COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Bumgardner 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

DANTE SHAW 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2670-00-1 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JULY 31, 2001 

CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS DEPARTMENT 

 OF SOCIAL SERVICES 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

H. Vincent Conway, Jr., Judge 

 (Kevin M. Diamonstein, on brief), for 

appellant. Appellant submitting on brief. 

 Christina A. Walsh, Assistant City Attorney 

(Allen L. Jackson, Chief Deputy City 

Attorney, on brief), for appellee. 

 Argument but no brief by Richard H. Lewis, 

Jr., Guardian ad litem for the child. 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication.

 Dante Shaw contends that the record does not contain clear 

and convincing evidence supporting the judgment terminating his 

parental rights. We disagree and affirm the judgment. 

I. 

 The evidence proved that a child was born to Lawanda 

Worthington on September 6, 1992. Worthington, who was in the 

custody of the City of Newport News Department of Social Services, 

later was hospitalized for a mental illness. After the Department 
obtained custody of her child in 1993, Worthington gave to the 

Department a name of a man she identified as the child's father. 

When paternity tests excluded that man as the father, Worthington 

identified Shaw as the child's father. In 1997, paternity tests 

confirmed that Shaw, who was then incarcerated in prison, was the 

father. 

 The Department notified Shaw that he was the child's father 

and obtained from him names and addresses of relatives who might 

care for the child during Shaw's incarceration. Letters, which 

were sent from the Department to relatives of Shaw, were produced 

at trial but not offered as exhibits. When the contacts with 

relatives were not productive, the Department contracted with 

Family Methodist Services "to continue to work with . . . Shaw to 

identify more potential relatives and to try to link the agency to 

those relatives." 

 A case worker employee of the Department testified that the 

Department sent copies of the service plans to Shaw but that the 

child was not taken to the prison to visit Shaw. She testified 

that prison visits are not necessarily provided when a parent is 

in prison and that the decision whether to do so is "done on a 

case-by-case basis." The case worker also testified that the 

child is in a foster home and adjusting well to the foster home. 

She further testified that the child has been "diagnosed with 

ADHD, reactive attachment disorder, and developmental coordination 

disorder." 

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 A family therapist testified about the variety of services 

she has rendered the child from 1995 through 2000, the child's 

psychological difficulties, and the medication the child receives. 

She also testified that she has had discussions with the child 

about her father without divulging "specifics about him." She 

reports that the child has vacillated between "lik[ing] to know 

who [her father] is . . . to expressing real terror that he would 

. . . take her away from her foster mother, and [having] . . . 

tremendous anxiety associated with that and along with the anxiety 

was another fantasy image of her father as a very negative 

figure." The therapist also testified as follows: 

Q: Contacts with the father, would that 

have strengthened a parent/child 

relationship? 

A: It would only have introduced [the 

child] to her father as an acquaintance who 

had the nominal title of being her father. 

It would not have been a parent/child 

relationship in the sense that a parent is a 

caretaker for a child. 

Q: And what effect would contact with her 

father have on [the child]? 

A: At this point, I believe it would 

produce tremendous anxiety, again 

re-arousing fears of being separated from 

her foster mother. 

Q: Are there any counseling services that 

you could offer that would lessen that 

effect on the child? 

A: The only counseling service that could 

be offered that would have any real benefit 

would be contingent on Mr. Shaw being a free 

man and being available for intensive work. 

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Q: And what effect if permanency was not 

-- if the agency did not achieve permanency 

for [the child] at this time and waited the 

four years remaining for Mr. Shaw to 

complete his time, what effect would that 

have on [the child]? 

A: You mean if in four years she were 

placed in his care? 

Q: Yes. What effect would it have for [the 

child] to wait four more years for her 

father to be free from incarceration? 

A: [The child] feels very much that she is 

in limbo right now. She wants closure. She 

wants a family because she knows that her 

only family right now is her foster mother 

and she wants to proceed with that 

relationship. 

Q: What would your recommendation be then 

for [the child] at this time? 

A: My recommendation would be that she be 

allowed to remain with her foster mother and 

that exploration of her foster mother as an 

adoptive parent proceed. 

 Shaw testified that when he last saw Worthington in 1992 

she was pregnant and he was twelve years old. He did not become 

aware he was the child's father until the Department contacted 

him in 1997. Shaw testified that his release date from prison 

is 2004 and that he has the possibility of early release in 

September 2002 with his "good time." He also testified that 

after he gave the Department names of relatives who might assist 

him in this matter, the Department did not provide him any other 

services. He testified, however, that when he received a foster 

care plan that detailed the child's difficulties, he believed 

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the Department "was lying or just trying to get [him] to give 

[his] rights away." Although he was told he could write to the 

child by sending correspondence to the Department, he only sent 

a birthday card in 1998. Shaw testified he did not wish to have 

his parental rights terminated. 

 In his ruling from the bench, the trial judge cited Shaw's 

incarceration, Shaw's lack of contact with the child, and, most 

significantly, the child's need for stability in her life. 

Commenting on Shaw's argument that more could have been done to 

help with the parenting, the judge said: "Well, I'm not sure 

what. The man is incarcerated. Meanwhile, this child is 

aging." This appeal followed the judge's order terminating 

Shaw's residual parental rights. 

II. 

 In pertinent part, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that 

"[t]he residual parental rights of a parent . . . of a child 

placed in foster care as a result of court commitment . . . may 

be terminated if the court finds, based upon clear and 

convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the 

child" and that the following conditions exist: 

 The parent or parents, without good 

cause, have been unwilling or unable within 

a reasonable period of time not to exceed 

twelve months from the date the child was 

placed in foster care to remedy 

substantially the conditions which led to or 

required continuation of the child's foster 

care placement, notwithstanding the 

reasonable and appropriate efforts of 

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social, medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agencies to such end. Proof 

that the parent or parents, without good 

cause, have failed or been unable to make 

substantial progress towards elimination of 

the conditions which led to or required 

continuation of the child's foster care 

placement in accordance with their 

obligations under and within the time limits 

or goals set forth in a foster care plan 

filed with the court or any other plan 

jointly designed and agreed to by the parent 

or parents and a public or private social, 

medical, mental health or other 

rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima 

facie evidence of this condition. The court 

shall take into consideration the prior 

efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the 

parent or parents prior to the placement of 

the child in foster care. 

Because "'[r]easonable and appropriate' efforts can only be 

judged with reference to the circumstances of a particular 

case," Ferguson v. Dep't of Social Servs., 14 Va. App. 333, 338, 

417 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1992), we have held that the trial judge "must 

determine what constitutes reasonable and appropriate efforts 

given the facts before the court." Id. at 338-39, 417 S.E.2d at 

4. 

 Shaw argues that the Department made only "minimal efforts" 

to assist him. The trial judge found, however, that, under the 

circumstances, the Department's actions were reasonable and that 

Shaw's incarceration limited the agency's capacity to remedy 

Shaw's deficiencies as a parent. In Ferguson, we held as 

follows: 

[W]hile long-term incarceration does not, 

per se, authorize termination of parental 

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rights or negate the Department's obligation 

to provide services, it is a valid and 

proper circumstance which, when combined 

with other evidence concerning the 

parent/child relationship, can support a 

court's finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that the best interests of the 

child will be served by termination. 

Id. at 340, 417 S.E.2d at 5. 

 The evidence in this record proved that beyond the 

biological fact of parentage, no relational history existed 

between the child and Shaw. Shaw was not aware he was the 

child's father until the Department contacted him in 1997, and 

he had never developed any type of relationship with the child. 

When given the opportunity to contact the child, he only sent a 

birthday card. In addition, the evidence is undisputed that the 

Department was unsuccessful in its efforts to place the child 

with Shaw's relatives during his incarceration. 

 The record contains expert testimony that these conditions 

when combined with Shaw's current incarceration would require 

intensive resources and would not lead to the establishment of a 

parent/child relationship while Shaw was incarcerated. That 

testimony further indicated that the child needed stability to 

ensure improved development and that direct contact with Shaw 

would be detrimental to the child. As in Ferguson, the trial 

judge "placed emphasis upon this expert testimony," id., and 

found that the agency had fulfilled its duties under the 

statute. We will not disturb this finding because the record 

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indicates that it was not plainly wrong or without evidence to 

support it. Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social 

Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986). 

 We hold that this record supports by clear and convincing 

evidence the trial judge's finding that the best interests of 

the child would be served by terminating Shaw's parental rights 

pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment. 

 Affirmed. 

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