18-2389

Meihua v. Barr

BIA

Loprest, IJ

A087 403 415

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED 

AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS 

COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX 

OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A 

PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY 

NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand twenty.

PRESENT:

ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

STEVEN J. MENASHI,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

NI MEIHUA,

Petitioner,

v. 18-2389

NAC

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: John S. Yong, New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney 

General; Jonathan Robbins, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; D. Nicholas 

Harling, Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, United 
2

States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 

AND DECREED that this petition for review of a decision of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is DENIED.

Petitioner Meihua Ni, 1 a native and citizen of the 

People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a July 23, 2018

decision of the BIA affirming an August 17, 2017 decision of 

an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her asylum application.2 

In re Ni Meihua, No. A087 403 415 (B.I.A. Jul. 23, 2018), 

aff’g No. A087 403 415 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 17, 2017). 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts 

and procedural history.

“Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s reasoning and 

offers additional commentary, we review the decision of the 

IJ as supplemented by the BIA.” Wala v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 

102, 105 (2d Cir. 2007). The applicable standards of review 

are well established. “We review the BIA’s legal conclusions 

de novo, and its factual findings . . . under the substantial 

1 Petitioner’s name, Meihua Ni, is transposed in the agency’s 

decisions as Ni Meihua. We refer to her in this order as “Ni.”

2 Ni also applied for withholding of removal and relief under the 

Convention Against Torture, but did not appeal those denials to 

the BIA, nor does she challenge them in the present petition.
3

evidence standard.” Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d 

Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

Absent past persecution, a noncitizen may establish 

eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear 

of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2); 

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004). 

To do so, an applicant must show either a reasonable 

possibility that she will be singled out for persecution or 

that the country of removal has a pattern or practice of 

persecuting similarly situated individuals. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 737, 741 

(B.I.A. 2005) (explaining that a pattern or practice of 

persecution is the “systemic or pervasive” persecution of a 

group).

The agency reasonably found that Ni did not show that 

she will be targeted for persecution. First, she did not 

provide any evidence that Chinese authorities were aware of 

her religious practice in the United States. See Hongsheng 

Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]o 

establish eligibility for relief based exclusively on 

activities undertaken after [her] arrival in the United 
4

States, an alien must make some showing that authorities in 

[her] country of nationality are (1) aware of [her] activities 

or (2) likely to become aware of [her] activities.”). Second, 

the agency reasonably afforded minimal weight to the unsworn 

letters from Ni’s relatives in China stating that the police 

sought to arrest her for distributing religious materials in 

2011. See Y.C., 741 F.3d at 334 (deferring to agency’s 

decision to give little weight to unsworn letter from 

applicant’s spouse in China that alleged authorities were 

looking for the applicant). Those letters lacked detail to 

substantiate the claim that police still sought to arrest Ni. 

Thus, given the “absence of solid support in the record” that 

Chinese authorities will target Ni for her Christian practice 

in this country or for her distribution of religious materials 

in China in 2011, her “fear is speculative at best.” Jian 

Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005).

The agency also reasonably concluded that Ni did not show 

a pattern or practice of persecution in Fujian Province of 

Christians, like Ni, who do not hold positions of prominence 

or high visibility within their congregations. The agency 

relied on the State Department’s 2015 International Religious 

Freedom Report, which states that approximately 45 million 
5

Christians practice in unregistered churches in China, and 

authorities in some areas allow unregistered churches to hold 

services, although authorities in other areas target and 

close such churches. The report does not identify Fujian 

Province as an area where Christians are targeted. Given the 

large number of Christians practicing in unregistered 

churches, the fact that restrictions on their activities vary 

by region, and the lack of evidence that Christians in Fujian 

Province face heightened restrictions, the agency did not err 

in determining that Ni did not establish a pattern or practice 

of persecution of similarly situated Christians. See 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii); Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & 

n.1 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of pattern or practice 

claim where evidence reflected that violence was not 

nationwide and that Catholics in many parts of Indonesia were 

free to practice their faith); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 

F.3d 138, 149, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in 

requiring locality-specific evidence where the record 

reflects that conditions vary by region).

Ni’s appellate arguments are unavailing. First, she 

urges us to take administrative notice of the 2018 Religious 

Freedom Report, but that report is not part of the 
6

administrative record and was not considered by the agency. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A) (limiting judicial review to 

“the administrative record on which the order of removal is 

based”). Moreover, even if the report were to be considered, 

it nowhere identifies “extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances” giving rise to a well-founded fear of future 

persecution. Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d 260, 269 (2d 

Cir. 2007); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c). To the contrary, the 

2018 report merely notes the one-day detention of a Catholic 

bishop and a surprise inspection of a kindergarten operated 

by an unregistered church in Fujian Province — neither of 

which amounts to widespread targeting of Christians in the 

area.

Second, Ni cites the 2010 Religious Freedom Report (which 

was before the agency) as evidence of local targeting of 

Christians in Fujian Province. But that report identified 

only interference with the funeral of a Catholic bishop and 

the detention of Catholic priests in Fujian Province, not the 

targeting of individual Christians, like Ni, who do not hold 

leadership positions. Thus, even in light of this report, 

the agency did not err in finding that Ni had not established 

“systemic or pervasive” persecution of similarly situated 
7

Christians sufficient to demonstrate a pattern or practice of 

persecution. In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741; 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 

stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,

Clerk of Court