1 IN TH E SUPREME COURT O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 Op in ion N um be r:

____ ____ ____ __ 3 F ili ng D at e: A ug us t 8, 201 6 4 N O. S -1 -S C -3 4733 5 STA TE OF NE W MEX ICO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v
. 8 ANTHONY SAMO RA, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant.
10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF BER NA LILLO C OUN TY 11 R oss C . S an ch ez , D ist ri ctJu dg e
12 Bennett J. Ba

ur, C hief Public De fender 13 J.K . T heodos ia Johns on, A ssistant Appellate D efender 14 San ta Fe, NM 15 fo r Appe llant
16 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 17 Steven H . Johnston , A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 18 San ta Fe, NM 19 for Appellee1 OPIN ION

2 CHÁ VEZ , Just ice. 3 { 1} D ef

en dant A nth ony

S am or a w as ac cu se d of lur ing a sixt ee n- y ear- old m al e int o 4 his truck bydeception, driving hi m to a secluded location in Albuquerque, and then 5 forcibly

penetrating him in the anus. A j ury convicted Def

endant of second-degree 6 cr im ina l se xua l pe ne tr at ionin the c om m iss ionof

a fe lon y (C SP -f

el ony ), co ntr ar

y to 7 NMS A 1978, Se ction 30 -9-11(E) (5) (2007, am ended 200 9), and first-degree 8 kidna ppi ng, c ontrary

to N MS A 197 8, S ec tio n 30 -4 -1 (A )( 4) ( 2003 ). D ue to 9 se nte nc ing e nhanc em en ts, D ef en dant w as se nte nc ed

to lif e im pr iso nm en t w iththe 10 poss ibi lity

of paro le a ft er

thi rty y ears f or his C SP-f

elony c onvi ct ionplu s a 11 consecutive eight een-y ear sentence for his kidnapp ing conv iction. In this direct 12 ap pe al , D ef

en dant b rings avari ety

of c ha lle nge s to both c onvi ct ion s, in cl udi ng a 13 ch al le nge to the dis tr ic t c ourt f or om itt ing that the se xua l a ct m ust ha ve be ennon 1 4 c o n s e n s u a l wh e n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e ju ry o n C S P
- f

e l o n y. 15 { 2} Be ca

use w e co nc lud e tha t i t w as f undam en ta l e rr or

to om it the phr as e “ w ith out 16 co nse nt” fr om the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns re le vant to CS P- fe lon y , w e m ust r ev er se 1 7 De fe n d an t ’s CS P c o n v i ct i o n . Th e s ame f u n d amen t al erro r a l s o i n f e ct ed t h e ju ry’s 18 fi ndi ngs w ithr es pe ct to D ef en da nt ’s in te nt t o in fl ic t a se xua l of

fe nse a ga ins t the 19 al le ge d vi ct im , and w e m ust the re fo re a lso r ev er se D ef en dant’ s ki dna

ppi ng14 A lth oughsom e m en tio n of the al le ge d vict im ’ s nam e w as ine vit ab le a t tri al , 1 15 we do not ref

er to him by nam e here because “ the constitu tion an d l aw s of Ne w 16 Me xic o r equir e tha t w e re spe ct ‘ the vic tim ’ s di gni ty

a nd p ri va cy th ro ughout the 17 crim inal justice proce ss,’ ” State v. A llen , 2000 -N MS C- 002, ¶ 2 n. 1, 128 N
. M. 482 , 18 994 P. 2d 7 28 (qu oti ng N. M. Co nst . a rt . I I, § 24 (A )( 1) ), a nd b ec au se the a lle ge d vi ct im 19 wa s a child un der N MSA1978 , S ection 32A-1-4(B) (2005, am ended 201 6), since 20 st at e la w affo rd s s om e d eg ree o f co nf id en ti al it y

in ch il d abu se an d n eg le ctcas es . See 21 generally N M S A 1 9 7 8 , § 3 2 A
- 4
- 3 3 ( 2 0 0 5 , a m e n d e d2 016) ; s ee als o Allen , 200 0- 22 N MS C- 002, ¶

2 n. 1. 2 1 co nvi ct ion
. A cc or din gly , w e re m an d th is c as e to the dis tr ic t c ourt, w he re D ef en dant 2 m ay be r etri ed

on b othc harg es . 3 I. BACKGRO UND 4 { 3} J
. Z. wa s a t a b u s s t o p i n d o w n t o w n A l b u qu e r qu e “b u g g i n g p e o p l e f o r mo n e y” 1 5 so that he could catch a bus ho m e. D efendant approached him , stated that he knew 6 J. Z
. ’ s f am ily , a nd o ff

er ed to giv e J. Z
. ar ide hom e. J. Z
. got int o D ef en dant’ s pi ck

up 7 tr uc k, a nd D ef

en dant s tart ed

dr ivi ng. 8 { 4} J.Z . te stified that he soon noticed that De fendant wa s not driving J.Z . tow ard 9 his hou se . J.Z
. tol d De fe ndant he w as dr ivi ng the w ro ng w ay , a nd D ef en dant d id n ot 10 respond. De fendant eventually stopp ed the tru ck i n a re m ote location un der a 1 1 h i g h w a y u n d e r

p a s s . D e f

e n d a n tt h e n p u n c h e dJ
. Z
. i n t h e h e a d , a n dJ
. Z
. b e c a me 12 “ diz zy . ” D ef

en dant p ull ed

dow n J. Z
. ’ s pants , m an eu ve red hi m into ar ec ep tiv e 13 posit ion, got on top of J.Z ., and penetrated J.Z .’ s anus with his peni s. J .Z. further3

1 t es t i fi ed t h at h e t r i e d t o es cap e b y o p en i n g t h e p as s en g er -s i d e d o o r o f D ef en d an t ’s 2 truc k, but

the doo r w oul d no t op en . A ft er af ewm inu te s D ef

en dant e j ac ula te d and 3 sa id, “N owI c antake y ou h om e. ” D ef en dant dro ppe d of

f J.Z. on th e w es t si de of 4 A lbu que rque a t a

ga s st at ionne ar

aW al m ar

t. J. Z
. te sti fi ed tha t he w as af ra id to c al l 5 the pol ic e be ca

use he did

not w an t t o be arr es te d f

or apr oba tio n vi ola tio n. H e al so 6 te sti fi ed

that he f ough t ba ck

thr ough out

the e nc ount er

but that D ef en dant thr ewhim 7 around and ov erpowe red him
. J.Z . w as s i x t ee n y ears old at the tim e of the alleged 8 crim e. 9 { 5} Tw o day s later, J.Z . w as arr ested for absconding from j uvenile prob ation. In 10 j ai l, J. Z
. tol d ac ouns el or that he ha d be ense xua lly a ssa ult ed
. J. Z. we nt thr ougha 11 se xua l ass au lt nur se e xa m ina tio n ( SA N E e xa m ) fo ur

day s a ft er

the a lle ge d a tta ck
. 12 D ur ing the S A

N E e xa m , anur se too k sw ab s f ro m J. Z
. ’ s anus, pe nis , a nd m outh. T he 13 nur se f

ound no e vid en ce of

a ny inj urie s on his body , a nd n o D N A f ro m D ef en dant 14 w as f ound on the sw ab s. 15 { 6} A ft er

his r el ea se f

ro m cu sto dy ab out thi rty day s late r, J. Z
. tol d Je nni fe r Br ow n, 16 his big sis te r unde r the Bi g B ro the rs Bi g Si ste rs pr ogr am , w ha t ha d ha ppe ne d to h im 17 an d de sc ri be d his atta ck er , inc lud ing the f ac t tha t the a tta ck er

w or e a G PS m oni tor

on 18 his be lt. Ms
. Br ow n loc at ed a phot ogr ap h of D ef en dant an d D ef

en dant’ s a ddr es s on4

1 a w eb sit e, a nd f

ro m that w eb sit e phot ogr ap h J. Z
. r ec ogni ze d Defen dant a s hi s 2 attacker. J.Z . drove to the address listed o n t h e website, and J.Z . identified 3 De fe n d ant’ s truck as the truck in which he w as attacked. State em ploy ees later 4 m at ch ed

the loc at ion s and s eque nc e of D ef en dant’ s G PS c oor din at es to tho se 5 d e s c r i b e di n J
. Z. ’s s t o ry. 6 { 7} D ef

en dant w as ind ic te d ontw o c ount s of c ri m ina l se xua l pe netr at io n inthe 7 second degree “ by

the use of force or coerc ion on a child thi rteen to eighteen y ears 8 of a ge ” (C SP -f

or ce /c oe rc ion ). S ec tio n 30 -9 -1 1( E )( 1)
. E ac h c ount w as a lte rn at ive ly 9 ch ar ge d a s C SP -f

el ony . S ec tio n 30 -9 -1 1( E )( 5)
. D ef en dant w as a lso ch arg ed w ith 10 crim inal sexual contact of a m inor in the fourth d egree (CSC ), contrary to NMS A 11 1978 , S ec ti on 30-9- 13( D )( 1) ( 2003 ), a nd k idn ap pin g, c ontrary to Se ct ion30- 4- 12 1( A )( 4)
. W ithr es pe ct to an al le ga tio n tha t D ef en dant fo rc ed J. Z
. to e nga ge in fe llatio 13 or tou ch ed J. Z
. ’ s p en is w ith out

his c onse nt, the j ur

y unanim ousl y

f ound D ef en dant 14 not guilt y of CSP-felony or CSP-force /coercion and not guilt y of t he charge of CSC. 15 T he j ur

y a lso unanim ousl y

f ound D ef en dant g uil ty

of CS P- fe lon y

w ithr es pe ct

to the 16 allegation of anal penetration and gu ilty of k i d nappin g. T he j ury hung on whether 17 De fendant wa s guilt y of CSP -forc e/coerc ion with respect to th e al l eg at ion of anal 18 pe ne tr at ion
.5

1 { 8} At a sep arat e se nt en ci ng pro ceed in g, see N MS A 1978 , § 31 -1 8- 26 ( 1996 ), the 2 j ury unanim ouslyfound bya preponderance of the evidence t hat Def endant had been 3 co nvi ct ed

of tw o vi ole nt sex ua l off

en se s purs uant t o N MS A 197 8, S ec tio n 31 -1 8- 4 25(F) (199 7 , amend ed 2015 ), and was a ccordingly subject to a m andatory 5 en hanc em en t by

ase nte nc e of lif

e im pr iso nm en t. D ef

en dant w as se nte nc ed

to nin e 6 y ears im

pr iso nm en t en hanc ed by a te rm of li fe im pr iso nm en t w iththe pos sib ili ty of 7 parole in thirty

y ears f or the second- d eg re e CSP- felony conviction and to eighteen 8 ye a r s i mp r i s o n men tf

o r f i r s t - d e g r e e k i d n ap p i n g , t o b e s e rv e dc o n s e c u t i v e l y. 9 II. DISC US SION 10 A. De fend ant’s Right to a Sp eedy Tr ial Was Not Violated 11 { 9} Th e S i x t h Amen d m en t t o t h e Un i t ed St at es Co n s t i tu t i o n g u ar an t ee s t h at “ [i ]n 12 all crim inal prosecution s, the ac cused shall enj oy the right to a speedy
. . . trial. ” See 13 als o N.M. Co ns t. ar t. II, § 14 (“ [T]he acc us edsh al l h av e th e ri gh t t o . . . a sp eed y . . . 14 tr ia l. ”)
. Preve nti ng p re j udi ce to the a cc use d is a t the he ar t of the spe edy

tr ia l r igh t, 15 which also em anates fr om “ the concom itant ‘ societal interest in bringin g an accused 16 to trial.’ ” Sta te v . Se rro s , 201 6- N MS C- 008, ¶ 4, 366 P
. 3d 1 121 (quot ing State v. 17 G arz a , 2009-NMS C-038, ¶ 12, 1 46 N. M. 499, 212 P. 3d 38 7). To deter m ine whether 18 the accused has been deprived of his speedy trial right, this Court follows the four-6

1 fa ct or te st es ta

bli she d by

the U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt i n B ark er v . W ing o , 407 2 U
. S. 514 ( 1972 ), a nd c onsi de rs “ (1 ) the le ngth of de lay in br ing ing the c as e to tri al , 3 (2 ) the r ea sons f

or th e de la y , (3) the de fe ndant’ s a sse rt ionof the r igh t t o aspe edy 4 t r i a l , a nd ( 4) t he pr e

j ud i c e t o t he de f

e nd a nt c aus e d by t he de lay .” G arz a , 200 9- 5 N MS C- 038, ¶

5 ( ci tin g Barker , 407 U. S. at 530). T he Court “ we igh[s] these factors 6 ac co rd ing to the uni que c ir cu m stanc es of e ach ca se in lig ht o f ‘ the S ta te a nd the 7 defendant’ s conduct and the harm to the def endant from

the delay .’ ” Id

. ¶ 5 ( quot ing 8 G arz a , 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 13)
. “ Inr ev ie w ing adis tr ic t c ourt’ s r uli ng o n aspe edy 9 tr ia l vi ola tio n c la im , w e de fe r to the c ourt’ s f ind ing s o f fact , a nd w e w ei gh and 10 balance the Barker

fac tors de novo .” Id

. ¶ 20. 11 1. Le ng th of

t he d el ay 12 { 10} T he Co urt m

ust f ir st d et er m ine w he the r the le ngth of the de lay is pr es um pti ve ly 13 pr ejud ic ia l. “ T he f

ir st f ac tor , the le ngth of

de lay , ha s adua l f

unc tio n: it ac ts a s a 14 triggering m echanism for considering the four B ark er fa ct or s if

the de lay cr oss es the 15 thr es hol d of

be ing pr es um

pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al , a nd i t i s an in de pe nd ent f ac tor to 16 consider in evaluating whether a sp eedy trial v iolation has occurred. ” Se rro s , 201 6- 17 NMS C-008, ¶ 22 (internal quot ation m arks an d ci tation om itted). D efendant w as 18 ar re st ed a nd i ndi ct ed

on S ep te m

be r 8, 200 8, a nd h is tri al be gan onN ove m be r 12,7

1 2013
. T he S ta te the re fo re f ai le d to br ing the c as e to tri al f or m or e than f

ive y ears . 2 Thi s d el ay

is pre su m pt iv el y pre jud ic ia l, re ga rd le ss of t he co m pl ex it y of th e cas e. See 3 Se rro s , 2016-NMS C-008, ¶¶ 21-23 (determ ining that a delay of m ore than four y ears 4 w a s “ p r e s u mp t i v e l y p r e ju d i c i a l i rr e s p e c t i v e o f

t h e c a s e ’s c o mp l e x i t y” )
. Th i s s i x t y5 tw o- m onth de lay

is ex tr ao rd inary an d w ei ghs he av ily a ga ins t the S ta te . B ec au se the 6 de lay is pr es um

pti ve ly pr ej udi ci al , w e m

ust c onsi de r the r em ai nin g Barker f ac tor s. 7 Se rro s , 201 6- N MS C- 008, ¶ 22. 8 2. R ea son s f

or t he d el ay 9 { 11} T he Co ur

t m ust e va lua te “ the r ea son the gov ernm en t as signs t o j ust if y the 10 delay ,” which “ m ay

either heighten or tem

per the prej udice to the defendant caused 11 by the length of the delay .” Id

. ¶ 29 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 12 If the S tate deliberately attem pts to d elay

the trial to h amp er t he defense, the delay 13 weig hs he av il y

ag ai n s t t h e St at e. Id

. N eg lig en t or

a dm ini str at ive de lay

m ust be 14 co nsi de re d be ca

use “ the ult im at e re spon sib ili ty fo r suc h c ir cu m stanc es m ust r es t w ith 15 th e g ov ern m en t,” alt ho ug h s uc h d el ay is no t wei gh edas h eav il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te . Id

. 16 (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). H owever , “ [a] s the length o f delay 17 in crea se s, n eg li ge nt or a dm in is tra ti ve de la y weig hs m or e h eav il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te .” 18 Id

. F ina lly , “ ‘ ap pr opr ia te de lay , ’ j ust if ie d f or ‘ a va li d r ea son, suc h a s am iss ing8

1 witness,’ is neutra l and does not we igh against the State. ” Id

. ( quot ing G arz a , 200 9- 2 NMSC -0 38 , ¶ 27 ). Dela y cau se d by a d efen da nt weig hs ag ai ns t t ha t d efen da nt . See 3 V erm ont v . B ril lon , 5 5 6 U.S . 8 1 , 9 0 , 9 4 (2 0 0 9 ) ( h o l d i n g t h at t h e d ef en d an t ’s 4 “ deliberate attem

pt to disrupt proceedings” we ighed heavily against the defendant). 5 { 12} Inthi s c as e, the pr etri al de lay can be gr oupe d int o thr ee tim e pe ri ods: (1 ) fr om 6 Se pte m be r 8, 2008 unt il Apr il 2010 ; ( 2) f ro m Apr il 2010 unt il Se pte m

be r 2011 ; and 7 (3 ) fr om

S ep te m be r 2011 unt il tr ia l i n N ove m be r 2013
. 8 { 13} D ur ing the f

ir st t im e pe ri od, the part ie s in div idu al ly or j oin tly fil ed a t l ea st a 9 dozen m otion s for con tinuance stating a v ariety of rea sons , including to negotiate a 10 ple a de al that po te nti al ly inc lud ed oth er c harg es a ga ins t D ef

en dant, to pr epare f

or 1 1 t ri a l , an dt o co m

p l et e d i s co v er y. Def

en d an tei t h ers t i p u l at ed t o ea ch o f t h e S t at e’s 12 m otion s or did not oppo se them
. For the fir st tim e on appeal, D efendant asserts that 13 he stipul ated to or j ointl y filed the num erous m otion s for continuan ce wh ich stated 14 as gr ound s the ne ed to con tinue ple a dis cu ssi ons be ca use of the appare nt p oli cy

of the 15 Se co nd Judi ci al D istri ct A tto rn ey ’ s O ff

ic e tha t onl y al low ed

ple a ne got ia tio ns p ri or 16 to the vic tim be ing int er vie w ed
. T his is the sa m e pol ic y tha t w e pr ev iou sly 17 dis favor ed

in Se rro s be ca

use “ it is w el l se ttl ed

that the pos sib ili ty

of aple a ag re em en t 18 doe s no t r el ie ve the S ta te of it s du ty to pur sue ati m el y

dis posi tio n of

the ca se . ” 2016
-9

1 N MS C- 008, ¶

¶ 69, 71- 72 ( ci tin g Sta te v . M addox , 200 8-NMS C-062, ¶ 26, 1 45 N. M. 2 242, 195 P.3d 125 4 (“ The State m ust affirm atively

seek to m ove the case to trial, even 3 whil e p l ea n eg o t i at i o n s ar e p en d i n g .” )) . He re , t h e p l ea n eg o t i at i o n s we re co m p l i ca ted 4 an d de lay ed

by D ef en dant’ s a dm iss ionto a par ole vio la tio n on June 2, 200 9, the f ili ng 5 of addition al crim inal sexual penetration ch arges agains t De fendant in Septem ber 6 2009 , an d the pa rt ie s’ ef fo rt to re ac h a pl ea

de al w ithr es pe ct

to al l c harg es pe ndi ng 7 ag ai nst D ef en dant and n ot j ust the ch ar ge s in this ca se . T he re is no evid en ce tha t the 8 State delibera tely

delay ed the case during this tim e, and therefore these nineteen 9 m onths f

ro m S ep te m be r 8, 200 8 unti l Apr il 201 0 w ei gh o nly sli ght ly a ga ins t the 10 State. 11 { 14} D ur ing the se co nd tim e per iod , D ef en dant con ce de s that he w as r es pons ibl e fo r 12 de lay ing the tr ia l fr om Apr il 2010 unt il Fe br uary 2011
. H ow ev er , D ef en dant w as a lso 13 responsib le for the delay from Marc h 201 1 unti l April 20 1 1 b ec au se his attorney 14 m iss ed

ahe ar ing a nd f

ile d a m oti on for a con tinuanc e due to a sc he dul ing c onf lic t i n 15 an oth er

c as e. O n M ay

2, 201 1, D ef

en dant f ile d ar eque st f

or j udi ci al re cu sa l. T his 16 m oti on w as de nie d, a nd the j udge f ound that the m oti on w as f

ile d f or the pur pose of 17 delay ing th e trial. O n May 6, 2011, D efendant petit i o n ed t h i s Court to issue an 18 ex tr ao rd inary

w ri t r ev er sin g th e distri ct j udge
. W e den ie d the w ri t onMay 27, 201 1.10

1 The tim e re lating to De fendant’ s petition for an extraordinary wr it cannot be we ighed 2 a g a i n s tt h e S t a t e , a n di n a n y e v e n t , De f e n d a n ta c c e p t e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r t h i s d e l a y. 3 Th e d i s t ri ct court set the trial for Septem ber 6, 2011 ; therefore , w e hold that 4 D ef en dant i s sole ly

r es pons ibl e fo r the se ve nte en -m onth de lay f ro m Apr il 2010 to 5 Se pte m be r 2011
. 6 { 15} T he thi rd

ti m e pe ri od, the tw en ty -s ix- m onth de lay f ro m Se pte m

be r 2011 unt il 7 Novem ber 2013, involv ed the district court’ s cons i de r at i on o f num e r ou s m ot i on s filed 8 by both p arties and an appeal to th is Court. T he State a ppealed an order w hich 9 excluded a statem ent Def endant m ade to his counselo r, Te wana Bell, which Be ll later 10 re lay ed

to pol ic e of

fi ce rs . I n th at

state m en t, D ef

en dant tol d Be ll tha t he ha d se x w ith 11 som eo ne w hose de sc ri pti on w as c onsi sten t with th e phy sic al c hara ct er ist ic s of the 12 al le ge d vi ct im
. T he dis tr ic t cour t ent er ed its or de r on D ec em be r 15, 201 1 e xc lud ing 13 Defen da nt ’s s ta te m en t be cau se of th e ps y ch ot he rap is t-p at ie nt pri vi le ge . See Ru le 11- 14 50 4 NM RA. 15 { 16} T he S ta te the n f ile d anot ic e of

appe al w iththe dis tr ic t c ourt on D ec em be r 16, 16 2011
. T he S ta te appe al ed to the Co urt of

App eal s, whi chtr an sf

er re d th e ap pe al to 17 thi s C ourt purs uant t o Sta te v . Sm all wo od , 2007 -N MS C- 005, ¶ 11, 141 N
. M. 178 , 152 18 P. 3d 8 21, be ca

use D ef en dant, if f ound gui lty , m igh t be se nte nc ed to lif e in p ri son.11

1 For speedy trial p urposes in we ighin g the responsib ility assigned to a party for delay 2 ca use d by a n inte rl oc uto ry ap pe al , co urts m ay co nsi de r se ve ra l f ac tor s, inc lud ing “ the 3 str en gth of th e Gove rn m en t’ s po sit ionon the appe al ed iss ue , the im

portanc e of

the 4 is su e in th e p os tu re o f th e cas e, an d— in so m e cas es —t he ser io us ne ss of t he cri m e.” 5 United States v. L oud Hawk , 47 4 U
. S
. 30 2, 31 5 ( 19 86 )
. App l y ing th e Lo u d Hawk 6 an al y sis , w e con cl ude tha t the de lay fr om the fi lin g of the ap pe al unt il our dis posi tio n 7 shou ld w ei gh n eu tr al ly be ca use t he re were no unusu al de lay s. F ir st, the S ta te 8 certifie d that the appeal wa s not taken for the purpos e of delay and that the evidence 9 would have been subs tantial proof of a m aterial f act. Sec ond, we are persuaded that 10 the ev ide nc e w as im

portant bec au se , if

a dm itt ed , it

se rv ed a s e vid en ce that D ef

en dant 11 adm itt ed

to ha vin g se x w ithsom eo ne w ho h ad the spe ci fi c ch arac te ri sti cs of the 12 al le ge d vi ct im
. T hir d, it il lus tr at ed

the se ri ousn es s of a cr im e tha t D ef en dant c oul d 13 be sub j ec te d to ase nte nc e of

li fe in pr iso n if

he w er e fo und guil ty . U lti m at el y , thi s 14 Co ur t i ss ue d a di sp os it io na l o rd er aff irming th e d is tri ctco ur t. Sta te v . Sam ora , N o. 15 33,394, dispo sition al order of affir m ance ¶ 13 (N. M. S up. Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). 16 { 17} F ur

th e r , the thr ee a nd o ne -h al f m onths o f m oti ons fr om S ep te m be r 6, 201 1 un til 17 De cem

ber 16, 2011 and the two and one-half m onth s betwee n our disp ositio nal order 18 an d th e ac tua l tr ia l on N ove m be r 12, 2013 are a dm ini str at ive de lay s w hic h w ei gh, if12

1 at all, only

slight ly against the State. 2 { 18} T o su m

m a r i z e h o ww e h a v e w e i g h e dt h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e d e l a y , t w e n t y - f

ive 3 m onths we igh sli ght ly ag ai nst the St at e, se ve nte enm onths w ei gh a ga ins t D ef en dant, 4 and twenty

m onth s weigh neutrally
. Consid ered together, the parties bear a sim ilar 5 responsib ility

for the delay s, and this factor w eighs on ly slight ly against the State. 6 C. Assert ion of the right 7 { 19} U nde r thi s f

ac tor , “ [w ] e ac co rd

w ei ght to the f re qu en cy a nd f or ce of the 8 defendant’ s objections to the delay and analy ze the def endant’ s actions with regard 9 to the delay .” Sta te v . Spe arm an , 2 0 1 2 -N M SC-023 , ¶ 31, 283 P.3d 272 (internal 10 quot ation m arks and citation om itted). T his inq uiry is “ closely

related t o t h e o ther 11 Barker

f ac tor s, be ca

use ‘ [t ] he str en gthof

[ the de fe ndant’ s] e ff

orts w ill be a ff

ec te d by 12 the le ngth of

the de lay , to som e ex te nt b y the r ea son fo r the de lay , a nd m ost 13 particularly

by the personal prej udice, which is not alway s readily identifiable, that 14 [the defendant] experiences. ’ ” G arz a , 200 9- N MS C- 038, ¶ 31 ( quot ing Barker , 407 15 U. S. at 531) (alterations in original). Further , “ [t] he tim eliness and vig or with w hich 16 the right is asserted m ay be considered as an indication of w hether a def endant was 17 denied needed acce ss to [a] speedy trial over his objec tion o r w hether the issue was 18 raised on a

ppeal as [an] after

thou ght.” Se rro s , 2016 -N MS C- 008, ¶ 76 (se co nd and13

1 third alterations in orig inal) (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 2 { 20} De fendant did no t m eaningfullyassert his right, and therefore this fa ctor does 3 not sup port hi s sp ee dy

tr ia l c la im
. D ef

en dant m ad e a pro f

orm a as se rt ionof

his r igh t 4 on October 30, 2008, w hen the Public Def ender D epartm ent entered its appearance 5 on h is b eh al f. T he onl y oth er ti m e he a sse rt ed

the r igh t was fiv e y ears la te r in h is 6 O ct obe r 25, 201 3 m oti on t o di sm iss on s pe edy tr ia l gr ound s. C onsi de re d a lon e, the se 7 tw o a sse rt ion s w oul d of te n be e noug h to w ei gh this f ac tor sli ght ly in favor of 8 Defen da nt . Se e, e. g. , Spe arm an , 201 2- N MS C- 023, ¶ ¶ 32- 33 ( hol din g th at

the 9 de fe ndant’ s in iti al pr o f orm a as se rt iona lon g w itham oti on to dis m iss ba se d ona 10 spe edy

tr ia l vi ola tio n w ei ghe d a ga ins t the S ta te ). H ow ev er , D ef en dant’ s a sse rt ion s 11 of the r igh t w er e m iti ga te d by his ac qui es ce nc e to, a nd r es pons ibi lity f or , num er ous 12 de la y s. Se e G arz a , 2009 -N MS C- 038, ¶ 34 (h old ing tha t the de fe ndant’ s as se rt ionof 13 the r igh t a t th e out se t of the c as e al ong w itham oti on t o di sm iss ba se d onaspe edy 14 tr ia l vi ola tio n w ei ghe d “ sli ght ly ” in the de fe ndant’ s fa vor w he re the a sse rt ionw as not 15 “ m iti ga te d .
. . by

a ny appare nt ac qui es ce nc e to the de lay ” by the de fe ndant)
. Inthi s 16 ca se , D ef

en dant e ith er

sti pul at ed

to or did not opp ose the S ta te ’ s nu m er ous m oti ons 1 7 f o r ac o n t i n u a n c e a n dwa s h i ms e l f r e s p o n s i b l e f

o r s e v e n t e e n mo n t h s o f

d e l a y. 18 A dm itt ed ly , it

is dif fi cu lt to d et er

m ine w he the r D ef

en dant o nly

sti pul at ed

to the14

1 continu ances because of the district attorney ’ s policyof n ot allowing plea d eals afte r 2 pretrial interview s wit h v ictim s. I n the petitio n for continuance filed on Dece m ber 3 4, 200 9, the St at e not ed tha t “ D ef en dant ha s ch ose n to f

or go p re tr ia l i nte rv ie w s of the 4 victim s until all w ritten discovery is com plete in both cases and to encourage a m ore 5 fa vo r ab l e p l e ao f

f e r f r o m t h e S t a t e . ” T h i s m a y

s u g g e s tt h a tD e f

e n d a n ta tle as t 6 p a rt i a l l y s t i p u l a t e dt o t h e c o n t i n u a n c e s b e c au s e o f t h e d i s t r i c t a t t o rn e y’s p o l i c y. 7 Further, in the petitio n for continuance filed o n M ar ch 3, 2010, the State said that 8 “ [t] he parties ar e in the process of s etting up pretrial int erview s and preparing for trial 9 in bot h cases should negotiatio ns fall through
. . . .” While this also m ay sugg est that 10 D ef en dant s tip ula te d due to the pol ic y , it is c er ta inl y not c onc lus ive
. I f D ef

en dant f el t 11 com pelled to concur in th e State’ s m otion s for a c ontin uance because of the district 12 attor ne y ’ s po lic y , he c oul d have state d so in a ple ad ing to the dis tr ic t c ourt so that the 13 co urt c oul d c onsi de r D ef en dant’ s po sit ion in ass es sin g whe the r to grant or de ny the 14 m oti on. W e ar e le ft

to spe cu la te w he the r D ef en dant tru ly

f el t co m pe lle d to s tip ula te 15 to the c ont inu an ce s or w he the r his c oun se l si m ply de ci de d it

w as not ur ge nt t o 1 6 co n du c tp r e - t r i a l i n t e rv i e w s b e c au s e D e f e n d a n th a da c c e s s t o J
. Z
. ’ s s a fe hous e 17 int er vie wa nd c oul d pr ep ar e his c as e on tha t ba sis
. D ef en dant a lso de m on st rated a 18 la ck of c onc er n f or his spe ed

y tr ia l rig ht by de lay ing his tr ia l f or se ve nte enm onths.15

1 D ef en dant’ s a sse rt ionof

his spe edy

tr ia l r igh t on ly

a t the ve ry be gin nin g and ver y e nd 2 of the pr etri al pe ri od, his co nti nue d stipu la tio ns to the St at e’ s c ont inu an ce s, a nd h is 3 ow n si gni fi cant c ontri but ion s to the de lay all sh ow th at

his a sse rt ionof

his spe edy 4 tr ia l r igh t w as onl y

a n a ft er tho ught , a nd th eref

ore thi s f ac tor doe s no t w ei gh i n hi s 5 favor. 6 D. Pr ejud ice 7 { 21} This Court m

ust analy ze three separate i nterests to determ ine whether 8 D ef en dant suf

fe re d pr ej udi ce : “ (i ) to pr ev en t oppr es siv e pr etri al inc ar ce ratio n; (ii) 9 to m inim ize anxiety

and concern of the ac cused; and (iii) to lim it the poss ibilitythat 10 t h e d efense w ill be im paired.” G arz a , 2 0 0 9
- N M S C
- 0 3 8 , ¶ 3 5 ( i n t e rn a l qu o t at ion 11 m ar ks and c it at io n om itt ed ). D ef en dant m ust m ak e a part ic ulari ze d sh ow ing of 12 pr ejud ic e to de m on st rat e a v io la ti on of a ny o f t he th ree i nt eres ts . Id

. ¶ ¶ 35, 37. 13 Be ca use som e oppr es sio n and anxi ety a re ine vit ab ly

suf fe re d by e ve ry de fe ndant 14 aw aiting trial, “ we we igh this factor in the defendant’ s favor on ly wher e th e pretria l 15 incarce ration or the anxiety suffere d is und ue.” Id

. ¶ 35. 16 { 22} He re, De fen d an t has not asserted any particularize d prej udice, such as 17 id en ti fy in g a wit ne ss who se m em ory m ay h a v e b e e n im

pa ire d b y th e d el ay . See 18 Se rro s , 201 6- N MS C- 008, ¶ 92 (h old ing tha t the ina

bil ity to int er vie wthe ve ry

y oung16

1 victim for f our y ears pre

j udiced the defendant’ s ability to defend h i m s el f at trial). 2 N or ha s D ef en dant m ad e a par

tic ulari ze d show ing tha t he suf fe re d un due a nxi ety

or 3 oppressiv e pretria l incarce ration. Furtherm ore, despite being incarce rated for m ore 4 than five y ears while awa iting trial in this c as e, Defendant would have been 5 inc a r c e r a t e do n t h e n e wC S P c h a r g e b r o u g h ti n S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 9 , a n do t h e r

s e ri ous 6 crim inal charges w ere also broug ht against hi m a y ear into th e p endency

of this case. 7 Cf

. id. ¶ ¶ 88- 91 ( de te rm ini ng tha t the de fe ndant b ei ng h el d inse gr eg at ed pr ote ct ive 8 cu sto dy

on a sin gle c harg e fo r ove r fo ur y ears w as e xtr em el y

pr ej udi ci al ). W e hol d 9 tha t D efend an t di d not art ic ula te a ny part ic ulari ze d pr ej udi ce that he suf fe re d a s a 10 result of the lengthydelay in this case. 11 5. Balancing the factors 12 { 23} To f

ind a speedy

trial violation withou t a sh owing of actual prejudice, the Court 13 m ust find th at the three other Barker fact or s wei gh he av il y ag ai ns t t he Sta te . G arz a , 14 20 09 -NMSC -0 38, ¶

39. Whil e the e xtr ao rd inary le ngth of

the de lay

in thi s c as e 15 w ei ghs he av ily ag ai nst the St at e, the re as ons fo r the de lay w ei gh o nly

sli ght ly a ga ins t 16 the State, and De fendant did not m eaningfullyassert his speedy trial right. Ther efore, 17 w e co nc lud e tha t the re w as no spe edy tr ia l vio la tio n. A cc or din gly , w e m ust e xa m ine 18 Defen da nt ’s ot he r cl ai m s.17

1 B. The District Cour t Com m itted Fu ndam ental Error by Failing to Instruct 2 on the Consen t Elem ent of CS P- Fe lony 3 { 24} The district court instructed the j ury that to convi ct D efendant of CS P, CSC, 4 or kidnapp ing, the j ury m ust f ind bey ond a reasonable doub t that he com m itted an act 5 tha t w as “ unl aw fu l. ” T he j ur y ins tr uc tio ns def

ine d an unlaw fu l a ct

a s f oll ow s: “ Fo r 6 the a ct to ha ve be enunl aw fu l i t m ust ha ve be endon e w iththe int en t t o a ro use or 7 gr at if y se xua l de sir e or

to intrude up on the bo dil y int eg ri ty or pe rs ona l sa fe ty

of 8 [J
. Z
. ]
. ” T his ins tr

uc tio n re fl ec te d U JI 14- 132 N MR A , ex ce pt tha t i t f

ai le d to inc lud e 9 the bracketed phrase “ without consent ,” which w ould have clarifie d that any sexual 10 co nta ct

betwee n J.Z. a nd D ef

en dant h ad

to be non -c onse nsua l f or the j ur y to 11 de te rm in e th atDefen da nt ’s actwas “ un la wfu l.” 12 { 25} I f

u n l a w f u l n e s s i s a ti s s u e , t h e n c o n s e n t i s a n e s s e n t i a l e l e men t o f C S P
- f e l o n y. 13 CS P is def

ine d, in r el ev an t part , a s “ the unl aw fu l and i nte nti ona l c au sin g of ape rs on 14 to e nga ge in
. . . a na l i nte rc our se . . . w he the r or not the re is an y

e m iss ion
. ” S ec tio n 15 30- 9- 11( A ). T he c ri m e of CS P- fe lon y

r equir es that CS P be pe rp etrate d “ in the 1 6 c o m m i s s i o n o f a n y o t h e r f

e l o n y . ” S e c t i o n 3 0
- 9
- 1 1 ( E ) ( 5 )
. I n State v . Ste ve ns , we 17 ex am ine d hi sto ri ca l so ur ce s r el ev an t t o C SP -f el ony a nd de te rm ine d th at

the 18 L eg isl at

ur e “ ha s ne ve r de via te d f

ro m the c om m on l awappr oa chof

c ri m ina liz ing onl y 19 those sex acts th at are perpetrated on persons without their consent, either a s a m atter18

1 of fact or, i n t he cas e o f ch il dr en or o th er v ul ne rab le vi ct im s, as a mat t e r of law.” 2 2014 -N MSC- 011, ¶ 27, 323 P. 3d 90 1. A ccordingly , w e c o n cl u ded that the CSP3 fe lon y of fe nse w as int en de d to cr im ina liz e only “ se xua l a ct s pe rp etrate d onpe rs ons 4 wi tho ut t

he ir c onse nt

. . . .” Id

. ¶ 39 (em phasis add ed). T herefor e, to convict un der 5 this prov isio n , t he j ury m ust determ ine that the und erly ing felonywa s “ com m itted 6 ag ai nst the vic tim

of , a nd .
. . a ssi st[ ed ] in the a cc om pli shm en t of

, se xua l pe ne tr at ion 7 perpetrated by

force or coerc ion ag ai nst a victim who, by age or other statutory 8 fact or ,” di d n ot or c ou ld no t g iv e la wfu l co ns en t. Id

. 9 { 26} He re, the State provided the unlawfulness j ury instruction to the district court 10 an d arg ue d th at

“ w ith out c onse nt” ha d be enpr ope rl y om it te d bec au se the iss ue of 11 consent was “ legally

irrele vant” to the unl aw fulness of CSP- felony in this case under 12 Sta te v . M

oore , 201 1- N MC A -0 89, 150 N
. M. 512 , 263 P
. 3d 28 9. Yet, a s th e St at e 13 ack no wled ge s o n ap p eal , M oore is in ap pl ic ab le to th is cas e. M oore he ld tha t “ the 14 co nse nt o f a s ta tut or ily de fi ne d c hil d is ir

re le vant t o th e unl aw fu lne ss e le m en t of 15 CS P[ -f

el ony ] , ” an d it

w as the re fo re pr ope r in M o o re to om it the phr as e “ w ith out 16 co nse nt” f

ro m the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns whe n th e al le ge d vi ct im w as f ourte eny ears old 17 a nd th e d efen da nt was fo rty-si x years o ld
. Id

. ¶ ¶ 1 3
- 1 6
. A s w e n o t e din Ste ve ns , 18 20 14 -N M S C
- 0 1 1 , ¶¶ 20 , 40 , M oore ’s re fe re n ce t o a “ ‘ s t at u t o ri l y d ef i n ed ch i l d ’ ”19

1 m eant a child “ below the age of consent.” The age of consent, and whether the lack 2 of co nse nt is an as pe ct of the unl aw fu lne ss el em en t of CS P, varies s ta tutor ily 3 de pe ndi ng on the pe rp etrator ’ s a ge , the c hil d’ s a ge , a nd o the r fa ct or s a s f oll ow s. 4 U nde r Se ct ion 30- 9- 11( D ), an y se xua l pene tr at ionof ac hil d un de r thi rt ee n y ears old 5 is f ir st- de gr ee CS P be ca

use the c hi ld can no t leg al ly c onse nt t o se x. S ec tio n 30 -9
- 6 11(E)( 1) punis hes as second-degree CSP any sexual penetration of a child between 7 the ages of thirteen and eighteen y ears old by the use of force or coerc ion. U nder that 8 fo rm of CS P, if the pr ose cu tio n ha s pr ove d th at f or ce or c oe rc ionw as use d by

the 9 pe rp etrator , it ha s a lso ne ce ssari ly pr ove d th at

the a ct w as non -c onse nsua l, a nd a 10 se pa ra t e f

i n d i n g o f a l ackof c on se nt is no t re qu ire d. See State v. Pe rea , 200 8- 11 NMC A- 147, ¶ 9, 145 N.M. 123, 194 P.3d 738 (“ Consent of a child between the ages 12 of thi rt ee n and s ixt ee n to e nga ge in se xua l i nte rc our se is ir re le vant whe re f

or ce or 13 co er ci on i s in vol ve d. ”)
. S ec tio n 30 -9 -1 1( G )( 1) pun ish es a ny se xua l pe ne tr ation , 14 re gard le ss o f co nse nt, w he re the c hil d is betw ee n thirte en an d sixte eny ears old a nd 15 the pe rp etrator

is at le as t e igh te eny ears old , is at le as t four y ears old er than the ch ild , 16 an d i s n o t t h e c h il d’s s po us e. Se e M oore , 2011-NMC A- 089, ¶ 11 (concluding that 17 “ [a c hild’s] consent or lac k the r e of i s legally irrele vant” under Section 30-9-11(6)(1)). 18 Finally , under S ection 30-9-11(G)( 2), consent is irrelevant when the child is betw een20

1 the ages of thirteen and eig hteen y ears old and the perpetrator is a sch ool em ploy ee 2 or volun teer, the perpetrator is a t least eighteen y ears old, is at least four y ears older 3 than th e ch ild , a nd i s no t the c hil d’ s sp ouse , a nd the pe rp etrator le ar ns whil e 4 pe rf orm ing se rv ic es f

or the sc hool that the c hil d is a stu de nt at the sc hool
. U nli ke in 5 M oore , w he re the vic tim w as fo urte eny ears old , w he the r J. Z
. c onse nte d to se x w ith 6 D ef e n d a n tw a s l e g a l l y

r e l e v a n tt o t h e C S P
- f

e l o n y c h a r g e b e c au s e s i x t e e n - y e a r - old 7 J. Z
. c oul d have le ga lly co nse nte d to se x w ith D ef en dant. T he re fo re , the om iss ionof 8 “ w ith out

c onse nt” f

ro m the j ur y ins tr uc tio ns w as e rr one ous. 9 { 27} Be ca

use D ef en dant f ai le d to obj ec t t o th e pr of fe re d j ur y ins tr uc tio n or 10 oth er w ise pr es er

ve thi s iss ue a t tri al , w e w ill onl y r ev er se if the om iss ionof

“ w ith out 11 co ns en t” was fu nd am en ta l er ro r. Se e Ste ve ns , 201 4-NMS C-011, ¶ 42. “ Fundam ental 12 er ro r onl y appl ie s in ex ce pti ona l cir cu m stanc es w he n guilt is s o do ubt fu l tha t i t w oul d 13 shock th e j udicial conscience to allow the conviction t o s t an d .” Id

. (internal 14 quot at ionm ar

ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). U nde r thi s st an dard , w e m ust de te rm ine 15 w he the r a re as ona

ble j ur or w oul d have be enc onf

use d or m isd ir ec te d “ not onl y f ro m 16 ins tr uc tio ns tha t are f

ac ia lly c ontra dic tor

y or a m big uous , b u t f

ro m ins tr uc tio ns whic h, 17 thr oughom iss ionor

m iss ta te m en t, fa il to pr ovi de the j ur or w itha n a cc ur at e re ndi tio n 18 of the relevant law .” Sta te v . B en all y , 200 1- N MS C- 033, ¶

12, 131 N
. M. 258 , 34 P
. 3d21

1 11 34 . “ In ap pl y in g th e fu nd am en ta l erro r an al y si s to de fic ie nt jury in st ru ct io ns , we 2 are requir ed

to re ve rs e w he n th e m isi nstru ct ionle av es us w ith‘ no w ay of kno w ing 3 wh et h ert h e c o n v i ct i o nwa s o r w as n o tb as edo n t h e l ac k o f t h e e s s en t i al el emen t .’ ” 4 State v. M

onto ya , 2013 -N MS C- 020, ¶ 14, 306 P. 3d 42 6 (quo tin g State v. Swick, 5 2012 -N MSC- 018, ¶ 46, 279 P. 3d 74 7). 6 { 28} “ [I ] f the ins tr

uc tio ns o m it te d an e le m en t w hic h w as a t i ssu e in the c as e, the 7 error could be fundam ental.” State v. O rosco , 1992 -N MS C- 006, ¶ 9, 113 N
. M. 780 , 8 833 P. 2d 1 146. A cc or din gly , w e ini tia lly e xa m ine w he the r J. Z
. ’ s c onse nt w as a t i ssu e 9 in this case to deter

m ine whether the om issio n of this elem ent could be f undam ental 10 er ro r. Cf

. id. ¶¶ 9 -2 0 ( co nc lud ing that i t w as not f undam en ta l e rr or

to om it the 11 unlawfulness elem ent of crim inal sexual c ontact of a m inor und er a ge thirteen wher e 12 the re w as no e vid en ce put tin g th e law fu lness of th e alle ge d a ct s “ in i ssu e, ” an d 13 the re fo re “ no ra tio na l j ur y co uld ha ve co nc lud ed tha t de fe ndants ha d c om m itt ed the 14 acts w ithou t also determ ining that the acts w ere perform ed in the m anner proscribed 15 by law ”). T here is som e evidence in the rec ord that could have led the j ury to infer 16 that consent w as at issue in this ca se. First, there wa s no eviden ce of phy sical injurie s 17 to c or ro bor at e J. Z
. ’ s sto ry tha t D ef en dant he ld him dow n an d fo rc ed him to h av e se x. 18 Second, during his int erviewwith police D efendant did not deny having sex on May22

1 25, 2008, so it would be po ssibl e to infer that he had consensu al s ex with J .Z . on th at 2 d at e. Th i rd , De fe n d an t ’s ri g o ro u s cr o s s -e x amin at i o n o f J .Z. fo c u s ed o n J .Z. ’s 3 ch an gin g a cc ount

of th e al le ge d se xua l a ssa

ult a nd h is a lle ge d un re lia

bil ity
. I f the 4 j ury believed that J.Z . w as in som e way unreliable or n ot telling the truth, th e j urors 5 co uld ha ve r ea sona

bly co nc lud ed

that D ef en dant and J
. Z
. w en t t o ar em ote loc at ion 6 and engaged in con sensual sex. Based on this testim ony , w e conclude that there w as 7 su ffi ci en t evi de nc e pr es en te d to th e jury to pu t con se nt at is su e in th is cas e, an d we 8 m ust therefore deter

m ine whether the om issio n o f t h i s essential elem ent was 9 fundam ental err or. 10 { 29} Fundam ental err or occurs w hen jury instruction s fail to inform the j urors that 11 the State has the b u rd en of proving an essential elem ent of a cr im e and we are left 12 w ith“ no w ay

of kno w ing ” w he the r the j ur y f ound tha t e le m en t be y ond a re as ona ble 13 do ub t. Swick , 201 2- N MS C- 018, ¶ 46; se e als o Rule 5-608(A) NMR A ( “ Th e court 1 4 mu s ti n s t r

u c tt h e j u ry up o n a l l qu e s t i o n s o f l a we s s e n t i a l f

o r a c o n v i c t i o n o f

a n y c r i me 15 subm itted to th e j ury .” ). However, we need not conclude that there w as fundam ental 1 6 er ro r d es p i t e t h e c o u rt ’s fa i l u re t o i n s t ru ct o n an es s en t i al el emen t wh er e “ t h e ju ry’s 17 fi ndi ngs, in lig ht of the undi sput ed ev ide nc e in the ca se , ne ce ssari ly es ta bli sh tha t the 18 [om itted] elem ent was m et b ey ond a re asonable dou bt.” Orosco , 199 2- N MS C- 006,23

1 ¶ 15. Fo r ins tanc e, in Ste ve ns w e he ld tha t it w as not fundam en ta l er ro r to om it the 2 el em en t of

unl aw fu lne ss f

ro m a CSP- fe lon y

ins tr uc tio n be ca

use the j ur

y f ound 3 be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt tha t the a lle ge d se xua l ac t oc curr ed be tw ee n th e thi rt ee n4 y ear- old victim and the defendant’ s boy friend, who wa s at least ten y ears older than 5 the victim , and that under those circum stances, the sexual ac t could no t be other than 6 unl aw fu l. 201 4- N MS C- 011, ¶¶ 43- 46. I n othe r w or ds, the j ur y ’ s f ind ing in Ste ve ns 7 tha t the se xua l ac t oc curr ed be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt w as ne ce ssari ly a lso af ind ing 8 tha t the a ct

w as unl aw fu l bey ond a re as ona ble doub t bec au se the vic tim in tha t c as e 9 could not legally consent to sex with t hat defendant, and there wa s no oth er e vidence 10 sugg es tin g th at

the a lle ge d se xua l a ct

co ul d ha ve be enoth er

w ise law fu l, suc h a s a 11 to u ch in g fo r pu rp os es of r eas on ab le m ed ic al tre at m en t. Se e id. F urthe r, in State v. 12 Cu nni ngha m , the failure to instruct on the essential elem ent of unlawfulness or self13 de fe nse w as not

f undam en ta l e rr or

be ca use the j ur

y r ec ei ve d ase parate se lf

-d ef en se 14 ins tr uc tio n co nta ini ng the ap pr opr ia te bur de n of pr oof an d the j ur or s sp eci fical ly 15 f o u n d b e yon d a reas on ab le do ub t th at th e de fen da nt di d no t act in se lf- de fen se , a 16 fi ndi ng w hic h a lso sa tis fi ed th e es se nti al e le m en t tha t w as e rr one ousl y e xc lud ed
. 17 2000 -N MS C- 009, ¶

¶ 9, 20- 22, 128 N
. M. 711 , 998 P
. 2d 1 76. 18 { 30} T ur

nin g to thi s c as e, to as ce rt ai n w he the r fundam en ta l e rr or oc curr ed , w e m

ust24

1 “ review the entire record, placing the j ury instructio ns in the context of the ind ividu al 2 fa ct s and c ir cu m stanc es of the c as e, to de te rm ine w he the r the D ef en dant’ s c onvi ct ion 3 wa s the result of a plain m iscarria ge of j ustice.” Sta te v . Sut phi n , 200 7- N MS C- 045, 4 ¶ 19, 142 N. M. 191, 164 P. 3d 72 (internal quotation m arks and ci t at i o n s om itted). 5 T he S ta te a rg ue s th at

if the om iss ionof

the e nti re “ unl aw fu l” e le m en t w as not 6 fundam en ta l e rr or

in Ste ve ns , the n th e dis tr ic t c ourt’ s in cl usi on o f tha t e le m en t and 7 om iss ionof

onl y tw o w or ds ( “ w ith out

c onse nt” ) cannot be fundam en ta l er ro r in this 8 case. H owever , as we have previousl y discuss ed, unl aw fulness is at i ssue in this case, 9 w he re a t a ge six te enthe a lle ge d vi ct im ha d pa sse d th e ag e of

c onse nt, unl ike the 10 thi rt ee n- y ear- old

vic tim in Ste ve ns w ho l eg al ly

c oul d no t c onse nt pur suant to S ec tio n 11 30- 9- 11( G )( 1) , a nd the c onc lus ionthat no f undam en ta l e rr or

oc curr ed in Ste ve ns is 12 therefore not dis posit ive here. T he State f urther contends that th e ju ry ’ s other 13 fi ndi ngs de m onstrate that the j ur or s m ust ha ve ult im at el y co nc lud ed tha t J. Z
. did not 14 co nse nt t o ana l pe ne tr at ionby D ef en dant. 15 { 31} T he j ur

y co nvi ct ed D ef

en dant o f kidna

ppi ng b y f ind ing be y ond a re as ona

ble 16 doub t tha t J. Z
. w as take n, re str ai ne d, co nf ine d, or tr an spor te d by f or ce , int im ida tio n, 17 or de ce pti on by D ef

en dant. A s part of the kidna ppi ng c onvi ct ion , the j ur

y a lso f ound 1 8 t h a t D e f

e n d a n ti n t e n d e dt o h o l dJ
. Z. a g a i n s th i s wi l l t o i n f l i c td e a t h , p h ys i c a l i n

ju ry,25

1 o r a s ex u al o ff

en s e o n h i m . Ho we v er , t h e ju ry’s co n cl u s i o n s re g ar d i n g De fe n d an t ’s 2 act of kidnappin g do no t establish b ey ond a reasonable doubt that it consid ered 3 De fe n d an t’ s separate a ct of anally penetrating J.Z . to have been non-consensual 4 be y ond a re as ona

ble doubt, de spi te the fa ct tha t it foun d th e an al pe ne tr at ionin thi s 5 case to h a ve t a ke n pl a c e dur i ng t he c om m i ss i ono f

k i dn app i ng . T he j ur

y f urther 6 fo und tha t D ef

en dant c omm it te d a “ se xua l of fe nse ” ag ai nst

J. Z
. dur ing the 7 kidn app i ng , de sp i t e t he abs e nc e of a de f i ni t i on of “ se xu a l of

f e ns e ” i n the jury 8 instructio n. T herefor e, t h e jury also could hav e re ached this findin g without an 9 understandi ng that in this case, it had to find bey ond a reasonable doub t that the anal 10 penetration was non-consensual for Def en d an t ’s act to constitu te a sexual offe nse. 11 Fi na lly , the j ur

y hun g ona n a lte rn ativ e CSP -f or ce /c oe rc ionc ount

w ithr es pe ct

to 12 De fendant’ s anal penetration of J.Z
. The only signi ficant distin ction betw een the j ury 13 instructio ns regarding CSP-f orce/coer cion and those regarding CSP- felony wa s that 14 the CS P- fo rc e/ co er ci on i nstru ct ionr equir ed the j ur y to ad dit ion al ly

c onc lud e be y ond 15 a re as ona

ble doub t tha t De fe ndant use d ph y sic al f or ce , phy sic al vio le nc e, or thr eats 16 of phy sic al f

or ce or phy sic al vio le nc e ag ai ns t J. Z
. Whil e a fi ndi ng tha t f or ce or 17 co er ci on w as use d duri ng the se xua l pe ne tr at ionis ce rt ai nly not ne ce ssary

to es ta bli sh 18 a lack of consent, if th e jury had found this elem ent bey ond a reasonable doub t under26

1 the a lte rn at ive c ount , w e w oul d have no m isg ivi ngs in con cl udi ng tha t the j ur y a lso 2 ne ce ssari ly

f ound be y ond a re as ona

ble doub t tha t the se xua l pene tr at ionin thi s c as e 3 was no n- co ns en su al . Yet t h e jury app aren tl y hu ng on th is ve ry

ele m en t, an d we 4 the re fo re c an not

dr awa ny de fi nit ive c onc lus ion s r eg ar din g th e j ur y ’ s un de rs tandi ng 5 of the role of c onsent from their findings regarding th e CSP -forc e/coerc ion charge. 6 { 32} Mor eo ve r, w e ag re e w ith D ef en dant tha t the j ur or

que sti ons subm itt ed

dur ing 7 trial hinted at j uror confusion regarding th e issue of consent. T he rec ord indicates 8 that several juror qu estions we re subm itted to th e district j udge after the j urors we re 9 pr ovi de d wit h th e instru ct ion s. I n on e of tho se que sti ons, aj ur or

a ske d “ [h ] owold 10 y ou h av e to b e to h av e co nse ntu al [ sic ] se x . . . ? W e thi nk [ the S A N E nur se ] sa id the 11 ag e w as 13. ” I nde ed , the S A N E nur se w ho e xa m ine d J. Z
. te sti fi ed that the a ge of 12 consent in New Mex i co wa s t hirteen. Another j uror asked what it m eant that 1 3 D e f e n d a n t ’s a c tn e e d e dt o b e “u n l a w f u l , ” a n df u rt h e r s t a t e dt h a tt h e t e rm “s e e ms 14 co nc lus [o ry ] or

unn ec es sary . ” T he dis tr ic t c ourt res ponded to the se que sti ons by 15 ins tr uc tin g th e j ur or s, “ y ou ar e to dec ide thi s ca se ba se d on the te sti m ony at tr ia l and 16 the j ur

y ins tr uc tio ns as a wh ole
. ” T he se que sti ons indi cate som e le ve l of c onf usi on 17 re gard ing the ag e of co nse nt in N ew Me xic o an d the m eanin g of the “ unl aw fu l a ct ” 18 el em en t of CS P- fe lon y , a nd f urthe r supp ort our co nc lus ionthat the j ur or s inthi s c as e27

1 m ay ha ve be enc onf

use d or m isd ir ec te d a s to w he the r D ef en dant c oul d have sti ll 2 act edun la wfu ll y

if J
. Z. h adco ns en te d t o s ex . Se e B en all y , 200 1- N MS C- 033, ¶

12 3 ( “ Under

[fundam ental err or review ,] we seek to determ ine wh ethe r a re ason able juror 4 wo uld hav e be en c onf

use d or m isdire ct ed by the jur

y ins tru ct ion
. ” (e m

pha sis a dde d) 5 (i nter na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio ns o m itt ed ))
. A cc or din gly , w e hol d th at in the 6 ci rc um stanc es of

thi s c as e, it

w as f undam en ta l e rr or

to om it th e el em en t of

c onse nt 7 f r o m th e ju ry i n s t r

u c t i o n s t h a twe r e r e l e v a n tt o C S P
- f e l o n y. 8 { 33} D ef

en dant o nly re que sts tha t his CS P- fe lon y co nvi ct ionbe r ev er se d a s ar es ult 9 of this error. H owever , w e ar e re spon sible f or determ ining whether this fund am ental 10 erro r al so in fect e d h i s c o n vi ct io n fo r ki dn ap pi ng . Se e Sta te v . A rre ndon do , 11 2012 -N MSC- 013, ¶ 20, 278 P. 3 d 517 (conclud ing th at appellate courts have a 1 2 re s p o n s i b i l i t y t o ra i s e i s s u es s u a s p o n t e w h e n i ti s n ec es s ar y t o p ro t ec ta p ar t y’ s 13 fundam en ta l r igh ts) ; se e als o State v . Ca be zue la , 201 1-NMS C-041, ¶ 39, 150 N. M. 14 654, 265 P.3d 70 5 (“ It is the f undam en ta l r igh t of

ac ri m ina l de fe ndant t o have the 15 j ur y de te rm ine w he the r ea che le m en t of the ch ar ge d off

en se ha s bee n prov ed

by the 16 state bey ond a reasonable doub t.” (internal quotation m arks and citations o m itted)). 17 W e conclude that the error of om ittin g t h e el ement o f consent from the j ury 18 ins tr uc tio n af fe ct ed the kidna

ppi ng c onvi ct ion
. T he j ur y ins tr uc tio ns d id n ot d ef

ine28

1 the te rm

“ se xua l of

fe nse” be y ond pr ovi din g th e el em en ts o f CS P an d C SC thr ough 2 oth er ins tr uc tio ns. Becaus e th e j ur

y m ay ha ve be enc onf

use d or m isd ir ec te d a s to 3 whether consensu al sex betwe en J.Z . and Defe ndant coul d still be a sexual offense, 4 then the jury ’ s finding under the kidn apping charge that D efendant intended to in flict 5 de ath, phy sic al inj ur

y , or ase xual off

en se on J
. Z
. w as ne ce ssari ly inf ec te d by the 6 sa m e pot en tia l co nf

usi on, af fe ct ing the ve rd ic t on the kidna ppi ng c harg e in this c as e 7 w he re the re w as not suf fi ci en t ev ide nc e to supp ort the inf er en ce tha t Defen dant 8 int en de d to inf

lic t de ath or

aphy sic al inj ur

y on J
. Z
. T he re fo re , be cau se w e cannot 9 de te rm ine w he the r the jury f ound that the se xua l a ct

w as non -c onse nsua l be y ond a 10 re as ona

ble doubt, w e m

ust a lso r ev er se D ef

en dant’ s ki dna

ppi ng c onvi ct ionf

or 11 fundam ental err or. 12 { 34} Be ca

use w e ha ve de te rm ine d th at w e m ust r ev er se D ef

en dant’ s c onvi ct ion s f

or 1 3 CSP- fe l o n y an dk i d n ap p i n g , we ar e r eq u i re dt o d et er m i n e w h et h ers u fficient evidence 14 w as pr es en te d to sup port the se c onvi ct ion s to av oid doub le j eo pardy c onc er ns s houl d 15 th e St at e se ekto ret ry

Defen da nt . Sta te v. D ow lin g , 201 1-NMS C-016, ¶ 18, 1 50 N. M. 16 110, 257 P
. 3d 9 30; Ca be zue la , 201 1- N MS C- 041, ¶ 40. “ T he te st fo r suf

fi ci en cy of 17 the evidence is whether subs tantial evidence of either a direct or c ircum stantial nature 18 exists to supp ort a v erdict o f gu ilty bey ond a reasonable do ubt with respect to every29

1 el emen t essential to a convictio n.” Id

. ¶ 42 ( int er na l qu ota tio n m ar

ks and c itatio n 2 om itt ed ). I n do ing so, w e vie w “ the ev ide nc e in the li ght m ost f av or ab le to the gui lty 3 verdict, indulging all rea sonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in the evidence 4 in favor of the verdict. ” Id

. (internal quotation m arks and citation om itted). 5 { 35} Ther e w as sufficient evidence to suppo rt D efendant’ s kidn apping and CSP6 fe lon y c onvi ct ion s. In thi s ca se , the al le ge d vic tim ’ s te sti m ony w as by it se lf e noug h 7 to establish every

elem ent of eac h o ffense bey ond a reasonable doub t under a 8 sufficiency

of the eviden ce revi ew . The j ury could have reasonably

inferr ed that 9 D ef en dant t ook or

tr an spor te d J. Z
. by de ce pti on ba se d on J. Z
. ’ s te sti m ony tha t he got 10 into D efendant’ s truck because De fendant said that he would take J.Z . h o m e. 11 A lte rn at ive ly , J. Z
. a lso te sti fi ed tha t w he n he tr ie d to e sc ap e fr om D ef en dant’ s tr

uc k, 12 the door w as loc ke d—t es tim ony fr om w hic h the j ur or s co uld ha ve rea sona bly 1 3 co nc l u d e d t h a t D e f

e n d a n t c o n f

i n e d J
. Z
. b y f

o r c e . F u rt h e r , t h e j u r o r s c o u l dha ve 14 reasonably inferre d that De fendant intended to hold J.Z . against J.Z .’ s will to inflict 15 a se xua l of

fe nse a ga ins t hi m

ba se d onJ. Z
. ’ s te sti m ony that D ef en dant t ook him to a 16 rem ot e loc at ion , pul le d do w n J. Z
. ’ s pants , a nd the n pe ne tr at ed his a nus. T his 17 ev ide nc e al so s uppo rt s a re as ona ble inf er en ce tha t D ef

en dant ca use d J. Z
. to en ga ge 18 in anal intercourse. Additionally , the j ury also could hav e re asonablyconcluded that30

1 D ef en dant’ s st at em en t to J. Z
. a ft er e j ac ula tin g—“

N owI c antake y ou 2 hom e”—indicated that De fendant transported J.Z . to a rem ote location and con fined 3 him the re fo r the pur

pose of inf lic tin g ase xua l of

fe nse on h im
. J. Z
. ’ s te sti m ony 4 regarding t he sexual act in this case also supp orted a re asonable inference that 5 De fendant’ s act against J.Z
. wa s unlawful because the j ury could have inferred that 6 i t was don e w ithou t J.Z .’ s consent and for the purpo se of gratify ing Defe ndant ’s 7 se xua l de sire o r to i ntr ude upo n J. Z
. ’ s bo dil y

sa fe ty or int eg ri ty . F urthe r, be ca

use 8 J. Z
. ’ s a cc ount supp orte d a co nvi ct ionf or kidna ppi ng, the j ur

y c oul d have r ea sona

bly 9 de te rm ine d th at

the CSP in thi s c as e w as c om m itt ed dur ing the c our se of

the 10 kidna ppi ng s inc e th e se xua l pe ne tr at ionoc curr ed w hil e J. Z
. w as e ith er

be ing 1 1 t ra n s p o rt ed b y d ec ep t i o n o r c o n fi n ed b y fo rc e. Ul t i m at el y, if t h e ju ry b el i ev ed J .Z. ’s 12 story regar ding his encoun ter w ith Defe ndant, it could have reasonab l y found that 13 every elem ent of both crim es wa s m et bey ond a reasonable doub t. The re fo re, 14 D ef en dant m ay

be r etri ed

on b othc harg es . 15 { 36} Beca

use we have dete rmined that the om issio n of consent from the j ury 16 ins tr uc tio ns r ose to the le ve l of fu ndam en ta l e rr or a nd r equir es r ev er sa l of both 17 co nvi ct ion s, w e ne ed

not r ea chthe oth er

iss ue s r ai se d by

D efendant. H ow ev er , to 18 pr ovi de guida nc e on r em an d, w e ad dr es s ( 1) the a dm iss ionof G PS e vid en ce a nd31

1 onl ine ide nti fi catio n e vid en ce , a nd (2 ) the sc ope of D ef en dant’ s c ro ss- ex am ina tio n 2 of J.Z., bu t n ot an y

of th e ot he r arg um en ts rai se d b y Defen da nt . Se e Sta te v . A lli son , 3 2000 -N MS C- 027, ¶ 1, 129 N
. M. 566 , 11 P
. 3d 1 41 ( sta tin g th at the Co urt m ay

a ddr es s 4 ad dit ion al iss ue s “ [f

] or gui danc e uponr em an d” ); State v. T orres , 199 9- N MS C- 010, 5 ¶ 8, 127 N.M. 20, 976 P.2d 20 (sam e). 6 III. The D istrict C ourt D id N ot Ab use Its D isc re tion by A dm itting Evide nce 7 Re garding J.Z .’ s Identif i ca tion of D efen dant via the Inter net or by 8 Allow ing Testim ony Regardin g the F act th at De fend ant Was Sub jectto 9 GPS Monitorin g 10 { 37} D ef

en dant c la im s th at

the dis tr ic t c ou rt ab use d it s di sc re tio n by a dm itt ing 1 1 ev i d en ce t h at h e wo re a GPS m o n i t o ri n g d ev i ce an d t h at J .Z. fo u n d D ef en d an t ’s 12 pic tur e, na m e, a nd ad dr es s on an In te rn et w eb sit e. Abse nt a cl ear ab use of dis cr et ion , 13 we wil l n ot rev ers e a t ria l ju dg e’s de ci si on t o a d mi t ev id en ce. State v. A poda ca , 14 1994 -N MSC- 121, ¶ 23, 118 N. M. 762, 887 P. 2d 75 6. “ An abuse of discretion occurs 15 when the ruling is clear ly against the logic and effe ct o f th e facts and circum stances 16 of th e cas e. W e can no t s ay

th e tr ia l co ur t ab us edit s di sc ret io n by its rul in g u nl es s we 17 can chara cterize it as clear l y u n t enable or not justified by rea son.” Id

. (internal 18 quot ation m arks and citations om itted). 19 { 38} Prior to trial, De fendan t fi l ed a m otion to exclude any evidence that he w ore 20 a G PS tracker and wa s subject to G PS m onito ring by the State, and any

evidence that32

1 J
. Z. i d e n t i f

i e dDe f e n d a n twh i l e v i e w i n g N e w M e x i c o ’s o n l i n e s e x o f f e n d e r r e g i s t ry. 2 T he dis tr ic t c ourt r

ule d th at the S ta te c oul d el ic it the f ac t tha t D ef

en dant w as w eari ng 3 a G PS de vic e, but

that i t c oul d no t de sc ri be the na tur e of D ef en dant’ s un de rl y ing 4 co nvi ct ion
. The dis tr ic t cour t lat er spe ci fi ed that i f the G PS m oni tor ing inf orm at ion 5 w as e l i c i t e d t h r o u g h t h e t e s t i m o n y o f p a r o l e au t h o r i t i e s , t h e y s h o u l d s i m p lybe 6 intro duc ed

a s e m plo y ee s of

the S ta te of

N ewMe xic o w ith out an y furthe r de ta il. T he 7 di st ric t c ourt f

urthe r he ld tha t the S ta te c oul d in tr oduc e ev ide nc e tha t J. Z
. f ound 8 D ef en dant’ s pi ct

ur e an d oth er ide nti fy ing inf orm at ion“ on the I nte rn et , ” but c oul d no t 9 be m ore specific about th e nature of the w ebsite. 10 { 39} As an initial m atter, we rej ect Defendant’ s argum ent that we shou ld consid er 11 his o ff

er to stipu late to being with J.Z . at the tim e and place of the a lleged sexual 12 assault as precluding the State’ s need for the online identification and GP S evidence 13 adm itted by

the district court. T he State is “ not bound to present its case to the j ury 14 thr oughabstra ct

sti pul at ion s, ” des pit e a def en dant’ s off

er to sti pul at e to c er

ta in f ac ts. 15 State v. M

artin ez , 1999-NMS C-018, ¶ 34, 127 N. M. 207, 979 P. 2d 71 8. F or exam ple, 16 in Sta te v . Sarrac ino , thi s Court hel d that it w as not an ab use of dis cr et ionto al low 17 the S ta te to el ic it te sti m ony r eg ar din g s ta te m en ts m ad e by the de fe ndant whil e 18 thr eate nin g a co upl e w ith a gun w he n the de fe ndant had of fe re d to sti pul at e to m ak ing33

1 the state m en ts and h ad c la im ed that the c ir cu m stances sur ro undi ng the ir

a dm iss ion 2 w oul d be im

pe rm iss ibl e ev ide nc e of

pr ior ba d ac ts. 1998 -N MS C- 022, ¶ ¶ 5, 21- 22, 3 125 N
. M. 511 , 964 P. 2d 72. In tha t ca se , w e loo ke d on ly to w he the r the e vid en ce of 4 thi s unc harg ed pr ior

ba d a ct f it w ith in an e xc ep tio n to Ru le 11- 404( B) N MR A , a nd 5 di d n ot co ns id er t he de fen da nt ’s s t i p ul at io n o fferin ou r an al y si s. Se e Sarrac ino , 6 1 9 9 8 -N M SC -0 2 2 , ¶2 2 . S i m i l ar l y, in t h i s ca s e w e n ee dn o tco n s i d erD e f e n d a n t ’s 7 of fe r to s tip ula te that he w as w ithJ. Z
. a t the ti m es a nd p la ce s a lle ge d to de te rm ine 8 w he the r the G PS a nd o nli ne ide nti fi catio n e vid en ce w as a dm iss ibl e unde r ei the r Ru le 9 1 1 -4 0 4 (B ) o r R

u l e 1 1
- 4 0 3 NM RA , o r w h et h eri ti m p ro p er l y b o l s t er ed J .Z. ’s 1 0 t e s t i mo n y. 11 { 40} W e also disagree w ith Defe ndant’s contention that adm issio n of “ [t] he fac t that 12 [D ef en dant] w as on G PS m oni tor ing an d tha t his na m e an d ad dr es s w er e lis te d ona 13 w eb sit e ine xor ab ly le ad s to o ne c onc lus ion : h e w as ac onvi ct ed se x of fe nde r” a nd 14 tha t this e vid en ce w as the re fo re im pr ope r ev ide nc e of pr ior ba d act s un de r Ru le 11- 15 40 4( B). Ru le 11 -4 04 (B)( 1) ex cl ud es “ [e]vi de nc e o f a cri m e, wro ng , o r ot he r act . . . 16 to p ro ve a pe rs on’ s ch ar ac te r in o rd er to showthat onapart ic ular oc ca sio n th e pe rs on 17 ac te d ina cc or danc e w ith[ tha t] c hara ct er . ” T his r ule onl y “ pr ohibit s th e use of 18 oth er wis e re le vant e vid en ce w he n it s sole pur pose or effect

is to prove crim inal34

1 propensit y .” Sta te v. G all egos , 2007 -N MS C- 007, ¶ 22, 141 N
. M. 185, 152 P
. 3d 8 28 2 (em phasis add ed). H owever , such “ evidence m ay be adm issib le for anoth er purpose, 3 s u c h a s p r o v i n g mo t i v e , o p p o rtu n i t y, i n t e n t , p r e p a r a t i o n , p l a n , kn o w l e d g e , i d e n t i t y, 4 ab se nc e of

m ist ak e, or

la ck of a cc ide nt. ” Ru le 11- 404( B) (2 ). I n co ns ide ri ng the 5 o n l i n e i d e n t i f

i c a t i o n e v i d e n c e i n t h i s c a s e , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u r to p i n e dt h a t“ n o w a d a ys 6 co m put er a cc es s and c om

put er use is v er

y c om m on . . . . I ’ ve tho ught

about the 7 wh o l e is s u e o f co m

p u t er ac ce s s an d co m

p u t er u s e, an d we ’re i n a n ew ag e, an d i t ’s 8 the 21s t c en tur

y , a nd i t’ s j ust

af ac t of li fe
. ” W e hol d th at

it w as not a n abus e of 9 discretion for the district court to conclud e that t h e l i m i t ed inform ation adm itted 10 re gard ing J. Z
. ’ s id en tifi cat ionof D ef en dant thr oughonl ine inf orm at iondid

not 11 co nst itu te e vid en ce of ac ri m e, aw ro ng, or

a nothe r ac t un de r Ru le 11- 404( B)
. T he 12 dis tr ic t c ourt a lso de te rm ine d th at e vid en ce of D ef

en dant’ s G PS c oor din at es on the 13 date of the alleged cr im e and the fac t that he was w earing a GP S tracking device we re 1 4 ad m i s s i b l e b e c au s e t h ey s h o we d“ i d en t i t y, op p o rt u n i t y an dl ac ko f mis t ak e. ” We 15 again conclude that it was not an a b u s e o f discretion in this case to adm it lim ited 16 ev ide nc e tha t D ef

en dant w as on G PS m oni tor ing
. T he e vid en ce did not ha ve the sol e 17 pur pose or e ff ec t of pr ovi ng c ri m ina l pr ope ns ity , but w as ins te ad

pr oba tiv e to 18 m at er ia l f

ac ts i n th e ca se be ca

use ( 1) J. Z
. te sti fi ed

that the pe rs on w ho a ssa

ult ed him35

1 w as w eari ng a

G PS m oni tor

on h is b el t, w hic h De fe ndant w as re qui re d to w ear; a nd 2 (2) Defendant’ s GP S coo rdinates placed h im in the sam e lo cations where J.Z . c laim ed 3 to h av e be ena ssa

ult ed
. 4 { 41} W e re

j ec t D ef en dant’ s a ddi tio na l c ont en tio n th at the pr oba tiv e va lue of

the 5 onl ine ide nti fi catio n and G PS e vid en ce w as subs tanti al ly outw ei ghe d by

adange r of 6 unf ai r pr ej udi ce f

ro m it s ad m iss ionund er

Ru le 11- 403. A s w e ha ve pr ev iou sly 7 discuss ed, the dist rict court lim ited the onli ne identification evid ence prese nted at 8 tr ia l t o c om

ple te ly e xc lud e the fa ct th at

J. Z
. f ound D ef en dant’ s pi ct

ur e at a n on lin e 9 se x of fe nde r re gis tr

y . T he dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t a buse it s di sc re tio n by

a dm itt ing thi s 10 lim ite d ve rs ionof

J. Z
. ’ s id en tif

ic at ion of D ef en dant b ec au se it

w as r ea sona

ble to 11 co nc lud e tha t the m er e fa ct that J. Z
. f

ound D ef en dant’ s pi ct

ur e, na m e, a nd a ddr es s 12 onlin e, without any

addition al inform ation, w as com pletely unrem arkable and neither 1 3 r e f l e c t e dn e g a t i v e l y o n De f

e n d a n tn o r

c r e a t e dad a n g e r

o f u n f a i r p r e ju d i c e . S i mi l a r l y, 14 the G PS e vid en ce w as lim ite d to pr ev en t an y m en tio n of w hy D ef en dant w as be ing 15 m onito red. U nder the circum stances of t h i s case, the generic inform ation that 16 De fendant wa s subj ec t to GPS m onito ring was not overly prej udicial, and contrary 17 to Def endant’ s sugg estion, did not strongl y im ply that De fendant wa s a sex offender. 18 During the h ea ri n g o n Def endant’ s m otion to exclude, the district court concluded36

1 that indi vidu als m ay

we ar a GP S device and be m onito red by state em ploy ees for a 2 vari ety of r ea sons , inc lud ing pr etri al m oni tor ing pr ogr am s and p ro ba tio n inc as es not 3 invo lving sex offenses. Indeed, during vo ir d ire, two p rospective jur ors m entioned 4 tha t the y

a sso ci at ed

G PS m oni tor ing w ith a D W I or oth er a lc ohol -r el at ed

of fe nse , but 5 none of the pr ospe ct ive j ur or s m en tio ne d an y spe ci fi c as soc ia tio n w ithse x of fe nse s. 6 Th u s , we d o n o t co n cl u d e t h at t h er e wa s an ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n i n t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s 7 adm iss ionof

the inf orm at ionthat D ef

en dant w as sub

j ec t t o G PS m oni tor ing by the 8 St at e, w ith out

a nythi ng m or e, be caus e an y pr ej udi ce to D ef

en dant d id n ot 9 subs tanti al ly outw ei gh the pr oba tiv e val ue of thi s evid en ce in ide nti fy ing D ef en dant 10 as J.Z .’ s alleged attacker. 11 { 42} Fi na lly , w e re j ec t De fe ndant’ s c ont en tio n th at pr es en tin g th e onl ine 12 identification an d GPS evidence im properly bolstered J.Z .’ s credibility
. Evidence 13 wi l l b e excluded as im proper bolstering when it directly com m ents on a witne s s ’s 14 cr ed ibi lity , but

not w he n it pr ovi de s “ [i ] nc ide nta l ve ri fi catio n” of a w itn es s’ s st or y or 1 5 o n l y i n d i r e c t l y b o l s t e r s t h a twi t n e s s ’s c r e di bi li ty. State v. A lberico , 199 3- N MS C- 047, 16 ¶ 89, 116 N
. M. 156 , 861 P
. 2d 1 92. F or e xa m ple , in Sta te v . L uc er o , ap s ych i at ri s t ’s 1 7 t es t i m o n y wa s i m

p ro p erb o l s t er i n g wh e n s h e c o m m en t edd i re ct l y o n t h e v i ct i m ’s 18 cr ed ibi lity , r ep eate dly m entio ne d th at

the vic tim

c la im ed to ha ve be ena ssa

ult ed by37

1 the defendant, and opined that the victim ’ s post -traum atic stress disorder wa s caused 2 by se xua l m ole sta tio n. 199 3- NMSC -0 64 , ¶ ¶ 5- 6, 15- 17, 116 N
. M. 450 , 863 P
. 2d 3 1071
. How ever, in this case the GP S evidence and online i d entification evidence 4 onl y c or ro bor at ed J. Z
. ’ s te sti m ony ; i t di d not co m m en t dir ec tly on his cr ed ibi lity or 5 im pin g e i n a n y

w a y o n t h e j u ry ’ s r o l e o f

a s s e s s i n g J
. Z
. ’ s s t o ry

a n dd e t e rm ini ng 6 w he the r he w as te lli ng the tr uth
. T he re fo re , the adm iss ion of thi s e vid en ce w as not 7 anabuse of

the dis tr ic t c ourt’ s di sc re tio n. 8 I V . T h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ’ s L i mi t a t i o n o f D e f e n d a n t ’ s C r o s s - E x a mi n a t i o n o f J . Z. 9 Was Not an Ab use of Discre tion and D id N ot Violate D efen dant’ s Rights 10 un de r th e C on fr on ta ti on C lau se 11 { 43} D ef

en dant arg ue s that the dis tr ic t cour t er re d by li m iti ng h is c ro ss- ex am ina tio n 12 of J. Z
. G en er al ly , “ [t ] he dis tr ic t c ourt has br oa d di sc re tio n to c ontro l the sc ope of 13 cross-exam ination , including th e discretion to control cross-exam ination to ensure a 14 fair and efficient trial. ” Sta te v . B en t , 2013 -N MC A -1 08, ¶ 10, 328 P
. 3d 6 77 ( ci ta tio n 15 om itt ed ). P ri or

to tr ia l, the St at e fi le d a m oti on s ee kin g to e xc lud e D ef en dant f ro m 16 usi ng any

of J. Z
. ’ s j uve nil e adjud ica tio ns f or im pe ac hm en t purp ose s, to lim it 17 D ef en dant t o on ly

inquir ing about t he num be r of J. Z
. ’ s f el ony c onvi ct ion s, a nd t o 18 ex cl ude D ef

en dant f ro m usi ng the na m es of

a ny of tho se f el oni es w iththe e xc ep tio n 19 of J. Z
. ’ s c onvi ct ionf

or c om m er ci al bur glary . T he r ec or d in dic at es that D ef en dant d id38

1 not file a w ritten response. The district c ourt held a hearing on this m otion and ruled 2 t h a t( a ) t h e n a mes o f

J
. Z. ’s ju v e n i l e a d

ju d i c a t i o n s we r e n o tt o b e p r e s e n t e dt o t h e ju ry; 3 (b ) D ef en dant c oul d m en tio n J. Z
. ’ s vi ola tio ns of his j uve nil e pr oba tio n r igh t a ft er the 4 al le ge d in ci de nt w ithD ef en dant b ec au se that w as “ a m atte r of m oti ve ”; ( c) D ef

en dant 5 could not cross-exam ine J.Z . regarding J.Z .’ s convictio ns for possess ion of a firearm 6 b y a f el o n an dco n t ri b u t i n g t o t h e d el i n qu en cy o f a m i n o r a s a r es u l t o f a D WI 7 be ca use “ it co nf

use s th e j ur

y , it ge ts [the m ] int o a m ini tr ia l, ” w hil e J. Z
. ’ s othe r fe lon y 8 co nvi ct ion s w en t t o c re dib ili ty a nd w er e fa ir

ga m e; ( d) how ev er , Defe ndant co uld 9 refe r to t he existence of t hese other felony conviction s without nam ing th em ; and (e) 10 D ef en dant c oul d a sk a

bout c harg es pe ndi ng ag ainst J. Z
. , but c oul d no t de ta il tho se 1 1 c h a r g e s a n dc o u l d

n o tb r i n g i n e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e t o p r o v e t h e m. 12 { 44} Fi rs t, D ef

en dant c ont en ds tha t i t w as im pr ope r to l im it cr oss -ex am ina tio n 13 regarding J.Z .’ s prior convictio ns and his experience with the crim inal justice sy stem 14 as a n a dul t and a s aj uve nile. U nde r Ru le 11- 609( D ) N MR A , pr ior j uve nil e 15 adj udication s are a dm issib le for im peachm ent of a w itness only when they are offer ed 16 in a c r i m i na l c a se , t he w i t ne ss i s no t t he de f e nd a nt , a n a du l t ’ s c on vi c t i on f or that 17 of fe nse w oul d no rm al ly

be a dm iss ibl e to at tac k c re dib ili ty , a nd a dm itt ing the 18 ev ide nc e is n ec es sary to fa ir ly de te rm in e guil t or

inn oc en ce . A t the he ar ing on the39

1 St at e’ s m oti on, the dis tr ic t co urt ind ic at ed tha t D ef en dant co uld use J .Z.’ s ju ve nil e 2 crim inal histo ry

to show that J.Z . w as in juvenile detention wh en he first ac cused 3 D ef en dant and tha t hi s de te nti on m ay ha ve giv en him a m oti ve to lie
. A t the he ar ing , 4 D ef en dant ag re ed tha t he did not ne ed to na m e J. Z
. ’ s pr ior

j uve nil e co nvi ct ion s, a nd 5 the dis tr ic t c ourt a cknow le dge d th at c onc es sio n onthe r ec or d. T he re fo re , D ef en dant 6 did not pr ope rl y pr es er ve f or appea l an y ob

j ec tio n w ithr es pe ct

to the sc ope of 7 pe rm is si bl e cro ss -ex am in at io n re ga rd in g J
. Z.’ s ju ve ni le co nv ic ti on s. See State v. 8 V are la , 199 9- N MS C- 045, ¶ 25, 128 N
. M. 454, 993 P. 2d 1 280 (“ Inor de r to p re se rv e 9 ane rr or

f or appe al , it

is es se nti al that the gr ound or gr ou nds of the obj ec tio n or 10 m oti on b e m ad e w ithsuf ficie nt s pe ci fi ci ty

to al er t the m ind

of the tr ia l c ourt t o th e 11 cl ai m ed

e rr or or e rr or s, a nd tha t a

r uli ng the re on the n be inv oke d. ” (i nte rn al quo ta tio n 12 m arks and citation om itted)). 13 { 45} A s to J.Z.’s ad ult c onvi ct ion s, und er

Ru le 11- 609( A ) the dis tr ic t c ourt m ust 14 adm it pr ior a dul t c onvi ct ion s f or im pe ac hm en t purp ose s if

( 1) the c onvi ct ionis fo r 1 5 a n y c r i m e t h a ti s p u n i s h ab l e b y i m p r i s o n m e n tf

o r m o r e th a n ay e a r , s ub

j e c tt o t he 16 ba lanc ing te st o f Ru le 11- 403, or ( 2) the c onvi ct ionis fo r an y c ri m e inv olv ing a 17 dis hone st a ct

or f al se state m en t. The di str ic t c ourt pe rm itt ed D ef en dant t o r ef

er by 18 na m e to J
. Z
. ’ s fe lon y

c onvi ct ion s f

or c om m er ci al bur glary , c onsp ir ac y to ta m pe r w ith40

1 evidence, and a probation violatio n on the charge of rece iving or transfer ring a stolen 2 ve hic le
. T he dis tr ic t c ourt als o exe rc ise d its disc re tio n unde r Ru le 11- 609( A )( 1) by 3 pr ev en ti ng D ef

en dant f ro m m en tio nin g by

na m e J. Z
. ’ s pr ior

c onvi ct ion s f

or 4 poss es sio n of

af ir earm by af el on and c ontri but ing to the de lin que nc y of am ino r 5 unde r Ru le 11- 403 . Ho wever , D ef en dant w oul d st ill be a llo w ed to re fe r to the 6 ex is te nc e o f th es e o th er fe lo ny con vi ct io ns wit ho ut na m in g t ho se off e n s e s . On 7 appeal, De fendant does not state which specific convictio ns he shou ld h av e b een 8 allowed to nam e, but ins tead m erely m akes a general refe rence to the jury ’ s potenti al 9 “ m i s u n d er standin g of [J.Z .’ s] possi ble m otives and th e extent to which he w as 10 fam iliar w ith the ho rse-tra din g as pect of the cr im inal justice sy stem .” W e hold that 11 the d i s t ri ct court did no t abuse its dis cretion in lim iting how D efendant could refer 12 to tw o of J. Z
. ’ s pr ior ad ult fe lon y co nvi ct ion s. Co ntr ar y to D ef en dant’ s arg um en ts, 13 the dis tr ic t co ur t’s rulin g st ill a llo w ed D ef en dant t o e lic it tha t J. Z
. ha d f re que nt 14 en co unt er s w ith the cr im ina l j ust ic e sy ste m an d to ar gue tha t J. Z
. w as e xa gge ratin g 15 his sto ry

to ge t a de al on s om e of

his oth er c harg es . 16 { 46} Second, D efendant asserts that it w as an abuse of discretion for the di s trict 17 co urt t o lim it his cr oss -e xa m ina tio n of J. Z
. r eg ar din g ho wJ. Z
. m ad e his li vin g onthe 18 streets, includi ng the fact that J.Z . “ used and/or sold drugs.” T he rec ord refle cts that41

1 D ef en da nt elic ite d te sti m ony f ro m J. Z
. that J. Z
. w as hus tli ng, panhandl ing , a nd 2 selling d rugs to su rvive on the streets. The district c ourt then cut off any addition al 3 que sti ons fr om

D ef en dant r eg ar din g ho wJ. Z
. m ad e his liv ing on the str ee ts b ec au se 4 the court reasoned that selling drugs and b eing hom eless wa s im perm issib le chara cter 5 e v i d e n c e t h a twa s n o t r e l e v a n t t o a n y i s s u e s e i t h e r i n t h e c a s e o r t o J
. Z. ’s c r e d i b i l i t y. 6 How ever, the district c ourt la ter allowed De fendant to e licit testim ony from J.Z . that 7 he had a ba d m e m or

y f r om us i ng dr

ug s, pr e su m abl y be c aus e t hat t e st i m on y wa s 8 re le vant t o th e j ur

y ’ s a sse ssm en t of

J. Z
. ’ s r el ia

bil ity a s aw itn ess. U nde r the se 9 circum stances, w e conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court 10 to l im it D ef

en dant’ s c ro ss- ex am ina tio n r eg ar din g J. Z
. ’ s ho m el es sne ss o r dr ug u se 11 since the specific issue of how J. Z. m ade his livin g on th e streets w as of m inim al 1 2 r e l e v a n c e t o a n y i s s u e s e i t h e r i n t h e c a s e o r

t o J
. Z. ’s c r e d i b i l i t y. 13 { 47} T hir d, D ef

en dant cl ai m s tha t it w as an im pr ope r ab use of dis cr et ion for the 14 dis tr ic t c ourt to pr ev en t D ef en dant f ro m pr ovi din g J. Z
. w ithtr an sc ri pts of his 15 safehouse interview while J.Z . was on the stand to refr esh J.Z .’ s recollection and then 16 im pe ac h hi m

w ithpr ior

inc onsi ste nt sta te m en ts. “ T he a dm iss ionor e xc lus ionof

[ an ] 17 inc onsi ste nt s ta te m en t r es ts w ith in th e soun d di sc re tio n of the tr ia l c ourt un de r the 18 pa rt i cu l ar facts in this case and w ill not b e re versed absent an abuse of that42

1 discretion.” Sta te v . D av is , 198 1- N MS C- 131, ¶ 20, 97 N
. M. 130 , 637 P
. 2d 5 61. 2 Dur ing c ro ss- ex am ina tio n, D ef en dant a ske d J. Z
. w he the r J. Z
. ha d st at ed dur ing his 3 sa feh ou se in te rv ie w th atDefen da nt pu nc he d h im . J.Z. re s p o n d e d, “ I be li ev e so .” 4 D ef en se c ouns el a ske d J. Z
. to showhim whe re in the tr an sc ri pt h e ha d m ad e thi s 5 statem ent. The Sta te obje cted that showing J.Z. the transcript w ould be im proper 6 re fr es hm en t and i m

pr ope r im pe ac hm en t. T he dis tr ic t cour t su sta ine d th is o bj ec tio n 7 an d di d no t agr ee to D ef en dant’ s pr opos al of

le tti ng J
. Z
. r ev ie wthe e nti re tr an sc ri pt 8 be ca use it w oul d have take n asig nifi can t am ou nt o f tim e an d th e iss ue w as de 9 m in im us . Defen da nt was t he n a ll owe d t o re su m e h i s c r o s s - ex am in at io n o f J.Z. 10 regarding J.Z .’ s safehouse statem ent, during which J.Z . stated that he w as n o t sure 11 wha t he sa id , t ha t he m ay no t ha ve sa id it , and th athe di d n ot kn ow i f he sai d i t. J .Z. 12 fi na lly

a gr ee d tha t he did not say tha t D ef en dant h ad

pun ch ed him in the he ad

dur ing 13 the int er

vie w . W e co nc lud e tha t the dis tr ic t c ourt a ct ed w ith in its dis cr et ionto co ntr ol 14 cr oss -e xa m ina tio n to en sur e an ef fi ci en t tri al by

de ny ing D ef

en dant’ s r eque st t o have 15 J.Z . r eview the e ntire transcript of the safe hous e interviewto confirm that he never 16 sa id h e w as hit

in the he ad , a nd i nst ea d r equi ring D ef en dant t o c ont inu e to c ro ss17 ex am in e J.Z. to el ic it th is st at em en t t hr ou gh tes ti m on y . Se e B en t , 201 3- N MC A -1 08, 18 ¶ 10.43

1 { 48} Fo urth and f

ina lly , D ef

en dant arg ue s th at t he se li m itatio ns o n hi s c ro ss2 ex am ina tio n of J. Z
. co lle ct ive ly vio la te d D ef

en dant’ s r igh ts unde r the Co nf ro nta tio n 3 Clause. The Confrontation Clause “ guarantees the right of an acc used in a cr im inal 4 prosecution to be confronted w ith the witnesses against him .” Davis v. Alaska , 415 5 U
. S. 308 , 315 ( 1974 ) (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). H ow ev er , “ the 6 tr i a l c o u rt r e t a i n s w i d e l a t i tu d e i n s o f a r a s t h e C o n f

r o n t a t i o n C l au s e i s c o n c erne d to 7 im pose r ea sona

ble li m its on . . . c ro ss- ex am ina tio n ba se d onc onc er ns abo ut, a m ong 8 oth er thi ngs, hara ssm en t, pr ej udi ce , co nf usi on of the iss ue s, the w itn es s’ [s ] sa fe ty , or 9 interrogation th at is repetitive or only m arginally

relevant. ” Sta te v . Sm ith , 10 2001 -N MSC- 004, ¶ 19, 130 N. M. 117, 19 P. 3d 254 (om issio n in origin al) (inter nal 11 quot at ionm ar

ks and cit at ion om itt ed ). A lth ough the ex te nt of cr oss -e xa m ina tio n is 12 within the sou n d discretion of the dis trict court, we still review de novo whether 13 li m it s o n c ro ss -ex am in at io n h av e v io la te d t he Co nf ro nt at io n C la us e. Id

. 14 { 49} W e dis ag re e w ithD ef en dant’s argum en t tha t the li m itatio ns o n c ro ss15 ex am ina tio n in thi s ca se w er e ana log ous to thos e lim itatio ns hel d to be vio la tio ns o f 16 the Co nf

ro nta tio n Clause by the U nit ed St at es Su pr em e Co ur

t i n D av is
. I n D av is , the 17 de fe ndant, w ho w as a cc use d of ste al ing a sa fe , w as pr ohi bit ed f ro m c ro ss- ex am ini ng 18 a wit ne ss ag ai nst

him r eg ar din g th e fa ct

that the w itn es s w as on p ro ba tio n f or44

1 bu rg la ry . 41 5 U.S. at 31 1- 12
. D av is he ld tha t the dis tr ic t co urt’ s lim itatio ns on c ro ss2 ex am ina tio n of the w itn es s vio la te d the de fe ndant’ s c onf ro nta tio n r igh ts b ec au se he 3 w as not

pe rm itt ed

to pr oduc e ev idenc e to c re at e an y r ec or d of

the r ea son tha t the 4 witness m ight p otentially be biased or m otivated to lie, such as the witness’ s fear that 5 the pol ic e m igh t oth er

w ise sus pe ct the w itn es s of c om m itt ing the c ri m e, ba se d onhis 6 pr io r cri m in al hi st ory . Se e id. at 317-18. Ins tead, “ defense cou nsel sho uld have been 7 perm itted to expo se to the jur y the fac ts from

which j urors, a s the sole triers of fac t 8 an d c re dib ili ty , co uld

appr opr ia te ly

dr awinf er en ce s r el at ing to the r el ia bil ity of the 9 witness.” Id

. B y c ontra st, he re the dis tr ic t co urt’ s lim itatio ns on c ro ss- ex am ina tio n 10 did not pr ev en t D ef

en dant f ro m c re at ing ar ec or d r eg arding p ote nti al c re dib ili ty 1 1 p r o b l e ms wi t h J
. Z. ’s t e s t i mo n y. I n d e e d , t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rts p e c i f i c a l l y did not li m it 1 2 D e f e n d a n t ’ s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n r e g a r d i n g J
. Z
. ’ s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n s f o r c r i m es of 13 di sh on es ty, an d p erm it te d Def en da nt to eli ci t g en eral info rm at io n i ll us tra ti ng th atJ.Z. 14 ha d si gni fi cant e xpe ri en ce w iththe c ri m ina l j ust ic e sy ste m a nd m ad e hi s li vin g by 15 hust lin g onthe str ee ts, both of w hic h a lso pr ovi de d f

odde r fo r D ef

en dant’ s arg um en t 16 tha t J. Z
. ha d m oti va tio ns t o f ab ri cate his sto ry . T he re fo re , w e co nc lud e tha t the 17 dis tr ic t c ourt’ s e xe rc ise of dis cr et ionto lim it the e xte nt of Defendan t’ s c ro ss18 ex am in at ion of

J. Z
. w as pr ope r an d di d no t vi ola te D ef en dant’ s r igh ts unde r the45

1 Confrontation Clause. 2 CON CLU SION 3 { 50} W e re ve rs e D ef en dant’ s c onvi ct ion s f

or CS P- fe lon y

a nd k idn ap pin g and 4 re m an d to the dis tr ic t c ourt, w he re D ef en dant m ay

be r etri ed

on those c harg es . 5 { 51} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

6

____ ____ ________

____ ____ ____ __ 7 EDWA RD L. CH ÁV EZ , Just ice

8 WE CONCUR:

9 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 10 CH ARLES W. DA NIEL S, Ch ief Justice

11 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 12 PE TRAJIMEN EZMA ES, Justice

13 ___ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ 14 BA RBA RAJ. V IGIL, Just ice