DLD-220 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 19-1256

___________

JAMEICE NASH,

 Appellant

v.

JAMES KENNEY, Mayor City of Philadelphia; SETH WILLIAMS, ADA Philadelphia 

District Attorney’s Office; RICHARD ROSS, Police Chief Philadelphia Police 

Department and Commissioner of Philadelphia Police Department, in their individual and 

official capacities; DHS DIRECTOR, Department of Human Services State of 

Pennsylvania; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GOVERNOR TOM WOLF, PA 

Governor; JOSHUA D. SHAPIRO, PA State Attorney General; JOHN A. WETZEL, 

SEC. of PA DOC; ILEANA JUSINO, SCI-Houtz, RCDS. OFF. Employee; TARA ANN 

MUCHMORE, SCI-Houtz. RCDS OFF. Employee; COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA, 

PA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-17-cv-02111)

District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 27, 2019

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 29, 2019)

_________

OPINION*

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
2

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Jameice Nash appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his 

complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s 

judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4(a).

In his operative amended complaint,1 Nash alleged that he is a legal permanent 

resident of the United States who was arrested in June 2013 “for an alleged noncapital 

crime of domestic violence.” ECF No. 19 at 8. He claimed that he was then detained, 

without bail, until he was ultimately convicted in July 2017.2

 He named numerous 

defendants, including, among others, the United States, Governor Tom Wolf, Attorney 

General Josh Shapiro, the City of Philadelphia, Mayor Jim Kenney, and Philadelphia 

Police Commissioner Richard Ross. He raised claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging 

that the defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him, improperly denied him bail, and 

deprived him of his right to a speedy trial. He sought damages of $200 million against 

each defendant. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

 

constitute binding precedent.

1 The District Court dismissed Nash’s first complaint without prejudice to the filing of an 

amended complaint.

2 According to the Court of Common Pleas docket sheet, he was convicted of attempted 

murder, aggravated assault, and other charges, and sentenced to 10-to-20 years’ 

imprisonment. See Phila. Cty. Ct. of C.P. No. CP-51-CR-0011415-2013; see generally

Orabi v. Att’y Gen., 738 F.3d 535, 537 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We may take judicial notice of 

the contents of another Court’s docket.”).
3

and the District Court granted the motion and dismissed the amended complaint without 

prejudice. Nash opted to stand on his amended complaint and filed a timely notice of 

appeal.3

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 

F.2d 950, 951–52 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam). We exercise a plenary standard of review. 

See Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012). In reviewing a

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), “we accept all factual allegations as true [and] construe 

the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 

292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We may affirm on any ground supported 

by the record. See Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 469 (3d Cir. 2015).

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case. To the extent that 

Nash raised claims of false arrest or false imprisonment, the claims are time-barred. The

statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania is two years, see Kach v. Hose, 

589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009), and these claims accrued in 2013 when Nash was 

arraigned, see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389–90, 397 (2007). Nash did not file his 

complaint until 2017, after the limitations period expired. 

 3 Nash also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Because 

Nash did not file a new or amended notice of appeal encompassing the order denying his

motion for reconsideration, we lack jurisdiction to consider that order. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253–54 (3d Cir. 2008).
4

Meanwhile, Nash’s malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims—which 

challenge his post-arraignment detainment—are barred by the favorable-termination rule 

of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “a 

prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the 

unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. 

Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005). Nash’s malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims 

fall within this rule. See McDonough v. Smith, No. 18-485, 2019 WL 2527474, at *4 

(U.S. June 20, 2019) (discussing malicious prosecution); Betterman v. Montana, 136 S. 

Ct. 1609, 1615 (2016). Because Nash has not shown that his conviction has been set 

aside, he cannot bring these claims at this time. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 

(3d Cir. 2016).

Finally, Nash has failed to state a claim with regards to being denied bail. 

Pennsylvania law provides that “[a]ll prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, 

unless . . . no condition or combination of conditions other than imprisonment will 

reasonably assure the safety of any person and the community when the proof is evident 

or presumption great.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5701. To the extent that the prosecutors 

argued that bail was not appropriate in Nash’s case, they are protected by prosecutorial 

immunity. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976); Root v. Liston, 444 F.3d 

127, 131 (2d Cir. 2006) (“absolute prosecutorial immunity protects a prosecutor for 

advocacy in connection with a bail application”). To the extent that he asserted this claim 

against the City of Philadelphia, he failed altogether to show that the alleged deprivation 

of his constitutional rights resulted from any official policy or custom. See Monell v. 
5

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 

47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding “vague assertions” were insufficient to impose 

Monell liability).

4

 

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

 4 Nash also objected to an immigration detainer that has been lodged against him, but he 

failed to plead a plausible claim that the detainer somehow violated his rights. See 

generally City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen., 916 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir. 2019) (discussing use 

of immigration detainers).