The FBI Fingerprint Identification

Automation Program: Issues and Options

November 1991

OTA-BP-TCT-84

NTIS order #PB92-157593
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The FBI Fingerprint Identification

Automation Program: Issues and Options--Background Paper, OTA-BP-TCT-84 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1991).
Foreword

The criminal justice process depends on quick and accurate identification of persons arrested for

violations of the law. Police, prosecutors, and judges need to know the extent of any arrestee’s

prior criminal record when making detention, bail, charging, and sentencing decisions.

Fingerprint identification is the most widely accepted method for establishing positive identification, and for linking an arrestee with any prior criminal record. Fingerprinting helps assure public safety by identifying repeat offenders who may need to be detained while a case is pending. It

also helps protect the constitutional rights of all persons who undergo criminal record checks—

whether arrestees or job, license, and security clearance applicants—by minimizing the chances of

misidentification.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has historically played a key role in providing fingerprint identification and criminal history records on a nationwide basis. But the FBI’s fingerprint

system is technically obsolete and incompatible with the many more advanced State and local systems. The FBI’s criminal history file is still not fully automated and complete—as many as half of

the arrests listed are missing information on the final disposition of the case.

OTA’s background paper assesses the FBI’s strategic plans to modernize and fully automate its

fingerprint identification and criminal history record system. The paper focuses on key assumptions that will affect the sizing and procurement of the new FBI system, and on other related steps

that appear necessary to ensure complete and up-to-date record systems. These include full implementation of a Federal/State/local partnership for maintaining and exchanging fingerprint and

criminal history records; enactment of an interstate compact or Federal legislation setting out uniform rules for the exchange of such records; standards and funding for improving criminal history

record completeness and disposition reporting; and privacy and security protections for electronic

fingerprint and record information.

This study was requested by Rep. Don Edwards, Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, House Committee on the Judiciary.

OTA benefited from discussion at a July 1991 workshop, comments on earlier drafts by many

law enforcement and criminal justice experts, and prior reports on this topic prepared by or for

criminal justice agencies. OTA appreciates the assistance of the FBI and Bureau of Justice Statistics; Federal, State, and local agencies that use FBI records; the FBI’s National Crime Information

Center Advisory Policy Board; SEARCH Group, Inc., a State/local consortium on criminal justice;

and groups concerned with the civil liberties implications of criminal justice record systems. The

content of the background paper is, however, solely the responsibility of OTA.

Director
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program

Workshop Participants

July 29,1991

Kenneth Bentfield

Office of Information Systems Management

Minnesota Department of Public Safety

Joseph P. Bonino

Records and Identification Division

Los Angeles Police Department

Bruce Brotman

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Gary Bush

Information Services Branch

Kentucky State Police

Gary R. Cooper

SEARCH Group, Inc.

Dennis DeBacco

Criminal Information Services

Nevada Highway Patrol

Lament Edwards

Criminal Justice Information System

Maryland Department of Public Safety

Gary D. McAlvey

Bureau of Identification

Illinois State Police

Maurice A. Ross

U.S. Department of Justice

Marc Rotenberg

Washington Office

Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility

Bernie Shipley

Criminal History Record Improvement Program

Bureau of Justice Statistics

Roland Sutfin

Information Systems Engineering

George Trubow

Center for Informatics Law

The John Marshall School of Law

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the workshop participants. The workshop participants do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse

this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

i v
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program:

OTA Project Staff

John Andelin, Assistant Director, OTA

Science, Information, and Natural Resources Division

James W. Curlin, Program Manager

Telecommunication and Computing Technologies Program

Project Staff

Fred B. Wood, Project Director

Administrative Staff

Liz Emanuel, Office Administrator

Jo Anne Young, Secretary

Karolyn St. Clair, PC Specialist
Reviewers and Contributors

James R. Amos

Bureau of Records and Information Services

Pennsylvania State Police

Kier T. Boyd

Technical Services Division

Federal Bureau of Identification

Robert J. Bradley

Division of Information Systems

Missouri State Highway Patrol

William C. Corley

State Bureau of Investigation

North Carolina Department of Justice

D.B. Cramer

Records and Identification Division

Pennsylvania State Police

Charles Cunningham

Identification Systems Section

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Jim Dempsey

Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights

House Committee on the Judiciary

Patrick J. Doyle

Division of Criminal Justice Information Systems

Florida Department of Law Enforcement

Gene Draper

Texas Criminal Justice Policy Council

Thomas E. Ewald

Defense Investigative Service

Pete Falcone

Civil Aviation Security Office

Federal Aviation Administration

Don Flynn

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Philip W. Gasiewicz

Federal Investigations Processing Center

Office of Personnel Management

Janlori Goldman

Privacy and Technology Project

American Civil Liberties Union

Jim Gildea

Enforcement Division

Immigration and Naturalization Service

Earl Gillespie

Criminal Justice Information Systems

Maryland Department of Public Safety

Owen Greenspan

New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services

Fred Hagan

Alameda County (California) Sheriff’s Office

John Hanby

PRC Inc.

Karen Hess

U.S. Border Patrol

Gwen A. Holden

National Criminal Justice Association

Jim Hoist

Interpol

Walter Johanningsmier

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mildred Jones

National Agency Check Division

Defense Investigative Service

Nolan E. Jones

Justice and Public Safety Committee

National Governors Association

Robert A. Jordan

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill Kardash

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

William G. Keller

Western Identification Network, Inc.

Stanley Klein

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

vi
. .

Gil Kleinknecht

Enforcement Division

[remigration and Naturalization Service

Dean Renfrow

Criminal Investigation Division

Oregon State Police

Arthur Law

IBM Corp.

Tom Roberts

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Valcocean Littles

Records and Identification Section

New Jersey State Police

James Sprung

MITRE Corp.

Charles Mandigo

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Douglas Smith

California Department of Justice

Anita Mauck

San Diego County (California) Sheriff’s Office

Phil Slowinski

Interpol

Ed McGuire

Management Control and Security Services

Bureau of the Census

John Sullivan

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

David Nemecek

Technical Services Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Arthur Thomas

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Tim Olech

U.S. Border Patrol

Enrico Togneri

Washoe County (Nevada) Sheriff’s Office

Julie Peternick

PRC Inc.

James D. Vaden

NEC Technologies, Inc.

Dallas G. Piper

Central Records Division

Michigan State Police

R. Lewis Vass

Virginia State Police

Fred Wynbrandt

Identification and Information Branch

California Department of Justice

James Pulio

remigration and Naturalization Service

Emmet Rathbun

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Virgil Young

Identification Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Art Rehkemper

Forensic Services

U.S. Secret Service

Joe Zahuronis

Inspection Service

U.S. Postal Service

Richard Reneau

Santa Clara County (California) Sheriff’s Office

NOTE: OTA appreciates and is grateful for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the reviewers. The reviewers do not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes

full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of its contents.

vii
Contents

Page

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... ...... 1

The Context for Ident Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Interstate Compactor Federal Legislation on Criminal Record Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

Criminal History Record Completeness and Disposition Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Standards for Security, Privacy, and Electronic Exchange of Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..1 5

The Ident Automation Strategic Plan: Critical Assumptions and Scenarios. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Assumptions About NFF/III Implementation and Criminal Justice Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17

Assumptions About Baseline Noncriminal Justice Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Assumptions About New Fingerprint Check Applications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Federal Agency Fingerprint Check Proposals. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Other Fingerprint Check Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Assumptions About Response Time .. ...................2 6

Assumptions About File Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Assumptions About Storage Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Cost, Schedule, and Staffing Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Illustrative Review of Ident Automation Costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Computer Matcher Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Building Construction Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Impact on Ident Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Composition and Training of Ident Workforce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Technical and Schedule Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Tables

Tables Page

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

State Plans for III Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Impact of NFF/III Implementation on FY2000 Daily Criminal Justice

Fingerprint Card Submissions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Projected Daily Noncriminal Justice Fingerprint Card Submissions, FY2000 Base Level ...............2O

Projected Total Fingerprint Card Submissions per Day, FY2000 Base Level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Possible Additional Federal Fingerprint Check Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

Possible FY2000 Targets for Fingerprint Card Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Range of Estimated Fingerprint Card Submissions Per Day, FY2000 ........................26

Number of Computer Matchers Required by Year 2000, as a Function

of Daily Fingerprint Submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Scenarios for Ident Fingerprint Volume, Staffing, and Office Complex Requirements, Year 2000...34

Scenarios for Ident Daily Fingerprint Volume, Response Time Matchers, and Cost...._........35

. . . Vlll
Boxes

Boxes Page

A. Why Automated Fingerprint Checks?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

B. A Year in the Life of a State AFIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

C. How the National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) Will Work ..........7

D. Cal-ID: An Early Success Story. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

E. Ident Automation: A Necessary Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Figures

Figures Page

1. Arrests Supported by Fingerprints in State Criminal History Files, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. Final Dispositions in State Criminal History Files, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3. Automation of State Criminal History Records, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

4. State-by-State Percentages of Automated Criminal History Records and Final

Dispositions, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

5. Total Volume of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to Ident by Type, 1981-90 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

6. Distribution of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to Ident by Type, 1990. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19

7. Projected Volume of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to Ident 2000.. ..........................25

8. Projected Number of Ident Computer Matchers, 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

9. Projected Number of Ident Personnel, 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

10. Projected Illustrative Ident Automation Costs, Selected Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

ix
Summary

Automated fingerprint identification and criminal

history records are vital for effective law enforcement

and criminal justice. These records also are increasingly used for a range of noncriminal justice purposes,

such as background checks of applicants for employment, licenses, or security clearances. Fingerprint

checks are essential to ensure positive identification,

detect or deter persons using aliases or phony identification documents, and protect the civil liberties of

arrestees, applicants, or employees.

Manual fingerprint and record systems are incapable

of meeting today’s needs for timely and accurate information. Many States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) have made significant progress over the

last decade in automating these systems. But the extent

of automation and quality of records varies widely, and

significant gaps in automation and record quality exist.

Criminal justice activities are being hindered as a

result. Proposed new national criminal record checks

will be difficult or impossible to implement until further improvements are in place.

Several events have combined to make the needed

improvements possible:

1.

2.

3.

4.

the extraordinary performance of automated fingerprint identification and computerized criminal

history records systems that has been demonstrated at the Federal, State, and local levels;

the recognition that automated systems and

improved record quality are needed to perform

“instant” checks of criminal records, e.g., when

booking and setting bail for arrestees;

the ongoing efforts to modernize the FBI’s Identification Division (Ident), linked with a move of

Ident from Washington, DC, to Clarksburg, West

Virginia; and

the growing consensus among criminal justice

officials on the National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) concept and

proposals to enact the necessary interstate compact or Federal legislation.

The NFF/III would reduce the duplicate fingerprints

and criminal history records currently received or

maintained by Ident. Ident would maintain only one

fingerprint card (or image) per offender per State and

no criminal history records (except on Federal offenders), but would provide an index of all offenders. The

NFF/III is, in principle, a sound concept for the

Federal/State/local partnership in criminal fingerprint

identification and criminal history record systems. The

time and resources required to implement NFF/III are

not yet known. The FBI and the Bureau of Justice

Statistics (BJS) need to make a detailed assessment of

implementation requirements.

Full NFF/III implementation requires, in addition to

time and resources, agreement on uniform national

rules for the interstate exchange of criminal history

information--especially when such information is used

for noncriminal justice purposes (e.g., employment and

licensing). The rules should cover who can have access

to what criminal history records for which purposes.

An interstate compact is, in principle, a sound concept

for enacting national rules. Questions remain, however,

about the content, timing, and feasibility of a compact.

The U.S. Attorney General and the FBI need to consult

with State legislatures and governors, as well as

Congress, to further refine the proposed compact,

develop a ratification plan, and determine under what

circumstances Federal legislation might need to be

considered in lieu of a compact.

Criminal history record improvement must be an

integral part of the NFF/III and Ident automation programs and may need to be included in an interstate

compact or legislation. The FBI is requesting funds to

eliminate a large backlog of unprocessed fingerprint

cards and dispositions over the next 2 years, and to

automate remaining active criminal history records

over the next 4 years. The Federal Government is providing grant funds for State/local record quality and

automation improvements in support of automated

firearm purchaser check initiatives. Ident could

develop a more comprehensive record quality program,

including criminal history audits by or for State/local

agencies and mandatory review and challenge procedures to protect the civil liberties of persons undergoing record checks. BJS and the Bureau of Justice

Assistance (BJA) need to develop a detailed State-byState record improvement and funding plan.

The NFF/III and modernization would enable Ident

to improve its service and regain leadership in fingerprint identification. This will require extraordinary

cooperation and support by the States, and substantial

funds from the Federal Government.

The Ident modernization program is the most costly

item on the Nation’s criminal record improvement

agenda—estimated at about $600 million in capital

investment over the next 4 years, including the new

building in West Virginia ($200 million) and its

-1-
2 Ž The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

automated equipment and systems ($400 million).

Technical advances and design modifications may

reduce costs, but the investment will still be large.1

The FBI has spent a year working on the strategic

plan for the Ident automation program. It will be the

basis for the design and procurement of the FBI’s automated fingerprint identification and criminal record

system. A well-executed strategic plan could ensure

that the technical system meets the needs in a feasible,

timely, cost-effective way.

The overall FBI technical strategy appears, qualitatively, to be sound. The Ident emphasis on the electronic scanning, transmission, processing, and storage

of fingerprints is appropriate, even though the full transition from paper to electronic will take years. The

emphasis on developing a common standard for the

electronic exchange of fingerprints, rather than a

generic fingerprint matching algorithm, is correct; this

assures compatibility with all Federal and State/local

automated fingerprint systems. The size of the planned

Box A—Why Automated Fingerprint Checks?

An automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) permits law enforcement agencies to run far more fingerprint checks than are feasible with manual processing. The payoff is greatest when comparing latent prints

(partial prints from a crime scene) against fingerprints of suspects or prior offenders already on file, and when

comparing prints of a suspect against those of persons wanted, charged, or convicted for offenses committed in

other jurisdictions.

Western Identification Network, Inc. (WIN) is a regional AFIS that serves the States of Alaska, California,

Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Fingerprint check results from the first months of

WIN operation highlight the value of automated checks:

Ž In Idaho, latent prints from a stolen and recovered police car were entered into the WIN AFIS, with no

match indicated. A week later fingerprints of a suspect in an unrelated case were checked against the WIN

database, resulting in a hit (a match between the latent print from the stolen car and the full fingerprint of

the arrestee).

Ž In Utah, fingerprints from an unidentified deceased 20-year-old person were entered into the WIN AFIS,

resulting in a match with the prints of a person in the Portland, Oregon, fingerprint file. Knowing the victim’s identify led police to a suspect who was subsequently arrested on murder charges.

• In Washington State, latent prints from the rearview mirror of a vehicle at the scene of a rape were entered

into the WIN AFIS, resulting in a fingerprint match and subsequent identification and arrest of a suspect.

Ž In Nevada, latent prints from the scene of a robbery and assault in Carson City were entered into the WIN

AFIS. The victim received serious head injuries and could not identify or remember anything about the

assailant, but the latent fingerprint check resulted in a match and subsequent arrest of a suspect in Virginia

City.

Ž In Wyoming, special agents arrested three suspects in Cheyenne on drug charges. Two of the suspects

claimed to be illegal aliens, but WIN AFIS searches identified them as repeat offenders with prior criminal

records in Utah and Nevada.

• In Nevada, the Washoe County Sheriff’s Office arrested an unknown person on charges of using stolen

credit cards to obtain money from teller machines. A WIN AFIS search identified the suspect as a repeat

offender with a prior criminal record in Oregon, which led in turn to an FBI record check indicating that

the suspect was wanted by the U.S. Secret Service, State of North Carolina, and District of Columbia for

fraud and weapons violations, and had arrests in seven States using multiple aliases.

Ž In Oregon, the State Police entered latent prints from a truck at the scene of an unsolved 1978 homicide

into the WIN AFIS, resulting in a match with the prints of a person in the Washington State fingerprint file

who was subsequently arrested.

SOURCE: Western Identification Network, Inc., 1990 and 1991.

l~e impact of automation on Operating ~ost~ is not known, although the ~1 is assuming that labor productivity will increase by 50 to 100 percent, thus significantly reducing the cost per fingerprint check.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 3

m

FINAL DWFO$llION

Photo credit: Federal Bureau of Investigation

A typical fingerprint card includes space for the rolled prints of each individual finger, flat prints of

both thumbs, and flat prints of the left and right four fingers. The card includes space for the name

and identifying information of the person being fingerprinted, the date and name of the official taking

the fingerprints, and arrest and disposition information if applicable. The fingerprints in this sample

were taken using a live scan fingerprint reader (using light or laser beams rather than ink). Trained

operators can take live scan prints with a quality equal to or better than inked prints.

system is reasonable, although the projected file size

and demand for fingerprint checks are still uncertain.

The FBI should design the system to accommodate

projected use plus some margin of error for unanticipated growth. States have found the greater risk to be

underdesigning new automated fingerprint identification systems, with demand typically exceeding design

capacity faster than expected.

Another potential payoff of Ident modernization is

improved processing of latent fingerprints. Latent

prints are single or partial fingerprints from door

handles, walls, firearms, clothing, and other items

found at or near the scene of a crime. The FBI needs to

design its latent searchable file to complement similar

files maintained by Federal and State/local criminal

justice agencies. Many States report that old and/or difficult criminal cases have been solved due to latent

matches that could not be conducted on a manual basis

(see box A).

The FBI should analyze the tradeoffs among volume

and type of fingerprint checks, file sizes, response

times, technical design, cost, schedule, technical risk,

number and type of employees, training needs, and

building requirements. These analyses are under way

and should be completed before the FBI procurement

process proceeds further so that the results can be used
4 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

by the Administration and Congress in making decisions on system design and funding.

OTA’s review suggests that the FBI could minimize

automation cost by

1.

2.

3.

ensuring that the NFF/III is implemented to the

maximum extent possible concurrently with

Ident modernization,

making realistic assumptions about the daily volume of new or expanded noncriminal justice fingerprint checks, and

adjusting the system design to defer or phase in

capabilities that may not be needed right away.

These actions, combined with technical advances,

could reduce the capital investment cost of Ident

automation by several tens of millions of dollars over

what would otherwise be required. The Administration

and Congress may need to allocate equivalent funds for

improvements in State/local automated identification

and record systems to support NFF/III, and for Federal

and regional automated identification systems that

complement NFF/III.

The current Ident automation schedule is tight and

allows little margin for error. Ident is proposing to procure a larger, more complex system than has been

installed by even the largest States, yet in the same

time frame as these States, and with the complications

of moving to a new building hundreds of miles away

from its current location in Washington, DC, relocating

existing employees, hiring new employees, and training virtually all employees.

The move does offer the prospect of a more stable,

higher quality Ident workforce, since salaries should be

more competitive, living costs lower, and commutes

shorter for employees living in the Clarksburg, West

Virginia, area. (Ident employees who do not elect to

move have been guaranteed continued FBI employment in the Washington, DC, area with no loss of pay.)

The move should help Ident break with the past and

establish a new, state-of-the-art facility with a reenergized workforce. The existing obsolete system will not

be moved but instead will be phased out at the present

location over a transitional period.

The FBI must skillfully use the design and procurement process to structure an advanced system with

acceptable risk. Requests for vendor information

before issuing the formal request for proposals, and

benchmark or prototype tests during the selection process, as planned by Ident, will help ensure a successful

procurement. The technical risk can be reduced and the

schedule better maintained by procuring the best commercially available technologies (existing at the time of

procurement), and conducting any remaining automated identification research and development (R&D)

work on a separate, longer term schedule.

The U.S. Department of Justice agencies involved

with criminal record systems and record quality

improvement—the FBI, BJA, and BJS—have an

opportunity to coordinate their efforts. Effective collaboration over the next 10 years could ensure that by

2000, the Nation will have a substantially automated

and complete criminal identification and record

system.
The Context for Ident Automation

There is widespread agreement among Federal,

State, and local law enforcement officials that automation of the fingerprint identification process is essential

to improve law enforcement and enhance criminal justice in the United States.2

Fingerprint identification is the most practical and

widely accepted method for positive biometric identification, and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable

future. 4 It is used to establish the identity of persons

arrested or who are otherwise involved with the criminal justice process (see figure 1). Criminal records tied

to fingerprints are used to track criminal cases from

booking through adjudication, and, where applicable,

through sentencing, incarceration, probation, and

parole. Many criminal justice decisions-e. g., charging, sentencing, and paroling—are based in part on a

defendant’s prior criminal record. Federal and State

Figure l—Arrests Supported by Fingerprints in

State Criminal History Files, 1989

25-40% 75-99 % 100% 

Percent of arrests with fingerprints

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

laws now require that repeat violent offenses and serious drug offenses carry longer, mandatory sentences

with reduced opportunity for parole.

Fingerprints normally are taken by rolling the inked

fingers over paper fingerprint cards that are then manually examined, processed, filed, stored, and exchanged.

This is a time-consuming and labor-intensive process.

Law enforcement agencies find, increasingly, that manual fingerprint identification is no longer workable.

Resources required for manual fingerprint checks often

exceed the staff and budgets available. Manual fingerprint checks can take too long for the law enforcement

action required, particularly if a full fingerprint check

must be conducted at the time of arrest, booking, or

bail decisions. Manual comparison of prints from a

crime scene with prints from a fingerprint file (known

as a latent print search) is difficult and frequently

impossible. Matching crime scene prints with those on

file is like searching for the proverbial needle in a

haystack—a job ideally suited for computers.

The Automated Fingerprint Identification System

(AFIS) is a proven technology. AFIS is based on computer matching or comparison of the digitized physical

identifiers from individual fingerprints (known as fingerprint minutiae).5 Most fingerprint cards processed

by computer are still rolled manually and physically

distributed or exchanged. Pilot tests indicate that the

live scanning of fingerprints (with lasers or light, not

ink) and transmission in digital form are technically

feasible. 6

The majority of States have some form of AFIS or

plan to implement an AFIS system (see box B). States

have found AFIS checks to be much more accurate,

faster, and more cost-effective than manual fingerprint

2&e, for example, T.F. Wilson ~d p.L. Woodud, SEARCH Group, Inc., Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems: Technology and policy

Zssues, NCJ-104342 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 1987); U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of

Justice Assistance (BJA), Planning for Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AF[S) Implementation (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, BJA, June 1988); National Crime Information Center Advisory* Policy Board (NCIC APB), III Ad Hoc Subcommittee, Identification Services

Task Group, Identification Division Revitalization, August 1989, available from the FBI.

Sunique hum~ descriptors such as retina scans, voice prints, and finge~rints.

dFOr discussion of biometric technologies, See U.S. congress, Office of Technology Assessment, llefe~lng secrets, S/zurirzg Data: New Locks

and Keys for Electronic Information, OTA-CIT-31O (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1987); Criminal Justice: New

Technologies and the Constitution, OTA-CIT-366 (Washingt~, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1988); and Genetic Witness; Forensic

Uses o~DNA Tests, OTA-BA-438 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990). Also see SEARCH Group, Inc., Legal and Policy

Issues Relating to Biometric Identification Technologies (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 16, 1989).

Ssee Wilson and Wcmdard, Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems, op. cit., fOOtnOte 2.

6Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Identification Division, Final Report of the Pennsylvania state po&/FBI Live-scan pilot Test, Aug. 31,

1990, and Final Report of the Internal Revenue ServicelFBI Pilot Test of Live-Scan Fingerprint Cards, May 31, 1990, both available from the FBI.

– 5 –
6 Ž The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Box B—A Year in the Life of a State AFIS

California has a State-wide automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS), known as the

Califomia Identification System or Cal-ID. Cal-ID

provides automated fingerprint and criminal

record services to local, county, and State law

enforcement and criminal justice agencies.

Cal-ID includes an AFIS database covering

arrestees and offenders, and an Automated Latent

Print System (ALPS) data base with a subset of

he AFIS database that can be searched against

latent prints from crime scenes.

1989 was a typical year in the life of Cal-ID. In

that year, Cal-ID:

• included fingerprint minutiae (for thumbs

only) on 6.26 million persons in the AFIS

database;

Ž searched 295,949 criminal fingerprints

against the AFIS database yielding 54,597

positive identifications (1 8.5 percent of

searches);

Ž searched 362,188 civil fingerprints against

the AFIS database yielding 14,758 positive

identifications (4.1 percent of searches);

Ž included fingerprint minutiae (for 8 fingers)

on 1.8 million persons in the ALPS

database;

• searched 7,372 latent fingerprints against

the ALPS database yielding positive

identifications in 646 cases (8.8 percent of

searches);

Ž identified suspects through latent searches

in 32 homicide cases, 33 narcotics cases, 33

robberies, 92 grand thefts, 9 sex crimes, and

9 assaults.

SOURCE: California Department of Justice, Cal@rrzia Identification (CAL-ID) System Remote Access Network

(RAN) Status Report: 1989-1990 (Sacramento, CA:

California DOJ, Division of Law Enforcement,

Bureau of Criminal Identification, 1990).

checks. 7 The FBI has its own custom-designed AFIS,

known as the Automated Identification System (AIS);

but the FBI’s system is obsolete and incompatible with

the AFIS systems used by the States. The average FBI

fingerprint check time is 15 to 20 work days (mail

delays can increase the average to 20 to 30 days) and is

too slow for many criminal justice purposes.

The FBI’s Ident revitalization program will upgrade

the AFIS technology and make it compatible with State

systems to provide a faster response.8 This modernization is a part of Ident’s planned move by 1995 from the

J. Edgar Hoover Building in Washington, DC, to

Clarksburg, West Virginia. State and local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies support the modernization of the FBI fingerprint identification

operations. 9

The Ident modernization plan is known as the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System

(IAFIS), and provides for the electronic transmission,

storage, and processing of fingerprints.10 During the

transition from paper to electronic formats, traditional

paper fingerprint cards will be scanned and converted

to electronic images. All processing and matching of

fingerprint images by Ident will be done electronically,

with verification by fingerprint examiners. Ident

expects that a significant percentage of fingerprints

will be received electronically during the early years of

IAFIS operation, but that full electronic transmission

will take many years to implement—primarily due to

limited State/local funding.

Several related key issues—besides technical design

and funding--can affect the modernization program’s

ability to improve the Nation’s overall criminal identification and record system. The Administration and

Congress may wish to include these topics as part of

the Ident modernization plan:

expeditious implementation of the NFF/III

concept;

. enactment of an interstate compact or Federal

legislation on criminal justice record systems;

. further improvement in criminal history record

completeness and disposition reporting; and

. setting of standards for security, privacy, and

electronic interchange of fingerprints.

7AFIS ~y~tem~ typically achieve 97_ to 98-percent accuracy, compared with 75-percent accuracy for the old Henry System of manual fingerprint

classification and comparison.

8FBI, Automation Program for Identification Division Revitalization, Aug. 30, 1990, available from the FBI.

9See minute5 of relevant meetings of the National Crime Information Center Advisory policy Board and SEARCH Group, Inc. Board of

Directors, available from the FBI and SEARCH Group, Inc., respectively.

IOFor a detailed overview, see FBI, Automation Program, Op. cit., footnote 8.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 7

The National Fingerprint record system. The debate has addressed a range of

File/Interstate Identification Index options, from a fully centralized FBI role to the sub-

(NFF/III) Concept

stantially decentralized system that exists today.11 The

criminal justice community generally supports the soThe States, the FBI, and others in the criminal jus- called NFF/III concept (see box C), in which the FBI’s

tice community have long debated their roles in a Ident would: 1) receive one fingerprint card per criminational fingerprint identification/criminal history nal offender per State (instead of several cards), 2)

Box C—How the National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) Will Work

For a typical arrest situation, the NFF/III will work as follows, using San Diego, California, as an illustration:

The arresting officer in the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department brings the suspect to the sheriff’s

office for booking.

 The suspect is fingerprinted and interviewed, to obtain his/her name and other identifying information.

The suspect’s name and identifiers are entered into the San Diego County Sheriff’s computerized criminal

record system to see if the suspect has a prior local criminal history record. If the suspect’s name matches a

name already on file, the suspect’s fingerprints are compared with the fingerprints on file to make positive

identification.

If the suspect’s identity is verified through a fingerprint match, then the name and identifiers (including

previously assigned criminal identification numbers) are checked against the California State Department

of Justice (DOJ) criminal record system and the FBI’s III to see if the person has a prior out-of-county or

out-of-State criminal history record.

If the suspect’s name does not match a name already in the San Diego County Sheriff’s criminal record

file, then the suspect’s fingerprints are searched against the local automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) database to see if the prints match anyone using a different name. If a match occurs, the suspect

can be positively identified at the local level.

If the suspect’s fingerprints do not match any prints in the San Diego AFIS, the suspect’s prints are then

transmitted to the California State DOJ in Sacramento for comparison against the larger State-wide AFIS

database. If a match occurs, the suspect can be positively identified at the State level.

If the suspect’s fingerprints do not match any prints in the State-wide AFIS, the prints are then transmitted

to the FBI’s AFIS in Clarksburg, West Virginia, to be searched against the FBI’s much larger fingerprint

database (known as the NFF). (Prints might also be transmitted to a regional AFIS, such as the Western

Identification Network, Inc., that serves California and several other Western States.)

 If an NFF match occurs, the FBI electronically notifies the California DOJ and San Diego Sheriff’s Department of the suspect’s true identify (including the FBI criminal identification number) that permits the

requesting agency to query local and State criminal record systems and the III. The FBI updates the III to

show that the suspect now has an arrest in California in addition to any other State(s) already listed. If no

NFF match occurs, the FBI adds the suspect’s fingerprints to the NFF, and adds the suspect’s name and

identifiers to the III.

The FBI’s NFF will contain one fingerprint per offender; States will submit, as a general rule, only the first

fingerprint per offender per State.

The FBI’s III will list the State(s) in which each offender has a prior criminal record, but will not include

the actual criminal record information, such as arrests and dispositions. (The exception will be Federal

offender records available directly from the FBI.)

 When the NFF/III is fully implemented, criminal history record information on State offenders will be

maintained and provided by the States-not the FBI. The traditional FBI rap sheet will cease to exist, but

instead will be an electronic composite drawn from individual States (and the FBI for Federal offenders).

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Department of Justice, San Diego County (California) Sheriff’s Department, 1990, 1991.

1 lsee U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, An Assessment of Alternatives for a National Computerized Criminal Histov Sysk’rn,

OTA-CIT-161 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1982); and FBI, Interstate identification Index Phase Three Test Findings June-July 1987 (Washington, DC: Nov. 30, 1987) and Interstate Identification Index Program: National Fingerprint File Operational Plan

(Washington, DC: July 10, 1990). Also see NCIC APB, Identification Division Revitalization, op. cit., footnote 2.

297-92o 0 - 91 - 2
8 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Photo credits: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991

An automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) speeds up the matching of latent prints from crime scenes with prints of known

offenders already on file. Latent prints are single or partial fingerprints from door handles, walls, firearms, clothing, and other items

found at or near the scene of a crime. The AFIS computer compares the latent print with the large number of fingerprints on file and

identifies any tentative matches. A fingerprint examiner then compares the prints on a computer screen to make the final match.

Left: A typical latent print on the left side of the screen is compared with a full fingerprint on the right.

Right: Latent and full prints are compared using a video display terminal and microcomputer keyboard. Print images are stored on

optical disks.

retain no criminal history information on non-Federal

offenders (except for basic identifiers such as date of

birth and race), and 3) maintain an index (the III) of

offenders with records in one or more States (but not

the criminal history records themselves). The NFF/III

is predicated on the basis that 60 to 70 percent of all

offenders are repeat offenders.12 These persons will

already have a criminal history record based on positive fingerprint identification, and will have State and

Federal identification numbers previously assigned.

The out-of-State records of repeat offenders would be

obtained from individual States by using III.

With full implementation of NFF/III, there would no

longer be an FBI “rap sheet” per se, except for Federal

offenders. Criminal history records on multi-State

offenders would be compiled electronically by combining the criminal records from each State. Each entry

into the III would be based on a positive fingerprint

identification using the NFF.

Assumptions about NFF/III will affect the design of

the Ident automation program. If fully implemented,

the NFF/III concept should significantly reduce the

number of criminal fingerprints submitted to the FBI.

The FBI currently receives duplicate fingerprint cards

for many offenders, either for repeat offenses within

the same State or for charging, sentencing, and correctional actions on the same offender. In some States, the

fingerprint cards are routed through a central source

(usually the State identification or criminal records

agency); in others. fingerprint cards are sent through

multiple channels. Some State/local agencies do not

send all fingerprints to the FBI, and some fingerprints

received by the FBI are rejected as illegible. The net

result is an incomplete fingerprint system.

Implementation of NFF/III should considerably

reduce the FBI’s criminal history recordkeeping. The

majority (about 80 percent) of criminal history records

maintained by Ident duplicate records in State criminal

justice repositories. Only about 20 percent of State

offenders have multi-State records. 13 Most record

activity is within the home States. The quality (completeness and accuracy) of Ident records is a major

12FBI estimate, 1991. ne FBI has assumed, for planning purposes, that 65 percent of offenders have multiple arrests.

13FB1 estimate, 1991.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 9

problem, because of disposition backlogs within Ident

and incomplete disposition reporting by States. States

face a major challenge as it is in maintaining highquality criminal history records on their own. Trying to

maintain complete and up-to-date records on about 24

million persons at the national level is even more

difficult.

For the NFF/III to work, each State should have

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

a central Statewide fingerprint identification and

criminal records repository;

centralized reporting of prints and records to this

repository;

single-source reporting, meaning that only one

agency per State—presumably the central repository-submits prints to the FBI;

a computerized criminal history records system

so that III responses can be provided electronically within seconds;

adherence to uniform rules for the interstate

exchange of criminal history records for noncriminal as well as criminal justice purposes; and

a basic AFIS capability (either at the State

repository or accessible via a regional network)

so that fingerprint checks can be processed

expeditiously.

Full NFF/III implementation thus would reduce the

demands on the FBI and the Ident automation program.

The NFF/III should significantly reduce the number of

criminal fingerprints submitted to the FBI; it also

should greatly reduce the number of criminal fingerprints and criminal history records maintained by the

FBI. Rejection or failure of the NFF/III, on the other

hand, would put greater demands on the FBI, since

Ident would need to process multiple duplicate fingerprint cards and maintain a large number of State criminal history records, as it does today. With partial

NFF/III implementation, demands on the FBI would

fall somewhere in between. In this case, the FBI

would, in effect, provide computer and recordkeeping

support for those States that did not have their own.

capabilities to participate in NFF/III. Only a few States

appear able to assume full NFF/III responsibilities by

1995. 14 Most States are not likely to fully participate

in NFF/III for 5 to 10 years or longer, unless additional

resources and incentives are provided.

Twenty-one States currently participate in III (not,

however, in the NFF). These States account for about

80 percent of the Nation’s criminal history records and

fingerprints. 15 The FBI is still maintaining duplicate

records and fingerprint cards for these States. The FBI

and Florida are conducting a pilot test of the full

NFF/III concept. Florida is submitting only one fingerprint card per offender to Ident, and most Florida criminal history records are being consolidated in Florida.

Florida is primarily responsible for responding to III

inquiries, but the FBI continues to be responsible for

residual Florida records maintained by Ident.

A successful Florida test would be a major step

toward full NFF/III implementation. It would help provide direction for the FBI and the other 20 States that

are III participants. Full NFF/III implementation will

take several years. A 1991 FBI survey found that 25

States plan to participate in NFF by 1995, and 7 additional States by 2000. A recent FBI update found that

State participation in NFF may proceed more slowly,

with as few as 9 States by 1995 and 20 States by

2000: 16

9 to 10 States by 1995, representing no more than

20 percent of total criminal fingerprint card submissions;

. 20 to 25 States by 2000, representing no more

than 50 percent of fingerprint submissions; and

all States by 2008.

Interim Florida pilot test results confirm the benefits

of III but also confirm the problems and complexities

of full NFF implementation that are likely to stretch

out the schedule.

The III, in contrast, is a proven concept, and State

participation is likely to progress faster. A 1990 FBI

survey (updated in 1991) found that 14 States, in addition to the current 21, plan to participate in III by the

end of 1993, and 4 States after 1993 (see table 1). Eight

other States plan to participate but have no definite

schedule, and three States have no plans or schedule.

The FBI believes that full III participation is possible

by 1995 or 1996.

Congress and the FBI may wish to include NFF/III

implementation as an integral part of Ident automation.

If so, then several further actions are necessary. First,

an interstate compact or Federal legislation would be

14According to estimates of the FBI and the NCIC Advisory Policy Board, Identification Services Subcommittee.

15 Based on the number of fingerprint cards submitted by the States to the FBI.

16FBI estimate, presented at the July 29, 1991, OTA workshop on the Ident automation program.
10 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Photo credits: Oregon State Police, 1991

The National Fingerprint File/Interstate Identification Index (NFF/III) would facilitate the accurate and speedy identification of persons

with prior out-of-State criminal history records. The NFF/III could be used for a variety of purposes—from reviewing the criminal records

of arrestees when setting bail, to checking firearm purchasers for felony convictions, to screening employment and licensing applicants

for disqualifying criminal records.

Right: The name and identifying information of a prospective handgun purchaser are entered into a local police computer system for

checking against local, State, and national criminal record files—including the Ill.

Left: The thumbprints of a prospective handgun purchaser are compared with fingerprints of prior offenders in a regional AFIS—which

in the future could be connected to the NFF. Here, a fingerprint examiner verifies a tentative match between the thumbprints of a

purchaser with those of a prior offender, in order to establish positive identification.

required to establish uniform operating rules and designate responsibilities needed to make the NFF/III work,

especially for noncriminal justice use of criminal history records. Second, this would require that the States

be willing and able to change State laws on noncriminal justice use to be consistent with an interstate compact or legislation. Third, a detailed assessment of current and projected State capabilities to support NFF/III

would be needed to ensure full implementation in an

agreed-to time frame. 17 This assessment should

include consideration of regional AFIS networks for

smaller States, such as the Western Identification Network that serves Alaska, California, Idaho, Nevada,

Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.18 The FBI

and BJS could collaborate with the States in preparing

a detailed State-by-State NFF/III implementation plan.

Fourth, Federal grant programs for State/local criminal justice record systems should be reviewed to

ensure that NFF/III implementation is given a priority.

Congress included a provision in the Crime Control

Act of 1990 requiring that 5 percent of Federal criminal justice block grants be used to improve State/local

criminal justice record systems. This could amount to

about $20 million per year starting in fiscal year 1992,

or perhaps $100 million total through fiscal year 1996

or $200 million through fiscal year 2001 (possible

milestones for significant NFF/III implementation).19

Fifth, the States would need to make up the difference

between their NFF/III cost and any Federal assistance

through tax revenues and user fees.

17T~~ recent sumey~ provide useful information, but me not by themselves sufficient for developing a detailed NFF/111 implementation plan. See

SEARCH Group, Inc., Survey of Criminal History lnforrnatiorz Systems, NCJ-125-620 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 1991), and FBI, survey of State needs and capabilities for fingerprint identification and criminal history record checks, 1991,

results available from the FBI.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 11

Table l-State Plans for Ill Participation

State Planned participation

Alaska. . 1991 (1 State)

Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas,

Kentucky, Nebraska, Nevada,

New Hampshire, North Dakota,

South Dakota, Utah, Washington,

West Virginia, and Wisconsin................ 1992-1993 (13 States)

Indiana, Maine, Mississippi,

Vermont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .After 1993 (4 States)

Alabama, Arizona, Hawaii, Iowa,

Maryland, New Mexico, Oklahoma,

Rhode Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No schedule (8 States)

Louisiana, Massachusetts,

Tennessee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .No plans to participate

(3 States)

aTwenty-one States already participate.

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1990, 1991.

Interstate Compact or Federal

Legislation on Criminal Record

Systems

If the NFF/III is fully implemented, and Ident no

longer maintains State criminal history records, the

interstate exchange of criminal justice information

could be impeded in the absence of uniform rules.

Agreement on uniform national rules for the use of

criminal records for nonjustice purposes is especially

important because about half of the requests for Ident

fingerprint/criminal record checks historically are for

such purposes-about 30 percent from Federal agencies and 20 percent from State/local agencies. Ident

currently handles these requests without regard for

widely varying State laws on noncriminal justice dissemination. Once the information is submitted to the

FBI, it is subject to Federal—not State—laws. State

laws differ on what types of criminal justice information (e.g., arrest record, convictions only) can be

disseminated for specific purposes (e.g., employment,

licensing). Current State laws would make national

noncriminal justice record checks incomplete and

perhaps unworkable, since the information provided

would be a “patchwork quilt” with some of the patches

missing.

Representatives of many of the State criminal justice agencies agree on a proposed solution to the noncriminal justice problem—that the laws of the requesting (or recipient) State should take precedence. For

instance, if California requested a criminal history

check for employment or licensing purposes on someone who had a prior criminal record in Arizona and

Texas, records would be used by California in

accordance with its law—not the laws of Arizona or

Texas. Similarly, if a Federal agency such as the

Defense Investigative Service (DIS) requested a record

check on a defense contractor employee with a prior

record in Maryland and New York, the State records

would be provided to DIS for use in accordance with

Federal law.

During the 1980s, two major criminal justice

advisory groups—the National Crime Information

Center Advisory Policy Board (NCIC APB, chartered

under the Federal Advisory Committee Act to advise

the FBI) and SEARCH Group, Inc. (a not-for-profit

State consortium on criminal justice information

policy)—and the FBI developed policy proposals

for the interstate exchange of criminal history

information. 20 These initiatives included rules on

criminal justice as well as noncriminal justice use of

criminal records and specified State and Federal

responsibilities for NFF/III implementation and oversight. The three proposals are similar in many respects

but have a few differences.

The SEARCH Group and FBI policy proposals covered both criminal justice and noncriminal justice use

of NFF/III, while the NCIC APB proposal was limited

to noncriminal justice purposes. All three proposals

included new advisory groups, but they differed in how

these groups would be formed and would operate. The

NCIC APB proposed that a new advisory group be

responsible only for noncriminal justice uses of

NFF/III, with criminal justice activities continued

18FOr fuflher information, see Bits & Hits, a newsletter published by the western Identification Network, Inc., 9343 Tech Center Drive, Suite

250, Sacramento, CA 95826.

19 States Co=ect]y point out that the 5-Prcent set-aside is not new money, and must be transfe~ed from other Stateflocal criminal justice purposes. BJA/BJS have not yet issued guidelines on qualifying uses of the grant monies set aside.

20For three interstate compact proposals, see SEARCH Group, Inc., “Interstate and Federal-State Compact on the Exchange of Criminal History

Records,” July 20, 1989; FBI, “Interstate Compact on the Exchange of Criminal History Records,” working draft, Aug. 4, 1989; and NCIC APB,

Interstate Identification Index Subcommittee, “Interstate and Federal-State Compact on the Exchange of Criminal History Records for Noncriminal

Justice Purposes,” final draft, Nov. 16, 1989, and revised final draft, Dec. 6, 1990. The FBI Director approved the NCIC APB draft on May 16, 1991,

and forwarded it to the U.S. Attorney General for action.
12 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

under the NCIC APB’s purview.21 The FBI withdrew

its proposal and supports the NCIC APB approach.

SEARCH Group, Inc., has also endorsed the APB proposal compact, even though some SEARCH members

prefer a broader approach.22

The NCIC APB, SEARCH, and the FBI have

endorsed an interstate compact to establish common

procedures for the interstate exchange of criminal justice information. The FBI Director has approved the

APB compact and forwarded it to the U.S. Attorney

General for action. Any compact would have to be ratified by State legislatures and Congress. If Congress

decides to make NFF/III implementation a part of Ident

automation, and if an interstate compact proves difficult to ratify, Federal legislation could substitute for a

compact. The FBI could ask the National Conference

of State Legislatures, National Governors Association,

National Criminal Justice Association, and other

appropriate organizations to survey the views of State

legislators and governors on criminal record policy.

The survey could include questions about the content,

timing, and feasibility of a compact, and preferences

for a compact versus legislation. The compact may

need to more explicitly addressed, for example, the

completeness of criminal history records exchanged

and the procedures by which persons can review and

challenge adverse record check results.

The FBI will have to make major decisions over the

next few months on the strategic direction of the Ident

automation program. If the FBI bases its automation

plans on full NFF/III implementation, it would have to

ensure that binding operating rules and responsibilities

would be agreed to on a timely basis—whether through

interstate compact or Federal legislation. It will take

time to adopt and ratify an interstate compact. A possible objective could be to begin the interstate compact

ratification process during the 102d Congress. This

would give the FBI a basis for planning, identifying

any substantive problems with the proposed compact,

and possibly formulating Federal legislation should an

alternative to the compact be needed.

Criminal History Record

Completeness and Disposition

Reporting

Congress and criminal justice study groups, most

recently in relation to the identification of felons

attempting to purchase firearms, have emphasized the

importance of record quality in criminal justice information systems.23 Incomplete or inaccurate criminal

history records can reduce the effectiveness of law

enforcement and the criminal justice process, and jeopardize individual rights. Record quality problems can

frustrate fully informed charging and sentencing decisions in criminal cases, and make it difficult to conduct

accurate criminal record checks on applicants for government employment or licenses, child care providers

or teachers, firearms purchasers, and the like, where

authorized or required by law.

The FBI did not, until 1990, distribute criminal history records for State/local noncriminal justice purposes when the record showed an open arrest (i.e., no

disposition listed) more than 1 year old. The FBI now

distributes such records, although with a warning that

applicants should be presumed innocent if no disposition is listed and should be given an opportunity to

challenge record information if used against them.24

This has not eliminated concern over possible civil

rights violations if incomplete records are used for

licensing and employment decisions. If records without

dispositions are not used at all, on the other hand, some

convicted offenders would be licensed or hired. Complete and accurate records are the only solution to this

dilemma.

The FBI continues to have problems with missing

dispositions, either because they are not reported by the

States or because the FBI lags in entering the reported

dispositions into the criminal history records. A significant percentage of reportable dispositions (roughly 30

to 50 percent) are never provided to the FBI. Ident currently has a backlog of about 2.5 million unprocessed

21 For fufiher discussion, see NCIC APB, “Interstate and Federal-State Compact,” Op. Cit., fOOtnOte 20.

22 See SEARCH Group, Inc., resolution dated July 18, 1991, available from SEARCH Group, Inc., 7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 145, Sacramento, CA 95831.

23See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers: [ssues and Options, OTA-TCT-497

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1991); U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Attorney General’s Program for Improving the Nation’s Criminal History Records and Identifying Felons Who Attempt To Purchase Firearms, NCJ-128131 (Washington,

DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, March 1991); U.S. Department of Justice, Task Force on Felon Identification in Firearm

Sales, Report to the Attorney General on Systems for ldenti~ing Felons Who Attempt To Purchase Firearms (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, Assistant Attorney General for Justice Programs, October 1989).

24FBI, Finge~fint Contributor Letter 90-4, “FBI Identification Division Services: one-year Rule,” Aug. 9, 1990.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 13

dispositions. Full implementation of NFF/III would

help solve this problem by getting the FBI out of the

business of collecting and maintaining criminal history

information-including dispositions-except for Federal offenders, and placing the responsibility for record

quality with the States.

Until that can be done, magnetic computer tape can

be used for disposition reporting, and additional staff

can be assigned to reduce the FBI disposition filing

backlog. Several States are submitting dispositions on

magnetic tape, with good success. The Attorney General has approved an FBI request for additional

resources to eliminate the disposition backlog over the

next 2 years, but this is a small fraction of total missing

dispositions.

Disposition reporting is also a problem at the State

level, although the States are a step closer to the

sources of dispositions (police, prosecutors, courts,

correctional officials) than the FBI. Many States have

taken various actions over the last decade to improve

disposition reporting and record quality and automation. Surveys estimate overall disposition reporting and

record automation rates of 60 to 70 percent, with some

States achieving higher rates and others lower (see figures 2 and 3).25 Whatever the actual rates, there is still

room for improvement.

Both OTA and the Attorney General’s Task Force

on Felon Identification in Firearm Sales concluded that

record quality problems are a major barrier to

implementing automated checks of firearms purchasers. 26 Federal law prohibits convicted felons from

obtaining or possessing firearms. If criminal history

records are missing disposition information, then it is

difficult or impossible to determine whether a person

arrested for a felony offense was actually convicted

and thereby disqualified from purchasing a firearm.

In recognition of the importance of improving criminal history record quality, the Attorney General authorized the expenditure of $9 million per year for 3 years

(FY91, FY92, FY93) in BJS/BJA grants to the States

for criminal record system improvements related to

record quality. These relatively modest sums appear to

be having a beneficial impact on the States. Several

States report that, in these times of tight State budgets,

even a few hundred thousand dollars in “new” money

can fund projects that are critical to improving record

quality. Typical projects include software upgrades to

automate disposition reporting, record quality audits,

and conversion of manual records to computerized

formats.

In addition, Congress included in the Crime Control

Act of 1990 a 5-percent set-aside of Federal criminal

Figure 2—Final Dispositions in State Criminal

History Records, 1989

Final dispositions as a percent of total arrests

within past 5 years

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

Figure 3-Automation of State Criminal History

Records, 1989

15

12

9

6

3

0

o % 1-50% 51-75 76-9 9 1 

Automated records as a percent of total records

SOURCE: Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group, Inc., 1991.

2% EARCH Group, Inc., Survey of Criminal History Information Op. cit., footnote 17. Also see OTA, Automated Checks of Firearm

Purchasers, op. cit., footnote 23.

26 See OTA, A~tomated Checks of Firearm pur~hasers, op. cit., footnote 23; U.S. Dep~ment of Justice, Attorney General’s program, op. cit.,

footnote 23; and Report to the Attorney General, op. cit., footnote 23.
14 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Figure 4-State-by-State Percentages of Automated Criminal History Records and Final Dispositions, 1989

Percent of records that are automated

!

I

I

I 1 1 I

Alabama

Alaska

Arizona

Arkansas

California

Colorado

Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

Georgia

Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois

Indiana

Iowa

Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

Massachusetts

Michigan

Minnesota

Mississippi

Missouri

Montana

Nebraska

Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

New Mexico

New York

North Carolina

North Dakota

Ohio

Oklahoma

Oregon

Pennsylvania

Rhode Island

South Carolina

South Dakota

Tennessee

Texas

Utah

Vermont

Virginia

Washington

Percent of final dispositions recorded

Washington, DC na

West Virginia 1

Wisconsin na

Wyoming 1

f 1 1 I

100 80 60 4 0 20 0 0 20 40 60 80 100

~

~ Percent of records that are automated NOTE : The percentages shown were estimated

 Percent of final dispositions recorded by State criminal record officials in 1989 and have

na Data not available not been independently verified or updated.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment and Bureau of Justice Statistics/SEARCH Group,.Inc., 1991.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 15

justice block grant funds (an estimated $20 million per

year, starting in FY92) for criminal record system

improvement related to record quality. This action also

reflected the recognition that automated record checks

of firearms purchasers require improved record quality.

The Senate-passed version of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1991 includes authorization for $100 million in additional Federal funds for State/local record

quality and automation improvements needed to support automated firearm purchaser checks. This Act also

establishes a nationwide minimum disposition reporting standard of 80 percent. This standard, if implemented, would modestly improve the national average

and dramatically upgrade reporting in States with the

lowest disposition levels (see figure 4).

Further record quality improvement actions could

be included in the Ident automation program. For

example, Ident could develop and implement a fingerprint identification and criminal history record audit

program. The FBI’s National Crime Information Center (NCIC) already conducts audits of State/local “hot

file” record systems (e.g., the wanted persons and

stolen vehicles files).27 Each State is audited about

every 3 years on a rotating basis. The audits include

compliance with NCIC procedures, related training

programs, and record quality of selected files. The

record quality audits include a comparison of the

entries in the NCIC national files with the corresponding entries in State/local files based on a random sample of records from each file. Incomplete or

erroneous entries and other discrepancies are discussed with the appropriate State/local criminal justice officials, along with remedial actions that may be

necessary.

Ident could conduct or require similar audits of

State/local fingerprint and criminal history record systems. The audits themselves could be carried out by

State/local auditing agencies, rather than Ident, with

Ident providing guidelines and reviewing the results.

The audits could include compliance with Ident procedures to be developed for use with the NFF/III and

automated systems, within the framework of an interstate compact or statute. If the interstate transmission

of fingerprints and criminal history records uses the

NCIC telecommunications network, then compliance

with NCIC operating procedures would likely be

audited as well. The audits also might include training

programs, as they do for the NCIC hot files.

Development and implementation of an Ident record

quality program need not wait on completion of Ident

modernization or NFF/III. The program could be in

place within 1 to 2 years, if it were assigned high priority and given adequate resources.28

An accurate and responsive criminal records system

today requires an automated system. Both the FBI and

many States have gaps in the automation of their criminal history records (see figure 4). Ident still maintains

about one-third of its records in manual format. As part

of an effort to upgrade criminal record systems in support of automated firearm purchaser checks, the

Attorney General has proposed funds to begin to computerize Ident’s remaining manual records on active

criminal offenders.29 The FBI estimates, however, that it

will take 4 years to convert these records. The BJS/BJA

grant and set-aside funds can be used for similar

upgrades at the State/local levels. These improvements

will help facilitate the interstate exchange of criminal

history information for a wide variety of purposes.

Standards for Security, Privacy, and

Electronic Exchange of Fingerprints

Fingerprint identification files and criminal history

records maintained by Ident are perhaps even more

sensitive than the hot files (e.g., on wanted persons and

stolen vehicles) maintained by NCIC. NCIC has developed procedures to protect the NCIC network from

unauthorized use, sabotage, and other physical, technical, and personnel security breaches. Only authorized

law enforcement and criminal justice personnel may

access NCIC. The NCIC APB places a high priority on

a secure, tightly controlled NCIC network. For this reason, the APB expressed reservations about proposals to

permit gun dealers (and other noncriminal justice personnel) direct NCIC access. Noncriminal justice users

may obtain NCIC information, but only for authorized

purposes and with access provided through authorized

law enforcement or criminal justice personnel. In addition, NCIC has procedures to protect the privacy of

NCIC record information, including III and criminal

history records transmitted over NCIC, by limiting

their dissemination to authorized persons.

27See NCIC audit reports for specific States, available from the FBI.

28Fu~l implementation of State.by-State audits and training could t~e longer, but the FBI should be able to define, develop, and initiate a record

quality program within 2 years.

29Re~ords on older, inactive offenders will not be automated.

297-920 0 - 91 - 3
16 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Similar security and privacy standards should be

included in the Ident automation program. If Ident uses

the NCIC telecommunications network for fingerprint

and record transmission, as planned, the NCIC standards would apply as they already do today to III/Ident

criminal history record dissemination. Security and privacy should be explicitly included in any Ident audit

program that may be developed. Ident should consider

issuing binding Federal regulations, or seeking legislation if necessary, to mandate procedures for persons to

review and challenge the results of criminal history

record checks used against them. This is especially

important so long as a significant percentage of records

are missing dispositions but are nonetheless disseminated and used for noncriminal justice purposes.

Review and challenge procedures also could be

included in an interstate compact; most States have

such procedures, although the specifics vary. State

record repositories could provide user agencies with

two copies of the record check results, one for the

agency and one to be passed on to the applicant, or a

copy could be sent directly to the applicant.

The FBI recognizes the need to design the Ident

automation program to be technically compatible with

State/local fingerprint identification and record systems. NFF/III implementation depends on the

exchange of fingerprints and criminal history records

among the States/localities and the FBI. Electronic

transmission is essential for timely, cost-effective

exchange. Technical standards for the electronic

exchange of documents such as criminal history

records are widely used in the computer and telecommunications industries. These standards are incorporated into State/local systems that interface with the

NCIC network and the National Law Enforcement

Telecommunications System.

All States use different formats for criminal history

records, whether manual or automated. This is a presentation problem and not a technical matter, and all of

the formats contain adequate information for most

criminal justice purposes. Nonetheless, efforts to standardize criminal history record formats are needed.

Standardized formats could be important for proposed

new record checks, such as automated firearm purchaser checks using III. The Virginia State Police, for

example, have found that out-of-State criminal history

records can be obtained through III in 10 to 15 seconds.

But because of differing record formats (and quality), it

may take 15 to 20 minutes or longer to interpret the outof-State records. This is longer than the State Police cart

reasonably hold gun dealers on the telephone line awaiting a record check on firearms purchasers. Initial

approval or disapproval decisions sometimes are based

on whether there is a III “hit” (a match between the

name of the gun purchaser and a name listed in the

index of criminal offenders), not on the content of the

criminal record. III entries may eventually be flagged to

indicate persons with felony convictions, thus eliminating the need to review detailed criminal history records

when checking firearm purchasers. But review of the

actual records would still be needed for many other

kinds of noncriminal justice record checks.

As for fingerprint transmission, the FBI is supporting an initiative by the National Institute of Standards

and Technology (NIST) to develop standards for electronic transmission of fingerprint images.30 Numerous

vendors and users are participating in the NIST standard-setting activity. The standard is intended to permit

the electronic capture of fingerprints (through live

scanning with video or laser units)31 and transmission

of the digitized print images to local, State, or Federal

agencies with automated fingerprint identification systems. The receiving agency could store the prints on

magnetic or—more typically—optical media, display

the prints on a computer screen, and print the fingerprints out on paper if needed. Multiple copies of fingerprints could easily be sent in later transmissions of

the electronic images. This process would make obsolete the time-consuming and error-prone rolled ink

copies and the mail or hand delivery required for duplicate (or triplicate) manual fingerprints.

Finally, the FBI has determined that standardized

fingerprint search algorithms, which would permit the

exchange of fingerprint minutiae among different

systems, are not needed. A standard or generic, nonproprietary search algorithm compatible with all major

vendor proprietary systems would be difficult to

develop. Successful implementation of the NFF/III

and Ident automation depends not on a generic search

algorithm but, instead, on standards for the electronic

transmission of digitized fingerprint images and related

information.32

30F~r ~ ~Pdate on ~rogres~ t. date, see FBI, “proceedings of the May 1991 Workshop on the Fingerprint Image Transmission Standard,”

cosponsored by the FBI and NIST.

31 Scanning Cm also be used to capture fingerprints of deceased crime victims.

32~1s vendors and users, the FBI, and the NIST have concluded that a generic algorithm is not feasible or necessary.
The Ident Automation Strategic Plan:

Critical Assumptions and Scenarios

The FBI has spent the last year working on a strategic plan for the Ident automation program. The

strategic plan will provide the basis for the design and

procurement of the FBI’s automated fingerprint identification and criminal record system. A quality strategic

plan will help ensure that the technical system meets

well-defined needs in a realistic, timely, cost-effective

way. Therefore careful congressional consideration of

the FBI’s planning process is needed. The FBI faces

several challenges in developing a strategic plan and

making key assumptions about

NFF/III implementation and criminal justice use,

baseline noncriminal justice use,

new fingerprint check applications,

response time,

file size, and

storage requirements.

Assumptions About NFF/III

Implementation and Criminal

Justice Use

The plan depends on assumptions about the implementation of NFF/III. If the NFF/III can be fully

implemented, including enactment of an interstate

compact or Federal legislation, then the daily volume

of criminal fingerprints received by Ident could be

reduced by as much as 50 percent or more from what it

would otherwise be. This reduction would likely be the

case even if there were an increase in the underlying

level of criminal activity.

Ident received about 17,900 State and local criminal

fingerprint cards per day in fiscal year 1990.33 (All

estimates of daily fingerprint card submissions assume

250 workdays per year-365 days less weekends and

holidays. 34) This number would increase to about

24,000 cards per day in 2000, assuming a basic underlying annual growth rate of 3 percent and no

implementation of NFF/III (see table 2). 35 T h e

volume would reach 29,200 cards per day in 2000,

assuming 5-percent annual growth. (Use of the term

“cards” includes fingerprint images as well, to the

Table 2—impact of NFF/III Implementation on

FY2000 Daily Criminal Justice Fingerprint Card

Submissions

Cards per day

State/local Federal Total

FY90 base (no growth) 17,900 700 18,600

With 3% a.g.

With no NFF/III . . . . . . . . . . . 24,100 940 25,040

With half NFF/III.......... 16,800 940 17,740

With full NFF/III............ 8,400 940 9,340

With 5% a.g.

With no NFF/III . . . . . . . . . . . 29,200 1,140 30,340

With half NFF/.......... 20,400 1,140 21,450

With full NFF/III........... 10,200 1,140 11,340

a.g. = annual growth.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

extent electronic submissions replace paper cards by

2000.) If the NFF/III is phased in over a 10-year

period, then this expected growth rate would be more

than offset by reductions in State/local criminal fingerprint card submissions. The maximum reduction would

be about 65 percent of the base in any given year after

full NFF/III implementation, since roughly that proportion of criminal offenders are repeat offenders whose

records (and fingerprints) should already be on file.

Thus State/local fingerprint card submissions could

decline from 18,000 per day in fiscal year 1990 to

about 8,400 per day in fiscal year 2000 with full

NFF/III and 3-percent underlying annual growth, or to

about 10,200 per day assuming 5-percent growth. If the

NFF/III is half implemented in fiscal year 2000, perhaps a more realistic scenario, the reduction would be

30 to 35 percent of the baseline growth. Under this scenario, State/local submissions would decline

marginally to about 16,800 cards per day in fiscal year

2000 with 3-percent underlying growth, or increase

modestly to 20,400 cards per day with 5-percent

growth.

Ident receives a small number of Federal criminal

fingerprint cards—about 700 per day in fiscal year

1990. This number would increase to perhaps 940 per

334.48 million cards divided by 250 workdays per year.

q41dent ~umently oFrates with a full day shift ~d one.ha}f evening shift Monday though Ffiday (except holidays), and with a skeleton staff

nights, weekends, and holidays to handle emergency requests and system maintenance. Ident assumes that the same basic staffing pattern will be used

with a fully automated system.

35 State/local ~fiminal fingewfint ~md submissions increased about 2 percent/ye~ for FY8 1-85, but 4 percent/year for FY86-90.

–17–
18 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Figure 5--TotaI Volume of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to ldent by Type, 1981-90

5

4

3

2

1

0

1981 1985 1990

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Identification, 1991.

day at an assumed annual growth rate of 3 percent, and

to 1,140 per day at 5-percent annual growth (which is

far greater than the historical rate36—see figure 5).

The total combined (Federal plus State/local) daily

criminal fingerprint card volume thus could range from

a low of about 9,000 with full NFF/III to a high of

about 25,000 with no NFF/III and 3-percent underlying

growth (see table 2). With 5-percent growth, the total

combined criminal fingerprint volume could range

from about 11,000 to 30,000 cards per day, again

depending on the extent of NFF/III implementation.37

The FBI’s crime statistics indicate that total criminal

arrests grew by about 3 percent per year from 1980

through 1989, and that serious crime arrests

grew by about 2 percent annually.38 Thus an assumed

3-percent baseline growth rate for the next decade should

cover likely increases in criminal fingerprint card

submissions generated by criminal activity. A 5-percent

baseline growth rate would allow for some further

increase in the underlying crime rate or in fingerprint

submissions for other reasons (e.g., new types of fingerprint checks, old fingerprints not submitted previously).

Since criminal fingerprints account for about half of

the total number of fingerprints received by Ident (figure 6), full NFF/III implementation should translate

into at least a 25-percent reduction in daily fingerprint

activity, other things being equal. Also, full NFF/III

implementation should result in a large reduction—as

much as 90 to 95 percent—in the size of the computerized criminal history file maintained by Ident. 39

Whether and when this reduction will be realized is

unclear, since it assumes that States will take full

responsibility for all of their own records, including

those currently maintained by Ident.

36The number of Federal criminal fingerprint card submissions grew only slightly over the last decade, fluctuating between 661 and 742 cmds per

day.

37The FBI questions whe~er full NFF/111 implementation will be realized in the foreseeable future, and has concluded that 5@percent implementation is the best that can reasonably be expected by 2000.

38 See U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, Crime in the United States: Unform Crime Reports 1989 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Mnting

Office, August 1990), p. 176.

39Even Writh full NFFflII implementation, the FBI is likely to retain responsibility for some older, less active or inactive records that are not maintained by the States.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 19

Figure 6-Distribution of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to Ident by Type, 1990

Federal criminal justice

SOURCE: Federal Bureau of Identification, 1991.

Assumptions About Baseline

Noncriminal Justice Use

The plan also depends on assumptions about growth

in current noncriminal justice uses of the Ident system.

Noncriminal justice fingerprint checks account for

about half of all Ident fingerprint card activity. Full

implementation of NFF/III might result in a small

reduction in noncriminal fingerprint submissions to

Ident, since a State’s own fingerprint files would occasionally have the relevant fingerprint, eliminating the

need to forward a print to the FBI. However, this

reduction is likely to be more than offset by underlying

growth in noncriminal justice fingerprint checks.

The total number of requests for noncriminal justice

fingerprint checks received by Ident from State and

Federal agencies has varied widely, but has shown little

net change over the last 10 years—the number was

about 3.7 million in 1981 and 4.1 million in 1990 (see

figure 5). Ident believes, however, that growth has

been artificially restrained due to policy changes and

increases in FBI fees charged for noncriminal justice

fingerprint checks.40

The number of requests for Federal noncriminal justice fingerprint checks received by Ident grew only

slightly during the

State/local criminal justice

1980s, from 2.1 million (about

8,400 per day) in fiscal year 1980 to 2.3 million (about

9,200 per day) in fiscal years 1989 and 1990. Most of

these are for employment and security purposes. Federal agency officials expect no significant baseline

growth during the 1990s, since the Federal civilian

workforce is unlikely to grow, and the Federal defense

workforce may actually shrink.

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) conducts

background investigations for Department of Defense

security clearances (on military, civilian, and industrial

defense personnel). DIS conducts about 800,000 to

900,000 national agency checks per year, of which

400,000 include a name check and 500,000 include

both a name and a fingerprint check. Little or no

growth in such checks is likely during the 1990s since

any increases in investigative requirements should be

offset by reductions in total personnel. The Office of

Personnel Management (OPM) conducts background

investigations on Federal civilian employees (including

some civilians employed by the Department of

Defense). OPM requests about 250,000 to 300,000

criminal record checks per year, including name and

fingerprint checks. The volume of checks roughly corresponds to the personnel turnover rate.41 OPM anticipates no significant change in baseline turnover rates

or fingerprint check volumes during the 1990s (new

4t)In Jauw 1990, the FBI established a user fee of $14 per fingerprint check for Federal employment applications, matching the fee previously

established for fingerprint checks on State/local employment and licensing applications. In March 1990, the FBI raised the State/local employment

and licensing fingerprint check fee to $20. In October 1990, the FBI raised the State/local fee to $23 per fingerprint check, and the Federal fee to $17

per check. The FBI believes that the noncriminal justice demand for fingerprint checks will rebound; however, the price elasticity of demand is

unknown.

41 Estimated to be 12 percent of 2.2 to 2.4 million employees.
20 FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

agency-specific fingerprint check requirements are

considered separately).

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

conducts criminal record checks, including fingerprint

checks, on about 1 million persons per year who are

seeking to become permanent U.S. residents (legal

aliens) or naturalized citizens, or who are seeking asylum (primarily refugees). The baseline total has

increased slightly during the 1980s, with the exception

of a temporary larger increase (or bulge) due to an

amnesty program. INS expects the 1990s to be similar,

but with some increase in the base growth rate (due to

higher immigration), possibly augmented by another

temporary increase in 3 to 8 years when some of those

granted amnesty seek naturalization. INS also runs

about 220,000 fingerprint checks per year on persons

who are apprehended at port-of-entry inspection stations or by the U.S. Border Patrol (Ident counts these

as Federal noncriminal justice, although they obviously

have a law enforcement dimension).

DIS, OPM, and INS collectively account for about

90 percent of all Federal noncriminal justice fingerprint

checks. The composite baseline estimates project no

significant growth during the 1990s. Federal noncriminal justice fingerprint card submissions would grow

Table 3-Projected Daily Noncriminal Justice

Fingerprint Card Submissions, FY 2000 Base Level

Cards per day

Federal:

FY90 base (no growth)

With 1% a.g.

With 2% a.g.

With 3% a.g.

State/local:

FY90 base (no growth—

use FY88 peak year)

With 2% a.g.

With 3% a.g.

With 5% a.g.

Total:

FY90 base

Federal at 1% a.g., State/local at 2% a.g.

Federal at 2% a.g., State/local at 3% a.g.

Federal at 2% a.g., State/local at 5% a.g.

Federal at 3% a.g., State/local at 5% a.g.

9,200

10,200

11,200

12,360

7,200

8,800

9,700

11,700

16,400

19,000

20,900

22,900

24,060

a.g. = annual growth.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

from 9,200 per day in fiscal year 1990 to 10,200 per

day in fiscal year 2000, assuming a l-percent growth

rate (see table 3), or 11,200 per day in fiscal year

2000 with a 2-percent growth rate (sources of growth

above the base are discussed later). The assumed 1- to

2-percent annual baseline growth rate for the next

decade should be adequate, since historical growth

has averaged 1 percent over the last decade, and no

net increase in Federal personnel or contractors is

likely (again, new fingerprint check requirements are

considered separately). The INS base might increase

by as much as 4 to 5 percent per year by fiscal year

2000. But since DIS and OPM (accounting for about

60 percent of the Federal base) are likely to show

very little if any baseline growth, a 2-percent overall

growth rate should be able to accommodate INS

needs. A 3-percent growth rate would provide an

additional margin for any unanticipated new fingerprint check requirements.

State/local noncriminal fingerprint card submissions also increased slightly during the 1980s, from

1.6 million (about 6,400 per day) in fiscal year 1980

to 1.7 million (6,800 per day) in fiscal year 1990.

Ident believes that demand was suppressed due to significant fee increases. The peak year was fiscal year

1988, when State/local submissions reached 1.8 million (7,200 cards per day). Setting data for fiscal

years 1989 and 1990 aside, the annual growth rate

between fiscal years 1980 and 1988 was about 2 percent. Using the peak year fiscal year 1988 figure as

the starting point for fiscal year 1990, State/local submissions would reach 8,800 per day in 2000 with 2-

percent annual growth, 9,700 with 3-percent growth,

or 11,700 with 5-percent growth. This gives a noncriminal justice base range of about 19,000 to 24,000

cards per day in fiscal year 2000 (see table 3).

The combined base (criminal and noncriminal),

assuming full NFF/III implementation, is about

29,000 to 34,000 fingerprint cards per day (see table

4). This means that the fiscal year 1990 level of

34,000 cards per day could be adopted as the fiscal

year 2000 base level, although this figure would not

allow much if any margin for new fingerprint check

applications. Without NFF/III, the projected fiscal

year 2000 volume would be 45,000 to 53,000 cards

per day. With NFF/III at 50-percent implementation,

the fiscal year 2000 volume would be 38,000 to

44,000 cards per day.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 21

Table 4-Projected Total Fingerprint

Card Submissions Per Day, FY2000 Base Level

Criminal justice:

State/local..., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,100 29,200 16,800 20,400 8,400 10,200

Federal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 940 1,140 940 1,140 940 1,140

Noncriminal justice:

State/local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9,700 11,700 9,700

Federal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,200a

11,20 0

b 10,20 0a

Totals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44,940 53,240 37,640 44,440 29,240 34,240

a.g. = annual growth.

a =With 1°Aa.g.

b= With 2% a.g.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment 1991.

Assumptions About New Fingerprint

Check Applications

Federal Agency Fingerprint Check Proposals

New applications could push the daily fingerprint

volume above the baseline growth projections. Some

possible criminal and noncriminal (also known as civil)

applications include INS naturalizations (civil); U.S.

Border Patrol and INS apprehensions (criminal);

checks on U.S. Census Bureau census takers, Federal

Aviation Administration airport employees, and U.S.

Postal Service employees; U.S. Secret Service investigations (criminal); and International Police

Organization (Interpol) investigations (criminal). Other

possibilities (discussed later) are fingerprint checks of

firearms purchasers, license applicants, child care

providers, teachers, and financial and securities industry officials.

INS projects a possible increase in naturalizations

starting in about 3 years and continuing for a 5-year

period. This increase will depend on how many aliens

granted amnesty apply for U.S. citizenship when eligible. INS estimates that up to 400,000 additional applicants could apply per year, resulting in about 1,600

more fingerprint checks per day (for roughly fiscal

years 1995 to 1999).

The U.S. Border Patrol would like to expand fingerprint checks on aliens apprehended at illegal border

crossing points. The Patrol intends eventually to check

everyone apprehended—about 1 to 1.2 million persons

per year (or about 4,800 checks per day)—but does not

intend to use Ident for the primary fingerprint checks.

The Patrol needs an initial response within minutes,

and plans to use live seamed single fingerprints compared against a fingerprint file of illegal aliens who are

serious repeat offenders.

The file size will be much smaller than State or Federal criminal fingerprint files, in order to ensure rapid

response using low-cost live scan equipment. The

Patrol is targeting repeat serious offenders (e.g., those

smuggling drugs, guns, and persons), not aliens who

are merely trying to get into the United States for jobs.

The Patrol does not have the resources, prosecutors, or

jails to follow up on more than a small percentage of

illegal entries—thus the need to focus on the most serious offenders. When the initial fingerprint check shows

a hit, the Border Patrol plans to run secondary checks

against State and Federal criminal fingerprint files. The

same approach is being considered for the INS Inspection Service, which makes about 2.4 million apprehensions per year (in addition to Border Patrol

apprehensions).

The Border Patrol and INS inspections combined

could generate over 3.4 million fingerprint checks by

2000. But these will be checked against INS, not FBI,

fingerprint files. The number of followup checks

against State and possibly Ident files might double.

This would mean an increase from about 220,000 full

checks in fiscal year 1990 (100,000 Border Patrol,

120,000 INS inspections) to perhaps 440,000 in fiscal

year 2000-a net increase of 220,000. The net impact

on Ident might be in the range of 900 additional fingerprint checks per day.

The U.S. Census Bureau normally has little need for

fingerprint checks—perhaps 1,000 per year on Census
22 . The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

employees (these are counted in the OPM totals). But

in decennial census years, the Census Bureau must

screen up to 2 million applicants for temporary census

taker jobs. The Census Bureau could use name checks

as the primary criminal records screening tool, with

fingerprint checks reserved for those with some indication of a criminal record or for otherwise questionable

applicants. Based on its 1990 experience, the Census

Bureau expects that about 15 percent of all applicants

will have some kind of criminal record (based on a

name hit) and one-fifth of these (3 percent of the total)

will have a disqualifying record. Fingerprint checks

may be needed on between 3 percent and 15 percent of

applicants, spread over the 18 months to 2 years preceding the 2000 census. This would translate into

30,000 to 150,000 additional fingerprint checks per

year (assuming 2 million applicants), or about 115 to

575 checks per day, for those 2 years.

Using name checks for applicant screening raises

civil liberties questions, however, if applicants are not

given the opportunity to challenge adverse findings.

Name checks might, in addition, miss criminals using

phony identification. Should the Census Bureau decide

to request fingerprint checks on all census taker applicants (and if it can afford them), an additional 1 million

fingerprint checks per year (about 4,000 per day) for 2

years would be needed.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has

been directed to develop a plan for conducting criminal

history record checks on all employees and applicants with unsupervised, unrestricted access to airport

operations (AOA access).42 The FAA is evaluating its

options. An estimated 650,000 persons have airport

identification badges,43 but many (e.g., parking lot,

restaurant, and gift shop employees) do not have AOA

access. Assuming 500,000 persons with AOA access

and a 15-percent annual turnover rate, about 75,000

new employee record checks per year would be

needed. One plan under consideration is to run namechecks on all current employees, and fingerprint

checks on those with a name check hit plus all new

employees. This would translate into about 150,000

fingerprint checks the first year (75,000 on current

employees, assuming 15 percent have a name hit, plus

75,000 new employees), and 75,000 (or about 300 per

day) each year thereafter.

Name checks may not be sufficient for AOA access

employees, given the high risk and cost of security

breaches, as well as civil liberties concerns. If the FAA

decided to run fingerprint checks on all other AOAaccess employees, say over a 2-year period, then

roughly 210,000 additional checks per year (840 per

day) would be needed for 2 years. If the FAA decided

to run fingerprint checks on all new AOA-access

employees at the time of hiring and all current AOAaccess employees on, say, a biannual basis, then an

additional 325,000 checks per year (1,300 per day)

would be needed on a continuing basis.

The U.S. Postal Service is planning to conduct new

fingerprint checks on an estimated 60,000 to 100,000

applicants and employees per year. If implemented,

this plan would mean 240 to 400 more fingerprint

checks per day.

The U.S. Secret Service already has its own AFIS

capability and criminal fingerprint file, and does not

depend on Ident for many of its fingerprint checks. In

order of priority, the Secret Service would prefer to

run fingerprint checks against: 1 ) the Secret Service

file, 2) regional or State files relevant to a particular

investigation, and 3) the Ident file. Ident automation

presumably would increase Secret Service ’demand

for Ident fingerprint checks, but the impact on overall

Ident volume is likely to be insignificant. The Secret

Service believes, nonetheless, that access to the new

Ident system is essential for all Federal criminal justice agencies, and that funding should be provided for

the peripheral equipment and terminals needed to

ensure such access.

Interpol provides an organizational link between

foreign and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The U.S.

Interpol office handles about 10,000 to 11,000 cases

per year, of which about 20 percent require fingerprint

checks by the FBI and/or States. This case level has

been stable, with some short-term variations during

tourist seasons, major political or sporting events, and

world political and military situations. The volume of

record checks might slowly increase, as other nations

become more automated. But even if FBI fingerprint

checks were run on all current cases (quadrupling the

number of checks), the impact on Ident would be minimal (about 40 more checks per day).

The potential impacts of the possible additional

Federal fingerprint checks discussed thus far are

summarized in table 5. The projected increase is highest in fiscal year 1999, ranging from 3,380 to 8,240

421ncludes aircraft, maintenance areas, fuel depots, runways, and taxiways.

43 Aiwofi, u.S. carrier, and foreign carrier Personnel.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 23

additional cards per day. The projected increase in the

base level is much less—1,480 to 2,640 cards per day

continuing after fiscal year 2000.

Assuming full NFF/III implementation, the fiscal

year 2000 target could be increased from 34,000 cards

per day (the high-end baseline growth) to 43,000 cards

per day to cover these proposed new Federal fingerprint check applications. The 43,000 level would provide a cushion of about 5,000 to 6,000 cards per day

for other new Federal (and perhaps State) applications

after fiscal year 2000 (in non-Census years). This cushion seems adequate, especially if operational and financial conditions limit the demand for new fingerprint

checks regardless of the FBI’s capability. Federal officials indicate, for example, that funding for large-scale

additional fingerprinting is by no means assured.

Other Fingerprint Check Proposals

Other proposals include running fingerprint checks

on firearm purchasers, driver’s license applicants,

child care (or senior care) providers, teachers, and

financial and securities officials. The efficacy and costeffectiveness of these proposals have not been established. Detailed examinations of firearm purchaser

check proposals have concluded that point-of-sale fingerprint checks are not feasible for the foreseeable

future. Even the most optimistic forecast for Ident

automation does not envision response times of less

than hours—much longer than the seconds or minutes

needed for point-of-sale checks. Point-of-sale fingerprint checks against criminal identification files would

be very expensive. The limited evidence available suggests that the percentage of ineligible firearms purchasers that could be detected only through fingerprint

checks (i.e., those using aliases or phony identification)

may be very small.44 Name checks may suffice, with

fingerprint checks reserved for secondary verification

when needed.

The firearm purchaser fingerprint check proposal

points up the need for comprehensive research on the

efficacy and cost-effectiveness of fingerprint checks

for noncriminal justice purposes. The use of fingerprint

checks needs to be rigorously compared with the use of

name checks, or initial name checks plus secondary

fingerprint checks, when: 1) the base rate of criminal

Table 5-Possible Additional Federal Fingerprint Check Requirements

(thousands per day)

Agency Possible checks Remarks

INS naturalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

INS Inspection Service apprehensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Border Patrol apprehensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Census Bureau census takers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

FAA Aviation Security employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Postal Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Secret Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Interpol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total increased base . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

(INS inspections, Border Patrol,

FAA, Postal Service)

1.6 FY95-99

0.4 Continuing

0.5 Continuing

0.1-4.0 FY1999-2000

0.3-1.3 Continuing

0.2-0.4 Continuing

Negligible

Negligible

1.4-2.6 Continuing

3.1-4.2

3.1-4.2

3.1-4.2

3.1-4.2

3.4-8.2

1.8-6.6

1.5-2.6

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

L&@ee OTA, A~tom~ted Record che~k~ of Fi~~~rrn purchasers, op. cit., footnote 23; ~egon state police, study of Retail Firearm Saies and concealed Handgun Licensing in Oregon (Salem, OR: Oregon State Police, Criminal Investigative Division, 1990).
24 . The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

activity in the population being checked is very low,

and 2) applicants or purchasers have an opportunity to

challenge record checks that result in disapproval (as is

the case with “instant” record checks of firearm purchasers at the point of sale).45

The use of name checks for many job applicants

raises civil liberties questions, since applicants may not

be told of the results or given an opportunity to challenge unfavorable findings. Name checks may be better suited for license applicants, who, like firearm

purchasers, presumably are given notice and the opportunity to challenge adverse actions. Name checks may,

on the other hand, miss persons using phony identification, and this risk must be carefully weighed. Consideration of each proposal for name or fingerprint record

checks should involve a careful balancing of benefits

against costs and risks.

Other potential sources of increases in the number

of fingerprint checks are stimulation of additional

demand for checks due to the convenience of electronic transmission, inclusion of some juvenile fingerprints in the State/local fingerprint submissions, and

submission of an estimated 10 million State/local criminal prints held by State fingerprint repositories and not

included in the FBI file.46 The stimulation of demand

depends, in part, on the efficacy and cost-effectiveness

of electronic fingerprint checks. The target of 43,000

cards (paper or electronic) per day could accommodate

perhaps a 5-percent stimulation of total demand (all

purposes) after fiscal year 2000, in lieu of (but not in

addition to) the additional margin for new applications

previously identified.

The submission of juvenile prints, presumably for

serious offenders, is an unresolved policy issue. The

volume and timing of such submissions are unknown.

Juvenile offenders (under 18 years of age) accounted

for about 640,000 serious arrests in 1989, which would

translate into about 2,500 fingerprint checks per day if

all arrests were checked.47 The 43,000-cards-per-day

target probably could accommodate phasing in serious

juvenile offender submissions by 2000, assuming that a

high percentage are repeat offenders and would have

fingerprints already on file. At a 3-percent annual

Table 6-Possible FY2000 Targets for

Fingerprint Card Submissions

(in thousands per day)

Criminal justice:

State/local base with

3% a.g. and full NFF/III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4

Federal base with 3% a.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1

Federal new applications (continuing):

INS inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4

INS Border Patrol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4

Interpol/U.S. Secret Service Negligible

State/local supplemental:

Juvenile offender submissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2

One-time criminal card submission

of 1.7 million over 5 years (and then

allows margin for demand stimulation,

other new applications, or NFF/III slippage) . . . . . . 1.4

Subtotal 12.9

Noncriminal justice:

State/local base + new applications with

5% a.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.7

Federal base with 2% a.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11.2

Federal new applications (continuing):

FAA security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3

U.S. Postal Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.4

Federal supplemental:

One-time civil card submissions (including

INS naturalizations FY95-99):.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.6

Census FY1999-2000.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.0

(and then allows margin for other new

Federal or State/local applications

and demand stimulation)

Subtotal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.2

Total FY2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.1

Plus State/local noncriminal

justice base with additional

4-5% a.g. (9-10%/year total growth) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.0

Grand total FY2000 high growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49.1

Plus State/local criminal justice

base with additional 2% a.g.

(5%/year total growth) and half

(rather than full) NFF/III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12.0

Grand total FY2000 high growth/half NFF/III........... 61.1

a.g. = annual growth.

a With full NFF/III implementation unless otherwise indicated.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

growth rate, serious juvenile offenses would reach

about 900,000 in 2000. If 35 percent were new offenders, an additional 310,000 fingerprint checks per year

(1,200 per day) would be needed.

450nly 1 t. 2 percent of ffieam~ ~urcha~er~, for example, appear t. have disqualifying criminal records, ad perhaps 10 to 15 percent have my

kind of record. See OTA, Automated Record Checks of Firearm Purchasers, op. cit., footnote 23. In contrast, 60 to 70 percent of arrestees, on the

average, will have a prior criminal record.

46Typically, such Pfints me not included in the FBI file becuase the State repository did not receive an extra fingerprint coPY to forward to the

FBI, or the FBI rejected a fingerprint card as illegible.

47 See U.S. Department of Justice, Crime in the United States, Op. d., footnote 38, p. 182. Serious arrests include murder, nonnegligent

manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 25

The 43,000-print target could not handle submission

of the estimated 10 million previously unfiled cards

unless submissions were stretched out over many

years; even 10 years would be tight, at 1 million cards

per year (4,000 per day). The 10-million estimate,

however, may be questionable. 48 The FBI has estimated that the actual number of unfiled prints on new

persons (with no prints on file from prior arrests) is

about 1.7 million (of the 10 million). This figure,

spread over 5 years, would result in an increase in

yearly card submissions of 340,000 (or about 1,400

cards per day). States should be able to identify most

repeat offenders by first running name checks against

State criminal history files and the III and then making

a positive identification at the State level. This procedure would reduce or eliminate the need for FBI fingerprint checks on repeat offenders.

The remaining major area of uncertainty is the rate

of growth due to fingerprint checks of license

applicants, financial and securities officials, child care

providers, and teachers, and other new State/local

noncriminal justice applications (whether pursuant to

State or Federal law). The FBI has surveyed all States

concerning projected noncriminal justice applications.

The initial survey results suggested a year 2000 daily

volume of noncriminal justice fingerprint checks at 50

percent or more above FBI expectations. Subsequent

validation and adjustment of the survey results indicate

that the original FBI estimate (37,000 cards per day) is

still reasonable. Using OTA’s analytical framework, the

FBI estimate is equivalent to assuming a 9 to 10 percent (rather than 3 or 5 percent) per year increase in

State/local noncriminal justice fingerprint checks. This

equates to an additional 6,000 to 7,000 checks per

day.@

The total daily volume target could be increased to

about 49,000 or 50,000 per day in 2000 (see table 6),

which should allow for substantial baseline growth,

significant new applications, and a healthy margin for

contingencies and perhaps some slippage in NFF/III

implementation beyond fiscal year 2000. If NFF/III is

assumed to be half (rather than fully) implemented in

fiscal year 2000, and baseline growth in State/local

criminal justice use is assumed to be 5 (rather than 3)

percent, an additional 12,000 checks per day would be

needed. The total fiscal year 2000 daily volume target

Figure 7—Projected Volume of Fingerprint Cards Submitted to Ident, 2000

In thousands of cards per day

48The 10 million includes some ~rcentage of the 4W,~ illegible fingerprint cards previously returned by the FBI to the States each year, P]US

an unknown number of cards never submitted. Many of these cards are, however, for repeat offenders who already have prints on file in State repositories and/or Ident.

49At lo-percent ~nua~ growth, the FY90 Stateflocal noncriminal justice base of 7,200 cards per day would increase to 18,674 cards per day in

FY2000, compared with 11,700 cards per day at 5-percent annual growth—an increase of 7,000 cards per day.
26 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Table 7—Range of Estimated Fingerprint Card Submissions Per Day, FY2000

OTA-1 a OTA-2a OTA-3a OTA-4b OTA-5 C OTA-6 C

Criminal justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,000 13,000 13,000 25,000 34,000 50,000

Noncriminal justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23,000 30,000 36,000 36,000 36,000 50,000

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34,000 43,000 49,000 61,000 70,000 100,000

a FuII NFF/III implementation.

b Half NFF/III implementation.

c No NFF/III implementation.

NOTE: See text for explanation of OTA scenarios.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

would then be about 61,000 fingerprint cards (see table

6 and figure 7). At 49,000 cards per day for full

NFF/III implementation and 61,000 cards per day for

half NFF/III implementation, the OTA and FBI projected totals are virtually identical, although arrived at

using different methodologies.50

OTA has identified six scenarios for fingerprint card

submissions (see table 7). The OTA-1, OTA-2, and

OTA-3 scenarios assume full NFF/III implementation;

the OTA-4 scenario assumes half NFF/III implementation. The OTA-5 and OTA-6 scenarios assume no

NFF/III implementations. The OTA-1 scenario

assumes no major new fingerprint check applications

beyond what can be accommodated in the baseline

growth. The OTA-2 scenario provides a margin for

some new applications. The OTA-3, OTA-4, and OTA5 scenarios provide margins for substantial additional

baseline growth and new fingerprint check applications, assuming full, half, and no NFF/III implementation, respectively. The OTA-6 scenario assumes a

much greater than expected growth in fingerprint

checks with no NFF/III implementation, and reflects

the unverified results of the FBI’s user survey.51

Assumptions About Response Time

The plan must make assumptions about response or

turnaround time for conducting FBI fingerprint checks.

The current Ident system takes an average of 15 to 20

days to process fingerprint checks. Including mail

delays, response time to the user can average 20 to 30

days. Many users claim total end-to-end response time

can take 45 to 60 days (routinely, according to OPM),

especially if the fingerprint cards must pass through

several organizational levels. The FBI assumes a 2-

hour criminal justice and 24-hour noncriminal justice

response time, on the average, for the new system.

Criminal justice checks would be given priority over

noncriminal justice checks during peak periods. And

the 2-hour criminal justice response would apply only

to electronic (not paper) fingerprint submissions which

are likely to account for only a minority of total submissions through the 1990s.

Most noncriminal justice fingerprint checks may

require only about 5 to 10 days, even with a new automated system. If fingerprint checks could be consistently done this fast, the checks would no longer be the

bottleneck in many employment and licensing clearances. OPM and DIS officials—two of the largest noncriminal justice users of Ident—indicate that a 5- to 10-

day response time would be adequate for the purposes

of Federal civilian and military (including defense contractor) screening. A faster turnaround would provide

little if any advantage since other aspects of background investigations take longer. This is unlikely to

change, given projected staffing and resource levels for

personnel security operations.

The response time for many kinds of criminal fingerprint checks needs to be much faster. Police usually

bring formal charges before a local magistrate within

several hours after arrest. The results of an FBI fingerprint check of an arrestee frequently need to arrive

within 2 to 4 hours to be useful. A prior criminal

SOThe FBI ~~timated a FY200() daily volume of 62,3~ cards, after verifying user survey results and assuming 5@percent NFF/111 implementation by FY2000. The FBI initially estimated a daily volume of 74,000 cards with no NFF/111 and 49,000 with full NFF/111. The unverified user survey

results suggested a volume as high as 100,000 cards per day.

51 The FBI subsequently adjusted its estimate from about 100,000 fingerprint cards per day, based on the unverified survey resuhs, to 78,000

cards per day with no NFF/HI, after verifying the survey results and correcting for double counting, purely speculative projections, and other

anomalies.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 27

record could be a significant factor in the magistrate’s

decision to release the arrestee on his/her own recognizance, set appropriate bail, or detain the arrestee in

jail. A quick response is also needed to identify

arrestees who may be wanted for criminal offenses in

other States and jurisdictions. Fingerprint checks conducted for other criminal justice purposes, such as

prosecution, sentencing, or parole decisions, usually do

not require a rapid response. A response time of several days could be adequate. Under the NFF/III concept, at most only about 35 percent of arrestees would

require an FBI fingerprint check in the first place.

About 65 percent can be expected to have a prior local

or State criminal record. Only first-time offenders in

the arresting State would require a full FBI fingerprint

check. All others would be positively identified at the

local or State level and would already have State and

Federal criminal identification numbers assigned

(backed up by previously submitted fingerprints).

The implication is that the Ident automation program could more than meet criminal and noncriminal

justice response time requirements with an overall

average response time of about twice what is currently

planned-this is still a dramatic improvement over current response times. The FBI’s response time goal thus

could be relaxed and still meet user needs. However,

the FBI has determined that longer average response

times would create queuing problems.52 The FBI has

set the 2-hour criminal and 24-hour noncriminal justice

response time goals to balance the overall workload

and handle peak demands without creating significant

backlogs. OTA and independent experts concur that the

system should be designed to avoid backlogs. The FBI

has reserved weekend and night-shift operations

for system maintenance. These times could be used to

process any temporary backlogs that might occur,

although the system is being designed to avoid backlogs altogether.

These response times are for Ident processing, and

do not include mail delays—which can add several

days or weeks. Live scanning and electronic transmission of fingerprints are the proposed long-term solutions to eliminate mail delays. Their technical feasibility has been proven, although necessary standards are

still being developed. Many Federal agency users of

Ident services53 seem enthusiastic about acquiring live

scan equipment and taking full advantage of electronic

transmission, which, they believe, would dramatically

improve overall response time by cutting out mail

delays and by reducing or eliminating bureaucratic

delays in the agencies.

Federal civilian agencies, for example, typically

route fingerprint checks through their own personnel

security offices, then to OPM’s personnel investigations processing center (or to DIS, if checking military

or defense contractors), and finally to the FBI. The

results of the fingerprint checks have to follow these

steps back to the original requesting agency. This

explains why checks can take 45 to 60 days or longer

to get to the end user, even though Ident may be processing them in 15 to 20 days.

Assumptions About File Size

The plan needs to make assumptions about the size

of Ident fingerprint files needed to support four kinds

of fingerprint matches:

1.

2.

3.

4.

10-print against 10-print fingerprints (incoming

fingerprints of persons arrested are compared

with fingerprints of prior offenders already on

file),

latent prints against 10-print fingerprints in a

latent cognizant file54 (latent prints from a crime

scene are compared with fingerprints of prior

offenders),

10-print fingerprints against unsolved latent

prints (incoming fingerprints of persons arrested

are compared with unresolved latent prints), and

latent prints against unsolved latent prints

(incoming latent prints are compared with

unsolved latent prints already on file).

By far the largest file is the 10-print file, which stores

fingerprints on known criminal offenders. Although it

is known as the 10-print file, prints for all 10 fingers

are not necessarily included. Some States store fingerprints on only 2 or 4 fingers, in order to reduce storage

costs. Two- or 4-finger prints are usually sufficient for

521dent plans to Operate 7 days a week, but all volume estimates (including OTA’s) are based on a 5-day work week. If the system is designed to

a 5-day week, with some built-in margin of safety, the weekends would provide an extra margin for eliminating any temporary backlogs that might

result from exceptionally high peak loads.

531ncluding INS, OPM, DIS, the Census Bureau, FAA, and the Secret Service.

54Te~hni~ally, lo-pfint fingewnnts suitable for matching against latent prints are known as “latent cognizant” fingerprints, which for kwge fingerprint volumes can be retained in a subset of the 10-print file known as a “latent cognizant file.”
28 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

10-print against 10-print searches, but not for comparison with incoming latent prints. The FBI plans to store

images for all 10 fingers, to support a latent cognizant

file and for archival purposes.

The Ident criminal 10-print fingerprint file currently

contains prints on about 24 million persons. The FBI

initially assumed that file size will grow to about 34

million persons in 2000, presumably based on some

growth in first-time arrestees plus the addition of some

portion of the prints on repeat offenders not previously

submitted at the time of initial arrest. The 34 million

would allow a margin for additional baseline growth in

the criminal population (up to the historical rate of 3

percent per year) plus submission of a limited number

of missing prints,55 but it is possible that a file of this

size would not be adequate beyond 2000. The FBI now

projects that a fiscal year 2000 10-print file size of 43

million is more realistic. This revised estimate is based

on user survey results and higher estimates of the number of missing prints.

Some States have found that large numbers of fingerprint arrest cards were never reported to State

repositories and thus are likely missing from the FBI

file. 56 Not all offenses are reportable to State and FBI

repositories, but crime statistics suggest the possibility

of significant underreporting. The FBI estimates that

14.3 million total arrests were made in 1989.57 O f

these, roughly 6.1 million were reportable to the FBI

(after deducting juvenile and nonserious misdemeanor

offenses) .58 The FBI received about 4.4 million criminal fingerprint cards in 1989, which suggests a shortfall

of about 1.7 million cards. With full NFF/III implementation, the shortfall would be about 0.6 million per

year (35 percent of 1.7 million), or 3.6 million over the

1995 to 2000 time frame. This number assumes about

three arrests per offender, on the average, and that

.,

arrest cards for repeat offenders would not be

reportable. But NFF/III may be only half implemented

by 2000, in which case the 43-million-person 10-print

file size could be needed to accommodate the additional submissions.59

The FBI currently receives about three fingerprint

cards per person, but only one fingerprint card per person is retained. All other cards are discarded or

returned to the States after microfilming. This procedure would be unchanged with NFF/III, except that the

primary images would be received and stored as electronic fingerprint images on optical disk rather than as

paper fingerprint cards in filing cabinets.

The FBI must also determine the size of the latent

cognizant fingerprint file, against which incoming

latent prints can be compared. The 24-, 34-, or 43-million person file discussed above is known as the 10-

print fingerprint file. This file is designed for storing

10-print fingerprints coming into the FBI for later comparison with other fingerprints. The matching of fingerprints is actually done by comparing fingerprint

minutiae (e.g., details on the location of fingerprint

characteristics). State and Federal AFIS experience

indicates that matching 10-print fingerprints with each

other works extremely well, with very high accuracy

levels, when minutiae from only 2 or 4 fingers (usually

the thumbs and forefingers) are compared.

The more difficult challenge is matching latent

prints from crime scenes against the latent cognizant

fingerprint file. Latent prints are single or partial fingerprints lifted from door handles, glasses, walls,

firearms, clothing, and other items found at or near the

scene of a crime. The latent print contains much less

information than a standard 10-print fingerprint. To

compensate, the number of fingers and the number of

55At 3.Wrcent annual growth, a file of 24 mi]lion persons would grow to 32.25 million in FY2000. This would allow a margin of 1.75 million for

the addition of missing fingerprints.

56Comprehensive data me not available. The FBI may wish to more systematically survey the states on unreported and unfiled criminal fingerprint cards.

57FBI, crime in the United States.. .1989, op. cit., footnote 38, p. ~72

5814.3 million less 2.15 million juvenile ~ests (estimated at 15 percent of the total) ~d 6.1 million nonserious misdemeanor arrests (defined for

estimating purposes to include vandalism, liquor law violations, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, curfew and loitering violations, runaways, and all other) equals 6.1 million reportable arrests. These are gross approximations, since some juvenile offenses (when the offender is

charged as an adult) and some nonserious misdemeanor offenses (e.g., for repeat offenders depending on State law) not included in the 6.1 million

may be reportable. In addition, some serious misdemeanors (e.g., simple assault, stolen property, drug abuse violations) included in the 6.1 million

may not be reportable (e.g., for first-time petty theft offenders, depending on State law). See FBI, Crime in the United States.. .Z989, op. cit., footnote 38, pp. 172, 176.

59Eventually the growth rate of the lo-print file size shou]d decline to that of the underlying growth in criminal activity, currently about 3 percent

per year. If two out of three crimes are committed by repeat offenders, then the growth rate of new offenders added to the 10-print file (not old

offenders previously unreported) would be about 1 percent per year if present trends continue.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 29

minutiae on the fingerprints for the latent cognizant file

must be increased to produce satisfactory search accuracy. This is typically done by extracting minutiae on

all 10 fingers and creating a separate latent cognizant

file that can be used for searching latent prints.

Thumbs and forefingers alone would not suffice for

comparison with latent prints, which could be from any

finger.

The cost of storing and searching a latent cognizant

file is much higher than the cost of storing and searching a 10-print file. The FBI found that extracting, storing, and searching for the additional fingerprint minutiae for all 24 million persons in the criminal 10-print

fingerprint file (or the 34 to 43 million persons projected for 2000) would be prohibitive in cost. Current

FBI plans propose a latent cognizant file on about 10 to

13 million persons (one-third the size of the 10-print

file), selected to include serious multi-state offenders,

with priority placed on violent offenders. Since Ident is

planning to store full fingerprint images, the latent file

could be expanded or modified in the future if technically and financially feasible. The ultimate size, composition, and geographic coverage of the FBI’s latent

cognizant file needs careful consideration to make sure

that the file meshes with related State, regional, and

local efforts and optimizes the Federal role. Decisions

on the latent cognizant file are especially important in

light of the high rate of success of automated latent

searches conducted at the State/regional/local level.

Many States report that old and/or difficult criminal

cases have been solved due to latent matches that could

not have been conducted manually (see boxes A

and D).

Assumptions About Storage

Requirements

The plan must make assumptions about the storage

requirements for each set of fingerprints in the file. The

FBI needs to store the entire image of each fingerprint

to facilitate the extraction of minutiae by whatever

vendor equipment the FBI ultimately procures and to

permit fingerprint examiners to verify the minutiaebased candidate matches provided by the AFIS. With

current technology, the AFIS identifies and ranks the

most likely fingerprint matches, but a human examiner

must make the final determination. Adequate image

resolution can be provided at 500 pixels (picture elements) per inch, or 250,000 pixels per square inch,

based on research conducted in support of the NIST

image transmission standard-setting process. The standard fingerprint card includes 5 rolled finger blocks, 1

four-finger block, and 1 thumb block per hand, or a

Box D-Cal-ID: An Early Success Story

The automated latent cognizant fingerprint

database of the California Identification (Cal-ID)

system became operational on October 9, 1985.

Automated latent fingerprint searches have proven

effective in helping solve old or difficult cases.

During the first year of operation, over 100 California law enforcement agencies used the latent

database to identify criminal suspects:

s The Los Angeles Police Department used

the Cal-ID latent system to identify and

arrest four suspects in the kidnapping and

execution-style murder of two college students, based on a latent print lifted from the

victims’ vehicle.

The Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department used Cal-ID to identify and arrest a

suspect in the murder of a Sheriff’s Department employee, based on a bloody latent

print found at the crime scene.

“ The San Diego County Sheriff’s Department used Cal-ID to identify and arrest a

suspect in a 3-year-old rape case, which led

to the identification of the suspect as a serial

rapist.

“ The Anaheim Police Department used CalID to identify and arrest a suspect in a 9-

year-old homicide case.

The Marysville Police Department used

Cal-ID to identify and arrest a suspect in a

2-year-old homicide case.

The Los Angeles Police Department used

Cal-ID to identify and arrest a suspect in the

axe attack and robbery of the California

Secretary of State, which led to identification of the suspect in connection with

numerous other robberies and burglaries.

SOURCE: California Department of Justice, California Identification (CAL-ID) System and Remote Access Network (RAN) Status Report: 1986 (Sacramento, CA:

California DOJ, Division of Law Enforcement,

Bureau of Criminal Identification, 1987).
30 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

total of 14 blocks. Fingerprint images in these blocks

typically cover about 24 square inches, 60 which

equates to 6 million pixels per fingerprint.61 The total

block size (including white space) is about 39 square

inches (or a maximum of 9.8 million pixels) .62

The FBI could store on optical disk the images of

fingerprints using various gray scales, ranging from

binary (black and white only) to 16, 64, or 256 shades

of gray. The emerging industry norm seems to be to

store images of all 10 fingers on a 256 gray scale.

Eight bits or 1 byte per pixel are required to capture a

256 gray scale. Minutiae may, in comparison, be

extracted and stored for as few as 2 or 4 fingers for the

10-print file, and 8 or 10 fingers for the latent cognizant file.

The FBI plans to store the images of all 10 fingers

in order to have a complete electronic fingerprint

archive. This would provide full backup and permit the

possible expansion of the latent cognizant file at a

future time, should technology and resources permit.

The FBI, NIST, and vendors are working on data compression techniques to reduce the image storage

requirements. A compression ratio of 8:1 provides

acceptable image quality with existing technology; the

FBI expects that compression ratios of 15:1 or greater

will be feasible with new methods. Thus the image

data per fingerprint card will be reduced from 9.8

megabytes to at most 1.2 megabytes (at 8:1 compression), and probably to 0.65 megabyte (at 15:1 compression) or less.

60(1.25 square inches x 10 rolled finger blocks) + (0.94 square inches x 2 four-finger blocks) + (4.5 square inches x 2 thumb blocks) = 12.5 +

1.88 + 9.0 square inches= 23.38 square inches per fingerprint card.

61250,000 pixels per square inch x 24 square inches = 6 million pixels per fingerprint card.

62FB1 estimate.
Cost, Schedule, and Staffing Implications

The FBI plan should consider the implications of

various design factors for technical risk, schedule, and

cost. Qualitatively, design parameters such as fingerprint volume, response times, fingerprint file sizes, and

fingerprint storage requirements will affect the technical and schedule risk and automation cost.

The plan should weigh the risks and costs of delays

that might result if system requirements exceed available technical capabilities. The FBI’s desire to regain

technological leadership in the fingerprint identification field is commendable. The current system is technically obsolete and incompatible with State systems.

Even implementation of today’s state of the art, or the

state of the art as it might exist when requests for proposals are solicited and contracts awarded, should be a

significant improvement over the status quo. The plan

should provide for an easy upgrade to the system as

technology advances and as needed if fingerprint storage and processing volumes exceed design capacity. A

modular upgrade strategy may be especially appropriate in light of uncertainties about possible major new

noncriminal justice needs for fingerprint checks.

The FBI planning process needs to consider several

alternatives simultaneously to help the user community

and Congress, as well as the FBI itself, to better understand the tradeoffs among different alternatives. In particular, the FBI needs to clearly show the tradeoffs

among volume and type of fingerprint checks, technical design, cost, schedule, technical risk, number and

type of employees, training needs, and building

requirements. A full tradeoff analysis is needed prior to

finishing the strategic plan and issuing the Request

for Information—the next major steps toward

procurement.

The FBI is conducting a tradeoff analysis with the

assistance of Mitre Corp., but because of procurement

sensitivity it does not, at this time, plan to make the

results public. The type of analysis needed is illustrated

below. This is, of course, no substitute for a complete

FBI study released in a format that both protects the

integrity of the procurement process and better informs

the public and Congress.

Illustrative Review of Ident

Automation Costs

Computer Matcher Requirements

The analysis could begin by focusing on the number

of computer matchers needed to handle the projected

Ident 10-print workload. Matchers are computers that

compare the minutiae of incoming fingerprints against

the minutiae of prints on file. The projected workload

is primarily a function of assumptions about processing

volume (fingerprint cards or electronic images received

per day), response (or turnaround) time, and file size.

Projections of fingerprint processing volume range

from 100,000 to 34,000 (see table 7). For this illustration, response time is assumed to be 2 hours criminal

and 24 hours civil, and file size is assumed to be 34

million.

Roughly 480 matchers would be needed to process

61,000 fingerprint checks per day (the OTA-4 scenario)

against a 34-million-fingerprint file—using 1990 technology. 63 A higher or lower daily volume would, other

things being equal, increase or decrease the number of

matchers required. Technical advances could, in the

Figure 8-Projected Number of Ident Computer

Matchers, 2000

800~

NOTE: See table 8 and accompanying text for detailed explanation.

Assumes 1990 technology; technical advances are likely to

reduce the number of matchers required to process any given

volume of fingerprint cards

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

630TA ~stimated the number of matchers for this illustration based on vendor assumptions abut scaling Up from the California AFIS. California

uses about 5 matchers to process 5,000 10-print searches per day comparing 2 fingers per print against a file of about 8.5 million prints. The illustrative Ident system would process 61,000 searches per day (about 12 times the number processed by California), comparing 4 fingers (2 times the number compared by California) against a file of 34 million prints (about 4 times the size of the California file). Thus the estimated baseline number of

Ident matchers is 5 x 12x2x4= 480.

-31-
32 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Table 8--Number of Computer Matchers Required by Year 2000,

as a Function of Daily Fingerprint Submissions

Daily card Criminal Civil Total Number of

submissions, matchesb matchesb matches b matches b

FY 2000a

100,000 (OTA-6) ,............................17,500 47,000 64,500 663

70,000 (OTA-5) ..............................1 1,900 33,840 45,740 470

61,000 (OTA-4) ..............................1 2,500 34,200 46,700 480

49,000 (OTA-3) ..............................1 1,830 34,560 46,390 477

43,000 (OTA-2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11,830 28,800 40,630 418

34,000 (OTA-1).. . . . . . . . . . .......10,010 22,080 32,090 330

a From table7.

b Number of matchers =(460)(matches atvolumex + matches at6?,000).

NOTES: All OTA scenarios assume the criminal/civil split shown in table 7.

OTA-1, OTA-2, and OTA-3 assume full NFF/111, 9-percent criminal name hit, and 4-percent civil name hit.

OTA-4 assumes half NFF/tll, 50-percent criminal name hit, and 5-percent civil name hit.

OTA-5 and OTA-6 assume no NFF/111, 65-percent criminal name hit, and 6-percent civil name hit.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

future, reduce the number of matchers needed for any

given volume of matches and fingerprint checks.

The OTA-1 estimate of daily fingerprint card submissions (34,000) would reduce the number of matchers by about one-third (to 330), other things being

equal (see table 8 and figure 8). The OTA-2 estimate

(43,000 cards per day) would reduce the number of

matchers by about 12 percent (to 418). The OTA-3 and

OTA-5 scenarios (49,000 cards per day with full

NFF/III, and 70,000 with no NFF/III, respectively)

would reduce the number of matchers only slightly.

The OTA-6 scenario (100,000 cards per day) would

increase the number of matchers by more than onethird (to 663 matchers). An important caveat: This

illustrative analysis assumes linear relationships among

volume, number of matches, and number of computer

matchers. Any nonlinear relationships, or any

economies or diseconomies of scale, could change the

results.

The results suggest that Ident could significantly

reduce the number of matchers only by designing for a

lower daily volume of noncriminal justice fingerprint

checks (see table 8). The number of criminal checks

does not have much effect on the number of matchers

(except under the very high OTA-6 estimate), since the

number of actual criminal matches is essentially the

same whether the NFF/III is implemented or not. The

NFF/III simply shifts the much less costly name hits

from Ident to the States. The impact of technical

advances, however, could be much greater. Vendors

estimate that the number of matchers might be reduced

by 25 percent with 1991 technology and by 50 to 90

percent with 1993 technology (the year planned for

actual procurement), other things being equal.

An analysis of the number of matchers required to

handle projected latent matches shows similar results.

The FBI has assumed a daily volume of 128 latent fingerprint searches in 2000. The number of latent print

matchers could be reduced if the volume of latent

searches is smaller. Many States have or are obtaining

their own automated latent search capabilities. These

States run latent prints against their own latent cognizant files first, thus substantially reducing the primary demand for FBI latent searches. Nonetheless, the

payoff from successful latent searches is very high, and

AFIS is the only viable means of conducting largescale latent searches. The number of latent searches

conducted by Ident has actually declined from about 90

per day in fiscal year 1981 to 50 per day in fiscal year

1990. The FBI believes that this trend reflects the

severe limitations of Ident’s current latent processing

system, and that demand would rebound once Ident

offered a state-of-the-art service. The 128 latent

searches per day projected for fiscal year 2000 seems

reasonable, if the real base is the 90 per day of fiscal

year 1981. A reduction in matchers is more likely to

result from technical advances.

This illustrative analysis focuses first on the computer matchers because they are the most expensive

and technically complex components of AFIS systems.

The matchers also are the most affected by volume.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 33

The number and size of optical disk storage devices,

for example, are determined largely by the size of the

Ident fingerprint file (and the number of fingerprint

images that need to be stored) and by the gray scale

and data compression ratios (which determine the number of bytes of data per image stored). The number and

size of magnetic tape or disk drives likewise are a

function of the fingerprint file size (and the number of

minutiae extracted per finger and fingerprint). The

FBI’s tradeoff analysis should cover all major AFIS

components, including optical, tape, and disk drive

storage as well as the matchers.

Building Construction Requirements

The FBI should analyze the implications of technical tradeoffs for building requirements. The FBI is

planning for a 46,500-square-foot Ident computer center at the new Clarksburg, West Virginia, location.64

The computer matchers, for example, typically account

for over one-third of the total computer center space

requirements—probably about 40 percent if peripheral

equipment (e. g., controllers) and cooling units are

included. The matchers typically account for perhaps

half of the computer center’s electric power needs.

Thus a hypothetical 20-percent reduction in the

number of computer matchers, for example, could

translate directly into an 8-percent reduction in computer center floor space and a 10-percent reduction in

power requirements. A 50-percent reduction in the

number of matchers, which may be possible with new

technology, could cut floor space by about 20 percent

and power by 25 percent. A 50-percent increase in

matchers, needed for the OTA-6 scenario using 1990

technology, could increase floor space and power

requirements by 20 and 25 percent, respectively.

The tradeoff analysis also should show impacts of

volume on other building requirements—primarily the

new office complex that will house most of the Ident

employees. The FBI has assumed, as a baseline, that

the daily fingerprint volume will nearly double by

2000 and the workforce will remain about constant.

The current workforce is 2,500 (down from over 3,000

a decade ago), with 479 additional positions requested

starting in fiscal year 1992 (to reduce the fingerprint

and disposition backlog, and to convert remaining

manual criminal history records). The new office

complex has been designed to accommodate 3,000

persons plus common areas (e.g., a cafeteria and

auditorium) .65

If the year 2000 daily volume is significantly less

than projected, some reduction in staffing would be

expected. This reduction would in turn reduce the

required size of the new office complex. However, a

lower projected daily volume does not translate

directly into lower staffing requirements, since some

staff functions do not vary much as a function of volume. Assume, for illustrative purposes, that one-third

of the staff are fixed and the other two-thirds variable,

that the variable staff changes in proportion to the

absolute volume of fingerprint checks requested, and

that 3,000 persons are required to process 61,000 fingerprint cards per day (with half implementation of

NFF/III, as in the OTA-4 scenario).

Staffing levels would range from a low of 2,100

persons at 34,000 cards per day to a high of 4,300 persons at 100,000 cards per day (see table 9 and figure

9). A daily volume of 49,000 fingerprint cards, rather

than 61,000, in the year 2000 would require a staffing

level of about 2,600 persons, rather than 3,000. This

could reduce the office requirements from 488,000

square feet to about 425,000 square feet—a reduction

of about 13 percent (see table 9). A daily volume of

100,000 cards, rather than 61,000, would, in contrast,

increase staffing and floor space by about 43 percent.

The FBI’s tradeoff analysis should more completely

specify the staffing levels and required office-complex

floor space for a range of fingerprint volume scenarios.

Impact on Ident Costs

Reductions in the number of computer matchers

combined with reductions in computer center and

office space needs could significantly reduce Ident

costs. Increases in the number of matchers and office

space needs, on the other hand, could increase costs.

Cost reductions or increases could be approximated as

follows. First, assume that Ident modernization costs

$200 million for building construction (including

design, inspection, taxes, and contingencies) to accommodate a volume of 61,000 cards per day. Second,

assume that the office complex typically costs about 42

percent of the construction total, and the computer center about 18 percent. Third, assume that the computer

~ne total computer center size is actually !z3,000 square feet, divided between two floors; only one floor is currently planned for Ident AmS.

65With 488,~ gross squwe feet, the fwility would be slightly l~ger th~ cu~ent Ident s~ce in the Hoover Building (330,0(K) ft2) ~d two other

buildings (1 10,000 ft2).
34 . The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Figure 9-Projected Number of

Ident Personnel, 2000

4

3

2

1

0

20 4 0 60 8 0 100

Fingerprint cards per day, in thousands

NOTE: See table 9 and accompanying text for detailed explanation.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

Table 9-Scenarios for ldent Fingerprint Volume,

Staffing, and Office Complex Requirements,

Year 2000

Daily Approximate Office complex

card staffing floor space

submissions levelsa(gross sq. feet)

100,000 (OTA-6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,300 620,000

70,000 (OTA-5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,300 540,000

61,000 (OTA-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,000 488,000

49,000 (OTA-3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,600 425,000

43,000 (OTA-2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,400 390,000

34,000 (OTA-1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100 340,000

a Assumes personnel are one-third fixed, two-thirds variable, and that a

daily volume of 61,000 cards requires a staff of 3,000 persons.

SOURCE: Office of Technologv Assessment. 1991

matchers cost about $100 million (for 1990

technology) .66 The cost savings (increase) at lower

(higher) projected daily volumes can then be estimated

in proportion to lower (higher) estimates of the requirements for computer matchers, staffing levels, and computer center and office complex space.

This illustrative analysis of the sensitivity of cost to

various assumptions about volume suggests that the

matcher cost component is quite sensitive. Lower

volume (OTA-1 or OTA-2 scenario) reduces the number of matchers needed, with savings in the $2 million

to $30 million range (see table 10). Higher volume

(OTA-6 scenario) could increase matcher cost by $40

million. The office complex cost is a function of volume and staffing: lower volumes and staffing levels

(OTA-1, OTA-2, OTA-3) reduce the space requirements, with possible savings in the $11 million to $25

million range. High volumes and staffing levels (OTA5, OTA-6) could increase the office cost by up to $23

million. The computer center cost varies with daily

volume and the number of matchers required. Lower

volume and fewer matchers mean smaller space

requirements, with a possible savings of up to $4 million. Higher volume and more matchers could increase

costs by $5 million.

The analysis illustrates that costs for the computer

matchers and computer center are not very sensitive to

changes in daily volume within the range of 49,000

cards with full NFF/III implementation to 70,000 cards

with no NFF/III implementation. This is because the

actual number of full fingerprint searches and matches

required (as compared with name checks of prior

offenders and simple fingerprint verifications) is about

the same at 49,000 cards with full NFF/III implementation, 61,000 cards with half NFF/III implementation,

and 70,000 cards with no NFF/III implementation. A

name check hit is confirmed by comparing the person’s

new fingerprint card (or image) for the current arrest

with the card (or image) on file from prior arrest listed

for that person, rather than having to conduct a search

of the entire fingerprint file. With no NFF/III, these

name checks and fingerprint verifications would be

conducted by Ident. With full NFF/III, the States would

do the name checks and verifications.

In this range, significant cost savings are more

likely to result from technical advances in computer

matchers (and related equipment) and, to a lesser

extent, from smaller office complex requirements at

the lower volumes and staffing levels.

Total potential savings for these three cost components range from about $30 million to $60 million (for

the OTA-2 and OTA-1 scenarios, respectively), against

a base of $220 million—a possible savings in the 14-

to 28-percent range (figure 10). The potential increases

for these cost components could be as much as $67

million, or 30 percent, for the OTA-6 scenario. The

66Assumes a Cost of about $210,000 per matcher with a volume discount. Some 1991 matchers cost in the range of $350,000 each but have twice

the processing capacity, for an effective cost of $175,000 for equivalent matcher capacity.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options . 35

Table 10-Scenarios for Ident Daily Fingerprint

Volume, Response Time, Matchers, and Cost

Number of Computer Office

Daily computer Matcher center complex Total

volume matchers cost costa

cost b Costc

100,000 (OTA-6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 663 $139M $41 M $107M $287M

70,000 (OTA-5) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470 $ 99M $36M $ 93M $228M

61,000 (OTA-4) . . . . . . . . . . . . 480 $1OOM $36M $84M $220M

49,000 (OTA-3) .......ti..ti. . . 477 $1OOM $36M $73M $209M

43,000 (OTA-2) . . . . . . . . . . .. . 418 $88M $34M $67M $189M

34,000 (OTA-1) . . . . . . . . . . . . 330 $70M $32M $59M $161M

a Includes prorated share of other costs. Assumes matchers (including Controllers and cooling UnitS to support

them) accountfor40 percent of computer center space. Assumes $22M isfixed cost.

blncludes prorated share ofother costs. Total cost isproportionai to floor space (Seetable 9).

concludes matcher, computer center, and office complex costs.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

cost differences between OTA-3, OTA-4, and OTA-5

are less significant. Matcher and computer center costs

do not appear to be very sensitive to daily fingerprint

volume within the 49,000 to 70,000 range, due to the

effects of NFF/III. Other automation components,

including image processing and minutiae extraction

systems, minutiae editing work stations, data entry

terminals, scanners and printers, and telecommunications input/output equipment and line capacity, may be

more sensitive.

Figure 10-Projected Illustrative Ident Automation

Costs, Selected Items

.-c

$’

tn

s

Fingerprint cards per day, in thousands

NOTES: Costs shown are for computer matchers, computer center

complex, and office complex only. See table 10 and accompanying text for detailed explanation.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.

The FBI tradeoff analysis should estimate potential

savings (or cost increases) in the total automation

budget, which can be roughly estimated as follows.

Assume first that the total automation cost breaks

down into 50 percent for AFIS (25 percent for matchers, 25 percent for other AFIS equipment); 25 percent

for criminal record computers (including III computers); and 25 percent for telecommunications .67

Assume second that the matcher cost is $100 million

(for 1990 technology). This suggests a total baseline

automation cost of $400 million to accommodate the

OTA-4 scenario (61,000 cards per day). Technical

advances should reduce the cost of the system somewhat if bought today, and more substantially by the

time the contract is actually awarded (planned for fiscal year 1993). To develop an authoritative analysis,

the FBI needs to carefully examine the cost impact of

assumptions about overall volume, NFF/III participation, and the ability of users to transmit fingerprints

electronically. The results should provide a better

understanding of how the FBI might reduce, to the

extent possible, costs of the AFIS, computer, and

telecommunication capabilities needed to support Ident

modernization. The results also should help the

Administration and Congress better understand what

capabilities can be purchased at various levels of

funding.

The tradeoff analysis also should consider implications for the composition as well as the size of the

workforce, for employee training, and for technical and

schedule risk.

67Typica] split for integrated AFIS/CCH systems at the State level, based on vendor estimates.
36 The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

Composition and Training of Ident

Workforce

Over time, Ident will have fewer employees doing

manual tasks, and more employees working directly

with computer terminals and systems. The skill

requirements will increase further for those already

working with computers. Thus Ident will need an

active retraining program for current employees and

training for new employees. The balance between

retraining and new hires will depend on total staffing

requirements, number of current employees electing to

move to West Virginia, employee attrition (retirements,

separations, transfers to other FBI divisions), rate of

transition from manual to electronic processing; and

rate of implementation of NFF/III.

OTA’s analysis of Ident job titles and staffing complements (as of Mar. 25, 1991) indicates significant

retraining needs, for example:

Identification record clerks doing typing will

need to be retrained for computer terminal

operation.

Mail and correspondence clerks will need to be

retrained for electronic mail and electronic filing/processing operations.

Most arrest record examiners and assistants will

no longer be needed with full NFF/III and will

have to be phased out through attrition or retrained

for other jobs.

Coding clerks will need to be retrained for new

AFIS/III systems.

Fingerprint examiners will need to be retrained

for new AFIS systems. The number needed will

be a function of processing volume.

The majority of current Ident employees who elect

to move to West Virginia will need retraining. New

hires will need more intensive and computer-oriented

training than in the past. Supervisory personnel at all

levels will need not only retraining in the relevant

technical skills but also training in changing to a

high-tech organizational setting. This will be especially

challenging for the supervisory coding clerks (64) and

supervisory fingerprint examiners (110) who will have

to contend simultaneously with changes in their own

jobs and those of their employees. In addition, employees moving to West Virginia will have to manage their

own personal relocation as well.

Ident will need a new cadre of in-house trainers,

possibly supplemented with outside assistance for the

Box E—Ident Automation: A Necessary Risk

The Ident automation program is high risk

because of the combination of technical, personnel, and building requirements:

Ž The new automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) must process a much

larger daily volume of fingerprint checks

against a much bigger fingerprint file than

even the largest State AFIS.

• The Ident automation schedule calls for

designing, procuring, and implementing the

new AFIS in the time frame typically

needed for smaller State systems.

Ž The Ident building schedule calls for construction (in Clarksburg, West Virginia) to

proceed faster than normal for a facility of

this size and complexity.

Ž The Ident personnel schedule calls for moving perhaps 750 to 1,000 employees (to

West Virginia), hiring 1,500 to 2,000 new

employees, and training all employees in a

compressed time frame.

But the Ident automation program is a necessary risk because:

• the current Ident fingerprint identification

system is technically obsolete (and should

be completely phased out);

• the current Ident system is too slow to meet

many criminal justice and nonjustice needs

for fingerprint checks;

Ž the current Ident building space (at the J.

Edgar Hoover Building in Washington, DC)

is inadequate for making the transition to a

fully automated system; and

• the current Ident workforce has experienced

high turnover and low morale due in part to

less competitive salaries and long commutes

(in the high cost Washington, DC, area).

Ident therefore needs to give special attention

to managing the risks of the entire revitalization

process (automation, construction, moving, training), and should be prepared to make adjustments

as new information becomes available.

Ident has an opportunity to break with the past

and establish a new, state-of-the-art facility with a

reenergize workforce. A modernized and revitalized Ident will help meet the Nation’s criminal

identification and records infrastructure needs at

and beyond the turn of the century.

SOURCE: Office of Technology Assessment, 1991.
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 37

transition. Ident’s current complement of nine fingerprint examiner instructors and two identification record

instructors could be upgraded and expanded. These

instructors would themselves need retraining. Additional trainers might be drawn from the ranks of the

most senior, most experienced fingerprint specialists

(75) and supervisory fingerprint specialists (22).

Another possibility would be to involve the current

group of computer personnel, including 24 computer

operators, 20 computer programmers (all types), 26

computer system analysts, 5 computer scientists/specialists, 3 electronics engineers, and 15 electronics

technicians. Again, retraining the trainers would be a

necessity.

Technical and Schedule Risk

The tradeoff analysis also needs to consider the

implications for technical and schedule risk (see

box E). The Ident modernization plan is, as it stands,

on a rigorous schedule. The building construction time

table requires that decisions on the size of the computer

center be made within the next few months. Bid packages for the computer center and central plant are to be

issued in late 1991 or early 1992, with construction to

begin in spring 1992. Bid packages for the main office

building will be issued in spring 1992, with construction to begin in the summer and to be completed in late

1994. Some parts of the computer center and office

complex are to be ready by April 1994, so phased

occupancy can take place between spring 1994 and

spring 1995. Full operation is planned for June 1995.

The building construction schedule is tight, but it

allows some margin for slippage and depends on

straightforward, proven construction techniques. The

technical risk for the building is small, and most, if not

all, of the necessary funding has already been appropriated by Congress.

The automation schedule, in comparison, is very

tight and allows little if any margin for error. Further,

the technical risk is inherently high, given the

unprecedented scope and scale of the project. (By way

of comparison, this project involves a file size about 3

to 5 times that of the California AFIS, a daily volume 7

to 12 times higher, and many additional features.) Little of the necessary funding for automation has been

approved by Congress.

The current automation schedule is as follows:

automation strategy decision, summer-fall 1991;

Request for Information (RFI) issued to all interested

vendors, fall 1991; Request for Proposal (RFP) issued

to selected best qualified vendors, early 1992; prototype demonstrations by the most qualified vendors,

mid to late 1992; contract award, early 1993; begin

system installation, spring 1994; full operation, June

1995. The schedule allows little room for delays for

any reason. The schedule is essentially a series of critical paths; delays at any point would be carried along to

each subsequent step in the process. The time between

contract award and full operation (about 27 months) is

in the same range required for procurement and installation of systems at the State level (typically 18 to 30

months). Ident is proposing to do a much larger, more

complicated system procurement and file conversion in

about the same time, and with the further complicating

factors of moving to a new building hundreds of miles

away (although the move offers other advantages),

relocating existing employees, hiring new employees,

and training virtually all employees.

The move should, however, help the FBI develop a

more stable, higher quality Ident workforce. Ident has

in the past experienced high turnover and low morale

at its current Washington, DC, location, in part because

the high cost of living and comparatively low salaries

require many Ident employees to commute long distances. Ident has difficulty filling vacancies with qualified persons. Ident expects salaries to be more competitive, living costs lower, and commutes shorter in West

Virginia. As of September 3, 1991, over 7,000 new

applicants had applied for the first 200 positions available at a satellite office opening in Clarksburg, West

Virginia. Ident estimates that about one-third of the

current workforce will elect to move to West Virginia

and thereby provide a core staff for training and transitional purposes. (All current Ident employees who

choose not to move have been guaranteed continued

FBI employment in the Washington, DC, area at no

loss of pay.)

The risks of moving to an area with a lower cost of

living and a potentially more stable, motivated workforce seem necessary, given the current staffing

problems. In addition, Ident’s present home (the J.

Edgar Hoover Building) is overcrowded and considered unsuitable for a fully automated Ident, especially

since the transition will probably require several years

of dual operation of the old and new systems. It
38 . The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options

appears much easier to phase the new system in at a

new location, and the old system out at the current

location, rather than try to do both at the same location.

Moving an agency can be an important part of organizational change and renewal, as seems to be the case

for Ident. The move to West Virginia should help Ident

break with the past and establish a new, state-of-the-art

facility with a reenergize workforce. The existing

facility in Washington, DC, and its obsolete system

will not be moved to the new location, but instead will

be phased out over a transitional period. Current Ident

employees who choose to move will, inevitably, face

some stress in adjusting to a small-town or rural environment. Ident has hired human resource consultants to

assist with the transition.

The move also illustrates the decentralizing potential of electronic technology. With a manual fingerprint

process, Ident had to be located in close physical proximity to other FBI laboratory and investigative operations. In the electronic era, Ident can be located at a

remote site, since fingerprints can be transmitted electronically and instantaneously between Clarksburg,

West Virginia, Washington, DC, and law enforcement

agencies around the country.

Some technical risk also is justifiable, since it is

unclear whether simple extension of current technology can meet Ident needs. Vendors claim they can meet

these needs without resorting to entirely new technical

approaches, but some users are skeptical. Pushing for

new technology solutions can be constructive, up to a

point, but unproven systems are risky and potentially

expensive. The FBI could reduce the technical risk

after reviewing the RFI responses by using the RFP to

procure the best commercially available technologies

existing at the time of the procurement, rather than

attempting to require significant additional R&D work

by vendors as part of the procurement. Most vendors

will do some development anyway, and will strive to

provide the most advanced proven technologies possible. But if FBI requirements are such that substantially

new and unproven technologies are required, then

Ident would be faced with the prospect of significant

shake-down and break-in problems associated with all

new systems (including hardware and software debugging). On the down side, Ident could face serious

delays and budget overruns, with no guarantee that

additional funds would be available.

If new technology solutions are not clearly evident

after the RFI, the lower technical risk strategy then

would be for Ident to: 1) push for the next generation of

current systems, which would be more powerful and

cost-effective, but which will be technically proven and

commercially available in the 1993 to 1994 time frame;

and 2) place the purely R&D work on a separate, longer

term track pointing toward 2000 and beyond. The experience of Federal agencies that have attempted automation programs of this magnitude is that some problems

will occur even with the best laid plans and proven

technologies. But if the plan involves significant R&D

and new technologies, the project is likely to encounter

serious technical problems and schedule and cost overruns. This is true even for agencies with major continuing R&D programs. Ident does not have an extensive

R&D track record. Making a long-term commitment to

AFIS R&D may be desirable, but the real pay-off from

R&D is typically 8 to 10 years or more in the future, not

2 to 3 years. Technical and schedule risk also could be

lowered by reducing the demands on the automated system as much as possible.

Another option is to simply stretch the project out

by 2 to 4 years. This would allow time for more R&D

before procurement commenced. This option could,

however, impact the cost of the project significantly.

The cost of procuring the new system could increase

due to inflation, perhaps in the range of $1 million per

month—$667,000 for automation delays 68 

a n d

$350,000 building construction delays.69 Thus a

2-year delay could add as much as $48 million to the

project cost. The cost of delay could be even higher, if,

for example, the new system is less expensive to operate than the current system, and potential savings are

foregone. A delay could, on the other hand, reduce

costs if further technical breakthroughs resulted in a

more cost-effective system with even lower net procurement and operating costs. The FBI does not

believe that additional technical advances of this magnitude are likely even with a 2-year stretchout.

68$4oo million times (i-percent escalation over the life of the project, divided by 36 months (FY92, FY93, FY94).

69$2Io million times 6-percent escalation divided by 36 months (FY92, FY93, FY94).
The FBI Fingerprint Identification Automation Program: Issues and Options 39

Lack of funding could, of course, force a delay in the

project. The new building construction is funded

(against the current schedule), but the automation component is only partially funded (including some proceeds from Ident user fees). The Office of Management

and Budget recommended zero funding for fiscal year

1992. 70 The FBI estimated that this would delay the

automation program by 16 to 18 months, at an additional

cost of $11 to $12 million. Congress is in the process of

determining the fiscal year 1992 appropriation.71

The true cost of Ident automation delays—for whatever reasons--could be much larger, because delays

prolong the unquantifiable but large number of criminal justice decisions made erroneously each day due to

untimely or incomplete Ident fingerprint and criminal

record checks. Ident fingerprint checks today cannot be

completed fast enough for use in arrest, initial charging,

or bail decisions. Even for sentencing decisions that

have a longer lead time, Ident fingerprint and record

checks could be incomplete because of the large backlog of unfiled arrest fingerprint cards and dispositions,

and the 8.8 million Ident criminal history records not

yet computerized (and not accessible via III). The FBI

has requested fiscal year 1992 funds to begin clearing

the backlogs and converting manual records. But these

remedial actions will take years (about 2 years for backlog clearance, 4 years for records conversion), and offer

only temporary improvement. The roughly 3 million

unfiled dispositions represent only a small fraction of

missing dispositions, which could total up to 36 million.72 In addition, Ident is receiving a large number of

duplicate criminal fingerprint cards, all requiring some

amount of processing. In fiscal year 1990, Ident

received and processed about 3 million criminal fingerprint cards that duplicated cards already on file. Ident

fingerprint identification and record check deficiencies

also are affecting nonjustice decisions.

The intangible costs of compromised criminal justice decisions and employment, licensing, and security

clearance record checks seem far greater than any

strictly monetary costs or benefits of delay. Nobody

has quantified how many repeat serious offenders are

inadvertently released because of misidentification or

missing criminal history records, how many nonserious

offenders are detained because of misidentification or

incomplete records, or how many serious crimes are

not solved because of the inability to conduct latent

fingerprint searches. But the public safety and civil liberties costs of delay are, undoubtedly, much larger.

The long-term solution to duplicate, incomplete, or

inaccessible fingerprint cards and criminal history

records is full implementation of NFF/III, combined

with further improvements in the automation and quality of State criminal records and a realistic, appropriately sized Ident automation program. The result

should be a criminal records infrastructure that can

meet the Nation’s needs at and beyond the turn of the

century.

70The office of M~~agement and B~dg~t believed that the Ident system design and procurement process was not sufficiently far along to justify

or require substantial FY92 expenditures.

71 The Senate included ~ additional $48.0 million for Ident automation and $12.5 million for Ident record conversion and backlog reduction in

the FY92 appropriations bill. The House included no additional funds. A Senate-House conference committee met to reconcile these and other differences. The conference committee agreed to the Senate funding levels, but with an additional requirement that the FBI set up an independent Ident

automation and relocation program office that is completely separate from the Ident division itself. The committee provided $1.5 million for this purpose. See U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, Oct. 1, 1991, pp. H7171-7172.

721dent receives dispositions on about half the arrests, so up to 36 mi]]ion dispositions could be missing from the estimated 75 million criminal

arrest events reportedly on file.