*

After examining the briefs and the records, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary.  Thus, the appeals are submitted on the briefs and the records.  See FED. R. APP.

P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted December 22, 2008*

Decided January 8, 2009

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2578

STEFANIE A. RODEN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE,

COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL

EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 24, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of

Wisconsin.

No. 07‐cv‐698‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Stefanie Roden, a former employee of the University of Wisconsin and member of

the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, claims that the

university’s Board of Regents and her supervisors wrongfully fired her from her job, and

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2578 Page 2

that the union and two of its representatives breached their duty to fairly represent her in

challenging the dismissal.  The district court dismissed the lawsuit, and Roden appeals.

Roden worked as a library technician until she was injured on icy steps in January

1996.  After exhausting her authorized medical leave, she informed her supervisors and the

union that she was not yet healed and could not return for a few more days.  When days

turned into weeks without any further contact from Roden, the university concluded that

she had abandoned her job.  See Wis. Stat. § 230.34(1)(am).  She was discharged in March

1996.

More than two years later, Roden complained to the Wisconsin Employment

Relations Commission that the university and union had engaged in unfair labor practices.

The Commission held the matter in abeyance at Roden’s request, but dismissed it eight

years later when she failed to pursue her grievance.  Roden sought review of the

Commission’s order in state court, then voluntarily dismissed that action in order to

proceed with this litigation.  As we read her complaint, Roden claims that the university

defendants fired her without due process, and that the union defendants violated the State

Employment Relations Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 111.80–111.94, by not adequately representing her

when she filed a grievance challenging her dismissal.  Roden’s complaint also includes an

isolated reference to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e‐17,

but she does not allege that her termination was on account of any ground actionable under

that statute.  The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on a number of bases, chief

among them that Roden’s claims are untimely.  Roden sought more time to amend her

complaint, but the district court, apparently misconstruing her request as a motion to

amend under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, denied the motion because Roden had not

attached her proposed amendment.  The court then dismissed Roden’s suit, reasoning that

both her due process claim and her state employment claim were barred by the pertinent

statutes of limitations.  The court also noted that any conceivable claim under Title VII was

destined to fail on the merits because Roden had never exhausted her administrative

remedies.

On appeal Roden does not argue that the district court wrongly decided that her

claims are time barred, nor does she dispute that she never filed an administrative charge of

discrimination under Title VII.  Instead she contends that the federal and state statutes of

limitations were tolled while her complaint before the Commission sat dormant.  She also

claims that the district court should have given her more time to file an amended complaint

before dismissing her suit.  Finally, she submits that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

dismiss her complaint because the defendants had neither been served with process nor

returned the waiver‐of‐service form.
No. 08‐2578 Page 3

Roden contends that the statutes of limitations were tolled because she did not

originally realize that she should pursue her claims in federal court, rather than through

state administrative, and then judicial, proceedings.  Equitable tolling would be appropriate

only if Roden could demonstrate, first, that conditions outside her control prevented her

from timely filing her claims and, second, that she diligently pursued her

claims despite the impediment.  See Pace v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S.408, 418 (2005); Tucker

v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 734 (7th Cir. 2008).  But there were no circumstances that

prevented Roden from filing her claims on time.  She missed the statutory deadlines

because she made several inadvisable strategic decisions—in particular, deferring her suit

until her state administrative claim, which she herself had suspended for eight years, was

dismissed—and her lack of legal expertise does not warrant equitable tolling.  See Tucker,

538 F.3d at 735.

We review the denial of a motion for an extension of time for abuse of discretion and

will overturn the district court’s ruling only if Roden can show that she was actually

prejudiced by the denial.  See United States v. Rinaldi, 461 F.3d 922, 928‐29 (7th Cir. 2006).

Roden suggests that she sought to amend her complaint to include a reference to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343.  That statute grants jurisdiction to district courts to hear certain civil‐rights claims; it

does not define a claim, and so adding it to her complaint, which already cited to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1331, would not have altered the complaint in any material way, see Myles v. United States,

416 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 2005) (explaining that § 1343 and § 1331 provide overlapping

jurisdiction over civil‐rights claims).  Certainly a reference to § 1343 would do nothing to

make Roden’s claims more timely.  We cannot say that she suffered prejudice because the

district court denied her more time to make a futile amendment.

As for Roden’s contention that the district court could not dismiss her complaint

without first acquiring personal jurisdiction over the defendants, a district court may

dismiss a complaint without ever involving the defendant if, as here, it is clear that relief is

barred by the relevant statutes of limitations.  See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007);

Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Village of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 802 (7th Cir. 2008).  And, anyway, the

district court gained personal jurisdiction over the defendants when they voluntarily

appeared in court to move for dismissal on grounds unrelated to jurisdiction.  See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(h)(1); United States v. Ligas, 2008 WL 5047770 at *4 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 2008).

For the foregoing reasons we AFFIRM the district court’s order dismissing Roden’s

case.