Plague of Locusts—Special Report

June 1990

OTA-F-450

NTIS order #PB90-254103
Recommended Citation:

U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, A Plague of Locwti+Special Report,

OTA-F-450 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990).

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402-9325

(order form can be found in the back of this report)
Foreword

Widespread outbreaks of rasshoppers, then plagues of locusts, occurred insome parts of

Africa from 1985 through 1 89. Donors, including the United States, mobilized sizable 8

amounts of foreign aid for disaster assistance. Congress played a role throughout the insect

upsurges, appropriating special funds for disaster assistance.

Congress also had broader concerns regarding a number of environmental problems

throughout Africa that seemed related to the locust and grasshopper situation. The Senate

Appropriations Committee and its Subcommittee on Foreign Operations requested that OTA

address a number of questions regardin how U.S. foreign aid dollars were spent during the

recent plague: Was insect control time y and effective? What were the impacts on donors f

long-term development efforts? What should the United States do when the problem recurs?

This is OTA’S fifth report on U.S. foreign aid and African agriculture and our most detailed

look at one specific problem. Here, we R

rovide background on the unusual nature of

grasshopper and locust problems, examine t e implications this has for the way problems are

treated, then consider how U.S. contributions to the bilateral and multilateral control effort

might be improved. We identifj two areas of technology-integrated pest management and

insect, weather, and vegetation monitoring–that could have important impacts. We include

specific ways in which Congress could ensure that such improvements are made.

Like all OTA studies, this special report draws on many people’s expertise. We appreciate

the efforts of our workshop participants, the people who responded to our survey, and those

who reviewed the two draft reports. In particular, our thanks go to staff at the Umted Nations

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID). OTA, USAID, and FAO’S analyses and policy suggestions

sometimes differ. But we at OTA are grateful for the assistance these other w-outx Provided

and the thoroughness with which they;eviewed our early work.

~f

A/# k

JOHN H. GIBBONS

Director

. . .

111
OTA Project Staff-A PLAGUE OF LOCUSTS

Roger C. Herdman, Assistant Director, OTA

Health and Life Sciences Division

Walter E. Parham, Pro am Manager

Food and Renewab e Resources F

Phyllis N. Windle, Project Director

Analytical Staff

Kath Desmond, Contractor

Da e T Bottrell, Contractor

Dean Haynes, Contractor

Paul Thompson, Contractor

Administrative Staff

Ellis Lewis, Oj@ce Administrator

Nellie Hammond, Administrative Secretary

Carolyn Swarm, PC Specialist

Dedication

OTA dedicates this report to the memory of S.M. Moobola, Director, International Red

Locust Control Organisation for Central and Southern Africa, in Zambia, who died in

mid-1989, and to Gladys Gilbert, USAID, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, who was killed in the 1989

plane crash of Congressman Mickey Leland’s delegation. Both took part in this work. We hope

that it reflects the same ideals of public service and global cooperation that they embodied.

iv
CONTENTS

Page

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY **.   ** **   ** ** **e

* ""*" **"* 0"**   ** 0* *0** *0e* 3

CHAPTER 1. THE BASICS ● **9**=* ● ****9*** .*..**.** ...*.*.** .*..*.*.* ● **.** 19

SettingtheStage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .= =” ”. ”” ”o”o=oooooooc*oo B ~~

Locusts andGrasshoppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....0”====” ““W MOOOOO

Locust and GrasshopperUpsurges, Declines, and theRoleofClimate . . . . . . . 27

OrganizationsInvolvedinI-mcust and GrasshopperControl. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Pastand Current Control Methods forLocusts andGrasshoppers . . . . . . . . . . . 37

cmPmR2. mTIsmEPRoBLEM? .00..0. .*..*.** ● .00.0=. ● *****=* ● ***** 45

VaryingPerceptions oftheProblem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...==...=-= 45

Locusts andGrasshoppers’ Impact onFoodProduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

The Effectiveness ofControl Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. =..”=.= 49

Health andtheEnvironment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .” ””’ ”O ”==””” 57

Institutional and PoliticalAspects ofControl . ....................==. . . . . . 62

CHAPTER 3. STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . ● ....*** ..**.*** ● O***** 69

WhatUSAIDDidWell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .=. . . . . . . . . . . . @

HowTo DoBetterNextTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......”==””= 71

WhatControlToUse: The Role ofTechnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

CHAPTER 4. POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIYE

BRANCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....=.== ● 000”00 87

Where WeStandToday. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . . . ....=..”” 87

PolicyOptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... .. OOOOOO ““=” 89

Appendixes

AppendixA Acronyms andGlossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............=== ...... 107

AppendixB List ofContractorPapers, Contracted Analysis, and Workshop

Participants .. . . . . .. . . .. .. .0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .000.0...000000..000000 109

AppendixC OTASurveyForm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11O

AppendixD List ofSurvey Respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

AppendixE Reviewers ofOTA’s DraftReport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

AppendixF Recommendations FromThree Recent Reports onPestManagement

in Developing Countries . ..................................00. ● “”~” ”.””” 119

AppendixG References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

v
Executive Summary
CONTENTS

Page

THE BASICS   ** ** **** *e** ***9  e** *********=*************************** 3

LocustsandGrasshoppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... . . ....==.=. 3

OrganizationsInvolvedinControlling Ikcusts andGrasshoppers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

ControllingGrasshoppersand Locusts ● *....*.* ● ********* 9**.**..*. ● ***.** 5

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? ● *****9* ● *******9 ● ******** ● O******* ● *ee***** ● ***9** 9

TheEffectivenessofControl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Impacts on Health andtheEnvironment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Institutional and PoliticalAspects ofControl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...=. 10

STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE ● ******O ●  O** ** 9*.****** ● -**O  ● ** ***** 10

HowTo DoBetterNextTime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . ... ... .....=. ..=. 11

What Control To Use: The Role of Technology . . ..”.,...9 ● .*****... ● *..,** 12

POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH . . . . . . . . . . 12

RevisingUSAID’sStrategy .....00 .00...0. .*..***. ● ..**.** ..s..000 ● ***** * 14

ImplementingIntegrated Pest Management . . ..**.”* .*.***.. . . . . . . . . ● ***** 14

Using PesticidesJudiciously . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

U.S. Coordinationand Support forAfrican, U.NVandRegional Organizations . 15

Funding Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CONCLUSION ● ...***. ● ******.* .******.. ● *.,.**.. ● ..*****. ..*.*.*** ● ******* * 15

Boxes

A AnOperiLetterto OTA’sReaders: ATirneforCaution .......,. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

B High PriorityPolicyOptionsfor Congress . . . . . . . . .*....* ..***.** ● *.***.. ..**** 13

Figure

1 DistributionofTwo MajorSpecies ofLocusts and AggregatingGrasshoppers in

Africaandthe MiddleEas~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Tables

1 Donor Assistance to Locust and Grasshopper Control Programs, 1986-89 . . . . . . . . . . 6

2 U.S. Assistance to Locust/Grasshopper Programs, Fiscal Years 1986-89. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Executive Summary

THE BASICS

Several ma”or species of locusts as well as significant po u ations of various grasshoppers 1

threatened Aricansimultaneously inthe 1980sfor

the first time in 50 years. This infestation began in

1985 and 1986 after rains ended a severe, severalthesepests~iatopro~~~~t~~~~~~;~~;~~~

year drought and new,

r

er species in the West African Sahe reached

evels high enough to result in Iar e-scale control

efforts. Also, a major plague of%esert Locusts

began in countries around the Red Sea, with

swarms moving west across the Sahelian countries.

By November, 1988, swarms of the Desert Locust

extended from Mauritania and Senegal in the west

to Iraq, Iran, and Kuwait in the east and some

fragments of swarms reached the Caribbean.

The recent pla uecaught African nations and

donors unprepare8 because the infrastructure to

fight these insects had deteriorated in the decades

since the last major problem. For donors such as

the U.S. Agency for International Development,

these insect problems caused shifts in funds,

operations, and programs to cope with the apparent emergency. The Desert Locust plague

ended in 1989 despite predictions that it would

continue for several ears. But longer term issues

remain (see box A).

%

rts differ widely in their

assessment of the si ni lcance of grasshopper and

locust outbreaks refative to other pest problems

and national level crop damage they cause; the

information base on which control decisions were

made is deficient; no sound technological alternatives exist for chemical pesticides; and education

and training for the next generation of experts

seems inadequate.

Locusts and Grasshoppers

Some200 rasshopperandkwusts pecies,with

different foo# preferences and geogra hic distribution, are agricultural pests in A!rica. A

smaller number cause the majority of concern,

including the Desert Locust and Senegalese

Grasshopper see figure 1). Different species can

invade virtual y all of the continent, as well as \

affect the Near East and Southwest Asia. Locust

and grasshopper species, with varied biological

characteristics, cause recurrent problems. Locust

upsurges are usually attributable to one species in

a given area and they occur e isodically.

Grasshopper infestations often invo 1!ve a number

of different species and cause agricultural damage

each year. The Sahelian region is particularly vulnerable.

Locusts and some grassho pers become a

serious problem when they breeJ rapidly, become

heavily concentrated, and undergo a biological

transformation to the gregarious hase. Each insect in a gregarious group (a ban of i young hoppers or a swarm of adults) can eat up to its own

weight per day and swarms may contain millions of

insects and migrate up to 1,000 km in a week. A

plague occurs when many gregarious bands and

swarms occur over a large area in different regions.

Damage to crops and the other ve etation is

not evenly distributed but often locafized, like

damage from a tornado, even during a plague. The

reasons for the start of an upsurge of locusts or

aggregating grasshoppers ire ~elatively wellknown-bountiful rainfall and the availability of

new vegetation–although the inability to for;cast

weather precludes accurate prediction of insect

build-u . The reasons forplagues’declines are less

clear. pacifically, the importance of control in {

declines is hotly debated.

Organizations Involved in Controlling

Locusts and Grasshoppers

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO has coordinated international locust control e forts since the 1950s, important because )

locust swarms mi rate across national boundaries.

African nationa crop protection services and f

regional organizations supplanted the English and

French colonial locust control organizations in the

1960s. Three semiautonomous regional organizations (OCLALAV for West Africa, the Desert

Locust Control Or anization for East Africa, and

the International #ed Locust Control Organization for Central and Southern Africa conduct

survey and control efforts in most of su 2 -Saharan

Africa, where national crop protection services are

less well-developed than elsewhere. Three

regional FAO commissions in Northwest Africa,

the Near East, and Southwest Asia, cover areas

where control is handled primarily by the national

crop protection agencies; the coordinate surveys,

control, training, and researci .

3
4 ● A Plague of Locusts
Executive Summtuy ● 5

Figure l-Distribution of Two Major Species of Locust and Aggregating Grasshoppers in

Africa and the Middle East

u L=:oo

KILOMETERS

Desert Locust

c 1

0

-

0 0

KILOMETERS

—

Senegalese Grasshopper

SOURCE: TAMS (kmaultants. Inc. and Consortium for International Crop Protection, Locust and Grasshopper Control in

AfiaMia.. A RQvammadc Environmental AwssmenL Main Report, cckactor rep&t prepared for the U.S. Agency for

International Dev~opment, March 1989, pp. C-7, C-19.

The African national crop protection services,

usually under the Ministry of Agriculture, are the

major national organizations responsible for

grasshopper control and they take over when

problems exceed the capacity of individual

farmers. They carried out ground spraying in the

recent campaigns, sometimes assisted by farmer

groups. Aerial sprayin~, often executed under

regional or donor auspices in the Sahel but by

national agencies in the Maghreb, was used for

more extensive or remote infestations.

Donors contributed some $275 million from

1986 through mid-1989 to locust and grasshopper

control, mamly in Northwest Africa and the Sahel.

The United States ave $59million, about 20percent of the donor !unds (tables 1 and 2). U.S. aid

provides assistance primarily through the U.S.

Agency for International Development (USAID).

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance N

responsible for short-term aid (3 to 6 months)

whale re ional bureaus and the Bureau for Science

and Tecfnology provide longer term aid.

As a result of donor and African countries’

efforts, approximately 4.6 million ha of land in 10

Sahelian and West African countries received

aerial or ground insecticide treatments in 1986 and

1987, mostly against grasshoppers. In 1988,10 million ha were sprayed in Northwest and West

Africa, mostly against Desert Locusts and approximate 13 million liters of insecticides were

used, most yin Northwest Africa, at a total cost of {

about $100 million.

Controlling Grasshoppers and Locusts

Most traditional methods have been replaced

by the use of chemical insecticides, at least in

official programs. The most effective traditional
6 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table I-Donor Assistance to Locust and Grasshopper Control Programs, 1986-89

(U.S. dollars/calendar year)

Donors 1986 198P 1988 1989 Total

(Jan.-May)

Bilateral donors:

Algeria

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Canada

China

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany (FR)

Greece

Indonesia

Iran

Israel

Italy

Japan

Kuwait

Libya

Luxembourg

Morocco

Netherlands

Nigeria

Norway

Portugal

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Thailand

Ti.misia

Tbrkey

United Kingdom

USAID

U.S.S.R.

Yugoslavia

Subtotal bilateral donors

50,000

0

0

130,000

3,014,500

500,000

692,500

400,000

1,792,537

3,025,887

50,000

0

0

0

2,659,000

1,288,000

0

0

0

20,000

2,350,000

0

3,127,000

0

0

0

62,511

1,185,929

403,000

11,000

0

0

1,909,183

9,1%,245

o

64,000

146,882

0

0

266,714

2,802,238

*

635,369

0

3,491,738

6,209,031

0

10,OOO

0

*

2,471,386

*

o

0

14Q,000

o

1,850,000

0

1,500,000

0

0

0

0

0

92,790

0

0

0

987,687

6,983,332*

o

31,931,292 27,587,167

180,000

205,000

29,041

500,000

2,243,000

40,000

2,813,068

208,455

6,030,127

11,992,000

160,000

25,000

7,500

0

2,994,675

4,100,368

1,000,000

1,212,000

244,000

320,000

6,592,347

400,000

1,615,000

606,000

12,000

2,860,000

2,440,000

2,599,386

944,268

0

90,000

500,000

5,800,000

21,599,859

1,376,000

0 —

o

0

0

1,300,000

343,000

120,000

2,400,000

75,000

3,150,000

14,250,000

0

0

0

0

1,000,000

13,620,000

0

0

0

0

0

0

2,000,000

0

0

0

0

0

338,000

0

0

0

207,000

12,000,000

0

0

376,882

205,000

29,041

2,1%,714

8,402,738

660,000

6,540,937

683,455

14,464,402

35,476,918

21O,OOO

35,000

7,500*

9,125,061

19,008,368

1,000,000

1,212,000

384,000

340,000

10,792,347

400,000

8,242,000

606,000

12,000

2,860,000

2,502,511

3,785,315

1,778,058

11,000

90,000

500,000

8,903,870

49,779,436

1,376,000

64,000

81,739,094 50,803,000 192,060,553
Executive Summay ● 7

Table l-Donor Assistance to Locust and Grasshopper Control Programs, 1986-89-Continued

(U.S. dollars/calendar year) Continued

Donors 1986 198? 1988 1989 Total

(Jan.-May)

Multilateral donors:

African Development Bank 165,000

Banque Africaine de

Developpement Afrieain (BADEA) 750,000

European Economic

Community (EEC)

Islamic Development Bank

Organization of African

Unity (OAU)

Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC)

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF)

UN Development Program

(UNDP)

UN Environment Program

(UNEP)

UN Food and Agriculture

Organiza tion (FAO)

UN World Food Program (WFP)

UN World Health Organization

(wHo)

Subtotal multilateral donors

Non-Governmental Organizations

Total

USAID as pereent of total

10,739,981

0

0

300,000

86,000

1,839,000

0

2,601,000

18,000

4,480

0

0

2,348,674

0

321,430

0

*

54,000b

o

20,000

0

0

200,000

0

9,600,143

14,400,000

300,000

39,000

1O,OOOC

2,926,332

48,405

4,700,000

0

0

6,019,730

0

400,000

2,044,000

0

0

0

0

0

610,000

0

0

6,384,730

750,000

23,088,798

16,444,000

621,430

339,000

%,000

4,819,332

48,405

7,931,000

18,000

4,480

16,503,461 2,744,104 32,223,880 9,073,730 60,545,175

1,211,460 133,000C 1,111,000 0 2,455,460

49.- 271a 1-4 59.876.730 25-

+ ~“ + 20-

275. -

18.5% 22.9% 18.7% 20.070 19.570

NOTES:

“Amount unknown (1987).

‘Includes only assistance to Sahelian and West African countries.

brncludmon~ a~istan~ to two of four recipient mu~tn~.

jIncludes onIy assistance from section aid to Gambia.

An additional $20 million was given by donors for programs in Northwest African countries, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen (Jeremy Roffey,

Emergency Center for Locust Operations, FAO, personal communication, June 26, 1989).

SOURCES:

Column 1: Jeremy Roffey, “1986 Funding Chart for Grasshopper and Locust campaigns in Africa” (Emergency Centre for LQcust

Operations, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, December 1986).

Column 2: U.N. Food and Agriculture Orgamzation, “Report of the Meeting on the Evaluation of the 1987 Grasshopper Campaign in the

Sahel, Annex VI Emergency (km-e for bcust Operations, Rome, December 1987.

Columns 3 and 4: J.N. Food and

%

nculture Organization, “Assistance Provided to&untries and Re ional Or animations,”

f t

Report of

the Thirtieth Session of the FAO esert Locust Control Committee, AGP:DLCC/89/4, Rome, Italy, une 12-1 , 1989.
8 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table 2-U.S. Assistance to Locust/Grasshopper Programs, Fiscal Years 1986-89

country 1986 1987 1988 1989 Dollars — —

Sahel and West Africa

Burkina Faso

Cameroon

~;~~ Verde

Gambia

Guinea Bissau

Mali

Mauritania

Niger

SM al

Sahe Regional f

East and Southern Africa

Botswana

Ethiopia

Sudan

Tanzania

Zaire

Zambia

East Africa Regional

Northern Africa and S.W. Asia

Algeria

Jordan

Morocco

Pakistan

Tunisia

Yemen

African Regional

$26##

‘ o

990,841

35,000

29,000

1,287,080

154,000

61,000

l,;SJ,&9

>

1,183,587

75,000

1,024,948

50,000

10,860

100,OOO

0

$5&,&2

‘ o

1,254,211

594,898

290,320

1,012,433

227,500

337,386

1,923,752

0

0

380,516

6(M),%

o

0

0

0

0

0

:

135.598

75,000

1,305 73g

()

o

1.775,110

1;446;964

1,199,647

245,892

0

407,82~

662.415 ,

0

0

0

0

1,070,032

5,295,71!

o

1,361,447

0

0

25,(X)8

o

25,000

0

200,000

866,256

317,000

3,362,320

0

0

13,800

173,713

:

o

0

18,866

152,600

10,308,974

2,000,000

1,410,535

0

!W&,&2

loojloo

3:$,;;;

319:320

4,274,623

2,694,720

1,915,033

7,189,313

244,000

1,183,587

877,136

2,461,076

50,000

10,860

100,OOO

0

1,088,898

m?$oo

15,985,203

2,000,000

2,771,982

135.598

75347 c

o .— 5,578-414 4,123,988 9,777;749

Total dollars $7,446,812 $7,548,346 ———

$20,424,184 $22,998,052 $58,797,910

Amount of total granted to FAO 4,084,587 358,000 2,465,000 1,508,910 8,416,497

Amount of total, OFDA fundsb’c 7,171,012 6,384,059 9,643,950 5,585,652 28,784,673

yoTEs:

&istance to Gambia in 1988 and some in 1989 included in amount for Senegal.

U.S. assistance consists of OFDA funds, USAID mission funds, Africa or Asia/Near East Bureau regional funds, and some local currency. In

FY 1988, OFDA contributed $9,643,950, the missions $4,840,600, the regional programs $6,689,656, and local currency $2,350,464, fora grand

total of $23,524,670. In FY 1989, OFDAcon@buted $5,585,652, the missions $15,847,400, the regional programs $1,565,000 and local currency

C$1,850,343, fora pand total of$24,848,395. Thus, the percent of OFDAfunding decreased significantly in 1988and 1989. Information in’this line from John Gelb, 1989, below.

SOURCES:

1986-John Gelb, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, AID, “USG Contributions to Locust/Grasshopper Threat in Africa - FY 1986 as

of September 30, 1986,” n.d.

1987–Officeof Foreign DisasterAssistance, “Insect Infestation,’’ OFDAAnnual Report Fisca1Year1987(Washington, DC: USAID, 1988.

1988-Offke of Foreign Disaster Assistance, “Insect Infestation,” OFDAAnnua] Report Fiscal Year 1988 (draft) (Washington, D :J

USAID, 1989.

1989–John Gelb, dffice of Forei n Disaster Assistance, “U.S. A.I.D.support, Desert Locust Task Force, FY 1987-89,” dated July 22-23,

1989. Due to the decline o the locust problem in early 1989, some of the funds allocated have been reprogrammed for other crop !

protection activities.
Executive Summary ● 9

method consists of driving hoppers into trenches

and then burnin ,

f

drowning, or crushing them.

Arsenic was the n-st chemical used against these

pests. Ground and then aerial sprayin ofpersistent organochlorines (dieldrin and B C) became 2

the preferred control method in the 1950s. But

dieldrin was banned, first in the United States and

then Europe, in the late 1970s because of its environmental and health hazards. Fenitrothion and

malathion were the major chemicals used in the

recent campaign.

WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?

Most people, and many locust experts, view

the recent upsurges of locusts and grasshoppers as

a disaster threatening Africa’s already precarious

food security. Swarms put political pressure on

national leaders and donors to mount aggressive,

chemical control. National government and donor

policies are based on the assumptions that locusts

are a serious problem, that pesticides are the way

to control them, and that control programs benefit

low-resource farmers and herders substantially.

Others disagreewith these assure tions; OTAalso

finds theassumptionsquestionab e. Experts differ r

over:

● the insects’ impact on food production and

whether they cause famine;

. the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of

control ~rograms based exclusively on

chemical insecticides;

● insecticides’ impacts on human health and

safety and the environment; and

. how control should be organized and which

strategies should be pursued.

Locusts and grasshoppers are relatively minor

f’

ests even durin upsurges in terms of overall crop

osses, although Focalizeddamage maybe devastating for short periods. Economic losses depend on

which plants are affected and their age so damage

is unevenly distributed among commercial and

subsistence farmers and herders. The link between

famine or food shortages and locusts and

grasshoppers is questionable. Locusts and

grasshoppers can harm national agricultural

production if they devastate areas crucial to a

nation’s economy (as in 1954 when Desert Locusts

destroyed citrus trees in Morocco’s Seuss Valley).

This type of dama e did not occur in the recent

plague, however. %amage was less than drought

would produce, and losses were locali=d, with the

aggregate level of reduction in 1986 in the nine

countries most afFected by grassho pers down

only about 1.0

r

rcent in weight an 1.5 percent x

in value, accor ing to FAO and USAID estimates.

The Effkxtiveness of Control

The efficacy, efficiency, and equitability of

locust and grasshop~r control programs are undocumented. While insecticides can protect standing crops, their ability to end or prevent lagues is

not clear. Nor have the economic bene ?lts of crop

protection been demonstrated. Experts’ views on

reasons for the decline of plagues range from “entirely due to weather” to control programs were

the major factors curtailing the la~ue.” Key data

forresolving these differences o opinion r arelacking. It seems that, in some places, at certain times,

properly administered control can help interrupt

the sequence of events that could contribute to an

upsurge’s spread. While climate is the dominant

factor, it seems that chemical control can lay an

important role, at least on the national sca e. f’

Various insecticides have different relative effectiveness based on ingredients and formulations.

A number were used in the recent campai ns,

often in ways that reduced or negated their ef factiveness, e.g., when temperatures and wind speeds

were beyond recommended ranges, after insects

had laid eggs, or when some areas were unnecessarily resprayed. Chlorinated h droc&rbonsdieldrin, lindane, and BHC-were e {iminated from

U.S.-supported efforts after USAID was sued by

environmental groups in 1975. FAO, however, advocates continued use of dieldrin, claiming it is

effective, cost-effective, and not harmful. Some

European donors still supply lindane. All three

were used in the most recent African locust and

grasshopper cam aign, althou hinsmall amounts,

and unused stocL remain. 1%e insecticides with

USAID’s qualified approval for use against

f

rasshoppers and locusts changes over time. That

ist is not totally congruent with insecticides

registered for use against grassho pers and locusts

in the United States by the U. . Environmental {

Protection Agency (EPA). Reliable field measurements of spraying’s impact on insects and nontarget organisms have not been made.
10 ● A Plague ofibcusts

The recent control efforts were plagued by

problems. Opportunities to spray hopper bands,

when the insects were more concentrated, were

missed because of the:

●

●

●

●

●

inaccessibility of breeding areas;

lack of vehicles, communication equipment,

and trained personnel;

governments’ not allowing cross-border

suney or spray operations;

crop protection services’ priority to protect

cropland; and

wars and civil strife.

Additional problems existed in the earliest part of

the campaign: lack of preparedness of staff, impassability of roads in the rainy season, donors’

diverse policies, and late arrival of equipment and

pesticides.

Costs of the control programs in Africa were

high, especially because chemicals had to be imi$h

orted and transportation costs were high–from

15 to 30 per ectarein 1986, compared to $5.50

to $9.00 erhectareforgrassho~per control in the

United 8tates. The Cost-effectweness of control

has not been demonstrated. Some evidence exists

that in 1986 the value of production saved in the

nine most affected countri~ did not equal or exceed the costs of control: a total of $40 million for

control to save $46 million of production. The

data on which this conclusion N based are few,

however, partly due to donors lack of effort in

collecting them and partly due to problems inherent in the effort.

Impacts on Health and the Environment

Safe and environmentally sound use of insecticides was not ensured during the recent locust

and grassho per campaigns. Application, stora e,

and dis sa were not monitored and the cumu r fative ef ects of chemicals used in various agricul- P

tural and health programs were not taken into

account. Case reports exist of toxic human exposure, especially to those who handled insecticides. Insufficient attention was paid to the effects of locust and grasshop rsprayingonwarce

food and water supplies. Empty pesticide containers have been used to store food and water.

Various pesticides used in the campaign are

known to have harmful effects on nontarget organisms (e.g., fenitrothion to birds and fish and

carbaryl to honeybees) and some of these occurred. Honeybee colonies were killed in Tunisia

and 30 sheep died after grazing on pesticide-contaminated land. Insecticide residues were found

in the soil in Mali and Morocco. Storage and

disposal of surplus insecticides and containers is

recognized as a major problem by African governments, donors, and FAO. Problems such as inadequate packaging and labeling have resulted in

contamination and loss of effectiveness.

Institutional and Political Aspects of

Control

Most African national and regional agencies

and donor institutions are not e uipped to deal

with locusts and grasshoppers on a 1 ong-termbasis.

Commonly, development goals are sacrificed in

favor of emergency management. In Africa, civil

strife and long-standing border disputes constrained access to some of the most important

areas for conducting insect surveys and control.

The shortcomings of Chad’s national crop

protection service in dealing with locust and

grasshopper programs were typcal: imprecise data

on pests, vehicle breakdown, poor training,

shortage of survey materials, inadequate preparations before the rainy season, inaccurate treatment figures, and no monitorin of adverse effects.

Donor organizations exhibitet a different set of

shortcoming s: organizational shifts and redirection of fun from development to crisis & mana~ement, and lack of experts experienced with

technical aspects of the program and with African

situations.

STRATEGIES FOR THE FUTURE

USAID made commendable attempts to: 1)

coordinate its efforts with U.S. agencies; foreign

donors and African officials; 2) provide training to
Ewcutive Summtuy ● 1 1

Africans anditsownpersonnel; and3 stress sound

selection, storage, application, and disposal of insecticides.

The Office of Forei n Disaster Assistance

(OFDA) Desert Locust ask Force was the focal +

point for coordination. It held weekl meetings,

bringing together eTrts from the J.S. Department of Agricultures Agricultural Plant Health

and Inspection SeMce and the Forest SeMce, the

EPA and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS .

Also, the Task Force reviewed its work annual y?

and prepared a helpful Locust/Grasshopper

Management erations Gukiebook. USAIDheld

IOtramingwor hops and funded additional train- L

ing by FAO and a regional organization.

USAID advocated use of less toxic insecticides, a

ban on dieldrin, and improved disposal of containers

and surplus stocks. Ako, USAID supplied protective

clothing for pesticide ap licators and tested

ap licators’ cholinesterase evels f in one muntry.

U 1AID clearly prevailed in reducing dieldrin’s use.

USAIDattemptedtomakecmtrol more efficient and

less costly bypre-positioning chemicak in Europe and

using remote sensing (gnxmness maps) to identi&

areas for ground suneys.

How To Do Better Next Time

Overall, the results of locust and grassho per

control were disappointin . Donors cannot a ford 1!

to fund expensive cmtro campaigns without ad- F

dressing fundamental questions regarding goals

and implementation. Now that the resects are in

recession, it is time to find methods that contribute

to development, to redouble preventive efforts, to

decide what actions will be most effective during

the next upsurge. OTA finds that four areas

deserve special attention. Each has important implications for the organization of African regional

and national efforts and for donor funding.

The Feasibility and Price of Pwvention

FAO and USAID maintain that the plague

prevention strategy that evolved in the 1960s surveys in seasonal breeding grounds and contro\Iing

populations as they become gregarious there)

could prevent lagues if properly applied. But this

depends one fective ! monitoring and control on a

continuous basis, and that is costly. Also, effective

spraying is difficult in actuality, partly due to factors beyond the control of donors or governments

(civil wars, weather .

k

FAO proposes a ma”or

preventive effort in t enext 5years. Itseemst at A

such a preventive strate would be less expensive

than widespread controRut this is undocumented

so far. CrisK maria ement mobilizes resources and

attention more e !!fectively than preventive approaches to chronic or slow-onset problems, however.

Integmtm● gEmeqymcy Cbntml Programs Wtih

Lag-Term llevebpment

Far more attention was given to emergency

assistance than to other efforts, including ~reventing insect problems from developing and ldenti&

ing alternative controls in the recent campaign.

For example, nearly all U.S. funds for locust and

grasshopper programs in fiscal year 1986 and 1987

were OFDA funds and 58 ercent of USAID’s

major longer term grass opper and locust E

project’s funds were allocated to emergency assistance for fiscal years 1988 through 1990. Respondents to OTA’S survey agreed that crisis

management was the major type of activi undertaken in the recent campaign and most a vocated ?

an increase in preventive measures and specific

types of relief and rehabilitation.

Iiuiividual or Mul@est Stra&gies

Sustainable protection of crops and livestock

requires comprehensive, multipest management

solutions. Management of all grasshoppers and

locusts, however, may not be able to be integrated

into single or animations. Some species, e.g., the

Senegalese &rasshopper and African Migratory

Locust, can be controlled by national crop protection services in programs integrated with efforts

against other pests. Others, e.g., the Desert

Locust, might be more effectively dealt with

regionally as a single species because it breeds in

remote areas and migrates among countries.

When and Where Cbntrol Eflorts Should Be

Mounted

During the recent cam aigns, vast areas were

sprayed with insecticides. he high cost of these

efforts, including the less documented environmental costs, require a reexamination of where

and when spraying should be done when outbreaks

occur. The relative merits of early treatment (e.g.,
12 ● A Plague of Locusts

FAO’S ‘strate “c control pro am” aimed at hopr

1

per bands in reeding areas v. later treatment

(e.g., when swarms or ban actually threaten

crops) arehotlydebated. The former maybe more

costly financially, and the latter politically.

Generally, a need exists to improve the recision

and accuracy of control efforts. USAI would !&

have to revise its strategy of controlling swarms

wherever they occur in order to do this.

What Control To Use: The Role of

Technology

Today, widespread insecticide spraying is the

predominant technolo y used a ainst

grasshoppers and locusts. &ree areas of technolgy seem promisin for the future: inte rated

pest management (IP ), alternative contros, and !14 f

monitoring insects, weather, and vegetation.

Major elements of 1PM apply during locust

and grasshopper upsurges: optimization of control, use of multiple control tactics, keepin$ pest

damage below economic inju level to mamtain

stable crop production, an7 minimization of

insecticides’ hazards. These were not followed in

the recent control efforts despite 1PM bein

USAID’sstated policy. This was artlydue tolac

i

E

of technolo and partly due to t e poor decisionmaking an performance by donors and African F

agencies. Today, biological control, cultural ractices, and other nonchemical components o 1PM ?

cannot provide the high level of control needed to

stop gregarious swarms. In the future, these

methods might, however, contribute significantly

when used together or at early states of an infestation. Research on alternatives and improved

use of pesticides can be done now and, in fact, must

be supported now if alternatives are to be available for future locust and grasshopper upsurges.

Experts estimate that it maybe 8 to 10 years or

longer before alternatives to insecticides are available for large-scale use.

Biolo ical control (the use or encouragement

of natura enemies for the reduction of pests) is f

one potential component of 1PM. Microbial control methods now bein researched include

Nosema (a protozoa) an viruses that could be f

incorporated with microbial pesticides. Biorational control methods also include botanical pesticides and pheromone traps, other potential

alternatives to synthetic chemical insecticides.

The chemicals contained in the neem tree have

received attention as a botanical insecticide with

antifeedant properties.

Monitorin insects, weather, and vegetation

can be done rom the ground or from the air. f

Generally, ground momtoring technologies are

adequate, but jurisdictional questions, remoteness

of breeding areas, and lack of resources in crop

protection seMces cause them to be used ineffectively. Current technologies for aerial monitoring

tend to be imprecise and their results delivered too

late. An arra of remote sensing satellites has

developed. JSAID and FAO fund important

remote sensing-based early warnin systems for

locust and grasshopper monitoring. SAID 5 sponsors greenness maps to help guide ground surveys.

In 1987, USGS began using U.S. National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite data to create time-series ma s of vegetation

changes. FAO began its ARTEM S (African Real f

Time Environmental Modeling Using Imaging

Satellites) program in 1988 (using Meteosat, the

European Space Agency satellite, and NOAA

data) to forecast rainfall and monitor changes in

vegetation. Currently, remote sensing for early

warning of grasshopper and locust upsurges is not

considered fully operational.

POLICY OPTIONS FOR CBO&GREHSS

AND THE EXECUTIVE

Congress and the Executive Branch can take

a number of actions to improve pest management

in developing countries in general and locust and

grasshopper control in particular. Congressional

micromana ementofthe U.S. foreign aid?rogram

is neither fesirable, effective, nor OTAs intent,

but USAID’s inaction or ineffectiveness has left a

G

licy vacuum that Congress ma need to fill.

ostly, the need exists for carefu congressional {

oversight of USAID programs–rather than new

authorizing legislation–that helps U.S. officials

decrease the unm-taintysurrounding grasshopper

and locust problems (box B).
J%xutive Summmy . 13
14 ● A Plague of Locusts

OTA’S work builds on several recent studies

on pesticide use in developing countries:

. Oppo~nities to Assist Develo@r Countnks

[

in the Proper Use o Agrlcuftural and

I.stnkl Chemical ( 988, 22);

. Locust and Grasshopper Control in

A@ai!!: A

v

mmatic Environme~l

Asessmznt(1989, 5); and

. African Emergency Locust/Grasshop~er

Assistance Project Mid-term Evaluation

(1989, 99)

At least two of these three reports stress: a)

the need for increased emphasis on integrated pest

management, b) improved use of pesticides, c)

assessing the cumulative impacts of control, d) the

need for training and technical assistance on topics

such as the safe and sound pesticide use, storage,

and disposal, e) additional research on alternate

control methods, and f) addressing institutional

factors that hamper efforts, including needed

management changes within USAID.

Revising USAID9S Strategy

USAID’s a preach would require significant

changes if the nited States wants to play a leader- J ’

ship role in developin$ sustainable

r

t management strategies for Africa: ~ivin hig er priority to

1PM; building in-house sclentiF]C capacity to improve its capacity to use pesticides judiciously; and

improving internal, interagency, and international

coordination as well as finding improved means to

support various other groups involved in pest

management.

USAID currently has enough information to

revise the Africa Bureau’s 1987 Locust/Grasshopper Strategy Paper and to ensure that the

Locust/Grasshopper Management Operations

Guidebook conforms to these revisions and that

the recommendations of USAID’s Pro rammatic

Environmental Assessments are impfemented.

OTA finds that Con ress might encourage

USAID to form a broa Pest Management Task %

Force to oversee implementation of these recommendations and coordinate the U.S. response to

various worldwide plant protection initiatives.

Also, the USAID Task Force might commission an

external group to evaluate the 1986 through 1989

control programs in Africa. The Task Force might

also designate a standing subcommittee on research to solicit, evaluate, and fund 1PM research

proposals related to locust and grasshopper control.

Implementing Integrated Pest Management

More fully using 1PM in grasshopper and

locust pro rams will r

i ?

uire a sizable investment

in researc , training o Africans, and improved

technical capacity among USAID staff. Since 1PM

is a multipronged systems a preach, it will require

renewed efforts at coor ination and drawing f

together information from a variety of sources:

U.S. universities, U.S. and African government

agencies, and other donors.

The United States has important capabilities

to contribute to improved pest management

strategies, but this approach is not well-understood nor fully implemented by those who led the

recent grasshopper and locust campaigns. A clear

need exists for training African farmers, extension

agents, and national crop protection services in

1PM as well as supporting several types of research.

Using Pesticides Judiciously

USAID needs to examine carefully its research, evaluations, and technical assistance

regarding insecticides and then incorporate results

so that chemicals are used more selectively. Training in safe and effmtive pesticide use should be a

key component of donor crop protection efforts.

Donor coordination will be essential if U.S.

policies are to have the greatest impact.

Currently, controversy and confusion reign on

such issues as the best insecticides to use, the

threshold at which to mount control, and the

habitats most vulnerable to hazards. USAID could

improve this situation by sponsoring further training at all levels, making one person responsible for

r

roviding USAID missions with irlsecticide-reated information, preparing and updating country

supplemental environmental assessments, and implementing itsownstaffssu estionsfromthelast

campaign. In some areas, 68AID cannot implement measures to improve pesticide use without
Ekecutive Summary ● 15

congressional action. Granting waivers to certain

requirements may help bring about more efficient

control.

U.S. Coordination and Support for African,

U.N., and Regional Organizations

Many African national crop protection services are poorly equipped to takeover a large part

of locust and grasshopper monitoring and control

or to develop integrated pest management

strategies. Better coordinated regional approaches are needed but support for building individual crop protection services must be a

significant part of donor assistance.

Regional groups have a distinct advantage in

dealing with regional problems such as migratory

pests like grasshoppers and locusts. African

regional organizations must continue improvin

their management and financial su port to reac

r

i

their potential, however. FAO can ead in compiling data, forecasting insect upsurges, and sponsoring meetings; the international agricultural

research organizations in Africa can develop alternative control methods. All of these, however,

need to integrate their work better with African

national agencies.

Local groups’

r

anticipation in locust and

grasshopper contro has significant advantages.

Their partici ation can be encouraged via the involvement o African nongovernmental organiza- !

tions and donors’ support for certain types of

training, technical assistance, and pilot projects on

extension and applied research.

Funding Implications

Some adjustments of U.S. bilateral and multilateral funding maybe necessary to ensure that the

most effective pest management is undertaken.

Some of monies needed to sup rt improvements

in USAID’s grasshopper an locust work may r

come from internal shifts of funds because the

Agen

%

is no longer funding massive control efforts. ngress may want to encourage USAID to

allocate more of its existing agricultural funds to

pest management generally and 1PMs

r

ifically.

Pestmanagement received adeclinings areofthe

Bureau for Science and Technology’s agricultural

budget in recent years. This trend, coupled with

reduced USAID funding to agriculture in general,

means that few U.S. development assistance funds

are being spent on long term pest management.

Congress re laced USAID’S functional accounts with the envelopment Fund for Africa in b

1988 to provide USAID with increased flexibility

and to make funding more efficient. Congress

could evaluate the impact of the Develo ment

Fund. Early indications are that agricultural fund- r

ing decreased relative to other sectors as a result

and ressure to fund activities that seem to have

quic [,visible results increased. If so, the Develo~-

ment Fund for Africa may neither be achieving lts

goals, nor be able to sene as a model for other

programs.

There is no doubt that some new efforts would

require new appro riations. What is not clear is

how much these ef orts would cost. Implementing [

1PM for locusts, grasshoppers, and other pests

would require funds for planning, training, research, coordination, and further preventive work

such as insect monitoring and forecasting.

USAID’s planning for follow-on work needs to

estimate such costs and present its conclusions to

Gngress. ~rtainly some improvements can be

made by supplying inexpensive equipment to

African orgamzations, e.g., fax machines, radios,

spare parts. Other items, such as satellite receiving

stations and major research programs, will be far

more costly.

CONCLUSION

Few would argue that the United States has an

obli ation to assist disaster victims around the

word. In some ways, the U.S. response to the 1986 f

through 1989 locust and grasshopper problems in

Africa modeled effectwe disaster aid: large

amounts of resources were mobilized. OTA’S research, however, uncovered distressing questions

about whether locusts and grasshoppers constitute

a national and international disaster and also

whether the U.S. response to the problem was

appropriate. It seems that pressure to take action,

some coming from Qmgras, was overwhelming,

and the scientific information that could have led

to a more suitable approach was misunderstood or

overlooked.

U.S. Iicy takes that road at its peril: massive

insectici e spraying in a crisis atmos here is costly r

in dollar terms; it tends to be ineFficient in the
16 ● A Plague of Locusts

short-term, ineffective in the medium-term, and Starting down a different route now is likely to

misses the roots of roblerns in the long-term; and

{

have long term benefits although the results of

the tential healt and environmental damage

K

taking a new direction are likely to be less visible,

can hi h. The alternative path is not readdy

t

less dramatic, and perhaps less satis~ing for

a~ arent, owever. Africa’s pest problems are sig-

?

donors in the short-term than spraying mdlions of

nl leant, the solutions are uncertain, and altema- hectares with insecticides.

tives to chemical control are mostly unavailable.
Chapter 1

The Basics
CONTENTS

SE’M’ING THE STAGE *.**   ** 0 *a****. .** **********"***********************

Page

19

LOCWSTS AND GRASSHOPPERS ...  . ** *** *4*. . *********************’S*******

Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Life Cycles: Eggs, Hop as, and Adults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Behawor: Solitary and8 regarious Inswts .................,....=..==.””+””.==.=””

Geographic Distribution and Migration Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● ● ..,..

LOCUST AND GRASSHOPPER UPSURGES, DECLINES, AND THE ROLE

OFCLIMATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ......”=...””.””””

ORG~I~~ONSIWOLWDINLOCUST~DG~SSHOPPER

CONTROL ● **9***9 ● ******** ● *.****** ●  .** * .**.***** ..******* **.****.* ● ***

National Crop ProtectionServices and Other National andkal Groups . . . . . . . . . . . .

Regional Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........”+.. ● =..’..”

U.N. Food andAgriculture Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ... ..=. .+..=”

USAIDand OtherDonors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........~~.~~””o ● -.

PASTANDCURRENTCONTROLMETHODSFORLOCUSTS

ANDGRASSHOPPERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-

Boxes

1-A Methods ofThisOTAStudy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-B MajorS ciesofLocusts andRelatedAggregating Grasshoppers inAfrica

andtreMiddleEast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...*.-..? ● ..?...

1-C USAID’s OperationalResponsibility for Locust/GrasshopperProblems . . . . . . . . . .

Figures

1-1 Life~cle oftheDesertLocust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2 ‘is%;::O:!f::&\:KEast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... =..=.-...

ies of Locust and Aggregating Grasshoppers in

1-3 Major Plagues of the Desert Locust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-4 Movement of13esert Locust Swarms, January 1985-April 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-5 Regional Organizations and FAO Commissions in Charge of Locust and

Grasshopper Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Tables

1-1 Donor Assistance to Locust and Grasshop rControl Programs, 1986-89 . . . . . . . . . . .

1-2 Inde endent Regional Or animations an Their Member Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r

1-3 Tota Area Controlled in t e r iSahelian Countries in 1986 and 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-4 U.S. Assistance to Locust/Grasshopper Programs, Fiscal Years 1986-89 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-5 Exam@es of Locust and Grasshopper Control Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-6 Insecticides Used Presently and in the Past Against Locusts and

Grasshoppers in Africa and the Near East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

22

22

22

23

27

28

28

29

29

34

37

20

21

39

23

24

28

30

35

32

34

37

38

40

42
Chapter 1

The Basics

SE!ITING THE STAGE

In the late 1980s, several major species of locusts

as well as significant populations of various grasshoppers simultaneously threatened Africa for the first

time in 50 years (93). This infestation began in 1985

through 1986 after rains ended a severe, several-year

drought and new,

#

em vegetation allowed these

pest species to pro “ crate.

Several grasshopper species in the West Afi-ican

Sahel reached levels high enough to result in lar~escale control efforts from 1985 to 1989. Also, a major

plague of Desert busts began in countries around

the Red Sea, with swarms moving west across the

Sahelian (see app. A) countries. By November 1988,

swarms of the Desert Locust extended from

Mauritania and Senegal in the west to Iraq, Iran, and

Kuwait in the east, and some fragments of swarms

even reached the Caribbean.

The last widespread Desert Locust plague extended from 1949 to 1%3. Following that plague,

the infrastructure to fight locusts and grassho ers

deteriorated, and the recent pla ue cau ht

unprepared and highly vulnerabF e. For onors, f ‘~camincluding the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID), the Desert Locust

plague, along with other locust and grasshopper

problems, caused shifts in funds, operations, and

programs to cope with the apparent emergency.

Despite earlier forecasts that the Desert

Locust plague mi ht continue for several more

years, in April 198 the United Nations Food and 5

Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced that

the plague had dissipated (105). But longer-term

issues remain. For example, expmts differ widely in

their assessment of the significance of locust and

grasshopper outbreaks relative to other pest

problems and in terms of the crop damage they

cause on a national level; the information base on

which major control decisions were based seems

deficient; no sound technological alternatives exist

for chemical pesticides; and education and training

for the next generation of experts to deal with

future plagues seems inadequate.

In this study box l-A), OTA examines what

happened duringt e i 1986to 1989plagueyearsand

considers the implications of the longer-term issues. The major species of locusts and related a -

k

regating grasshoppers in Africa and the Midd ef

ast (box 1-B) are the focus. From 1986 to 1989,

most international control efforts in Africa were

directed at the Desert Locust and the Senegalese

Grasshopper, so most examples in this report deal

with these two species.

LOCUSTS AND GRASSHOPPERS

Locusts and aggregating grasshoppers have

fascinated biologists and caused farmers anxiety for

centuries because of their unusual behavior. This

section details the insects’ biology and behavior.

For readers with less need for detailed knowledge,

the following information is critical to understanding later sections of this report and to making

informed policy choices:

●

●

●

●

Different locust andgrwhopperspeciescanbe

difficult to identi~, yet the have distinct

biologies that require dif i!’erent control

strategies.

Eachinsectcaneatitsownwei tinvegetation

each day. Damage mainlyPepends on the

number of insects, how long they stay in a given

area, which plants they eat (non-crop,

commercial cro , subsistence crop) and the

plants’ stageof envelopment Cf

When crowded (by breeding or congregating in

moist places) these insects undergo a

chang-from living as scattered, sedentary

individuals to becomin cohesive, gregarious

bands ofhoppersorhi&mobile adult swarms.

Swarms can migrate hundreds of miles in a few

weeks.

Locusts and grasshoppers’ life cycles have

three stages: eggs, hoppers, and adults.

Gregarious insects are most concentrated and

vulnerable to control during the second stage

because hoppem cannot fly.

19
20 ● A Plague of Locusts

1.

Il.

Flowchart of Study Methods

r ‘- ‘

(Senate Committee on Appropriations

—- 

Congressional Request

~

and

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations)

L..—— I

Imtlal Research

Additional Internal OTA Research

[.*I

Inlhal external review

— ——— I

~—– . . —— L-—— , 1

1

USAID Review (12) I

Additional Review (24)

(FAO, African, Other Experts)

Meeting with IJSAID I

L

Revised Report (approx. 150 pp.)

I

+

[ Final Review (2)

I J

Revisions

I I
Ch. I-The Basics ● 21
22 ● A Plague of Locusts

. Weather conditions affect insect behavior.

Outbreaks occur after rainfall. Predominant

reasons for declines also relate to

weather–unfavorable breeding conditions

(insufficient moisture, vegetation or low

temperature) or wind patterns.

Definitions

Locusts belong to a large group of insects commonly called grasshoppers-insects recognized by

powerful hind legs adapted for jumping–in the insect order Orthoptera. Technically, grasshop~ers

and locusts belong to the superfamily Acridoldea

within that order. Therefore, they are close biological relatives.

Many scientists distinguish locusts from

grasshoppers based on locusts ability to form dense

groups comprised of large numbers of insects. In

some cases this distinction is not clear because

“aggregating” grasshoppers can behave similarly.

Thus, the terms “locust” and “grasshopper” are

sometimes ambiguous.

Also, the term “locust” is used nontechnically. In

the United States, for example, cicadas-a different

type ofinsectintheorder Homoptera-are sometimes

called “locusts.” Different kinds of cicadas occur in

large numbers at regular 13- and 17-year intervals.

Unlike locusts, periodical cicadas do little damage to

vegetation. People who have experienced their dense

hatching, however, know something of what locust

outbreaks are like. “bust”, in French, is “cnquet,”

but theinsectsAmericans call crickets also differ from

locusts and asshoppem although the three insect

types sharetKesamescientific order.

Atleastl,500speciesof grasshop rsandlocusts

exist in Africa, withawidespectrumo characteristics. r

Some 200 species have been reported as pests. Accurate scientific identification, often essential to assessing the magnitude of a pest problem and selecting

suitable control methods, can be difficult.

Life Cycles: Eggs, Hoppers, and Adults

The life cycle of all species of locusts and

grasshoppers consists of three stages: e~s, ho -

pers, and adults. Usually eggs occur In fret y{

cylindrical pods deposited at shallow depths in

moist ground. Eggs hatch into hoppers primarily

during the rainy season after an incubation period

affected by temperature. Hoppem periodically

“molt,” or cast off their skins, as they grow. Usually

the insects molt five times, with the growth stages

between each known as “instam.” After the last

molt, the insects are considered “fledglings,” or

immature adults, but have developed win s strong

enough to fly (figure l-l). Desert Locusts five from

2.5 to 5 months (93) and, under optimal environmental renditions, populations probably can multiply 10 times in each generation (71).

Various grasshopper and locusts

r

ies differ in

important ways, such as the length o time eggs can

survive without rain and the insects’ vulnerabdity to

natural enemies (predators, parasites, and

pathogens). Desert Locust e~ are viable for up to

10 to 12weeks in soil that remains sufficient moist

(118). On the other hand, Senegalese Grass opper 1

eggs can survive in dry soil for several years and hatch

when rains come (55). Grasshopper often fall prey

to natural enemies (99), but usually natural enemies

only are significant sources of mortality for Desert

Locusts when populations are in decline for other

reasons (93). Weather, however, is the most important natural cause of Desert Locust mortality.

Behavior: Solitary and Gregarious Insects

Behavior patterns principally distinguish locusts

from other grassho pers. Locusts behave as “typical”

~asshoppers and ivef’ as solitaxy individuals when

their po ulations are small. However, when locusts

occur in argenumbers andhighdensity theyundergo 1?

a transformation to a gregarious phase, and move

to ether in dense groups. Gregarious locusts are

ca led swarms when composed of adults, and bands f

when composed of young ho pers. A swarm of adult

Desert Imcustsmaycontain!Omillionto 150million

individuals per square kilometer and spread over an

area ranging from a few hectares to hundreds of

square kilometers. Adult swarms of Desert Locusts

can migrate several thousand kilometem while hopper bands move only a few kilometers. Fledgling

swarms make the longest flights of all adults, traveling

up to 1,000 km in a week (93).

Experts enerally agree that rain and the

availability o new ve f etation create conditions

conducive for the trans formation of solitary insects

into gregarious bands or swarms (93). Outbreaksmarked population increases leading to the a -

pearan~ of gregarious groups-follow success !U1

breeding. Three processes are involved: the concentration of solitary locusts in one area, their

subsequent multiplication and, finally, the
Ch. I-The Basics ● 23

Figure 1-1- Life Cycle of the Desert Locust

Y w*+‘ ‘- [$’ ‘ -

NOTE: The relative sizes of the five instarhoppers and adult Desert Locust, shown at approximately one-half actual size.

SOURCE: A Steedman, cd., Locust Handboo k (United Kingdom: Overseas Development Natural Resourees Institute, 1988), p. 20.

gregarization process (83). Sometimes solitary

locusts breed successively in one location; other

times they congregate in new breeding sites. The

resultant crowding produces gregarious behavior

(83).

Physiological changes in the insects’ appearance also are associated with the gregarization

process and maybe dramatic. Some species change

so markedly that solitary and gregarious forms were

originally described as different species. Often,

sohtary phase locusts resemble the color of their

habitat, whereas gregarious phase locusts are

brightly colored. In addition, color changes may

occur with sexual maturity. For example, solitary

Desert Locusts are pale gray or beige when sexually

immature but males turn pale yellow when mature.

Gregarious Desert Locusts are bright pink when

sexually immature fledglings and bright yellow

when mature.

Gregarious behavior is used often to distinguish

locusts from grasshoppers. However, some species

of grasshoppe~ behave ~riodically in a gregarious

manner–multiplying rapidly and producing swarms

like locusts Population increases maybe started by

unusual weather or certain changes in land use (93).

Generally, gregarious behavior in locusts and aggregating grasshoppers proceeds ~ intermediate or

transition stages and it is reversible if conditions

change. Also some species are highly gregarious

whereas othen are less so. Still other species’ behavior

falls on the continuum in between It is therefore not

surprising that experts differ in drawing the line between locusts and grasshoppers. For example, one

OTA reviewer wrote, “the Tree Locust is categorized

bysomeacridologists among aggregatinggrasshoppers

because of [its] poor swarming behavior” (64). Others

call the Sudanese Grasshopper the Sudanese Imcust

Q71 and the Senegalese Grasshopper the

negalese Locust (69).

~u~t and grasshopper species vary in their food

preferences. Some species (e.g., the African Migratory

Locust, Red Locust, Brown Locust, and the

Senegalese Grasshopper) prefer grasses, including

economically important food crops such as co~ millet,

sorghum, and wheat (95). The Tree Locust prefers

trees, shrub and bushes. The Desert Lore@ on the

other hand eats a wide range of food (93), although

some believe it prefem grasses but eats other vegetation only when necessary (54, 95).

Imcusts and aggregating grasshopper represent

the greatest dan er to agriculture during their

gregarious phase. 6ne analysis of records of Desert

Locust damage showed that 8 percent of crop damage

is done by hoppers, 69 percent by immature and maturing swarms, and 23 pereent by sexually mature adult

swarms (93). Crop damage by hoppers is low because

the breeding areas where hoppers hatch are mostly

outside crop areas. But once gregarious swarms begin

to migrate, the potential for damage increases. Individual locusts and grasshoppers can eat their own

weight (up to 2grarns) in fdeve~day. Desert Locust

swarms are particularly large so their ~tential for

damage is especially great. One-half mfllion Desert

Locusts, a small part of an average swa~ weigh approximately 1 ton and eat as much “fd” per day as

about 2,500 people (93).

Geographic Distribution and Migration

Patterns

The regional distribution of each locust and

phopperspecies variesfmmputo ,butthespecies

lnwkd in large+cale outbreaks xUprxlqy%huw

@P-(*@.fir-@=7 outbreak

areas, those permanent breeding and gregarization areas,
24 ● A Plague of Locusts

.

‘s

n
Ch. I–The Basics ● 25

F ‘---- ‘----

( ,“ ‘---’: ~ ;-’ ” ”’’;-_..> \

?$ \ ‘.. .

,--- , ,’

u :’-”-- - ‘ > “- ‘- /

~b .,-,’-’- --- .:”

‘!
26 ● A Plague of bcusts

can be distinguished km larger invasion areas. For

example, the Red Ikcus$ the Mican Mi atory

bcus~ and the Moroccan Imcust all have fined z

outbreak areas. The larger, combined invasion

areas of the major species cover vktwdly all of

Africa

Desert Locusts have a particularly extensive

distribution, with no localized or well-defined outbreak areas. Between outbreaks, bands and swarms

are rare, and low-density solitary forms occupy the

central, drier part of its distribution, known as the

recession area. This vast desert and semi-desert

north of the equator is about half the size of the

invasion area. During plagues, migratory swarms

of the Desert Locust may penetrate all of the invasion area–nearly 20 percent of the world’s land

area. Up to 57 nations in Africa, the Middle East,

and Asia (and Spain and Portugal in Europe) may

be affected (93).

Certain zones exist within the Desert Locust’s

recession area that areparticularly suitable for breeding and formation of gre arious groups. These zones

constitute a small part o the total f! recess ion area (12,

54). I.mcusts moving into such a seasonal breeding

area may be further concentrated by wind convergence and moisture, laying their e

P

in constricted

sites. Major Desert Locust outbrea occur when the

amount and frequency of rainfall enables insect numbers to build from one generation to the next (71).

Should the build-u continue long enough, a plague

results. A Desert Lust plague occurs when many

gregarious bands and swarms occur at the same

time over a large area in different regions (12, 93).

While Desert Locust outbreaks are frequent, upsurges large enough to start lagues are rare. More

frequently, potentially angerous, partially J

gregarious populations die down without producing bands or swarms, usually because of weather

conditions but sometimes because parasites and

predators kill hoppers (93).

Locusts and grasshoppers cause recurrent

problems for Africa, the Near Eas~ and Southwest

Asia. Imcust outbreaks are usually attributable to one

species in a given area and they occur intermittently

but irregularly. The Desert bust in articular has

widespread, sporadic, and unpredicta Ele upsurges.

Grasshop~r outbreaks often involve a number of

species with widely varied biological characteristics

and cause chronic agricultural damage each year (93).

Th~b~~helian region of Africa is particularly vul-

.

Locusts’ migratory patterns are affected by

prevailing seasonal winds, topography, and temperature. Normally, insects drift downwind until they encounter conditions suitably moist for breeding and

feeding. Nevertheless, broad seasonal pattemsofrnovement are detectable. For example, in West A&ic~ summer Desert Imcust breeding occun in the Sahel and

swarms produced there generally move tiom east-towest north of a weather pattern known as the InterTropical Convergence Zone and west-to+ist to its

south. Winter breeding areas are located in the

Mahgreb countries and swarms move mostly north-tosouth horn there. Weather conditions also affect

specific insect migration routes. For example, fragmentx of lkert lmcust swarms reached the Caribbean

with the aid of October 1988 storms. They crossed the

Atlantic from West Africa-a distance of 5,000

kilometewin a

E

riod estimated from several days

(85) to a week ( ). Mountains in Morocco, Algeria,

Yemen, and Iran, highlands in Ethiopia, and the

escarpment in SaudiArabia affectwindpattemswhich,

in turn, influence the direction and speed of locust

movement. For example, the Anti-Atlas Mountains

south of the Seuss Valley forma topographical barrier

to northward-moving swarms. Low temperatures,

commonly found at higher altitudes, stop flight

activity and hatching and prolong insect development. Deserts, however, do not seem to impede

movement.

Changing land-use patterns also influenw the

distribution ofgrasshop ers and locusts. Alreadya

variety of environment changes has led to certain r

changes as natural vegetation gives way to cultivated

land, as irrigation brings moisture to areas, as cultivation disturbs e pods, or as vegetation is reduced.

For example, t e Red Locust’s importance declined 1?

in Mauritms as agricultural land expanded and locust

populations became less dense (36). Likewise, the

normally gregarious African Migratory Locust today

is behaving more like a nongregarious grasshopper

due to the break-up of its habitat in Mali (118). On

the other hand, the Variegated Grasshopper, a minor

nuisance in the 1930s, became a major problem in the

1970sfollowin widespread forest clearingforcoffee

production in t %eIvory Coast. Thepestflourished in

the environment created by certain weeds that invaded clearings (71). Similarly, Cavin (19) feels that

desertification can be expected to increase the
Ch. l-l%e Basics ● 27

amount of habitat suitable for high intensity Desert

Locust breeding.

LOCUST AND GRASSHOPPER

UPSURGES, DECLINES AND THE

ROLE OF CLIMkE

Early civilizations knew that locust plagues occurred intermittently. Since then, people have tried

without success to predict upsurges.

No evidence exists of regular intends between

major or regional Desert Locust plagues of the last

century (138) and no method is known to predict

whether upsurges or declines will occur in a $iven

year. Scientists can detect sequences of rainfall

suitable for the types of outbreaks that lead to

upsurges using modern surveillance and weather

forecasting techni~ues, e.g., satellite remote sensing and com uterued mathematical models. But

they are una Ele to predict weather patterns sufficient in advance to knowwhether an upsurgewill

actua {ly materialize.

On the other hand, the mechanisms of Desert

Locust upsurges have been described qualitatively

and, in some cases, quantitatively. ‘Upsurges,” “outbreaks,” and “plagues” are relative terms and no

generally accepted, quantifiable standard exists for

definingwhen aplaguebe ins. Thus, experts differ

in their analysis of thenum % erand timingofthe last

century’s plagues. The most thorough analysis of

the upsurges and declines of the Desert Imcust

showed that seven major plagues, lasting from 7 to

22 years each, occurred in the 112-year period from

1860 to 1972 in Africa, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia (138, figure 1-3). Statistical anal is

revealed two kinds of plagues in the indivirual

regions: those lasting a year or so and those lasting

6 to 8 yearn.

Most agree that the last nrajorplague subsided

in 1962 to 1%3 (70, 93). Several major Desert

Locust upsurges occurred since then: 1%7 to 1968,

1977 to 1978, and 1986 to 1989, but these were

shorter and less extensive than earlier plagues (70,

figure 1-3). Disa reement exists whether these upsurges in the 19 0s (95) and 1980s reached plague !

status. FAO considers that the most recent upsurge, at least that portion which occurred in 1988,

did ~uali& as a plague and was similar in scale to

that m most years from 1950 to 1%2.

Ako, mo6t experts a~ that locust and grasshop

T

r upsurges are heavily influenced by meteorological

actom.Forexample, the main factor ~ap’artfiombcust

invasions from the outside) assoaated with 1860

through 1972 Desert Locust plagues seemed to be

above-average winter and s ring rains (138). Researchem have sought cormr ations of pla es with

drough~ wind cinmlatio~ even sun spots. e R Intertropical ~nvergence Zone is of particular interest

because areas of converging air masses are mo6t likely

to receive rain and the swarm position can be related

to this Zone (93).

Some contend that plague decline also is principally due to environmental causes, especially

chmatic factors (e.g., B.P. Uvarov, founder of the

Anti-Locust Research Center in London). However, Waloff (138) concluded that”. . . the causes

for the Desert Locust] plague declines remain [ obscure. Also, two researchers developed a mathematical model that could acmunt for plagues and

recessions of the Desert and Red Locusts over the

F

ast century without including environmental information (5). The main cmtroversyregarding the

decline of plagues is over the impact of control.

Most agree that widespread plague dynamics

are influenced by successive conditions in seasonal

breeding areas and areas where mi ations occur,

as illustrated here by the recent ~esert Locust

upsurge (figure 1-4). The first migrants probably

entered the Sahel in late 1986 and swarmed into

northwest Africa in late 1987, following fauorable

conditions that led to formation of gregarious

swarms in the seasonal breeding areas around the

Red Sea and in parts of the Sahel in 1985 and 1986.

Following successful winter breeding in North

Africa in early 1988, large numbers of swarms

f

mi rated south joining locusts breeding in the

Sa el because of the abundant rainfall there (74).

Lucas Brader (12) of FAO attributes the decline of

the Desert Locust in late 1988 and early 1989 to

three factors: efficient control campaigns in the

affected countries, the loss of a large number of

swarms from the Sahel in the Atlantlc Ocean, and

unfavorable breeding conditions (mainly low rainfall and low temperatures) during the winter and

20-954 0 - 90 - 2 : QL 3
28 ● A Plague of Locusts

Figure 1-3-Major Plagues of the Desert Locust

Number of territories affected by swarms 50 I

40–

30-

20-

10

1

0 : ;/ u “ +

u

u u u “ 11 I II II I I II I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I II II I I I I II I I II I I I I

1860 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 1900 05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85

NOTE: The undulating line above the graph outlines the plagues and reeession periods, the broken portion suggesting the extent of infestation

during the period 1860-1924 when reeords were incomplete.

SOURCE: Zena Waloff, “Some Tern ral Characteristics of Desert Locust Plagues,”

3

Anh-Loewt Memoir 13 (London: Anti-Locust

Research Center, 1976). Updat by Joyee Magor, “Joining Battle with the Deaert Loeust;f SheZIAgricuZture, No. 3,1989, p. 13.

spring breeding season in Northwest and East

Africa. Throughout the period, USAID, FAO, and

others were predicting that the plague would continue for times ranging from 1 to 10 years.

In summary, the reasons for the start of a locust

or grasshopper upsurge are relatively well known,

though inability to forecast weather precludes accurately predicting when u urges will occur and

their duration. Reasons forp agues’ subsiding are less Y

clear. Specifically, the im rtance of control in

declines is debated (seech.r ).

ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN

LOCUST AND GRASSHOPPER CONTROL

Many locust and grasshopper control responsibilities of the colonial period were shifted in the

1950s to FAO, along with the mandate to coordinate bilateral and multilateral activities. Newly

formed national crop protection agencies and

regional organizations supplanted colonial structures as African nations achieved independence in

the 1960s.

Bilateral donors also play important roles.

France and the United Kingdom continued to play

important roles in locust and grasshopper control

until 1985. USAID provided approximately 20 percent of all donor funding of the most recent campaign

and assigned it some priority in its African programs

(table l-l).

National Crop Protection Services and

Other National and Local Groups

The national crop protection services, under

the Ministry of Agriculture in most countries, have

the mandate to protect crops. Therefore, they are

the major national organizations responsible for

grasshopper and locust control and take over when

problems exceed the capacity of individual farmers.

Generally, thecropprotection servicesorganized and

carried out ground surveys and spraying in recent

control campaigns, using four-wheel drive vehicles.

Aerial spraying+ften executed under regional and/or

donor auspi~ in the Sahel+as used for more extensiveor remote infestations orwhen the crop protection

setices could not meet needs.
Ch. 1–7he Basics ● 29

Additional Ministry of Agriculture agencies also

were involved in control efforts: agricultural extension

agents assisted in monitoring, conducting control, and

organizing local participation. National research and

forestry seMces contributed knowledge, skills, and

resources. Other government agencies, too, took part

in the large control campaigns; these included public

health departmen~ weather bureaus, customs services, and transportation ministries. In some countries,

military pilots aksted with aerial spraying.

Localfarmerbrigadeswerea majorcom nent

of the ground swweillance and control ef orts in r

some countries. In Mali, 400,0(Xl hectares were

treated by ground spraying in I%& and 45 farmer

brigades received hi h praux for their effectiveness.

Their expertisewas evelopedinthe previous2 ears’ f

efforts: experienced farmers used hand or bac ack L

sprayerx and untrained ones used dusters. Niger

reportedly had 10,000 five-pemon farmer brigades;

Chat 1,000 brigades with 1O,O(K) farmers (99). Farmer

committees were trained to reco@ buildups of the

SenegaleseGrasshopper andinitiatecontrdin Burkina

Faso, Gambi~ M& Niger, and S6n6gal (19, 71).

USAID estimates that the affected countries

contributed $28.5 million in fiscal year 1988 and

$124 million in fiical year 1989 of their own funds

to locust/grasshopper control (33). This was nearly

as much as the donors provided in those years. For

example, in fiscal year 1989, the governments of

Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia contributed $76million, $58 mdlion, and $10 million, respectively.

Sudan, Somalia, Mali, and S6n6gal contributed

from $1 million to $4 million each. Many seriously

affected countries, however, were Sahelian nations

with little revenue to support the control effort.

Regional Organizations

Thmesemiautonomousr egionalorganizations-the

Desert Imcust Cbntrol Organization for Eastern Africa

(DLCO-EA), the Joint tit and Bird Chntrol Organization (OCLALAV), and the International Red

Imcust ~ntrqlor anisationfor Gmtraland Southern

Mica (IRLCO A)-and -& three regional FAO commissions dealwithmigratory ~ts that transeendnationa.1 boundaries in Afnw the Near Eas~ and Southwest

Asia (see table l-2andfigure 1-5).

The organizational structure, mandate, membership, programs, and financial support of the

African regional organizations continue to evolve.

The most well-established of the regional organizations is DLCO-~ founded in 1%2 by Ethiopia,

France (for Djibouti), Ken a, Somalia, Tanzania,

and Uganda and joined by udan in 1968. Its main J

objective is control of the Desert Locust, but in

1976 its Council of Ministers decided to undertake

control of grain-eating birds (e.g., the quelea),

armyworms, and tsetse flies when locusts are in

recession (63).

OCLALAV, created in 1%5 to counter the

Desert Locust andgrain+atingbir@ was restructwd

in March 1989 into a West Afiiean information and

coordinating organization without an operational

capacity. Itsearlieroperational roleinsuxveyandcontrol

was carried out by FAO during the recent upsurges and

then was missigned to the national crop protection

services. In ~ the crop protection semices’ representatives began discussions with the Sahel Institute

Ed

SA of the Permanent Intemtate Committee for

ou t Ckmtrol in the Sahel (CILSS) regarding a

regional approach (99). A previous regional crop

rotection project of CILSS was terminated in 1987,

Folknving withdrawal of USATD fix-din . The CILSSasociated meteorological or anization 1GRHYMET

continues to provide valuab e weather information to f

members.

Currently, IRLCO-CSA suffers from a lack of

member states’ payments, but its situation is imProving, following locust andgrasshop erupsurges

m the region, and donor assistance is eing sought [

(12). On the other hand, the International African

Migratory Locust Organization was dissolved in

1986 (102).

The three regional FAO Commissions for Controlling the Desert Imcust (for Northwest Africa, the

Near East, and Southwest Asia) were begun in 1971,

1%7, and 1964 respectively in areas where locust

survey and control were already the responsibility of

national structures. (In sub-Saharan Africa, survey

and control were principally done by regional entities

then (106)). These Commissions support survey, control, traimng, and research. Member nations set

policy anddeterminecontrol activities, whereasFAO

coordinates the work and serves as secretariat.

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

(FAO) has been the principal coordinator of international locust and grasshopper control campaigns

since the early 1950s, a role confirmed by the U.N.

General Assembly in December 1988. Initially, FAO
30 ● A Plague of Locusts

Figure 1-4-Movement of Desert must swarms,Januw 1985 ‘APfil 1989

7.

I ““fi ‘ “~

I !

.,. . ,. .{

Q ;’

: ,’ 0“Ii / ---- I

May-August ‘;,;

,, ..-J ,

t {

1985

.

;:@ ,

/ 1987
Ch. I-The Basics ● 31

Figure l-4=Movement of Desert Locust Swarms, January 1985-APril 198~ontinued

December 1987

13.

:-...

{

,. . - .’{ ,’ Q“ ‘ i ,’

{

h,

January-April ‘:,( k’ 1989

\

,.. , ,

January-April ‘,, ’l

I

\ L_i!L -

;:’q.. .,--

;17 ,

1988

SOURCE: PRIFAS “The SGR Saga in 13 Imageq’’prepared byM. Launoisand G. Blanca (Montpelier, France, 1989).
32 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table l-l-Donor Assistance to Locust and Grasshopper Control Programs, 1986-89

(U.S. dollars/calendar year)

Donors 1986 198? 1988 1989 Total

(Jan.-May)

Bilateral donors:

Algeria

Australia

Austria

Bel@m

Canada

China

Denmark

Finland

France

Germany (FR)

Greece

Indonesia

Iran

Israel

Italy

Japan

Kuwait

Libya

Luxembourg

Morocco

Netherlands

Nigeria

Norway

Portugal

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Thailand

llnisia ~

~rkey

United Kingdom

USAID

U.S.S.R.

Yugoslavia

Subtotal bilateral donors

50,000

0

0

130,000

3,014,500

500,000

692,500

400,000

1,792,537

3,025,887

50,000

0

0

0

2,659,000

1,288,000

0

0

0

20,000

2,350,000

0

3,127,000

0

0

0

62,511

1,185,929

403,000

11,000

0

0

1,909,183

9,1%,245

o

146,882

0

0

266,714

2,802,238*

635,369

0

3,491,738

6,209,031

0

10,OOO

0

*

2,471,386

*

o

0

14Q,000

o

1,850,000

0

1,500,000

0

0

0

0

0

92,790

0

0

0

987,687

6,983,332

*

()

180,000

205,000

29,041

500,000

2,243,000

40,000

2,813,068

208,455

6,030,127

11,992,000

160,000

25,000

7,500

0

2,994,675

4,100,368

1,000,000

1,212,000

244,000

32Q,000

6,592,347

400,000

1,615,000

606,000

12,000

2,860,000

2,440,000

2,599,386

944,268

0

90,000

500,000

5,800,000

21,599,859

1,376,000

(-l

o

0

0

1,300,000

343,000

120,000

2,400,000

75,000

3,150,000

14,250,000

0

0

0

0

1,000,000

13,620,000

0

0

0

0

0

0

2,000,000

0

0

0

0

0

338,000

0

0

0

207,000

12,000,000

0

0

376,882

205,000

29,041

2,1%,714

8,402,738

660,000

6,540,937

683,455

14,464,402

35,476,918

21O,OOO

35,000

7,500*

9,125,061

19,008,368

1,000,000

1,212,000

384,000

340,000

10,792,347

400,000

8,242,000

606,000

12,000

2,860,000

2,502,511

3,785,315

1,778,058

11,000

90,000

500,000

8,903,870

49,779,436

1,376,000

64,000 64,000

31,931,292 27,587,167 81,739,094 50,803,000 192,060,553
Ch. I-The Basics ● 33

Table I-l—Donor Assistance to Locust and Grassho

.-&

r Control Programs, 1986-89

(U. S.dollars/calendar year) ontinued

Donors 1986 198~ 1988 1989 Total

(Jan.-May)

Multilateral donors:

African Development Bank 165,000

Banque Africaine de

Developpement Afrieain (BADEA) 750,000

European Economic

Community (EEC) 10,739,981

Islamic Development Bank o

Organization of African

Unity (OAU) o

Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) 300,000

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 86,000

UN Development Program

(UNDP) 1,839,000

UN Environment Program

(UNEP) o

UN Food and Agriculture

Organization (FAO) 2,601,000

UN World Food Program (WFP) 18,000

UN World Health Organization

6,384,730

750,000

23,088,798

16,444,000

621,430

339,000

%,000

4,819,332

48,405

7,931,000

18,000

4,480

0 200,000 6,019,730

0 0 0

9,600,143

14,400,000

400,000

2,044,000

2,348,674

0

321,430 300,000 0

0

*

39,000

1O,OOOC

o

0

54,000b

2,926,332 0

0 48,405 0

20,000

0

4,700,000

0

610,000

0

(wHo) 4,480 (-1 o 0

Subtotal multilateral donors 16,503,461 2,744,104 32,223,880 9,073,730 60,545,175

Non-Governmental Organizations 1,211,460 133,000 C

1,111,000 0 2,455,460

Total

USAID as pereent of total 18.5!?lo 22.9$Z0 18.7$Z0 20.0% 19.570

NOTES:

*Amount unknown (1987).

aIncludes only assistance to Sahelian and West African countries. bInclud= only assistan~ to two of four recipient ~Untfi~.

~Includes only assistance from section aid to Gambia.

An additional $20 million was given by donors for programs in Northwest African countries, Sudan, Ethiopia, and Yemen (Jeremy Roffey,

Emergency Center for Locust Operations, FAO, personal communication, June 26, 1989).

SOURCES:

Column 1: Jeremy Roffey, ‘1986 Funding Chart for Grasshopper and Locust campaigns in Africa” (Emergency Centre for Locust

Operations, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome, December 1986).

Column 2: U.N. Food and Agriculture Orgamzation, “Report of the Meeting on the Evaluation of the 1987 Grasshopper Campaign in the

Sahel, Annex VI Emergency Centre for Locust Operations, Rome, December 1987.

Columns 3 and 4: J.N. Food and

%

riculture Organization, “Assistance Provided to&untries and Re ional Or animations,” Report of

the Thirtieth Session of the FAO esert Locust Control Committee, AGP:DLCC~9/4, Rome, Italy, une 12-1 ,1989. f %
34 . A Plague of Locusts

Table 1-2-Independent Regional Organizations and Their Member Nations

Organization Member States Headquarters

DLCO-EA: Desert Locust Control Djibouti, Ethiopia, Sudan, Addis Ababa,

Organisation for Eastern Africa Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia

Uganda

OCLALAV: Organisation Commune Chad, Cameroon, Dakar, Senegal

de Lutte Antiacridienne et de Benin, Gambia,

Lutte Antiviare/Joint Locust and Ivory Coast, Niger, Mali,

Bird Control Organization Mauritania, Senegal

IRLCO-CSA: International Red Locust Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Ndola, Zambia

Control Organisation for Central Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe,

and Southern Africa Botswana, Swaziland,

Mozambique

SOURCE: Dale G. Bottrell. ’’Locusts and GrasshomxxsinAfr icaand the Middle East,’’ contractor report prepared . . . forthe Office of Technology

Assessment, JanuaV 1989. . .

focused only on Desert I_mcust problems, but its

scope was broadened later to include other

migratory pests.

The FAO Desert Imcust Control Gmnittee

(DLCC) is the overall intergovernmental body that

coordinates all Desert Imcust-related control and research. In 1955, the United States was a founding

member of the DLCC and remains one of some 50

member countries The Emer ency~ntreforhust

Operations ECLO), creat in 2 1%6 and housed in

FAO’S hea quarters in Rome, bears operational h

respordility within FAO. It asmmed responsibility

for raising donor funds and coordinating control aG

tivitiesdurin therecentupsur~e. ECLOhashandled

approximate $10 million in \ad each year since 1%6

in addition to coordinating some 150 ~m” funded

by bilateral and multilateral donom, mcYuding FAO

itself (109).

FAO’S activities include:

. supporting a centralized Desert Locust

reporting and forecasting seMce in Rome;

. pre aring and distributing the monthly

FA 8/ECLO Desert Locust %ulletiq special

bulletins on other locusts and grasshoppers as

need@ and a semiannual research regist~

beginning in 1989;

● organizing international meetings for

representatives of donors and national

W=f=@

. sponsoring research and training on locust

surveillance and control; and

. implementinglocustprojectsfmancedbyFAO,

the United Nations Development Programme,

and the international community.

Also, FAOcoordinates activities of the African

regional locust and grasshopper control organizations and sponsors the FAO regional Commissions

in Africa and Donor Coordination Committees in

each count~ receiving assistance.

USAID and Other Donors

Many donors contributed large amounts of

money during the recent plague, principally for

insecticides and spraying equipment, but also for

training and technical assistance, vehicles, rotective clothing, radios, and spare parts. FA ‘s data 8

indicate that total donor expenditures for programs
Ch. l–The Basics ● 3S

Figure l-5-Regional Organimtions and FAO Commissions in Charge of Locust and Grasshopper ControlA .

AFGHANISTAN ie”

/ IIIAU

1// , m..— $AKlfiTA#

?2zEL

I I

II

Y’

,

/

-- ~>=oMALIAf

~ Addis — AL- I.- ----

●

tisxl

tzzizl

c 1

11111

11111

B

UDIIl

c1

Headquarters of the Locust Control

Organizations and Memberships

Commission for Controlling the

Desert Locust in Northwest Africa

Commission for Controlling the

Desert Locust in the Near East

Organisation commune de Iutte antiacridienne et de Iutte antiaviare

(OCLALAV)

Desert Locust Control Organization

for Eastern Africa (DLCOEA)

International Red Locust Control

Organisation for Central and

Southern Africa (IRLCOCSA)

\

, ----- ‘“ ,.-L \

.-.

“)

i

i

==?=3’

EANDA

h

I RNLHilIl

07’

MALAWI

Commission for Controlling the Desert

Locust in the Eastern Region of its

Distribution Area in Southwest Asia

o 500 1000 1500

SOURCE: TAMS Consultants, Inc. and the Consortium for International Crop Protection, Lmwt@d Gr~hoPperContrO1 inA@.cafAsia:

A Programmatic Environmental Assessmen ~ Executive Summary and Recommendations,

Agenq for International Development, March 1989, p. Exsum-11.

contractor report prepared for the U.S.
36 ● A Plague of Locusts

in affected countries were at least $49.6 million in

1986, $50.5 million in 1987, $115.1 million in 1988,

and $59.9 million through mid-1989, for a grand

total of $275 million committed through mid-1989

(table l-l).

As a result of donor and African countries’

efforts, approximate 4.6 million ha of land in 10

Sahelian and Westdrica countries alone received

aerial or ground insecticide treatments in 1986 and

1987, mostly against grasshoppers (table 1-3). In

1988, 10 million ha were sprayed in Northwest and

West Africa, mostly against Desert Locusts (12).

The United States, through USAID, provided

an average 20

r

rcent of all donor contributions

through mid-1 89 to Northwest and sub-Saharan

Africa. Data from USAID show U.S. expenditures,

by fiscal year, totaling $58.8 million from 1986 to

1989: $7.4 million in fiscal year 1986, $7.5 million

in fiscal year 1987, $20.4 million in fiscal year 1988,

and $23.0 million in fiical year 1989 (table 1-4). In

1988 and 1989, this amounted to approximately 4

[

!

ercent of U.S. deve opment assistance to subaharan Africa (123).

The United States has provided financialandtechnical assistance to locust and assho per control effortsinAfiicasincethe1950s.~tigt~W45through

1%3 upsurges, U.S. monetary contributions were less

than the United Kingdom’s and FAO’S. However, in

the 195(k and l%(k, the United States provided techP

nical specialists and hel establish the DLCO-EA

Following a tides rea ~assho per outbreak in the

Sahel in 1974 an 1975, US f & set up a Regional

Food Crop Protection Project to stren hen national

semices in West Africa and funded t e f CILSS Integrated Pest Management Pro.ect in the Sahel. In

addition to supporting projectsb”d aterallyinthevarious

Afi-ican nations, the United States helps Finance the

work of FAO/lXLO.

USAID provides assistance through its Africa

(AFR) and Asia andthe Near East (ANE)regional

bureaus, the Bureau for Science and Technology

[

S&T), the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

OFDA) and its missions (box l-C).

OFDA is responsible for short-term emergency

assistance (3 to 6 months) and replaced AFR’s temr

rary OfEce of Emergency Operations in takin the

ead in USAID locust and grassho

K

rcpntrol e orts k

L

in 1%7 (99. In July l% the Administrator

created the rtbcust Task Force, under the ae .

of OFDA The Task Force included staff kmr e

various USAID bureaus (AFR and ANE), offkes

(contracts andle alsections, Public Affairs, Legislative Affaim, etc. , and missions; the State Depart- 5

ment; the U.S. Department of @culture (USDA ;

kl

the U.S. Environmental ProtectIon Agency (EPA ;

theU.S. Geolo@alSuxvey;a ndothers.Itmetwee y

before dissolving on June 1, 1989, following the

decline of the locust swarms.

The regional bureaus’ Offices of Technical

Resources and S&T are responsible for longer-term

development assistance but also managed the Mica

Emergency Locust/Grassho ~r Assistance pro.ect.

Financial as r (

tsofU.S. mu tdateralassistance e.g.,

to the U.N. Kelopment Programme and FAO) are

handled by the Department of State’s Bureau of

International Orgamzation Affaim.

USAIDoftenhiresoutside technicalexpertisehm

U.S. consulting firms, univemi@ and USDA USDA’s

OfficeofIntemational Coo rationandDevelo men~

for example, used $26 “ “on of s USAID fi.lncl fi-om

1986 to 1%9. Of@ $1.5 million supported technical

experts from USDA agen~ such as the Animal and

Plant Health Inspection Service andtheFbrest Service,

and $1.1 million was spent on supplies forcontrd campaigns (3).

Other U.S. agencies assist in control efforts, For

example, the U.S. Geological Survey provided “greenness maps” showin where vegetation was abundant

followin rainfall;

h

bA s@ working with USAID,

advised can governments-on safe disposal of surplus

.msectkibandemptycontainen;andU.S.P~Corps

volunteas participated in the Mauritania control campaign (119).

In addition toofficialgovemment donors, anumber of private, nongovernmental organizations

(NGOS) provided assistance to A.fiican countries

IThe Development Fund for Africa is the baseline against which these contributions were measured. This Fund does not include Food

for Peace (Public Law 480), Economic Support Funds, or multilateral assistance.
Ch. l–l%e Basics ● 3 7

Table I-kTotal Area Controlled in the Sahelian Countries in 1986 and 1987

Ground (ha) Aerial (ha) Total (ha)

1986 / 1Y86 8’/ 1986 1987

.——

Mauritania 100,OOO 22,365 193,000 225,200 293,000 M:,:g

Sene al

%

300,000 36,556 1,159,800 13#; 1,458,800

Gam ia 11,500 12,104 247,710 259,210 55;044

Mali 68,000 2,329 484,000 166;866 552,000 169,195

Burkina Faso 20,893 211,140 232,033 9,062

Chad 25,222 42,4; 143,700 212,55! 186,922 254,983

Niger 151,414 75,420 270,505 230,834 421,919 3&,&4

Cameroon o 54,000 0 0 0

Guinea Bissau o 9,000 0 0 0 9:000

Nigeria o 0 0 0 60,000 60,000

Total 677,029 254,202 2,709,855 1,012,267 3,403,884 1,322,531

SOURCE: TAMS Consultants and Consortium for International Crop Protection, Locwt and Grasshopper Control in Afi”ca/Asia: A

Progr aromatic Environmental Assessmm tj Main Report, contractor report prepared for the U.S. Ageney for International Develop- . . . -.

ment, March 1989, p. D-37. .

affected by locusts and asshoppem. Some of these

organizations used U. .fforeign aid in addition to

their own funds for these programs. Oxfam, Band

Aid, C- Save the Children, Caritas, and World

Vision were among the organizations that provided

insecticides, vehicles, spraying equipment, and first

aid kits. Band Aid made the Iar est single NGO

contniutio~ donatingaplanetoMa “for aerial spraying f

(82).

Donor-Sponsored Research

Many organizations engaged in locust and

grasshopper control also carry out related research.

And some primarily research organizations are beginnin~ to examine improved control methods. The International Clmter on Insect Physiology and Ecology in

Nairobi, Kenya and the International Institute for

Tropical Agriculture in West Africa are among the

latter.

some donors fund locust and gmsshopper ~

projects by their own scientis~ such as the United

Win’ s OverxasDevelopment NaturalResOurmInstituteandtheFrenchgmssho &G~=g

Ofthecenterforhltema

Research fa hklpnleflt on the other

contracts out scientix usually to private consulting firms and universities. The Locust Research

Task Force of the Special Program for Mican

A@cultural Research of the World Bank maintams a computerized directory of donor-sponsored

research. It listed 151 projects being planned or

conducted in the Sahelian countries as of January

1989. Some of these projects involve collaboration

with African research institutions and/or researchers, while others are solely donor efforts.

PAST AND CURRENT CONTROL

METHODS FOR LOCUSTS AND

GRASSHOPPERS

Often, individual farmers do nothing when

faced with locusts or

Fasshopr r

rs. But the also

developed a variety o cultura and physica controls before the availability of chemical ones (table

1-5). Almost all these methods have been used in

the’ United States and Canada, too. Physical and

cultural control methods continue to be practiced,

alone or in combination with chemical control,

especially against small infestations in crops or hop-

!

er bands near croplands. For example, some

armers combine the use of pesticides with fire,

burning roostin

f

locusts at night (32). Village

brigades in Cha herded hopper bands into deep

trenches and buried them in the recent campaign
38 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table 1-4-U.S. Assistance to Locust/Grasshopper Programs, l?iscal Years 1986-89

country 1986 1987 1988 1989 Dollars

Sahel and West Africa

Burkina Faso

Cameroon

Cape Verde

Chad

Gambia

Guinea Bissau

Mali

Mauritania

Niger

S6n6 al

Sahe Regional f

East and Southern Africa

Botswana

Ethiopia

Sudan

Tanzania

Zaire

Zambia

East Africa Regional

Northern Africa and S.W. Asia

Algeria

Jordan

Morocco

Pakistan

Tunisia

Yemen

African Regional

$268,800

200,000

0

990,841

35,000

29,000

1,287,080

154,000

61,000

1,657,349

244,000

1,183,587

75.000

1,024;948

50,000

10,860

100,OOO

0

$5!&&2

‘ o

1,254,211

594,898

290,320

1,012,433

227,500

337,386

1,923,752

0

0

380,516

6(M);OO0

o

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

135,598

0

0

0

75.000

l,305’73g

()

o

1,775,110

1,446,964

1,199,647

245,892

0

0

407,820

662,415

0

0

0

0

1,070,032

0

5,295,713

0

1,361,447

5.578.41~

o

0

25,000

0

25,000

0

200,000

866,256

317.000

3,362;320

o

0

13,800

173,713

0

0

0

0

18,866

152,600

l;,3&,~4

1:410:535

o

4.123.988

~,&2

100:OOO

3;;:,:;;

319;320

4,274,623

2,694,720

1,915,033

7,189,313

244,000

1,183,587

877,136

2,461,076

50,000

10,860

100,OOO

0

1,088,898

152,600

15,985,203

2,000,000

2,:;:,;;;

9.777:749

Total dollars $7,446,812 $7,548,346 $20,424,184 $22,998,052 $58,797,910

Amount of total granted to FAO 4,084,587 358,000 2,465,000 1,508,910 8,416,497

Amount of total, OFDA fundsb’c 7,171,012 6,384,059 9,643,950 5,585,652 28,784,673

NOTES:

@ssistance to Gambia in 1988 and some in 1989 included in amount for Senegal.

U.S. assistance consists of OFDA funds, USAID mission funds, Africa or Asia/Near East Bureau regional funds, and some local currency.

In fiscal year 1988, OFDA contributed $9,643,950, the missions $4,840,600? the re ional programs $6,689,656, and local currency

$2,350,464, for a grand total of $23,524,670. In fiscal year 1989, OFDA contributed #,585,652, themissions $15,847,400, the regional programs $1,565,000 and local currency $1,850,343, for a grand total of $24,848,395. Thus, the percent of OFDA funding decreased significantly in 1988 and 1989.

conformation in this line from John Gelb, 1989, below.

SOURCES:

1986-John Gelb, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, AID, “USG Contributions to Locust/Grasshopper Threat in Africa-FY 1986 as

of September 30, 1986,” n.d.

1987-OfficeofForei nDisasterAssistance, ''Insect Infestation,'' OF'DA~nual Report Fiscal Year 1987(Washington, DC: USAID, 1988.

$ 2

1988-Office of oreign Disaster Assistance, “Insect Infestation,” OFDA Annual Report Fiscal Year 1988 (draft) (Washington, D :

USAID. 19891.

1989–John Gelb~O’ffice of Forei n Disaster Assistance, ‘fU.S.A.I.D. Support, Desert Locust Task Force, FY 1987-89,” dated July 22-23,

1989. Due to the decline o the locust problem in early 1989, some of the funds allocated have been reprogrammed for other crop F

protection activities.
Ch. l-Zhe Basics ● 39

(119), using what is probably the most effective

traditional control.

Some traditional control methods are sometimes ineffective, e.g., plowing fields infested with

pods (12). And some other means, e.g., planting

resistant varieties of sorghum, cultivating

grasslands, fallowing agricultural land, or rotating

crops, are effective against some species but not

others. For example, cassava, a root crop, is Ianted

in some areas as a security against locusts ut it is I

very vulnerable to attack by the Variegated

Grasshop er (71). Planting rooted sor~hum plants

instead o seeds in flood-recession irrigated areas [

can protect crops from the Sudan Plague Imcust

but not other species (12).

Most traditional controls have been replaced

by the use of chemical insecticides, at least m official control programs. Numerous synthetic organic

insecticides are available now. The fust chemical

treatment, used from the 1880s through the 1940s,

was an arsenic-poisoned bait. Baiting could be done

by unskilled labor, but buying, storing, and

transporting tons of wheat bran for bait made this

costly, remote breeding sites were missed, and

sometimes the ests did noteat the bait (79). In the

1940s and 19 0s, first ground, and then aerial, f

spraying techniques were introduced and the persistent or a nochlorines BHC (benzen e

hexachloride?anddieldrin became the insecticides

of choice (34, 79). In the 1960s, dieldrin was most

often used against Desert Locust hopper bands and
40 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table l-5-Examples of Locust and Grasshopper Control Methods

Cultural methods

Physical methods

Biological methods

Chemical methods

. Planting of security crops such as cassava

. Crop rotation

. Use of resistant or tolerant plants

. Good land management (avoidance of deforestation, overgrazing,

and heavy fallowing)

. Planting short-season crop varieties or seeding or harvesting early

or reseeding

. Beating or trampling on the hop rs

. Digging up egg pods or plowing Flelds infested with egg pods

● Scatterm straw over roosting sites and then burning It

. Lighting lres 1! or making noise to prevent swarms from settling in

crops

. Driving hoppers into trenches and burning, drowning, or crushing

them

. Use of flame throwers

. Use of horse-, tractor-, or truck-drawn collecting machines

. Running poultry in crops

. Use of cattle to eat off and trample grass in locust breeding

grounds

. Introduction of pathogens

. Use of conventional chemical insecticides

. Use of botanical compounds, e.g., neem extracts

SOURCES: Compiled in Dale G. BottrelI, “Locusts and Grasshoppers in Afri~ and the Middle East,” contractor report prepared for the

Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, DC, Januaxy 1989, p. 24, from: D.L. Gunn, “Systems and Mana ement+trate ies,

Systems, Value Judgments and Dieldrin in control of Locust ~oppe~,ffphilosophical Transactions of the Royal J ociety of Lonh n,

Sen”eSB, Vol. 287,1979, pp. 429-445; C.F. Hemmin , netiustM~ace, Centre for Overseas Pest Research, London, 1974; J. Led er,

A@’can HWi?Jife, vol. 41,1987, p . 197-210; J. Rof!ey, ’The Effects of Changing Lxmd Use onl.mcustsand Grassho pers p .199-

Procee&”ngs of the International ?Stu@ Conference on Current and Future Problerm of Acridology, London, 1970; +’AMd&nsult&;

and Consortium for International Crop Protection, bust and Grasshopper Con&ol in Afi”ca/Asia: A Pro arnnua

~

tic Environmental

Assemnen ~ Main Report, contractor report prepared for the U.S. Agency for International Development, arch 1989.

BHC against adult swarms (55). Also, BHC was

used a-ainst Brown Locus~ upsurges in South

Africa from the late 1940s through the 1980s (52).

Dieldrin has been used against Red Locust outbreaks since the 1950s (79).

Initially, dieldrin and the other persistent pesticides seemed to be a major technological advance.

Dieldrin, for example, remains toxic for 30 to 40

days on vegetation and longer in soil, despite rain

or sun (34, 118). Hopper bands were controlled by

spraying swathes of vegetation with dieldrin, forming “barriers” in front of marching bands. Since

dieldrin acts as a stomach poison that accumulates

over time, the insects eventually ingested a lethal

dose by eating treated vegetation. Low doses were

effective and respraying was unnecessary, even if a

second hatching occurred (54, 104).

concern mounted in the 1970s regarding the

heavy use of persistent pesticides. DDT, the

proto~ rsistent organochlorine, was banned by

the Umtr States in 1972 and dieldrin came under

increased scrutiny. Studies in developed countries in

the 1960s showed substantial traces of dieldrin in

human tissue. High levels of dieldnn are known to

cause convulsions in humans and the chemical is

responsible for 13 recorded deaths (104). The

evidence of dieldrin’s carcinogenicity ~ strong in

mice, weaker in other experimental animals, and

inconclusive or negative in humans (17, 104, 137).

EPAcanceled most dieldrin uses inthe United States
Ch. l–i%elkzsics ● 4 1

in 1974 and European countries also banned its

use. EPA cited cheldrin’s carcino enicity, bioaccumulation, hazards to wildlife, an other chronic %

effects (134).

USAID routinely sponsored ovemeas use of -

ticides in the 197Qs that EPAbanned or restrict for r

use in the United States. In 1975, four environmental

organizations sued USAID for faihue to prepare an

environmental impact statement (EIS) on these pesticide uses, as required by the 1969 National Envircmmental Policy Act USAID, in response, re ared an

EIS in 1977 and issueda pesticide policyt LFOllowing

year prescriiin~ how pesticides should be treated in

USAID activities 8). Since the 1978 publication of

Regulation 16 (22 kederal Code of Regulations Part

216), the United States has required environmental

assessments prior to approving purchase or use of

pesticides overseas with U.S. funds. The

chlorinated hydrocarbons dieldrin, lindane, and

BHC could neither be purchased nor used in U. S.-

supported efforts. USAID environmental offices in

Washington approved individual USAID missions’

requests forvarlous insecticides depending on what

J

was known at the time (43 . Beginning in 1977,

various amendments to the oreign Assistance Act

further required that USAID consider the environmental impacts of its overseas projects and specifically undertake activities to maintain and restore

natural resources in developing countries (127).

The USAID policy on sticides served as a

model for other donors for revelo ing regulations

on their use of pesticides in Third orld countries. &

The World Bank promulgated Guidelines for the

Selection and Use of Pesticides in Bank Finunced

Projects and Their ~ocurement When Financed by

the Bank in 1985, developed with the assistance of

the United States. In the same year, FAO passed

an International Code of Conduct on the Duti”bution and Use of Pesticides.

The type of insecticides used in African locust and

grasshopper control programs has shifted markedly

away hm the pdstent or anochlorines (dieldrin,

BHC, aldrin, and lindane) a though some use f con-

$

times table 1-6). At least one-half of OTA survey

res n ents identified the use of BHC, dieldrin, and

lin~ne in the past but on one or two respondents

indicated their current use.!0me European countries

still allow the use of lindane, closely related to BHC

chemically (12). ‘Ihe insecticides most commonly used

for controlling grasshop~rs and locusts in Mica are

fenitmthion and malathlon (10). These organophosphates are ~rincipdy contact insecticides with short

residual action (2 to 3 days) (118).

Most donors have requirements to purchase

pesticides from domestic companies (“tied aid”),

and USAID did so, by and large, even though

F

urchases funded with OFDA money are exempt

rom these provisions due to their emergency nature. Fenitrothion, introduced by Sumitomo and

independently by Bayer, is Japanese-owned and

manufactured in the large uantities needed for

locust control in Japan and %urope. Malathion is

manufactured in the United States and elsewhere.

Dieldrin is no longer produced in significant quantities in the United States, where it was developed,

or in Europe. Thus, malathion was a major component of U.S. donations.
42 ● A Plague of Locusti

Table I-&Insecticides Used Presently and in the Past Against Locusts and Grasshoppers in

Africa and the Near East

Insecticide Present use

Commercial FAOb OTAC OTAC LHBd

Name namea

Aldrin

Alphacypermethrin

Alphamethrin

Arsenic compounds

Bendiocarb

BHC, Benzene

Hexachloride

Carbaryl

Chlorpyrifos

Darslean

DDT

Dichlorvos

Deltamethrin

Diazinon

Dieldrin

DNOC

Esfenvalerate

Fenitrothion

Fenvalerate

Heptachlor

Fastac

Ficam

Sevin

Dursban

DDVP

Decis

Basudine

Ensodil

Sumithion

Folithion

x x

x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x Isobenzan

Lambdacyhalothrin Karate x x

Lindane x

Malathion x x

Para-oxon x

Parathion PenCap x

Propoxur/Phoxim Undine x x

NOTES:

aIllustrative examples, since many commercial brands exist.

b

FAO’s list of pesticides are those used on a substantial scale for Desert Locust control.

‘Pesticides listed are those that OTA’S survey respondents indicated as currently used for locust/grasshopper control, regardless of the scale

of that use.

‘Insecticides no longer used for either locust or grasshopper control.

SOURCES:

FAO: U.N. Food and Agriculture Or anization, Emer en

k %7

Center for Locust Operations, “Pesticides for Desert Locust Control: June 1989

Uodate.’’ii”canLi xustBullehnhn. o. 14/89. June ,1 89, PP. 6-7.

OTA: Res&&s to OTA SU~ey, 1988. ‘ ‘ - ‘

LHB: Steedman~ A., The LoeustHandbook London: Overseas Develo ment Natural Resources Institute), 1988, p. 119.

Namelcommerclalnamex USAID, Locust/ &rasshoppManagernent: aerations Guidebook (Washington, J DC: January 1989), pp. VII-4-5,

and PRIFAS, SASNewsletteq No. 8, Aug. 7, 1989, p. 37.
Chapter 2

What is the Problem
CONTENTS

VARYING PERCEFI’IONS OF THE PROBLEM . . .

Locusts and Grasshopper Outbreaks as Disasters

Page

● ****O*********.***.*** * 45

● . **.*0...*********..*.* 45

Overview of the Debates ● *..*.* .’..**** ● ....*** ......0. ● *.9.*** ● **8* * 46

LOCUSTS AND GI?ASSHOPPERS IMPACTS ON FOOD PRODUCTION .....46

Do Locusts Cause Famine? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Pest ProblemsinContext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● . .! . . ● . ● . ● . . . ● . . . . . * ● . 49

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONTROL PROGRAMS ● *e***** ● m*o***e* ● **9*** 49

COntrolv.Clirnate “..***. ● ...*.** ● ....,.. . . . . . . . . ......** ● .*..*., ..*. 49

“Pe#icidesofChoice”andTheir Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

TheEconomicCostsandI!3enefits ofControl. . .**.... .**..... ,“..,... ● * * 55

HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT ****   ** e* **** **** 4*4* O*v***O*O **e * 57

Human Exposure ..o. *.. ,.*oeo. *o*. ... ... *o** .o**. *.e@o. *o** ... o@m *o . 57

13nvironment~ Effects .**. ... ... ... ... ... ... .*. *.*. ..*. .*. * * m*...... * 59

Storage and Disposal . . . . . . . . . . . . **** **9* **** *.** *.. ..*w****e**e **e** 59

Cumulative Effects .., .e*. *.*. *.. ... .*. **** ... .o. ..o. ... eO*O*. ***o *0 * 61

The Special Case of Dieldrin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CONTROL 90** e98***ee0e9 62

Institutional Factors .*. e**. ... .o. *.. *,. ... *.. .*** .,. ... **. ,.. ,* e.**** 62

The PoLitics of Locusts and Grasshoppers . . . . . .,*. **** **. o**. ..m o.***** * 65

Figure

2-1 Uses of U.S. Assistance far Locus~@asshopper Control; $7.5 Million in Fisca.1

Year 1987 ..** .*. .. * s * . . " * . . . * . * . . * . * . . . * . . . . * . . . . . . . * * * . . *.*.**.+. 54

Tables

2-1 Crop PrOdUetiOnAffected~Y Grasshoppers, 1986. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

2-2 International Re ‘Stration status of LocuSt/Grasshopp~r Insecticides in

Selected Deve oped countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 T

2-3 Pesticides PurChaseciwith uSATD Funds for Locust/Grasshopper Campaign;

Fis~ Years 1986 and 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

2-4 Toxicity of VariOUS Pesticides to Non-Tar~et Organisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @

2-5 Stren hsof Fifteen WeStand Central ~rlCan CoUntfieSin Various Areas

of $lant I?rotection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Chapter 2

What Is The Problem?

Finding: M~ views exist on various aspectsof

locust and grasshop~rpmbks but these have not

been widely dkbated nor msolvtxl. hstead, muny

host-muntry and &nor policymakm base mntml

policiks andpmgrams on ctwtain assumptiims: thut

locusts andgrasshop~m ama serious problem, tti

pesticides am the way to control them, and that mntrol piwgrams have substantial benefits for most

farmem andherdens. OTAJndk these assumptiims

questionable.

Locust and Grasshopper Outbreaks as

Disasters

To many, especially the general ublic, the

recent upsurges of locusts and grass[oppers in

Africa seem to ose a major threat to that

continent’s alrea y precarious food security. The x

New York Times proclaimed: “Locusts Threaten

Sub-Sahara Africa With Famine” (April 24, 1988,

p. 14) and “The Cloud Over Africa Is Locusts”

(November 11, 1988, ~. A3). This perception is

one of large swarms of resects, stripping vast areas

of vegetation. Also, people assume that these insects are the most dama ing pests facing African

farmers and herders an the problem seems un- f

solvable because, after all, locusts have caused

@agues since biblical times. In many minds, these

resect outbreaks are inevitabl linked to famine

and the popular press has rein [orced this view.

Many aspects of the public policy response to

locust and grasshopper problems match this perception. For example, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) or$anized a special

Desert Imcust Task Force within the Office of

Foreign Disaster AAstance (OFDA) to manageU.S.

contributions to control efforts. Earlier locust and

grasshopper outbreaks had been treated in much the

same way, with special control efforts, by donors and

regional and national organizations. The contribution of donors, $275 million from early 19W

through mid-1989, reflect this view of averting

plague-induced disaster.

The resources committed by USAID, $59 million

horn fiscal~r 1986 through fiscal year 1989, indicate

the high pnoritygiven to this officially declared emergency.

Many within the expert community, especially

those who work with grasshopper and locust contro~

agree with this assessment of the disastrous impact of

locusts and grasshopper on Mean agriculture. The

problem is perceived as serious enough to warrant

specialized attention and to mobilize substantial

donor and host country resources. Most people who

responded to OTA’S survey (app. B) noted that locust

and grasshopper problems are ‘\ery serious” in the

areas with which they are familiar, with the 1%6 to

19890utbreakbeingas serious as any on record Also,

approximately one-half of the responde~fi rank

locusts as the most serious pest in theu area.

Gxtainly locusts can devastate vegetation over

sizable are~ especiall if swarms are moving slowly

and stay in one place or several days. The potential 1’

for national-level drops in agricultural production

exists if swarms affect areas crucial to a country’s

economy. Any loss of food crops to locusts or

grassho pers puts some

i!’ r

ple at risk in localities

where ood supplies area eady precarious.

For example, the African Migratory Imcust

destroyed 50 percent and 40 percent, respectively, of

Kenya’s wheat and Corn crop in a peak infestation

in 1931 (15), although this level of loss did not

occur in the recent upsurge. In northwest Mali,

cro losses to ~rasshop ers were estimated at 20

to O ? perce~t m 1985 espite 8 spra ing pesticides

on 900 km and, in 1986, some armers’ millet 1’

crops were destroyed three times before they

eventually abandoned some fields or planted sorghum instead because of its resistance to these

resects (93). The Variegated Grasshopper can

ICertain aspects of OTA’s sunwy ma have led respondents to exaggerate the magnitude of thex problems: some questionswere not precise

enough regarding the time and geograp iic areas of outbreaks; the response rate was low (2S pereent) and people who pereeive the problem to

be serious are those most likely to complete a lengthy form; many of the respondents are affiliated with locust and grasshopper control programs;

and the questionnaire was sent at the peak of the reeent upsurges.

45
46 ● A Plague of bcusts

cause up to 65 percent yield loss in cassava if it

strips leaves, bark, buds, and shoots late in the

season (93).

Overview of the Debates

Other experts, commonly entomologists who

are not involved in control efforts, make uite a

different assessment of the threat posed by ?ocusts

to African food security. They suggest that the

severe, localized nature of these outbreaks almost

ensures that their importance be improperly exaggerated relative to other pest problems. These

experts note that locusts and grasshoppers occur

in large swarms infrequently. For example, outbreaks occur often, but upsurges that lead to a

plague are rare (93). In this, the analogy to a

natural disaster such as a tornado is apt. In a given

location, the situation may be disastrous but the

impact, measured over a wider area and/or for a

longer time period, may have little significance.

Thus, many in this second group of experts

conclude that current public policies are based on

questionable.or faulty assumptions. A significant

number of OTA’S contractors and reviewers

agree, in general, with this position although they

hold a range of views on specific aspects of the

problem.

Assumptions provide a needed basis for

prelimina~ answers to im rtant policy-related

questions m the absence o reliable data and: r

. . . the experience of using insufficient data that are

of uncertain quality to make critiml determinations

about the use of scarce resources, k nothing new in

the Third World. (72, p.2)

Unresolved, major discrepancies in how ex erts

view locust and rasshopper problems now,Iowever, have signi !Icant repercussions for congressional and other olicy decision making.

Moreover, the lack o debate on important issues ?

outside a small group of scientists and control

experts means that those who see the situation as

disastrous, warranting massive spraying, often

carry the day.

Specific, significant areas of debate include:

1) the insects’ impact on food reduction; 2) the

importance of locusts and grass oppers in relation f

to other pests; and 3) whether or not these insects

cause famine. Experts’ judgments differ, too, concerning 4) the effectiveness of current control

Programs based exclusively on the use of chemical

insecticides, 5) the relative roles of climate and

control in bringing about declines of insect

upsurges; and 6) whether the benefits of control,

in terms of crops saved, exceed the costs of control.

Experts differ, also, in their opinions onthenature

and severity of costs in terms of 7) human health

and safety and 8) environmental impacts. People

also disagree on 9) how control efforts should be

organized and what strategies should be followed.

LOCUSTS AND GRASSHOPPERS’

IMPACT ON FOOD PRODUCTION

Finding: The link between kcust andgrasshopper upsuqys and fbod shortkzges or J&nine is questwnable. In fizct, locusts and grasshoppers are

mkhtively minor pesti in terms of overall cmp limes,

dhough they can (&?wmwe kxd amzs for short

perihdk oftime. Thus, the highpriority~”ven tokwust

andgrasshoppr contmlpmgrams k unwarranted.

Do Locusts Cause Famine?

USAID, like others, justifies its locust and

~rassho~percontrol ro ramonthebasisof avertmg famme. The 198 U AID Tf Locust/Grasshopper

Strate~ Paper defines the purpose of the strategy

as:

. . . dealing with one of the most serious exogenous

factors adversely affecting agricultural production:

the cyclically recurring infestations of locusts and

grasshoppers, which can result in significant crop

losses and periodically lead to plague and famine

conditions in many parts of Mica. (113, p.1)

More recently, USAID stated that the goal of

its $22 million African Emer ency Locust

Grassho er Assistance (AELGA project, fiscal !

years 19!7 through 1989, is “to contribute to the

Improved nutritional status and well being of

Africans by reducing the threat of locust and

grassho per plague-induced famine, and its associate economic and social suffering.” f

Key data are missing, but historical analysis

(16) and recently acquired data (72) suggest that
Ch. 2–JWat Is 7?ae Problem? ● 47

what is often considered fact–the connection between swarming insects and famine-is actually a

questionable assumption.

Crop loss from locusts and grasshoppers may

be severe in certain areas without having significant impact on national cro production.

USAID country reports reveal litt e overall crop r

damage by Desert Locusts during 1988, the height

of the recent Iague-crop losses of 2 percent in

Sudan and dali (with some localized severe

damage –and minimal or negligible losses in

Niger, had (117), and Algeria (89 . The authors c?

of the Chad case study claim that e i!fective control

was the reason for the small losses, but also admit

that no system exists for reliably evaluating crop

damage by locusts.

The insects’ impact is highly dependent on a

number of variables, including the number of insects present, how long they stay in the area, and

the amount each insect eats (16). However, the

stage of crop development also determines the

amount of crop loss. Total crop loss usually occurs

only if the insects attack at certain stages in cro

development. Young grain crops are highly vu -f’

nerable but replanting maybe possible if they are

destroyed early. Damage to more mature crops is

usually lower until just before grains begin to

ripen; nevertheless, a swarm can cause artial or

total crop loss (95 . At other stages, ama e is x

substantial less. Jor example, one study o the f

African digratory Locust’s effect in Kenya

showed that the pest caused 100 percent yield loss

when attacking very young or flowerin corn, 20

percentyieldloss oncornwithunripene % ears, and

no yield loss on corn over 30 cm tall (139).

Economic losses also depend on which Iant

species and what part of the plant locusts a feet, F

e.g., consuming grain or folia e or breaking

branches due to their weight. rain crops are ~

highly susceptible at the “milky $rain” stage and

100 percent yield loss may occur If even low densities of locusts or grasshoppers attack then.

Studies on the impact of locusts on sugarcane

yields in several countries showed that the highest

recorded cro loss was due to Red Locusts in

Mozambiques P su~arcane fields, where yield was

reduced by an estimated 33 percent in 1934 (95).

Sugar-cane losses of 12 to 18 percent were more

usual (in South Africa in the 1950s and the Philip-

?

pines in the 1930s , but inone case yield increased

after defoliation 95). Also, the weight of roosting locusts may break branches of trees, affecting

future yields of valuable commercial crops.

As a result, crop losses are unevenly distributed in space and time, even during upsurges.

Within affected areas, sometimes all vegetation is

stri peal, especially in sites such as breedin areas

an traditionally infested areas, e.g., in Cf !udan,

Ethiopia and Somalia, or when unusual weather

conditions trap locusts in one spot for an extended

period of time. In most infested areas, however,

damage is less than total and uneven due to

swarms’ mobility and other factors.

Comparatively small areas of the total area

infested b Desert Locusts experience losses in

excess of O percent (16). This occurred in the $

1954 through 1955 season when nearly90 ercent

of the total reported damage was in a smal part of r

southern Morocco and in 1958, when a higher

ercentage was concentrated in two small areas in

Bthiopia, causing severe, but localized, economic

losses (16). The U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) speculates that, on average,

crop damage does not exceed 5 percent over the

Desert Locust’s whole invasion area during a

plague (12). However, data toverifythis percentage would be difficult to obtain. Grasshoppers,

the Senegalese Grasshopper in particular, caused

more generalized and heavier damage than locusts

in recent years (12). No areas within nine West

African countries studied have been affected

severely enough by locusts and rasshoppers to be

abandoned by cultivators (95), t us illustrating the i

temporary nature of damage.

The location and timing of grasshopper and

locust infestations, along with the food preference

of the species involved, means that damage is not

evenly distributed among different types of

farmers and herders. For example, orange trees

were severely attacked by Desert Locusts in

Morocco’s Seuss Valley in late 1954 and early

1955, so commercial growers were hard hit. But

the Sene~alese grasshopper adversely affects most

of the mallet- and much of the sorghum-growing

areas of the Sahel (71) and, thus, subsistence

farmers bear much of the damage.

Some insect species prefer grains and pose a

f

reater threat to farmers than herders. Generally,

erders seem to be less affected by locust swarms

than farmers, probabl because swarms occur

when rainfall is plentifu , thus providing abundant /’
48 ● A Plague of Locusts

vegetation for grazing. Also, herders often can

move their herds from damaged areas. Locusts and

grassho~pers are more likely to affect herders adversely If their movement from devastated areas is

restricted or if overgrazing already has reduced

grass cover (95).

Substantial crop damage ma lead to local adverse impacts on fti security. Lyond this, little

can be said with much certainty. Locust and

!rasshOpF

r damage contributed to 1986 and 1987

ood de lclts in some countries but perhaps no

more than other factors (72). In 1986, FAO estimated that crop losses due to locusts and

grasshoppers in nine Sahelian countries was $31.0

million, 1.5 percent of the total value of agricultural production or 1.0 percent of totaI production.

The relationship between this figure and that of

other years or other outbreaks is not known (95).

The damage associated with locust and

grasshopper outbreaks often results from the interaction of multiple adverse factors over time in

addition to large numbers of insects: drought, loss

of vegetation, civil strife, economic stagnation, etc.

Most of these factors also contribute to famine or

food shortages. Therefore, the impact of locusts

and grasshoppers alone is difficult, if not impossible, to determine. On a countqnvide basis, the

recent locust or grasshopper upsurges did not have

the negative impact that a drought would produce.

Generally, the ag regate amount of damage

reported was much ess than feared and the losses f

were on the scale of localized,

r

rhaps near-normal stress rather than nationa calamities (table

2-l). Some observers report that locust and

f

rasshopper outbreaks often do not result in even

ocal food shortages, because of replantin ,

regrowth ofvegetatlon, use of resistant cro s suc%

as cassava and, especially, help from nei h Lrs or

relatives. Thus, the “popular image o a locust f

outbreak leadin to famines seems to have little or 8 no basis in fact. (95)

Famines have com Iex causes, as shown by

recent examination ofF amines in Ethio ia from

1972 to 1974 (87) and the Sahel from 1dto 1973

(86). llrought may set the stage, but other factors

determine which groups are affected and by how

much. The problem is more one of fd distribution and food access than food production, since

food shortages alone do not e lain starvation.

Neither a~regate food availabiT ity nor average

consumption of food per person declined slgnificantlyin Ethio iaduringone of theworstyears

of the famine (8 ). Apparently people starved !

because they could not afford to bu food from

outside the area when their own arm output [

declined. Pastoralistswere particularly hard hit in

Ethiopia and the Sahel, but social, economic, and

political factors, nottheseverityof drou ht, determined this. For exam le, the growth o f commercial agriculture reZ uced herders’ access to

dry-season grazing areas in Ethiopia. In the Sahel,

too, herders’ traditional methods of ensuring

against famine broke down: high taxes meant

fewer herders could afford to store animals on the

hoof; wildlife populations had declined so much

that hunting could not replace domesticated

animals; growing commerciahzation of agriculture

had disrupted arrangements by which herders

traded with farmers for access to cropland for

dry-season grazing.

Given thecom lexityofsuch interactions, it is

unlikely that the ro1’ e locusts and rasshoppers lay

in famine could be assessed wit aggregate i t?ood

F

reduction data rather than information on local

ood availability. Data on local cro production

losses and local shorta es is essentia f but does not

seem to exist, especial y for food crops. Even na- f

tional a gregate data commonly are only estimates. Lust and grasshopper control has taken

place s~radically for decades and numerous organizations have been involved in this work. Yet

the damage caused by these insects has not been

documented accurately.

. . . the data 1s [sic] fragmented and episodic, reflecting outbreaks that were sufficierXIy large to merit the

attention of an international agency or a governmerit. . . . There exist no accurate crop yield and/or

loss data for most of the area subject to attack by

locusts. (95)

In 1987, Oregon State University began

USAID-funded work to improve the assessment

of losses due to these insects. However, USAID’s

expectation that the International Plant Protection Center, using a computer model, could determine crop losses among several other objectives,

proved overambitious. Most of the required data

were spotty, unavailable, or unreliable and, thus,

the model could not produce an improved crop

loss assessment (99).

The number of variables involved complicates

estimating potential crop losses and helps explains
Ch. 2-???hat Is Zhe Problem? . 49

why the authors of so many published estimates of

actual crops losses do not describe their methodology, having arrived at estimates subjectively.

Measuring crop loss is difficult for migratory pests,

especially the Desert Locust; peo Ie have made

attempts in the past-and failed. Ereeding areas

are remote with access further limited by civil

strife; upsurges can be lar e and widely scattered;

and locusts are very mobi e (16, 79). F

?

erienced

observers can estimate severe crop osses accurately in the local areas with which they are

familiar, but miss more subtle yield reductions

caused by these insects (16).

Pest Problems in Context

The relative importance of grasshoppers and

locusts compared to other pests has not been

determined precisely. Grasshopper and locust

losses may be significant in some years. Yet compelling evidence does not exist that they cause

worse losses than other pests (37, 72, 95). For

instance, plant protection experts often assume

that all types of preharvest crop losses in the Sahel

region are as great as 30 percent but sometimes

larger. Of this, grasshoppers maybe responsible

for 5 to 18 percent of crop losses each year (72).

In 1986, grasshoppers were considered a major

problem and large-scale control programs were

undertaken. Yet the 1986 crop production losses

caused by grassho pers seems to be below this

normal range (tab e 2-l). These data, com r iled

forthe Famme Early WarningSystem (FEW t)are

the best available, although somewhat unreliable.

However, the 1986 FEWS data corres ond

with earlier estimates, many made before arge r

control-campaigns existed. Compilations of

reports on damage to crops and livestock in 40

countries during major Desert Locust plagues

were made by the Anti-Locust Research Center in

London for 1925 through 1934 and FAO for 1949

through 1958. Analyzing this information, F.T.

Bullen found that the Desert Locust caused, on

average, about 1.4 percent of the overall crop loss

due to insects in the same area (or about 0.2

~~~::n~ of the total crop production) and only

r

rcent in a peak plague year (or, only

about O. percent of total crop production). He

concluded, “Locusts and grasshoppers, even at

their worst, constitute only a very small proportion

of the overall crop protection problem.” (16)

In fact, weeds cause greater food crop losses

in Africa than insects–15 to 35 percent of potential

production depending on crop (millet, sorghum,

rice, or maize) versus 10 to 20 percent, according

to a standard reference-and locusts are not a

major insect

r

st when examined overtime (25, as

cited in 95). TAreviewers concurred, noting, for

example, that birds are the worst pest (32), the

weed Sti”ga costs farmers more losses (31), and the

armyworm causes losses to cereal crops up to 30

percent in Zimbabwe in some years (61).

Finally, losses due to pests also must be placed

in context-many other factors cause economic

losses for farmers. For example, postharvest losses often account for a si nificant portion of

s

r

iled production. In 198 , in West Africa and +

t e Sudan, despite severe grasshopper infestations, losses to farmers due to inadequate marketing and storage facilities were greater than those

caused by insects (12).

THE EFFECTINIIINIIEJSM~F CONTROL

Finding: The eficacy, eficiency, and equitability of ihcust and grasshopper control programs

an undocumented or mly hugely on anecdotal information. While insecticides undoubtedly kill insects

andcanpnllxt standing crops, insecticides ’abil@ to

end or prevent plagues k not clear. Nor have the

economic benefits of control programs been

demonstrated convincingly, espciully for the lowresoum farnum and herderx who am most vulnerable.

The stated goals of control programs include

preventing famine, saving crops and livestock, and

preventing and ending plagues, but the link between the pesticide spraying campaigns and

achieving these goals has not been demonstrated.

Control v. Climate

Many insecticides are effective for killing

locusts and grasshoppers (95). However, the

relationship between insect mortality and preventing crop or forage losses, in the area sprayed or

distant from it, is uncertain. Also, it is not clear

whether control campaigns prevent a plague from

developing, hasten the end of a plague, or do not
50 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table 2-l-Crop Production Affected by Grasshoppers, 1986 (thousands of metric tons)

Gross Production lost

Country production to grasshoppers Production savedb Production affectedb

1,000s MT Percent 1,000s MT Percent 1,000s MT Percent c

Burkina Faso

Chad

Ethiopia

Gambia

Mauritania

Mali

Niger

Senegal

Sudan

All

1,917.0

685.0

6,504.0

144.0

125.0

1,780.0

1,807.0

964.0

4,300.0

18,226.0

8.3

24.0

0.5

1.0

10.0

30.0

108.0

50.0

9.2

241.0

<1

4

<1

<1

8

2

6

5

< 1

1.4

91.5

30.0

0.5

1.0

10.0

30.0

108.0

70.0

9.2

350.2

5

4

<1

<1

8

2

6

7

<1

1.9

99.8

54.0

1.0

2.0

20.0

60.0

216.0

120.0

18.5

591.3

5

8

<1

1

16

3

12

12

<1

3.2

NOTES:

~Original data from USAID, FAO, CILSS/FAO.

Original data from FAO, FEWS estimates.

‘Percents lost and saved do not always equal percent affected due to rounding errors.

SOURCE: Price, Williams & Associates, “1986 Grasshopperand Locust Infestations,’’ FEWS Special Report No. 1, cxmtractorreport prepared

for U.S. Agency for International Dmelopment, March 1987, pp. 4-12.

affect it. Some note the danger of broad-spectrum

insecticides killing natural predators of these insects and the potential for developing pest resistance (which has not yet been known to occur for

locusts). Inthesecases, insecticides could increase

threats from locusts and grasshoppers indirectly.

Experts point out that control with chemical

insecticides is the only effective method presently

available for preventing locust and grasshopper

outbreaks from becoming widespread (34, 38, 95).

Generally, grasshopper control is considered less

effective (95).

Somecreditmonitorin ,surveillance, andcontrol methods developed a ter World War II with ?

reducing the duration and incidence of some

species’ plagues or of reducing the intensity and

geographic size of other species’ outbreaks when

they do occur (54, 93). They contend that control

efforts rolonged recessions between plagues of

the Re Locust (5), the African J Migrato Locust

(2), and the Desert Locust (79). Genera ly, how- 7

ever, analysts admit that evidence was sometimes

incomplete and circumstantial and that control

sometimes has not been effective (4).

FAO contends that present control measures,

properly applied, can prevent upsurges from

developing into lagues or considerably shorten

the duration oft ose that do develop (12). Fur- E

thermore, the failure to mobilize adequate

resources and the inaccessibility of target areas,

rather than ineffective methods themselves,

caused several missed opportunities to prevent the

Desert Locust upsurges from develo ing into a

widespread plague in 1987 and 1988inFAO’sview

(106).

Others find, however, that control efforts have

had negligible impacts on plague populations and

that their decline is due almost entirely to natural

causes (135). Support for this view comes from

reviewing past Desert Locust and Brown Locust

plagues. Plagues occurred for both insects at times

when chemical control measures were used extensively (9, 52). For example, the Desert Locust

plague from 1949 to 1%3 (when chemical controls
Ch. 2–Wwt Is The Problem? ● 51

were being de loyed) was no less intense and

lasted twice as ong as plagues earlier in the cen- f’

tury, which occurred before these control

techniques were available (138, figure 1-3).

Climate is known to have a controlling effect

on many aspects of locust and grasshopper behavior. Most believe that climate can retard

locusts andgrassho pers as much as control (95).

But some believe t at climate alone controls in- E

sects and that locust plagues end whether they are

treated or not (135). If so, locust upsurges could

be allowed to run their course at considerably less

financial and environmental expense than current

massive interventions. Such an approach would

be analo ous to the U.S. Forest SeMce’s practice

of usual y letting forest fires bum, except where F

fires threaten lives or homes.

Not surprisingly, OTA’S reviewers similarly

have points of view ranging from insect declines

are entirely due to weather (63J to the control

program was the major factor m curtailing the

plague (44). Others (61, 79) believe that control

campaigns definitely su press lague development and hasten the en of a p ague, but admit Xr

adverse weather may play a crucial role.

As a result, several conclusions are possible:

“the question of whether the decline of the plague

was due to [human intervention] or . . . nature

remains unresolved” (71). Or, “There is no firm

evidence that control campai ns have a preciabl

affected the declines” (9). ~eFrenc~researc~

agency PRIFAS conjectured that 20 percent of the

Desert Locust population was destroyed by control efforts in late 1988 and early 1989,30 percent

perished in storms over the Atlantic, 30 percent

were killed by low temperatures, and 20

r

rcent

by insufficient rainfall (76). FAO’S Bra er (13)

concluded that:

While climate appears to be the dominant factor

determining the fate of Ioeust plagues, chemical control mayplayan important role at kast on the national scale.

Currently, FAO is supportin research by the

British Overseas Development I+atural Resources

Institute examining the roles of weather and control in the sequence of events leading to the upsurge, spread, and decline of the Desert ~USt

plague between 1985 and 1989. The scientist

coordinating that research said:

The usual view of those involved in control campaigns is that control measures are key in ending

plagues. The moreobjeetiveviewthat of nmst scientists not involved in control-is that weather is key,

that weather has as much if not a greater role than

mntrol. (54)

Key data for resolving these differences of

opinion regarding the impact of control pro ams

are lacking. This includes accurate surveys o : the F

numbers of insects present in a given location and

time during an infestation; baseline numbers of

insects present during recessions; the percent of

totaI production actually at risk; the actual amount

of damage done to crops and other vegetation; the

impact of this local dama eon local and aggregate

crop production. Similar y, specific information is f

needed on weather and control variables. For

example, experts at a 1988 World Meteorological

Organization workshop on meteorological contributions to locust control stressed the need for

more case studies as well as improved coordination

between weather and locust control operations

(112). This missing information is key to making

informed decisions regarding whether chemical

control efforts are economically justifiable, where

resources should be directed and when, the appropriate nature, timing, and quantity of emergency aid, and the amount of preparation needed to

meet threats in succeeding years (73).

However, historical data can support

R

revisional decisions and some data syntheses

ave been completed (e.g., 4). Based on these, it

appears that, in some laces and at certain times,

certain kinds ofcmtrormayhelpbreak a sequence

of events that could lead to a widespread insect

upsurge; under other circumstances, control can

have negligible impact. For example, a kill rate of

95 percent might be required over a vast area when

weather favors insect build-up; once rains decline,

a lesser effort properl admmistered, can hasten

what nature started ( 5). Other generalizations J

regarding the effectiveness of locust control are

highly suspect and some costly decisions are being

made with little data to support them.

“Pesticides of Choice” and Their

Effectiveness

In August 1988, USAID waived Regulation 16

and identified malathion, carbaryl, and

fenitrothion as the “pesticides of choice” and listed

others that could be used in locust and grasshop-
52 ● APlague of Locusts

per control (table 2-2). As a result of the waiver,

USAID was not required to prepare an environmental assessment before esticide use. The

waiver was justified on the asis of a declared E

emergency and other environmental research

E

lanned and underway. For instance, the Agen

ad contracted with TAMS Consultants, Inc. (wit1!

technical input from the Consortium for International Crop Protection (CICP) headquartered at

the University of Maryland) toconduct a Pro rammatic Environmental Assessment regardingfocust

and grasshopper control throughout Africa and

Asia.

Also, USAID contracted with a private firm,

DYnamac, to conduct trials of 6 to 8 insecticides for

their efficacy; impact on nontar et, beneficial organisms; and residues in soil an on vegetation in i

Mali (against the Senegalese Grassho

tr

r) and

Sudan (againsttheDesertLocust)in 19 through

1988. It was known that the relative effectiveness

of various ingredients, formulations, and applications of insecticides must be assessed under field

conditions and balanced against harmful effects,

but this had not been done adequatel . USAID

hoped that the Dynamac trials would ?111 in some

of these gaps.

With the reinstatement of Regulation 16 in

August 1989 and based on the completed

Programmatic Environmental Assessment,

USAID expanded the number of insecticides that

could be purchased or used-most with a number

of restrictions and qualifications-to include

propoxur, acephate, and cyperrnethrin (122).

USAID’s approval onl overlapped in part

with the Environmental $rotection Agenc ‘s

(EPA) list of pesticides registered for use in t e i

United States against grasshoppers and locusts.

EPA registers malathion, carba~l, diazinon, lindane, acephate, chlorpyrifos, and tralomethrin

(with lene)but notsomeothers commonly used

in US D-approved locust control efforts, e.g., %

fenitrothion and propoxur. USAID’s list allowed

the United States to match other donors’ approved pesticides more closel , at least for the

major chemicals. However, lac of clarity existed i

in the field about which were best and why some

pesticides ap roved for use in the United States

were disal owed overseas. Advice from r

Washington regarding these oiicies was sometimes too slow in coming an voluminous to be Cf

helpful (120).

.

No single organization seems able to provide

complete or accurate information on the quantities or types of pesticides used in Africa for any

purpose, and some past estimates are known to be

inaccurate (95). However, indications are that the

total amount of pesticides used in 1986 to 1989 for

locust and grasshopper control was formidable.

Insecticide use seems to vary widely among

countries, ran ing from 34 to 1,014 metric tons in

7 individualfahelian countries in 1986, for instance (95), and between regions. In 1988, the 4

northwest African countries of the Maghreb

region used 11 million liters of insecticides and the

4 most affected Sahelian countries, 2 million liters,

at a total cost on the order of $100 million (109).

Fragmentary data exist on the total amount of

insecticides supplied by donors during the 1986

through 1989 locust and grasshopper control campaign, but it is not clear how accurate these figures

are. Donors provide the same pesticide indifferent

formulations so figures are difficult to summarize

and compare. Also, FAO’S information does not

include the amounts of pesticides purchased by

African governments; these amounts are significant in the Maghreb but negligible in the Sahel

(12).

U.S. assistance during the ast campaign consisted principally of pesticiZ es, airplanes, and

equipment for spra “ng (figure 2-l). The United

States provided 60 r,5181iters and 450 metric tons

of insecticides in 1986 and 1987, according to the

OFDA database (table 2-3). This was mostly

malathion, carbaryl, and lesser amounts of

propoxur and fenltrothion, at a cost of approximate $3.2million. Apparently, carbarylwas

purchased utnot used (99) because spree African 1

officials doubted its effectiveness and wanted

quicker-acting chemicals.

The United Statesexem tsemergency efforts,

i.e., those supported by Ob~ from “tied aid”

provisions, but these requirements apply to pesticide choice for longer-term efforts, e. ., those

funded by USAID missions and bureaus, orwhich 1!

waivers are more difficult to obtain. In fact, most

OFDA funds spent on pesticides went to U.S.

manufacturers.

The use of U.S. manufactured pesticides and

U.S. procurement requirements affected~sticide

selection, control costs, and the speed mth which

pesticides reached Africa. USAID usually selected
Ch. 2-lWat Is TheProblem? . 53

Table 2-2-International Registration Status of Locust/Grasshopper Insecticides in Selected

Developed Countries

United States

Approved Re~stered Repstered

by AID3

by EPA4

by EPA for

West grasshopper/

Insecticide Canadal France2 U.K.2 Germanf locust4

Main:

Malathion

Carbaryl

Fenitrothion

Propoxur

Dkizinon

Lindane

Dieldrirt

Acephate

Others:

Bendiocarb

(Ficam)

Chlorpyrifos

(Dursban)

Cyhalothrin

(Karate) a

Tralomethrin

(scout)

Cypermethrin

Carbosulfan

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No,

(pending)

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

N/A

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

N/A

N/A

Yes

N/A

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes*

No

No

No

Yes*

Yes*

Yes*

Yes*

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes No

Yes Yes

No, No

(pending)

Yes Yes,

in combo

with zylene

Yes No

Yes No

NOTES:

N/A = not available.

● Approved with the qualification that use be monitored or justified.

‘No a proved common name exists for Karate, a trade name for a synthetic pyrethroid, according to Farm Chemicals Handbook 1989

(Wil 1’oughby, OH: Meister Publishing Co., 1989).

SOURCES:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Dr. Peter Bennett, Chemical Evaluation Division, Bureau of Chemical Safety, Food Directorate, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, KIA OL2,

January 1988.

European Directory of

9

rochemical Products, Part 3, Insecticides and Acaricides, Royal Society of Chemist~, The University,

Nottingham, England, NG 2RD, 1984.

Insecticide approved from Au .15, 1988-Au .15, 1989. Charles Gladson et al.,

& A

“Waiver of Pesticides Procedures for Locust/Grasshopper Control Programs in and ANE egions,’’action memorandum for AID Administrator, Aug. 15,1988, Attachment A pp.

6-7. This differs from direction on pesticide selection in the Locuw/Grm.dtoppM anagement Operaaons Guidebook (1989). New

information requires that the list be updated constant .

TAMS Ccmsu##sandConsort ium for International ?rop Protection, LocustandGra.sshopperControlinAjh'ca/Asia:Al+ogrammatic

Environment w?swnenq Main Report, contractor report prepared for USAID, March 1989, p. D-56.
54 ● A Plague of L.ocusts

Figure 2-l-Uses of U.S. Assistance for Locust/Grasshopper Control:

$7.5 Million in Fiscal Year 1987

Postlcld

36%

\

Equlpmont

7s

Plan.. and heIlcoptero

37%

SOURCE: John Gelb, Office of Foreign Disaster Asistance, USAID, “U. S. A.I.D. Support, Desert Locust Task Force, FY 1987,’’June 22,1989.

Table 2-3-Pesticides Purchased With USAID Funds for Locust/Grasshopper Campaign:

Fiscal Years 1986 and 1987

Pesticide

1986a

Valuec Volumed

1987b

Valuec Volumea

Carbaryl o 0 258,802 %,690 L

217,739 50 tf

Fenitrothion 260,000 50,000 Le205,000 5,000 L

Malathion 199,305 60,000 L 1,382,959 393,828 L

Propoxur o 0 600,000 4oot

Unspecified 115,000 N.A. o 0

Total 574,305 110,000 L 2,664,500 495,518 L

450 t

NOTES: N.A=Not available

~Recipient countries listed in 1986: Mali and Senegal.

Recipient countries listed in 1987: Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Sudan, and Yemen.

~Often “value” includes the eat of ocean and/or air freight.

Active ingredients va~ considerably (e.g., between 1 and 4 pounds per liter depending on the formulation).

‘L=liter

‘t = metric ton.

SOURCE: Dennis King, USAID/OFD~ ‘0.F.D.A Commodity/Serviee Report; Washington, DC, June 27,1989.
Ch. 2-WM.t Is The Problem? ● 55

malathion and carbaryl because the pesticides are

U.S.-manufactured and teehnical advisors from

USDA had long-term experience using them for

U.S. grasshopper control. Generally, U. S.-

produced insecticides are more costly than those

manufactured in other countries so tied aid

provisions increase control programs’ costs (30).

Also, various USAID procurement requirements affectin bureau admission money, including the need or competitive bids, were a major f

cause of delays in U.S. programs. USAID/Morocco noted that approximately 5 months were

needed to purchase and ship insecticides in 1988

and 1989 because of these r uirements (120). In

Chad, the insecticidal arriv3 late also, but in this

case the delay was not detrimental because the

locusts had “mysteriously disappeared” (117).

O~ratkmal EJi*veness of Control

The use of insecticides may protect standing

crops from grasshoppers and locusts. However,

few detailed studies have been made of the operational effectiveness of the recent spraying campaigns, e.g., insecticides’ efficacy in killing resects

was not monitored. Also, insecticides were often

used in ways that reduced or negated their effectiveness (54, 99).

Incorrect application methods and careless

tar et selection redueed the effectiveness of contro. Some areas were sprayed too late in the day f

or when temperatures or wind speeds were beyond

recommended ranges or that had already been

sprayed. Mounting targeted control efforts was

not a priority of USAID and others during this

campaign. Some swarms were treated that posed

little threat because they were not expected to

reach croplands or because they had already laid

eg s and their ~pulations were in decline (54,

11 ). Opportunities to spray hopper bands, when !

the insects are more vulnerable and concentrated,

were missed. Where hopper spraying was attempted, areas needing treatment were sometimes

bypassed or unaffected areas sprayed because

often hopper bands were not visible from the air.

This occurred, in part, because USAID, in its

1987 Strategy Paper, approved control operations

against swarms wherever they might be, rather

than emphasizing focused operations at specific

places and insect life-stages.

The 1986 to 1987 spraying program was difficult to execute due to the widespread extent of

infestations, lackofpre aredness ofstaff,wars and

civil strife, impassabir ity of roads after rains,

donors’ diverging policies, lack of transport and

communications, and late ordering and arrival of

e~uipment and pesticides. Air shipments of supphes were more timely in 1987. Yet, some 1987

operations were not justified, necessary, or

economical. Over-dosage of pesticides occurred in

many ground and aerial operations. And parceling

out the program among many donors meant that

!!

round support was duplicated and sometimes eforts were not concentrated when and where they

were needed (95).

The Economic Costs and Benefits of Control

The economic cost of control programs varies

with insecticide, formulation, and a plication

method. For example, carbaryl costs at east twice f’

as much as malathion and fenitrothion ($4.50 v.

$2.00 r ha). Ground application costs ranged

from 6.00 to $8.50 per ha for ultra-low volume r

(ULV) spraying, $8 to $12 per ha for baits, to $18

to $26 per ha for dusts in Senegal in 1986. Aerial

and ground ULV spraying cost approximately the

same per hectare. However, farmers treated only

0.5ha rhour, thecro protectionservice treated

8 to 1 ha per hour wit ground spraying, whereas r R

aerial spraying averaged 450 to 470 ha per hour

(118). Multiengine aircraft are most costly per

hour but can cover the largest areas; using smaller,

single engine aircraft costs about $1,000 per hour.

These estimated costs for ULV spraying are

comparable to current U.S. costs of grasshopper

control, which range from $5.50 to $9.00 per ha.

But these estimates assume that the pesticides are

in place where needed and do not account for the
56 ● A Plague of Locusts

freight of formulated chemicals. Air freight was a

substantial cost in 1986 at the beginning of these

cam aigns. More realistic estimates of total donor

and Yocal costs in Africa range from $15 to $30 per

hectare in 1986 (95). Thus, the actual costs of

control programs m Africa are high.

The direct benefits of control campai ns can

be assessed by estimating the value o crops f

threatened, or saved. Indnect benefits, e.g., institutional development of national crop protection services, also exist but are largely

unquantifiable and, thus, not included.

The value of crops threatened de~nds on the

crop, with cash crops’ value more easdy measured

than those such as sorghum and millet, grown for

direct consumption on the farm (15). Yet, much of

the invasion area of the Desert Locust in Africa is

devoted to subsistence farming and herding.

Thus, the economic benefits of control rograms

for the most vulnerable are even less c ear than Y

those for large-scale commercial farmers. By and

large, the micro-level economic and sociological

research needed to make this determination has

not been done.

The value of crops saved is more relevant than

value of crops lost, a conclusion reached by the

1989 Programmatic Environmental Assessment

and the Anti-Locust Research Centre in London

in the 1960’s (15). However, crops threatened is

no easier to determine than crops lost.

The Programmatic Environmental Assessment summarizes the best available estimates of

the costs of grasshopper and locust damage, but it

E

rovides little basis from which to derive the

enefits of control. Existing measurements of

benefits are subject to wide margins of error (92,

95). Economic estimates of potential agricultural

losses to the Desert Locust commonly are based

on hypothetical calculations rather than field data

on crop losses and insect biology. Also, some underlying assumptions are faulty, such as assuming

that damage is evenly distributed and total in a

given area. Or, estimates maybe based on worstcase scenarios. For example, potential damage

from Desert Locusts in Morocco was estimated at

$125 million to $250 million in 1988, the value of

all crops produced in the Seuss Valley and

southern Morocco (115). But this estimate assumed that the intensi and scope of the damage

in 1988 would equal t at of 1954 and 1955. A 1!

technical advisor to the Moroccan Government

present at the time believes that what occurred

then was a freak event due to unusual weather that

tra ped 14 immature swarms in the narrow Seuss

Va ley for 6 to 8 weeks and its probability of recur- r

rence is low (41).

Resultant claims of the value of crops saved

due to control arequestionable at best when based

on faulty assumptions, hypothetical figures, and/or

worst-case scenarios.

No estimates exist of what the cost would be

of letting an infestation run its course, although

some instructive historical evidence exists, such as

records of damage in average and plague years

before control campai nswere mounted. Costs of

not controlling an in estation would include the P

value of the crops lost plus resulting relief and

rehabilitation costs, e.g., food aid and seeds for

replanting.

Whencostsv.benefM are examined, the monetary

costs of the 1986 through 1%9 mntrol program may

not have yielded a favorable net return in terms of the

amount and value of cro saved USAID’s mid-term

evaluation ofits AELG project found that datawas r

not available to asses thevalue of cqs and livestock

saved (99). Some evidence, however, shows that the

value of production saved in 1986, generally did not

equal or exceed the value of inputs received fortreat-

$

mentinfiveoftheninesaheliancountries 72). Overa~ donor contributions of $40 million or control

seem hip compared to the estimated $46 million of

L

roductlon saved. These findings were based on the

t available, but admittedly unreliable, nationallevel aggregate data. USAID’s 1989 Programmatic

Environmental Assessment of grasshopperflocust

control incorporated the findings and underlying assumptions of this 1987 study. Thus, USAID accepted

the conclusion that the costs of the control program

in 1986, barely exceeded the value of the crops saved

Furthermore, historical data show that increases in

%

control rests do not necessa “ result in decreases in

crop lmwes. Data from earlier rt Locust plagues

show that average annual crop damage increased

175 percent between 1930 and 1955 even though

control expenditures climbed an average of 600

percent (15).

The costs of control relative to the value of

benefits is also affected by the efficiency of operations and the way that costs and benefits are

defined in space and time. Inappropriate spraying
Ch. 2-JWat Is 7he Problem? ● 57

and target selection increase the cost of control.

Earl treatment iscostly if benefits aredefined for

loca or national areas. Yet, early treatment may r

be considered economically efficient if it prevents

a Plague (95)” In that case, estimated benefits increase because they accrue to a number of

countries over a longer time period.

The cost-effectiveness of locust and grasshopper control pro rams has not been demonstrated

convincing .

i

dis is due, in part, to the scarcity of

data, and t at is understandable, given the constraints of data-gathering in vast, remote areas, the

few people and other resources that national

governments can devote to the task, and the emergen~ nature of the situation. No sin le organization N responsible for collecting the ind of data %

that would be required to provide a thorough

evaluation of the costs and benefits of control

o erations. Groups have concentrated on imp ementing control operations without asking I’

whether those efforts were, in fact, ecmomically

justified and without using part of their resources

to collect data on crop losses and control costs.

Without such data, sound policymaking is impossible.

After-the-fact cost/benefit analysis reinforces

the impression that control pro~rams are expensive and ineffective (95). Yet, this assessment may

be unfair because cost/benefit analysis is more

appropriately used to evaluate options before one

is selected. Also, cost/benefit analysis assumes

that money not put into one use would be available

for other uses. This is not the case here because

money available for disaster assistance is not

necessarily available for other uses.

A number of issues, such as local knowledge

and acceptance of the risks of control, are not well

captured in cost/benefit anal is yet may have important implications for t e effectiveness of r

F

rograms (131), for the rowth of institutions, and

or U.S. interests (9 ). In addition, donors’ f

responses to perceived emergencies do not follow

a strictly economic rationale. This assumes, however, that: 1) locust and grasshopper outbreaks or

upsurges are trul emergencies and 2) emergency

responses are e {fective. These are questionable

assumptions (95).

Certainly if control operations cannot be justified on the basis of monetary costs alone, it would

be hard to justi

7

such efforts based on broader

definitions of ef activeness that account for additional costs (or hazards and risks) such as environmental and health hazards. For example, attempts

to calculate the costs and benefits of current control pro rams have not estimated the real or

potentia costs of loss of beneficial organisms, f’

onset of insect resistance, and general environmental contamination.

Regardless of debates about cost/benefit

analysis, it remains clear that control costs in

Africa can be reduced. Spra@g efficiency can be

improved. In addition, cmslderable room for improvement exists in determining provisional

economic thresholds for making pesticide application decisions (95).

HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Finding: Safe, environmentally sound use of insecticides was not emmmd dun”ng the 1986 through

1989 grasshopper and locust control pngrams and

human and envinmmental exposure were, at times,

dizngmmsly high. Application, stkwage, anddikposal

of insectitidk wem not monitm?d adequately, nor

wemthe cumulative e~its of other health and sprayingprwgrams taken h account.

Human Exposure

Evidence from a variety of sources suggests

that direct and indirect human ex osure to msecticides was sometimes dangerous y high in recent r

campaigns. At least half of the respondents to

OTA’S survey indicated that either accidental

Poisoning of humans or adverse environmental

impacts due to pesticide use had been detected.

Frequent instances of contamination in ground

spraying crews were observed in the Gambia,

resulting in some poisonings (114). The AELGA

mid-term evaluation cites a story of flies dropping

on contact with a control technician even after he

washed thoroughly (99). Insecticide poisoning

was reported in Ni er as a result of people eating

5 treated locusts (99 . Also, human poisoning occurred when “empty” pesticide containers were

reused to store water or food (77).
58 ● A Plague of Locusts

Numerous pesticid~, known to be toxic to

grassho persandlocustsatdifferentformulations,

rates o application, temperatures, etc., also ? constitute various levels of hazard to people, according to the U.N. World Health Organization (111):

● extremely hazardous (parathion),

!

. hi hly hazardous (aldrin, dichlorvos,

die drm, DNOC),

. moderately hazardous (al ha

bendiocarb, BHC (or iici?y%%%$;

carbosulfan, chlorp rifos, cyhalothrm,

F

rmet~ D~ Jeltame~ diazino~

enitrothio~ fenvalera~ ~ptachlor,-

@Q@~J~1

● slightly hazarcbus (acephate, malathion).

The health effects of insecticides can be acute

or chronic, depending on the amount, extent, and

duration of exposure, chemical concentration, and

individual sensitivity. With sufficient exposure at

sub-acute levels, some chemicals produce chronic

health effects, includin cancer and neurological

and reproductive disor ers. For example, t aldrin,

BHC, dieldrin, and lindane accumulate and

remain in the human body for considerable

periods of time, with the ~tential for chronic

effects. USAID has rohiblted the use of these

persistent pesticides ?orhealth and environmental

reasons since the late 1970s (43). The impact of

long term exposure of entire populations in given

are;s to pes~icides from a v~riety of agricufiural

and health spraying programs is largely undocumented. However, the fact that large numbers of

people may unknowingly e~rien~ subclinical,

chronic changes without having been offered information or risk-reducing choices is worrisome

(95).

People can inhale or ingest insecticides directly or absorb these chemicals through their skin.

Also, people can be exposed to insecticides indirectly through food or water supplies. For instance, locusts and grasshoppers are used as food

in many African countries, es

r

ially by children,

and they may in est chemica residues by eating

sprayed insects. however, the relative importance

of locusts in people’s diets is not known, nor do

data seem to emst on the amount of pesticide

residues on insects prepared as food.

People are likely to be exposed to significant

levels of

r

ticide residues in other ways, also.

USAID- unded field trials of six pesticides’

residues in Sudan detected levels high enough that

researchers recommended that bendiocarb should

be limited to areas not used for agriculture or

grazing, and that post-spray harvesting be

restricted after fenithrothion and chlorpyrifos use

(28). The dangers of exposure to insecticide

residues in food and water supplies are known but

were not routinely monitored as part of the spray

campaigns in Africa. Insufficient attention was

paid to the danger of contamination of alreadyscarce fd, groundwater, and surface water in the

recent campaigns. Insecticides that break down

relatively quickly, such as malathion, are less likely

to reach water sources than more persistent ones,

such as lindane, but pesticide choice has not, by

and large, been dictated by criteria such as potential envmonmental contamination.

Accidental exposure to pesticides can occur in

a variety of ways: whens raying equi ment malfunctions, when chemicas are store with little Y f

regard to long term safety, or when containers are

reused inappropriately (14). Technicians and

herders have the highest probability of significant

chemical exposure m locust and grasshopper control programs (27 . Technicians are more likely

than the genera population to be aware of )

insecticides’ hazards but few were trained to avoid

them. Also, pesticides are often used in developing countries with inadequate safe uards for

operators. Protective gear (goggles, ace masks, i!

respirators, boots, gloves and special protective

clothing) is often unavailable. Or, its use may not

be perceived as worth the discomfort in tropical

climates. Soa and water for washing after

handling or app ying pesticides may be scarce. 1’

Some contamination does occur, especially in

areas where pesticides are not widely used and

technicians are unfamiliar with them. Lack of

training increases the risks of im roper application and, thus, dangerous leves of exposure. /

Over-application of malathion occurred, for example, because control personnel mistakenly expected it to be a fast-acting insecticide and sprayed

until insects dropped (99). While some training in

safe pesticide use was developed during the recent

cam ai ns, too few people participated for it to

reac t e people most in need. [[
Ch. 2–W4at Is 7he Problem? ● 59

Some believe that the public’s exposure to

pesticides used for locust control is likely to be

quite small, especially because spraying often

takes place over sparsely settled areas. However,

USAID evaluators observed that “pesticide

poisonin of humans and livestock is a more immediate fethal threat than the presence of locust

swarms and hopper bands in isolated areas” (99).

Widely dispersed pastoralists and subsistence

farmers constitute a sizable portion of the population where locusts and grasshoppers occur, and

their exposure to spraying is unrecorded. Although officials attem ted towarn people inhabiting areas to be sprayJnot to eat locusts, radio and

print messa es did not reach many seminomadic

people and fow-resource farmers (99).

Collecting age and gender disa~gregated data

is especially Important in monitormg health impacts of pesticide spraying. Some chemical

residues may affect nursing mothers, but not other

people in the area.

Environmental Effects

Just as different insecticides pose various

levels of hazard to humans, some insecticides,

dosages, and methods of application are potentially more harmful to the environment than others

(table 2-4). The extent of damage that insecticides

inflict on the environment is not well-understood

although certain chemicals seem to be preferable

to others, given a region’s environmental characteristics.

Aerial application of fenitrothion have been,

reported to be phytotoxic to sorghum and reduce its

yield (84). Malathion and carba@ (like others) are

highly toxic to insect pollinator. Some evidence

suggests that the organophosphate pesticides

generally have adverse effects on nontarget terrestrial organisms. For exam le, fenitrotluon and

diazinon cankill birds (58 an malathion applied to f

mallard eggs adversely a ected fl! hatchlings (42).

Several examples of harm to nontarget organisms and the environment were re orted due

to the recent campaigns in Africa. 1?n Tunisia,

substantial numbers of honeybee colonies were

lost (50), damagin

f

economically important

apiculture and exten ing to the country’s produce

production because bees are important fruit tree

pollinators. The most dramatic case of animal loss

reported was the death of 30 sheep grazing in

pesticide-contaminated areas (50). Also, chemical residues were found in the soil following spraying programs in Mali and Morocco (12). But no

systematic program exists for monitoring the control program’s effects on humans or the environment, so the extent of the damage is unknown.

USAID’s recent Dynamac-run field trials were

expected to provide additional information on

these types of environmental risks, but a recent

evaluation found the design, implementation, and

analysis of the trials faulty due to lack of baseline

data, the insufficient involvement of the national

crop protection services, and the absence of

locusts in the Sudan trials (99).

“Many species may beat risk” based on potential impacts of the insecticides and given what is

known about their effects from American and

European research (95). The fenitrothion dosage

recommended by FAO is near the threshold at

which aerial applications cause immediate mortality to birds (93). Environmentally sensitive

habitats (such as wetlands and lakes) are located

in important control areas such as the outbreak

areas of the African Migratory Locust and the Red

Locust and certain of the Desert Locust’s breeding

areas. At least thus far, locust and grasshopper

control has taken precedence over protecting environmentally sensitive areas.

Storage and Disposal

Many feel that inadequate pesticide storage

facilities are an acute problem (46, 48, 101).

Generall , stores are poorly ventilated and need

repair. 8or example, the 19 storage facilities in

Somalia had leaking roofs, poor ventilation, and

cracked earth flmrs (l).

Improperly stored pesticides may lose their

effectiveness as well as pose a hazard. Undoubtedly some old stocks were used in the recent campaign without verifjing whether ingredients were

still active (37). And the leaks and spills that result

from improper handling and storage can lead to

major sources of contamination (95). For example,

25 200-liter barrels of malathion were badly

dented, some were leaking, and they were stored

in direct sunlight at a site in Al eria (89). A mound

of approximately 2,000 Five-llter cans of

dimethoate have corroded and leaked outside of

Khartoum, Sudan (49) and all of Sudan’s provincial stores needed complete overhaul when they

were examined in the mld-1980s (101). Twenty-six

20-954 0 - 90 - 3 : QL 3
60 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table 2-4-Toxicity of Various Pesticides to Non-Target Organisms

Aquatic -

Chemical Persistence Bioaccumulation Birds Mammals Fish invertebrates

Carbaryl L L-M L L L L

Diazinon M M M-H L M H

Dieldrin H H H H H M

Fenitrothion L M H L L

a H

Lindane M-H H M-H M M M

Malathion L L M L-M L L

Propoxur L-M L-M L-M M L H

Acephate L L L L L L

Bendiocarb M M M M M M

Chlorpyrifos M-H M-H -- M L-M H

Cypermethrin M-H H

b L H H

Lambda-cyhalothrin M H

b L H H H

Tralomethrin M H

b L L H H

my: L = low

M = medium

H = high

NOTES: aFenitrothion is m~emte~ tofic t. fish, Foster L. Ma er, Jr. and Mark R. Ellersieck, ~anual ofAcute To~”c~ : ~nt~remo”on and DatU

Basefor410 ChemicaLrand 66 S~ciesofFreshwater Jish, Resouree Publication 160 (Washington, DC: U.S. epartment of the % Intenor,

Fish and Wildlife Setiee, 1986), pp. 224-230.

bBased on log P.

SOURCE: TAMS, Inc. and the Consortium for ]nternationa] Crop protection, L~ust and Grasshopper Control in Ajiica/Asia: A Programmatic

Environment tal Assessmen & Exeeutive Summatv. contractor reoort m-eDared for the U.S. /bzenev for International Develo~ment. March

1989, p. EXSUM-25. ‘ ., 1 “ -. .

metric tons of old fenitrothion, dimethoate, and

heptachlor formed a toxic lake outside the Desert

Locust Control Center in North Yemen (48).

Many experts find that improved storage

facilities are urgently needed, along with the training to manage them, because sizable stocks of

insecticides, including the more hazardous organochlorines, exist in a number of countries. For

example, 60,000 liters of dieldrin are stored in

Mali, 56,000 liters in Mauritania, 35,500 liters in

Somalia, 30,0001iters in Ethio ia, and21,0001iters

L

in Niger 13). In some cases, indane and r dieldrin

are kept y the national crop rotection services

to use as a last resort only if ot er insecticides are [

not available or if infestations reach critical levels.

Suitable dis~sal facilities are lacking for these

and other pesticides and their containers. As a

result, only a portion are destroyed following

recommended procedures and excess stocks and

containers may be discarded in ways that make

human, land, or water contamination virtually certain. Many of the estimated 10,000200-liter metal

drums used in the recent campaign probably have

been used to store water, fuel, or grain or for a

variety of other purposes (77). Disposal procedures are highl variable among countries and

various donors a so assess the situation differently. 1’

In some cases, donors contribute to the

storage and disposal problems. Often, donated

insecticides are inadequately packaged for ship-
Ch. 2-Wuat Is The Problem? . 61

ping, storage, and use in the tropics, with labeled

mstructlons not understandable to the

r

rsons

handling them. For example, Ken a an North

Yemen received dimethoate in lea “ng drums in L

the late 1970s and were unable to use it. Now, the

old stocks remain, creating a disposal problem

(47,48).

Cumulative Effects

Pesticide use for locust and grasshopper control pro~rams should be put in the context of total

develo m country estlcide use. Chemicals a -

plied or ?!ocust an grasshopper control, whi e f Y

substantial, may be overshadowed by broad-scale

applications for other agricultural purposes and

for disease control. The amounts used for such

different purposes vary considerably, making it

difficult to sort out the potential impacts of each.

Generally, more pesticides are used in agriculture

than for health-related vector control. For example, estimates exist that Sudan uses 100 times

more pesticide on cotton crops than in malaria

control programs (95). Many of the same chemicals are used in both programs, as well as for

grasshopper and locust control. For example,

dieldrin, DDT, malathion, fenitrothion and

propoxur are, or have been, used for malaria control (14) and dieldrin for tsetse fly control (34).

Some fear that the overlap of various spraying

programs may lead to unanticipated human health

effects, increases in resistant disease vectors, or

greater likelihood of certain epidemics (14, 95).

Pesticide use seems tobeon the upswing. The

current shift from persistent organchlorines to organophosphate and carbamate compounds requires more frequent application. With the

amount of arable land available for new cultivation

diminishing, many African countries can only increase their agricultural production through more

intensive a riculture. Increased use of pesticides

is often a ey strategy and African farmers are i

using increased amounts of pesticides each year

(loo).

The Special Case of Dieldrin

Of those pesticides used for locust and

grassho per control, dieldrin’s use is the most

debate z,with the United States atodds with FAO

and French officials. In the United States, concerns are over the potentially “fearsome” (95)

negative effects of dieldrin’s widespread and longterm use in locust and grasshopper programs.

European and U.S. studies, beginnin in the

1960s, found substantial traces of die drin in f

human tissue. Problems of environmental persistence and negative effects on nontarget s

r

ies

also surfaced. As a result, EPA cancele most

dieldrin uses in the United States (133) and a

number of European countries followed suit (53).

Currently, USA.ID gives reference to shortlived, nonpersistent materias and to chemicals r

having EPA registration, articularly if registered

for the intended use. Lieldrin meets neither

criterion. Therefore, USAID supports no efforts

in which dieldrin is used. In lar e part, this restriction has led other donors and A!!/!rican governments

to abandon use of dieldrin in grasshopper and

locust control.

On the other hand, FAO (104) claims that the

severity of the 1988 desert locust infestation is

partl attributable to donors’ unwillin ness to

supp yr dieldrin in 1987. As a result, F O con- i

tends, swarms escaped on two major occasions

from restricted breeding areas, and gave rapid rise

to the expansion of the plague.

While the United States may regard [the effective

withdrawal of the use of dieldrin] as a victory, the fact

is that Desert Locust hopper control using nonpersistent pesticides will be much more time-consuming, must less effective, and much more expensive

than it was with dieldrin. Our prediction is that this

will substantially increase the likelihood of seasonal

upsurges developing into major upsurges and

plagues, at least until such time as some of the

postulated alternatives prove effective. (13)

French officials, relying on recommendations

of a French research agency (PRIFAS), also disagree with the U.S. position to withhold dieldrin.

However, as African countries become more

aware of dieldrin’s harmful effects, they have become more supportive of the U.S. pcxntion, even

impounding donated stocks of dieldrin. For example, Ca Verde nowbans allpesticides thatare

prohibite in the United States (99). r

Dieldrinis no longer reduced insizablequantities, except perhaps in ibya and India (121), so L

continuing debates regarding its use center on

whether existing stocks should be destroyed or

used in remote areas with special guidance. The
62 ● A Plague of Locusts

most recent estimate is 380,000 liters stored in

West Africa 77). Currently, FAO policy is that

use of availab e stocks is left to countries \ m which

they are located, as specified in the International

Code of Conduct on the Use and Distribution of

Pesticides.

INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL

ASPECTS OF CONTROL

Finding: Mixrtinstitutions-whetherA&ican natwrud or regional or donor-am not equipped to deal

with grasshopper, bust, or otherpestpmblems on a

long-term basis. Development needs are often

sacrlji!i!ed in favor of crisis mamgement. Disputes

within, betwee~ and among A@an countries and

donors constrain theefli?ctivenes sofshort-term emergency programs and kmger-term preventive ones.

Institutional Factors

A variety of institutional problems related to

pest management are commonplace in Africa.

Many countries lack the resources~perational

aircraft, vehicles, communications an~ts~pr~~sig

equipment, and fuel–to deal with

many lack the le al structure forre~uY ating im ort~

application, an disposal of pesticides. Few ave t E

medical facilities to treat pesticide poisoning or

extension programs to tram farmers how to use

pesticides roperly. Most countries lack personnel traine to detect environmental damage from Z

insecticide use, to assess economics of locust control, and the effects of changing land use, etc.

Coordination between agencies is difficult to

achieve, and many other agricultural problems

compete for scarce research attention.

These conditions are true for many countries,

but wide variations exist also. Generally, the

northwest African governments have more welldeveloped infrastructure, more trained personnel,

and far more resources than Sahelian governments.

Teng (96) documented shortcomings of

African national plant-protection services m 15

tropical West and Central African countries (table

2-5). Some problems were common to most public

institutions, such as cumbersome decisionmaking

and staff reductions accompanying policy reforms.

But others were specific to these services. Major

forms of plant rotection infrastructure are not in

place in many &rican countries, for example, only

five African countries have pesticide laws (%).

A variety of additional factors affect locust and

grasshopper rograms specifically, especially due

to the epis0?ic nature of upsurges. Much of the

infrastructure built for rasshopper and locust research and control gra fually lapsed after the last

major Desert Locust plague ended in 1%3. Many

European experts with valuable field experience

gained in earlier campaigns had retired or died

without training replacements. As a result, little

institutional memory remained when the current

upsurge began and the new generation of entomologists had not faced ~roblems of this kind or

scale before. Thus, existing African and donor

infrastructure was incapable of handling this emergencyeffort well, let alone mountinga longer-term

approach that would emphasize upsurge prevention.

An examination of these specific problems was

made in Chad, highli hting problems of imprecise

data on the extent o the problem, vehicle break- t!’

down, oor training, shortage of survey materials

and ot er equipment, lack of preparation before E

the rainy season, inaccurate treatment figures, and

no records of undesirable environmental effects

(11). Donor-supported programs may not be sustainable given such conditions. For example,

USAID’s 1987 training-of-trainer efforts broke

down when Sahelian governments did not allocate

sufficient funds for travel costs and other expenses

needed for these newly trained personnel to train

field-level staff, in turn (95).

National crop protection services benefit from

the international support that follows a disaster

and national governments may exaggerate the

locust and grassho per problem in an effort to

obtain resources. 8ften crop protection services

rely on these funds for maintaining their staff,

vehicles, and spraying and communication equipment. Governments take the opportunity to

restock imported insecticides that could be used

against insects other than grasshoppers and locusts

(114). Even under the best of circumstances,

locusts and grasshoppers are difficult to count.

For example, hopper bands in remote areas are

difficult to detect and maybe undercounted, but

migrating swarms are sighted in many areas and are

easily overcounted. FAO, like other U.N. a encies, compiles information from indivi ual

countries rather than collecting independent data.

With no means toveri$data supplied by individual
Ch. 2-What Is The Problem? ● 63

Table 2-5-Strengths of Fifteen West and Central Aftican Countriesa in Various Areas of

Plant Protection

percent of Countries in cate~

Area of plant protection Good Moderate Poor

Plant protection personnel 7 40 46

Pest control equipment o 47 47

Support facilities o 13 80

Plant protection laboratories o 47 47

Pest diagnostic laboratories o 47 47

Plant quarantine buildings, equipment 7 40 40

Pesticides available locally o 43 20

Plant protection service 7 20 40

Agricultural schools, training facility 7 66 20

Specialized plant protection curriculum 7 33 53

1nstitutionalized research 7 53 20

On-farm, applied research o 13 74

Pest lists 13 47 33

Pest distribution knowledge o 47 40

Pest biology knowledge 7 7 13

Economic loss knowledge o 27 40

Pest control knowledge o 20 80

Overall strength:

Extension 7 40 40

Research 20 54 13

Training 7 46 40

NOTE: aCountries in surv

3

were Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,

IVOV Coast, Liberia, igeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, and Zaire

SOURCE: P.S. Teng, “Plant Protection Systems in Weat and Central Africa-A Situation Analysis,” unpublished report to U.N. Food and

Agriculture Organization’s Plant Protection Setviee (Rome, FAO) August 1985.

countries, neither technical errors nor institutional incentives for over-stating can be balanced.

In sub-Saharan Africa, locust and grasshopper

control is unlikely to ever be the sole responsibdity

of national crop protection services or other national groups, even under the best of

circumstances. First, man locust and grasshopper

breeding areas, especia7 ly that of the Desert

Locust, are in remote and uncultivated areas that

the national crop protection setices have neither

the resources nor clear mandate to reach. Also,

extensive seasonal migration patterns mean that

insects originating in one country threaten crops

in another. The ong recession periods between f

insect upsurges mean plans can go untested for

long periods of time and scarce national resources

can be diverted to other efforts.

The re ional African institutions in the Sahel,

establish to pool scarce technical resources and c1?’

to accommodate the regional nature of these

migratory pests, also are beset with funding and

management problems. In addition, they are subject to conflicting and chan ing approaches of

member states and donors. l?’or example, institutional weaknesses of the Permanent Interstate

Committee for Drought Control (CILSS), a

regional intergovernmental organization in the

Sahel, were cited as a major reason for the disappointing performance of the regional integrated

pest management project of the 1970s (128).
64 ● A Plague of Locusts

Similarly, shortcoming s in donor programs

have been documented. hnors and insecticide

manufacturers were un~repared for the recent

upsurges, like their African counterparts. As a

result, technologies selected for the recent control

effort did not differ si nificantly from those used

in the early 1960s. I?ewer insecticides and containers had not been tested in Africa, and the latter

proved inadequate in the African setting. USAID

had little scientific capacity to carry out a longterm, technically sound locust and grasshopper

control program. U.S. entomologists were

brought on as temporary cmsultants, interns, or

borrowed from other agencies. Few had field experience dealing with locust and grasshopper upsurges in Africa. Fewer spoke French, and most

of the area affected in the recent upsurges is Francophone.

Locust and grasshopper programs became

crisis management, in part, because of this lack of

preparedness. And, the high costs of crisis

management are nearly unammously cited as a

problem (99). Generally, emergency assistance

has not been done with an eye to future development needs; nor has development assistance

usually incorporated disaster mitigation (68). The

locust and grasshopper programs were no exception.

Developmental goals of locust and grasshopper programs are not well defined and tend to be

overshadowed by the attention to the emergency

effort. Emphasis on crisis management can narrow other opportunities due to direct competition

for funds within donors’ budgets, shifts to more

readily funded short-term research, etc. For example, USAID mission buy-ins for emergency activities reduced the amount available for

long-term development projects, and particularly

adversely affected countries with small USAID

programs (99). Similarly, USAID-funded training

programs were suspended in 1988 because resources were redirected to emergency control. A

related result was confusion over roles and responsibilities, especially within USND missions. For

example, the USAID missions’ locust and

grasshopper staff

r

rformed the duties of other

staff, often for t e sake of expediency (114).

Generally, an emphasis on short-term emergency

management has also meant that donors and

African agencies missed opportunities to tap local

resources such as people’s indigenous knowledge

of pest biology (57).

Crisis operations do not lend themselves well

to institution-building and the present campaign

was no exception. For example, due to the lack of

preparedness of the African regional institutions

such as the Joint Locust and Bird Control Organization OCLALAV), expatriates under the

aus ices of AO ran the control operations, k especial y aerial spraying, in much of the Sahel. This r

F

arallel organization resulted in a technically efeetive control program that, inadvertently, further undermined OCLALAV (99).

Differences in strategy and tactics among

donors led to confusion among African officials

re arding technical ap roaches and to costly

de ays and duplication o effort. Also, differences f ?

increased pressure on the African officials who

dealt with the oft-conflicting requirements while

attemptin to manage national campaigns. For

example, Fleld personnel had to be trained in the

E

roper use and maintenance of several different

inds of spraying equipment for the same use.

Donors agree that emergency relief has substantial popular appeal. Further, USAID and

FAO agree that lack of funds constrains them from

implementing key components of a more preventive approach, e.g., lon~-term institution building

of crop protection semces, providing equi~ment

and training for surveillance and monitormg of

insects, pre-~sitioning of pesticides to reduce

costly air freight expenses, and setting up mobile

units to sumey and control locusts in “strategic”

breeding areas in remote areas.

These institutional perspectives, combined

with the lack of important information, help explain the tendency to exaggerate locust and

grasshopper problems and to take a crisis management approach. Acting in one’s self-interest is appropriate, and actin

!

in the interest of one’s

organization is norma. The common good, however, requires balancing individual self-interest

and the interests of others. To do this, leaders

need an accurate view of overall problems. Sometimes this view was lost during the recent campaign. For example, frequent assertions by

representatives of FAO, USAID, and African

governments that the recent upsurges were the
Ch. 2–Wtat Is The Problem? . 65

worst locust lague ever recorded are not documented (see Flgure 1-3).

The Politics of Locusts and Grasshoppers

There are those who claim that locusts and

grasshoppers are primarily “political pests” because

of politwal pressure to mount a control campaign.

Some of this ressure is readily understandable:

locusts are hig 1!ly visible, swarms can create panic,

they can cause severe damage in localized areas, and

large-scale aerial spraying is more easily undertaken

and provides more visible results than alternatives.

Memories of devastating incidents caused by

Desert Locusts and other swarming insects in the

1940s and 1950s can lead political leaders to

respond urgently to the ~rceived threat of disaster. This, combined wth popular perceptions

that these insects cause severe crop damage, increases political pressure to mount an aggressive

control effort. For example, during the recent

upsurge, Moroccans and others often referred to

the near-total damage caused in 1954 and 1955 by

Desert Locusts in the Seuss Valley where orange

trees are the most valuable agricultural product.

This damage was estimated at $14 million in 1954

dollars 13); at least 10 percent of Morocco’s

farmlan was affected mostly in the south and i

Seuss Vane (115). Moroccans feared that the

insects wou d cause similar serious damage even 1’

though swarms of the Desert Locust came to the

Seuss Valley in 29 of the 55 years up to 1968 (79)

without causing such damage. A crisis mentality

and erception of imminent disaster can lead

peep e to act hastily and may account for some of f

the carelessness in pesticide use and over-spraying

that occurred in the recent campaign (99).

Emergency Control pro rams are pular, like

other disaster assistance e forts. O all kinds of f F

forei n aid programs, Americans support disaster

relie the most; three quarters of Americans sur- i!’

veyed recently gave it top priority (23). Thus,

donors, like their African counterparts, come

under political pressure from legislatures and the

public to act during locust and grasshopper

upsurges.

Also, donors do not want to be left out or

appear unresponsive when African governments

request disaster assistance. USAID, like the national crop protection services, benefits from support garnered during a disaster. USAID officials

can readily justi~ requests to Congress for additional funds to stop a plague of locusts, and those

funds generally are forthcoming.

Other vested interests come into play during

locust and grassho per campaigns, such as

preferences for bi 1’ateral over multilateral

programs, tied aid requirements, or funding

pro~rams in certain countries but not others for

pohtical reasons. These factors often override

decisionmakingbased on technical considerations.

For example, some advocate sharply curtailing

fenitrothion’s use because of potential environmental damage. Political factors are likely to enter

into such a decision-whether made by USAID,

FAO, or African Governments. The United States

would be seen as advocatin U.S.-manufactured

alternatives (American tyanamid produces

malathion and Union Carbide, carbaryl) to the

Japanese- and German-produced fenitrothion.

The most public differences amen donors in

this recent campaign related to pestici# e selection

and application methods. However, many less

visible differences existed regarding overall

development goals and strategies. For example,

donors disagreed on the relative importance of

increasing net agricultural production, increasing

yield, increasing farm income, building democratic

institutions, developing a more equitable distribution of power, or supporting sustainable agriculture. Different donors also assessed the locust and

grasshopper situation differently and proposed

different control strategies-e. g., the highest

priority sites for treatment, whether ground or

aerial sprayin

#

should be done, what types of

aircraft shoul be used, whether or not to emphasize training or environmental monitoring, etc.

Also, donor agencies disagreed internally on many

of these items.

Finally, coordinating a regional response is

made more complicated by political roblems

within and between affected countries. ivil strife 8

and wars in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, and

Mauritania prevented survey and control campaigns from reaching locust breeding areas before

swarms grew large and began migrating. For example, in 1987 the Ethiopian Government did not

allow the Desert Locust Control Organization for

Eastern Africa and the Red Cross to conduct survey and control efforts in the Tigre, Eritrea, and

Wolla provinces due to civil war. These are ‘

seasonal Desert Locust breeding areas where the
66 ● A Plague of Locusts

upsurge might have been contained. Nor was the

national crop protection service able to carry out

control efforts in these areas, although the

Eritrean Liberation Front trained and equipped

its members to conduct effective ground control

operations (19).

Land mines in the Western Sahara precluded

ground survey and control efforts; a USAID-contracted spray plane was downed by a Polisario

missile there, killing the five on board. Also, longstanding border disputes constrained cooperation

between countries. Morocco, frustrated by ineffective control efforts in Sahelian countries that

resulted in swarms invading the southern part of

Morocco, proposed sending their survey and control teams into Mauritania in military-like missions.
Chapter 3

Strategies for the Future
CONTENTS

Page

WHAT USAID DID WELL ● ****4*****.**.******+**”.***”***********”****** 69

Promoting Internal and External Coordination , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @

ProvidingTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .=......” ,.*”.”””~*ooos TO

AdvocatingSoundInsecticide Use. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . .....=.=. .==. ””-”” TO

HOW TO DO BETI’ER NEXT TIME ● *e ● ● ● * 9 ● ● ● ● 0 ● ● ● * ● * ● e ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ****** ● ● ● ● O 71

The FeasililityandPrice ofPrevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....=..” 72

Integrating13mergeriq”COntxOl Programs Into ~ng TerrnDeVelOPrnent . . ’73

1ndividualorMultipestStrategies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. = ... = .......=” ~~

Whenand Where ShouldContrOl Programs Remounted? ..*...* . . . . . . .

WHAT CONTRALTO USE: THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

IntegratedPest Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....=.-. ...=”. 76

MonitoringInsects, Weather, andVegetation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Figure

3-1 PrincipalSatelMesUs edinEarly Warning andForecasting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

Tables

3-1 OTASurveyRespondents: Percent occurrent and Ideal LoCustEffortS

Foeused onCrisis,Reliefi andPrevention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

3-2 ControlTactics NowEmployed Against Major Pestsof Wheatinthe

U.S. Great PlainsandSorghum inTexas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Chapter 3

Strategies for the Future

OTA’S analysis found that the 1986-89 locust

and grasshopper control campaigns in Africa were

based on questionable premises, with partially effective to ineffective im lamentation. Yet, some

things worked well and 8.S. efforts contributed to

these successes.

WHAT USAID DID WELL

Finding: US~D& commendable attempts:

1) to coordinate its eflorts with other U.S. agenciks,

foreign donom, and A&can o~iak; 2) to provide

training for A~ans and U.S. pemonnel; and 3) to

highlight iksues of sound iksectkidk choke, stkrage,

applicatwn, and dikposal. Overall, the internathud

control campaign lkked these characteristics, however. USAID didprevail successfidly against the use

of dieldrin.

Promoting Internal and External

Coordination

The U.S. Agency for International Develo -

ment (USAID) coordinated its work successfurIy

within USAID and with other U.S. Government

agencies involved in the campaigns despite formidable institutional constraints. The Desert

Locust Task Force, established within USAID’s

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA),

was one of the most effective means of coordination within the U.S. Government. From July 1988

through June 1989, the Task Force held weekly

meetin s to share information, assign res~onsibility or implementing activities, and coordinate F’

efforts.

Also, OFDA brou ht together people representingavariety of US Departments and other h

organizations to review results from the revious

year’s efforts, to identi~ lessons Iearnef , and to

plan more effective future control. OFDA sponsored two workshops for Task Force members

from Washington, DC, USAID mission staff from

Africa, and outside experts. First, the U.S. Forest

Service’s Disaster Assistance Support Program

managed a 3-day workshop in January 1988 in

Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, for 69 officials,

mostly from the U.S. Government, to evaluate the

1986 and 1987 campaigns and provide direction for

a staff guidebook on locust and grasshopper

programs. Then, 32 participants took part in a

4-day, February 1989, workshop in Dakar,

Senegal; they reviewed each country’s 1988 campaign and were introduced to the finalized USAID

guidebook.

This 1989 Locust/Grasshop er Management

Operations Guidebook is wel $-prepared and

thorough, for the most part. It promdes a comprehensive overview of USAID’s policies regarding locust and grasshopper control, includes useful

back round information on the insects’ biology

and iehavior, sets forth the rationale and procedures for mounting a control operation, provides

details on conducting insect surveys and selecting

appropriate control techniques, and includes helpfulsupplementary information e.g., pesticide-use

guidelines, procurement proce$ures).

OTA expects that the Guidebook will contribute to a more expert, consistent, and coordinated U.S. response to rasshopper and locust

problems in the future. f used effectively, the f

Guidebook could achieve its purpose: “... to assist

Missions to assess, prepare for, and organize

locust/grasshopper control programs on an emergency and non-emergency basis” (118, p. I-2).

The Guidebook is the most up-to-date operational source for selecting insecticides for U.S.-

funded work and lists a number of selection

considerations. However, the database on insecticides constantl changes. For example, the U.N.

World Health rganization’s Hazard Classifica- d

tion, revised every 2 years, now has different

ratings for a proximate one-fourth of the esticides incluZ ed in the 19 i 9Guidebook. US . &

preparing Country Supplemental Environment~~

Assessments in 1990, with technical assistance

from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), to apply thecontinent-wide Programmatic

Environmental Assessment to the individual

countries planning to use insecticides against

grasshoppers and locusts. This process, which aims

to make more site-specific plans, could allow updated information on different chemical products

to be incorporated in the supplemental assessments simultaneously. However, these supplemental assessments also will need to be revised

periodically to remain current.

69
70 ● A Plague of Locusts

USAID actively promoted coordination

among other donors and African governments,

and agreement exists that coordination and collaboration among countries increased as the

recent campai ns progressed. For example, representatives o !USAID or the U.S. De artment of

Agriculture’s (USDA) Animal and P ant Health r

Inspection Service attended erhaps a dozen

meetings sponsored the U.N.5oodandAgriculture Organization ( AO) to share information 8

and plan future strate . USAID funded FAO’S

Emer enc Centre or Locust Operations Y

(ECL&), tte worldwide coordination site for

locust and rassho per control operations, and

USAID sta f prow ed ECLO with data on insect ! “cl’

F

ovulations and U.S. control efforts. The Bureau

or Science and Technology participated in the

World Bank’s Special Program for African

Agricultural Research on locusts.

USAID required that recipient countries have

an operational Country Coordinating Committee,

composed of representatives from relevant

government and donor or animations, before U.S.

emergen~ funds were re eased. f USAID mission

staff participated in these committees and also

maintained direct contact with the national crop

protection setices and other African agencies involved in control.

Providing Training

USAIDprovided trainin foritsownpersonnel

and Afi-ican officials throu# workshops and the

provision of technical assistance. Additionally, the

United States funded trainin programs for

Africans, conducted by FA and regional d

organizations. For example, FAO trained Sahelian

national crop

1

rotectlon personnel in locust

surveillance an another group, Application of

Agrometeorology and Hydrology for the Sahel

[

AGRHYME , conducted an annual short course T

or African officials on using “greenness maps.” This

training and technical assistance, together with the

provision of equipment and supplies, undoubtable

strengthened the ca acity of national institutions to

mount future locusJfasshop~rsumyandcontrol

programs and to eal wlt other agricultural

problems.

USAID conducted 10 training workshops

from 1987 through late 1989 with a total of approximately 150 participants. One early workshop

on how to plan and manage aerials rayin operations was attended by Africans ~om &negal,

Gambia, Niger, and Sudan. From April through

June 1989, three regional workshops were held on:

1) aerial and ground ultra-low volume (ULV) application, 2) training extension workers to use new

teaching materials on pesticide use, and 3) human

health impacts of pesticide application (121). A

February 1990 conference on pesticide disposal,

held in Niame , Niger, attracted 58 participants

from 15 West rican countries and international Kf

organizations such as Earthwatch and Greenpeace. Action plans were drawn up for each

count . Otherworkshops planned for 1990 areon

identi?lcation of immature Sahelian grasshoppers

and crop loss assessment.

USAID developed some useful materials for

its training efforts. For example, the Pesticide

Users Guuie, prepared in four languages for

African extensmn agents, details how to conduct

pest sumeys, plan insecticide applications, and

apply, transport, store, and dispose of pesticides.

In addition, USAID funded publication of a field

manual for identifying immature grasshoppers

(51).

USAID attem ted to increase its own technical capacity by orrowing experts from other E

U.S. agencies and hiring consultants from universities and rivate firms. An effort was made to pair

senior an junior entomologists on technical assis- f

tance teams to increase the pool of expertise available in the future. USAID encouraged

participation of African officials on the several

dozen U.S. technical assistance teams sent to

Africa. This practice imparts on-the-job training–

for those U.S. scientists unfamiliar with Mican

conditions as well as for African experts unfamiliar

with some recent pest management technologies.

Advocating Sound Insecticide Use

USAID advocated safe and sound insecticide

use throughout the 1986-89 campaign and enforced its relevant environmental policies. Its

greatest success was persuading other donors and

African governments not to use dieldrin, even

though many African countries had existing

dieldrin stocks and FAO and France urged its use.

With encouragement from USAID, FAO is taking

inventory of existing stocks of dieldrin, beginning

a study of potential environmental risks of dieldrin
Ch. 3–Strategiesfor the Futire ● 7 1

use in areas where the Desert Locust is present,

and intends to develop a plan for use or destruction of dieldrin based on these findings (104).

USAID, too, has compiled some information on

stocks of dieldrin (99) and sent EPA representatives to advise African officials on storage

and disposal of surpluses.

USAID’s efforts also increased awareness in

Africa of the potential dangers of the persistent

organochlorines and helped reduce the use of benzene hexachloride (BHC) and lindane. USAID

encouraged the use of less toxic chemicals and, to

a limited extent, tested new insecticides for locust

and grasshopper control under African conditions.

USAID promoted increased efficiency in

some spray operations, for example, by propositioning insecticides in Africa to reduce high air

freight costs. Bysu porting application of satellite

remote sensing to ocust r surveillance and funding

research on alternative control methods, USAID

began to lay the groundwork for reduced reliance

on spraying as the only available response to locust

and grasshopper upsurges.

USAID included safety concerns in its technical assistance and training rograms, e.g., by

providing protective clothing or spray operators. i!’

USAID claims it was the first to introduce

cholinesterase testing into locust control programs

in Africa. Moroccan applicators were tested

before, during, andaftersprayin in 1988and 1989

to determine if the enzyme ciolinesterase had

been suppressed by pesticides (51).

Also, USAID exhibited concern about the environmental effects of control programs, in particular by preparin$ environmental assessments

for Morocco, Tunisia, and all of Africa and Asia

affected. Since mid-1989, USAID has been designing ways to implement the 38 recommendations of

the Programmatic Environmental Assessment

Hp. ) E . Technical assistance teams are assisting

rlcan nations on the safe disposal of empty containers and surplus insecticides now that

widespread spraying is unnecessary.

USAID is seen as among the strictest donors

regarding safe pesticide disposal and is planning to

take stronger measures in the future. Its operational Guidebook contains directions for storing,

packaging, labeling anddisposingof pesticides and

emp~ containers. An annex contains a co of

FAOs 1985 Guidelines for the Disposal of aste P

Pestide and Pesticide Containerson the Farm that

details physical, chemical, and biological disposal

methods. Some other donors have similar interests and a recent workshop on disposal of obsolete

pesticides and empty containers in Niamey

demonstrated African concern as well.

In short, USAID succeeded in almost

eliminating the use of the most hazardous chemical, dieldrm, and identified some lessons learned

for improved strate ies and tactics for future

programs. The overa F1 locust campaign, however,

demonstrated the need for more coordinated action, far more training, better understanding of

locust and grasshopper d amics and effects on

crop yields, and improve control methods. For P

example, the new Locust/Grasshopper Management Operdars Guidebook fails to discuss the

debate over the relative roles of control in insect

declines; USAID’s 1988 training sessions were

sidelined when its resources were redirected to

spraying activities; USAID’S training and technical

assistance reached only a few Africans; and, in

some cases, USAID did not convince Africans of

less toxic chemicals’ effectiveness.

Admittedly, USAID is only one im rtant

actor, having provided about one-fifth o donor r

funding for recent control campaigns. Thus,

USAID has limited responsibility for the failures

of recent campaigns, as well as their successes.

HOW TO DO BE’ITER NEXT TIME

Finding: tinom and~tin governme~ cannot aflord to fund expensive control campaigns

without &mssing@ndame& questions regarding

goals and implementation. Now ii the time tajhd

methodk that wntribute to kmg-tlnn development,

redouble pmve~”ve eforts, and decidk WW actiims

will be most efiective during the ti upsurge.

Doing better in the future, during recessions

and upsurges of these insects, revolves a

reexamination of fundamental questions regarding who should do what, and when, where, how,

and why it should be done. These are broad policy

questions encompassing all as~cts of control

~rograms. For example, which resects should be

included in programs (individual pests or groups
72 ● A Plague of Locusts

of similar pests), where control should be mounted

(“strategic” areas, breeding sites, or anywhere),

when control should be undertaken (when a

plague threatens, when swarms threaten crops, or

whenever insects become gregarious), why control

is needed (e.g., to stop plagues, save crops, or

prevent famine) and how control is best done (e.g.,

aerial or round spraying, four- or single-engine

planes orielicopters).

Control or animations, host governments, and

‘onop ‘ave ‘ie ‘eTnsibili? ‘0 questions. Here, O A ldentl ES some elements answer ‘hese

of the discussion and notes that resolution of these

issues shouldbe attem tednowthat upsurges have

subsided for a time. &e roles of various groups–

who should do what–also need to be clarified. This

question is addressed in chapter 4.

Further discussion and clarification are especially needed regarding the goals of the control

programs and indicators to measure their results

within specified times. Do the programs aim to

prevent plagues, stop plagues, protect cro s, or

end famine? Different oals imply dif ?erent

strategies, action plans, an evaluation criteria. t

The Feasibility and Price of Prevention

The FAO and USAID officials responsible for

grasshopper and locust control pro~rams maintain

that knowledge is available that, lf properly applied, could prevent future lagues of locusts and

grasshoppers (12, 95, 121). ~lagueprevention has

consisted, since the 1960s, of making surveys in

seasonal breeding areas and controlling any already-gregarious resects or populations becoming

gregarious (70). Certainly, the feasibility of

prevention steadily increases as additional

countries agree to participate in such an approach

durin recessions; as breeding areas are more

clear y identified; as improved methods are f

developed for forecasting the rise and movement

of insect populations, weather systems, and plant

cover; and as more effective, carefully aimed control operations are mounted. However, some factors that contribute to plagues are unresolvable by

existing technologies or largely beyond the control

of donors. These constraints include the un redictability of weather and disputes within an be- X

tween countries. Also, wide-scale implementation

of what is known, e.g., about effective spraying, is

often exceedingly difficult under actual conditions. Thus, OTA questions whether donors and

affected countries can prevent upsur es and

plagues, although that goal is lauda~le and

deserves to be foremost.

FAO finds that:

although there is a rational strategy for the

p~evention of desert locust pla ues, and tactics and

techniques have been evolvJto implement that

strategy, circumstances can still combine to lead to

the threat of the development of a new major plague.

Furthermore such combinations of circumstances,

and in particular sequences of widespread heavy

rain, cannot yet be forecast

and concluded that:

local outbreaks capable of !eading to major

~~urges are likely to be a recurrent but intermittent

feature of Desert must population dynamics. . .

(81, cited in 13).

The preventive strategy FAO and USAID advocate thus requires a certain amount of continuing monitoring and control. Usuall , that has not

been done between upsurges. FA and 6 USAID

officials are requesting funds for a plying this

strategy now with the ex licit o~ jective of

preventing future outbreaks romdevelopinginto [

plagues.

They, like others, assume that plague prevention costs less than plague control. This seems

correct intuitively but it has yet to be proven.

Donor costs of the 1986-89 control campaign,

8

rincipally against the Desert Locust and

enegalese Grasshopper, were $275 million. In

1988, representatives from several governments

met in Fez, Morocco and approved plans for a

multinational ongoing survey and control operation to monitor the Desert Locust in its remote

Sahelian breedin areas. This International

Desert Locust Tas Force, with 5 main units and f

13 sub-units in strategic areas, carried a $77.4 million price tag. As the plague subsided, the estimate

for Phase I in 1989 was revised down to $3.5 million

(106). Thus, the cost of maintaining these mobile

units is far less than the cost of the recent control

campai n in an equivalent period. However, the

costs o plague prevention v. control should be F

calculated over a longer time period from a

broader base, e.g., perhaps including costs for

monitoring and controlling other grasshoppers

and locusts and the related expenses of the national crop protection services.
Ch. 3-Strategies forthe~utire ● 73

FAO proposed recently a 5-year re ional

preventive Desert bcust control rogram or the !

8 countries of Maghreb and theJahel. FAO asserts that control measures in a eneralized invasion would cost, in 1 year, w at preventive E

control activities would cost in 15 to 20 years.

FAO anticipates that this reventive program

would cost $6 million to 8 million per year 1

(108,109) and result in less insecticide use over a

smaller area, e.g., 50,000 to 100,000 ha per year

sprayed compared to the 15 million ha treated in

1987/88 (108). The availability of funding for such

a broad international program has not yet been

determined. Even if the preventive approaches

advocated by FAO, USAID, and other officials

were fully funded, it seems likely that emergency

efforts would still be needed when the insects

escape strategic control efforts.

Shifting to a preventive approach first requires

a reorientation of thinking by African and donor

policymakers, followed by corresponding changes

in programs and financing. Crises mobihze attention and resources: emergency locust and

grasshopper programs garner far more policy interest than long-term efforts, such as inte rated

pest management (1PM). Africans favoredFasteract-ing insecticides. Emergency spraying operations fit within what some find is a “cowboy”

mentality among U.S. officials: a tendency to

promote large interventions and uick solutions.

For example, U.S. officials emp1 asized use of

four-engine planes while FAO and other donors

preferred smaller planes. Thus, preventive approachespresent psycholo icalaswell as technical

challenges and their imp ementation would re- f

quire attitudinal shifts and technical training

within USAID, among other donors, within

African countries, and in Congress.

Integrating Emer ency Control Programs

Into Long erm Development +

Donor groups often classify their activities as

relief or development focussed. Generally, relief

activities are short-term and address symptoms or

consequences of deeply rooted problems. They

can include actual control efforts and other activities to help eople recover from losses, e.g.,

providing fooc1’ to areas where locusts have

destroyed crops, or providing seeds for replanting.

Some also describe activities that help recipients

recover from control programs (e.g., destruction

of pesticide containers, disposal of surplus stocks,

testin operators for over-exposure to insecticides5 as “relief and rehabilitation.” Development activities, in contrast, tend to deal with the

underlying causes of problems and are necessarily

longer term. For example, entomological researc 1

to develop safer or more effective control methods

and efforts to prevent locust or grasshopper upsurges would be development actwities.

Individuals and organizations generally concentrate their efforts on one approach or the other

because of the difficulties of combining the two.

Some relief efforts incorporate development objectives better than others: e.g., roviding seeds

rather than food aid, and training armer brigades F

to conduct local survey and control programs

rather than replacing local efforts with expatriaterun operations. Some relief programs can hamper

development efforts. For example, food aid has

long been criticized as lessening incentives for

small farmer production although this is not always

the case.

The U.S. foreign assistance mandate encomb

asses both relief and development programs.

owever, the recent grasshop er and locust control programs seem overwei~[ ted by short-term

emergency responses despite the well-known

weaknesses of crisis management. Nearly all U.S.

funds for locust and grasshopper programs in fiscal

years 1986 and 1987 were OFDAfunds (table 1-3)

and 58 ercent of the Africa Emergency

Locust/ 8rasshopper Assistance (AELGA)

project’s budget for fiscal years 1988 through 1990

was allocated to emergency assistance (chemicals,

equipment, and short-term technical assistance) v.

42 percent for development assistance (research,

training, and institutional support) (99). Respondents to OTA’S survey agreed that crisis management (e.g., sprayin programs) was the major type

of activity underta en in recent campaigns (table E

3-l). Most noted the need for a decrease in crisis

management per se and an increase in both

preventive measures and specific types of relief,

althou h they did not advocate decreasing the

overal total amount of resources (10). Their f

analysis agrees with that of others (e.g., 95).

The farmers and herders who are the intended

beneficiaries of donors’ programs do not distinguish between crisis management, subsequent

relief activities, and long-term development assis-
74 ● A Plague of Locusts

Table 3-1-OTA Survey Respondents: Percent of Current and Ideal Locust Efforts Focused

on Crisis, Relief, and Prevention

(N = 25)

Current effort Ideal effort

Median (Range) Median (Range)

Crisis 9070 (25 - 100%) 50% (O - 80%)

Relief 5% (o - 30%) 10% (o - 50%)

Prevention 170 (O - 32%) 30% (5 - 100%)

SOURCE: Dale G. Bottrell. ‘locusts in Africa and the Middle East: Summary of Response% to OTA Questionnaire,” contractor report

prepared for the Office of Technology Assessment, May 1989.

tance. For them, locusts and grassho pers represent one more crisis in lives that are l’uI1 of crises,

each further narrowing their options and contributing to the downward spiral of poverty (20).

Likewise, locusts and grasshoppers are only two of

many types of pests that threaten their crops. For

long-term development to succeed, it seems that

far more attention must be aid to how pest

problems interact with otherdi1’ficulties and to the

development implications of grasshopper and

locust control.

In this context, plant protection needs to be

viewed as a process that integrates local, national,

regional, and international components. Many

farmers and herders have few options for controlling large upsurges of locusts and grasshoppers

when prevention fails. They may need assistance

during that difficult, but brief, period in which their

losses can be severe. Thus, short-term relief may

be needed locally, either to prevent crop damage

or to enable farmers to recover from that damage,

preferably in forms that contribute to long-term

development.

Individual or Multipest Strategies?

General agreement exists that sustainable

protection of crops and livestock requires comprehensive, multipest management solutions. But,

some do not agree that management strategies for

locusts and grasshoppers should be integrated into

multipest management schemes of single organizations, such as the national crop protection services.

They note that certain insects require distinctly different control efforts by actors at different levels.

Some species, e.g., the Senegalese grasshopper

and African Migratory Locust, breed in areas

where dryland farming predominates and can be

monitored by farmer committees and integrated

into multipest management by the national crop

protection services and farmers. Generally this

approach could apply to most grasshop rs. On

the other hand, species such as the Re Locust, r

Brown Locust, and especially the Desert Locust,

breed in remote areas and migrate across boundaries. They may be more effectively dealt with as

individual species based on interstate or regional

cooperation. Pro osals are now being considered

for a regional aJ hoc task force to control the

Desert Locust in “strategic” areas outside of West

Africa’s croplands. The same role was proposed

for the regional organization DLCO-EA in Eastern Africa.

However, addressing locust and grasshopper

problems within thecontextof broader pest problems

would have several advantages: costs would drop

relative to benefits because benefits would accrue

each year rather than sporadically; institutional continuity and expertise would be built; already-existing organizations could respond more qulckl to

outbreaks and they could accommodate shi ting i?

pest problems methodically; pesticides could be

turned over and replenished more rapidly so less

waste would occur (95). The constraints to adopting a multi est strategy are often olitical and

institutiona rather than technical. I they can be f f

overcome, economic savings and improved chances of sustainability maybe achieved.
Ch. 3-Strategies forthe FMure . 75

When and Whe~S&h&ll&~ntrol Programs

●

During the recent grasshopper and locust

campaigns vast areas were sprayed with insecticides. The high costs of these efforts, including

the less clearly documented environmental costs,

require a reexamination of where and when spraying should be done when future outbreaks occur.

Some decisions could be worked out ahead of

time, e.g., the level of infestation required for

control of the various species, by representatives

of African and donor organizations. Alternately,

various control strategies could be selected and

coupled with improved plans for carefully

monitoring their impact.

Many experts conclude that early treatment,

especially of hopper bands, is most efficient, and

the economic, institutional, and environmental

costs of control increase with waiting (99). For

example, carbaryl and malathion are much more

economically applied against U.S. rangeland

grasshoppers earl in their life cycle; optimal control occurred at t e fourth i instar when grasshoppers were beginning to cause enough crop damage

7

to justi control costs yet populations were still

relative y small so control could be limited (66).

On the other hand, some propose later treatment, perhaps waiting until swarms pose an actual

threat to crops and not spraying rangeland and

forests at all unless they border threatened

cropland. This approach increases the risk of crop

damage because insects can move quickly and significant time is required to mount a spray operation. When environmental conditions are right, for

example, gregarious swarms of the Desert Locust

appear more or less simultaneously over a large

area (4). Under these conditions insects could

threaten crops before a spray operation could be

mounted. Thus, a late spraying approach may have

high political costs (71, 121).

Others propose careful review of the lessons

learned in controlling analogous pests, such as the

Australian Plague Locust orquelea birds. Quelea

bird ovulations can increase rapidly after rains,

but t e control strategy is to kill only those birds E

actually attacking crops. Likewise, methods

developed elsewhere to make pest control more

effective could be applied to locust pro rams. For

example, general information is availa[le on the

relative merits, disadvantages, costs, and uses of

various ground- and aerial-spraying methods (95,

118). Some

r

t surveys have been organized for

international chemical control efforts, but little

information is available on nonchemical efforts

(37). And few of the recent grasshopper and

locust spray operations were followed by post-application assessments of numbers of insects killed

that would help in future decision-making regarding control tactics.

The U.S. Forest Setice (USFS) developed a

r

s tern for monitoring gypsy moth populations to

etermine when and whereto mount control and for

assessin control operations to determine which were

most e fective. This pro am illustrates the type of

work needed to improve focust and grasshopper control. Special “forest pest management” grou s lay

out plots for gypsy-moth treatment and deci e the x

appropriate time to do treatment, based on a

threshold number of eggpods and stage of development of the caterpillar. Aerial treatment is done

during specified weather conditions. Then, the pest

management groups revisit anumberof treated plots

at 7, 14, and 21 days to check the number of insects

killed. Usually thesameteamdoes re-and ost-applicationassessments. Dataonapp r“~ lcatlon e.g., formulation, characteristics of the e uipment and

plane, pilot’s name) and, when possil) le, treatment

results for each plot are remrded on standardized

forms. From this dat~ the USFS learned that results

depended significantly on which pilot did the spraying, and that treatment should begin at lower

thresholds so that smaller areas could be s rayed

(59). These methods and lessons may be #irectly

applicable to grasshopper and locust programs.

Resolving issues of when and whereto control

locusts and grasshoppm is USAID’s responsibility.

Policymakers need to listen to all sides of the

debate, examine available evidence, and then

determine ways to be more selective regarding

timing and target sites to reduce costs (including

environmental costs) and maximize effectiveness.

WHAT CONTRALTO USE: THE ROLE

OF TECHNOLOGY

The choice of technology to control grasshoppers and locusts, as for other purposes, carries with

lt a variety of consequences. Some technologies

can play a strong development role while others

can hinder development. Often, support for in-
76 ● A Plague of Locusts

dividual types of technologies sets up complex

trade-offs.

The decision to support widespread pesticide

use for agriculture is such a case. In effect, donorsupplied pesticides subsidize high pesticide use.

Because of these subsidies, users paid from 85

percent to only 10 percent of the real cost of

pesticides in one stud of nine developing

countries. Users paid on y 11 percent of the real [

cost in Senegal and 33 percent in Ghana, the two

African countries included; these subsidies were

worth $4 million and $20 million, respectively (80).

As a result, farmers have decreased or abandoned

alternative control methods–such as sound

agronomic practices and varietal selection–in

favor of pesticides. The social and environmental

side effects of these chan es are largely undocumented but may be signi leant. For example, in- ?

creased pesticide use was among the factors that

accompanied the increased commercialization of

agriculture. This process has increased demands

on women farmers’ labor, reduced the amount of

food grown for local consumption, and encouraged planting higher value crops.

Today, widespread pesticide spraying is the

predominant technolo used against grasshoppers and locusts. Usua ly, effective pest manage- ?

ment for crops includes a larger number and wider

variety of options (table 3-2). Implementing a

long-term development approach to locust and

grasshopper management requires broadening

the current range of technolo les and identi~ing

or developing ones that can L used by various

groups in environmentally, economically, and institutionally sustainable ways. Integrated pest

management, joined with various forms of early

warning, are two types of technology that hold

promise. Both require additional research to be

fully operational.

Integrated Pest Management

Finding: Integrated pest management is

USAID% stutedpolicy, but many elhne~ of such an

approach wem notadkquately emphasized dun”ngthe

recent grasshop~r and locust campaigns, partly because of lizck of available technology and partly because of thepoorpeflormance of &nom andAfti

agenciks. If USXID tind% b implement &policy

fully, the Agency must suppoti mseamh to dkvelbp

alternatives to widkspnud spraying, cOh!ect W on

economic injury lkvels ofcmps, assess thee~ectiveness

of various control strat@s, and wise its approach

based on these eflorts.

Integrated pest management is “the optimization of pest control in an economically and ecologically sound manner accomplished by the

coordinated use of multiple tactics to assure stable

crop production and to maintain pest damage

below economic inju~ level while minimizing

hazards to humans, ammals, plants, and the environment. In its broadest form an 1PM pro ram

encompasses all significant components o the f

agroecosystem–soil, crops, water, air, insects,

pathogens, weeds, nematodes, and other organisms--which interact among themselves and

with other components of the system.” (125).

Integrated pest management combines a

variety of control techniques to reduce and keep

pest populations at acceptable levels, based on

criteria of crop ield, profit, and safety. It seeks

maximum use o biological control, pest-resistant ?’

crop varieties, and cultural practices. Pesticides

are normally used only after the target pest

reaches an infestation level called economic

threshold or economic injury level, i.e., a pest density at which the costs of control “ust equal crop

returns. Even if insecticides are t e onl control i

option available, an 1PM a preach stipu ates that {

the chemicals be used as ef Fectively and efficiently

as possible and their environmental and health

impacts be monitored carefully.

Furthermore, 1PM can be described as a way

of thinking, a process of dealing with a problem

holistically. This approach requires flexibility and

the ability to deal with multiple factors at one time.

Practitioners must be discriminating, adapting the

same principles to different situations, rather than

appl mg a single solution to all cases in a narrow,

blac or white z way of thinking. In this sense,

mediating diplomatic solutions to border disputes

could be considered part of an 1PM strategy for

locust control in Africa.

Promotion of 1PM is USAID policy. However,

it still is not used widely within USAID’s agricultural and health projects. The Agency tends to

support 1PM in special pro”ects rather than integrating it into overall deve Iopment strategy and

programs (22). Many feel that USAID should

support increased research on 1PM and make in-
Table 3-2–Control Tactics Now Employed Against Major Pests of Wheat in the U.S. Great Plains and Sorghum in Texas

7

Biolo “cal Host

Pred.a plant Elimi- Crop

C“l:: :Z::=‘“:,or::::

and Micro- resist- Sanita- nating rota- Planting Clean

Major pests para. bial anee tion hosts tion date

Wheat:

Hessian fl b

x Greenbug

Wheat stem sawfly’

Army wormsc

Cutworms c

Aphids c

Grasshoppers c

Wheat stem ma ot c

F

False wireworm

True wirewormc

Sorghum:

White grub

Wlreworms

Greenbug aphidb

Fall army wormb

Beet army wormb

S.W. corn borerb

Sugarcane borer

Chinch bug

Sorghum midgeb

Sotwhum webworm

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

1

2

1

1

2

2

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

3

3

3

3

1

1

1

3

2

2

2

2

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

“ 1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

2

1

1

1

3

3

1

1

2

2

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2

3

1

1

1

2

2

1

1

2

2

2

3

1

2

3

2

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

3

2

2

1

1

2

3

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

NOTES:

~Predators and parasites

introduced pest

‘native p3st

KEY: 1 = little or no use

2 = some use

3 = major use

SOURCE: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Pest Management Strategies in Crop Protection, vol. 1- Summa~ (Springfield,

1979, pp!22, 54).

VA National Technical Information Service, October
78 ● A Plague of Locusts

creased efforts to integrate 1PM in the majority of

its a ricultural programs. Generally, the concept

of I M is not well-understood b 1? decisionmakers.

For example, most USAID of i?lcials responsible

for the grasshopper and locust program maintain

that 1PM does not apply to grasshopper and locust

control during upsurges (44).

However, various elements of 1PM nevertheless were clearly appropriate during the recent

campaigns and poorly implemented:

Optimization of control-l%is refers to efficient and effective use of resources, differing from

maximization of control. The large numbers of

hectares sprayed could have been treated far more

effectively vwth available technologies. Pin

r

inting tar ets, improved consideration of win drift,

groun8 temperature, time of day, stage of insect

develo~ment–among other things–would have

greatly unproved efficiency.

Multiple control tactics-These were not used

because control methods against migrating swarms

are limited. The lack of alternative methods, however, reflects the lack of resources and low priority

given to developing them. Donors could have set

aside more resources for developing alternatives

rather than spending the overwhelming proportion of their funds on emergency spraying.

Pest damage kept below the economic injury

level (EIL) to maintain stable crop productionMajor crop loss due to grasshoppers and locusts

did not seem to occur at the national level in 1986

to 1989, although some individual farms suffered

significant losses (18). By and large, swarms did

not affect croplands. In some cases, spraying

seemed to protect crops. The lack of dama e cannot be attributed automatically to contro, how- f

ever, because of the complex relationship amen

increased rainfall, insect upsurges, and crop yiel .f

High rainfall in the mid-1980s increased crop

growth in many areas, making “stable crop production” difficult to calculate. Reliable data needed to

sort out these various factors are lacking so it is

also difficult to determine economic injury level

accurately. Even so, little, if any, effort was made

to base decisions to spray particular areas on such

a determination.

Minimal hazards to peo le and the environment–Atbest, this element o IPMwas not carried /!’

out consistently, despite efforts by USAID and

others. For example, broad-spectrum insecticides

killed nontarget organisms, and disposal of excess

pesticides and their containers remains

problematic.

Relatively workable 1PM programs have been

developed for a range of

r

ts and cro s and are

being used in some deve oping areas 103. The r)

cost-benefit analyses of those pro~rams evaluated

generally show a reduction in pesticide use and an

increase in profits (35). 1PM has not been emphasized in locust and grasshopper control in

Africa and the Middle East, however (95). Today,

biological control, cultural practices, and other

nonchemical components of 1PM cannot provide

the high level of control needed to stop gregarious

hopper bands and swarms of adults. These

methods might, however, contribute significantly

when used together or at early stages of an infestation (9).

An effective 1PM program would aim to

f

revent serious locust and grasshopper outbreaks.

t could include activities at a variety of levels, but

regional aspects would be necessary due to the

cross-boundary migration of insects. New 1PM approaches would rely on controlling locusts and

grasshoppers at earher points than achieved in the

recent campaign, similar to the “strategic control”

advocated by FAO for the Desert Locust, but

place a greater emphasis on using alternatives to

spraying as these become known or available.

Examples of 1PM strategies for grasshoppm

and locusts might include planting alternative crops

that are less susceptible to these meets; increasing

animal production; developing cottage industries to

F

reduce locust meal for food or to produce extracts

rom neem trees for use as an antifeedant (126 , and

developing pesticide regulations to improve c2 emical use. Sound land management-especially reforestation, upgrading range quality, and avoidance of

overgrazing and widespread burning-can suppress

%

rasshoppers and locusts and decrease suitable

$

reedingsites 95). This andotherapproaches might

be part of an I M approach for some other species

as well.
Ch. 3-Strate@”esfor the Futire ● 79

Certain as ects of an 1PM a roach to

grasshopper an locust problems x cmP be implemented immediately, e.g., improved use of pesticides.

In the short-term, improved regulation, selectio~

storage, application, and disposal of pesticides maybe

the best strategy, especially for reasserting control

after an u urge (95). Mechanical and cultural

methods o control are also currently available and r

these might be suitable for controlling small infkstationsincro .Theyaremostlikely tobeusefulforthe

Variegat Grasshopper, especially 2 ifpairedwith additional training for extension agents.

Research on microbial and botanical pesticides, insect ~pulation modeling, forecasting,

developing resistant crop varieties, and further

improvements in insecticide application offer a

better outlook in the medium and long-term 95).

Distinct approaches will have to be develope$ for

each of the major locust and grasshopper species,

however. For example, since the Desert Locust

eats many types of vegetation, developing resistant

plant varieties does not seem to be a feasible approach to controlling it.

Biological Clmtml

Normally, naturally occurring biological control is not sufficient to prevent outbreaks of major

locust and grasshopper species (93). But enhanced

biological control-the use or encouragement of

natural enemies for the reduction of pests-is one

potential component of an improved 1PM approach. Ikcusts and rasshoppers have anarrayof

natural enemies. So ar, these have not been used f

in control campaigns, nor has what is known about

natural pest mortality been ex loited to produce

predictable or consistent resu ts r (95). Some feel

that biological control offers considerable potential, although additional research and field testing

are required before their real value will be known.

Because of the priority currently given to chemical

control, much of the research on alternative

methods is in its early stages.

Some biological control agents, when packaged, are called microbial pesticides. Most have

the advantage of easy deployment; they could be

formulated and sprayed or used as baits in much

the same way that chemical insecticides are now.

Some newer biotechnology may be helpful in

develo ingthese alternatives. However, microbial

contro s require EPA registration for commer- r

cialization and such approval is difficult to obtain

for emetically engineered microorganisms.

Simi farly, African governments want reassurance

that these biological control agents do not pose

hazards to human or animal health.

Grassho pers and locusts are susceptible to

infection byEacteria, viruses, fungi, and protozoa

and several potential new microbial control

methods are being tested. Nosema Zocustae, the

first protozoa registered by EPA for use against an

insect, is approved for control of U.S. rangeland

grasshoppers. Developed at USDA’s Agricultural

Research Service’s Ran e Insect Control Research Unit in Bozeman, hontana, it is sold commercially as Nolobait. Used with a wheat-bran bait,

it takes 3 to 4 weeks to kill 50 to 60 percent of the

insects and persists for two seasons because it is

passed from one generation to another. It is less

expensive than chemical insecticides and does not

adversely affect beneficial species or other natural

enemies (21, 88). Field experiments in Cape Verde

and Mauritania showed that native grasshoppers

were infected with Nosema (39) but did not determine whether it could suppress grasshopper outbreaks (9). USAID supported Nosema research in

Mali; it was stopped in 1988 due to Malian

Government fears of possible hazards (99).

USAID supports further work on Nosema and

other microorganisms in Cape Verde by USDA

scientists and the national agricultural research

service. Several recent studies suggest that further

research in Africa on various s ecies of Nosema

may a off for rasshopperand rocustcontrol (95,

99). fi?DA an~ other researchers began examining viruses as potential control agents because

viruses are more deadly, kill faster, and could be

used in combination with slower-acting microbial.

For example, an entomopoxvirus for the Senegalese

grasshopper shows potential as a microbial control

agent (94). The fungal pathogen Entomophaga grylli attach some locusts and grassho pers. It has not

beenstudied in Africa orthe Mid CfleEast (95), but

itspotentia.1 insemi-aridareaswhere mostgrasshoppm

occur seems small because fungal development

de nds on high humidity (94 . It may be usefid in

x‘ca’s humid areas, however, or these same reasons. )

Some new strains of spore- or toxin-forrnin bacteria

(like those used already for biological ccmtrof for other

.msects)mightbeisolatedfromlocustsandgrasshop rs

(78). Rickettsia are virulent to grasshoppers, but t reir

use may be too hazardous to have much potential

because they also infect vertebrates (94).
80 ● A Plague oflzxusts

Other Biorational Contmik MatzriuLs

These include botanical pesticides and

pheromone traps-alternatives to Synthetic chemical

insecticides. One botanical insecticide has received

attention, especially for its antifdant effects. Extracts from neem trees (Azadirachta indica) discoura e loctits,

! Y

asshoppers, and other insects

horn eedingon pants to which it is applied (9 . In

India, neem spray and dust protected crops om 2

Desert Locusts an~ in Togo, neem repelled ~asshoppers. However, 1988 trials at International

Crops Research Institutefor the Semi-Arid Tropics

(ICRISA in Niger were less than successful and

indicated t at farmers might be unwilling to invest 2

the labor or funds to use neem orJ grain crops, since

repeat ap lications are needed (99). A neem insecticide, Jargosan-0, is being distributed in the

United States by W.R. Grace and G., but EPA has

not ap roved its use for food crops. The authors of

USN ‘bS Pro rammatic Environmental Review

and the AEL A evaluation supported further re- 2

search on neem as an antifeedant.

The E tian Government supports research

on the anti Teedant properties of a number of indigenous plants, and the German Agency for

Technical Cooperation (GTZ) funds trials with

neem, Nosema, and other natural a$ents as part of

its program of developing altematwe methods of

locust and grasshopper control (107).

The International Center on Insect Physiology

and Ecology (ICIPE) and others are attempting to

identify natural attractants. Recently, ICIPE

achieved some success using pheromones (natural

k

attractants as bait to trap certain species of the

tsetse fly ( ashington Post, April 3, 1989). Like

biological control agents, attractants are usually

narrow-spectrum and thus less harmful to nontarget organisms and the environment than broadspectrum chemical insecticides. The potential for

using pheromones for grasshop r or locust control 1s not known and many fee that pheromone r

work is not justified for this reason (6).

Nw Reseamh on Alte~”ve Cbntmk

Those en aged in planning and conducting research on bio fogical control agents, especially the

microbial ones, stress that it maybe 8 to 10 years or

longer before these will be ready for large-scale

use (55, 65). First, the microorganisms have to be

identified and isolated from locusts and grasshop IX

tih(~).~enwriowfo~~atio~ m~t~r eld

tested against target s~ies and nontarget or anisms

under various conditions and these resufts corroborated. Fmall , wa~ to mass-produce and apply

the agents must L developed and tested. Research

projects such as these reqture long-term institutional

support for an agency to attract qualified scientists and

sustain their wrk.

The International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) recently be an a major research effort

on biological control o grasshopper and locusts. f

The $1.0 million USAID-fimded project aims to

develop strains of two fungal ~atho~ens recovered

fiomlocustsand assho persmAfnca as biological

E

ticidesandfie r{dtestt eminthe Sahel. WorkWill

led by scientists from the London-based Commonwealth Agricultural Bureau International’s Institute for Biological Control at IITA’s facility in

Benin.

1cpEahzrOr

a major research initiative.

By late 1989, I IP had received $0.5 million horn

the World Bank and African Development Bank

toward the $14 million r uested for the first 5-year

hase, 1989 to 1993. ICIP% ‘s proposal encompasses

Eve areas of research on alternative control metho@

including biorational agents and improved chemical

insecticides:

population dynami~ (to detect potentially

dangerous populations during recessions);

pheromones and kairomones (to use as

attractants in locust control);

endocrinology of locust phase<hanges and

gregarious behavior (to pinpoint targets for

growth regulators and broad-spectrum chemical

. .

~).9

biological control (to augment role of

pathogens and arasites, includin enhancin

theirvu-ulence !ygeneticmanipu ation); an f f

new approaches to the use of baits (since they

tend not to affect natural enemies and

nontarget organisms).
Ch. 3-Stratep”esfor the Future ● 81

Monitoring Insects, Weather, and Vegetation

Finding: Technologies for ground monitoring

insect popuhtims are adequute but sometimes am

used ine+i’vely. Techno&@s for monitoringfim

the air tend to be impmcise and their msulks ofin

delivered lati?. Themfom, technological and institutwnulimprovementsw needkdforgmundandaerial

surveillance andfomcdng, necessary wmponenO of

a preveti”ve strategy.

Monitoring is essential for a number of purposes.

A preventive ap roach to locust and grasshopper

control requires ?orecasting, ground monitoring, and

early treatment to interrupt swarm formation. Effective pest management strategies require monitoring,

or tracking insect ~pulations before control to find

ident~, and delinut infestations and further monitoring after control to assess its effectiveness. Famine

early warning systems benefit horn information on

fluctuating insect populations.

Ttzhnolbgiks

Methods already exist for monitoring pest

populations on the ground and for measuring the

Impacts of control but their use needs to be improved, especially by increasing national capacity.

Today, most remote sensing and forecasting

work is done by expatriates at scientific centers in

Europe, the United States, or regional centers

without ad uate, timely, and accurate field data.

Consequent y, African field programs remain 7

largely untouched by the technological advances

at remote sensing centers; quickly exchangin information between the field and centers is dif !lcult

(95); and often forecasts are wrong.

Anarrayof detection strategies, each appropriate

fors

e

“ c times and locations, can im rove forecasting. meinforrnationcanbeobtain J only byground

surv teams (insect species, stage of development

popu 7ation density). Other information can be obtained best from amxaft and satellites (current and

likely future vegetation, wind and rainfall patterns).

Combining remote sensing data with maps showing:

1) political boundaries, roads, and landmarks, 2)

historic breeding areas and migration patterns, and

3) insects’soil andvegetationpreferences can be used

to help ~ound survey teams select high priority areas

formomtoring. (George Popovpreparedmaps on the

preferred habitats of the Desert Imcust in the Sahel

for FAO but these are not yet available to national

crop protection services.)

All aerial survey methods require round

verification. Thus, they cannot substitute or cru- f

cial ground monitoring and improved integration

of the two methods is critical. For example, information from remote sensing could better guide the

work of ground teams just as insect population

data from ground teams could supplement the

vegetative cover data provided by remote sensing.

The most critical component of early detection of pest populations is a network of trained

ground observers (37) with adequate equipment.

Thus, training remains one of the most important

needs for improved field applications of forecasting. Training could encourage managers to make

greater use of remote sensing and provide a cadre

of field officers for various early warning and survey activities, including data interpretation (95).

Certain aspects of monitoring programs are unresolved. For example, some feel that a monitoring system designed for pest complexes would be

a more efficient use of resources than ones

designed for single insect pests. Any effective system, however, must include many levels of organizations, working within the framework of

national and regional programs, to improve accuracy and sustainability.

Types of Early W~ing and Forecasting Systems

Current early warning systems combine remote

sensing data with other aerial, ground and statistical

information for a variety of purposes, such as agricultural and environmental assessment and resource

management (45). AGRHYMETdata, for example,

are used for crop and pasture monitoring in the

Sahel.

Several groups monitor pest damage as one of

several major risks to agricultural production to

predict food shortages and famine, and thus anticipate the need for food aid and other forms of

assistance. USAID’S Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and FAO’S Global Information and

Early Warning System are examples.

Three major organizations make or plan to make

locust and grasshopper forecasts s

r

ifically: 1 )

FAO/ECLO tkXl@ the ARTEMI (~ca RealTii Environmental Modeling Using Imaging Satel-
82 ● A Plague of Locusts

lites) proj~ 2) the French research age~, p~~

(pf?ro arnmede Recherches Interdisciplinary Francais

sur es Acridiens au Sahel, reorganized now as

Acridologie Operationnelle-Ecoforce Intemationale),

and 3) the Permanent Interstate ~mmittee for

Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) meteorolo~

agency, AGRHYMET (99). ‘Ihese type of programs

have significant potential. For exam Ie, a model

predicting upsurges and locations o the African f

Migratory Lncus~ developed by a pint FAO/U.N.

Development Programme proje@ reduced annual

scouting efforts from 144 to 90 pemon-months (2).

Current programs also have serious limitations. Reports from PRIFAS and ELCO often are

not quantified, detailed, or timely enough to be

useful in the field. For example, Operation SAS

(surveillance des Acridiens au Sahel) was estabhshed within the French PRIFAS for rapid collection of field observations from a Sahel-wide

network. However, data collection has been slow,

sporadic, and incomplete, preventin reliable

J

prediction (99 . Also, the biweekly SA newslet- 8

ter has been istributed too slowly for recipients

to use it for planning; it is used primarily as a

situation summary. SAS first constructed a predictive model for the Senegalese Grasshopper and

used historical records, G. Popov’s qualitative

vegetation and soil maps, and AGRHYMET

weather data (often relying on 30-year averages)

but not remote sensing data. In the past 3 ears,

PRIFAS has been developing a similar m Jel for

the Desert Locust and is working with

AGRHYMET to set u a locust survey and warning service for the CIA S countries (75).

The ECLO in FAO/Rome provides faster information because its monthly “Desert Locust

Summary” is sent by fax. FAO combines data from

field reports and remote sensing. Originally, FAO

used Landsat data, but now uses Meteosat and

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA) imagery in the Dutch-designed

ARTEMIS system. FAO also uses this technology

to produce 10- and 30-day rainfall maps, relying on

the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather

Forecasting for forecasts of temperature, pressure,

wind, and rain for up to 5 days in advance (13). Like

the SAS Bulletin, however, FAO’S “Desert Imcust

~~~~~~eld&ta(95).

“ is lagued by gaps in coverage due to

FAO’S separate “U

c

ate” includes a general

status report, a l-mont forecas~ descriptions of

weather and ecological conditions, specific country

information on pests sighted and assistance reques@ and assistance provided bydonors. Recently, ECLO entered historical data on locust plagues

in its computerized database and plans to use it in

forecasting locust migration patterns.

Retnoti Sensing and Greenness Mizps

Satellite-based weather, vegetation and land

SUrVw, maps, etc., are all likely to be useful for

building scientific institutional capacity in African

countries. Such information can be used for government @arming and regulation and for monitoring

desetitication, vegetation, surface features, wind

patterns, etc. Probably satellite-based remote sensing will be used less for locust and grasshopper

forecasting and control than for these purposes. In

1988, the multidonor Club du Sahel commissioned a

study of 50 remote sensing projects in the Sahel.

Remote sensing seemedve useful forclimatological applications, less useful 7or crop monitoring (although ve etation indexes were of some use), and

least usefuf for forecastingyields because ofdifficulties in measuring crop acreage and discriminating

between crops (67).

USAID sponsored the development of greenness maps, one particular type ofve etation index,

by the U.S. Geological Survey (U GS) 5 in 1987.

Greenness maps were furnished to five Sahelian

countries every 2 weeks between 1987 and 1989 by

the USGS EROS (Earth Resources Observation

Systems data center in South Dakota, using data

from N JAAsatellites. These maps showed changesinvegetation overtime. FAO’s ARTEMISprogram also monitors rainfall and changes inve~etative

cover. These maps helped field teams ldentifj

places where locusts might be found and areas

where ground surveillance was not needed (95),

especially in places where rainfall is irregular and

ground cover inconsistent.

The USGS greenness maps were valued highly

by those interviewed during the AELGA evaluation but were judged not too useful for making

control decisions because delivery to Africa took

up to 2 weeks (in 1987) or 8 days (in 1988). As a

result, maps were sent by fax to Mauritania and
Ch. 3-Strategies forthe Futim ● 83

Niger by late 1989 (121). Both USGS and the

ARTEMIS maps have another weakness that is

less easily corrected. Areas with very low amounts

of vegetative cover may not show up on existing

satelhte imagery yet be areas where potentially

damaging Desert Locust populations develop

(13).

Imagery for grasshopper and locust control is

or can be provided by several types of satellites:

● Meteosat, operated by the European Space

Agency;

. weather satellites operated by NOAA (part

of the U.S. Chnmerce Department);

. Landsat, developed by the National

&ronautics and Space Ahninistration but

owned since 1984 by the private U.S. Earth

Observation Satellite Co.; and

. the French S teme Probatoire d’Obsemation

delaTerre( POT) (figure 3-1). T

The first two are used by those monitoring

insects now; the second two provide more detailed

information on land cover. Landsat has greater

resolution than NOAA’s polar orbitin satellites

but NOAA provides daily coverage whi e f Landsat

passes over the same areas only once every 16days.

Landsat has not proven capable of monitoring

crop production (26) and obtaining Landsat data

is more expensive than from NOAA satellites so

FEWS and USGS rely on NOAA’s system. In

general, a confusing array of Earth-monitoring

satellites exist, and the U.S. Government has been

criticized by scientists and others for having spent

too much on satellite hardware that produces too

much inaccessible and unanalyzed data (56).

USAID plans to transfer significant aspects of

U.S. remote sensing application to locust forecasting to African countries or regional organizations

(62). USGS, whichhassup rtedAGRHYMETfor

a number of years, recent y trained r AGRHYMET

staff and key personnel of the Sahelian national

crop protection services to use greennas maps.

Also, USGS technicians are training

AGRHYMET staff to produce and distribute

their own greenness maps (99). AGRYHMET is

expected to provide this service to its nine member

states in 1990, according to some sources (45,62 ,

or within the next3 years, according to others (99 .)

Similarly, USGS is transferring greemess mapmaking capability to Tunisia for Northwest African

and planning to develop it in Djibouti for the six

East African nations (62). USAID is funding installation of a satellite dish in Niger so

AGRHYMETwill be able to receive data directly

from the NOAA weather satellites.

Currently, remote sensing for early warning of

F

rasshopper and locust upsurges is not considered

ully operational nor does rapid transmission from

satellite to Earth ensure that all sta es of data

gatherin , analysis, and use are coor finated and

rapid (9 ). One perceived danger is that, as these f

programs develop, remote sensing will dominate

other types of information-gathering, thereby reducing the resources available for field scouting. For

example, obscxvers are concerned that FAO’S interest in a very expensive, centralized program based in

Rome ma preclude other, less glamorous, approaches. 6n the more promising side, plans exist to

extend satellite-based monitoring to other important migratory pests such as the grain-eating quelea

bird, the African Migratory bust, the Senegalese

Grasshopper, armyworms, and the Red Locust (95).

The various groups conducting early warning

and remote sensing activities do not necessarily

duplicate efforts because they operate with di -i?

ferent mandates for research, applications, information dissemination, and training. Nevertheless,

clear duplication of effort exists and improved

coordination and cooperation is needed (95). International organizations are mo6t suited to provide

sup~rt for remote sensing, due to the high mst of

eq.upment and thecomplexityofsupport semices, but

regional groups might be responslkie for establishing

uniform reporting systems.
84 ● A Plague of Locusts

Figure 3-1-Principal Satellites Used in Early Warning and Forecasting

Meteosat (geosynchronous)

35,800 km. altitude

Images hemisphere every

30 minutes

10

altitude

e

SPOT

w

832 km. altitude

26 day repeat cycle

(more frequent imaging of

selected areas upon comm

.:,f .’ K~~thwidthB’85km Swath width 2700 kilometers~y“.”j:;:.

. . “, ,“

. . . . . . . . . . .

. . , .

. . . . : “. . . . ., .

.., ,,. “,,

,. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . “. “. . .“ .“ “ . . . . .

.., . ,. ., . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . .

.- . . - . “. . . . . . ., . .

. . . . . . , . . .

. .’ ..-

. . ‘ . . .

,.

.-

Image Resolution

10 meters, 0.01 ha. panchromatic bands SPOT

20 meters, 0.04 ha. multispectral bands SPOT

‘30 meters, 0.1 ha. thematic mapper (TM) Landsat

*—80 meters, 0.5 ha. multispectral scanner (MSS) Landsat

Advanced very high resolution radiometer (AVHRR)

+ NOAA 9 and 10 satellites >

1

1,1 kilometers, 120 ha. local area coverage (LAC)

4.0 kilometers, 400 ha. global area coverage (GAC) 1

SOURCE: TAMS Consultants, Inc. and Consortium for International Crop Protection, Locu.wand Grasshopper ControZinAj7ica/Asia: A

Programrna tic EnvtionmentalAssessmen4 Main Report, contractor report prepared for the Ageney for International Development,

March 1989, p. D-7.
Chapter 4

Policy Options for Congress

and the Executive Branch
CONTENTS

Page

WHERE WE STAND TODAY e*** **=* .*. **** ***" **** *"** ***e   0 ** ***m******* 87

OversighLNotMicromanage~en6 Isthe Goal ... ... =.== ”=”~ .. .= ”== ”=s-= ”=”’ 87

Recommendations FromOther Studies ...,......””~”= ● =. MO= MDU=MO ● ==== 88

POLICY OPTIONS ....*** ..*.**** ● *.***** ,....0.0 ● .*.**** ● 99***** ● ******- ● **

89

Revising USAID’sStrateW .. =. . . . . . . . . . . . ...””=”oo””~=o”=” w“”=w===o*”*=** ~~

ImplementingIntegrated Pest Management .. ... ... ...~.--.*=””~*-vo=- ●

UsingPesticidesJudiCiOuSIY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

...0.0. ● .*..*** ...**..* ● *** 95

U.S. CoordinatiOnand SuPPOrt forAfrican, IJ.Nv and RegiomdO rganizatiOnS . . . . 97

Funding Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....”=.==”=oDo •“”==”=~”””=”~”” .OOOO*lW

Boxes

4-A Potential Congressional oversight Questions and Congressional Pol@OptiOnS:

Re~singus~D’sstrategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. ..:. ....=.:. ● a s=;=*..”= 90

4-B Potential COngreSSiOnal @erSight Questions and Congressional PollcyOptlOns:

Implementing Integrated PeSt Management . . . . . . . . .......=” .t=..=”~:=”=”” 93

4-C Potential CongreSSiOnal@erSight Questions and Congressional POllcy Options:

Usin~PesticidesJudiCiOuSIY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....=..==.=.~O.t”$=”~~:OC “e” 96

4-D Potential COngressional Oversight Questions and CongressiOnalP@cY @~Ons:

Coordinationand suppOrtfOr African, U.Nv andRegiOnal Organizations ...=. 98

4-E IntegratingFarmers’ and Scientists’ KnowledgeforVariegated

Grasshopper Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “*” .” ’” ”oosoo*ooo1O3
Chapter 4

Policy Options for Congress

and the Executive Branch

WHERE WE STAND TODAY

Oversight, Not Mic~o~anagement, Is the

OTA’S work suggests that no major new U.S.

authorizing legislation is needed to improve locust

and grasshop r control at this time. Sup~rtive

elements cou d be added to the Foreign r Awstance

Act or the Farm Bill, however. These laws set out

key dimensions of U.S. foreign aid and agricultural

~olicy. Thus, this legislation could ap ropriately

include statements regarding U.S. ad erence to ~

economically, institutionally, and environmentally

sustainable pest management as one element of

successful agricultural and international development.

A great deal of uncertainty exists regarding the

nature of grasshopper and locust problems, the

costs, benefits, and im acts of control, and the

desirability of variousr uture ap roaches. OTA

cannot confident suggest speci IC! areas in which

funding might 1 e adjusted with numerical

benchmarks given this hl h degree of uncertainty.

Theinternatlonal controf efforts of 1986 and 1989

did little to resolve important questions. Instead,

the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) seems unable to:

. findlong-term solutions to problems such as

grasshopper and locust upsurges that have

episodic and chronic dimensions;

. take advantage of recession periods to put

into place preventive programs; or

. research alternative controls effectively.

In these circumstances, congressional action

mi ht best be directed toward helping U.S. officias decrease the uncertainty surrounding locust Y

and grasshopper programs by requesting that

USAID carefully review what is known and not

known, assign priorities for gathering information,

and improve sttate~ies to deal with future pest

problems. Congress oversight role is key and this

can be done by the relevant authorizing and appropriations mmmittees. Boxes A through D set

out possible oversight questions and options to

help Congress play that role.

Congress’ micromanagement of USAID is not

the goal. USAID’s failure to answer these strategic

questions, however, has left a policy vacuum. If

USAID is unable to fill the vacuum, Congress has

little choice but to become more involved if U.S.

programs are to be effective.

Danger exists that the United States will

respond to the next pest upsurges in the same

costly way as before, wth strategies based on questionable premises. Public support of disaster assistance increases this probabili . Danger also exists

that special interest groups wi 1 exert undue policy T

influence and that decisions will be ill-informed.

For example, tied aid re uirements for the use of

American-made comrno3 ities mean that U.S. pesticide manufacturers have a vested interest in

maintaining a control strategy based almost exclusively on insecticide use. They can be expected

to over-stress benefits, overlook difficulties of following safer practices in Africa, and minimize the

hazards of insecticide use. On the other hand,

environmental groups have legal power to sue

USAID if environmental laws and regulations are

not met. They can be expected to emphasize the

hazards of insecticide use, to over-stress thepotential of alternative controls, and to favor natural

resource protection over economic development.

USAID responds to all of these pressures. At

the same time, USAID has the political and

economic power to influence, if not determine, the

shape of grasshopper and locust management

worldwide. U.S. financial contributions to control

are sizable and USAID has placed effective conditions on the use of these funds. The United

States is perceived by many to have the technical

resources for pest management generally.

On the whole, USAID has assumed a reactive,

rather than a proactive, posture toward Congress

as well as other pressure groups. So far, USAID’s

grasshopper and locust work has escaped the kind

of scrutiny that it desemes. Generally, Congress’

87
S8 ● A Plague of bcusts

reporting requirements have been counterproductive, deflecting attention horn more fundamental issues and glaring missteps:

Nena Vreeland of CDIE IUSAID’S Center for

Development Information and Evaluation] found

out from interviews that [USAID] field professionals

spend about 6 percent of their time on reporting

requirements to Congress and another 20 percent on

re orting to IUSAID]/Washington. AS one

[&AID] staff member pointed out, ‘Development

is something that [USAID] does on a Thursday

afternoon.” (98)

Thus, OTA does not intend that the improved

oversight discussed here be done on a haphazard

basis by Congress nor be used by USAID to

generate stacks of irrelevant and unread paper.

Instead, Con ress and USAID need to en age in

a thoughtfu dialogue with effective f !ollowthrough. Perhaps it is time to involve additional

outsiders in this process and to mediate the

process deliberately. In this chapter, OTA highlights recommendations from several other recent

studies related to pest management in development, then turns to policy changes within USAID

and options for Congress.

Recommendations From Other Studies

OTA’S study complements three recent

reports (22, 95, 99). The options considered here

are generally cons~tent with recommendations in

one or more of the reports (app. F). Each report

fulfilled congressional requirements; each was

contracted externally but conducted with the assistance of USAID staff.

USAID contracted Oppotiunities to Assist

Developing Countries in the I?roper Use ofA “ ultural and Industil Chemicals (22) to comp y with r

a 1987 Foreign Assistance Act amendment by

Rep. David Obey’s Appro riations Subcommittee

on Foreign Operations, Lrt Financing, and

Trade. It was prepared by the Committee on

Health and the Envmonment (which included representatives of environmental groups, indust ,

labor organizations, and universities) with he p7

from the Conservation Foundation. Its scope included chemical use for industry as well as agriculture and industry; that distinguished it from the

following two reports.

A Programmatic Environmental Assessment

for African and Asian locust and rassho per control programs (95) was prepare by T # &SConsultants and the Consortium for International

Crop Protection. This fulfilled USAID’sstatutory

requirement to assess the environmental impact of

overseas operations and the Agency’s internal environmental regulations. On the whole, this is

considered a comprehensive and balanced presentation, and OTA’S analysis relies heavily on it.

Also, this report has had a significant impact on

USAID: a task force has met regularly since mid1989 to consider ways of implementing the report’s

recommendations.

The third study, a mid-term evaluation of

USAID’s Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper

Assistance (AELGA) project, was conducted by

Tropical Research and Development (99 . This,

unlike the others, was not a complete y inde- )

pendent external review because an USAID entomologist served on the three-person analytical

team. It assesses the progress of a number of

USAID projects through mid-1989 with the emphasis on locust and grasshopper control programs

m five Sahelian countries.

The recommendations from these three

studies have some similarities and differences:

. Integrated Pest Management (lTM): The

Conservation Foundation re rt and the

Programmatic Environment Assessment r

emphasize that USAID should increase use

of 1PM, with the goal of making 1PM its

primary pest management approach as well

as its stated policy. But the AELGA

evaluation omits 1PM from its major

recommendations, confining the 1PM

discussion to an annex on research.

● Improved Use of Pesticides: All three

reports recommend improved use of

pesticides as consistent with an 1PM

approach, and they also stress the need for

monitoring health and environmental

effects of insecticide use and improved

environmental protection. For example, the

Programmatic Environmental Assessment

recommends prohibiting insecticide
Ch. 6Policy Options for Congress andthe Executive Branch . 89

application in environmentally sensitive

areas (such as near bodies of water or in

areas containing endangered species),

minimizing the area sprayed, and using

economic thresholds for deciding if and

when to spray.

. Cumulative Impacts of Control: The

Programmatic Environmental Awessment

and the AELGA evaluation address the

problem of cumulative impacts of pesticides

used in health and agricultural programs.

. Trainin : All emphasize providing training

and tecinical ass~tance to various groups,

such as crop ~rotection personnel, USAID

staff, and African farmers, on various topics,

e.g., safe and sound pesticide use, storage,

and disposal.

. ControlAlternatives: Allendomeincreased

research on alternative technologies. The

Programmatic Environmental Assessment

and the AELGA evaluation advocate

field-based economic research as well. The

Conservation Foundation stresses linking

research with the perspectives of project

beneficiaries. The Programmatic

Environmental Assessment recommends

field testing Noserna and other biological

agents such as neem extracts.

. The Role of Different Groups: The

AELGA evaluation and Conservation

Foundation report give more attention to

institutional factors and USAID

management than the Programmatic

Environmental Assessment, although all

advise involvin international, regional,

national, and focal organizations and

coordinating efforts.

In addition to these reports, USAID has its

own reservoir of newly acquired data. Some

preliminary work has been done by USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) internally to tap lessons learned, mission cable traffic

contains similar lesson. The minutes of USAID

meetin s in Harper’s Ferry, WV, and Dakar,

Senega f

L

rovide some insights from the field.

Also, US D mission staff have access to information from African government agencies that could

be compiled and analyzed. OTA finds that the

three reports described here, along with these

other sources of information, can form the basis

for initiatives in several important areas.

POLICY OPTIONS

Revising USAID’s Stmtegy

Finding: USAID5 strategy would require signi~nt changes if the United States wants tnpldy a

leadership role in developing sustainable pest

management strate~”es for Africa: giving higher

priority to 1PM; building inhouse scienti~ic capacity

to improve its ability to use pestides judicwusly;

improving intwnal, interagency, and internatwnal

coordination as well as improvingsupprt for varwus

other organizatwns involved in pest management.

The changes needed to improve USAID’s approach to pest mana~ement are substantial

enough to require a shift in the way the agency

views the oals of pest management and the ways

in which t ose goals are implemented (box 4-A). f

For example, USAID saw its strength in conducting aerial spraying in the recent emergenq effort

(44). The United States contribution might instead focus more substantially on using American

scientific expertise and other resources to develop

alternative control methods (including safer insecticides and improved cost/benefit methods), to improve forecasts, and to improve environmental

monitoring of insecticide use. Generally, the U.S.

strate

P

should lay out a long-term, multipest approac (where possible) to pest management, one

that would support preparedness and prevention

while minimizing pesticide use and increasing environmental and health safeguards. Also, this lan

should carefully define complementary uses o dis- r

aster and development assistance. Congress could

1’

rovide USAID with overall direction, set time

imits during which this strategy should be

developed, implemented, and then evaluated, and

provide adequate funding for the initiative.

USAID currently has enough information to

revise the Africa Bureau’s 1987 Locust/Grasshopper Strate~ Paper (113). Revisions should reflect

the full geogra hic and institutional scope of the

problem as wel as its episodic and chrome dimen- r

sions. For example, relevant regional bureaus, the

Bureau for Science and Technology, and OFDA

should participate in setting priorities for U.S.

programs during upsurges and recessions. Later,
90 ● A Plague of Locusts

gressional Oversight Questions and Congressional Policy Options: I

J were for pes{ management-of all pests, compart

z&? HOW does tbs compare to ~timat~ of c~p ]osses f~m d

invite UJMID to discuss differences between its actual priorities and those rectwn-

~mmatic EnvironmentalAssessme nt. USAID could be asked to list objectives, milestones,

~cti”vities to implement the assessment’s recommenda”ons. 1

I
Ch. 4-Policy Options for Congress andthe&ecutive Branch ● 91

USAID should revise the 1989 Locust/Grasshopper Mana~ement Operations Gutiebook to conform with lts updated strategy. The revised locust

and grasshopper strategy a r might be incorporated in, or later appen e to, a Zr USAID policy

document on pest management.

A number of the Programmatic Environmental Assessment’s recommendations directl relate

to strategic considerations and policy c ianges.

Many of these should be incorporated into the

revised USAID Strategy Paper and the updated

Operations Guidebook because this is the most

comprehensive analysis available on many of these

issues. USAID seems to be moving to implement

many of these recommendations. However, certain differences are apparent between the two sets

of~riorities. For example, USAID is giving higher

priority to pesticide disposal and less to surveys of

environmentally critical habitats.

The AELGA Project

The major USAID funding of locust and

grassho er programs currently 1s through the 3-

year AI?!GA project slated to end September 30,

1990. While the AELGA project’s goals encompassed emer ency and long-term development,

the individua components had not been f carefull

thou ht through and manys ecific activities su -/’

fere from poor planning. reject assure tions 1 !

were not identified; constraints were not dea rtwith

in advance; measurable objectives and realistic

milestones to measure progress were not set;

feasible management systems were not put in

place before funding began, etc. As a result, often

emergency and long-term elements did not reinforce each other in practice. Even more important, the list of things that were not done during

the recent control campaigns–for example, not

measuring insect kill-rates nor monitoring health

and environmental im acts of spray programsreflects the absence of udgeting time, I ersonnel,

and resources for these activities uring the t

project planning and contracting processes.

These problems should be avoided in the next

phase.

A Rok for Task Fomes

OFDA forms task forces in response to

specific disasters with the goal of improving interagen~ coordination. When a given disaster is

percemd to have run its course, OFDA disbands

lts task force and other grou s within USAID are

expected to carry on. OTA ound that the OFDA ?

Desert Locust Task Force, with its weekly meetings and annual evaluation and planning conferences, was generally effective in coordinating

the U.S. emergency response. Forthelocust problem, however, the task force’s position in OFDA

and its narrow mandate to coordinate the emergency response had serious negative consequences. OFDA disbanded the Desert Locust Task

Force in June, 1989, and the people who built up

knowled e during this effort moved on to new

responsi % ilities within USAID and other U.S.

a encies. Thedatacollected during the task force’s

li e was put into storage. f

A similarly organized USAID task force with

a broader mandate to examine lon -term pest

management might initially formuf ate an improved USAID strategy and plan and oversee its

Implementation. The broader mandate would

imply a wider membership on the Pest Mana ement Task Force and reater responsibilities or !

evaluation. For examp e, persons with solid tech- f

nical expertise and those representing research, in

addition to control, should be included. So should

representatives of private voluntary organizations

working with local farmer groups. Data gathered

during the course of an upsurge should be mined

rather than stored. The Pest Management Task

Force might also oversee implementation of

recommendations from the Programmatic Environmental Assessment and coordinate the U.S.

response to various worldwide plant protection

initiatives.

Initially, this Pest Management Task Force

could commission an independent, external group

to examine the 1986 to 1989 locust and grasshopper control programs in Africa to determine

whether andior how much these efforts contributed to stopping the plague and where costs

might be cut. Attention should be given to identi&ing clearly where and when chemical control

programs are mounted most effectively and how

they could be minimized. Also, the group could

provide recommendations for future U.S.

programs. While this grou should collaborate

with U.S. agencies, it shouli be organized by an

outside group, such as the National Research

20-954 0 - 90 - 4 : QIi 3
92 ● A Plague of Locusts

Council, with official responsibility in the hands of

those outside the U.S. Government’s locust and

grasshopper control operations.

At the same time, USAID could conduct its

own evaluations of disaster assistance and pest

management. For example, USAID’s Center for

Development Information and Evaluation

(CDIE), which conducts evaluations of programs

both inside and outside of USAID, might examine

USAID’s disaster work, especially that of OFDA

In the process, CDIE might identi& broad lessons

learned about natural disasters, hazard mitigation,

the role of disaster planning, etc., as they relate to

insect outbreaks. In this context, the Federal

Emergency Management Administration’s experience with domestic natural hazard research

and planning may be relevant.

Implementing Integrated Pest Management

Finding: Mom fidly using 1PM will n?quti a

substantial investment in research, training of

Aftians, and impmved technical capacity among

USAID st@@ Since 1PM b a multi mnged systems

approach, u wilt require nmewed e #orts at coordinatwn anddrawingtogether informationfim a variety

of sources: U.S. univenities, government agencies,

and other diwuzs.

The United States has important capabilities

to contribute to improved pest management via

1PM. Certain U.S. organizations and individuals

have substantial experience in using this s terns

approach. Likewise, USAID has staff w o are r

knowledgeable about institution-building and

regulation of pesticides and the U.S. scientific

community has resources far beyond most

developing countries. However, pohcy changes

are needed if these capabilities are to be exploited

for improved 1PM (box 4-B).

The term “integrated ~est management,”

derived from theear-herterm integrated Pest control,” was introduced by the U.S. Councd on Environmental Quality in 1972. The Council

promoted 1PM as an environmentally sound alternative to the misuse of pesticides m large-scale

temperate agriculture. Use of the term soon

spread to those working with small-scale agriculture in the tropics (8).

Developing countries usually modelled their

pest management programs after those of colonial

powers. So, national crop protection senkes,like

their donor counterparts, are oriented primarily

towards chemical control of pests. This orientation, however, is questionable when most of the

national crop protection services’ clients lack the

resources to adopt this control and some of their

existing agricultural practices might be better

adapted to 1PM.

It seems that USAID policy regarding 1PM

was not well understood nor fully implemented by

those who led the recent emergency grasshopper

and locust campaigns. USAID sto ped funding

several regional longer term 1PM ef ?orts in Africa.

Termination of funding seems justified for these

specific

x

rejects but no alternatives were

develope and funded. The agency has supported

imaginative and effective pest control approaches,

such as an 1PM program in Honduras, however. A

new USAID licy statement on 1PM, the Pest

Management rector Review, was planned (29 for

Spring 1990 but has been delayed until at east )

1991. This could clari&the Agency’s position, but

a corresponding reallocation of resources is required. To date, emergency control operations

have received far more resources than the various

elements of prevention, such as 1PM.

Reseamh

Shifting from the current emergency focus to

a preparedness and prevention approach will re8

uire that USAID tackle several types of research.

eveloping improved control programs requires a

long-term, stable research program with sizable

resources. The United States has a comparative

advantage in conducting research of this type and

Congress could encourage the U.S. Department

of Agriculture USDA), Environmental Protection Agency +)~PA , De artment of Energy

[

DOE), and t e Nationa Science Foundation

NSF), as well as USAID to support it. USAID

could ex@ore “twinning” programs between U.S.

universities (land-grant and nonland grant col-
Ch. 4-Policy Options for Congress andthe Executive Branch . 93
94 ● A Plague of Locusts

leges and universities) and developing country

grou s to conduct applied 1PM research and to

deve op and implement training in Africa. r

Providing pesticides, aircraft, and spraying

equipment consumed an inordinately large part of

U.S. resources in the recent cam algn. Stall, the

part of U.S. cmtributions current rydesi nated for

development of biological control for ocust and F

grassho per problems ma be unwarranted because o biological contro unproven potential. ! r

So, important questions remain, especially regarding future priorities of U.S. research.

USAXD needs improved inhouse technical expertise and this is especially important if USAID

supports 1PM research pro~rams. Deciding

priorities among research projects and making

specific funding decisions seems beyond the technical expertise currently within USAID. Without

such expertise, USAID pro rams suffer in quality,

become unduly influenced y political considera- %

tions, and lack continuity. While USAID has always relied on contracted e

T

rtise, many find

current trends disturbing. U AID is known to

have minimal technical ca abili in pest management (22). It seems that SAI has increasingly Eg

fewer career professionals with technical expertise

and that the a ency has problems retaining those

f

it does have 132). Some experts contend that

other donors, such as the Dutch, West Germans,

and French, did a better “ob tapping their

countries’ technical expertise or grasshopper and I

locust problems.

Overall, U.S. Government agencies pay experiencedscientists less than the private sector. In

addition, USAID incentives reward those who

plan–rather than carry out–programs. USAID

field staff with general administrative experience

and degrees in political science and economics are

in a poor position to monitor the scientific merit

of ongoing work related to scientific and technical

issues (129). As a result, many layers of review by

outside experts and other USAID staff in

Washington are required, adding to the cost and

time required to complete a given activity.

Research programs should take place in Africa

as much as possible, include gender and family

systems anal sis, focus on the neediest farmers and

herders, an tap indigenous knowledge as well as J

“frontier” technology. For example, efforts to implement an 1PM approach must include a sophisticated analysis of gender and family roles in

agricultural production and the application of this

analysis to proposed efforts. Women’s agricultural

roles display very different patterns in different

African countries, and too often new technologies

have increased their labor or decreased their share

of the benefits.

Appl “ng IPMto African realities will be challen~ing or American and r Euro~an scientists.

African scientists familiar with their environment,

and able to speak the small farmers’ language(s)

may be better positioned to conduct this research

than others. A small competitive grants program

to support IPM-related research by Africans might

encoura e this type of work while bypassing the

financia and management problems that were f

typical of the failed Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS)

1PM project (136).

The Pest Management Task Force discussed

above might designate a standing Research Advisory Committee, comprised of experts in 1PM, to

assist USAID in deciding which research topics are

most important to sup ort. Members of the committee might assist U AID in designing realistic 8

requests for proposals and selecting the researchers to carry them out. The committee,

therefore, must be informed of: 1) the U.N. Food

and Agriculture Organization (FAO) pro ress on

research priorities regarding African grassE oppers

and locusts, 2) African and European researchers’

work on African insects, and 3) relevant research

in Canada, Australia, and the United States

re arding other types of grasshoppers and locusts.

U AID could tap the modeling work of other 8

Federal agencies and university scientists to improve forecasting. New or improved pest population and migration models are potentially very

useful, especially for the African Migratory

Locust, the Desert Locust, and Senegalese

Grasshopper.

Training

Generally, training is cost-effective, helps

strengthen institutions, and increases programs’

sustainability. A clear need exists for training

farmers in currently available 1PM methods, such

as early identification of pests, safe pesticide use,

and planting security crops. USAID should sup-
Ch. &Policy Options for Congress andthel&cutive Branch . 95

port such training for African extension agents,

national crop protection services, and local

farmers and herders. Moreover, USAID should

review its current training programs to ensure that

1PM is included.

Bi&n~”neered Organisms

Some bioengineered organisms are likely to

have applications for pest management. The International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (ICIPE) has already submitted a research

proposal to USAID and other donors with plans

to use such organisms. In the United States,a new

and complex regulatory environment is developing related to the testing and use of bioengineered

organisms involving EPA USDA the National

Institutes of Health, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and several government advisory bodies on biotechnology (60). USAID

should take the initiative to establish a policy

framework for using such organisms overseas,

while providing environmental and health

safeguards. In the 1970s, USAID was forced by a

lawsuit to develop appropriate guidelines for its

development and use of pesticides. Today,

USAID’s policy response to the use of bioengineered or anisms in pest management should

not await a Yawsuit. Setting up protective regulations for testing and using additional ty es of

biological control a ents overseas might al 1’eviate

African, as well as Lerican, fears such as those

that led the government of Mali to cancel USAIDfunded lhenra trials after considerable funds had

been expended (99).

Using Pesticides Judiciously

Finding: USAID needh to exumine carefully &

pesticide reseamh, evaluations, and technikal ass&

tance and then incorporate msulks so that pesticides

are used more selectively. Training in safe and eJectivepesticide use should be a @ component of donor

crop protection eflorts. Donor coordination will be

essentihl 1~ U.S. poltiiks am to have the greatest impact.

Past locust and grasshop er control programs

have left Africa with a egac of unsolved f

problems. USAID’S response to ate seems woe- J

fully inadequate in light of its own conclusions

regarding pesticide disposal and health problems.

In 1989, USAID spent only $50,000 for one health

workshop. Congress could play an important role

in changing this situation (box 4-C).

Judicious insecticide use includes a spectrum

of activities such as developing and selecting less

harmful insecticides, applying them more effectively and efficiently, and storing and disposing

surplus supplies safely–all with greater regard to

protecting people, their food and water, and the

environment. An essential dimension is better

balancing the costs and benefits of control.

Another E improved surveillance and forecasting

to allow more accurate and precise pesticide application on small target areas. Research to improve understanding of the insects’ biology, such

as pinpointing conditions and reasons for swarming behavior, can strengthen the foundation for

these improvements.

Controversy and confusion reign on such issues as the best insecticides to use, the threshold

at which to mount control, and the most vulnerable

habitats. For example, the list of insecticides “approved” by USAID constantly changes, along with

the rationale for selection and accompanying

restrictions. These are researchable topics, however, and USAID is well-placed to conduct this

type of research and then incorporate it into agencystrategic andprogramplanning. Also, USAID’s

pro~rams probably would be more cost-effective if

declsionmakers were more explicit regarding

trade-offs and their consequences regarding insecticide use. For example, sam Iingspraying’s effectiveness and impacts might a low fewer hectares to f

be treated. This could lead to decreased pesticide

use and related expenses, e.g., for respraying and

clean-up.

Training

Training in safe and effective esticide selection and use is needed on al levels, from f

policymakers to individual farmers. Trainin and

institutional development for African agricuftural

agencies (e.g., national crop protection selwices

and agricultural extension services) should be a

key component of donor crop protection

strategies. Advanta es might exist to makin

trainin part of broa -based efforts, e. ., f

f f

USAI%

could evelop training programs for a 1 pesticide

applicators, whether spraying for malaria,
96 ● A Plague of Locusts

f

rasshoppers, or other a ricultural pests. This is

f

Preparedness

ikely to save money in t e long-term and ensure

a more integrated approach to pesticide use and Preparedness can save time and e~ense in the

documentation. long run. Information on insecticides in the
Ch. &Policy Options for Congress andthe&zcutive Branch ● 97

Programmatic Environmental Assessment (e.g.,

about which insecticides are more or less tome to

various habitats) and the Operations Guidebook

is a good first step. USAID cdd take additional

steps to alleviate cmfusion in the field regarding

various insecticides and help its missions prepare

for the next pest upsurges. Makin one person in

US~D/Washington responsible or maintaining f

up-to-date files on each insecticide used and

providing clear information to missions would help

missions be better prepared. Such a pesticide

specialist could help USAID missions analyze

technical information, apply what is known about

the specific chemicals to their particular situation,

and prepare or update count supplemental environmental assessments to fu 7fill Regulation 16.

USAID can implement its own staffs’ suggestions to prepare for upsurges. For example, establishing more broadly-based rosters of highly

qualified technical experts and experienced cmtractors who cmduct aerial spraying (114) and

maintaining up-to-date rosters could reduce

delays in providing missions with assistance.

The cmcerted joint efforts of donors is likel

to have greater impacts than single-handed U. .1

efforts. For example, a need exists for a comprehensive evaluation of pesticide use in agriculture and disease control in developing countries.

The U.N. agencies are the logical choice for this

task because the U.N. World Health Organization

is the major supporter of health-related spraying

and FAO, for agricultural spraying. The U.N. Environment Programme would have an important

role as well. The United States could contribute

to this lobal effort in various ways. Either an

externa review anel or an interagency 1PM task f

force could ana yze pesticide use in all 1’ USAIDsupported work. Donor coordination also is important in order to provide African countries with

consistent advice on regulations for safe and effective use of pesticides.

In some areas, USAID cannot implement

measures to improve pesticide use without congressional action. U.S. procurement requirements

regarding U.S. develo~ment assistance sometimes

add to program rests, increase administrative burdens on Africans, and result in the use of inappropriate technologies (128). OFDA funds have

built-in waivers from certain of these requirements, but pest problems rarely fit within OFDA’S

limit of providing assistance for 60 to 90 days. The

recent campaign showed that repositioning insecticides and equipment in drica or Europe is

rest-effective because it reduces air freight and

enables a more timely response. Grantin waivers

to competitive bidding requirements or f nonOFDA funds may help bring about a more efficient control program and help maintain such

b

re-positioned “pesticide banks” during upsurges.

owever, prepositionin~ insecticides might also

facilitate even more vwdespread spraying. Pesticide banks would need careful maintenance to

assure proper storage and this has not been done

in the past.

U.S. Coordination and Support for African,

U.N., and Regional Organizations

The United States does not administer foreign

aid directly. Virtually every program requires the

approval of African government and then depends

on the participation of government or regional

or animations to carry out U.S.-funded work.

U AID, like others, increasingly 8 reco@zes that

strengthening African organizations 1s essential

for U.S.-supported efforts to be sustainable.

Within this context, a variety of organizations

receive donor support, ranging from the national

crop protection services to FAO and the regional

African research and control organizations. A

more coordinated approach to supportin these

groups, as well as to supportin work in SAID 6

and among U.S. agencies and ot erdonors is likely k

to stretch scarce resources (box 4-D). To its credit,

USAID actively promoted coordinating committees in each African country and participated in

FAO and World Bank-sponsored meetings during

the recent campaigns.

The Structure of U.S. Aid

Administrative responsibility for coordinating

locust and grasshopper efforts within USAID

shifted four times during the 4 years of the recent

cam aign (99). The lack of continuity in

Was ington caused changes in objectives, staff, 1!

~rograms, and funding restrictions. Also, changes

m administrative res~onsibilit~, coupled with

bureaucratic complexity, sometimes resulted in

long delays in responding to requests from USAID
98 ● A Plague of Locusts

@k U“D to”’dimtig~ehzted adkties beinpc;ndmtedbv othen and”&scn”be huw ~

missions in Africa. Such administrative changes Now that the insects are in recession, donors

compounded lon -standin problems ofcoordinaA&and ot%erU.S. agencies.

and others will be tempted to turn attention to

tion within US other issues rather than carefully reassessing past
Ch. &Policy Options for Congress andthe Executive Branch ● 99

programs and planning more sustainable, preventive approaches. Congress should ensure that this

doesn’t happen, although this may be the time for

leadership of the U.S. effort to shift with new

objectives. APHIS re resents the United States

orI the FAO’S Desert Lust Control Committee;

S&T/USAID has a Ieadershi role in the World

Bank Special Program for hrican Agricultural

Research (SPAAR) research task force and participates in a multidonor effort to prepare a global

crop protection initiative (31). These agencies can

play a larger role now, but their financial resources

are relatively insignificant relative to other

USAID bureaus and the U.S. State Department

which administers funding for U.N. organizations.

Working with other countries’ scientists

should be a high priority because wasteful duplication already exists in high-priority technical areas.

For example, USAID/U.S. Geological Survey

(USGS) and World Bank efforts in early warning

and forecasting seem to arallel efforts by the

Dutch, French, and FA . 8 Negotiations could

eliminate the more costly overlaps and ensure that

various components are integrated. An increased

pro ortionofU.S. assistance might beallocatedto

mu ftilateral organizations because the tied aid requirements of bilateral assistance contributes to

du Iication of donors’ efforts. At a minimum,

U AID should track the progress of others’ J

planned or current projects before designing or

funding similar ones. And, USAID should share

its plans with other donors.

The Rolk of Natwnal Crop Protectwn Services

Finding: Many Ajiian natiorud cmpprotectwn

services am poorly equipped to take over a kwgepati

of locust and grasshopper monitoring and control or

to develop integrtid pest management strategies.

Better-coordinated regional approaches are needed,

but suppoti for building individual crop protectwn

services must be a significantpartof donur assistance.

Africans must set their own agendas for

development if efforts are to be most effective

(132) and gradually assume more res~nsibility

and leadership for ~rograms. The national crop

protection services m sub-Saharan Africa should

gradually assume a greater role in leading the 1PM

and locust and grasshopper control. In Northwest

Africa, however, the national crop protection services already carry out this role.

Numerous avenues can increase the ability of

African national cro

k

rotection seMces and other

agencies within the “ tries of Agriculture to do

this, e.g., training, technical assistance, and institutionaldevelopmen~ Currently, manycropprotection services in the Sahel are handicapped b institutional

constrain~jurisdictional problems, an Jorthelackof

inbstructure, trained pemonnel, and working equipment. They also lack information on alternative

controls for insect pests. Donors can su port applied research by Africans to identi~ an test new f

methods, building on indigenous knowlkdge and

practices where possible.

The situation differs among countries, however, so donors need to be flexible and use a variety

of approaches. For example, the ability to monitor

insects during recessions and to control outbreaks

in remote breeding areas varies greatly. In some

countries, the national crop protection service already undertakes these actnnties; in others, neighboring countries or regional organizations assist.

The Northwest African countries monitor remote

regions for locusts within their own borders.

Generally, the four Maghreb countries have wellorganized crop

1’

rotection services (sometimes

with specialized ocust control groups) and they

can respond quickly to insect upsurges. They

rapidly established locust control operations with

a central headquarters, regional headquarters, and

a number of technical and other committees

during the recent campaigns.

The Department of Plant Protection and

Locust Control of Somalia’s Ministry of Agriculture recently proposed to strengthen its locust

control service along these lines. The Ministry

hopes to establish 9 units, with a total staff of 48,

including 7 permanent or mobile field units, to

monitor the Desert Locust in its summer and

winter breeding grounds and control outbreaks as

they begin. The Ministry requested funds for training, supplies (insecticides, application equipment,

protective clothing), communication and

transportation equipment (including spare parts

and camping equipment), and improving pesticide

storage facilities. The estimated budget was

$’720,000 for 3 years (l).

On the other hand, Mali, whose national crop

protection service is restricted to protecting

croplands located mostly in the southern part of

the country, allowed Algeria and Morocco to con-
100 ● A Plague of Locusts

duct ground o

r

rations in northern Mali so that

swarms WOU1 not enter the Maghreb region.

Also, Algeria and Morocco collaborated on surveillance and control in remote areas near their

common border.

The national crop protection semices, however, cannot be effective without working with

additional national agencies. For example, 1PM

requires, among other things, the cooperative effort of cr~p rotection services with agricultural

research an extension x setices, forest services,

etc., to identi~ and use new pest management

technologies.

The Role ofA&an Re@nal Organizations, FAO,

ItiernationalAgricultural Reseamh Organizations,

and Local Groups

Finding: Regimud groups have a distinct advantage in dealing with mgiinud pmblkms such as

grasshopper and lbcust upsuqys. AjHcan n?gibnal

organizations must continue improving their

management and financiid supprt to reach their

potentiul. FAO can had in compiling da@ forecasting insect upsurges, and sponsoring meeti’ngs; the

internatwnal agrhd!tural mseamh oWani&ns in

Africa can develbp alternative control methoci%.

Finding: Local gmups’pa@ation in locust

and grasshop~r moniton”ng and control has signljiiatiadvantages. Participation can beenwumged

via the involvement of African nongovernmental organizatwns and donom’supptifor cwtain types of

training, technid assistance, andpilbtpmjects.

The recent locust and grasshopper upsurges

demonstrated the importance of a variety of African

groups andintemationalor anizationsandhighlighted

their limitations. The res$ ting lessons learned have

implications forimproving U.S. development assistance

to Africa

The sub-saharan regional control groups- Joint

Imcust and Bird Control Organization (OCLAIAv

Desert Locust CkmtrOl Organization for Eastern Afii~’

and International Red Imcust CMrol Or anisation for

Gmtral and southern Abica-tradition& conducted

control inareasbeyondthe reachoffinanciallystrapped

national crop ~rotection servixx These groups are

sorting out theu mandates, capabilities, and resources,

and deciding the relative amount of forecasting,

surveillance, research, and control each will do and

where they will do it. For example, OCLALAV’S

members recently shifted responsibility for locust

and grasshopper control from OCLALAV to their

respective national crop protection services.

Donors have been instrumental in shaping

these groups’ reorganization and need to continue

their involvement for their investment to pay off.

At the same time,

{

romoting institutional sustainabili r~uires t at African member nations

take the ead m deciding mandates, organizational 7

structure, amounts of members’ dues, and

programs. Deciding what activities and organizations to support is extremely difficult because of

thechan~es underwa .

r

Donors need to be flexible

and consider the who e picture-the relationship of

the work of each regional organization to that of

the others, FAO, other donors, and national crop

protection services-before supporting particular

activities.

For example, USAID’S decision to fund the

Center for Application of A rometeorology and

Hydrology for the Sahel (A&RHYMET) greenness maps has implications for similar programs

funded by FAO as well as for relationships amen

Af&anregionalorganizations AIso, decisionsregaJ -

ing OCLALAV’S new responsibiliti~ Africans and

donors must consider OCLALAV’S work in relation to that of the other regional organizations

associated with CILSS, es cially AGRHYMET

in Niame , Niger and the Sa rel Institute in Bamako,

Mali. A 6.RHYMET has been steadily increasing

1k ‘whn*cal ‘Oramtln%capaclY but’”llke ‘A O Programmede Recherc eInter ficlplmalre Fran-’

cais sur les Acridiens (PRIFAS), and USGS, has

problems obtaining field data and disseminating

reformation rapidly throughout the Sahel. The

Sahel Institute, with trained scientists and up-todate equipment, has the potential to conduct research and help implement some components of

regional 1PM programs. CILSS’ cro protection

training department in Nigerma beailetoimplement other components. Also, ILSS maybe able Z

to help mediate disputes between members that

jeopardize survey and control efforts. However,

CILSS’ track record in 1PM and in resolving Member disputes has been disappointing.

In some cases, collaborative efforts between

regional research and control organizations and

national crop protection services would increase

the effectiveness of both as well as the efficiency
Ch. &Policy Options for Congress andthe Executive Brunch . 101

with which donor funds are spent. Such efforts

might include ada tive research; information exchanges; fellows ips, training, and personnel f

swaps; institutional “twinning,” and sharing

facihties.

Problems associated with disputes within nations and concerns between nations need to be alleviated to make pest control more effective. The

regional control organizations’ mandates do not include resolving internal disputes within countries

nor differences between member and nonmember

nations. The international Desert bcust task force

proposed in 1988 by the countries of the Sahel and

Maghreb maybe a model for joint ventures in other

areas.

FAO–The uestions surroundin the recent

locust and grass opper campaign 1 wi[ remain unanswered until some group becomes responsible

for developing standard forms and procedures for

use throughout the affected region, and then collects, compiles, and analyzes the data needed for

forecasting, for monitoring insect populations, and

for selecting control sites. In the United States,

USDA collects the type of data needed and FAO,

as the comparable international or anization,

could make similar efforts worldwide. his is likely

to demand more resources, especially to develop

a public database on pest levels, pesticides used,

value of crops, etc.

Also, more coordinated responses are needed

during upsurges and recessions. FAO has a long

history coordinating these programs and is the only

organization with the U.N. mandate and credibility to

bring together the large number of donors and affectednations. Forexam le, FAOisapplyingremote

sensing andmodelingtotEelocustproblemwith more

continuity, cohesiveness, and smpe than any other

organization. So FAO is in a position to assist other

donors divide responsibility among competing early

warning and remote sensin programs and complement each others’ efforts. !AO-sponsored regional

conferences cancontinw topmmotedonorandAfiican

coordination on topics such as priority research and

monitoring for migrato~ pests in remote areas.

The FAO/Emergency Centre for Locust Operations (ECLO) has demonstrated the technical expertise and the willingness to improve its work based

on lessons learned during the recent locust and

grasshopper campaign. FAO’S current efforts to

improve forecasting and implement “strate iccontrol” with multinational teams are examp es, and f

the organization’s intention to fund these efforts

during recessions deserves U.S. su port. FAO

must actively educate African, U. ., and donor {

policymakerx on the necessity for laying groundwork

during recessions for quicker, more precise

responses during upsurges, for focusing on

preventive work, and for supporting institutional

development for these efforts to succeed.

Continued research is another long term need

and FAO is moving ahead on at least two related

projecKFAOandthe U.N. Develo~ment Programme

(UNDP) established a joint ScientficAdvisory Cornc

mittee in late 1989 to review research pro for

UNDP and donor funding. Also, FAO/E O published the fnt semi-annual Desert Imcust Research

and Development Register in July, 1989, identifying

current and proposed research.

During the recent campaigns, FAO conducted

mntrol operations in some areas of sub-Saharan

Africa, hi hlighting the inadequacy of regional and

national h“can groups. In the short term, FAO’S

direct participation m control probably will be

needed but its goal should be to increase African

ca acity-regional and national–to mount their own

ef 1!orts. FAO’S successful training and forecasting

programs help achieve this. In addition, FAO can

help donor and African participants devise ways to

monitor the effectiveness of spraying and its impacts

on health and the environment.

Several broader problems exist inprovidingU.S.

support to regional and U.N. organizations. Pursuing foreign ~licy objectives sometimes has resulted

in termination of U AID funding in the middle of &

long term development programs. Also, the various

components of U.S. assistance themselves may have

contradictory goals and constrain effixtiveness. The

results of some “policy reform” measures may gut

other programs supported by donors, for example,

bycausingsevere cut-backs ingovemment employees

(24).

The U.S. Department of State allocates funds

to pay assessments and arrears due U.N. agencies,

within general congressional guidelines. To some,

it appears that the State Department’s recent decisions

have resulted in FAO’S bearing a disproportionate

burden of money owed to all U.N. agencies (90).

From 1985 to February 1990, the United States fell
102 ● A Plague ofl%custs

$195 million behind in assessed payments to FAO.

This amounts to near] 70percent of FAO’s 1990

annual operating bu et. In several instances, J

lackoffunds affected AO’S # locustworkadversely, e.g., field control staff were recalled when it

appeared that FAO could not meet its payroll (91).

In January 1990, the Bush administration requested nearly full fundin of U.S. assessments

and 100 percent payment or arrears, scheduled f

over 5 years.

Congress’ guidelines for State’s decisions are

broad, emphaslzepolitical and financial considerations, and provide the State De~artment with wide

latitude (see 124). Authorization for USAID and

the State De artment is done in different legislation by the house Foreign Affairs and Senate

Foreign Relations Committees. The Senate and

House A propriations Committees set USAID

and the tate Department’s budgets. In each ~

chamber, however, two different subcommittees

are involved. These various congressional actors

differ in philosoph , reporting requirements, and

the latitude they a low Executive Agencies. This 1’

constrains U.S. development efforts in Africa.

Therefore, the various con ressional subcommittees have a responsibility or coordinating their f

activities. For example, the two relevant &nate

Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittees: 1)

Foreign Operations and 2) Commerce, Justice;

and State; the Judiciary; and Related Agencies)

could together examine the eneral congressional

guidelines for funding U. . agencies, their ap- 3

plication to FAO, and their substantive adequacy.

International and Regional Agricultural Research Organizations-ICIPE and IITA are currently loringbiological andbiorationalcontrols

for the esert Locust and certain grassho per %

species. ICIPE and DLCO-EA are among t ose E

testing the effectiveness of improved chemical insecticides.

These or animations should train thestaff’s of

Ministries o Agriculture and conduct joint re- !

search with national agencies as part of their research. These international organizations are

likely to increase their research’s chance of success, build support for their organizations, and

increase national capacity in this way. Donors and

member nations need to provide continuing support for these efforts to succeed. Also, they should

ensure that regular communication takes place

between the scientists at these organizations and

those in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere

in Africa.

Participation of Local Groups-Certain ground

suwe and control efforts in the recent campai$ns

were ~ighlysuccessful because of theparticipatlon

of local groups of farmers and herders. Generally,

farmers’ groups helped conduct survey and control

efforts near their croplands and herders scouted in

more remote areas. Local groups’ abilities to supp1 indigenous knowledge about pests and provide

Jonors and others with specific information

regarding local needs was less adequately tapped,

however.

In the Sahel, farmer brigades were organkd by

national cro protection services assisted by USAID

and UNDP riding. For example, farmer committees E

in Senegal and Gambia were trained to recognize the

buildup of the Senegalese asshopper and take action in or near their fields 19. Similar training was r~

conducted in Ma~ Burkina aso, and Ni er 71).

Crop protection teams in Mali, aided by R AS $&

repor@ identified areas of heaviest infestation, setup

insecticide stores, and trained farmem to use manual

dustem or sprayem to kill Senegalese grasshopper as

they hatched. Similarly, Malian farmen, trained by

plant protection and extension officers, monitored

e -laying and controlled Desert busts atthetime

o !!%atching (71).

In countries where roads are poor or nonexistent, nomads on camels and farmers on donkeys

can reach areas that the crop protection services

cannot. In the Sudan, for example, crop protection services hired hundreds of herders on camels

as local scouts to monitor insect buildup in inaccessible areas (121).

l-he more that local k and their organizations

takepartindecisionmakinga Yutpestmanagemen~ the

less Unmtainty exists regarding dObx and

methods that are acceptable and sustainab~ and the

morelikely jectsaretocaptureimportantinformation

(see box4-~Et&tivepest management that benefits

low-resourmfium~~uldbuildo~ mtherthan~p~

local rnezlm

‘“’ -

g proachm to cmp protection have fd-7”d- oped‘-”&hsto

m ~ highly integrated with their social goals and

technnl capabilities Fbr example, villages in the Lake

Victoria regmn coopemte in protecting crops fi-ombirds

byplantingthesamecolorandvarietyofcropat thesame
Ch. &Poiicy Options for Congress andthe&cutive Branch . 103

time, thus spreading risk among all the farmers.

Government and donor planners would benefit

horn studying such approaches Highly centralized research and management tends to exclude

participation

7

local grmqx And most grasshopper and ocust control efforts are highly

centralized.

Themo6tseriouslimitationto increasedfarmerand

herder participation is lack of information about improved pest management. Generally, pest management networks do not exist, people have little

access to ap ropriate literature, they are not

literate, etc. 8rop protection services and others

can increase their ability to reach larger numbers

of farmers and herders by working with existing

village or farmer orgamzations or other nongovernmental organizations in the area. The

African Development Foundation (ADF) and

others have demonstrated that local intermediary

groups can play an important role in development

programs (130). Many such groups exist within

20-954 0 - 90 - 5 : QL 3
104 ● A Plague of Locusts

African countries, including local church groups, that

have the ability to mobilize or communicate with

people in an area. Information diwxninatedthrough

these types of grOU

L

may be quite effective. F@

exarnpl~ one ADF- pm”ect deaemed useof

lindane afkr dancers and a localLrwamed people

of its&n&m.

Funding Implications

Some adjustments of U.S. bilateral and multilateral funding maybe necessary to ensure that the

most effective pest management is undertaken.

These can be obtained by:

●

●

●

reapportion nrnent within current appropriations

leve&

chan&s to financial Strllcture$ such as usAID’s

Development Fired for- created in 1988,

and

appropriations of additional funds.

Reapportwning Current Appropriations

Some monies needed to support im rovements

in USAID’s grasshopper and locust wor may come E

from internal shifts of funds because the Agency is

no longer funding massive control efforts. For example, on-going programs, such as institutional

development of African agricultural organizations,

may incorporate 1PM or improved insecticide use

without requiring additional funds.

Congr* maywant to encourage USAID to allocate additional existing agricultural funds to pest

management generally and IPM specifically. Pest

management received a declining share of the Bureau

for Science and Technology’s agricultural budget in

recent years. From fiscal years 1977 to 1988, pest

management received an overall average of 5.8 percent of S&T/agriculture funds, but in 1986 this sector

only received 1.0 percent; in 1987,3.2 percent; and

in 1988, 1.8 percent (116). The amounts of fhnds

allocated worldwide were small: $340,000 in 1986;

$900,MD in 1987; and $520,000 in 198& This trend

coupled with reduced USAID fhnding to agriculti in

general, means that few U.S. development assistancefilndsm~spentonlongtermpest~~

Changes to FinanciaI Structures

Congress replaced USAID’s functional accounts

with the Development Fund for Africa in 1988 to

L

rwide USAIDwithincreased flexibili andtomake

riding more efficient. Congress COU1T evaluate the

impactofthe Develo ment Fund. Early indications

are that agricultural funding decreased relative to r

other sectors as a result, as did pressure to fund

activities with quic~visible results. If so, the Develo~-

ment Fund for Africa may neither be achieving lts

goals, nor be able to seine as a model for other

programs.

Appropriations ofAdditionalFunds

There is no doubt that new efforts would require new appropriations. What is not clear is how

much these efforts would cost.

Im lementingIPMfor locusts and asshoppers

and ot er pests would require funds or planning, [ r

training, research, and coordination. Also, funding

would be required for preventive work e.g., monitorin P=tPoP~ations (asadvocat~bYus~DJ FAO>

ot erdonors, and affected countries) and improving f

forecasting systems. For example, establishing the

proposed International Task Force for ground

monitoring and control of the Desert hcust in remote

areas in the Sahel and continuing to produce greenness maps would require new or continued funding.

The price-tag for such new efforts is not clear, but

USAID will need to estimate some of these costs

while planning the AELGA follow-on projec~ Congress may want to ensure that all components of

USAID’s follow-on work are considered together.

Providingequipment andsuppliescanbe unimportant part of efforts to strengthen loca~ nation~ and

regional A&&m institutions. Some relatively inexpensive items may increase the Capacity of national crop

protection institutions to momtor insect puIations,

e.~, fax machines, radios, and spare parts. &ler itemssuch as satellite remiving stations and major rewxu-ch

propods-are fir more costly.
Appendixes
Appendix A-Acronyms and Glossary

Acronyms

AELGA –Africa Emergency Locust/Grasshopper Assistance (USAID project)

AFR –Africa Bureau (USAID)

AGRHYMET –~~er fm~li- ofAgrometeorolANE

APHIS

ARTEMIS

BHC

CDIE

CILSS

D D T

DLCO-EA

DOE

ECLO

EIS

EPA

EROS

FAO

FEWS

GIEWS

GTZ

ICIPE

ogyandH@o@yfortheS~l (Nkuney,

N~r, aflliatedwith CILSS)

–Asia/Near East Bureau (USAID)

–Animal and Plant Health Inspection

Service (USDA)

–Africa Real Time Environmental

Modeling Using Imaging Satellites

(FAO)

–Benzene hexachloride, a persistent

chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticide

–Center for Development Information

and Evaluation, USAID

–French acronym for the Permanent InterstateCommittee for Drought Control

in the Sahel (a regional organization of

nine nations: Burkina Fhso, Cape Verde,

Chad, The Gambia, Guinea Bissaq

Ma Mauritan@ N~er, and Senegal)

–Dichloro diphenyl trichloroethane, a

persistent chlorinated hydrocarbon

pesticide

–Desert Locust Control Organization for

EastemMica(Addis Abab~Ethiopia)

–U.S. Department of Energy

–Emergency Centre for Locust Operations (FAO)

–Environmental impact statement, as

required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1%9

–U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

–Earth Resources Obsemation Systems

(USGS)

–Food and Agriculture Organization

of the United Nations

–Farnine Early WrningSystem (UsAID)

–Global Information and Early Warning System (FAO)

–German acronym for the German

Agency for Technical Cooperation

–International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology (Nairobi Kenya)

ICRISAT

IITA

1PM

IRLCO-CSA

NOAA

NSF

OCLALAV

OFDA

OICD

OTA

PRIFAS

S&T

SAS

SPAAR

SWA

ULV

UNDP

USAID

USDA

USFS

USG

USGS

–International Crops Research Institute

for the Semi-Arid llopics

–International Institute for Tropical

Agriculture (Ibadq N~eria)

–Integrated Pest Management

–International Red Locust Control Organisation for Central and Southern

Africa (Ndola, Zambia)

–National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (U.S. Department of

Commerce)

–U.S. National Science Foundation

–French acronym for the Joint Locust

and Bird Control Organization

(Dakar, Senegal)

–Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

(USATD)

–Office of International Cooperation

and Development (USDA)

–Office of lbchnology Assessmen~ U.S.

Congres

–Programme de Recherches InterdiaplinaireFrancais surksAcridiem du

Sahel (unit oftheFrenchr-ch agency

CIRAD that studies locusts and grasshoppers of the Sahel).

–Bureau for Science and Technology

(uSAID)

–Surveillance des Acridiens au Sahel,

a French network for collecting field

observations on locusts and grasshoppers in the Sahel (PRIFAS)

–Special Program for African Agricultural Research (World Bank)

–Office of Sahel/West Africa

(USAID/AFR)

–Ultra-low volume (spraying application)

–United Nations Development

Programme

–U.S. Agency for International Development

–U.S. Department of Agriculture

–U.S. Forest Service (USDA)

–U.S. Government

–U.S. Geological Survey (U.S. Department of the Interior)

107
108 ● A Plague of Locusts

Glossary

Band: Cohesive group of gregarious hoppers that

march together in daytime and roost at night

Fax: AIso, telef~ facsimile; method for electronic

transmission of documents

Fledgling: A sexually immature adult locust or

grasshopper that isableto~, developmental stageatler

the last molt

Grasshoppers: Insects with powerfd @ adapted fw

jump~ belonging to the scientific order (lrt.hopter~ in

this report refers to a small number of species of

aggregatinggradoppers that can fbrmgregariousbands

and swarms

Gregarious Phase: Period when locust populations form

kirge, dense groups resulting horn crowding; imolves

behavior, color, then shape and physiol@.al changes

in the insects

Hopper: Second stage of locusts’ life cycle (between

egg and adult) comprised of several instars and

characterized by insects’ inability to fly

Instar: Growth period between times that grasshoppers

and locusts molt

invasion Areas: Areas, larger than outbreak areas, in

which locust and grasshopper bands and swarms

can be found after gregarization

Locusts: Insects within the scientific order Orthopter~

superfamily Acridoidea; distinguished from most

grasshoppers primaily by ability to form gregarious

bands and SWWIIIS

Maghreb: Area north of the Sahara desert and east of

Egypt; countries of Algeria, Morocco, Libya, and

Tunisia

Molt: Process by which hoppers shed their skin

periodically, usually occurring five times during the

second stage of the insecfs’ life cycle

Outbmalc Marked increases in locust or gpshopper

populations leading to the appmrance of gregarious

grou~ occurs frequently and maymarkthe bq$nnhgof

an upsurge

Outbreak Areas: permanent breeding and

gregarization areas that have been identified for

major locust species except Desert Locusts; very

much smaller than invasion areas of these species

Plague: Occurrence ofmanybands and swarms over a

large area in different regions at the same time

Recession: Period when gregarious bands and swarms

of locusts and grasshoppers are rare, solitary insects

predominate

Recession Area: Area that solitary Desert Locusts

occupy at low density; the vast central, drier area of

Desert hcust distribution, within its invasion area

Sahel: Geographically, the semiarid areas of the

Sahara Desert’s southern edge. Politically, the nine

West African countries that are CINS members.

Solitary Phase: Period when locusts and aggregating

grasshoppers live as individuals, when populations

are low-density and scattered

Swarm: Cohesive group of gregarious adult locusts or

grasshoppers that fly together, usually during the

day, and rest at night

Upsurge: Buildup of bands and swarms, especially

outside of outbreak areas; infrequently marks the

start of a plague
Appendix B-List of Contractor Papers, Contracted

Analvsis. and Worksho~ Participants

Contractor Paper s

“Locusts and Grasshoppers in Africa and the Middle East”

Author: Dale G. Bottrell

Department of Entomology

University of Maryland

College Park, MD

“The Prospect for Equitable and Sustainable Desert Locust Control in A Changing African

Environment”

Author: Dean L. Haynes

Department of Entomology

Michigan State University

East Lansing, MI

“Social and Ethical Issues in Desert Locust Control for Africa”

Author: Paul B. Thompson

Philosophy Department

Texas A&M University

College Station, TX

Contracted Analysis

“Locusts in Africa and the Middle East: Summary of Responses to OTA Questionnaire”

Author: Dale G. Bottrell

Department of Entomology

University of Maryland

College Park, MD

Workshop

Dale G. Bottrell, Author

Dean L. Haynes, Author

Paul B. Thompson, Author

Kathleen M. Desmond, Contractor

Participants

Roger C. Herdman, OTA

Walter E. Parham, OTA

Phyllis N. Windle, OTA

109
Appendix C-OTA Survey Form

INFORMATION FORM FOR LOCUST EXPERTS

Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress

Your Name

The Country/s or Region/s with which you are familiar and upon which you have based the following information.

Please provide a brief description of your experience related to locusts and your current position.

PART A. THE CURRENT SITUATION

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

How would you rate the intensity of the locust problem in the country or region with which you are familiar, over

the last several decades? Please circle one response for each time period.

1950-59 Very Serious Serious InsignMcant Not Present

1960-69 Very Serious Serious InsignKlcant Not Present

1970-79 Very Serious Serious Insignitlcant Not Present

1980-88 Very Serious Serious Insignificant Not Present

If you detect a serious or very serious locust problem now, please ident~, with numbers 1-3, the frost, second,

and third most important locust species involved.

Desert locust @chistocerca gregan”a)

African migratory locust (Locusta migratoria)

Red locust (Nomadkcris septemfmciata)

Other

Howwouldyoujud ethegeographicdistribution of the locust infestations intheareaswithwhich you are familiar

over the last sever decades? Please circle one response for each time period. 3

1950-59 Not Signifkant Local Widespread Large/Regional

1960-69 Not Signifhnt Local Widespread Large/Regional

1970-79 Not Significant Local Widespread Large/Re~onal

1980-88 Not Significant Local Widespread Large/Regonal

Please comment on any trends in locust problems that you see.

Is desertification or local weather patterns intensifying locust problems in this area? Why/W@ not?

Do people in the region with which you are familiar eat locusts?

Yes No

Please add anyt~ else that you feel U.S. policymakers, donor groups, or researchers should know regarding

the locust situation m the area with which you are familiar.

110
App. C–OTA Survey FOnn ● 111

PART B. EFFECTS OF THE IXKUST INFESTATION

1. Please listthecrops(e

T

rt and/or subsistence crops) that are principally affected by locusts, the stage/sat which

locusts attack the~an yourestimate of the percentage of thecount

2’

or region’s crop seriously enough affected

by the current locust infestation to cause a signifkant drop in norm crop yields.

Crop

2. Please estimate, ifyou~the average nationalperhectareyiddc )fthesecmps,with andwithoutlocust infestation

in the country or region with which you are familiar. (Include units)

Average Yield Without Average Yield Wkh

Cr~

.

4 c~

3. What are the social consequences of locust infestation in the region?

4. Please list the other types of lands principally affected by locusts and estimate, if you can, the percentage of the

area seriously enough affected by the current locust infestation to cause a significant threat to livestock

production, tourism, soil Conservation, or other important uses of non-croplands.

u= Percenta e of

Area Af#cte~

Grazing lands

Parks and protected areas

Other:

5. Please add anything that you feel U.S. polic akers, donor

Y

ou s, or researchers should know regarding the

effects of locusts in the country or region wit which you are ami Fflar.

PART C. CONTROL EFFORTS

1. Please ~ the national agencies that conduct locust control programs in your country or region and the

international organizations that support local control programs.

2. Please~the insecticides that are used presently and were used in the past for locust control in these programs,

along with their application method (e.g., ground spraying).

~icides Used Currently ~r)lication Method/S

M e -

3. On what basis are decisions made to apply pesticides, e.g., surveys, previous outbreaks, etc.?

4. How are pesticides provided (e.g., from the private sector, from donors)?
112 ● A Plague of Locusts

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

How are excess pesticides disposed of?

Have side effects from these pesticides been detected? If so, please list them.

How are safety issues addressed?

Please list the principle locust controls used by subsistence farmers in this area. Indicate whether these are used

predominantly by men, women, or both.

Are village level groups taking part in locust control efforts in this area? If so, how?

What nonpesticide locust control methods are known, available, and/or encouraged in the area with which you

are familiar? Please list these.

What promising new technologies are available now or might be available in the fiture for controlling locusts in

this area?

How effective do you consider various locust control efforts to be? Very effective (vE), Somewhat Effective

(SE), Ineffective (I), Don’t Know (DK). Please circle one response.

International efforts VE SE I DK

National Efforts VE SE I DK

Local efforts VE SE I DK

Please add anything that you feel U.S. p

lic akers, donors, or researchers should knowregardinglocust control .F efforts in the area with which you are armhar.

PART D. PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

1. What are the most crucial needs for dealing more effectivelywith potential future locust infestations in the region

with which you are familiar? Please circle all that apply and feel free to add others.

Personnel:

laborers, trained technicians, scientific researchers,

Infrastructure:

facilities, roads, cars, trucks, motorcycles, airplanes, spray equipment, chemical supplies, pesticide disposal

sites,

Institutions:

research laboratories, field research sites, regulations for pesticide use,

Information:

weather forecasts, locust monitoring, locust early-warning systems, locust status reports from neighboring

countries,
App. C–OTA Survey Form ● 113

2. Howirn rtant would locusts rate if you listed the 10 most serious pests in the country or region with which you

are fare” ar? Please circle one rating (l-most serious; 10-least serious). r

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 lower than 10

3. Please list the three most serious needs this area faces related to current locust problems.

4. Please list the three most serious needs this area faces in all types of agricultural research.

5. Please list the three most serious agricultural research needs related specifically to locust problems.

6. How could United States’ foreign aid assist most effectively in current locust problems?

7. Please characterize the proportion of various types of locust activities underway now in the area with which you

are familiar (use percentages). Then please provide what you would see as the ideal proportion.

% of C- Effort % of IsblEf&t

Crisis Management

(e.g., spraying locusts)

Relief Activities

(e.g., roviding food

for af ected areas) 1’

Outbreak Prevention

(e.g., long-term

entomological research)

(other)

Total 100% 100%

8. Please add anything that you feel U.S. policymakers, donors, or researchers need to knowregarding planning for

future locust control programs in the area with which you are familiar.

PARTE. METHODS

1. What degree of certainty do you have in the information for the country or region with which you are familiar?

DK=don’t know; VU =very uncertain; U=uncertain; C=certain; VC=very certain. Please circle 1 response.

Part A. Data on Current Locust Infestation

a. Measures of the intensity and distribution of locust outbreaks.

DK u c V c

b. Measures of the effects of desertification and weather on outbreaks.

DK u c V c
114 ● A Plague of Locusts

Part B. Estimates of the Effects of the Current Locust infestation.

a. Percentage of crops affected

DK u c Vc

b. Percentage ofnoncroplands affected.

DK u c V c

Part C. Your estimate of the effectiveness of locust control efforts.

DK u c Vc

Part D. Planning for the Future

a. Likelihood of improved locust control technologies

DK u c Vc

b. Consensus on agricultural research needs related to locusts

DK u c Vc

2. May we contact you for further evaluation of your responses for our report? Please circle one response.

Yes No

We appreciate the time you have spent in completing this form. Please return it by February 6, 1989 to:

Dr. Phyllis N. Wmdle

Offke of ‘Ikchnology Assessment

U.S. Con~ess

Washingto~ DC 20510 USA
Appendix D-List of Survey Respondents

OTA Respondents

Clifford Ashall

Michel Launois

Highfield, Whitchurch

CIRAD-PRIFAS

Montpelier, France

Aylesbury, Bucks, United Kingdom

Nabila M.S. Bakry

Professor, Faculty of Agriculture

University of Alexandria

Alexandria, Egypt

Nezil Mahjoub

Official for Acridid Control in Africa

Regional Anti-Acridid Commission in

Northwest Africa

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

El Sadiq A. Bashir

Algiers, Algeria

Chief Technical Advisor G.A. Matthews

Plant Protection Project

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Entomologist

Gaborone, Botswana

Silwood Center for Pest Management

Silwood Park, Berks, United Kingdom

Lukas Brader

Director, Plant Production

and Protection Division

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

H.D. Brown

Red Locust Control Service

Pretoria, South Africa

David J. Greathead

Director

CAB International, Institute of

Biological Control

Ascot, Berks, United Kingdom

Hans Herren

International Institute

for Tropical Agriculture

Cotonou, Republique Populaire

du Benin

Tecwyn Jones

Deputy Director

Overseas Development Natural

Resources Institute

Chatham, Kent, United Kingdom

H.Y. Kayumbo

Director General

Desert Locust Control Organization

for Eastern Africa

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

S.S. Mlambo

Director

Plant Protection Research Institute

Department of Research

and Specialist Services

Ministry of Agricukure

Harare, Zimbabwe

Saul M. Moobolal

Director, International Red

Locust Control Organization

for Central and Southern Africa

Ndola

Copperbelt Province, Republic of Zambia

Alioune Ndiaye

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Dakar, S6n6gal

M’Baye N’Doye

Entomologist

Dakar, S4n6gal

M.O.M. Nurein

Director

Scientific Research Division

Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Owen Olfert

Research Laboratory

Agriculture Canada

Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada

IDeeeased.

115
116 ● A Plague of Locusts

Yassin M. Osman

Under-Secretary of Agricukure (Pest Control)

Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation

Dokki, Giza, Egypt

J.B. Okeyo Owuor

Research Scientist

International Center for Insect Physiology and Edogy

Nairobi, Kenya

George B. Popov

London, United Kingdom

Reginald Charles Rainey

Aylesbury, Bucks, United Kingdom

Jean Pierre Rigoulot

Senior Agronomist

African Development Bank

Abidjan, Ivory Coast

Jeremy Roffey

Senior Migratory Pests Officer

Plant Production and Protection Division

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

P.M. Symmons

Consultant

U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Galledou Tahara

Chef, Service National

Protection des V6g6taux

Nouakchott, Mauritania

AID Respondents

Carl Castleton

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Abidjan, Ivory Coast

Mamadou Fofana

U.S. Agency for International Development

Bamako, Mali

Gladys Gilbert2

Special Projects Ofllcer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Robert Hellyer

Agricultural Development Officer

U.S. Agency for Internationzd Development

Rabat, Morocco

Charles J. Kelly

Disaster Relief Unit

U.S. Agency for International Development

Niamey, Niger

Khoi Nguyen Le

Agronomist

U.S. Agency for International Development

Dacca, Bangladesh

Salah Mahjoub

Locust Project Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

Tunis, Tunisia

John Mullenax

U.S. Agency for International Development

Khartoum, Sudan

Paul F. Novick

Agriculture Development Officer

Asia/Neareast Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Allan T. Showier

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

William B. Thomas

Grasshopper/Locust Program Coordinator

U.S. Agency for International Development

Nouakchott, Mauritania

2Deeeased.
Appendix E-Reviewers of OTA% Draft Report

USAID Reviewers

Richard Cobb

Director

Office of Technical Resources

Africa Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Phyllis Dichter

Director

Sahel and West Africa

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Kate Farnsworth

Disaster Operations Specialist

Asia/Near East Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

William Furtick

Office of Food and Agriculture

Bureau for Science and Technology

U.S. Agency for international Development

Washington, DC

John Gaudet

Environmental Liaison Officer

Africa Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Rosslyn, VA

John V. Gelbl

Bureau for Private Enterprise

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Robert Huesmann2

Acting AID Representative

U.S. Agency for International Development

I’raia, cape Verde

Walter I. Knausenberger

Entomology Advisor

Africa Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Paul Novick

Agricultural Development Officer

Asia/Near East Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

Allan Showier

Entomologist

Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

U.S. Agency for International Development

Washington, DC

William B. Thomas

Locust Control Program

U.S. Agency for Internatiomd Development

Nouakchott, Mauritania

Abdul Wahab

Branch Chief

Africa Bureau

U.S. Agency for Internatiomd Development

Washingto~ DC

Other Reviewers

Yvonne Andualem

Office of International Cooperation

and Development

Technical Assistance Division

U.S. Department of Agricukure

Washington, DC

Dale Bottrell

Department of Entomology

Umversity of Maryland

College Park, MD

Lukas Brader

Director

Plant Production and Protection Division

Emergency Centre for Locust Operations

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

E.K. Byaruhanga

Director

International Red Locust Control

Or

r

“zation for Central and Southern Africa

Ndo a, copperbelt Province, ZAMBIA

George Cavin

Consultant

New Braunfells, TX

Re@nald Chapman

Arizona Research Laboratories

Division of Neurobiolo~

University of Arizona

Tucson, AZ

IFormerly, Program Analyst, Desert Locust Task Force, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID.

2

Formerly, Director, Desert Locust Task Force, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, USAID.

117
118 ● A Plague of Locusts

Robert Gray

Office of International Cooperation

and Development

U.S. Department of Agriculture

Washington, DC

David Groenfeldt

The Conservation Foundation

Washington, DC

Dean Haynes

Entomology Department

Michigan State University

East Lansing MI

Hans R. Herren

International Institute of Tropical

Agriculture

Benin Research Station

Cotonou, Republique Populaire

du Benin

Joyce I. Magor

Acting Head of Department

Pest and Vector Management

Overseas Development Natural

Resources Institute

Chatham, United Kingdom

Patricia Matteson

Pest Management Specialist

Raleigh, NC

Lawrence McCulloch

Senior Officer

Plant Protection Service

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

S.S. Mlambo

Director

Plant Protection Research Institute

Department of Research and

Special Services

Ministry of Agriculture

Harare, Zimbabwe

Donald G. Moore

Manager

EDC International Projects

U.S. Geological Survey

EROS Data Center

Sioux Falls, SD

M.O.M. Nurein

Director of Scientflc Research

Desert Locust Control Organization

for Eastern Africa

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Zerubabel Mijumbi Nyiira

Regional FAMESA Project Coordinator

The International Centre of Insect

Physiology and Ecology

Nairobi Kenya

George B. Popov

Consultant

London, United Kingdom

R.C. Rainey, F.R.S.

Consultant

Aylesbury, Bucks

United Kingdom

Jeremy Roffey

Senior Officer for Locusts, Other hligrato~

Pests, and Emergency Operations Group

Emergency Centre for Locust Operations

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Allen Ruby

Consultant

Garrett Park, MD

R. Skaf

Emergency Centre for Locust Operations

Food and Agriculture Organization

Rome, Italy

Galledou Tahara

Chef, Service National Protection

des V6g&aux

Nouakchott, Mauritania

Paul Thompson

Philosophy Department

Texas A&M University

College Station, TX
Appendix F–Recommendations From Three Recent

Reports on Pest Management in Developing Countries

Several recent studies provided comprehensive rcxmmmendations for USAID and for Congress on pest management generally and locust and grasshopper programs

specifically. The recommendations tiom three of these are

included below because Congress can find a number of

important options among the recmnrnendations

I. Programma tic Environmental kse~ment of Locust

and Grasshopper Control in Africa/Asia (1%9)

II. Africa fier~ncy Locust/G~hopper Askance

(AELGA) hhd-’rmEvahMtion (1989)

III. Report of the Comrm“ttee on Health and Environment

(1988)

SECI’ION I

RECOMMENDAT1ONS FRoM THE

PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT OF LOCUST AND G~SHOPPER

CONTROL IN AFRICA/AS~

Required Precondition

This report included 38 recommendations, grouped

according to priority. It recommended that:

1. USMD amtinue its involvement in bcust and Grasshopper ControL Operationally, the approach to be

adopted should evoive toward one of Integrated Pest

Management (IPM).

Top Priority, for Immediate Implementation

2.

3.

4.

5.

h inventory and mapping program be started to

determine the extent and bmdaries of environmentally fragile areas.

A system for dynamic inventory of pesticide

chemical stocks be developed.

USAID take an active role in assisting host

countries in identifying alternate use or disposal of

pesticide stocks. Refer to Recommendation 14.

FAO, as lead agency for migratory pest contro~ be

requested to establish a system for the inventory of

manpower, procedures, and equipment.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

There benopesticide app~~km~fierwironmentally

fragile areas and human .

Pesticides used be those with the minimum impact

on nontarget species.

Pre- and post-treatment monitoring and sampling

of sentinel organisms and water and/or soils be

carried out as an integral part of each control

campaign.

One of the criteria to be utilized in the selection of

control techniques be a minimization of the area

to be sprayed.

Helicopters be used primarily for survey to support ground and air control units. When aerial

treatment is indicated, it should only be when very

accurate spraying is necesswy, such as close to environmentally fragile areas or for locahzed treatment.

Whenever

r

ible, small planes be favored over

medium to arge two-or four-engine transport types.

In all cases experienced contractors will be used.

Any U.S. Government-fhnded locust/grassho r

control actio~ which provide

r

tickles and er z

commodities or aerial or groun application services

include technical assistance and environmental assessment expertise as an integral component of the assistance package.

All pesticide containers be appropriately labeled.

High Priority, For Implementation When

Resources Are Available

14. USAID provide assistance to host governments in

disposing of em ty esticide containers and pesticides that areo so ete or no longer usable for the { f

purpose intended.

15. USAID support the desi~ reproduction, and

presentation of public education materials on pesticidesafety(e.g., ~ radio, posters booklets). This

would include such sub”ects ~ safely using cost

effective pesticides eco ogy, i’ t management of

locusts and grasshop r% an the hazards of r pesticides. The oalwo rdbetohelppolicymakers and

local Dorm fations recomize Dotential health

proble~}elated to pestia~e apphcations.

ITAMS Consultants, Inc. and the Consortium for International Crop Protection, “LucustandGrassho erControZinAfia/Asia:A

Programmatic Environmentalssessmen~ Executive Summary and Recommendations (Washington, DC: SAID) contractor report prepared f

for the U.S. Agency for International Development, March 1989, pp. EXSUM-34-53.

119
120 ● A Plague of Locusts

16.

1’7.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

lhiningcour=bedesig nedanddeveloped for health

r

rsonnel in all areas where pesticides are used

equently.

Each health center anddispensarylocated in an area

where pesticide poisonings are expected to occur be

sup@ied with large wall ters m which the diagnosls and treatment o specific poisonin are r

depicted. The centers and dispensaries sho fdalso

be rovid@priorto spra~wit.h those medicines

an antidotes required for treatment of poisoning J

cases.

Presently available tests for monitoring human exposure to pesticides be evaluated in the field This

mcludw measurement ofcholinesterase levels in small

samples of blood as a screening test

The specifications develofxxl for USATD purchase of

IWW~W~opWr insecticides be adapted for ~ insecticides.

Pesticide container specifications be developed.

Nosema and other biolo@cal agents such as Neem

be fieldtested under African and Asian conditions

in priority countries.

A comprehensive training pr

x

am be developed for

USAID Mission personnel o have responsibility

for control operations. This will involve a review of

existing materials and those under development, in

order to save resources.

Local programs of training be instituted for pesticide storage maria ement, environmental

monitoring and public% ealth (see Recommendation 16).

Whentechnicalassistance tearnsare provid@theybe

given shortterrnintensive teclmicaltraining (including

language, if ) and some background in the

Field research be carried out to generate badly

needed economic data on a country-by-country

basis.

No pesticide be a plied unless the provisional

economic thresholi of locusts or grasshoppers is

exceeded.

USAID provide assistance to host countries in

drawing up re

P

ations on the registration and

management o ~sticides and the drafting of environmental pohcy.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

A pesticide use inventory covering all treatments in

Imthagricultural andhealthprograms bedevelope~

on a country-by-country basn.

LZrE~?;;*x~”&tdP’’dehmdThat technical assistance, education and training

and equipment be provided crop protection services

of host countries with a view to making the services

eventually self sustaining.

Desirabl~ But Less Urgent

More pesticide storage facilities be built. Until that

occ~ emergency supplies be pre-positioned in the

United States.

USAID make a decision as to whether to continue

funding forecastingandremote sensing or utilize the

FAO’s early warning program.

A series of epidemiologic case-control studie~

within the countries involved in locust and grasshop

percontro~beirnplemented inareasofheavyhuman

exposure to pesticides.

Applied research be carried out on the efficacy of

various pesticides and growth retardants and their

application.

Applied research be carried out on the use of

Neem as an antifeedant.

kearchbe canied out to cktwminethe be5t techniques

for assess@ the impts of

locust andgradmpper con

of these and other chemicals for other pest control

programs.

Procedures To Accelerate Implementation Of’

All Recommendations

37. USAID, on the basis of the previous Recommendations develop a plan of action with practical

E

rocedures to provide guidance in locust/grassopper control to missions in the field.

38. Detailed guidelines be developed for USAID to

E

remote common approaches to locust and grasshopper control and safe ~sticide use among UN

Agencies and donor nations. Coordination of efforts is becoming increasingly important because of

the increasing number and magnitude ofmult.ilateral

agreements and follow up efforts in subsequent years

by various donors.
App. F–Recommendations From Recent Repotis on PestiUanagementin Developing Countn”es . 121

SECTION II

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE AFRICA

EMERGENCY LOCUST/GRASSHOPPER

ASSISTANCE (AELGA) ~ID-TERM

EVALUATION

Set 1: Emergency Control Operations

Emergency control operations succeed or fail on

the efficacy of their logistics.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

Set

Implement, either directly through the AELGA

project or indirectly through the USDA Resource

Senkes Su port Agreement (RSSA), short-term

(6-7months7 technical assistance inentomologyto

the missions that still lack this expertise.

Expandthepesticidebanktoincludeothera~ptable

chemical and biological agents besides the carbaryl

and malathion that are presently available.

Maintain a current file of firms that provide aerial

spraying services and pestiade transpo~ with aircraft

type, availability and cost.

Continue the present RSSA with USDA for the

provision of greenness maps and for the provision

of short-term technical assistance in map interpretation.

Continue the present RSSA with USDA for the

provision of long- and short-term technical assistance for locust surveys and control operations.

Work with the appropriate Mricart regional organizatio~ such as OCLALAV and CILSS, for the

conclusion of interstate agreements on flyer rights for

the movement of survey aircrti, fly over rights for

cross-border locust control operatio~ the transport

of pesticides and other agents among member

states, and other such regional issues that have

impeded locust control from time to time.

2: Development Actions for the Short-term

AELGA should provide whatever assistance that

USAID mission require in their locust control programs.

Training courses are more traditional institution-building

activities. The topics for these training CO- which must

emphasize field-level concerns are (in addition to the courses now being delivered by AELGA on locust and grasshopper identiflcatio~ ultra-low volume aerial application and

crop-loss assessment):

a. Management of logistical operations, for supervisors.

b. Health concerns for locust control operations, for

health personnel and locust control supervisors, as

well as for pesticide handlers.

c. Strengthening of farmer brigades and of the crop

protection services terrestrial teams.

d. Rdmiques forproperstorageof pesticides and their

wntainers.

e. Cumulative effects of P@icide use on the environmen~ a regional confenmce for senior government

personnel.

Set3: Long-term Actions for Locust Control

Forecasting, Institution-building and Research

The[AELGA] project should focus itseffortsduring its

remaining life on those longer-term development aims that

have the potential of assisting future locust control efforts

and that complement ongoing activities.

a. Work with the international organizations, in particular the FAO, that are developing a locust

forecasting capability.

b. Work through USAID/AFR/SWA with African

regional organizatio~ such as OCLALA~ CILSS

(INSA), and AGHRYME~ @ respectively the

development of training materials and the coordination of crop protection services (which are

charged with locust survey and control); the coordination of 10 “stical considerations such as fl er

rights); and, t e provision of meteoro r \ ogtcal - .?m ormation. . . . While it maybe necessary to continue

to fund these activities through the FAO in the

short-term, that organization must be required to

collaborate closely with the regional organizations

and a portion of the FAO grant moneys could be

earmarked for this purpose.

c. Coordinate the work be”

T

done by bilateral USAID

missions in locust contro and crop protection and

facilitate the improvement of locust survey and

control activities in national crop proeetion services, as requested by the concerned USAID missions.

d. Develop the present economic cost/benefit anal sk

based on crop loss assessment for deciding w en i

spraying operations are necessary. —

hropieal Research and Development, Inc. “Africa Emergency ~ust/Grasshopper Assistan@ (AELGA Mid-Term Evaluation,” ecmtractor report prepared for U.S. Ageney for International Development (Washington, DC: USAID), July 1 ,1989. 2
122 ● A Plague of Locusts

e.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g“

Insttuteanenvironrnentalrnomt

T

@erhap6meonjunction with other monitoring e orts) and health

safety prqyam (e&, application proced~ drum

dispo6almethods).

Set 4: Considerations in (AELGA) Project

Management

Ret~ AFR/offlm of Technieal Resources as the

project location within AID.

Thke immediate steps to put in place the implementation mechanisms suggested in Recommendation Set 1 above.

Desi~alonger-terrn development rogramalong

the lines of Recommendation Sets and 3. !

Review the use of agreements with USG and the

international agenaes for emergency operational activities such as the procurement of serwces and commodities for the control ofloeust outbreaks.

Computerize the project monitoring system to

track project activities.

Exert closer control of all research activities to

ensure that the activities are relevant to AELGA

needs, responsive to mission concerns, and integrated vwth host country ageney activities.

AnadditionalinternbefimdedthroughUSDA/OICD

RSSAto @s~ t+e~esent project manager and longterm tcxhkal achkr.

Set 5: Major Design Considerations in Locust

Control Programs

Locust control is a long-term problem that requires

international cooperation.

The reeent and present emphasis on locust control

through the actions of national crop protection serviees’

will, if successful, provide only a partial solution to the

long-term problem.

. Institutional strengthening of the national

crop protection seMces is fundamentally

necessary for locust control, particularly in

agricultural areas.

a.

. Nonetheless, a regional problem requires a

regional response.

● . . .USAID’S locust control strategy must

remain flexible.. .to work with and through

the FAO to carry out necessary locust

forecasting and control operations while, at

the same time, building national and regional

response capability=

. While the mission buy-in mechanism can work

successfidlyfornormaldevelopmenttie it

is ill-adapted for continued emergency disaster

plarming and implementation.

Set 6: The Need for a Follow-on Project

Develop a follow-on umbrella pest managemen~

crop p;otectio~ or food semir

project tlat will

eontinuetheon-goingactivitieso locust controlan~

at the same time, stren@hen the crop protection

ageneies in the concerned countries so that they are

better able to assist small producersin achieving the

benefits from improved agriculture that are now

a-”

SECTION III

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE

REPORT OF THE COMMI’ITEE N

HEALTH AND ENVIRONMEN?

The Foreign AssistaneeAppropriations Act of 1987

charged USAID with forming a Committee on Health

and Environment to exarnine opportunities to assist

developing countries in the proper use of agricultural

and industrial chemicals. The Committee, with help

from the Conservation Foundation, submitted these 6

major recommendations to USAID, along with detailed

suggestions for implementation:

1. USAID and other ClOrlm +OUk@nkto !4m@hen and

irmeasetintiof~ rnmukipiemmand

kxelsof ~d=h-~eand~ . . . .

chenwakrn

dewloping countries.

‘Conservation Foundation, Opportunities tOAssist&VelOpi.ng Countria in the Proper Use ofA~”cuhural and Iruihtrial Cherru”c&, vol. 1,

Final Report (Washington, DC: The Conservation Foundation), Feb. 18,1988.
App. F–Recommendations From Recent Repotis on Pest Management in Developing Countn”es . 123

2. USAID should enhance the effectiveness of its

agricultural and health pr

T

ams that affect or

involve pesticide or chemica use.

3. USAID should increase its use of Integrated Pest

Management (IPM) significantly, with the goal of

makingIPM itsprimarypest management approach.

Achieving thisgoalwillr uire irnprovedirnplementation and more support or research and 7 trb

and would have a catalytic effect on other donors.

4. In cooperation with other U.S. agencies and the

private sector, USAID should prepare a longterm Ian for its role in~reventir+jand mitigating

prob ems associated with activities involving in- ?

dustrial chemicals in developing countries.

5. USAID should report to Congress every two ybeginning in 1989, on its progress toward implementing the recommendations in this report

and on future opportunities to address pesticide

and chemieal issues in developing countries.

6. Congress should provide clear policy guidance to

U.S. Government agencies re ding the revision

to, and use of, agricultural an industrial c r \ emieals

in developi% countries. The Executive Branch

should then unplement that policy in a consistent

fashion.
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