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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

EDWARD CLYDE SILVIS 

 Appellant No. 525 WDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order Entered March 14, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-03-CR-0000007-1970 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED OCTOBER 7, 2016 

 Edward Silvis appeals from an order dismissing his petition under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq., which he 

styled as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm. 

 In 1969, Silvis was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to 

life imprisonment. The Supreme Court, on direct appeal, affirmed his 

conviction and sentence. Commonwealth v. Silvis, 284 A.2d 740 

(Pa.1971). He filed three unsuccessful petitions for post-conviction relief, 

the third of which resulted in a published opinion, Commonwealth v. 

Silvis, 452 A.2d 1045 (Pa.Super.1982). He remains in state prison to this 

day. 

On November 12, 2015, Silvis filed the present petition in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Forest County, Pennsylvania. On January 13, 2016, the 
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Forest County court transferred the matter to the Court of Common Pleas of 

Armstrong County (hereinafter “the common pleas court”), where Silvis had 

been tried and sentenced more than 45 years earlier. 

Silvis’s petition alleged that he should be released from custody based 

on what he claims is false information in his Department of Corrections 

(“DOC”) records. In particular, he complained about two forms. The first 

form, a Form DC-23B (“Sentence Status Change Report”) dated August 10, 

1988, stated that Silvis was sentenced for “Murder 1

st Degree”. The use of 

these words, Silvis asserted, was erroneous because his sentencing order 

did not include a degree of murder. 

The second form, a Form DC-16E dated November 5, 2004, listed 

Silvis’s offense as “CC2502-Murder,” which appears to be an abbreviation of 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, the murder statute presently in the Crimes Code. Silvis 

argues that he was not convicted under section 2502, and that this statute 

did not become effective until June 1973, after his date of sentencing. 

Silvis claimed that he was not challenging the legality or validity of his 

sentence but only objected to the DOC’s inclusion of “false” information in its 

data system. But at the same time, Silvis asked the court to order the DOC 

either to correct the information to match his sentencing order or release 

him from custody immediately.

Noting that the respondent in the petition was the superintendent of 

SCI Rockview, where Silvis is imprisoned, the common pleas court deemed 

Silvis’s petition to be a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the DOC to 
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change items of information in its data system concerning Silvis’s 

imprisonment. The common pleas court held that it lacked jurisdiction to 

order the DOC to take any steps, and that Silvis’s sole remedy was to file a 

petition for mandamus in the Commonwealth Court. 

On March 17, 2016, the common pleas court entered an order 

dismissing Silvis’s petition. Silvis filed a timely notice of appeal, and both 

Silvis and the common pleas court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Silvus raises two issues in this appeal: 

1. Whether [Silvis] was denied his constitutional right to a writ 

of habeas corpus? 

2. Whether the trial court erred and abused its discretion when 

it failed to consider unlawful detention on writ of habeas corpus

but instead without jurisdiction [held] a post conviction hearing? 

Brief For Appellant, at 5. 

Silvis styled his filing as a habeas corpus petition, and the common 

pleas court construed his petition as seeking a writ of mandamus against the 

DOC. We conclude, however, that Silvis actually seeks relief under the 

PCRA. 

This Court has explained: 

It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means 

of achieving post-conviction relief. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542; 

Commonwealth v. Haun, [ ] 32 A.3d 697 ([Pa.]2011). Unless 

the PCRA could not provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA 

statute subsumes the writ of habeas corpus. [Commonwealth 

v.] Fahy, [737 A.2d 214,] 223–224 [Pa.1999]; 

Commonwealth v. Chester, [] 733 A.2d 1242 ([Pa.]1999). 

Issues that are cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a 

timely PCRA petition and cannot be raised in a habeas corpus
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petition. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638 

([Pa.]1998); see also Commonwealth v. Deaner, 779 A.2d 

578 (Pa.Super.2001) (a collateral petition that raises an issue 

that the PCRA statute could remedy is to be considered a PCRA 

petition). Phrased differently, a defendant cannot escape the 

PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or motion as a writ of 

habeas corpus.

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 465–66 (Pa.Super.2013). Styling 

a petition as a habeas petition in lieu of a PCRA petition does not remove a 

petition from the subject matter of the PCRA, nor does it excuse a petitioner 

from complying with the PCRA’s requirements. Commonwealth v. 

Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 96 n. 2 (Pa.2001) (notwithstanding captioning of 

petition, claims only cognizable to the extent they would be cognizable under 

the PCRA); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 641 (Pa.1998) 

(PCRA subsumes habeas corpus and petitioner must abide by PCRA 

requirements). 

 Here, Silvis argues that the murder statute listed in his DOC records, 

18 Pa.C.S. § 2502, was not in effect at the time of his trial and sentencing -- 

and on this basis, he requests (among other things) his release from 

custody. This request indicates that Silvis is challenging the legality of his 

sentence, a subject within the purview of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(2)(vii). Therefore, we will treat Silvis’s petition as a PCRA petition. 

Before we address the merits of Silvis’s claim, we must determine 

whether the common pleas court had jurisdiction to review his petition. We 
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conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to review Silvis’s petition under 

the PCRA’s one-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b). 

Section 9545 provides that a petition “including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); accord Commonwealth v. 

Bretz, 830 A.2d 1273, 1275 (Pa.Super.2003). No court has jurisdiction to 

hear an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 

1076, 1079 (Pa.Super.2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Robinson, 837 

A.2d 1157, 1161 (Pa.2003)). A judgment is final “at the conclusion of direct 

review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United 

States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time 

for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3).

Three exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar provide for very limited 

circumstances under which a court may excuse the late filing of a PCRA 

petition. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1); Monaco, 996 A.2d at 1079. The late 

filing of a petition will be excused if a petitioner alleges and proves:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the 

result of interference by government officials with

the presentation of the claim in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the 

Constitution or laws of the United States; 

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were 

unknown to the petitioner and could not have been 

ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that 

was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United 
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States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after 

the time period provided in this section and has been 

held by that court to apply retroactively. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). A petition invoking an exception to the 

PCRA time bar must “be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have 

been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).1

 Silvis’s judgment of sentence became final on March 19, 1972, three 

months after December 20, 1971, the date our Supreme Court affirmed his 

judgment of sentence on direct appeal. The statute of limitations for filing a 

petition for relief under the PCRA expired on March 19, 1973. The present 

petition, filed on November 12, 2015, is untimely on its face. 

None of the exceptions in section 9545(b)(i-iii) apply to this case. 

Silvis does not allege that the government interference or newly acquired 

evidence exceptions in section 9545(b)(i-ii) apply to his case. Nor does he 

invoke section 9545(b)(iii), which affords relief when the right in question is 

a constitutional right that the United States Supreme Court or Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court has held to apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. 

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1

 The 1995 amendments to the PCRA also provided that if the judgment of 

sentence became final before the effective date of the amendments (January 

16, 1996), a PCRA petition could be filed within one year, or by January 16, 

1997. This grace period did not apply to second or subsequent petitions, 

regardless of when the first petition was filed. Commonwealth v. Thomas,

718 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa.Super.1999). Silvus filed several post-conviction 

petitions in the 1970’s and 1980’s, so this grace period did not apply to him. 
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 For these reasons, both the common pleas court and this Court lack 

jurisdiction over Silvis’s petition. 

 Order affirmed.2

 Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum. 

 President Judge Emeritus Ford Elliott concurs in the result. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/7/2016 

____________________________________________ 

2

 It does not appear that the errors that Silvus complains of entitle him to 

release from prison. Although his DOC records refer to a murder statute not 

in effect at the time of his trial and sentence (18 Pa.C.S. § 2502), another 

murder statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4701, was in effect at that time. Our Supreme 

Court’s opinion affirming Silvus’s judgment of sentence on direct appeal 

provides: “Appellant was tried before a jury which ultimately rendered a 

verdict of first-degree murder. After disposition of post-trial motions, 

appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment.” Silvus, 284 A.2d at 741. 

Obviously, Silvus was convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to life 

imprisonment, under section 4701. The clerical errors in his DOC records 

are harmless.