Frank Tobe, “Chinese Shopping for Global Robotics Venture,” The Robot Report, April 26, 2015, accessed July 

6, 2016, https://www.therobotreport.com/news/chinese-acquiring-us-and-russian-robotics-related-technologies.

507 Ibid.
107

Chapter Seven: Implications and Recommendations for the United 

States

China’s advances in industrial, service, and military robotics, as well as artificial intelligence and 

nanorobotics present opportunities and challenges for U.S. stakeholders. This section lays out the 

implications of China’s advancements in these sectors for the United States, including areas of 

opportunity such as cooperation or investments, and challenges to economic and security interests. 

These recommendations can help ensure that the United States enjoys the benefits of China’s 

surging robotics industries while safeguarding its own economic growth and national security. 

Recommendation 1: The U.S. Government should promote advanced manufacturing and 

robotics technologies by implementing the recommendations of the AMP2.0 Steering 

Committee Report and by supporting initiatives and expansion of the National Network for 

Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI).

China’s Made in China 2025 and recent plans for industrial robotics are the most ambitious to date, 

and will likely sustain growth in this sector. These programs reflect Chinese economic and political 

leaders’ strong desire to move up the value chain, relying on robotics investments as a means to 

increase productivity, quality, and cost-effectiveness. Rising Chinese labor costs make this 

transition increasingly necessary. Simply put, China is determined to become an advanced 

manufacturing power, with implications for how and in what sectors it will be more competitive 

vis-à-vis U.S. producers.

The long-term challenge for the United States will be maintaining its manufacturing advantages, 

particularly in high-end manufacturing. The United States has been the leading producer of 

manufactured goods for over a century, but in the next five to ten years, advances in China’s 

manufacturing sector could erode long-held advantages. Chinese leaders and policies are 

launching some of China’s most ambitious programs to date to improve high-end manufacturing, 

largely through the adoption and production of industrial robotics. Future increases in precision, 

quality control, and efficiency, when combined with relatively cheap labor, could make Chinese 

high-end products more competitive with their U.S. counterparts.

The United States is already heading in the right direction with the Advanced Manufacturing 

Partnership (AMP), a national effort to bring together industry, universities, and the federal 

government to invest in emerging technologies. Some analysts consider AMP and European 

manufacturing initiatives as inspirations for China’s Made in China 2025 plan. The first AMP 

report in 2012 set three pillars for the United States to expand advanced manufacturing: (1) enable 

innovation, (2) secure the talent pipeline, and (3) improve the business climate. A second report

from the AMP2.0 Steering Committee lays out detailed proposals for increasing coordination 

among U.S. Government, industry, and universities to secure and establish strategic advantages. 

Ranging from education and certifications for workers to coordinated plans and investment 

strategies, these plans if implemented could help ensure success for U.S. manufacturing. 508

 

508 Executive Office of the President, Accelerating U.S. Advanced Manufacturing, prepared by the Steering 

Committee of the Advanced Manufacturing Partnership 2.0 (AMP2.0) and adopted by the President’s Council of 

Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 

October 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/amp20_report_final.pdf
108

Building off these recommendations, the Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) brings 

together industry, academia, and government partners to achieve these goals.509 These initiatives 

and legislation such as the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act (signed into 

law on December 16, 2014) can help ensure that U.S. manufacturing maintains its technological 

edge and that U.S. workers have the tools needed to remain the most productive in the world.510

Recommendation 2: U.S. defense planners should monitor and account for Chinese advances 

in unmanned systems and electronic countermeasures that may improve anti-access/area 

denial (A2/AD) capabilities such as long-range precision strike and anti-submarine warfare.

Chinese advances in military robotics, unmanned systems, and electronic countermeasures may 

improve its air and naval capabilities, and in turn A2/AD capabilities such as long-range precision 

strike and anti-submarine warfare. China’s research and deployment of unmanned systems in all 

domains can accomplish a variety of missions, but the bulk of these applications affect the United 

States, such as:

 If Chinese unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can facilitate guidance and navigation of antiship ballistic missiles and if China’s unmanned combat aerial vehicles become capable

platforms, these systems can hold U.S. assets at risk at greater distances. 

 As the United States implements the Third Offset strategy and deploys increasing numbers 

of unmanned systems, China’s increasing electronic warfare and countermeasure 

capabilities warrant concern. 

 In the future, Chinese advances in unmanned undersea vehicles and autonomous 

underwater vehicles, in combination with plans to increase undersea monitoring and 

improve anti-submarine warfare capabilities, may erode the U.S. Navy’s long-held 

advantages in undersea warfare.

Recommendation 3: The U.S. Government should conduct an interagency review with 

economic, scientific, and regional experts to assess U.S.-China cooperation and bilateral 

investments in artificial intelligence (AI) to ensure that such arrangements do not put the 

United States at a disadvantage in AI research, breakthroughs, and applications.

The Baidu Silicon Valley AI Laboratory in California and the Dell-Chinese Academy of Sciences 

(CAS) joint Artificial Intelligence and Advanced Computing Joint Laboratory in China are unique 

initiatives that can benefit AI applications and research worldwide. One concern, however, is 

whether the Chinese government and military have an advantage in benefiting from this research. 

Baidu and CAS are China’s national champions for AI research, and it is difficult to imagine a 

scenario in which either entity refuses government or military requests for assistance or 

information on breakthroughs. In contrast, private U.S. companies in Silicon Valley such as 

Google or Apple may refuse to do business with the U.S. Government for reputational or financial 

 

509 Advanced Manufacturing National Program Office, “National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI),”

accessed August 29, 2016, https://www.manufacturing.gov/nnmi/.

510 Ibid.
109

considerations. 511 Financially, U.S. technology companies worry that compliance and 

procurement procedures with U.S. Government customers are too complicated and expensive.

512

These differing relationships between industry and military in the United States and China could 

lead to an asymmetry in national-level implementation of AI research. The key question is whether 

the Chinese government and military hold a distinct advantage in gaining access to AI 

breakthroughs compared to their U.S. counterparts. The Chinese government and military hold

tremendous sway over CAS and Baidu, and can influence research agendas, take advantage of 

breakthroughs, or demand access to technologies and source code.513 Commercial entities in the 

United States, on the other hand, can refuse such requests. This possibility warrants attention from

policymakers as AI research, application, and commercialization advance around the world.

Recommendation 4: The U.S. Government should increase awareness among federal 

agencies, defense contractors, and research universities that Chinese research institutes 

actively collect their published materials, designs, specifications, and graphics to assess U.S. 

military systems and guide Chinese research.

China leverages a vast open source collection apparatus to study science and technology (S&T)

developments abroad and synthesize that information for domestic programs. U.S. Government 

agencies (such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), defense contractors, and 

research universities should increase awareness among their employees that Chinese research 

institutes actively collect and utilize their published materials, designs, specifications, and 

graphics. For entities engaged in unmanned systems and other research, abiding by U.S. 

classification guides and self-restraint in publishing are critical for keeping sensitive information 

out of China’s defense research and development (R&D) complex. Regarding enforcement of such 

guidelines, any U.S. Government groups funding or supporting research into unmanned systems 

and robotics could consider more detailed guidelines on publications, rules on participation in 

conferences (especially those involving international travel), and penalties for violations such as

the cancellation of funding.

 

511 Andrew Griffin, “Google joins Apple in refusing to hack into phones to give US government access to terrorist’s 

messages” Independent, February 18, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgetsand-tech/news/google-joins-apple-in-refusing-to-hack-into-phones-to-give-us-government-access-to-terrorist-sa6880926.html; Matt Apuzzo, David E. Sanger, and Michael S. Schmidt, “Apple and Other Tech Companies Tangle 

with U.S. Over Data Access,” New York Times, September 7, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/08/us/politics/apple-and-other-tech-companies-tangle-with-us-over-access-todata.html?_r=0.

512 Jon Harper, “Acquisition Process Undermining Silicon Valley Outreach Efforts,” National Defense Magazine, 

June 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2016/June/Pages/AcquisitionProcessUnderminingSiliconValleyOu

treachEfforts.aspx; Sandra I. Erwin, “SecDef, Industry CEOs Exchange Views on Innovation, Acquisition 

Reforms,” National Defense Magazine, March 29, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=7c996cd7-cbb4-4018-baf8-

8825eada7aa2&ID=2141.

513 For a discussion of the PRC government’s influence on Baidu, see Brad Stone, “How Baidu Won China,” Reuters, 

November 11, 2010, accessed September 30, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-11-11/how-baiduwon-china.
110

Recommendation 5: The U.S. Government should fully implement the Cybersecurity 

National Action Plan (CNAP) and incorporate input from companies and research institutes 

that develop unmanned systems, robots, and their relevant technologies.

According to news media, China’s cyber espionage has already compromised leading U.S. and 

foreign defense companies, including those engaged in robotics and unmanned systems. When 

Chinese cyber actors fail to infiltrate leading U.S. defense contractors, they often shift tactics 

downstream to smaller suppliers and supporting contractors. Initiatives to share data on intrusions, 

reviews of best practices, and timely updates to identified vulnerabilities can help mitigate these 

risks. The Obama Administration’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan (CNAP) incorporates 

lessons from cybersecurity trends, threats, and intrusions, and proposes actions to improve 

cybersecurity across the Federal Government, private sector, and individuals. 514 The U.S. 

Government should fully implement CNAP’s recommendations and incorporate input, feedback, 

and participation of companies, research institutes, and universities engaged in robotics and 

unmanned systems research.

Recommendation 6: To help counter Chinese espionage against unmanned systems and 

other sensitive technologies, the U.S. Government should better exploit China’s state plans, 

procurement practices, defense plans, and other Chinese language materials. Such sources 

identify technologies that the Chinese government is seeking to acquire and would provide 

advance warning to U.S. law enforcement.

China is actively seeking technologies it has trouble developing domestically, and targets U.S. 

companies and technological advantages in areas such as UAVs and unmanned undersea vehicles. 

The targets for such conspiracies often appear in Chinese state plans and academic publications in 

advance of acquisition efforts. State plans can read “like a shopping list” of foreign technologies 

China needs to acquire for specific industries, and Chinese publications are candid about what 

materials and technologies are lacking. Analysis of these plans, as well as procurement, defense,

and other Chinese language materials may provide early warnings to U.S. law enforcement and 

industries that may be targets of espionage or conspiracies to commit export violations. The U.S. 

Government should invest in analysis of these plans, practices, and documents, and educate U.S. 

law enforcement agencies and supporting personnel to help prevent and prosecute Chinese 

espionage cases.

Recommendation 7: To address informal technology transfers, U.S. Government sponsors 

of academic exchanges and research in emerging technologies should consider requirements 

to more thoroughly vet foreign participants for military or other undisclosed defense 

affiliations.

Informal technology transfer from the United States to China is pervasive and may erode U.S. 

advantages in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. U.S. policy may not be able to 

address some of these tactics, such as generous funding and grants from the Chinese government 

for leading international experts to work at Chinese institutions. The U.S. Government can and 

 

514 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “FACTSHEET: Cybersecurity National Action Plan,” February 

9, 2016, accessed August 30, 2016, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/fact-sheetcybersecurity-national-action-plan.
111

should, however, insist on adequate vetting of foreign participants in federally-funded research 

and academic exchanges. 

To be clear, the problem here is not Chinese participation in international conferences or academic 

exchanges, as both the United States and China benefit greatly from these interactions. Rather, the 

concern lies in the participation of Chinese military officers and other personnel who do not openly 

declare their military affiliations. As reported earlier, one of China’s leaders in the field of artificial 

intelligence openly displays both his military rank and civilian credentials in Chinese-language 

media, but lists only his civilian affiliations in English-language publications. Federal funding for 

research in emerging, sensitive, or dual-use technologies should mandate more thorough vetting 

of participants to ensure that China’s military R&D infrastructure does not benefit from leading 

experts in emerging technologies to the detriment and at the expense of the United States.

Recommendation 8: The U.S. Government, in particular the Committee on Foreign 

Investment in the United States (CFIUS), should monitor and when necessary investigate 

China’s growing foreign investments in robotics and AI companies, and consider the security 

implications of transactions and acquisitions involving emerging technologies such as AI and 

nanorobotics. 

As China increases its foreign investments in robotics and emerging technologies, the U.S. 

Government, in particular CFIUS, should monitor these trends and consider their security 

implications. Chinese companies will likely continue to invest in and acquire leading European 

robotics companies whose products are necessary to U.S. industries, including defense companies. 

CFIUS should consider the implications of these changes of ownership for the U.S. defense 

manufacturing base, and identify any areas, systems, or other capabilities that these changes may 

compromise. China is also “poised to target” AI companies in the United States, as seen in the 

recent investment in Neurala. CFIUS should ensure that its review processes account for new and 

emerging technologies, and consider reviewing this transaction. Other U.S. Government 

authorities and outside experts may provide detailed lists of technologies with security 

implications, as well as those targeted for acquisition by Chinese end-users. This review process 

will help ensure that foreign countries do not gain access to game-changing technologies at the 

expense of the United States.
112

Appendix I: Leading Industrial and Service Robotics Manufacturers, 

Research Institutes, and Professional Associations in China

Org. Name (EN/CN) Summary

Companies

Siasun

沈阳新松机器人自动

化股份有限公司

 Siasun is China’s largest robot maker by market value and states 

that the company is expanding its facilities to accommodate 

growing domestic demand.515

 Siasun’s robot product lines include industrial robots, mobile 

robots, cleaning robots, specialty robots, and service robots, and the 

company offers a total of more than 80 types of robot products.516

 Siasun is a chair member organization for the China Robot Industry 

Alliance (中国机器人产业联盟) as well as a chair member 

organization for the China Robot Innovation Alliance (中国机器人

创新联盟).517

Harbin Boshi 

Automation

哈尔滨博实自动化设

备有限责任公司

 Harbin Boshi Automation’s products are used in petroleum, chemical, fertilizer, 

salt chemical engineering, coal chemical engineering, and metallurgical 

industries, port logistics, precise chemical engineering, food product, and animal 

feed product industries. 518

 Harbin Boshi Automation is a major provider of Chinese-made equipment for 

the Chinese oil industry. It is a tier-one supplier enterprise to Sinopec, and 

exports equipment to international oil companies.519

 Boshi’s products have been sold within China as well as internationally to 

customers in more than 10 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa. 520

Shanghai Mechanical 

and Electrical 

Industry Company

上海机电一体化工程

公司

 Shanghai Mechanical and Electrical Industry Company is a leading Chinese 

machine equipment manufacturing enterprise and a market listed company.521

 It is an important subsidiary of Shanghai Electrical Group Company, a stateowned, Hong Kong- and Shanghai-listed company that is one of China’s largest 

electrical equipment manufacturing groups.522

 Its main business areas are elevator manufacturing, refrigeration equipment 

manufacturing, printing and packaging machinery manufacturing, welding 

equipment and materials manufacturing, artificial board-making machinery 

manufacturing, artificial board materials manufacturing, and engineering 

machinery manufacturing.523

 

515 “China’s Siasun Expands To Seize More Of The Domestic Market,” Robotics Business Review, October 8, 2012, 

accessed May 26, 2016, 

http://www.roboticsbusinessreview.com/article/chinas_siasun_expands_to_seize_more_of_the_domestic_market.

516

"企业介绍" [Company Introduction], Siasun 新松, accessed May 10, 2016,

http://www.siasun.com/about/Introduction.html.

517 Ibid.

518 Boshi 博实, accessed May 11, 2016, http://www.boshi.cn/.

519 Ibid.

520

“博实:机器人及智能装备“排头兵” [Boshi: Robots and Intelligent Equipment "Frontline Troops"], Boshi 博实

, accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.boshi.cn/News_More.aspx?ID=1514.

521

“上海机电股份有限公司” [Shanghai Mechanical and Electrical Industry Company], Baidu Baike 百度百科, 

accessed May 12, 2016, http://baike.baidu.com/view/1969738.htm.

522 Ibid.

523 Ibid.
113

FA Company

上海富安工厂自动化

公司

 FA Company was established in 1996 as a subsidiary of Shanghai Electric 

Group’s subsidiary Shanghai Machine Tool Works, making it a state-owned 

enterprise.524

 The company provides manufacturing automation control equipment and 

maintenance services for a variety of industries including automotive, molds, 

precision devices, printing machinery, medical machinery, textile machinery, 

motorcycle, bicycle, household appliances. Among these industries, the 

company’s main target customers are producers of cars, appliances, and 

precision devices. 525

 FA Company’s main products and services include digitally-controlled machine 

tools, digitally-controlled milling tools, digitally-controlled machining centers, 

digitally-controlled machine tool training equipment, digitally-controlled 

milling tools, digitally-controlled chip scribes, and digitally-controlled special 

devices. 526

 FA’s production and manufacturing enterprise customers include: SAIC General 

Motors Co., Ltd., Shanghai Lunfude Auto Parts Company, Shanghai Hino 

Engine Co., Ltd., Shanghai Diesel Engine Company, Shanghai Huida 

Manufacturing Co., Delphi Shanghai Dynamics and Propulsion Systems Co., 

Ltd., Shanghai SAIC—Metzeler Sealing Systems Co., Ltd., Shanghai Jiao Yun 

Group. 527

Harbin Welding 

Institute

哈尔滨焊接研究所

 Harbin Welding Institute was founded in 1956 and was originally subordinate 

to the former Ministry of Machine Building. 528

 It operates as a comprehensive welding technology national scientific research 

institute and became a science and technology enterprise during reforms 

implemented in 1999. 529

 HWI is currently operated as a state-owned enterprise under the State-owned 

Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the Chinese State 

Council (SASAC).

530

Beijing Research 

Institute of 

Machinery and 

Electronic 

Technology

北京机电研究所

 The Beijing Research Institute of Machinery and Electronic Technology was 

established in 1956.531

 It is subordinate to the China Academy of Machinery Science and Technology 

(机械科学研究总院), a major technology group corporation under SASAC.532

 It is a leading organization within China in the fields of metal forging, thermal 

processing, and die and mold technology development and technology 

transfer.533

 It is recognized as a National High Technology Enterprise, National Torch 

Program Key Technology Enterprise, Beijing Patent Model Unit, and 

Zhongguancun Open Laboratory. 534

Shougang Motoman 

Robot Co. Ltd.

 Shougang Motoman Robot Co., Ltd. is a joint venture between 

China-based Shougang Group (中国首钢(集团)总公司), Japan-

 

524

“上海富安工厂自动化有限公司” [Shanghai Fu’an Factory Automation Co.], HC360 慧聪, accessed May 12, 

2016, http://shanghaifuan.b2b.hc360.com/shop/show.html#.

525 Ibid.

526 Ibid.

527 Ibid.

528 “HWI Profile” Harbin Welding Institute, accessed May 12, 2016, http://en.hwi.com.cn/CorporateProfile.html.

529 Ibid.

530 Ibid.

531

“企业简介” [Company Introduction], Beijing Research Institute of Mechanical & Electrical Technology 北京机

电研究所, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.brimet.ac.cn/CN/about.aspx?nid=13.

532 Ibid.

533 Ibid.

534 Ibid.
114

首钢莫托曼公司 based Yaskawa, and Japan-based Iwatani Co. (岩谷产业株式会

社), set up in Beijing’s Economic and Technology Development 

Zone as China’s first company specializing in producing robot 

products.535

 It has USD 7 million in registered capital and is currently one of 

China’s largest and most advanced robot production enterprises, 

capable of manufacturing 800 robots and systems annually. 536

 Shougang Motoman mainly engages in technology development, 

production, and sales of robots, robotic workstations, and largescale robotic automated systems for welding, assembly, painting, 

handling, cutting and grinding operations used in the automotive, 

motorcycle, engineering machinery, chemical engineering, home 

appliance, and construction industries. It also provides peripheral 

equipment and components and technology services for its 

customers. 537

Beijing Yaskawa Bei 

Ke Automation 

Engineering (BK 

Masic)

安川北科公司/北京

北科麦思科自动化工

程技术有限公司

 Beijing-based BK Masic was set up in 1994 as Japanese robotics 

manufacturer Yaskawa’s first authorized sales agent.538

 It is overseen by the Beijing University of Science and 

Technology’s school industry group and engages in automated 

control product development, manufacturing, integration, and 

sales.539

 Many of the products sold by BK Masic are from its Japanese 

partner Yaskawa, including Yaskawa frequency converters (or 

frequency changers), Yaskawa servo motors, Yaskawa motion 

control systems, and a variety of other Yaskawa components related 

to frequency converters.540

Professional and Research Associations

China Robot 

Industry Alliance

中国机器人产业联盟

 The China Robot Industry Alliance (CRIA) is a non-profit, national 

industry association for China’s robotics industry, including 

educational and research institutions as members as well as robotics 

users and other interested parties.541

 CRIA seeks to expand the application of robotics technology in all 

fields, and to improve national robotics industry chains. It 

endeavors to promote the development of China’s robotics industry 

and enhance its competitiveness. 542

 The Alliance’s main objective is to carry out national industrial 

policy, promote the exchange of its members in terms of 

technology, markets, and intellectual property, encourage 

partnerships between research, industry, and academia, promote 

 

535 “Shougang Motoman Robot Co. Ltd.” [首钢莫托曼机器人有限公司], accessed May 16, 2016, 

http://etc.gdut.edu.cn/source/amt/PART3/sg-motoman/.

536 Ibid.

537 Ibid.

538

“公司简介” [Company Introduction], BK MASIC, accessed May 16, 2016, 

http://www.bkmasic.com/page/html/index.php.

539 Ibid.

540 Ibid.

541 Ibid.

542

“联盟简介” [Alliance Introduction], China Robot Industry Alliance 中国机器人产业联盟, accessed May 23, 

2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/gylm.asp.
115

industry self-governance, and coordinate to avoid overlap within 

the industry.543

China Robot 

Industry Innovation 

Alliance

中国机器人产业创新

联盟

 The China Robot Industry Innovation Alliance was established in 

Beijing on March 16, 2013 by a consortium of over 40 robotics 

enterprises and research organizations.544

 Shenyang Siasun (沈阳新松机器人自动化股份公司) serves as 

president of the organization and the National Robot Engineering 

Center (机器人国家工程中心) is deputy director.545

 Zhang Meiying, vice chairman of the Eleventh National People’s 

Political Consultative Committee, gave a speech at the 

organization’s commencement and Li Yizhong, director of the 

Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), also gave 

an address.546

 

543

“联盟简介” [Alliance Introduction], China Robot Industry Alliance 中国机器人产业联盟, accessed May 23, 

2016, http://cria.mei.net.cn/gylm.asp.

544

“中国机器人产业创新联盟” [China Robot Industry Innovation Alliance], Baidu Encyclopedia 百度百科, 

accessed June 6, 2016, http://baike.baidu.com/view/10299596.htm.

545 Ibid.

546 Ibid.
116

Appendix II: Leading Chinese Research Institutes and Producers of 

Military Robotics and Unmanned Systems 

Org. Name (EN/CN) Summary

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)

Northwest 

Polytechnic 

University 

西北工业大学

 Northwest Polytechnic University (NWPU) is a leading technical 

university that conducted China’s first research into UAVs in the 

1950s.547

 Currently, NWPU’s 365th Research Institute (西北工业大学第

365 研究所), also known by its commercial name Xi’an ASN 

Technology Group (西安爱生技术集团公司), is one of China’s 

leading UAV design and manufacturing entities.548 The NWPU 

365th RI’s work includes design optimization, system integration 

and controls, takeoff and landing, and comprehensive performance 

tests.549

 It is reported to be China’s largest UAV production company and 

R&D base, and designed three of the UAVs featured in China’s 

60th National Day Military Parade.550

 The RI hosts the Key Laboratory of UAV Special Technology (无

人机特种技术重点实验室), as well as a provincial level 

laboratory dedicated to advanced air layout and controls aviation 

technologies.551

Beihang University 

北京航空航天大学

 Beihang University (formerly the Beijing University of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics/BUAA) is the PRC’s first university dedicated to 

air and space, and is directly under MIIT.552

 In 1959 it tested China’s first UAV, and in 1962 established the 

UAV Institute (无人机所 / 无人驾驶飞行器设计研究所), China’s 

first UAV R&D center.553

 

547 Li Caixiang 李彩香, Liu Yinzhong 刘银中, “探访西北工业大学无人机事业发展之路” [Looking at 

Northwestern Polytechnical University's UAV Development Road], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西北工

业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1091/6411.htm.

548 Wang Fanhua 王凡华, Guo Youjun 郭友军, “我校研制生产的无人机参加国庆阅兵载誉归来” [UAVs 

Developed and Manufactured by Our School in the National Day Troop Review], Northwestern Polytechnical 

University 西北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1091/4169.htm.

549

“无人机特种技术重点实验室” [UAV Special Technology Key Lab], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西

北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1266/12808.htm.

550 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 8; 

http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/xxgk/xxjj.htm. http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1091/4169.htm

551

“无人机特种技术重点实验室” [UAV Special Technology Key Lab], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西

北工业大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1266/12808.htm; “西北工业大学重点实验室一

览表” [Northwestern Polytechnical University Key Lab -- Table], Northwestern Polytechnical University 西北工业

大学, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1157/9868.htm.

552

“学校简介” [Introduction to the University], Beihang University, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.buaa.edu.cn/bhgk/index.htm#1.

553

“北京航空航天大学无人驾驶飞行器设计研究所简介” [Beihang University UAV Design Research Institute 

Introduction], November 14, 2013, Beihang University 北京航空航天大学, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://wrjs.buaa.edu.cn/zxgg/49517.htm.
117

 The institute is vast and includes laboratories or design centers for 

vehicle design and integration center, testing, a simulations, and 

electronics and countermeasures.554

 The institute is responsible for the BZK-005 UAV and Changying 

(长鹰) UAV programs.555

Nanjing University of 

Aeronautics and 

Astronautics 

南京航空航天大学

 Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (NUAA) has 

specialized in tactical UAVs since its founding.556

 Its UAV Institute (南京航空航天大学无人机研究院) is reported 

to be responsible for designing the Changkong (长空) and BZK002 UAV series, as well as unmanned helicopters.557

Aviation Industry 

Corporation of 

China (AVIC)

中航工业 / 

中国航空工业集团公

司

 Established in November 2008 after the merger of AVIC 1 and 

AVIC 2, AVIC is a large state-owned enterprise responsible for 

producing defense aviation equipment.558

 AVIC is the premier Chinese military aircraft and weapons 

supplier, producing fighter jets, fighter-bombers, bombers, military 

transport craft, training aircraft, surveillance aircraft, helicopters, 

attack aircraft, general-purpose aircraft, UAVs, turboprops, 

turboshafts, turbojets, turbofan engines, air-air, air-surface, and 

surface-air missiles. 

 AVIC produces the J-10, JH-7, FC-1, L-15, and JL-9/ FTC-2000 

fighter aircraft, as well as the Taihang, Qinling, and Kunlun 

engines.

559

 AVIC maintains over 140 subsidiaries, nearly 30 listed companies, 

and over 500,000 employees.560

Shenyang Aircraft 

Design Institute 

(SADI; 601 Aircraft 

Design Institute)

沈阳飞机设计研究所

 SADI is one of the largest subsidiaries of the defense conglomerate 

AVIC and supports the PLA’s UAV program by specializing in 

advanced UCAV design.561

 SADI is credited with designing the Lijian (Sharp Sword), Anjian 

(Dark Sword), and Zhanying (Warrior Eagle) UCAV models.562

Chengdu Aircraft 

Design Institute

(CADI; 611 Design 

Institute) 成都飞机设

计研究所

 Established in 1970, CADI is a subdivision of the Chengdu Aircraft 

Industry Group (CAC; 中航工业成都飞机工业(集团)有限责任公

司), an AVIC subsidiary, and focuses on the design and research of 

advanced fighter aircraft, including UAV and UCAV design.

563

 

554 Ibid.

555 Easton and Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational 

Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” 6.

556 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 8.

557 Easton and Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational 

Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” 7.

558

“集团简介” [Group Introduction], Aviation Industry Corporation of China 中国航空工业集团公司, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://www.avic.com/cn/gxwm/jqgk/jqjg/index.shtml.

559 Ibid.

560 “About Us,” AVIC, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.avic.com/en/aboutus/index.shtml.

561 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 10; Easton and Hsiao, “The 

Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational Capacities and Operational 

Capabilities,” 7.

562 Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 10.

563

“单位介绍” [Organization Introduction], AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute 中航工业成都飞

机设计研究所, accessed July 8, 2016, http://611.zhiye.com/a/AboutUs; Hsu, Murray, and Cook, “China’s Military 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Industry,” 9.
118

 CADI claims to control the full design process of aircraft due to its 

expertise in over 120 fields, including overall pneumatic stealth, 

structural strength, vibration, aviation control, aviation electronics, 

electromechanical integration, aviation sensors, photoelectronics, 

advanced materials, information processing, advanced aerodynamic 

configuration, stealth technology, and virtual simulations.564

 CADI is credited with development of the J-7 (歼-7), FC-1 (枭龙), 

J-10 series (歼十系列), and the Yilong/Pterodactyl 1 MALE UAV, 

also known as the Wing Loong.565

 CADI partners with the Guizhou Aircraft Company (GAC), another 

subsidiary of AVIC, in the development of major UAV systems.566

Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs)

Chinese Academy of 

Sciences’ Shenyang 

Institute of 

Automation (CAS 

SIA)

中科院沈阳自动化研

究所

 The CAS SIA in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, is a leading 

research institute and publisher on UUVs.567

 Its Autonomous Underwater Vehicle Laboratory (自主水下机器人

技术研究室) conducts research on all aspects of UUV 

technologies, including complicated environment recognition and 

pattern establishment, and advanced intelligence and autonomous 

behavior. It also researches platform designs (including analysis of 

designs, simulations, hydrodynamics, and structures), controller 

technologies, and various types of AUVs and USVs. 

 It was responsible for China’s first UUV, the CR-01,that achieved a 

depth of 6,000m.568

Harbin Engineering 

University 

哈尔滨工程大学

 HEU’s College of Shipbuilding Engineering (船舶工程学院) is 

home to the National Defense S&T Key Laboratory of Military-Use 

Underwater Intelligent Vehicle Technology (军用水下智能机器人

技术国防科技重点实验室).569

 HEU was formerly known as the PLA Military Engineering 

Institute, established in Harbin in 1953, and is currently an R&D 

base for China’s shipbuilding industry, naval armaments, and ocean 

development and exploitation.570

 It has seven research institutes and multiple laboratories dedicated 

to shipbuilding and ocean engineering, and recruits leading foreign 

 

564

“单位介绍” [Organization Introduction], AVIC Chengdu Aircraft Design & Research Institute 中航工业成都飞

机设计研究所, accessed July 8, 2016, http://611.zhiye.com/a/AboutUs.

565 Ibid.

566 Easton and Hsiao, “The Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Project: Organizational 

Capacities and Operational Capabilities,” 8.

567

“自主水下机器人技术研究室” [Independent Underwater Robot Technology Research Lab], Shenyang Institute 

of Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.sia.cn/jgsz/kyxt/zzsxjqrjsysj/.

568 Ibid.

569 Ju Lei 鞠磊, Su Yumin 苏玉民, Zhao Jinxin 赵金鑫, Liu Yebao 刘业宝, and Cui Tong 崔桐, “船桨干扰定常空

化性能数值模拟” (Steady Interaction Numerical Simulation of Cavitating Turbulent Flow between Ship Hull and 

Propeller), 船舶力学 Journal of Ship Mechanics, vol. 6, no. 16 (2012).

570

“学院简价” [College Introduction], College of Shipbuilding Engineering 哈尔滨工程大学船舶工程学院, 

accessed July 8, 2016, http://heusei.hrbeu.edu.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=2.
119

experts in these fields through China’s 111 Plan, described in more 

detail in the Talent Acquisition section on page 102.

571

 Key systems developed by HEU include the Zhishui series of 

AUVs, discussed on page 66.

 

571 Li Xiaohua, “China to Undergo Brain Gain through Plan 111” China Internet Information Center 中国网, 

September 14, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/181075.htm.
120

Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs)

Shanghai University 

Unmanned Vessel 

Engineering 

Research Institute

上海大学无人艇工程

研究院

 Founded in 2010, this research institute is China's first research 

organization to focus on USVs and integrate the fields of 

machinery, control, communications, mechanics, materials, and 

computers.572

 The research institute produces the “Jinghai” (精海) series of USVs 

which include multiple different models, and it is currently working 

on development of the Jinghai-7.573

China Shipbuilding 

Industry 

Corporation (CSIC) 

701st Research 

Institute

中国船舶重工集团公

司701所

(中船重工 701 所)

AKA the China Ship 

Research and Design 

Center (中国舰船研

究设计中心)

 The CSIC 701st Research Institute is the premier institution 

focusing on the research and design of warships and other naval

vessels, and is a leader in in air-independent propulsion (AIP) 

research.574

 The CSIC 701st Research Institute is one of several Chinese 

organizations competing in the manufacture and development of 

USVs.575

 Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Ltd. (青岛北海

船舶重工有限责任公司), a CSIC subsidiary, jointly develops the 

Jinghai series of USVs with Shanghai University.576

Harbin Engineering 

University

哈尔滨工程大学

 HEU’s College of Shipbuilding Engineering (船舶工程学院) is home to the 

National Defense S&T Key Laboratory of Military-Use Underwater Intelligent 

Vehicle Technology (军用水下智能机器人技术国防科技重点实验室).577

 HEU is currently an R&D base for China’s shipbuilding industry, naval 

armaments, and ocean development and exploitation.578

 It has seven research institutes and multiple laboratories dedicated to 

shipbuilding and ocean engineering, and recruits leading foreign experts in these 

fields through China’s 111 Plan, described in more detail in the Talent 

Acquisition section on page 102.

579

 Key systems developed by HEU include the Zhishui series of AUVs, discussed 

on page 66.

Dalian Maritime 

University

(DLMU)

大连海事大学

 Known as Dalian Maritime College until 1994, Dalian Maritime 

University (DLMU) is a “national key university” under China's 

Ministry of Transport.580

 In March 2015, a delegation from the China Academy of Launch 

Vehicle Technology (中国运载火箭技术研究院) visited DLMU to 

discuss USV research and development and various other topics.581

 DLMU conducts a program entitled “Small UAV Intelligent 

Control based on Beidou Satellite Navigation.”

582

Shanghai Maritime 

University

(SMU)

上海海事大学

 Established in 2004 with predecessor institutions reaching back to 

1909, SMU operates under the Shanghai municipal government and 

the Ministry of Transport.583

 Shanghai Maritime University (上海海事大学), which hosts a state 

key laboratory for marine technology and controls, and has 

published on navigation and GPS guidance for USVs.584

 The SMU Shipping Technology and Control Engineering 

Transportation Industry Key Laboratory Unmanned Surface Vessel 

Working Group (航运技术与控制工程交通行业重点实验室无人

水面艇课题组) produces the Haiteng 01 (海腾 01) Intelligent 

High-speed USV, and it is also capable of being manually 

controlled.585
121

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs)

China North Vehicle 

Research Institute 

中国北方车辆研究所

 In June 2014 the China North Vehicle Research Institute (中国北方

车辆研究所), directly subordinate to the NORINCO Group, 

established the Weapons Unmanned Ground Vehicle R&D Center 

(兵器地面无人平台研发中心). The center develops UGVs for 

 

572

“无人艇:在江河湖海中展露身手” [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/07/c_1119182583.htm.

573Xie Yao 谢姚, “不经历风雨怎么见彩虹” [If You Don't Go Through the Storm, How Will You See the 

Rainbow], School of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation 机电工程与自动化学院, December 31, 2015, 

accessed July 8, 2016,

http://old.auto.shu.edu.cn/Default.aspx?tabid=12022&ctl=Detail&mid=59127&Id=172263&SkinSrc=[L]Skins/jizi1/

jizi1; “无人艇:在江河湖海中展露身手” [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 

7, 2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/07/c_1119182583.htm.

574

“首页” [Homepage], China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 中国船舶重工集团公司, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.csic.com.cn/.

575

“无人艇:在江河湖海中展露身手” [Unmanned Vessel: Showing Skill in All Waters], Xinhua 新华社, July 7, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/2016-07/07/c_1119182583.htm.

576

“北船承制无人艇获工博会创新金奖” [Qingdao Beihai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. Manufactured 

Unmanned Vessel and Awarded Engineering Innovation Gold Medal], China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation 中

船重工, December 28, 2015, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.csic.com.cn/zgxwzx/zgcydt/314027.htm.

577 The college’s website describes the lab as “军用水下 xx 重点实验室” (Military-Use Underwater XX Key 

Laboratory), but author affiliations on articles include the full name of the lab. For example, see Ju Lei 鞠磊, Su 

Yumin 苏玉民, Zhao Jinxin 赵金鑫, Liu Yebao 刘业宝, and Cui Tong 崔桐, “船桨干扰定常空化性能数值模拟” 

(Steady Interaction Numerical Simulation of Cavitating Turbulent Flow between Ship Hull and Propeller), Journal 

of Ship Mechanics 船舶力学, vol. 6, no. 16 (2012).

578

“学院简价” [College Introduction], College of Shipbuilding Engineering 哈尔滨工程大学船舶工程学院, 

accessed July 8, 2016, .http://heusei.hrbeu.edu.cn/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=lists&catid=2.

579 Li Xiaohua, “China to Undergo Brain Gain Through Plan 111”" China Internet Information Center 中国网, 

September 14, 2006, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/181075.htm.

580

“学校简介” [School Introduction], Dalian Maritime University 大连海事大学, accessed July 7, 2016, 

http://www.dlmu.edu.cn/html/hdgk/xxjj/.

581

“中国运载火箭技术研究院院长助理龚知明一行来访我校” [China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology 

President's Assistant Gong Zhiming and Delegation Visit Our School], Dalian Maritime University 大连海事大学, 

March 27, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.dlmu.edu.cn/html/2015/kydt_0327/884.html.

582

“基于北斗卫星导航的小型无人飞行器的智能控制” [Small Model UAV's Intelligent Control Based on Beidou 

Satellite Navigation], Dalian Maritime University 大连海事大学, May 18, 2014, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.dlmu.edu.cn/html/2014/hdyx_0518/50.html.

583

“校情总览” [School General Overview], Shanghai Maritime University 上海海事大学, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.shmtu.edu.cn/AboUt/AboUt.Htm.

584 For example, see Xiong Yazhou 熊亚洲 and Wang Jianhua 王建华, “一种利用天水线感知无人水面艇运行环

境的方法” (Acquiring Environmental Condition for Unmanned Surface Vehicle Using Skyline Information), 

Journal of Shanghai Dianji University 上海电机学院学报, vol. 18, no. 4 (2015); and Wu Yuping 吴玉平, Wang 

Jianhua 王建华, and Yang Zhao 杨钊, “基于双天线的高精度 GPS 定位测向系统及其在无人水面艇上的应用” 

(High Precision GPS System Based on Double Antennas and Its Application in Unmanned Surface Vessel), 

Computer Measurement & Control 计算机测量与控制, no. 4 (2015).

585

“我院自主研发的——“海腾 01”号智能高速无人水面艇研发成功” [Our Academy's Independently 

Developed--‘Haiteng01’ Model Intelligent High-Speed Unmanned Surface Vessel Research and Development 

Success], Shanghai Maritime University Scientific Research Academy 上海海事大学科学研究院, November 28, 

2014, accessed July 8, 2016, http://sra.shmtu.edu.cn/publish/detail.jspx?cid=156&contentid=650.
122

military, police, security, defense industry, and commercial 

clients.586

 NORINCO Group’s Deputy General Manager Yang Zhuo (杨卓), 

who spoke at the center’s opening, said NORINCO was already 

working on a variety of unmanned ground vehicles for civilian and 

military use, and saw the center as a means to accelerate this 

work.587

 The Weapons Unmanned Ground Vehicle R&D Center is reported 

to be developing the Chinese version of BigDog, a rough-terrain 

robot with four legs developed by Boston Dynamics. Formally 

called the “Mountainous Four-Legged Bionic Mobile Platform” (山

地四足仿生移动平台), the system can carry out transport, 

reconnaissance, attack, and search and rescue operations. Chinese 

media also colloquially refers to the system as “Big Dog” (大狗).588

Beijing Institute of 

Technology (BIT) 

北京理工大学

 One of BIT’s missions is to support “national strategic needs” such as aerospace 

engineering, information technology, and mechanical engineering and 

automation.589

 BIT is directly subordinate to MIIT and is part of China’s national 211 and 985 

projects, which were aimed at strengthening China’s S&T capabilities at its 

universities.590

 Recent publications on UGVs appear to focus on situational awareness and 

vision, operation when GPS signals are disrupted, and general autonomous 

operation in urban environments.

 BIT’s team came in third place in the “2014 Leap Over Treacherous Paths”

contest for UGVs.591

National University 

of Defense 

Technology (NUDT) 

国防科技大学

 NUDT is under the dual leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry 

of Education, and has numerous laboratories dedicated to technology 

development.592

 

586 Chen Yu 陈瑜,“兵器地面无人平台研发中心成立” [The Weaponry Ground Unmanned Platform R&D Center 

Is Established], Science and Technology Daily 科技日报, June 28, 2014. 

587

“中国兵器工业集团成立地面无人平台研发中心 为解放军研制无人作战车辆” [NORINCO Establishes 

Ground Unmanned Platform Research & Development Center to Develop Unmanned Combat Vehicles for the 

PLA], Guanchazhe 观察者, July 3, 2014, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.guancha.cn/militaryaffairs/2014_07_03_243289_s.shtml.

588

“BigDog–The Most Advanced Rough-Terrain Robot on Earth,” Boston Dynamics; and Zhang Peng 张鹏 and 

Peng Kuang 彭况, “军网记者亲身体验中国军用机器人” [Chinese Military Network Reporters Personally 

Experience China’s Military-Use Robots], China Military Network 中国军网, February 27, 2015, accessed July 7, 

2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.

589

“学校简介” [School Introduction], March 26, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.bit.edu.cn/gbxxgk/gbxqzl/xxjj/index.htm; “Welcome to Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT)” May 18, 

2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://english.bit.edu.cn/AboutBIT/GeneralInformation/index.htm.

590

“学校简介” [School Introduction], March 26, 2013, accessed July 11, 2016, 

http://www.bit.edu.cn/gbxxgk/gbxqzl/xxjj/index.htm; “Welcome to Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT)” May 18, 

2015, accessed July 11, 2016, http://english.bit.edu.cn/AboutBIT/GeneralInformation/index.htm.

591

“跨越险阻-2016”地面无人系统挑战赛等你来战!” [The 2016 Leap Over Treacherous Paths Ground 

Unmanned Systems Competition Welcomes You to Come Compete!], 中国军网 China Military Network, June 14, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.

592

“学校概况” [Summary of the University], 国防科技大学 National University of Defense Technology, accessed 

July 11, 2016, http://www.nudt.edu.cn/introduce.asp?classid=4.
123

 NUDT’s College of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation (机电工程与自

动化学院) has a Department of Automatic Control (自动控制系), which 

conducts research on robotics, including guidance and controls.593

 NUDT teams came in first and second place in the “2014 Leap Over Treacherous 

Paths”contest for UGVs.594

EOD Robotics 

Companies

Numerous Chinese defense companies and RIs have developed explosive ordnance 

disposal robots, including: 595

 Lingxi (灵蜥 or “quick lizard”) by the CAS Shenyang Institute of 

Automation 

 Raptor EOD robot by the Beijing Bochuang Group (北京博创集

团)

 Snow Leopard-10 (雪豹-10) by China Aerospace Science and 

Industry Corporation (CASIC)

 uBot-EOD series by Shanghai HRSTEK Co., Ltd (上海合时智能

科技有限公司)

 

593

“自动控制系” (Department of Automatic Control), 国防科技大学 National University of Defense Technology, 

accessed July 11, 2016, http://www.nudt.edu.cn/ArticleShow.asp?ID=22.

594

“跨越险阻-2016”地面无人系统挑战赛等你来战!” [The 2016 Leap Over Treacherous Paths Ground 

Unmanned Systems Competition Welcomes You to Come Compete!], China Military Network 中国军网, June 14, 

2016, accessed July 7, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-02/27/content_6372686_5.htm.

595

“排爆机器人” [Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robots], Baike 百科, accessed July 7, 2016, 

http://www.baike.com/wiki/%E6%8E%92%E7%88%86%E6%9C%BA%E5%99%A8%E4%BA%BA.
124

Appendix III: Leading Artificial Intelligence Companies, 

Professional Associations, and Research Institutes in China

 

596

“关于我们” [About Us], Turing Robot 图灵机器人, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://www.tuling123.com/html/doc/About_us.html; "Turing OS" Baidu Encyclopedia 百度百科, accessed June 9, 

2016, http://baike.baidu.com/item/Turing%20OS.

597 Turing Robot 图灵机器人, accessed June 9, 2016, http://www.tuling123.com/.

598 Ibid.

599 Song Yelei 宋业磊, “图灵机器人发 Turing OS 操作系统推儿童机器人玩具” [Turing Robot Issued Turing OS 

Operating System Promoting Children's Robot Toy], Phoenix 凤凰网科技, November 6, 2015, accessed June 9, 

2016, http://tech.ifeng.com/a/20151106/41502786_0.shtml.

600

“智能硬件机器人 Nao” [Intelligent Hardware Robot Nao], Xiaoi Robot 小 i 机器人, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://www.xiaoi.com/entity/hardware/nao.html.

601

“公司概况” [Company Summary], Horizon Robotics, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.horizonrobotics.com/company_cn.html; “Chinese Start-Up on Track to Deliver Artificial Intelligence-on-a-Chip" South 

China Morning Post, March 6, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.scmp.com/tech/article/1921396/chinesestart-track-deliver-artificial-intelligence-chip.

602 “Company Overview,” iFLYTEK, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.iflytek.com/en/about/index.html.

603 Ibid.

Org. Name (EN/CN) Summary

Companies

Turing Robot 

图灵机器人

 Chinese start-up that has developed and marketed AI products 

including robots, voice assistance, and chat robots. Turing Robot 

claims to have developed the leading Chinese semantic language 

processing platform, Turing OS, which was developed in 

November 2015.596

 Turing Robot uses cutting-edge natural language processing and 

semantic language analysis intelligent technologies to create robotic 

devices that are “friendly AI solutions.”597 Turing Robot sells the 

“Nao” robot, which the company boasts is the world’s most 

advanced humanoid robot.598

 Chinese media states that Turing’s “Xian’er” Budda robot and the 

Turing OS uses the Tianhe-2 supercomputer to integrate massive 

databases for its intelligent learning and processing system.599

Xiaoi Robot 

小 i 机器人

 Develops Chinese language chat robots and virtual voice assistants. 

 Strategic partners include Microsoft, Lenovo, Alibaba, Tencent, 

and China Unicom, China Telecom, and China Mobile. 

 Xiaoi sells cloud platform chat robots as well as hardware robots 

such as sweeping robots and humanoid robots such as “Nao” and 

“Ina.”600

Horizon Robotics 地

平线机器人

 Founded in 2015, Horizon Robotics focuses on developing and 

marketing intelligent chips for devices such as vehicles, service 

robots, toys, and household robots.601

iFLYTEK

科大讯飞股份有限公

司

 Software company focusing on intelligent speech technology, 

natural language processing, and speech recognition.602

 Recipient of substantial Chinese government funding, iFLYTEK

contributed to e-government system integration, and has attracted 

visits from high-level government leaders.603
125

 

604 Ibid.

605 “Alibaba Arm Seeks to Use Police Face Scans for Banking” Bloomberg News, January 28, 2015, accessed July 

8, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-28/alibaba-arm-seeks-to-use-police-face-scans-forbanking; “About Us” FACE++, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.faceplusplus.com/about/; Juro Osawa, "Alibaba’s 

Alipay Turns to Faces, Fingerprints for Security" The Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2014, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/10/16/alibabas-alipay-turns-to-faces-fingerprints-for-security/.

606

“智能云机器人事业部” [Intelligent Cloud Business Unit], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 

8, 2016, http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/product/pro_list/6.

607 “Intelligent Cloud Business Unit” HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/en/product/product_show/11.

608 Alyssa Abkowitz, Lilian Lin, “Alibaba’s ‘Ai’ Predicts Winners of China’s Hit TV Show ‘I Am a Singer’” The 

Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/04/11/alibabasai-predicts-winners-of-chinas-hit-tv-show-i-am-a-singer/.

609 Catherine Shu, “Alibaba’s Cloud Computing Group Says Its New Artificial Intelligence Platform Is China’s 

First” TechCrunch, August 25, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016, https://techcrunch.com/2015/08/25/aliyun-ai/;

“阿里云发布国内首个人工智能平台 深化大数据分析技术” [Alibaba Cloud Issues First Domestic Artificial 

Intelligence Platform, Deepens Big Data Analysis Technology], 电子信息产业网, August 18, 2015, accessed July 

8, 2016, http://www.cena.com.cn/2015-08/18/content_289216.htm.

610Alyssa Abkowitz, Lilian Lin, “Alibaba’s ‘Ai’ Predicts Winners of China’s Hit TV Show ‘I Am a Singer’” The 

Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/04/11/alibabasai-predicts-winners-of-chinas-hit-tv-show-i-am-a-singer/; “小 Ai-阿里云人工智能” [XiaoAi-Alibaba Cloud 

Artificial Intelligence], Alibaba Cloud 阿里巴巴集团, accessed July 8, 2016, https://ai.aliyun.com/xiaoai.

611 “About Tencent” Tencent 腾讯, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.tencent.com/en-us/at/abouttencent.shtml.

612

“腾讯 AI Lab,力邀国内外大牛加盟” [Tencent AI Lab, Strongly Invite Domestic and International Experts to 

Join], Tencent 腾讯, accessed July 8, 2016, http://hr.tencent.com/news_detail.php?id=224.

 Boasts development of the world’s first cloud voice platform over 

mobile Internet.

604

Megvii

北京旷视科技有限公

司

 Company working with Alibaba’s Alipay that has developed 

intelligent facial recognition software Face++ that has application 

for banking and public security605

HIT Robot Group, 

Intelligent Cloud 

Robot Business Unit

哈工大机器人集团, 

智能云机器人事业部

 Focuses on use of the cloud in networking, Internet services, big 

data, cloud computing, AI, pattern recognition, and 

electromechanical integration, embedded data and information, 

physics fusion, service oriented computing, robot motion control, 

power control, machine vision, location services, algorithm, data 

collection and analysis, and the identification and treatment of core 

control platforms.606

 Primary products are an Internet + product quality remote detection 

system, an intelligent flying robot for high-risk environments, and 

an intelligent cloud-based robot remote fault diagnosis system.607

Alibaba

阿里巴巴集团

 E-commerce provider Alibaba developed cloud platform Aliyun 

(阿里云) to support AI systems608

 “DTPAI” platform released in 2015 was announced as the first 

intelligent AI platform in China.609

 “Ai” AI system (小 Ai) used to predict Chinese reality show 

winners.610

Tencent

腾讯公司

 Internet service company that owns QQ chat and WeChat611

 AI laboratory focuses on machine learning, computer vision, 

translation, intelligent chat, and speech recognition.612
126

 

613 Kevin McSpadden, “Tencent leads US$10M Series A funding in AI startup Diffbot” YAHOO! News, February 

12, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/tencent-leads-us-10m-series-funding-ai-startup051318017.html.

614 Qrobot, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.qrobot.com/.

615

“腾讯人工智能系统 Betae 与谷歌 AlphaGo 麻将大战!” [Tencent Artificial Intelligence System Betae and 

Google AlphaGo Majiang War!], Toutiao 今日头条, April 3, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://toutiao.com/i6269283260069577218.

616 “IDL 介绍” [IDL Introduction], Baidu Institute of Deep Learning 百度深度学习实验室, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://idl.baidu.com/IDL-about.html.

617 “Institute of Deep Learning” Baidu Research, accessed July 8, 2016, http://research.baidu.com/institute-of-deeplearning/.

618 “IDL 研究方向” [IDL Research Direction], Baidu Institute of Deep Learning 百度深度学习实验室, accessed 

July 8, 2016, http://idl.baidu.com/IDL-direction.html.

619 Baidu, Inc., “Baidu Opens Silicon Valley Lab, Appoints Andrew Ng as Head of Baidu Research,” PR Newswire, 

May 16, 2014, accessed June 24, 2016, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/baidu-opens-silicon-valley-labappoints-andrew-ng-as-head-of-baidu-research-259539471.html; Di Wenting 翟文婷, “起底百度美国研发中心” 

[Breaking Ground on the Baidu-U.S. R&D Center], Sina S&T 新浪科技, February 3, 2015, accessed June 24, 2016, 

http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-02-03/doc-iawzunex9713856.shtml.

620 Tammy Parker, “Baidu's Silicon Valley R&D center targets deep learning”, FierceWirelessTech, May 18, 2014, 

accessed June 24, 2016, http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/baidus-silicon-valley-rd-center-targets-deeplearning/2014-05-18.

621 Paul Mozur and Rolfe Winkler, “Baidu to Open Artificial-Intelligence Center in Silicon Valley: Former Stanford, 

Google Researcher Will Lead Efforts at $300 Million Facility,” The Wall Street Journal, May 16. 2014, accessed 

June 24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304908304579565950123054242;

Di Wenting 翟文婷, “起底百度美国研发中心” [Breaking Ground on the Baidu-U.S. R&D Center], Sina S&T 新浪

科技, February 3, 2015, accessed June 24, 2016, http://tech.sina.com.cn/i/2015-02-03/doc-iawzunex9713856.shtml;

 Invested 10 million USD in Silicon Valley AI company Diffbot in 

2015613

 Sells Q robot (小小 Q 智能机器人) consumer product614

 Developed “Betae” AI system615

Baidu Deep Learning 

Laboratory 

百度深度学习实验室

 Established by CEO Li Yanhong (李彦宏) in 2013,616 Baidu’s 

Deep Learning Laboratory in Beijing works on developments 

related to image recognition, robotics, 3D vision, machine learning, 

and human-computer interaction.617

 Baidu has worked on the development of UAVs, translation tools, 

voice assistants, web searching tools, and driverless cars, and 

advertises products such as the BaiduEye and BaiduLight personal 

electronic devices.618

Baidu Silicon Valley 

AI Laboratory 

(SVAIL)

百度美国硅谷研发中

心

 One of three research laboratories under Baidu Research, along 

with the Beijing Deep Learning Laboratory (百度深度学习实验

室), formerly known as the Institute of Deep Learning, and the 

Beijing-based Baidu Big Data Laboratory (百度大数据实验室).619

 Focused on building the next generation infrastructure that will help AI 

researchers productively express their networks in computer code, and then 

efficiently train them on clusters of GPU's.

 Purpose is to focus on fundamental research, while the Deep Learning 

Laboratory will continue to target applications of deep learning to new and 

existing Baidu products.620

 Baidu announced in May 2014 that it will invest USD 300 million 

in the Silicon Valley laboratory over five years, and the staff has 

grown to 100 personnel as of 2015.621
127

 

Tammy Parker, “Baidu's Silicon Valley R&D center targets deep learning,” FierceWirelessTech, May 18, 2014. 

http://www.fiercewireless.com/tech/story/baidus-silicon-valley-rd-center-targets-deep-learning/2014-05-18.

622

“中国人工智能学会简介” [Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence Introduction] Chinese Association for 

Artificial Intelligence 中国人工智能学会, accessed June 9, 2016,

http://new.caai.cn/index.php?s=/Home/Article/index/id/2.html.

623 Ibid.

624

“人工智能与模式识别专业委员会” [Artificial Intelligence & Pattern Recognition Experts Committee] China 

Computer Federation 中国计算机学会, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.ccf.org.cn/sites/ccf/rgznzw.jsp.

625 Ibid.

626 “Introduction” China Robot Industry Alliance, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://cria.mei.net.cn/English/introduction.asp.

Professional and Research Associations

Chinese Association 

for Artificial 

Intelligence (CAAI)

中国人工智能学会

 Established in 1981, CAAI is the only national-level professional 

society focused on scientific fields of research relating to AI in 

China.622

 Promotes academic exchange, publication, education, and research 

exhibition for the purpose of AI development in China.623 Has 40 

subcommittees focused on different fields within AI.

 CAAI is led by automation and AI expert Li Deyi (李德毅), a 

Major General in the PLA and doctoral advisor at the GSD 61st 

Research Institute (总参第六十一研究所).

 Affiliated with Beijing University of Posts and 

Telecommunications.

 Leadership consists of experts from Chinese and foreign 

institutions, including companies and military organizations.

China Computer 

Federation (CCF) 

Artificial Intelligence 

and Pattern 

Recognition 

Committee 

(TCAIPR)

中国计算机学会人工

智能与模式识别专业

委员会

 Established in November 1986 at Taiyuan Shanxi University (太原

山西大学). Its predecessor organization was the Artificial 

Intelligence Study Group (人工智能学组), founded by Jilin 

University CAS Scholar Wang Xianghao (王湘浩). 

 Focuses on AI basic theory, intelligent expression and reasoning, 

machine learning, intelligent engineering, intelligent programming, 

heuristic searches, data mining, computational intelligence, neural 

networks, evolving computation, distributed AI, pattern 

recognition, natural language processing, information retrieval and 

extraction, and intelligent systems application.624

 Led by five professors, all from different universities. Including its 

leadership, CCF TCAIPR consists of 112 members, affiliated with

numerous universities and educational institutions.625

China Robot 

Industry Alliance 

(CRIA)

中国机器人产业联盟

 Founded on April 21, 2013, CRIA is a non-profit organization 

consisting of 104 members that include companies, manufacturers, 

universities, research institutes, robotic associations, and 

government-sponsored organizations.

 Headquartered at the China Machinery Industry Federation (CMIF; 

中国机械工业联合会). The goal of CRIA is to serve as a 

cooperation platform for the industry, and thereby strengthen 

members' R&D capabilities, organize exhibitions and conferences, 

and generally expand robot applications in China.626

 Siasun (沈阳新松机器人自动化股份有限公司) and CMIF lead 

CRIA, followed by 20 tech and robotics companies.
128

 

627

“我国自动控制学术团体——中国自动化学会” [Our Country's Automation Control Study Group--Chinese 

Association of Automation], Chinese Association of Automation 中国自动化学会, accessed June 9, 2016, 

http://www.caa.org.cn/index.php?me_id=2.

628 “Faculty and Staff” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://english.iim.cas.cn/pe/fs/.

629 “Research Fellow,” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://english.iim.cas.cn/pe/as/.

630 “Brief Introduction,” Institute of Intelligent Machines Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed July 8, 2016, 

http://english.iim.cas.cn/au/bi/.

631 Ibid.

632 Ibid.

633 Wang Wowen 王握文, Li Zhi 李治, Jia Min 贾敏 (Ed.), “国防科大推出我国首款智能安保机器人 与‘天河’联

机” [NUDT Launched China's First Intelligent Security Robot and ‘Tianhe’ Joins], PLA Daily 解放军报, April 22, 

2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-04/22/content_7030386.htm.

634 Ibid.

635 Kuang Chunlin 匡春林, “国防科大成功研制我国首款智能安保服务机器人” [NUDT Succeeds in Developing 

China's First Intelligent Security Service Robot], People's Daily Online 人民网, April 22, 2016, accessed July 8, 

2016, http://it.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0422/c1009-28298304.html.

Chinese Association 

of Automation 

(CAA)

中国自动化学会

 CAA is a professional society that promotes education, business, 

research, and development in the Chinese automation industry.627

 Has subcommittees on a range of automation-related subjects.

Government, Military, and Academic Research Institutes

Chinese Academy of 

Sciences (CAS) 

Institute of 

Intelligent Machines 

(IIM) 中国科学院合

肥智能机械研究所

 Founded October 8, 1979.

 Employs 213 personnel,628 24 research fellows,629 focuses on 

artificial intelligence and sensor technology, and consists of four 

research branches: Research Center for Biomimetic Sensing and 

Control, Research Center for Biomimetic Functional Materials and 

Sensing Devices, Research Center for Intelligent Information 

Systems and Research Center for Information Technology of Sports 

and Health.630

 Collaborates with the University of Science and Technology of 

China, the Hefei Institute of Physical Science, and Anhui 

University, in its current support of 200 students pursuing graduate 

degrees in Pattern Recognition and Intelligent Systems, 

Instrumentation Technology and Automatic Devices, Precision 

Instrument and Machine and Information Acquisition and 

Control.631

 IIM states that it “attaches great importance to high-technology 

transfer, which is the center source of the transformation and 

industrialization of the research products.”

632

National University 

of Defense 

Technology (NUDT)

国防科学技术大学

 As a military university, NUDT pioneered robotics development in 

China by developing China’s first two-legged robot, humanoid 

robot, and ground patrol robot.633 The university has made 

significant accomplishments in AI research at the Robotics and 

Ocean Technologies Interdisciplinary Research Center (国防科大

机器人与海洋技术交叉研究中心).634

 Announced the development of the “AnBot” intelligent security 

robot in April 2016,635 designed for security surveillance and threat 

detection, and designed for connection to the NUDT-constructed 
129

 

636 Wang Wowen 王握文, Li Zhi 李治, Jia Min 贾敏 (Ed.), “国防科大推出我国首款智能安保机器人 与 ‘天河’联

机” [NUDT Launched China's First Intelligent Security Robot and ‘Tianhe’ Joins], Jiefangjun Bao 中国军网-解放

军报, April 22, 2016, accessed July 8, 2016, http://youth.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-04/22/content_7030386.htm.

637 Jack Clark, “Dell Expands in China With Venture Group, Creates AI Lab” Bloomberg Technology, September 9, 

2015, accessed July 8, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-10/dell-expands-in-china-withventure-group-creation-of-ai-lab; Mark Hanrahan, “Dell Inc Announces $125B Investment In China, Including 

Artificial Intelligence Lab” International Business Times, September 10, 2015, accessed July 8, 2016,

http://www.ibtimes.com/dell-inc-announces-125b-investment-china-including-artificial-intelligence-lab-2090481.

Tianhe Supercomputer Robotic Cloud Service Center (天河超级计

算机机器人云服务中心).636

Dell-Chinese 

Academy of Sciences 

(CAS) Artificial 

Intelligence and 

Advanced 

Computing Joint 

Laboratory

人工智能与先进计算

联合实验室

 Established in November 2015.

 Focuses on developing advanced technologies relating to cognitive systems and 

deep learning.637
130

Appendix IV: Leading Chinese Nanorobotics Institutions

Org. Name (EN/CN) Summary

Professional Associations

Chinese Society of MicroNano Technology MicroNano Robot Subcommittee

中国微米纳米技术学会微

纳机器人分会

 Academic committee to focus on academic exchanges as well as 

technological development.638

 Chairman Sun Lining (孙立宁) is a national 863 expert in robotics, 

MEMS, advanced manufacturing technology, and micro/nano 

manufacturing technology from Soochow University.639

Companies

HIT Robot Group (HRG)

哈工大机器人集团

 HRG works on the development of service, military-use, and industrial 

robots.

 In late 2015, HRG announced the development of a nanorobotic 

manipulation system while working with scientists from the University of 

Toronto. 640 In the announcement, HRG acknowledges the technology 

“came from returning overseas talent,” and that the device was presented 

at the 2015 World Robot Conference (2015 世界机 器 人大 会) in 

Beijing.641

Academic Research Institutes

Tsinghua University

清华大学

 Tsinghua University has put much research into robotics development in 

recent years. Collaborating with University of Lincoln, Tsinghua 

researchers designed a swarm robotic system in 2014.642

Nanjing University 

南京大学

 In 2010, Nanjing University researchers collaborated with researchers 

from NYU to construct a nanorobot assembly line, which successfully put 

together DNA component nanodevices.643 These devices were assembled 

with programmable DNA devices that could function through switches.

 

638

“中国微米纳米技术学会” [Chinese Society of Micro-Nano Technology], Chinese Society of Micro-Nano 

Technology 中国微米纳米技术学会 (Google Cache), July 10, 2016, accessed July 12, 2016, 

https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:62vuenOG6HMJ:www.csmnt.org.cn; “中国微米纳米技

术学会微纳机器人分会成立” [Chinese Society of Micro-Nano Technology Establishes Micro-Nano Robotics 

Subcommittee], Chinese Association for Science and Technology 中国科学技术协会, May 16, 2016, accessed July 

12, 2016, http://www.cast.org.cn/n17040442/n17045712/n17059079/17192447.html.

639

“现任领导简介——院长孙立宁” [Current Leader Introduction—Director Sun Lining], Soochow University 

School of Mechanical and Electric Engineering 苏州大学机电工程学院, November 25, 2015, accessed July 12, 

2016, http://jdxy.suda.edu.cn/ShowPage.aspx?type=6741; “中国微米纳米技术学会微纳机器人分会成立” 

[Chinese Society of Micro-Nano Technology Establishes Micro-Nano Robotics Subcommittee], May 16, 2016, 

accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.cast.org.cn/n17040442/n17045712/n17059079/17192447.html.

640

“哈工大机器人集团(HRG): 工业机器人让劳动更高效” [HIT Robot Group (HRG): Industrial Robots Allow 

Labor Force to be More Efficient], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集团, November 18, 2015, accessed July 12, 

2016, http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/news/news_show/115; “港媒:中外科学家成功研发可拿起纳米物体机器人” 

[Hong Kong Media: Chinese and Foreign Scientists Successfully Develop Robot That Can Handle Nano Objects], 

November 30, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, http://news.163.com/15/1130/11/B9LSHA4Q00014AEE.html; “2015

世界机器人大会圆满落幕” [2015 World Robot Conference Comes to an End], HIT Robot Group 哈工大机器人集

团, November 28, 2015, accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.hitrobotgroup.com/news/news_show/104.

641 Ibid.

642 “‘Honeybee’ Robots Replicate Swarm Behavior,” September 18, 2014, Nanowerk News, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://www.nanowerk.com/news2/robotics/newsid=37414.php.

643 “Nature: 分子纳米机器人新突破” [Nature: Molecular Nanorobot New Breakthrough], Bioon.com, May 14, 

2010, accessed July 12, 2016, http://www.bioon.com/biology/nanometer/442876.shtml; “Nanorobot Can Manipulate

Molecules within a DNA Device,” Nanowerk News, February 15, 2009, accessed July 12, 2016, 

http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=9280.php.
131

 Nanjing University scientists have published research on nanomotors.

644

Beijing Institute of 

Technology (BIT)

北京理工大学

 In 2008, Thousand Talent micro- and nanomanipulation and nanorobotics 

expert Toshio Fukuda (福田敏男)

645 came to BIT after collaborating with 

researchers there. 646 Fukuda became an IEEE fellow in 2015 and is 

currently on the founding editorial board of AAAS Science Robotics.

647

CAS Beijing Institute of 

Nanoenergy and 

Nanosystems (BINN) 中国

科学院北京纳米能源与系

统研究所

 In 2016, a team led by BINN director Wang Zhonglin (王中林) developed 

a triboelectric nanogenerator sized one billionth of a meter that could 

generate electrical energy through frictional forces.648

 Wang has published widely in top journals on nanotechnology and is 

internationally recognized as a top researcher in the field.649

Harbin Institute of 

Technology (HIT) State 

Key Laboratory of 

Robotics and System

 In 2002, HIT researchers had begun constructing nanorobots to aid with 

gene manipulation with applications for medicine and agriculture.650

 In late 2012, HIT announced that researchers were able to construct 

“nanorocket” (纳米火箭) nanomotors that were able to move at 74 

micrometers per second.651 These autonomous nanobots were made out of 

 

644 Yu Xiaoping, Wu Jie, Ju Huangxian, “The Application of Micro/Nanomotor in Biosensing” [微/纳米马达在生

物传感中的应用], Progress in Chemistry 化学进展, 2014:10.

645 “[讲座]Toshio Fukuda 教授讲座” [[Lecture] Professor Toshio Fukuda Lecture], Northwestern Polytechnical 

University 西北工业大学, April 2, 2015, accessed June 6, 2016, http://www.nwpu.edu.cn/info/1007/14666.htm.

646 “Professor Toshio Fukuda wins Chinese Government Friendship Award” Beijing Institute of Technology 北京理

工大学, October 21, 2014, accessed June 6, 2016, http://english.bit.edu.cn/NewsEvents/BITNews/106550.htm.

647 “Professor Toshio Fukuda elected to IEEE Fellow,” Beijing Institute of Technology 北京理工大学, December 

16, 2015, accessed June 6, 2016, http://english.bit.edu.cn/NewsEvents/BITNews/120092.htm; "Editorial and 

Advisory Boards Founding Editorial Board Members," ScienceRobotics, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://www.sciencemag.org/journals/robotics/editorial-board-members.

648

“纳米发电机:摩擦也能带来‘正能量’--石油百科” [Nanogenerator: Friction Can Also Bring ‘Positive Energy’ 

– CNPC Encyclopedia], China National Petroleum Corporation, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://center.cnpc.com.cn/bk/system/2016/02/23/001580896.shtml.

649 Katherine Bourzac, “Nanogenerator Powers Up” MIT Technology Review, November 8, 2010, accessed June 6, 

2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/421577/nanogenerator-powers-up/; “Zhong Lin Wang,” Professor 

Zhong Lin Wang's Nanoscience Research Group, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://www.nanoscience.gatech.edu/group/Current%20Members/Group%20Leader/Zhong%20Lin%20Wang.php;

“Triboelectric Nanogenerator – a New Energy Technology,” Shanghai Jiaotong University Nano Science 

Technology Research Academy 上海交通大学微纳科学技术研究院, May 11, 2015, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://tfmlab.sjtu.edu.cn/index.aspx?menuid=4&type=articleinfo&lanmuid=7&infoid=221&language=cn.

650

“中国研制出纳米级的高精度微动机器人” [China Developed a Nanometer High Precision Micro Motor 

Robot], Xinhua 新华社, May 24, 2002, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/60/20020524/736240.html; “哈工大为我国研制出可操作细胞的纳米级高

精度微动机器人” [HIT Developed a Nanometer High Precision Micro Motor Robot that Can Be Manipulated at the 

Cell for China], Harbin Institute of Technology, May 25, 2002, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://todayhistory.hit.edu.cn/54/2002/540525070916/.

651

“科研信息” [Scientific Research News], Today HIT 今日哈工大, May 24, 2013, accessed June 6, 2016,

https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:CZpq3_t5ZdUJ:http://today.hit.edu.cn/news/2013/05-

24/8241105150RL0.htm; Wu Yingjie, Wu Zhiguang, Lin Xiankun, He Qiang, Li Junbai, “Autonomous Movement 

of Controllable Assembled Janus Capsule Motors” ACS NANO, vol. 12, no. 6 (2012): 10910–10916, accessed June 

6, 2016, http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/nn304335xs; Yao Wen 耀文, “哈工大人工合成自驱动纳米机器取得

新进展” [HIT Created Self-Propelling Nano Robot Achieves New Progress], CENA 电子信息产业网, July 18, 

2014, accessed June 6, 2016, http://cyyw.cena.com.cn/2014-07/18/content_233533.htm; “近红外光驱动聚合物多

层纳米火箭” [Near Infrared Light Propelled Polymer Multi-layered Nano Rocket], Materials Views, March 1, 2016, 

accessed June 6, 2016, http://www.materialsviewschina.com/2016/03/near-infrared-light-driven-multi-layernanometer-polymer-rocket/.
132

哈尔滨工业大学机器人技

术与系统国家重点实验室

and Micro/Nanotechnology 

Research Center

微纳米技术研究中心

platinum-coated nanoparticles that composed Janus particle motors, 

enabling the nanoparticles to utilize hydrogen peroxide as fuel to move.652

 In late 2015, lead author He Qiang (贺强)

653 with researchers from HIT 

Micro/Nanotechnology Research Center (微纳米技术研究中心) built a 

microrobot that was able to manipulate nanoscale objects.654

 The Micro/Nanotechnology Research Center conducts research on 

nanotechnology and nanodevices and at least since 2007 has received state 

and provincial-level awards for nanorobotics and nanomanipulation 

research, including small nanorobots for MEMS operations and nanoprecision positioning technology for object manipulation.655

CAS Institute of 

Automation

中国科学院自动化所

 Researchers at the CAS Institute of Automation have published research 

on nanorobotics and nanomainpulation of DNA.656

CAS Shenyang Institute of 

Automation (SIA)

中国科学院沈阳自动化研

究所

 SIA along with researchers at its Micro and Nano Robotics Group under 

the State Key Laboratory of Robotics are conducting China’s most 

cutting-edge nanorobotics and nanomanipulation research since 2009.

 SIA researchers have been publishing this work in top international 

journals.

 SIA has collaborated with Chinese military hospitals for nanorobotics 

application research.657

 

652

“哈工大人工合成自驱动纳米机器研究取得新进展” [HIT Created Self-Propelling Nano Robot Achieves New 

Progress], 中国表面处理网, July 24, 2014, accessed June 6, 2016,

http://info.pf.hc360.com/2014/07/240932468243.shtml.

653

“国际合作” [International Cooperation], Harbin Institute of Technology Faculty Resources 哈尔滨工业大学教

师个人主页, accessed June 6, 2016, http://homepage.hit.edu.cn/pages/heqiang.

654

“港媒:中外科学家成功研发可拿起纳米物体机器人” [Hong Kong Media: Foreign and Chinese Scientists 

Succeeds in Developing a Robot that Can Pick Up a Nano Body], Cankao Xiaoxiwang 参考消息网, November 30, 

2015, accessed June 6, 2016, http://news.163.com/15/1130/11/B9LSHA4Q00014AEE.html; “Hong Kong media: 

Chinese and foreign scientists have successfully developed a robot can pick up the nano-objects” Netease 

International News, November 30, 2015, accessed June 6, 2016, http://www.88p4.com/2015/11/30/hong-kongmedia-chinese-and-foreign-scientists-have-successfully-developed-a-robot-can-pick-up-the-nano-objects135021.html; Guo Xiang, Li Zhijia (Trans.), Jonathan Wylie (Ed.), “HIT makes great progress in the field of 

synthetic self-driven nano-machines” HIT News, July 31, 2014, accessed June 6, 2016,

http://en.hit.edu.cn/snews.asp?id=743.

655

“哈尔滨工业大学微纳米技术研究中心” [Harbin Institute of Technology Micro-Nano Technology Research 

Center], Baidu Encyclopedia 百度百科, accessed June 6, 2016, http://baike.baidu.com/view/6495596.htm.

656 “Sub-Nuclear Nano Robotic Manipulation Based on Scanning Electron Microscope Vision Serve,” Institute of 

Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences, accessed June 6, 2016, 

http://english.ia.cas.cn/rh/pro/201604/t20160415_161917.html.

657

“‘纳米操作机器人在癌症靶向治疗中的应用研究’取得新进展获权威刊物封面刊载” [‘Applied Research on 

Nano Operator Robots to Cure Cancer Targets’ Achieves New Progress in Authoritative Publication on Cover], 

Shenyang Institute of Automation Chinese Academy of Sciences 中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所, November 16, 

2011, accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.sia.cn/xwzx/kydt/201111/t20111116_3396890.html; “Drug-Induced 

Changes of Topography and Elasticity in Living B Lymphoma Cells Based on Atomic Force Microscopy” 

ScienceNet 科学网, May 29, 2012, accessed June 8, 2016, http://doc.sciencenet.cn/DocInfo.aspx?id=11470; Zhang 

Weijing, “纳米操作机器人治疗淋巴瘤获进展” [Nano Operator Robot Treats Lymphoma and Achieves Progress], 

Acta Physico-Chimica Sinica 物理化学学报, May 29, 2012, accessed June 8, 2016, 

http://news.sciencenet.cn/htmlpaper/201252915252947924670.shtm; “Drug-Induced Changes of Topography and 

Elasticity in Living B Lymphoma Cells Based on Atomic Force Microscopy” Acta Physico-Chimica Sinica, 物理化

学学报, vol.28, no. 6 (2012), accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.whxb.pku.edu.cn/EN/abstract/abstract28019.shtml;

“沈阳自动化所利用纳米操作机器人靶向治疗淋巴瘤获进展” [Shenyang Institute of Automation Uses Nano 
133

Nankai University Center 

for Nanoscale Science and 

Technology

南开大学纳米科学与技术

研究中心

 In 2016, researchers constructed an intelligent swimming nanobot out of 

polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) and graphene that was able to “swim” at 

a speed of 5.02 millimeter per second.658

Soochow University Robot 

and Microsystem Research 

Center

苏州大学机器人与微系统

研究中心

and Jiangsu Key 

Laboratory for Advanced 

Robotics Technologies

江苏省先进机器人技术重

点实验室

 One of the center’s focuses of nanotechnology and advanced 

manufacturing research is micro and nanorobotics equipment and 

research.659

 Researchers from the center have published articles in Chinese journals 

on piezoelectrics in nanoscale nano-manipulation.

660

CAS Institute of Intelligent 

Machines (IIM)

中国科学院合肥智能机械

研究所

 Conducts research on intelligent nanodevices and nanomaterials as well 

as sensors and actuators.

661

 Has published research on “robotic skin” and nanoscale sensors.

662

 

Operator Robot to Treat Lymphoma and Achieves Progress], Shenyang Institute of Automation 沈阳自动化研究所, 

May 28, 2012, accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.cas.cn/ky/kyjz/201205/t20120525_3585654.shtml.

658 weijunjie [sic], “石墨烯/PVDF: 造就会游泳的机器人” [Graphene/PVDF: Creating a Swimming Robot], Tongji 

University, April 25, 2016, accessed June 8, 2016, http://qgwang.tongji.edu.cn/News/details/145; Xiao Peishuang, 

Yi Ningbo, Zhang Tengfei, Huang Yi, Chang Huicong, Yang Yang, Zhou Ying, Chen Yongsheng, “Construction of 

a Fish-like Robot Based on High Performance Graphene/PVDF Bimorph Actuation Materials” WILEY-VCH Verlag 

GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim, March 31, 2016, accessed June 8, 2016, 

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/advs.201500438/abstract.

659

“机器人与微系统研究中心” [Robot and Microsystem Research Center], Research Institute of Advanced 

Manufacturing Technology, Soochow University 苏州大学先进制造技术研究院, accessed June 8, 2016, 

http://riamt.suda.edu.cn/cn/ShowPage.aspx?id=611.

660 Zhong Bowen, Wang Zhenhua, Chen Liguo, Sun Lining, “Current Development of Trans-Scale Precision 

Positioning Technology Based on the Stick-Slip Effect” [基于粘滑驱动跨尺度精密定位技术的研究现状]” 

Piezoelectrics & Acoustooptics [压电与声光], 2011.

661

“智能微纳器件研究室” [Intelligent Micro Nano Device Laboratory], Chinese Academy of Sciences Institute of 

Intelligent Machines 中国科学院合肥智能机械研究所, accessed July 12, 2016,

http://www.iim.cas.cn/jgsz/znwnqj/.

662 Huang Ying 黄英, Miao Wei 缪伟, Li Leiming 李雷鸣, Cai Wenting 蔡文婷, Yang Qinghua 杨庆华, and Ge 

Yunjian 葛运建, “三维力柔性触觉传感器电极研究与实验” (Research and Experiment of Electrodes for 3D Force 

Flexible Tactile Sensor), Journal of Electronic Measurement and Instrument 电子测量与仪器学报, no.1 (2013).