### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs A ugus t 13
, 200 3

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JEFF ERY LEE MA SON

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Giles County

No. 10123 Stella Hargrove , Judge

No. M2002- 01709-CCA -R3-C D - F iled May 19, 2004

Hay es, Da vid G., J udg e, dissenting

I am unable to join wit h the m ajority in concluding that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to support the de fe nd a nt’ s c on vic tio n f or a tte mpt ed vo lu nta

ry ma ns la ug hte r a nd that a n in str uc tio n o n th is offe n s e wa s warr anted unde r the fa cts of this case . I find nothing in the r ecor d which esta blishes that, at t h e t i me of the a ttempted homicide, the def endant wa s “in a state of

passion produce d by adequate provoc ation sufficie nt to lead a rea sonable person to a ct in a n irrational manne r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 211(a) (2003). Accor dingly
, I respe ctfully dissent on the m ajority ’s applica tion of both the law a nd fac ts.

Preliminarily , I

note that the def

endant r equeste d that the jury b e i n s t ructed only on the indicted offe nse of a ttempted first deg ree murder a nd misdemeanor rec kless endang erme nt, as the only lesser included offe nse established by the evidenc e. Ove r the objec tion of the defe ndant, the trial court, in ac corda nce w ith the State’s reque st, instruc ted on attempted voluntary manslaug hter. Thus, this iss ue is prese rved f or appe al. Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-18-110 ( 2003).

Appli cation of Fac ts

Whil e conc eding th at t h e convic ting e vidence “is at best only marg inally

sufficie nt,” the majority co ncludes that “ a subtle for m of provocation could have be en infe rre d by the jury .” The

ma jority op ine s th a t, b y

virtue of the de fe nd a nt’ s st a tus a s a sha c kle d an d ha nd c uf fe d pri so ne r, the se fac ts could permit a finding of provoc ation by the jury
, “at least by

a subjec tive understanding of the term.” Provoc ation, howeve r, is s ta tu to ril y g o v e rn e d b y an objec tive or “r easona

ble per son” standar d

no t by a su bje c tiv e on e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 13 -2 11 . M or e ov e r, to r e a c h th is c on c lus ion wo uld require pure spe culation bec ause, acc ording to the testimonyof De puty Gra ves, the de fenda nt was

c o o p e r a ti v e th r o u g h o u t th e p r o c e d u r e a n d th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e th a t h e w a s p r o v o ked bybeing shackle d and handc uffe d. Testimony established that the defenda nt esca ped bec ause he did not like jail conditions, and the majority conclude s that this circumstance also supports provoca tion.-2-

Howeve r, I

find that, if anything, this shows that the def endant’ s actions we re deliberate and calc ulated. While the defe ndant may have be en ang ry , ang er to re duce a n unlawful homicide to the deg ree of vol untary manslaug hter, must be ange r produced by adequate provoc ation. Hargrove v

. State, 281 S.W .2d 692, 698 (Tenn. 1955)

.

I f the fa c ts o f this c a se ri se to a le ve l of ad e qu a te pr ov oc a tio n, the n p ro vo c a tio n w ou ld e xist in a lmo st e ve ry se t of c ir c ums ta nc e s in e ve ry ho mic ide pr os e c uti on

. To fi nd pr ov oc a tio n in this c a se would requ i re the finding that the deputy in the perf

ormanc es of his duties as a law enf orce ment office r provoke d the def

endant into attac king him.

Appli cation of L aw

I n finding the instruction on attempted voluntary manslaug hter wa rra nted, the majority

relies
upon State v. Me llons , 557 S.W .2d 497 (T en n

. 1 9 7 7 ), and Sta te v . D av is, 751 S.W .2d 167 (Tenn. Cr i m

. Ap p

. 1 988). These case s, as observe d by the majority , permit a c onviction to stand where the r e i s N O e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e e l e m e n t s o f t h e l e s s e r i n c l u d e d c o n v i c t i o n , a s l o n g a s t h e re is proof of the g rea ter c rime for

which the de fendan t wa s char g ed. Da v is relies e ntirely upon the Mellon ’s holding. Mellons pr e da te s Jack son v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 3 1 5, 99 S.Ct . 2781, 2789 (1979), a nd Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e)
, both of which re quire pr o o f o f t he esse ntial elements of the convicted offe nse bey ond a re asonable doubt. Additionally , the ra tionale of Mellons wa s e xpre ssl y predicat ed u pon then Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 40-2520, w hich was r epea led in 1979. The Supreme Court in Jack

son v. Virginia denounce d the “no evidenc e” rule, finding that application of this rule viol ates a defe ndant’s due proce ss rig hts because the rule “is simplyinadequa te to protec t ag ainst misapplications of the consti tutional standard of r easona ble doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U. S. a t 32 0, 99 S. Ct . a t 27 89 . A c c or din g ly , I fi nd that Da v is and Me llo ns w e r e o v e rruled s ub sil e nti o by

the holding in Jack

son v. Virginia. I n this state, provoca tion is an e le me nt o f the of fe ns e of voluntary

manslaug hter

, and proof

to convict m ay not be merely marg inal but is required be y ond

a re a so na ble do ub t. T e nn . Co de An n. § 3 9- 11 -2 01 (2 00 3) ; see also Mullaney v. W ilbur , 4 21 U. S. 68 4, 95 S. Ct. 18 81 (1 97 5) (s ta te ma y no t sh if t bu rd e n of pr oo f to the de fe nd a nt, a s due pro ces s require s state to prove e lements of the of fense bey ond a re asonable doubt).

Clearly , the lesser

included test of Me llo ns does not comport with our c urre n t test in Sta te v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 454 (Tenn. 1999) . The majority summarily

notes t h at attempted voluntary manslaug hter is a lesse r included offe nse of attempted first deg ree murder unde r the Bu rn s te st. Th is
sta te me nt a nd the a na ly sis wh ic h f oll ow s le a ve the c le ar i mpl ic a tio n th a t vo lun tary ma ns la ug hte r i s

a le s s e r o f

f e n s e u n d e r p ar t ( a ) o f

the Burns t es t and should, theref ore, be char g ed in eve ry

case

. Howeve r, it is well settled that voluntary m an s l au gh t er is a lesser inc luded offe nse of f irst deg ree murder unde r part (b) of the Burns test and, there fore , an instruction shou l d b e gi v en only if (1)

re a so na ble min ds c ou ld a c c e pt the of fe ns e a s a les ser in clude d a nd (2 ) the e vid e nc e is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support a conviction for the lesser inc luded offe nse. Burns , 6 S.W. 3d a t 46 9; se e als o State v. Dominy , 6 S.W. 3d 47 2, 47 7 n .9 , ( Te nn . 1 99 9) ; State v. K en n eth Anthony He nderson , No. M1 99 9- 00 54 7- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn. Cr im. Ap p. a t N a sh vil le , A pr . 1 1, 20 02 ); State v. W illiam Binkley

, No. M2001-00404-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App. at Na shville, Apr. 5, 2002); (ea ch of-3-

these c ases e x pressly

holds that voluntary

manslaug hter is a lesser included offe nse of first deg ree murder under part (b) of the Burns te st)

. Th e “ a lte rn a tiv e me a ns ” a na ly sis uti lize d b y the ma jority in affir ming the c onviction applied the Me llo ns test and found that, although there was littl e or no evi den ce of prov oc a tio n b y the de fe nd a nt, the re wa s p ro of of the g re a te r c ri me of

a tte mpt e d f

ir st deg ree murder a nd, there fore , the conviction could stand. This a naly sis ignore s the fac t that, under Mellons
, all lesser offe nses would fa ll under part (a) of the Bu rn s test. Mellons had no provision for (b) or (c) Burns lesser inc luded offe nses. Under Mellons proof of the g rea ter off ense pr oved the lesser, how ever , under Burns this is not nece ssarily true for lesser of fense s under pa

rts (b) a nd (c)

. The majority notes, “The Tenne ssee Constitution i s unique in that in criminal case s, the jury is the judge of the law and the f acts.” I n its complete form, Article I , section 19 states that the “the jury sh a ll h a ve a

ri g ht t o d e te rm ine the la w an d the fa c ts, un de r the dir e c tio n of the c ou rt [.]” Th is does not mean that “the judge should tell the jury that this is t he law but y ou don’t have to pay any attention to it if y ou don’t want to.” W righ t v. State, 394 S.W .2d 883, 884 (T e nn . 1 96 5) . T his

se c tio n o f o ur

c on sti tut ion pla c e s th e re sp on sib ili ty fo r sa fe g ua rd ing the int e g ri ty

of the jury tr ia l in the hands of the trial cou rt

. T his includes withholding lesser offe nses from the jury

when the evidenc e is not leg ally

sufficie nt to support a conviction for suc h offe nse.

I n this case , the majority

conclude s that the evidenc e would have supported a c onviction for
att em p t ed fi rst deg ree murder or attempted sec ond deg ree murder. I fully ag ree . Howeve r, by striving to uphold this conviction based upon a 1977 decision which totally conflicts with pre sent day jurisprudenc e, the major ity only invites further c onfusion at the trial c ourt level.

I n all other re spects, I

ag ree

.



### ______________________________

DAVID G. H AYES, JUDGE