area handbook series

China

a country study



China

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by

Robert L. Worden,

Andrea Matles Savada,

and Ronald E. Dolan

Research Completed

July 1987
On the cover: The artist's pen-and-ink rendering of a cast- bronze horse, chariot, and driver of the Eastern Han

dynasty (A.D. 25-220) reveals the dual sense of vitality

and passivity often found in Chinese art.

Fourth Edition, First Printing, 1988.

Copyright ®1988 United States Government as represented by

the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

China, a country study.

(DA pam; 550-60)

"Research completed September 1987."

Bibliography: p. 637. Includes index.

Supt. of Docs. no. : LC D101 .22:60/987

1. China. I. Worden, Robert L., 1945- . II. Savada,

Andrea Matles, 1950- . III. Dolan, Ronald E., 1939-

IV. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. V. Series. DS706.C489 1988 951 87-600493

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-60

Supersedes 1981 edition

I .., Sale by [he Superintenclenl of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

The Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

in

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to acknowledge their use and adaptation of

several chapters from the 1981 edition of China: A Country Study,

edited by Frederica M. Bunge and Rinn-Sup Shinn. In particular, substantial parts of the following chapters were incorporated

by the authors of the new edition: Martin Weil's "Physical Environment and Population," Joel N. Glassman's "Education and

Culture," Thomas R. Gottschang's "Industry" and "Trade and

Transportation," Rinn-Sup Shinn's "Party and Government,"

and David G. Barlow and Daniel W. Wagner's "Public Order and

Internal Security."

The authors also are indebted to a number of individuals in the

United States government and in international, diplomatic, and

private organizations who gave of their time and special knowledge on Chinese affairs to provide research data and perspective. Those

who were particularly helpful were Judith Banister of the United

States Bureau of the Census; Paul Schroeder of the Map Library,

Department of State; Edward P. Parris of the Department of

Defense; Chi Wang of the Asian Division, Library of Congress;

and Constance A. Johnson of the Far Eastern Law Library, Library

of Congress. The photographs that illustrate this study were generously contributed by a variety of individuals and public and pri- vate organizations. All have been credited in the captions. In

particular, Liu Haiming of the Embassy of the People's Republic

of China assisted in making available numerous photographs on

diverse subjects. None of the aforementioned individuals or their

organizations, however, are responsible for the contents of the book.

The authors also wish to express their appreciation to members

of the staff of the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress,

who contributed to the preparation of the book. Foremost among

these was Barbara L. Dash, who meticulously reviewed the text. Without her assistance the entire effort would not have been as complete and as finely tuned as it has come to be. Ms. Dash was

assisted in editing by Glenn E. Curtis and Martha E. Hopkins,

who also managed production of the book. Mervin J. Shello and

Ly H. Burnham examined specialized and technical sections of the

manuscript, and Carolina E. Forrester reviewed textual references

to China's geography and scrutinized the maps that appear in this volume. David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Cotugno, and Kimberly Lord

provided copious graphic arts support. Tracy M. Henry assisted on numerous phases of the book, including wordprocessing of

v
chapter texts, formatting and typing much of the tabular data, and

proofreading. Alberta Jones King, Barbara Edgerton, and Izella Watson diligently provided wordprocessing. Richard F. Nyrop

reviewed all parts of the book and made valuable suggestions

throughout its development.

Others who contributed to this edition were Paulette A. Marshall,

who designed the cover and chapter illustrations; Teresa E. Kamp,

who prepared several of the maps; and Margaret Varghese of

Editorial Experts, who compiled the index. Andrea T. Merrill made

a very important contribution to the overall consistency and quality of the book in performing the final, prepublication review. Also,

the late John G. Early, head of the Printing and Processing Section, Library of Congress, was instrumental in establishing procedures for typesetting the final text. Peggy F. Pixley, of the same

section, directed the actual typesetting, which was accomplished

by Diann Johnson.

VI
Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xvii Country Profile XXI Introduction XXXI Chapter 1. Historical Setting l Rinn-Sup Shinn and Robert L. Worden

THE ANCIENT DYNASTIES 5 The Dawn of History 5 The Zhou Period 6 The Hundred Schools of Thought 7 THE IMPERIAL ERA 11 The First Imperial Period 11 Era of Disunity 13 Restoration of Empire 13 Mongolian Interlude 16 The Chinese Regain Power 18 The Rise of the Manchus 18 EMERGENCE OF MODERN CHINA 21 The Western Powers Arrive 21 The Opium War, 1839-42 22 The Taiping Rebellion, 1851-64 23 The Self-Strengthening Movement 24

The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath 28

The Republican Revolution of 1911 29

REPUBLICAN CHINA 30

Nationalism and Communism 31 Anti-Japanese War 36

Return to Civil War 38

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 39

The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57 41 The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 43

Readjustment and Recovery, 1961-65 46

The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76 47 The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78 53

China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82 54

vn
Chapter 2. Physical Environment and

Population 59

Michael L. Waddle

PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 62

Boundaries 64

Terrain and Drainage 65

Climate 71 Wildlife 71 POPULATION 72 The Data Base 72 Mortality and Fertility 74 Population Control Programs 75 Density and Distribution 78

Migration 78

Minority Nationalities 84

Policy 87

Labor Force 88

Health Care 90

Chapter 3. The Social System 97

Donald R. DeGlopper

ETHNIC BOUNDARIES 99

HAN DIVERSITY AND UNITY 101 TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND CULTURE 103

Diffusion of Values 105

The Confucian Legacy 105

Traditional Social Structure 106

The Examination System 107

Social Stratification 108

Stratification and Families 109

Social Mobility 110

SOCIAL CHANGE 112 DIFFERENTIATION 114

The Work Place 114

Communist Party Membership 116

Urban-Rural Distinctions 117 Regional Distinctions 118

COMMON PATTERNS 119

Work Units 120

Wages and Benefits 121 Informal Mechanisms of Exchange 122 RURAL SOCIETY 124

Collectivization and Class Status 124

Decollectivization 125

Vlll
The Role of the Household 126

Consequences of Rural Reform 127 Regulations and Favors 128

Family and Household 130

Marriage 132

Community Structure 133

URBAN SOCIETY 134

Distinctive Features 134

Housing 136

Families and Marriage 138

Providing for the Next Generation 139

Opportunities and Competition 140

Examinations, Hereditary Transmission of Jobs,

and Connections 142 WOMEN 143

RELIGION 145

TRENDS AND TENSIONS 147 Chapter 4. Education and Culture 151 Andrea Matles Savada and Ronald E. Dolan EDUCATION POLICY 154

THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 156

New Directions 156

Compulsory Education Law 157

Key Schools 159

PRIMARY EDUCATION 160

Primary Schools 160

Preschool Education 162

Special Education 163

SECONDARY EDUCATION 163

Middle Schools 163

Vocational and Technical Schools 164

HIGHER EDUCATION 166

Background 166

Modernization Goals in the 1980s 168 Entrance Examinations and Admission Criteria 169

Changes in Enrollment and Assignment Policies 171 Scholarship and Loan System 173

Study Abroad 173

Educational Investment 174

TEACHERS 176

ADULT EDUCATION 177 Role in Modernization 177

Alternative Forms 177 Literacy and Language Reform 179

IX
POLICY TOWARD INTELLECTUALS 180

Background 180

Post-Mao Development 182 CULTURE AND THE ARTS 185

Traditional Literature 185

Modern Prose 188

Literature in the Post-Mao Period 189

Traditional Arts 190

Contemporary Performing Arts 195 Publishing 198

Chapter 5. Economic Context 205

Thomas R. Gottschang

GENERAL NATURE OF THE ECONOMY 210

ECONOMIC POLICIES, 1949-80 213

Recovery from War, 1949-52 213

The First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57 215

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60 216

Readjustment and Recovery: "Agriculture First,"

1961-65 218

Events During the Cultural Revolution, 1966-76 .... 220

The Post-Mao Interlude, 1976-78 222

Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979 . . 223

STRUCTURE AND OPERATION OF

THE ECONOMY 228

Roles of the Government and the Party 228

The Two Major Sectors: Agriculture and Industry ... 231

Other Important Sectors 236

Planning 238

The Budget 242

The Banking System 243

Prices 246

LIVING STANDARDS 250

Progress since 1949 250

Food 251 Clothing 252

Consumer Goods 254

Housing 254

Income Distribution 255

POTENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL GOALS 260

Chapter 6. Agriculture 265

Frederick W. Crook

RESOURCES ENDOWMENT 268

x
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES 271

The 1950s 271 Importance of Agriculture Recognized 273

Recovery 274

Post-Mao Policies 275

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION 278

OPERATIONAL METHODS AND INPUTS 281

Cropping Patterns 281

Fertilizer 281

Mechanization 282

Water Conservancy 284

Pest Control 284

Seed Varieties 285

Agricultural Science 285

PRODUCTION 286

Crops 286

Animal Husbandry 291

Forestry 292

Fishery 292

Sideline Production 292

AGRICULTURAL TRADE 294

Chapter 7. Industry 299

Michael L. Waddle

TRENDS IN INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION 302

ORGANIZATION 305

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY 305

LEVEL OF TECHNOLOGY 306

SUPPLIES OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES 308

Capital 308

Labor 309

Raw Materials 309

Energy 310

MANUFACTURING 310

Iron and Steel 310

Machine Building 313

Chemicals 317

Building Materials 318

Paper 319

Textiles 320

Food Processing 321

Other Consumer Goods 322

CONSTRUCTION 322

Housing Construction 322

Capital Construction 323

xi
MINING 324

Coal 324

Iron Ore 324

Other Minerals and Metals 325

ENERGY 326

Oil and Natural Gas 326

Electric and Nuclear Power 328

RURAL INDUSTRY 331

DEFENSE INDUSTRY 332

Chapter 8. Trade and Transportation 335

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis and Ernestine H. Wang

INTERNAL TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION 337

Agriculture 337

Industry 340

Lateral Economic Cooperation 342

Retail Sales 343

FOREIGN TRADE 344

History of Chinese Foreign Trade 344

Trade Policy in the 1980s 347

Organization of Foreign Trade 349

Composition of Foreign Trade 352

Trading Partners 353

Tourism 354

TRANSPORTATION 354

Railroads 357

Subways 358

Highways and Roads 360

Bridges 361

Inland Waterways 361

Maritime Shipping 362

Civil Aviation 363

POSTAL SERVICES 364

TELECOMMUNICATIONS 365

Historical Development 365

Telecommunication Services 366

Chapter 9. Science and Technology 371

Donald R. DeGlopper

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE

AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY 374

Pre- 1949 Patterns 374

Soviet Influence in the 1950s 377

"Reds" Versus "Experts" in the 1950s and 1960s . . . 379

Rehabilitation and Rethinking, 1977-84 382

xii
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1980s 386

The Supply of Skilled Manpower 386

Research Institutes 387

National Organization and Administration 387

Integration of Administrative Systems 393

International Ties 395

THE REFORM PROGRAM 397

Shortcomings of the Science and Technology

System 397

The Program 398

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 403

Policy 403

Modes of Transfer 403

Linking Technology and Economics 404

Chapter 10. Party and Government 407

Marcia R. Ristaino

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 411

Party Constitution 411

National Party Congresses 412

Central Committee and Political Bureau 413

Secretariat 415

Central Military Commission 415

Other Party Organs 416

Membership 417

Mass Organizations 418

THE GOVERNMENT 421

Constitutional Framework 421

The National People's Congress 424

The State Council 426

The Judiciary 427

Local Administration 428

The Cadre System 434

THE MEDIA 437

Chapter 11. The Political Process 443

Marcia R. Ristaino

POLITICAL REALIGNMENTS AT THE PARTY

CENTER 447

Deng Xiaoping Consolidates Power 447

Institutionalizing Collective Leadership 450

A Successor Generation 452
THE FIRST WAVE OF REFORM, 1979-84 453

The Opening Up Policy and Reform in the Countryside 454

Rectification and Reform 456

THE SECOND WAVE OF REFORM, 1984-86 458

The Repercussions of Urban Reform 458

The Decentralization of Power 459

THE THIRD WAVE OF REFORM, BEGINNING IN

1986 460

Political Reform 460

Resistance and the Campaign Against Bourgeois

Liberalization 461

THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION 462

The Components of Reform 463

Competing Bureaucratic Interests 463

Deng Xiaoping's Seminal Role 465

MARXISM-LENINISM-MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT

RE-THOUGHT 465

The Role of Ideology 466

Ideology and the Socialist Man 468

Ideology and Social Change 468

Chapter 12. Foreign Relations 471

Elizabeth E. Green

EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY 475

Historical Legacy and Worldview 475

Nationalism 476

The Influence of Ideology 478

Decision Making and Implementation 481

AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS ... 488

Sino-Soviet Relations 488

Sino-American Relations 492

Relations with the Third World 495

Relations with the Developed World 498

China's Role in International Organizations 501

Chapter 13. Criminal Justice and Public

Security 505

Ronald E. Dolan

THE LEGAL SYSTEM 508

Imperial China 508

The Republican Period 509

Developments after 1949 509

Return to Socialist Legality 517

xiv
COURT STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 522

LAW ENFORCEMENT 525

Historical Background 525

Public Security Forces 529

Grass-Roots Organizations 534

THE PENAL SYSTEM 537

Chapter 14. National Defense 541

Roxane D. V. Sismanidis

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1927-79 545

From the Founding of the People's Liberation Army

to the Korean War 545

Military Modernization in the 1950s and 1960s 547

The People's Liberation Army in the Cultural

Revolution 549

Military Modernization in the 1970s 551

MILITARY MODERNIZATION 553

Civil-Military Relations 555

Political Role of the People's Liberation Army 555

Military Organization 557

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics 562

Education and Training 564

Personnel 565

Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the People's Liberation Army 568

PERCEPTION OF THREAT 575

The Soviet Union 576

Vietnam 577

India 578

South China Sea 579

Taiwan 579

FOREIGN MILITARY COOPERATION 579

FORCE STRUCTURE 582

Ground Forces 582

Air Force 583

Navy 585

Nuclear Forces 587

Paramilitary Forces 590

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND PROSPECTS 593

Appendix A. Tables 595

Appendix B. Chronology and Lists 617

Appendix C. The People's Liberation Army at a Glance 633

XV
Bibliography 637

Glossary 699

Index 709

List of Figures

1 China, 1988 xxx

2 The Chinese Empire, circa 220 B.C., A.D. 700, 1580, and

1775 12

3 China-Soviet Union Border Area 66

4 Topography and Drainage 70

5 Population Density, 1982 79

6 Distribution of Major Minority Nationalities 85

7 Gross National Product and Major Economic Sectors,

1952-86 212

8 Agricultural Regions, 1987 269

9 Per Capita Gross Value of Agricultural Output

(GVAO) and Crop Production, 1952-83 276

10 Composition of Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985 . . . 296

11 Major Industrial Facilities, 1987 307

12 Steel Production and Capacity, 1948-86 314

13 Coal Reserves and Major Mining Areas, 1987 325

14 Major Oil Basins and Oil Fields, 1987 329

15 Railroads and Major Air and Sea Ports, 1987 355

16 Principal Improved Inland Waterways, 1987 363

17 Organization of the Science and Technology

Establishment 389

18 Organization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987 414

19 The Structure of the Government, 1987 428

20 Organization of the People's Courts and People's

Procuratorates, 1987 524

21 Organization of the Public Security System, 1987 530

22 Organization of the Military Establishment, 1987 558

23 Military Regions and Fleet Commands, 1986 563

xvi
Preface

China in the 1980s was a nation rapidly modernizing as its leader- ship implemented sweeping reforms in the economic, social, and

political sectors and adopted a policy of opening up to the outside

world. The scale and pace of China's comprehensive modernization program have necessitated this new and updated edition of

China: A Country Study, which supersedes the third edition published

in 1981 under the same title. Much of what was reported in 1981

has been overtaken by events. Sources of information in the new

edition have included scholarly journals and monographs, official reports of governments and international organizations, foreign and

domestic media reports, numerous periodicals, and, significantly,

the increasingly available and accurate Chinese government statisti- cal reports and analyses. Bibliographic essays calling attention to useful sources of further reading appear at the end of each chapter.

The aim of the authors has been to present an understanding

of China in a period of transition and modernization against the

backdrop of both a long and illustrious historical heritage and

twentieth-century political turmoil. As an aid to readers seeking an understanding of the broad framework of China's long history, a chronology of dynasties is provided (see table A). Increasingly

reliable information about all sectors of Chinese society became

available in the 1980s—emanating from scholars and technical

experts, both Chinese and foreign—aiding the authors of this volume in presenting what is hoped is a clear and thoughtful analysis. Nevertheless, gaps in data and inconsistent reporting have

required the authors to make interpretations and conclusions, some

of which must be regarded as highly tentative. Both old questions

and new developments need additional investigation by interested

observers of Chinese affairs. With certain minor exceptions, Chinese personal names and

place-names in this study are represented according to the pinyin

system of romanization. For those familiar with the Wade-Giles

system of romanization, once commonly used in Western-language

publications on Chinese subjects and still used in whole or in part

by some, conversions are provided for pinyin, Wade-Giles, and

conventional ("post office") spellings of major place-names (see

table 2, table 3, Appendix A). The standard spellings provided by

the United States Board on Geographic Names are used throughout the book. Exceptions were made for the names of well-known

historical figures like Confucius and Sun Yat-sen and certain xvn
place-names, such as Hong Kong and Macao, to coincide with offi- cial usage in English-language publications of the government of

the People's Republic of China. It should be noted too that in the

text and on maps some generic parts of Chinese geographic names

have been retained in following Chinese official usage in foreignlanguage publications. Thusjiang and he (river), hai (sea), wan (bay),

and shan and ling (mountain) have been used, but the English terms

have been retained for island, plateau, basin, plain, desert,

province, autonomous region, and special municipality.

Measurements are given in the metric system; a table is provided

to assist those readers who wish to convert between metric and nonmetric systems (see table 1 , Appendix A). A glossary and bibliography also are included at the back of the book.

Organizational names are spelled out to avoid confusing those

reading about China for the first time. Thus, there are the National

Party Congress (of the Chinese Communist Party) and the National

People's Congress (the legislature), rather than the acronym NPC.

Some longer or more complicated names appear in acronym form

after being spelled out in their first use in each chapter.

xviu
Table A. Chronology of Chinese Dynasties

Dates Dynasty

ca. 21st-16th century B.C Xia

1700-1027 B.C Shang

1027-771 B.C Western Zhou

770-221 B.C Eastern Zhou

770-476 B.C Spring and Autumn period 475-221 B.C Warring States period 221-207 B.C Qin

206 B.C.rA.D. 9 Western Han

A.D. 9-24 Xin (Wang Mang interregnum) A.D. 25-220 Eastern Han

A.D. 220-280 Three Kingdoms (San Guo)

220- 265 Wei

221-263 Shu

229-280 Wu

A.D. 265-316 Western Jin A.D. 317-420 Eastern Jin A.D. 420-588 Southern and Northern Dynasties 420-588 Southern Dynasties 420-478 Song

479-501 Qi

502-556 Liang 557-588 Chen

386-588 Northern Dynasties 386-533 Northern Wei

534-549 Eastern Wei

535-557 Western Wei

550-577 Northern Qi

557-588 Northern Zhou

A.D. 581-617 Sui A.D. 618-907 Tang

A.D. 907-960 Five Dynasties A.D. 907-979 Ten Kingdoms

916-1125 Liao

XIX
Table A. —Cont.

Dates Dynasty 960-1279 Song

960-1127 Northern Song

1127-1279 Southern Song

1038-1227 Western Xia

1115-1234 Jin 1279-1368 Yuan

1368-1644 Ming

1644-1911 Qing

Source: Based on information from China Handbook Editorial Committee, China Handbook Series: History (trans., Dun J. Li), Beijing, 1982, 188-89; and Shao Chang Lee, "China's Cultural Development" (wall chart), East Lansing, 1964.

XX
Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: People's Republic of China.

Short Form: China.

Term for Citizens: Chinese.

Capital: Beijing.

Geography

Size: Area about 9.6 million square kilometers; east to west dis- tance about 5,000 kilometers, from the Heilong Jiang (Amur River)

to Pamir Mountains in Central Asia; north to south distance

approximately 4,050 kilometers, from Heilongjiang Province to Hainan Island in south, and another 1,450 kilometers further south

to Zengmu Shoal, territorial claim off north coast of Malaysia.

xxi
Topography: Main topographic features include Qing-Zang

(Qinghai-Tibet) Plateau 4,000 meters above sea level and Kunlun,

Qin Ling, and Greater Hinggan ranges. Longest of country's numerous rivers, Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) and Huang He (Yellow

River), extend for some 6,300 and 5,400 kilometers, respectively.

Climate: Most of country in temperate belt. Complex climatic pat- terns ranging from cold-temperate north to tropical south. Precipitation varies regionally; temperatures range from minus 30°C in north in January to 28°C in south in July. Alternating wet monsoon in summer, dry monsoon in winter.

Society

Population: 1982 census reported total population of

1,008,180,738; official estimate at end of 1986 nearly 1.1 billion

with 1.4 percent annual rate of increase. Urban population offi- cially estimated at 382 million by end of 1985, or 37 percent of

total. About 94 percent of population lives on approximately 36 per- cent of land.

Education: In 1985, about 96 percent of primary-school-age chil- dren attended school as compared with about 20 percent before

1949. About 136 million students enrolled in more than 832,000

primary schools. Secondary-level middle schools divided into junior

and senior stages; majority of schools at lower level. About

48.6 million students attended some 104,800 secondary-level

institutions. Technical education emphasized. Intense competition

for admission to more than 1,000 colleges and universities; about

1.7 million students in various higher educational institutions. Beijing and Qinghua universities and more than 100 other key universities most sought after by college entrants. Ethnic Minorities: As of 1987 China recognized 55 minority

nationalities, numbering about 70 million persons, concentrated

in northwest and southwest. Not largest, but most important

politically, Tibetans (Zang nationality) and various Turkic-speaking

groups constituted majorities in Xizang (Tibet) and Xinjiang-Uygur

autonomous regions, respectively.

Health: Level of health and medical care improving. System of

national, provincial-level, and local facilities in urban and rural areas plus network of industrial and state-enterprise hospitals.

Traditional and Western medicine both practiced. Average life expectancy of sixty-nine years in 1985. Many once-widespread epidemic diseases now under control or eradicated. xxn
Economy

Salient Features: Economic system in transition, cautiously moving

away from Soviet-style central planning and gradually adopting

market economy mechanisms and reduced government role. Industry, largely based on state and collective ownership, marked by

increasing technological advancements and productivity. China's

people's communes (see Glossary) largely eliminated by 1984—after more than twenty-five years—and responsibility system (see Glossary) of production introduced in agricultural sector. Private ownership of production assets legal, although major nonagricultural and

industrial facilities still state owned and centrally planned. Restraints on foreign trade relaxed and joint ventures encouraged.

Industry: In 1985 employed about 17 percent of labor force but

produced more than 43 percent of gross national product (GNP).

Fastest growing sector; average annual growth of 1 1 percent from

1952 to 1985. Wide range of technological levels; many small handicraft units; many enterprises using machinery installed or designed

in 1950s and 1960s; significant number of big, up-to-date plants,

including textile mills, steel mills, chemical fertilizer plants, and

petrochemical facilities but also burgeoning light industries producing consumer goods. Produced most kinds of products made by

industrialized nations but limited quantities of high-technology

items. Technology transfer by importing whole plants, equipment,

and designs an important means of progress. Major industrial centers in Liaoning Province, Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan area, Shanghai, and Wuhan. Mineral resources included huge reserves of iron ore; adequate to abundant supplies of nearly all other industrial minerals. Outdated mining and ore processing technologies

gradually being replaced with modern techniques.

Agriculture: In 1985 employed about 63 percent of labor force; proportion of GNP about 29 percent. Low worker productivity

because of scanty supplies of agricultural machinery and other

modern inputs. Most agricultural processes still performed by hand.

Very small arable land area (just above 10 percent of total area,

as compared with 22 percent in United States) in relation to size of country and population. Intensive use of land; all fields produce

at least one crop a year; wherever conditions permit, two or even

three crops grown annually, especially in south. Grain most important product, including rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, and

millet. Other important crops include cotton, jute, oilseeds, sugarcane, and sugar beets. Eggs a major product. Pork production has

increased steadily; poultry and pigs raised on family plots. Other

xxin
livestock relatively limited in numbers, except for sheep and goats,

grazed in large herds on grasslands of Nei Monggol Autonomous

Region (Inner Mongolia) and northwest. Substantial marine and

freshwater fishery. Timber resources mainly located in northeast

and southwest; much of country deforested centuries ago. Wide

variety of fruits and vegetables grown.

Energy Sources: Self-sufficient in all energy forms; coal and petroleum exported since early 1970s. Coal reserves among world's largest; mining technology inadequately developed but improving in

late 1980s. Petroleum reserves very large but of varying quality

and in disparate locations. Suspected oil deposits in northwest and

offshore tracts believed to be among world's largest; exploration

and extraction limited by scarcity of equipment and trained per- sonnel; twenty-seven contracts for joint offshore exploration and

production by Japanese and Western oil companies signed by 1982,

but by late 1980s only handful of wells producing. Substantial

natural gas reserves in north, northwest, and offshore. Hydroelectric

potential greatest in world, sixth largest in capacity; very large

hydroelectric projects under construction, others in planning stage.

Thermal power, mostly coal fired, produced approximately 68 per- cent of generating capacity in 1985; expected to increase to 72 per- cent by 1990. Emphasis on thermal power in late 1980s seen by

policy makers as quick, short-term solution to energy needs; hydroelectric power seen as long-term solution. Petroleum production

growth to continue in order to meet needs of nationwide mechanization and provide important foreign exchange but domestic use

to be restricted as much as possible.

Foreign Trade: Small by international standards but growing

rapidly in size and importance, represented 20 percent of GNP

in 1985. Trade controlled by Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade and subordinate units and by Bank of China, for- eign exchange arm of central bank. Substantial decentralization

and increased flexibility in foreign trade operations since late 1970s.

Textiles leading export category. Other important exports included

petroleum and foodstuffs. Leading imports included machinery,

transport equipment, manufactured goods, and chemicals. Japan

dominant trading partner, accounting for 28.9 percent of imports

and 15.2 percent of exports in 1986. Hong Kong leading market

for exports (31.6 percent) but source of only 13 percent of imports. In 1979 United States became China's second largest source of

imports and in 1986 was third largest overall trade partner. Western

Europe, particularly Federal Republic of Germany, also major trad- ing partner. Tourism encouraged and growing.

xxiv
Transportation and Communications

Railroads: Basis of transportation system. About 52,000 kilometers

of track in operation. Only 18 percent double tracked in 1984 and some important lines lacking modern equipment. Ninety percent

of locomotives steam engines in 1979; but by mid-1980s production of diesel and electric models growing rapidly. Freight cars numbered 280,000, passenger cars numbered 20,000 in 1985. Railroads

efficient within limits of track system. Expansion and improvement

progressing in 1987.

Roads: About 962,800 kilometers in 1986; about 80 percent sur- faced. Importance of highways and motor vehicles growing but

bicycles and animal carts still much in evidence throughout country.

Inland Waterways: About 136,000 kilometers of navigable rivers,

streams, lakes, and canals carried 44 percent of freight traffic in 1986, only slightly less than railroads. Rapid growth. Principal sys- tem ChangJiang and its tributaries in central and east China; major

freight artery. Secondary system Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) and its tributaries in south.

Maritime Shipping: Rapidly growing merchant fleet; 600 vessels of various kinds in 1984, total cargo capacity over 16 million tons. Major ports include Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao, Qingdao,

Tianjin, and Huangpu. Rapid modernization of port facilities. Civil Aviation: About 228,000 kilometers of domestic routes; about

94,000 kilometers of international routes in 1987. State airline

General Administration of Civil Aviation of China known as CAAC. Regional airlines established in mid-1980s. Small but growing share of total freight and passenger traffic; important link to remote areas and foreign countries. In 1987 fleet included

American-made Boeing 707, 737, 747, and 767 and McDonnellDouglas MD-82 jetliners as well as other American, British, Soviet,

West German, and domestic aircraft. Beijing International Airport completed in 1980.

Telecommunications: Diversified system linked all parts of country

by telephone, telegraph, radio, and television. Marked improvements by mid-1980s with influx of foreign technology and increased

domestic production capabilities. International and long-distance

telephone links by cable and satellite of high quality. Telegraph,

facsimile, and telex all in use. International satellite ground sta- tions in Beijing and Shanghai; domestic satellite communication

network operational in 1986. Over 160 radio stations by mid-1980s;

transistorized radio receivers common. Vast wired broadcasting

xxv
system including over 2,600 stations carrying radio transmissions

into all rural units and many urban areas. Television system grew

rapidly in 1980s; 90 television stations and 80 million sets. Science and Technology: One of Four Modernizations, its highspeed development declared essential to all national economic

development by Deng Xiaoping. Major breakthroughs in nuclear

weapons, satellite launching and recovery, superconductivity, highyield hybrid rice. Policy formulation at top levels puts emphasis on application of science to industry and foreign technology transfer. Government and Politics

Party and Government: A unitary and "socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat," based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao

Zedong Thought, led by 46-million-member Chinese Communist

Party (CCP). Political processes guided by party and state constitutions, both promulgated in 1982; constitutions stress principle

of democratic centralism (see Glossary), under which representative organs of both party and state are elected by lower bodies and

they in turn elect their administrative arms at corresponding levels. Within representative and executive bodies minority must abide

by decisions of majority; lower bodies obey orders of higher level organs. In theory, National Party Congress highest organ of power

of party, but real power lies in Political Bureau of CCP Central

Committee and, still more, in select Standing Committee of Politi- cal Bureau. National People's Congress highest government organ

of state power; ratifies CCP-approved policies and programs.

Reforms implemented in early 1980s allowed more serious review

and deliberations concerning government programs in National

People's Congress. State Council serves as equivalent of cabinet;

key members also hold positions in important party organs.

Administrative Divisions: Divided into three tiers. In 1987

twenty-nine provincial-level units comprise twenty-one provinces,

five autonomous regions, and three centrally governed special

municipalities; middle tier consists of autonomous prefectures,

counties, autonomous counties, cities, and municipal districts; and

basic level comprises townships, and villages.

Judicial System: Four-level court system. Supreme People's Court

in Beijing; higher people's courts in provinces, autonomous regions,

and special municipalities; intermediate people's courts at prefec- ture level and also in parts of provinces, autonomous regions, and

special municipalities; basic people's courts in counties, towns, and

xxvi
municipal districts. Special courts handle matters affecting military, railroad transportation, water transportation, and forestry.

Court system paralleled by hierarchy of prosecuting organs called

people's procuratorates; at apex stands Supreme People's Procuratorate. Foreign Affairs: As of late 1980s, China pursued independent for- eign policy and sought friendly relations and trade with many countries despite political differences. China regards itself as developing

country and member of Third World. China, however, has close cooperative relations, including economic, technological, political,

and limited military cooperation, with United States, Japan, and

other industrially developed nations. Earlier strains in Chinese

relations with Soviet Union, long considered by Beijing as main

threat of war, somewhat ameliorated by late 1980s but still fell short

of full normalization.

National Security

Armed Forces: In 1987 combined strength of combat support units

of People's Liberation Army (PLA) just under 3 million. Ground

forces estimated at 2.1 million, world's largest standing army. Air

Force estimated at 390,000. Navy estimated at 350,000, including those assigned to Naval Air Force, Coastal Defense Forces, and

Marine Corps. Strategic Missile Force estimated at 100,000.

Combat Units and Major Equipment: In 1987 ground forces consisted of 35 main-force armies comprising 118 infantry divisions,

13 armored divisions, and 33 artillery and antiaircraft divisions;

73 regional-force divisions, about 70 main- and regional-force

independent combat and combat support regiments. Major weapons

systems included Type 34, Type 59, and Type 69 main battle tanks,

Type 62 and Type 63 light battle tanks; various caliber howitzers

and guns and antiaircraft artillery. Air Force equipment included

nearly 5,200 combat aircraft. Navy equipment included 5 nuclearpowered submarines (3 attack and 2 ballistic missile launching),

110 diesel attack submarines, 46 major surface combatants (destroyers and frigates), 877 fast-attack craft (armed with guns, missiles, or torpedoes), nearly 900 other combatant and support ships and

boats, and 780 Naval Air Force combat aircraft. Strategic Missile

Force included 50 medium-range ballistic missiles (range of 650

nautical miles), 60 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (range of

1 ,620 nautical miles), 4 limited-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (range of 3,780 nautical miles), and 2 full-range intercontinental

ballistic missiles (range of 8,100 nautical miles). xxvn
Military Budget: Officially announced for 1987 at ¥20. 4 billion (for value of the yuan—see Glossary). Western analysts believe

defense spending roughly double announced budget, or about

4 percent of GNP.

Police Agencies and Paramilitary Forces: Police organized under

Ministry of Public Security. People's Armed Police Force, primarily

demobilized PLA troops estimated at 600,000. Supported by grass- roots party, government, and neighborhood organizations. Armed

militia estimated at 4.3 million; ordinary, unarmed militia esti- mated at 6 million.

xxvin


Introduction

REFORM—DUBBED CHINA'S "SECOND REVOLUTION" —was one of the most common terms in China's political

vocabulary in the 1980s. Reform of the Chinese Communist Party

and its political activities, reform of government organization,

reform of the economy, military reforms, cultural and artistic reforms, indeed, China's post-Mao Zedong leaders called for reform

of every part of Chinese society. The leaders of the People's Republic of China saw reform as the way to realize the broad goal of the

Four Modernizations (announced by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1975:

the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology,

and national defense) and to bring China into the community of

advanced industrial nations by the start of the new millennium.

The reform movement had antecedents in Chinese history in the

Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), Song (960-1279), and Qing (1644-

1911) dynasties, when concerted efforts were made to bring about

fundamental changes in administrative methods while keeping the

overall institutional framework intact. Thus, the reform movement

of the 1980s—which has been attributed largely to the insights and

determination of Deng Xiaoping, the most important figure in the

post-Mao Zedong leadership—took its place in the broad spectrum

of Chinese history. As with previous reform movements, history

will measure this one's success. Late twentieth-century Chinese society has developed out of some

3,300 years of recorded history and, as archaeological finds indicate, several millennia of prehistoric civilization. For thousands of

years, the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo—the Chinese name for China) was marked by organizational and cultural continuity, which were reaffirmed in a cyclic rise, flourishing, and decline of imperial

dynasties. Short-lived, vibrant, but often tyrannical dynasties fre- quently were followed by long periods of stability and benevolent

rule that were built on the best features of the preceding era and

that discarded or modified more authoritarian ideas. An ethical

system of relations—governed by rules of propriety attributed to the School of Literati (also known as the Confucian school)

carefully defined each person's place in society. In this system, harmony of social relations rather than the rights of the individual was

the ideal. The highest social status was held by scholar-officials,

the literati who provided the interpretations needed for maintaining harmony in a slowly evolving world. Hard-working farmers,

xxxi
XXX

the providers of sustenance to society, also occupied an important

place in the societal structure. China's development was influenced by the alien peoples on the

frontiers of Chinese civilization, who were sinicized into the Chinese

polity (see fig. 1, frontispiece). Occasionally, groups arose among

alien border peoples that were strong enough to conquer China

itself. These groups established their own dynasties, only to be

absorbed into an age-old system of governance. The importation

of Buddhism, too, in the first century A.D. and its gradual assimilation had a fundamental impact on China. Early contacts with

the premodern Western world brought a variety of exchanges. The

Chinese contributed silk, printing, gunpowder, and porcelain. Sta- ple foodstuffs from Africa and the Americas were assimilated by

China, as was the Western-style chair. In later centuries, Chinese

scholars studied Western astronomy, mathematics, and other

branches of science. Westerners arrived in China in the nineteenth

century, during the decline of the Qing dynasty, in search of trade

and colonial empires. Through force of arms the Westerners

imposed unequal treaties compelling China to accept humiliating

compromises to its traditional system of society and government.

China reacted to intrusions from the West—and from a newly

modernized Japan (to which China lost a war in 1895) —in a variety of ways, sometimes maintaining the traditional status quo,

adapting Western functions to Chinese substance, or rejecting

Chinese tradition in favor of Western substance and form. As the

Qing dynasty declined, reforms came too late and did too little. The unsuccessful reform efforts were followed by revolution. Still burdened with the legacy of thousands of years of imperial rule

and nearly a century of humiliations at foreign hands, China saw

the establishment of a republic in 1911. But warlord rule and civil war continued for nearly forty more years, accompanied in 1937-45

by war with Japan.

The Chinese civil war of 1945-49 was won by the Chinese Communist Party, the current ruling party of China, led by its chairman and chief ideologist, Mao Zedong. The Communists moved

quickly to consolidate their victory and integrate all Chinese soci- ety into a People's Republic. Except for the island of Taiwan (which

became the home of the exiled Guomindang under Chiang Kai-shek

and his successors), the new government unified the nation and

achieved a stability China had not experienced for generations.

Eagerness on the part of some Communist leaders to achieve even

faster results engendered the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), a pro- gram that attempted rapid economic modernization but proved

disastrous. Political reaction to the Great Leap Forward brought

xxxn
only a temporary respite before a counterreaction occurred in the

form of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), a period of radical

experimentation and political chaos that brought the educational

system to a halt and severely disrupted attempts at rational eco- nomic planning. When Mao Zedong died in 1976, the Cultural

Revolution era effectively came to an end.

Eager to make up for lost time and wasted resources, China's

leaders initiated China's "second revolution" —a comprehensive

economic modernization and organizational reform program. Deng

Xiaoping and his associates mobilized the Chinese people in new

ways to make China a world power. Starting with the Third Plenum

of the Chinese Communist Party's Eleventh National Party Congress in December 1978, Deng reaffirmed the aims of the Four

Modernizations, placing economic progress above the Maoist goals

of class struggle and permanent revolution. Profit incentives and

bonuses took the place of ideological slogans and red banners as China's leaders experimented with ways to modernize the economy.

Mao's legendary people's communes were dismantled and replaced

by a responsibility system, in which peasant households were given

greater decision-making power over agricultural production and

distribution. Farm families were allowed to lease land and grow

crops of their own choosing. In the urban sector, factory managers

were granted the flexibility to negotiate with both domestic and

foreign counterparts over matters that previously had been handled by central planners in Beijing. Exploitation of China's rich

natural resources advanced significantly in the late 1970s and

throughout the 1980s. As China's industrial sector advanced, there was increasing movement of the population to urban areas. China's

population itself had surpassed 1 billion people by 1982 and was

experiencing an annual rate of increase of 1 .4 percent. As in times

past, foreign specialists were invited to assist in the modernization

process, and joint ventures with foreign capitalists and multinational

conglomerates proliferated. Increasing numbers of Chinese students

went abroad to pursue advanced degrees in a wide range of scientific and technical fields. All this change was not without cost —both political and monetary. Efforts at fundamental transformation of economic, governmental, and political organizations caused discontent among some

people and in some institutions and were resisted by those who clung

to the "iron rice bowl" of guaranteed lifetime job tenure. Beijing's

reform leaders made repeated calls for party members and government bureaucrats to reform their "ossified thinking" and to adopt

modern methods. Older and inappropriately trained bureaucrats

retired in great numbers as a younger and more technically oriented

xxxiii
generation took over. In the ongoing debate between those who

emphasized ideological correctness and those who stressed the need

for technical competence—"reds'" versus "experts" —the tech- nocrats again emerged predominant. But developing and successfully applying technological expertise —the very essence of the Four

Modernizations—cost vast sums of money and required special

effort on the part of the Chinese people. In a rejection of the timehonored concept of "self-reliance,' ' China entered into the milieu

of international bank loans, joint ventures, and a whole panoply

of once-abhorred capitalist economic practices.

As politics and the economy continued to respond to and change

each other, China's reformers had to balance contending forces within and against their reform efforts while maintaining the

momentum of the Four Modernizations program. In doing so. Deng Xiaoping and his associates were faced with several unenviable tasks. One was to create unity and support for the scope

and pace of the reform program among party members. There w as also a necessity to deliver material results to the broad masses of

people amid economic experiments and mounting inflation . Failure

to achieve these balances and to make mid-course corrections could

prove disastrous for the reform leadership.

A sound ideological basis was needed to ensure the support of

the party for the reform program. Deng's political idioms, such as "seeking truth from facts" and "socialism with Chinese characteristics," were reminiscent of reformist formulations of centuries past

and had underlying practical ramifications. The supporters of Deng

held that theory and practice must be fully integrated if success is to be hoped for, and they articulated the position that the MarxistLeninist creed is not only valid but is adaptable to China's special —if not unique—situation. The ideological conviction that China was

still in the "initial stage of socialism" —a viewpoint reaffirmed at the Thirteenth National Party Congress in October and November

1987 —provided a still broader ideological basis for continuing the

development of the Deng's reform program in the late 1980s and

early 1990s. This ideological pronouncement also emphasized

reformers' fundamental tenet that since the end of the "'period of

socialist transformation" (turning over private ownership of the means of production to the state) in 1956, there had been numerous "leftist" errors made in the party's ideological line. Mistakes

such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had

produced setbacks in achieving "socialist modernization" and had

kept China from emerging from the initial stage of socialism. It was, perhaps, the very failure of these leftist campaigns that had paved

the way lor the reforms of the 1980s.

xxxiv
Political confrontation over the reforms was pervasive and, to many foreign observers, confusing. In simplistic terms, the "conservatives" in the reform debate were members of the post-Mao

"left," while the "liberals" were the pro-Deng "right. " Being conservative in China in the 1980s variously meant adhering to the

less radical aspects of Maoi st orthodoxy (not all of which had been

discredited) or accepting the goals of reform but rejecting the pace,

scope, or certain methods of the Deng program. Thus, there were

both conservative opponents to reform and conservative reformers. While many reform opponents had been swept away into

"retirement," conservative reformers until the late 1980s served

as members of China's highest ruling body and locus of power,

the Standing Committee of the party's Political Bureau. Such leaders as Standing Committee member Chen Yun, one of the principal architects of economic reform, objected to the "bourgeois

liberalization" of the modernization process that came with infusions of foreign, especially Western, culture. In the conservative

reform view, the application of Chinese values to Western technology (reminiscent of the traditional tiyong [substance versus form]

formulation evoked in the late-nineteenth-century reform period)

would serve the People's Republic in good stead.

In the 1980s China's intellectuals and students frequently tested

the limits of official tolerance in calls for freer artistic and literary

expression, demands for more democratic processes, and even criti- cisms of the party. These confrontations reached their apex in late 1986, when thousands of students throughout the nation took to the streets to make their views known. In the resulting crackdown, some prominent intellectuals were demoted or expelled from the

party. Even its highest official was not invulnerable: General Secretary Hu Yaobang was demoted in January 1987 for having dealt

unsuccessfully with public activism and criticism of the party. Hu's

ouster paved the way for the chief implementer of the Deng reforms,

Zhao Ziyang, premier of the State Council, to assume command

of the party and more firmly establish Deng's ideology as the sta- tus quo of reform. At the time of the writing of this book, it remained to be seen what degree of success the conservative reform

elements would have in effecting a compromise, having placed their own representatives in the Political Bureau Standing Committee

and the State Council's highest offices in late 1987.

Self-proclaimed successes of the reforms of the 1980s included

improvements in both rural and urban life, adjustment of the struc- tures of ownership, diversification of methods of operation, and

introduction of more people into the decision-making process. As

market mechanisms became an important part of the newly

xxxv
reformed planning system, products circulated more freely and the

commodity market was rapidly improved. The government sought

to rationalize prices, revamp the wage structure, and reform the

financial and taxation systems. The policy of opening up to the

outside world (the Chinese eschew the term open door, with its legacy

of imperialist impositions) brought a significant expansion of eco- nomic, technological, and trade relations with other countries.

Reforms of the scientific, technological, and educational institu- tions rounded out the successes of the Deng-inspired reforms. For

the first time in modern Chinese history, the reforms also were

being placed on the firm basis of a rational body of law and a carefully codified judicial system. Although reform and liberalization

left the once more-strictly regimented society open to abuses, the

new system of laws and judicial organizations continued to foster the stable domestic environment and favorable investment climate

that China needed to realize its modernization goals.

Amid these successes, the authorities admitted that there were

difficulties in attempting simultaneously to change the basic eco- nomic structure and to avoid the disruptions and declines in production that had marked the ill-conceived "leftist experiments" of the

previous thirty years. China's size and increasing economic development rendered central economic planning ineffective, and the

absence of markets and a modern banking system left the central

authorities few tools with which to manage the economy. A realistic pricing system that reflected accurately levels of supply and

demand and the value of scarce resources had yet to be implemented. The tremendous pent-up demand for consumer goods and

the lack of effective controls on investment and capital grants to

local factories unleashed inflationary pressures that the government

found difficult to contain. Efforts to transform lethargic state fac- tories into efficient enterprises responsible for their own profits and

losses were hampered by shortages of qualified managers and by

the lack of both a legal framework for contracts and a consistent

and predictable taxation system. The goals of economic reform were

clear, but their implementation was slowed by practical and politi- cal obstacles. National leaders responded by reaffirming support

for reform in general terms and by publicizing the successes of those

cities that had been permitted to experiment with managerial

responsibility, markets for raw materials, and fundraising through

the sale of corporate bonds.

National security has been a key determinant of Chinese planning since 1949. Although national defense has been the lowest

priority of the Four Modernizations, it has not been neglected.

China has had a perennial concern with being surrounded by

xxxvi
enemies—the Soviets to the north and west, the Vietnamese to the

south, and the Indians to the southwest—and has sought increasingly to project itself as a regional power. In response to this con- cern and power projection, in the 1980s China moved to augment

"people's war" tactics with combined-arms tactics; to develop

intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, and other

strategic forces; and to acquire sophisticated foreign technologies

with military applications. In the international arena, China in the

1980s increasingly used improved bilateral relations and a variety

of international forums to project its "independent foreign policy

of peace" while opening up to the outside world.

March 8, 1988

After the manuscript for this book was completed in the sum- mer of 1987, several momentous events took place in China. Some

were alluded to as imminent in the various chapters of the book.

From October 25 to November 1, 1987, the Chinese Communist

Party held its Thirteenth National Party Congress. Dozens of vet- eran party leaders retired from active front-line positions. Not least among the changes was the alteration of the Standing Committee

of the party Political Bureau—the very apex of power in China

both in personnel and in stated purpose. Deng Xiaoping, Chen

Yun, and Li Xiannian stepped down, and Hu Yaobang's demotion to mere Political Bureau membership was confirmed. Only

one incumbent—Zhao Ziyang—was left on the Standing Committee. In place of the party elders and Hu Yaobang, a group of mostly

younger, more technologically oriented individuals were seated.

The Political Bureau's Standing Committee comprised Deng's protege, sixty-eight-year-old Zhao Ziyang (who relinquished his position as head of government to become general secretary of the

party); Li Peng, a sixty-year-old, Soviet-educated engineer, who

became acting premier of the State Council in Zhao's place (he was confirmed as premier in spring 1988); Qiao Shi, a sixty-fouryear-old expert in party affairs, government administration, and

legal matters; Hu Qili, a fifty-eight-year-old party Secretariat member in charge of ideological education, theoretical research, and

propaganda; and veteran economic planner and conservative reform

architect Yao Yilin, the new party elder at age seventy-one. In regard to function, the Political Bureau no longer was conceived

of as a group of influential individuals but as a consensual decisionmaking organization. The party constitution was amended to make

xxxvn
the party Secretariat a staff arm of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee, rather than the somewhat autonomous body

it had been since 1982. By mid- 1988 the Chinese Communist Party

had announced that its increasingly well educated membership had

risen to 47 million, an all-time high.

The retirees were not left without a voice. Deng, eighty-three

and still China's de facto leader, retained his positions as chairman of the party and state Central Military Commissions, the lat- ter of which designated him as commander-in-chief of the Chinese

armed forces. (Zhao Ziyang was appointed first vice chairman of

the party and state Central Military Commissions, giving him mili- tary credentials and paving the way for him to succeed Deng.)

Eighty-two-year-old Chen Yun gave up his position as first secre- tary of the party Central Commission for Discipline Inspection but

replaced Deng as chairman of the party's Central Advisory Commission, a significant forum for party elders. Li Xiannian who relin- quished his position as head of state, or president, to another party

elder—eighty-one-year-old Yang Shangkun—to become chairman

of the Seventh Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

in spring 1988, was left without a leading party position. Hu

Yaobang, far from being totally disgraced after his January 1987

debacle, retained membership on the Political Bureau and enjoyed

a fair amount of popular support at the Thirteenth National Party

Congress and afterward.

Below the national level, numerous leadership changes also took

place following the Thirteenth National Party Congress. More than

600 younger and better educated leaders of provincial-level congresses and governments had been elected in China's twenty-nine

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities.

The Seventh National People's Congress was held from March

25 to April 13, 1988. This congress, along with the Seventh Chinese

People's Political Consultative Conference, held from March 24

to April 10, 1988, was marked by a new openness and tolerance

of debate and dissent. The opening ceremony of the National People's Congress was televised live, and meetings and panel discussions were recorded and broadcast the same day. Chinese and

foreign journalists were permitted to attend the panel discussions

and question the deputies in press conferences. Dissenting state- ments and dissenting votes were widely publicized in the domestic

press. A spirit of reform prevailed as laws and constitutional amendments were ratified to legitimize private business and land sales and to encourage foreign investment. The State Council was

restructured and streamlined. Fourteen ministries and commissions were dissolved and ten new ones—the State Planning Commission

xxxvin
and ministries of personnel, labor, materials, transportation,

energy, construction, aeronautics and astronautics industry, water

resources, and machine building and electronics industry—were

established. Many of the ministries that were dissolved were converted into business enterprises responsible for their own profits

and losses. Li Peng was elected premier of the State Council, as expected,

and Yao Yilin and fifty-nine-year-old financial expert Tian Jiyun

were re-elected as vice premiers. Sixty-six-year-old former Minister

of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian also was elected vice premier. State

councillors, all technocrats chosen for their professional expertise, were reduced in number from eleven to nine. All state councillors

except Beijing mayor Chen Xitong and Secretary General of the State Council Chen Junsheng served concurrently as heads of

national-level commissions or ministries. Although seven of the nine were new state councillors, only Li Guixian, the newly appointed

governor of the People's Bank of China, was new to national

politics. In a move that seemed to bode well for reform efforts, longtime Deng ally and political moderate Wan Li was selected to replace Peng Zhen as chairman of the Standing Committee of the

Seventh National People's Congress. The conservative Peng had

been considered instrumental in blocking or delaying many

important pieces of reformist legislation. It also was decided at the

Seventh National People's Congress to elevate Hainan Island, for- merly part of Guangdong Province, to provincial status and to desig- nate it as a special economic zone.

In September and October 1987 and again in March 1988, riots erupted in the streets of Lhasa, the capital of Xizang Autonomous

Region (Tibet). Calls for "independence for Tibet" and expressions of support for the exiled spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama,

were made amid violence that claimed the lives of at least six people in 1987 and at least nine more (including policemen) in 1988.

Many more were reported to have been badly injured. Although

Chinese authorities condemned the riots, their initial response was

restrained in comparison with actions they had taken against earlier anti-Chinese demonstrations in Xizang. In addition, the authorities accompanied their censure of the Lhasa riots with a plethora

of publicity on advances made by the inhabitants of Xizang in recent years and a lifting of travel restrictions on foreign correspondents.

The March 1988 rioting spread to neighboring Qinghai Province,

where there is a sizable Tibetan (Zang) minority. This time the

authorities resorted to sterner measures, such as military force and numerous arrests, but only after offering lenient treatment to riot- ers who turned themselves in voluntarily. By mid- 1988, it appeared

xxxix
that both the Dalai Lama, concerned that violence and bloodshed

in his homeland was out of control, and the Chinese government,

worried about instability in a strategic border area, were displaying greater flexibility in their respective positions.

The January 1988 death of Taiwan's leader, Chiang Ching-kuo,

brought expressions of sympathy from Zhao Ziyang and other

Chinese Communist Party leaders and renewed calls for the reunification of China under the slogan "one country, two systems."

Implicit in the mainland's discussion of the transfer of power to a new generation of leaders—Taiwan-born Li Teng-hui succeeded

Chiang—was regret that the opportunity had been lost for reaching a rapprochement with the last ruling member of the Chiang

family. Beijing appealed to the patriotism of the people in Taiwan

and called for unity with the mainland but, at the same time, kept

a close watch for any sentiments that might lead to independence

for Taiwan.

In foreign affairs, Beijing continued to balance its concern for security with its desire for an independent foreign policy. China

reacted cautiously to the signing of a nuclear arms treaty by the

Soviet Union and the United States and refused to hold its own

summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Despite a lessen- ing of tensions between Beijing and Moscow and greatly improved

Chinese relations with the governments and ruling parties throughout Eastern Europe, China continued to insist that the Soviet Union

would have to end its support for Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, withdraw all of its troops from Afghanistan, and significantly

reduce Soviet forces deployed on the Sino-Soviet border and in the

Mongolian People's Republic before relations between the Chinese

and Soviet governments and parties could improve. By mid- 1988

there were indications that the Soviet Union was taking steps to remove these "three obstacles" to improved Sino-Soviet relations.

As early as the fall of 1986, the Soviet Union announced the pullback of a significant number of troops from Mongolia and the SinoSoviet border. In May 1988 Moscow began withdrawing troops

from Afghanistan with the goal of evacuating its forces from that

country by early 1989. But China remained skeptical of Vietnamese

government announcements that it would withdraw 50,000 troops

from Cambodia by the end of 1988, and China's leaders continued

to pressure the Soviet Union to exert more influence on Vietnam

to secure an early withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. Already strained Sino-Vietnamese relations were exacer- bated when Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces clashed in March

1988 over several small islands in the strategically located Nansha

(Spratly) archipelago.

xl
In Sino-American relations, disputes over trade and technology

transfer in 1987 were further clouded by United States concern

over reported Chinese Silkworm shore-to-ship missile sales to Iran,

sales of Dongfeng-3 intermediate-range missiles to Saudi Arabia,

and disclosures that Israel allegedly assisted China in the development of the missile system later sold to the Saudis. Another concern was China's protest over an October 1987 United States Senate

resolution on the "Tibetan question" that focused on alleged human

rights violations in Xizang. A visit to Washington, by then Minister

of Foreign Affairs Wu Xueqian in March 1988, however, had salu- tary effects on bilateral relations: China made assurances that it would cease Silkworm missile sales to Iran and the United States pledged to continue to make desired technologies available to China.

The perennial Taiwan issue and problems in Xizang apparently were subsumed by larger national interests. In February 1988 Beijing China achieved its long-sought goal

of establishing diplomatic relations with Uruguay, one of the few

nations that still had state-to-state ties with Taipei. With this accomplishment China increased its diplomatic exchanges to 134

countries, while Taiwan's official representations were reduced

to 22. The dynamism of China's domestic activities and international

relations will continue as the new millennium approaches. Developments in the all-encompassing reform program and their resulting

impact on Chinese society, particularly the efforts of China's leaders

to bring increasing prosperity to the more than 1 billion Chinese

people, and China's growing participation and influence in the

international community will remain of interest to observers

throughout the world.

July 15, 1988 Robert L. Worden,

Andrea Matles Savada,

and Ronald E. Dolan

xli

Chapter 1. Historical Setting
This artist 's conception of a human-shaped bronze wheel pin from the Western Zhou dynasty (1027-771 B. C.) shows not only the high level of orna- mentation common for functional items, but also the style of dress of the period.
THE HISTORY OF CHINA, as documented in ancient writings, dates back some 3,300 years. Modern archaeological studies

provide evidence of still more ancient origins in a culture that

flourished between 2500 and 2000 B.C. in what is now central

China and the lower Huang He (Yellow River) Valley of north

China. Centuries of migration, amalgamation, and development

brought about a distinctive system of writing, philosophy, art, and

political organization that came to be recognized as Chinese civili- zation. What makes the civilization unique in world history is its continuity through over 4,000 years to the present century.

The Chinese have developed a strong sense of their real and

mythological origins and have kept voluminous records since very

early times. It is largely as a result of these records that knowledge

concerning the ancient past, not only of China but also of its neighbors, has survived.

Chinese history, until the twentieth century, was written mostly

by members of the ruling scholar-official class and was meant to provide the ruler with precedents to guide or justify his policies.

These accounts focused on dynastic politics and colorful court his- tories and included developments among the commoners only as backdrops. The historians described a Chinese political pattern of

dynasties, one following another in a cycle of ascent, achievement,

decay, and rebirth under a new family.

Of the consistent traits identified by independent historians, a

salient one has been the capacity of the Chinese to absorb the people of surrounding areas into their own civilization. Their success can be attributed to the superiority of their ideographic written lan- guage, their technology, and their political institutions; the refinement of their artistic and intellectual creativity; and the sheer weight

of their numbers. The process of assimilation continued over the

centuries through conquest and colonization until what is now

known as China Proper was -brought under unified rule. The

Chinese also left an enduring mark on people beyond their borders, especially the Koreans, Japanese, and Vietnamese.

Another recurrent historical theme has been the unceasing struggle of the sedentary Chinese against the threat posed to their safety

and way of life by non-Chinese peoples on the margins of their

territory in the north, northeast, and northwest. In the thirteenth

century, the Mongols from the northern steppes became the first alien people to conquer all China. Although not as culturally

3
China: A Country Study

developed as the Chinese, they left an imprint on Chinese civili- zation. They also heightened Chinese perceptions of threat from

the north. China came under alien rule for the second time in the

mid-seventeenth century; the conquerors—the Manchus—came

again from the north and northeast.

For centuries virtually all the foreigners that Chinese rulers saw came from the less developed societies along their land borders.

This circumstance conditioned the Chinese view of the outside

world. The Chinese saw their domain as the self-sufficient center of the universe and derived from this image the traditional (and

still used) Chinese name for their country—Zhongguo, literally,

Middle Kingdom or Central Nation. China saw itself surrounded on all sides by so-called barbarian peoples whose cultures were

demonstrably inferior by Chinese standards.

This China-centered ("sinocentric") view of the world was still undisturbed in the nineteenth century, at the time of the first seri- ous confrontation with the West. China had taken it for granted

that its relations with Europeans would be conducted according

to the tributary system that had evolved over the centuries between

the emperor and representatives of the lesser states on China's borders as well as between the emperor and some earlier European

visitors. But by the mid-nineteenth century, humiliated militarily

by superior Western weaponry and technology and faced with

imminent territorial dismemberment, China began to reassess its position with respect to Western civilization. By 1911 the twomillennia-old dynastic system of imperial government was brought

down by its inability to make this adjustment successfully.

Because of its length and complexity, the history of the Middle

Kingdom lends itself to varied interpretation. After the communist

takeover in 1949, historians in mainland China wrote their own

version of the past —a history of China built on a Marxist model

of progression from primitive communism to slavery, feudalism,

capitalism, and finally socialism. The events of history came to be

presented as a function of the class struggle. Historiography became

subordinated to proletarian politics fashioned and directed by the

Chinese Communist Party. A series of thought-reform and antirightist campaigns were directed against intellectuals in the arts, sciences, and academic community. The Cultural Revolution

(1966-76) further altered the objectivity of historians. In the years

after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, however, interest grew

within the party, and outside it as well, in restoring the integrity

of historical inquiry. This trend was consistent with the party's com- mitment to "seeking truth from facts." As a result, historians and

social scientists raised probing questions concerning the state of

4
Historical Setting

historiography in China. Their investigations ineluded not only

historical study of traditional China but penetrating inquiries into

modern Chinese history and the history of the Chinese Communist

Party. In post-Mao China, the discipline of historiography has not been

separated from politics, although a much greater range of historical topics has been discussed. Figures from Confucius—who was

bitterly excoriated for his "feudal" outlook by Cultural Revolutionera historians—to Mao himself have been evaluated with increasing

flexibility. Among the criticisms made by Chinese social scientists

is that Maoist-era historiography distorted Marxist and Leninist

interpretations. This meant that considerable revision of historical texts was in order in the 1980s, although no substantive change

away from the conventional Marxist approach was likely. Historical institutes were restored within the Chinese Academy of Social

Sciences, and a growing corps of trained historians, in institutes

and academia alike, returned to their work with the blessing of the

Chinese Communist Party. This in itself was a potentially signifi- cant development.

The Ancient Dynasties

Chinese civilization, as described in mythology, begins with

Pangu, the creator of the universe, and a succession of legendary

sage-emperors and culture heroes who taught the ancient Chinese

to communicate and to find sustenance, clothing, and shelter. The

first prehistoric dynasty is said to be Xia, from about the twentyfirst to the sixteenth century B.C. Until scientific excavations were made at early bronze-age sites at Anyang, Henan Province, in 1928,

it was difficult to separate myth from reality in regard to the Xia.

But since then, and especially in the 1960s and 1970s, archaeologists have uncovered urban sites, bronze implements, and tombs

that point to the existence of Xia civilization in the same locations

cited in ancient Chinese historical texts. At minimum, the Xia

period marked an evolutionary stage between the late neolithic cul- tures and the Chinese urban civilization typical of the Shang

dynasty.

The Dawn of History

Thousands of archaeological finds in the Huang He Valley

the apparent cradle of Chinese civilization —provide evidence about

the Shang dynasty, which endured roughly from 1700 to 1027 B.C.

The Shang dynasty (also called the Yin dynasty in its later stages)

is believed to have been founded by a rebel leader who overthrew

the last Xia ruler. Its civilization was based on agriculture,

5
China: A Country Study

augmented by hunting and animal husbandry. Two important

events of the period were the development of a writing system, as revealed in archaic Chinese inscriptions found on tortoise shells and flat cattle bones (commonly called oracle bones), and the use

of bronze metallurgy. A number of ceremonial bronze vessels with

inscriptions date from the Shang period; the workmanship on the

bronzes attests to a high level of civilization. A line of hereditary Shang kings ruled over much of northern

China, and Shang troops fought frequent wars with neighboring

settlements and nomadic herdsmen from the inner Asian steppes.

The capitals, one of which was at the site of the modern city of

Anyang, were centers of glittering court life. Court rituals to propiti- ate spirits and to honor sacred ancestors were highly developed.

In addition to his secular position, the king was the head of the ancestor- and spirit-worship cult. Evidence from the royal tombs

indicates that royal personages were buried with articles of value,

presumably for use in the afterlife. Perhaps for the same reason, hundreds of commoners, who may have been slaves, were buried

alive with the royal corpse. The Zhou Period

The last Shang ruler, a despot according to standard Chinese

accounts, was overthrown by a chieftain of a frontier tribe called Zhou, which had settled in the Wei Valley in modern Shaanxi

Province. The Zhou dynasty had its capital at Hao, near the city

of Xi'an, or Chang'an, as it was known in its heyday in the imperial

period. Sharing the language and culture of the Shang, the early

Zhou rulers, through conquest and colonization, gradually sini- cized, that is, extended Shang culture through much of China

Proper (see Glossary) north of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River).

The Zhou dynasty lasted longer than any other, from 1027 to 221 B.C. It was philosophers of this period who first enunciated

the doctrine of the "mandate of heaven" {tianming), the notion that the ruler (the "son of heaven") governed by divine right but that

his dethronement would prove that he had lost the mandate. The

doctrine explained and justified the demise of the two earlier

dynasties and at the same time supported the legitimacy of present

and future rulers. The termfeudal has often been applied to the Zhou period because

the Zhou's early decentralized rule invites comparison with medieval

rule in Europe. At most, however, the early Zhou system was protofeudal, being a more sophisticated version of earlier tribal organization, in which effective control depended more on familial ties than on feudal legal bonds. Whatever feudal elements there may

6
Historical Setting

have been deereased as time went on. The Zhou amalgam of city- states became progressively centralized and established increasingly

impersonal political and economic institutions. These developments,

which probably occurred in the latter Zhou period, were manifested

in greater central control over local governments and a more routinized agricultural taxation. In 771 B.C. the Zhou court was sacked, and its king was killed by

invading barbarians who were allied with rebel lords. The capital was moved eastward to Luoyang in present-day Henan Province.

Because of this shift, historians divide the Zhou era into Western

Zhou (1027-771 B.C.) and Eastern Zhou (770-221 B.C.). With

the royal line broken, the power of the Zhou court gradually

diminished; the fragmentation of the kingdom accelerated. Eastern

Zhou divides into two subperiods. The first, from 770 to 476 B.C.,

is called the Spring and Autumn Period, after a famous historical

chronicle of the time; the second is known as the Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.).

The Hundred Schools of Thought

The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, though

marked by disunity and civil strife, witnessed an unprecedented

era of cultural prosperity—the "golden age" of China. The atmosphere of reform and new ideas was attributed to the struggle for survival among warring regional lords who competed in building

strong and loyal armies and in increasing economic production to ensure a broader base for tax collection. To effect these economic,

military, and cultural developments, the regional lords needed ever- increasing numbers of skilled, literate officials and teachers, the

recruitment of whom was based on merit. Also during this time, commerce was stimulated through the introduction of coinage and

technological improvements. Iron came into general use, making

possible not only the forging of weapons of war but also the

manufacture of farm implements. Public works on a grand scale

such as flood control, irrigation projects, and canal digging—were

executed. Enormous walls were built around cities and along the

broad stretches of the northern frontier.

So many different philosophies developed during the late Spring

and Autumn and early Warring States periods that the era is often

known as that of the Hundred Schools of Thought. From the

Hundred Schools of Thought came many of the great classical writings on which Chinese practices were to be based for the next two

and one-half millennia. Many of the thinkers were itinerant

intellectuals who, besides teaching their disciples, were employed

7
China: A Country Study

as advisers to one or another of the various state rulers on the

methods of government, war, and diplomacy.

The body of thought that had the most enduring effect on subsequent Chinese life was that of the School of Literati (ru). often

called the Confucian school in the West. The written legacy of the

School of Literati is embodied in the Confucian Classics, which were to become the basis for the order of traditional society. Confucius (551-479 B.C.), also called Kong Zi, or Master Kong, looked

to the early days of Zhou rule for an ideal social and political order.

He believed that the only way such a system could be made to work

properly was for each person to act according to prescribed rela- tionships. "Let the ruler be a ruler and the subject a subject." he

said, but he added that to rule properly a king must be virtuous.

To Confucius, the functions of government and social stratifica- tion were facts of life to be sustained by ethical values. His ideal was the junzi (ruler's son), which came to mean gentleman in the sense of a cultivated or superior man.

Mencius (372-289 B.C.), or Meng Zi, was a Confucian disci- ple who made major contributions to the humanism of Confucian

thought. Mencius declared that man was by nature good. He

expostulated the idea that a ruler could not govern without the people's tacit consent and that the penalty for unpopular, despotic rule was the loss of the "mandate of heaven."

The effect of the combined work of Confucius, the codifier and

interpreter of a system of relationships based on ethical behavior,

and Mencius, the synthesizer and developer of applied Confucian

thought, was to provide traditional Chinese society with a comprehensive framework on which to order virtually every aspect of

life (see Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3; Culture and the

Arts, ch. 4). There were to be accretions to the corpus of Confucian thought,

both immediately and over the millennia, and from within and outside the Confucian school. Interpretations made to suit or influence

contemporary society made Confucianism dynamic while preserving

a fundamental system of model behavior based on ancient texts. Diametrically opposed to Mencius, for example, was the interpretation of Xun Zi (ca. 300-237 B.C.), another Confucian follower.

Xun Zi preached that man is innately selfish and evil and that goodness is attainable only through education and conduct befitting one's

status. He also argued that the best government is one based on

authoritarian control, not ethical or moral persuasion.

Xun Zi's unsentimental and authoritarian inclinations were

developed into the doctrine embodied in the School of Law

(fa), or Legalism. The doctrine was formulated by Han Fei

8
Confucius

Courtesy Library of Congress
China: A Country Study

(d. 233 B.C.) and Li Si (d. 208 B.C.), who maintained that human

nature was ineorrigibly selfish and therefore the only way to preserve

the social order was to impose discipline from above and to enforce

laws strictly. The Legalists exalted the state and sought its prosperity

and martial prowess above the welfare of the common people. Legalism became the philosophic basis for the imperial form of government. When the most practical and useful aspects of Confucianism

and Legalism were synthesized in the Han period (206 B.C.-

A.D. 220), a system of governance came into existence that was

to survive largely intact until the late nineteenth century. Taoism

(or Daoism in pinyin), the second most important stream of Chinese

thought, also developed during the Zhou period. Its formulation

is attributed to the legendary sage Lao Zi (Old Master), said to predate Confucius, and Zhuang Zi (369-286 B.C.). The focus of

Taoism is the individual in nature rather than the individual in society. It holds that the goal of life for each individual is to find one's own personal adjustment to the rhythm of the natural (and

supernatural) world, to follow the Way (dao) of the universe. In many ways the opposite of rigid Confucian moralism, Taoism

served many of its adherents as a complement to their ordered daily

lives. A scholar on duty as an official would usually follow Confucian teachings but at leisure or in retirement might seek harmony

with nature as a Taoist recluse. Another strain of thought dating to the Warring States Period

is the school ofyin-yang and the five elements. The theories of this school attempted to explain the universe in terms of basic forces

in nature, the complementary agents of yin (dark, cold, female,

negative) andyang (light, hot, male, positive) and the five elements

(water, fire, wood, metal, and earth). In later periods these theories came to have importance both in philosophy and in popular

belief.

Still another school of thought was based on the doctrine of Mo

Zi (470-391 B.C.?), or Mo Di. Mo Zi believed that "all men are equal before God" and that mankind should follow heaven by practicing universal love. Advocating that all action must be utilitarian,

Mo Zi condemned the Confucian emphasis on ritual and music.

He regarded warfare as wasteful and advocated pacificism. Mo Zi

also believed that unity of thought and action were necessary to achieve social goals. He maintained that the people should obey

their leaders and that the leaders should follow the will of heaven.

Although Moism failed to establish itself as a major school of

thought, its views are said to be "strongly echoed" in Legalist

thought. In general, the teachings of Mo Zi left an indelible

impression on the Chinese mind.

10
Historical Setting

The Imperial Era

The First Imperial Period

Much of what came to constitute China Proper was unified for the first time in 221 B.C. (see fig. 2). In that year the western frontier state of Qin, the most aggressive of the Warring States, subjugated the last of its rival states. {Qin in Wade-Giles romanization

is Ch'in, from which the English China probably derived.) Once

the king of Qin consolidated his power, he took the title Shi Huangdi

(First Emperor), a formulation previously reserved for deities and

the mythological sage-emperors, and imposed Qin's centralized,

nonhereditary bureaucratic system on his new empire. In subjugating the six other major states of Eastern Zhou, the Qin kings had

relied heavily on Legalist scholar- advisers. Centralization, achieved

by ruthless methods, was focused on standardizing legal codes and

bureaucratic procedures, the forms of writing and coinage, and

the pattern of thought and scholarship. To silence criticism of

imperial rule, the kings banished or put to death many dissenting

Confucian scholars and confiscated and burned their books. Qin

aggrandizement was aided by frequent military expeditions pushing forward the frontiers in the north and south. To fend off barbarian intrusion, the fortification walls built by the various warring

states were connected to make a 5,000-kilometer-long wall. (What

is commonly referred to as the Great Wall is actually four great

walls rebuilt or extended during the Western Han, Sui, Jin, and

Ming periods, rather than a single, continuous wall.) At its extremities, the Great Wall reaches from northeastern Heilongjiang

Province to northwestern Gansu. A number of public works projects were also undertaken to consolidate and strengthen imperial rule. These activities required enormous levies of manpower and

resources, not to mention repressive measures. Revolts broke out

as soon as the first Qin emperor died in 210 B.C. His dynasty was

extinguished less than twenty years after its triumph. The imperial

system initiated during the Qin dynasty, however, set a pattern

that was developed over the next two millennia.

After a short civil war, a new dynasty, called Han (206 B.C.-

A.D. 220), emerged with its capital at Chang'an. The new empire

retained much of the Qin administrative structure but retreated a bit from centralized rule by establishing vassal principalities in some areas for the sake of political convenience. The Han rulers modified some of the harsher aspects of the previous dynasty; Confucian ideals of government, out of favor during the Qin period, were adopted as the creed of the Han empire, and Confucian schol- ars gained prominent status as the core of the civil service. A civil

11
China: A Country Study

Source: Bast-don information from Chiao-min Hsich Alias of China, New York, 1973, 225, 2!58, 247, and 249.

Figure 2. The Chinese Empire, circa 220 B.C. , A.D. 700, 1580, and 1775

service examination system also was initiated. Intellectual, liter- ary, and artistic endeavors revived and flourished. The Han period

produced China's most famous historian, Sima Qian (145-87

B.C.?), whose Shiji (Historical Records) provides a detailed chronicle from the time of a legendary Xia emperor to that of the Han

emperor Wu Di (141-87 B.C.). Technological advances also marked this period. Two of the great Chinese inventions, paper

and porcelain, date from Han times.

The Han dynasty, after which the members of the ethnic majority

in China, the "people of Han," are named, was notable also for

its military prowess. The empire expanded westward as far as the

rim of the Tarim Basin (in modern Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous

Region), making possible relatively secure caravan traffic across Central Asia to Antioch, Baghdad, and Alexandria. The paths of

12
Historical Setting

caravan traffic are often called the "silk route" because the route was used to export Chinese silk to the Roman Empire. Chinese

armies also invaded and annexed parts of northern Vietnam and

northern Korea toward the end of the second century B.C. Han

control of peripheral regions was generally insecure, however. To

ensure peace with non-Chinese local powers, the Han court developed a mutually beneficial "tributary system." Non-Chinese states were allowed to remain autonomous in exchange for symbolic

acceptance of Han overlordship. Tributary ties were confirmed and

strengthened through intermarriages at the ruling level and periodic exchanges of gifts and goods.

After 200 years, Han rule was interrupted briefly (in A.D. 9-24

by Wang Mang, a reformer) and then restored for another 200

years. The Han rulers, however, were unable to adjust to what

centralization had wrought: a growing population, increasing wealth

and resultant financial difficulties and rivalries, and ever-more complex political institutions. Riddled with the corruption characteristic

of the dynastic cycle, by A.D. 220 the Han empire collapsed. Era of Disunity

The collapse of the Han dynasty was followed by nearly four

centuries of rule by warlords. The age of civil wars and disunity

began with the era of the Three Kingdoms (Wei, Shu, and Wu,

which had overlapping reigns during the period A.D. 220-80). In

later times, fiction and drama greatly romanticized the reputed

chivalry of this period. Unity was restored briefly in the early years

of the Jin dynasty (A.D. 265-420), but the Jin could not long contain the invasions of the nomadic peoples. In A.D. 317 the Jin court was forced to flee from Luoyang and reestablished itself at Nanjing

to the south. The transfer of the capital coincided with China's

political fragmentation into a succession of dynasties that was to

last from A.D. 304 to 589. During this period the process of siniciza- tion accelerated among the non-Chinese arrivals in the north and

among the aboriginal tribesmen in the south. This process was also accompanied by the increasing popularity of Buddhism (introduced

into China in the first century A.D.) in both north and south China.

Despite the political disunity of the times, there were notable technological advances. The invention of gunpowder (at that time for use only in fireworks) and the wheelbarrow is believed to date from

the sixth or seventh century. Advances in medicine, astronomy,

and cartography are also noted by historians.

Restoration of Empire

China was reunified in A.D. 589 by the short-lived Sui dynasty

(A.D. 581-617), which has often been compared to the earlier Qin

13
China: A Country Study

dynasty in tenure and the ruthlessness of its accomplishments. The

Sui dynasty's early demise was attributed to the government's tyrannical demands on the people, who bore the crushing burden of taxes and compulsory labor. These resources were overstrained in the

completion of the Grand Canal—a monumental engineering feat

and in the undertaking of other construction projects, including

the reconstruction of the Great Wall. Weakened by costly and disas- trous military campaigns against Korea in the early seventh century, the dynasty disintegrated through a combination of popular

revolts, disloyalty, and assassination.

The Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907), with its capital at Chang'an,

is regarded by historians as a high point in Chinese civilization

equal, or even superior, to the Han period. Its territory, acquired

through the military exploits of its early rulers, was greater than

that of the Han. Stimulated by contact with India and the Middle

East, the empire saw a flowering of creativity in many fields. Buddhism, originating in India around the time of Confucius, flourished

during the Tang period, becoming thoroughly sinicized and a per- manent part of Chinese traditional culture. Block printing was

invented, making the written word available to vastly greater audiences. The Tang period was the golden age of literature and art (see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). A government system supported

by a large class of Confucian literati selected through civil service

examinations was perfected under Tang rule. This competitive

procedure was designed to draw the best talents into government.

But perhaps an even greater consideration for the Tang rulers, aware that imperial dependence on powerful aristocratic families

and warlords would have destabilizing consequences, was to cre- ate a body of career officials having no autonomous territorial or

functional power base. As it turned out, these scholar-officials

acquired status in their local communities, family ties, and shared

values that connected them to the imperial court. From Tang times

until the closing days of the Qing empire in 1911, scholar-officials

functioned often as intermediaries between the grass-roots level and

the government.

By the middle of the eighth century A.D., Tang power had

ebbed. Domestic economic instability and military defeat in 751

by Arabs at Talas, in Central Asia, marked the beginning of five centuries of steady military decline for the Chinese empire. Misrule, court intrigues, economic exploitation, and popular rebellions

weakened the empire, making it possible for northern invaders to terminate the dynasty in 907. The next half-century saw the fragmentation of China into five northern dynasties and ten southern

kingdoms. But in 960 a new power, Song (960-1279), reunified

14
Partially excavated terra-cotta figures unearthed during the 1970s at the tomb of China's first emperor, Shi Huangdi, near XVan. Chinese archaeologists discovered over 9,000

warriors, horses, chariots, and associated artifacts in the tomb. Courtesy China Pictorial

most of China Proper. The Song period divides into two phases: Northern Song (960-1 127) and Southern Song (1 127-1279). The division was caused by the forced abandonment of north China in 1127 by

the Song court, which could not push back the nomadic invaders.

The founders of the Song dynasty built an effective centralized

bureaucracy staffed with civilian scholar-officials. Regional military governors and their supporters were replaced by centrally

appointed officials. This system of civilian rule led to a greater concentration of power in the emperor and his palace bureaucracy than

had been achieved in the previous dynasties.

The Song dynasty is notable for the development of cities not only for administrative purposes but also as centers of trade, industry, and maritime commerce. The landed scholar-officials, sometimes collectively referred to as the gentry, lived in the provincial

centers alongside the shopkeepers, artisans, and merchants. A new

group of wealthy commoners—the mercantile class—arose as printing and education spread, private trade grew, and a market econ- omy began to link the coastal provinces and the interior.

Landholding and government employment were no longer the only means of gaining wealth and prestige.

15
China: A Country Study

Culturally, the Song refined many of the developments of the

previous centuries. Included in these refinements were not only

the Tang ideal of the universal man, who combined the qualities

of scholar, poet, painter, and statesman, but also historical writings, painting, calligraphy, and hard-glazed porcelain. Song intel- lectuals sought answers to all philosophical and political questions

in the Confucian Classics. This renewed interest in the Confucian

ideals and society of ancient times coincided with the decline of

Buddhism, which the Chinese regarded as foreign and offering few

practical guidelines for the solution of political and other mundane

problems.

The Song Neo-Confucian philosophers, finding a certain purity

in the originality of the ancient classical texts, wrote commentaries on them. The most influential of these philosophers was Zhu Xi

(1130-1200), whose synthesis of Confucian thought and Buddhist,

Taoist, and other ideas became the official imperial ideology from

late Song times to the late nineteenth century. As incorporated into

the examination system, Zhu Xi's philosophy evolved into a rigid

official creed, which stressed the one-sided obligations of obedience

and compliance of subject to ruler, child to father, wife to husband,

and younger brother to elder brother. The effect was to inhibit the

societal development of premodern China, resulting both in many

generations of political, social, and spiritual stability and in a slow- ness of cultural and institutional change up to the nineteenth cen- tury (see Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Neo-Confucian

doctrines also came to play the dominant role in the intellectual

life of Korea, Vietnam, and Japan.

Mongolian Interlude

By the mid-thirteenth century, the Mongols had subjugated north

China, Korea, and the Muslim kingdoms of Central Asia and had

twice penetrated Europe. With the resources of his vast empire,

Kublai Khan (1215-94), a grandson of Genghis Khan (1167P-1227)

and the supreme leader of all Mongol tribes, began his drive against

the Southern Song. Even before the extinction of the Song dynasty,

Kublai Khan had established the first alien dynasty to rule all China—the Yuan (1279-1368).

Although the Mongols sought to govern China through traditional institutions, using Chinese (Han) bureaucrats, they were not up to the task. The Han were discriminated against socially and

politically. All important central and regional posts were monopolized by Mongols, who also preferred employing non-Chinese from

other parts of the Mongol domain—Central Asia, the Middle East,

and even Europe—in those positions for which no Mongol could

16
Historical Setting

be found. Chinese were more often employed in non-Chinese

regions of the empire.

As in other periods of alien dynastic rule of China, a rich cul- tural diversity developed during the Yuan dynasty. The major cul- tural achievements were the development of drama and the novel

and the increased use of the written vernacular. The Mongols'

extensive West Asian and European contacts produced a fair amount of cultural exchange. Western musical instruments were

introduced to enrich the Chinese performing arts. From this period

dates the conversion to Islam, by Muslims of Central Asia, of growing numbers of Chinese in the northwest and southwest. Nestorianism and Roman Catholicism also enjoyed a period of toleration.

Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) flourished, although native Taoism

endured Mongol persecutions. Confucian governmental practices

and examinations based on the Classics, which had fallen into dis- use in north China during the period of disunity, were reinstated

by the Mongols in the hope of maintaining order over Han society.

Advances were realized in the fields of travel literature, cartography and geography, and scientific education. Certain key Chinese

innovations, such as printing techniques, porcelain production,

playing cards, and medical literature, were introduced in Europe,

while the production of thin glass and cloisonne became popular

in China. The first records of travel by Westerners date from this time. The most famous traveler of the period was the Venetian

Marco Polo, whose account of his trip to "Cambaluc," the Great

Khan's capital (now Beijing), and of life there astounded the people of Europe. The Mongols undertook extensive public works.

Road and water communications were reorganized and improved.

To provide against possible famines, granaries were ordered built

throughout the empire. The city of Beijing was rebuilt with new

palace grounds that included artificial lakes, hills and mountains,

and parks. During the Yuan period, Beijing became the terminus

of the Grand Canal, which was completely renovated. These commercially oriented improvements encouraged overland as well as maritime commerce throughout Asia and facilitated the first direct

Chinese contacts with Europe. Chinese and Mongol travelers to the West were able to provide assistance in such areas as hydraulic

engineering, while bringing back to the Middle Kingdom new scientific discoveries and architectural innovations. Contacts with the

West also brought the introduction to China of a major new food

crop—sorghum—along with other foreign food products and methods of preparation.

17
China: A Country Study

The Chinese Regain Power

Rivalry among the Mongol imperial heirs, natural disasters, and numerous peasant uprisings led to the collapse of the Yuan dynasty.

The Ming dynasty (1368-1644) was founded by a Han Chinese

peasant and former Buddhist monk turned rebel army leader. Having its capital first at Nanjing (which means Southern Capital) and

later at Beijing (Northern Capital), the Ming reached the zenith

of power during the first quarter of the fifteenth century. The

Chinese armies reconquered Annam, as northern Vietnam was then

known, in Southeast Asia and kept back the Mongols, while the

Chinese fleet sailed the China seas and the Indian Ocean, cruising as far as the east coast of Africa. The maritime Asian nations

sent envoys with tribute for the Chinese emperor. Internally, the

Grand Canal was expanded to its farthest limits and proved to be

a stimulus to domestic trade.

The Ming maritime expeditions stopped rather suddenly after 1433, the date of the last voyage. Historians have given as one of

the reasons the great expense of large-scale expeditions at a time

of preoccupation with northern defenses against the Mongols.

Opposition at court also may have been a contributing factor, as conservative officials found the concept of expansion and commercial ventures alien to Chinese ideas of government. Pressure from

the powerful Neo-Confucian bureaucracy led to a revival of strict agrarian-centered society. The stability of the Ming dynasty, which was without major disruptions of the population (then around 100

million), economy, arts, society, or politics, promoted a belief

among the Chinese that they had achieved the most satisfactory

civilization on earth and that nothing foreign was needed or welcome.

Long wars with the Mongols, incursions by the Japanese into

Korea, and harassment of Chinese coastal cities by the Japanese

in the sixteenth century weakened Ming rule, which became, as

earlier Chinese dynasties had, ripe for an alien takeover. In 1644

the Manchus took Beijing from the north and became masters of

north China, establishing the last imperial dynasty, the Qing

(1644-1911).

The Rise of the Manchus

Although the Manchus were not Han Chinese and were strongly

resisted, especially in the south, they had assimilated a great deal

of Chinese culture before conquering China Proper. Realizing that

to dominate the empire they would have to do things the Chinese

way, the Manchus retained many institutions of Ming and earlier

18
Ming dynasty stone guardians near an inner

section of the Great Wall

northwest of Beijing

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

The Great Wall at Badaling,

northwest of Beijing. The

strategic section of the wall,

known as the "key to the gate to Beijing" was built during the Ming dynasty.

Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio
China: A Country Study

Chinese derivation. They eontinued the Confueian court practices

and temple rituals, over which the emperors had traditionally

presided.

The Manchus continued the Confucian civil service system.

Although Chinese were barred from the highest offices, Chinese

officials predominated over Manchu officeholders outside the capital, except in military positions. The Neo-Confucian philosophy,

emphasizing the obedience of subject to ruler, was enforced as the

state creed. The Manchu emperors also supported Chinese liter- ary and historical projects of enormous scope; the survival of much

of China's ancient literature is attributed to these projects.

Ever suspicious of Han Chinese, the Qing rulers put into effect measures aimed at preventing the absorption of the Manchus into

the dominant Han Chinese population. Han Chinese were prohibited from migrating into the Manchu homeland, and Manchus

were forbidden to engage in trade or manual labor. Intermarriage

between the two groups was forbidden. In many government

positions a system of dual appointments was used—the Chinese

appointee was required to do the substantive work and the Manchu

to ensure Han loyalty to Qing rule. The Qing regime was determined to protect itself not only from

internal rebellion but also from foreign invasion. After China Proper

had been subdued, the Manchus conquered Outer Mongolia (now

the Mongolian People's Republic) in the late seventeenth century.

In the eighteenth century, they gained control of Central Asia as

far as the Pamir Mountains and established a protectorate over

the area commonly known in the West as Tibet, but which the

Chinese call Xizang. The Qing thus became the first dynasty to eliminate successfully all danger to China Proper from across its land borders. Under Manchu rule the empire grew to include a

larger area than before or since; Taiwan, the last outpost of antiManchu resistance, was also incorporated into China for the first time. In addition, Qing emperors received tribute from the vari- ous border states. The chief threat to China's integrity did not come overland, as

it had so often in the past, but by sea, reaching the southern coastal area first. Western traders, missionaries, and soldiers of fortune

began to arrive in large numbers even before the Qing, in the six- teenth century. The empire's inability to evaluate correctly the

nature of the new challenge or to respond flexibly to it resulted

in the demise of the Qing and the collapse of the entire millenniaold framework of dynastic rule.

20
Historical Setting

Emergence of Modern China

The success of the Qing dynasty in maintaining the old order

proved a liability when the empire was confronted with growing

challenges from seafaring Western powers. The centuries of peace

and self-satisfaction dating back to Ming times had encouraged little change in the attitudes of the ruling elite. The imperial NeoConfucian scholars accepted as axiomatic the cultural superiority

of Chinese civilization and the position of the empire at the hub

of their perceived world. To question this assumption, to suggest

innovation, or to promote the adoption of foreign ideas was viewed

as tantamount to heresy. Imperial purges dealt severely with those

who deviated from orthodoxy.

By the nineteenth century, China was experiencing growing

internal pressures of economic origin. By the start of the century,

there were over 300 million Chinese, but there was no industry

or trade of sufficient scope to absorb the surplus labor. Moreover,

the scarcity of land led to widespread rural discontent and a breakdown in law and order. The weakening through corruption of the

bureaucratic and military systems and mounting urban pauperism

also contributed to these disturbances. Localized revolts erupted

in various parts of the empire in the early nineteenth century. Secret

societies, such as the White Lotus sect in the north and the Triad

Society in the south, gained ground, combining anti-Manchu subversion with banditry.

The Western Powers Arrive

As elsewhere in Asia, in China the Portuguese were the pioneers,

establishing a foothold at Macao (Aomen in pinyin), from which

they monopolized foreign trade at the Chinese port of Guangzhou

(Canton). Soon the Spanish arrived, followed by the British and

the French. Trade between China and the West was carried on

in the guise of tribute: foreigners were obliged to follow the elaborate, centuries-old ritual imposed on envoys from China's tributary states. There was no conception at the imperial court that the

Europeans would expect or deserve to be treated as cultural or

political equals. The sole exception was Russia, the most powerful

inland neighbor.

The Manchus were sensitive to the need for security along the

northern land frontier and therefore were prepared to be realistic in dealing with Russia. The Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) with the

Russians, drafted to bring to an end a series of border incidents

and to establish a border between Siberia and Manchuria (northeast China) along the Heilong Jiang (Amur River), was China's

21
China: A Country Study

first bilateral agreement with a European power. In 1727 the Treaty

of Kiakhta delimited the remainder of the eastern portion of the

Sino-Russian border. Western diplomatie efforts to expand trade on equal terms were rebuffed, the official Chinese assumption being

that the empire was not in need of foreign —and thus inferior

products. Despite this attitude, trade flourished, even though after 1760 all foreign trade was confined to Guangzhou, where the for- eign traders had to limit their dealings to a dozen officially licensed

Chinese merchant firms.

Trade was not the sole basis of contact with the West. Since the

thirteenth century, Roman Catholic missionaries had been attempting to establish their church in China. Although by 1800 only a few hundred thousand Chinese had been converted, the missionaries—mostly Jesuits—contributed greatly to Chinese knowledge

in such fields as cannon casting, calendar making, geography,

mathematics, cartography, music, art, and architecture. The Jesuits were especially adept at fitting Christianity into a Chinese framework and were condemned by a papal decision in 1704 for having

tolerated the continuance of Confucian ancestor rites among Christian converts. The papal decision quickly weakened the Christian

movement, which it proscribed as heterodox and disloyal.

The Opium War, 1839-42

During the eighteenth century, the market in Europe and

America for tea, a new drink in the West, expanded greatly.

Additionally, there was a continuing demand for Chinese silk and

porcelain. But China, still in its preindustrial stage, wanted little that the West had to offer, causing the Westerners, mostly British, to incur an unfavorable balance of trade. To remedy the situation, the foreigners developed a third-party trade, exchanging their

merchandise in India and Southeast Asia for raw materials and

semiprocessed goods, which found a ready market in Guangzhou.

By the early nineteenth century, raw cotton and opium from India

had become the staple British imports into China, in spite of the

fact that opium was prohibited entry by imperial decree. The opium

traffic was made possible through the connivance of profit-seeking

merchants and a corrupt bureaucracy.

In 1839 the Qing government, after a decade of unsuccessful

anti-opium campaigns, adopted drastic prohibitory laws against

the opium trade. The emperor dispatched a commissioner, Lin

Zexu (1785-1850), to Guangzhou to suppress illicit opium traffic. Lin seized illegal stocks of opium owned by Chinese dealers and

then detained the entire foreign community and confiscated and

destroyed some 20,000 chests of illicit British opium. The British

22
Historical Setting

retaliated with a punitive expedition, thus initiating the first AngloChinese war, better known as the Opium War (1839-42). Unprepared for war and grossly underestimating the capabilities of the

enemy, the Chinese were disastrously defeated, and their image

of their own imperial power was tarnished beyond repair. The

Treaty of Nanjing (1842), signed on board a British warship by

two Manchu imperial commissioners and the British plenipotentiary, was the first of a series of agreements with the Western trading

nations later called by the Chinese the "unequal treaties." Under

the Treaty of Nanjing, China ceded the island of Hong Kong

(Xianggang in pinyin) to the British; abolished the licensed monopoly system of trade; opened 5 ports to British residence and for- eign trade; limited the tariff on trade to 5 percent ad valorem;

granted British nationals extraterritoriality (exemption from Chinese

laws); and paid a large indemnity. In addition, Britain was to have

most-favored-nation treatment, that is, it would receive whatever

trading concessions the Chinese granted other powers then or later. The Treaty of Nanjing set the scope and character of an unequal

relationship for the ensuing century of what the Chinese would call "national humiliations." The treaty was followed by other incursions, wars, and treaties that granted new concessions and added new privileges for the foreigners.

The Taiping Rebellion, 1851-64

During the mid-nineteenth century, China's problems were com- pounded by natural calamities of unprecedented proportions,

including droughts, famines, and floods. Government neglect of

public works was in part responsible for this and other disasters,

and the Qing administration did little to relieve the widespread

misery caused by them. Economic tensions, military defeats at Western hands, and anti-Manchu sentiments all combined to produce widespread unrest, especially in the south. South China

had been the last area to yield to the Qing conquerors and the first to be exposed to Western influence. It provided a likely setting for the largest uprising in modern Chinese history—the Taiping

Rebellion.

The Taiping rebels were led by Hong Xiuquan (1814-64), a vil- lage teacher and unsuccessful imperial examination candidate.

Hong formulated an eclectic ideology combining the ideals of pre- Confucian utopianism with Protestant beliefs. He soon had a

following in the thousands who were heavily anti-Manchu and anti- establishment. Hong's followers formed a military organization to protect against bandits and recruited troops not only among

believers but also from among other armed peasant groups and

23
China: A Country Study

secret societies. In 1851 Hong Xiuquan and others launched an

uprising in Guizhou Province. Hong proclaimed the Heavenly

Kingdom of Great Peace (Taiping Tianguo, or Taiping for short)

with himself as king. The new order was to reconstitute a legendary ancient state in which the peasantry owned and tilled the land

in common; slavery, concubinage, arranged marriage, opium smoking, footbinding, judicial torture, and the worship of idols were

all to be eliminated. The Taiping tolerance of the esoteric rituals and quasi-religious societies of south China—themselves a threat

to Qing stability—and their relentless attacks on Confucianism—still widely accepted as the moral foundation of Chinese behavior

contributed to the ultimate defeat of the rebellion. Its advocacy of

radical social reforms alienated the Han Chinese scholar-gentry

class. The Taiping army, although it had captured Nanjing and

driven as far north as Tianjin, failed to establish stable base areas. The movement's leaders found themselves in a net of internal feuds,

defections, and corruption. Additionally, British and French forces,

being more willing to deal with the weak Qing administration than

contend with the uncertainties of a Taiping regime, came to the

assistance of the imperial army. Before the Chinese army succeeded

in crushing the revolt, however, 14 years had passed, and well over 30 million people were reported killed. To defeat the rebellion, the Qing court needed, besides Western

help, an army stronger and more popular than the demoralized

imperial forces. In 1860 scholar-official Zeng Guofan (1811-72),

from Hunan Province, was appointed imperial commissioner and

governor-general of the Taiping-controlled territories and placed

in command of the war against the rebels. Zeng's Hunan army,

created and paid for by local taxes, became a powerful new fighting force under the command of eminent scholar-generals. Zeng's

success gave new power to an emerging Han Chinese elite and

eroded Qing authority. Simultaneous uprisings in north China (the

Nian Rebellion) and southwest China (the Muslim Rebellion) fur- ther demonstrated Qing weakness.

The Self-Strengthening Movement

The rude realities of the Opium War, the unequal treaties, and

the mid-century mass uprisings caused Qing courtiers and officials to recognize the need to strengthen China. Chinese scholars and

officials had been examining and translating "Western learning"

since the 1840s. Under the direction of modern-thinking Han offi- cials, Western science and languages were studied, special schools were opened in the larger cities, and arsenals, factories, and shipyards were established according to Western models. Western

24
Ceremonial bronze tortoise incense burner known as Pei Xi,

a mythological river god, Hall of Supreme Harmony,

Forbidden City, Beijing

Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio

diplomatic practices were adopted by the Qing, and students were

sent abroad by the government and on individual or community

initiative in the hope that national regeneration could be achieved

through the application of Western practical methods.

Amid these activities came an attempt to arrest the dynastic

decline by restoring the traditional order. The effort was known

as the Tongzhi Restoration, named for the Tongzhi Emperor

(1862-74), and was engineered by the young emperor's mother,

the Empress Dowager Ci Xi (1835-1908). The restoration,

however, which applied "practical knowledge" while reaffirming

the old mentality, was not a genuine program of modernization.

The effort to graft Western technology onto Chinese institutions

became known as the Self-Strengthening Movement. The move- ment was championed by scholar-generals like Li Hongzhang

(1823-1901) and Zuo Zongtang (1812-85), who had fought with

the government forces in the Taiping Rebellion. From 1861 to 1894,

leaders such as these, now turned scholar-administrators, were

responsible for establishing modern institutions, developing basic

industries, communications, and transportation, and modernizing

the military. But despite its leaders' accomplishments, the Self- Strengthening Movement did not recognize the significance of the

25
China: A Country Study

political institutions and social theories that had fostered Western

advances and innovations. This weakness led to the movement's

failure. Modernization during this period would have been difficult under the best of circumstances. The bureaucracy was still deeply

influenced by Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. Chinese society was still reeling from the ravages of the Taiping and other rebellions, and

foreign encroachments continued to threaten the integrity of China.

The first step in the foreign powers' effort to carve up the empire was taken by Russia, which had been expanding into Central Asia.

By the 1850s, tsarist troops also had invaded the Heilong Jiang

watershed of Manchuria, from which their countrymen had been

ejected under the Treaty of Nerchinsk. The Russians used the

superior knowledge of China they had acquired through their

century-long residence in Beijing to further their aggrandizement.

In 1860 Russian diplomats secured the secession of all of Manchuria north of the Heilong Jiang and east of the Wusuli Jiang

(Ussuri River). Foreign encroachments increased after 1860 by means of a series of treaties imposed on China on one pretext or

another. The foreign stranglehold on the vital sectors of the Chinese

economy was reinforced through a lengthening list of concessions.

Foreign settlements in the treaty ports became extraterritorial

sovereign pockets of territories over which China had no jurisdiction. The safety of these foreign settlements was ensured by the

menacing presence of warships and gunboats.

At this time the foreign powers also took over the peripheral states that had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty and given tribute to the

emperor. France colonized Cochin China, as southern Vietnam

was then called, and by 1864 established a protectorate over Cambodia. Following a victorious war against China in 1884-85, France

also took Annam. Britain gained control over Burma. Russia

penetrated into Chinese Turkestan (modern-day Xinjiang-Uygur

Autonomous Region). Japan, having emerged from its centuryand-a-half-long seclusion and having gone through its own modernization movement, defeated China in the war of 1894-95. The

Treaty of Shimonoseki forced China to cede Taiwan and the Penghu

Islands to Japan, pay a huge indemnity, permit the establishment

ofJapanese industries in four treaty ports, and recognize Japanese

hegemony over Korea. In 1898 the British acquired a ninety-nineyear lease over the so-called New Territories of Kowloon (Jiulong

in pinyin), which increased the size of their Hong Kong colony.

Britain, Japan, Russia, Germany, France, and Belgium each gained

spheres of influence in China. The United States, which had not acquired any territorial cessions, proposed in 1899 that there be an "open door" policy in China, whereby all foreign countries

26
A Ming dynasty marble

huabiao or ornamental

column, just inside the Tiananmen Gate in Beijing

incorporates a dragon in half relief and is crested with a dragon resting in a lotus flower. The crosspieces are

stylized clouds. Courtesy Robert L. Worden

Empress Dowager

Ci Xi 's throne in the Palace of Gathering Excellence, Palace Museum, Beijing

Courtesy Beijing Slide Studio

27
China: A Country Study

would have equal duties and privileges in all treaty ports within

and outside the various spheres of influence. All but Russia agreed

to the United States overture. The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath

In the 103 days from June 1 1 to September 21, 1898, the Qing

emperor, Guangxu (1875-1908), ordered a series of reforms aimed

at making sweeping social and institutional changes. This effort reflected the thinking of a group of progressive scholar-reformers

who had impressed the court with the urgency of making innovations for the nation's survival. Influenced by the Japanese success with modernization, the reformers declared that China needed more

than "self-strengthening" and that innovation must be accompanied by institutional and ideological change.

The imperial edicts for reform covered a broad range of subjects, including stamping out corruption and remaking, among

other things, the academic and civil-service examination systems,

legal system, governmental structure, defense establishment, and

postal services. The edicts attempted to modernize agriculture,

medicine, and mining and to promote practical studies instead of

Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. The court also planned to send students

abroad for firsthand observation and technical studies. All these

changes were to be brought about under a de facto constitutional

monarchy.

Opposition to the reform was intense among the conservative

ruling elite, especially the Manchus, who, in condemning the

announced reform as too radical, proposed instead a more moderate and gradualist course of change. Supported by ultraconservatives and with the tacit support of the political opportunist Yuan

Shikai (1859-1916), Empress Dowager Ci Xi engineered a coup

d'etat on September 21, 1898, forcing the young reform-minded

Guangxu into seclusion. Ci Xi took over the government as regent.

The Hundred Days' Reform ended with the rescindment of the new edicts and the execution of six of the reform's chief advocates.

The two principal leaders, Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Liang

Qichao (1873-1929), fled abroad to found the Baohuang Hui (Protect the Emperor Society) and to work, unsuccessfully, for a constitutional monarchy in China.

The conservatives then gave clandestine backing to the antiforeign

and anti-Christian movement of secret societies known as Yihetuan

(Society of Righteousness and Harmony). The movement has been

better known in the West as the Boxers (from an earlier name

Yihequan, Righteousness and Harmony Boxers). In 1900 Boxer

bands spread over the north China countryside, burning missionary

28
Historical Setting

facilities and killing Chinese Christians. Finally, in June 1900, the

Boxers besieged the foreign concessions in Beijing and Tianjin, an

action that provoked an allied relief expedition by the offended

nations. The Qing declared war against the invaders, who easily

crushed their opposition and occupied north China. Under the Protocol of 1901, the court was made to consent to the execution of

ten high officials and the punishment of hundreds of others, expansion of the Legation Quarter, payment of war reparations, stationing of foreign troops in China, and razing of some Chinese

fortifications. In the decade that followed, the court belatedly put into effect some reform measures. These included the abolition of the moribund Confucian-based examination, educational and military

modernization patterned after the model ofJapan, and an experiment, if half-hearted, in constitutional and parliamentary government (see The Examination System, ch. 3). The suddenness and

ambitiousness of the reform effort actually hindered its success. One

effect, to be felt for decades to come, was the establishment of new

armies, which, in turn, gave rise to warlordism.

The Republican Revolution of 1911

Failure of reform from the top and the fiasco of the Boxer

Uprising convinced many Chinese that the only real solution lay

in outright revolution, in sweeping away the old order and erect- ing a new one patterned preferably after the example of Japan.

The revolutionary leader was Sun Yat-sen (Sun Yixian in pinyin,

1866-1925), a republican and anti-Qmg activist who became

increasingly popular among the overseas Chinese (see Glossary)

and Chinese students abroad, especially in Japan. In 1905 Sun

founded the Tongmeng Hui (United League) in Tokyo with Huang

Xing (1874-1916), a popular leader of the Chinese revolutionary

movement in Japan, as his deputy. This movement, generously

supported by overseas Chinese funds, also gained political support

with regional military officers and some of the reformers who had

fled China after the Hundred Days' Reform. Sun's political philosophy was conceptualized in 1897, first enunciated in Tokyo in 1905,

and modified through the early 1920s. It centered on the Three

Principles of the People (san min zhuyi); "nationalism, democracy,

and people's livelihood." The principle of nationalism called for overthrowing the Manchus and ending foreign hegemony over

China. The second principle, democracy, was used to describe Sun's

goal of a popularly elected republican form of government. People's livelihood, often referred to as socialism, was aimed at helping

29
China: A Country Study

the common people through regulation of the ownership of the means of production and land.

The republican revolution broke out on October 10, 1911, in Wuchang, the capital of Hubei Province, among discontented modernized army units whose anti-Qing plot had been uncovered. It had been preceded by numerous abortive uprisings and organized

protests inside China. The revolt quickly spread to neighboring

cities, and Tongmeng Hui members throughout the country rose

in immediate support of the Wuchang revolutionary forces. By late November, fifteen of the twenty-four provinces had declared their

independence of the Qing empire. A month later, Sun Yat-sen

returned to China from the United States, where he had been rais- ing funds among overseas Chinese and American sympathizers.

On January 1, 1912, Sun was inaugurated in Nanjing as the provisional president of the new Chinese republic. But power in Beijing already had passed to the commander-in-chief of the imperial

army, Yuan Shikai, the strongest regional military leader at the

time. To prevent civil war and possible foreign intervention from

undermining the infant republic, Sun agreed to Yuan's demand

that China be united under a Beijing government headed by Yuan.

On February 12, 1912, the last Manchu emperor, the child Puyi,

abdicated. On March 10, in Beijing, Yuan Shikai was sworn in as provisional president of the Republic of China.

Republican China

The republic that Sun Yat-sen and his associates envisioned

evolved slowly. The revolutionists lacked an army, and the power

of Yuan Shikai began to outstrip that of parliament. Yuan revised

the constitution at will and became dictatorial. In August 1912 a new political party was founded by Songjiaoren (1882-1913), one

of Sun's associates. The party, the Guomindang (Kuomintang or KMT—the National People's Party, frequently referred to as the

Nationalist Party), was an amalgamation of small political groups,

including Sun's Tongmeng Hui. In the national elections held in February 1913 for the new bicameral parliament, Song campaigned

against the Yuan administration, and his party won a majority of

seats. Yuan had Song assassinated in March; he had already

arranged the assassination of several pro-revolutionist generals. Animosity toward Yuan grew. In the summer of 1913 seven southern

provinces rebelled against Yuan. When the rebellion was suppressed, Sun and other instigators fled to Japan. In October 1913 an intimidated parliament formally elected Yuan president of the

Republic of China, and the major powers extended recognition

to his government. To achieve international recognition, Yuan

30
A pavilion at the Yeheyuan (Summer Palace), Beijing

Courtesy Rinn -Sup Shinn

Shikai had to agree to autonomy for Outer Mongolia and Xizang.

China was still to be suzerain, but it would have to allow Russia

a free hand in Outer Mongolia and Britain continuance of its influence in Xizang.

In November Yuan Shikai, legally president, ordered the Guomindang dissolved and its members removed from parliament.

Within a few months, he suspended parliament and the provincial

assemblies and forced the promulgation of a new constitution,

which, in effect, made him president for life. Yuan's ambitions

still were not satisfied, and, by the end of 1915, it was announced

that he would reestablish the monarchy. Widespread rebellions

ensued, and numerous provinces declared independence. With

opposition at every quarter and the nation breaking up into warlord

factions, Yuan Shikai died of natural causes in June 1916, deserted

by his lieutenants.

Nationalism and Communism

After Yuan Shikai 's death, shifting alliances of regional warlords

fought for control of the Beijing government. The nation also was

threatened from without by the Japanese. When World War I broke

out in 1914, Japan fought on the Allied side and seized German

holdings in Shandong Province. In 1915 the Japanese set before

the warlord government in Beijing the so-called Twenty-One

31
China: A Country Study

Demands, which would have made China a Japanese protectorate.

The Beijing government rejected some of these demands but yielded

to the Japanese insistence on keeping the Shandong territory already

in its possession. Beijing also recognized Tokyo's authority over

southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia. In 1917, in secret communiques, Britain, France, and Italy assented to the Japanese

claim in exchange for Japan's naval action against Germany.

In 1917 China declared war on Germany in the hope of recover- ing its lost province, then under Japanese control. But in 1918 the

Beijing government signed a secret deal with Japan accepting the

latter' s claim to Shandong. When the Paris peace conference of

1919 confirmed the Japanese claim to Shandong and Beijing's sell- out became public, internal reaction was shattering. On May 4,

1919, there were massive student demonstrations against the Beijing

government and Japan. The political fervor, student activism, and

iconoclastic and reformist intellectual currents set in motion by the

patriotic student protest developed into a national awakening known

as the May Fourth Movement. The intellectual milieu in which

the May Fourth Movement developed was known as the New Culture Movement and occupied the period from 1917 to 1923. The

student demonstrations of May 4, 1919 were the high point of the

New Culture Movement, and the terms are often used synonymously. Students returned from abroad advocating social and

political theories ranging from complete Westernization of China

to the socialism that one day would be adopted by China's communist rulers. Opposing the Warlords

The May Fourth Movement helped to rekindle the then-fading cause of republican revolution. In 1917 Sun Yat-sen had become

commander-in-chief of a rival military government in Guangzhou

in collaboration with southern warlords. In October 1919 Sun

reestablished the Guomindang to counter the government in Beijing. The latter, under a succession of warlords, still maintained

its facade of legitimacy and its relations with the West. By 1921

Sun had become president of the southern government. He spent

his remaining years trying to consolidate his regime and achieve

unity with the north. His efforts to obtain aid from the Western

democracies were ignored, however, and in 1921 he turned to the

Soviet Union, which had recently achieved its own revolution. The

Soviets sought to befriend the Chinese revolutionists by offering

scathing attacks on "Western imperialism." But for political

expediency, the Soviet leadership initiated a dual policy of support for both Sun and the newly established Chinese Communist

32
Historical Setting

Party (CCP). The Soviets hoped for consolidation but were pre- pared for either side to emerge victorious. In this way the struggle

for power in China began between the Nationalists and the Communists. In 1922 the Guomindang-warlord alliance in Guangzhou

was ruptured, and Sun fled to Shanghai. By then Sun saw the need

to seek Soviet support for his cause. In 1923 a joint statement by

Sun and a Soviet representative in Shanghai pledged Soviet assis- tance for China's national unification. Soviet advisers—the most

prominent of whom was an agent of the Comintern (see Glossary),

Mikhail Borodin —began to arrive in China in 1923 to aid in the

reorganization and consolidation of the Guomindang along the lines of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The CCP was under

Comintern instructions to cooperate with the Guomindang, and

its members were encouraged to join while maintaining their party

identities. The CCP was still small at the time, having a membership of 300 in 1922 and only 1,500 by 1925. The Guomindang in 1922 already had 150,000 members.

Soviet advisers also helped the Nationalists set up a political

institute to train propagandists in mass mobilization techniques and

in 1923 sent Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi in pinyin), one of Sun's

lieutenants from Tongmeng Hui days, for several months' military and political study in Moscow. After Chiang's return in late 1923, he participated in the establishment of the Whampoa

(Huangpu in pinyin) Military Academy outside Guangzhou, which was the seat of government under the Guomindang-CCP alliance. In 1924 Chiang became head of the academy and began the rise to prominence that would make him Sun's successor as head of

the Guomindang and the unifier of all China under the right-wing

nationalist government.

Sun Yat-sen died of cancer in Beijing in March 1925, but the

Nationalist movement he had helped to initiate was gaining momentum. During the summer of 1925, Chiang, as commander-in-chief

of the National Revolutionary Army, set out on the long-delayed

Northern Expedition against the northern warlords. Within nine

months, half of China had been conquered. By 1926, however,

the Guomindang had divided into left- and right-wing factions, and

the Communist bloc within it was also growing. In March 1926,

after thwarting a kidnapping attempt against him, Chiang abruptly

dismissed his Soviet advisers, imposed restrictions on CCP members' participation in the top leadership, and emerged as the pre- eminent Guomindang leader. The Soviet Union, still hoping to prevent a split between Chiang and the CCP, ordered Communist

underground activities to facilitate the Northern Expedition, which was finally launched by Chiang from Guangzhou in July 1926.

33
China: A Country Study

In early 1927 the Guomindang-CCP rivalry led to a split in the

revolutionary ranks. The CCP and the left wing of the Guomindang had decided to move the seat of the Nationalist government

from Guangzhou to Wuhan. But Chiang, whose Northern Expedition was proving successful, set his forces to destroying the Shanghai CCP apparatus and established an anti-Communist government

at Nanjing in April 1927. There now were three capitals in China:

the internationally recognized warlord regime in Beijing; the Communist and left-wing Guomindang regime at Wuhan; and the rightwing civilian-military regime at Nanjing, which would remain the

Nationalist capital for the next decade.

The Comintern cause appeared bankrupt. A new policy was

instituted calling on the CCP to foment armed insurrections in both

urban and rural areas in preparation for an expected rising tide

of revolution. Unsuccessful attempts were made by Communists

to take cities such as Nanchang, Changsha, Shantou, and Guangzhou, and an armed rural insurrection, known as the Autumn Harvest Uprising, was staged by peasants in Hunan Province. The

insurrection was led by Mao Zedong (1893-1976), who would later become chairman of the CCP and head of state of the People's

Republic of China. Mao was of peasant origins and was one of

the founders of the CCP.

But in mid-1927 the CCP was at a low ebb. The Communists

had been expelled from Wuhan by their left-wing Guomindang

allies, who in turn were toppled by a military regime. By 1928 all of China was at least nominally under Chiang's control, and the

Nanjing government received prompt international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China. The Nationalist government announced that in conformity with Sun Yat-sen's formula

for the three stages of revolution —military unification, political

tutelage, and constitutional democracy—China had reached the

end of the first phase and would embark on the second, which would

be under Guomindang direction.

Consolidation under the Guomindang

The decade of 1928-37 was one of consolidation and accomplishment by the Guomindang. Some of the harsh aspects of foreign

concessions and privileges in China were moderated through

diplomacy. The government acted energetically to modernize the

legal and penal systems, stabilize prices, amortize debts, reform

the banking and currency systems, build railroads and highways,

improve public health facilities, legislate against traffic in narcotics, and augment industrial and agricultural production. Great

strides also were made in education and, in an effort to help unify

34
The mausoleum of Sun Yat-sen in Nanjing

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

Chinese society, in a program to popularize the national language

and overcome dialectal variations. The widespread establishment

of communications facilities further encouraged a sense of unity

and pride among the people.

Rise of the Communists

There were forces at work during this period of progress that

would eventually undermine the Chiang Kai-shek government. The

first was the gradual rise of the Communists.

Mao Zedong, who had become a Marxist at the time of the emergence of the May Fourth Movement (he was working as a librarian

at Beijing University), had boundless faith in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. He advocated that revolution in China focus on them rather than on the urban proletariat, as prescribed by

orthodox Marxist-Leninist theoreticians. Despite the failure of the

Autumn Harvest Uprising of 1927, Mao continued to work among

the peasants of Hunan Province. Without waiting for the sanction

of the CCP center, then in Shanghai, he began establishing peasantbased Soviets (Communist-run local governments) along the border

between Hunan and Jiangxi provinces. In collaboration with mili- tary commander Zhu De (1886-1976), Mao turned the local peasants

into a politicized guerrilla force. By the winter of 1927-28, the combined "peasants' and workers' " army had some 10,000 troops.

35
China: A Country Study

Mao's prestige rose steadily alter the failure of the Cominterndirected urban insurrections. In late 1931 he was able to proclaim

the establishment of the Chinese Soviet Republic under his chairmanship in Ruijin, Jiangxi Province. The Soviet-oriented CCP

Political Bureau came to Ruijin at Mao's invitation with the intent

of dismantling his apparatus. But, although he had yet to gain membership in the Political Bureau, Mao dominated the proceedings.

In the early 1930s, amid continued Political Bureau opposition

to his military and agrarian policies and the deadly annihilation

campaigns being waged against the Red Army by Chiang Kaishek's forces, Mao's control of the Chinese Communist movement

increased. The epic Long March of his Red Army and its supporters, which began in October 1934, would ensure his place in his- tory. Forced to evacuate their camps and homes, Communist

soldiers and government and party leaders and functionaries numbering about 100,000 (including only 35 women, the spouses of

high leaders) set out on a circuitous retreat of some 12.500 kilo- meters through 11 provinces, 18 mountain ranges, and 24 rivers

in southwest and northwest China. During the Long March, Mao

finally gained unchallenged command of the CCP, ousting his rivals and reasserting guerrilla strategy. As a final destination, he selected southern Shaanxi Province, where some 8,000 survivors of the original group from Jiangxi Province (joined by some 22,000 from other

areas) arrived in October 1935. The Communists set up their headquarters at Yan'an, where the movement would grow rapidly for the next ten years. Contributing to this growth would be a combination of internal and external circumstances, of which aggression

by the Japanese was perhaps the most significant. Conflict with

Japan, which would continue from the 1930s to the end of World

War II, was the other force (besides the Communists themselves)

that would undermine the Nationalist government.

Anti-Japanese War

Few Chinese had any illusions about Japanese designs on China.

Hungry for raw materials and pressed by a growing population.

Japan initiated the seizure of Manchuria in September 1931 and

established ex-Qing emperor Puyi as head of the puppet regime

of Manchukuo in 1932. The loss of Manchuria, and its vast potential for industrial development and war industries, was a blow to the Nationalist economy. The League of Nations, established at the end of World War I, was unable to act in the face of the Japanese

defiance. The Japanese began to push from south of the Great Wall

into northern China and into the coastal provinces. Chinese fury

against Japan was predictable, but anger was also directed against

36
Historical Setting

the Guomindang government, which at the time was more pre- occupied with anti-Communist extermination campaigns than with

resisting the Japanese invaders. The importance of "internal unity

before external danger" was forcefully brought home in December 1936, when Nationalist troops (who had been ousted from Manchuria by the Japanese) mutinied at Xi'an. The mutineers forcibly

detained Chiang Kai-shek for several days until he agreed to cease

hostilities against the Communist forces in northwest China and

to assign Communist units combat duties in designated antiJapanese front areas. The Chinese resistance stiffened after July 7, 1937, when a clash

occurred between Chinese and Japanese troops outside Beijing (then

renamed Beiping) near the Marco Polo Bridge. This skirmish not

only marked the beginning of open, though undeclared, war

between China and Japan but also hastened the formal announce- ment of the second Guomindang-CCP united front against Japan.

The collaboration took place with salutary effects for the beleaguered

CCP. The distrust between the two parties, however, was scarcely

veiled. The uneasy alliance began to break down after late 1938,

despite Japan's steady territorial gains in northern China, the coastal regions, and the rich Chang Jiang Valley in central China. After

1940, conflicts between the Nationalists and Communists became more frequent in the areas not under Japanese control. The Communists expanded their influence wherever opportunities presented

themselves through mass organizations, administrative reforms,

and the land- and tax-reform measures favoring the peasants

while the Nationalists attempted to neutralize the spread of Communist influence.

At Yan'an and elsewhere in the "liberated areas," Mao was able

to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. He taught party

cadres to lead the masses by living and working with them, eating

their food, and thinking their thoughts. The Red Army fostered an image of conducting guerrilla warfare in defense of the people.

Communist troops adapted to changing wartime conditions and

became a seasoned fighting force. Mao also began preparing for the establishment of a new China. In 1940 he outlined the program of the Chinese Communists for an eventual seizure of power.

His teachings became the central tenets of the CCP doctrine that came to be formalized as Mao Zedong Thought. With skillful organizational and propaganda work, the Communists increased

party membership from 100,000 in 1937 to 1.2 million by 1945. In 1945 China emerged from the war nominally a great mili- tary power but actually a nation economically prostrate and on the

verge of all-out civil war. The economy deteriorated, sapped by

37
China: A Country Study

the military demands of foreign war and internal strife, by spiraling inflation, and by Nationalist profiteering, speculation, and

hoarding. Starvation came in the wake of the war, and millions were rendered homeless by floods and the unsettled conditions in many parts of the country. The situation was further complicated

by an Allied agreement at the Yalta Conference in February 1945

that brought Soviet troops into Manchuria to hasten the termination of war against Japan. Although the Chinese had not been

present at Yalta, they had been consulted; they had agreed to have

the Soviets enter the war in the belief that the Soviet Union would

deal only with the Nationalist government. After the war, the Soviet

Union, as part of the Yalta agreement, dismantled and removed more than half the industrial equipment left there by the Japanese.

The Soviet presence in northeast China enabled the Communists

to move in long enough to arm themselves with the equipment sur- rendered by the withdrawing Japanese army. The problems of

rehabilitating the formerly Japanese-occupied areas and of reconstructing the nation from the ravages of a protracted war were staggering, to say the least. Return to Civil War

During World War II, the United States emerged as a major

actor in Chinese affairs. As an ally it embarked in late 1941 on

a program of massive military and financial aid to the hard-pressed

Nationalist government. In January 1943 the United States and

Britain led the way in revising their treaties with China, bringing

to an end a century of unequal treaty relations. Within a few

months, a new agreement was signed between the United States and China for the stationing of American troops in China for the

common war effort against Japan. In December 1943 the Chinese

exclusion acts of the 1880s and subsequent laws enacted by the

United States Congress to restrict Chinese immigration into the

United States were repealed.

The wartime policy of the United States was initially to help

China become a strong ally and a stabilizing force in postwar East

Asia. As the conflict between the Nationalists and the Communists

intensified, however, the United States sought unsuccessfully to reconcile the rival forces for a more effective anti-Japanese war

effort. Toward the end of the war, United States Marines were

used to hold Beiping and Tianjin against a possible Soviet incursion, and logistic support was given to Nationalist forces in north

and northeast China.

Through the mediatory influence of the United States a mili- tary truce was arranged in January 1946, but battles between

38
Historical Setting

Nationalists and Communists soon resumed. Realizing that American efforts short of large-scale armed intervention could not stop

the war, the United States withdrew the American mission, headed

by General George C. Marshall, in early 1947. The civil war, in which the United States aided the Nationalists with massive eco- nomic loans but no military support, became more widespread.

Battles raged not only for territories but also for the allegiance of

cross sections of the population.

Belatedly, the Nationalist government sought to enlist popular

support through internal reforms. The effort was in vain, however,

because of the rampant corruption in government and the accompanying political and economic chaos. By late 1948 the Nationalist position was bleak. The demoralized and undisciplined

Nationalist troops proved no match for the People's Liberation

Army (PLA). The Communists were well established in the north

and northeast. Although the Nationalists had an advantage in numbers of men and weapons, controlled a much larger territory and

population than their adversaries, and enjoyed considerable international support, they were exhausted by the long war with Japan

and the attendant internal responsibilities. In January 1949 Beiping was taken by the Communists without a fight, and its name

was changed back to Beijing. Between April and November, major

cities passed from Guomindang to Communist control with minimal

resistance. In most cases the surrounding countryside and small

towns had come under Communist influence long before the cities. After Chiang Kai-shek and a few hundred thousand Nationalist

troops fled from the mainland to the island of Taiwan, there

remained only isolated pockets of resistance. In December 1949

Chiang proclaimed Taipei, Taiwan, the temporary capital of

China.

The People's Republic of China

On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was for- mally established, with its national capital at Beijing. "The Chinese

people have stood up!" declared Mao as he announced the creation of a "people's democratic dictatorship." The people were

defined as a coalition of four social classes: the workers, the peasants,

the petite bourgeoisie, and the national-capitalists. The four classes were to be led by the CCP, as the vanguard of the working class. At that time the CCP claimed a membership of 4.5 million, of which

members of peasant origin accounted for nearly 90 percent. The

party was under Mao's chairmanship, and the government was

headed by Zhou Enlai (1898-1976) as premier of the State Administrative Council (the predecessor of the State Council).

39
China: A Country Study

The Soviet Union recognized the People's Republic on October 2, 1949. Earlier in the year, Mao had proclaimed his policv

of "leaning to one side" as a commitment to the socialist bloc. In February 1950, after months of hard bargaining. China and

the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and

Mutual Assistance, valid until 1980. The pact also was intended

to counter Japan or any power's joining Japan for the purpose of

aggression.

For the first time in decades a Chinese government was met with

peace, instead of massive military opposition, within its territory.

The new leadership was highly disciplined and. having a decade

of wartime administrative experience to draw on, was able to embark on a program of national integration and reform. In the

first year of Communist administration, moderate social and eco- nomic policies were implemented with skill and effectiveness. The

leadership realized that the overwhelming and multitudinous task

of economic reconstruction and achievement of political and social

stability required the goodwill and cooperation of all classes of people. Results were impressive by any standard, and popular support was widespread.

By 1950 international recognition of the Communist government

had increased considerably, but it was slowed by China's involvement in the Korean War. In October 1950, sensing a threat to the

industrial heartland in northeast China from the advancing United

Nations (UN) forces in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

(North Korea), units of the PLA—calling themselves the Chinese

People's Volunteers—crossed the Yalu Jiang River into North

Korea in response to a North Korean request for aid. Almost simultaneously the PLA forces also marched into Xizang to reassert Chinese sovereignty over a region that had been in effect independent of Chinese rule since the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. In 1951 the UN declared China to be an aggressor in Korea and

sanctioned a global embargo on the shipment of arms and war

materiel to China. This step foreclosed for the time being any possibility that the People's Republic might replace Nationalist China

(on Taiwan) as a member of the UN and as a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council.

After China entered the Korean War, the initial moderation in Chinese domestic policies gave way to a massive campaign against

the "enemies of the state," actual and potential. These enemies

consisted of "war criminals, traitors, bureaucratic capitalists, and

counterrevolutionaries." The campaign was combined with partysponsored trials attended by huge numbers of people. The major

targets in this drive were foreigners and Christian missionaries who

40
Historical Setting

were branded as United States agents at these mass trials. The

1951-52 drive against political enemies was accompanied by land

reform, which had actually begun under the Agrarian Reform Law

of June 28, 1950. The redistribution of land was accelerated, and

a class struggle (see Glossary) against landlords and wealthy peasants was launched. An ideological reform campaign requiring self- criticisms and public confessions by university faculty members,

scientists, and other professional workers was given wide publicity.

Artists and writers were soon the objects of similar treatment for

failing to heed Mao's dictum that culture and literature must reflect the class interest of the working people, led by the CCP. These

campaigns were accompanied in 1951 and 1952 by the san fan

("three anti") and wu fan ("five anti") movements. The former was directed ostensibly against the evils of "corruption, waste, and

bureaucratism"; its real aim was to eliminate incompetent and

politically unreliable public officials and to bring about an efficient,

disciplined, and responsive bureaucratic system. The wufan move- ment aimed at eliminating recalcitrant and corrupt businessmen

and industrialists, who were in effect the targets of the CCP's con- demnation of "tax evasion, bribery, cheating in government contracts, thefts of economic intelligence, and stealing of state assets." In the course of this campaign the party claimed to have uncovered

a well-organized attempt by businessmen and industrialists to cor- rupt party and government officials. This charge was enlarged into an assault on the bourgeoisie as a whole. The number of people

affected by the various punitive or reform campaigns was estimated

in the millions.

The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57

The period of officially designated "transition to socialism" cor- responded to China's First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). The period was characterized by efforts to achieve industrialization, collectiviza- tion of agriculture, and political centralization.

The First Five-Year Plan stressed the development of heavy

industry on the Soviet model. Soviet economic and technical assis- tance was expected to play a significant part in the implementation of the plan, and technical agreements were signed with the

Soviets in 1953 and 1954. For the purpose of economic planning,

the first modern census was taken in 1953; the population of mainland China was shown to be 583 million, a figure far greater than

had been anticipated.

Among China's most pressing needs in the early 1950s were food

for its burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and

purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and

41
China: A Country Study

military hardware. To satisfy these needs, the government began

to collectivize agriculture. Despite internal disagreement as to the

speed of collectivization, which at least for the time being was

resolved in Mao's favor, preliminary collectivization was 90 per- cent completed by the end of 1956. In addition, the government

nationalized banking, industry, and trade. Private enterprise in mainland China was virtually abolished.

Major political developments included the centralization of party

and government administration. Elections were held in 1953 for delegates to the First National People's Congress, China's national

legislature, which met in 1954. The congress promulgated the state constitution of 1954 and formally elected Mao chairman (or president) of the People's Republic; it elected Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969)

chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and named Zhou Enlai premier of the new State Council.

In the midst of these major governmental changes, and helping

to precipitate them, was a power struggle within the CCP leading

to the 1954 purge of Political Bureau member Gao Gang and Party

Organization Department head Rao Shushi, who were accused of

illicitly trying to seize control of the party.

The process of national integration also was characterized by

improvements in party organization under the administrative direction of the secretary general of the party, Deng Xiaoping (who

served concurrently as vice premier of the State Council). There

was a marked emphasis on recruiting intellectuals, who by 1956

constituted nearly 12 percent of the party's 10.8 million members.

Peasant membership had decreased to 69 percent, while there was

an increasing number of "experts" (see Glossary), who were needed

for the party and governmental infrastructures, in the party ranks.

As part of the effort to encourage the participation of intellectuals

in the new regime, in mid- 1956 there began an official effort to liberalize the political climate (see Policy Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). Cultural and intellectual figures were encouraged to speak

their minds on the state of CCP rule and programs. Mao personally

took the lead in the movement, which was launched under the classical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools

of thought contend." At first the party's repeated invitation to air constructive views freely and openly was met with caution. By

mid- 195 7, however, the movement unexpectedly mounted, bringing

denunciation and criticism against the party in general and the

excesses of its cadres in particular. Startled and embarrassed, leaders

turned on the critics as "bourgeois rightists" and launched the AntiRightist Campaign. The Hundred Flowers Campaign (see Glossary),

42
Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong in 1957

Courtesy China Pictorial

sometimes called the Double Hundred Campaign, apparently had

a sobering effect on the CCP leadership.

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60

The antirightist drive was followed by a militant approach toward

economic development. In 1958 the CCP launched the Great Leap

Forward campaign under the new "General Line for Socialist Construction." The Great Leap Forward was aimed at accomplishing

the economic and technical development of the country at a vastly

faster pace and with greater results. The shift to the left that the new "General Line" represented was brought on by a combination of domestic and external factors. Although the party leaders

appeared generally satisfied with the accomplishments of the First

Five-Year Plan, they—Mao and his fellow radicals in particular

believed that more could be achieved in the Second Five-Year Plan

(1958-62) if the people could be ideologically aroused and if domestic resources could be utilized more efficiently for the simultaneous

development of industry and agriculture. These assumptions led

the party to an intensified mobilization of the peasantry and mass

organizations, stepped-up ideological guidance and indoctrination

of technical experts, and efforts to build a more responsive politi- cal system. The last of these undertakings was to be accomplished

through a new xiafang (down to the countryside) movement, under

43
China: A Country Study

which cadres inside and outside the party would be sent to factories, communes, mines, and public works projects for manual labor

and firsthand familiarization with grass-roots conditions. Although

evidence is sketchy, Mao's decision to embark on the Great Leap

Forward was based in part on his uncertainty about the Soviet policy

of economic, financial, and technical assistance to China. That

policy, in Mao's view, not only fell far short of his expectations

and needs but also made him wary of the political and economic

dependence in which China might find itself (see Sino-Soviet

Relations, ch. 12).

The Great Leap Forward centered on a new socioeconomic and

political system created in the countryside and in a few urban

areas—the people's communes (see Glossary). By the fall of 1958, some 750,000 agricultural producers' cooperatives, now designated

as production brigades, had been amalgamated into about 23,500

communes, each averaging 5,000 households, or 22,000 people.

The individual commune was placed in control of all the means

of production and was to operate as the sole accounting unit; it was subdivided into production brigades (generally coterminous

with traditional villages) and production teams. Each commune

was planned as a self-supporting community for agriculture, smallscale local industry (for example, the famous backyard pig-iron fur- naces), schooling, marketing, administration, and local security

(maintained by militia organizations). Organized along paramilitary and laborsaving lines, the commune had communal kitchens, mess halls, and nurseries. In a way, the people's communes constituted a fundamental attack on the institution of the family,

especially in a few model areas where radical experiments in com- munal living—large dormitories in place of the traditional nuclearfamily housing—occurred. (These were quickly dropped.) The

system also was based on the assumption that it would release

additional manpower for such major projects as irrigation works

and hydroelectric dams, which were seen as integral parts of the

plan for the simultaneous development of industry and agriculture

(see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). The Great Leap Forward was an economic failure. In early 1959,

amid signs of rising popular restiveness, the CCP admitted that

the favorable production report for 1958 had been exaggerated.

Among the Great Leap Forward's economic consequences were

a shortage of food (in which natural disasters also played a part);

shortages of raw materials for industry; overproduction of poorquality goods; deterioration of industrial plants through mismanagement; and exhaustion and demoralization of the peasantry and of

the intellectuals, not to mention the party and government cadres

44
Historical Setting

at all levels. Throughout 1959 efforts to modify the administration of the communes got under way; these were intended partly

to restore some material incentives to the production brigades and

teams, partly to decentralize control, and partly to house families

that had been reunited as household units.

Political consequences were not inconsiderable. In April 1959

Mao, who bore the chief responsibility for the Great Leap For- ward fiasco, stepped down from his position as chairman of the

People's Republic. The National People's Congress elected Liu

Shaoqi as Mao's successor, though Mao remained chairman of the

CCP. Moreover, Mao's Great Leap Forward policy came under

open criticism at a party conference at Lushan, Jiangxi Province.

The attack was led by Minister of National Defense Peng Dehuai,

who had become troubled by the potentially adverse effect Mao's

policies would have on the modernization of the armed forces. Peng

argued that "putting politics in command" was no substitute for economic laws and realistic economic policy; unnamed party leaders were also admonished for trying to "jump into communism in one

step." After the Lushan showdown, Peng Dehuai, who allegedly

had been encouraged by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to oppose

Mao, was deposed. Peng was replaced by Lin Biao, a radical and

opportunist Maoist. The new defense minister initiated a systematic

purge of Peng's supporters from the military.

Militancy on the domestic front was echoed in external policies

(see Evolution of Foreign Policy, ch. 12). The "soft" foreign policy

based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (see Glossary)

to which China had subscribed in the mid-1950s gave way to a "hard" line in 1958. From August through October of that year,

the Chinese resumed a massive artillery bombardment of the

Nationalist-held offshore islands of Jinmen (Chin-men in WadeGiles, but often referred to as Kinmen or Quemoy) and Mazu

(Ma-tsu in Wade-Giles). This was accompanied by an aggressive

propaganda assault on the United States and a declaration of intent

to "liberate" Taiwan.

Chinese control over Xizang had been reasserted in 1950. The

socialist revolution that took place thereafter increasingly became

a process of sinicization for the Tibetans. Tension culminated in a revolt in 1958-59 and the flight to India by the Dalai Lama, the

Tibetans' spiritual and de facto temporal leader. Relations with

India—where sympathy for the rebels was aroused—deteriorated

as thousands of Tibetan refugees crossed the Indian border. There

were several border incidents in 1959, and a brief Sino-Indian

border war erupted in October 1962 as China laid claim to Aksai

Chin, nearly 103,600 square kilometers of territory that India

45
China: A Country Study

regarded as its own (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). The Soviet

Union gave India its moral support in the dispute, thus contributing to the growing tension between Beijing and Moscow.

The Sino-Soviet dispute of the late 1950s was the most important development in Chinese foreign relations. The Soviet Union

had been China's principal benefactor and ally, but relations

between the two were cooling. The Soviet agreement in late 1957

to help China produce its own nuclear weapons and missiles was

terminated by mid- 1959 (see Defense Industry and the Economic

Role of the People's Liberation Army, ch. 14). From that point

until the mid-1960s, the Soviets recalled all of their technicians and

advisers from China and reduced or canceled economic and technical aid to China. The discord was occasioned by several factors. The two countries differed in their interpretation of the nature of

"peaceful coexistence." The Chinese took a more militant and

unyielding position on the issue of anti-imperialist struggle, but

the Soviets were unwilling, for example, to give their support on

the Taiwan question. In addition, the two communist powers dis- agreed on doctrinal matters. The Chinese accused the Soviets of

"revisionism' '

; the latter countered with charges of "dogmatism /

Rivalry within the international communist movement also exacer- bated Sino-Soviet relations. An additional complication was the

history of suspicion each side had toward the other, especially the

Chinese, who had lost a substantial part of territory to tsarist Russia in the mid-nineteenth century. Whatever the causes of the dis- pute, the Soviet suspension of aid was a blow to the Chinese scheme

for developing industrial and high-level (including nuclear) technology.

Readjustment and Recovery, 1961-65

In 1961 the political tide at home began to swing to the right, as evidenced by the ascendancy of a more moderate leadership. In an effort to stabilize the economic front, for example, the party

still under Mao's titular leadership but under the dominant

influence of Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Peng Zhen,

Bo Yibo, and others—initiated a series of corrective measures. Among these measures was the reorganization of the commune sys- tem, with the result that production brigades and teams had more

say in their own administrative and economic planning. To gain more effective control from the center, the CCP reestablished its six regional bureaus and initiated steps aimed at tightening party

discipline and encouraging the leading party cadres to develop

populist-style leadership at all levels. The efforts were prompted

by the party's realization that the arrogance of party and government

46
Historical Setting

functionaries had engendered only public apathy. On the industrial front, much emphasis was now placed on realistic and effi- cient planning; ideological fervor and mass movements were no

longer the controlling themes of industrial management. Production authority was restored to factory managers. Another notable

emphasis after 1961 was the party's greater interest in strengthening the defense and internal security establishment. By early 1965

the country was well on its way to recovery under the direction

of the party apparatus, or, to be more specific, the Central Committee's Secretariat headed by Secretary General Deng Xiaoping.

The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76

In the early 1960s, Mao was on the political sidelines and in semiseclusion. By 1962, however, he began an offensive to purify the

party, having grown increasingly uneasy about what he believed were the creeping "capitalist" and antisocialist tendencies in the

country. As a hardened veteran revolutionary who had overcome

the severest adversities, Mao continued to believe that the material

incentives that had been restored to the peasants and others were

corrupting the masses and were counterrevolutionary.

To arrest the so-called capitalist trend, Mao launched the Socialist Education Movement (1962-65; see Glossary), in which the primary

emphasis was on restoring ideological purity, reinfusing revolutionary fervor into the party and government bureaucracies, and

intensifying class struggle. There were internal disagreements,

however, not on the aim of the movement but on the methods of

carrying it out. Opposition came mainly from the moderates

represented by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, who were unsympathetic to Mao's policies. The Socialist Education Movement was

soon paired with another Mao campaign, the theme of which was

"to learn from the People's Liberation Army." Minister of National

Defense Lin Biao's rise to the center of power was increasingly conspicuous. It was accompanied by his call on the PLA and the CCP

to accentuate Maoist thought as the guiding principle for the

Socialist Education Movement and for all revolutionary undertakings in China.

In connection with the Socialist Education Movement, a thorough

reform of the school system, which had been planned earlier to coincide with the Great Leap Forward, went into effect. The reform was intended as a work-study program—a new xiafang movement

in which schooling was slated to accommodate the work schedule

of communes and factories. It had the dual purpose of providing mass education less expensively than previously and of re-educating

intellectuals and scholars to accept the need for their own

47
China: A Country Study

participation in manual labor. The drafting of intellectuals for manual labor was part of the party's rectification campaign, publicized through the mass media as an effort to remove "bourgeois"

influences from professional workers—particularly, their tendency

to have greater regard for their own specialized fields than for the

goals of the party. Official propaganda accused them of being more

concerned with having "expertise" than being "red" (see Glossary).

The Militant Phase, 1966-68

By mid- 1965 Mao had gradually but systematically regained control of the party with the support of Lin Biao, Jiang Qing (Mao's

fourth wife), and Chen Boda, a leading theoretician. In late 1965

a leading member of Mao's "Shanghai Mafia," Yao Wenyuan,

wrote a thinly veiled attack on the deputy mayor of Beijing, Wu

Han. In the next six months, under the guise of upholding ideological purity, Mao and his supporters purged or attacked a wide

variety of public figures, including State Chairman Liu Shaoqi and

other party and state leaders. By mid- 1966 Mao's campaign had

erupted into what came to be known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the first mass action to have emerged against the

CCP apparatus itself. Considerable intraparty opposition to the Cultural Revolution was evident. On the one side was the Mao-Lin Biao group, supported by the PLA; on the other side was a faction led by Liu Shaoqi

and Deng Xiaoping, which had its strength in the regular party

machine. Premier Zhou Enlai, while remaining personally loyal

to Mao, tried to mediate or to reconcile the two factions.

Mao felt that he could no longer depend on the formal party

organization, convinced that it had been permeated with the

"capitalist" and bourgeois obstructionists. He turned to Lin Biao

and the PLA to counteract the influence of those who were allegedly " 'left' in form but 'right' in essence." The PLA was widely

extolled as a "great school" for the training of a new generation

of revolutionary fighters and leaders. Maoists also turned to middleschool students for political demonstrations on their behalf. These

students, joined also by some university students, came to be known

as the Red Guards (see Glossary). Millions of Red Guards were

encouraged by the Cultural Revolution group to become a "shock

force" and to "bombard" with criticism both the regular party

headquarters in Beijing and those at the regional and provincial

levels. Red Guard activities were promoted as a reflection of Mao's

policy of rekindling revolutionary enthusiasm and destroying "outdated," "counterrevolutionary" symbols and values. Mao's ideas,

48
Historical Setting

popularized in the Quotations from Chairman Mao, became the stan- dard by which all revolutionary efforts were to be judged. The "four

big rights" —speaking out freely, airing views fully, holding great

debates, and writing big-character posters (see Glossary)—became

an important factor in encouraging Mao's youthful followers to criti- cize his intraparty rivals. The "four big rights" became such a major

feature during the period that they were later institutionalized in the state constitution of 1975 (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). The result of the unfettered criticism of established organs of control by China's exuberant youth was massive civil disorder, punctuated also by clashes among rival Red Guard gangs and between

the gangs and local security authorities. The party organization was

shattered from top to bottom. (The Central Committee's Secretariat

ceased functioning in late 1966.) The resources of the public security organs were severely strained. Faced with imminent anarchy,

the PLA—the only organization whose ranks for the most part had

not been radicalized by Red Guard-style activities—emerged as the

principal guarantor of law and order and the de facto political

authority. And, although the PLA was under Mao's rallying call to "support the left," PLA regional military commanders ordered

their forces to restrain the leftist radicals, thus restoring order

throughout much of China. The PLA also was responsible for the

appearance in early 1967 of the revolutionary committees, a new

form of local control that replaced local party committees and administrative bodies. The revolutionary committees were staffed with Cultural Revolution activists, trusted cadres, and military commanders,

the latter frequently holding the greatest power.

The radical tide receded somewhat beginning in late 1967, but

it was not until after mid- 1968 that Mao came to realize the uselessness of further revolutionary violence. Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and their fellow "revisionists" and "capitalist roaders" had

been purged from public life by early 1967, and the Maoist group

had since been in full command of the political scene. Viewed in larger perspective, the need for domestic calm and

stability was occasioned perhaps even more by pressures emanating from outside China. The Chinese were alarmed in 1966-68

by steady Soviet military buildups along their common border. The

Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 heightened Chinese

apprehensions. In March 1969 Chinese and Soviet troops clashed on Zhenbao Island (known to the Soviets as Damanskiy Island)

in the disputed Wusuli Jiang (Ussuri River) border area. The ten- sion on the border had a sobering effect on the fractious Chinese

political scene and provided the regime with a new and unifying

rallying call (see The Soviet Union, ch. 14).

49
China: A Country Study

The Ninth National Party Congress to the Demise of Lin Biao,

1969-71

The activist phase of the Cultural Revolution—considered to be

the first in a series of cultural revolutions—was brought to an end

in April 1969. This end was formally signaled at the CCP's Ninth

National Party Congress, which convened under the dominance

of the Maoist group. Mao was confirmed as the supreme leader.

Lin Biao was promoted to the post of CCP vice chairman and was named as Mao's successor. Others who had risen to power by means

of Cultural Revolution machinations were rewarded with positions on the Political Bureau; a significant number of military commanders were appointed to the Central Committee. The party congress also marked the rising influence of two opposing forces, Mao's

wife, Jiang Qing, and Premier Zhou Enlai.

The general emphasis after 1969 was on reconstruction through

rebuilding of the party, economic stabilization, and greater sensitivity to foreign affairs. Pragmatism gained momentum as a central theme of the years following the Ninth National Party Congress,

but this tendency was paralleled by efforts of the radical group to reassert itself. The radical group—Kang Sheng, Xie Fuzhi, Jiang

Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen

no longer had Mao's unqualified support. By 1970 Mao viewed

his role more as that of the supreme elder statesman than of an

activist in the policy-making process. This was probably the result as much of his declining health as of his view that a stabilizing

influence should be brought to bear on a divided nation. As Mao

saw it, China needed both pragmatism and revolutionary enthusiasm, each acting as a check on the other. Factional infighting

would continue unabated through the mid-1970s, although an uneasy coexistence was maintained while Mao was alive. The rebuilding of the CCP got under way in 1969. The process was difficult, however, given the pervasiveness of factional tensions

and the discord carried over from the Cultural Revolution years. Differences persisted among the military, the party, and left- dominated mass organizations over a wide range of policy issues,

to say nothing of the radical-moderate rivalry. It was not until

December 1970 that a party committee could be reestablished at the provincial level. In political reconstruction two developments

were noteworthy. As the only institution of power for the most part

left unscathed by the Cultural Revolution, the PLA was particularly important in the politics of transition and reconstruction. The

PLA was, however, not a homogeneous body. In 1970-71 Zhou

Enlai was able to forge a centrist-rightist alliance with a group of

50
Historical Setting

PLA regional military commanders who had taken exception to certain of Lin Biao's policies. This coalition paved the way for a more moderate party and government leadership in the late 1970s

and 1980s (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11).

The PLA was divided largely on policy issues. On one side of

the infighting was the Lin Biao faction, which continued to exhort

the need for "politics in command" and for an unremitting struggle against both the Soviet Union and the United States. On the

other side was a majority of the regional military commanders, who

had become concerned about the effect Lin Biao's political ambitions would have on military modernization and economic development. These commanders' views generally were in tune with the

positions taken by Zhou Enlai and his moderate associates. Specifically, the moderate groups within the civilian bureaucracy and

the armed forces spoke for more material incentives for the peasantry, efficient economic planning, and a thorough reassessment

of the Cultural Revolution. They also advocated improved rela- tions with the West in general and the United States in particular—if for no other reason than to counter the perceived expansionist aims

of the Soviet Union. Generally, the radicals' objection notwithstanding, the Chinese political tide shifted steadily toward the right

of center. Among the notable achievements of the early 1970s was

China's decision to seek rapprochement with the United States, as dramatized by President Richard M. Nixon's visit in February

1972. In September 1972 diplomatic relations were established with

Japan.

Without question, the turning point in the decade of the Cultural Revolution was Lin Biao's abortive coup attempt and his subsequent death in a plane crash as he fled China in September 1971

.

The immediate consequence was a steady erosion of the fundamentalist influence of the left-wing radicals. Lin Biao's closest supporters were purged systematically. Efforts to depoliticize and promote

professionalism were intensified within the PLA. These were also accompanied by the rehabilitation (see Glossary) of those persons

who had been persecuted or fallen into disgrace in 1966-68.

End of the Era of Mao Zedong, 1972- 76

Among the most prominent of those rehabilitated was Deng

Xiaoping, who was reinstated as a vice premier in April 1973,

ostensibly under the aegis of Premier Zhou Enlai but certainly with

the concurrence of Mao Zedong. Together, Zhou Enlai and Deng

Xiaoping came to exert strong influence. Their moderate line favor- ing modernization of all sectors of the economy was formally con- firmed at the Tenth National Party Congress in August 1973, at

51
China: A Country Study

which time Deng Xiaoping was made a member of the party's Central Committee (but not yet of the Political Bureau).

The radical camp fought back by building an armed urban

militia, but its mass base of support was limited to Shanghai and

parts of northeastern China—hardly sufficient to arrest what it denounced as "revisionist" and "capitalist" tendencies. In January 1975 Zhou Enlai, speaking before the Fourth National People's Congress, outlined a program of what has come to be known

as the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) for the four sectors of

agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology

(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). This program would be

reaffirmed at the Eleventh National Party Congress, which con- vened in August 1977. Also in January 1975, Deng Xiaoping's

position was solidified by his election as a vice chairman of the CCP

and as a member of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. Deng also was installed as China's first civilian chief of the

PLA General Staff Department.

The year 1976 saw the deaths of the three most senior officials in the CCP and the state apparatus: Zhou Enlai in January, Zhu

De (then chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and de jure head of state) in July, and Mao Zedong

in September. In April of the same year, masses of demonstrators

in Tiananmen Square in Beijing memorialized Zhou Enlai and criti- cized Mao's closest associates, Zhou's opponents. In June the

government announced that Mao would no longer receive foreign

visitors. In July an earthquake devastated the city of Tangshan

in Hebei Province. These events, added to the deaths of the three

Communist leaders, contributed to a popular sense that the "mandate of heaven" had been withdrawn from the ruling party. At

best the nation was in a state of serious political uncertainty.

Deng Xiaoping, the logical successor as premier, received a temporary setback after Zhou's death, when radicals launched a major

counterassault against him. In April 1976 Deng was once more

removed from all his public posts, and a relative political unknown,

Hua Guofeng, a Political Bureau member, vice premier, and minister of public security, was named acting premier and party first vice chairman.

Even though Mao Zedong's role in political life had been sporadic

and shallow in his later years, it was crucial. Despite Mao's alleged

lack of mental acuity, his influence in the months before his death

remained such that his orders to dismiss Deng and appoint Hua

Guofeng were accepted immediately by the Political Bureau. The

political system had polarized in the years before Mao's death into

increasingly bitter and irreconcilable factions. While Mao was

52
Historical Setting

alive —and playing these factions off against each other—the con- tending forces were held in check. His death resolved only some

of the problems inherent in the succession struggle.

The radical clique most closely associated with Mao and the Cultural Revolution became vulnerable after Mao died, as Deng had

been after Zhou Enlai's demise. In October, less than a month after Mao's death, Jiang Qing and her three principal associates

denounced as the Gang of Four (see Glossary)—were arrested with

the assistance of two senior Political Bureau members, Minister

of National Defense Ye Jianying (1897-1986) and Wang Dongxing, commander of the CCP's elite bodyguard. Within days it was formally announced that Hua Guofeng had assumed the positions of party chairman, chairman of the party's Central Military

Commission, and premier.

The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78

The jubilation following the incarceration of the Gang of Four

and the popularity of the new ruling triumvirate (Hua Guofeng,

Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian, a temporary alliance of necessity) were succeeded by calls for the restoration to power of Deng Xiaoping and the elimination of leftist influence throughout the political

system. By July 1977, at no small risk to undercutting Hua

Guofeng' s legitimacy as Mao's successor and seeming to contradict

Mao's apparent will, the Central Committee exonerated Deng

Xiaoping from responsibility for the Tiananmen Square incident.

Deng admitted some shortcomings in the events of 1975, and finally, at a party Central Committee session, he resumed all the posts from

which he had been removed in 1976.

The post-Mao political order was given its first vote of confidence at the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12-18,

1977. Hua was confirmed as party chairman, and Ye Jianying,

Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, and Wang Dongxing were elected

vice chairmen. The congress proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four, and reiter- ated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical

period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country

by the end of the twentieth century." Many contradictions still were apparent, however, in regard to the Maoist legacy and the

possibility of future cultural revolutions.

The new balance of power clearly was unsatisfactory to Deng,

who sought genuine party reform and, soon after the National Party

Congress, took the initiative to reorganize the bureaucracy and

redirect policy. His longtime protege Hu Yaobang replaced Hua

supporter Wang Dongxing as head of the CCP Organization

53
China: A Country Study

Department. Educational reforms were instituted, and Cultural

Revolution-era verdicts on literature, art, and intellectuals were

overturned. The year 1978 proved a crucial one for the reformers.

Differences among the two competing factions—that headed by Hua

Guofeng (soon to be branded a leftist) and that led by Deng and

the more moderate figures —became readily apparent by the time

the Fifth National People's Congress was held in February and

March 1978. Serious disputes arose over the apparently disproportionate development of the national economy, the Hua forces call- ing for still more large-scale projects that China could ill afford. In the face of substantive losses in leadership positions and policy

decisions, the leftists sought to counterattack with calls for strict adherence to Mao Zedong Thought and the party line of class struggle. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic

to his reform plans were stepped up. Not only were many of those

purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but

individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism by

students, whose big-character posters attacking Deng's opponents

and even Mao himself—appeared with regularity.

China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82

The culmination of Deng Xiaoping' s re-ascent to power and the

start in earnest of political, economic, social, and cultural reforms were achieved at the Third Plenum of the National Party Congress's Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978. The Third

Plenum is considered a major turning point in modern Chinese

political history. "Left" mistakes committed before and during the

Cultural Revolution were "corrected," and the "two whatevers"

policy ("support whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made

and follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave") was repudiated. The classic party line calling for protracted class struggle was

officially exchanged for one promoting the Four Modernizations.

In the future, the attainment of economic goals would be the measure of the success or failure of policies and individual leadership;

in other words, economics, not politics, was in command. To effect such a broad policy redirection, Deng placed key allies on the

Political Bureau (including Chen Yun as an additional vice chairman and Hu Yaobang as a member) while positioning Hu Yaobang as secretary general of the CCP and head of the party's

Propaganda Department. Although assessments of the Cultural

Revolution and Mao were deferred, a decision was announced on

"historical questions left over from an earlier period." The 1976

Tiananmen Square incident, the 1959 removal of Peng Dehuai,

54
Historical Setting

and other now infamous political machinations were reversed in favor of the new leadership. New agricultural policies intended to loosen political restrictions on peasants and allow them to produce more on their own initiative were approved.

Rapid change occurred in the subsequent months and years. The

year 1979 witnessed the formal exchange of diplomatic recognition between the People's Republic and the United States, a border war between China and Vietnam, the fledgling "democracy move- ment" (which had begun in earnest in November 1978), and the

determination not to extend the thirty-year-old Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. All these events led to some criticism of Deng Xiaoping, who had to

alter his strategy temporarily while directing his own political

warfare against Hua Guofeng and the leftist elements in the party

and government. As part of this campaign, a major document was

presented at the September 1979 Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh

Central Committee, giving a "preliminary assessment" of the entire

thirty-year period of Communist rule. At the plenum, party Vice

Chairman Ye Jianying pointed out the achievements of the CCP

while admitting that the leadership had made serious political errors

affecting the people. Furthermore, Ye declared the Cultural Revolution "an appalling catastrophe" and "the most severe setback

to [the] socialist cause since [1949]." Although Mao was not specifically blamed, there was no doubt about his share of responsibility. The plenum also marked official acceptance of a new

ideological line that called for "seeking truth from facts" and of

other elements of Deng Xiaoping' s thinking. A further setback for Hua was the approval of the resignations of other leftists from leading party and state posts. In the months following the plenum, a party rectification campaign ensued, replete with a purge of party

members whose political credentials were largely achieved as a result of the Cultural Revolution. The campaign went beyond the civilian ranks of the CCP, extending to party members in the PLA as well. Economic advances and political achievements had strengthened

the position of the Deng reformists enough that by February 1980

they were able to call the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central

Committee. One major effect of the plenum was the resignation

of the members of the "Little Gang of Four" (an allusion to the

original Gang of Four, Mao's allies) —Hua's closest collaborators

and the backbone of opposition to Deng. Wang Dongxing, Wu

De, Ji Dengkui, and Chen Xilian were charged with "grave [but

unspecified] errors" in the struggle against the Gang of Four and

demoted from the Political Bureau to mere Central Committee

membership. In turn, the Central Committee elevated Deng's

55
China: A Country Study

proteges Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the newly restored party Secretariat.

Under the title of secretary general, Hu Yaobang took over dayto-day running of the party (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979—

84, ch. 11). Especially poignant was the posthumous rehabilitation of the late president and one-time successor to Mao, Liu

Shaoqi, at the Fifth Plenum. Finally, at the Fifth National People's Congress session in August and September that year, Deng's

preeminence in government was consolidated when he gave up his vice premiership and Hua Guofeng resigned as premier in favor

of Zhao Ziyang.

One of the more spectacular political events of modern Chinese

history was the month-long trial of the Gang of Four and six of

Lin Biao's closest associates. A 35-judge special court was convened

in November 1980 and issued a 20,000-word indictment against

the defendants. The indictment came more than four years after the arrest of Jiang Qing and her associates and more than nine

years after the arrests of the Lin Biao group. Beyond the trial of

ten political pariahs, it appeared that the intimate involvement of

Mao Zedong, current party chairman Hua Guofeng, and the CCP

itself were on trial. The prosecution wisely separated political errors from actual crimes. Among the latter were the usurpation of state power and party leadership; the persecution of some 750,000 people, 34,375 of whom died during the period 1966-76; and, in the case of the Lin Biao defendants, the plotting of the assassination

of Mao. In January 1981 the court rendered guilty verdicts against

the ten. Jiang Qing, despite her spirited self-vindication and defense

of her late husband, received a death sentence with a two-year sus- pension; later, Jiang Qing's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. So enduring was Mao's legacy that Jiang Qing

appeared to be protected by it from execution. The same sentence was given to Zhang Chunqiao, while Wang Hongwen was given

life and Yao Wenyuan twenty years. Chen Boda and the other Lin

Biao faction members were given sentences of between sixteen and

eighteen years. The net effect of the trial was a further erosion of

Mao's prestige and the system he created. In pre-trial meetings,

the party Central Committee posthumously expelled CCP vice

chairman Kang Sheng and Political Bureau member Xie Fuzhi

from the party because of their participation in the "counterrevolutionary plots" of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing. The memorial speeches

delivered at their funerals were also rescinded. There was enough

adverse pre-trial testimony that Hua Guofeng reportedly offered

to resign the chairmanship before the trial started.

56
Historical Setting

In June 1981 the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee marked a major milestone in the passing of the Maoist era. The Central Committee accepted Hua's resignation from the chairmanship and granted him the face-saving position of vice chair- man. In his place, CCP secretary general Hu Yaobang became

chairman. Hua also gave up his position as chairman of the party's

Central Military Commission in favor of Deng Xiaoping. The plenum adopted the 35,000-word "Resolution on Certain Questions

in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's

Republic of China." The resolution reviewed the sixty years since

the founding of the CCP, emphasizing party activities since 1949.

A major part of the document condemned the ten-year Cultural

Revolution and assessed Mao Zedong's role in it. "Chief responsibility for the grave 'Left' error of the 'cultural revolution,' an

error comprehensive in magnitude and protracted in duration, does

indeed lie with Comrade Mao Zedong. . . . [and] far from making a correct analysis of many problems, he confused right and

wrong and the people with the enemy. . . . Herein lies his tragedy." At the same time, Mao was praised for seeking to correct personal and party shortcomings throughout his life, for leading the effort that brought the demise of Lin Biao, and for having

criticized Jiang Qing and her cohort. Hua too was recognized for

his contributions in defeating the Gang of Four but was branded

a "whateverist." Hua also was criticized for his anti-Deng Xiaoping

posture in the period 1976-77.

Several days after the closing of the plenum, on the occasion of

the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the CCP, new party

chairman Hu Yaobang declared that "although Comrade Mao

Zedong made grave mistakes in his later years, it is clear that if we consider his life work, his contributions to the Chinese revolution far outweigh his errors. . . . His immense contributions are immortal." These remarks may have been offered in an effort to repair the extensive damage done to the Maoist legacy and by

extension to the party itself. Hu went on, however, to praise the

contributions of Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai,

and a score of other erstwhile enemies of the late chairman. Thus

the new party hierarchy sought to assess, and thus close the books

on, the Maoist era and move on to the era of the Four Modernizations. The culmination of Deng's drive to consolidate his power

and ensure the continuity of his reformist policies among his suc- cessors was the calling of the Twelfth National Party Congress in September 1982 and the Fifth Session of the Fifth National

57
China: A Country Study

People's Congress in December 1982 (see The First Wave of

Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11).

* * *

Chinese history is a vast field of intellectual inquiry. Advances

in archaeology and documentary research constantly produce new

results and numerous new publications. An excellent and concise

survey of the entire course of Chinese history up to the 1970s is China: Tradition and Transformation by John K. Fairbank and Edwin

O. Reischauer. For a more in-depth review of modern Chinese

history (beginning of the Qing dynasty to the early 1980s),

Immanuel C.Y. Hsu's The Rise ofModern China should be consulted.

Hsu's book is particularly useful for its chapter-by-chapter bibliography. Maurice Meisner's Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic presents a comprehensive historical analysis of

post- 1949 China and provides a selected bibliography.

There are a number of excellent serial publications covering

Chinese history topics. These include China Quarterly, Chinese Studies

in History, and Journal of Asian Studies. The Association for Asian

Studies' annual Bibliography ofAsian Studies provides the most comprehensive list of monographs, collections of documents, and arti- cles on Chinese history. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

58
Chapter 2. Physical Environment and Population
A fierce white tiger graces this Han dynasty (206 B. C. -A.D. 220) decorative, circular facade tile.
REMARKABLY VARIED LANDSCAPES suggest the disparate

climate and broad reach of China, the third largest country in the

world in terms of area. China's climate ranges from subarctic to tropical. Its topography includes the world's highest peaks, tortu- ous but picturesque river valleys, and vast plains subject to life- threatening but soil-enriching flooding. These characteristics have

dictated where the Chinese people live and how they make their

livelihood.

The majority of China's people live in the eastern segment of

the country, the traditional China Proper. Most are peasants liv- ing, as did their forebears, in the low-lying hills and central plains

that stretch from the highlands eastward and southward to the sea. Agriculture predominates in this vast area, generally favored by

a temperate or subtropical climate. The meticulously tilled fields are evidence in part of the government's continuing concern over farm output and the food supply.

Although migration to urban areas has been restricted since the

late 1950s, as of the end of 1985 about 37 percent of the population was urban. An urban and industrial corridor formed a broad

arc stretching from Harbin in the northeast through the Beijing

area and south to China's largest city, the huge industrial metropoli- tan complex of Shanghai.

The uneven pattern of internal development, so strongly weighted

toward the eastern part of the country, doubtless will change little even with developing interest in exploiting the mineral-rich and

agriculturally productive portions of the vast northwest and southwest regions. The adverse terrain and climate of most of those

regions have discouraged dense population. For the most part, only

ethnic minority groups have settled there. The "minority nationalities" are an important element of

Chinese society. In 1987 there were 55 recognized minority groups,

comprising nearly 7 percent of the total population. Because some

of the groups were located in militarily sensitive border areas and

in regions with strategic minerals, the government tried to maintain benevolent relations with the minorities. But the minorities

played only a superficial role in the major affairs of the nation.

China's ethnically diverse population is the largest in the world,

and the Chinese Communist Party and the government work

strenuously to count, control, and care for their people. In 1982

China conducted its first population census since 1964. It was by

61
China: A Country Study

far the most thorough and accurate census taken under Communist

rule and confirmed that China was a nation of more than 1 billion

people, or about one-fifth of the world's population. The census provided demographers with a wealth of accurate data on China's

age-sex structure, fertility and mortality rates, and population density and distribution. Useful information also was gathered on

minority ethnic groups, urban population, and marital status. For

the first time since the People's Republic of China was founded,

demographers had reliable information on the size and composition of the Chinese work force. Beginning in the mid-1950s, the Chinese government introduced,

with varying degrees of enthusiasm and success, a number of family

planning, or population control, campaigns and programs. The

most radical and controversial was the one-child policy publicly

announced in 1979. Under this policy, which had different guidelines for national minorities, married couples were officially per- mitted only one child. Enforcement of the program, however, varied

considerably from place to place, depending on the vigilance of

local population control workers.

Health care has improved dramatically in China since 1949.

Major diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and scarlet fever have been

brought under control. Life expectancy has more than doubled,

and infant mortality has dropped significantly. On the negative

side, the incidence of cancer, cerebrovascular disease, and heart

disease has increased to the extent that these have become the leading causes of death. Economic reforms initiated in the late 1970s

fundamentally altered methods of providing health care; the col- lective medical care system was gradually replaced by a more

individual-oriented approach.

More liberalized emigration policies enacted in the 1980s facili- tated the legal departure of increasing numbers of Chinese who

joined their overseas Chinese relatives and friends. The Four

Modernizations program (see Glossary), which required access of

Chinese students and scholars, particularly scientists, to foreign

education and research institutions, brought about increased contact with the outside world, particularly the industrialized nations.

Thus, as China moved toward the twenty-first century, the diverse resources and immense population that it had committed to a comprehensive process of modernization became ever more important

in the interdependent world.

Physical Environment

China stretches some 5,000 kilometers across the East Asian land- mass in an erratically changing configuration of broad plains,

62
Karst formations on the Li Jiang near Guilin

Courtesy

Douglass M. Dolan

Overlooking Pagoda of the Six Harmonies on the Qiantang Jiang, Hangzhou

Courtesy

Zhejiang Slide Studio

63
China: A Country Study

expansive deserts, and lofty mountain ranges, including vast areas of inhospitable terrain. The eastern half of the country, its seacoast fringed with offshore islands, is a region of fertile lowlands, foothills and mountains, and subtropical areas. The western half of China

is a region of sunken basins, rolling plateaus, and towering massifs,

including a portion of the highest tableland on earth. The vast- ness of the country and the barrenness of the western hinterland

have important implications for defense strategy (see Doctrine,

Strategy, and Tactics, ch. 14). In spite of many good harbors along

the approximately 18,000-kilometer coastline, the nation has tradi- tionally oriented itself not toward the sea but inland, developing

as an imperial power whose center lay in the middle and lower

reaches of the Huang He (Yellow River) on the northern plains.

Figures for the size of China differ slightly depending on where

one draws a number of ill-defined boundaries. The official Chinese

figure is 9.6 million square kilometers, making the country substantially smaller than the Soviet Union, slightly smaller than

Canada, and somewhat larger than the United States. China's con- tour is reasonably comparable to that of the United States and lies largely at the same latitudes.

Boundaries

In 1987 China's borders, more than 20,000 kilometers of land

frontier shared with nearly all the nations of mainland East Asia, were disputed at a number of points. In the western sector, China

claimed portions of the 41 ,000-square-kilometer Pamir Mountains

area, a region of soaring mountain peaks and glacial valleys where

the borders of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China

meet in Central Asia. North and east of this region, some sections

of the border remained undemarcated in 1987. The 6,542-kilometer

frontier with the Soviet Union has been a source of continual fric- tion. In 1954 China published maps showing substantial portions

of Soviet Siberian territory as its own. In the northeast, border fric- tion with the Soviet Union produced a tense situation in remote

regions of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia)

and Heilongjiang Province along segments of the Ergun He (Argun

River), Heilongjiang (Amur River), and Wusuli Jiang (Ussuri

River) (see fig. 3). Each side had massed troops and had exchanged

charges of border provocation in this area. In a September 1986

speech in Vladivostok, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev offered

the Chinese a more conciliatory position on Sino-Soviet border

rivers. In 1987 the two sides resumed border talks that had been

broken off after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see

64
Physical Environment and Population

Sino-Soviet Relations, ch. 12; The Soviet Union, ch. 14). Although

the border issue remained unresolved as of late 1987, China and

the Soviet Union agreed to consider the northeastern sector first. A major dispute between China and India focuses on the north- ern edge of their shared border, where the Aksai Chin area of north- eastern Jammu and Kashmir is under Chinese control but claimed

by India. Eastward from Bhutan and north of the Brahmaputra

River (Yarlung Zangbo Jiang) lies a large area controlled and

administered by India but claimed by the Chinese in the aftermath

of the 1959 Tibetan revolt. The area was demarcated by the British McMahon Line, drawn along the Himalayas in 1914 as the

Sino-Indian border; India accepts and China rejects this boundary. In June 1980 China made its first move in twenty years to

settle the border disputes with India, proposing that India cede the

Aksai Chin area in Jammu and Kashmir to China in return for China's recognition of the McMahon Line; India did not accept

the offer, however, preferring a sector-by-sector approach to the

problem. In July 1986 China and India held their seventh round

of border talks, but they made little headway toward resolving the

dispute. Each side, but primarily India, continued to make alle- gations of incursions into its territory by the other.

China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over both

the Xisha (Paracel) and the Nansha (Spratly) islands, but the major

islands of the Xishas are occupied by China. The Philippines claims an area known as Kalayaan (Freedom Land), which excludes the

Nansha in the west and some reefs in the south. Malaysia claims

the islands and reefs in the southernmost area, and there also is a potential for dispute over the islands with Brunei.

The China-Burma border issue was settled October 1, 1960, by

the signing of the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty. The first joint

inspection of the border was completed successfully in June 1986. In 1987 the island province of Taiwan continued to be under the

control of the Guomindang authorities (see Sino-United States Relations, ch. 12).

Terrain and Drainage

Terrain and vegetation vary greatly in China. Mountains, hills, and highlands cover about 66 percent of the nation's territory,

impeding communication and leaving limited level land for agricul- ture. Most ranges, including all the major ones, trend east-west. In the southwest, the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains enclose

the Qing Zang Plateau, which encompasses most of Xizang

Autonomous Region (also known as Tibet) and part of Qinghai

Province. It is the most extensive plateau in the world, where

65
China: A Country Study

Western Sector

AFGHANISTAN X I Z A N G

V.« Karatoram ^

Chinese //ne^

J»of confro/f ^ / a.

^ AKSAI

v{ CHIN In dispute. Based on 1895 Anglo-Russian ^rea,y* DOUndary not recognized by China

Figure 3. China-Soviet Union Border Area

elevations average more than 4,000 meters above sea level and the

loftiest summits rise to more than 7,200 meters. From the Qing Zang Plateau, other less-elevated highlands,

rugged east-west trending mountains, and plateaus interrupted by

deep depressions fan out to the north and east. A continental scarp

marks the eastern margin of this territory extending from the

Greater Hinggan Range in northeastern China, through the Taihang Shan (a range of mountains overlooking the North China

Plain) to the eastern edge of the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau in the

south (see fig. 4). Virtually all of the low-lying areas of China

the regions of dense population and intensive cultivation—are found

east of this scarp line. East-west ranges include some of Asia's greatest mountains. In addition to the Himalayas and the Kunlun Mountains, there are

66
Physical Environment and Population

Eastern Sector

Argun R

Manzhouli

Soviet maps stiow bourn

according to 1911 Treaty of Tsitsiho, > Treats f Beij.ne

Chinese maps show boundary Ussuri-~f lSfiO

according to 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta River f , nn '„ , / 400.000 sq. km

Territorial difference is about 900 sq.km^C yielded to Russia

Boundary west of Ussuri headwaters\_. T

' hniinr)qrv was demarcated in 1861 and V

1 reat > boundary

redemarcated in 1886. -A^V/odivosfolc

International boundary

* International boundary in dispute Other line of separation

. Provincial-level boundary 50 100 150 200 250 Kilometers 50 100 150 200 250 Miles

Figure 3. (continued)

the Gangdise Shan (Kailas) and the Tian Shan ranges. The latter stands between two great basins, the massive Tarim Basin to the

south and the Junggar Basin to the north. Rich deposits of coal,

oil, and metallic ores lie in the Tian Shan area. The largest inland

basin in China, the Tarim Basin measures 1,500 kilometers from

east to west and 600 kilometers from north to south at its widest

parts.

The Himalayas form a natural boundary on the southwest as the Altai Mountains do on the northwest. Lesser ranges branch

out, some at sharp angles from the major ranges. The mountains

give rise to all the principal rivers. The spine of the Kunlun Mountains separates into several

branches as it runs eastward from the Pamir Mountains. The northernmost branches, the Altun Shan and the Qilian Shan, rim the

67
China: A Country Study

Qing Zang Plateau in west-central China and overlook the Qaidam

Basin, a sandy and swampy region containing many salt lakes. A

southern branch of the Kunlun Mountains divides the watersheds

of the Huang He and the ChangJiang (Yangtze River). The Gansu

Corridor, west of the great bend in the Huang He, was traditionally an important communications link with Central Asia.

North of the 3,300-kilometer-long Great Wall, between Gansu

Province on the west and the Greater Hinggan Range on the east,

lies the Nei Monggol Plateau, at an average elevation of 1,000

meters above sea level. The Yin Shan, a system of mountains with

average elevations of 1,400 meters, extends east-west through the center of this vast desert or steppe peneplain. To the south is the

largest loess plateau in the world, covering 600,000 square kilo- meters in Shaanxi Province, parts of Gansu and Shanxi provinces,

and some of Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region. Loess is a yellowish soil blown in from the Nei Monggol deserts. The loose, loamy

material travels easily in the wind, and through the centuries it has veneered the plateau and choked the Huang He with silt. Because the river level drops precipitously toward the North

China Plain, where it continues a sluggish course across the delta,

it transports a heavy load of sand and mud from the upper reaches,

much of which is deposited on the flat plain. The flow is channeled

mainly by constantly repaired manmade embankments; as a result the river flows on a raised ridge several meters—in some places more than ten meters— above the plain, and waterlogging, floods,

and course changes have recurred over the centuries. Traditionally,

rulers were judged by their concern for or indifference to preser- vation of the embankments. In the modern era, the new leadership has been deeply committed to dealing with the problem and

has undertaken extensive flood control and conservation measures. Flowing from its source in the Qing Zang highlands, the Huang

He courses toward the sea through the North China Plain, the

historic center of Chinese expansion and influence. Han (see Glossary) people have farmed the rich alluvial soils of the plain since

ancient times, constructing the Grand Canal for north-south trans- port (see The Imperial Period, ch. 1). The plain itself is actually a continuation of the Dongbei (Manchurian) Plain to the northeast but is separated from it by the Bo Hai Gulf, an extension of

the Huang Hai (Yellow Sea).

Like other densely populated areas of China, the plain is subject not only to floods but to earthquakes. For example, the mining and industrial center of Tangshan, about 165 kilometers east of Beijing, was leveled by an earthquake in July 1976 that reportedly also killed 242,000 people and injured 164,000.

68
Physical Environment and Population

The Yellow, East China, and South China seas, too, are marginal

seas of the Pacific Ocean. More than half the coastline (predominantly in the south) is rocky; most of the remainder is sandy. The

Bay of Hangzhou roughly divides the two kinds of shoreline.

Climate

Monsoon winds, caused by differences in the heat-absorbing

capacity of the continent and the ocean, dominate the climate.

Alternating seasonal air-mass movements and accompanying winds

are moist in summer and dry in winter. The advance and retreat of the monsoons account in large degree for the timing of the rainy season and the amount of rainfall throughout the country. Tremendous differences in latitude, longitude, and altitude give rise to sharp

variations in precipitation and temperature within China. Although

most of the country lies in the temperate belt, its climatic patterns

are complex.

China's northernmost point lies along the Heilong Jiang in Heilongjiang Province in the cold-temperate zone; its southernmost point, Hainan Island, has a tropical climate (see table 4,

Appendix A). Temperature differences in winter are great, but in summer the diversity is considerably less. For example, the north- ern portions of Heilongjiang Province experience an average January mean temperature of below 0°C, and the reading may drop

to minus 30°C; the average July mean in the same area may exceed

20°C. By contrast, the central and southern parts of Guangdong

Province experience an average January temperature of above

10°C, while the July mean is about 28°C.

Precipitation varies regionally even more than temperature.

China south of the Qin Ling experiences abundant rainfall, most

of it coming with the summer monsoons. To the north and west

of the range, however, rainfall is uncertain. The farther north and

west one moves, the scantier and more uncertain it becomes. The

northwest has the lowest annual rainfall in the country and no

precipitation at all in its desert areas. Wildlife

China lies in two of the world's major zoogeographic regions,

the Palearctic and the Oriental. The Qing Zang Plateau, Xinjiang

and Nei Monggol autonomous regions, northeastern China, and

all areas north of the Huang He are in the Palearctic region. Central, southern, and southwest China lie in the Oriental region. In

the Palearctic zone are found such important mammals as the river

fox, horse, camel, tapir, mouse hare, hamster, and jerboa. Among

the species found in the Oriental region are the civet cat, Chinese

71
China: A Country Study

pangolin, bamboo rat, tree shrew, and also gibbon and various

other species of monkeys and apes. Some overlap exists between

the two regions because of natural dispersal and migration, and

deer or antelope, bears, wolves, pigs, and rodents are found in all of the diverse climatic and geological environments. The famous

giant panda is found only in a limited area along the Chang Jiang.

Population

The Data Base

The People's Republic conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, and

1982. In 1987 the government announced that the fourth national census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every

ten years thereafter. The 1982 census, which reported a total population of 1,008,180,738, is generally accepted as significantly more

reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various

international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conducting the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities which donated US$15.6 million for the preparation

and execution of the census. The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976.

Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan

to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Computers were installed in every provincial-level unit except Xizang

and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing

headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pretests and smallscale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between

1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census sta- tions were opened in rural production brigades (see Glossary) and

urban neighborhoods. Beginning July 1, 1982, each household sent a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census

required about a month to complete and employed approximately

5 million census takers. The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic cate- gories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of household, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level,

profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, number of children born and still living, and number of births in 1981 . The six items pertaining to households were type (domestic

or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births

in 1981, number of deaths in 1981, and number of registered per- sons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in a number of important areas for which previous data were either

72
Landscape on the Grand Canal

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

extremely inaccurate or simply nonexistent, including fertility, marital status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex composition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment (see

table 5, Appendix A).

A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some

Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and

death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the

household registration system were different, the two systems

arrived at similar population totals (see Differentiation, ch. 3). The

discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the under-reporting

of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration

system; families would not report some births because of the onechild policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to the rations of the deceased. Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an

eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of

reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demographic patterns, measure current population conditions, and

predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and for- eign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the

base population for forecasting and making assumptions about

future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mortality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making

73
China: A Country Study

pangolin, bamboo rat, tree shrew, and also gibbon and various

other species of monkeys and apes. Some overlap exists between

the two regions because of natural dispersal and migration, and

deer or antelope, bears, wolves, pigs, and rodents are found in all of the diverse climatic and geological environments. The famous

giant panda is found only in a limited area along the Chang Jiang.

Population

The Data Base

The People's Republic conducted censuses in 1953, 1964, and

1982. In 1987 the government announced that the fourth national census would take place in 1990 and that there would be one every

ten years thereafter. The 1982 census, which reported a total population of 1,008,180,738, is generally accepted as significantly more

reliable, accurate, and thorough than the previous two. Various

international organizations eagerly assisted the Chinese in conducting the 1982 census, including the United Nations Fund for Population Activities which donated US$15.6 million for the preparation

and execution of the census. The nation began preparing for the 1982 census in late 1976.

Chinese census workers were sent to the United States and Japan

to study modern census-taking techniques and automation. Computers were installed in every provincial-level unit except Xizang

and were connected to a central processing system in the Beijing

headquarters of the State Statistical Bureau. Pretests and smallscale trial runs were conducted and checked for accuracy between

1980 and 1981 in twenty-four provincial-level units. Census sta- tions were opened in rural production brigades (see Glossary) and

urban neighborhoods. Beginning July 1, 1982, each household sent a representative to a census station to be enumerated. The census

required about a month to complete and employed approximately

5 million census takers. The 1982 census collected data in nineteen demographic cate- gories relating to individuals and households. The thirteen areas concerning individuals were name, relationship to head of household, sex, age, nationality, registration status, educational level,

profession, occupation, status of nonworking persons, marital status, number of children born and still living, and number of births in 1981. The six items pertaining to households were type (domestic

or collective), serial number, number of persons, number of births

in 1981 , number of deaths in 1981 , and number of registered per- sons absent for more than one year. Information was gathered in a number of important areas for which previous data were either

72
Landscape on the Grand Canal

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

extremely inaccurate or simply nonexistent, including fertility, marital status, urban population, minority ethnic groups, sex composition, age distribution, and employment and unemployment (see

table 5, Appendix A).

A fundamental anomaly in the 1982 statistics was noted by some

Western analysts. They pointed out that although the birth and

death rates recorded by the census and those recorded through the

household registration system were different, the two systems

arrived at similar population totals (see Differentiation, ch. 3). The

discrepancies in the vital rates were the result of the under-reporting

of both births and deaths to the authorities under the registration

system; families would not report some births because of the onechild policy and would not report some deaths so as to hold on to the rations of the deceased. Nevertheless, the 1982 census was a watershed for both Chinese and world demographics. After an

eighteen-year gap, population specialists were given a wealth of

reliable, up-to-date figures on which to reconstruct past demographic patterns, measure current population conditions, and

predict future population trends. For example, Chinese and for- eign demographers used the 1982 census age-sex structure as the

base population for forecasting and making assumptions about

future fertility trends. The data on age-specific fertility and mortality rates provided the necessary base-line information for making

73
China: A Country Study

population projections. The census data also were useful for esti- mating future manpower potential, consumer needs, and utility,

energy, and health-service requirements. The sudden abundance

of demographic data helped population specialists immeasurably

in their efforts to estimate world population. Previously, there had

been no accurate information on these 21 percent of the earth's

inhabitants. Demographers who had been conducting research on

global population without accurate data on the Chinese fifth of the

world's population were particularly thankful for the 1982 census. Mortality and Fertility In 1949 crude death rates were probably higher than 30 per 1 ,000,

and the average life expectancy was only 32 years. Beginning in the early 1950s, mortality steadily declined; it continued to decline

through 1978 and remained relatively constant through 1987. One

major fluctuation was reported in a computer reconstruction of

China's population trends from 1953 to 1987 produced by the

United States Bureau of the Census (see table 6, Appendix A; data

in this table may vary from officially reported statistics). The computer model showed that the crude death rate increased dramatically during the famine years associated with the Great Leap

Forward (1958-60, see Glossary), resulting in approximately 30

million deaths above the expected level. According to Chinese government statistics, the crude birth rate followed five distinct patterns from 1949 to 1982. It remained sta- ble from 1949 to 1954, varied widely from 1955 to 1965, experienced

fluctuations between 1966 and 1969, dropped sharply in the late 1970s, and increased from 1980 to 1981. Between 1970 and 1980,

the crude birth rate dropped from 36.9 per 1,000 to 17.6 per 1,000.

The government attributed this dramatic decline in fertility to the wan xi shao (later marriages, longer intervals between births, and

fewer children) birth control campaign. However, elements of

socioeconomic change, such as increased employment of women

in both urban and rural areas and reduced infant mortality (a

greater percentage of surviving children would tend to reduce

demand for additional children), may have played some role (see

Labor Force, this ch.). To the dismay of authorities, the birth rate increased in both 1981 and 1982 to a level of 21 per 1,000, primarily

as a result of a marked rise in marriages and first births. The rise was an indication of problems with the one-child policy of 1979

(see Population Control Programs, this ch.). Chinese sources, however, indicated that the birth rate decreased to 17.8 in 1985

and remained relatively constant thereafter. In urban areas, the housing shortage may have been at least

74
Physical Environment and Population

partly responsible for the decreased birth rate. Also, the policy in force during most of the 1960s and the early 1970s of sending large

numbers of high school graduates to the countryside deprived cities of a significant proportion of persons of childbearing age and

undoubtedly had some effect on birth rates (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). Primarily for economic reasons, rural birth rates tended to decline

less than urban rates. The right to grow and sell agricultural

products for personal profit and the lack of an old-age welfare sys- tem were incentives for rural people to produce many children,

especially sons, for help in the fields and for support in old age. Because of these conditions, it is unclear to what degree propaganda

and education improvements had been able to erode traditional

values favoring large families.

Population Control Programs

Initially, China's post-1949 leaders were ideologically disposed

to view a large population as an asset. But the liabilities of a large,

rapidly growing population soon became apparent. For one year,

starting in August 1956, vigorous propaganda support was given

to the Ministry of Public Health's mass birth control efforts. These

efforts, however, had little impact on fertility. After the interval

of the Great Leap Forward, Chinese leaders again saw rapid population growth as an obstacle to development, and their interest in birth control revived. In the early 1960s, propaganda, somewhat more muted than during the first campaign, emphasized the virtues of late marriage.

Birth control offices were set up in the central government and some

provincial-level governments in 1964. The second campaign was

particularly successful in the cities, where the birth rate was cut

in half during the 1963-66 period. The chaos of the Cultural Revolution brought the program to a halt, however.

In 1972 and 1973 the party mobilized its resources for a nationwide birth control campaign administered by a group in the State Council (see The State Council, ch. 10). Committees to oversee

birth control activities were established at all administrative levels and in various collective enterprises. This extensive and seemingly

effective network covered both the rural and the urban population. In urban areas public security headquarters included population

control sections. In rural areas the country's "barefoot doctors"

(see Glossary) distributed information and contraceptives to people's commune (see Glossary) members. By 1973 Mao Zedong was

personally identified with the family planning movement, signifying a greater leadership commitment to controlled population

75
China: A Country Study

growth than ever before. Yet until several years after Mao's death

in 1976, the leadership was reluctant to put forth directly the

rationale that population control was necessary for economic growth

and improved living standards.

Population growth targets were set for both administrative units

and individual families. In the mid-1970s the maximum recom- mended family size was two children in cities and three or four

in the country. Since 1979 the government has advocated a onechild limit for both rural and urban areas and has generally set a maximum of two children in special circumstances. As of 1986

the policy for minority nationalities was two children per couple,

three in special circumstances, and no limit for ethnic groups with

very small populations. The overall goal of the one-child policy was to keep the total population within 1.2 billion through the year

2000, on the premise that the Four Modernizations (see Glossary)

program would be of little value if population growth was not

brought under control.

The one-child policy was a highly ambitious population control

program. Like previous programs of the 1960s and 1970s, the onechild policy employed a combination of propaganda, social pressure, and in some cases coercion. The one-child policy was unique,

however, in that it linked reproduction with economic cost or

benefit.

Under the one-child program, a sophisticated system rewarded

those who observed the policy and penalized those who did not. Couples with only one child were given a "one-child certificate"

entitling them to such benefits as cash bonuses, longer maternity

leave, better child care, and preferential housing assignments. In

return, they were required to pledge that they would not have more

children. In the countryside, there was great pressure to adhere

to the one-child limit. Because the rural population accounted for approximately 60 percent of the total, the effectiveness of the onechild policy in rural areas was considered the key to the success or failure of the program as a whole.

In rural areas the day-to-day work of family planning was done

by cadres at the team and brigade levels \who were responsible for women's affairs and by health workers. The women's team leader

made regular household visits to keep track of the status of each

family under her jurisdiction and collected information on which

women were using contraceptives, the methods used, and which

had become pregnant. She then reported to the brigade women's

leader, who documented the information and took it to a monthly

meeting of the commune birth-planning committee. According to reports, ceilings or quotas had to be adhered to; to satisfy these

76
Physical Environment and Population

cutoffs, unmarried young people were persuaded to postpone marriage, couples without children were advised to ' 'wait their turn,

'

women with unauthorized pregnancies were pressured to have abortions, and those who already had children were urged to use contraception or undergo sterilization. Couples with more than one

child were exhorted to be sterilized. The one-child policy enjoyed much greater success in urban than

in rural areas. Even without state intervention, there were compelling reasons for urban couples to limit the family to a single child. Raising a child required a significant portion of family income,

and in the cities a child did not become an economic asset until

he or she entered the work force at age sixteen. Couples with only one child were given preferential treatment in housing allocation. In addition, because city dwellers who were employed in state enterprises received pensions after retirement, the sex of their first child was less important to them than it was to those in rural areas

(see Urban Society, ch. 3). Numerous reports surfaced of coercive measures used to achieve

the desired results of the one-child policy. The alleged methods

ranged from intense psychological pressure to the use of physical

force, including some grisly accounts of forced abortions and

infanticide. Chinese officials admitted that isolated, uncondoned

abuses of the program occurred and that they condemned such acts, but they insisted that the family planning program was administered on a voluntary basis using persuasion and economic measures only.

International reaction to the allegations were mixed. The UN Fund

for Population Activities and the International Planned Parenthood

Association were generally supportive of China's family planning

program. The United States Agency for International Development,

however, withdrew US$10 million from the Fund in March 1985

based on allegations that coercion had been used.

Observers suggested that an accurate assessment of the one-child

program would not be possible until all women who came of childbearing age in the early 1980s passed their fertile years. As of 1987

the one-child program had achieved mixed results. In general, it was very successful in almost all urban areas but less successful in rural areas. The Chinese authorities must have been disturbed by

the increase in the officially reported annual population growth rate (birth rate minus death rate): from 12 per 1,000, or 1.2 percent in 1980 to 14.1 per 1,000, or 1.4 percent in 1986. If the 1986 rate is maintained to the year 2000, the population will exceed 1.2 billion. Rapid fertility reduction associated with the one-child policy has

potentially negative results. For instance, in the future the elderly

might not be able to rely on their children to care for them as they

77
China: A Country Study

have in the past, leaving the state to assume the expense, which

could be considerable. Based on United Nations statistics and data

provided by the Chinese government, it was estimated in 1987 that by the year 2000 the population 60 years and older (the retirement

age is 60 in urban areas) would number 127 million, or 10.1 per- cent of the total population; the projection for 2025 was 234 million elderly, or 16.4 percent. According to one Western analyst,

projections based on the 1982 census show that if the one-child policy were maintained to the year 2000, 25 percent of China's population would be age 65 or older by the year 2040.

Density and Distribution

Overall population density in 1986 was about 109 people per

square kilometer. Density was only about one-third that of Japan

and less than that of many other countries in Asia and in Europe.

The overall figure, however, concealed major regional variations

and the high person-land ratio in densely populated areas. In the

11 provinces, special municipalities, and autonomous regions along

the southeast coast, population density was 320.6 people per square

kilometer (see fig. 5). In 1986 about 94 percent of the population lived on approximately 36 percent of the land. Broadly speaking, the population was concentrated in China Proper, east of the mountains and south

of the Great Wall. The most densely populated areas included the

Chang Jiang Valley (of which the delta region was the most

populous), Sichuan Basin, North China Plain, Zhu Jiang Delta,

and the industrial area around the city of Shenyang in the northeast.

Population is most sparse in the mountainous, desert, and grass- land regions of the northwest and southwest. In Nei Monggol

Autonomous Region, portions are completely uninhabited, and only a few sections have populations more dense than ten people per

square kilometer. The Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, and Xizang autonomous regions and Gansu and Qinghai provinces comprise 55 per- cent of the country's land area but in 1985 contained only 5.7

percent of its population (see table 7, Appendix A).

Migration

Internal

China has restricted internal movement in various ways. Official efforts to limit free migration between villages and cities began

as early as 1952 with a series of measures designed to prevent

individuals without special permission from moving to cities to take

advantage of the generally higher living standards there.

78
Physical Environment and Population

Source: Based on Zhongguo 1982 Man Renkou Pucha Ziliao (1982 Population Census

of China), Beijing, March 1985.

Figure 5. Population Density, 1982

The party decreased migration to cities during the 1960s and 1970s

for economic and political reasons (see The Politics of Modernization,

ch. 11). In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, large numbers of urban youths were "sent down" to the countryside for

political and ideological reasons. Many relocated youths were eventually permitted to return to the cities, and by the mid-1980s most

had done so (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). The success of the agricultural reforms under Deng Xiaoping

in the late 1970s and early 1980s dramatically increased the food

supply in China's cities, making it possible for more people to come

in from rural areas and survive without food ration cards. Because

79
China: A Country Study

of the increased food supply, the authorities temporarily relaxed

the enforcement of migration restrictions. This relaxation, however, was short-lived, and in May 1984 new measures strengthened resi- dence regulations and reinstated official control over internal migration. Additionally, in March 1986 a draft revision of the 1957

migration regulations was presented to the Standing Committee

of the Sixth National People's Congress calling for stricter population control policies.

Nonetheless, migration from rural areas to urban centers continued. The problem of too-rapid urbanization was exacerbated by the

agricultural responsibility system (see Glossary), which forced a real- location of labor and left many agricultural workers unemployed.

The central government attempted to control movement through

the household registration system and promote development of small

cities and towns, but within this system many people were still able

to migrate primarily for employment or educational purposes (see

Differentiation, ch. 3). Leaving their place of official registration

for days, months, or even years, unemployed agricultural workers

found jobs in construction, housekeeping, or commune-run shops

or restaurants. This temporary mobility was permitted by authorities because it simultaneously absorbed a large amount of surplus

rural labor, improved the economies of rural areas, and satisfied urban requirements for service and other workers. The most significant aspect of the temporary migration, however, was that it was viewed as a possible initial step toward the development of

small, rural-oriented urban centers that could bring employment

and urban amenities to rural areas. Although the temporary migration into the cities was seen as

beneficial, controlling it was a serious concern of the central government. An April 1985 survey showed that the "floating" or nonresident population in eight selected areas of Beijing was 662,000,

or 12.5 percent of the total population. The survey also showed

that people entered or left Beijing 880,000 times a day. In an effort to control this activity, neighborhood committees and work units

(danwei—see Glossary) were required to comply with municipal

regulations issued in January 1986. These regulations stipulated

that communities and work units keep records on visitors, that those

staying in Beijing for up to three days must be registered, and that

those planning to stay longer must obtain temporary residence per- mits from local police stations.

Although some cities were crowded, other areas of China were

underpopulated. For example, China had little success populating the frontier regions. As early as the 1950s, the government

began to organize and fund migration for land reclamation,

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Physical Environment and Population

industrialization, and construction in the interior and frontier

regions. Land reclamation was carried out by state farms located

largely in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region and Heilongjiang

Province. Large numbers of migrants were sent to such outlying

regions as Nei Monggol Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province

to work in factories and mines and to Xinjiang-Uygur Autono- mous Region to develop agriculture and industry. In the late 1950s,

and especially in the 1960s, during the Cultural Revolution, many

city youths were sent to the frontier areas. Much of the resettled population returned home, however, because of insufficient government support, harsh climate, and a general inability to adjust to

life in the outlying regions. China's regional population distribution was consequently as unbalanced in 1986 as it had been in 1953.

Nevertheless, efforts were still underway in 1987 to encourage

migration to the frontier regions.

Urbanization

In 1987 China had a total of twenty-nine provincial-level administrative units directly under the central government in Beijing. In

addition to the twenty-one provinces (sheng), there were five autonomous regions (zizhiqu) for minority nationalities, and three special

municipalities (shi) —the three largest cities, Shanghai, Beijing, and

Tianjin. (The establishment of Hainan Island as a provincial-level

unit separate from Guangdong Province was scheduled to take place

in 1988.) A 1979 change in provincial-level administrative boundaries in the northeast region restored Nei Monggol Autonomous

Region to its original size (it had been reduced by a third in 1969)

at the expense of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning provinces. Urban

areas were further subdivided into lower-level administrative units

beginning with municipalities and extending down to the neighborhood level (see Local Administration, ch. 10).

The pace of urbanization in China from 1949 to 1982 was rela- tively slow because of both rapid growth of the rural population

and tight restrictions on rural-urban migration for most of that

period. According to the 1953 and 1982 censuses, the urban population as a percentage of total population increased from 13.3 to 20.6 percent during that period. From 1982 to 1986, however, the

urban population increased dramatically to 37 percent of the total population. This large jump resulted from a combination of factors. One was the migration of large numbers of surplus agricultural workers, displaced by the agricultural responsibility system,

from rural to urban areas (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). Another was a 1984 decision to broaden the criteria for classifying an area

as a city or town. During 1984 the number of towns meeting the

81
China: A Country Study new urban criteria increased more than twofold, and the urban

town population doubled. In the mid-1980s demographers expected

the proportion of the population living in cities and towns to be

around 50 percent by the turn of the century. This urban growth was expected to result primarily from the increase in the number

of small- and medium-sized cities and towns rather than from an

expansion of existing large cities. China's statistics regarding urban population sometimes can be

misleading because of the various criteria used to calculate urban

population. In the 1953 census, urban essentially referred to settle- ments with populations of more than 2,500, in which more than

50 percent of the labor force were involved in nonagricultural pursuits. The 1964 census raised the cut-off to 3,000 and the requirement for nonagricultural labor to 70 percent. The 1982 census used

the 3,000/70 percent minimum but introduced criteria of 2,500 to 3,000 and 85 percent as well. Also, in calculating urban population, the 1982 census made a radical change by including the agricul- tural population residing within the city boundaries. This explains

the dramatic jump in urban population from the 138.7 million

reported for year-end 1981 to the 206.6 million counted by the 1982

census. In 1984 the urban guidelines were further loosened, allowing for lower minimum population totals and nonagricultural per- centages. The criteria varied among provincial-level units. Although China's urban population—382 million, or 37 percent

of the total population, in the mid-1980s—was relatively low by

comparison with developed nations, the number of people living

in urban areas in China was greater than the total population of

any country in the world except India and the Soviet Union. The

four Chinese cities with the largest populations in 1985 were Shanghai, with 7 million; Beijing, with 5.9 million; Tianjin, with

5.4 million; and Shenyang, with 4.2 million. The disproportionate distribution of population in large cities occurred as a result of the government's emphasis after 1949 on the development of

large cities over smaller urban areas. In 1985 the 22 most populous

cities in China had a total population of 47.5 million, or about 12 percent of China's total urban population. The number of cities with populations of at least 100,000 increased from 200 in 1976

to 342 in 1986 (see table 8, Appendix A).

In 1987 China was committed to a three-part strategy to control

urban growth: strictly limiting the size of big cities (those of 500,000

or more people); developing medium-sized cities (200,000 to 500,000); and encouraging the growth of small cities (100,000 to 200,000). The government also encouraged the development of small

market and commune centers that were not then officially designated

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Physical Environment and Population

as urban places, hoping that they eventually would be transformed

into towns and small cities. The big and medium-sized cities were

viewed as centers of heavy and light industry, and small cities and

towns were looked on as possible locations for handicraft and workshop activities, using labor provided mainly from rural overflow.

Emigration and Immigration

Through most of China's history, strict controls prevented large

numbers of people from leaving the country. In modern times,

however, periodically some have been allowed to leave for various

reasons. For example, in the early 1960s, about 100,000 people were allowed to enter Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, vigilance

against illegal migration to Hong Kong was again relaxed somewhat. Perhaps as many as 200,000 reached Hong Kong in 1979,

but in 1980 authorities on both sides resumed concerted efforts to reduce the flow. In 1983 emigration restrictions were eased as a result in part

of the economic open-door policy. In 1984 more than 11,500 busi- ness visas were issued to Chinese citizens, and in 1985 approximately 15,000 Chinese scholars and students were in the United

States alone. Any student who had the economic resources, from

whatever source, could apply for permission to study abroad. United

States consular offices issued more than 12,500 immigrant visas

in 1984, and there were 60,000 Chinese with approved visa petitions in the immigration queue.

Export of labor to foreign countries also increased. The Soviet

Union, Iraq, and the Federal Republic of Germany requested

500,000 workers, and as of 1986 China had sent 50,000. The signing

of the United States-China Consular Convention in 1983 demonstrated the commitment to more liberal emigration policies. The

two sides agreed to permit travel for the purpose of family reunification and to facilitate travel for individuals who claim both Chinese

and United States citizenship. Emigrating from China remained

a complicated and lengthy process, however, mainly because many

countries were unwilling or unable to accept the large numbers of

people who wished to emigrate. Other difficulties included bureaucratic delays and in some cases a reluctance on the part of Chinese

authorities to issue passports and exit permits to individuals making notable contributions to the modernization effort. The only significant immigration to China has been by the overseas Chinese (see Glossary), who in the years since 1949 have been

offered various enticements to return to their homeland. Several

million may have done so since 1949. The largest influx came in 1978-79, when about 160,000 to 250,000 ethnic Chinese fled

83
China: A Country Study

Vietnam for southern China as relations between the two countries worsened. Many of these refugees were reportedly settled in

state farms on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. Minority Nationalities

Demographic Overview

Approximately 93 percent of China's population is considered

Han. Sharp regional and cultural differences, including major variations in spoken Chinese, exist among the Han, who are a mingling of many peoples. All the Han nonetheless use a common

written form of Chinese and share the social organization, values,

and cultural characteristics universally recognized as Chinese (see

Han Diversity and Unity, ch. 3). Officially, China has fifty-six "nationality" groups, including the

Han. The Chinese define a nationality as a group of people of com- mon origin living in a common area, using a common language,

and having a sense of group identity in economic and social organization and behavior. Altogether, China has fifteen major linguistic

regions generally coinciding with the geographic distribution of the

major minority nationalities (see fig. 6). Members of non-Han

groups, referred to as the "minority nationalities," constitute only

about 7 percent of the total population but number more than 70

million people and are distributed over 60 percent of the land.

Some minority nationalities can be found only in a single region;

others may have settlements in two or more. In general, however,

the minorities are concentrated in the provinces and autonomous

regions of the northwest and the southwest. In Xizang, Xinjiang,

and Nei Monggol autonomous regions, minorities occupy large

frontier areas; many are traditionally nomadic and engage primarily

in pastoral pursuits. Minority groups in Yunnan and Guizhou

provinces and in the Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region are more fragmented and inhabit smaller areas. According to the 1982 census, approximately 95 percent of

Xizang' s civilian population of 1.9 million are Tibetan (Zang

nationality). An internally cohesive group, the Tibetans have proven

the most resistant of the minority groups to the government's

integration efforts. Xinjiang, which is as vast and distant from Beijing as Xizang, is the minority area next in demographic and politi- cal significance. Despite a large-scale immigration of Han since

the 1950s, in 1985 around 60 percent of Xinjiang's 13.4 million

population belonged to minority nationalities. Of these, the most

important were 6. 1 million Uygurs and more than 900,000 Kazaks,

both Turkic-speaking Central Asian peoples (see table 9, Appendix A).

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Physical Environment and Population

Figure 6. Distribution of Major Minority Nationalities

Provinces with large concentrations of minorities include Yunnan, where the Yi and other minority groups comprised an esti- mated 32 percent of the population in 1985; Guizhou, home of more

than half of the approximately 4 million Miao; and sparsely populated Qinghai, which except for the area around the provincial capital of Xining is inhabited primarily by Tibetans and other minority

nationality members, amounting in 1986 to approximately 37 per- cent of the total provincial population. Additionally, in 1986 minority nationalities constituted approximately 16 percent of the

population of Nei Monggol Autonomous Region. The GuangxiZhuang Autonomous Region contains almost all of the approximately 13.5 million members of what is China's largest minority

nationality, the Zhuang; most of them, however, are highly

assimilated.

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China: A Country Study

Because many of the minority nationalities are located in politically sensitive frontier areas, they have acquired an importance

greater than their numbers. Some groups have common ancestry

with peoples in neighboring countries. For example, members of

the Shan, Korean, Mongol, Uygur and Kazak, and Yao nationalities are found not only in China but also in Burma, Korea, the

Mongolian People's Republic, the Soviet Union, and Thailand,

respectively. If the central government failed to maintain good

relations with these groups, China's border security could be

jeopardized (see Threat Perception, ch. 14). Since 1949 Chinese offi- cials have declared that the minorities are politically equal to the

Han majority and in fact should be accorded preferential treatment

because of their small numbers and poor economic circumstances.

The government has tried to ensure that the minorities are well

represented at national conferences and has relaxed certain policies that might have impeded their socioeconomic development.

The minority areas are economically as well as politically

important. China's leaders have suggested that by the turn of the

century the focus of economic development should shift to the north- west. The area is rich in natural resources, with uranium deposits

and abundant oil reserves in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

Much of China's forestland is located in the border regions of the

northeast and southwest, and large numbers of livestock are raised

in the arid and semiarid northwest. Also, the vast amount of virgin

land in minority areas can be used for resettlement to relieve population pressures in the densely populated regions of the country.

In the early 1980s, the central government adopted various measures to provide financial and economic assistance to the minority

areas. The government allotted subsidies totaling approximately

¥6,000 million (for value of the yuan, see Glossary) in 1984 to balance any deficits experienced in autonomous areas inhabited

by minority nationalities. After 1980 the autonomous regions of

Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, Xizang, Guangxi, and Ningxia and the

provinces of Yunnan, Guizhou, and Qinghai were permitted to keep all revenues for themselves. The draft state budget written

in April 1986 allocated a special grant of ¥800 million to the

underdeveloped minority nationality areas over and above the regular state subsidies. The standard of living in the minority areas improved dramatically from the early to the mid-1980s. In Xizang

Autonomous Region, annual per capita income increased from

¥216 in 1983 to¥317 in 1984 (national per capita income was ¥663

in 1983 and ¥721 in 1984). The per capita net income of the

minority areas in Yunnan Province increased from ¥118 in 1980

to¥263 in 1984, for an increase of 81.3 percent. Overall, however,

the minority areas remained relatively undeveloped in 1986.

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Physical Environment and Population

Policy

Since 1949 government policy toward minorities has been based on the somewhat contradictory goals of national unity and the protection of minority equality and identity. The state constitution

of 1954 declared the country to be a "unified, multinational state" and prohibited "discrimination against or oppression of any nationality and acts which undermine the unity of the nationalities." All

nationalities were granted equal rights and duties. Policy toward

the ethnic minorities in the 1950s was based on the assumption

that they could and should be integrated into the Han polity by

gradual assimilation, while permitted initially to retain their own

cultural identity and to enjoy a modicum of self-rule. Accordingly,

autonomous regions were established in which minority languages were recognized, special efforts were mandated to recruit a cer- tain percentage of minority cadres, and minority culture and

religion were ostensibly protected. The minority areas also benefited

from substantial government investment.

Yet the attention to minority rights took place within the larger

framework of strong central control. Minority nationalities, many

with strong historical and recent separatist or anti-Han tendencies, were given no rights of self-determination. With the special exception of Xizang in the 1950s, Beijing administered minority regions

as vigorously as Han areas, and Han cadres filled the most important leadership positions. Minority nationalities were integrated

into the national political and economic institutions and structures. Party statements hammered home the idea of the unity of all the

rationalities and downplayed any part of minority history that identified insufficiently with China Proper. Relations with the minorities were strained because of traditional Han attitudes of cultural

superiority. Central authorities criticized this "Han chauvinism"

but found its influence difficult to eradicate.

Pressure on the minority peoples to conform were stepped up

in the late 1950s and subsequently during the Cultural Revolution. Ultraleftist ideology maintained that minority distinctness was

an inherently reactionary barrier to socialist progress. Although

in theory the commitment to minority rights remained, repressive

assimilationist policies were pursued. Minority languages were

looked down upon by the central authorities, and cultural and

religious freedom was severely curtailed or abolished. Minority

group members were forced to give up animal husbandry in order

to grow crops that in some cases were unfamiliar. State subsidies were reduced, and some autonomous areas were abolished. These

policies caused a great deal of resentment, resulting in a major

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China: A Country Study

rebellion in Xizang in 1959 and a smaller one in Xinjiang in 1962,

the latter bringing about the flight of some 60,000 Kazak herders

across the border to the Soviet Union. Scattered reports of violence in minority areas in the 1966-76 decade suggest that discontent was high at that time also. After the arrest of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) in 1976, poli- cies toward the ethnic minorities were moderated regarding language, religion and culture, and land-use patterns, with the

admission that the assimilationist policies had caused considerable alienation. The new leadership pledged to implement a bona

fide system of autonomy for the ethnic minorities and placed great

emphasis on the need to recruit minority cadres.

Although the minorities accounted for only about 7 percent of

China's population, the minority deputies to the National People's

Congress made up 13.5 percent of all representatives to the congress in 1985, and 5 of the 22 vice chairmen of its Standing Committee (23 percent) in 1983 were minority nationals. A Mongol,

Ulanhu, was elected vice president of China in June 1983.

Nevertheless, political administration of the minority areas was the same as that in Han regions, and the minority nationalities were

subject to the dictates of the Chinese Communist Party. Despite

the avowed desire to integrate the minorities into the political mainstream, the party was not willing to share key decision-making powers with the ethnic minorities. As of the late 1970s, the minority

nationality cadres accounted for only 3 to 5 percent of all cadres.

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese government

in the mid-1980s was pursuing a liberal policy toward the national

minorities. Full autonomy became a constitutional right, and policy

stipulated that Han cadres working in the minority areas learn the

local spoken and written languages. Significant concessions were made to Xizang, historically the most nationalistic of the minority

areas. The number of Tibetan cadres as a percentage of all cadres

in Xizang increased from 50 percent in 1979 to 62 percent in 1985.

In Zhejiang Province the government formally decided to assign only

cadres familiar with nationality policy and sympathetic to minorities to cities, prefectures, and counties with large numbers of minority

people. In Xinjiang the leaders of the region's fourteen prefectural

and city governments and seventy-seven of all eighty-six rural and

urban leaders were of minority nationality.

Labor Force

A 10-percent sample tabulation of census questionnaires from

the 1982 census provided badly needed statistical data on China's

working population and allowed the first reliable estimates of the

88
Jinuo musicians, Yunnan Province

Courtesy China Pictorial Va dancer, southwest China

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

89
China: A Country Study

labor force's size and characteristics. The quality of the data was

considered to be quite high, although a 40-million-person discrepancy existed between the 10-percent sample and the regular

employment statistics. This discrepancy can be explained by the combination of inaccurate employment statistics and varying methods

of calculation and scope of coverage. The estimated mid- 1982 labor

force was 546 million, or approximately 54 percent of the total population. Males accounted for slightly more than half of the estimated

labor force, and the labor force participation rates for persons age

fifteen years and older were among the highest in the world.

The 10-percent sample showed that approximately three-fourths

of the labor force worked in the agricultural sector. According to the State Statistical Bureau, in the mid-1980s more than 120 million people worked in the nonagricultural sector. The sample

revealed that men occupied the great majority of leadership positions. The average worker was a youthful thirty-three years old,

and three out of every four workers were under forty-five years

of age. The working population had a low education level. Less

than 40 percent of the labor force had more than a primary school

education, and 30 percent were illiterate or semiliterate. In mid- 1982 the overall unemployment rate was estimated to be about 5 percent. Of the approximately 25 million unemployed,

12 million were men and 13 million were women. The unemployment rate was highest in the northeast and lowest in the south. The

unemployment rates were higher than those of East Asian,

Southeast Asian, and Pacific island countries for which data were

available but were lower than the rates found in North America

and Europe. Virtually all of the unemployed persons in cities and

towns were under twenty years of age. Health Care

Since the founding of the People's Republic, the goal of health

programs has been to provide care to every member of the population and to make maximum use of limited health-care personnel, equipment, and financial resources. The emphasis has been on preventive rather than on curative medicine on the premise that preventive medicine is "active" while curative medicine is "passive." The health-care system has dramatically improved the health

of the people, as reflected by the remarkable increase in average

life expectancy from about thirty-two years in 1950 to sixty-nine

years in 1985.

After 1949 the Ministry of Public Health was responsible for all health-care activities and established and supervised all facets of

health policy. Along with a system of national, provincial-level,

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Physical Environment and Population

and local facilities, the ministry regulated a network of industrial

and state enterprise hospitals and other facilities covering the health

needs of workers of those enterprises. In 1981 this additional net- work provided approximately 25 percent of the country's total health

services. Health care was provided in both rural and urban areas through a three-tiered system. In rural areas the first tier was made

up of barefoot doctors working out of village medical centers. They

provided preventive and primary-care services, with an average

of two doctors per 1,000 people. At the next level were the township health centers, which functioned primarily as out-patient clinics for about 10,000 to 30,000 people each. These centers had about

ten to thirty beds each, and the most qualified members of the staff were assistant doctors. The two lower-level tiers made up the "rural

collective health system" that provided most of the country's medical care. Only the most seriously ill patients were referred to the

third and final tier, the county hospitals, which served 200,000 to 600,000 people each and were staffed by senior doctors who held

degrees from 5-year medical schools. Health care in urban areas was provided by paramedical personnel assigned to factories and

neighborhood health stations. If more professional care was neces- sary the patient was sent to a district hospital, and the most seri- ous cases were handled by municipal hospitals. To ensure a higher

level of care, a number of state enterprises and government agencies sent their employees directly to district or municipal hospitals, circumventing the paramedical, or barefoot doctor, stage.

An emphasis on public health and preventive treatment characterized health policy from the beginning of the 1950s. At that time

the party began to mobilize the population to engage in mass "patriotic health campaigns" aimed at improving the low level of

environmental sanitation and hygiene and attacking certain diseases. One of the best examples of this approach was the mass assaults on the "four pests" —rats, sparrows, flies, and mosquitoes—and on schistosoma-carrying snails. Particular efforts were devoted in the health campaigns to improving water quality through such measures as deep-well construction and human-waste treatment. Only

in the larger cities had human waste been centrally disposed. In the

countryside, where "night soil" has always been collected and applied

to the fields as fertilizer, it was a major source of disease. Since the

1950s, rudimentary treatments such as storage in pits, composting,

and mixture with chemicals have been implemented.

As a result of preventive efforts, such epidemic diseases as cholera,

plague, typhoid, and scarlet fever have almost been eradicated. The

mass mobilization approach proved particularly successful in the

fight against syphilis, which was reportedly eliminated by the 1960s.

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China: A Country Study

The incidence of other infectious and parasitic diseases was reduced

and controlled. Relaxation of certain sanitation and antiepidemic

programs since the 1960s, however, may have resulted in some

increased incidence of disease. In the early 1980s, continuing defi- ciencies in human-waste treatment were indicated by the persis- tence of such diseases as hookworm and schistosomiasis.

Tuberculosis, a major health hazard in 1949, remained a problem

to some extent in the 1980s, as did hepatitis, malaria, and dysentery. In the late 1980s, the need for health education and improved

sanitation was still apparent, but it was more difficult to carry out

the health-care campaigns because of the breakdown of the brigade

system. By the mid-1980s China recognized the acquired immune

deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus as a serious health threat but

remained relatively unaffected by the deadly disease. As of mid- 1987

there was confirmation of only two deaths of Chinese citizens from

AIDS, and monitoring of foreigners had begun. Following a 1987

regional World Health Organization meeting, the Chinese government announced it would join the global fight against AIDS, which

would involve quarantine inspection of people entering China from

abroad, medical supervision of people vulnerable to AIDS, and

establishment of AIDS laboratories in coastal cities. Additionally,

it was announced that China was experimenting with the use of

traditional medicine to treat AIDS.

In the mid-1980s the leading causes of death in China were similar to those in the industrialized world: cancer, cerebrovascular dis- ease, and heart disease. Some of the more prevalent forms of fatal cancers included cancer of the stomach, esophagus, liver, lung, and

colon-rectum. The frequency of these diseases was greater for men

than for women, and lung cancer mortality was much greater in higher income areas. The degree of risk for the different kinds of cancers varied widely by region. For example, nasopharyngeal

cancer was found primarily in south China, while the incidence

of esophageal cancer was higher in the north.

To address concerns over health, the Chinese greatly increased

the number and quality of health-care personnel, although in 1986

serious shortages still existed. In 1949 only 33,000 nurses and 363,000

physicians were practicing; by 1985 the numbers had risen dramatically to 637,000 nurses and 1.4 million physicians. Some 436,000

physicians' assistants were trained in Western medicine and had

2 years of medical education after junior high school. Official Chinese

statistics also reported that the number of paramedics increased from

about 485,400 in 1975 to more than 853,400 in 1982. The number

of students in medical and pharmaceutical colleges in China rose from about 100,000 in 1975 to approximately 160,000 in 1982.

92
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China: A Country Study

Efforts were made to improve and expand medical facilities. The

number of hospital beds increased from 1.7 million in 1976 to 2.2 million in 1984, or to 2 beds per 1,000 compared with 4.5 beds

per 1,000 in 1981 in the United States. The number of hospitals

increased from 63,000 in 1976 to 67,000 in 1984, and the number

of specialized hospitals and scientific research institutions doubled

during the same period.

The availability and quality of health care varied widely from

city to countryside. According to 1982 census data, in rural areas

the crude death rate was 1.6 per 1 ,000 higher than in urban areas, and life expectancy was about 4 years lower. The number of senior

physicians per 1 ,000 population was about 10 times greater in urban

areas than in rural ones; state expenditure on medical care was more than¥26 per capita in urban areas and less than¥3 per capita in rural areas. There were also about twice as many hospital

beds in urban areas as in rural areas. These are aggregate figures,

however, and certain rural areas had much better medical care and

nutritional levels than others. In 1987 economic reforms were causing a fundamental trans- formation of the rural health-care system. The decollectivization

of agriculture resulted in a decreased desire on the part of the rural

populations to support the collective welfare system, of which health care was a part. In 1984 surveys showed that only 40 to 45 percent

of the rural population was covered by an organized cooperative

medical system, as compared with 80 to 90 percent in 1979.

This shift entailed a number of important consequences for rural

health care. The lack of financial resources for the cooperatives

resulted in a decrease in the number of barefoot doctors, which

meant that health education and primary and home care suffered

and that in some villages sanitation and water supplies were checked

less frequently. Also, the failure of the cooperative health-care sys- tem limited the funds available for continuing education for barefoot

doctors, thereby hindering their ability to provide adequate preventive and curative services. The costs of medical treatment increased,

deterring some patients from obtaining necessary medical attention. If the patients could not pay for services received, then the

financial responsibility fell on the hospitals and commune health

centers, in some cases creating large debts.

Consequently, in the post-Mao era of modernization, the rural areas were forced to adapt to a changing health-care environment.

Many barefoot doctors went into private practice, operating on a

fee-for-service basis and charging for medication. But soon farmers demanded better medical services as their incomes increased,

bypassing the barefoot doctors and going straight to the commune

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Physical Environment and Population

health centers or county hospitals. A number of barefoot doctors

left the medical profession after discovering that they could earn

a better living from farming, and their services were not replaced.

The leaders of brigades, through which local health care was

administered, also found farming to be more lucrative than their

salaried positions, and many of them left their jobs. Many of the

cooperative medical programs collapsed. Farmers in some brigades

established voluntary health-insurance programs but had difficulty

organizing and administering them.

Although the practice of traditional Chinese medicine was

strongly promoted by the Chinese leadership and remained a major

component of health care, Western medicine was gaining increasing acceptance in the 1970s and 1980s. For example, the number

of physicians and pharmacists trained in Western medicine reportedly increased by 225,000 from 1976 to 1981, and the number of

physicians' assistants trained in Western medicine increased by

about 50,000. In 1981 there were reportedly 516,000 senior physicians trained in Western medicine and 290,000 senior physicians

trained in traditional Chinese medicine. The goal of China's medical professionals is to synthesize the best elements of traditional

and Western approaches.

In practice, however, this combination has not always worked

smoothly. In many respects, physicians trained in traditional medicine and those trained in Western medicine constitute separate groups

with different interests. For instance, physicians trained in Western

medicine have been somewhat reluctant to accept "unscientific"

traditional practices, and traditional practitioners have sought to preserve authority in their own sphere. Although Chinese medical

schools that provided training in Western medicine also provided some instruction in traditional medicine, relatively few physicians were regarded as competent in both areas in the mid-1980s.

The extent to which traditional and Western treatment methods

were combined and integrated in the major hospitals varied greatly.

Some hospitals and medical schools of purely traditional medicine were established. In most urban hospitals, the pattern seemed to be to establish separate departments for traditional and Western

treatment. In the county hospitals, however, traditional medicine

received greater emphasis.

Traditional medicine depends on herbal treatments, acupuncture, acupressure, moxibustion (the burning of herbs over acupuncture points), and "cupping" of skin with heated bamboo. Such

approaches are believed to be most effective in treating minor and

chronic diseases, in part because of milder side effects. Traditional

treatments may be used for more serious conditions as well,

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China: A Country Study

particularly for such acute abdominal conditions as appendicitis,

pancreatitis, and gallstones; sometimes traditional treatments are used in combination with Western treatments. A traditional method

of orthopedic treatment, involving less immobilization than Western

methods, continued to be widely used in the 1980s.

Although health care in China developed in very positive ways

by the mid-1980s, it exacerbated the problem of overpopulation.

In 1987 China was faced with a population four times that of the

United States and over three times that of the Soviet Union. Efforts

to distribute the population over a larger portion of the country

had failed: only the minority nationalities seemed able to thrive

in the mountainous or desert-covered frontiers. Birth control programs implemented in the 1970s succeeded in reducing the birth

rate, but estimates in the mid-1980s projected that China's population will surpass the 1 .2 billion mark by the turn of the century,

putting still greater pressure on the land and resources of the nation.

A thorough, scholarly study of China's geography is Zhao Songqiao's Physical Geography of China, which contains a number of

detailed maps and charts, as well as interesting photographs and

Landsat images. The China Handbook Editorial Committee's China

Handbook Series: Geography provides a less technical overview of the

physical environment and includes brief summaries of the topography, climate, and administrative divisions of China's provinces,

autonomous regions, and special municipalities.

A good overview of China's population is provided in a series of articles found in China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000,

Volume 1: The Four Modernizations , a collection of papers published

by the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee. It opens

with a general assessment of population policies and problems and

continues with articles on the 1982 census results, family planning,

the labor force, and material poverty. An article written by H. Yuan

Tien, entitled "China: Demographic Billionaire," in Population

Bulletin also provides a good demographic overview.

China's One-Child Family Policy, edited by Elisabeth Croll, Delia

Davin, and Penny Kane, is an excellent analysis of the radical policy

first announced in 1979. The work discusses the origins, problems,

and prospects of the one-child policy. Tien's "Redirection of the

Chinese Family" provides a concise overview of the one-child policy

and its implications. (For further information and complete cita- tions, see Bibliography.)

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Chapter 3. The Social System
A Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-906) female dancer
China, the world's largest society, is united by

a set of values and institutions that cut across extensive linguistic,

environmental, and subcultural differences. Residents of the south- ern and northern regions of the country might not understand each

other's speech, enjoy each other's favorite foods, or make a living

from each other's land, and they might describe each other with

derogatory stereotypes. Nonetheless, they would regard each other

as fellow Chinese, members of the same society, and different from

the Vietnamese or Koreans, with whom some Chinese might seem

to have more in common.

Chinese society, since the second decade of the twentieth century,

has been the object of a revolution intended to change it in fundamental ways. In its more radical phases, such as the Great Leap

Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the

revolution aimed at nothing less than the complete transformation

of everything from the practice of medicine, to higher education,

to family life. In the 1980s China's leaders and intellectuals considered the revolution far from completed, and they intended further

social change to make China a fully modernized country. It had

become increasingly clear that although many aspects of Chinese

social life had indeed undergone fundamental changes as a result of both political movements and economic development, the trans- formation was less than total. Much of the past either lived on in modified form or served to shape revolutionary initiatives and to limit the choices open to even the most radical of revolutionaries.

Ethnic Boundaries

China is, like all large states, multiethnic; but one ethnic group

the Han Chinese (see Glossary)—dominates the politics, government, and economy. This account focuses on the Han, and it considers the minority peoples only in relation to the Han ethnic group

(see Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). Over the centuries a great many peoples who were originally not Chinese have been assimilated into Chinese society. Entry into

Han society has not demanded religious conversion or formal

initiation. It has depended on command of the Chinese written lan- guage and evidence of adherence to Chinese values and customs.

For the most part, what has distinguished those groups that have

been assimilated from those that have not has been the suitability

of their environment for Han agriculture. People living in areas

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China: A Country Study

where Chinese-style agriculture is feasible have either been displaced or assimilated. The consequence is that most of China's minorities inhabit extensive tracts of land unsuited for Han-style agriculture; they are not usually found as long-term inhabitants of Chinese

cities or in close proximity to most Han villages. Those living on

steppes, near desert oases, or in high mountains, and dependent on pastoral nomadism or shifting cultivation, have retained their

ethnic distinctiveness outside Han society. The sharpest ethnic

boundary has been between the Han and the steppe pastoralists, a boundary sharpened by centuries of conflict and cycles of conquest and subjugation. Reminders of these differences are the

absence of dairy products from the otherwise extensive repertoire

of Han cuisine and the distaste most Chinese feel for such typical

steppe specialties as tea laced with butter.

Official policy recognizes the multiethnic nature of the Chinese

state, within which all "nationalities" are formally equal. On the one hand, it is not state policy to force the assimilation of minority

nationalities, and such nonpolitical expressions of ethnicity as native

costumes and folk dances are encouraged. On the other hand,

China's government is a highly centralized one that recognizes no

legitimate limits to its authority, and minority peoples in far western

Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region, for example, are considered

Chinese citizens just as much as Han farmers on the outskirts of

Beijing.

Official attitudes toward minority peoples are inconsistent, if not

contradictory. Since 1949 policies toward minorities have fluctu- ated between tolerance and coercive attempts to impose Han stan- dards. Tolerant periods have been marked by subsidized material

benefits intended to win loyalty, while coercive periods such as the

Cultural Revolution have attempted to eradicate "superstition"

and to overthrow insufficiently radical or insufficiently nationalistic local leaders.

What has not varied has been the assumption that it is the central government that decides what is best for minority peoples and

that national citizenship takes precedence over ethnic identity. In

fact, minority nationality is a legal status in China. The government reserves for itself the right to determine whether or not a group

is a minority nationality, and the list has been revised several times

since the 1950s. In the mid-1980s the state recognized 55 minority

nationalities, some with as few as 1,100 members. Minority nationalities are guaranteed special representation in the National People's Congress and the Chinese People's Political Consultative

Conference (see Glossary). Areas where minorities form the majority of the population may be designated "autonomous" counties,

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The Social System

prefectures, or regions, subject to the authority of the central government in Beijing rather than to provincial or subprovincial administrations. It is expected that local administrations in such regions

will be staffed at least in part by minority nationals and that application of national policies will take into account local circumstances

and special needs. In the early 1980s, for example, minority peoples were exempted from the strict limitations on the number of

children per family dictated to the Han population.

Most Han Chinese have no contact with members of minority

groups. But in areas such as the Xizang (also known as Tibet) or Xinjiang autonomous regions, where large numbers of Han have

settled since the assertion of Chinese central government authority over them in the 1950s, there is clearly some ethnic tension (see

Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). The tension stems from Han

dominance over such previously independent or semi-autonomous

peoples as the Tibetans and Uygurs, from Cultural Revolution

attacks on religious observances, and from Han disdain for and

lack of sensitivity to minority cultures. In the autonomous areas

the ethnic groups appear to lead largely separate lives, and most

Han in those areas either work as urban-based administrators and

professionals or serve in military installations or on state farms.

Since the late 1970s, the central authorities have made efforts to conciliate major ethnic minorities by sponsoring the revival of

religious festivals and by increasing the level of subsidies to the

poorest minority regions. Because of these efforts, other moderate

government policies, and the geographic distribution and relatively

small size of minority groups in China, the country has not suffered

widespread or severe ethnic conflict. Han Diversity and Unity

The differences among regional and linguistic subgroups of Han

Chinese are at least as great as those among many European

nationalities. Han Chinese speak seven or eight mutually unintelligible dialects, each of which has many local subdialects. Cultural

differences (cuisine, costume, and custom) are equally great.

Modern Chinese history provides many examples of conflict, up

to the level of small-scale regional wars, between linguistic and

regional groups.

Such diversities, however, have not generated exclusive loyalties, and distinctions in religion or political affiliation have not reinforced regional differences. Rather, there has been a consistent

tendency in Chinese thought and practice to downplay intra-Han

distinctions, which are regarded as minor and superficial. What

all Han share is more significant than the ways in which they differ.

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China: A Country Study

In conceptual terms, the boundary between Han and non-Han is absolute and sharp, while boundaries between subsets of Han are

subject to continual shifts, are dictated by local conditions, and do

not produce the isolation inherent in relations between Han and

minority groups.

Han ethnic unity is the result of two ancient and culturally central Chinese institutions, one of which is the written language.

Chinese is written with ideographs (sometimes called characters)

that represent meanings rather than sounds, and so written Chinese

does not reflect the speech of its author. The disjunction between

written and spoken Chinese means that a newspaper published in Beijing can be read in Shanghai or Guangzhou, although the resi- dents of the three cities would not understand each other's speech.

It also means that there can be no specifically Cantonese (Guangzhou dialect) or Hunanese literature because the local speech of

a region cannot be directly or easily represented in writing. (It is possible to add local color to fiction, cite colloquialisms, or transcribe folk songs.) Therefore, local languages have not become a

focus for regional self-consciousness or nationalism. Educated

Chinese tend to regard the written ideographs as primary, and they

regard the seven or eight spoken Han Chinese dialects as simply

variant ways of pronouncing the same ideographs. This is linguistically inaccurate, but the attitude has significant political and social consequences. The uniform written language in 1987 continued

to be a powerful force for Han unity.

The other major force contributing to Han ethnic unity has been

the centralized imperial state. The ethnic group takes its name from

the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220; see The Imperial Era, ch. 1). Although the imperial government never directly controlled the vil- lages, it did have a strong influence on popular values and culture. The average peasant could not read and was not familiar with

the details of state administration or national geography, but he was aware of belonging to a group of subcontinental scope. Being

Han, even for illiterate peasants, has meant conscious identification with a glorious history and a state of immense proportions.

Peasant folklore and folk religion assumed that the imperial state, with an emperor and an administrative bureaucracy, was the nor- mal order of society. In the imperial period, the highest prestige

went to scholar-officials, and every schoolboy had the possibility,

at least theoretically, of passing the civil service examinations and

becoming an official. The prestige of the state and its popular identification with the

highest values of Chinese civilization were not accidents; they were

the final result of a centuries-long program of indoctrination and

102
Confucius observing the practice of rules oj conduct among the members of society. Woodcuc.

Courtesy Library of Congress

education directed by the Confucian scholar-officials. Traditional

Chinese society can be distinguished from other premodern civili zations to the extent that the state, rather than organized religious

groups or ethnic segments of society, was able to appropriate the

symbols of wisdom, morality, and the common good. The legacy

for modern Chinese society has been a strong centralized government that has the right to impose its values on the population and

against which there is no legitimate right of dissent or secession.

Traditional Society and Culture

The leaders who directed the efforts to change Chinese society

after the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 were raised in the old society and had been marked with its values.

Although they were conscious revolutionaries, they could not wholly

escape the culture into which they had been born. Nationalists as well as revolutionaries, they had no intention of transforming China

into a replica of any foreign country. They had an ambivalent

attitude toward their country's past and its traditional society, con- demning some aspects and praising others. Furthermore, as practical administrators, China's post- 1949 leaders devoted energy and

attention to changing some aspects of traditional society, such as rural land tenure and the content of education, while leaving other

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China: A Country Study

aspects, such as family structure, largely untouched. Change in Chinese society, therefore, has been less than total and less consistent than has often been claimed by official spokesmen. To understand contemporary society, it is necessary to be familiar with past

legacies, particularly in the realm of values and in areas of social

life, such as family organization, where transformation has not been

a high-priority political goal.

China's traditional values were contained in the orthodox version of Confucianism, which was taught in the academies and tested

in the imperial civil service examinations. These values are dis- tinctive for their this-worldly emphasis on society and public administration and for their wide diffusion throughout Chinese society.

Confucianism, never a religion in any accepted sense, is primarily

concerned with social order. Social harmony is to be achieved within

the state, whose administrators consciously select the proper policies and act to educate both the rulers and the subject masses. Confucianism originated and developed as the ideology of professional

administrators and continued to bear the impress of its origins (see

The Ancient Dynasties; The Imperial Era, ch. 1). Imperial-era Confucianists concentrated on this world and had

an agnostic attitude toward the supernatural. They approved of

ritual and ceremony, but primarily for their supposed educational

and psychological effects on those participating. Confucianists

tended to regard religious specialists (who historically were often

rivals for authority or imperial favor) as either misguided or intent on squeezing money from the credulous masses. The major metaphysical element in Confucian thought was the belief in an impersonal ultimate natural order that included the social order.

Confucianists asserted that they understood the inherent pattern

for social and political organization and therefore had the authority

to run society and the state. The Confucianists claimed authority based on their knowledge,

which came from direct mastery of a set of books. These books,

the Confucian Classics, were thought to contain the distilled wisdom of the past and to apply to all human beings everywhere at

all times (see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). The mastery of the Classics was the highest form of education and the best possible qualification for holding public office. The way to achieve the ideal society was to teach the entire people as much of the content of the Classics as possible. It was assumed that everyone was educable and

that everyone needed educating. The social order may have been

natural, but it was not assumed to be instinctive. Confucianism

put great stress on learning, study, and all aspects of socialization.

Confucianists preferred internalized moral guidance to the external

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The Social System

force of law, which they regarded as a punitive force applied to those unable to learn morality. Confucianists saw the ideal society

as a hierarchy, in which everyone knew his or her proper place

and duties. The existence of a ruler and of a state were taken for granted, but Confucianists held that rulers had to demonstrate their

fitness to rule by their "merit." The essential point was that heredity was an insufficient qualification for legitimate authority. As practical administrators, Confucianists came to terms with hereditary

kings and emperors but insisted on their right to educate rulers

in the principles of Confucian thought. Traditional Chinese thought

thus combined an ideally rigid and hierarchical social order with an appreciation for education, individual achievement, and mobility

within the rigid structure. Diffusion of Values

While ideally everyone would benefit from direct study of the

Classics, this was not a realistic goal in a society composed largely

of illiterate peasants. But Confucianists had a keen appreciation

for the influence of social models and for the socializing and teaching

functions of public rituals and ceremonies. The common people were thought to be influenced by the examples of their rulers and

officials, as well as by public events. Vehicles of cultural transmission, such as folk songs, popular drama, and literature and the arts, were the objects of government and scholarly attention. Many scholars, even if they did not hold public office, put a great deal of effort into popularizing Confucian values by lecturing on morality, publicly praising local examples of proper conduct, and "reforming"

local customs, such as bawdy harvest festivals. In this manner, over hundreds of years, the values of Confucianism were diffused across China and into scattered peasant villages and rural culture.

The Confucian Legacy

Traditional values have clearly shaped much of contemporary

Chinese life. The belief in rule by an educated and functionally

unspecialized elite, the value placed on learning and propagating an orthodox ideology that focuses on society and government, and

the stress on hierarchy and the preeminent role of the state were

all carried over from traditional society. Some of the more radical

and extreme policies of the 1950s and 1960s, such as attacks on

intellectuals and compulsory manual labor for bureaucrats, can only

be understood as responses to deep-rooted traditional attitudes. The

role of model workers and soldiers, as well as official concern for the content and form of popular literature and the arts, also reflects characteristically Chinese themes. In the mid-1980s a number of

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China: A Country Study

Chinese writers and political leaders identified the lingering hold

of "feudal" attitudes, even within the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP), as a major obstacle to modernization. They identified such

phenomena as authoritarianism, unthinking obedience to leaders,

deprecation of expert knowledge, lack of appreciation for law, and

the failure to apply laws to leaders as "feudal" legacies that were

not addressed in the early years of China's revolution.

Traditional Social Structure

Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese

population have been farmers. The farmers supported a small number of specialized craftsmen and traders and also an even smaller

number of land- and office-holding elite families who ran the soci- ety. Although the peasant farmers and their families resembled

counterparts in other societies, the traditional Chinese elite, often

referred to in English as the gentry, had no peers in other societies. The national elite, who comprised perhaps 1 percent of China's

population, had a number of distinctive features. They were dis- persed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene. Although they held

land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed

large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. They

achieved their highest and most prestigious titles by their perfor- mance on the central government's triennial civil service examinations. These titles had to be earned by each generation, and since

the examinations had strict numerical quotas, competition was

fierce. Government officials were selected from those who passed

the examinations, which tested for mastery of the Confucian Classics. Elite families, like everyone else in China, practiced partible

inheritance, dividing the estate equally among all sons. The combination of partible inheritance and the competition for success in the examinations meant that rates of mobility into and out of the

elite were relatively high for a traditional agrarian society.

The imperial state was staffed by a small civil bureaucracy. Civil

officials were directly appointed and paid by the emperor and had

to have passed the civil service examinations. Officials, who were

supposed to owe their primary loyalty to the emperor, did not serve

in their home provinces and were generally assigned to different

places for each tour of duty. Although the salary of central offi- cials was low, the positions offered great opportunities for personal

enrichment, which was one reason that families competed so fiercely to pass the examinations and then obtain an appointment. For most

officials, officeholding was not a lifetime career. They served one

or a few tours and then returned to their home districts and families,

106
Musicians with a variety of

instruments important to Confucian rituals Courtesy Library of Congress

where their wealth, prestige, and network of official contacts made

them dominant figures on the local scene. The Examination System

In late imperial China the status of local-level elites was ratified by contact with the central government, which maintained a monopoly on society's most prestigious titles. The examination sys- tem and associated methods of recruitment to the central bureaucracy were major mechanisms by which the central government

captured and held the loyalty of local-level elites. Their loyalty,

in turn, ensured the integration of the Chinese state and countered

tendencies toward regional autonomy and the breakup of the centralized system. The examination system distributed its prizes

according to provincial and prefectural quotas, which meant that

imperial officials were recruited from the whole country, in numbers roughly proportional to a province's population. Elites all over China, even in the disadvantaged peripheral regions, had a chance

at succeeding in the examinations and achieving the rewards of

officeholding.

The examination system also served to maintain cultural unity

and consensus on basic values. The uniformity of the content of

the examinations meant that the local elite and ambitious would-be

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China: A Country Study

elite all across China were being indoctrinated with the same values. Even though only a small fraction (about 5 percent) of those who

attempted the examinations passed them and received titles, the

study, self-indoctrination, and hope of eventual success on a subsequent examination served to sustain the interest of those who took

them. Those who failed to pass (most of the candidates at any sin- gle examination) did not lose wealth or local social standing; as dedicated believers in Confucian orthodoxy, they served, without

the benefit of state appointments, as teachers, patrons of the arts, and managers of local projects, such as irrigation works, schools, or charitable foundations. In late traditional China, then, education was valued in part

because of its possible payoff in the examination system. The overall result of the examination system and its associated study was cul- tural uniformity—identification of the educated with national rather

than regional goals and values. This self-conscious national identity underlies the nationalism so important in China's politics in the twentieth century (see Republican China, ch. 1). Social Stratification

Traditional thought accepted social stratification as natural and

considered most social groups to be organized on hierarchical principles. In the ideal Confucian scheme of social stratification, schol- ars were at the highest level of society, followed by farmers, then

by artisans, with merchants and soldiers in last place. In society at large, the highest and most prestigious positions were those of political generalists, such as members of the emperor's

council or provincial governors. Experts, such as tax specialists or

physicians, ranked below the ruling political generalists. Although commerce has been a major element of Chinese life since the early

imperial period, and wealthy merchants have been major figures

in Chinese cities, Confucianists disparaged merchants. Commercial success never won respect, and wealth based on commerce was

subject to official taxes, fees, and even confiscation. Upward mobility by merchants was achieved by cultivating good relations with

powerful officials and educating their sons in the hope they might

become officials. Although dynasties were founded by military conquest, Confucian ideology derogated military skill. Common sol- diers occupied a low position in society and were recruited from

its lowest ranks. Chinese civilization, however, includes a signifi- cant military tradition, and generals and strategists usually were

held in high esteem.

Most of China's population was composed of peasant farmers,

whose basic role in supporting the rulers and the rest of society

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The Social System

was recognized as a positive one in Confucian ideology. In practical terms, farming was considered a hard and insecure life and one

that was best left if an opportunity was available. In Chinese communities the factors generating prestige were education, abstention from manual labor, wealth expended on the arts and education, a large family with many sons, and community ser- vice and acts of charity. Another asset was an extensive personal

network that permitted one to grant favors and make introductions

and recommendations. There was no sharp line dividing the elite from the masses, and social mobility was possible and common.

Stratification and Families

Before 1950 the basic units of social stratification and social

mobility were families. Although wealthy families were often quite

large, with as many as thirty people in three or four generations

living together on a common budget, most families contained five or six people. In socioeconomic terms, late traditional China was composed of a large number of small enterprises, perhaps as many

as 100 million farms and small businesses. Each was operated by

a family, which acted not only as a household but also as a commercial enterprise. The family head also was the trustee of the estate and manager of the family business. Families could own property,

such as land or shops, and pass it on to the next generation.

About 80 percent of the population were peasant farmers, and

land was the fundamental form of property. Although many peasant

families owned no land, large estates were rare by the eighteenth

and nineteenth centuries. Peasant families might own all of the land

they worked, or own some and rent some from a landowner, or

rent all their land. Regardless of the form of tenure, the farm was managed as a unit, and the head of household was free to decide

what to plant and how to use the labor of family members. Land

could be bought and sold in small parcels, as well as mortgaged

and rented in various forms of short-term and long-term contracts. The consequence was that in most villages peasant families occupied

different steps on the ladder of stratification; they did not form a uniformly impoverished mass. At any time, peasant families were

distinguished by the amount of land that they owned and worked

compared with the percentage of their income they paid in rent. Over time, peasant families rose or fell in small steps as they bought

land or were forced to sell it. Most non-farm enterprises, commercial or craft, were similarly

small businesses run by families. The basic units were owned by

families, which took a long-term view of their prospects and

attempted to shift resources and family personnel from occupation

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China: A Country Study

to occupation to adapt to economic circumstances. In all cases, the

long-term goal of the head of the family was to ensure the survival

and prosperity of the family and to pass the estate along to the next

generation. The most common family strategy was to diversify the

family's economic activities. Such strategies lay behind the large

number of small-scale enterprises that characterized Chinese soci- ety before 1950. Farming and landowning were secure but not very

profitable. Commerce and money-lending brought in greater

returns but also carried greater risks. A successful farm family might

invest in a shop or a food-processing business, while a successful restaurant owner might buy farmland, worked by a sharecropping

peasant family, as a secure investment. All well-to-do families

invested in the education of sons, with the hope of getting at least one son into a government job. The consequence was that it was

difficult to draw a class line dividing landlords, merchants, and

government workers or officials. Social Mobility

Formal education provided the best and most respected avenue

of upward mobility, and by the nineteenth century literacy rates

in China were high for a traditional peasant society. Chances of

receiving a good education were highest for the upper classes in and around coastal cities and lowest for the farmers of the interior.

If schooling was not available, there were other avenues of mobility.

Rural people could move to cities to seek their fortunes (and in some cases the cities were in Southeast Asia or the Americas). People

could go into business, gamble on the market for perishable cash

crops, try money-lending on a small scale or, as a long shot, join

the army or a bandit group. Late traditional society offered alter- nate routes to worldly success and a number of ways to change

one's position in society; but in all routes except education the

chances of failure outweighed those of success. In many cases, whether in business or banditry, success or failure depended to a great degree on luck. The combination of population pressure, the low rate of economic growth, natural disasters,

and endemic war that afflicted the Chinese population in the first half of the twentieth century meant that many families lost their

property, some starved, and almost all faced the probability of misfortune (see Republican China, ch. 1). From the perspective of

individuals and individual families, it is likely that from 1850 to 1950 the chances of downward mobility increased and the ability

to plan ahead with confidence decreased.

110
Open-air shop, Yangzhou,

Jiangsu

Province

Courtesy

Stephanie Marcus

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China: A Country Study

Social Change

After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, the

uncertainty and risks facing small-scale socioeconomic units were

replaced by an increase in the scale of organization and bureaucratization, with a consequent increase in predictability and personal

security. The tens of millions of small enterprises were replaced

by a much smaller number of larger enterprises, which were

organized in a bureaucratic and hierarchical manner. Collectivization of land and nationalization of most private businesses meant

that families no longer had estates to pass along. Long-term interests for families resided primarily with the work unit (collective farm,

office, or factory) to which they belonged.

Mobility in most cases consisted of gaining administrative pro- motions within such work units. Many of the alternate routes to social mobility were closed off, and formal education continued to be the primary avenue of upward mobility. In villages the army

offered the only reasonable alternative to a lifetime spent in the

fields, and demobilized soldiers staffed much of the local administrative structure in rural areas. For the first time in Chinese history,

the peasant masses were brought into direct contact with the national

government and the ruling party, and national-level politics came

to have a direct impact on the lives of ordinary people. The for- merly local, small-scale, and fragmented power structure was

replaced by a national and well-integrated structure, operating by

bureaucratic norms. The unpredictable consequences of market

forces were replaced by administrative allocation and changing eco- nomic policies enforced by the government bureaucracy.

The principal transformation of society took place during the

1950s in a series of major campaigns carried out by the party. In

the countryside, an initial land reform redistributed some land from

those families with an excess to those with none. This was quickly

followed by a series of reforms that increased the scale of organization, from seasonal mutual aid teams (groups of joint-support

laborers from individual farming households), to permanent mutual

aid teams, to voluntary agricultural cooperatives, to compulsory

agricultural cooperatives, and finally to large people's communes

(see Glossary). In each step, which came at roughly two-year

intervals, the size of the unit was increased, and the role of inherited

land or private ownership was decreased. By the early 1960s, an

estimated 90 million family farms had been replaced by about

74,000 communes. During the same period, local governments took over commerce, and private traders, shops, and markets were

replaced by supply and marketing cooperatives and the commercial

112
113
China: A Country Study

bureaus of local government. In the cities, large industries were

nationalized and craft enterprises were organized into large-scale

cooperatives that became branches of local government. Many small

shops and restaurants were closed down, and those that remained

were under municipal management.

In both city and countryside, the 1950s saw a major expansion

of the party and state bureaucracies, and many young people with

relatively scarce secondary or college educations found secure whitecollar jobs in the new organizations. The old society's set of for- mal associations—everything from lineages (clans), to irrigation

cooperatives, to urban guilds and associations of persons from the same place of origin, all of which were private, small-scale, and

usually devoted to a single purpose—were closed down. They were

replaced by government bureaus or state-sponsored mass associations, and their parochial leaders were replaced by party members.

The new institutions were run by party members and served as channels of information, communication, and political influence.

The basic pattern of contemporary society was established by

1960, and all changes since then, including the reforms of the early

and mid-1980s, have represented only modifications and adjustments to the pattern. The pattern is cellular; most people belong

to one large, all-embracing unit, such as a factory, government

office, or village. The unit is run by a party branch, operates (or

should operate) under common administrative rules and procedures,

and reflects the current policies of the party. The consequence has

been that most aspects of social differentiation, stratification,

mobility, and tensions are now played out within an institutional

framework. Most of the questions about any individual's life and

prospects can be answered by specifying the unit—the social cell

with which that individual is associated.

Differentiation

Although much of the social structure of modern China can be

interpreted as reflecting basic drives for security and equality, qualities in short supply before 1950, not all organizations and units are alike or equal. There are four major axes of social differentiation in modern China. To some extent they overlap and reinforce

each other, but each rests on distinct and separate grounds.

The Work Place

Work units (danwei) belong to the state or to collectives. State- owned units, typically administrative offices, research institutes,

and large factories, offer lifetime security, stable salaries, and

benefits that include pensions and free health care. Collectives

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The Social System

include the entire agricultural sector and many small-scale factories,

repair shops, and village- or township-run factories, workshops,

or service enterprises. Employees on the state payroll enjoy the best

benefits modern China has to offer. The incomes of those in the

collective sector are usually lower and depend on the performance

of the enterprise. They generally lack health benefits or pensions,

and the collective units usually do not provide housing or child- care facilities. In 1981 collective enterprises employed about 40 per- cent of the nonagricultural labor force, and most of the growth of

employment since 1980 has come in this sector. Even though the

growth since 1980 of individual businesses and small private

enterprises, such as restaurants and repair services, has provided some individuals with substantial cash incomes, employment in the state sector remains most people's first choice. This reflects the

public's recognition of that sector's superior material benefits as well as the traditional high prestige of government service.

"Security and equality" have been high priorities in modern

China and have usually been offered within single work units.

Because there is no nationwide insurance or social security system

and because the income of work units varies, the actual level of

benefits and the degree of equality (of incomes, housing, or

opportunities for advancement) depend on the particular work unit

with which individuals are affiliated. Work units are responsible

for chronic invalids or old people without families, as well as for families confronted with the severe illness or injury of the breadwinner. Equality has always been sought within work units (so that

all factory workers, for example, received the same basic wage,

or members of a collective farm the same share of the harvest),

and distinctions among units have not been publicly acknowledged.

During the Cultural Revolution, however, great stress was placed on equality in an abstract or general sense and on its symbolic act- ing out. Administrators and intellectuals were compelled to do

manual labor, and the uneducated and unskilled were held up as examples of revolutionary virtue. In the mid-1980s many people on the lower fringes of administration were not on the state payroll, and it was at this broad, lower

level that the distinction between government employees and non- government workers assumed the greatest importance. In the countryside, village heads were collective-sector workers, as were the

teachers in village primary schools, while workers for township

governments (and for all levels above them) and teachers in middle schools and universities were state employees. In the armed

forces, the rank and file who served a three- to five-year enlistment

at very low pay were considered citizens serving their military

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China: A Country Study

obligation rather than state employees. Officers, however, were state employees, and that distinction was far more significant than their

rank. The distinction between state and collective-sector employment was one of the first things considered when people tried to find jobs for their children or a suitable marriage partner.

Communist Party Membership

Every unit in China, from the villages through the armed forces,

is run by the party, which has a monopoly on political power (see

Membership, ch. 10). Party members are in a sense the heirs of

the traditional gentry. They are a power-holding elite, dispersed over the whole country, and serve as intermediaries between their

own communities or units and the nation. They are recruited from

the population at large on universalistic grounds of "merit," and

they claim authority by their mastery of an ideology that focuses on government and public order. The ideology is contained in books, and party members are expected to be familiar with the basic

texts, to continue studying them throughout their careers, and to apply them in concrete situations.

The differences between the traditional elite and the party are obvious. Party members are supposed to be revolutionaries, be

devoted to changing society rather than restoring it, come from

and represent the peasants and workers, and be willing to submit

themselves totally and unreservedly to the party. On the whole,

party members are distinctly less bookish and more militaryoriented and outwardly egalitarian than traditional elites. Party

members have been preferentially recruited from the poor peasantry

of the interior, from the army, and from the ranks of industrial

workers; intellectuals have usually found it difficult to enter the

party. The party is represented in every village and every large or medium-sized enterprise in the country. The scope of its actions

and concerns is much greater than that of its traditional predecessors. Relatively speaking, there are more party members than there were traditional gentry. In 1986 the Chinese Communist Party had

44 million members in 2.6 million local party branches. This meant

that about 8 percent of China's adult population belonged to the

party. Not all party members hold state jobs: some hold village

and township-level positions, and many armed forces enlisted per- sonnel join the party during their service. (Indeed, a chance to join

the party has been one of the major attractions of military service

for peasant youth.)

Party members direct all enterprises and institutions and

dominate public life and discussion. Anyone with ambitions to do

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The Social System

more than his or her daily job or work in a narrow professional

specialty must join the party. Membership is selective, and candidates must demonstrate their zeal, devotion to party principles,

and willingness to make a total commitment to the party. Ideally,

membership is a complete way of life, not a job, and selection for membership depends more on assessment of an individual's total personality and "moral" character than on specific qualifications or technical skills. While this could probably be said of all communist parties, Chinese Communist Party members certainly mirror China's traditional mandarins, who were political generalists

rather than technical specialists. Party members are the intermediaries who link enterprises and communities with high-level structures, and they can belong to more than one organization, such

as a factory and a municipal party body. Party membership is vir- tually a requirement for upward mobility or for opportunities to leave one's original work unit.

Urban-Rural Distinctions

In modern China, legal distinction is made between urban and

rural dwellers, and movement from rural to urban status is difficult. Urban life is felt to be far preferable, and living standards and

opportunities for such advantages as education are much better

in the cities. This firm and absolute distinction, which had no prece- dent in traditional society, is the result of a set of administrative

decisions and policies that have had major, if unintended, conse- quences for social organization. Modern Chinese society has been

marked by an extraordinary degree of residential immobility, and

internal migration and population movement have been limited

by state control. For most of the period since 1958, there has been no legal way to move out of villages or from small cities to large

cities. Although people have not inherited estates and private

property, they have inherited rural or urban status, which has been

a major determinant of living standards and life chances.

China's cities grew rapidly in the early and mid-1950s as rural

people moved in to take advantage of the employment opportunities generated by economic growth and the expansion of heavy

industry. The authorities became alarmed at this influx, both

because of the cost of providing urban services (food supply, waste

disposal) and because of the potential problems of unemployed or semi-employed migrants creating squatter settlements. Additionally, Chinese leaders held a certain anti-urban bias and tended to regard China's cities as unproductive. They accused city residents

of living off the countryside and indulging in luxury consumption.

Extolling large, smoking factories, they sought to engage the

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China: A Country Study

population in the manufacture of utilitarian commodities, like steel or trucks. The authorities demonstrated their bias against commerce and service trades by closing down many shops and markets. Since 1958 they have employed household registration and

food rationing systems to control urban growth and general migration (see Migration, ch. 2). In the 1980s the distinction between urban and rural status grew

mainly out of the food distribution and rationing system. Rural

registrants were/assumed to be growing their own staple foods, and

there was no provision for state allocation of grain to them. The

state monopolized the trade in grain; it collected grain in the countryside as a tax or as compulsory purchase and used it to supply

its functionaries and the urban population (see Internal Trade and

Distribution, ch. 8). Urban status entitled one to purchase an

allotment of grain, oil, and various other staple items. These were

rationed, and a ration coupon as well as money was necessary to obtain grain legally. Ration coupons were good only in their own

localities. The rationing system served several purposes. They

included the fair distribution of scarce goods, prevention of pri- vate speculation in staple foods, and residence control. In addition, the police in cities kept household registration records and

could make unannounced inspections, usually at night, looking for people who did not have legal permission to reside in a city. The

controls have not been foolproof and have worked more effectively

in times of shortages and strict political control. In the 1980s the reasons for the administrative barriers around

cities were fairly straightforward. Incomes and living standards in China's cities are two to three times higher than in the countryside. In addition, more urban dwellers have secure state jobs with

their associated benefits. State investment has been concentrated

in heavy industry, mostly urban, and agriculture and the rural sec- tor have been left to their own devices, after meeting their tax

obligations. The ironic consequence of a rural and peasant-based

revolution has been a system that has acted, intentionally or not,

to increase the social and economic gap between country and city.

Regional Distinctions

Regional distinctions in ways of life and standards of living were marked in traditional China and continue to have a strong influence on contemporary Chinese society. China's size, poorly developed

transportation system, and state controls on migration mean that

regional differences in income and in life chances remain large.

Contemporary Chinese commentary, while certainly explicit on

the role of class, has tended to ignore regional variation. This may

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The Social System

reflect the characteristic emphasis on Chinese unity and uniformity,

as well as the difficulty of fitting regional analysis into a Marxist

framework. Nevertheless, both geographical position and a community's position in administrative and regional hierarchies act

to limit income from sideline occupations, cash crops, village

industries, and even such matters as marriage choices.

Incomes and educational standards in the 1980s were highest

in the productive lower Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley and

central Guangdong Province regions and lowest in the semi-arid

highlands of the northwest and the Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, as they had been since the late nineteenth century. The lowest incomes

and living standards were in the peripheral areas inhabited by

minority nationalities. Within all regions, there were distinctions

between urban cores, intermediate areas, and peripheries. Villages on the outskirts of major cities had more opportunities for production of cash crops such as vegetables, more opportunities in side- line occupations or subcontracting for urban factories, and easier

access to urban services and amenities. Higher village incomes were

reflected in better housing, higher school attendance, well-appointed

village meeting halls, and a high level of farm and domestic mechanization. For settlements on the periphery, however, even if only

a short distance from urban centers, transportation was difficult. Such settlements had changed little in appearance since the 1950s

and devoted most of their land and work force to growing staple

grains. Many children in these villages dropped out of school before

completing primary education, as physical strength and endurance were more highly regarded than book learning.

There is clearly a degree of overlap in the four fields of social

differentiation (work units, party membership, urban-rural distinctions, and regional distinctions). The top of the hierarchy is occupied

by those who work in state organizations, belong to the party, live in a major city, and inhabit a prosperous region. Correspondingly,

the least favored inhabitants are peasants whose villages are located

in the remote parts of poor regions. What is most impressive about

social differentiation in modern China is the extent to which key

variables such as region and rural or urban status are ascribed,

and not easily changed by individual effort. This is the negative

side of the security and stability that attracted China's populace

to the party and its programs.

Common Patterns

The cellular structure of contemporary Chinese society and the

Chinese Communist Party's single-party rule mean that almost all social organizations share common characteristics (see Social

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China: A Country Study

Change, this ch.). The same general description (an all-embracing

social unit, whose members are assigned to it for life and which

is organized on bureaucratic principles, subordinate to higher

administrative levels, and managed by a branch of the party) applies

to villages, schools, administrative offices, factories, or army units. All of these are work units.

Work Units

In some ways, Chinese work units {danwei) resemble the largescale bureaucratic organizations that employ most people in eco- nomically developed societies. The unit is functionally specialized,

producing a single product or service, and is internally organized

into functional departments, with employees classified and rewarded

according to their work skills. Professional managers run the organization, enforce internal regulations and work rules, and negotiate

with other work units and administrative superiors.

Chinese work units, however, have many distinctive qualities.

Workers usually belong to the same unit for their entire working

life. The degree of commitment to the unit and the extent to which

the unit affects many aspects of the individual worker's life have no parallel in other societies. Chinese work units are highly cor- porate, closed, permanent, and all-embracing groups. In most cases, people are either born into their units (villages count as units) or

are assigned to them when they enter the work force. Units supply their members with much more than a wage. Housing in the cities is usually controlled and assigned by work units.

Consequently, one's neighbors are often one's workmates. If child- care facilities are available, they will most often be provided by

the work unit. Recreation facilities will be provided by the work

unit. Political study is carried out with one's workmates. In the

cities many people meet prospective spouses either at work or through the introduction of fellow workers. For most people, social mobility takes the form of working their way up within the organization.

If goods are in short supply, they will be rationed through work

units. This was the case with bicycles and sewing machines in the

1970s. The same can apply to babies. As part of China's planned

birth policy, unit supervisors monitor the fertility of married women

and may decide whose turn it is to have a baby (see Population

Control Programs, ch. 2). At the other end of the life cycle, pensions and funeral expenses are provided by work units. Travel to another city usually requires the written permission of one's work

unit before a ticket can be purchased or food coupons for one's

destination issued. Every unit is managed by party members, who

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The Social System

are responsible for personnel matters. Outside the farm sector, a written dossier is kept for every member of a unit. Units are often

physically distinct, occupying walled compounds whose exits are monitored by gatekeepers. The unit is thus a total community, if not a total institution, and unit membership is the single most significant aspect of individual identity in contemporary China.

Since the 1950s the individual's political life too has been centered in the work unit. Political campaigns have meant endless meetings and rallies within the unit, and when individuals were to be

criticized or condemned for political deviation or bad class origins,

it was done within the work unit, by fellow workers. In the postMao Zedong era, many people were working side by side with others

whom they had publicly condemned, humiliated, or physically beaten

fifteen or twenty years before. Much of the quality of life within a unit derives from the long-term nature of membership and human

relations and from the impossibility of leaving. Members seem most

often to aim for affable but somewhat distant ties of "comradeship"

with each other, reserving intimate friendships for a few whom they

have known since childhood or schooldays.

The work-unit system, with its lifetime membership—sometimes

referred to as the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary)—and lack ofjob

mobility, is unique to contemporary China. It was developed during the 1950s and early 1960s with little discussion or publicity.

Its origins are obscure; it most likely arose through the efforts of

party cadres whose background was rural and whose experience was largely in the army and in the disciplined and all-embracing

life of party branches.

The special characteristics of the Chinese work unit —such as

its control over the work and lives of its members and its strict subordination to administrative superiors who control the resources neces- sary to its operation—make the unit an insular, closed entity. Units

are subject to various administrative hierarchies; reports go up and

orders come down. The Chinese Communist Party, as a nationwide body, links all units and, in theory, monopolizes channels

of communication and command (see Chinese Communist Party,

ch. 10). Vertical, command relations seem to work quite effectively,

and the degree of local compliance with the orders of superior bodies

is impressive. Conversely, horizontal relations with other units are

often weak and tenuous, presenting a problem especially for the

economy.

Wages and Benefits

Much of any worker's total compensation (wages, benefits, and

official and unofficial perquisites) is determined by membership

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China: A Country Study

in a particular work unit. There is considerable variation in the

benefits associated with different work units. Although the wage

structure is quite egalitarian when compared with those of other

countries, wages are only part of the picture (see Income Distribution, ch. 5). Many of the limited goods available in China cannot be bought for money (see Retail Sales, ch. 8). Rather, they

are available only to certain favored work units. Housing is an

obvious example. Many collective enterprises may have no housing at all or offer only rudimentary dormitories for young, unmarried workers.

High-level administrative cadres and military officers may earn

three or four times more than ordinary workers; in addition, the

government often grants them superior housing, the unlimited use

of official automobiles and drivers, access to the best medical care

in the country, opportunities for travel and vacations, and the right

to purchase rare consumer goods either at elite shops or through

special channels. Although China is a socialist state, it is not exactly a welfare state. Pensions, medical benefits, and survivors' benefits are provided through work units and come out of the unit's budget.

The amount and nature of benefits may vary from unit to unit.

The state, through local government bodies, does provide some

minimal welfare benefits, but only to those with no unit benefits or family members able to support them.

Retirees who have put in twenty-five or thirty years in a state- run factory or a central government office can expect a steady

pension, most often at about 70 percent of their salary, and often

continue to live in unit housing, especially if they have no grown

children with whom they can live. In many cases, workers have

been able to retire and have their children replace them. In other

cases, some large state enterprises have started smaller sideline or subcontracting enterprises specifically to provide employment for the grown children of their workers. In contrast, peasants and those

employed in collective enterprises generally receive no pensions and

must depend on family members for support.

Informal Mechanisms of Exchange

In China formal exchanges of everything from goods and ser- vices to information are expected to go through official channels,

under the supervision of bureaucrats. Administrative channels,

however, are widely acknowledged to be inadequate and subject

to inordinate delays. People respond by using and developing

informal mechanisms of exchange and coordination. The most

general term for such informal relations is guanxi (personal connections). Such ties are the affair of individuals rather than

122
Construction workers near the Beijing International Airport

Courtesy Rinn -Sup Shinn

Factory workers pose for picture, Beijing

Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

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China: A Country Study

institutions and depend on the mutually beneficial exchange of

favors, services, introductions, and so on. In China such ties are created or cultivated through invitations to meals and presentation of gifts.

Personal relations are morally and legally ambiguous, existing

in a gray and ill-defined zone. In some cases, personal connections

involve corruption and favoritism, as when powerful cadres "enter

through the back door" to win admission to college or university

for their children or to place their relatives or clients in secure, state- sector jobs. In other cases, though, the use of such contacts is absolutely necessary for the survival of enterprises. Most Chinese

factories, for example, employ full-time "purchasing agents,"

whose task is to procure essential supplies that are not available

through the cumbersome state allocation system. As the economic

reforms of the early 1980s have expanded the scope of market

exchanges and the ability of enterprises to make their own decisions on what to produce, the role of brokers and agents of all sorts has expanded. In the countryside, village and township cadres often

act as brokers, finding markets for the commodities produced by

specialized farming households and tracking down scarce inputs,

such as fertilizer or fuel or spare parts for agricultural machinery.

Although the form and operation of guanxi networks clearly has

traditional roots, as well as parallels in overseas Chinese (see Glossary) societies and in Hong Kong and Taiwan, they are not simply inheritances or holdovers from the traditional past. Personal

connections and informal exchanges are a basic part of modern

Chinese society, are essential to its regular functioning, and are

in many ways a response to the specific political and economic struc- tures of that society. They thrive in the absence of formal, public,

and overt means of exchange and may be considered a response

to scarcity and to blocked official channels of communication.

In modern China, those with the most extensive networks of per- sonal connections are cadres and party members, who have both

the opportunity to meet people outside their work units and the

power to do favors.

Rural Society

Collectivization and Class Status

The first major action to alter village society was the land reform

of the late 1940s and early 1950s, in which the party sent work

teams to every village to carry out its land reform policy. This in

itself was an unprecedented display of administrative and political

power. The land reform had several related goals. The work teams

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The Social System

were to redistribute some (though not all) land from the wealthier

families or land-owning trusts to the poorest segments of the population and so to effect a more equitable distribution of the basic means of production; to overthrow the village elites, who might

be expected to oppose the party and its programs; to recruit new

village leaders from among those who demonstrated the most com- mitment to the party's goals; and to teach everyone to think in terms of class status rather than kinship group or patron-client ties. In pursuit of the last goal, the party work teams convened extensive series of meetings, and they classified all the village families

either as landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, or poor peasants.

These labels, based on family landholdings and overall economic

position roughly between 1945 and 1950, became a permanent and

hereditary part of every family's identity and, as late as 1980, still affected, for example, such things as chances for admission to the

armed forces, colleges, universities, and local administrative posts

and even marriage prospects.

The collectivization of agriculture was essentially completed with

the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. Communes

were large, embracing scores of villages. They were intended to be multipurpose organizations, combining economic and local administrative functions (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). Under

the commune system the household remained the basic unit of con- sumption, and some differences in standards of living remained,

although they were not as marked as they had been before land

reform. Under such a system, however, upward mobility required

becoming a team or commune cadre or obtaining a scarce technical position such as a truck driver's.

Decollectivization

Under the collectivized system, grain production kept up with

population growth (China's population nearly doubled from 1950

to 1980), and the rural population was guaranteed a secure but

low level of subsistence (see Population, ch. 2). But the collectivized

system seemed to offer few possibilities for rapid economic growth.

There was some discontent with a system that relied so heavily on

orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions

or local initiative. In the late 1970s, administrators in provinciallevel units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low

standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure

and production. In most cases, these took the form of breaking up

the collective production team (see Glossary), contracting with

individual households to work assigned portions of collective land,

and expanding the variety of crops or livestock that could be

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China: A Country Study

produced. The experiments were deemed successful and popular,

and they soon spread to all districts. By the winter of 1982-83, the

people's communes were abolished; they were replaced by administrative townships and a number of specialized teams or businesses

that often leased such collective assets as tractors and provided ser- vices for money.

The agricultural reforms of the early 1980s led to a confusingly

large number of new production arrangements and contracts. Underlying the variability of administrative and contractual forms were several basic principles and trends. In the first place, land,

the fundamental means of production, remained collective property.

It was leased, allocated, or contracted to individual households,

but the households did not own the land and could not transfer

it to other households. The household became, in most cases, the

basic economic unit and was responsible for its own production

and losses. Most economic activity was arranged through contracts,

which typically secured promises to provide a certain amount of

a commodity or sum of money to the township government in return

for the use of land, or workshops, or tractors. The goal of the contracting system was to increase efficiency in the use of resources and to tap peasant initiative. The rigid requirement that all villages produce grain was replaced by recognition

of the advantages of specialization and exchange, as well as a much

greater role for markets. Some "specialized households" devoted

themselves entirely to production of cash crops or provision of ser- vices and reaped large rewards. The overall picture was one of

increasing specialization, differentiation, and exchange in the rural

economy and in society in general. Rural incomes increased rapidly,

in part because the state substantially increased the prices it paid

for staple crops and in part because of economic growth stimulated

by the expansion of markets and the rediscovery of comparative

advantage.

The Role of the Household

Decollectivization increased the options available to individual

households and made household heads increasingly responsible for the economic success of their households. In 1987, for example,

it was legally possible to leave the village and move into a nearby

town to work in a small factory, open a noodle stand, or set up

a machine repair business. Farmers, however, still could not legally

move into medium-sized or large cities. The Chinese press reported an increased appreciation in the countryside for education and an

increased desire for agriculturally oriented newspapers and journals, as well as clearly written manuals on such profitable trades

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The Social System

as rabbit-raising and beekeeping. As specialization and division

of labor increased, along with increasingly visible differences in

income and living standards, it became more difficult to encompass most of the rural population in a few large categories. During

the early 1980s, the pace of economic and social change in rural

China was rapid, and the people caught up in the change had

difficulty making sense of the process. Consequences of Rural Reform

The state retained both its powers and its role in the rural econ- omy in the 1980s. Decollectivization, like the collectivization of the

1950s, was directed from the top down. Sometimes, apparently,

it was imposed on communities that had been content with their

collective methods. But in permitting households and communities greater leeway to decide what to produce and in allowing the

growth of rural markets and small-scale industries, the state stepped

back from the close supervision and mandatory quotas of the 1960s

and 1970s.

Decollectivization obviated the supervisory functions of low-level

cadres, who no longer needed to oversee work on the collective

fields. Some cadres became full-time administrators in township

offices, and others took advantage of the reforms by establishing

specialized production households or by leasing collective property

at favorable rates. Former cadres, with their networks of connections and familiarity with administrative procedures, were in a better position than ordinary farmers to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the growth of markets and commercial activity.

Even those cadres not wholly devoted to increasing their own

families' income found that to serve their fellow villagers as expected

it was necessary to act as entrepreneurs. Village-level cadres in the

mid-1980s were functioning less as overseers and more as extension agents and marketing consultants (see Post-Mao Policies, ch. 6). By 1987 rural society was more open and diverse than in the

1960s and 1970s, and the rigid collective units of that period, which

had reflected the state's overwhelming concern for security, had

been replaced by networks and clusters of smaller units. The new,

looser structure demonstrated the priority placed on efficiency and

economic growth. Basic security, in the sense of an adequate supply of food and guarantees of support for the disabled, orphaned,

or aged, was taken for granted. Less than half of China's population remembered the insecurity and risks of pre- 1950 society, but

the costs and inefficiencies of the collective system were fresh in their minds. Increased specialization and division of labor were

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China: A Country Study

trends not likely to be reversed. In the rural areas the significance

of the work unit appeared to have diminished, although people still lived in villages, and the actions of low-level administrative cadres

still affected ordinary farmers or petty traders in immediate ways.

The state and its officials still dominated the economy, controlled

supplies of essential goods, taxed and regulated businesses and markets, and awarded contracts. The stratification system of the Maoist

period had been based on a hierarchy of functionally unspecialized cadres directing the labors of a fairly uniform mass of peasants.

It was replaced in the 1980s by a new elite of economically specialized households and entrepreneurs who had managed to come to terms with the administrative cadres who controlled access to many

of the resources necessary for economic success. Local cadres still had the power to impose fees, taxes, and all manner of exactions.

The norms of the new system were not clear, and the economic

and social system continued to change in response to the rapid

growth of rural commerce and industry and to national economic

policies and reforms.

Regulations and Favors

Increased commercial activity produced a high degree of nor- mative ambiguity, especially in areas like central Guangdong and

Jiangsu provinces, where rural economic growth was fastest. Neither

the proper role of local officials nor the rights and obligations of new entrepreneurs or traders were clear. The line between the nor- mal use of personal contacts and hospitality and extraordinary and

criminal favoritism and corruption was ambiguous. There were

hints of the development of a system of patron-client ties, in which

administrative cadres granted favors to ordinary farmers in return

for support, esteem, and an occasional gift. The increased number of corruption cases reported in the Chinese press and the

widespread assumption that the decollectivization and rural eco- nomic reforms had led to growing corruption probably reflected

both the increased opportunities for deals and favors of all sorts and the ambiguous nature of many of the transactions and rela- tionships. The party's repeated calls for improved "socialist spiritual

civilization" and the attempts of the central authorities both to create a system of civil law and to foster respect for it can be interpreted

as responses to the problem (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-

84, ch. 11; Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). On the local level,

where cadres and entrepreneurs were engaged in constant negotiation on the rules of their game, the problem was presumably being

addressed in a more straightforward fashion.

128
Grandparents

near Tiananmen Square

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus

An elderly attendant

surveys his kingdom,

Forbidden City, Beijing.

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus
China: A Country Study

Family and Household

In past Chinese society, the family provided every individual's

support, livelihood, and long-term security. Today the state guarantees such security to those with no families to provide for them,

and families and work units share long-term responsibility for the

individual. The role of families has changed, but they remain

important, especially in the countryside. Family members are bound, in law and custom, to support their aged or disabled members. The state, acting through work units, provides support and

benefits only when families cannot. Households routinely pool

income, and any individual's standard of living depends on the

number of household wage earners and the number of dependents.

In both cities and villages, the highest incomes usually are earned

by households with several wage earners, such as unmarried adult sons or daughters. In late traditional society, family size and structural complexity

varied directly with class. Rural landlords and government offi- cials had the largest families, poor peasants the smallest. The poorest

segment of the population, landless laborers, could not afford to marry and start families. The need to provide for old age and the

general association between the numbers of sons surviving to adulthood and long-term family success motivated individuals to create various nonstandard family forms. Couples who produced no sons, or no children at all, adopted or purchased infants outright. Families

with daughters but no sons tried to find men willing to marry their

daughters and move into their families, abandoning their original

families and sometimes even their original surnames. Families with

daughters but no property to attract a son-in-law were sometimes

forced to sell their daughters as concubines or prostitutes. The variation in family size and complexity was the result of variation in

class position and of the dual role of the household as both family

and economic enterprise. In contemporary society, rural families no longer own land or pass it down to the next generation. They may, however, own and

transmit houses. Rural families pay medical expenses and school

fees for their children. Under the people's commune system in force from 1958 to 1982, the income of a peasant family depended directly on the number of laborers it contributed to the collective fields. This, combined with concern over the level of support for the aged

or disabled provided by the collective unit, encouraged peasants

to have many sons. Under the agricultural reforms that began in the late 1970s, households took on an increased and more responsible economic role. The labor of family members is still the primary

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The Social System

determinant of income. But rural economic growth and commercialization increasingly have rewarded managerial and technical

skills and have made unskilled farm labor less desirable. As long

as this economic trend continues in the countryside in the late 1980s,

peasant families are likely to opt for fewer but better educated

children.

The consequence of the general changes in China's economy and

the greater separation of families and economic enterprises has been

a greater standardization of family forms since 1950. In 1987 most

families approximated the middle peasant (a peasant owning some

land) norm of the past. Such a family consisted of five or six people and was based on marriage between an adult son and an adult

woman who moved into her husband's family. The variant family

forms—either the very large and complex or those based on minor,

nonstandard forms of marriage—were much less common. The

state had outlawed concubinage, child betrothal, and the sale of

infants or females, all of which were formerly practiced, though

not common. Increased life expectancy meant that a greater proportion of infants survived to adulthood and that more adults lived

into their sixties or seventies. More rural families were able to achieve the traditional goal of a three-generation family in the 1980s.

There were fewer orphans and young or middle-aged widows or widowers. Far fewer men were forced to retain lifelong single status. Divorce, although possible, was rare, and families were stable,

on-going units.

A number of traditional attitudes toward the family have sur- vived without being questioned. It is taken for granted that every- one should marry, and marriage remains part of the definition of

normal adult status. Marriage is expected to be permanent. That

marriage requires a woman to move into her husband's family and

to become a daughter-in-law as well as a wife is still largely accepted.

The norm of patrilineal descent and the assumption that it is sons who bear the primary responsibility for their aged parents remain.

The party and government have devoted great effort to controlling the number of births and have attempted to limit the number

of children per couple (see Population Control Programs, ch. 2). But the authorities have not attempted to control population growth

by suggesting that some people should not marry at all. In the past, kinship principles were extended beyond the domestic

group and were used to form large-scale groups, such as lineages.

Lineages were quite distinct from families; they were essentially

corporate economic-political groups. They controlled land and, in some areas of China, dominated whole villages and sets of villages

and held title to most of the farmland. Like most other late

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China: A Country Study

traditional associations, lineages were dominated by wealthy and

educated elites. Ordinary peasants paid as much of their crop to their lineage group as they might have to a landlord. The Communists denounced these organizations as feudal systems by means

of which landlords exploited others. The lineages were suppressed

in the early 1950s and their land confiscated and redistributed in the land reform. Communal worship of distant lineage ancestors

lost much of its justification with the dissolution of the lineage estate and was easily suppressed over the next several years. Domestic

ancestor worship, in which members of a single family worshiped

and memorialized their immediate ancestors, continued at least until 1966 and 1967, in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, when

Red Guards destroyed altars and ancestral tablets. In 1987 the party was still condemning ancestor worship as superstitious but had made

little effort to end it. Marriage

The Marriage Law of 1950 guaranteed everyone the freedom

to choose his or her marriage partner. Nevertheless, especially in the countryside, there are few opportunities to meet potential mates. Rural China offers little privacy for courtship, and in villages there

is little public tolerance for flirting or even extended conversation

between unmarried men and women. Introductions and go- betweens continue to play a major role in the arrangement of marriages. In most cases each of the young people, and their parents,

has an effective veto over any proposed match.

In the past, marriage was seen as the concern of families as well

as of the two parties to the match. Families united by marriage were expected to be of equivalent status, or the groom's family to be of somewhat higher status. This aspect of marriage patterns has

continued while the definitions of status have changed. Because

inherited wealth has been eliminated as a significant factor, evaluation has shifted to estimates of earning power and future prosperity.

The most desirable husbands have been administrative cadres, party

members, and employees of large state enterprises. Conversely,

men from poor villages have had difficulty finding wives. From

the early 1950s to the late 1970s, when hereditary class labels were

very significant, anyone with a "counterrevolutionary" background, that is, anyone previously identified with the landlord or even rich peasant class, was a bad prospect for marriage. Such

pariahs often had no choice but to marry the offspring of other

families with "bad" class backgrounds. At the other end of the

social scale, there appears to be a high level of intermarriage among

the children of high-level cadres.

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The Social System

Community Structure

Most rural Chinese live in one of some 900,000 villages, which

have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages have never been self-contained, self-sufficient units, and the

social world of Chinese peasants has extended beyond their home

villages. Almost all new wives come into a village from other set- tlements, and daughters marry out. All villagers have close kinship ties with families in other villages, and marriage go-betweens

shuttle from village to village.

Before 1950 clusters of villages centered on small market towns

that linked them to the wider economy and society. Most peasants were only a few hours' walk or less from a market town, which

provided not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of

specialized services. The villages around a market formed a social

unit that, although less immediately visible than the villages, was

equally significant.

From the early 1950s on, China's revolutionary government

made great efforts to put the state and its ideology into direct contact with the villages and to sweep aside the intermediaries and

brokers who had traditionally interpreted central policies and

national values for villagers. The state and the party were generally successful, establishing unprecedented degrees of political and

ideological integration of villages into the state and of village-level awareness of state policies and political goals.

The unintended consequence of the economic and political poli- cies of the 1950s and 1960s was to increase the closed, corporate

quality of China's villages and to narrow the social horizons of vil- lagers. Land reform and the reorganization of villages as subunits

of people's communes meant that villages became collective landholding units and had clear boundaries between their lands and

those of adjacent villages. Central direction of labor on collective

fields made the former practices of swapping labor between vil- lages impossible. The household registration and rationing systems

confined villagers to their home settlements and made it impossible for them to seek their fortune elsewhere. Cooperation with fel- low villagers and good relations with village leaders became even more important than they had been in the past. The suppression

of rural markets, which accompanied the drive for self-sufficiency

in grain production and other economic activities, had severe social as well as economic consequences. Most peasants had neither rea- son nor opportunity for regular trips to town, and their opportunities for exchange and cooperation with residents of other villages

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China: A Country Study

were diminished. Villages became work units, with all that that implied.

Decollectivization in the early 1980s resulted in the revival of

rural marketing, and a limited relaxation of controls on outmigration opened villages and diminished the social boundaries around

them. The social world of peasants expanded, and the larger marketing community took on more significance as that of the village

proper was diminished. Village membership, once the single most

important determinant of an individual's circumstances, became

only one of a number of significant factors, which also included

occupation, personal connections, and managerial talent. Urban Society

There is considerable confusion in both Chinese and foreign

sources over definitions of urban places and hence considerable vari- ation in estimates of China's urban population (see Migration,

ch. 2). The problem of determining the size of the urban population reflects inconsistent and changing administrative categories;

the distinction between rural and urban household registry and

between categories of settlements; the practice of placing suburban or rural districts under the administration of municipal governments; and the differences in the status accorded to small towns.

In sociological terms, urban refers to an area characterized by a rela- tively high degree of specialization in occupational roles, many

special-purpose institutions, and uniform treatment of people in impersonal settings. In this sense, a Chinese market town is more

urban than a village, and settlements become more urban as they

grow in size and economic complexity. Large municipalities like Beijing and Shanghai have the highest degree of division of labor

and the most specialized institutions.

Distinctive Features

Legal status as an urban dweller in China is prized (see Differentiation, this ch.). As a result of various state policies and practices,

contemporary Chinese urban society has a distinctive character,

and life in Chinese cities differs in many ways from that in cities in otherwise comparable developing societies. The most consequential policies have been the household registration system, the legal

barriers to migration, the fostering of the all-embracing work unit,

and the restriction of commerce and markets, including the housing market. In many ways, the weight of official control and supervision is felt more in the cities, whose administrators are concerned

with controlling the population and do so through a dual administrative hierarchy. The two principles on which these control

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The Social System

structures arc based arc locality and occupation. Household registers are maintained by the police, whose presence is much stronger in the cities than in the countryside (see Public Security Forces,

ch. 13). Cities are subdivided into districts, wards, and finally into

small units of some fifteen to thirty households, such as all those

in one apartment building or on a small lane. For those employed

in large organizations, the work unit either is coterminous with

the residential unit or takes precedence over it; for those employed

in small collective enterprises or neighborhood shops, the residential committee is their unit of registration and provides a range

of services.

The control of housing by work units and local governments and

the absence of a housing market have led to a high degree of residential stability (see The Work Place, this ch.). Most urban residents

have spent decades in the same house or apartment. For this rea- son, urban neighborhoods are closely knit, which in turn contributes to the generally low level of crime in Chinese cities. Since the early 1950s, the party leadership has consistently made

rapid industrialization a primary goal and, to this end, has generally favored investment in heavy industry over consumption. For

cities, these policies have meant an expansion of factories and

industrial employment, along with a very low level of spending in such "nonproductive" areas as housing or urban transit systems

(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). The emphasis on production and heavy industry and the discouragement of consumption

and exchange, along with state takeovers of commerce and the ser- vice sector, led to cities having many factories but no peddlers,

snack stalls, or entertainment districts. In the 1950s and early 1960s,

major efforts were made to bring women into the paid labor force. This served the goals of increasing production and achieving sex- ual equality through equal participation in productive labor, a classic- Marxist remedy for sexual inequality. By 1987 almost all young

and middle-aged women in the cities worked outside the home.

Chinese cities, in contrast to those in many developing countries, contain a high proportion of workers in factories and offices and a low proportion of workers in the service sector. Workers enjoy

a high level of job security but receive low wages. Between 1963

and 1977 most wages were frozen, and promotions and raises were

very rare. Even with the restoration of material incentives in the

late 1970s, two general wage raises in the 1980s, and increased

opportunities for bonuses and promotions, wages remained low and

increased primarily with seniority. As in most parts of the world, one reason that so many Chinese urban women are in the work

force is that one income is not enough to support a family.

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China: A Country Study

In the 1980s it was possible to purchase such consumer durables as television sets and bicycles on the market, but housing

remained scarce and subject to allocation by work units or municipal

housing bureaus. Although housing was poor and crowded, Chinese

neighborhoods had improved greatly over the slum conditions that existed before 1950. Most people were gainfully employed at secure

if low-paying jobs; the municipal government provided a minimal

level of services and utilities (water and sanitation); the streets were

fairly clean and orderly; and the crime rate was low (see Wages

and Benefits, this ch.; Living Standards, ch. 5). Housing

Chinese urban dwellers, as a category, receive subsidies on food,

housing, and transportation services. In the 1980s such subsidies came to occupy an increasingly large share of the state budget. Even

with subsidies, food purchases took the largest share of household

budgets. Rents, in contrast, were very low, seldom taking more

than 5 percent of household income even with water and electricity

charges included. Little new housing was built between 1950 and

1980, and although more urban housing was erected between 1980

and 1985 than in the previous thirty years, housing remained in short supply. Entire families often lived in one room and shared

cooking and toilet facilities with other families. Marriages were

sometimes delayed until housing became available from the municipal office or the work unit. Young people were expected to live with their parents at least until marriage. This was consonant with

traditional family patterns but was also reinforced by the shortage

of housing. The pattern of long-term residential stability and great

pressure on the stock of available housing meant that city neighborhoods were less stratified by occupation or income than those

of many other countries. Not only were incomes more egalitarian

to begin with, but more money could not buy a bigger or better

equipped apartment. Managers and technical specialists lived under

much the same conditions as manual workers, often in the same

buildings. While many urban families enjoyed higher real incomes

in the 1980s, they usually could not translate those incomes into

better housing, as peasants could.

The combination of full adult employment with a minimal service sector put heavy burdens on urban households. By the 1980s both

the public and the government recognized the burdens on urban

households and the associated drain on the energies of workers,

managers, and professionals. After 1985 more money was budgeted

for housing and such municipal services as piped-in cooking gas. But state encouragement of the private or collective service sector

136
Workers' mid-rise housing, Beijing

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

Entrance to a private

residence in north China

Courtesy Rinn -Sup Shinn
China: A Country Study

had greater effect. Unemployed urban youth were permitted and

sometimes advised to set up small restaurants or service establishments. Peasants were permitted to come into cities to sell produce

or local products. Municipal authorities seemed to ignore the move- ment of substantial numbers of rural people into the urban service sector as peddlers, carpenters, and other skilled workers or, occasionally, as domestic workers. In the mid-1980s the Chinese press reported an influx of teenage girls from the country seeking shortterm work as housekeepers or nannies. Like other rural migrants,

they usually used ties with relatives or fellow villagers resident in the city to find positions.

Families and Marriage

Urban families differ from their rural counterparts primarily in being composed largely of wage earners who look to their work

units for the housing, old-age security, and opportunities for a better

life that in the countryside are still the responsibility of the family.

With the exception of those employed in the recently revived urban

service sector (restaurants, tailoring, or repair shops) who sometimes operate family businesses, urban families do not combine

family and enterprise in the manner of peasant families. Urban

families usually have multiple wage earners, but children do not

bring in extra income or wages as readily as in the countryside.

Urban families are generally smaller than their rural counterparts,

and, in a reversal of traditional patterns, it is the highest level managers and cadres who have the smallest families. Late marriages and one or two children are characteristic of urban managerial

and professional groups. As in the past, elite family forms are being

promoted as the model for everyone.

Three-generation families are not uncommon in cities, and a healthy grandparent is probably the ideal solution to the child-care

and housework problems of most families. About as many young

children are cared for by a grandparent as are enrolled in a workunit nursery or kindergarten, institutions that are far from universal.

Decisions on where a newly married couple is to live often depend

on the availability of housing. Couples most often establish their

own household, frequently move in with the husband's parents,

or, much less often, may move in with the wife's parents. Both

the state and the society expect children to look after their aged

parents. In addition, a retired worker from a state enterprise will have a pension and often a relatively desirable apartment as well. Under these circumstances elderly people are assets to a family.

Those urban families employing unregistered maids from the countryside are most likely those without healthy grandparents.

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The Social System

Families play less of a role in marriage choices in cities than in the countryside, at least in part because the family itself is not the

unit promising long-term security and benefits to its members. By

the late 1970s, perhaps half of all urban marriages were the result of introductions by workmates, relatives, or parents. The marriage

age in cities has been later than that in the countryside, which

reflects greater compliance with state rules and guidelines as well

as social and economic factors common to many other countries.

People in cities and those with secondary and postsecondary education or professional jobs tend to marry later than farmers. In China it is felt that marriage is appropriate only for those who have

jobs and thus are in a position to be full members of society. Peasant

youth, who have an automatic claim on a share of the collective

fields and the family house, qualify, but college students or urban

youths who are "waiting for assignment" to a lifetime job do not. In any case, work-unit approval is necessary for marriage.

Urban weddings are usually smaller and more subdued than their rural counterparts, which reflects the diminished role of the families in the process. More guests will be workmates or friends of

the bride and groom than distant kin or associates of the parents.

The wedding ceremony focuses on the bride and groom as a couple rather than on their status as members of families. Similarly, a brief honeymoon trip rather than a three-day celebration in which

the entire village plays a part is an increasingly common practice.

Long engagements are common in cities, sometimes because the

couple is waiting for housing to become available.

Providing for the Next Generation

Although Chinese families continue to be marked by respect for parents and a substantial degree of filial subordination, parents have

weighty obligations toward their children as well. Children are obliged to support parents in their old age, and parents are obliged

to give their children as favorable a place in the world as they can. In the past this meant leaving them property and providing the

best education or training possible. For most rural parents today

the choice of a career for their children is not a major issue. Most

children of peasants will be peasants like their parents, and the

highest realistic ambition is a position as a low-level cadre or teacher or perhaps a technician. The primary determinant of a rural child's status and well-being remains his or her family, which is one rea- son for the intense concern with the marriage choices of sons and

daughters and for the greater degree of parental involvement in those decisions.

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China: A Country Study

Urban parents are less concerned with whom their children marry

but are more concerned with their education and eventual careers. Urban parents can expect to leave their children very little in the

way of property, but they do their best to prepare them for secure and desirable jobs in the state sector. The difficulty is that such

jobs are limited, competition is intense, and the criteria for entry

have changed radically several times since the early 1950s. Many

of the dynamics of urban society revolve around the issue of job

allocation and the attempts of parents in the better-off segments

of society to transmit their favored position to their children. The

allocation of scarce and desirable goods, in this case jobs, is a

political issue and one that has been endemic since the late 1950s.

These questions lie behind the changes in educational policy, the

attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to settle urban youth in the countryside, the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution, and the post- 1980

encouragement of small-scale private and collective commerce and

service occupations in the cities. All are attempts to solve the

problem, and each attempt has its own costs and drawbacks.

Opportunities and Competition

Cities, by definition, are places with a high degree of occupational specialization and division of labor. They are places offer- ing their inhabitants a range of occupational choice and also, to the degree that some occupations are seen as better than others,

competition for the better occupations. Cities also provide the train- ing for specialized occupations, either in schools or on the job. In China there is a cultural pattern stressing individual achievement and upward mobility. These are best attained through for- mal education and are bound up with the mutual expectations and

obligations of parents and children. There is also a social struc- ture in which a single, bureaucratic framework defines desirable

positions, that is, managerial or professional jobs in the state sec- tor or secure jobs in state factories. Banned migration, lifetime

employment, egalitarian wage structures, and the insular nature

of work units were intended by the state, at least in part, to curtail

individual competition. Nevertheless, some jobs are still seen as preferable to others, and it is urbanites and their children who have

the greatest opportunities to compete for scarce jobs. The question for most families is how individuals are selected and allocated

to those positions. The lifetime tenure of most jobs and the firm

control of job allocation by the party make these central issues for parents in the favored groups and for local authorities and party

organizations.

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The Social System

Between the early 1950s and mid-1980s, policies on recruitment

of personnel and their allocation to desirable jobs changed several

times. As the costs and drawbacks of each method became apparent, pressure mounted to change the policy. In the early and

mid-1950s, the problem was not acute. State offices were expanding rapidly, and there were more positions than people qualified

to fill them. Peasants moved into cities and found employment in the expanding industrial sector. Most of those who staffed the new

bureaucratic sectors were young and would not begin to retire until the 1980s and 1990s. Those who graduated from secondary schools or universities, however, or were discharged from the armed forces

in the late 1950s and early 1960s found few jobs of the sort they were qualified for or had expected to hold.

Attempts to manage the competition for secure jobs were among

the many causes of the radical, Utopian policies of the period from

1962 to 1976. Among these, the administrative barriers erected

between cities and countryside and the confinement of peasants

and their children to their villages served to diminish competition

and perhaps to lower unrealistic expectations. Wage freezes and

the rationing of both staples and scarce consumer goods in cities attempted to diminish stratification and hence competition. The

focusing of attention on the sufferings and egalitarian communal

traditions of the past, which was so prominent in Maoist rhetoric

and replaced the future orientation of the 1950s, in part diverted

attention from frustrations with the present. Tensions were most

acute within the education system, which served, as it does in most

societies, to sort children and select those who would go on to managerial and professional jobs. It was for this reason that the

Cultural Revolution focused so negatively on the education sys- tem. Because of the rising competition in the schools and for the

jobs to which schooling could lead, it became increasingly evident

that those who did best in school were the children of the "bourgeoisie" and urban professional groups rather than the children

of workers and peasants (see Education Policy, ch. 4). Cultural Revolution-era policies responded with public deprecation of schooling and expertise, including closing of all schools

for a year or more and of universities for nearly a decade, exaltation of on-the-job training and of political motivation over expertise, and preferential treatment for workers and peasant youth.

Educated urban youth, most of whom came from "bourgeois"

families, were persuaded or coerced to settle in the countryside,

often in remote frontier districts. Because there were no jobs in the cities, the party expected urban youth to apply their education

in the countryside as primary school teachers, production team

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China: A Country Study

accountants, or barefoot doctors (see Glossary); many did manual

labor. The policy was intensely unpopular, not only with urban

parents and youth but also with peasants and was dropped soon

after the fall of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) in late 1976. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, many of the youth who had

been sent down to the countryside managed to make their way back

to the cities, where they had neither jobs nor ration books. By the

mid-1980s most of them had found jobs in the newly expanded ser- vice sector (see Internal Trade and Distribution, ch. 8). In terms of creating jobs and mollifying urban parents, the 1980s

policies on urban employment have been quite successful. The jobs

in many cases are not the sort that educated young people or their

parents would choose, but they are considerably better than a

lifelong assignment to remote frontier areas. The Maoist policies on education and job assignment were successful in preventing a great many urban "bourgeois" parents from

passing their favored social status on to their children. This reform,

however, came at great cost to the economy and to the prestige

and authority of the party itself. Examinations, Hereditary Transmission of Jobs, and Connections

Beginning in the late 1970s, China's leaders stressed expertise

and education over motivation and ideology and consequently

placed emphasis again on examinations. Competition in the schools was explicit, and examinations were frequent. A major step in the

competition for desirable jobs was the passage from senior middle

school to college and university, and success was determined by

performance on a nationwide college and university entrance

examination (see Education Policy, ch. 4). Examinations also were

used to select applicants for jobs in factories, and even factory

managers had to pass examinations to keep their positions. The

content of these examinations has not been made public, but their use represents a logical response to the problem of unfair competition, favoritism, and corruption.

One extreme form of selection by favoritism in the 1980s was

simple hereditary transmission, and this principle, which operated on a de facto basis in rural work units, seems to have been fairly

widely used in China's industrial sector. From the 1960s to the

1980s, factories and mines in many cases permitted children to replace their parents in jobs, which simplified recruitment and was

an effective way of encouraging aging workers to retire. The government forbade this practice in the 1980s, but in some instances state- run factories and mines, especially those located in rural or remote

areas, used their resources to set up subsidiaries or sideline

142
The Social System

enterprises to provide employment for their workers' children. The

leaders of these work units evidently felt responsible for providing

employment to the children of unit members.

The party and its role in personnel matters, including job assignments, can be an obstacle to the consistent application of hiring

standards. At the grass-roots level, the party branch's control of

job assignments and promotions is one of the foundations of its power, and some local party cadres in the mid-1980s apparently

viewed the expanded use of examinations and educational qualifications as a threat to their power. The party, acting through local employment commissions, controlled all job assignments. Party

members occupied the most powerful and desirable positions; the

way party members were evaluated and selected for positions

remained obscure. Local party cadres were frequently suspected

by the authorities of using their connections to secure jobs for their

relatives or clients (see Informal Mechanisms of Exchange, this ch.).

Women

Traditional Chinese society was male-centered. Sons were pre- ferred to daughters, and women were expected to be subordinate

to fathers, husbands, and sons. A young woman had little voice

in the decision on her marriage partner (neither did a young man).

When married, it was she who left her natal family and community

and went to live in a family and community of strangers where

she was subordinate to her mother-in-law. Far fewer women were

educated than men, and sketchy but consistent demographic evi- dence would seem to show that female infants and children had

higher death rates and less chance of surviving to adulthood than

males. In extreme cases, female infants were the victims of infanticide, and daughters were sold, as chattels, to brothels or to wealthy

families. Bound feet, which were customary even for peasant

women, symbolized the painful constraints of the female role. Protests and concerted efforts to alter women's place in society

began in China's coastal cities in the early years of the twentieth

century. By the 1920s formal acceptance of female equality was common among urban intellectuals. Increasing numbers of girls

attended schools, and young secondary school and college students

approved of marriages based on free choice. Footbinding declined

rapidly in the second decade of the century, the object of a nationwide campaign led by intellectuals who associated it with national

backwardness.

Nevertheless, while party leaders condemned the oppression and

subordination of women as one more aspect of the traditional society

they were intent on changing, they did not accord feminist issues

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China: A Country Study

very high priority. In the villages, party members were interested

in winning the loyalty and cooperation of poor and lower-middleclass male peasants, who could be expected to resist public criti- cism of their treatment of their wives and daughters. Many party

members were poor and lower-middle-class peasants from the

interior, and their attitudes toward women reflected their background. The party saw the liberation of women as depending, in a standard Marxist way, on their participation in the labor force

outside the household.

The position of women in contemporary society has changed from

the past, and public verbal assent to propositions about the equality of the sexes and of sons and daughters seems universal. Women

attend schools and universities, serve in the People's Liberation

Army, and join the party. Almost all urban women and the majority

of rural women work outside the home. But women remain disadvantaged in many ways, economic and social, and there seems no

prospect for substantive change.

The greatest change in women's status has been their movement

into the paid labor force. The jobs they held in the 1980s, though, were generally lower paying and less desirable than those of men.

Industries staffed largely by women, such as the textiles industry,

paid lower wages than those staffed by men, such as the steel or mining industries. Women were disproportionately represented in collective enterprises, which paid lower wages and offered fewer

benefits than state-owned industries. In the countryside, the work

of males was consistently better rewarded than that of women, and

most skilled and desirable jobs, such as driving trucks or repairing

machines, were held by men. In addition, Chinese women suffered

the familiar double burden of full-time wage work and most of the

household chores as well. As there come to be both more opportunities and more explicit

competition for them in both city and countryside, there are some

hints of women's being excluded from the competition. In the countryside, a disproportionate number of girls drop out of primary

school because parents do not see the point of educating a daughter who will marry and leave the family and because they need her

labor in the home. There are fewer female students in key rural

and urban secondary schools and universities. As economic growth

in rural areas generates new and potentially lucrative jobs, there

is a tendency in at least some areas for women to be relegated to agricultural labor, which is poorly rewarded. There have been

reports in the Chinese press of outright discrimination against

women in hiring for urban jobs and of enterprises requiring female

applicants to score higher than males on examinations for hiring.

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The Social System

On the whole, in the 1980s women were better off than their

counterparts 50 or a 100 years before, and they had full legal equality with men. In practice, their opportunities and rewards were

not entirely equal, and they tended to get less desirable jobs and

to retain the burden of domestic chores in addition to full-time jobs.

Religion

Traditionally, China's Confucian elite disparaged religion and

religious practitioners, and the state suppressed or controlled organized religious groups. The social status of Buddhist monks and

Taoist priests was low, and ordinary people did not generally look

up to them as models. In the past, religion was diffused throughout the society, a matter as much of practice as of belief, and had

a weak institutional structure. Essentially the same pattern continues in contemporary society, except that the ruling elite is even

less religious and there are even fewer religious practitioners.

The attitude of the party has been that religion is a relic of the

past, evidence of prescientific thinking, and something that will fade away as people become educated and acquire a scientific view

of the world. On the whole, religion has not been a major issue. Cadres and party members, in ways very similar to those of Confucian elites, tend to regard many religious practitioners as charlatans out to take advantage of credulous people, who need protection. In the 1950s many Buddhist monks were returned to secular life, and monasteries and temples lost their lands in the land reform.

Foreign missionaries were expelled, often after being accused of

spying, and Chinese Christians, who made up only a very small

proportion of the population, were the objects of suspicion because

of their foreign contacts. Chinese Christian organizations were

established, one for Protestants and one for Roman Catholics, which

stressed that their members were loyal to the state and party. Seminaries were established to train "patriotic" Chinese clergy, and

the Chinese Catholic Church rejected the authority of the Vatican, ordaining its own priests and installing its own bishops. The

issue in all cases, whether involving Christians, Buddhists, or members of underground Chinese sects, was not so much doctrine or theology as recognition of the primacy of loyalty to the state and

party. Folk religion was dismissed as superstition. Temples were

for the most part converted to other uses, and public celebration

of communal festivals stopped, but the state did not put much

energy into suppressing folk religion.

During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, in 1966 and

1967, Red Guards destroyed temples, statues, and domestic

ancestral tablets as part of their violent assault on the "four olds"

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China: A Country Study

(old ideas, culture, customs, and habits). Public observances of ritual essentially halted during the Cultural Revolution decade. After

1978, the year marking the return to power of the Deng Xiaoping

reformers, the party and state were more tolerant of the public

expression of religion as long as it remained within carefully defined

limits (see Political Realignments at the Party Center, ch. 11). Some

showcase temples were restored and opened as historical sites, and some Buddhist and even Taoist practitioners were permitted to wear

their robes, train a few successors, and perform rituals in the

reopened temples. These actions on the part of the state can be

interpreted as a confident regime's recognition of China's traditional past, in the same way that the shrine at the home of Confucius in Shandong Province has been refurbished and opened to the public. Confucian and Buddhist doctrines are not seen as a

threat, and the motive is primarily one of nationalistic identification with China's past civilization. Similar tolerance and even mild encouragement is accorded to Chinese Christians, whose churches were reopened starting in the

late 1970s. As of 1987 missionaries were not permitted in China,

and some Chinese Catholic clergy were imprisoned for refusing

to recognize the authority of China's "patriotic" Catholic Church

and its bishops.

The most important result of state toleration of religion has been

improved relations with China's Islamic and Tibetan Buddhist

minority populations. State patronage of Islam and Buddhism also plays a part in China's foreign relations (see Relations with the

Third World, ch. 12). Much of traditional ritual and religion sur- vives or has been revived, especially in the countryside. In the

mid-1980s the official press condemned such activities as wasteful

and reminded rural party members that they should neither participate in nor lead such events, but it did not make the subject a major issue. Families could worship their ancestors or traditional

gods in the privacy of their homes but had to make all ritual paraphernalia (incense sticks, ancestral tablets, and so forth) themselves, as it was no longer sold in shops. The scale of public celebrations was muted, and fuli-time professional clergy played no role. Folk religious festivals were revived in some localities, and there was occasional rebuilding of temples and ancestral halls. In rural

areas, funerals were the ritual having the least change, although

observances were carried out only by family members and kin, with no professional clergy in attendance. Such modest, mostly

household-based folk religious activity was largely irrelevant to the concerns of the authorities, who ignored or tolerated it.

146
The Social System

Trends and Tensions

By the mid-1980s the pace of social change in China was increasing, and, more than in any decade since the 1950s, fundamental

changes in the structure of society seemed possible. The ultimate

direction of social changes remained unclear, but social trends and

tensions that could generate social change were evident. These

trends were toward greater specialization and division of labor and

toward new, more open and loosely structured forms of association (see Rural Society; Urban Society, this ch.). The uniform pat- tern of organization of work units in agriculture, industry, public

administration, and the military was beginning to shift to an

organization structured to reflect its purpose. Education and technical qualification were becoming more significant for attaining

high status in villages, industries, the government, or the armed

forces. Opportunities for desirable jobs remained limited, however,

and competition for those jobs or for housing, urban residence, or college admission was keen.

The primary tension in Chinese society resulted from the value

political leaders and ordinary citizens placed on both the social

values of security and equality and the goals of economic growth

and modernization. China remained a society in which all desired

goods were in short supply, from arable land to secure nonmanual

jobs, to a seat on a city bus. Crowding was normal and pervasive.

Competition and open social strife were restrained by the public

belief that scarce goods were being distributed as equitably as possible and that no individual or group was being deprived of liveli- hood or a fair share. In the mid-1980s Chinese authorities feared

that social disorder might result from popular discontent over price

increases or the conspicuous wealth of small segments of the population, such as free-market traders. The press frequently condemned

the expressions of jealousy and envy that some people directed at those who were prospering by taking advantage of the opportunities the reformed economy offered. The rise in living standards in the 1980s may have contributed to rising expectations that could

not be met without considerably more economic growth.

The tension between security and economic growth was reflected in the people's attitudes toward the work unit and the degree of

control it exercised over their lives. There was no apparent reason why even a socialist, planned economy had to organize its work

force into closed, insular, and sometimes nearly hereditary units.

People generally liked the security and benefits provided by their

units but disliked many other aspects of "unit life," such as the

prohibition on changing jobs. Limited surveys in cities indicated

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China: A Country Study

that most people were assigned to work units arbitrarily, without

regard to their wishes or skills, and felt little loyalty toward or identification with their work units. People adapted to unit life but

reserved loyalties for their families at the one extreme and for the

nation and "the people" at the other.

Rural reforms had essentially abolished the work unit in the countryside, along with its close control over people's activities. State and party control over the rural economy and society persisted,

but individuals were accorded more autonomy, and most rural people seemed to welcome the end of production teams and production brigades (see Glossary). The success of these rural reforms made

modification or even abolition of work units in the urban and state sectors a possibility.

By the mid-1980s the Chinese press and academic journals were

discussing recruitment and movement of employees among work

units. Although the discussion initially focused on scientists and

technicians, whose talents were often wasted in units where they

could not make full use of them, the questions raised were of general

import. Such blocked mobility was recognized by China's leadership as an impediment to economic growth, and a "rational" flow

of labor was listed as a goal for reform of the economy and the

science and technology system (see The Reform Program, ch. 9). But few concrete steps had been taken to promote labor mobility,

although government resolutions granted scientists and technicians

the right to transfer to another unit, subject to the approval of their

original work unit. The issue was politically sensitive, as it touched on the powers and perquisites of the party and of managers.

Managers often refused permission to leave the unit, even to those

scientists and engineers who had the formal right to apply for a

transfer. Similarly, foreign-funded joint ventures, on which China's

government placed its hopes for technology transfer, found it impossible to hire the engineers and technicians they needed for high-technology work. There may have been personnel at other

enterprises in the same city eager to work for the new firm, but

there was no way to transfer them. In 1986 the State Council, in a move that had little immediate effect but considerable potential,

decreed that henceforth state enterprises would hire people on contracts good for only a few years and that these contract employees

would be free to seek other jobs when their contracts expired (see

The State Council, ch. 10). The contract system did not apply,

as of late 1986, to workers already employed in state enterprises,

but it did indicate the direction in which at least some leaders wished

to go.

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The Social System

The fundamental issues of scarcity, equity, and opportunity lay

behind problems of balance and exchange among work units,

among the larger systems of units such as those under one industry ministry, or between city and country (see Differentiation, this ch.; Urban Society, this ch.; Reform of the Economic System

Beginning in 1979, ch. 5; Lateral Economic Cooperation, ch. 8). One of the major goals of the economic reform program in the

mid-1980s was to break down barriers to the exchange of information, personnel, and goods and services that separated units,

industrial systems, and geographic regions. National-level leaders

decried the waste of scarce resources inherent in the attempts of

industries or administrative divisions to be self-sufficient in as many

areas as possible, in their duplication of research and production,

and in their tendencies to hoard raw materials and skilled workers.

Attempts to break down administrative barriers (such as bans on

the sale of industrial products from other administrative divisions or the refusal of municipal authorities to permit factories subordinate to national ministries to collaborate with those subordinate

to the municipality) were often frustrated by the efforts of those

organizations that perceived themselves as advantageously placed

to maintain the barriers and their unduly large share of the limited

goods. Economic growth and development, which accelerated in the 1980s, was giving rise to an increasingly differentiated economic

and occupational structure, within which some individuals and

enterprises succeeded quite well. Economic reforms in rural areas generated a great income spread

among households, and some geographically favored areas, such

as central Guangdong and southern Jiangsu provinces, experienced more rapid economic growth than the interior or mountainous

areas. The official position was that while some households were

getting rich first, no one was worse off and that the economy as a whole was growing. Press commentary, however, indicated a fairly

high level of official concern over public perceptions of growing

inequality. The problem confronting China's leaders was to pro- mote economic growth while retaining public confidence in society's

fundamental equity and fair allocation of burdens and rewards.

The major question was whether the basic pattern of Chinese

society, a cellular structure of equivalent units coordinated by the

ruling party, would continue with modifications, or whether its costs were such that it would be replaced by a different and less uniform system. In the late 1980s, either alternative seemed possible.

The outcome would depend on both political forces and economic

pressures. In either case, balancing individual security with

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China: A Country Study

opportunity would remain the fundamental task of those who direct

Chinese society.

Among the best works on China's traditional society and cul- ture are Derk Bodde's brief overview, China's Traditional Culture: What and Whither? and the American missionary Arthur H. Smith's

Village Life in China and Chinese Characteristics, both written after many

years in Shandong Province and north China at the end of the

nineteenth century. Late traditional society is detailed in G. William

Skinner's The City in Late Imperial China. Chinese society during

World War II is presented in Graham Peck's Two Kinds of Time.

Sociologist C. K. Yang's yl Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition supplies a field study of a village just outside Guangzhou and

an account of the initial stages of the transformation of rural soci- ety in 1949. Ida Pruitt's A Daughter of the Han is a well-done life history of a servant woman from Shandong Province. The changes

of the 1950s are summarized in Franz Schurmann's authoritative

Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Ezra F. Vogel's Canton under Communism and Lynn T. White's Careers in Shanghai cover

the transformation of urban society. The Cultural Revolution is covered in William Hinton's Hundred Day War and Stanley Rosen's

Red Guard Factionalism and the Cultural Revolution in Guangzhou. Susan

Shirk's Competitive Comrades illuminates competition within urban

schools and its consequences. Son of the Revolution by Liang Heng

and Judith Shapiro and To the Storm by Yue Daiyu and Carolyn

Wakeman provide autobiographical accounts of the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath.

Two primary texts on modern Chinese society, based on inter- views in Hong Kong in the mid-1970s, are Village and Family in Contemporary China and Urban Life in Contemporary China written by

sociologists Martin King Whyte and William L. Parish. Also based on interviews in Hong Kong are Chen Village by Anita Chan,

Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger; Chan's Children of Mao

and Madsen' s Morality and Power in a Chinese Village.

The most important English-language journal covering modern

Chinese society is the China Quarterly published in London. Social

trends and official policies are described in a range of Englishlanguage journals published in China; the primary ones are Bei- jing Review and China Daily. (For further information and complete

citations, see Bibliography.)

150
Chapter 4. Education and Culture
A somberfigure playing a sheng, a reed-pipe instrument, is represented by

a Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) clay tomb figure.
SINCE THE REPUDIATION of the Cultural Revolution

(1966-76), the development of the education system in China has

been geared particularly to the advancement of economic modernization. Among the notable official efforts to improve the system were a 1984 decision to formulate major laws on education in the

next several years and a 1985 plan to reform the education sys- tem. In unveiling the education reform plan in May 1985, the

authorities called for nine years of compulsory education and the

establishment of the State Education Commission (created the fol- lowing month). Official commitment to improved education was nowhere more evident than in the substantial increase in funds for education in the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90), which

amounted to 72 percent more than funds allotted to education in the previous plan period (1981-85). In 1986 some 16.8 percent of

the state budget was earmarked for education, compared with 10.4

percent in 1984.

Since 1949, education has been a focus of controversy in China.

As a result of continual intraparty realignments, official policy alter- nated between ideological imperatives and practical efforts to fur- ther national development. But ideology and pragmatism often have

been incompatible. The Great Leap Forward (1958-60) and the

Socialist Education Movement (1962-65) sought to end deeply

rooted academic elitism, to narrow social and cultural gaps between

workers and peasants and between urban and rural populations,

and to "rectify" the tendency of scholars and intellectuals to dis- dain manual labor. During the Cultural Revolution, universal education in the interest of fostering social equality was an overriding

priority.

The post-Mao Zedong Chinese Communist Party leadership

viewed education as the foundation of the Four Modernizations.

In the early 1980s, science and technology education became an

important focus of education policy. By 1986 training skilled per- sonnel and expanding scientific and technical knowledge had been

assigned the highest priority. Although the humanities were considered important, vocational and technical skills were considered

paramount for meeting China's modernization goals. The reorientation of educational priorities paralleled Deng Xiaoping' s strategy

for economic development. Emphasis also was placed on the fur- ther training of the already-educated elite, who would carry on the

modernization program in the coming decades. Renewed emphasis

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China: A Country Study

on modern science and technology, coupled with the recognition

of the relative scientific superiority of the West, led to the adoption, beginning in 1976, of an outward-looking policy that encour- aged learning and borrowing from abroad for advanced training

in a wide range of scientific fields. Beginning at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party

Congress Central Committee in December 1978, intellectuals were encouraged to pursue research in support of the Four Modernizations and, as long as they complied with the party's "four cardinal principles" —upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the

proletariat, the leadership of the party, and Marxism-LeninismMao Zedong Thought—they were given relatively free rein. But

when the party and the government determined that the strictures

of the four cardinal principles had been stretched beyond tolera- ble limits, they did not hesitate to restrict intellectual expression.

Literature and the arts also experienced a great revival in the

late 1970s and 1980s. Traditional forms flourished once again, and

many new kinds of literature and cultural expression were

introduced from abroad.

Education Policy

During the Cultural Revolution, higher education in particular

suffered tremendous losses; the system was shut down, and a ris- ing generation of college and graduate students, academicians and

technicians, professionals and teachers, was lost. The result was

a lack of trained talent to meet the needs of society, an irrationally

structured higher education system unequal to the needs of the eco- nomic and technological boom, and an uneven development in secondary technical and vocational education. In the post-Mao

period, China's education policy continued to evolve. The pragmatist leadership, under Deng Xiaoping, recognized that to meet

the goals of modernization it was necessary to develop science, tech- nology, and intellectual resources and to raise the population's

education level. Demands on education—for new technology,

information science, and advanced management expertise —were

levied as a result of the reform of the economic structure and the

emergence of new economic forms. In particular, China needed

an educated labor force to feed and provision its 1 -billion-plus population. By 1980 achievement was once again accepted as the basis for admission and promotion in education. This fundamental change

reflected the critical role of scientific and technical knowledge and

professional skills in the Four Modernizations. Also, political activ- ism was no longer regarded as an important measure of individual

154
Teacher and students in a traditional academic setting. Woodcut.

Courtesy Library of Congress

performance, and even the development of commonly approved

political attitudes and political background was secondary to achievement. Education policy promoted expanded enrollments,

with the long-term objective of achieving universal primary and

secondary education. This policy contrasted with the previous one, which touted increased enrollments for egalitarian reasons. In 1985

the commitment to modernization was reinforced by plans for nineyear compulsory education and for providing good quality higher

education.

Deng Xiaoping' s far-ranging educational reform policy, which

involved all levels of the education system, aimed to narrow the

gap between China and other developing countries. Modernizing

China was tied to modernizing education. Devolution of educational management from the central to the local level was the means

chosen to improve the education system. Centralized authority was not abandoned, however, as evidenced by the creation of the

State Education Commission. Academically, the goals of reform were to enhance and universalize elementary and junior middle

school education; to increase the number of schools and qualified

teachers; and to develop vocational and technical education. A uniform standard for curricula, textbooks, examinations, and teacher

qualifications (especially at the middle-school level) was established,

and considerable autonomy and variations in and among the

155
China: A Country Study

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities were

allowed. Further, the system of enrollment and job assignment in higher education was changed, and excessive government control over colleges and universities was reduced.

The Education System

To provide for its population, China has a vast and varied school

system. There are preschools, kindergartens, schools for the deaf

and for the blind, key schools (similar to college preparatory

schools), primary schools, secondary schools (comprising junior and

senior middle schools, secondary agricultural and vocational schools,

regular secondary schools, secondary teachers' schools, secondary

technical schools, and secondary professional schools), and vari- ous institutions of higher learning (consisting of regular colleges

and universities, professional colleges, and short-term vocational

universities). In terms of access to education, China's system repre- sented a pyramid; because of the scarcity of resources allotted to higher education, student numbers decreased sharply at the higher

levels. Although there were dramatic advances in primary education after 1949, achievements in secondary and higher education were not as great.

Although the government has authority over the education sys- tem, the Chinese Communist Party has played a role in managing education since 1949. The party established broad education

policies and under Deng Xiaoping, tied improvements in the quality

of education to its modernization plan. The party also monitored

the government's implementation of its policies at the local level and within educational institutions through its party committees.

Party members within educational institutions, who often have a leading management role, are responsible for steering their schools

in the direction mandated by party policy.

New Directions

The May 1985 National Conference on Education recognized

five fundamental areas for reform to be discussed in connection

with implementing the party Central Committee's "Draft Decision on Reforming the Education System." The reforms were

intended to produce "more able people"; to make the localities responsible for developing "basic education" and systematically

implement a nine-year compulsory education program; to improve

secondary education; to develop vocational and technical education;

to reform the graduate-assignment system of institutions of higher

education and to expand their management and decision-making

powers; and to give administrators the necessary encouragement

156
Education and Culture

and authority to ensure smooth progress in educational reform.

The National Conference on Education paved the way for the

abolition of the Ministry of Education and the establishment of the

State Education Commission, both of which occurred in June 1985.

Created to coordinate education policy, the commission assumed

roles previously played by the State Planning Commission and the

Ministry of Education. As a State Council commission, the new

State Education Commission had greater status than the old Ministry of Education had had and was in charge of all education

organizations except military ones (see The State Council, ch. 10).

Although the State Education Commission assumed a central role

in the administration of education, the reform decentralized much

of the power previously wielded by the Ministry of Education and

its constituent offices and bureaus, which had established curriculum and admissions policies in response to the State Planning Commission's requirements.

The State Education Commission, with its expanded administrative scope and power, was responsible for formulating guiding

principles for education, establishing regulations, planning the

progress of educational projects, coordinating the educational programs of different departments, and standardizing educational

reforms. Simplification of administration and delegation of authority were made the bases for improving the education system. This devolution of management to the provinces, autonomous regions, and

special municipalities meant local governments had more decisionmaking power and were able to develop basic education. State- owned enterprises, mass organizations, and individuals were

encouraged to pool funds to accomplish education reform. Local

authorities used state appropriations and a percentage of local reserve financial resources (basically township financial revenues)

to finance educational projects.

Compulsory Education Law

The Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education, which took effect July 1 , 1986, established requirements and deadlines for attaining

universal education tailored to local conditions and guaranteed

school-age children the right to receive education. People's congresses at various local levels were, within certain guidelines and

according to local conditions, to decide the steps, methods, and

deadlines for implementing nine-year compulsory education in accordance with the guidelines formulated by the central authorities. The program sought to bring rural areas, which had four to

six years of compulsory schooling, into line with their urban

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China: A Country Study

counterparts. Education departments were exhorted to train millions of skilled workers lor all trades and professions and to offer guidelines, curricula, and methods to comply with the reform pro- gram and modernization needs.

Provincial-level authorities were to develop plans, enact decrees

and rules, distribute funds to counties, and administer directly a few key secondary schools. County authorities were to distribute

funds to each township government, which were to make up any

deficiencies. County authorities were to supervise education and

teaching and to manage their own senior middle schools, teachers'

schools, teachers' in-service training schools, agricultural vocational

schools, and exemplary primary and junior middle schools. The

remaining schools were to be managed separately by the county

and township authorities.

The compulsory education law divided China into three

categories: cities and economically developed areas in coastal

provinces and a small number of developed areas in the hinterland; towns and villages with medium development; and economically backward areas. By November 1985 the first category—the

larger cities and approximately 20 percent of the counties (mainly

in the more developed coastal and southeastern areas of China)

had achieved universal 9-year education. By 1990 cities, economically developed areas in coastal provincial-level units, and a small

number of developed interior areas (approximately 25 percent of

China's population) and areas where junior middle schools were

already popularized were targeted to have universal junior-middleschool education. Education planners envisioned that by the

mid-1990s all workers and staff in coastal areas, inland cities, and

moderately developed areas (with a combined population of 300

million to 400 million people) would have either compulsory 9-year

or vocational education and that 5 percent of the people in these areas would have a college education—building a solid intellectual foundation for China. Further, the planners expected that secondary education and university entrants would also increase by the

year 2000.

The second category targeted under the 9-year compulsory education law consisted of towns and villages with medium-level

development (around 50 percent of China's population), where

universal education was expected to reach the junior-middle-school

level by 1995. Technical and higher education was projected to develop at the same rate. The third category, economically backward (rural) areas (around

25 percent of China's population) were to popularize basic education without a timetable and at various levels according to local

158
Education and Culture

economic development, though the state would "do its best" to support educational development. The state also would assist education in minority nationality areas (see Minority Nationalities,

ch. 2). In the past, rural areas, which lacked a standardized and

universal primary education system, had produced generations of

illiterates; only 60 percent of their primary school graduates had

met established standards.

As a further example of the government's commitment to nineyear compulsory education, in January 1986 the State Council

drafted a bill passed at the Fourteenth Session of the Standing

Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress that made it illegal for any organization or individual to employ youths before

they had completed their nine years of schooling. The bill also authorized free education and subsidies for students whose families had financial difficulties. Key Schools

"Key schools," shut down during the Cultural Revolution,

reappeared in the late 1970s and, in the early 1980s, became an

integral part of the effort to revive the lapsed education system.

Because educational resources were scarce, selected ("key")

institutions—usually those with records of past educational accomplishment—were given priority in the assignment of teachers, equipment, and funds. They also were allowed to recruit the best students

for special training to compete for admission to top schools at the next level. Key schools constituted only a small percentage of all regular senior middle schools and funneled the best students into

the best secondary schools, largely on the basis of entrance scores. In 1980 the greatest resources were allocated to the key schools that would produce the greatest number of college entrants. In early 1987 efforts had begun to develop the key school from

a preparatory school into a vehicle for diffusing improved curricula,

materials, and teaching practices to local schools. Moreover, the

appropriateness of a key school's role in the nine-year basic education plan was questioned by some officials because key schools

favored urban areas and the children of more affluent and better

educated parents. In 1985 entrance examinations and the key-school

system had already been abolished in Changchun, Shenyang,

Shenzhen, Xiamen, and other cities, and education departments

in Shanghai and Tianjin were moving to establish a student recom- mendation system and eliminate key schools. In 1986 the Shanghai Educational Bureau abolished the key junior-middle-school

system to ensure "an overall level of education.

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China: A Country Study

Primary Education

Primary Schools

The development of primary education in so vast a country as China was a formidable accomplishment. In contrast to the

20-percent enrollment rate before 1949, in 1985 about 96 percent

of primary-school-age children were enrolled in approximately

832,300 primary schools (see table 10, Appendix A). This enroll- ment figure compared favorably with the record figures of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when enrollment standards were more

egalitarian. In 1985 the World Bank estimated that enrollments

in primary schools would decrease from 136 million in 1983 to 95 million in the late 1990s and that the decreased enrollment would

reduce the number of teachers needed. Qualified teachers, however,

would continue to be in demand.

Under the Law on Nine-Year Compulsory Education, primary

schools were to be tuition-free and reasonably located for the con- venience of children attending them; students would attend primary

schools in their neighborhoods or villages. Parents paid a small fee per term for books and other expenses such as transportation, food,

and heating. Previously, fees were not considered a deterrent to attendance, although some parents felt even these minor costs were more than they could afford. Under the education reform, students

from poor families received stipends, and state enterprises, insti- tutions, and other sectors of society were encouraged to establish

their own schools. A major concern was that scarce resources be

conserved without causing enrollment to fall and without weakening of the better schools. In particular, local governments were warned not to pursue middle-school education blindly while

primary-school education was still developing, or to wrest money,

teaching staff, and materials from primary schools.

Children usually entered primary school at seven years of age

for six days a week. The two-semester school year consisted of 9.5

months, with a long vacation in July and August. Urban primary

schools typically divided the school week into twenty-four to twenty- seven classes of forty-five minutes each, but in the rural areas the

norm was half-day schooling, more flexible schedules, and itiner- ant teachers. Most primary schools had a five-year course, except

in such cities as Beijing and Shanghai, which had reintroduced six- year primary schools and accepted children at six and one-half years rather than seven. The primary-school curriculum consisted of

Chinese, mathematics, physical education, music, drawing, and

elementary instruction in nature, history, and geography, combined with practical work experiences around the school compound.

160
Kindergarten

children Courtesy

Xinhua News Agency

A general knowledge of politics and moral training, which stressed

love of the motherland, love of the party, and love of the people

(and previously love of Chairman Mao), was another part of the

curriculum. A foreign language, often English, was introduced in about the third grade. Chinese and mathematics accounted for about 60 percent of the scheduled class time; natural science and

social science accounted for about 8 percent. Putonghua (common

spoken language, see Glossary) was taught in regular schools and

pinyin romanization in lower grades and kindergarten. The State Education Commission required that all primary schools offer courses on communist ideology and morality. Beginning in the

fourth grade, students usually had to perform productive labor two

weeks per semester to relate classwork with production experience

in workshops or on farms and subordinate it to academic study.

Most schools had after-hour activities at least one day per week

often organized by the Young Pioneers—to involve students in recreation and community service.

By 1980 the percentage of students enrolled in primary schools was high, but the schools reported high dropout rates and regional

enrollment gaps (most enrollees were concentrated in the cities).

Only one in four counties had universal primary education. On

the average, 10 percent of the students dropped out between each

grade. During the 1979-83 period, the government acknowledged

the "9-6-3" rule, that is, that nine of ten children began primary

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China: A Country Study

school, six completed it, and three graduated with good perfor- mance. This meant that only about 60 percent of primary students

actually completed their five year program of study and graduated,

and only about 30 percent were regarded as having primary-level

competence. Statistics in the mid-1980s showed that more rural

girls than boys dropped out of school.

Within the framework of the Law on Nine-Year Compulsory

Education and the general trend toward vocational and technical

skills, attempts were made to accommodate and correct the gap

between urban and rural education. Urban and key schools almost

invariably operated on a six day full-time schedule to prepare stu- dents for further education and high-level jobs. Rural schools generally operated on a flexible schedule geared to the needs of the

agricultural seasons and sought to prepare students for adult life and manual labor in lower-skilled jobs. They also offered a more

limited curriculum, often only Chinese, mathematics, and morals.

To promote attendance and allow the class schedule and academic

year to be completed, agricultural seasons were taken into account. School holidays were moved, school days shortened, and full-time,

half-time, and spare-time classes offered in the slack agricultural seasons. Sometimes itinerant teachers were hired for mountain vil- lages and served one village in the morning, another village in the

afternoon.

Rural parents were generally well aware that their children had

limited opportunities to further their education. Some parents saw

little use in having their children attend even primary school,

especially after the establishment of the agricultural responsibility

system (see Glossary). Under that system, parents preferred that

their children work to increase family income—and withdrew them

from school —for both long and short periods of time (see Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). Preschool Education

Preschool education, which began at age three and one-half, was

another target of education reform in 1985. Preschool facilities were

to be established in buildings made available by public enterprises,

production teams, municipal authorities, local groups, and families. The government announced that it depended on individual

organizations to sponsor their own preschool education and that

preschool education was to become a part of the welfare services

of various government organizations, institutes, and state- and col- lectively operated enterprises. Costs for preschool education varied

according to services rendered. Officials also called for more

preschool teachers with more appropriate training.

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Education and Culture

Special Education

The 1985 National Conference on Education also recognized the

importance of special education, in the form of programs for gifted

children and for slow learners. Gifted children were allowed to skip

grades. Slow learners were encouraged to reach minimum stan- dards, although those who did not maintain the pace seldom reached

the next stage. For the most part, children with severe learning

problems and those with handicaps and psychological needs were

the responsibilities of their families. Extra provisions were made

for blind and severely hearing-impaired children, although in 1984

special schools enrolled fewer than 2 percent of all eligible children

in those categories. The China Welfare Fund, established in 1984,

received state funding and had the right to solicit donations within

China and from abroad, but special education remained a low

government priority.

Secondary Education

Middle Schools

Secondary education in China has a complicated history. In the

early 1960s, education planners followed a policy called "walking

on two legs," which established both regular academic schools and

separate technical schools for vocational training. The rapid expansion of secondary education during the Cultural Revolution created

serious problems; because resources were spread too thinly, educational quality declined. Further, this expansion was limited to regular secondary schools; technical schools were closed during the

Cultural Revolution because they were viewed as an attempt to provide inferior education to children of worker and peasant

families. In the late 1970s, government and party representatives

criticized what they termed the "unitary" approach of the 1960s,

arguing that it ignored the need for two kinds of graduates: those

with an academic education (college preparatory) and those with

specialized technical education (vocational). Beginning in 1976 with

the renewed emphasis on technical training, technical schools

reopened, and their enrollments increased (as did those of^key

schools, also criticized during the Cultural Revolution). In the drive

to spread vocational and technical education, regular secondaryschool enrollments fell. By 1986 universal secondary education was

part of the nine year compulsory education law that made primary

education (six years) and junior-middle-school education (three

years) mandatory. The desire to consolidate existing schools and

to improve the quality of key middle schools was, however, under

the education reform, more important than expanding enrollment.

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China: A Country Study

Chinese secondary schools are called middle schools and are divided into junior and senior levels. In 1985 more than 104,000

middle schools (both regular and vocational) enrolled about 51 million students. Junior, or lower, middle schools offered a three year

course of study, which students began at twelve years of age. Senior, or upper, middle schools offered a twr o or three year course, which

students began at age fifteen. The regular secondary-school year usually had two semesters,

totaling nine months. In some rural areas, schools operated on a

shift schedule to accommodate agricultural cycles. The academic

curriculum consisted of Chinese, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, foreign language, history, geography, politics, physiology, music, fine arts, and physical education. Some middle schools

also offered vocational subjects. There were thirty or thirty-one

periods a week in addition to self-study and extracurricular activity.

Thirty-eight percent of the curriculum at a junior middle school was in Chinese and mathematics, 16 percent in a foreign language.

Fifty percent of the teaching at a senior middle school was in natural

sciences and mathematics, 30 percent in Chinese and a foreign

language.

Rural secondary education has undergone several transformations since 1980, when county-level administrative units closed some

schools and took over certain poorer schools run by the people's

communes (see Glossary). In 1982 the communes were eliminated.

In 1985 educational reform legislation officially placed rural secondary schools under local administration. There was a high dropout

rate among rural students in general and among secondary stu- dents in particular, largely because of parental attitudes. All stu- dents, however, especially males, were encouraged to attend

secondary school if it would lead to entrance to a college or university (still regarded as prestigious) and escape from village life. In China a senior-middle-school graduate is considered an educated person, although middle schools are viewed as a training

ground for colleges and universities. And, while middle-school stu- dents are offered the prospect of higher education, they are also confronted with the fact that university admission is limited. Middle schools are evaluated in terms of their success in sending graduates on for higher education, although efforts persist to educate

young people to take a place in society as valued and skilled members of the work force. Vocational and Technical Schools

Both regular and vocational secondary schools sought to serve modernization needs. A number of technical and "skilled-worker"

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Education and Culture

training schools reopened after the Cultural Revolution, and an

effort was made to provide exposure to vocational subjects in general

secondary schools (by offering courses in industry, services, business, and agriculture). By 1985 there were almost 3 million vocational and technical students.

Under the educational reform tenets, polytechnic colleges were

to give priority to admitting secondary vocational and technical

school graduates and providing on-the-job training for qualified

workers. Education reformers continued to press for the conversion of about 50 percent of upper secondary education into vocational education, which traditionally had been weak in the rural

areas. Regular senior middle schools were to be converted into vocational middle schools, and vocational training classes were to be

established in some senior middle schools. Diversion of students

from academic to technical education was intended to alleviate skill shortages and to reduce the competition for university enrollment.

Although enrollment in technical schools of various kinds had not

yet increased enough to compensate for decreasing enrollments in regular senior middle schools, the proportion of vocational and technical students to total senior-middle-school students increased from

about 5 percent in 1978 to almost 36 percent in 1985, although

development was uneven. Further, to encourage greater numbers

of junior-middle-school graduates to enter technical schools, vocational and technical school graduates were given priority in job

assignments, while other job seekers had to take technical tests. In 1987 there were four kinds of secondary vocational and technical schools: technical schools that offered a four year, post-junior

middle course and two- to three-year post-senior middle training

in such fields as commerce, legal work, fine arts, and forestry; workers' training schools that accepted students whose senior-middleschool education consisted of two years of training in such trades

as carpentry and welding; vocational technical schools that accepted

either junior- or senior-middle-school students for one- to threeyear courses in cooking, tailoring, photography, and other services; and agricultural middle schools that offered basic subjects and

agricultural science.

These technical schools had several hundred different programs.

Their narrow specializations had advantages in that they offered

in-depth training, reducing the need for on-the-job training and

thereby lowering learning time and costs. Moreover, students were more motivated to study if there were links between training and

future jobs. Much of the training could be done at existing enterprises, where staff and equipment were available at little additional

cost.

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China: A Country Study

There were some disadvantages to this system, however. Under

the Four Modernizations, technically trained generalists were needed more than highly specialized technicians. Also, highly

specialized equipment and staff were underused, and there was an

overall shortage of specialized facilities to conduct training. In addition, large expenses were incurred in providing the necessary

facilities and staff, and the trend in some government technical agencies was toward more general technical and vocational education.

Further, the dropout rate continued to have a negative effect on

the labor pool as upper-secondary-school technical students dropped

out and as the percentage of lower-secondary-school graduates

entering the labor market without job training increased. Occupational rigidity and the geographic immobility of the population,

particularly in rural areas, further limited educational choices.

Although there were 668,000 new polytechnic school enrollments

in 1985, the Seventh Five-Year Plan called for annual increases

of 2 million mid-level skilled workers and 400,000 senior technicians, indicating that enrollment levels were still far from sufficient. To improve the situation, in July 1986 officials from the State Education Commission, State Planning Commission, and Ministry of

Labor and Personnel convened a national conference on developing China's technical and vocational education. It was decided that technical and vocational education in rural areas should accom- modate local conditions and be conducted on a short-term basis.

Where conditions permitted, emphasis would be placed on organizing technical schools and short-term training classes. To alleviate

the shortage of teachers, vocational and technical teachers' colleges were to be reformed and other colleges and universities were to be mobilized for assistance. The State Council decision to improve

training for workers who had passed technical examinations (as

opposed to unskilled workers) was intended to reinforce the development of vocational and technical schools.

Higher Education

Background

Higher education reflects the changes in political policies that

have occurred in contemporary China. Since 1949 emphasis has

continually been placed on political re-education, and in periods

of political upheaval, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, ideology has been stressed over professional or

technical competence. During the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, tens of thousands of college students joined Red Guard

(see Glossary) organizations, effectively closing down the higher

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Education and Culture

education system (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76,

ch. 1). In general, when universities reopened in the early 1970s,

enrollments were reduced from pre-Cultural Revolution levels, and

admission was restricted to individuals who had been recommended

by their work unit (danwei—see Glossary) possessed good political

credentials, and had distinguished themselves in manual labor. In

the absence of stringent and reasonably objective entrance examinations, political connections became increasingly important in securing the recommendations and political dossiers necessary to qualify for university admission. As a result, the decline in educational quality was profound. Deng Xiaoping reportedly wrote Mao

Zedong in 1975 that university graduates were "not even capable

of reading a book" in their own fields when they left the university.

University faculty and administrators, moreover, were demoralized by what they faced.

Efforts made in 1975 to improve educational quality were

unsuccessful. By 1980 it appeared doubtful that the politically ori- ented admission criteria had accomplished even the purpose of

increasing enrollment of worker and peasant children. Successful

candidates for university entrance were usually children of cadres

and officials who used personal connections that allowed them to "enter through the back door." Students from officials' families

would accept the requisite minimum two year work assignment

in the countryside, often in a suburban location that allowed them

to remain close to their families. Village cadres, anxious to please

the parent-official, gladly recommended these youths for university placement after the labor requirement had been met. The child

of an official family was then on his or her way to a university

without having academic ability, a record of political activism, or

a distinguished work record.

After 1976 steps were taken to improve educational quality by

establishing order and stability, and calling for an end to political

contention on university campuses, and expanding university enroll- ments. This pressure to maintain quality and minimize expenditures led to efforts both to run existing institutions more efficiently

and to develop other college and university programs. As a result,

labor colleges for training agro-technicians and factory-run colleges

for providing technical education for workers were established. In

addition, eighty-eight institutions and key universities were provided

with special funding, top students and faculty members, and other

support, and they recruited the most academically qualified students

without regard to family background or political activism.

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China: A Country Study

Modernization Goals in the 1980s

The commitment to the Four Modernizations required great

advances in science and technology. Under the modernization pro- gram, higher education was to be the cornerstone for training and

research. Because modernization depended on a vastly increased

and improved capability to train scientists and engineers for needed

breakthroughs, the renewed concern for higher education and aca- demic quality—and the central role that the sciences were expected

to play in the Four Modernizations—highlighted the need for scientific research and training. This concern can be traced to the criti- cal personnel shortages and qualitative deficiencies in the sciences

resulting from the unproductive years of the Cultural Revolution,

when higher education was shut down. In response to the need

for scientific training, the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth National

Party Congress Central Committee, held in September 1986.

adopted a resolution on the guiding principles for building a socialist society that strongly emphasized the importance of education and

science.

Reformers realized, however, that the higher education system was far from meeting modernization goals and that additional

changes were needed. The Provisional Regulations Concerning the

Management of Institutions of Higher Learning, promulgated by

the State Council in 1986, initiated vast changes in administration and adjusted educational opportunity, direction, and content. With the increased independence accorded under the education

reform, universities and colleges were able to choose their own

teaching plans and curricula; to accept projects from or cooperate

with other socialist establishments for scientific research and technical development in setting up

1 'combines' 1 involving teaching,

scientific research, and production; to suggest appointments and

removals of vice presidents and other staff members; to take charge

of the distribution of capital construction investment and funds

allocated by the state; and to be responsible for the development

of international exchanges by using their own funds.

The changes also allowed the universities to accept financial aid

from work units and decide how this money was to be used without

asking for more money from departments in charge of education.

Further, higher education institutions and work units could sign contracts for the training of students.

Higher education institutions also were assigned a greater role

in running interregional and interdepartmental schools. Within their state-approved budgets, universities secured more freedom to allocate funds as they saw fit and to use income from tuition and

168
Students from Tongji University, Shanghai, work with construction models under direction of Western adviser. Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

technical and advisory services for their own development, including

collective welfare and bonuses.

There also was a renewed interest in television, radio, and

correspondence classes. Some of the courses, particularly in the

college-run factories, were serious, full-time enterprises, with a twoto three-year curriculum.

Entrance Examinations and Admission Criteria

National examinations to select students for higher education (and

positions of leadership) were an important part of China's culture,

and, traditionally, entrance to a higher education institution was

considered prestigious. Although the examination system for admission to colleges and universities has undergone many changes since

the Cultural Revolution, it remains the basis for recruiting academically able students. When higher education institutions were

reopened in the early 1970s, candidates for entrance examinations

had to be senior-middle-school graduates or the equivalent, generally below twenty-six years of age. Work experience requirements were eliminated, but workers and staff members needed permission

from their enterprises to take the examinations.

Each provincial-level unit was assigned a quota of students to be admitted to key universities, a second quota of students for

169
China: A Country Study

regular universities within that administrative division, and a third

quota of students from other provinces, autonomous regions, and

special municipalities who would be admitted to institutions operated at the provincial level. Provincial-level administrative units

selected students with outstanding records to take the examinations.

Additionally, preselection examinations were organized by the

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities for potential students (from three to five times the number of places

allotted). These candidates were actively encouraged to take the

examination to ensure that a sufficient number of good applicants

would be available. Cadres with at least two years of work experi- ence were recruited for selected departments in a small number

of universities on an experimental basis. Preferential admission

treatment (in spite of lower test scores) was given to minority candidates, students from disadvantaged areas, and those who agreed

in advance to work in less developed regions after graduation.

In December 1977, when uniform national examinations were

reinstated, 5.7 million students took the examinations, although

university placement was available for only the 278,000 applicants

with the highest scores. In July 1984, about 1.6 million candidates

(30,000 fewer than in 1983) took the entrance examinations for the 430,000 places in China's more than 900 colleges and universities. Of the 1.6 million examinees, more than 1 million took the

test for placement in science and engineering colleges; 415,000 for places in liberal arts colleges; 88,000 for placement in foreign language institutions; and 15,000 for placement in sports universities

and schools. More than 100,000 of the candidates were from

national minority groups. A year later, there were approximately

1.8 million students taking the 3-day college entrance examination to compete for 560,000 places. Liberal arts candidates were

tested on politics, Chinese, mathematics, foreign languages, his- tory, and geography. Science and engineering candidates were

tested on politics, Chinese, mathematics, chemistry, and biology.

Entrance examinations also were given in 1985 for professional and

technical schools, which sought to enroll 550,000 new students.

Other innovations in enrollment practices included allowing col- leges and universities to admit students with good academic records

but relatively low entrance-examination scores. Some colleges were

allowed to try an experimental student recommendation system

fixed at 2 percent of the total enrollment for regular colleges and

5 percent for teachers' colleges—instead of the traditional entrance

examination. A minimum national examination score was established for admission to specific departments at specially designated

colleges and universities, and the minimum score for admission

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Education and Culture

to other universities was set by provincial-level authorities. Key

universities established separate classes for minorities. When several applicants attained the minimum test score, the school had the

option of making a selection, a policy that gave university faculty

and administrators a certain amount of discretion but still protected

admission according to academic ability. In addition to the written examination, university applicants had

to pass a physical examination and a political screening. Less than

2 percent of the students who passed the written test were eliminated

for reasons of poor health. The number disqualified for political rea- sons was unknown, but publicly the party maintained that the number was very small and that it sought to ensure that only the most

able students actually entered colleges and universities.

By 1985 the number of institutions of higher learning had again

increased—to slightly more than 1,000. The State Education Commission and the Ministry of Finance issued a joint declaration for nationwide unified enrollment of adult students—not the regular

secondary-school graduates but the members of the work force who

qualified for admission by taking a test. The State Education Commission established unified questions and time and evaluation

criteria for the test and authorized provinces, autonomous regions,

and special municipalities to administer the test, grade the papers

in a unifoim manner, and determine the minimum points required

for admission. The various schools were to enroll students according to the results. Adult students needed to have the educational

equivalent of senior-middle-school graduates, and those applying

for release or partial release from work to study were to be under

forty years of age. Staff members and workers were to apply to study job-related subjects with review by and approval of their

respective work units. If employers paid for the college courses,

the workers had to take entrance examinations. In 1985 colleges

enrolled 33,000 employees from various enterprises and companies, approximately 6 percent of the total college enrollment.

In 1985 state quotas for university places were set, allowing both

for students sponsored by institutions and for those paying their

own expenses. This policy was a change from the previous system

in which all students were enrolled according to guidelines established in Beijing. All students except those at teachers' colleges,

those who had financial difficulties, and those who were to work

under adverse conditions after graduation had to pay for their own

tuition, accommodations, and miscellaneous expenses.

Changes in Enrollment and Assignment Policies

The student enrollment and graduate assignment system also

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China: A Country Study

was changed to reflect more closely the personnel needs of modernization. By 1986 the state was responsible for drafting the enroll- ment plan, which took into account future personnel demands, the

need to recruit students from outlying regions, and the needs of

trades and professions with adverse working conditions. Moreover,

a certain number of graduates to be trained for the People's Liberation Army were included in the state enrollment plan. In most cases, enrollment in higher education institutions at the employers' request was extended as a supplement to the state student enrollment plan.

Employers were to pay a percentage of training fees, and students were to fulfill contractual obligations to the employers after graduation. The small number of students who attended colleges and

universities at their own expense could be enrolled in addition to those in the state plan.

Accompanying the changes in enrollment practices were reforms,

adopted in 1986, in the faculty appointment system, which ended

the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) employment system and gave

colleges and universities freedom to decide what departments,

majors, and numbers of teachers they needed. Teachers in insti- tutions of higher learning were hired on a renewable contract basis,

usually for two to four years at a time. The teaching positions avail- able were teaching assistant, lecturer, associate professor, and

professor. The system was tested in eight major universities in Beijing and Shanghai before it was instituted nationwide at the end

of 1985. University presidents headed groups in charge of

appointing professors, lecturers, and teaching assistants according

to their academic levels and teaching abilities, and a more rational

wage system, geared to different job levels, was inaugurated.

Universities and colleges with surplus professors and researchers were advised to grant them appropriate academic titles and encour- age them to work for their current pay in schools of higher learning where they were needed. The new system was to be extended

to schools of all kinds and other education departments within two

years. Under the 1985 reforms, all graduates were assigned jobs by the

state; a central government placement agency told the schools where

to send graduates. By 1985 Qinghua University and a few other

universities were experimenting with a system that allowed graduates to accept job offers or to look for their own positions. For

example, of 1,900 Qinghua University graduates in 1985, 1,200

went on to graduate school, 48 looked for their own jobs, and the

remainder were assigned jobs by the school after consultation with

the students. The college students and postgraduates scheduled to graduate in 1986 were assigned primarily to work in forestry,

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Education and Culture

education, textiles, and the armaments industry. Graduates still were needed in civil engineering, computer science, finance, and

English.

Scholarship and Loan System

In July 1986 the State Council announced that the stipend sys- tem for university and college students would be replaced with a new scholarship and loan system. The new system, to be tested

in selected institutions during the 1986-87 academic year, was

designed to help students who could not cover their own living

expenses but who studied hard, obeyed state laws, and observed

discipline codes. Students eligible for financial aid were to apply

to the schools and the China Industrial and Commercial Bank for low-interest loans. Three categories of students eligible for aid were

established: top students encouraged to attain all-around excellence;

students specializing in education, agriculture, forestry, sports, and

marine navigation; and students willing to work in poor, remote,

and border regions or under harsh conditions, such as in mining

and engineering. In addition, free tuition and board were to be

offered at teachers' colleges, and the graduates were required to teach at least five years in primary and middle schools. After graduation, a student's loans were to be paid off by his or her employer

in a lump sum, and the money was to be repaid to the employer

by the student through five years of payroll deductions.

Study Abroad

In addition to loans, another means of raising educational quality, particularly in science, was to send students abroad to study.

A large number of Chinese students studied in the Soviet Union

before educational links and other cooperative programs with the

Soviet Union were severed in the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s,

China continued to send a small number of students abroad,

primarily to European universities. In October 1978 Chinese stu- dents began to arrive in the United States; their numbers accelerated after normalization of relations between the two countries in January 1979, a policy consistent with modernization needs.

Although figures vary, more than 36,000 students, including 7,000

self-supporting students (those who paid their own way, received

scholarships from host institutions, or received help from relatives

and "foreign friends"), studied in 14 countries between 1978 and

1984. Of this total, 78 percent were technical personnel sent abroad

for advanced study. As of mid- 1986 there were 15,000 Chinese

scholars and graduates in American universities, compared with

the total of 19,000 scholars sent between 1979 and 1983.

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China: A Country Study

Chinese students sent to the United States generally were not

typical undergraduates or graduate students but were mid-career

scientists, often thirty-five to forty-five years of age, seeking

advanced training in their areas of specialization. Often they were

individuals of exceptional ability who occupied responsible positions in Chinese universities and research institutions. Fewer than

15 percent of the earliest arrivals were degree candidates. Nearly

all the visiting scholars were in scientific fields. Educational Investment

Many of the problems that had hindered higher educational

development in the past continued in 1987. Funding remained a major problem because science and technology study and research

and study abroad were expensive. Because education was competing

with other modernization programs, capital was critically short. Another concern was whether or not the Chinese economy was suffi- ciently advanced to make efficient use of the highly trained technical personnel it planned to educate. For example, some observers

believed that it would be more realistic to train a literate work force

of low-level technicians instead of research scientists. Moreover,

it was feared that using an examination to recruit the most able

students might advance people who were merely good at taking

examinations. Educational reforms also made some people uncomfortable by criticizing the traditional practice of rote memorization and promoting innovative teaching and study methods.

The prestige associated with higher education caused a demand

for it. But many qualified youths were unable to attend colleges

and universities because China could not finance enough university places for them. To help meet the demand and to educate a highly trained, specialized work force, China established alternate

forms of higher education—such as spare-time, part-time, and radio

and television universities.

China cannot afford a heavy investment, either ideologically or

financially, in the education of a few students. Since 1978 China's

leaders have modified the policy of concentrating education resources

at the university level, which, although designed to facilitate modernization, conflicted directly with the party's principles. The policies

that produced an educated elite also siphoned off resources that might

have been used to accomplish the compulsory nine year education more speedily and to equalize educational opportunities in the city

and the countryside. The policy of key schools has been modified

over the years. Nevertheless, China's leaders believe an educated

elite is necessary to reach modernization goals.

174
175
China: A Country Study

Teachers

Among the most pressing problems facing education reformers was the scarcity of qualified teachers, which has led to a serious

stunting of educational development. In 1986 there were about

8 million primary- and middle-school teachers in China, but many

lacked professional training. Estimates indicated that in order to meet the goals of the Seventh Five- Year Plan and realize compulsory 9-year education, the system needed 1 million new teachers

for primary schools, 750,000 new teachers for junior middle schools,

and 300,000 new teachers for senior middle schools. Estimates

predict, however, that the demand for teachers will drop in the

late 1990s because of an anticipated decrease in primary-school

enrollments.

To cope with the shortage of qualified teachers, the State Education Commission decreed in 1985 that senior-middle-school

teachers should be graduates with two years' training in professional institutes and that primary-school teachers should be

graduates of secondary schools. To improve teacher quality, the

commission established full-time and part-time (the latter preferred

because it was less costly) in-service training programs. Primaryschool and preschool in-service teacher training programs devoted

84 percent of the time to subject teaching, 6 percent to pedagogy

and psychology, and 10 percent to teaching methods. In-service

training for primary-school teachers was designed to raise them

to a level of approximately two years' postsecondary study, with

the goal of qualifying most primary-school teachers by 1990.

Secondary-school in-service teacher training was based on a unified

model, tailored to meet local conditions, and offered on a spare- time basis. Ninety-five percent of its curricula was devoted to subject teaching, 2 to 3 percent to pedagogy and psychology, and 2 to 3 percent to teaching methods. There was no similar large-scale

in-service effort for technical and vocational teachers, most of whom

worked for enterprises and local authorities.

By 1985 there were more than 1,000 teacher training schools—an

indispensable tool in the effort to solve the acute shortage of qualified teachers. These schools, however, were unable to supply the

number of teachers needed to attain modernization goals through

1990. Although a considerable number of students graduated as

qualified teachers from institutions of higher learning, the relatively

low social status and salary levels of teachers hampered recruitment, and not all of the graduates of teachers' colleges became

teachers. To attract more teachers, China tried to make teaching

a more desirable and respected profession. To this end, the

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Education and Culture

government designated September 10 as Teachers' Day, granted

teachers pay raises, and made teachers' colleges tuition free. To

further arrest the teacher shortage, in 1986 the central government

sent teachers to underdeveloped regions to train local schoolteachers.

Because urban teachers continued to earn more than their rural

counterparts and because academic standards in the countryside

had dropped, it remained difficult to recruit teachers for rural areas. Teachers in rural areas also had production responsibilities for their

plots of land, which took time from their teaching. Rural primary

teachers needed to supplement their pay by farming because most

were paid by the relatively poor local communities rather than by

the state. Adult Education

Role in Modernization

Because only 4 percent of the nation's middle-school graduates

are admitted to universities, China has found it necessary to develop

other ways of meeting the demand for education. Adult education

has become increasingly important in helping China meet its modernization goals. Adult, or "nonformal," education is an

alternative form of higher education that encompasses radio, tele- vision, and correspondence universities, spare-time and part-time

universities, factory-run universities for staff and workers, and

county-run universities for peasants, many operating primarily during students' off-work hours. These alternative forms of education

are economical. They seek to educate both the "delayed generation" —those who lost educational opportunities during the Cultural Revolution—and to raise the cultural, scientific, and general

education levels of workers on the job.

Alternative Forms

Schools have been established by government departments, busi- nesses, trade unions, academic societies, democratic parties (see

Glossary), and other organizations. In 1984 about 70 percent of

China's factories and enterprises supported their own part-time

classes, which often were referred to as workers' colleges. In Beijing alone, more than ninety adult-education schools with night

schools enrolled tens of thousands of students. More than 20,000

of these students graduated annually from evening universities,

workers' colleges, television universities, and correspondence

schools—more than twice the number graduating from regular col- leges and universities. The government spent ¥200 (for value of

the yuan—see Glossary) to ¥500 per adult education student and

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China: A Country Study

at least ¥1,000 per regular university student. In 1984 approximately 1.3 million students enrolled in television, correspondence,

and evening universities, about a 30-percent increase over 1983.

Spare-time education for workers and peasants and literacy classes for the entire adult population were other components of basic education. Spare-time education included a very broad range of educational activities at all levels. Most spare-time schools were sponsored

by factories and run for their own workers; they provided fairly

elementary education, as well as courses to upgrade technical skills. Most were on-the-job training and retraining courses, a normal

part of any industrial system. These schools continually received

publicity in the domestic media as a symbol of social justice, but

it was unclear whether they received adequate resources to achieve

this end.

China's educational television system began in 1960 but was sus- pended during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. In 1979 the Central Radio and Television University was established in Beijing with

branches in twenty-eight provincial-level universities. Many Central

Radio and Television University students are recent senior-middleschool graduates who scored just below the cut-off point for admission to conventional colleges and universities. Full-time (who

take four courses) and part-time students (two courses) have at least two years' work experience, and they return to their jobs after graduation. Spare-time students (one course) study after work. Stu- dents whose work units grant them permission to study in a televi- sion university are paid their normal wages; expenses for most of

their books and other educational materials are paid for by the state. A typical Central Radio and Television University student spends

up to six hours a day over a three-year period watching lectures on videotapes produced by some of the best teachers in China.

These lectures are augmented by face-to-face tutoring by local instructors and approximately four hours of homework each evening. The major problem with the system is that there are too few

television sets. In 1987 the Central Television and Radio University had its pro- grams produced, transmitted, and financed by the Ministry of

Radio, Cinema, and Television (see Telecommunications Services,

ch. 8). The State Education Commission developed its curriculum

and distributed its printed support materials. Curriculum included

both basic, general-purpose courses in science and technology and more specialized courses. Programs in English-language instruction were particularly popular. The Central Television and Radio

University offered more than 1 ,000 classes in Beijing and its suburbs

and 14 majors in 2- to 3-year courses through 56 working centers.

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Education and Culture

Students who passed final examinations were given certificates entitling them to the same level of remuneration as graduates of

regular, full-time colleges and universities. The state gave certain

allowances to students awaiting jobs during their training period.

Literacy and Language Reform

The continuing campaigns to eradicate illiteracy also were a part

of basic education. Chinese government statistics indicated that

of a total population of nearly 1.1 billion in 1985, about 230 million people were illiterate or semiliterate. The dif ficulty of mastering written Chinese makes raising the literacy rate particularly

difficult. In general, language reform was intended to make writ- ten and spoken Chinese easier to learn, which in turn would foster both literacy and linguistic unity and serve as a foundation for a simpler written language. In 1951 the party issued a directive that

inaugurated a three-part plan for language reform. The plan sought

to establish universal comprehension of a standardized common

language, simplify written characters, and introduce, where possible, romanized forms based on the Latin alphabet. In 1956 putonghua was introduced as the language of instruction in schools and

in the national broadcast media, and by 1977 it was in use throughout China, particularly in the government and party, and in education. Although in 1987 the government continued to endorse the

goal of universalizing putonghua, hundreds of regional and local dialects continued to be spoken, complicating interregional communication.

A second language reform required the simplification of ideographs because ideographs with fewer strokes are easier to learn. In 1964 the Committee for Reforming the Chinese Written Language released an official list of 2,238 simplified characters most

basic to the language. Simplification made literacy easier, although

people taught only in simplified characters were cut off from the

wealth of Chinese literature written in traditional characters. Any

idea of replacing ideographic script with romanized script was soon abandoned, however, by government and education leaders.

A third area of change involved the proposal to use the pinyin

romanization system more widely. Pinyin (first approved by the

National People's Congress in 1958) was encouraged primarily to

facilitate the spread of putonghua in regions where other dialects and

languages are spoken. By the mid-1980s, however, the use of pinyin was not as widespread as the use of putonghua.

Retaining literacy was as much a problem as acquiring it, particularly among the rural population. Literacy rates declined

between 1966 and 1976. Political disorder may have contributed

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to the decline, but the basic problem was that the many Chinese

ideographs can be mastered only through rote learning and are often

forgotten because of disuse.

Policy Toward Intellectuals

Background

The current status of Chinese intellectuals reflects traditions

established in the imperial period. For most of this period, government officials were selected from among the literati on the basis

of the Confucian civil service examination system (see Restoration

of Empire, ch. 1; Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Intellec- tuals were both participants in and critics of the government. As

Confucian scholars, they were torn between their loyalty to the

emperor and their obligation to

ik correct wrong thinking" when

they perceived it. Then, as now, most intellectual and government

leaders subscribed to the premise that ideological change was a prerequisite for political change. Historically. Chinese intellectuals rarely formed groups to oppose the established government. Rather,

individual intellectuals or groups of intellectuals allied themselves

with cliques within the government to lend support to the policies

of that clique.

With the abolition of the civil service examination system in 1905

and the end of the last imperial dynasty in 1911. intellectuals no

longer had a vehicle for direct participation in the government.

Although the absence of a strong national government would have

been expected to provide a favorable situation for maximum

intellectual independence, other inhibiting factors—such as the concentration of intellectuals in foreign-controlled treaty ports, isolated

from the mainstream of Chinese society, or in universities dependent on government or missionary financing—remained. Probably the greatest obstacle to the development of an intellectual

community free of outside control was the rising tide of nationalism coupled with the fear of being accused of selling out to foreign

interests. In 1927 the newly established Guomindang government

in Nanjing attempted to establish an intellectual orthodoxy based on the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, but intellectuals continued to operate

with a certain degree of freedom in universities and treaty ports

(see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). Following the Japanese

invasion and occupation of large parts of China in the 1930s, the

Guomindang government tightened control over every aspect of

life, causing a large number of dissident intellectuals to seek refuge

in Communist-administered areas or in Hong Kong.

When the People's Republic of China wr as established in 1949.

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intellectuals came under strict government control. Educated overseas Chinese (see Glossary) were invited to return home, and those

intellectuals who remained in China were urged to contribute their

technical expertise to rebuilding the country. Intellectuals were

expected to serve the party and the state. Independent thinking was stifled, and political dissent was not tolerated. In mid- 1956 the Chinese Communist Party felt secure enough

to launch the Hundred Flowers Campaign (see Glossary), solicit- ing criticism under the classical "double hundred" slogan "Let

a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought con- tend." "Let a hundred flowers bloom" applied to the development

of the arts, and "let the hundred schools of thought contend"

encouraged the development of science. The initiation of this campaign was followed by the publication in early 1957 of Mao

Zedong's essay "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among

the People," in which he drew a distinction between "constructive criticisms among the people" and "hateful and destructive criti- cism between the enemy and ourselves." In August 1957, when

it was clear to the leadership that widespread criticism of the party

and party cadres had gotten out of hand, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was launched to suppress all divergent thought and firmly

reestablish orthodox ideology. Writers who had answered the party's

invitation to offer criticisms and alternative solutions to China's

problems were abruptly silenced, and many were sent to reform

camps or internal exile. By the early 1960s, however, a few intellec- tuals within the party were bold enough to again propose policy

alternatives, within stringent limits. When the Cultural Revolution began, in 1966, party functionaries assumed positions of leadership at most research institutes

and universities, and many schools were closed or converted to "soldiers', workers', and peasants' universities." Intellectuals,

denounced as the "stinking ninth category," either were purged

or had their work heavily edited for political "purity," which

severely hampered most serious research and scholarship.

Following the fall of Lin Biao, minister of national defense and

Mao's heir apparent, in 1971, the atmosphere for intellectuals began

to improve. Under the aegis of Zhou Enlai and later Deng Xiaoping, many intellectuals were restored to their former positions and

warily resumed their pre-Cultural Revolution duties. In January

1975 Zhou Enlai set out his ambitious Four Modernizations (see

Glossary) program and solicited the support of China's intellec- tuals in turning China into a modern industrialized nation by the

end of the century (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76;

The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1).

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Post-Mao Development

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee in December 1978 officially made the Four Modernizations basic national policy and reemphasized the importance of

intellectuals in achieving them. The policy of "seeking truth from

facts" was stressed, and scholars and researchers were given freer rein to pursue scientific research. Most mainstream intellectuals were content to avoid political involvement and to take on the role of scholar-specialists within their spheres of competence, with the

understanding that as long as they observed the four cardinal

principles—upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat,

the leadership of the party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong

Thought—they would be permitted to conduct their research with

minimal bureaucratic interference. This was accomplished more

easily in the natural sciences, which are generally recognized as

apolitical, than in the social sciences, humanities, and the arts. The first serious challenge to the more tolerant policy toward

intellectuals came in 1980, as conservative ideologues in the mili- tary and the party stepped up their calls to combat "bourgeois liber- alization," a loosely defined appellation for any writing or activity

believed to stretch the limits of the four cardinal principles. By early

1981 opposition to "bourgeois liberalization" was focused on Bai

Hua, a writer with the Political Department of what was then the

Wuhan Military Region. Bai had long been a strong advocate for relaxation of cultural and social policy, but what especially alarmed

the guardians of cultural orthodoxy was his screenplay "Bitter

Love," which depicted the frustrated patriotism of an old painter

who faces misunderstanding and ill-treatment when he returns to China from the United States. When the screenplay first appeared

in a nationally circulated literary magazine in the fall of 1979, it caused little stir. The motion picture version, however, which was shown to selected officials, drew strong censure. A commentary

in the April 18, 1981, issue ofJiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily)

accused Bai Hua of violating the four cardinal principles and

described the screenplay as an example of "bourgeois liberalization." The commentary was reprinted in the next month's issue

oi Jiefangjun Wenyi (Liberation Army Literature and Art), along

with other articles critical of "Bitter Love." Over the next few

months the criticism was taken up by most civilian newspapers,

and the acting minister of culture, Zhou Weizhi, singled out "Bitter Love" for attack in a speech delivered to the Twentieth Ses- sion of the Fifth National People's Congress Standing Committee

in September. Finally, Bai Hua yielded to the ostracism and wrote

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a letter of self-criticism addressed to Jiefangjun Bao and Wenyibao

(Literary Gazette), in which he apologized for a "lack of balance"

in "Bitter Love" and for failing to recognize the power of the party

and the people to overcome obstacles in Chinese society. Bai Hua

was out of public view for the next year but remained active, writing four short stories in the period. In January 1983 he was invited

by the Ministry of Culture to participate in a Shanghai conference on film scripts, and in May of that year the Beijing People's Art

Theater presented his new historical play, "The King of Wu's

Golden Spear and the King of Yue's Sword," thought by many

to be a veiled criticism of Mao Zedong and perhaps even of Deng

Xiaoping. Although the "Bitter Love" controversy caused considerable anxiety in the intellectual community, it is as noteworthy

for what it did not do as for what it did do. Unlike previous campaigns in which writers and all of their works were condemned,

criticism in this case focused on one work, "Bitter Love." Neither

Bai Hua's other works nor his political difficulties in the 1950s and

1960s were part of the discussion. In fact, as if to emphasize the

limited nature of the campaign, at its height in May 1981 Bai was

given a national prize for poetry by the Chinese Writers'

Association.

After a mild respite in 1982 and most of 1983, "antibourgeois

liberalization" returned in full force in the short-lived campaign

against "spiritual pollution" launched by a speech given by Deng

Xiaoping at the Second Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee in October 1983. In the speech, Deng inveighed against advocates of abstract theories of human nature, "bourgeois

humanitarianism," "bourgeois liberalization," and socialist alien- ation, as well as the growing fascination in China with "decadent

elements" from Western culture. Conservatives, led by Political Bureau member Hu Qiaomu and party Propaganda Department

head Deng Liqun, used the campaign in an effort to oppose those

aspects of society that they disliked. The campaign soon was out

of control and extended to areas beyond the scope that Deng Xiaoping had intended, raising fears at home and abroad of another

Cultural Revolution.

Because of the campaign against spiritual pollution, intellectuals (including scientists and managerial and technical personnel) and

party and government cadres were hesitant to take any action that

could expose them to criticism. Peasants, whose production had

greatly increased under the responsibility system adopted in 1981,

felt uncertain about the future course of central policy (see Post- Mao Policies, ch. 6). Because of this, many of them returned their

specialized certificates and contracts to local authorities, sold their

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equipment, and lowered production targets. Many ordinary

citizens, especially the young, resented the sudden interference in their private lives. Foreign businessmen and government leaders

expressed serious reservations about the investment climate and

China's policy of opening to the world.

Because of these adverse results, the central leadership reevaluated the campaign and limited it to theoretical, literary, and artistic circles and did not permit it to extend to science and technology,

the economy, or rural areas. All ideological, theoretical, literary,

and artistic issues were to be settled through discussion, criticism,

and self-criticism, without resorting to labeling or attacks. By January 1984 the campaign against spiritual pollution had died out. and attention was once more turned to reducing leftist influence

in government and society.

Following the campaign's failure, and perhaps because of it, the

position and security of intellectuals improved significantly. In 1984

the party and government turned their attention to promoting urban

economic reforms. A more positive approach to academic and cul- tural pursuits was reflected in periodic exhortations in the official press calling on the people to support and encourage the building

of "socialist spiritual civilization," a term used to denote general

intellectual activity, including ethics and morality, science, and

culture.

Writers and other intellectuals were heartened by a speech deliv- ered by Hu Qili, secretary of the party Secretariat, to the Fourth

National Writers' Congress (December 29. 1984. to January 5. 1985). In the speech, Hu decried the political excesses that produced

derogatory labels and decrees about what writers should and should

not write and called literary freedom "a vital part of socialist litera- ture." But as writers began to test the limits of the free expression

called for by Hu Qili, they were reminded of their "social responsibilities," a thinly veiled warning for them to use self-censorship

and to remain within the limits of free expression.

These limits, still poorly defined, were tested once again when

Song Longxian, a young researcher at Nanjing University, using

the pseudonym Ma Ding, published an article entitled "Ten

Changes in Contemporary Chinese Economic Research" in the

November 2, 1985, issue of the trade union paper Gongren Ribao

(Workers' Daily). The article urged a pragmatic approach to eco- nomic theory and sharply attacked much previous economic

research. A somewhat toned-downed version was republished in a subsequent issue of Beijing Review, a weekly magazine for for- eign readers, and immediately became the center of a controversy

continuing well into 1986. Ma Ding's supporters, however, far

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outnumbered his critics and included some important government

officials. In May 1986 the editor otGongren Ribao, writing in another

economic journal, summed up the controversy. He termed the criti- cism of the article of far greater significance than the article itself and commended the "related departments" for handling the "Ma

Ding incident very prudently" and "relatively satisfactorily," and

he expressed the hope that "more people in our country, particularly leaders," would join in '"providing powerful protection to the

theoretical workers who are brave enough to explore."

In 1986 there were numerous calls for a new Hundred Flowers

Campaign, and there were indications that these calls were being

orchestrated from the top. At a May 1986 conference to com- memorate the thirtieth anniversary of the original Hundred Flowers Campaign. Zhu Houze, new head of the party's Propaganda

Department, sounded the keynote when he said, "Only through

the comparison and contention of different viewpoints and ideas can people gradually arrive at a truthful understanding. ..." Qin

Jianxian, editor of Shijie Jingji Daobao (World Economic Journal),

carried this theme further when he called for "unprecedented shocks

to political, economic, and social life as well as to people's ideas,

spiritual state, lifestyle, and thinking methods." In a July 1986

interview with Beijing Review, Wang Meng, the newly appointed

minister of culture, held out great expectations for a new Hundred

Flowers Campaign that he said "could arouse the enthusiasm of

writers and artists and give them the leeway to display their

individual artistic character." During the summer of 1986, expectations were raised for a resolution to come out of the Sixth Plenum

of the Twelfth Central Committee in September, a resolution that

General Secretary Hu Yaobang promised would have a "profound

influence on the development of spiritual civilization." The actual

document, however, was a watered-down compromise that fell far short of expectations. It became clear that intellectual policy is not

a matter to be easily resolved in the short-term but requires lengthy

debate.

Culture and the Arts

Traditional Literature

Classics

China has a wealth of classical literature, both poetry and prose, dating from the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770-221 B.C.) and including

the Classics attributed to Confucius (see The Zhou Period, ch. 1; Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Among the most important classics in Chinese literature is the Yijing (Book of Changes),

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a manual of divination based on eight trigrams attributed to the

mythical emperor Fu Xi. (By Confucius' time these eight trigrams

had been multiplied to sixty-four hexagrams.) The Yijing is still used by adherents of folk religion. The Shijing (Classic of Poetry)

is made up of 305 poems divided into 160 folk songs; 74 minor

festal songs, traditionally sung at court festivities; 31 major festal songs, sung at more solemn court ceremonies; and 40 hymns and

eulogies, sung at sacrifices to gods and ancestral spirits of the royal

house. The Shujing (Classic of Documents) is a collection of documents and speeches alleged to have been written by rulers and offi- cials of the early Zhou period and before. It contains the best

examples of early Chinese prose. The Liji (Record of Rites), a resto- ration of the original Lijing (Classic of Rites), lost in the third cen- tury B.C., describes ancient rites and court ceremonies. The Chun

Qiu (Spring and Autumn) is a historical record of the principality

of Lu, Confucius' native state, from 722 to 479 B.C. It is a log

of concise entries probably compiled by Confucius himself. The

Lunyu (Analects) is a book of pithy sayings attributed to Confucius

and recorded by his disciples.

Early Prose

The proponents of the Hundred Schools of Thought in the Warring States period made important contributions to Chinese prose

style (see The Hundred Schools of Thought, ch. 1). The writings

of Mo Zi (Mo Di; 470-391 B.C.?), Mencius (Meng Zi; 372-289

B.C.), and Zhuang Zi (369-286 B.C.) contain well-reasoned, carefully developed discourses and show a marked improvement in organization and style over what went before. Mo Zi is known for extensively and effectively using methodological reasoning in his polemic prose. Mencius contributed elegant diction and, along with

Zhuang Zi, is known for his extensive use of comparisons, anecdotes, and allegories. By the third century B.C., these writers had

developed a simple, concise prose noted for its economy of words,

which served as a model of literary form for over 2,000 years. Early Poetry

Among the earliest and most influential poetic anthologies was

the Chuci (Songs of Chu), made up primarily of poems ascribed

to the semilegendary Qu Yuan (ca. 340-278 B.C.) and his follower

Song Yu (fourth century B.C.). The songs in this collection are more lyrical and romantic and represent a different tradition from

the earlier Shijing. During the Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220),

this form evolved into thefu, a poem usually in rhymed verse except

for introductory and concluding passages that are in prose, often

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in the form of questions and answers. The era of disunity that fol- lowed the Han period saw the rise of romantic nature poetry heavily

influenced by Taoism.

Classical poetry reached its zenith during the Tang dynasty

(A.D. 618-907). The early Tang period was best known for its lilshi (regulated verse), an eight-line poem with five or seven words in each line; zi (verse following strict rules of prosody); andjueju (truncated verse), a four-line poem with five or seven words in each line. The two best-known poets of the period were Li Bai (701-762) and

Du Fu (712-770). Li Bai was known for the romanticism of his

poetry; Du Fu was seen as a Confucian moralist with a strict sense of duty toward society.

Later Tang poets developed greater realism and social criticism

and refined the art of narration. One of the best known of the later Tang poets was Bai Juyi (772-846), whose poems were an inspired

and critical comment on the society of his time.

Subsequent writers of classical poetry lived under the shadow

of their great Tang predecessors, and although there were many

fine poets in subsequent dynasties, none reached the level of this period. As the classical style of poetry became more stultified, a more flexible poetic medium, the ci, arrived on the scene. The ci, a poetic form based on the tunes of popular songs, some of Central Asian origin, was developed to its fullest by the poets of the

Song dynasty (960-1279).

As the ci gradually became more literary and artificial after Song

times, the san qu, a freer form, based on new popular songs, developed. The use of san qu songs in drama marked an important step

in the development of vernacular literature.

Later Prose

The Tang period also saw a rejection of the ornate, artificial style

of prose developed in the previous period and the emergence of a simple, direct, and forceful prose based on Han and pre-Han

writing. The primary proponent of this neoclassical style of prose, which heavily influenced prose writing for the next 800 years, was Han Yu (768-824), a master essayist and strong advocate of a return

to Confucian orthodoxy.

Vernacular fiction became popular after the fourteenth century,

although it was never esteemed in court circles. Covering a broader

range of subject matter and longer and less highly structured than

literary fiction, vernacular fiction includes a number of masterpieces. The greatest is the eighteenth-century domestic novel Hong

Lou Meng (Dream of the Red Chamber). A semiautobiographical

work by a scion of a declining gentry family, Hong Lou Meng has

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been acknowledged by students of Chinese fiction to be the master- work of its type.

Modern Prose

In the New Culture Movement (1917-23; see Glossary), liter- ary writing style was largely replaced by the vernacular in all areas of literature (see Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). This was

brought about mainly by Lu Xun (1881-1936), China's first major

stylist in vernacular prose (other than the novel), and the literary

reformers Hu Shi (1891-1962) and Chen Duxiu (1880-1942).

The late 1920s and 1930s were years of creativity in Chinese

fiction, and literary journals and societies espousing various artistic theories proliferated. Among the major writers of the period were Guo Moruo (1892-1978), a poet, historian, essayist, and critic; Mao Dun (1896-1981), the first of the novelists to emerge from

the League of Left-Wing Writers and one whose work reflected the revolutionary struggle and disillusionment of the late 1920s;

and Ba Jin (b. 1904), a novelist whose work was influenced by Ivan

Turgenev and other Russian writers. In the 1930s Ba Jin produced

a trilogy that depicted the struggle of modern youth against the

age-old dominance of the Confucian family system. Comparison

often is made between Jia (Family), one of the novels in the trilogy,

and Hong Lou Meng. Another writer of the period was the gifted

satirist and novelist Lao She (1899-1966). Many of these writers

became important as administrators of artistic and literary policy

after 1949. Most of those still alive during the Cultural Revolution were either purged or forced to submit to public humiliation

(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). The League of Left-Wing Writers was founded in 1930 and

included Lu Xun in its leadership. By 1932 it had adopted the Soviet

doctrine of socialist realism, that is, the insistence that art must

concentrate on contemporary events in a realistic way, exposing

the ills of nonsocialist society and promoting the glorious future

under communism. After 1949 socialist realism, based on Mao's

famous 1942 "Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art," became the

uniform style of Chinese authors whose works were published. Conflict, however, soon developed between the government and the

writers. The ability to satirize and expose the evils in contemporary

society that had made writers useful to the Chinese Communist

Party before its accession to power was no longer welcomed. Even more unwelcome to the party was the persistence among writers

of what was deplored as "petty bourgeois idealism," "humanitarianism," and an insistence on freedom to choose subject matter. At the time of the Great Leap Forward, the government increased

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Education and Culture

its insistence on the use of socialist realism and combined with it so-called revolutionary realism and revolutionary romanticism (see

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60, ch. 1). Authors were permitted to write about contemporary China, as well as other times during China's modern period—as long as it was accomplished with

the desired socialist revolutionary realism. Nonetheless, the politi- cal restrictions discouraged many writers. Although authors were

encouraged to write, production of literature fell off to the point

that in 1962 only forty-two novels were published.

During the Cultural Revolution, the repression and intimidation led by Mao's fourth wife, Jiang Qing, succeeded in drying

up all cultural activity except a few "model" operas and heroic

stories. Although it has since been learned that some writers con- tinued to produce in secret, during that period no significant liter- ary work was published.

Literature in the Post-Mao Period

The arrest of Jiang Qing and the other members of the Gang

of Four (see Glossary) in 1976, and especially the reforms initiated

at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, led more and more older writers and some younger writers

to take up their pens again. Much of the literature discussed the

serious abuses of power that had taken place at both the national

and the local levels during the Cultural Revolution. The writers

decried the waste of time and talent during that decade and

bemoaned abuses that had held China back. At the same time, the

writers expressed eagerness to make a contribution to building

Chinese society.

This literature, often called "the literature of the wounded,"

contained some disquieting views of the party and the political sys- tem. Intensely patriotic, these authors wrote cynically of the politi- cal leadership that gave rise to the extreme chaos and disorder of

the Cultural Revolution. Some of them extended the blame to the

entire generation of leaders and to the political system itself. The

political authorities were faced with a serious problem: how could

they encourage writers to criticize and discredit the abuses of the

Cultural Revolution without allowing that criticism to go beyond

what they considered tolerable limits?

During this period, a large number of novels and short stories were published; literary magazines from before the Cultural Revolution were revived, and new ones were added to satisfy the seemingly insatiable appetite of the reading public. There was a special

interest in foreign works. Linguists were commissioned to translate recently published foreign literature, often without carefully

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considering its interest for the Chinese reader. Literary magazines

specializing in translations of foreign short stories became very

popular, especially among the young.

It is not surprising that such dramatic change brought objections from some leaders in government and literary and art cir- cles, who feared it was happening too fast. The first reaction came

in 1980 with calls to combat "bourgeois liberalization," a campaign that was repeated in 1981. These two difficult periods were

followed by the campaign against spiritual pollution in late 1983,

but by 1986 writers were again enjoying greater creative freedom

(see Policy Toward Intellectuals, this ch.).

Traditional Arts

Drama

Traditional drama, often called "Chinese opera," grew out of

the zaju (variety plays) of the Yuan dynasty (1279-1368) and continues to exist in 368 different forms, the best known of which is Beijing Opera, which assumed its present form in the midnineteenth century and was extremely popular in the Qing dynasty

(1644-1911) court. In Beijing Opera, traditional Chinese string

and percussion instruments provide a strong rhythmic accompaniment to the acting. The acting is based on allusion: gestures, foot- work, and other body movements express such actions as riding a horse, rowing a boat, or opening a door. Spoken dialogue is divided into recitative and Beijing colloquial speech, the former

employed by serious characters and the latter by young females

and clowns. Character roles are strictly defined. The traditional

repertoire of Beijing Opera includes more than 1,000 works, mostly

taken from historical novels about political and military struggles. In the early years of the People's Republic, the development of

Beijing Opera was encouraged; many new operas on historical and

modern themes were written, and earlier operas continued to be

performed. As a popular art form, opera has usually been the first of the arts to reflect changes in Chinese policy. In the mid-1950s,

for example, it was the first to benefit under the Hundred Flowers

Campaign. Similarly, the attack in November 1965 on Beijing

Deputy Mayor Wu Han and his historical play, "Hai Rui's Dismissal from Office," signaled the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, most opera troupes were

disbanded, performers and scriptwriters were persecuted, and all operas except the eight "model operas" approved by Jiang Qing

and her associates were banned. After the fall of the Gang of Four

in 1976, Beijing Opera enjoyed a revival and continued to be a

190
Beijing Opera characters. The figure at right is Baogong, a high

official known for his upright and unbending character. Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

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China: A Country Study

very popular form of entertainment both in theaters and on tele- vision. In traditional Chinese theater, no plays were performed in the

vernacular or without singing. But at the turn of the twentieth century, Chinese students returning from abroad began to experiment

with Western plays. Following the May Fourth Movement of 1919, a number of Western plays were staged in China, and Chinese

playwrights began to imitate this form. The most notable of the

new-style playwrights was Cao Yu (b. 1910). His major works

"Thunderstorm," "Sunrise," "Wilderness," and "Peking

Man" —written between 1934 and 1940, have been widely read

and performed in China.

In the 1930s, theatrical productions performed by traveling Red

Army cultural troupes in Communist-controlled areas were consciously used to promote party goals and political philosophy. By

the 1940s theater was well-established in the Communist-controlled

areas. In the early years of the People's Republic, Western-style theater was presented mainly in the form of "socialist realism." During

the Cultural Revolution, however, Western-style plays were con- demned as "dead drama" and "poisonous weeds" and were not

performed.

Following the Cultural Revolution, Western-style theater experienced a revival. Many new works appeared, and revised and

banned plays from China and abroad were reinstated in the national

repertoire. Many of the new plays strained at the limits of creative

freedom and were alternately commended and condemned, depending on the political atmosphere. One of the most outspoken of the

new breed of playwrights was Sha Yexin. His controversial play

"The Imposter," which dealt harshly with the favoritism and perquisites accorded party members, was first produced in 1979. In

early 1980 the play was roundly criticized by Secretary General

Hu Yaobang—the first public intervention in the arts since the Cultural Revolution. In the campaign against bourgeois liberalism in 1981 and the antispiritual pollution campaign in 1983, Sha and

his works were again criticized. Through it all Sha continued to write for the stage and to defend himself and his works in the press. In late 1985 Sha Yexin was accepted into the Chinese Communist

Party and appointed head of the Shanghai People's Art Theater,

where he continued to produce controversial plays.

Music

Chinese music appears to date back to the dawn of Chinese civi- lization, and documents and artifacts provide evidence of a

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Education and Culture

well-developed musical culture as early as the Zhou dynasty

(1027-221 B.C.). The Imperial Music Bureau, first established in the Qin dynasty (221-207 B.C.), was greatly expanded under the

Han emperor Wu Di (140-87 B.C.) and charged with supervising

court music and military music and determining what folk music

would be officially recognized. In subsequent dynasties, the development of Chinese music was strongly influenced by foreign music,

especially that of Central Asia.

Chinese vocal music has traditionally been sung in a thin, nonresonant voice or in falsetto and is usually solo rather than choral.

All traditional Chinese music is melodic rather than harmonic.

Instrumental music is played on solo instruments or in small

ensembles of plucked and bowed stringed instruments, flutes, and

various cymbals, gongs, and drums. The scale has five notes. The New Culture Movement of the 1910s and 1920s evoked a

great deal of lasting interest in Western music as a number of

Chinese musicians who had studied abroad returned to perform

Western classical music and to compose works of their own based on the Western musical notation system. Symphony orchestras were formed in most major cities and performed to a wide audience in the concert halls and on radio. Popular music—greatly influenced

by Western music, especially that of the United States—also gained

a wide audience in the 1940s. After the 1942 Yan'an Forum on

Literature and Art, a large-scale campaign was launched in the

Communist-controlled areas to adapt folk music to create revolutionary songs to educate the largely illiterate rural population on

party goals.

After the establishment of the People's Republic, revolutionary

songs continued to be performed, and much of the remainder of

popular music consisted of popular songs from the Soviet Union

with the lyrics translated into Chinese. Symphony orchestras

flourished throughout the country, performing Western classical music and compositions by Chinese composers. Conservatories and

other institutions of musical instruction were developed and

expanded in the major cities. A number of orchestras from Eastern

Europe performed in China, and Chinese musicians and musical

groups participated in a wide variety of international festivals. During the height of the Cultural Revolution, musical composition and performance were greatly restricted. After the Cultural

Revolution, musical institutions were reinstated and musical composition and performance revived. In 1980 the Chinese Musicians'

Association was formally elected to the International Musicological Society. Chinese musical groups toured foreign countries, and

foreign musical organizations performed in China. In the mid-1980s

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China: A Country Study

popular ballads and Western folk and elassieal music still drew the

greatest audiences, but other kinds of music, including previously

banned Western jazz and rock and roll, were being performed and

were receiving increasing acceptance, especially among young

people.

Painting and Calligraphy

In imperial times, painting and calligraphy were the most highly

appreciated arts in court circles and were produced almost exclusively by amateurs—aristocrats and scholar-officials—who alone

had the leisure to perfect the technique and sensibility necessary

for great brushwork. Calligraphy was thought to be the highest and

purest form of painting. The implements were the brush pen, made

of animal hair, and black inks made from pine soot and animal

glue. In ancient times, writing, as well as painting, was done on

silk. But after the invention of paper in the first century A.D., silk was gradually replaced by the new and cheaper material. Original

writings by famous calligraphers have been greatly valued throughout China's history and are mounted on scrolls and hung on walls

in the same way that paintings are. Painting in the traditional style involves essentially the same tech- niques as calligraphy and is done with a brush dipped in black or colored ink; oils are not used. As with calligraphy, the most popular materials on which paintings are made are paper and silk. The

finished work is then mounted on scrolls, which can be hung or

rolled up. Traditional painting also is done in albums and on walls,

lacquerwork, and other media.

Beginning in the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907), the primary subject matter of painting was the landscape, known as shan-shui

(mountain-water) painting. In these landscapes, usually monochromatic and sparse, the purpose was not to reproduce exactly the

appearance of nature but rather to grasp an emotion or atmosphere

so as to catch the "rhythm" of nature. In Song dynasty (960-1279)

times, landscapes of more subtle expression appeared; immeasurable distances were conveyed through the use of blurred outlines,

mountain contours disappearing into the mist, and impressionistic treatment of natural phenomena. Emphasis was placed on the

spiritual qualities of the painting and on the ability of the artist to reveal the inner harmony of man and nature, as perceived

according to Taoist and Buddhist concepts (see The Hundred

Schools of Thought, ch. 1). Beginning in the thirteenth century, there developed a tradition

of painting simple subjects —a branch with fruit, a few flowers, or one or two horses. Narrative painting, with a wider color range

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Education and Culture

and a much busier composition than the Song painting, was

immensely popular at the time of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).

During the Ming period, the first books illustrated with colored

woodcuts appeared. As the techniques of color printing were perfected, illustrated manuals on the art of painting began to be published. Jieziyuan Huazhuan (Manual of the Mustard Seed Garden),

a five-volume work first published in 1679, has been in use as a

technical textbook for artists and students ever since.

Beginning with the New Culture Movement, Chinese artists started to adopt Western techniques. It also was during this time

that oil painting was introduced to China.

In the early years of the People's Republic, artists were encour- aged to employ socialist realism. Some Soviet socialist realism was

imported without modification, and painters were assigned subjects and expected to mass-produce paintings. This regimen was

considerably relaxed in 1953, and after the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956-57, traditional Chinese painting experienced a significant revival. Along with these developments in professional art

circles, there was a proliferation of peasant art depicting everyday

life in the rural areas on wall murals and in open-air painting

exhibitions.

During the Cultural Revolution, art schools were closed, and

publication of art journals and major art exhibitions ceased.

Nevertheless, amateur art continued to flourish throughout this period.

Following the Cultural Revolution, art schools and professional

organizations were reinstated. Exchanges were set up with groups

of foreign artists, and Chinese artists began to experiment with new

subjects and techniques.

Contemporary Performing Arts Motion Pictures

Motion pictures were introduced to China in 1896, but the film

industry was not started until 1917. During the 1920s film technicians from the United States trained Chinese technicians in Shanghai, an early filmmaking center, and American influence continued

to be felt there for the next two decades. In the 1930s and 1940s,

several socially and politically important films were produced.

The film industry continued to develop after 1949. In the 17 years between the founding of the People's Republic and the Cultural

Revolution, 603 feature films and 8,342 reels of documentaries and

newsreels were produced. The first wide-screen film was produced

in 1960. Animated films using a variety of folk arts, such as

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China: A Country Study

papercuts, shadow plays, puppetry, and traditional paintings, also were very popular for entertaining and educating children.

During the Cultural Revolution, the film industry was severely

restricted. Most previous films were banned, and only a few new

ones were produced. In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the film industry again flourished as a medium

of popular entertainment. Domestically produced films played to large audiences, and tickets for foreign film festivals sold quickly. In the 1980s the film industry fell on hard times, faced with the

dual problems of competition from other forms of entertainment

and concern on the part of the authorities that many of the popular thriller and martial arts films were socially unacceptable. In January 1986 the film industry was transferred from the Ministry

of Culture to the newly formed Ministry of Radio, Cinema, and

Television to bring it under "stricter control and management"

and to "strengthen supervision over production."

Radio and Television

Radio and television expanded rapidly in the 1980s as important means of mass communication and popular entertainment (see

Telecommunications, ch. 8; The Media, ch. 10). By 1985 radio

reached 75 percent of the population through 167 radio stations,

215 million radios, and a vast wired loudspeaker system. Television, growing at an even more rapid rate, reached two-thirds of the

population through more than 104 stations (up from 52 in 1984 and

44 in 1983); an estimated 85 percent of the urban population had

access to television. As radio and television stations grew, the content of the programming changed drastically from the political lec- tures and statistical lists of the previous period. Typical radio listening

included soap operas based on popular novels and a variety of

Chinese and foreign music. Most television shows were entertainment, including feature films, sports, drama, music, dance, and chil- dren's programming. In 1985 a survey of a typical week of television programming made by the Shanghai publication Wuxiandian Yu

Dianshi (Journal of Radio and Television) revealed that more than

half of the programming could be termed entertainment; education

made up 24 percent of the remainder of the programming and news

15 percent. A wide cross section of international news was presented

each evening. Most news broadcasts were borrowed from foreign news organizations, and a Chinese summary was dubbed over. China Central Television also contracted with several foreign broadcasters for entertainment programs. Between 1982 and 1985, six United States television companies signed agreements to provide

American programs to China.

196
One of China's many folk arts is juggling.

Courtesy Douglass M. Dolan

Folk and Variety Arts

Folk and variety arts have a long history in China. One of the

oldest forms of folk art is puppetry. Puppeteers use various kinds

of puppets, including marionettes, rod puppets, cloth puppets, and

wire puppets in performances incorporating folk songs and dances

and some dialogues. The subject matter is derived mainly from

children's stories and fables. The shadow play is a form of puppetry that is performed by moving figures made of animal skins or cardboard held behind a screen lit by lamplight. The subject

matter and singing style in shadow plays are closely related to local opera. Another popular folk art is the quyi, which consists of vari- ous kinds of storytelling and comic monologues and dialogues, often

to the accompaniment of clappers, drums, or stringed instruments.

Variety arts, including tightrope walking, acrobatics, animal acts, and sleight of hand date back at least as far as the Han dynasty

(206 B.C.-A.D. 220) and were very popular in the imperial court. Later, many of these feats were incorporated into the traditional

theater, and they continued to be performed by itinerant troupes.

As these troupes traveled around the countryside, they developed

and enriched their repertoire. Since 1949 these art forms have

gained new respectability. Troupes have been established in the

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities, and

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China: A Country Study

theaters speeifically dedicated to the variety arts have been built

in major cities. Some troupes have become world famous, playing

to packed houses at home and on foreign tours. Publishing

Background

Publishing in China dates from the invention of woodblock printing around the eighth century A.D. and was greatly expanded with

the invention of movable clay type in the eleventh century. From

the tenth to the twelfth century, Kaifeng, Meishan, Hangzhou,

and Jianyang were major printing centers. In the nineteenth century, China acquired movable lead type and photogravure printing plates and entered the age of modern book and magazine

printing. The largest of the early publishing houses were the Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshuguan), established in 1897, and the

China Publishing House (Zhonghua Shuju), established in 1912,

both of which were still operating in 1987. Following the May

Fourth Movement of 1919, publishers, especially those associated

with various groups of intellectuals, proliferated. During the Chinese

civil war, New China Booksellers (Xinhua Shudian) published a

large amount of Marxist literature and educational materials in the Communist-controlled areas. On the eve of the establishment

of the People's Republic in 1949, there were over 700 New China

Booksellers offices. Between 1949 and 1952, the New China Booksellers offices scat- tered throughout the country were nationalized and given responsibility for publishing, printing, and distribution. Also, several small

private publishers were brought under joint state-private ownership, and by 1956 all private publishers had been nationalized. After

a brief nourishing during the Hundred Flowers Campaign of

1956-57, the publishing industry came under strong political pres- sure in the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 (see The Transition

to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1). The industry had not fully recovered

from this campaign when it was plunged into the Cultural Revolution, a period in which publishing was severely curtailed and

limited mainly to political tracts supporting various campaigns. Fol- lowing the Cultural Revolution, publishing again flourished in unprecedented ways. In 1982 the China National Publishing

Administration, the umbrella organization of Chinese publishers, was placed under the Ministry of Culture, but actual management

of the industry was directed through four systems of administration: direct state administration; administration by committees or

organizations of the State Council or the party Central Committee;

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Education and Culture

armed forces administration; and administration by provinces,

autonomous regions, or special municipalities. In 1984 statistics showed that 17 of the country's 418 publishing establishments were in Shanghai, whereas Beijing was home

to 160 publishers. In 1985 plans were announced to foster the

growth of the publishing industry in Chongqing, Xi'an, Wuhan,

and Shenyang to take some of the workload from Beijing and

Shanghai.

Different publishers were assigned to specific kinds of publications. For example, the People's Publishing House was responsible for publishing works on politics, philosophy, and the social

sciences; the People's Literature Publishing House produced ancient

and modern Chinese and foreign literature and literary history and

theory; the China Publishing House had the principal responsibility for collating and publishing Chinese classical literary, historical, and philosophical works; and the Commercial Press was the

principal publisher of Chinese-to-foreign-language reference works

and translations of foreign works in the social sciences. Other publishers dealt with works in specialized fields of science. In addition to the routine method of distributing books to bookstores in major cities, other methods of distribution were devised

to meet the special needs of readers in urban and rural areas throughout the country. Mobile bookshops made regular visits to

factories, mines, rural villages, and People's Liberation Army units,

and service was provided in those locations through which individuals could request books. Arrangements were made with the libraries of educational institutions and enterprises to supply them with the

books that they required, and books specifically applicable to cer- tain industries were systematically recommended and provided to the departments concerned. Also, book fairs and exhibits frequently were provided at meetings and in public parks on holidays and other

special occasions.

Newspapers

In 1987 China had two news agencies, the Xinhua (New China)

News Agency and the China News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe)

(see The Media, ch. 10). Xinhua was the major source of news

and photographs for central and local newspapers. The official newspapers Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) and Guangming Ribao

(Enlightenment Daily), and the People's Liberation Army'sJiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily) continued to have the largest cir- culation. In addition to these major party and army organs, most

professional and scientific organizations published newspapers or journals containing specialized information in fields as varied as

199
China: A Country Study

astronomy and entomology. Local morning and evening newspapers concentrating on news and feature stories about local people and events were extremely popular, selling out each day shortly

after they arrived at the newsstands. In June 1981 the Englishlanguage China Daily began publication. This newspaper, which was provided for foreigners living or traveling in China but which

also was read by a large number of Chinese literate in English,

offered international news and sports from the major foreign wire

services as well as interesting domestic news and feature articles. Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), an official news organ that car- ried foreign news items in Chinese translation, was available to cadres and their families. In 1980 it enjoyed a circulation of

11 million, but, with the subsequent proliferation of other news

sources, its circulation dropped to 4 million in 1985, causing the

subscription policy to be changed to make it available to all Chinese.

Another source of foreign reporting was Cankao Ziliao (Reference

Information), a more restricted Chinese reprint of foreign reportage available only to middle- and upper-level cadres. Both of these

publications often included foreign reports critical of China.

Libraries and Archives

Very early in Chinese civilization, scholars had extensive pri- vate libraries, and all of the imperial dynasties constructed libraries and archives to house literary treasures and official records. The

first modern libraries, however, did not appear in China until the

late nineteenth century; even then, library service grew slowly and

sporadically. In 1949 there were only fifty-five public libraries at the county level and above, most concentrated in major coastal commercial centers. Following the founding of the People's Republic, government

and education leaders strove to develop library services and make

them available throughout the country. The National Book Coordination Act of 1957 authorized the establishment of two national

library centers, one in Beijing and the other in Shanghai, and nine

regional library networks. Even so, libraries still were scarce, and

those facilities that were available were cramped and offered only

rudimentary services. Seeing the lack of libraries as a major impediment to modernization efforts, government leaders in the early

1980s took special interest in the development of library services.

The special concentration of funds and talent began to produce

significant results. By 1986 China had over 200,000 libraries,

including a national library and various public, educational,

scientific, and military libraries. More than forty Chinese institu- tions of higher learning also had established library-science or

200
Anhui Provincial Library

Courtesy Alfonz Lengyel

information-science departments. There were more than 2,300 public libraries at the county level and above, containing nearly 256

million volumes, and below the county level some 53,000 cultural centers included a small library or reading room. The country's main library, the National Library of China, in central Beijing, housed a rich collection of books, periodicals,

newspapers, maps, prints, photographs, manuscripts, microforms,

tape recordings, and inscriptions on bronze, stone, bones, and tor- toiseshells. In 1987 a new National Library building, one of the

world's largest library structures, was completed in the western

suburbs. The Shanghai Municipal Library, one of the largest public

libraries in the country, contained over 7 million volumes, nearly

1 million of which were in foreign languages. The Beijing University Library took over the collections of the Yanjing University

Library in 1950 and by the mid-1980s—with more than 3 million

volumes, one-fourth of them in foreign languages—was one of the

best university libraries in the country.

On the basis of the General Rules for Archives published in 1983,

historical archives were being expanded at the provincial and county

levels. Two of the most important archives were the Number One

Historical Archives of China, located in Beijing containing the

archives of the Ming and Qing dynasties, and the Number Two

Historical Archives of China, located in Nanjing containing the

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China: A Country Study

archives of the Guomindang period. A number of foreign scholars

have been granted access to these archives. In 1987 public and

research libraries still faced serious space, management, and ser- vice problems. Even with the special efforts being made to solve

these problems, it was clear that they would not be quickly resolved. In the late 1980s, China was experiencing an active educational

and cultural life. Students were staying in school longer, educational standards were being raised, and facilities were being

improved. Intellectuals were encouraged to develop their expertise, especially in the scientific and technical spheres, and a wide

variety of traditional and foreign literary and art forms were allowed

to flourish. This situation was likely to continue as long as it served

the interest of economic modernization and posed no threat to the

political establishment.

* * *

Several general works provide a good overview of China's education and culture. However, because the most important educational reforms did not evolve or become effective until 1985-86,

and were still changing in 1987, these books generally did not address many of the latest educational reforms. Some of the most

valuable books available include China Issues and Prospects in Education, Annex 1, 1985 by the World Bank, which provides an over- view of the system, detailed statistics, and projections; John

Cleverly's The Schooling of China, which has excellent chapters on

the anatomy of the educational system and its problems and

prospects; and Ruth Hayhoe's Contemporary Chinese Education, which

has valuable chapters on primary, secondary, and teacher education. Other informative works are the chapter on "Education" by

Stanley Rosen in a book he co-edited with John Burns, entitled

Policy Conflicts in Post-Mao China, and a brief article by Eli Seifman

in the March 1986 issue of Asian Thought and Society.

Carol Lee Hamrin and Timothy Cheek's China's Establishment

Intellectuals , Merle Goldman's China's Intellectuals, and Michael S. Duke's Blooming and Contending are indispensable sources of information on Chinese intellectual policy past and present. Liu Wu-chi's

An Introduction to Chinese Literature gives an excellent summary of

traditional literature and drama, and C.T. Hsia's/1 History ofModern

Chinese Fiction gives insight into modern Chinese literature before

the Cultural Revolution. Encyclopedia of China Today, edited by

Fredric M. Kaplan, Julian M. Sobin, and Stephen Andors, contains valuable information about linguistic reform and gives a good

overview of the arts in the post-Cultural Revolution period.

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Education and Culture

The Zhongguo Chuban Nianjian (China Publishing Yearbook), put

out by the Commercial Press since 1980, provides rare data on that industry. Chi Wang's "An Overview of Libraries in the People's

Republic of China" in the September 1984 issue of China Exchange

News is an excellent source on Chinese libraries in the 1980s.

Other useful articles providing information on the changes and

directions of China's education and cultural policy can be found

in various issues of Beijing Review, China News Analysis, China Exchange

News, China Reconstructs , and the Foreign Broadcast Information

Service Daily Report: China, and the Joint Publications Research

Service China Report: Political, Sociological, and Military Affairs . People's Republic of China Yearbook also provides useful information and

statistics. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

203


A Sui dynasty (A.D. 581-617) architectural house model made of clay shows

the complexity of that period's construction.
IN THE LATE 1980s the Chinese economy was a system in transition, moving cautiously away from central planning and gradually adopting some of the institutions and mechanisms of a market

economy. The process of economic reform began in earnest in 1979,

after Chinese leaders concluded that the Soviet-style system that

had been in place since the 1950s was making little progress in improving the standard of living of the Chinese people and also was failing to close the economic gap between China and the industrialized nations.

The first major success of the economic reform program was the

introduction of the responsibility system of production in agriculture, a policy that allowed farm families to work a piece of land

under contract and to keep whatever profits they earned. By 1984

the responsibility system had dramatically increased food production, and the government had eliminated the people's communes

the hallmark of Chinese socialism for over twenty years. In most

other sectors of the economy the role of government was reduced,

managers were given more decision-making power, enterprises were encouraged to produce for profit, the role of the private sector

increased, and experimentation with new forms of ownership began

in the state sector. Constraints on foreign trade were relaxed, and

joint ventures with foreign firms were officially encouraged as sources of modern technology and scarce foreign exchange. With

rising incomes, greater incentives, and rapid growth in the service

and light industrial sectors, the People's Republic of China began

to exhibit some of the traits of a consumer society.

Movement toward a market system, however, was complex and

difficult, and in 1987 the transition was far from complete. Relaxing

restrictions on economic activity quickly alleviated some of China's

most pressing economic difficulties, but it also gave rise to a new

set of problems. Inflation—the greatest fear of Chinese consumers

became a problem for the first time since the early 1950s, and along

with new opportunities to seek profit came growing inequality in income distribution and new temptations for crime, corruption, and

Western cultural styles, regarded by many older Chinese people as decadent and "spiritually polluting." The state still owned and controlled the largest nonagricultural enterprises, and the major industries were still primarily guided by the central plan.

Thus, the Chinese economy in the late 1980s was very much

a mixed system. It could not be accurately described as either a

207
China: A Country Study

centrally planned economy or a market economy. The leadership was committed to further expansion of the reform program as a

requisite for satisfactory economic growth, but at the same time

it was compelled to keep a tight grip on key aspects of the

economy—particularly inflation and grain production—to prevent

the emergence of overwhelming political discontent. Under these

circumstances, forces in the economic system worked against each

other, producing what the Chinese leadership called internal "contradictions.' ' On the one hand, the economy was no longer tightly

controlled by the state plan because of the large and growing market sector. On the other hand, the market could not operate effi- ciently because many commodities were still under government

control and most prices were still set or restricted by government

agencies. Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the entire nation was "riding the tiger" —making great progress but not entirely

in control —and therefore unable to stop the process without

risk.Despite the burst of progress in the 1980s, the Chinese economy

still shared many basic characteristics with the economies of other

developing countries. The gross national product per capita in 1986

was¥849 (for value of the yuan —see Glossary), or about US$228

(at the 1986 exchange rate), reflecting the low average level of labor

productivity. As in many countries that did not begin sustained

industrialization efforts until the middle of the twentieth century,

the majority of the Chinese labor force —over 60 percent—was still employed in agriculture, which produced around 30 percent of the

value of national output. Agricultural work still was performed

primarily by hand. Modern equipment was in general use in industry but was largely typified by outdated designs and low levels of

efficiency. In other respects China's economy was quite different from those

of most developing nations. The most important difference was

that the Chinese economy—although in the midst of far-reaching

changes—was organized as a socialist system, directed by a central planning structure. The predominance of state and collective

ownership, firm central control over the financial system, redistri- bution of resources among regions, rationing of grain, and subsidized provision of housing resulted in a pattern of income

distribution that was much narrower than those in almost all other

developing countries. There was relatively little true capitalism in the form of private ownership of productive assets. Agricultural

land was farmed under lease by farm households but was formally

owned by villages, towns, and townships—the collective units that had replaced the rural commune system.

208
Economic Context

In the mid-1980s most Chinese were still very poor by American standards, but several important measures indicated that the

quality of their lives was considerably better than implied by the

level of gross national product (GNP) per capita. According to World Bank data, in 1984 energy consumption per person was 485

kilograms of oil equivalent, higher than that for any other country

ranked as a low-income country and greater than the average for lower middle-income countries. In 1983 the daily calorie supply

per capita was 2,620—11 percent above the basic requirement and

nearly as high as the average for countries classified as upper middleincome countries. Significantly, infant mortality in 1985 was 39

per 1,000, well below the average for upper middle-income countries, and life expectancy at birth was 69 years, higher than the

average for upper middle-income countries.

Despite the major economic gains made by China since 1949

and the dramatic advances of the 1980s, serious imbalances and

deficiencies have persisted. Contributing to these deficiencies were

the political turmoil that disrupted the economy during the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76), insufficient flexibility in the

planning process, and serious inaccuracies in price structures. Power

shortages, inadequate transportation and communication networks,

shortages of technicians and other highly trained personnel, insuffi- cient foreign exchange for procurement of advanced technology

from other countries, and inadequate legal and administrative provisions for both foreign and domestic trade further hindered modernization.

An important by-product of the reform program since the late 1970s has been an enormous increase in the amount of information available on the economy. The government collected and published basic national economic data in the 1950s, but the centralized

statistics-keeping system broke down at the end of the 1950s, and

very little statistical information was available during the 1960s and

early 1970s. It was not until 1979 that the State Statistical Bureau

ended the statistical "blackout" with the publication of an economic

statistical communique. In subsequent years the State Statistical Bureau published larger and more frequent compendia, including

annual almanacs of the economy and annual statistical yearbooks,

which became progressively more sophisticated and informative.

In addition, most provincial-level units and cities, as well as the

major industries and economic sectors, such as coal mining and

agriculture, began to produce their own specialized statistical year- books. In the early 1980s, numerous new periodicals, many of which

specialized in economic data and analysis, started publication.

Although Chinese statistical definitions and practices still differed

209
China: A Country Study

from those in the West in many respeets and the aecuracy of some

figures was called into doubt even by Chinese economists, foreign

analysts in 1987 had access to a rich and growing body of data that would support extensive analysis of the Chinese economy.

General Nature of the Economy

Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as during much of earlier Chinese history, the economy was barely

able to meet the basic needs of the country's huge population

the largest in the world (see Population, ch. 2). In normal years

the economy produced just about the amount of food required to meet the minimum nutritional requirements of the populace. In times of drought, flood, warfare, or civil disorder, there was not enough food, and before 1949 such conditions often led to starvation on a vast scale. Under the government of the People's Republic,

food shortages were countered by redistributing supplies within

China and by importing grain from abroad, which successfully

averted famine except in the catastrophic years of 1959, 1960, and

1961.

Despite formidable constraints and disruptions, the Chinese econ- omy was never stagnant. Production grew substantially between

1800 and 1949 and increased fairly rapidly after 1949. Before the

1980s, however, production gains were largely matched by population growth, so that productive capacity was unable to outdistance

essential consumption needs significantly, particularly in agriculture. Grain output in 1979 was about twice as large as in 1952,

but so was the population. As a result, little surplus was produced

even in good years. Further, few resources could be spared for investment in capital goods, such as machinery, factories, mines,

railroads, and other productive assets. The relatively small size of

the capital stock caused productivity per worker to remain low,

which in turn perpetuated the economy's inability to generate a

substantial surplus (see fig. 7). China's socialist system, with state ownership of most industry

and central control over planning and the financial system, has

enabled the government to mobilize whatever surplus was avail- able and greatly increase the proportion of the national economic

output devoted to investment. Western analysts estimated that investment accounted for about 25 percent of GNP in the 30 years

after 1949, a rate surpassed by few other countries. Because of the

comparatively low level of GNP, however, even this high rate of

investment secured only a small amount of resources relative to the size of the country and the population. In 1978, for instance,

only 16 percent of the GNP of the United States went into gross

210
A traditional country peddler. Woodcut.

Courtesy Woodcuts of Wartime China

investment, but this amounted to US$345.6 billion, whereas the

approximately 25 percent of China's GNP that was invested came

to about the equivalent of US$1 1 1 billion and had to serve a population 4.5 times the size of that in the United States. The limited resources available for investment prevented China from rapidly

producing or importing advanced equipment. Technological development proceeded gradually, and outdated equipment continued

to be used as long as possible. Consequently, many different levels of technology were in use simultaneously (see Historical Development of Science and Technology Policy, ch. 9). Most industries

included some plants that were comparable to modern Western

facilities, often based on imported equipment and designs. Equipment produced by Chinese factories was generally some years

behind standard Western designs. Agriculture received a smaller

share of state investment than industry and remained at a much

lower average level of technology and productivity. Despite a significant increase in the availability of tractors, trucks, electric pumps, and mechanical threshers, most agricultural activities were

still performed by people or animals (see Agricultural Policies,

ch. 6). Although the central administration coordinated the economy

and redistributed resources among regions when necessary, in practice most economic activity was very decentralized, and there was

211
China: A Country Study

Billions of 1986 yuan

1 952 1 956 1 960 1 964 1 968 1 972 1 976 1 980 1 984

For value of the yuan -- see Glossary. Gross national product. Includes other economic sectors, such as services.

Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Year- book of China, 1986, Hong Kong, 1986.

Figure 7. Gross National Product and Major Economic Sectors, 1952-86

relatively little flow of goods and services between areas (see Internal

Trade and Distribution, ch. 8). About 75 percent of the grain grown

in China, for instance, was consumed by the families that produced

it. One of the most important sources of growth in the economy

was the improved ability to exploit the comparative advantages of

each locality by expanding transportation capacity. The communications and transportation sectors were growing and improving

but still could not carry the volume of traffic required by a modern

economy because of the scarcity of investment funds and advanced

technology (see Transportation; Telecommunications, ch. 8). Because of limited interaction among regions, the great variety

of geographic zones in China, and the broad spectrum of technologies in use, areas differed widely in economic activities, organizational forms, and prosperity (see Physical Environment, ch. 2). Within any given city, enterprises ranged from tiny, collectively

owned handicraft units, barely earning subsistence-level incomes

for their members, to modern state-owned factories, whose workers received steady wages plus free medical care, bonuses, and an

assortment of other benefits. The agricultural sector was diverse,

accommodating well-equipped, "specialized households" that supplied scarce products and services to local markets; wealthy

212
Economic Context

suburban villages specializing in the production of vegetables, pork,

poultry, and eggs to sell in free markets in the nearby cities; fish- ing villages on the seacoast; herding groups on the grasslands of

Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia); and poor,

struggling grain-producing villages in the arid mountains of Shaanxi

and Gansu provinces. The economy had progressed in major ways

since 1949, but after four decades experts in China and abroad

agreed that it had a great distance yet to go. Economic Policies, 1949-80

When the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 1949,

its leaders' fundamental long-range goals were to transform China

into a modern, powerful, socialist nation. In economic terms these

objectives meant industrialization, improvement of living standards,

narrowing of income differences, and production of modern mili- tary equipment. As the years passed, the leadership continued to subscribe to these goals. But the economic policies formulated to achieve them were dramatically altered on several occasions in response to major changes in the economy, internal politics, and

international political and economic developments.

An important distinction emerged between leaders who felt that the socialist goals of income equalization and heightened political

consciousness should take priority over material progress and those

who believed that industrialization and general economic modernization were prerequisites for the attainment of a successful socialist order. Among the prominent leaders who considered politics the

prime consideration were Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, and the members of the Gang of Four (see Glossary). Leaders who more often

stressed practical economic considerations included Liu Shaoqi,

Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping. For the most part, important

policy shifts reflected the alternating emphasis on political and eco- nomic goals and were accompanied by major changes in the positions of individuals in the political power structure. An important

characteristic in the development of economic policies and the

underlying economic model was that each new policy period, while

differing significantly from its predecessor, nonetheless retained

most of the existing economic organization. Thus the form of the

economic model and the policies that expressed it at any given point

in Chinese history reflected both the current policy emphasis and

a structural foundation built up during the earlier periods.

Recovery from War, 1949-52

In 1949 China's economy was suffering from the debilitating

effects of decades of warfare. Many mines and factories had been

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China: A Country Study

damaged or destroyed. At the end of the war with Japan in 1945,

Soviet troops had dismantled about half the maehinery in the major

industrial areas of the northeast and shipped it to the Soviet Union.

Transportation, eommunieation, and power systems had been

destroyed or had deteriorated because of lack of maintenance.

Agriculture was disrupted, and food production was some 30 percent below its pre-war peak level. Further, economic ills were com- pounded by one of the most virulent inflations in world history.

The chief goal of the government for the 1949-52 period was

simply to restore the economy to normal working order. The administration moved quickly to repair transportation and communication links and revive the flow of economic activity. The banking

system was nationalized and centralized under the People's Bank

of China. To bring inflation under control by 1951, the government unified the monetary system, tightened credit, restricted

government budgets at all levels and put them under central control, and guaranteed the value of the currency. Commerce was

stimulated and partially regulated by the establishment of state trad- ing companies (commercial departments), which competed with

private traders in purchasing goods from producers and selling them

to consumers or enterprises. Transformation of ownership in industry proceeded slowly. About a third of the country's enterprises

had been under state control while the Guomindang government was in power (1927-49), as was much of the modernized trans- portation sector. The Chinese Communist Party immediately made

these units state-owned enterprises upon taking power in 1949. The

remaining privately owned enterprises were gradually brought

under government control, but 17 percent of industrial units were

still completely outside the state system in 1952.

In agriculture a major change in landownership was carried out. Under a nationwide land reform program, titles to about 45 per- cent of the arable land were redistributed from landlords and more

prosperous farmers to the 60 to 70 percent of farm families that

previously owned little or no land. Once land reform was completed in an area, farmers were encouraged to cooperate in some

phases of production through the formation of small "mutual aid

teams" of six or seven households each. Thirty-nine percent of all farm households belonged to mutual aid teams in 1952. By 1952

price stability had been established, commerce had been restored,

and industry and agriculture had regained their previous peak levels of production. The period of recovery had achieved its goals (see

Rural Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6).

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Econ o mic Con text

The First Five-Year Plan, 1953-57

Having restored a viable economic base, the leadership under

Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and other revolutionary veterans was

prepared to embark on an intensive program of industrial growth

and socialization. For this purpose the administration adopted the

Soviet economic model, based on state ownership in the modern

sector, large collective units in agriculture, and centralized eco- nomic planning. The Soviet approach to economic development was manifested in the First Five- Year Plan (1953-57) (sec The

Transition to Socialism, ch. 1; Organization, ch. 7). As in the Soviet

economy, the main objective was a high rate of economic growth,

with primary emphasis on industrial development at the expense

of agriculture and particular concentration on heavy industry and

capital-intensive technology. Soviet planners helped their Chinese

counterparts formulate the plan. Large numbers of Soviet engineers,

technicians, and scientists assisted in developing and installing new

heavy industrial facilities, including many entire plants and pieces

of equipment purchased from the Soviet Union. Government control over industry was increased during this period by applying

financial pressures and inducements to convince owners of private,

modern firms to sell them to the state or convert them into joint

public-private enterprises under state control. By 1956 approximately 67.5 percent of all modern industrial enterprises were state owned, and 32.5 percent were under joint public-private ownership. No privately owned firms remained. During the same period,

the handicraft industries were organized into cooperatives, which

accounted for 91.7 percent of all handicraft workers by 1956.

Agriculture also underwent extensive organizational changes.

To facilitate the mobilization of agricultural resources, improve

the efficiency of farming, and increase government access to agricul- tural products, the authorities encouraged farmers to organize

increasingly large and socialized collective units. From the loosely

structured, tiny mutual aid teams, villages were to advance first to lower-stage, agricultural producers' cooperatives, in which

families still received some income on the basis of the amount of

land they contributed, and eventually to advanced cooperatives, or collectives. In the advanced producers' cooperatives, income

shares were based only on the amount of labor contributed. In

addition, each family was allowed to retain a small private plot on which to grow vegetables, fruit, and livestock for its own use. The

collectivization process began slowly but accelerated in 1955 and

1956. In 1957 about 93.5 percent of all farm households had joined

advanced producers' cooperatives.

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China: A Country Study

In terms of economic growth the First Five- Year Plan was quite

successful, especially in those areas emphasized by the Soviet-style

development strategy. A solid foundation was created in heavy

industry. Key industries, including iron and steel manufacturing,

coal mining, cement production, electricity generation, and machine

building were greatly expanded and were put on a firm, modern

technological footing. Thousands of industrial and mining enterprises were constructed, including 156 major facilities. Industrial

production increased at an average annual rate of 19 percent

between 1952 and 1957, and national income grew at a rate of

9 percent a year. Despite the lack of state investment in agriculture, agricultural

output increased substantially, averaging increases of about 4 per- cent a year. This growth resulted primarily from gains in efficiency

brought about' by the reorganization and cooperation achieved

through collectivization. As the First Five- Year Plan wore on. however, Chinese leaders became increasingly concerned over the

relatively sluggish performance of agriculture and the inability of

state trading companies to increase significantly the amount of grain

procured from rural units for urban consumption.

The Great Leap Forward, 1958-60

Before the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the growing imbalance

between industrial and agricultural growth, dissatisfaction with

inefficiency, and lack of flexibility in the decision-making process

convinced the nation's leaders —particularly Mao Zedong—that the highly centralized, industry-based Soviet model was not appropriate for China. In 1957 the government adopted measures

to shift a great deal of the authority for economic decision making

to the provincial-level, county, and local administrations. In 1958

the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-62), which was intended to continue the policies of the first plan, was abandoned. In its place the

leadership adopted an approach that relied on spontaneous heroic

efforts by the entire population to produce a dramatic "great leap"

in production for all sectors of the economy at once (see The Great

Leap Forward, 1958-60, ch. 1; Rural Society, ch. 3; The 1950s,

ch. 6). Further reorganization of agriculture was regarded as the

key to the endeavor to leap suddenly to a higher stage of productivity. A fundamental problem was the lack of sufficient capital to invest heavily in both industry and agriculture at the same time.

To overcome this problem, the leadership decided to attempt to create capital in the agricultural sector by building vast irrigation

and water control works employing huge teams of farmers whose

labor was not being fully utilized. Surplus rural labor also was to

216
Economic Context

be employed to support the industrial sector by setting up thousands

of small-scale, low-technology, "backyard" industrial projects in farm

units, which would produce machinery required for agricultural

development and components for urban industries. Mobilization of

surplus rural labor and further improvements in agricultural effi- ciency were to be accomplished by a "leap" to the final stage of

agricultural collectivization —the formation of people's communes.

People's communes were created by combining some 20 or 30

advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members

on average, although membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000 in some cases. When first instituted, the communes

were envisaged as combining in one body the functions of the lowest

level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production

brigade (roughly equivalent to the advanced producers' cooperatives, or a traditional rural village); and the production team, which

generally consisted of around thirty families. At the inception of

the Great Leap Forward, the communes were intended to acquire

all ownership rights over the productive assets of their subordinate

units and to take over most of the planning and decision making

for farm activities. Ideally, communes were to improve efficiency

by moving farm families into dormitories, feeding them in com- munal mess halls, and moving whole teams of laborers from task

to task. In practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form of com- mune was not instituted in most areas. Ninety-eight percent of the farm population was organized into

communes between April and September of 1958. Very soon it became evident that in most cases the communes were too unwieldy

to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. In 1959 and 1960, most production decisions reverted to the brigade and team levels, and eventually

most governmental responsibilities were returned to county and

township administrations. Nonetheless, the commune system was

retained and continued to be the basic form of organization in the

agricultural sector until the early 1980s.

During the Great Leap Forward, the industrial sector also was

expected to discover and use slack labor and productive capacity

to increase output beyond the levels previously considered feasi- ble. Political zeal was to be the motive force, and to "put politics

in command" enterprising party branches took over the direction

of many factories. In addition, central planning was relegated to a minor role in favor of spontaneous, politically inspired production decisions from individual units.

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China: A Country Study

The result of the Great Leap Forward was a severe economic

crisis. In 1958 industrial output did in fact "leap" by 55 percent,

and the agricultural sector gathered in a good harvest. In 1959,

1960, and 1961, however, adverse weather conditions, improperly

constructed water control projects, and other misallocations of resources that had occurred during the overly centralized communization movement resulted in disastrous declines in agricultural

output. In 1959 and 1960, the gross value of agricultural output

fell by 14 percent and 13 percent, respectively, and in 1961 it dropped a further 2 percent to reach the lowest point since 1952.

Widespread famine occurred, especially in rural areas, according

to 1982 census figures, and the death rate climbed from 1.2 per- cent in 1958 to 1.5 percent in 1959, 2.5 percent in 1960, and then

dropped back to 1.4 percent in 1961. From 1958 to 1961, over 14

million people apparently died of starvation, and the number of

reported births was about 23 million fewer than under normal conditions. The government prevented an even worse disaster by canceling nearly all orders for foreign technical imports and using the

country's foreign exchange reserves to import over 5 million tons of grain a year beginning in 1960. Mines and factories continued

to expand output through 1960, partly by overworking personnel

and machines but largely because many new plants constructed

during the First Five-Year Plan went into full production in these

years. Thereafter, however, the excessive strain on equipment and

workers, the effects of the agricultural crisis, the lack of economic

coordination, and, in the 1960s, the withdrawal of Soviet assistance

caused industrial output to plummet by 38 percent in 1961 and

by a further 16 percent in 1962.

Readjustment and Recovery: "Agriculture First/' 1961-65

Faced with economic collapse in the early 1960s, the government

sharply revised the immediate goals of the economy and devised

a new set of economic policies to replace those of the Great Leap

Forward. Top priority was given to restoring agricultural output

and expanding it at a rate that would meet the needs of the growing population. Planning and economic coordination were to be

revived—although in a less centralized form than before the Great

Leap Forward—so as to restore order and efficient allocation of

resources to the economy. The rate of investment was to be reduced

and investment priorities reversed, with agriculture receiving first consideration, light industry second, and heavy industry third. In a further departure from the emphasis on heavy industrial

development that persisted during the Great Leap Forward, the

government undertook to mobilize the nation's resources to bring

218
Economic Context

about technological advancement in agriculture. Organizational

changes in agriculture mainly involved decentralization of production decision making and income distribution within the commune

structure. The role of the central commune administration was

greatly reduced, although it remained the link between local government and agricultural producers and was important in carrying

out activities that were too large in scale for the production brigades.

Production teams were designated the basic accounting units and

were responsible for making nearly all decisions concerning production and the distribution of income to their members. Private plots,

which had disappeared on some communes during the Great Leap

Forward, were officially restored to farm families (see Importance

of Agriculture Recognized; Planning and Organization, ch. 6). Economic support for agriculture took several forms. Agricultural taxes were reduced, and the prices paid for agricultural

products were raised relative to the prices of industrial supplies for agriculture. There were substantial increases in supplies of chemical fertilizer and various kinds of agricultural machinery, notably

small electric pumps for irrigation. Most of the modern supplies were concentrated in areas that were known to produce "high and

stable yields" in order to ensure the best possible results. In industry, a few key enterprises were returned to central state control, but control over most enterprises remained in the hands

of provincial-level and local governments. This decentralization had

taken place in 1957 and 1958 and was reaffirmed and strengthened in the 1961-65 period. Planning rather than politics once again

guided production decisions, and material rewards rather than

revolutionary enthusiasm became the leading incentive for production. Major imports of advanced foreign machinery, which had come to an abrupt halt with the withdrawal of Soviet assistance

starting in 1960, were initiated with Japan and West European

countries.

During the 1961-65 readjustment and recovery period, economic

stability was restored, and by 1966 production in both agriculture

and industry surpassed the peak levels of the Great Leap Forward

period. Between 1961 and 1966, agricultural output grew at an

average rate of 9.6 percent a year. Industrial output was increased

in the same years at an average annual rate of 10.6 percent, largely

by reviving plants that had operated below capacity after the eco- nomic collapse in 1961. Another important source of growth in this period was the spread of rural, small-scale industries, particularly

coal mines, hydroelectric plants, chemical fertilizer plants, and

agricultural machinery plants. The economic model that emerged

in this period combined elements of the highly centralized,

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China: A Country Study

industrially oriented, Soviet-style system of the First Five-Year Plan

with aspects of the decentralization of ownership and decision making that characterized the Great Leap Forward and with the strong

emphasis on agricultural development and balanced growth of the

"agriculture First" policy. Important changes in economic policy

occurred in later years, but the basic system of ownership, decisionmaking structure, and development strategy that was forged in the

early 1960s was not significantly altered until the reform period

of the 1980s.

Events During the Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76

The Cultural Revolution was set in motion by Mao Zedong in 1966 and called to a halt in 1968, but the atmosphere of radical leftism persisted until Mao's death and the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976

(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). During this period, there were several distinct phases of economic policy.

High Tide of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-68

The Cultural Revolution, unlike the Great Leap Forward, was

primarily a political upheaval and did not produce major changes

in official economic policies or the basic economic model. Nonetheless, its influence was felt throughout urban society, and it pro- foundly affected the modern sector of the economy. Agricultural

production stagnated, but in general the rural areas experienced

less turmoil than the cities. Production was reduced in the modern

nonagricultural sectors in several ways. The most direct cause of

production halts was the political activity of students and workers

in the mines and factories. A second cause was the extensive dis- ruption of transportation resulting from the requisitioning of trains

and trucks to carry Red Guards (see Glossary) around the country. Output at many factories suffered from shortages of raw materials and other supplies. A third disruptive influence was that the

direction of factories was placed in the hands of revolutionary committees, consisting of representatives from the party, the workers,

and the People's Liberation Army, whose members often had lit- tle knowledge of either management or the enterprise they were

supposed to run. In addition, virtually all engineers, managers,

scientists, technicians, and other professional personnel were "criti- cized," demoted, "sent down" to the countryside to "participate

in labor," or even jailed, all of which resulted in their skills and

knowledge being lost to the enterprise. The effect was a 14-percent

decline in industrial production in 1967. A degree of order was

restored by the army in late 1967 and 1968, and the industrial sec- tor returned to a fairly high rate of growth in 1969.

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Economic Context

Other aspects of the Cultural Revolution had more far-reaching

effects on the economy. Imports of foreign equipment, required

for technological advancement, were curtailed by rampant xenophobia. Probably the most serious and long-lasting effect on the econ- omy was the dire shortage of highly educated personnel caused by

the closing of the universities. China's ability to develop new tech- nology and absorb imported technology would be limited for years

by the hiatus in higher education (see Higher Education, ch. 4). Resumption of Systematic Growth, 1970-74

As political stability was gradually restored, a renewed drive for coordinated, balanced development was set in motion under the

leadership of Premier Zhou Enlai. To revive efficiency in industry, Chinese Communist Party committees were returned to positions of leadership over the revolutionary committees, and a campaign was carried out to return skilled and highly educated

personnel to the jobs from which they had been displaced during

the Cultural Revolution. Universities began to reopen, and for- eign contacts were expanded. Once again the economy suffered

from imbalances in the capacities of different industrial sectors and

an urgent need for increased supplies of modern inputs for agriculture. In response to these problems, there was a significant increase

in investment, including the signing of contracts with foreign firms

for the construction of major facilities for chemical fertilizer production, steel finishing, and oil extraction and refining. The most notable of these contracts was for thirteen of the world's largest and

most modern chemical fertilizer plants (see Chemicals, ch. 7). During this period, industrial output grew at an average rate of 8 per- cent a year. Agricultural production declined somewhat in 1972 because of

poor weather but increased at an average annual rate of 3.8 percent for the period as a whole. The party and state leadership undertook a general reevaluation of development needs, and Zhou Enlai

presented the conclusions in a report to the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975. In it he called for the Four Modernizations (see Glossary). Zhou emphasized the mechanization of

agriculture and a comprehensive two-stage program for the modernization of the entire economy by the end of the century.

The Gang of Four, 1974-76

During the early and mid-1970s, the radical group later known

as the Gang of Four attempted to dominate the power center through their network of supporters and, most important, through

their control of the media. More moderate leaders, however, were

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China: A Country Study

developing and promulgating a pragmatic program for rapid modernization of the economy that contradicted the set of policies

expressed in the media. Initiatives by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were vehemently attacked in the press and in political campaigns as "poisonous weeds." Using official news organs, the Gang

of Four advocated the primacy of nonmaterial, political incentives,

radical reduction of income differences, elimination of private farm

plots, and a shift of the basic accounting unit up to the brigade

level in agriculture. They opposed the strengthening of central planning and denounced the use of foreign technology.

In the face of such contradictory policy pronouncements and

uncertain political currents, administrators and economic decision

makers at all levels were virtually paralyzed. Economic activity

slowed, and the incipient modernization program almost ground

to a halt. Uncertainty and instability were exacerbated by the death

of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and the subsequent second purge

of Deng Xiaoping in April. The effects of the power struggle and

policy disputes were compounded by the destruction resulting from

the Tangshan earthquake in July 1976. Output for the year in both

industry and agriculture showed no growth over 1975. The inter- lude of uncertainty finally ended when the Gang of Four was

arrested in October—one month after Mao's death.

The Post-Mao Interlude, 1976-78

After the fall of the Gang of Four, the leadership under Hua

Guofeng—and by July 1977 the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping

reaffirmed the modernization program espoused by Zhou Enlai in 1975. They also set forth a battery of new policies for the purpose

of accomplishing the Four Modernizations. The new policies

strengthened the authority of managers and economic decision makers at the expense of party officials, stressed material incentives

for workers, and called for expansion of the research and education systems (see The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). Foreign

trade was to be increased, and exchanges of students and "foreign

experts" with developed countries were to be encouraged. This new policy initiative was capped at the Fifth National People's Congress in February and March 1978, when Hua Guofeng presented

the draft of an ambitious ten-year plan for the 1976-85 period. The

plan called for high rates of growth in both industry and agricul- ture and included 120 construction projects that would require massive and expensive imports of foreign technology.

Between 1976 and 1978, the economy quickly recovered from

the stagnation of the Cultural Revolution. Agricultural production was sluggish in 1977 because of a third consecutive year of adverse

222
Economic Context

weather conditions but rebounded with a record harvest in 1978.

Industrial output jumped 14 percent in 1977 and increased by

13 percent in 1978.

Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979

At the milestone Third Plenum of the National Party Congress

Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, the party leaders

decided to undertake a program of gradual but fundamental reform

of the economic system. They concluded that the Maoist version

of the centrally planned economy had failed to produce efficient economic growth and had caused China to fall far behind not only

the industrialized nations of the West but also the new industrial

powers of Asia: Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan,

and Hong Kong. In the late 1970s, while Japan and Hong Kong

rivaled European countries in modern technology, China's citizens

had to make do with barely sufficient food supplies, rationed clothing, inadequate housing, and a service sector that was inadequate

and inefficient. All of these shortcomings embarrassed China inter- nationally.

The purpose of the reform program was not to abandon com- munism but to make it work better by substantially increasing the

role of market mechanisms in the system and by reducing—not eliminating—government planning and direct control. The process

of reform was incremental. New measures were first introduced

experimentally in a few localities and then were popularized and

disseminated nationally if they proved successful. By 1987 the pro- gram had achieved remarkable results in increasing supplies of food

and other consumer goods and had created a new climate of dynamism and opportunity in the economy. At the same time, however,

the reforms also had created new problems and tensions, leading

to intense questioning and political struggles over the program's

future. The Period of Readjustment, 1979-81

The first few years of the reform program were designated the

"period of readjustment," during which key imbalances in the econ- omy were to be corrected and a foundation was to be laid for a well-planned modernization drive. The schedule of Hua Guofeng's

ten-year plan was discarded, although many of its elements were

retained. The major goals of the readjustment process were to expand exports rapidly; overcome key deficiencies in transportation, communications, coal, iron, steel, building materials, and electric power; and redress the imbalance between light and heavy

industry by increasing the growth rate of light industry and reducing

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China: A Country Study

investment in heavy industry. Agricultural production was stimulated in 1979 by an increase of over 22 percent in the procurement

prices paid for farm products.

The central policies of the reform program were introduced

experimentally during the readjustment period. The most successful reform policy, the contract responsibility system of production in agriculture, was suggested by the government in 1979 as a way

for poor rural units in mountainous or arid areas to increase their

incomes. The responsibility system allowed individual farm families to work a piece of land for profit in return for delivering a set amount of produce to the collective at a given price. This arrangement created strong incentives for farmers to reduce production

costs and increase productivity. Soon after its introduction the

responsibility system was adopted by numerous farm units in all sorts of areas. Agricultural production was also stimulated by official encouragement to establish free farmers' markets in urban areas, as well as

in the countryside, and by allowing some families to operate as

tl specialized households," devoting their efforts to producing a

scarce commodity or service on a profit-making basis (see Post- Mao Policies, ch. 6). In industry, the main policy innovations increased the autonomy

of enterprise managers, reduced emphasis on planned quotas,

allowed enterprises to produce goods outside the plan for sale on

the market, and permitted enterprises to experiment with the use

of bonuses to reward higher productivity. The government also tested a fundamental change in financial procedures with a limited

number of state-owned units: rather than remitting all of their profits to the state, as was normally done, these enterprises were allowed

to pay a tax on their profits and retain the balance for reinvestment and distribution to workers as bonuses.

The government also actively encouraged the establishment of

collectively owned and operated industrial and service enterprises

as a means of soaking up some of the unemployment among young

people and at the same time helping to increase supplies of light

industrial products. Individual enterprise —true capitalism —also was allowed, after having virtually disappeared during the Cultural Revolution, and independent cobblers, tailors, tinkers, and

vendors once again became common sights in the cities. Foreigntrade procedures were greatly eased, allowing individual enterprises

and administrative departments outside the Ministry of Foreign

Trade (which became the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations

and Trade in 1984) to engage in direct negotiations with for- eign firms. A wide range of cooperation, trading, and credit

224
Shanghai \s Baoshan iron and steel works

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

arrangements with foreign firms were legalized so that China could

enter the mainstream of international trade (see Foreign Trade,

eh. 8). Reform and Opening, Beginning in 1982

The period of readjustment produced promising results, increasing incomes substantially; raising the availability of food, housing, and other consumer goods; and generating strong rates of

growth in all sectors except heavy industry, which was intentionally restrained. On the strength of these initial successes, the reform

program was broadened, and the leadership under Deng Xiaoping

frequently remarked that China's basic policy was "reform and

opening," that is, reform of the economic system and opening to foreign trade. In agriculture the contract responsibility system was adopted as the organizational norm for the entire country, and the commune

structure was largely dismantled. By the end of 1984, approximately

98 percent of all farm households were under the responsibility sys- tem, and all but a handful of communes had been dissolved. The

communes' administrative responsibilities were turned over to township and town governments, and their economic roles were assigned

to townships and villages. The role of free markets for farm produce was further expanded and, with increased marketing possibilities

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China: A Country Study

and rising productivity, farm incomes rose rapidly (sec Post-Mao

Policies, ch. 6). In industry the complexity and interrelation of production

activities prevented a single, simple policy from bringing about the

kind of dramatic improvement that the responsibility system

achieved in agriculture. Nonetheless, a cluster of policies based on

greater flexibility, autonomy, and market involvement significantly

improved the opportunities available to most enterprises, generated high rates of growth, and increased efficiency. Enterprise

managers gradually gained greater control over their units, including the right to hire and fire, although the process required endless struggles with bureaucrats and party cadres. The practice of

remitting taxes on profits and retaining the balance became universal by 1985, increasing the incentive for enterprises to maximize

profits and substantially adding to their autonomy. A change of

potentially equal importance was a shift in the source of investment funds from government budget allocations, which carried no

interest and did not have to be repaid, to interest-bearing bank

loans. As of 1987 the interest rate charged on such loans was still too low to serve as a check on unproductive investments, but the

mechanism was in place.

The role of foreign trade under the economic reforms increased

far beyond its importance in any previous period. Before the reform

period, the combined value of imports and exports had seldom

exceeded 10 percent of national income. In 1980 it was 15 percent, in 1984 it was 21 percent, and in 1986 it reached 35 percent.

Unlike earlier periods, when China was committed to trying to achieve self-sufficiency, under Deng Xiaoping foreign trade was

regarded as an important source of investment funds and modern

technology. As a result, restrictions on trade were loosened fur- ther in the mid-1980s, and foreign investment was legalized. The

most common foreign investments were joint ventures between for- eign firms and Chinese units. Sole ownership by foreign investors

also became legal, but the feasibility of such undertakings remained

questionable.

The most conspicuous symbols of the new status of foreign trade were the four coastal special economic zones (see Glossary), which

were created in 1979 as enclaves where foreign investment could

receive special treatment. Three of the four zones—the cities of

Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Sha'ntou —were located in Guangdong

Province, close to Hong Kong. The fourth, Xiamen, in Fujian

Province, was directly across the strait from Taiwan. More significant for China's economic development was the designation in April 1984 of economic development zones in the fourteen largest

226
Roadside stand on the route to the Ming tombs near Beijing

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus

North China fruit seller Courtesy Ann Matles

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China: A Country Study

coastal cities —including Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou—all of which were major commercial and industrial centers. These zones were to create productive exchanges between foreign

firms with advanced technology and major Chinese economic

networks.

Domestic commerce also was stimulated by the reform policies,

which explicitly endeavored to enliven the economy by shifting the

primary burden of the allocation of goods and services from the

government plan to the market. Private entrepreneurship and free- market activities were legalized and encouraged in the 1980s,

although the central authorities continuously had to fight the efforts of local government agencies to impose excessive taxes on independent merchants. By 1987 the state-owned system of commercial

agencies and retail outlets coexisted with a rapidly growing pri- vate and collectively owned system that competed with it vigorously,

providing a wider range of consumption choices for Chinese citizens than at any previous time.

Although the reform program achieved impressive successes, it also gave rise to several serious problems. One problem was the

challenge to party authority presented by the principles of free- market activity and professional managerial autonomy. Another

difficulty was a wave of crime, corruption, and—in the minds of

many older people—moral deterioration caused by the looser eco- nomic and political climate. The most fundamental tensions were

those created by the widening income disparities between the people who were "getting rich" and those who were not and by the

pervasive threat of inflation. These concerns played a role in the

political struggle that culminated in party general secretary Hu Yaobang's forced resignation in 1987 (see Resistance and the Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization, ch. 11). Following Hu's

resignation, the leadership engaged in an intense debate over the

future course of the reforms and how to balance the need for effi- ciency and market incentives with the need for government guidance

and control. The commitment to further reform was affirmed, but

its pace, and the emphasis to be placed on macroeconomic and

microeconomic levers, remained objects of caution.

Structure and Operation of the Economy

Roles of the Government and the Party

Under China's socialist political and economic system, the

government was explicitly responsible for planning and managing

the national economy. The State Constitution of 1982 specifies that the state is to guide the country's economic development and that

228
Economic Context

the State Council is to direct its subordinate bodies in drawing up

and carrying out the national economic plan and the state budget

(see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). A major portion of the governmental apparatus was devoted to managing the economy; all but

a few of the more than 100 ministries, commissions, administrations,

bureaus, academies, and corporations under the State Council were

concerned with economic matters (see The State Council, ch. 10).

Each significant economic sector was supervised and controlled

by one or more of these organizations, which included the People's Bank of China, State Planning Commission, State Economic

Commission, State Machine-Building Industry Commission, and

the ministries of agriculture, animal husbandry, and fishery; coal

industry; commerce; communications; finance; light industry;

metallurgical industry; petroleum industry; railways; textile industry; and water resources and electric power. Several aspects of the

economy were administered by specialized departments under the State Council, including the State Statistical Bureau, General

Administration of Civil Aviation of China, and China Travel and

Tourism Bureau. Each of the economic organizations under the

State Council directed the units under its jurisdiction through subordinate offices at the provincial and local levels. Economic policies and decisions adopted by the National People's Congress and the State Council were passed on to the eco- nomic organizations under the State Council, which incorporated

them into the plans for the various sectors of the economy. Economic plans and policies were implemented by a variety of direct

and indirect control mechanisms. Direct control was exercised by

designating specific physical output quotas and supply allocations

for some goods and services. Indirect instruments—also called "eco- nomic levers" —operated by affecting market incentives. These

included levying taxes, setting prices for products and supplies,

allocating investment funds, monitoring and controlling financial

transactions by the banking system, and controlling the allocation

of scarce key resources, such as skilled labor, electric power, trans- portation, steel, and chemical fertilizer. A major objective of the

reform program was to reduce the use of direct controls and to increase the role of indirect economic levers. Major state-owned

enterprises still received detailed plans specifying physical quantities of key inputs and products from their ministries. Even these

units, however, were increasingly affected by prices and allocations

that were determined through market interaction and only indirectly

influenced by the central plan.

By 1987 the majority of state-owned industrial enterprises, which were managed at the provincial level or below, were partially

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China: A Country Study

regulated by a combination of specific allocations and indirect controls, but they also produced goods outside the plan for sale in the

market. Important, scarce resources —for example, engineers or

finished steel —might be assigned to this kind of unit in exact numbers. Less critical assignments of personnel and materials would

be authorized in a general way by the plan, but with procurement

arrangements left up to the enterprise management. Enterprises

had increasing discretion over the quantities of inputs purchased,

the sources of inputs, the variety of products manufactured, and

the production process. Collectively owned units and the agricultural sector were regulated primarily by indirect instruments. Each collective unit was

"responsible for its own profit and loss," and the prices of its inputs

and products provided the major production incentives.

Consumer spending was subject to a limited degree of direct

government influence but was primarily determined by the basic

market forces of income levels and commodity prices. Before the

reform period, key goods were rationed when they were in short

supply, but by the mid-1980s availability had increased to the point

that rationing was discontinued for everything except grain, which

could also be purchased in the free markets.

Foreign trade was supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, General Administration of Customs,

and Bank of China, the foreign exchange arm of the Chinese banking system, which controlled access to the scarce foreign currency

required for imports. Because of the reduced restrictions on for- eign trade, however, there were broad opportunities for individual

work units to engage in exchanges with foreign firms without much

interference from official agencies (see Organization of Foreign

Trade, ch. 8). The role of the government in the economy was buttressed by

the pervasive influence of the Chinese Communist Party. The struc- ture of the party organization paralleled that of the government

but also extended below the lowest level of government into individual work units. Important economic decision makers at all levels,

from the members of the State Council down to the managers of

factories, either were party members themselves or worked closely

with colleagues who were party members. The party served as a powerful supplementary network for transmitting and implementing

the economic goals and policies of the government.

Although the government dominated the economy, the extent

of its control was limited by the sheer volume of economic activity.

Furthermore, the concept of government supervision of the econ- omy had changed—at least in the minds of the advocates of

230
Economic Context

reform—from one of direct but stilling state control to one of indirect

guidance of a more dynamic economy (see The First Wave of

Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11).

The Two Major Sectors: Agriculture and Industry

The two most important sectors of the economy were agricul- ture and industry, which together employed 80 percent of the labor

force and in 1985 produced 72 percent of GNP. The two sectors differed in nearly all respects. Technology, labor productivity, and

incomes advanced much more rapidly in industry than in agriculture. Agricultural output was vulnerable to the effects of weather,

while industry was more directly influenced by political upheavals.

The organization of industry was based on state and collective

ownership, planning, and wage labor, while that of agriculture was

built around household farming, self-reliance, and market incentives. The disparities between the two sectors combined to form

an economic-cultural-social gap between the rural and urban

areas—the major division in Chinese society.

Agriculture

In the late 1980s, China remained a predominantly agricultural

country. As of 1985 about 63 percent of the population lived in rural areas, and nearly 63 percent of the national labor force was

engaged in agriculture (see Migration; Labor Force, ch. 2). Modern

technology had spread slowly in the vast farm areas, and the avail- ability of modern supplies was less than adequate, causing growth

in agricultural output to lag behind production increases in the rest of the economy. The proportion of GNP produced by agriculture

declined from over 43 percent in the early 1950s to about 29 per- cent in 1985. The low agricultural growth rate as compared with

other sectors of the economy reflected the fact that the average

farmer had far less machinery and electric power and fewer other

modern production aids to work with than the average worker in industry. Under the responsibility system (see Glossary), farm

households and collective organizations purchased large amounts

of new machinery, particularly small tractors and trucks. The horsepower of agricultural machinery per farmer increased by almost

30 percent between 1979 and 1985 but still came to less than 1 horsepower per person.

Before the early 1980s, most of the agricultural sector was organized according to the three-tier commune system (see Rural

Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). There were over 50,000

people's communes, most containing around 30,000 members.

Each commune was made up of about sixteen production brigades,

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China: A Country Study

and each production brigade was composed of around seven production teams. The production teams were the basic agricultural col- lective units. They corresponded to small villages and typically

included about 30 households and 100 to 250 members. The communes, brigades, and teams owned all major rural productive assets and provided nearly all administrative, social, and commercial ser- vices in the countryside. The largest part of farm family incomes

consisted of shares of net team income, distributed to members

according to the amount of work each had contributed to the col- lective effort. Farm families also worked small private plots and

were free to sell or consume their products.

By the end of 1984, approximately 98 percent of the old production teams had adopted the contract responsibility system, and all but 249 communes had been dissolved, their governmental functions passed on to 91,000 township and town governments. Production team organizations were replaced by 940,000 village

committees. Under the responsibility system, farm families no

longer devoted most of their efforts to collective production but

instead generally signed contracts with the village or town to culti- vate a given crop on a particular piece of land. After harvest a certain amount of the crop had to be sold to the unit at a predetermined

price, and any output beyond that amount was the property of the

family, either to be sold in the market or to be consumed. Beyond

the amount contracted for delivery to the collective, farmers were

allowed to determine for themselves what and how to produce.

Market activity played a central role in the rural economy of

the 1980s. Farmers sold a growing share of their produce in rural or urban free markets and purchased many of the inputs that had

formerly been supplied by the team or brigade. A prominent new

institution that thrived in the market environment was the "specialized household." Specialized households operated in the classic pat- tern of the entrepreneur, buying or renting equipment to produce

a good or service that was in short supply locally. Some of the most

common specialties were trucking, chicken raising, pig raising, and

technical agricultural services, such as irrigation and pest control.

Many of the specialized households became quite wealthy relative

to the average farmer.

The new economic climate and the relaxation of restrictions on

the movements of rural residents gave rise to numerous opportunities for profit-making ventures in the countryside. Towns, vil- lages, and groups of households referred to as "rural economic

unions" established small factories, processing operations, construction teams, catering services, and other kinds of nonagricultural concerns. Many of these organizations had links with urban

232
nese and American technicians conduct a drilling operation

at the Antibao coal mine, Shanxi Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

233
China: A Country Study

enterprises that found the services of these rural units to be less expensive and more efficient than those of their formal urban counterparts.

The growth of these nonagricultural enterprises in the countryside created a large number of new jobs, making it possible for many workers who were no longer needed in agriculture to "leave

the land but stay in the country," significantly changing the struc- ture of the rural economy and increasing rural incomes. In 1986

nonagricultural enterprises in the countryside employed 21 per- cent of the rural labor force and for the first time produced over

half the value of rural output.

Although the chief characteristic of the new rural system was

household farming for profit, collective organizations still played

a major role. Agricultural land still was owned by township or town

governments, which determined the crops farmers contracted to grow and the financial terms of the contracts. Many township, town,

and village governments also engaged in major entrepreneurial

undertakings, establishing factories, processing mills, brick works,

and other large-scale enterprises. Finally, the maintenance and

operation of public works, such as irrigation systems, power plants,

schools, and clinics, generally still was regarded as the responsibility of the collective administrations.

Four percent of the nation's farmland was cultivated by state farms, which employed 4.9 million people in 1985. State farms were owned and operated by the government much in the same way

as an industrial enterprise. Management was the responsibility of

a director, and workers were paid set wages, although some ele- ments of the responsibility system were introduced in the mid-1980s.

State farms were scattered throughout China, but the largest numbers were located in frontier or remote areas, including XinjiangUygur Autonomous Region in the northwest, Nei Monggol

Autonomous Region, the three northeastern provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning and the southeastern provinces of Guangdong, Fujian, and Jiangxi.

Industry

The industrial sector employed only about 17 percent of the labor

force in 1985 but, as a result of much higher labor productivity

than the agricultural sector, accounted for over 46 percent of

national income. Industrial units were very diverse in size and tech- nological sophistication, ranging from tiny handicraft manufacturing enterprises to giant modern complexes producing such goods

as steel, chemical fertilizer, and synthetic fibers. The majority of

the country's large industrial units were clustered in the major

234
Economic Context

industrial centers in the northeast, the Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan

area, the Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley, and Shanghai. Small

and medium-size units were found throughout the country, and

a number of first-rank plants were located far from the leading cit- ies (see Geographical Distribution of Industry, ch. 7). Ownership

of industrial enterprises fell into three general categories: state ownership, urban collective ownership, and rural collective ownership. Industry was dominated by the state-owned sector, which

included the largest, most technically advanced, and most important enterprises. In 1985 state-owned enterprises produced 70 percent of national

industrial output by value, held 75 percent of fixed industrial assets, and employed 46 percent of the industrial labor force (including

rural industrial enterprises). Although all of these units were owned

by "the state" in the abstract sense, operational control and effective ownership of specific enterprises were divided among the differ- ent levels of government. A few of the largest enterprises were under

the direct authority of their respective ministries in the central

government. Most major enterprises were owned by the province,

autonomous region, or special municipality where they were located or were subject to shared control by the central ministry and the

provincial-level government. Small and medium-size units usually were owned by city, prefecture, county, or town governments.

Control of some enterprises was shared with higher administrative levels. Workers in state-owned enterprises were paid regular wages

according to an established pay scale, as well as bonuses that were

supposed to be related to personal or enterprise performance or

both. In addition, they received a number of important benefits,

including free health care, subsidized housing, and subsidies for such work-related expenses as special clothing and commuting costs. The average income of industrial workers was considerably higher

than that of most farmers and was much more stable. Urban, collectively owned enterprises (owned by the workers)

for the most part were small units equipped with relatively little machinery. Many of these units were engaged in handicraft production or other labor-intensive activities, such as manufacturing fur- niture or assembling simple electrical items. In the late 1970s and

early 1980s, the government promoted them as a means of using

surplus labor to increase supplies of consumer and export goods.

By 1985 urban collective industrial enterprises employed over

17 million people, 20 percent of the total industrial labor force. These enterprises held only 13 percent of all industrial fixed assets but produced 19 percent of total industrial output value.

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China: A Country Study

Rural, collectively owned industrial enterprises —commonly

referred to as "township enterprises" —were the most rapidly growing portion of the industrial sector in the mid-1980s. The government regarded them as a means of expanding industrialization

(without further taxing the overcrowded major urban centers),

alleviating rural unemployment, and increasing supplies of industrial products in rural areas. Most of the township enterprises were

operated by township and town governments, but a large number

of very small units were operated by private cooperative organizations called "rural economic unions." In 1985 township enterprises

employed 30 million workers, over a third of the total industrial

labor force. The value of their fixed assets, however, was only

12 percent of the national total, and their output value came to

less than 10 percent of the national total. Nonetheless, in 1985 their

income grew by 44 percent over the 1984 levels. The most com- mon products of township industries were building materials,

agricultural machinery, textiles, and processed foods.

Other Important Sectors

Transportation, the postal system, and telecommunications

employed over 12 million people in 1985. Long-distance transportation was carried primarily by railroads, inland waterways, and

highways. The government-run railroad network was the backbone

of the freight system, and rail lines extended to nearly all parts of

China. In most areas, however, the rail system had too few feeder

lines and was inadequately integrated. Much of the rail system had

been improved in the 1980s; many heavily used stretches were converted to double track or upgraded, and several key new lines were

constructed to relieve congested areas. Most locomotives in use in the early 1980s were picturesque but outdated steam engines. By

1987, however, several railroad districts had converted entirely to more modern and efficient diesel or electric locomotives, and domestic production of modern engines was supplemented by imported

models. Within their limitations the railroads functioned fairly

efficiently and made intensive use of the rail network. In 1986 the

railroads carried 874.5 billion ton-kilometers of freight, 45 percent

of the national freight total and a 7.8 percent increase over 1985.

They also carried nearly 1.1 billion passengers, 20 percent of the

national total. Despite reasonably good performance, the ability

of the economy to move goods between cities and regions was

severely limited by deficiencies in the system, and improvement

of the railroads continued to be a high priority for state investment

(see Railroads, ch. 8). Inland navigation grew more quickly than the rail system and

236
Economic Context

in 1986 carried 827.8 billion ton-kilometers of freight, nearly as much as the railroads. The principal inland waterway was the

Chang Jiang and its tributaries, which constituted the major artery

linking the industrial and agricultural areas of central China and

the southwest to the great port and industrial center of Shanghai.

Improvements to the water routes enabled larger and faster modern

vessels to use them, extended their navigable length, and reduced

the amount of time they were closed each year. In addition to modern vessels, the lakes, rivers, and canals were plied by thousands of motorized and nonmotorized traditional craft of all sizes (see Inland Waterways, ch. 8). Local road networks were extensive, but many were narrow and

unpaved, and all were overcrowded with trucks, jeeps, buses, carts pulled by tractors and animals, bicycles, pedestrians, and grain

laid out to dry by local farmers. Owing to rapid increases in the

volume of private and work-unit trucking, highway freight traffic was the fastest growing major portion of the transportation sys- tem aside from ocean shipping. In 1986 highway freight traffic totaled 259.6 billion ton-kilometers, an increase of 47 percent over

1985, and 80 percent of the volume was carried by vehicles that were not managed by state highway departments. In 1986 buses

served 4.3 billion passengers for relatively short trips (see Highways and Roads, ch. 8). Civil aviation provided important links both to isolated areas of the country and to foreign nations. It carried, however, only

a small fraction of total freight and passenger traffic (see Civil Aviation, ch. 8). The service sector expanded quickly during the reform period,

making up for major deficiencies that had developed in the preceding quarter century. In the 1950s and 1960s, services were regarded

as nonproductive and were therefore neglected. During the Cultural Revolution, they were relentlessly attacked as "remnants of

capitalism." By the late 1970s, the service trades, such as food ser- vice, barbering, laundering, tailoring, and repair work, were seri- ously understaffed and were far from able to meet the needs of the

population. Furthermore, they were all concentrated in large,

inefficient state-owned units. The service occupations requiring

advanced training, such as health care, education, and legal ser- vices, were decimated by the breakdown of the education system

during the Cultural Revolution decade.

Revival of the service sector was a well-publicized goal of the

reform program. Legalization of private and collective enterprise

quickly led to the appearance of tinkers, cobblers, tailors, barbers,

and small food-service stands, particularly in the free markets.

237
China: A Country Study

Between 1978 and 1985, the number of people engaged in the ser- vice trades, retail sales, and catering grew from only 6.1 million

to over 25 million, of whom 21 million were in collective or individual enterprises. In 1986 the government further stimulated the

growth of the sector by leasing to private individuals or groups a

large number of small, state-owned, service establishments, including restaurants, repair shops, and barber shops, that had consistently been operating at a loss under state management.

Other service sectors that employed significant quantities of labor

included health care, education and culture, and government

administration. These sectors were important to the national econ- omy and employed over 25 million people.

China produced nearly all of its own medicines and medical

equipment, but most hospitals were poorly equipped by Western

standards. A more serious shortage was the relatively small number of doctors and other highly trained medical personnel. In 1985 some 4.3 million people worked in health-care institutions. Of these,

1 .4 million were doctors—including 336,000 doctors of traditional

(rather than Western) medicine, 637,000 were nurses, and 1.4 million were midwives, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, and other

technical personnel. The number of doctors of Western medicine

grew by over 35 percent between 1978 and 1985, and renewed contact with the West opened training opportunities in Europe, the

United States, and Japan.

Only a little over 10 percent of all Chinese received free medical care. Free care was provided to government workers, military

personnel, teachers, college students, and workers in state-owned

enterprises. A portion of the medical expenses incurred by their

dependent family members was covered by the work units. Most

rural towns and villages operated voluntary cooperative medical

systems (see Health Care, ch. 2). Educational and cultural institutions employed 12.7 million people in 1985. This total included 871 ,000 teachers and staff in insti- tutions of higher education, an increase of 68 percent over the

number in 1978, reflecting the intensive reconstruction of the education system in the 1980s. There were nearly 8 million people working in government administration in 1985.

Planning

Until the 1980s the economy was directed and coordinated by means of economic plans that were formulated at all levels of

administration. The reform program significantly reduced the role of central planning by encouraging off-plan production by state- owned units and by promoting the growth of collective and

238
Urban market

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

individual enterprises that did not fall under the planning system.

The government also endeavored to replace direct plan control with

indirect guidance of the economy through economic levers, such

as taxes and investment support. Despite these changes, overall

direction of the economy was still carried out by the central plan,

as was allocation of key goods, such as steel and energy.

When China's planning apparatus was first established in the

early 1950s, it was patterned after the highly centralized Soviet sys- tem. That system basically depended on a central planning bureaucracy that calculated and balanced quantities of major goods

demanded and supplied. This approach was substantially modified during the Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), when

economic management was extensively decentralized. During the

1960s and 1970s, the degree of centralization in the planning sys- tem fluctuated with the political currents, waxing in times of pragmatic growth and waning under the influence of the Cultural

Revolution and the Gang of Four.

At the national level, planning began in the highest bodies of the

central government. National economic goals and priorities were determined by the party's Central Committee, the State Council, and

the National People's Congress. These decisions were then communicated to the ministries, commissions, and other agencies under the

State Council to be put into effect through national economic plans.

239
China: A Country Study

The State Planning Commission worked with the State Economic

Commission, State Statistical Bureau, the former State Capital Construction Commission, People's Bank of China, the economic ministries, and other organs subordinate to the State Council to formulate

national plans of varying duration and import. Long-range plans

as protracted as ten and twelve years also were announced at vari- ous times. These essentially were statements of future goals and

the intended general direction of the economy, and they had little direct effect on economic activity. As of late 1987 the most recent such long-range plan was the draft plan for 1976-85, presented

by Hua Guofeng in February 1978.

The primary form of medium-range plan was the five-year plan,

another feature adopted from the Soviet system. The purpose of

the five-year plan was to guide and integrate the annual plans to achieve balanced growth and progress toward national goals. In

practice, this role was only fulfilled by the First Five- Year Plan

(1953-57), which served effectively as a blueprint for industrialization. The second (1958-62), third (1966-70), fourth (1971-75),

and fifth (1976-80) five-year plans were all interrupted by politi- cal upheavals and had little influence. The Sixth Five- Year Plan

(1981-85) was drawn up during the planning period and was more

a reflection of the results of the reform program than a guide for reform. The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) was intended

to direct the course of the reforms through the second half of the

1980s, but by mid- 1987 its future was already clouded by political

struggle.

A second form of medium-range planning appeared in the readjustment and recovery periods of 1949-52, 1963-65, and 1979-81

each of which followed a period of chaos—the civil war, the Great

Leap Forward, and the Gang of Four, respectively. In these

instances, normal long- and medium-range planning was suspended

while basic imbalances in the economy were targeted and corrected. In each case, objectives were more limited and clearly defined than

in the five-year plans and were fairly successfully achieved.

The activities of economic units were controlled by annual plans.

Formulation of the plans began in the autumn preceding the year

being planned, so that agricultural output for the current year could

be taken into account. The foundation of an annual plan was a "material balance table." At the national level, the first step in the preparation of a material balance table was to estimate—for each province, autonomous region, special municipality, and

enterprise under direct central control —the demand and supply

for each centrally controlled good. Transfers of goods between

provincial-level units were planned so as to bring quantities

240
Economic Context

supplied and demanded into balance. As a last resort, a serious

overall deficit in a good could be made up by imports.

The initial targets were sent to the provincial-level administrations and the centrally controlled enterprises. The provincial-level

counterparts of the state economic commissions and ministries broke

the targets down for allocation among their subordinate counties,

districts, cities, and enterprises under direct provincial-level control. Counties further distributed their assigned quantities among

their subordinate towns, townships, and county-owned enterprises,

and cities divided their targets into objectives for the enterprises

under their jurisdiction. Finally, towns assigned goals to the state- owned enterprises they controlled. Agricultural targets were dis- tributed by townships among their villages and ultimately were

reduced to the quantities that villages contracted for with individual

farm households.

At each level, individual units received their target input allo- cations and output quantities. Managers, engineers, and accountants compared the targets with their own projections, and if they

concluded that the planned output quotas exceeded their capabilities, they consulted with representatives of the administrative body

superior to them. Each administrative level adjusted its targets on

the basis of discussions with subordinate units and sent the revised

figures back up the planning ladder. The commissions and ministries evaluated the revised sums, repeated the material balance table procedure, and used the results as the final plan, which the State Council then officially approved.

Annual plans formulated at the provincial level provided the

quantities for centrally controlled goods and established targets for goods that were not included in the national plan but were important to the province, autonomous region, or special municipality.

These figures went through the same process of disaggregation,

review, discussion, and reaggregation as the centrally planned tar- gets and eventually became part of the provincial-level unit's annual

plan. Many goods that were not included at the provincial level were similarly added to county and city plans.

The final stage of the planning process occurred in the individual

producing units. Having received their output quotas and the

figures for their allocations of capital, labor, and other supplies,

enterprises generally organized their production schedules into ten- day, one-month, three-month, and six-month plans.

The Chinese planning system has encountered the same problems

of inflexibility and inadequate responsiveness that have emerged

in other centrally planned economies. The basic difficulty has been

that it is impossible for planners to foresee all the needs of the

241
China: A Country Study

economy and to specify adequately the characteristics of planned

inputs and products. Beginning in 1979 and 1980, the first reforms were introduced on an experimental basis. Nearly all of these policies increased the autonomy and decision-making power of the vari- ous economic units and reduced the direct role of central planning.

By the mid-1980s planning still was the government's main mechanism for guiding the economy and correcting imbalances, but its ability to predict and control the behavior of the economy had been

greatly reduced.

The Budget

The nature of the state budget also was significantly altered by

the reform program. Before 1979 the state budget was the financial component of the national economic plan. It was made up of

the budgets of both the central government and the local governments and included the revenues and expenditures of all state-owned

enterprises. All profits from state enterprises were remitted to the

state budget, and investment funds were allocated from the state budget. Under the reform, there was increased separation of enterprises from direct state control. Enterprises now paid proportional

taxes on their incomes rather than remitting their entire profits to the state. Investment funds were, in principle, no longer to be

allocated directly to state enterprises from the state budget but were

to be obtained from the banking system in the form of interestbearing loans. In 1985 total state revenues of ¥186.6 billion included ¥51 .4 billion in income taxes from state-owned enterprises and only

¥4.4 billion in enterprise incomes. The largest category of revenues was industrial and commercial taxes, which amounted to ¥110.1

billion. Agricultural taxes were ¥4. 2 billion, continuing the previ- ous policy of levying only negligible taxes on the farm sector. Revenues also included borrowing equal to ¥9 billion, a practice

followed annually since 1978. As of 1983 roughly 30 percent of total revenues were collected by the central government and 70 percent

by local governments, while each accounted for about 50 percent

of expenditures.

In 1985 the largest category of budget expenditure was appropriations for capital construction, which received 31.3 percent of the

total allotment. Culture, education, science, and public health constituted the next largest category, with 17 percent of expenditures.

National defense, which averaged 19 percent of budgetary expenditures in the 1960s and 1970s, received only 10.3 percent of the

total in 1985. Administrative expenses were 7.7 percent of the budget and new technology in enterprises 5.5 percent. In 1984 the

242
Economic Context

state paid out ¥37 billion in price subsidies, an amount equal to 24 percent of total expenditures in that year. The bulk of the

subsidies—¥32 billion —was for consumer goods.

An important function of the state budget was to transfer resources from prosperous regions to poor regions. The budgets

that were finally approved by the Ministry of Finance for the

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities allowed

surplus funds from affluent areas to be transferred to cover planned

expenditures in the deficit areas, while bringing the budget for the

entire country into balance. The resulting pattern of revenue sharing

between provincial-level administrations and the central government was one in which the advanced industrialized regions paid

a much higher rate of net taxation than most areas, and the least- developed regions were heavily subsidized. For example, in 1985

Shanghai remitted ¥8. 4 billion in profits and taxes, equal to 4.5 per- cent of national budget revenues, although it had only 1.1 percent

of the national population.

The Banking System

The history of the Chinese banking system has been somewhat

checkered. Nationalization and consolidation of the country's banks

received the highest priority in the earliest years of the People's

Republic, and banking was the first sector to be completely socialized. In the period of recovery after the Chinese civil war (1949-52),

the People's Bank of China moved very effectively to halt raging

inflation and bring the nation's finances under central control. Over

the course of time, the banking organization was modified repeatedly to suit changing conditions and new policies.

The banking system was centralized early on under the Ministry of Finance, which exercised firm control over all financial ser- vices, credit, and the money supply. During the 1980s the banking

system was expanded and diversified to meet the needs of the reform

program, and the scale of banking activity rose sharply. New

budgetary procedures required state enterprises to remit to the state only a tax on income and to seek investment funds in the form

of bank loans. Between 1979 and 1985, the volume of deposits nearly tripled and the value of bank loans rose by 260 percent. By 1987

the banking system included the People's Bank of China, Agricultural Bank, Bank of China (which handled foreign exchange matters), China Investment Bank, China Industrial and Commercial

Bank, People's Construction Bank, Communications Bank, People's Insurance Company of China, rural credit cooperatives, and

urban credit cooperatives.

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China: A Country Study

The People's Bank of China was the eentral bank and the foundation of the banking system. Although the bank overlapped in function with the Ministry of Finance and lost many of its responsibilities during the Cultural Revolution, in the 1970s it was restored

to its leading position. As the central bank, the People's Bank of

China had sole responsibility for issuing currency and controlling

the money supply. It also served as the government treasury, the

main source of credit for economic units, the clearing center for financial transactions, the holder of enterprise deposits, the national

savings bank, and a ubiquitous monitor of economic activities. Another financial institution, the Bank of China, handled all deal- ings in foreign exchange. It was responsible for allocating the country's foreign exchange reserves, arranging foreign loans, setting

exchange rates for China's currency, issuing letters of credit, and

generally carrying out all financial transactions with foreign firms

and individuals. The Bank of China had offices in Beijing and other

cities engaged in foreign trade and maintained overseas offices in major international financial centers, including Hong Kong, London, New York, Singapore, and Luxembourg.

The Agricultural Bank was created in the 1950s to facilitate financial operations in the rural areas. The Agricultural Bank provided

financial support to agricultural units. It issued loans, handled state appropriations for agriculture, directed the operations of the rural

credit cooperatives, and carried out overall supervision of rural

financial affairs. The Agricultural Bank was headquartered in Beijing and had a network of branches throughout the country. It flourished in the late 1950s and mid-1960s but languished thereafter until the late 1970s, when the functions and autonomy of the

Agricultural Bank were increased substantially to help promote

higher agricultural production. In the 1980s it was restructured

again and given greater authority in order to support the growth

and diversification of agriculture under the responsibility system.

The People's Construction Bank managed state appropriations

and loans for capital construction. It checked the activities of loan

recipients to ensure that the funds were used for their designated

construction purpose. Money was disbursed in stages as a project

progressed. The reform policy shifted the main source of investment funding from the government budget to bank loans and

increased the responsibility and activities of the People's Construction Bank.

Rural credit cooperatives were small, collectively owned savings

and lending organizations that were the main source of small-scale

financial services at the local level in the countryside. They handled deposits and short-term loans for individual farm families,

244
Economic Context

villages, and cooperative organizations. Subject to the direction

of the Agricultural Bank, they followed uniform state banking poli- cies but acted as independent units for accounting purposes. In 1985 rural credit cooperatives held total deposits of ¥72.5 billion. Urban credit cooperatives were a relatively new addition to the

banking system in the mid-1980s, when they first began widespread

operations. As commercial opportunities grew in the reform period,

the thousands of individual and collective enterprises that sprang

up in urban areas created a need for small-scale financial services

that the formal banks were not prepared to meet. Bank officials therefore encouraged the expansion of urban credit cooperatives

as a valuable addition to the banking system. In 1986 there were more than 1,100 urban credit cooperatives, which held a total of ¥3.7 billion in deposits and made loans worth ¥1.9 billion. In the mid-1980s the banking system still lacked some of the

services and characteristics that were considered basic in most countries. Interbank relations were very limited, and interbank borrowing and lending were virtually unknown. Checking accounts were used by very few individuals, and bank credit cards did not

exist. In 1986 initial steps were taken in some of these areas. Inter- bank borrowing and lending networks were created among twenty- seven cities along the Chang Jiang and among fourteen cities in north China. Interregional financial networks were created to link banks in eleven leading cities all over China, including Shenyang,

Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing, and Xi'an and also to link the

branches of the Agricultural Bank. The first Chinese credit card,

the Great Wall Card, was introduced in June 1986 to be used for foreign exchange transactions. Another financial innovation in 1986 was the opening of China's first stock exchanges since 1949. Small

stock exchanges began operations somewhat tentatively in Shenyang, Liaoning Province, in August 1986 and in Shanghai in September 1986.

Throughout the history of the People's Republic, the banking

system has exerted close control over financial transactions and the

money supply. All government departments, publicly and collec- tively owned economic units, and social, political, military, and

educational organizations were required to hold their financial

balances as bank deposits. They were also instructed to keep on hand only enough cash to meet daily expenses; all major financial

transactions were to be conducted through banks. Payment for goods and services exchanged by economic units was accomplished

by debiting the account of the purchasing unit and crediting that

of the selling unit by the appropriate amount. This practice effec- tively helped to minimize the need for currency.

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China: A Country Study

Since 1949 China's leaders have urged the Chinese people to build up personal savings accounts to reduce the demand for con- sumer goods and increase the amount of capital available for investment. Small branch offices of savings banks were conveniently

located throughout the urban areas. In the countryside savings were

deposited with the rural credit cooperatives, which could be found

in most towns and villages. In 1986 savings deposits for the entire

country totaled over ¥223.7 billion. Prices

Determination of Prices

Until the reform period of the late 1970s and 1980s, the prices

of most commodities were set by government agencies and changed

infrequently. Because prices did not change when production costs or demand for a commodity altered, they often failed to reflect the true values of goods, causing many kinds of goods to be misallocated and producing a price system that the Chinese government

itself referred to as "irrational."

The best way to generate the accurate prices required for eco- nomic efficiency is through the process of supply and demand, and

government policy in the 1980s increasingly advocated the use of

prices that were "mutually agreed upon by buyer and seller," that

is, determined through the market. The prices of products in the

farm produce free markets were determined by supply and demand,

and in the summer of 1985 the state store prices of all food items

except grain also were allowed to float in response to market conditions. Prices of most goods produced by private and collectively

owned enterprises in both rural and urban areas generally were

free to float, as were the prices of many items that state-owned enter- prises produced outside the plan. Prices of most major goods

produced by state-owned enterprises, however, along with the grain

purchased from farmers by state commercial departments for retail sales in the cities, still were set or restricted by government agencies and still were not sufficiently accurate.

In 1987 the price structure in China was chaotic. Some prices were determined in the market through the forces of supply and

demand, others were set by government agencies, and still others were produced by procedures that were not clearly defined. In many

cases, there was more than one price for the same commodity,

depending on how it was exchanged, the kind of unit that produced

it, or who the buyer was. While the government was not pleased

with this situation, it was committed to continued price reform.

It was reluctant, however, to release the remaining fixed prices

246
Selling fish under the floating-price policy, Jiangsu Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

247
China: A Country Study

because of potential political and economic disruption. Sudden

unpredictable price changes would leave consumers unable to continue buying some goods; some previously profitable enterprises

under the old price structure would begin to take losses, and others

would abruptly become very wealthy.

The Role of Prices

As a result of the economic reform program and the increased

importance of market exchange and profitability, in the 1980s prices

played a central role in determining the production and distribution of goods in most sectors of the economy. Previously, in the

strict centrally planned system, enterprises had been assigned output

quotas and inputs in physical terms. Now, under the reform program, the incentive to show a positive profit caused even state- owned enterprises to choose inputs and products on the basis of

prices whenever possible. State-owned enterprises could not alter the amounts or prices of goods they were required to produce by

the plan, but they could try to increase their profits by purchasing

inputs as inexpensively as possible, and their off-plan production

decisions were based primarily on price considerations. Prices were

the main economic determinant of production decisions in agricul- ture and in private and collectively owned industrial enterprises

despite the fact that regulations, local government fees or harassment, or arrangements based on personal connections often pre- vented enterprises from carrying out those decisions.

Consumer goods were allocated to households by the price

mechanism, except for rationed grain. Families decided what commodities to buy on the basis of the prices of the goods in relation

to household income.

Problems in Price Policy

The grain market was a typical example of a situation in which

the government was confronted with major problems whether it allowed the irrational price structure to persist or carried out price

reform. State commercial agencies paid farmers a higher price for grain than the state received from the urban residents to whom

they sold it. In 1985 state commercial agencies paid farmers an

average price of Y416.4 per ton of grain and then sold it in the

cities at an average price of ¥383. 3 a ton, for a loss of ¥33.1 per

ton. Ninety million tons were sold under this arrangement, caus- ing the government to lose nearly ¥3 billion. If the state reduced

the procurement price, farmers would reduce their grain production. Because grain was the staple Chinese diet, this result was

unacceptable. If the state increased the urban retail price to equal

248
Economic Context

the procurement price, the cost of the main food item for Chinese

families would rise 9 percent, generating enormous resentment.

But even this alternative would probably not entirely resolve the

problem, as the average free-market price of grain —¥510.5 a ton

in 1987 —indicated that its true value was well above the state procurement price.

There was no clear solution to the price policy dilemma. The

approach of the government was to encourage the growth of non- planned economic activity and thereby expand the proportion of

prices determined by market forces. These market prices could then

serve as a guide for more accurate pricing of planned items. It was

likely that the Chinese economy would continue to operate with

a dual price system for some years to come.

Inflation

One of the most striking manifestations of economic instability

in China in the 1930s and 1940s was runaway inflation. Inflation

peaked during the Chinese civil war of the late 1940s, when wholesale prices in Shanghai increased 7.5 million times in the space of

3 years. In the early 1950s, stopping inflation was a major government objective, accomplished through currency reform, unification and nationalization of the banks, and tight control over prices

and the money supply. These measures were continued until 1979,

and China achieved a remarkable record of price stability. Between

1952 and 1978, retail prices for consumer goods grew at an aver- age rate of only 0.6 percent a year. During the reform period, higher levels of inflation appeared

when government controls were reduced. The first serious jump

in the cost of living for urban residents occurred in 1980, when

consumer prices rose by 7.5 percent. In 1985 the increase was

11.9 percent, and in 1986 it was 7.6 percent. There were several

basic reasons for this burst of inflation after thirty years of steady

prices. First, the years before the reform saw a generally high rate of investment and concentration on the manufacture of producer

goods. The resultant shortage of consumer commodities caused a gradual accumulation of excess demand: personal savings were rela- tively large, and, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was a booming market for such expensive consumer durables as watches

and television sets. Second, the real value of many items changed

as some resources became more scarce and as technology altered

both manufacturing processes and products. The real cost of producing agricultural products rose with the increased use of modern

inputs. Manufactured consumer goods that were more technologically advanced and more expensive than those previously on the

249
China: A Country Study

market—such as washing machines and color television sets

became available.

During the early 1980s, both consumer incomes and the amount

of money in circulation increased fairly rapidly and. at times,

unexpectedly. Consumer incomes grew because of the reform pro- gram's emphasis on material incentives and because of the overall

expansion in productivity and income-earning possibilities. The

higher profits earned and retained by enterprises were passed on

to workers, in many cases, in the form of wage hikes, bonuses,

and higher subsidies. At the same time, the expanded and diversified role of the banking system caused the amounts of loans and

deposits to increase at times beyond officially sanctioned levels,

injecting unplanned new quantities of currency into the economy.

Living Standards

Progress since 1949

Before 1949 the Chinese economy was characterized by

widespread poverty, extreme income inequalities, and endemic

insecurity of livelihood. By means of centralized economic planning, the People's Republic was able to redistribute national income

so as to provide the entire population with at least the minimal

necessities of life (except during the kk three bad years" of 1959,

1960, and 1961) and to consistently allocate a relatively high proportion of national income to productive investment. Equally important to the quality of life were the results of mass public-health and

sanitation campaigns, which rid the country of most of the conditions that had bred epidemics and lingering disease in the past.

The most concrete evidence of improved living standards was that

average national life expectancy more than doubled, rising from

around thirty-two years in 1949 to sixty-nine years in 1985 (see

Mortality and Fertility; Health Care, ch. 2). In 1987 the standard of living in China was much lower than

in the industrialized countries, but nearly all Chinese people had

adequate food, clothing, and housing. In addition, there was a positive trend toward rapid improvements in living conditions in the

1980s as a result of the economic reforms, though improvements

in the standard of living beyond the basic level came slowly. Until

the end of the 1970s, the fruits of economic growth were largely

negated by population increases, which prevented significant

advances in the per capita availability of food, clothing, and housing beyond levels achieved in the 1950s (see Population, ch. 2). The second major change in the standard of living came about as a result of the rapid expansion of productivitv and commerce

250
Economic Context

generated by the reform measures of the 1980s. After thirty years

of austerity and marginal sufficiency, Chinese consumers suddenly were able to buy more than enough to eat from a growing variety

of food items. Stylish clothing, modern furniture, and a wide array

of electrical appliances also became part of the normal expectations

of ordinary Chinese families.

Food

While food production rose substantially after 1949, population

increases were nearly as great until the 1980s. Production of grain,

the source of about 75 percent of the calories in the Chinese diet,

grew at an average rate of 2.7 percent a year between 1952 and

1979, while population growth averaged almost 2 percent a year. Total grain output per capita grew from 288 kilograms a year in 1952 to 319 kilograms in 1978, an increase of only 11 percent in 26 years. In 1984, however, a remarkably good harvest produced

396 kilograms of grain per capita, an increase of 24 percent in only

6 years. In 1985 grain output fell below the peak level of 1984,

to 365 kilograms per person, and recovered only partially in 1986

to 369 kilograms per capita (see table B; Crops, ch. 6). Other important food items that remained in short supply before

the economic reforms included edible oil, sugar, and aquatic products. Production of oil-bearing crops increased at an average rate of about 2 percent a year from 1952 to 1979, and annual consumption of edible oil was less than 2 kilograms per person in 1979.

Between 1978 and 1985, output grew at over 16 percent a year, and annual consumption increased to 5.1 kilograms per person.

Sugar production grew at an average annual rate of 4.5 percent

after 1952, but in 1979 consumption per person still was only

3.5 kilograms per year. From 1979 to 1985, sugar production grew

by 10 percent a year, and the total amount of sugar available per

person rose to 5.6 kilograms in 1985. Output of aquatic products

rose at an average rate of only 2 percent a year between 1957 and

1978 and declined slightly in 1979; between 1979 and 1985,

however, output grew at an average rate of 8.5 percent a year, and

individual annual consumption rose from 3.2 kilograms to 4.9 kilograms.

Pork, eggs, and vegetables were increasingly available before the

1980s (see Animal Husbandry, ch. 6). Annual consumption of

pork—the most commonly eaten meat in China—grew from

5.9 kilograms per person in 1952 to 7.5 kilograms per person in the mid-1970s. In 1979 a sharp increase in procurement prices for pork brought about a surge in supply—to 9.6 kilograms per person. Beginning in 1980, availability increased steadily, reaching

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China: A Country Study

14 kilograms of pork per capita in 1985, an increase of 9 percent

each year from 1978. Consumption of fresh eggs followed a similar pattern, climbing from an average of just over one kilogram

per person in 1952 to almost two kilograms in 1978. The economic

reforms elicited rapid increases in the supply of eggs, as they had

with pork, and by 1985 consumption had more than doubled, to 5 kilograms of eggs per person a year, for an increase of over

14 percent a year. Vegetables were the major supplement to grain in the Chinese

diet and were very important nutritionally. In 1957 annual vegetable

consumption per capita in Chinese cities averaged 109 kilograms

and by 1981 had grown to 152 kilograms. Household survey data

indicated that in 1985 vegetable consumption had leveled off, at 148 kilograms per person per year in urban areas and 131 kilo- grams in the countryside, as people used their higher incomes to increase their purchases of more expensive foods, such as meat,

fish, and edible oil. As of the late 1970s, famine and malnutrition were no longer

major problems in China, but the average diet lacked variety and

provided little more than basic nutritional requirements. Protein,

in particular, was barely adequate for health maintenance. By the

mid-1980s the availability of food had improved dramatically.

Bustling street markets offered a good variety of fruits and vegetables throughout the year, and per capita consumption of highprotein foods—meat, poultry, eggs, and fish —increased by

63 percent over the 1979 level, to nearly 27 kilograms a year in 1985.

Clothing

Before the reform period, clothing purchases were restricted by

rationing. Cotton cloth consumption was limited to between four

and six meters a year per person in the 1970s. In the 1980s one

of the most visible signs of the economic "revolution" was the

appearance in Chinese cities of large quantities of relatively modern,

varied, colorful, Western-style clothes, a sharp contrast to the monotone image of blue and gray suits that typified Chinese dress in earlier years. Cloth consumption increased from eight meters per

person in 1978 to almost twelve meters in 1985, and rationing was

ended in the early 1980s. Production of synthetic fibers more than

tripled during this period; in 1985 synthetics constituted 40 per- cent of the cloth purchased (see Textiles, ch. 7). Consumers also tripled their purchases of woolen fabrics in these years and bought

growing numbers of garments made of silk, leather, or down. In 1987 Chinese department stores and street markets carried clothing

252
Economic Context

253
China: A Country Study

in a large variety of styles, colors, quality, and prices. Many people displayed their new affluence with relatively expensive and styl- ish clothes, while those with more modest tastes or meager incomes

still could adequately outfit themselves at very low cost. Consumer Goods

As with food supplies and clothing, the availability of housewares

went through several stages. Simple, inexpensive household items,

like thermoses, cooking pans, and clocks were stocked in department stores and other retail outlets all over China from the 1950s

on. Relatively expensive consumer durables became available more

gradually. In the 1960s production and sales of bicycles, sewing

machines, wristwatches, and transistor radios grew to the point that these items became common household possessions, followed in the late 1970s by television sets and cameras (see Other Consumer

Goods, ch. 7). In the 1980s supplies of furniture and electrical appliances increased along with family incomes. Household sur- vey data indicated that by 1985 most urban families owned two

bicycles, at least one sofa, a writing desk, a wardrobe, a sewing

machine, an electric fan, a radio, and a television. Virtually all urban adults owned wristwatches, half of all families had washing

machines, 10 percent had refrigerators, and over 18 percent owned

color televisions. Rural households on average owned about half

the number of consumer durables owned by urban dwellers. Most

farm families had 1 bicycle, about half had a radio, 43 percent

owned a sewing machine, 12 percent had a television set, and about

half the rural adults owned wristwatches.

Housing

Housing construction in towns and cities lagged behind urban

population growth. A 1978 survey of housing conditions in 192 cit- ies found that their combined population had increased by

83 percent between 1949 and 1978, but housing floor space had

only grown by 46.7 percent. In 1978 there were only 3.6 square

meters of living space per inhabitant in these cities, a reduction

of 0.9 square meter since 1949. To remedy this problem, construction of modern urban housing became a top priority in the late 1970s, and by the mid-1980s new high-rise apartment blocks and

the tall cranes used in their construction were ubiquitous features

of large cities. Some apartments in the new buildings had their own

lavatories, kitchens, and balconies, but others shared communal

facilities. Nearly all were of much higher quality than older houses,

many of which were built of mud bricks and lacked plumbing.

By 1981 living space in urban housing had increased to 5.3 square

254
Economic Context

meters per person, and by 1985 the figure was 6.7 square meters

(see Housing Construction, ch. 7). Despite this progress, scarcity

of housing continued to be a major problem in the cities, and many

young married couples had to live with parents or make do with

a single room (see Housing, ch. 3). Housing conditions in rural areas varied widely. During the 1960s

and 1970s, thousands of production brigades built sturdy, sanitary houses and apartments and in many cases entire new villages.

With the introduction of the responsibility system and the more

than doubling of rural incomes in the early 1980s, another wave

of housing construction took place as farm families moved quickly

to invest in their major personal assets—their homes—which for the most part were privately owned. Many farm family houses

lacked running water, but virtually all had electricity and were considerably more spacious than urban dwellings. In 1980 farm homes

averaged 9.4 square meters of living space per person, and by 1985

the figure had risen to 14.7 square meters. Despite extensive construction of new housing, in poorer regions some farm families still lived in traditional dwellings, such as mud-brick and thatch houses

or, in some regions, cave houses. Many of the nomadic herders

in Nei Monggol, Xinjiang, and Xizang (Tibet) autonomous regions

still lived in tents or felt yurts. In the Chang Jiang Valley and in south China, some fishing and boat transportation communities

continued to live on their vessels (see Minority Nationalities, ch. 2). Income Distribution

Income differences in China since the 1950s have been much

smaller than in most other countries. There was never any attempt,

however, at complete equalization, and a wide range of income

levels remained. Income differences grew even wider in the 1980s

as the economic reform policies opened up new income opportunities. More than two-thirds of all urban workers were employed

in state-owned units, which used an eight-grade wage system. The

pay for each grade differed from one industry to another, but generally workers in the most senior grades earned about three times

as much as beginning workers, senior managers could earn half

again as much as senior workers, and engineers could earn twice

as much as senior workers. In 1985 the average annual income

of people employed in state-owned units was ¥1,2 13. An important component of workers' pay was made up of bonuses and subsidies. In 1985 bonuses contributed 13 percent of the incomes of

workers in state-owned units; subsidies for transportation, food,

and clothing added another 15 percent. One of the most important subsidies—one that did not appear in the income figures

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China: A Country Study

was for housing, nearly all of which was owned and allocated by

the work unit and rented to unit members at prices well below real value. In 1985 urban consumers spent just over 1 percent of their

incomes on housing (see Wages and Benefits; Urban Society, ch. 3). The 27 percent of the urban labor force that was employed in collectively owned enterprises earned less on average than workers

in state-owned units. The income of workers in collectively owned

enterprises consisted of a share of the profit earned by the enterprise. Most such enterprises were small, had little capital, and did

not earn large profits. Many were engaged in traditional services,

handicrafts, or small-scale, part-time assembly work. In 1985 workers in urban collective units earned an average annual income

of ¥968. In the more open commercial environment of the 1980s,

a small but significant number of people earned incomes much

larger than those in regular state-owned and collectively owned

units. Employees of enterprises run by overseas Chinese (see Glossary), for instance, earned an average of ¥2,437 in 1985, over twice

the average income of workers in state-owned units.

The small but dynamic domestic private sector also produced some lucrative opportunities. Private, part-time schools, which

appeared in large numbers in the mid-1980s, offered moonlighting work to university professors, who could double or triple their

modest incomes if they were from prestigious institutions and taught

desirable subjects, such as English, Japanese, or electronics. Smallscale entrepreneurs could earn considerably more in the free markets than the average income. Business people who served as a

liaison between foreign firms and the domestic economy could earn incomes many times higher than those of the best-paid employees

of state-owned units. A handful of millionaire businessmen could

be found in the biggest cities. These people had owned firms before

1949, cooperated with the government in the 1950s in return for stock in their firms, and then lost their incomes in the political tur- moil of the Cultural Revolution. In the late 1970s and early 1980s,

when these businessmen were politically rehabilitated, their incomes were returned with the accrued interest, and some suddenly found

themselves quite wealthy. Although the number of people earning

incomes far beyond the normal wage scale was tiny relative to the

population, they were important symbols of the rewards of eco- nomic reform and received a great deal of media attention. In 1985

most of these people worked in enterprises classified as "units of

other ownership" (private rather than state- or collectively owned

enterprises). These enterprises employed only 440,000 people out

of the total urban labor force of 128 million in 1985 and paid

256
Shuangyushu department store in Beijing; the sign advertises

fabrics, apparel, shoes, and hats. Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

average annual salaries of ¥1,373, only slightly higher than the

overall urban national average.

In China, as in other countries, an important determinant of

the affluence of a household was the dependency ratio—the number of nonworkers supported by each worker. In 1985 the average

cost of living for one person in urban areas was ¥732 a year, and

the average state enterprise worker, even with food allowance and

other benefits added to the basic wage, had difficulty supporting one other person. Two average wage earners, however, could easily support one dependent. Families with several workers and few

or no dependents had substantial surplus earnings, which they saved

or used to buy nonessential goods. An important positive influence on the per capita consumption levels of urban families was a decline

in the number of dependents per urban worker, from 2.4 in 1964

to 0.7 in 1985. In farm families the dependency ratio fell from 1.5

in 1978 to 0.7 in 1985. Farm incomes rose rapidly in the 1980s

under the stimulus of the responsibility system but on average

remained considerably lower than urban incomes. Household sur- veys found that in 1985 average net per capita income for rural

residents was ¥398, less than half the average per capita urban

income, which was ¥821. The value of goods farmers produced

and consumed themselves accounted for 31 percent of rural income

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China: A Country Study

in 1985. The largest component of income in kind was food,

58 percent of which was self-produced.

Farm family members on average consumed much less of most

major kinds of goods than urban residents. For instance, a household survey found in 1985 that the average urban dweller consumed

148 kilograms of vegetables, 20 kilograms of meat, 2.6 kilograms

of sugar, and 8 kilograms of liquor. At the same time, a survey

of rural households found that the average rural resident consumed

131 kilograms of vegetables, 11 kilograms of meat, 1.5 kilograms

of sugar, and 4 kilograms of liquor. Differences of a similar nature

existed for consumer durables.

Another indication of the gap between urban and rural income

levels was the difference in personal savings accounts, which in 1985

averaged Y277 per capita for urban residents but only ¥85 per capita for the rural population. There was great variation in rural in- come levels among different provincial-level units, counties, towns,

villages, and individual families. While the average net per capita

income for rural residents in 1985 was ¥398, provincial-level aver- ages ranged from a high of ¥805 for farm families living in Shanghai to a low of ¥255 for the rural population of Gansu Province.

The fundamental influence on rural prosperity was geography

(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). Soil type and quality, rainfall,

temperature range, drainage, and availability of water determined

the kinds and quantities of crops that could be grown. Equally

important geographic factors were access to transportation routes and proximity to urban areas (see Internal Trade and Distribution, ch. 8). The highest agricultural incomes were earned by suburban units

that were able to sell produce and sideline products in the nearby

cities. Under the responsibility system, household incomes depended on the number of workers in each household and the household's

success in holding down production costs and in supplying goods

and services to local markets. Most of the rural families with the

highest incomes—the "10,000-yuan households" —were "specialized households" that concentrated family efforts on supplying a

particular service or good. Many of these families owned their own

equipment, such as trucks or specialized buildings, and operated

essentially as private concerns. An increasingly important influence on rural incomes in the

mid-1980s was the expansion of nonagricultural rural enterprises,

often referred to as "township enterprises." These were factories,

construction teams, and processing operations, most of which were owned by collectives, primarily villages, towns, and townships.

Some were owned by voluntary groups of families. Township

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Economic Context

enterprises were considered by the government to be the main

source of employment for rural workers who were leaving agricul- ture because of rising productivity under the responsibility system.

By the end of 1986, township enterprises employed 21 percent of

the rural labor force. The movement of rural labor into township

enterprises helped to increase average rural incomes because of the

higher productivity in nonagricultural jobs. In 1986 industrial workers in rural areas produced an average annual value of ¥4,300 per

person, compared with about ¥1,000 per farmer in the same year. The change in farm production from primarily collective to primarily household operations is reflected in household survey data on the sources of rural incomes. Before the 1980s farmers received

income in the form of shares of the profits earned by their production teams plus supplementary income from household sideline

activities. In 1978 two-thirds of the net income of farm families came from the collective, and only 27 percent was derived from

household production. With the shift to the responsibility system

these ratios were reversed. By 1982 the collective provided only

21 percent of farm income, while household production provided

69 percent. In 1985 the collective share of farm income had fallen

to just over 8 percent, and the family production share had risen

to 81 percent.

Perhaps the most serious gaps in living standards between rural

and urban areas were in education and health care. Primary schools

existed in most rural localities, and 80 percent of the country's

primary-school teachers worked in rural schools. Secondary schools were less widely distributed; only 57 percent of the total number

of secondary-school teachers served in rural schools. Most rural

schools were less well equipped and their staffs less adequately

trained than their urban counterparts. Health care had been greatly

improved in rural areas in the 1960s and 1970s through sanitation

campaigns and the introduction of large numbers of barefoot doctors (see Glossary), midwives, and health workers. Most modern

hospitals, fully trained doctors, and modern medical equipment,

however, were located in urban areas and were not easily accessi- ble to rural families. In 1985 two-thirds of all hospital beds and

medical staff personnel were located in urban hospitals. The eco- nomic reforms affected rural education and health care positively

in places where farm communities used their higher incomes to improve schools and hospitals and negatively in localities where

the reduced role of the collective resulted in deterioration of col- lective services (see Health Care, ch. 2; Primary Education, ch. 4; Secondary Education, ch. 4).

259
China: A Country Study

Potential for Achieving National Goals

By 1987, under the stimulus of the reform program, the Chinese

economy had made major strides toward achieving modernization

and improved living standards. The potential for further improvements in efficiency and productivity was greatly increased by the

revival of the education system, the opening of the economy to broader trade and cooperation with other countries, the expanded

use of the market to enliven commerce and production, and the

increased decision-making power of individual economic units (see

Modernization Goals in the 1980s, ch. 4; Trade Policy in the 1980s,

ch. 8). The country's most important resource was its labor force, the

largest in the world. The rapid expansion and improvement of the

education system that began in the late 1970s was creating larger

numbers of workers who were skilled and well educated, as well

as the first substantial numbers of advanced-degree holders to staff the nation's universities and research institutes. In addition, the

decentralization of management encouraged the participation in planning and decision making of growing numbers of local and

enterprise-level managers, planners, administrators, and scientists.

It also trained future economic leaders for higher administrative

responsibilities. In terms of material resources, China was adequately endowed

to meet the needs of modernization in all but a few materials. Under

the new policy of encouraging cooperation and joint ventures with

foreign firms, advanced technology was more widely used to exploit

China's large deposits of iron ore and other important minerals,

along with the country's vast coal and petroleum reserves and its enormous hydroelectric potential —the largest in the world. Much

of the investment in expanding the transportation network in the

1980s was aimed at improving access to previously remote mineral

and energy resources for both domestic needs and foreign trade.

The most stringent resource constraint was the limited amount

of arable land, which actually declined in the 1980s as cropland was appropriated for new rural housing and urban expansion.

Between 1978 and 1985, the total area sown to crops declined by

over 4 percent. The loss of farmland, however, was more than compensated for by improved productivity of the land that remained

under cultivation. Farmers expanded the irrigated area, increased

fertilizer application, acquired improved crop varieties, and made

better use of comparative advantage in determining which crops

to grow, resulting in an average rate of growth in the value of crop

production of better than 5 percent a year over the same 7-year

260
A supermarket run by the Sanlian Company in the Zhuhai special economic zone, Guangdong Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

period. Although agricultural growth rates had begun to fall off

in the mid-1980s, the incentives of the responsibility system and

greater access to international technical advances suggested that the farm sector could continue to meet the needs of the growing

economy in the foreseeable future.

The industrial sector, while much less advanced than those of

the developed countries, was nonetheless a solid base for modernization. Industrial enterprises were dispersed throughout the country

and included units capable of producing all major kinds of

machinery, equipment, chemicals, building materials, and light

industrial goods. Chinese enterprises could make most of the

products required for modernization, and the growing pool of

industrial technicians and managers was increasingly capable of

effectively integrating advanced foreign technology into Chinese

production processes. Key industries were being technologically

strengthened by the purchase of advanced foreign equipment and

the adoption of modern management techniques. Despite promising potential, formidable obstacles still impeded the drive for modernization. Physical restraints included a renewed increase in birth

rates and population growth rates as the number of women of child- bearing age began to rise in 1986 and 1987. Some crucial resources—especially educated personnel and modern equipment

261
China: A Country Study

still were in very short supply because of the sheer size of the econ- omy. In the realm of policy, the administration faced the daunting problem of trying to integrate market measures—for efficiency—with government planning and control, the source of

stability. In 1987 both kinds of mechanisms exerted extensive

influence, with the result that market efficiency was hindered by

government intervention and government plans were undermined

by off-plan activities. Finally, the most serious concern of government leaders was the possibility of future political upheavals. While

nearly all Chinese people enjoyed better living conditions as a result of the progress achieved by the reform program, the new policies also had given rise to new social problems and political tensions.

Increasing crime and corruption, greater emphasis on the profit

motive, widening income disparities, and inflation aroused resis- tance in many conservative quarters and resulted in the political

struggle that caused Hu Yaobang to be forced from his position

as Chinese Communist Party general secretary in early 1987. By

mid- 1987 it was not yet clear what the outcome of the struggle would

be or how it would affect the future course of economic reform.

Among the most useful works on economic development in China

before 1949 are Mark Elvin's The Pattern of the Chinese Past and

Dwight H. Perkins' Agricultural Development in China, 1368-1968.

These books examine the fundamental relationships between technology, population, society, and economic growth in China. A

good, brief integration of much of the scholarship on the Chinese

economy in the modern period may be found in Ramon H. Myers'

The Chinese Economy Past and Present. China 's Modern Economy in Historical Perspective, edited by Perkins, is a valuable collection of articles by leading scholars dealing with various aspects of China's modern

economic development. A concise description of the Chinese econ- omy in the eighty years before 1949 is presented in two brief works

by Albert Feuerwerker, The Chinese Economy, ca. 1 870-1 91 1 and

Economic Trends in the Republic of China, 1912-1949. The most authoritative and detailed sources of information on the economy of the

People's Republic are the annual statistical yearbooks compiled

by the State Statistical Bureau. As of 1987 the most recent was

Statistical Yearbook of China, 1986, which contains updated information on most major aspects of the Chinese economy since 1949,

as well as a set of explanatory notes that define the terms and measures used. Another useful annual Chinese publication is the Almanac

of China's Economy. Recent general treatments of the Chinese

262
Economic Context economy by Western scholars include a good overview, China's

Political Economy by Carl Riskin, and a mathematically oriented

work, The Chinese Economy by Gregory C. Chow. Some of the earlier

classic works on the post- 1949 economy are China's Economic Revolution by Alexander Eckstein, China's Economy by Christopher Howe,

China 's Economic System by Audrey Donnithorne, The Economy of the Chinese Mainland by Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia Yeh, and The

Chinese Economy under Communism by Nai-Ruenn Chen and Walter

Galenson. China's Development Experience in Comparative Perspective,

edited by Robert F. Dernberger, is a collection of studies by noted

economists dealing with China's modern economic development.

A good description of the Maoist economic model is presented in John G. Gurley's China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy. The United

States Congress Joint Economic Committee has published a series of useful volumes on the Chinese economy: An Economic Profile of

Mainland China (1967); People's Republic of China: An Economic Assess- ment (1972); China: A Reassessment of the Economy (1975); Chinese Econ- omy Post-Mao (1978); China under the Four Modernizations (1982); and

China 's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 (1986). There are many

useful works dealing with specific aspects of the Chinese economy.

Economic planning is analyzed by Perkins in Market Control and Plan- ning in Communist China and more recently by Nicholas R. Lardy

in Economic Growth and Distribution in China. The banking system

is described in Money and Monetary Policy in Communist China by

Katherine H. Hsiao and in China's Financial System by William A.

Byrd. The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China, edited by

Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine Wong, is a collection of insightful analyses of the reform process. Prominent among the many

works on Chinese agriculture are Food for One Billion: China's Agriculture since 1949 by Robert C. Hsu, Agriculture in China 's Modern Eco- nomic Development by Lardy, and The Chinese Agricultural Economy,

edited by Randolph Barker, Radha Sinha, and Beth Rose. Current economic information appears in several official Englishlanguage periodicals from China, including Beijing Review, China

Daily, and China Reconstructs . Major periodicals published outside

China that monitor the Chinese economy include Asian Wall Street fournal, China Quarterly, Economist, and Far Eastern Economic Review.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

263

Chapter 6. Agriculture
The original of this Han dynasty (206 B. C. -A.D. 220) pottery sheep was

discovered in Henan Province.
CHINA HAS THE WORLD'S LARGEST agricultural economy

and one of the most varied. The nation stands first among all others

in the production of rice, cotton, tobacco, and hogs and is a major

producer of wheat, corn, millet, tea, jute, and hemp. This wide

range of crops is possible because of the country's varied climate

and agricultural zones. China participates on a large scale in inter- national agricultural markets, both as an exporter and as an

importer.

For over 4,000 years, China has been a nation of farmers. By

the time the People's Republic of China was established in 1949,

virtually all arable land was under cultivation; irrigation and

drainage systems constructed centuries earlier and intensive farming

practices already produced relatively high yields. But little prime

virgin land was available to support population growth and eco- nomic development. However, after a decline in production as a

result of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60), agricultural reforms

implemented in the 1980s increased yields and promised even

greater future production from existing cultivated land.

A successful agricultural sector is critical to China's development.

First, it must feed more than 1 billion people, about 21 percent

of the world's population, using only 7 percent of the world's arable land. Second, it must provide raw materials for the industrial

sector. Third, agricultural exports must earn the foreign exchange

needed to purchase key industrial items from other countries.

Since 1949 China's political leaders have tried a variety of largescale social experiments to boost agricultural production. First, a massive land reform program eliminated landlords and gave land

to those who farmed it. Next, farm families were progressively

organized into cooperatives, collectives, and finally people's communes. After more than twenty-five years of experience with communes, officials abolished these institutions, which had become too bureaucratic and rigid to respond to the flexible requirements of

agricultural production. Also, farm production incentives languished in the commune system. In 1978 China's leaders began

a program of far-reaching agricultural reforms. Townships and vil- lages were organized, and new incentives were incorporated into

contractual relationships tying farmers to economic cooperatives

and businesses.

Since the revolution in 1949, China has devoted most of its investments and administrative energy to the industrial sector.

267
China: A Country Study

Generally, the agricultural sector received special attention only

when the leaders perceived that the sector was beginning to restrain

China's overall economic development. Agricultural output basically kept pace with the growth of population but did not expand

fast enough to raise living standards. Per capita consumption of

grains, fibers, edible oil, sugar, fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, eggs, and dairy products remained low. The value of goods generated

by the agricultural sector has grown, but not as fast as output generated by other sectors in the economy. In 1949 about half of the

country's output came from the agricultural sector. This ratio

dropped to 41 percent by 1955, declined to 31 percent by 1965,

and fell another few percentage points in 1975 to 25 percent. But

agricultural reforms initiated in the early 1980s brought a rise in agriculture to 33 percent of GNP in 1985. At the same time, more

than 60 percent of the national labor force was employed in agriculture.

China in the late 1980s was thus poised to confront growing

demands for agricultural production with a combination of timetested farming methods and modern agro-technology. The size and

diversity of the country—in geography and in population

however, presented a unique challenge to China's policy makers

and implementors.

Resources Endowment

Arable land in China is scarce; little more than 10 percent of

the total land area, most of it in the eastern third of the country, can be cultivated. This compares with more than 20 percent for the continental United States, which is slightly smaller than China.

Further agricultural expansion would be relatively difficult because

almost no land that could be profitably cultivated remains unused

and because, despite intensive cultivation, yields from some marginal lands are low. Some possibility for expansion exists in thinly

populated parts of the country, especially in the northeast, but the

growing season there is short and the process of land reclamation

prolonged and costly.

China Proper (see Glossary) is divided by the Oin Ling range

into highly dissimilar north and south agricultural areas (see fig. 8). In semitropical south China, rainfall is relatively abundant and

the growing season long. Rice is the predominant grain crop. The

paddies can generally be irrigated with water from rivers or other

sources. Although much of the soil is acid red clay, the heavy use

of fertilizer (at one time organic but by the mid-1980s also including a large proportion of chemical nutrients) supports high yields.

Frequently two or even three crops a year are cultivated on the

268
Agriculture

Figure 8. Agricultural Regions, 1987

same land. Food crops other than rice are also grown, most fre- quently in hilly areas or during the winter. These include potatoes

and winter wheat. The highest grain yields in the country in the

mid-1980s were generally found in the Sichuan Basin, the lower

Chang Jiang (Yangtze River) Valley, and Guangdong and Fujian

provinces, where multiple cropping of rice and other crops was the

typical pattern. Cotton, tea, and industrial crops were also produced

there. Wheat has traditionally been the main crop in north China, a considerably drier region than south China. The winter wheat crop

accounts for nearly 90 percent of China's total production. Spring

wheat is grown mainly in the eastern portion of Nei Monggol

Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia) and the northeastern

provinces. Other important grain crops include corn, sorghum,

269
China: A Country Study

and millet. These are usually dryland crops. Since the late 1960s,

irrigation has been greatly expanded, but water remains an important

limiting factor. Compared with the south, soils in the north are generally better; however, because of the shorter growing season and

colder, drier climate, yields per cultivated hectare tend to be lower

and irrigation less extensive. Labor is not as abundant in the north

as in the south, but cropping patterns tend to require less labor,

and mechanization (especially of plowing) is more advanced.

The North China Plain, the most important growing area in north China, extends across several provinces. Winter wheat and

corn are the leading grain crops; cotton is also grown, and Shandong Province produces peanuts. The North China Plain, although

fertile, was traditionally subject to frequent floods and droughts,

but water conservation measures ameliorated the problem (see

Physical Environment, ch. 2). Winter wheat is grown in the mountainous areas west of this plain, but the climate is more severe and

the danger of natural disasters even greater. The fertile soils of the

northeastern plains have been used to plant corn, spring wheat,

and even rice. High-quality soybeans are grown in the northeast

and are exported to many Pacific Rim countries. Although Nei

Monggol Autonomous Region produces some spring wheat and

other grain, it is best known as a pastoral area. Much of China's vast and generally inhospitable northwest and

southwest regions is unsuitable for cultivation. Xinjiang-Uygur

Autonomous Region in the northwest, like Nei Monggol Autonomous Region, is also best known as a pastoral area. In Xizang

Autonomous Region (Tibet) in the southwest, most of the culti- vated area has been irrigated, and special strains of wheat, rice,

and barley suitable for the climate of that high-altitude region have

been developed.

China's rural labor force in 1985 consisted of about 370 million

people. The quality of the labor force had improved in the previ- ous three decades, primarily because of the introduction of rural

schools, which stressed elementary education (see Primary Education, ch. 4). Nevertheless, a large portion of the rural population was illiterate or semiliterate in 1987, and very few high school

and college graduates lived in villages and towns. Lack of education continued to retard the spread of advanced technology in rural areas. The scarcity of cultivable land and the abundance of manpower led to the development of labor-intensive production in most

parts of the country. And, although China's agriculture was less labor intensive than that in some neighboring countries, it was

characterized by meticulous tending of the land and other techniques employed in East Asia for centuries.

270
Agriculture

In the 1980s the rural labor force also was employed in rural

capital construction projects and small-scale industries. During the

winter months, large numbers of rural people worked on construction and maintenance of irrigation or land-leveling projects. Where

rural industrial plants existed, they usually employed a small proportion of the rural labor force, and many peasants also engaged in sideline activities, such as handicrafts. The government tightly

limited migration from rural to urban areas (see Migration, ch. 2). By the 1980s China had improved its agricultural resources, but

important obstacles remained. The country's agricultural capital

stock had been built up in large part by land modification. Through

the centuries fields were leveled and consolidated, and substantial

investments were made in building and modernizing irrigation

facilities. Since the 1950s the production of mechanical agricultural

equipment had been a major industry. But in the 1980s many

observers still noted a shortage of transportation facilities to take

crops to market and bring seed, fuel, and fertilizer to users (see

Transportation, ch. 8). In addition to capital, China had available a supply of skilled labor and a stock of technical information on seed varieties and fertilizer use despite the damage done by the

Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glossary).

Agricultural Policies

Agricultural policy has gone through three broad phases: the

1950s, when agriculture was collectivized, ending with the Great

Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary); the period from 1961 to the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, when more agricultural progress came to depend on the supply of capital and modern inputs; and

the period under the post-Mao leadership, which has been characterized by greater reliance on markets, prices, and incentives to boost production and to diversify output. (Inputs in this chapter

refer to components of production such as land, labor, seed, fertilizer, machinery, tools, and irrigation water.)

The 1950s

During the 1950s the government of the new People's Republic

made a concerted effort to redistribute land more equitably.

Although many peasants owned part or all of the small holdings

they farmed before 1949, tenancy was common, especially in south

China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) implemented land

reforms in areas under its control even before 1949, and subsequently landlords and wealthy peasants became targets of party

attack. Their elimination as a class was a major aim of the land

reform movement begun under the Agrarian Reform Law of

271
China: A Country Study

June 28, 1950 (see The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1). Collectivization of agriculture, which was accomplished in several

stages, began about 1952.

The first stage of land reform was characterized by mutual aid

teams. The mutual aid system was kept simple at first, involving

only the temporary sharing of labor and some capital; individual

households remained the basic unit of ownership and production.

In 1954 mutual aid teams were organized with increasing rapidity

into agricultural producers' cooperatives, which differed from

mutual aid teams in that tools, draft animals, and labor were shared on a permanent basis. Cooperative members retained ownership

of their land but secured a share in the cooperative by staking their

plots along with those of other members in the common land pool.

By 1956 the transformation of mutual aid teams into agricultural

cooperatives was nearly complete. By the end of that year, moreover, the great majority of cooperatives had moved to a still higher

stage of collectivization, having become advanced producers'

cooperatives. These cooperatives contrasted with those of the earlier stage in that members no longer earned income based on shares

of land owned. Instead, collective farm profits were distributed to members primarily on the basis of labor contributions. The aver- age cooperative was made up of 170 families and more than 700

people. Although small private plots were permitted, most of the

land was owned collectively by the cooperative. Another development in this period was the establishment of state farms in which

land became the property of the state (see Planning and Organization, this ch.).

This degree of collectivization was achieved with much less tur- moil than had occurred during collectivization in the Soviet Union.

As in the Soviet Union, however, investment in the agricultural

sector was kept low relative to industrial investment because plan- ners chose to achieve more rapid growth of basic industries. But

collectivization did not prevent the growth of agricultural production; grain production, for example, increased by 3.5 percent a year under the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57). Growth was

achieved mainly through the intensified use of traditional agricultural techniques, together with some technical improvements.

Once collectivization was achieved and agricultural output per

capita began to increase, the leadership embarked on the extremely

ambitious programs of the Great Leap Forward of 1958-60 (see table 11, Appendix A). In agriculture this meant unrealistically

high production goals and an even higher degree of collectivization than had already been achieved. The existing collectives were

organized very rapidly into people's communes (see Glossary),

272
The Ming and Qjng

emperors prayed for a

successful harvest at the Temple of Heaven in Beijing.

Courtesy Ronald E. Dolan

much larger units with an average of 5,400 households and a total of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average. The production targets were not accompanied by a sufficient amount of capital and modern

inputs such as fertilizer; rather, they were to be reached in large measure by heroic efforts on the part of the peasants.

Substantial effort was expended during the Great Leap Forward

on large-scale but often poorly planned capital construction projects,

such as irrigation works. Because of the intense pressure for results,

the rapidity of the change, and the inexperience and resistance of

many cadres and peasants, the Great Leap Forward soon ran into

difficulties. The peasants became exhausted from the unremitting

pressure to produce. The inflation of production statistics, on the

theory that accuracy mattered less than political effect, resulted in extravagant claims. Disruption of agricultural activity and trans- portation produced food shortages. In addition, the weather in 1959-61 was unfavorable, and agricultural production declined

sharply (see fig. 9). By the early 1960s, therefore, agriculture was

severely depressed, and China was forced to import grain (during

the 1950s it had been a net exporter) to supply urban areas. Otherwise, an excessive amount of grain would have been extracted from

rural areas (see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). Importance of Agriculture Recognized

Faced with this depression, the country's leaders initiated policies

273
China: A Country Study

to strengthen the agrieultural seetor. The government inereased

ineentives for individual and eolleetive produetion, deeentralized

eertain management funetions, and expanded the role of private

plots and markets. The people's eommune system was reorganized

so that production teams with 20 to 30 households and 90 to 140

people owned most of the assets, accounted for profits or losses,

made economic decisions, and distributed income. Most important, the leadership embarked on policies designed to put "agriculture first" in planning, at least in principle. This meant more modern inputs for the countryside. Chemical fertilizer production

and imports increased. Modern high-yielding seed varieties began

to be developed. Irrigation facilities —many of which had been

washed out during disastrous Hoods in 1959-61 —were repaired and

expanded, and the government began to provide more mechanical pumps and other irrigation equipment.

These improvements were not haphazard; most were focused on more advanced and productive areas. The intent was to build areas of modernized agriculture with high and stable yields that would form the basis for more stable agricultural production. In general, the places designated as "high- and stable-yield areas" were those with adequate irrigation and drainage, so that the payoff

for greater use of fertilizer and new seeds would be higher.

Recovery

By the mid-1970s China's economy had recovered from the

failures of the Great Leap Forward. In 1979 per capita grain out- put first surpassed previous peak levels achieved in 1957. In addition, small enterprises in the mid-1960s began to produce substantial

quantities of chemical fertilizer. Government researchers developed

fertilizer-responsive seeds. Focusing these inputs on the high- and

stable-yield areas meant that parts of China that were already

advanced tended to be favored over backward or less-developed

regions, thus widening a gap that already had potentially serious

implications (see Differentiation, ch. 3). At the same time, the government urged poorer areas to rely

mainly on their own efforts. This was symbolized, especially during the Cultural Revolution, by the campaign to "learn from

Dazhai." Dazhai was a village in Shaanxi Province that overcame

poverty and poor production conditions to become relatively

wealthy. The authorities claimed that this was accomplished through

self-reliance and struggle. Dazhai became a model of political organization and its leaders national emulation models as well. These policies—"agriculture first," emphasis on the supply of

modern inputs, and the Dazhai and other models—formed the

274
Agriculture

framework for agricultural development from the early 1960s until the post-Mao era. The Cultural Revolution caused some disruption in the agricultural sector, such as political struggle sessions

and changes in local leadership, but not nearly as much as in the

industrial sector (see Trends in Industrial Production, ch. 7). Post-Mao Policies

When the party leadership began to evaluate progress in the

agricultural sector in the light of its campaign to move the nation

toward the ambitious targets of the Four Modernizations (see Glossary), it noted disappointing failures along with some impressive

gains. Furthermore, even though per capita grain production

increased from the depressed levels of the early 1960s, output stagnated in the 1975-77 period, so that in 1978 per capita production was still not above average levels of the 1950s. Production of other

major crops grew even more slowly. The leadership decided in 1978

to thoroughly revamp the rural economic system.

Top government and party leaders decided to dismantle the people's commune system and restructure it into a new rural system

the township-collective-household system—consisting of five parts:

local government, party, state and collective economic entities, and

households. Whereas the commune system integrated politics,

administration, and economics into one unit, the new system was

designed to have separate institutions handle specific functions.

Townships, the basic unit of government in pre-commune days, were reconstructed to handle government and administrative functions. Party committees were to concentrate on party affairs. Economic collectives were organized to manage economic affairs. Households were encouraged to sign contracts with economic

collectives. The reform of the commune system fundamentally changed the

way farmers were motivated to work. Nonmaterial incentive policies, such as intergroup competitions for red flags, were downplayed. Egalitarian distribution of grain rations declined, and the

work payment system in effect on and off since the 1950s was

scrapped (see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). Rural cadres

adopted an entirely new scheme to motivate farmers, called baogan

(household production responsibility) system. Under baogan, eco- nomic cooperatives assigned specific plots of land to a family to cultivate for up to fifteen years. For each piece of land, the eco- nomic cooperative specified the quantity of output that had to be

delivered to procurement stations. The contract also outlined household obligations, such as contributions to capital accumulation and

welfare funds; the number of days to be contributed to maintenance

275
China: A Country Study

Percentage of 1970

per capita GVAO

170 160 /

150 / 140" GVAO. J

130

120

110- ^^ROPS

100

90-

80-

70- i i i mYmi 1 1 1 1

1 952 1956 1960 1964 1 968 1 972 1976 1 980 1 983

Source: Based on information in U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research

Service, China: Review of Agriculture in 1981 and Outlook for 1982, Washington,

August 1982; 1983 estimated.

Figure 9. Per Capita Gross Value ofAgricultural Output (GVAO) and Crop

Production, 1952-83.

of water control systems; and debt repayment schedules. Output

raised in excess of state and collective obligations was the reward

to the household. Families could consume the surplus or sell it in rural markets as they wished. Baogan permitted families to raise

income through hard work, good management, wise use of technology, and reduction of production costs. While the overall level of investment within the agricultural sector did not change much during the reform period, substantial changes

took place in investment patterns. National leaders called for greater

investment in agriculture, but actual state expenditures declined

in the first part of the 1980s. Whereas communes had invested considerable sums in agriculture, the rate of investment from the newly

formed economic cooperatives was far below the rate before the

reform. The revitalization and extension of the rural banking sys- tem (the Agricultural Bank and rural credit cooperatives) and

favorable lending policies did provide a small but steady source

of investment funds for the sector. The major change, however, was that after 1978 farm families were allowed to invest funds, and

their investment in small tractors, rural industry, and housing was

substantial. In 1983 rural households invested Y21 billion (for the

276
Agriculture

value of the yuan—see Glossary) in housing compared with ¥11

billion from state sources. Mao Zedong's policy of self-reliance was relaxed, and his dic- tum "grow grain everywhere" was abandoned. Farm households

began to produce crops and animals best suited for their natural

conditions. Excellent cotton growing land in Shandong Province

that had grown grain during the Cultural Revolution returned to growing cotton. Areas sown with grain crops declined, and areas sown with cotton, oilseeds, and other cash crops expanded. Reform

policies also reduced major administrative barriers that had limited

labor and capital from moving beyond commune boundaries.

Households with insufficient labor or little inclination to farm were

able to transfer land contracts to families that were interested in cultivation and animal husbandry. Rural workers were permitted

to shift from crop cultivation to commercial, service, construction,

and industrial activities in rural townships. Capital in rural areas was permitted to move across administrative boundaries, and

individuals invested not only in their own farm production but also

in business ventures outside their own villages.

The rural marketing system changed substantially in the postMao period. The system of mandatory sales of farm produce to local state purchasing stations ended, as did state rationing of food

grains, cooking oil, and cotton cloth to consumers. Households with

marketable surpluses had several options: goods could be consumed

on the farm, sold in local markets, or sold to state stations according to signed purchase contracts. Rural markets disbanded during the Cultural Revolution were reopened, and the number of

markets rose from 33,000 in 1978 to 61,000 in 1985. Total trade

in these markets increased from¥12.5 billion in 1978 to¥63.2 bil- lion in 1985. Consumers purchased food and daily necessities in stores run by the state, cooperatives, and private entrepreneurs and

in local free markets. Coincident with these reforms, the state raised

procurement prices to improve incentives and increase production

by farmers. From 1966 to 1982, wheat and rice procurement prices rose by 66 percent, while oilseed prices increased 85 percent. To

avoid urban discontent over high prices, the state absorbed the

increasing additional costs, and retail prices for these goods

remained constant. The new policies quickly began to produce results. The gross value of agricultural output nearly doubled from 1978 to 1985.

Production of grain, oilseeds, cotton, and livestock increased rapidly

in this period (see Production, this ch.). Per capita net income of

peasant households rose dramatically from ¥134 in 1978 to ¥397

in 1985, but income inequality increased. The demise of collective

277
China: A Country Study

institutions, however, brought decreases in health, education, and

welfare services. Less attention was paid to maintaining the environment, and some water, soil, and forest resources were wasted.

Despite this, mid-1980s observers opined that prospects were good

for an overall rise in rural prosperity.

Reforms in the late 1970s and early 1980s also swept away policies and administrative rules restricting business activity. Old com- mune production and brigade enterprises were reorganized, and

a host of new firms were founded by economic cooperatives and

citizens. Business activity included manufacturing, mining, trans- portation, catering, construction, and services. By the mid-1980s

the value generated by these enterprises surpassed the value of out- put from raising crops and livestock.

Planning and Organization

The state's role in the mid-1980s was chiefly to plan production

and manage resources. Among state institutions at the national

level, the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery was primarily responsible for coordinating agricultural pro- grams. Other central bodies of importance in agricultural policy matters included the State Economic Commission; the State Planning Commission; the ministries of commerce, forestry, and the

chemical industry; the State Statistical Bureau; and the Agricultural Bank; and various academies and institutions that conducted

research on agricultural science, agricultural economics, and related subjects.

Between state institutions at the national level and the townships

and villages at the base of the administrative hierarchy were vari- ous provincial-level, prefectural, and county-level government

organs that also administered programs, including some agricultural research and extension activities. Some 2,000 county-level

units coordinated programs and enforced policies with the economic

cooperatives and households in their jurisdictions. County-level

units sometimes operated their own chemical fertilizer plants or other factories producing basic agricultural items, and they helped

direct the allocation of the materials produced to peasant farmers.

Some agricultural production occurred on state farms where

workers received regular wages, like factory workers. State farms were mostly found on the fringes of the main agricultural areas, especially on newly reclaimed land and particularly in the northeast, where they nevertheless accounted for only about 4 percent

of total cultivated land.

Most of the economic activity in rural areas took place within the context of collectively and privately owned enterprises.

278
Agriculture

Economic cooperatives, enterprises, and households were guided by

their own self- sufficiency requirements, pursuit of profits, and compliance with annual economic plans. Forces of self-sufficiency con- tinued to play an important role in decision making, especially as farm households allocated resources to ensure their own food grain

rations. The pursuit of profit traditionally had been a driving force

in rural areas, and although this energy had largely been curbed

in the past, in the 1980s farmers were encouraged to seek profits.

The state drafted annual economic plans that were passed down

through administrative channels to assist local cadres. Operators

of farms and other enterprises reviewed the plan targets, which

guided them to make proper economic decisions. The state has used

both direct and indirect methods to affect decisions. In past decades

cadres decided what would be produced, what production techniques were to be employed, and how output was to be distributed on the basis of annual plans. Indirect controls, such as prices and

interest rates, became more important after 1980. Different combinations of the forces of self-sufficiency, profits, and state plans

affected decision making for a given product in a given year. For

example, in 1985 cotton farmers were told via state plans how much

area to plant in cotton, whereas farmers received no state plans

to sow fields with melons; rather, they planted melons in the hope

of increasing profits.

The state continued to control the economic behavior of farm

households, economic cooperatives, and enterprises through powerful political and administrative mechanisms in the late 1980s. The

first of these mechanisms was the more than 83,000 township

governments, which were responsible for civil and military affairs,

public security (police), family planning, and statistics. Village committees numbered more than 940,000 and were subordinate to townships. Although they were not formal government institutions,

they maintained public order, managed welfare services, and over- saw water conservancy projects. Probably the most powerful entities on the local level were Chinese Communist Party committees

in townships and the subordinate party branches in villages. More

than 20 million rural party members staffed posts and headed committees that supervised all aspects of rural life. They coordinated

relations between party, government, and economic entities, and

they ensured that party policies were followed. They nominated

candidates to administrative posts and approved applications for military service, jobs, and opportunities for higher education (see

Rural Society, ch. 3; The Cadre System, ch. 10).

The second mechanism—control of marketing functions—gave

the state powerful tools to influence agricultural decisions. As in

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other centrally planned economies, the state was responsible for organizing and directing a major part of the flow of resources between sectors. It could achieve this using a variety of means,

including prices and markets as well as direct controls. It needed

to balance the needs of various sectors for input such as fuel, cement,

timber, and machinery (as well as the needs of consumers in both

rural and urban areas) in trying to meet its goals (see Structure

and Operation of the Economy; Living Standards, ch. 5). The government procured grain and other agricultural products

from the peasants to supply urban areas and food-deficient regions

with subsistence and to provide raw materials for textile and other

light industries. Part of the required amount was obtained simply

as a direct tax. The proportion obtained from taxes declined over

time, however, and the tax in 1984 was less than 3 percent of the

value of total production. The remainder was obtained through

purchases by state procurement agencies.

In the period from 1957 to 1978, the state raised prices for agricul- tural produce while lowering the prices of basic items such as fertilizer and fuel used in agricultural production. This was necessary

to promote the use of more fertilizer and fuel to obtain greater

production and to provide incentives for the production and sale of agricultural commodities.

As a third mechanism, the state exercised considerable leverage

in rural affairs through its control over credit and agricultural

production supplies. The state owned and controlled some 27,000

agricultural banks that served rural areas and provided production loans. Agricultural banks also supervised the activities of more

than 42,000 credit cooperatives that provided banking services for cooperatives and rural households and provided production and consumer loans to customers. The state controlled banking activities through administrative regulations, loan policy, and interest

rates. The state regulated delivery of fertilizer, machinery, and fuel through its marketing channels. In addition, government control

of water and electricity supplies provided the state with an important lever to induce farmers to comply with political policies and

economic plans (see table 12, Appendix A).

Finally, local governments possessed considerable influence in

local affairs because they delivered social welfare services. Economic

cooperatives and peasant households were not likely to engage in

activities that could lead to diminishing supplies of social services.

Rural families desired and increasingly felt entitled to medical, education, welfare, and cultural benefits. Villages competed to have

these facilities located within their boundaries, not only to have more

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convenient access to their services but also to take advantage of

the employment opportunities they afforded.

Operational Methods and Inputs

China's farmers have long used techniques such as fertilization and irrigation to increase the productivity of their scarce land. Over

time, many farming techniques have been modernized: chemical

fertilizers have supplemented organic fertilizers, and mechanical

pumps have come into use in irrigation. Government planners in the 1980s emphasized increased use of fertilizer, improved irrigation, mechanization of agriculture, and extension of improved seed

varieties as leading features of the agricultural modernization

program.

Cropping Patterns

All of these elements of modern agriculture are used in the context of the traditional intensive cropping patterns. To maximize

year-round use of the land, two or more crops are planted each

year where possible. Rice, wheat, cotton, vegetable, and other crop

seedlings are sometimes raised in special seedbeds and then trans- planted to fields. Transplanting shortens the time required for a crop to mature, which allows farmers the opportunity to squeeze

in an additional crop each growing season. Another method to make

optimum use of scarce land is to plant seedlings in a mature stand

of another crop. For example, when planting winter wheat in October, farmers in the north leave spaces among the rows so that cotton seedlings can be planted or transplanted in April and May.

Without intercropping, farmers could raise only one crop a year. Mechanization supports this intensive cropping pattern. Despite

a huge rural labor force, labor shortages occur each season when

farmers are required to harvest one crop and plant another in its place, all within the space of a few weeks. In the 1980s farmers

invested in harvesting and planting machinery to overcome the

shortage of labor. Seed breeders also supported intensive cropping

patterns by selecting and breeding varieties that had shorter growing

seasons.

Fertilizer

Intensive use of the arable soil made the use of fertilizer imperative to replace nutrients and to help improve yields. Organic fertilizers have long supplied the bulk of soil nutrients and have helped

to maintain the structure of the soil. Over the centuries, use of

organic fertilizers also increased with the growth in population and

with the increased size of livestock herds. Peasants have traditionally

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China: A Country Study

used a large proportion of their labor in collecting organic materials for fertilizers. Use has been especially heavy in south China,

where more intensive cropping has required more fertilizer and

where the sources of fertilizer have been more abundant. Chemical fertilizers, however, have been used more widely since the 1960s.

Use of chemical fertilizers in 1985 was more than 150 kilograms

per hectare, measured in nutrient weight. The country's considerable future requirements will have to be met by chemical fertilizer because of the natural limits on rapid increases in production of

organic fertilizers. Production and imports of chemical fertilizers increased rapidly

under the "agriculture first" programs of the early 1960s. The

domestic industry was expanded, partly with the help of imported

fertilizer factories, and production reached 1.7 million tons by 1965.

Imports in 1965 were more than 600,000 tons. In the mid-1960s

the government also began to emphasize the production of nitrogen fertilizer in small plants, usually operated by counties, that

yielded about 10,000 tons per year. Their products were used

locally, which helped conserve transportation resources. In 1972

the government contracted to import thirteen large-scale urea

plants, each capable of producing more than 1 million tons of stan- dard nitrogen fertilizer a year. By 1980 these were in operation,

and total chemical fertilizer production in 1985 was 13.4 million

tons, of which 12.3 million tons were nitrogen fertilizer. Imports

added another 7.6 million tons. In the 1980s chemical fertilizer use per hectare was less than the

Japanese and Korean averages but more than the Indonesian and

Indian averages. Future production and imports were likely to emphasize phosphate and potassium content in order to balance

the nutrients obtained from organic fertilizers and from existing

factories. Institutional reforms in the early 1980s encouraged households to cut costs and maximize earnings, which probably led to more efficient use of chemical fertilizer as farmers applied fertilizer to those crops giving the highest rates of return. Mechanization

Post-Mao reforms dramatically affected farm mechanization.

Most commune tractor stations were disbanded, and farm households were allowed to purchase equipment. The percentage of privately owned tractors increased from near zero in 1975 to more

than 80 percent in 1985. The area plowed and planted by machine

decreased in this period, but peasant use of tractors and trucks to transport goods soared dramatically. As much as 60 percent of trac- tor use was devoted to local hauling. Firms manufacturing farm

282
"Ploughing Corn. " Woodcut.

Courtesy Woodcuts of Wartime China

machinery adjusted to the shift in rural organization by producing more small tractors, appropriate tractor-drawn equipment, better quality hand tools, and food and feed processing equipment.

A rural electric power system—dams, generators, and transmission lines—had been under construction since 1949, and in 1987

most villages had access to electricity. In the period of the Four

Modernizations, rural electric power consumption rose by 179 percent, from 18.3 billion kilowatt-hours in 1975 to 51.2 billion

kilowatt-hours in 1985.

Despite the large stock and high production rate of tractors, most

farm tasks in the mid-1980s were performed manually. Rice con- tinued to be transplanted by hand, as local engineers had yet to develop and produce rice transplanters in substantial quantities. Only

36 percent of the land was plowed by machines, only 8 percent sown

by machines, and only 3 percent of the crop area was harvested by

machines. Draft animals continued to be important sources of power,

and the number of animals increased sharply in the post-Mao period.

Success in mechanization enabled surplus rural laborers to leave the

fields to find jobs in rural industry and commerce. In the 1980s most

observers believed that China would continue for some time to use mechanization to solve labor shortages at times of peak labor demand

and to concentrate mechanization in areas of large-scale farming,

as in the North China Plain and the northeast.

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China: A Country Study

Water Conservancy

Irrigation was important in China's traditional agriculture, and some facilities existed as long as 2,000 years ago. The extension

of water conservancy facilities by labor-intensive means was an

important part of the agricultural development programs of the

1950s. During the Great Leap Forward, a number of water con- servancy projects were undertaken, but with insufficient planning

and capital. During the turmoil and bad weather of 1959-61 , many

water conservancy works were washed out by floods or otherwise

destroyed, considerably reducing the irrigated acreage. Facilities were rebuilt in the early 1960s. By the 1980s irrigation facilities covered nearly half the cultivated land; systems installed since the

late 1960s extended over a considerable part of north China, especially on the North China Plain. In the era of post-Mao reform, irrigation and drainage systems

expanded to increase the stock of stable and high-yielding land.

The inventory of mechanical pumps also greatly increased; powered

irrigation equipment reached almost 80 million horsepower in 1985. In this period the government began to charge fees for the water

the farmers used, and farmers therefore limited the amount of water

applied to their crops on a benefit cost basis. The reorganization

of rural institutions weakened administrative measures necessary

to make large-scale waterworks function. Lowered investment, poor

maintenance, and outright damage to facilities lessened the effec- tiveness of the system. Adding additional acreage was likely to be

increasingly costly because areas not under irrigation were remote

from easily tapped water sources. In the mid-1980s government

officials recognized the problems and undertook to correct them.

North China is chronically short of water and subject to frequent

droughts (see Climate, ch. 2). A considerable proportion of its irrigation water comes from wells. Officials in the Ministry of Water

Resources and Electric Power (and its predecessors) have periodically proposed diverting water from the Chang Jiang to irrigate

the North China Plain. The enormous expense of constructing such a project has precluded its realization. Farmers have also been

encouraged to use sprinkler systems, a more efficient use of scarce water resources than flood-type irrigation systems.

Pest Control

In 1987 the main method of weed and insect control continued

to be labor-intensive cultivation. Fields were carefully tended, and

a variety of biological controls, such as breeding natural enemies

of crop pests, were used. Production and use of chemical herbicides

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Agriculture

and pesticides increased rapidly from the mid-1950s to the

mid-1970s, but output fell subsequently by more than half (to about

200,000 tons) because the products were relatively ineffective,

expensive, and highly toxic. Chemical pesticide use, therefore, was

low compared with use in other countries.

Seed Varieties

Improved seed varieties have contributed significantly to improving crop yields. Highly fertilizer-responsive varieties came into use beginning in the mid-1960s. These were comparable to those developed outside China but were adapted to the shorter growing sea- son imposed by multiple cropping. Their extensive use has

complemented the large increases in fertilizer use and the increase

in irrigated area. In the mid-1970s farmers began to plant hybrid

rice, claiming yield increases of more than 20 percent. Hybrid rice

is not used elsewhere because of the amount of labor it requires,

but more than 6 million hectares of it were planted in the mid-1980s,

accounting for 20 percent of total rice area. The China National

Seed Company was established in 1978 to popularize improved seed

varieties; it exported Chinese vegetable seeds and imported

improved grain, cotton, forage, and oil seeds. About 5 percent of

China's arable land was being used to raise seed in the mid-1980s,

and the company operated more than 2,000 seed companies at provincial, prefectural, and county levels. Agricultural Science

Agricultural science suffered from changes in policy and emphasis

after the 1950s. The Cultural Revolution disrupted agricultural

science training and research programs, but since the mid-1970s

training and research programs have been restored. Government

officials emphasized practical, production-oriented scientific work.

The rural extension system popularized new techniques and new

inputs, such as sprinkler irrigation systems. In 1987 eighty-four

agricultural colleges and research institutes pursued research in seven broad fields: agriculture, forestry, aquatic production, land

reclamation, mechanization, water conservation, and meteorology.

In addition, almost 500 agricultural schools had a total staff of

29,000 teachers and 71,000 students. In the 1980s thousands of

researchers and students were sent abroad (see Educational Invest- ment, ch. 4). Research was being strengthened by the construction of sixteen regionally distributed agricultural experiment

stations. New agricultural journals and societies were established

to promote the dissemination of research results within the country. The Chinese sought technical information abroad as well

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China: A Country Study

through the import of technology and machinery and the international exchange of delegations.

Production

Five economic activities generated the bulk of agricultural output: crops, livestock, forestry, fishery, and sideline production (rural

industry). Crop raising was the dominant activity, generating as much as 80 percent of the total value of output in the mid-1950s.

The policy of stressing crop output was relaxed in the early 1980s,

and by 1985 this figure fell to about 50 percent. The proportion

of output generated by the livestock, forestry, and fishery sectors increased slowly after the 1950s. The sector that expanded the most

rapidly was sideline production, whose share increased from 4 per- cent in 1955 to 30 percent in 1985.

The results of China's agricultural policies in terms of output

have been mixed. Food consumption was maintained at subsistence

level despite the catastrophic drop in production following the Great

Leap Forward but failed to increase much above that level until

the 1980s. Investment in irrigation and water control projects

blunted the effects of severe weather on output, but in many parts

of the country production continued to be negatively affected by

the weather. Production rates varied considerably throughout the

country, creating income inequalities. Despite rapid gains in rural areas in the 1980s, a substantial gap remained between rural and

urban living standards (see Differentiation, ch. 3). Crops

In the mid-1980s China's farmers annually planted crops on

about 145 million hectares of land. Eighty percent of the land was sown with grain, 5 percent with oilseed crops, 5 percent with fruits, 3 percent with vegetables, 2 percent with fiber crops, and 0.5 per- cent with sugar crops and tobacco. Other crops made up the

remaining 4 percent. In the 1960s and 1970s, when policies emphasized grain output, the area sown with grain exceeded 85 percent.

After the reforms were launched in the early 1980s, the area sown

with grain fell below 80 percent and the area sown with other crops

expanded correspondingly.

Grain is China's most important agricultural product. It is the source of most of the calories and protein in the average diet and

accounts for a sizable proportion of the value of agricultural production. China's statisticians define grain to include wheat, rice, corn, sorghum, millet, potatoes (at one-fifth their fresh weight), soybeans,

barley, oats, buckwheat, field peas, and beans. Grain output

paralleled the increase in population from 1949 through 1975 but

286
A bumper harvest at a granary in rural Jiangsu Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

Harvesting rice, on the road from Wuxi to Suzhou

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus

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China: A Country Study

rose rapidly in the deeade between 1975 and 1985 (see table 13,

Appendix A).

In 1987 China was the world's largest producer of rice, and the

crop made up a little less than half of the country's total grain output. In a given year total rice output came from four different crops. The early rice crop grows primarily in provinces along the Chang

Jiang and in provinces in the south; it is planted in February to April and harvested in June and July and contributes about 34 per- cent to total rice output. Intermediate and single-crop late rice grows

in the southwest and along the Chang Jiang; it is planted in March

to June and harvested in October and November and also contributed about 34 percent to total rice output in the 1980s. Doublecrop late rice, planted after the early crop is reaped, is harvested

in October to November and adds about 25 percent to total rice production. Rice grown in the north is planted from April to June

and harvested from September to October; it contributes about

7 percent to total production.

All rice cultivation is highly labor intensive. Rice is generally

grown as a wetland crop in fields Hooded to supply water during

the growing season. Transplanting seedlings requires many hours

of labor, as does harvesting. Mechanization of rice cultivation is only minimally advanced. Rice cultivation also demands more of

other inputs, such as fertilizer, than most other crops. Rice is highly prized by consumers as a food grain, especially

in south China, and per capita consumption has risen through the

years. Also, as incomes have risen, consumers have preferred to eat more rice and less potatoes, corn, sorghum, and millet. Large

production increases in the early 1980s and poor local transportation systems combined to induce farmers to feed large quantities

of lower quality rice to livestock. In 1987 China ranked third in the world as a producer of wheat.

Winter wheat, which in the same year accounted for about 88 per- cent of total national output, is grown primarily in the ChangJiang

Valley and on the North China Plain. The crop is sown each fall from September through November and is harvested in May and

June the subsequent year. Spring wheat is planted each spring in the north and northeast and is harvested in late summer. Spring

wheat contributes about 12 percent of total wheat output.

Wheat is the staple food grain in north China and is eaten in the

form of steamed bread and noodles. Per capita consumption has

risen, and the demand for wheat flour has increased as incomes have

risen. Wheat has been by far the most important imported grain.

Corn is grown in most parts of the country but is most common

in areas that also produce wheat. Corn production has increased

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Agriculture

substantially over time and in some years has been second only

to production of rice. Consumers have traditionally considered corn

less desirable for human use than rice or wheat. Nevertheless, it frequently yields more per unit of land than other varieties of grain,

making it useful for maintaining subsistence. As incomes rose in the early 1980s, consumer demand for corn as a food grain

decreased, and increasing quantities of corn were allocated for animal feed. Millet and sorghum are raised in the northern provinces, primarily in areas affected by drought. Millet is used primarily as a food

grain. Sorghum is not a preferred food grain and in the 1980s was

used for livestock feed and maotai, a potent alcoholic beverage.

Both Irish and sweet potatoes are grown in China. In the 1980s

about 20 percent of output came from Irish potatoes grown mostly

in the northern part of the country. The remaining 80 percent of

output came primarily from sweet potatoes grown in central and

south China (cassava output was also included in total potato

production). Potatoes are generally considered to be a somewhat

lower-quality food grain. Per capita consumption has declined

through time. Potatoes are also used in the production of vodka

and as a livestock feed. Other grains, such as field peas, beans, and pulses, are grown

throughout China. These grains are good sources of plant protein

and add variety to the diet. Barley is a major grain produced in the lower Chang Jiang Basin. It is used for direct human consumption, livestock feed, and increasingly is in great demand as a feedstock to produce beer.

Soybeans, a leguminous crop, are also included in China's grain

statistics. The northeast has traditionally been the most important

producing area, but substantial amounts of soybeans are also produced on the North China Plain. Production of soybeans

declined after the Great Leap Forward, and output did not regain

the 10-million-ton level of the late 1950s until 1985. Population

growth has greatly outstripped soybean output, and per capita con- sumption has fallen. Soybeans are a useful source of protein and

fat, an important consideration given the limited amount of meat

available and the grain- and vegetable-based diet. Oilseed cakes,

by-products of soybean oil extraction, are used as animal feed and

fertilizer. Cotton is China's most important fiber crop. The crop is grown

on the North China Plain and in the middle and lower reaches of

the Chang Jiang Valley. In the 1970s domestic output did not meet

demand, and significant quantities of raw cotton were imported.

Production expanded dramatically in the early 1980s to reach a

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China: A Country Study

record 6 million tons in 1984. Although production declined to 4.2

million tons in 1985, China was still by far the largest cotton producer in the world. In the 1980s raw cotton imports ceased,

and China became a major exporter of cotton. Significant quantities of jute and hemp are also produced in China. Production of these crops expanded from 257,000 tons in 1955 to 3.4 million tons in 1985. Major producing provinces include

Heilongjiang and Henan and also provinces along the Chang Jiang.

China is an important producer of oilseeds, including peanuts,

rapeseed, sesame seed, sunflower seed, and safflower seed. Oilseed output in 1955 was 4.8 million tons. Output, however, did

not expand between 1955 and 1975, which meant per capita oil- seed availability decreased substantially because of population

growth. Production from 1975 to 1985 more than tripled, to 15.5 million tons, but China continues to have one of the world's

lowest levels of per capita consumption of oilseeds.

Sugarcane accounted for about 83 percent of total output of sugar

crops in 1985. Major producing provinces include Guangdong,

Fujian, and Yunnan provinces and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous

Region. Production has grown steadily through the years from

about 8 million tons in 1955 to over 51 million tons in 1985.

Sugar beet production accounted for the remaining 17 percent

of total output in 1985. Major producing provinces and autono- mous regions include Heilongjiang, Jilin, Nei Monggol, and Xinjiang. Sugar beet production rose from 1.6 million tons in 1955

to 8.9 million tons in 1985. Despite these impressive increases in output, per capita consumption was still very low, and large quantities were imported.

China is the world's largest producer of leaf tobacco. Farmers

produce many kinds of tobacco, but flue-cured varieties often make

up more than 80 percent of total output. Major producing areas include Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan provinces.

Tea and silk, produced mainly in the south, have traditionally

been important commercial crops. The domestic market for these

products has been substantial, and they continue to be important

exports. Given China's different agricultural climatic regions, many

varieties of vegetables are grown. Farmers raise vegetables in pri- vate plots for their own consumption. Near towns and cities, farmers

grow vegetables for sale to meet the demand of urban consumers.

Vegetables are an important source of vitamins and minerals in the diet. Temperate, subtropical, and tropical fruits are cultivated in China. Output expanded from 2.6 million tons in 1955 to more

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Agriculture

than 1 1 million tons in 1985. Reforms in the early 1980s eneouraged

farmers to plant orchards, and the output of apples, pears, bananas,

and citrus fruit was expected to expand in the late 1980s.

Animal Husbandry

In 1987 China had the largest inventory of hogs in the world.

The number increased from about 88 million in 1955 to an esti- mated 331 million in 1985. Hogs are raised in large numbers in every part of China except in Muslim areas in the northwest. Most

hogs are raised in pens by individual farm households, but in the

mid-1980s the Chinese were constructing large mechanized feeding operations on the outskirts of major cities. Before the 1980s

the state's major goal was to increase output with little regard to the ratio of meat to fat. In the 1980s consumers became more conscious of fat content, and breeders and raisers were shifting to the

production of leaner hogs.

Draft animals are important sources of motive power in rural

areas. Draft animal numbers increased steadily from about 56 million in 1955 to 67 million in 1985 despite rapid increases in the

number of tractors and trucks in rural areas. Animals that provide draft power for crop cultivation and rural transportation include

water buffalo, horses, mules, donkeys, oxen, and camels.

Sheep and goats are China's most important grazing animals.

Most of these animals are bred in the semiarid steppes and deserts

in the north, west, and northwest. The number of sheep and goats

has expanded steadily from about 42 million in 1949 to approximately 156 million in 1985. Overgrazed, fragile rangelands have

been seriously threatened by erosion, and in the late 1980s authorities were in the midst of a campaign to improve pastures and rangelands and limit erosion.

The dairy and poultry sectors of the livestock economy grew most

rapidly in the 1980s. Dairy cows numbered just under 500,000 in 1978 but tripled to around 1.5 million in 1985. Consumers with

rising incomes demanded more fresh and powdered milk for infants

and elderly people. A large part of this increased demand was met

by individual farmers who were permitted to purchase and own

their animals. The government supported increased milk output

by importing breeding animals and constructing large dairies and

processing facilities. Most poultry was still grown in farmyard flocks,

but reforms encouraged individuals and groups of households to invest in confined feeding operations. Egg output, especially, in- creased rapidly in the 1980s.

China's first modern feed mills were constructed in the 1970s,

followed by many mills equipped with imported technology.

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China: A Country Study

Production of mixed and compound feed grew rapidly, reaching more than 12 million tons in 1985. This development supported

the growth of animal husbandry.

Forestry

Forests were cleared in China's main agricultural areas centuries ago. Most timber, therefore, comes from northeast China and

the less densely populated parts of the northwest and southwest.

The yield totaled around 60 million cubic meters in 1985. Bamboo poles and products are grown in the Chang Jiang Valley and

in south China, and output reached 230 million poles in 1985. Rubber trees are cultivated in Guangdong Province; output rose steadily

from 68,000 tons in 1975 to 190,000 tons in 1985. Other important forestry products include lacquer, tea oilseed, tung oil, pine

resin, walnuts, chestnuts, plywood, and fiberboard.

The area covered by forests amounted to some 12 percent of total land area, which officials hoped to increase over the long term to 30 percent. Afforestation campaigns are carried out annually to re-establish forests, plant shelter belts, and set up soil stabilization

areas. But because of continued overcutting of forests and low seedling survival rates in newly planted sections, China's forests are

in a precarious situation. Better management and increased investment over a long period of time will be required to increase out- put of valuable forest products.

Fishery

Aquatic production increased slowly after the 1950s, reaching

6.2 million tons in 1985. Output is composed of both marine and

freshwater fish, shellfish, and kelp. Marine products contributed

63 percent to total aquatic production. Fishermen collected more

than 83 percent of marine output from the open seas. The remaining

17 percent of output came from sea farms along China's coasts. The freshwater catch accounted for 37 percent of total aquatic

output in the mid-1980s. Fish farming in ponds accounted for 80 percent of the total freshwater catch; only 20 percent was col- lected in natural rivers, lakes, and streams. Fish from all sources provides consumers with an important source of protein and added

variety in their diet. Sideline Production

In addition to improving the principal yield of agricultural units,

the post-Mao economic reforms greatly stimulated sideline production in rural areas. Before 1984 sideline production generated by

production brigades, production teams, and households included

292
Silkworms being fed mulberry leaves Courtesy Nanjing Slide Studio

Clearing lotus pond, Hangzhou

Courtesy Douglass M. Dolan

293
China: A Country Study

hunting, fishing, collecting wild herbs, and producing family handicrafts, as well as various kinds of industry, commerce, transportation, and services. Sideline industrial output included fertilizer,

farm machinery, textiles, bricks, electrical appliances, and vari- ous consumer goods. Sideline industrial activities also included

processing cotton, grain, and oilseeds; mining coal, iron ore, and

gold; and dredging gravel and sand. Among the services included

in sideline output were barbering, entertainment, and catering.

As part of the sideline economy, rural entities transported people

and goods and operated retail stores; rural construction groups built dams, factory sites, roads, and houses. Of all kinds of sideline

production, the state counted only the industrial output of enterprises operated by counties and communes in its total industrial

output.

Output rose so rapidly that by 1985 the value of production gener- ated in sidelines exceeded the value of principal crop and livestock

production. To make the gross value of agricultural output more

realistically represent agricultural production, statisticians in 1985

limited sideline production to hunting and fishing, collecting wild

herbs, and producing family handicrafts. After 1985, therefore,

there were at least three aggregate measures of economic performance: gross value of output; gross value of agricultural output

(crops, livestock, forestry, aquatic, and sideline); and gross value

of rural society, which included the gross value of agricultural output

plus the value of rural industrial, transportation, construction, and

other output (see Rural Industry, ch. 7). Agricultural Trade

Since 1949 agricultural exports for most years have exceeded

agricultural imports. China's officials have used this export sur- plus as an important source for financing the importation of highpriority industrial items. Agricultural exports have risen through

the years but have not grown as fast as industrial exports. In 1970,

for example, agricultural exports accounted for 45 percent of total exports, but in 1985 China's US$6.5 billion in agricultural exports was only 20 percent of the total exports. In the 1970s agricultural imports accounted for about 30 per- cent of total imports. For example, of the US$7.1 billion worth

of products imported in 1977, US$2.1 billion (30 percent) were

agricultural products. In 1985 US$4.7 billion worth of agricultural

products were imported, which was only 5 percent of the US$42.8

billion of total imports (see fig. 10; table 14, Appendix A). The

ratio of agricultural imports to other imports was expected to rise in the late 1980s and 1990s.

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Agriculture

Wheat has been imported nearly every year since the early 1950s.

These imports averaged about 5 million tons in the 1960s and 1970s

but rose to a peak of more than 13 million tons in 1982. Wheat

imports fell as wheat output expanded rapidly, so that by 1985

imports fell to just under 5.5 million tons. Argentina, Australia,

Canada, France, and the United States have been major sources

of China's wheat imports.

China is one of the world's largest rice exporters, annually shipping out about 1 million tons. Rice exports go primarily to Asian

and East European countries and to Cuba.

China is both an importer and an exporter of coarse grains. Up

to 1984 sorghum, millet, and corn exports usually totaled only

several hundred thousand tons but reached a peak of over 5 million tons in 1985 (see Crops, this ch.). In the mid-1980s corn was

shipped primarily to Japan, North Korea, and the Soviet Union.

Barley is imported as a livestock feed and as a feedstock to brew

beer. Corn is imported for human consumption and for livestock

feed. Quantities imported varied considerably depending on internal

supply conditions and prices in international markets. Large quantities of corn were imported during the Great Leap Forward (when

grain production fell dramatically), in the early 1970s, and at the

end of the 1970s, when corn imports hit a peak of 3.6 million tons. Major coarse grain suppliers include Argentina, Australia, Canada,

France, Thailand, and the United States. Soybeans have been a major foreign exchange earner for most

of this century. Static production and rising domestic demand for soybeans and soybean products meant a decline in exports until the

early 1980s. For example, in 1981 Argentina and the United States shipped more than 500,000 tons of soybeans to China; these two

countries and Brazil also exported soybean oil to China. Domestic

production expanded in the early 1980s, however, and by 1985 soy- bean imports fell and exports exceeded 1 million tons. Also in the

early 1980s, China began to ship soybean meal to Asian markets.

Before 1983 China was one of the world's largest importers of raw cotton. These imports averaged around 100,000 tons annually

but climbed to a peak of nearly 900,000 tons in 1980. A dramatic

increase in domestic cotton production filled domestic demand, and

exports exceeded imports in 1983. In 1985 China shipped nearly

500,000 tons of raw cotton to Asian and European markets.

Sugar imports to China come primarily from Australia, Cuba,

the Philippines, and Thailand. Quantities imported climbed steadily

from 100,000 tons in 1955 to 500,000 tons in the mid-1970s and

continued to rise dramatically to a peak of more than 2 million tons in 1985.

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China: A Country Study

EXPORTS

Live Animals

Coffee, Tea, and Spices 8% 0ilseed and Nuts 77%

IMPORTS

Grain 22.5%

Figure 10. Composition of Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985

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Agriculture

In addition to the commodities just noted, China also exports

a host of other products from its vast agricultural resources. Large

quantities of live animals, meat, fish, vegetables, and fruits are shipped to Asian markets. Tea, spices, and essential oils are shipped

to major international markets. China also exports animal products,

such as hog bristles, fur, and other animal products.

Agricultural trade remains an important component of China's

general agricultural modernization effort. China is likely to continue to import grain and other agricultural products for the fore- seeable future. These imports would be used to maintain or improve

living standards, especially in urban areas. In rural areas, imports

help reduce the pressure for more procurement, freeing resources

for increased consumption or investment in local agricultural

programs.

In the long run, China may reduce the expenditure of foreign

exchange needed to finance agricultural imports. These expenditures reduce the amount of other imports that can be used for modernization and investment in the nonagricultural sectors of the

economy. Success in reducing agricultural imports will eventually

depend on the development of domestic sources of supply, for which

China hopes to rely in part on new production bases for marketable crops. Pressure for increased consumption is likely to continue.

The increase in population and the need for more agricultural goods

(including grain, industrial crops, and grain-consuming livestock)

to support higher real incomes both in urban areas and in the new

agricultural base areas will continue to be factors creating this pressure.

Useful general works on China's agricultural sector include

Dwight H. Perkins' Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968;

Randolph Barker, Radha Sinha, and Beth Rose's The Chinese

Agricultural Economy; and Nicholas R. Lardy' s Agriculture in China's

Modern Economic Development. Since 1981 China's State Statistical Bureau has published data on the agricultural sector in annual

statistical yearbooks. More detailed statistics, summary information, and policy statements are published by the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery in its Nongye Nianjian

(Agricultural Yearbook). The China Daily, printed in English and

published in China, contains important data and policy statements. Thousands of Chinese-language books on agricultural topics, and

newspapers such as Zhongguo Nongbao (China Agriculture), are avail- able by purchase or subscription. China Quarterly, published in

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China: A Country Study

London, occasionally contains articles on Chinese agriculture by

foreign observers. The National Academy of Sciences Committee

on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China

has published several interesting trip reports by United States agricultural delegations.

The United States government also publishes information and

analysis concerning China. The Joint Economic Committee of the

United States Congress periodically publishes a volume on China's

economy; the 1986 edition is entitled China's Economy Looks Toward

the Year 2000. Each year the United States Department of Agriculture publishes China: Situation and Outlook Report, which reviews

China's agricultural production and trade for the past year and

provides an outlook for the coming year. The department also publishes monthly forecasts of production and trade and prepares

specialized reports on various topics. (For further information and

complete citations, see Bibliography.)

298

Perseverance characterizes this Western Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 9)

female overseer excavated at an archaeological site in Yunnan Provice. The

original was bronze with gold inlay.
CHINA'S INDUSTRIAL SECTOR has shown great progress

since 1949, but in the late 1980s it remained undeveloped in many

respects. Although the country manufactured nuclear weapons and

delivery systems and could launch domestically produced satellites,

many of its industries used technologies of the 1950s. Although

China was one of the world's largest producers of fuel in the

mid-1980s and had the world's largest hydroelectric power potential, frequent energy shortages caused lengthy factory shutdowns.

Despite massive coal reserves in north China, transportation defi- ciencies necessitated coal imports to south China. Research institutes developed sophisticated industrial technologies, but bureaucratic

and political obstacles impeded implementation.

To solve these and other problems, the Chinese leadership

initiated sweeping economic reforms in the late 1970s. Although

specific industrial reforms were not clearly defined, broad goals

included loosening bureaucratic controls on enterprises and

managers to promote a decentralization of authority. Other broad

goals were to increase worker productivity by offering incentives;

to give market forces greater influence on output mix, purchases,

sales, and hiring; to make enterprises operate more efficiently and

be responsible for profits and losses; and to restructure the price

system to reflect supply and demand more accurately.

Another major goal of the reform program was development of

light industry. Beginning with the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57),

China adopted the Soviet model of economic development, stress- ing a heavy industrial base. However, this emphasis seriously

strained China's resources and capital and led the leadership in the late 1970s to shift to development of light industry. Because

light industry is labor intensive, this shift helped to alleviate unemployment. It also satisfied growing consumer demand, which had

not been met because of overemphasis on heavy industry. Another

reason for diversification into light industry was the desire to increase exports to obtain much-needed foreign currency.

By the mid-1980s industrial reforms had achieved substantial

success in some areas. Industrial output was about twenty-five times

that of 1952. A wide range of modern industries had been established, and the country was one of the world's leading producers

of coal, textiles, and bicycles. There were major plants in almost

every key industry, and a strong effort had been made to introduce

manufacturing into undeveloped and rural areas. Light-industry

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China: A Country Study

output of consumer goods had increased dramatically. In some

cases, enterprises reduced operating costs, managers were able to exercise greater autonomy, and technical innovations were implemented to increase efficiency.

Despite these bright spots in the 1980s, overall results were dis- appointing to Chinese economic planners. Major problems included

failure to reform the price system, interference of local cadres in the managers' operation of enterprises, and perpetuation of the

life tenure, "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) system for workers.

Rapid industrial growth made energy shortages one of the most

critical problems facing the economy, limiting industrial enterprises

and mines to 70 or 80 percent of capacity. According to China's

energy planners, the country would have to quadruple electricity

production to meet the gross value of industrial and agricultural

output target for the year 2000. For a quick increase in output,

the industry emphasized short-term development of thermal power

plants. For the long term, China planned to rely on its vast hydroelectric power potential and nuclear power to meet electricity

demand.

In the 1980s large-scale, centrally controlled plants dominated

manufacturing. These large plants were supplemented with many

small-scale town and township enterprises, which accounted for significant percentages of national output of coal, construction

materials, and leather products.

Trends in Industrial Production

The shifts in economic policy typical of the People's Republic

of China since 1949 have strongly affected industrial production

(see Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). In the period of recovery

from World War II and the Chinese civil war of 1945-49, industrial output more than doubled as plants were repaired and employment rose. The First Five-Year Plan concentrated on constructing

plants and equipment for heavy industry, much of it with Soviet

assistance. The machinery, iron and steel, and mining industries

all built their foundations in this period. The increases in productive capacity resulted in a second doubling of output.

The Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary) saw production surge by 45 percent in 1958 as new plants went into operation, facilities operated beyond capacity, and great numbers of small

local plants were established. But the overambitious plan to revamp

China's economy soon encountered problems of misallocation and

overextension of resources. The demands of the Great Leap For- ward left the work force physically exhausted. As the overburdened

economy began to collapse, growth fell to 22 percent in 1959 and

302
Glazed-ware finishing at Jingdezhen, a major porcelainmanufacturing center in Jiangxi Province

Courtesy Robert Tichane

4 percent in 1960. Output dropped precipitously in 1961 because

of the earlier withdrawal of Soviet technicians, misallocation of

resources, and a serious food shortage (see The 1950s, ch. 6). In

1962, with the restoration of planning and coordination, production began to recover. Industrial priorities were transferred from

production of industrial goods to agricultural inputs and consumer

goods. By 1965 most sectors of industry had regained their 1957

production levels. In the early stages of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glossary), production declined when civil disturbances disrupted fac- tories and transport in the big industrial cities. In 1967 output fell, and it remained below the 1966 level in 1968. After order was

restored, production recovered in 1969 and grew by 18 percent

in 1970. With resumption of growth and the beginning of the Fourth

Five-Year Plan (1971-75), output grew by over 10 percent in 1971

and 1972 and by 13 percent in 1973. A wide-ranging program of

investment in plants and equipment, including foreign imports,

raised industrial capacity. Throughout the 1970s thousands of new,

small-scale plants added significantly to levels of production,

especially in coal, chemical fertilizer, cement, and electricity,

although there were some setbacks. In the mid-1970s the influence

of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) and disruption by the succession

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China: A Country Study

struggle again reduced industrial output. Political activities in fac- tories and uncertainty of managers and planners caused growth

to fall to 4.4 percent in 1974. Growth recovered to 10.3 percent

in 1975 but fell to zero in 1976 in the uncertainty surrounding the

deaths of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, the second fall of Deng

Xiaoping, and the destruction caused by the Tangshan earthquake

(see The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). In 1977 and 1978, the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) effort began in earnest. Growth reached 14 percent in 1977, when politi- cal stability was restored and plants resumed full operation. The

high growth rate in 1977 and 1978 caused a serious overheating

of the economy, however. At the end of 1978, the leadership

introduced a comprehensive economic reform. In 1979 the economy

entered a period of readjustment, emphasizing a slower, more

rational rate of growth. Policy stressed development of light industry and gave priority to the textile and consumer industries in sup- plying raw and unfinished materials, power, fuel, and finances.

Capital investment in light industry increased from 5.4 percent in 1978 to about 8 percent in 1980. Between 1978 and 1981, the

proportion of light industry in gross industrial output value

increased by about 9 percent. The rate of capital construction

decreased, and the government initiated a major drive to correct imbalances in the economy by gearing production to consumer

needs and improving efficiency (see table 15, Appendix A).

In 1983 the government took measures to economize on fuel,

energy, raw materials, and working capital. The policy experimentally granted enterprises more autonomy. It introduced new kinds

of contracts, permitting limited competition among enterprises serv- ing the same markets. The government began to allow market forces

to determine production. At the Third Plenum of the Twelfth

National Party Congress Central Committee in October 1984, the

party officially reiterated its commitment to reform the urban econ- omy, signaling a high priority for industrial modernization.

The Seventh Five-Year Plan (1986-90) called for greater responsiveness to consumer demand, increased efficiency, and a further

assimilation of modern technology. The plan sought to accelerate

development of the energy and raw-materials industries and control growth of manufacturing industries, making the two sectors develop more proportionately. Development of the transportation

and communications sectors received high priority, and plans called

for expanding the building industry. The leadership hoped to speed

development of tertiary industry, such as restaurants and small

shops, to meet consumer needs.

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Industry

Organization

The government managed industry according to the kind and

level of control, using various State Council organizations (see The

State Council, ch. 10). In 1987 there were separate ministries con- cerned with industry, including those for aeronautics, astronautics, the chemical industry, the coal industry, the electronics

industry, the metallurgical industry, the nuclear industry, the

petroleum industry, the textile industry, light industry, railways,

and water resources and electric power. There were two commissions concerned with industry—the National Defense Science,

Technology, and Industry Commission and the State MachineBuilding Industry Commission.

In 1986 the government recognized four kinds of economic enterprise ownership: "ownership by the whole people" (or state ownership), collective, individual, and other. Under state ownership, the

productive assets of an enterprise were owned by the state, activities of the enterprise were determined by national economic plans,

and profits or losses accrued to the state budget. Most of the largest modern enterprises were state owned and directly controlled

by the central government. Many other enterprises also were state owned but were jointly supervised by the central government and

authorities at the provincial, prefectural, or county levels. Profits

from these enterprises were divided among the central and lowerlevel units (see Local Administration, ch. 10).

Under collective ownership, productive assets were owned by

the workers themselves (in the case of an urban enterprise) or by

the members of enterprises established by rural units. Profits and

losses belonged to the members of the collective, and government

authorities directed the enterprise loosely. Collectively owned enterprises were generally small and labor intensive, employing approximately 27 million people in cities and towns in 1983. Individual

ownership belonged to the category of individual handicrafts in the

1950s; by the mid-1980s it also included individual enterprises with

a maximum of thirty employees. The Chinese authorities left the

"other" category undefined.

Geographical Distribution of Industry

Before 1949 industry was concentrated in the large coastal cities and in the northeast. Shanghai was the largest industrial center,

followed by Anshan, Fushun, and Shenyang. Qingdao and Tianjin also were important industrial centers. Only a few cities in the

interior had any modern industry; they included Wuhan, Chongqing, and Taiyuan (see fig. 11).

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China: A Country Study

During the First Five- Year Plan, the government specifically

emphasized development of the northeast and areas other than

Shanghai, China's most important industrial base. Industrial sites were constructed in the north around the new steel mills at Baotou

in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), and at Wuhan in Hubei Province. Industrial centers also arose in the

southwest, mostly in Sichuan Province

In the 1950s industrial centers in east and northeast China

accounted for approximately two-thirds of total industrial output.

By 1983, however, industrial centers in the north, central-south,

and southwest had increased their share of output to more than

40 percent. This increase was the result of a policy begun in the

1950s to gradually expand existing industrial bases to new areas,

to build new bases in the north and central-south, and to establish a new base in the southwest.

From 1952 to 1983, central-south, southwest, and northwest

China registered higher industrial growth than the east, northeast,

and north regions. Total industrial output grew the fastest in the

central-south region—from 13.7 percent of total output in 1952

to 18.6 percent in 1983 (see table 16, Appendix A). The government had stressed developing the interior regions since the 1950s,

but by 1986 it had abandoned that strategy in order to develop

areas with more established infrastructures. According to this plan,

the south would continue growing, but the east and northeast would

be the main benefactors.

Level of Technology

Despite marked improvement over the early years of the People's Republic, the technological level of Chinese industry generally remained quite low in the late 1980s. The Chinese made

remarkable technological progress in some areas, such as nuclear

weaponry, satellites, and computers; but overall the industrial sector lagged far behind that of the developed countries (see The Reform

Program, ch. 9). Much of China's machinery and equipment dated

from the 1950s and 1960s. The Soviet Union had provided technology assistance during the early and mid-1950s, but such aid

ended in the late 1950s and early 1960s with the break in relations

(see Sino-Soviet Relations, ch. 12).

One of the main reasons for lagging technology was the lack of

coordination between research institutes and production enterprises.

Between 1979 and 1984, the number of major scientific and technical research discoveries grew from 2,790 to 10,000, and the number of inventions approved by the state rose from 42 to 264. Most

of the discoveries and inventions were never implemented. This

306
Industry

Figure 11. Major Industrial Facilities, 1987

was mainly because research institutes and production enterprises

operated independently and had little or no exchange of information. Also, most enterprise managers were more concerned with

meeting production quotas than with technological innovations.

There were no clear goals for research and development and no

concept of the importance of research and development to industry. Instead, efforts were concentrated on research and development for purely scientific purposes. Therefore, China did not develop a broad base of industrial research and development. By

the early 1980s only 8 percent of the total research and development work force was involved in industrial research compared with

72 percent in the United States and in the ensuing years the situation did not improve. Institutional obstacles and resource shortages also plagued research institutes.

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China: A Country Study

In 1985 the Chinese Communist Party issued the "Resolution on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management System." The resolution sought to coordinate research and production more closely. Part of the overall strategy of the Four

Modernizations was to redirect science and technology toward eco- nomic progress. Research institutes were to compete for contracts from various industries and operate on a fee-for-service basis.

Emphasis went to cooperation among factories and universities and

other institutes. As of 1987 the status of this effort remained unclear. On the one

hand, the metallurgical industry had applied more internal technological innovation than the electronics industry because the tech- nologies in the former were more developed than in the latter. The

metallurgical industry made a stronger effort to blend research and

production in individual enterprises. Also, major metallurgical complexes had internal research facilities for new-product research. On

the other hand, electronics was much more compartmentalized;

by the late 1980s, there was no decisive breaking of the barriers

between the technical and production elements.

China's assimilation of imported technology had mixed results

in the mid-1980s. There had been some remarkable accomplishments, but they had taken a long time. For example, advanced

West German cold-rolling technology had moved into the Anshan

iron and steel complex in Liaoning Province. The electronics sec- tor was not as successful because of shortages of raw materials, lack

of a reliable power supply, low manpower skill, and a shortage of

service and applications personnel. An exception was the Jiangnan

semiconductor plant in Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, which received

equipment from numerous Japanese and American companies. By

1987 it was highly productive. China's electronics industry,

however, like most other industries, was far from implementing

advanced technology, whatever its source. Supplies of Industrial Resources

Capital

Since 1949 China has devoted a large percentage of investment

to industry. By 1983 investment in industry was approximately 57

percent of investment in fixed assets. In 1984 about ¥44 billion

(for value of the yuan—see Glossary), or roughly 30 percent of total state expenditures, was slated for capital construction. In 1981 the

leadership attempted to limit uncontrolled, excessive investment

in capital construction. The results were not especially positive

partly because of reinvestment by enterprises allowed to retain

profits and partly because of foreign investment.

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Industry

To supplement domestic sources of capital, China's leadership

began allowing virtually all forms of foreign loans and credit by

the end of 1979. By early 1980 the country had access to the equivalent of almost US$30 billion in foreign loans and credits extending through 1985. The Chinese also sought foreign capital by

encouraging joint-venture projects between Chinese and foreign

enterprises (see Foreign Trade, ch. 8). But in early 1986 foreign

companies viewed China as a high-cost and high-risk investment

area. In 1985 US$8.5 billion worth of foreign capital had been committed, compared with only US$500 million in the first quarter

of 1986.

Labor

In the mid-1980s about 120 million people worked in the industrial sector (see Labor Force, ch. 2). In state-owned enterprises the

annual output per worker (the Chinese measure of productivity)

rose by 9.4 percent to¥15,349. In 1987 there was a severe urban

unemployment problem and consequently a virtually unlimited supply of unskilled and semiskilled labor. Skilled workers, engineers,

scientists, technicians, and managerial personnel were in very short

supply. During the Cultural Revolution, many specialists were

forced to abandon their occupations, and most training and education programs ceased during the ten-year hiatus in higher education from 1966 to 1976 (see Education Policy, ch. 4). This led

to a shortage of skilled personnel that seriously hampered the

industrial sector's implementation of imported modern technology

and independent development of new management and production forms. In 1980 a modern management training center was

established in Dalian, Liaoning Province, with the help of foreign

experts. In 1987 many Dalian graduates found it difficult to use

their newly acquired skills because managerial autonomy was lacking, and many cadres had a vested interest in maintaining the sta- tus quo. It was unclear what effect students educated abroad were

having on industry.

Raw Materials

China is well endowed with most of the important industrial ores,

fuels, and other minerals. Only a few raw materials are not present

in deposits large enough for domestic needs. Supplies of iron and

coking coal, although of poor quality, are adequate. By the early

to mid-1980s, China was a significant exporter of rare metals necessary for the aerospace and electronics industries. Nonetheless, China

imported materials such as steel, pig iron, copper, and aluminum

because of a large domestic demand and an inadequate transportation

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China: A Country Study

infrastructure (see Iron Ore; Other Minerals and Metals, this ch.).

Energy

Although China was the fourth largest world producer of fuel

in 1985, energy shortages remained a major obstacle to industrial

growth. Energy waste was considerable; to offset this, some energy

prices were increased, and penalties for waste went into force. Coal was the primary energy source, accounting in 1985 for more

than 70 percent of total fuel consumption. Proven reserves were more than 700 billion tons, and estimated reserves were 3,000 bil- lion tons. Onshore and offshore oil reserves in 1985 were around

5.3 billion tons, mostly untapped. China had the world's sixth largest electric power generating potential, but output still fell far short

of demand. Total natural gas output for 1985 was 12.7 billion cubic meters; 15 billion cubic meters was set as the target for 1990.

Natural gas and oil received equal weight in the Seventh Five-Year

Plan (see Electric and Nuclear Power, this ch.).

Manufacturing

China's manufacturing sector developed according to the principle of "walking on two legs," a policy of self-reliance introduced

in the 1950s. In the 1980s one leg consisted of the state-funded and

state-controlled large and medium-sized plants with the most qualified personnel and the most advanced equipment. The other leg was small-scale plants using inferior equipment and large amounts

of local labor. Together, the two sectors produced a wide range

of industrial products. In most cases the larger plants accounted

for the bulk of production, but the smaller enterprises were increasing their share and producing a significant percentage of cement,

fertilizers, and farm machinery.

Iron and Steel

Before 1949 the iron and steel industry was small and dispersed;

the Japanese had built the only modern steel facility just after World

War I at Anshan, Liaoning Province. Although Japan eventually

built nine blast furnaces in Anshan, total steel output by all plants never exceeded 1 million tons annually. Much of the Japanese

equipment was either damaged in the Chinese civil war (1945-49)

or removed by the Soviets at the end of World War II. Since the establishment of the People's Republic, considerable

investment has consistently gone to expand steel output. Steel production, however, has been very sensitive to changes in eco- nomic policies and political climate (see fig. 12). Steel output rose

310
Oil exploration in the Daqing oil field, Heilongjiang Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

An offshore oil- drilling

platform in the South China Sea

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency
China: A Country Study

steadily in the 1950s, when Soviet advisers helped establish the basis

of the iron and steel industry, installing numerous Soviet-designed

blast and open-hearth furnaces. The Great Leap Forward saw a

significant increase in the number of primitive backyard furnaces

producing poor-quality pig iron; numerous new, small, modern

plants; overuse of large plants; and exaggerated production reports. In 1961 the industry broke down. Nearly all small plants were

closed, and output fell to less than half the amount reported for 1960. From 1961 to 1965, output gradually recovered as equipment was repaired; basic oxygen furnaces were purchased from

Austria and electric furnaces from Japan. Production fell in 1967

and 1968 during the Cultural Revolution but grew rapidly in the

relative political stability from 1969 through the early 1970s. In

the mid-1970s political upheaval retarded output, as did the cata- strophic Tangshan earthquake of 1976. That event severely

damaged the Tangshan steel plant and the Kailuan coal mines.

The latter are major sources of coking coal. After 1976 output

climbed steadily, reaching 34.5 million tons in 1979. Steel production for 1986 was 50 million tons. Steel was viewed as the cornerstone or "key link" of both the

Great Leap Forward and the Four Modernizations programs (see

Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). But the post-Mao leadership was determined not to repeat the economically disastrous Great

Leap Forward policies: in 1978 it called for a period of readjustment and a cutback in steel investment. It had set a goal, however,

of producing 80 million tons of steel by 2000. Production targets were to be met by renovating and improving existing facilities,

rather than building new ones. Improvements in existing plants

reduced steel-industry energy consumption from 73.8 million tons of coal in 1978 to 69.1 million tons in 1983, and production

increased by 26 percent. The Chinese realized they would need

outside assistance to fully modernize their steel industry. They

sought hardware, technology transfer, and managerial and planning assistance. In 1987 China was the world's fifth largest producer of iron and

steel but lagged far behind developed countries in production

methods and quality. Most steel capacity was in open-hearth fur- naces with basic oxygen furnaces, electric furnaces, and side-blown

converters. Much of the iron and coking coal used in making steel was of low quality. Approximately 25 percent of the country's coal

went for steel production in 1985. In 1985 capital construction,

considered excessive by the Chinese, exacerbated existing shortages of rolled steel, and imports filled 25 percent of domestic

demand.

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Industry

The Ministry of Metallurgical Industry reported in 1985 that

China had 13 plants capable of producing at least 1 million tons per year. Accounting for approximately 65 percent of total production, these mills were built mostly during the 1950s. The Anshan

plant was the oldest and most productive of all, producing 7 million tons per year. The next largest was in Wuhan. It was constructed in the 1950s with Soviet aid. China began construction

in 1978 on its first integrated steel complex, the Baoshan iron and

steel works in Shanghai, but the completion date moved from 1982

to 1985 and finally to 1988.

Besides the larger plants, about 800 smaller mills were dispersed

throughout the country in 1985. They ranged from specialty mills

producing 500,000 tons per year to very small operations under

local jurisdiction or other ministries. Many of the smaller mills were

legacies of the Great Leap Forward, when local authorities had hurriedly established their own steel-making facilities. In the mid-1980s

the government hoped to phase out these inefficient plants in favor

of larger, more productive plants. In the late 1980s, it was apparent that steel output would remain

insufficient to meet the needs of the Four Modernizations. During the period covered by the Seventh Five-Year Plan, imports were

expected to average 41 percent of domestic output. Thin rolled

sheets, used to make such items as motor vehicles, washing

machines, and refrigerators, were in extremely short supply. In 1984 China had to import about half its steel sheet and about 80 per- cent of its steel plate. Production of tubes and pipes also was inadequate, and approximately 50 percent of all tubes had to be imported.

The country was most proficient in the production of steel bars,

but it still had to import an estimated 1 .8 million tons of rods and

bars in 1984. In 1985 China imported a record 15 million tons of

steel, more than two-thirds of it from Japan.

Machine Building

The machinery industry has been a leading priority since the

founding of the People's Republic. The industry expanded from

a few small assembly and repair facilities before 1949 to a large,

widely distributed machine-building sector producing many kinds

of modern equipment. However, as of 1987 the overall level of tech- nology was still relatively backward. In the late 1970s and early

1980s, China intended to use large-scale imports to modernize the

machinery industry but later decided that limiting imports to critical areas would be less costly. The former Ministry of MachineBuilding Industry's plans called for about 60 percent of the industry's products in 1990 to reach the technological level of the

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China: A Country Study

Figure 12. Steel Production and Capacity, 1948-86

industrialized countries during the 1970s and 1980s. Products built to international standards received priority in allocation of funds,

materials, and energy.

In 1987 the machinery industry was distributed throughout the

country. Nearly all counties and towns had one or more machine

factories. Major machinery centers were Shanghai, Tianjin, Shenyang, Beijing, Harbin, Changchun, Taiyuan, Luoyang, Wuhan,

Chongqing, Chengdu, Xi'an, and Lanzhou.

The machinery industry was selected by the State Council to lead the way in management reform. China's leaders realized that

the quality of machinery would determine the success of modernization in all areas of the economy. The industry's extreme compart- mentalization (a legacy of the Maoist obsession with self-reliance)

showed a lack of communication among government offices or within regions. Skilled managers also were lacking.

Machine Tools

In 1986 about 120 major enterprises produced most of China's

machine tools. Many of the large plants were in the east, north,

and northeast, particularly in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Harbin, and Tianjin. In the early and mid-1980s, a number of agreements with foreign manufacturers aimed to help China upgrade

its machine-tool industry. The Shanghai municipal government

also asked assistance from the World Bank in preparing and

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Industry

financing a comprehensive modernization scheme for the Shanghai machine-tool industry.

Overall, the machine-tool industry was based on 1960s technol- ogy. Many of the tools had a service life of only five to seven years, compared with twelve to fifteen years in industrialized countries.

The tools were generally unreliable and were poorly suited for precision work because of outdated design, low-quality purchased components, substandard manufacturing facilities, and a lack of

production-management expertise.

Electric Power Equipment

By the early 1970s, major generator production centers in Harbin, Shanghai, Beijing, and Deyang (in Sichuan Province) had built both hydroelectric and thermal generators as large as 300 megawatts. There also were numerous small and medium-sized plants

producing generators in the 3.2- to 80-megawatt range. As of 1986

China manufactured condenser-type turbo-generating units with

capacities of 6,000 to 300,000 kilowatts; back-pressure extraction

generating units with capacities of 12,000 to 50,000 kilowatts;

geothermal facilities with capacities of 1,000 to 3,000 kilowatts; and

hydroelectric power equipment consisting of generator equipment

with an 18-million-kilowatt capacity. Deficiencies showed in powergenerating equipment and transmission technology, and signifi- cant problems existed in direct-current transmission, particularly

in converter technology. China continued to lack experience in design and production of high-volt-ampere transformers and cir- cuit breakers.

Transportation Equipment

The automotive industry, which grew substantially after 1949,

did not keep pace with the demands of modernization. In the early

1980s, demand was still low. A surge in demand resulted in the

production of 400,000 vehicles and the importation of another

300,000 vehicles through early 1985. In the second half of 1985,

stringent administrative measures curtailed most imports, and in early 1986 domestic production was reduced to 13 percent of that

in early 1985. One cause for this was a large surplus created by

high production and importation levels in 1984 and 1985. Although

1986 production levels were considered a short-term slowdown, the

targets of the Seventh Five-Year Plan were quite low.

China's investment in the railroad industry during the Seventh

Five-Year Plan was higher than that for any previous five-year plan,

with an 80-percent increase over the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-

85). The country allocated Y10 billion to manufacture and purchase

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China: A Country Study

locomotives, and the remainder went to repair and rebuild obsolete equipment. During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the Ministry

of Railways set a production goal of 5,000 locomotives, including over 800 electric and over 2,000 diesel locomotives. The ministry

also planned to manufacture 1 10,000 freight and 10,000 passenger

cars. Despite these ambitious domestic production targets, China

had to rely heavily on imported technology to modernize its rail- road rolling stock. From 1961 to 1987, China's maritime fleet grew faster than that of any other country in the world. During that time, the merchant

fleet tonnage increased by an average 13.6 percent per year. From

1982 to 1987, Chinese shipyards produced 55 ships, including bulk

cargo vessels, freighters, tankers, container ships, partial container

ships, and passenger-cargo vessels, with a total deadweight ton- nage of more than 700,000 million tons. At the end of 1985, about

17 percent of China's merchant fleet was built domestically.

In the late 1950s, China began developing its own aircraft, known

as the Yun, or Y series. China built 135 civil aircraft between 1981

and 1985 and was scheduled to build hundreds more during the

Seventh Five-Year Plan. Civil aircraft and aircraft engines were

produced in large plants located primarily in Shanghai, Xi'an, Harbin, and Shenyang. Medium-sized factories produced the necessary test equipment, components, avionics, and accessories. China

hoped for eventual self-reliance in all aircraft production, but it still imported aircraft in 1987.

Metallurgical Equipment

Much equipment in the metallurgical industry was based on

Japanese designs of the 1930s and Soviet designs of the 1950s. Twothirds of the major equipment at Anshan, one of the largest plants

in China, was built during the 1930s and 1950s. In general, major

metallurgical equipment was more technologically advanced than

instruments and control systems. Measuring and monitoring instru- ments, essential to quality control, were in short supply.

Most of the iron- and steel-making equipment in general use was domestically produced. This included blast furnaces based on

Chinese improvements to old Soviet designs, ore-beneficiation

plants, open-hearth furnaces, electric furnaces, and a wide range

of steel-finishing equipment. To achieve a higher technological level, various pieces of equipment were imported because China had not

assimilated the technology necessary for domestic production. In most instances the industry imported only the main equipment,

neglecting necessary control instruments and auxiliary technologies.

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Industry

Electronics

In 1987 China's electronics industry was about ten to fifteen years behind those of the industrialized nations. Key problems were the

inability to transfer technology from research to production and

continued reliance on hand labor. Also, impatience to reach

Western standards sometimes proved counterproductive. For example, instead of buying a complex item such as a microprocessor

abroad, China chose to develop its own, at great expense.

In 1985 the electronics industry consisted of approximately 2,400

enterprises, 100 research institutions, 4 institutes of higher learning, and 20 secondary vocational schools. The industry employed some 1.4 million people, including 130,000 technical personnel.

Besides the approximately 2,000 kinds of electronic components

and large-scale integrated circuits produced by the industry, it made

400 varieties of electronic machinery, including electronic computers, television broadcast transmitters and receivers, and radar

and communications equipment. In the 1980s China made great

strides in the production of consumer electronic products, such as

televisions, radios, and tape recorders.

Chemicals

China's chemical industry evolved from a negligible base in 1949,

grew substantially in the 1950s and early 1960s, and received major

emphasis in the late 1960s and 1970s. In 1984 chemical products

served primarily agriculture and light industry. The three main

areas of chemical manufacturing were chemical fertilizers, basic

chemicals, and organically synthesized products. Chemical fertilizer was consistently regarded as the key to increased agricultural output. The output of many chemical products rose steadily, sometimes dramatically, from 1978 to 1986.

Except for a few items, such as soda ash and synthetic rubber,

the great majority of chemical products, including fertilizer, came

from small factories. Small-scale plants could be built more quickly

and inexpensively than large, modern plants and were designed

to use low-quality local resources, such as small deposits of coal or natural gas. They also minimized demands on the overworked

transportation system.

Larger and more modern fertilizer plants were located in every

special municipality, province, and autonomous region. In the early

1970s, China negotiated contracts with foreign firms for construction of thirteen large nitrogenous-fertilizer plants. By 1980 all thir- teen plants had been completed, and ten were fully operational.

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China: A Country Study

From 1980 to 1984, many inefficient fertilizer plants were shut

down, and by 1984 additional plants were being built with the most

advanced equipment available. To capitalize on China's rich mineral resources, the new plants were being constructed close to coal,

phosphate, and potassium deposits.

Compared with advanced countries, China's chemical fertiliz- ers lacked phosphate and potassium and contained too much nitrogen. To boost supplies of phosphate and potassium, China relied

heavily on imports during the Sixth Five-Year Plan.

Basic chemical production grew rapidly after 1949. In 1985

production of sulfuric acid was approximately 6.7 million tons. Major production centers were in Nanjing and Liida, and large

plants were located at many chemical-fertilizer complexes. Soda-ash

output in 1985 was 2 million tons; production was concentrated near major sources of salt, such as large coastal cities, Sichuan and

Qinghai provinces, and Nei Monggol Autonomous Region.

Production of caustic soda was scattered at large facilities in Liida,

Tianjin, Shanghai, Taiyuan, Shenyang, and Chongqing. In 1985

output of caustic soda was 2.4 million tons. Nitric acid and hydrochloric acid were produced in the northeast and in Shanghai and

Tianjin.

The chemical industry's organic-synthesis branch manufactured

plastics, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, dyes, pharmaceuticals,

and paint. Plastics, synthetic rubber, and synthetic fibers such as nylon were particularly important in the modernization drive

because they were used to produce such basic consumer goods as footwear and clothing. From 1979 to 1985, plastics production grew

from 793,000 tons to 1.2 million tons and chemical fibers from

326,300 tons to 947,800 tons. The major centers for organic synthesis included Shanghai, Jilin, Beijing, Tianjin, Taiyuan, Jinxi,

and Guangzhou. The industry received large amounts of foreign

machinery in the 1970s.

Building Materials

Large-scale capital construction dramatically increased the

demand for building materials. Like the chemical fertilizer industry, cement production featured simultaneous development of smallscale plants and large, modern facilities. Widespread construction

of small-scale cement plants began in 1958. By the mid-1970s, these

plants existed in 80 percent of China's counties; in 1984 they

accounted for a major share of national cement output. These local plants varied widely in size and technology. In 1983 China produced

approximately 108 million tons of cement, second in the world to the Soviet Union. In 1984 production increased 14 percent, to

318
A rotor-blade assembly

being installed in an

electric generator

Courtesy China Reconstructs

123 million tons and, except for Xizang (Tibet) and Ningxia-Hui

autonomous regions, every province, autonomous region, and special municipality had plants capable of producing 500,000 tons of

cement per year. In 1985 cement production increased to almost

146 million tons. China's building-materials industry developed rapidly and

reached an output value of ¥28.7 billion in 1984. It manufactured

over 500 kinds of products and employed approximately 3.8 million people in 1984. These materials were used in the metallurgical, machinery, electronics, aviation, and national defense industries

and in civil engineering projects. The main production centers for building materials were Beijing, Wuhan, and Harbin.

By the mid-1980s China was one of the world's primary pro- ducers of plate glass, a critical building material. Production in 1985 reached 49.4 million cases, and twenty urban glass factories

each produced 500,000 cases annually. Three large glass plants,

each having a production capacity of 1.2 million standard cases, were scheduled for completion in 1985 in Luoyang, Qinhuangdao,

and Nanning.

Paper

In the early 1980s, China's serious shortage of productive forest combined with outdated technology to create a shortage of pulp

and paper at a time of increasing demand. From 1981 to 1986,

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China: A Country Study

the annual growth rate of paper produetion was 7.3 percent. In 1986, however, only 20 percent of paper pulp was made of wood;

the remainder derived from grass fiber. China's more than 1,500 paper mills produced approximately

45.4 million tons and over 500 different kinds of machine-made

paper in 1986. Approximately 1 million tons of pulp and paper were imported annually. In 1986 China focused on pollution control, increased product variety, reduced use of fiber and chemical

ingredients, and more efficient use of energy as measures to improve

production. China also sought foreign assistance to achieve these

goals.

Textiles

China has a long and rich history in production of silk, bast fiber,

and cotton textiles. The earliest silk producer, China began exporting to West Asia and Europe around 20 B.C. Ramie, a grass used

to produce woven fabrics, fish lines, and fish nets, was first culti- vated around 1000 B.C. and is found in the provinces of Hunan,

Hubei, Sichuan, Guangdong, and Guizhou and the GuangxiZhuang Autonomous Region. Cotton spinning and weaving was

the largest domestic industry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After a respectable but inconsistent performance

from 1949 to 1978, textile production increased significantly with

the introduction of the responsibility system (see Glossary) for agriculture in 1979 (see Crops, ch. 6). By 1979 supplies of textiles had improved, the cloth-rationing system (in force since 1949) had

ended, and the industry had begun to flourish.

From 1979 to 1984, the output value of the textile industry rose approximately 13 percent annually. In 1984 China had about 12,000

enterprises producing cotton and woolen goods, silk, linen, chemical fibers, prints and dyed goods, knitwear, and textile machinery.

Textile production was 15.4 percent of the country's total industrial

output value in 1984. Textile exports in 1984 (excluding silk goods)

totaled US$4.2 billion, up 21.7 percent over 1983, and accounted

for 18.7 percent of the nation's total export value. By 1986 textiles had replaced oil as the top foreign-exchange earner. Traditionally, the coastal areas had the most modern textile equipment and facilities. Shanghai and Jiangsu Province were the nerve centers of the industry, accounting for 31.6 percent of the

total gross-output value for textiles in 1983. Other major textile areas were Shandong, Liaoning, Hubei, Zhejiang, and Hebei

provinces.

After 1949 cotton textile production was reorganized and

expanded to meet consumer needs. Cotton cultivation increased

320
Silk textile weaver, Wuxi, Jiangsu Province

Courtesy Nanjing Slide Studio

in the areas around the established spinning centers in the port

cities of Shanghai, Qingdao, Tianjin, and Guangzhou. New spinning and weaving facilities opened near the inland cotton-producing

regions. In 1983 China produced 4.6 millions tons of cotton, more

than double the 1978 total. China still was the world's largest silk producer in 1985, manufacturing approximately 422,000 meters of silk textiles. Shanghai and

Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces were the main silk centers. In 1985

China also produced approximately 125,000 tons of knitting wool,

218 million meters of woolen piece goods, 3.5 million tons of yarn,

and 541,000 tons of chemical fibers. Food Processing

Food processing made significant advances in China after 1949.

The most basic improvement was the nearly universal establishment of mechanized grain-milling facilities in rural production units. The processing of food into finished and packaged products also grew extensively.

Although a growing number of food products were packaged for export, China's food processing capacity was relatively low in the

mid-1980s. An immense variety of baked goods and candies were produced for local consumption, and most Chinese continued to

resist processed food. Rising standards of living, however, increased

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China: A Country Study

the demand for proeessed food because of its nutritional and

hygienic advantages.

The beverage industry was very large and widespread. All regions

had breweries and distilleries producing beer and a variety of domestie and Western alcoholic beverages. China successfully exported

several varieties of beer and liquor, and domestic soft-drink production was widespread.

Other Consumer Goods

In the first thirty years of the People's Republic, many basic con- sumer goods were scarce because of the emphasis on heavy industry. The 1979 economic reform program resulted, however, in a consumer goods explosion. For example, television production

increased from approximately 500,000 sets in 1978 to over 16 million sets by 1985. During the same period, bicycle output increased

by a factor of about three and one-half, production of electric fans

increased twelvefold, and the output of radios doubled. In the first half of 1985, compared with the same period in 1984. production

of television sets, washing machines, electric fans, and refrigerators increased dramatically. Refrigerators, washing machines, and

televisions included imported components. In 1985 economic plan- ners decided to limit production of refrigerators because they esti- mated that supply would outstrip demand by 5.9 million units in 1990. The following year, authorities curbed production of televi- sions to emphasize quality over quantity.

Construction

Housing Construction

Modern housing has been in chronic shortage in contemporarv

China. Housing conditions in 1949 were primitive and crowded,

and massive population growth since then has placed great strains on the nation's building industry. According to 1985 estimates.

46 million additional units of housing, or about 2.4 billion square

meters of floor space, would be needed by the year 2000 to house

every urban family. Adequate housing was defined as an average

of eight square meters of living space per capita. As of 1985.

however, the average per capita urban living space, for example, was only 6.7 square meters. Housing specialists suggested that the

housing construction and allocation system be reformed and that the eight-square-meter target be achieved in two stages: six square

meters by 1990 and the additional two square meters between 1990

and 2000. To help relieve the situation, urban enterprises were

increasing investment in housing for workers. In 1985 housing built

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Industry

by state and collective enterprises in eities and towns totaled

130 million square meters of floor space. In the countryside, housing

built by farmers was 700 million square meters. Capital Construction

Since the 1950s, the capital construction industry has been

plagued by excessive growth and compartmentalization. There were

frequent cost overruns and construction delays, and resources were

overtaxed. Project directors often failed to predict accurately the

need for such elements as transportation, raw materials, and energy.

A large number of small factories were built, providing surplus

capacity at the national level but with deficient economies of scale

at the plant level. Poor cooperation among ministries and provinciallevel units resulted in unnecessary duplication. Because each area

strove for self-sufficiency in all phases of construction, specialization suffered. Since the early years of the People's Republic, over- investment in construction has been a persistent problem. Fiscal

reforms in 1979 and 1980 exacerbated overinvestment by allowing local governments to keep a much greater percentage of the revenue from enterprises in their respective areas. Local governments could then use the retained earnings to invest in factories

in their areas. These investments, falling outside the national eco- nomic plan, interfered with the central government's control of capital investment.

From 1979 to 1981 the economy underwent a "period of readjustment," during which the investment budget for capital construction was sharply reduced (see Reform of the Economic System,

Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). This administrative solution to over- investment proved ineffective, and later reforms concentrated on

economic measures such as tax levies to discourage investment.

The issuance of interest-bearing loans instead of grants was also intended to control construction growth. Despite reforms, capital

construction continued at a heated pace in 1986. The majority of the new investment was unplanned, coming from loans or enterprises' internal capital.

During the Seventh Five-Year Plan, 925 medium- and largescale projects were scheduled. The government planned to allo- cate ¥1.3 trillion for fixed assets, an increase of 70 percent over

the Sixth Five-Year Plan. Forty percent of the funds were allocated

for new projects and the remaining 60 percent for renovation or expansion of existing facilities. Some of the projects involved were

power-generating stations, coal mines, railroads, ports, airports,

and raw-material production centers.

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China: A Country Study

Mining

Coal

In the first half of the twentieth century, coal mining was more

developed than most industries. Such major mines as Fushun,

Datong, and Kailuan produced substantial quantities of coal for railroads, shipping, and industry. Expansion of coal mining was

a major goal of the First Five-Year Plan. The state invested heavily

in modern mining equipment and in the development of large,

mechanized mines. The "longwall" mining technique was adopted

widely, and output reached 130 million tons in 1957.

During the 1960s and 1970s, investment in large mines and

modern equipment lagged, and production fell behind the industry's growth. Much of the output growth during this period came

from small local mines. A temporary but serious production set- back followed the July 1976 Tangshan earthquake, which severely

damaged China's most important coal center, the Kailuan mines.

It took two years for production at Kailuan to return to the 1975

level. In 1987 coal was the country's most important source of primary

energy, meeting over 70 percent of total energy demand. The 1984

production level was 789 million tons. More than two-thirds of

deposits were bituminous, and a large part of the remainder was

anthracite. Approximately 80 percent of the known coal deposits were in the north and northwest, but most of the mines were located

in Heilongjiang Province and east China because of their proximity to the regions of highest demand (see fig. 14).

Although China had one of the world's largest coal supplies, there

still were shortages in areas of high demand, mainly because of an inadequate transportation infrastructure. The inability to trans- port domestic coal forced the Chinese to import Australian coal

to south China in 1985. The industry also lacked modern equipment and technological expertise. Only 50 percent of tunneling,

extracting, loading, and conveying activities were mechanized, compared with the 95-percent mechanization level found in European

nations. Iron Ore

China had iron-ore reserves totaling approximately 44 billion tons in 1980. In the mid-1980s, however, China relied on imports

because of domestic transportation and production problems. Sizable iron-ore beds are distributed widely in about two-thirds of

China's provinces and autonomous regions. The largest quantities are found in Liaoning Province, followed by Sichuan, Hebei,

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Industry

Figure 13. Coal Reserves and Major Mining Areas, 1987

Shanxi, Anhui, Hubei, Gansu, Shandong, and Yunnan provinces

and Nei Monggol Autonomous Region.

In the mid-1980s mines lacked modern excavation, transportation, and ore-beneficiation equipment. Most of the ore mined had

a low iron content and required substantial refining or beneficiation before use in blast furnaces. Most mines lacked modern plants

for converting low-grade iron ore into concentrated pellets.

Other Minerals and Metals

After 1949 geological exploration discovered deposits of more

than 130 useful minerals. China is among the world leaders in proven deposits of tungsten, antimony, rare earth metals, molybdenum, vanadium, titanium, pyrite, gypsum, barite, copper, tin,

lead, zinc, aluminum, mercury, manganese, nickel, phosphorus,

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China: A Country Study

asbestos, fluorite, magnesite, and borax. Of these, China exported

antimony, tin, and tungsten in significant quantities. In general,

mineral extraction was inadequate for industrialization because of

transportation bottlenecks and shortages of modern equipment for mining, smelting, and refining. A number of important mineral

products were imported despite large domestic deposits, including aluminum, copper, and zinc.

Among the rare earth metals and ferroalloys, beryllium, tungsten, molybdenum, barium, manganese, mercury, niobium, zir- conium, and titanium were present in large reserves and were

extracted in adequate quantities. Deficiencies existed in chromium,

platinum, and gold.

China produced sufficient quantities of most nonmetallic minerals

to meet domestic needs. Barite, fluorite, salt, and talc were available in massive reserves and were exported in large quantities.

Graphite, magnesite, phosphates, and pyrite were less abundant

but generally satisfied domestic demand. Sulfur deposits were large,

but quality was low and imports were necessary.

China is rich in uranium and has favorable geological conditions

for the formation of uranium deposits. The ore is easy to mine and

dress because of its relatively simple physical composition.

Energy

Oil and Natural Gas

Before 1949 China imported most of its oil. During the First FiveYear Plan it invested heavily in exploration and development of

wells. In 1959 vast reserves were discovered in the Songhua Jiang

(Sungari River)-Liaohe Basin in northeast China. The Daqing oil field in Heilongjiang Province became operational in 1960. Daqing

was producing about 2.3 million tons of oil by 1963, and it con- tinued to lead the industry through the 1970s. Further important

discoveries, including the major oil fields of Shengli (in Shandong

Province), and Dagang (in Tianjin special municipality) enabled

China to meet domestic needs and eliminate nearly all imports by

the mid-1960s (see fig. 15). In 1973, despite a steadily growing

internal demand for petroleum products, output was large enough

to export 1 million tons of crude oil to Japan. Exports increased

to 6.6 million tons in 1974 and reached 13.5 millions tons in 1978. In 1985 exports of crude oil amounted to approximately 20 million tons, roughly 16 percent of total production. The majority of

1985 exports were to Japan, but the government also had released

increasing quantities on the spot market and sent some to Singapore for refining. Although the government temporarily abandoned

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Industry

its drive to broaden its oil export base in 1986, 130.7 million tons

of crude oil still were produced, an increase of 5.8 million tons over

1985.

Oil reserves are large and widely dispersed. In general, development is concentrated on deposits readily accessible from major

industrial and population centers. Deposits in remote areas such

as the Tarim, Junggar, and Qaidam basins remain largely unexplored. The quality of oil from the major deposits varies considerably. A few deposits, like the Shengli field, produce low-quality

oil suitable mainly as fuel. Most of the oil produced in China from

the big fields in the north and northeast is heavy, is low in sulfur,

and has a very high paraffin content, making it difficult and

expensive to extract and to refine. Offshore exploration and drilling were first undertaken in the

early 1970s and became more widespread and advanced as the

decade progressed. Chinese and foreign oil experts believed that

offshore deposits were extensive and could equal onshore reserves. Offshore operations relied heavily on foreign technology. In 1982

thirty-three foreign oil companies submitted bids for offshore drilling

rights; twenty-seven eventually signed contracts. By the mid-1980s,

when offshore exploration results were disappointing and only a handful of wells were actually producing oil, China began to emphasize onshore development. To continue offshore exploration, China

established the China National Offshore Oil Corporation to assist foreign oil companies in exploring, developing, extracting, and

marketing China's oil. Offshore exploration and drilling were concentrated in areas in the South China Sea, Gulf of Tonkin, and Zhu Jiang (Pearl River)

Delta in the south, and the Bo Hai Gulf in the north. Disputes

between China and several neighboring countries complicated the

future of oil development in several promising offshore locations

(see Physical Environment, ch. 2). Natural gas was a relatively minor source of energy. Output grew

rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s. By 1985 production was approximately 12 billion cubic meters—about 3 percent of China's primary

energy supply. The following year, output increased by 13 billion cubic meters. Sichuan Province possesses about half of China's

natural gas reserves and annual production. Most of the remaining

natural gas is produced at the Daqing and Shengli oil fields in the

northeast. Other gas-producing areas include the coastal plain in Shanghai and in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces; the Huabei complex in Hebei Province; and the Liaohe oil field in Liaoning Province.

The exact size of China's natural gas reserves was unknown.

Estimates ranged from 129 billion to 24.4 trillion cubic meters.

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China: A Country Study

The Chinese hoped for a major discovery in the Zhongyuan Basin,

a 5, 180-square-kilometer area along the border of Henan and Shandong provinces. Major offshore reserves have been discovered. If successfully tapped, these could increase gas output by 50 percent.

The largest unexploited natural gas potential is believed to be in Qmghai Province and Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

A rudimentary petroleum-refining industry was established with

Soviet aid in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, this base was

modernized and expanded, partially with European and Japanese

equipment. In 1986 Chinese refineries were capable of processing

about 2.1 million barrels per day. By 1990 China plans to reach

2.5 million barrels per day.

In the 1970s China constructed oil pipelines and improved ports

handling oil tankers. The first oil pipeline was laid from Daqing

to the port of Qinhuangdao; 1 , 150 kilometers long, it became operational in 1974. The following year the pipeline was extended to Beijing; a second line connected Daqing to the port of Liida and

branched off to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A pipeline from Linyi in Shandong Province to Nanjing was completed

in 1978, linking the oil fields of Shengli and Huabei to ports and

refineries of the lower Chang Jiang region. In 1986 plans had been

made to construct a 105-kilometer pipeline linking an offshore well

with the Chinese mainland via Hainan Island.

Electric and Nuclear Power

From 1949 to the mid-1980s, China pursued an inconsistent

policy on the development of electric power. Significant underinvestment in the readjustment period, starting in 1979, caused

serious power shortages into the mid-1980s. Although China's

hydroelectric power potential was the world's largest and the power

capacity was the sixth largest, 1985 estimates showed that demand

exceeded supply by about 40 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Because of power shortages, factories and mines routinely operated

at 70- to 80-percent capacity, and in some cases factories only ran

for 3 or 4 days a week. Whole sections of cities were frequently

blacked out for hours.

China's leaders began to acknowledge the seriousness of the power

shortage in 1979. The government took no positive steps until the

mid-1980s, when it announced import of 10,000 megawatts of ther- mal power-plant capacity to serve the east's large population centers.

It also launched a nationwide campaign to create an additional 5,000

megawatts of electric-power capacity. Under the Seventh Five-Year

Plan, China planned to add 30,000 to 35,000 megawatts of capacity, a 55- to 80-percent increase over previous five-year plans.

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Industry

Figure 14. Major Oil Basins and Oil Fields, 1987

The leadership decided to build thermal power plants to meet

the country's electricity needs, because such plants were relatively

inexpensive and required construction lead times of only three to

six years. In 1985 approximately 68 percent of generating capacity was derived from thermal power, mostly coal fired, and observers

estimated that by 1990 its share would increase to 72 percent. The

use of oil-fired plants peaked in the late 1970s, and by the mid-1980s

most facilities had been converted back to coal. Only a few ther- mal plants were fueled by natural gas. Hydroelectric power

accounted for only about 30 percent of generating capacity. Observers expected that during the Seventh Five-Year Plan, China would

continue to emphasize the development of thermal power over

hydroelectric power because of the need to expand the power supply quickly to keep pace with industrial growth. However, in the

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China: A Country Study

long term, hydroelectric power gradually was to be given priority over thermal power.

In 1986 China's total generating capacity was 76,000 megawatts:

52,000 from thermal plants and 24,000 from hydroelectric power

sources. China planned to construct large generators having capacities of 100 to 300 megawatts to increase thermal power capacity.

The new, larger generators would be much more efficient than

generators having capacities of only fifty megawatts or less. With

the larger generators, China would only have to increase coal con- sumption by 40 percent to achieve a 54-percent increase in generating capacity by 1990. Foreign observers believed that as China

increased its grid network, it could construct power plants close

to coal mines, then run power lines to the cities. This method would

eliminate the costly and difficult transportation of coal to smaller

urban plants, which had already created a significant pollution

problem.

From 1949 to 1986, China built at least 25 large, 130 medium,

and about 90,000 small-sized hydroelectric power stations. According to the Ministry of Water Resources and Electric Power, China's

1983 annual power output was 351.4 billion kilowatt-hours, of which

86 billion kilowatt-hours were generated by hydroelectric power.

While construction of thermal plants was designed as a quick

remedy for alleviating China's power shortages, the development

of hydroelectric power resources was considered a long-term solution. The primary areas for the construction of hydroelectric power

plants were the upper Huang He (Yellow River), the upper and

middle stream tributaries and trunk of the Chang Jiang, and the

Hongshui He in the upper region of the Zhu Jiang Basin. The construction of new hydroelectric power plants was expected to be a

costly and lengthy process, undertaken with assistance from the

United States, Canada, Kuwait, Austria, Norway, France, and

Japan.

To augment its thermal and hydroelectric power capacity, China was developing a nuclear energy capability. China's nuclear

industry began in the 1950s with Soviet assistance. Until the early

1970s, it had primarily military applications. In August 1972,

however, reportedly by directive of Premier Zhou Enlai, China

began developing a reactor for civilian energy needs. After Mao

Zedong's death in 1976, support for the development of nuclear

power increased significantly. Contracts were signed to import two

French-built plants, but economic retrenchment and the Three Mile

Island incident in the United States abruptly halted the nuclear

program. Following three years of "investigation and demonstration," the leadership decided to proceed with nuclear power

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Industry

development. By 1990 China intended to commit between 60 and

70 percent of its nuclear industry to the civilian sector. By 2000

China planned to have a nuclear generating capacity of 10,000

megawatts, accounting for approximately 5 percent of the country's total generating capacity. In 1986 a 300-megawatt domestically designed nuclear power

plant was under construction at Qinshan, Zhejiang Province, with

completion planned for 1989. Although most of the equipment in the plant was domestic, a number of key components were

imported. The Seventh Five-Year Plan called for constructing two

additional 600-megawatt reactors at Qinshan. Another plant, with

two 900 megawatt reactors, was under construction at Daya Bay

in Guangdong Province. The Daya Bay project was a joint venture with Hong Kong, with considerable foreign loans and expertise.

Rural Industry

From 1980 to 1986, the number of rural town and village

enterprises rose from 1.4 million to more than 12.2 million. There

were five kinds of town and township enterprises: township enterprises, village enterprises, cooperative enterprises, enterprises jointly run by several households, and household enterprises. In 1986 the

assets of the enterprises at the township and village levels totaled

¥134 billion. Their total output value for 1985 was¥272.8 billion, 17 percent

of the gross national output and 44 percent of the gross agricultural

output. Rural enterprises absorbed a large portion of the surplus

agricultural labor displaced by the agricultural responsibility sys- tem and the breakdown of the people's commune system (see Post- Mao Policies, ch. 6). This absorption helped the state greatly by

eliminating state support of millions of displaced workers. In 1986

rural enterprises employed approximately 76 million people, or 20 percent of China's total work force. The town and village enterprises made a significant contribution

to overall economic growth. In 1985 an estimated 28 percent of

coal, 53 percent of construction materials, 30 percent of paper, 20

percent of textile goods, 33 percent of garments, and 75 percent

of leather products came from rural enterprises. The enterprises

also made extensive progress in the export market, with 8,000

export-oriented factories, of which 870 were Chinese-foreign joint ventures. In 1985 town and village enterprises earned about

¥4 billion in foreign currency.

Despite the rapid growth and success of town and village enterprises, continued expansion faced obstacles in 1987. The government was trying to limit production because of economic

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China: A Country Study

and environmental concerns. Moreover, financial mismanagement,

poor market analysis, rising energy and raw-material cost, substandard equipment, and constant interference from local government authorities hampered production and expansion. In certain

areas, such as Zhejiang Province, efforts were made to solve some

of the problems facing the rural enterprises. Local governments

allowed the enterprises to keep 70 percent of profits, and of the

remaining 30 percent remitted to the county government, 70 per- cent was invested in existing enterprises or used to establish new

ones. Defense Industry

China's defense industrial complex produced weapons and equipment based predominantly on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s.

Because of a lack of foreign exchange, a low short-term threat per- ception, and an emphasis on the other three of the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, and science and technology), China

had decided to develop its defense industries gradually. It would

rely primarily on domestic production, importing foreign technology only in areas of critical need.

The defense industries produced a wide range of military materiel. Large quantities of small arms and tanks were produced, and

many were exported to Third World countries such as Iran. China

had upgraded Soviet aircraft and was developing nuclear-powered

ballistic-missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and

tanks equipped with infrared night-vision gear and laser range

finders (see Military Modernization, ch. 14).

Because defense was assigned the lowest priority in the Four

Modernizations in the 1970s, China's large defense sector has

devoted an increasing amount of its resources to civilian production. For example, in the mid-1980s approximately one-third of

the ordnance industry's output was allocated to civilian production, and the share was expected to rise to two-thirds by 1990. The

defense sector produced a wide variety of products, ranging from

furniture to telescopes, cameras to heavy machinery.

Despite the military's contribution to the industrial sector, in 1987 Chinese industry lagged far behind that of the industrialized

nations. Much of industrial technology was seriously outdated.

Severe energy shortages, transportation bottlenecks, and bureaucratic interference also hindered modernization. Although output was high in a number of industries, quality was often poor.

However, China's industrial sector has made considerable progress

since 1949. Output of most products has increased dramatically

since the 1950s, and China now produces computers, satellites,

332
Oil tanks at Maoming, Guandong Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

and other high-technology items. The reform program introduced

in the late 1970s brought an era of more rational economic planning and laid the groundwork for more balanced and sustained

industrial growth. As of 1987 China's leaders were aware of the

need for greater industrial efficiency and productivity and were

striving to achieve these goals.

* * *

Industrial growth before 1949 is outlined by John K. Chang in

Industrial Development in Pre- Communist China. Thomas G. Rawski

describes the development of the producer goods industries, both

before and after the founding of the People's Republic, in China's

Transition to Industrialism. A wealth of material on Chinese industry is found in the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, which includes an overview article, as well as specific articles relating to the structure, management, ownership and control, and finance and planning of industry. It also describes and analyzes the energy sector

in detail. The second volume of China: Socialist Economic Development in the

World Bank Country Study series, contains information on industrial organization, policy, strengths and weaknesses, and issues

333
China: A Country Study

and challenges. Another World Bank Country Study, China: LongTerm Development Issues and Options, looks at some of the major

development issues facing China to the year 2000. Two Rand

studies, Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metallurgical Industry and Chinese Electronics Industry in Transition, are

excellent case studies, documenting China's attempt to modernize

its outdated industrial sector. The annual Statistical Yearbook of China

provides figures on a wide range of industrial categories. The semimonthly China Business Review provides well-researched articles on many topics related to industry, and the Country Report: China, North

Korea, (formerly Quarterly Economic Review of China, North Korea) outlines economic events on a quarterly basis and provides annual summaries. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

334
Chapter 8. Trade and Transportation
Rich in detail, this Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907) pottery horse is typical

of the lively art style of the period. The original on which this artist 's rendition is based was polychromatic and stood about thirty-nine centimeters high.
TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION are the lifeblood of an econ- omy. In the twenty-five years that followed the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's trade institutions and

transportation and communications networks were built into a partially modern but somewhat inefficient system. The drive to modernize the economy that began in 1978 required a sharp acceleration

in commodity flows and greatly improved efficiency in economic

transactions. In the ensuing years economic reforms were adopted

by the government to develop a "socialist planned commodity econ- omy" that combined central planning with market mechanisms.

These changes resulted in the decentralization and expansion of

domestic and foreign trade institutions, a greatly enlarged role for

free markets in the distribution of goods, and a prominent role for foreign trade and investment in economic development. Despite

increased investment and development in the 1980s, the transportation and communications sectors were strained by the rapid

expansion of production and the exchange of goods.

Transportation, postal services, communications, and trade,

including services, employed about 6.3 percent of the national labor

force in the mid-1980s—about 22 percent of the nonagricultural

labor force. Chinese statistics estimate that these sectors produced

about 7.4 percent of the gross national product in 1983.

Internal Trade and Distribution

Agriculture

Agricultural products were distributed in three major ways in China during the 1980s. They were either retained by the household (now the primary production unit) for distribution among its members, procured by the state, or sold in free rural or urban

markets.

Approximately 63 percent of the population was located in rural areas, where the majority of the people worked in agriculture and

rural industries. Under the responsibility system (see Glossary) for agriculture instituted in 1981, the household replaced the production team (see Glossary) as the basic production unit. Families contracted with the economic collective to farm a plot of land, delivered a set amount of grain or other produce and the agricultural tax

to the state, and paid a fee to the collective. After meeting these

obligations, the household was free to retain its surplus produce

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China: A Country Study

or sell it in free markets. Restrictions on private plots and household sideline production were lifted, and much of the production

from these was also sold on free markets (see Post-Mao Policies;

Planning and Organization, ch. 6). Distribution of food and other agricultural goods to urban con- sumers, industry, and rural areas deficient in food was carried out primarily by the state and secondarily by producers or cooperatives. The state procured agricultural goods by means of taxes in kind and by purchases by state commercial departments (state trad- ing companies) under the Ministry of Commerce. The agricultural

tax was not large, falling from 12 percent of the total value of agricul- tural output in 1952 to 5 percent in 1979. In 1984 the number of

agricultural and sideline products subject to state planning and purchasing quotas was reduced from twenty-nine to ten and included

grains, edible oil, cured tobacco, jute, hemp, and pigs. In 1985

the system of state purchasing quotas for agricultural products was

abolished. Instead, the state purchased grain and cotton under contract at a set price. Once contracted quotas were met, the grain

and cotton were sold on the market at floating prices. If market

prices fell below the listed state price, the state purchased all available market grain at the state price to protect the interests of producers. Vegetables, pigs, and aquatic products sold to urban,

mining, and industrial areas were traded in local markets according to demand. Local commercial departments set the prices of these

goods according to quality to protect the interests of urban con- sumers. All other agricultural goods were sold on the market to the state, to cooperatives, or to other producers. Restrictions on

private business activities were greatly reduced, permitting peasants

as well as cooperatives to transport agricultural goods to rural and

urban markets and allowing a rapid expansion of free markets in the countryside and in cities. The number of wholesale produce

markets increased by 450 percent between 1983 and 1986, reaching a total of 1,100 and easing pressure on the state produce dis- tribution network, which had been strained by the burgeoning

agricultural production engendered by rural reforms. In 1986 free markets, called "commodity fairs," numbered 61,000 nationwide.

Once food was procured and transported to urban areas, it was

sold to consumers by state-owned stores and restaurants. In the

mid-1980s food items were also available in free markets, where

peasants sold their produce, and in privately owned restaurants. As noted previously, the prices of pigs, aquatic products, and

vegetables were determined by local authorities according to quality

and demand; prices of other products floated freely on the market. Except for grain, edible oil, and a few other rationed items,

338
Livestock are still an important form

of power and

transportation.

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus

Horse-drawn carts are

still frequently seen in the countryside.

Courtesy Stephanie Marcus
China: A Country Study

food items were in good supply. Industrial goods used in agricultural production were sold to agricultural units in the 1980s. Local

cooperatives or state supply and marketing bureaus sold most

agricultural producer goods, including chemical fertilizers and

insecticides, to households at set prices. The state also offered

preferential prices for agricultural inputs to grain farmers to encour- age grain production. Households were permitted to purchase

agricultural machinery and vehicles to transport goods to market.

In order to ensure that rural units could cover the costs of the

increasing quantities of industrial inputs required for higher yields,

the government periodically reduced the prices of the industrial

goods sold to farmers, while raising the procurement prices for agricultural products. In the mid-1980s, however, the price gap

between agricultural and industrial products was widening to the

disadvantage of farmers.

Industry

After 1982, reforms moved China's economy to a mixed sys- tem based on mandatory planning, guidance planning (use of

economic levers such as taxes, prices, and credit instead of administrative fiat), and the free market. In late 1984 further reforms

of the urban industrial economy and commerce reduced the scope

of mandatory planning, increased enterprise autonomy and the

authority of professional managers, loosened price controls to rationalize prices, and cut subsidies to enterprises. These changes

created a "socialist planned commodity economy," essentially a dual economy in which planned allocation and distribution are sup- plemented by market exchanges based on floating or free prices

(see Prices, ch. 5). As a result of these reforms, the distribution of goods used in industrial production was based on mandatory planning with fixed

prices, guidance planning with floating prices, and the free market. Mandatory planning covered sixty industrial products, including coal, crude oil, rolled steel, nonferrous metals, timber, cement,

electricity, basic industrial chemicals, chemical fertilizers, major

machines and electrical equipment, chemical fibers, newsprint,

cigarettes, and defense industry products. Once enterprises under

mandatory planning had met the state's mandatory plans and supply contracts, they could sell surplus production to commercial

departments or other enterprises. Prices of surplus industrial

producer goods floated within limits set by the state. The state also had a planned distribution system for important materials such as

coal, iron and steel, timber, and cement. Enterprise managers who

chose to exceed planned production goals purchased additional

340
Bicycle repair shop in Beijing

Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

Bicycle parking area in Beijing

Courtesy Rinn-Sup Shinn

341
China: A Country Study

materials on the market. Major cities established wholesale markets for industrial producer goods to supplement the state's allo- cation system.

Under guidance planning, enterprises try to meet the state's planned goals but make their own arrangements for production

and sales based on the orientation of the state's plans, the availability of raw and unfinished materials and energy supplies, and

the demands on the market. Prices of products under guidance planning either are unified prices or floating prices set by the state or

prices negotiated between buyers and suppliers. Production and

distribution of products not included in the state's plans are regulated by market conditions.

Lateral Economic Cooperation

China also undertook measures to develop "lateral economic

ties," that is, economic cooperation across regional and institu- tional boundaries. Until the late 1970s, China's planned economy

had encouraged regional and organizational autarky, whereby

enterprises controlled by a local authority found it almost impossible to do business with other enterprises not controlled by the same institution, a practice that resulted in economic waste and

inefficiency. Lateral economic cooperation broke down some barriers in the sectors of personnel, resources, capital, technical

expertise, and procurement and marketing of commodities. -In order

to promote increased and more efficient production and distribution of goods among regions and across institutional divisions, ties were encouraged among producers of raw and semifinished materials and processing enterprises, production enterprises and research

units (including colleges and universities), civilian and military

enterprises, various transportation entities, and industrial, agricultural, commercial, and foreign trade enterprises.

A multitiered network of transregional economic cooperation

associations also was established. The Seventh Five-Year Plan

(1986-90) divided China into three regions—eastern, central, and

western, each with its own economic development plans. In addition to the three major regions, three echelons of economic cooperation zones were created. The first echelon—national-level economic

development zones—cut across several provincial-level boundaries

and linked major economic areas. Among these were the Shanghai Economic Zone, the Northeastern Economic Zone, the energy

production bases centering on Shanxi Province, the Beijing-TianjinTangshan Economic Zone, and the Southwestern Economic Zone.

The second-echelon network linked provincial-level capitals with

designated ports and cities along vital communication lines and

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Trade and Transportation

included the Huaihai Economic Zone (consisting of fifteen coastal

prefectures and cities in Jiangsu, Anhui, Henan, and Shandong

provinces) and the Zhu Jiang Delta Economic Zone centered on

the southern city of Guangzhou. The third tier of zones centered on provincial-level capitals and included the Nanjing Regional Economic Cooperation Association. Smaller-scale lateral economic ties below the provincial level, among prefectures, counties, and cities, also were formed.

Retail Sales

Retail sales in China changed dramatically in the late 1970s and

early 1980s as economic reforms increased the supply of food items

and consumer goods, allowed state retail stores the freedom to purchase goods on their own, and permitted individuals and collectives greater freedom to engage in retail, service, and catering trades

in rural and urban areas. Retail sales increased 300 percent from

1977 to 1985, rising at an average yearly rate of 13.9 percent—10.5

percent when adjusted for inflation. In the 1980s retail sales to rural areas increased at an annual rate of 15.6 percent, outpacing the

9.7-percent increase in retail sales to urban areas and reflecting

the more rapid rise in rural incomes. In 1977 sales to rural areas comprised 52 percent of total retail sales; in 1984 rural sales accounted for 59.2 percent of the total. Consumer goods comprised

approximately 88 percent of retail sales in 1985, the remaining

12 percent consisting of farming materials and equipment.

The number of retail sales enterprises also expanded rapidly in the 1980s. In 1985 there were 10.7 million retail, catering, and

service establishments, a rise of 850 percent over 1976. Most

remarkable in the expansion of retail sales was the rapid rise of

collective and individually owned retail establishments. Individuals engaged in businesses numbered 12.2 million in 1985, more

than 40 times the 1976 figure. Furthermore, as state-owned busi- nesses either were leased or turned over to collective ownership or were leased to individuals, the share of state-owned commerce in

total retail sales dropped from 90.3 percent in 1976 to 40.5 per- cent in 1985.

In 1987 most urban retail and service establishments, including

state, collective, and private businesses or vendors, were located

either in major downtown commercial districts or in small neighborhood shopping areas. The neighborhood shopping areas were numerous and were situated so that at least one was within easy

walking distance of almost every household. They were able to supply nearly all the daily needs of their customers. A typical neighborhood shopping area in Beijing would contain a one-story

343
China: A Country Study

department store, bookstore, hardware store, bicycle repair shop,

combined tea shop and bakery, restaurant, theater, laundry, bank,

post office, barbershop, photography studio, and electrical appli- ance repair shop. The department stores had small pharmacies and

carried a substantial range of housewares, appliances, bicycles, toys,

sporting goods, fabrics, and clothing. Major shopping districts in big cities contained larger versions of the neighborhood stores as well as numerous specialty shops, selling such items as musical

instruments, sporting goods, hats, stationery, handicrafts, cameras, and clocks. Supplementing these retail establishments were free markets in which private and collective businesses provided services, hawked

wares, or sold food and drinks. Peasants from surrounding rural areas marketed their surplus produce or sideline production in these

markets. In the 1980s urban areas also saw a revival of "night markets," free markets that operated in the evening and offered

extended service hours that more formal establishments could not match.

In rural areas, supply and marketing cooperatives operated

general stores and small shopping complexes near village and township administrative headquarters. These businesses were supplemented by collective and individual businesses and by the free markets that appeared across the countryside in the 1980s as a result of rural reforms. Generally speaking, a smaller variety of consumer

goods was available in the countryside than in the cities. But the

lack was partially offset by the increased access of some peasants

to urban areas where they could purchase consumer goods and market agricultural items.

A number of important consumer goods, including grain, cot- ton cloth, meat, eggs, edible oil, sugar, and bicycles, were rationed

during the 1960s and 1970s. To purchase these items, workers had

to use coupons they received from their work units. By the

mid-1980s rationing of over seventy items had been eliminated;

production of consumer goods had increased, and most items were

in good supply. Grain, edible oil, and a few other items still required

coupons. In 1985 pork rationing was reinstated in twenty-one cities as supplies ran low. Pork was available at higher prices in supermarkets and free markets.

Foreign Trade

History of Chinese Foreign Trade

Chinese foreign trade began as early as the Western Han dynasty

(206 B.C.-A.D. 9), when the famous "silk route" through Central

344
Urban market in Qingdao, Shandong Province

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

Asia was pioneered by Chinese envoys (see The Imperial Era,

ch. 1). During later dynasties, Chinese ships traded throughout

maritime Asia, reaching as far as the African coast, while caravans extended trade contacts in Central Asia and into the Middle East. Foreign trade was never a major economic activity, however, and

Chinese emperors considered the country to be entirely self- sufficient. During parts of the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing

(1644-1911) dynasties, trade was officially discouraged.

In the nineteenth century, European nations used military force

to initiate sustained trade with China. From the time of the Opium

War (1839-42) until the founding of the People's Republic in 1949,

various Western countries and, starting in the 1890s, Japan compelled China to agree to a series of unequal treaties that enabled

foreigners to establish essentially autonomous economic bases and

operate with privileged status in China. Foreign privileges were

abolished when the People's Republic came into being (see Emergence of Modern China, ch. 1). Foreign trade did not account for a large part of the Chinese

economy for the first thirty years of the People's Republic. As in most large, continental countries, the amount of commerce with

other nations was small relative to domestic economic activity. During the 1950s and 1960s, the total value of foreign trade was only

about 2 percent of the gross national product (GNP). In the 1970s

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China: A Country Study

trade grew rapidly but in 1979 still amounted to only about 6 per- cent of GNP.

The importance of foreign trade in this period, however, far exceeded its volume. Foreign imports alleviated temporary but criti- cal shortages of food, cotton, and other agricultural products as well as long-term deficiencies in a number of essential items,

including raw materials such as chrome and manufactured goods

such as chemical fertilizer and finished steel products. The acquisition of foreign plants and equipment enabled China to utilize the more advanced technology of developed countries to speed its own

technological growth and economic development.

During the 1950s China imported Soviet plants and equipment

for the development program of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57).

At the same time, the Chinese government expanded exports of

agricultural products to repay loans that financed the imports (see

The First Five-Year Plan, ch. 5). Total trade peaked at the equivalent of US$4.3 billion in 1959, but a sudden decline in agricultural

production in 1959-61 required China's leaders to suspend fur- ther imports of machinery to purchase foreign grain. Under a policy

of "self-reliance," in 1962 total trade declined to US$2.7 billion. As the economy revived in the mid-1960s, plants and equipment

again were ordered from foreign suppliers, and substantial growth

in foreign trade was planned. But in the late 1960s, the chaos and

antiforeign activities of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76; see Glossary) caused trade again to decline.

The pragmatic modernization drive led by party leaders Zhou

Enlai and Deng Xiaoping and China's growing contacts with

Western nations resulted in a sharp acceleration of trade in the early

1970s. Imports of modern plants and equipment were particularly

emphasized, and after 1973 oil became an increasingly important

export. Trade more than doubled between 1970 and 1975, reaching US$13.9 billion. Growth in this period was about 9 percent

a year. As a proportion of GNP, trade grew from 1.7 percent in 1970 to 3.9 percent in 1975. In 1976 the atmosphere of uncertainty

resulting from the death of Mao and pressure from the Gang of

Four (see Glossary), whose members opposed reliance on foreign

technology, brought another decline in trade. Beginning in the late 1970s, China reversed the Maoist economic

development strategy and, by the early 1980s, had committed itself to a policy of being more open to the outside world and widening

foreign economic relations and trade. The opening up policy led

to the reorganization and decentralization of foreign trade institu- tions, the adoption of a legal framework to facilitate foreign eco- nomic relations and trade, direct foreign investment, the creation

346
Trade and Transportation

of special economic zones (see Glossary) and "open cities," the

rapid expansion of foreign trade, the importation of foreign tech- nology and management methods, involvement in international

financial markets, and participation in international foreign eco- nomic organizations. These changes not only benefited the Chinese

economy but also integrated China into the world economy. In 1979 Chinese trade totaled US$27.7 billion —6 percent of China's

GNP but only 0.7 percent of total world trade. In 1985 Chinese

foreign trade rose to US$70.8 billion, representing 20 percent of

China's GNP and 2 percent of total world trade and putting China

sixteenth in world trade rankings.

Trade Policy in the 1980s

Under the policy of opening up to the outside world, exports,

imports, and foreign capital were all assigned a role in promoting

economic development. Exports earned foreign currency, which was

used to fund domestic development projects and to purchase advanced foreign technology and management expertise. Imports of

capital goods and industrial supplies and foreign loans and investment were used to improve the infrastructure in the priority areas of

energy, transportation, and telecommunications and to modernize

the machine-building and electronics industries. To earn more for- eign currency and to conserve foreign exchange reserves, foreign

capital was also used to expand production of export commodities,

such as textiles, and of import substitutes, such as consumer goods.

China has adopted a variety of measures to promote its foreign

economic relations, maximizing the role of imports, exports, and

foreign capital in economic development. Foreign trade organizations were reorganized, and control of imports and exports was

relaxed or strengthened depending on the balance of trade and the

level of foreign exchange reserves. Heavy purchases of foreign plants

and equipment resulted in import restraint from 1980 to 1983.

Because of the expansion of exports in the mid-1980s, a large for- eign reserve surplus, and the decentralized management of foreign

trade, imports surged. Huge, uncontrolled purchases of consumer

goods led to trade deficits in 1984 and 1985, resulting in the introduction of an import and export licensing system, stricter controls on foreign exchange expenditures, and the devaluation of the yuan

in order to reduce the trade deficit and ensure that machinery,

equipment, and semifinished goods, rather than consumer goods, were imported. In 1985 China had foreign exchange reserves of

US$11.9 billion. China joined a number of international economic organizations,

becoming a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary

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China: A Country Study

Fund, the Asian Development Bank, the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the Multi-Fiber Agreement. Ghina

became an observer of GATT in 1982 and formally applied to participate as a full member in July 1986. China also reversed its aversion to foreign capital, borrowing money from international lending

organizations, foreign governments, and foreign commercial banks

and consortia and permitting foreign banks to open branches in China. The Chinese government maintained a good credit rating

internationally and did not pile up huge foreign debts like many

other communist and developing countries. Between 1979 and 1985,

China signed loans totaling US$20.3 billion, US$15.6 billion of

which it already had used. Most loans went into infrastructure

projects, such as energy and transportation, and funded raw- materials imports. The Bank of China, the principal foreign

exchange bank, established branches overseas and participated in international financial markets in Eurobonds and loan syndication.Legal and institutional frameworks to facilitate foreign investment and trade also were created. Laws on taxation, joint ventures, foreign investments, and related areas were promulgated to encourage foreign investment. In 1979 China created four special

economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou (in Guangdong

Province), and Xiamen (in Fujian Province). The special economic

zones essentially were export-processing zones designed to attract foreign investment, expand exports, and import technology and

expertise. In 1984 fourteen coastal cities were designated "open

cities." These too were intended to attract foreign funds and technology. But in 1985 the government decided to concentrate

resources on only four of the cities: Dalian, Guangzhou, Shanghai,

and Tianjin. Although the special economic zones and open cities had the power to grant investment incentives, problems with the

red tape, bureaucratic interference, and lack of basic infrastruc- ture resulted in less foreign investment and fewer high-technology

projects than initially envisioned.

From 1979 to 1985, China received US$16.2 billion in foreign

investment and used US$4.6 billion of that amount. By 1986 China

had over 6,200 foreign-funded businesses, including 2,741 joint

ventures, 3,381 cooperatively managed businesses, and 151 enterprises with sole foreign investment. Of the joint ventures, 70 per- cent were in production enterprises (manufacturing or processing)

and 30 percent were service industries (primarily hotels or tourism).

Hong Kong provided 80 percent of the joint-venture partners, the

United States 7 percent, and Japan 6 percent.

348
A 22-million-ton berth at the Baoshan iron and steel works, Shanghai

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

Organization of Foreign Trade

The increasingly complex foreign trade system underwent

expansion and decentralization in the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1979

the Ministry of Foreign Trade's nine foreign trade corporations

lost their monopoly on import and export transactions as the industrial ministries were permitted to establish their own foreign trade

enterprises. The provincial branch corporations of the state for- eign trade corporations were granted more autonomy, and some

provinces, notably Fujian, Guangdong, and the special municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai were permitted to set up independent, provincial-level import-export companies. Some

selected provincial enterprises were granted autonomy in foreign

trade decisions. In 1982 the State Council's Import-Export Control Commission, Foreign Investment and Control Commission,

Ministry of Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations were merged to form the Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade. In 1984 the foreign trade system underwent

further decentralization. Foreign trade corporations under this and

other ministries and under provincial-level units became independent of their parent organizations and were responsible for their

own profits and losses. An agency system for foreign trade also was

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China: A Country Study

established, in which imports and exports were handled by specialized enterprises and corporations acting as agents on a commission basis.

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade

The main functions of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade were to establish and supervise foreign trade policies; to work with the State Planning Commission in setting

long-term foreign trade plans and annual quotas for imports and

exports; to control imports and exports through licenses and quotas; to supervise the management of foreign trade corporations and

enterprises; and to coordinate economic and trade relations with

foreign governments and international economic organizations. The

ministry also undertook international market research, led insti- tutes of foreign economic relations and trade, and directed the

General Administration of Customs.

Foreign Trade Corporations and Enterprises

In the late 1980s China had numerous specialized national cor- porations handling import and export transactions in such areas

as arts and crafts, textiles, "native produce" and animal byproducts, foodstuffs of various kinds, chemicals, light industrial

products, metals and minerals technology, industrial machinery

and equipment, petrochemical and petroleum products, scientific instruments, aerospace technology and services, ships, and weapons

(see table 2, Appendix B). Although nominally supervised by the

Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade each of these

corporations was responsible for its own profits and losses. Included

among these enterprises, for example, was the Great Wall Industrial Corporation, which imported and exported transportation

vehicles, satellites and other products associated with aerospace pro- grams, mechanical equipment, electrical products, hardware and

tools, medical apparatus, and chemicals. China Northern Industrial Corporation, subordinate to the Ministry of Ordnance Industry, used military production facilities to manufacture civilian products for export. The business activities of China Northern

Industrial Corporation included the sale of heavy machinery, hard- ware and tools, and heavy-duty vehicles; light chemical industry

products, such as plastic, paints, and coatings; and high-precision

machinery and optical and optical-electronic equipment. Other cor- porations offered a variety of professional consulting services. One

of these, the China International Economic Consultants Corporation, provided economic and legal expertise on investment and other

economic activities.

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Trade and Transportation

Financial Transactions and Investment

Foreign exchange and reserves were controlled in the mid-1980s

by the State Administration of Exchange Control under the People's Bank of China, the central bank. Foreign exchange alloca- tions to banks, ministries, and enterprises were all approved by

the State Administration of Exchange Control. The Bank of China,

the foreign exchange arm of the People's Bank of China, lost its monopoly on all foreign exchange transactions in 1984 when the

Agricultural Bank, People's Construction Bank, China Industrial

and Commercial Bank, and China International Trust and Invest- ment Corporation (CITIC) were permitted to deal in foreign cur- rency. The Bank of China remained China's principal foreign

exchange bank and provided loans for production and commercial transactions related to exports, set up branches overseas, maintained correspondent relations with foreign banks, and did research on international monetary trends. The Bank of China also was

active in international financial markets through such activities as loan syndication and issuing of foreign bonds. CITIC, formed in 1979 to facilitate foreign investment in China, also borrowed and

lent internationally and issued foreign bonds in addition to encour- aging and participating in joint ventures, importing foreign technology and equipment, and making overseas investments. In 1986

CITIC was renamed CITIC Group and shifted its emphasis to power, metallurgical, and raw materials industries, which had trou- ble attracting investments. In late 1986 the CITIC Group had set up 47 joint ventures, invested in 114 domestic companies, and

issued US$550 million in foreign bonds. The China Investment

Bank was established in 1981 as a channel for medium- and longterm loans from international financial institutions such as the

World Bank.

Other Organizations Involved in Trade

The State Council's State Planning Commission and State Economic Commission were involved in long-term planning for the

development of foreign trade, and they developed national priorities for imports and exports. Several other organizations under the

State Council were also involved in foreign trade matters: the Special Economic Zones Office, State Import and Export Commodities Inspection Administration, General Administration of Customs,

and China Travel and Tourism Bureau. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) assisted the Ministry

of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in foreign trade relations. CCPIT handled trade delegations to and from China, organized

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China: A Country Study

foreign trade exhibitions in China and Chinese exhibitions in other

countries, and published periodicals promoting Chinese trade. The

People's Insurance Company of China expanded its operations in 1980 for the purpose of encouraging foreign trade. New categories

of coverage offered to foreign firms included compensatory trade,

satellite launching, nuclear power plant safety, offshore oil development insurance, insurance against contract failure, and insurance

against political risk. Composition of Foreign Trade

The dominant pattern of foreign trade after 1949 was to import

industrial producer goods from developed countries and to pay for them with exports of food, crude materials, and light manufactures,

especially textiles. The pattern was altered as circumstances

demanded; in the period of economic collapse following the Great

Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), food imports increased from

a negligible amount in 1959 to 39 percent of all imports in 1962.

At the same time, imports of machinery and equipment dropped

from 41 percent to 5 percent of the total. From this time on, food

and live animals remained a significant, although declining, share

of imports, amounting to 14.8 percent of the total in 1980 but dropping to 4.1 percent in 1985. The pattern also shifted over time as China's industrial sector expanded, gradually increasing the share

of exports accounted for by manufactured goods. Manufactures

provided only 30 percent of all exports in 1959, 37.9 percent in 1975, and grew to 44.9 percent in 1985.

Important changes occurred in several specific trade categories

in the 1970s and 1980s (see table 17, Appendix A). Imports of textile fibers rose from 5.8 percent in 1975 to 10.7 percent in 1980

as the Chinese textile industry grew faster than domestic cotton

supplies but then fell to 4 percent in 1985 as domestic cotton production increased. Imports of unfinished textile products also increased

from 1.3 percent in 1975 to 5.3 percent in 1985 as a result of textile industry growth. Iron and steel accounted for approximately

20 percent of imports in the 1970s, fell to 11.6 percent in 1980,

then rose to 14.9 percent in 1985. Imports of manufactured goods,

machinery, and transportation equipment represented 62.6 per- cent of total import value in 1975, fell to 53.9 percent in 1980 as imports were cut back during the "period of readjustment" of the

economy (1979-81), and rose again to 75.2 percent in 1985. On

the export side, the share of foodstuffs fell to 12.5 percent in 1985.

The fastest growing export item in the 1970s was petroleum, which was first exported in 1973. Petroleum rocketed to 12.1 percent of

all exports in 1975, 22 percent in 1980, and 21.2 percent in 1985.

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In the 1980s textile exports grew rapidly. Although exports of

unfinished textiles remained about 14 percent of total exports, all categories of textile exports rose from 5 percent in 1975 to 18.7 per- cent in 1984. In 1986 textiles replaced petroleum as China's largest single export item.

Trading Partners

During the 1950s China's primary foreign trading partner was

the Soviet Union. In 1959 trade with the Soviet Union accounted

for nearly 48 percent of China's total. As relations between the

two countries deteriorated in the early 1960s, the volume of trade

fell, decreasing to only just over 7 percent of Chinese trade by 1966.

During the 1970s trade with the Soviet Union averaged about

2 percent of China's total, while trade with all communist countries made up about 15 percent. In 1986, despite a trade pact with

the Soviet Union, Chinese-Soviet trade, according to Chinese cus- toms statistics, amounted to only 3.4 percent of China's total trade,

while trade with all communist countries fell to 9 percent of the

total (see table 18, Appendix A).

By the mid-1960s Japan had become China's leading trading

partner, accounting for 15 percent of trade in 1966. Japan was

China's most natural trading partner; it was closer to China than

any other industrial country and had the best transportation links

to it. The Japanese economy was highly advanced in those areas where China was weakest, especially heavy industry and modern

technology, while China was well endowed with some of the important natural resources that Japan lacked, notably coal and oil. In

the 1980s Japan accounted for over 20 percent of China's foreign

trade and in 1986 provided 28.9 percent of China's imports and

15.2 percent of its exports. Starting in the late 1970s, China ran

a trade deficit with Japan.

Beginning in the 1960s, Hong Kong was consistently the leading market for China's exports and its second largest partner in overall trade. In 1986 Hong Kong received 31.6 percent of Chinese

goods sold abroad and supplied about 13 percent of China's imports.

Hong Kong was a major market for Chinese foodstuffs and served

as a transshipment port for Chinese goods reexported to other

countries.

The United States banned trade with China until the early 1970s.

Thereafter trade grew rapidly, and after the full normalization of

diplomatic and commercial relations in 1979, the United States became the second largest importer to China and in 1986 was

China's third largest partner in overall trade. Most American goods

imported by China were either high-technology industrial products,

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China: A Country Study

such as aircraft, or agricultural products, primarily grain and cotton. Western Europe has been important in Chinese foreign trade

since the mid-1960s. The Federal Republic of Germany, in particular, was second only to Japan in supplying industrial goods to China during most of this period. China followed a policy of shopping widely for its industrial purchases, and it concluded deals of

various sizes with nearly all of the West European nations. In 1986

Western Europe accounted for nearly 18 percent of China's for- eign trade, with imports exceeding exports.

Third World countries have long served as a market for Chinese

agricultural and light industrial products. In 1986 developing countries purchased about 15 percent of Chinese exports and supplied

about 8 percent of China's imports.

Tourism

Between 1949 and 1974, the People's Republic was closed to all but selected foreign visitors. Beginning in the late 1970s, when the

leadership decided to promote tourism vigorously as a means of

earning foreign exchange, China quickly developed its own tourist

industry. Major hotel construction programs greatly increased the

number of hotels and guest houses, more historic and scenic spots were renovated and opened to tourists, and professional guides and

other service personnel were trained. The expansion of domestic

and international airline traffic and other tourist transportation

facilities made travel more convenient. Over 250 cities and counties were opened to foreign visitors by the mid-1980s. Travelers

needed only valid visas or residence permits to visit 100 locations;

the remaining locales required travel permits from public security

departments. In 1985 approximately 1 .4 million foreigners visited

China, and nearly US$1.3 billion was earned from tourism.

Transportation

Transportation is a major factor in China's national economy.

For most of the period since 1949, however, transportation occupied

a relatively low priority in China's national development. Inadequate transportation systems hindered the movement of coal from

mine to user, the transportation of agricultural and light industrial

products from rural to urban areas, and the delivery of imports

and exports. As a result, the underdeveloped transportation sys- tem constrained the pace of economic development throughout the

country. In the 1980s the updating of transportation systems was

given priority, and improvements were made throughout the trans- portation sector (see fig. 15). In 1986 China's transportation system consisted of long-distance

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Trade and Transportation

Figure 15. Railroads and Major Air and Sea Ports, 1987

hauling by railroads and inland waterways and medium-distance

and rural transportation by trucks and buses on national and

provincial-level highways. Waterborne transportation dominated

freight traffic in east, central, and southwest China, along the Chang

Jiang (Yangtze River) and its tributaries, and in Guangdong

Province and Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, served by the

Zhu Jiang (Pearl River) system. All provinces, autonomous regions,

and special municipalities, with the exception of Xizang Autono- mous Region (Tibet), were linked by railroads. Many double-track

lines, electrified lines, special lines, and bridges were added to the

system. Subways were operating in Beijing and Tianjin, and construction was being planned in other large cities. National highways linked provincial-level capitals with Beijing and major ports.

Roads were built between large, medium, and small towns as well

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China: A Country Study

as between towns and railroad eonnections. The maritime fleet made hundreds of port calls in virtually all parts of the world, but

the inadequate port and harbor facilities at home still caused major

problems. Civil aviation underwent tremendous development during the 1980s. Domestic and international air service was greatly

increased. In 1985 the transportation system handled 2.7 billion tons of goods. Of this, the railroads handled 1.3 billion tons; highways handled 762 million tons; inland waterways handled 434 million tons; ocean shipping handled 65 million tons; and civil airlines handled 195,000 tons. The 1985 volume of passenger traffic was

428 billion passenger-kilometers. Of this, railroad traffic accounted

for 241.6 billion passenger-kilometers; road traffic, for 157.3 bil- lion passenger-kilometers; waterway traffic, for 17.4 billion passenger-kilometers; and air traffic, for 11.7 billion passengerkilometers.

Ownership and control of the different elements of the trans- portation system varied according to their roles and their importance in the national economy. The railroads were owned by the

state and controlled by the Ministry of Railways. In 1986 a contract system for the management of railroad lines was introduced

in China. Five-year contracts were signed between the ministry

and individual railroad bureaus that were given responsibility for their profits and losses. The merchant fleet was operated by the

China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), a state-owned enterprise. The national airline was run by the General Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC). Regional airlines were

run by provincial-level and municipal authorities. Highways and

inland waterways were the responsibilities of the Ministry of Communications. Trucking and inland navigation were handled by

government-operated transportation departments as well as by pri- vate enterprises.

Transportation was designated a top priority in the Seventh FiveYear Plan (1986-90). Under the plan, transportation-related

projects accounted for 39 of 190 priority projects. Because most

were long-term development projects, a large number were car- ried over from 1985, and only a few new ones were added. The

plan called for an increase of approximately 30 percent in the volume

of various kinds of cargo transportation by 1990 over 1985 levels. So each mode of transportation would have to increase its volume

by approximately 5.4 percent annually during the 5-year period.

The plan also called for updating passenger and freight transportation and improving railroad, waterways, and air transportation.

To achieve these goals, the government planned to increase state and local investments as well as to use private funds.

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Trade and Transportation

The Seventh Five-Year Plan gave top priority to increasing the

capacity of existing rail lines and, in particular, to improving the

coal transportation lines between Shanxi Province and other

provincial-level units and ports and to boosting total transportation capacity to 230 million tons by 1990. Other targets were the

construction of 3,600 kilometers of new rail lines, the doubletracking of 3,300 kilometers of existing lines, and the electrifica- tion of 4,000 kilometers of existing lines. Port construction also was listed as a priority project in the plan.

The combined accommodation capacity of ports was to be increased

by 200 million tons, as compared with 100 million tons under the

Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-85). Priority also was given to highway construction. China planned to build new highways and rebuild

existing highways to a total length of 140,000 kilometers. At the

end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan, the total length of highways

was to be increased to 1 million kilometers from the existing 940,000

kilometers. Air passenger traffic was to be increased by an aver- age of 14.5 percent annually over the 5-year period, and air trans- portation operations were to be decentralized. Existing airports were

to be upgraded and new ones built. Railroads

China's first railroad line was built in 1876. In the 73 years that

followed, 22,000 kilometers of track were laid, but only half were

operable in 1949. Between 1949 and 1985, more than 30,000 kilo- meters of lines were added to the existing network, mostly in the

southwest or coastal areas where previous rail development had

been concentrated. By 1984 China had 52,000 kilometers of operating track, 4,000 kilometers of which had been electrified. All provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities, with

the exception of Xizang Autonomous Region, were linked by rail. Many double-track lines, electric lines, special lines, and railroad

bridges were added to the system. Railroad technology also was

upgraded to improve the performance of the existing rail network.

There still were shortcomings, however. Most of the trunk lines were old, there was a general shortage of double-track lines, and

Chinese officials admitted that antiquated management techniques

still were being practiced. There were plans in the late 1980s to upgrade the rail system, particularly in east China, in the hope

of improving performance.

China's railroads are heavily used. In 1986, the latest year for which statistics were available, railroads carried 1 billion passengers

and 1.3 billion tons of cargo. The average freight traffic density was 15 million tons per route-kilometer, double that of the United

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China: A Country Study

States and three times that of India. Turnaround time between

freight car loadings averaged less than four days.

Between 1980 and 1985, China built about 3,270 kilometers of

new track, converted 1,581 kilometers to double track, and electrified 2,500 kilometers of track. The total investment in this period

amounted to over ¥21.4 billion (for value of the yuan—see Glossary). Railroads accounted for over two-thirds of the total ton-kilometers and over half the passenger-kilometers in China's

transportation systems. China's longest electrified double-track rail- road, running from Beijing to Datong, Shanxi Province, was opened

for operation in 1984. One of the world's highest railroads, at 3,000

meters above sea level in Qinghai Province, also went into service

in the same year, and improved doubletrack railroads, some of them

electrified, offered a fast way to transport coal from Shanxi Province

to the highly industrialized eastern part of the country and the port

of Qinhuangdao for export.

Production and maintenance of modern locomotives also made

an important contribution to increased rail capacity. Manufacturing output in the mid-1980s increased significantly when production of electric and diesel locomotives for the first time exceeded

that of steam-powered ones. China hoped, in the long-run, to phase

out its steam-powered locomotives. In the mid-1980s China had more than 280,000 freight cars and about 20,000 passenger cars. The country still was unable, however, to meet the transportation

needs brought about by rapid economic expansion.

Subways

China's first subways opened to traffic in Beijing in 1970, and

Tianjin in 1980, respectively, and subway systems were planned

for construction in Harbin, Shanghai, and Guangzhou beginning

in the 1980s. In its first phase, the Beijing subway system had 23.6

kilometers of track and 17 stations. In 1984 the second phase of

construction added 16.1 kilometers of track and 12 stations, and

in 1987 additional track and another station were added to close the loop on a now circular system. In 1987 there were plans to upgrade the signaling system and railcar equipment on seventeen

kilometers of the first segment built. The subway carried more than

100 million passengers in 1985, or about 280,000 on an average

day and 450,000 on a peak day. In 1987 this accounted for only

4 percent of Beijing's 9 million commuters. The Beijing subway

authorities estimated that passenger traffic would increase 20 percent yearly. To accommodate the increase in riders, Beijing planned

to construct an extension of a seven-kilometer subway line under

Chang'an Boulevard, from Fuxing Gate in the east to Jianguo Gate

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359
China: A Country Study

in the west. The Tianjin subway opened a five-kilometer line in 1980. The Shanghai subway was planned to have 14.4 kilometers

of track in its first phase.

Highways and Roads

In 1986 China had approximately 962,800 kilometers of highways, 52,000 kilometers of which were completed between 1980

and 1985. During this period China also rebuilt 22,000 kilometers

of highways in cities and rural areas. Nearly 110,000 kilometers

of roads were designated part of a network of national highways,

including roads linking provincial-level capitals with Beijing and

China's major ports.

Provincial-level and local governments were responsible for their

own transportation and road construction, some with foreign expertise and financing to hasten the process. Most financing and maintenance funds came from the provincial level, supplemented in the case of rural roads by local labor. In line with the increased emphasis on developing light industry and decentralizing agriculture, roads were built in large, medium-sized, and small towns and to railroad

connections, making it possible for products to move rapidly between

cities and across provincial-level boundaries. In 1986 approximately

780,000 kilometers of the roads, or 81 percent, were surfaced. The

remaining 19 percent (fair-weather roads) were in poor condition,

hardly passable on rainy days. Only 20 percent of the roads were paved with asphalt; about 80 percent had gravel surfaces. In addition, 60 percent of the major highways needed repair.

China's highways carried 660 million tons of freight and 410

million passengers in 1985. In 1984 the authorities began assigning medium-distance traffic (certain goods and sundries traveling

less than 100 kilometers and passengers less than 200 kilometers)

to highways to relieve the pressure on railroads. Almost 800 national

highways were used for transporting cargo. Joint provincial-level

transportation centers were designated to take care of cross-country

cargo transportation between provinces, autonomous regions, and

special municipalities. A total of about 15,000 scheduled rural buses

carried 4.3 million passengers daily, and more than 2,300 national

bus services handled a daily average of 450,000 passengers. The

number of trucks and buses operated by individuals, collectives,

and families reached 130,000 in 1984, about half the number of

state-owned vehicles. In 1986 there were 290,000 private motor

vehicles in China, 95 percent of which were trucks. Most trucks

had a four- to five-ton capacity.

The automobile was becoming an increasingly important mode

of transportation in China. The automotive industry gave priority

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Trade and Transportation

to improving quality and developing new models rather than

increasing production. Nevertheless, as a result of the introduction of modern technology through joint ventures with advanced

industrialized countries, Chinese automobile production for 1985

surpassed 400,000 units.

Although cars and trucks were the primary means of highway

transportation, in the mid-1980s carts pulled by horses, mules, donkeys, cows, oxen, and camels still were common in rural areas. Motor vehicles often were unable to reach efficient travel speeds near towns and cities in rural areas because of the large number

of slow-moving tractors, bicycles, hand- and animal-drawn carts, and pedestrians. Strict adherence to relatively low speed limits in some areas also kept travel speeds at inefficient levels. Bridges

In the late 1980s, China had more than 140,000 highway bridges.

Their length totaled almost 4,000 kilometers. Among the best

known were the Huang He (Yellow River) Bridge in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia), the Liu Jiang Bridge

in Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region, the Ou Jiang Bridge in Zhejiang Province, the Quanzhou Bridge in Fujian Province, and

four large bridges along the Guangzhou-Shenzhen highway. Five

major bridges—including China's longest highway bridge, the

5,560-meter-long Huang He Bridge at Zhengzhou—were under

construction during the mid-1980s, and a 10,282-meter-long rail- road bridge across the Huang He on the Shandong-Henan border was completed in 1985.

Inland Waterways

Inland navigation is China's oldest form of transportation (see

fig. 16). Despite the potential advantages of water transportation,

it was often mismanaged or neglected in the past. Beginning in 1960 the network of navigable inland waterways decreased further

because of the construction of dams and irrigation works and the

increasing sedimentation. But by the early 1980s, as the railroads

became increasingly congested, the authorities came to see water

transportation as a much less expensive alternative to new road

and railroad construction. The central government set out to over- haul the inefficient inland waterway system and called upon localities to play major roles in managing and financing most of the projects.

By 1984 China's longest river, the Chang Jiang, with a total of

70,000 kilometers of waterways open to shipping on its main stream

and 3,600 kilometers on its tributaries, became the nation's busiest shipping lane, carrying 72 percent of China's total waterborne

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China: A Country Study

traffic. An estimated 340,000 people and 170,000 boats were engaged in the water transportation business. More than 800 shipping enterprises and 60 shipping companies transported over 259

million tons of cargo on the Chang Jiang and its tributaries in 1984.

Nationally, in 1985 the inland waterways carried some 434 million tons of cargo. In 1986 there were approximately 138,600 kilo- meters of inland waterways, 79 percent of which were navigable.

The Cihuai Canal in northern Anhui Province opened to navigation in 1984. This 134-kilometer canal linking the Ying He, a major tributary of the Huai He, with the Huai He's main course, had an annual capacity of 600,000 tons of cargo. The canal promoted the flow of goods between Anhui and neighboring provinces

and helped to develop the Huai He Plain, one of China's major

grain-producing areas. Maritime Shipping

During the early 1960s, China's merchant marine had fewer than

thirty ships. By the 1970s and 1980s, maritime shipping capabilities had greatly increased. In 1985 China established eleven shipping offices and jointly operated shipping companies in foreign

countries. In 1986 China ranked ninth in world shipping with more

than 600 ships and a total tonnage of 16 million, including modern

roll-on and roll-off ships, container ships, large bulk carriers,

refrigerator ships, oil tankers, and multipurpose ships. The fleet called at more than 400 ports in more than 100 countries.

The container ship fleet also was expanding rapidly. In 1984

China had only fifteen container ships. Seven more were added

in 1985, and an additional twenty-two were on order. By the early

1980s, Chinese shipyards had begun to manufacture a large number of ships for their own maritime fleet. The China Shipping

Inspection Bureau became a member of the Suez Canal Authority

in 1984, empowering China to sign and issue seaworthiness certificates for ships on the Suez Canal and confirming the good reputation and maturity of its shipbuilding industry. In 1986 China

had 523 shipyards of various sizes, 160 specialized factories, 540,000

employees, and more than 80 scientific research institutes. The main

shipbuilding and repairing bases of Shanghai, Dalian, Tianjin,

Guangzhou, and Wuhan had 14 berths for 10,000-ton-class ships

and 13 docks.

The inadequacy of port and harbor facilities has been a longstanding problem for China but has become a more serious obstacle because of increased foreign trade. Beginning in the 1970s, the

authorities gave priority to port construction. From 1972 to 1982,

port traffic increased sixfold, largely because of the foreign trade

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Trade and Transportation

Figure 16. Principal Improved Inland Waterways, 1987

boom. The imbalance between supply and demand continued to grow. Poor management and limited port facilities created such

backups that by 1985 an average of 400 to 500 ships were waiting

to enter major Chinese ports on any given day. The July 1985 delay

of more than 500 ships, for instance, caused huge losses. All of

China's major ports are undergoing some construction. To speed

economic development, the Seventh Five-Year Plan called for the

construction by 1990 of 200 new berths—120 deep-water berths

for ships above 10,000 tons and 80 medium-sized berths for ships

below 10,000 tons—bringing the total number of berths to 1,200.

Major port facilities were developed all along China's coast. Civil Aviation

In 1987 China's civil aviation system was operated by the General

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China: A Country Study

Administration of Civil Aviation of China (CAAC). By 1987 China

had more than 229,000 kilometers of domestic air routes and more

than 94,000 kilometers of international air routes. The more than

9 million passengers and 102,000 tons of freight traffic represented

a 40 percent growth over the previous year. The air fleet consisted

of about 175 aircraft and smaller turboprop transports. CAAC had

274 air routes, including 33 international flights to 28 cities in 23 countries, such as Tokyo, Osaka, Nagasaki, New York, San

Francisco, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Frankfurt, East Berlin,

Zurich, Moscow, Istanbul, Manila, Bangkok, Singapore, Sydney,

and Hong Kong. Almost 200 domestic air routes connected such

major cities as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Hangzhou.

Kunming, Chengdu, and Xi'an, as well as a number of smaller

cities. The government had bilateral air service agreements with more than 40 countries and working relations with approximately

386 foreign airline companies. CAAC also provided air service for agriculture, forestry, communications, and scientific research.

The staff of CAAC was estimated at approximately 50,000 in the 1980s. The administration operated three training colleges to educate future airline personnel. In a bid to improve CAAC's ser- vices, more ticket offices were opened in major cities for domestic

and international flights. In the mid-1980s regional airlines began operations under the

general aegis of CAAC. Wuhan Airlines, run by the Wuhan

municipal authorities, started scheduled passenger flights to Hubei.

Hunan, Guangdong, and Sichuan provinces in May 1986. Xizang

also planned to set up its own airline to fly to Kathmandu and Hong

Kong.

In the 1980s the central government increased its investment in airport construction, and some local governments also granted special funds for such projects. Lhasa Airport in Xizang, Jiamusi Airport in Heilongjiang Province, and Kashi and Yining airports in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region were expanded, and new air- ports were under construction in Xi'an, Luoyang, and Shenzhen.

An investment ofY500 million was planned for expanding run- ways and building new terminals and other airport facilities. In 1986 China had more than ninety civilian airports, of which eight

could accommodate Boeing 747s and thirty-two could accommodate Boeing 737s and Tridents.

Postal Services

Postal service is administered by the Ministry of Posts and

Telecommunications, which was established in 1949 and reestablished in 1973 after a two-year period during which the postal and

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Trade and Transportation

telecommunications functions had been separated and the ministry downgraded to a subministerial level. Although postal service

in China goes back some 2,500 years, modern postal services were

not established until 1877 by the Qing government. Development

was slow; by 1949 there was only 1 post office for every 370 square

kilometers.

Since then the postal service has grown rapidly. In 1984 China

had 53,000 post and telecommunications offices and 5 million kilo- meters of postal routes, including 240,000 kilometers of railroad

postal routes, 624,000 kilometers of highway postal routes, and

230,000 kilometers of airmail routes. By 1985 post offices were handling 4.7 billion first-class letters and 25 billion newspapers and

periodicals. In 1987, after a six-year hiatus, six-digit postal codes were ordered to be put into use. Telecommunications

In 1987 China possessed a diversified telecommunications sys- tem that linked all parts of the country by telephone, telegraph,

radio, and television. None of the telecommunications forms were

as prevalent or as advanced as those in modern Western countries,

but the system included some of the most sophisticated technology

in the world and constituted a foundation for further development

of a modern network.

Historical Development

When the People's Republic was founded in 1949, the telecommunications facilities in China were outdated, and many had been

damaged or destroyed during the war years. In the 1950s existing

facilities were repaired, and, with Soviet assistance, considerable

progress was made toward establishing a long-distance telephone

wire network connecting Beijing to provincial-level capitals. In

addition, conference telephone service was initiated, radio communications were improved, and the production of telecommunications equipment was accelerated. Growth in telecommunications

halted with the general economic collapse after the Great Leap For- ward (1958-60) but revived in the 1960s after the telephone net- work was expanded and improved equipment was introduced,

including imports of Western plants. An important component of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) was a major development pro- gram for the telecommunications system. The program allotted top

priority to scarce electronics and construction resources and dramatically improved all aspects of China's telecommunications capabilities. Microwave radio relay lines and buried cable lines were

constructed to create a network of wideband carrier trunk lines,

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China: A Country Study

which covered the entire country. China was linked to the inter- national telecommunications network by the installation of communications satellite ground stations and the construction of coaxial

cables linking Guangdong Province with Hong Kong and Macao.

Provincial-level units and municipalities rapidly expanded local tele- phone and wire broadcasting networks. Expansion and modernization of the telecommunications system continued throughout the

late 1970s and early 1980s, giving particular emphasis to the pro- duction of radio and television sets and expanded broadcasting capabilities. Telecommunications Services

In 1987 the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications administered China's telecommunications systems and related research

and production facilities. Besides postal services, some of which were handled by electronic means, the ministry was involved in a wide spectrum of telephone, wire, telegraph, and international

communications (see Postal Services, this ch.). The Ministry of

Radio and Television was established as a separate entity in 1982

to administer and upgrade the status of television and radio broadcasting. Subordinate to this ministry were the Central People's

Broadcasting Station, Radio Beijing, and China Central Television. Additionally, the various broadcasting training, talent-search,

research, publishing, and manufacturing organizations were

brought under the control of the Ministry of Radio and Television. In 1986 responsibility for the movie industry was transferred

from the Ministry of Culture to the new Ministry of Radio, Cinema,

and Television (see Contemporary Performing Arts, ch. 4). The

Chinese Communist Party's Propaganda Department coordinates

the work of both telecommunications-related ministries.

As of 1987 the quality of telecommunications services in China

had improved markedly over earlier years. A considerable influx

of foreign technology and increased domestic production capabilities had a major impact in the post-Mao period.

The primary form of telecommunications in the 1980s was local and long-distance telephone service administered by six regional

bureaus: Beijing (north region), Shanghai (east region), Xi'an

(northwest region), Chengdu (southwest region), Wuhan (centralsouth region), and Shenyang (northeast region). These regional

headquarters served as switching centers for provincial-level subsystems. By 1986 China had nearly 3 million telephone exchange

lines, including 34,000 long-distance exchange lines with direct,

automatic service to 24 cities. By late 1986 fiber optic communications technology was being employed to relieve the strain on

366
Chengdu Airport in Sichuan Province, a major air traffic center Courtesy Sichuan People's Publishing House

existing telephone circuits. International service was routed through

overseas exchanges located in Beijing and Shanghai. Guangdong

Province had coaxial cable and microwave lines linking it to Hong

Kong and Macao.

The large, continuously upgraded satellite ground stations, originally installed in 1972 to provide live coverage of the visits to China

by U.S. president Richard M. Nixon and Japanese prime minister

Kakuei Tanaka, still served as the base for China's international

satellite communications network in the mid-1980s. By 1977 China

had joined Intelsat and, using ground stations in Beijing and Shanghai, had linked up with satellites over the Indian and Pacific oceans. In April 1984 China launched an experimental communications

satellite for trial transmission of broadcasts, telegrams, telephone

calls, and facsimile, probably to remote areas of the country. In February 1986 China launched its first fully operational telecommunications and broadcast satellite. The quality and communications capacity of the second satellite reportedly was much greater

than the first. In mid-1987 both satellites were still functioning.

With these satellites in place China's domestic satellite communication network went into operation, facilitating television and radio

transmissions and providing direct-dial long-distance telephone,

telegraph, and facsimile service. The network had ground stations

in Beijing, Uriimqi, Hohhot, Lhasa, and Guangzhou, which also were linked to an Intelsat satellite over the Indian Ocean.

Telegraph development received lower priority than the telephone

network largely because of the difficulties involved in transmitting

the written Chinese language. Computer technology gradually

alleviated these problems and facilitated further growth in this area. By 1983 China had nearly 10,000 telegraph cables and telex lines

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China: A Country Study

transmitting over 170 million messages annually. Most telegrams were transmitted by cables or by shortwave radio. Cut-microwave

transmission also was used. Teletype transmission was used lor messages at the international level, but some 40 percent of county and

municipal telegrams still were transmitted by Morse code.

Apart from traditional telegraph and telephone services, China

also had facsimile, low-speed data-transmission, and computercontrolled telecommunications services. These included on-line

information retrieval terminals in Beijing, Changsha, and Baotou

that enabled international telecommunications networks to retrieve news and scientific, technical, economic, and cultural information

from international sources. High-speed newspaper-page-facsimile equipment and Chinesecharacter-code translation equipment were used on a large scale. Sixty-four-channel program-controlled automatic message retrans- mission equipment and low-or medium-speed data transmission

and exchange equipment also received extensive use. International

telex service was available in coastal cities and special economic

zones. The Central People's Broadcasting Station controlled China's

national radio network. Programming was administered by the

provincial-level units. The station produced general news and cul- tural and educational programs. It also provided programs for minority groups in the Korean, Manchurian, Zang (Tibetan),

Uygur, and Kazak languages, as well as programs directed toward

Taiwan and overseas Chinese (see Glossary) listeners. Radio Beijing

broadcast to the world in thirty-eight foreign languages, putonghua

(see Glossary), and various dialects, including Amoy, Cantonese,

and Hakka. It also provided English-language news programs aimed

at foreign residents in Beijing. Medium-wave, shortwave, and FM

stations reached 80 percent of the country—over 160 radio stations

and 500 relay and transmission stations—with some 240 radio

programs.

The nationwide network of wire lines and loudspeakers trans- mitted radio programs into virtually all rural communities and

many urban areas. By 1984 there were over 2,600 wired broadcasting stations, extending radio transmissions to rural areas outside

the range of regular broadcasting stations. In 1987 China Central Television (CCTV), the state network,

managed China's television programs. In 1985 consumers purchased 15 million new sets, including approximately 4 million color

sets. Production fell far short of demand. Because Chinese viewers often gathered in large groups to watch publicly owned sets, authorities estimated that two-thirds of the nation had access to

368
i

television. In 1987 there were about 70 million television sets, an

average of 29 sets per 100 families. CCTV had four channels that

supplied programs to the over ninety television stations throughout the country. Construction began on a major new CCTV stu- dio in Beijing in 1985. CCTV produced its own programs, a large

portion of which were educational, and the Television University

in Beijing produced three educational programs weekly. The

English-language lesson was the most popular program and had

an estimated 5 to 6 million viewers. Other programs included daily news, entertainment, teleplays, and special programs. Foreign pro- grams included films and cartoons. Chinese viewers were particularly interested in watching international news, sports, and drama

(see Contemporary Performing Arts, ch. 4; The Media, ch. 10).

Descriptions of the evolving domestic and foreign trade systems

are found in a variety of periodicals, including China Daily, Far Eastern Economic Review, Asiaweek, China Trade Report, China Business

Review, and Beijing Review. Jean C. Oi's "Peasant Grain Marketing and State Procurement: China's Grain Contracting System"

provides a good description of grain procurement and marketing.

Useful articles on foreign trade are "China's International Trade:

Policy and Organizational Change and Their Place in the

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China: A Country Study

'Economic Readjustment' " by Y.Y. Kueh and Christopher Howe

and "Understanding Chinese Trade" by John Frankenstein. Valuable analyses of China's economic reforms and their impact on

domestic and foreign trade appear in both volumes of the 1986

United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's China's Econ- omy Looks Toward the Year 2000 and in China 's Economy and Foreign

Trade, 1981-85 by Nai-Ruenn Chen and Jeffrey Lee. Transportation and telecommunications developments are described in the periodicals China Transport and China Business Review.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

370

This glazed earthenware funerary object from the Eastern Han dynasty

(A.D. 25-220) shows some of the intricacies of Chinese architecture of the era.
IN A SPEECH to the National Science Conference in March 1978,

then-Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping declared: "The crux of the Four

Modernizations is the mastery of modern science and technology.

Without the high-speed development of science and technology,

it is impossible to develop the national economy at a high speed."

For more than a century China's leaders have called for rapid

development of science and technology, and science policy has

played a greater role in national politics in China than in many

other countries. China's scientific and technical achievements are impressive in many fields. Although the World Bank classified it in the 1980s as a low-income, developing country, China has by

its own efforts developed nuclear weapons, the ability to launch

and recover satellites, a supercomputer, and high-yield hybrid rice. But the development of science and technology has been uneven,

and significant achievements in some fields are matched by low

levels in others.

The evolving structure of science and technology and frequent

reversals of policy under the People's Republic have combined to give Chinese science a distinctive character. The variation in quality

and achievements stems in part from a large and poorly educated

rural populace and limited opportunities for secondary and col- lege education—conditions common to all developing countries.

The character of Chinese science also reflects concentration of resources in a few key fields and institutions, often with military

applications. In more politically radical periods—such as the Great

Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)

efforts were made to expand the ranks of scientists and technicians

by sharply reducing education and certification standards.

China's leaders have involved themselves in the formulation of

science policy to a greater extent than have the leaders of most countries. Science policy also has played a significant part in the struggles between contending leaders, who have often acted as patrons

to different sectors of the scientific establishment. Party leaders, not themselves scientifically trained, have taken science and scientists quite seriously, seeing them as keys to economic development

and national strength. Party efforts to control science to "serve

production" and generate economic and military payoffs, however,

have met with repeated frustrations. The frustration in turn has

contributed to frequent reversals of policy and has exacerbated the

inherent tension between the scientific and political elites over the

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China: A Country Study

goals and control of the nation's science and technology. In any

economic system there are likely to be tensions and divergences

of interest between managers and scientists, but in China such ten- sions have been extreme and have led to repeated episodes of perse- cution of scientists and intellectuals. Science in China has been

marked by uneven development, wide variation in quality of work,

high level of involvement with politics, and high degree of policy

discontinuity. In the post-Mao era, the anti-intellectual policies of the Cultural

Revolution have been reversed, and such top leaders as Deng

Xiaoping have encouraged the development of science. But China's

leaders in the 1980s remained, like their predecessors over the past

100 years, interested in science primarily as a means to national

strength and economic growth. The policy makers' goal was the

creation of a vigorous scientific and technical establishment that

operates at the level of developed countries while contributing in a fairly direct way to agriculture, industry, and defense. The

mid-1980s saw a major effort to reform the scientific and technical

system through a range of institutional changes intended to pro- mote the application of scientific knowledge to production. As in the past 100 years, policy makers and scientists grappled with such

issues as the proportion of basic to applied research, the priorities

of various fields of research, the limits of professional and academic

freedom, and the best mechanisms for promoting industrial innovation and widespread assimilation of up-to-date technology.

Historical Development of Science and Technology Policy

Pre-1949 Patterns

Until the Ming dynasty (1368-1644), China was a world leader

in technology and scientific discovery. Many Chinese inventions

paper and printing, gunpowder, porcelain, the magnetic compass,

the sternpost rudder, and the lift lock for canals—made major contributions to economic growth in the Middle East and Europe. The

outside world remained uninformed about Chinese work in agronomy, pharmacology, mathematics, and optics. Scientific and technological activity in China dwindled, however, after the fourteenth

century. It became increasingly confined to little-known and marginal individuals who differed from Western scientists such as Galileo or Newton in two primary ways: they did not attempt to reduce the regularities of nature to mathematical form, and they

did not constitute a community of scholars, criticizing each others'

work and contributing to an ongoing program of research. Under

the last two dynasties, the Ming (1368-1644) and the Qmg

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Science and Technology

(1644-1911), China's ruling elite intensified its humanistic concentration on literature, the arts, and public administration and

regarded science and technology as either trivial or narrowly utilitar- ian (see The Confucian Legacy, ch. 3). Foreign Learning and Chinese Learning

Western mathematics and science were introduced to China in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Jesuit missionaries but

had little impact. In the nineteenth century, the trauma of repeated

defeat at the hands of Western invaders (in 1840-41 and 1860)

finally convinced some Chinese leaders of the need to master for- eign military technology. As part of the Self-Strengthening Movement in the 1860s, a number of foreign-style arsenals, shipyards,

and associated training schools were established (see The Self- Strengthening Movement, ch. 1). The initial effort to produce

steamships and artillery led, step-by-step, to recognition of the need

to master metallurgy, chemistry, mathematics, physics, and for- eign languages. The last decades of the century saw the establishment, under the auspices either of the imperial government or of

foreign missionaries, of secondary schools and colleges teaching

science, as well as the movement of Chinese students to advanced

studies in Japan, the United States, and Europe.

Individual Chinese students had no great difficulty mastering

Western science, but the growth in their numbers and potential

influence posed a challenge to the Confucian scholar-officials who

dominated the imperial government and Chinese society. Such offi- cials were reluctant to grant foreign-trained scientists and engineers a status equal to that of Confucian scholars, and they were suspicious of foreign ideas about politics and social organization, such

as professional autonomy, freedom of speech and assembly, and

experiments rather than written texts as validation of propositions.

Nineteenth-century officials attempted to control the influx of for- eign knowledge and values, distinguishing militarily useful technology, which was to be imported and assimilated, from foreign

philosophy, religion, or political and social values, which were to be rejected. The slogan "Chinese learning for the essence, Western

learning for utility" expressed this attitude. Although the terms were no longer used, the fundamental issue remained significant

in the 1980s, as the Chinese Communist Party attempted to dis- tinguish between beneficial foreign technology and harmful and

"polluting" foreign ideas and practices. Throughout the twentieth

century, China's political leaders have had a deeply ambivalent

attitude toward science and technology, promoting it as necessary

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China: A Country Study

for national defense and national strength but fearing it as a carrier

of threatening alien ideas and practices.

By 1900 China's science and technology establishment, minimal

though it was, already manifested several features that would

characterize it throughout the twentieth century. Although China's

early scientific achievements were a source of national pride, they

had no direct influence on the practice and teaching of science in China, which was based on foreign models and foreign training.

As a group, China's scientists, with their foreign education, foreignlanguage competence, and exposure to foreign ideas of science as an autonomous, international, and professional activity, formed

the most cosmopolitan element of the population. China's scientists, more than their foreign counterparts, were motivated by

patriotism and the desire to help their country through their work,

and many deliberately chose applied over basic scientific work.

Chinese intellectuals were influenced by the Confucian teachings

that intellectuals had special responsibilities toward their society

and should play a role in public affairs. Much scientific work was

done under government patronage, direction, and funding. The

government, whether imperial or republican, was interested in science for what it could contribute to national development and

military power, and it saw science as a means rather than as an end in itself. The first major publisher of translations of scientific works was the Jiangnan Arsenal, founded in Shanghai in 1866,

which published nearly 200 basic and applied scientific texts originally written in English, French, or German.

In the first two decades of the twentieth century an increasing

number of colleges and universities were founded, and growing

numbers of Chinese students were educated abroad. The Science

Society of China, whose membership included most of the country's leading scientists and engineers, was founded by Chinese stu- dents at Cornell University in 1914. In 1915 it began publication

in China of a major journal, Kexue (Science), which was patterned on the journal of the American Association for the Advancement

of Science. In 1922 the Society established a major biological

research laboratory in Nanjing. The Society devoted itself to the

popularization of science through an active and diverse publication program, the improvement of science education, and participation in international scientific meetings.

The establishment of the Guomindang government at Nanjing

in 1927 was followed by the creation of several government research

and training institutions (see Republican China, ch. 1). The Academia Sinica, founded in 1928, had a dozen research institutes, whose

personnel did research and advised the government. The late 1920s

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Science and Technology

and early 1930s saw the establishment of many research institutes,

such as the Fan Memorial Biological Institute in Beijing and the

Beijing Research Laboratory, which eventually formed departments

in physics, biology, pharmacology, and other fields. Most of the

research institutes were characterized both by very limited funds

and personnel and by productive, high-quality scientific work. By

the 1930s China possessed a number of foreign-trained scientists who did research of high quality, which they published in both

Chinese and foreign scientific journals. These scientists worked in the major universities or in research institutes funded by the government or foreign organizations (such as missionary groups and the

Rockefeller Foundation) and were concentrated in Beijing, Nanjing, and Shanghai.

Between 1937 and 1949, China's scientists and scientific work

suffered the ravages of invasion, civil war, and runaway inflation. Funds to support research, never ample, almost totally disappeared,

and most scientists were forced to devote most of their energies

to teaching, administration, or a government job. In a change from

the earlier pattern, many students opted not to return to China

after foreign education, choosing instead to seek careers abroad.

Soviet Influence in the 1950s

After the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China

reorganized its science establishment along Soviet lines —a system

that remained in force until the late 1970s, when China's leaders

called for major reforms. The Soviet model is characterized by a bureaucratic rather than a professional principle of organization,

the separation of research from production, the establishment of a set of specialized research institutes, and a high priority on applied

science and technology, which includes military technology.

The government's view of the purpose of scientific work was set forth in the September 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (see Glossary), which stated,

"Efforts should be made to develop the natural sciences in order

to serve the construction of industry, agriculture, and the national

defense." On November 1, 1949, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was founded, amalgamating research institutes under the former

Academia Sinica and Beijing Research Academy (the former Beijing Research Laboratory). In March 1951 the government directed

the academy to determine the requirements of the production sec- tor of the economy and to adjust scientific research to meet those

requirements. Scientists were to engage in research with signifi- cant and fairly immediate benefits to society and to work as

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China: A Country Study

members of collectives rather than as individuals seeking personal

fame and recognition.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences was explicitly modeled on the

Soviet Academy of Sciences, whose director, Sergei I. Vavilov, was

consulted on the proper way to reorganize Chinese science. His

book Thirty Years of Soviet Science was translated into Chinese to serve

as a guide. Soviet influence also was realized through large-scale

personnel exchanges. During the 1950s China sent about 38,000

people to the Soviet Union for training and study. Most of these

(28,000) were technicians from key industries, but the total cohort

included 7,500 students and 2,500 college and university teachers

and postgraduate scientists. The Soviet Union dispatched some

1 1 ,000 scientific and technical aid personnel to China. An estimated

850 of these worked in the scientific research sector, about 1,000

in education and public health, and the rest in heavy industry. In 1954 China and the Soviet Union set up the Joint Commission

for Cooperation in Science and Technology, which met annually

until 1963 and arranged cooperation on over 100 major scientific projects, including those in nuclear science. When the Chinese

Academy of Sciences completed a draft twelve-year plan for scientific development in 1956, it was referred to the Soviet Academy

of Sciences for review. In October 1957 a high-level delegation of

Chinese scientists accompanied Mao Zedong to Moscow to negotiate an agreement for Soviet cooperation on 100 of the 582 research

projects outlined in the twelve-year plan.

The Soviet aid program of the 1950s was intended to develop

China's economy and to organize it along Soviet lines. As part of

its First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), China was the recipient of the

most comprehensive technology transfer in modern industrial his- tory. The Soviet Union provided aid for 156 major industrial

projects concentrated in mining, power generation, and heavy

industry. Following the Soviet model of economic development,

these were large-scale, capital-intensive projects. By the late 1950s,

China had made substantial progress in such fields as electric powr er, steel production, basic chemicals, and machine tools, as well as

in production of military equipment such as artillery, tanks, and

jet aircraft. The purpose of the program was to increase China's

production of such basic commodities as coal and steel and to teach

Chinese workers to operate imported or duplicated Soviet factories. These goals were met and, as a side effect, Soviet standards

for materials, engineering practice, and factory management were

adopted. In a move whose full costs would not become apparent

for twenty-five years, Chinese industry also adopted the Soviet sepa- ration of research from production.

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Science and Technology

The adoption of the Soviet model meant that the organization

of Chinese science was based on bureaucratic rather than professional principles. Under the bureaucratic model, leadership is in the hands of nonscientists, who assign research tasks in accordance

with a centrally determined plan. The administrators, not the scientists, control recruitment and personnel mobility. The primary

rewards are administratively controlled salary increases, bonuses,

and prizes. Individual scientists, seen as skilled workers and as employees of their institutions, are expected to work as components

of collective units. Information is controlled, is expected to flow

only through authorized channels, and is often considered proprietary or secret. Scientific achievements are regarded as the result primarily of "external" factors such as the overall economic and

political structure of trie society, the sheer numbers of personnel,

and adequate levels of funding. Under professional principles, which

predominate in Western countries, scientists regard themselves as members of an international professional community that recruits

and rewards its members according to its own standards of professional excellence. The primary reward is recognition by professional peers, and scientists participate in an elaborate network of communication, which includes published articles, grant proposals, conferences, and news of current and planned research carried by

scientists who circulate from one research center to another.

"Reds" Versus "Experts" in the 1950s and 1960s

Tensions between scientists and China's communist rulers existed

from the earliest days of the People's Republic and reached their

height during the Cultural Revolution (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). In the early 1950s, Chinese scientists, like other intellectuals, were subjected to regular indoctrination

intended to replace bourgeois attitudes with those more suitable

to the new society. Many attributes of the professional organization of science, such as its assumption of autonomy in choice of

research topics, its internationalism, and its orientation toward

professional peer groups rather than administrative authorities, were condemned as bourgeois. Those scientists who used the brief period

of free expression in the Hundred Flowers Campaign of 1956-57

(see Glossary)—to air complaints of excessive time taken from scientific work by political meetings and rallies or of the harmful effects of attempts by poorly educated party cadres to direct scientific work—were criticized for their "antiparty" stance, labeled as "rightists," and sometimes dismissed from administrative or aca- demic positions (see The Transition to Socialism, 1953-57, ch. 1).

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China: A Country Study

The terminology of the period distinguished between "red" and

"expert" (see Glossary). Although party leaders spoke of the need

to combine "redness" with expertise, they more often acted as if political rectitude and professional skill were mutually exclusive qualities. The period of the Great Leap Forward saw efforts to reassign

scientists to immediately useful projects, to involve the uneducated

masses in such research work as plant breeding or pest control, and

to expand rapidly the ranks of scientific and technical personnel by

lowering professional standards. The economic depression and

famine following the Great Leap Forward, and the need to compensate for the sudden withdrawal of Soviet advisers and technical

personnel in 1960, brought a renewed but short-lived emphasis on

expertise and professional standards in the early 1960s. The scientific establishment was attacked during the Cultural Revolution, caus- ing major damage to China's science and technology. Most scientific research ceased. In extreme cases, individual scientists were singled out as "counterrevolutionaries" and made the objects of public criti- cism and persecution, and the research work of whole institutes was

brought to a halt for years on end. The entire staffs of research

institutes commonly were dispatched to the countryside for months

or years to learn political virtue by laboring with the poor and lowermiddle peasants. Work in the military research units devoted to nuclear weapons and missiles presumably continued, although the secrecy surrounding strategic weapons research makes it difficult to assess the impact of the Cultural Revolution in that sector. In the most general sense, the Cultural Revolution represented

the triumph of anti-intellectualism and the consistent, decade-long

deprecation of scholarship, formal education, and all the qualities

associated with professionalism in science. Intellectuals were assumed to be inherently counterrevolutionary, and it was asserted

that their characteristic attitudes and practices were necessarily

opposed to the interests of the masses. Universities were closed from

the summer of 1966 through 1970. when they reopened for undergraduate training with very reduced enrollments and a heavy

emphasis on political training and manual labor. Students were

selected for political rectitude rather than academic talent. Primary

and secondary schools were closed in 1966 and 1967. and when

reopened were repeatedly disrupted by political struggle. All scientific journals ceased publication in 1966, and subscriptions to for- eign journals lapsed or were canceled. For most of a decade China

trained no new scientists or engineers and was cut off from foreign

scientific developments.

During the decade between 1966 and 1976, China's leaders

attempted to create a new structure for science and technology

380
China's HL-1 controlled- nuclear fusion experimental device Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

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China: A Country Study

characterized by mass participation, concentration on immediate

practical problems in agriculture and industry, and eradication of distinctions between scientists and workers. Ideologues saw research

as an inherently political activity and interpreted all aspects of scientific work, from choice of topic to methods of investigation, as evi- dence of an underlying political line. According to this view,

research served the interests of one social class or another and

required the guidance of the party to ensure that it served the

interest of the masses. The early 1970s were characterized by mass experimentation,

in which large numbers of peasants were mobilized to collect data

and encouraged to view themselves as doing scientific research.

Typical projects included collecting information on new crop varieties, studying the effectiveness of locally produced insecticides, and

making extensive geological surveys aimed at finding useful minerals or fossil fuels. Mao Zedong took a personal interest in earthquake prediction, which became a showcase of Cultural

Revolution-style science. Geologists went to the countryside to collect folk wisdom on precursors of earthquakes, and networks of thousands of observers were established to monitor such signs as the

level of water in wells or the unusual behavior of domestic animals.

The emphasis in this activity, as in acupuncture anesthesia, was

on immediate practical benefits, and little effort was made to inte- grate the phenomena observed into larger theoretical frameworks.

The effects of the extreme emphasis on short-term problems and

the deprecation of theory were noted by Western scientists who

visited China in the mid- and late 1970s. For example, work in research institutes affiliated with the petrochemical industry was

described as excessively characterized by trial and error. In one

case, large numbers of substances were tried as catalysts or modifiers of the wax crystals in crude oil, and little attention was given

to the underlying chemical properties of the catalytic or modifying agents.

Rehabilitation and Rethinking, 1977-84

The Cultural Revolution's attacks on science and its deprecation

of expertise were opposed by those within the government and party

who were more concerned with economic development than with

revolutionary purity. In the early 1970s, Premier Zhou Enlai and

his associate Deng Xiaoping attempted to improve the working conditions of scientists and to promote research. At the January 1975

session of the Fourth National People's Congress, Zhou Enlai defined

China's goal for the rest of the century as the Four Modernizations

(see Glossary), that is, modernization of agriculture, industry, science

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Science and Technology

and technology, and national defense. Although the policies pro- posed in the speech had little immediate effect, they were to become

the basic guide for the post-Mao period. In 1975 Deng Xiaoping,

then vice chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, vice premier

of the government, and Zhou Enlai's political heir, acted as patron

and spokesman for China's scientists (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). Under Deng's direction, three major policy documents—on science and technology, industry, and foreign trade

were drafted. Intended to promote economic growth, they called

for rehabilitating scientists and experts, reimposing strict academic

standards in education, and importing foreign technology. The

proposals for reversing most of the Cultural Revolution policies

toward scientists and intellectuals were denounced by the ideologues

and followers of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) as "poisonous

weeds." Zhou died in January 1976, and Deng was dismissed from

all his posts in April. Deng's stress on the priority of scientific and

technical development was condemned by the radicals as "taking

the capitalist road." This dispute demonstrated the central place

of science policy in modern Chinese politics and the link between

science policies and the political fortunes of individual leaders.

Some of the immediate consequences of Mao's death and the

subsequent overthrow of the Gang of Four in October 1976 were

the reversals of science and education policies (see The Post-Mao

Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). During 1977 the more vocal supporters

of the Gang of Four were removed from positions of authority in research institutes and universities and replaced with professionally qualified scientists and intellectuals. Academic and research

institutions that had been closed were reopened, and scientists were summoned back to their laboratories from manual labor in the countryside. Scientific journals resumed publication, often carrying

reports of research completed before everything stopped in the sum- mer of 1966. The media devoted much attention to the value of

science and the admirable qualities of scientists. It denounced the

repressive and anti-intellectual policies of the deposed Gang of Four,

who were blamed for the failure of China's science and technology

to match advanced international levels. The news media now

characterized scientists and technicians as part of society's "productive forces" and as "workers" rather than as potential counterrevolutionaries or bourgeois experts divorced from the masses. Considerable publicity went to the admission or readmission of

scientists to party membership.

The March 1978 National Science Conference in Beijing was

a milestone in science policy. The conference, called by the party

Central Committee, was attended by many of China's top leaders,

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China: A Country Study

as well as by 6,000 scientists and science administrators. Its main

purpose was to announce publicly the government and party policy

of encouragement and support of science and technology. Science

and technology were assigned a key role in China's "New Long

March" toward the creation of a modern socialist society by the

year 2000. A major speech by Deng Xiaoping reiterated the concept of science as a productive force and scientists as workers, an

ideological formulation intended to remove the grounds for the

political victimization of scientists. Speeches by then-Premier Hua

Guofeng and Vice Premier Fang Yi, the top government figure

involved in science and technology, urged that scientists be given

free rein in carrying out research as long as the work was in line with broad national priorities. Basic research was to be supported,

although stress would continue to be placed on applied work, and

China's scientists would be given wide access to foreign knowledge

through greatly expanded international scientific and technical

exchanges.

By 1978 substantial progress had been made toward restoring

the science and technology establishment to its pre-Cultural Revolution state. Leaders with special responsibility for science and tech- nology joined recently rehabilitated senior scientists in looking ahead

and framing sweeping and very ambitious plans for further development. The draft Eight- Year Plan for the Development of Science

and Technology, discussed at the 1978 National Science Conference, called for a rapid increase in the number of research workers, for catching up to advanced international levels by the

mid-1980s, and for substantial work in such fields as lasers, manned

space flight, and high-energy physics. For some scientists, and

perhaps for their political sponsors as well, mastering technologies

and developing Chinese capabilities in the most advanced areas of science were goals in themselves, regardless of the costs or of

the likely benefits to the peasants and workers.

Both political leaders and media personnel seemed captivated

by the vision of rapid economic growth and social transformation

made possible by the wonders of science. Further, many leaders, not themselves scientifically trained, tended toward unrealistic

expectations of the immediate benefits from research. This atti- tude, while different from the hostility to science exhibited during

the Cultural Revolution, was based on a misunderstanding of the

nature of scientific work and was therefore a poor foundation for science policy.

The plans for rapid advance in many scientific areas were

associated with equally ambitious calls for economic growth and

the large-scale import of complete factories. During 1979 it became

384
Physicists at the Chinese Academy of Sciences work on superconducting materials. Courtesy China Reconstructs

increasingly clear that China could not pay for all the imports or

scientific projects wanted by all the ministries, regional authorities, and research institutes. It also became increasingly evident

that those promoting the projects had overlooked financial constraints and severe shortages of scientific and technical manpower

and that they lacked a comprehensive plan. In February 1981 a

report of the State Science and Technology Commission reversed

the overly ambitious 1978 eight-year scientific development plan

and called for renewed emphasis on the application of science to practical problems and on training more scientists and engineers.

As scientists and administrators confronted the problems of

applying and linking research with development, they became aware

of the constraints of the existing system and of the extent to which

the endemic difficulties in applying scientific knowledge were con- sequences of the Soviet-style structure for science and industry that China had uncritically adopted in the 1950s. Attention shifted to reforming the existing system and promoting greater efficiency and

better use of scarce resources, such as trained manpower. Between

1981 and 1985, a number of new journals discussed China's scientific system and suggested improvements, while national and local administrators sponsored a wide range of experimental reforms and

reorganizations of research bodies. The extensive discussion and

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China: A Country Study

experimentation culminated in a March 1985 decision of the party

Central Committee calling for thorough reform of China's science

system (see The Reform Program, this ch.).

Science and Technology in the 1980s

The Supply of Skilled Manpower

Research and development is a labor-intensive endeavor, in which the critical resource is the size and quality of the pool of

trained manpower. China suffers both from an absolute shortage

of scientists, engineers, and technicians and from maldistribution

and misuse of those it has. Chinese statistics on the number and

distribution of scientific personnel are neither complete nor consistent. According to the State Statistical Bureau, at the end of 1986

there were some 8.2 million personnel (out of 127.7 million workers) in the natural sciences working in state-owned enterprises,

research institutes, and government offices. These numbers probably excluded military personnel and scientists in military research

bodies, but they included support personnel in research institutes. "Scientific and technical personnel" comprised about 1.5 percent

of all employed persons, but only about 350,000 of them were

"research personnel." Their number had increased markedly from

the 1970s as well-trained students began graduating from Chinese

colleges and universities in substantial numbers and as postgraduates began returning from advanced training in foreign countries.

Between 1979 and 1986, China sent over 35,000 students abroad,

23,000 of whom went to the United States. More significant than sheer numbers of scientific personnel were

their quality and distribution. The total numbers masked wide

variations in educational background and quality, lumping together

graduates of two-year institutions or those who had attended secondary or postsecondary schools during periods of low standards with

those who had graduated from major institutions in the early 1960s

or the 1980s, that is, before or after the period of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution had removed an entire generation from access to university and professional training, creating

a gap in the age distribution of the scientific work force. The scientific community included a small number of elderly senior scientists, often trained abroad before 1949, a relatively small group

of middle-aged personnel, and a large number of junior scientists who had graduated from Chinese universities after 1980 or returned

from study abroad. In the mid-1980s many of the middle-aged,

middle-rank scientists had low educational and professional attainments, but generally they could be neither dismissed nor retired

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Science and Technology

(because of China's practice of secure lifetime employment); nor

could they be retrained, as colleges and universities allocated scarce places to younger people with much better qualifications. Scientists and engineers were concentrated in specialized research insti- tutes, in heavy industry, and in the state's military research and

military industrial facilities, which had the highest standards and

the best-trained people. A very small proportion of scientists and

engineers worked in light industry, consumer industry, small-scale

collective enterprises, and small towns and rural areas. Research Institutes In the late 1980s, most Chinese researchers worked in specialized research institutes rather than in academic or industrial enterprises. The research institutes, of which there were about 10,000

in 1985, were, like their Soviet exemplars, directed and funded

by various central and regional government bodies. Their research

tasks were, in theory, assigned by higher administrative levels as part of an overall research plan; the research plan was, in theory,

coordinated with an overall economic plan. Research institutes were

the basic units for the conduct of research and the employment

of scientists, who were assigned to institutes by government per- sonnel bureaus. Scientists usually spent their entire working careers within the same institute. Research institutes functioned as ordinary Chinese work units, with the usual features of lifetime

employment, unit control of rewards and scarce goods, and limited contact with other units not in the same chain of command (see

Work Units, ch. 3). Each research institute attempted to provide

its own staff housing, transportation, laboratory space, and instruments and to stockpile equipment and personnel. The limited channels for exchanges of information with other institutes often led

to duplication or repetition of research.

National Organization and Administration

The research institutes belonged to larger systems or hierarchies,

defined by the administrative bodies that directed and funded their

subordinate institutes. Research institutes were grouped into five major subsystems, known in China as the "five main forces" (see

fig. 17). The five subsystems were administratively distinct and

had little contact or communication.

Chinese Academy of Sciences In the late 1980s, the Chinese Academy of Sciences remained

the most prestigious research agency in the natural sciences. It administered about 120 research institutes in various parts of China,

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China: A Country Study

with major concentrations in Beijing and Shanghai. In 1986 the

academy employed 80,000 persons, over 40,000 of whom were

scientific personnel. It also operated the elite Chinese University

of Science and Technology, located in Hefei, Anhui Province, as well as its own printing plant and scientific instrument factory. Its institutes concentrated on basic research in many fields and did

research (such as that on superconductor materials) that met inter- national standards. The Chinese Academy of Sciences institutes

employed China's best-qualified civilian scientists and had better

laboratories, equipment, and libraries than institutes in the other

four research systems. The academy's concentration on basic

research was intended to be complemented by the work of the more numerous institutes affiliated with industrial ministries or local governments, which focused on applied research.

Although nominally subordinate to the State Science and Technology Commission, the Chinese Academy of Sciences in practice

reported directly to the State Council (see The State Council,

ch. 10). Before 1956 the academy was directly responsible for overall science planning, and in 1987 it retained a fairly high degree of

institutional autonomy and influence on national science policy.

The academy provided expert advice, when asked, to the State Council and its ministries, commissions, and agencies. Its specialized research institutes also did work for the military research and

development program. Additionally, it had responsibility for multidisciplinary research, monitoring the level of technology in Chinese

industries and suggesting areas where foreign technology should

be purchased. During the 1980s the academy repeatedly was asked

to pay more attention to the needs of production and the application of knowledge.

The membership of the Chinese Academy of Sciences included

the nation's most senior and best-known scientists, some of whom

had long-standing personal ties with senior political leaders. Such

ties and the prestige of the academy helped it win favorable treat- ment in the state budgetary process and operate with relatively lit- tle outside interference. Its relatively privileged position generated

resentment among those working in less well-funded institutes under

the industrial ministries, whose workers—as well as some planners

in the state administration—reportedly considered the academy both

overfunded and overstaffed with theoreticians who contributed little to the national economy.

State Science and Technology Commission

The State Science and Technology Commission, a ministeriallevel organ of the State Council, had responsibility for overseeing

388
Science and Technology

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China: A Country Study

the work of civilian research institutes subordinate to the various

industrial ministries, such as the Ministry of Electronics Industry

and the Ministry of Coal Industry, or to provincial-level, prefectural, or municipal bureaus. More than 80 percent of China's

10,000 research institutes fell in this category, and their range of

quality was considerable. Central planners and administrators considered the proliferation of low-quality research institutes a waste

of scarce research funds, but as of mid- 1987 they had not been able

to overrule powerful ministries or local governments. Such insti- tutes, which employed the majority of China's scientists and engineers, were expected to devote themselves to the application of

science and to useful innovations and improvements to industrial

processes and products. They had little direct contact with factories, and they reported their research results up the chain of com- mand of their department or ministry, which was responsible for passing them on to factories. The scientists and engineers had lit- tle opportunity for interchanges with research institutes that were

doing similar work but that were subordinate to a different ministry or commission.

The State Science and Technology Commission also has primary

responsibility for coordinating science policy with the state's planning and budgeting operations, working in coordination with the

State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and

the Ministry of Finance. The importance of science and science

policy was indicated by the high state and party rank of the ministers

and vice ministers placed in charge of the State Science and

Technology Commission. Provincial-level units, responsible for budgeting, planning, and coordinating across administrative hierarchies, had their own science and technology commissions. The

demarcation between the responsibilities of the Chinese Academy

of Sciences and the State Science and Technology Commission in policy formulation and consultation was not entirely clear, and there was probably a certain degree of ambiguity and contention in their

dealings with each other. The commission was apprised of the

research being done at the academy institutes and approved the

academy budget as a whole, but it could not direct the allocation

of funds within the academy.

National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission

Since the 1950s much of China's research and development effort has been channeled into military work. Military research facilities and factories are reported to have China's best-trained personnel, highest level of technology, and first priority for funding.

Although the military sector has been shrouded in secrecy, its work

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Science and Technology

has resulted in the largely independent development of nuclear and

thermonuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear

submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and the successful launch and recovery of communications and reconnaissance

satellites. Little information on the military research sector has been

made public, and secrecy has been reinforced by isolation of many

military research centers in the remote deserts and mountains of

China's western regions. The overall level of China's military tech- nology is not high by international standards, and the achievements

in nuclear weapons and missiles have apparently resulted from

projects featuring concentrated resources, effective coordination of

distinct specialties and industries, and firm leadership directed at the achievement of-a single, well-defined goal. The style recalls the

1940s Manhattan Project in the United States, and the accomplishments demonstrate the effectiveness of the Soviet-style "big push"

mode of organizing research and development.

The military sector has developed in comparative isolation from

the civilian economy, and until the 1980s its higher level of skills made little contribution to the national economy. Throughout the

1980s efforts have been made to break down some of the administrative barriers separating the military and civilian research and

development systems. The military sector has been relatively privileged, and the spirit of self-reliance has been strong. Nevertheless,

the rapid development of electronics and computer applications in the 1970s and 1980s rendered much of China's military industry

obsolete. Consequently, pressure for more contact between the mili- tary research units and civilian institutes (which, with foreign contact and up-to-date foreign technology, may surpass the technical

level of the military institutes) may be generated.

In 1987 the work of the military research institutes continued

to be directed by the State Council's National Defense Science,

Technology, and Industry Commission (NDSTIC). The NDSTIC

was created in 1982 with the merger of the National Defense Science

and Technology Commission, National Defense Industries Office,

and Office of the Science, Technology, and Armament Commission of the party Central Military Commission. The NDSTIC functioned in a manner similar to the State Science and Technology

Commission, concentrating on high-level planning and coordination across the vertical chains of command in which military

research institutes and factories are organized.

Research in Colleges, Universities, and Enterprises

As a consequence of China's adopting the Soviet model for the

organization of science and industry—featuring strict separation

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China: A Country Study

of research, production, and training—little research has been done

in Chinese universities. The State Education Commission has

provided only limited funding to support research, and through

the 1980s the scale of research at most colleges and universities has

been very modest. Since 1980 a few academic research institutes

have been established in such areas as computer science. The World

Bank has supported a major effort to increase research in Chinese

universities and to make better use of the scarce skills of faculty

members. On the whole, though, universities have continued to play only a minor role in scientific research.

Research institutes associated with or organized as constituent

parts of productive enterprises have been quite rare and represent

the smallest of the five systems of research institutes. Only the largest mines, oil fields, or factories, such as the Anshan iron and steel complex in Liaoning Province or the Yanshan petrochemical complex in Beijing, had their own research units, dedicated to solving

immediate problems in production in the late 1980s. Enterprises

concentrated on production, and their managers had little incentive to take the risks associated with innovation.

Planning Scientific Research

Since 1949 China has attempted, with mixed success, to organize

research and development according to a centralized national plan.

The various plans for scientific development that China has adopted

since 1957 have been broad—listing topics and areas of priority

without going into much detail or attempting to issue targets or

dates to specific research institutes. From the 1950s through the

mid-1980s, the "iron rice bowl" (see Glossary) of guaranteed

employment and funding applied to research institutes and researchers as much as to any other enterprises or state-sector workers (see

Economic Policies, 1949-80, ch. 5). No institute ever had its budget

cut for failing to make a planned discovery, and no scientist was

dismissed for failing to publish or to make progress in research.

Much of the initiative in research seems to have come from below,

with institutes submitting proposals for projects and funding to the State Science and Technology Commission. The commission's

plans were drawn up after conferences in which scientists and directors of institutes suggested work that seemed feasible and worthwhile. The Beijing headquarters of the commission had a staff of

between 500 and 1 ,000, not all of whom had scientific or economic

backgrounds. Some of their energies were devoted to communication and coordination with other elements of the central administration, such as the State Planning Commission and the State Economic Commission. The core of the responsibility and power

392
The Long March-3

satellite-carrier rocket ready for launch

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

of the State Science and Technology Commission was in its allo- cation of funds for research and approval of projects. It possessed

neither the manpower nor the expertise to monitor the work of the

several thousand research institutes it oversaw, and of necessity

it concentrated on major projects and relied on the advice of expert

scientists and the regional scientific and technological commissions,

which processed reports and applications for new projects. Much

of its work consisted of "balancing" the competing requests for limited funds, and its decisions often were made on grounds other

than scientific merit. Although China's leaders have addressed the

rhetoric of centralized planning to scientific research, research

activities have been more decentralized and more subject to pres- sures from powerful ministries and provincial-level governments.

Integration of Administrative Systems

In the late 1980s, two of the five research subsystems—the

Chinese Academy of Sciences and the military system—were rela- tively privileged in receiving government financing and being supplied with scarce resources and historically had tended to form

closed, self-sufficient domains. The system under the State Science

and Technology Commission, which included the largest number

of research institutes, was marked by wide variations in quality

and a vertical, bureaucratic mode of organization that inhibited

collaboration and exchange of information. Both the universities

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China: A Country Study

and the research institutes attached to large industrial complexes were short of funds and out of the mainstream of research. Overall, China's science and technology structure was marked by lopsided distribution of skilled manpower, pervasive fragmentation,

compartmentalization, and duplication of research —an outcome

of the 1950s decision to adopt a bureaucratic mode of organization for science and technology. Chinese policy makers were well aware of these problems and, over the years, had responded with

two forms of organizational remedies: high-level coordinating bodies

and mass scientific associations that cut across administrative

boundaries.

Leading Group for Science and Technology

The growth of China's scientific system and the tendencies toward

compartmentalization inherent in the Soviet mode of scientific and

industrial organization, which it emulated, were matched by the

creation of administrative bodies intended to coordinate the activities of vertically organized administrative hierarchies. Both the State Science and Technology Commission and the NDSTIC, which were formed by the amalgamation of earlier coordinating bodies founded

as long ago as the mid-1950s, had this primary function. Efforts

to fill the need for progressively more authoritative and comprehensive coordination culminated in the establishment of the State Council's Leading Group for Science and Technology in January

1983. The leading group, a special-purpose task force formed by

the State Council to address problems that cut across administrative boundaries, was China's highest-level policy-making organ for science and technology. In 1987 its chairman was Premier Zhao

Ziyang, and its membership included Fang Yi, state councillor and

former head of the State Science and Technology Commission and

the Chinese Academy of Sciences, and leading members of the State Science and Technology Commission, NDSTIC, State Planning

Commission, State Economic Commission, State Education Commission, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and Ministry of Labor and

Personnel. That the leading group was headed by the premier

indicated both the significance China's leaders attached to science

policy and the level of authority necessary to settle disputes and

encourage cooperation.

China Association of Science and Technology

At the lower end of the administrative hierarchy, communication and cooperation were intended to be promoted by professional

organizations, whose membership cut across administrative boundaries. The primary organization was the China Association of

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Science and Technology

Science and Technology, a nongovernment mass organization.

Because it was funded by the government and, like all organizations in China, directed by party cadres, its autonomy had strict limits. The China Association of Science and Technology was an

umbrella organization: as of 1986 it comprised 139 national scientific societies organized by discipline and 1.9 million individual

members. It succeeded earlier scientific associations that had been

founded in 1910-20. The China Association of Science and Technology served three major purposes. First, like professional associations in most countries, it brought individual scientists and

administrators together with their professional peers from other

work units at conferences, lectures, and joint projects, and it promoted communication across administrative boundaries. Second,

the China Association of Science and Technology had a major role

in the popularization of science and dissemination of scientific knowledge to the general public. This latter function was accomplished through the publication of popular-science journals and

books aimed at an audience with a high-school education and

through lecture series, refresher training for technicians and engineers, and consultation for farmers and rural and small-scale

industries. Throughout the 1980s, the China Association of Science

and Technology and its constituent associations served increasingly

as consultants to government officials. Third, the China Association of Science and Technology played a major role in China's

international scientific exchanges and hosted delegations of foreign

scientists, sponsored international scientific conferences in China,

participated in many joint research projects with foreign associations and scientific bodies, and represented China in many inter- national science societies. International Ties

Since emerging from the self-imposed isolation and self-reliance

of the Cultural Revolution, China has expanded its international

scientific exchanges to an unprecedented degree. The 1980s policy

of opening up to the outside world, a basic element of Deng Xiaoping's prescription for modernization, was nowhere better exemplified than in science and technology policy (see China and the

Four Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). The goal was to help China's

science and technology reach international standards as quickly as possible and to remedy the damage done by the Cultural Revolution. This was achieved by participating in international conferences, cooperating in projects with foreign scientists, and sending

thousands of Chinese graduate students and senior researchers to foreign universities for training and joint research.

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China: A Country Study

Scientific cooperation has come to play a significant part in China's foreign relations and diplomatic repertoire. Visits of Chinese leaders to foreign countries are often marked by the signing

of an agreement for scientific cooperation. In mid-1987 China had

diplomatic relations with 133 countries and formal, governmentto-government agreements on scientific cooperation with 54 of them

(see An Overview of China's Foreign Relations, ch. 12). When

diplomatic relations were established between China and the United

States in January 1979, the Joint Commission in Scientific and

Technological Cooperation was founded. Since then, the two governments have signed twenty-eight agreements on scientific and

technical cooperation in fields ranging from earthquake prediction

to industrial management. China has mutually beneficial scientific exchange programs with both technically advanced nations and

those having only a minimal scientific capability. Although China

tended to receive aid from more scientifically advanced nations and

to render aid to the less developed, the equality implied in scientific exchange made it a useful diplomatic form.

In 1987 China had scientific-exchange relations with 106 countries—usually in the form of agreements between the China Association of Science and Technology and a foreign equivalent.

Incomplete statistics indicated that by 1986 Chinese scientists had

completed over 500 joint projects with scientists in the United States and were working on 1,500 projects with counterparts in various

West European countries, 300 with those in Eastern Europe, and

at least 30 with Japanese researchers. In June 1986 the Chinese

Academy of Sciences signed an agreement with the Soviet Academy

of Sciences for scientific cooperation in unspecified fields. Many

exchanges with the United States involved Chinese-American scientists and engineers, who collaborated with visiting Chinese researchers in the United States and visited China to lecture on their

specialties and to advise scientific bodies.

By 1986 the China Association of Science and Technology or

its constituent associations were full members of 96 international

scientific societies and committees, and over 300 Chinese scientists held office in international scientific bodies. China also was

an active participant in United Nations scientific activities in the

1980s. Luoyang, Henan Province, is the site of the United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's International

Silt Research and Training Center, which specializes in problems

of river silts. Apart from the 35,000 students China sent abroad

for training between 1979 and 1986, approximately 41,000 Chinese

scientists took part in various international exchanges. Between 1980

and 1986, China hosted 155 international academic conferences,

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Science and Technology

which were attended by 10,000 foreign scholars and 30,000 Chinese

participants. China also has employed substantial numbers of for- eign experts, often retired scientists or engineers, as short-term consultants. International exchanges represent one of the most successful

aspects of the Chinese government's efforts to raise the level of

science and demonstrate the strength of the centralized direction

and funding possible under China's bureaucratic organization of

science. The weaknesses of that mode of organization are evident

in the less successful efforts to improve the internal functioning and

productivity of the domestic science and technology establishment

and have generated a major effort to reform that establishment.

The Reform Program

Shortcomings of the Science and Technology System

From the perspective of China's leaders, the entire science and

technology system of the late 1980s, with its 8 million personnel

and 10,000 research institutes, represented an expensive, underutilized and not very productive capital investment. Dissatisfaction with the system had become pervasive by the early 1980s, and

both scientists and political leaders agreed on the necessity for fundamental reform. The primary complaint of the leadership was that,

despite thirty years of policy statements, central plans, and politi- cal campaigns directed at the attitudes of scientists and engineers,

science still was not serving the needs of the economy. Reformist

political leaders and senior scientists identified a number of organizational problems that were inherent in the system adopted from

the Soviet Union and that had been compounded by Chinese workunit and lifetime job assignment practices (see Differentiation; Common Patterns, ch. 3). In an October 1982 speech to the National Science Awards Conference, Premier Zhao Ziyang identified the following as primary

problems: uneven development and lack of coordination among

scientific fields; lack of communication between research and

production units; duplication of research and facilities; rivalry

among institutes, administrative bodies, and hierarchies; and maldistribution of personnel, with some units and fields overstaffed

and others very short of skilled personnel. Zhao's speech drew upon

and was followed by extensive discussions of management and organization by scientists and administrators. These discussions emphasized the prevalence of departmentalism, compartmentalism, and

fragmentation of efforts. These problems, when combined with poor

management, poorly educated managers, absence of incentives for

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China: A Country Study

good work or of penalties for poor performance, and absence of

direct communication between research units and productive enterprises, resulted in the failure of the science and technology establishment to serve production and economic growth.

In the 1980s research institutes, like all Chinese work units,

responded to an economic system in which supplies were uncertain by attempting to be as self-sufficient as possible. Exchanges

of information, services, or personnel across the very strictly defined

administrative boundaries were difficult, resulting in failure to share

expensive imported equipment and in widespread duplication of

facilities. The absence of information on work being done in other

research institutes, even in the same city, frequently led to duplication and repetition of research.

Like all other workers in China, scientists were assigned to research institutes or universities by government labor bureaus.

Such assignments frequently did not reflect specialized skills or train- ing. Assignments were meant to be permanent, and it was very

difficult for scientists or engineers to transfer to another work unit. In many cases, talents or specialized training were wasted. Insti- tutes that may have had the funds to purchase advanced foreign

equipment often had no way to hire a Chinese chemist or mathematician. Not only were China's scientists and engineers in short

supply, many were underemployed or misemployed.

The Program

In March 1985, after extensive discussion, consultation, and

experimentation, the party Central Committee called for sweeping

reforms of science management. The reforms proposed in the "Decision on the Reform of the Science and Technology Management

System" represented a major break with past practices, and they

assumed corresponding reforms in the nation's industrial and eco- nomic systems. By changing the method of funding research insti- tutes, encouraging the commercialization of technology and the

development of a technology market, and rewarding individual scientists, the reforms of the mid-1980s were meant to encourage the application of science to the needs of industry. It was envisaged that most

research institutes would support themselves through consulting and

contract work and would cooperate with factories through partnerships, mergers, joint ventures, or other appropriate and mutually

agreeable means. The ultimate goal was to encourage exchange and

cooperation and to break down the compartmentalization characterizing China's research and development structure. The principal means for accomplishing the reforms was changing the funding system to force research institutes to establish contact

398
Science and Technology

with productive enterprises and to do work directly supporting those

enterprises. Direct allocation of funds to research institutes was to be phased out and replaced by a system under which institutes sold

their services in the marketplace. The distinctions among institutes subordinate to the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the industrial

ministries, provincial-level governments, colleges and universities,

and even the NDSTIC were to be minimized, and all were to compete and collaborate in a single market-oriented system. Institutes

doing basic research were to compete for grants from a National

Natural Science Foundation (which was subsequently established).

The reforms were not intended as a budget-cutting measure, and

total state funding for science and technology was to be increased.

A technology market and the commercialization of technology

in the late 1980s were to be developed to encourage the transfer

of technology and the transformation of research results into

products and services. Direct centralized administration and supervision of research were to decline, and institutes were to be headed

by younger, technically qualified directors, who were to be given

broad powers to select their own research topics and to seek out

partners for cooperation and consultation. Scientific personnel were

to receive better pay and benefits, recognition of their achievements,

and the right to do supplementary consulting work and to transfer

to units where their talents could be better utilized. The Relation with Economic Reform

Implementing the reforms of the science and technology system,

however, presupposed reforms of the economic, industrial, and local administrative systems (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). In general, science and technology reforms

represented the application to that sector of the principles underlying the sweeping reforms of the economy proposed in the October 1984 "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese

Communist Party on Reform of the Economic Structure." Both

reform "decisions" emphasized greater autonomy for institutions, a greater role for the market, more competition, and rewards for the successful introduction of improved products and processes. In every case, the goal was increased productivity and economic

benefit.

The central provisions of the 1980s reform related to funding,

the technology market and cooperative ventures, and the rights and

potential job mobility of individual researchers. The intent of the

reformers was to change the basic conditions of the economic sys- tem, so that the self-interest that had pushed managers of factories

and research institutes toward compartmentalization, duplication,

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China: A Country Study

and hoarding of resources would henceforth push them toward

cooperation, division of labor, and orientation toward the needs

of the market. Because these reforms represented a radical departure from the procedures developed since the 1950s, the leadership anticipated that their implementation would be slow, and it planned to phase them in over a number of years. Perhaps because of the centrality of funding to the whole reform

scheme and because the administrative machinery for handling

budgets was already in place, many concrete provisions for funding research were adopted following the March 1985 Central Committee decision. In February 1986 the State Council promulgated

provisional regulations under which science and technology projects

listed in the annual state economic plan were to be completed as contract research, in which there would be nationwide open bidding on the contracts. Banks were to monitor expenditures under

the contract. Institutes conducting basic research were to have their

regular operating expenses guaranteed by the state, but all other

income would come from competitive research grants. The government was to continue to fund completely the institutes working in public health and medicine, family planning, environmental science,

technical information, meteorology, and agriculture. In 1986 the

newly established National Natural Science Foundation, explicitly

modeled on the United States National Science Foundation, dis- bursed its first competitive awards, totaling¥95 million (for value

of the yuan—see Glossary), to 3,432 research projects selected from

12,000 applications. The amount of money awarded to individual

projects was not large, but the precedent of competition, disregard

of administrative boundaries, and expert appraisal of individual

or small-group proposals was established and widely publicized.

And, early in 1987, the NDSTIC announced that henceforth

weapons procurement and military research and development would

be managed through contracts and competitive bidding.

Technology Markets and Joint Ventures Commercializing technology requires markets, and China in the

late 1980s had to develop market institutions to handle patents,

the sale of technology, and consulting contracts. This was a major

endeavor and one that promised to take many years. Deciding how

to set prices for technology and how to write and enforce contracts

for technical consulting proved difficult, largely because of the complexity of technology markets. Further, China lacked the legal and

commercial frameworks to support such markets. Nevertheless,

institutes and factories participated in "technology fairs" and estab- lished contractual relations in great numbers, with the total

400
The control center at the Baoshan iron and steel complex in Shanghai

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

technology trade volume in 1986 reaching an estimated ¥2.3 bil- lion. Research institutes and universities formed companies to sell technical services and develop products. Even the formerly self- contained Chinese Academy of Sciences set up companies to export

specialty magnets and to develop optical products.

In the late 1980s, China's technology markets and efforts to commercialize scientific and technical knowledge were growing rapidly

amid considerable confusion, ferment, and turmoil. Although progressing, the commercialization of technology was proving difficult to implement, and, perhaps for this reason, the State Council

announced in February 1987 that most applied scientific research

institutes were to be incorporated into large and medium-sized

productive enterprises to coordinate research with the needs of

production. The precise form the technology market would eventually take was not clear, but its development had wide support

and was not likely to be halted or reversed.

Personnel and Job Mobility

From one perspective the most important element of China's

science and technology system is its human capital —its trained

scientists and engineers. By the 1980s it was widely recognized in the Chinese press that scientists, like all intellectuals, had been

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China: A Country Study

poorly treated, underpaid, and burdened with difficult living conditions that reduced their productivity. In many cases scientists'

abilities were wasted because they were assigned to jobs outside

their expertise or because their institute already had all the professionals in their field it needed and there was no way for them to change jobs (see Educational Investment, ch. 4). Many Chinese

science policy writers were familiar with the conclusion of Western

specialists that scientific progress and the effective application of

science to practical problems are facilitated by personnel mobility.

Accordingly, the March 1985 party Central Committee decision

called for reform of the personnel system to promote a "rational

flow" of scientific and technical personnel.

Throughout the late 1980s, however, job mobility and attempts

to place scientists where their talents could have the greatest effect were the aspect of reform in which least was achieved. Transfer

of scientists from one unit to another remained a major step, and

a relatively infrequent one. According to the State Science and

Technology Commission, 2 percent of scientists and engineers

changed work units in 1983, and only 4 percent in 1985. Personnel still required the permission of their work unit heads to transfer, and that permission often was withheld. Many directors of

institutes were accused of having a "feudal mentality," that is, regarding personnel as part of their unit's property.

The State Council reiterated in the mid-1980s that scientists and

engineers had the right to do consulting work in their spare time. In practice, however, such spare-time consulting often created

problems within the work unit as some institute directors attempted

to confiscate payments for consulting or even to charge their per- sonnel in the local courts with corruption and theft of state property.

Although the press gave considerable publicity to scientists who

had left the "iron rice bowl" of a Chinese Academy of Sciences

institute to start their own business or to join a growing collective or rural factory, such resignations remained relatively rare. Possibly more common were practices whereby institutes detailed their

personnel on temporary consulting contracts to productive enterprises.

The difficulties in transferring scientific personnel even when

the Central Committee and the State Council made it official policy

demonstrated the significance of China's unique work-unit system

of employment and economic organization and the obstacles it presented to reform. Allowing personnel to decide for themselves

to move out of the work units to which the state and the party

assigned them would be a major break with the practices that have

become institutionalized in China since 1949. Some observers

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Science and Technology

believe that because of its potential challenge to the authority of

the party, which controls personnel matters in all work units, job

mobility for scientists, even though it would promote scientific productivity and the growth of the economy, may be too extreme

a reform to be feasible (see Differentiation, ch. 3). Technology Transfer

Policy

In the late 1980s, China's goals of modernization and rapid eco- nomic growth depended on the large-scale introduction of foreign

technology. The task was to import technology to renovate and

upgrade several thousand factories, mines, and power stations whose

levels of productivity and energy efficiency were far below prevailing

international standards. Since 1980 Chinese policy statements have

stressed the need to improve existing facilities, to import technology

rather than finished goods, and to renovate factories through selec- tive purchase of key technology rather than through purchase of

whole plants. This was an unprecedented problem, since China's

previous experience with technology transfer, both in the massive

Soviet technical-aid program of the 1950s and in the more modest

purchases of fertilizer and petrochemical plants in the 1960s and

early 1970s, featured large projects that brought in complete plants. In the 1980s much of the technology to be imported was production or process technology, representing better ways of producing

items China already manufactured, such as truck transmissions or telephone cables. Such technology was usually the proprietary

knowledge of foreign corporations, and China demonstrated an

unprecedented willingness to cooperate with such firms. With the

explicit aim of promoting technology imports, China made great

efforts to attract foreign businesses and foreign capital and per- mitted joint ventures and even foreign-owned subsidiaries to operate

in China.

China's economic planners gave priority in technology imports

to electronics, telecommunications, electric-power generation and

transmission, transportation equipment, and energy-saving devices.

The degree of central control over technology imports fluctuated

in the 1980s, reflecting changing foreign trade policies and foreign

exchange balances, but the overall trend was toward devolution

of decision making to those who use the technology or equipment.

Bank loans and other means were made available to encourage end

users to select appropriate technology.

Modes of Transfer

The transfer of proprietary technology from a foreign corporation

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China: A Country Study

is, among other things, a commercial transaction, and such trans- actions take many forms. Chinese authorities have selected jointequity ventures as their preferred mode of technology transfer. In such ventures, both the foreign and the Chinese partner contribute capital, each provides what it has the advantage in (usually tech- nology and access to world market for the foreign partner and labor

and a factory for the Chinese partner), and management and profits are split. Many major foreign corporations with technology that

China desires have been reluctant to risk their capital in such ventures. But enough have agreed to produce such items as jet airliners,

computers, and machine tools that Chinese authorities can claim

success for their policy.

Linking Technology and Economics

As they have accumulated experience in dealing with foreign cor- porations, Chinese economic administrators and enterprise

managers have become better able to negotiate contracts that, while not full joint ventures, still permit the necessary training and consultation in the use of foreign technology. By the late 1980s, the

transfer of foreign technology had become a normal commercial

transaction. To an increasing extent, policy and practices for technology transfer were becoming part of general economic and for- eign trade policies. China faced problems in assimilating technology

in the factories that imported it and in deciding which foreign tech- nologies to import. It was becoming clear to Chinese planners and

foreign suppliers of technology that these problems reflected overall deficiencies in technical and management skills and that they were general economic and management problems. The solution

to these problems was increasingly seen by Chinese administrators as lying in reforms of the economy and industrial management. The effort to import and assimilate foreign technology thus

served to help unify technology policy and economic policy and

to overcome the problems of the separation of science, technology,

and the economy, which China's leaders had been trying to solve

since the early 1950s.

* * *

Because of the continuity of the issues affecting China's science

and technology, many of the studies carried out in the early 1960s

are still useful. Among these are Leo A. Orleans' Professional Manpower and Education in Communist China, Wu Yuan-li and Robert

B. Sheeks' The Organization and Support of Scientific Research and Devel- opment in Mainland China, and Cheng Chu-yuan's Scientific and

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Science and Technology

Engineering Manpower in Communist China, 1949-1963 . Richard P. Suttmeier's 1974 Research and Revolution: Science Policy and Societal Change in China sets out most of the basic policy choices for science

in China. Articles by Suttmeier and Denis Fred Simon cover most

aspects of current science policy. Science in Contemporary China, edited

by Orleans, assesses the state of science in China as of 1980. Rudi

Volti's Technology, Politics, and Society in China and K.C. Yeh's

Industrial Innovation in China with Special Reference to the Metallurgical

Industry provide good overviews of China's science and technology

system. Current news of policies and achievements in science and

technology is available in such Chinese sources as Beijing Review,

China Daily, and China Exchange News. Chinese reports and discussions of science and technology policy are translated and published

in the Joint Publications Research Service's China Report: Science and Technology . (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

405

Chapter 10. Party and Government
Representation of a terra-cotta figure of a Qin dynasty (221-207 B. C.) general.

Thefigure near the tomb of thefirst Qin emperor, Shi Huangdi, near present- day Xi 'an, Shaanxi Province.
THE THIRD PLENUM of the Central Committee of the Eleventh

National Party Congress, held in December 1978, marked a major

turning point in China's development. The course was laid for the

party to move the world's most populous nation toward the ambitious targets of the Four Modernizations. After a decade of tur- moil brought about by the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the new

direction set at this meeting was toward economic development and

away from class struggle. The plenum endorsed major changes in the political, economic, and social system. It also instituted sweeping

personnel changes, culminating in the elevation of two key supporters of Deng Xiaoping and the reform program, Hu Yaobang

and Zhao Ziyang, to the posts of general secretary of the party (September 1982) and premier of the State Council (September 1980),

respectively. In January 1987 Hu Yaobang lost the position of

general secretary when he failed to control violent student demonstrations. Zhao Ziyang became acting general secretary, in addition to serving as premier, pending confirmation by the Thirteenth

National Party Congress, scheduled for October 1987.

Under the new and pragmatic leadership, the modernization pro- gram, slated to be well established by the year 2000, was to engage

the energies and talents of the entire population in reaching the

reform goals. But unlike in the past, acceptable class background was not to play a role in selecting and promoting participants for the national program. Intellectuals or those with advanced education were no longer negatively categorized. Class consciousness was

being replaced by one that fostered initiative and encouraged each

person to contribute according to his or her ability.

An initial challenge facing the reform leadership was to provide

for a rational and efficient governing system to support economic

development. In pursuit of that goal, the cult of personality sur- rounding Mao Zedong was unequivocally condemned and replaced

by a strong emphasis on collective leadership. An example of this new emphasis was the party's restoration in February 1980 of its Secretariat, which had been suspended since 1966. The new party

and state constitutions, both adopted in 1982, provided the institu- tional framework for the Four Modernizations program. These

documents abolished the post of party chairman and restored the

post of president of the People's Republic of China, thereby giving additional weight to government functions and providing a degree of balance to the authoritative party structure. Also, the

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China: A Country Study

government's role was broadened by the addition of standing committees and direct elections at subnational levels of the government's

presiding body, the National People's Congress.

The political structure in 1987 seemed to represent consensus and continuity, but it continued to undergo the test of accommodation and a process of trial and error. The experimental approach was rooted in official recognition that the party and the government had to remain self-critical and responsive if they were to fulfill the expectations that the reform leaders had raised since 1978

of solving old problems and meeting new challenges. Some of the

most sweeping changes concerned the party and government cadre

system that was essential to the implementation and performance

of the reform program. Manned by about 14 million cadres, the

system was acknowledged officially to be overstaffed and sluggish.

The drive to weed out tens of thousands of aged, inactive, and

incompetent cadres was intensified. Even more revolutionary, the

life tenure system for state and party cadres was abolished, and

age limits for various offices were established. While removing

superfluous personnel, the reform leaders stressed the importance

of creating a "third echelon" of younger leadership to enter responsible positions and be trained for future authority. Between 1978

and 1987, some 470,000 younger officials reportedly were promoted

to responsible positions.

The theoretical basis of the political system continued to be

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (which combined borrowings from Soviet ideology with Mao's theoretical writings), but

with an unmistakable emphasis on the application of this doctrine

to achieve desired results. The test of a reform was no longer how

closely it reflected hallowed quotations or ideas—although reforms

continued to be couched in proper doctrinal arguments—but

whether or not it produced demonstrable benefits to the reform

program. The banner slogan of the reform agenda was "socialism

with Chinese characteristics." This slogan implied that considerable leeway would be allowed in doctrinal matters in order to achieve

the overriding goal of rapid modernization. But reform leaders real- ized that successful implementation of the broad-ranging reform

program required a stable, professional bureaucracy to direct the course of events. The course chosen included a more rational divi- sion of powers and functions for th. party and government, and

it provided a body of regulations and procedures to support the

separation. Institutions were set up to maintain discipline and to audit bureaucratic records. In December 1986 the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress established the Ministry

of Supervision to oversee the work of the government cadre. Of

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Party and Government

course, the primacy of the party over all other sociopolitical insti- tutions was an unchanging fact of political life. Another recognized requirement for a successful reform program

was the decentralization of authority, including a greater voice and

degree of accountability for local bodies in the formulation and

implementation of programs and policies. In the 1980s government

leaders instituted experimental programs at all levels to achieve

this end. The party, wielding poetical power and having close access

to reform leaders, appeared to act increasingly in an advisory role,

guiding events in accordance with its own general policy and serving

as an intermediary between government officials and front-line

producers, for example, departmental administrators and enterprise

managers. The role of the party was still being defined, but it appeared less focused on dictating the specific course of events. Chinese Communist Party

Party Constitution

The party constitution adopted in September 1982 at the Twelfth

National Party Congress clearly defines the powers and functions

of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and it assigns the party

a pivotal role in guiding national efforts toward a communist social system. Although the party constitution sets legal limits on CCP

activities, the party's role in areas of political, ideological, and

organizational leadership is authoritative and unquestioned.

The organizational principle that drives the Chinese political sys- tem is democratic centralism. Within the system, the democratic

feature demands participation and expression of opinion on key

policy issues from members at all levels of party organization. It depends on a constant process of consultation and investigation.

At the same time, the centralist feature requires that subordinate

organizational levels follow the dictates of superior levels. Once

the debate has reached the highest level and decisions concerning

policy have been made, all party members are obliged to support

the Central Committee.

In the party constitution, and in other major policy statements,

the CCP diminished the role of centralism by abolishing the post

of party chairman, by prohibiting any future cult of personality,

and by emphasizing the importance of collective leadership. Most

of the aged revolutionary veterans who had worked for years under

the highly centralized party organization dominated by Mao Zedong

were made honorary advisers, elected to the Central Advisory Commission initiated at the Twelfth Congress. Although their prestige

remained intact, these leaders were effectively removed from direct

411
China: A Country Study

participation in the policy-making process. This development per- mitted their replacement by younger leaders more supportive of

the Four Modernizations (see Glossary). In addition, the new party

constitution emphasized the party's role in promoting socialist democracy, in developing and strengthening a socialist legal sys- tem, and in consolidating public resolve to carry out the modernization program.

The priorities expounded at the Twelfth National Party Congress were designed not only to improve the organizational cohesion and morale of the party and government but also to hasten

prosperity and foster national power. The congress endorsed

programs from the Eleventh National Party Congress that stressed

stability and unity, balance between ideology and technical skill, collective rather than individual leadership, party discipline, training

of successors at all levels of party organization, and a more relaxed

climate for intraparty debate on major national and local issues. The economic policies of the Twelfth National Party Congress con- tinued to be oriented toward growth, but the party's subsequent

direction emphasized a more controlled growth program.

National Party Congresses

The National Party Congress is in theory the highest body of

the CCP. (It should be distinguished from the National People's

Congress, China's highest legislative body—see The National People's Congress, this ch.) After its ascent to power in 1949, the party

held no congress until 1956. This was the eighth congress since

the party's founding in 1921 ; (see table 1 , Appendix B). The Ninth

National Party Congress convened in April 1969, the tenth in August 1973, the eleventh in August 1977, and the twelfth in September 1982. The Thirteenth National Party Congress was scheduled for October 1987. The National Party Congress reviews reports on party activities since the last session, revises the party constitution, ratifies the party program for a specific period, and elects the

Central Committee, which serves as the highest organ of the CCP

when the National Party Congress is not in session. The congress

has, however, neither the independence to generate legislative bills nor the effective power to check and balance the party and government bureaucracies. Although limited in its role —in effect it is a pro forma approval body—the National Party Congress performs

a useful function as a forum for rising party cadres who represent

all regions, ethnic groups, and functional groups. The delegates

(there were 1,545 for the Twelfth National Party Congress) can

observe firsthand the working of the party machine at the national

level, gain a better perspective on the direction of political

412
Party and Government

transformation planned by the leadership, and serve as communicators of party policies to the grass roots. Further, delegates can

provide the top party leadership a sense of the response and progress made concerning key party programs in their home districts. Central Committee and Political Bureau

Political power is formally vested in the much smaller CCP Central Committee and the other central organs answerable directly

to this committee. The Central Committee is elected by the National

Party Congress and is identified by the number of the National

Party Congress that elected it. Central Committee meetings are known as plenums (or plenary sessions), and each plenum of a new

Central Committee is numbered sequentially. Plenums are to be

held at least annually. In addition, there are partial, informal, and

enlarged meetings of Central Committee members where often key

policies are formulated and then confirmed by a plenum. For

example, the "Communique of the Third Plenum of the Eleventh

Central Committee" (December 1978), which established the

party's commitment to economic modernization, resulted from a month-long working meeting that preceded the Third Plenum.

The Central Committee's large size and infrequent meetings

make it necessary for the Central Committee to direct its work

through its smaller elite bodies—the Political Bureau and the even more select Political Bureau's Standing Committee—both of which

the Central Committee elects. The Twelfth Central Committee consisted of 210 full members and 138 alternate members. The Political Bureau had twenty-three members and three alternate members.

The Standing Committee—the innermost circle of power—had six members who were placed in the most important party and government posts. These six leaders were Hu Yaobang (who was demoted

from party general secretary in January 1987), Ye Jianying (who

died in October 1986, a year after resigning his Standing Committee post), Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang (who was named act- ing general secretary in January 1987), Li Xiannian, and Chen

Yun.

The leadership was altered significantly at a special conference

of delegates called the National Conference 6f Party Delegates, held

September 18-23, 1985. The conference was convened on the

authority of Article 12 of the 1982 party constitution, which provides for holding conferences of delegates between full congresses.

These national conferences of delegates appear to be more authoritative than regular plenums. The conference was attended by 992

delegates, and it elected 56 new full members and 35 new alter- nate members to the Central Committee, while accepting the

413
China: A Country Study

NATIONAL PARTY CONGRESS

CENTRAL ADVISORY COMMISSION

CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR

DISCIPLINE INSPECTION

CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

ALTERNATE MEMBERS

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION

POLITICAL BUREAU

STANDING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

ALTERNATE MEMBERS

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY GENERAL

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT

POLICY DIRECTION

POLICY RESEARCH

OFFICE

SECRETARIAT GENERAL SECRETARY

SECRETARIES RURAL POLICY RESEARCH CENTER

DAY TO DAY SUPERVISION

BUREAU FOR TRANSLATING THE WORKS OF MARX, ENGELS, LENIN, AND STALIN CENTRAL COMMISSION FOR GUIDING PARTY CONSOLIDATION CENTRAL FIVE STRESSES, FOUR BEAUTIES, AND

THREE LOVES COMMISSION CENTRAL PATRIOTIC PUBLIC HEALTH CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE

COMMISSION FOR

COLLECTING PARTY

HISTORICAL DATA

COMPILATION AND

TRANSLATION BUREAU

GENERAL OFFICE

INFORMATION AND

MEDIA AGENCIES

GUANGMING DAILY PEOPLE'S DAILY (RENMIN RIBAO) RED FLAG (HONGQI)

INTERNATIONAL

LIAISON DEPARTMENT

LEADING GROUP FOR

EDUCATION OF CADRES

LEADING GROUP FOR

EDUCATIONAL REFORM

ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT

PARTY COMMITTEE FOR CENTRAL ORGANS

PARTY HISTORY RESEARCH CENTER

PARTY SCHOOL

POLITICAL AND LEGAL COMMISSION PROPAGANDA

DEPARTMENT

UNITED FRONT WORK

DEPARTMENT

PROVINCIAL, MUNICIPAL, AND LOCAL PARTY COMMITTEES

Figure 18. Organization of the Chinese Communist Party, 1987

414
Party and Government

resignations of 65 full and alternate members, including Ye Jianying

and nine other senior Political Bureau members. The Fifth Ple- num, which immediately followed the conference, elected six new

members to the Political Bureau, dropped three from the party

Secretariat, and added five new members to the latter body. The

conference thus produced a sizable turnover in the senior party

leadership and in a direction very favorable to Deng's reform program. Younger and better educated leaders who supported Deng's

reforms replaced aging and long-inactive leaders. The other major

accomplishment of the conference was its adoption of the "Proposal on the Seventh Five-Year Plan" (1986-90), the framework for developing the actual plan adopted at the Sixth National People's

Congress in 1986 (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning

in 1979, ch. 5). Secretariat

The day-to-day work of the CCP is carried out by the Secretariat and its various departments—all placed under the direction

of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee (see fig. 18).

Headed by Hu Yaobang until January 1987, the Secretariat (suspended in 1966) was reestablished in February 1980 as the administrative center of the party apparatus, or, more aptly, as the party's

inner cabinet. The Secretariat and its general secretary are elected

by the CCP Central Committee. In early 1987 seven of the eleven

members of the Secretariat held concurrent positions on the Political Bureau. This overlap in responsibilities permitted reform leaders

to exercise greater control than in the past over policy implementation. In the same way, Secretariat members sitting on the Politi- cal Bureau have acquired a role in party policy making. The

Secretariat evidently is used as a proving ground for successors to senior party leaders.

Central Military Commission

The CCP's Central Military Commission is also elected by the

Central Committee and exercises authority over the military

through the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Since 1982 the party Central Military Commission has had a counterpart organization in the state Central Military

Commission (see The National People's Congress, this ch.). In fact, the leadership of both bodies is identical. Nevertheless, because

the party Central Military Commission reports directly to the

powerful Central Committee, it is the authoritative body in matters of military policy (see Military Organization, ch. 14).

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China: A Country Study

Other Party Organs

Another body, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, is chartered to monitor the implementation of party policy

and to handle disciplinary matters regarding party organizations

and members. The Central Advisory Commission was established

by the 1982 Party Constitution to facilitate the transfer of power

from the Long March (see Glossary) generation to younger and

better educated successors. This body has consultative rather than

decision-making powers. Its chairman is an ex-officio member of

the Political Bureau's Standing Committee. Deng Xiaoping was made the first chairman of this body, both to lend it prestige and

to encourage older leaders to retire. Below the central level, party committees and congresses were formed in the twenty-one provinces, five autonomous regions, and

three special municipalities directly under the central government.

Taiwan was listed as a province but, of course, was not under

China's administration. The party also was represented in vari- ous county subdivisions (which included the prefectures) and within

the PLA from regional headquarters down to regimental level (see

Military Organization, ch. 14). At the bottom of the party hierarchy were three kinds of basic organizations: general party branches,

primary party committees, and party branches. These were set up

in factories, shops, schools, offices, neighborhoods, PLA companies, and other places, depending on local circumstances and subject to approval by the appropriate party committees.

Party committees at the provincial level are elected by the

provincial-level congresses that convene every five years and have

as additional functions the election of a discipline inspection commission, advisory commissions, and delegates to the National Party

Congress. The county-level party congress convenes every three

years and elects a committee, standing committee, and secretary.

Below the county and PLA regimental levels, the general branch

committee meets twice a year and is elected for a two-year term. The party branch, or lowest level of party organization, meets four

times a year and elects a branch committee for a two-year term. Every party member must be a member of a branch committee.

Party branch committees and their members at the grass-roots level are the backbone of the party organization. This is also the level where admission and expulsion of party members takes place.

Branch members exchange views on issues, become thoroughly

informed concerning party goals and policies, and learn to accept

party discipline.

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Party and Government

Membership

In 1987 the CCP had 46 million members (4.3 percent of the

national population). To qualify as party members, applicants must

be at least eighteen years of age and must go through a one-year

probationary period. Emphasis is placed on the applicant's technical and educational qualifications rather than on ideological

criteria. Members are expected, however, to be both "red" and

"expert" (see Glossary), and the need to make the party apparatus more responsive to the demands and wishes of the masses of

the people is stressed. A major corollary of the self-improvement and self-cleansing

activities is an ongoing campaign to weed out corrupt and dishonest

party officials from all levels of the party organizations. Ideally this

is accomplished by persuasion, but if necessary by punishment.

The party's seriousness concerning this campaign was underlined

with its September 1986 expulsion of the governor and party deputy

secretary ofJiangxi Province for "violations of law and discipline"

and "unhealthy tendencies" that purportedly included corruption,

moral degeneration, abuse of official power, intercession in favor

of relatives and friends, leaking of secret information, and many

other charges.

Significantly, the party also experimented with the direct elec- tion of its party committee members. In late 1984 Hu Yaobang

prescribed election procedures for direct election under a limited

franchise of the Shaanxi Province party secretary. This election

process included involvement of a large number of cadres down

to the county level, open nominations, and a series of runoff elec- tions, reportedly with no interference from either the central party

Secretariat or the provincial party committee. In addition, party

election procedures required that the number of candidates be

greater than the number of persons to be elected. In 1987 efforts to upgrade organizational effectiveness, unity,

and discipline were proceeding in accordance with a document

adopted in September 1986 by the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth

Central Committee. The "Resolution of the Central Committee

of the Communist Party of China on the Guiding Principles for Building a Socialist Society with an Advanced Culture and Ideology" shifted attention away from the controversial issue of

"unhealthy tendencies" in the party to focus on the need for aca- demic freedom, mass supervision of the party, and other aspects

of political reform. The stated goal was to build a truly communist

society, but one defined authoritatively as "socialism with Chinese

characteristics." Party energies and discipline were to be directed

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China: A Country Study

at achieving this goal and removing all obstructions and obstructionists. Thus, while earlier the party had identified corruption as a prime target, this concern was replaced with attention to "indige- nous feudal tendencies" that might hinder success in economic

modernization (see The Third Wave of Reform, Beginning in 1986,

ch. 11). The plenum endorsed the party's commitment to politi- cal reform and the extension of "socialist democracy and improving the socialist legal system, all for the purpose of facilitating

socialist modernization."

Mass Organizations

In its efforts toward enlisting broad popular support and involvement, the CCP in 1987 continued to rely on mass organizations,

"democratic parties" (see Glossary), and professional organizations. These organizations, affiliated directly and indirectly with

the CCP, were without exception headed by and permeated with

party cadres. As secondary or auxiliary vehicles for the party's

"mass line," the organizations constituted a united front of support for the party line and policies and conveyed the impression

desired by the party that the broad strata of the population endorsed

and was unified behind the communist leadership. Moreover, mass

organizations were used as a means to penetrate the society at large,

encourage popular participation, mobilize the masses, and inte- grate them into party-directed political life. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference

The activities of the mass organizations in theory are represented

by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

but in actuality are directed by the United Front Work Department of the Central Committee. The CPPCC has national and

local committees and is composed of a variety of groups and individuals: the Chinese Communist Party, the "eight democratic parties"; mass organizations, including the All-China Federation of

Trade Unions, Communist Youth League, All-China Women's

Federation, and All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce;

minorities; compatriots from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan;

overseas Chinese (see Glossary); and outstanding scientists, educators, cultural figures, journalists, and medical professionals. In June 1983 the Sixth CPPCC held its first session, which was

attended by 2,039 delegates, including representatives from the

Chinese Communist Party (technically a member of the united front associated with the CPPCC). CPPCC national sessions usually are held in conjunction with the session of the National People's Congress. The CPPCC has as its basic functions providing political

418
China's party and state leaders in 1985: from left to right, Hu Yaobang, Deng Xiaoping, Li Xiannian, Zhao Ziyang,

Deng Yingchao, and Peng Zhen

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

consultancy on major state policies and encouraging a united front

of patriotic intellectuals to contribute to modernization. The

CPPCC is an important symbol of multiparty cooperation in China's modernization programs, and reform leaders have increasingly emphasized its role. Democratic Parties

The eight "democratic parties" have existed since before 1950.

They include the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Guomindang, founded in 1948 by dissident members of the mainstream

Guomindang then under control of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek;

China Democratic League, begun in 1941 by intellectuals in education and the arts; China Democratic National Construction

Association, formed in 1945 by educators and national capitalists

(industrialists and business people); China Association for Promoting Democracy, started in 1945 by intellectuals in cultural, education (primary and secondary schools), and publishing circles; Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, originated in 1930 by intellectuals in medicine, the arts, and education; China

Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interest), founded in 1925 to attract the support of overseas Chinese; Jiusan (September Third)

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China: A Country Study

Society, founded in 1945 by a group of college professors and scientists to commemorate the victory of the "international war against

fascism"; and Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League, cre- ated in 1947 by "patriotic supporters of democracy who originated

in Taiwan and now reside on the mainland."

Trade Unions

The most prominent mass organizations were given key responsibility for supporting and implementing the reform program. CCP

Secretariat member Hao Jianxiu, speaking to an executive meeting of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, said that "as mass organizations of the working class, trade unions should stand

at the forefront of the ongoing economic reform in China. They

should blaze a new trail with distinct Chinese characteristics for conducting trade union activities." Specifically, Federation organizations were to aid members in acquiring modern scientific knowledge and technological skill. Within the membership and its affiliated organizations, intellectuals were to be protected and considered as members of the working class. Workers acquired the

right to examine and discuss their factory director's principles,

management plans, reform programs, budgets, and accounts. They

also had the right to vote and to supervise and appraise leaders

at all organizational levels. The workers' congress, held twice a

year, was the organization empowered to exercise those rights. The

regular organization that managed the daily affairs was the trade

union body. These liberalizing changes were designed to improve

workers' morale and thereby their productivity.

Communist Youth League

The Communist Youth League, the other primary communist

organization, functioned as an all-purpose school for party members. Except for its top-ranking officials, the league's members,

from fifteen to twenty-five years of age, were indoctrinated, trained,

and prepared to serve as future party regulars. The league was

organized on the party pattern. Its leader (in 1987 Song Defu) was

identified as first secretary and member of the party's Central Committee. The Communist Youth League's eleventh congress, held

in December 1982, was attended by about 2,000 delegates. The

congress elected a central committee of 263 members and 51 alter- nate members. In 1987 the league included 52 million members

attached to 2.3 million branches. They were required to carry out party policies, respect party discipline, and act as a "shock force

and as a bridge linking the party with the broad masses of young

people." Since 1984 the league's leadership has increased ties with

420
Party and Government

youth organizations worldwide through friendly exehanges and

cooperation. The Communist Youth League was responsible also

for guiding the activities of the Young Pioneers (for children below

the age of fifteen).

Women, Artists, Students, and Others

Among the other CPPCC groups, the All-China Women's Federation enlisted women in the party's effort to spread ideological awareness and to raise educational and technical levels. It also protected women's rights, promoted their welfare, and assisted them

in family planning. The All-China Federation of Literary and Art

Circles was guided by the principle "Let a hundred flowers bloom,

let the hundred schools of thought contend," but with the strin- gent official qualification that all works must conform to the four

cardinal principles (socialism, dictatorship of the proletariat, supporting the party leadership, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong

Thought). The All-China Federation of Youth was designed as a

patriotic united front, with the Communist Youth League as its "nucleus." An affiliated youth organization was the All-China Students' Federation for university and college students. The All-China

Federation of Industry and Commerce took part in modernization

efforts, offering consultant services in sciences and economics, train- ing teachers and business managers, and running schools. The

Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries was responsible for promoting friendly relations and mutual

understanding on nongovernmental levels through foreign contacts and cultural exchanges. In 1985 the association had connections

with more than 150 foreign countries. There were also several

politically active groups among Chinese adherents of Buddhism,

Islam, Taoism, and Christianity.

The Government

Constitutional Framework

The formal structure of government in 1987 was based on the State Constitution adopted on December 4, 1982, by the National

People's Congress (NPC), China's highest legislative body. Three

previous state constitutions—those of 1954, 1975, and 1978—had

been superseded in turn. The 1982 document reflects Deng Xiaoping's determination to lay a lasting institutional foundation for domestic stability and modernization. The new State Constitution

provides a legal basis for the broad changes in China's social and

economic institutions and significantly revises government struc- ture and procedures.

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China: A Country Study

The 1982 State Constitution is a lengthy, hybrid document with

138 articles. Large sections were adapted directly from the 1978

constitution, but many of its changes derive from the 1954 constitution. Specifically, the new Constitution deemphasizes class struggle and places top priority on development and on incorporating

the contributions and interests of nonparty groups that can play

a central role in modernization. Accordingly, Article 1 of the State Constitution describes China as a "people's democratic dictatorship," meaning that the system is based on an alliance of the working classes —in communist terminology, the workers and

peasants—and is led by the Communist Party, the vanguard of

the working class. Elsewhere, the Constitution provides for a renewed and vital role for the groups that make up that basic

alliance—the CPPCC, democratic parties, and mass organizations.

The 1982 Constitution expunges almost all of the rhetoric associated

with the Cultural Revolution (see Glossary) incorporated in the

1978 version. In fact, the Constitution omits all references to the

Cultural Revolution and restates Mao Zedong's contributions in accordance with a major historical reassessment produced in June

1981 at the Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, the

"Resolution on Some Historical Issues of the Party since the Founding of the People's Republic."

There also is emphasis throughout the 1982 State Constitution on socialist law as a regulator of political behavior. Thus, the rights

and obligations of citizens are set out in detail far exceeding that

provided in the 1978 constitution. Probably because of the excesses

that filled the years of the Cultural Revolution, the 1982 Constitution gives even greater attention to clarifying citizens' "fundamental rights and duties" than the 1954 constitution did. The right

to vote and to run for election begins at the age of eighteen except

for those disenfranchised by law. The Constitution guarantees the

freedom of religious worship as well as the "freedom not to believe

in an\^ religion" and affirms that "religious bodies and religious

affairs are not subject to any foreign domination."

Article 35 of the 1982 State Constitution proclaims that "citizens

of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the

press, of assembly, of association, of procession, and of demonstration." In the 1978 constitution, these rights were guaranteed,

but so were the right to strike and the "four big rights,

'

" often called the "four bigs": to speak out freely, air views fully, hold great

debates, and write big-character posters. In February 1980. fol- lowing the Democracy Wall period (see Glossary), the four bigs were abolished in response to a party decision ratified bv the

National People's Congress. The right to strike was also dropped

422
Gate to Zhongnanhai, seat of the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council, Beijing

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

from the 1982 Constitution. The widespread expression of the four

big rights during the student protests of late 1986 elicited the

regime's strong censure because of their illegality. The official response cited Article 53 of the 1982 Constitution, which states that

citizens must abide by the law and observe labor discipline and

public order. Besides being illegal, practicing the four big rights

offered the possibility of straying into criticism of the CCP, which was in fact what appeared in student wall posters. In a new era

that strove for political stability and economic development, party

leaders considered the four big rights politically destabilizing.

The new State Constitution is also more specific about the responsibilities and functions of offices and organs in the state structure. There are clear admonitions against familiar Chinese practices that the reformers have labeled abuses, such as concentrating power

in the hands of a few leaders and permitting lifelong tenure in leader- ship positions. In addition, the 1982 Constitution provides an

extensive legal framework for the liberalizing economic policies of

the 1980s. It allows the collective economic sector not owned by

the state a broader role and provides for limited private economic

activity. Members of the expanded rural collectives have the right

"to farm private plots, engage in household sideline production,

and raise privately owned livestock." The primary emphasis is

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China: A Country Study

given to expanding the national economy, which is to be accomplished by balancing centralized economic planning with supplementary regulation by the market.

Another key difference between the 1978 and 1982 state constitutions is the latter' s approach to outside help for the modernization

program. Whereas the 1978 constitution stressed "self-reliance"

in modernization efforts, the 1982 document provides the constitutional basis for the considerable body of laws passed by the NPC

in subsequent years permitting and encouraging extensive foreign

participation in all aspects of the economy. In addition, the 1982

document reflects the more flexible and less ideological orientation of foreign policy since 1978. Such phrases as "proletarian

internationalism" and "social imperialism" have been dropped.

The National People's Congress

In the mid-1980s the NPC acquired heightened prominence. The

NPC is defined in the 1982 Constitution as "the highest organ of

state power" without being identified, as it was in the 1975 state constitution, as "under the leadership of the Communist Party of

China." In addition, the Constitution states that "all power in the

People's Republic of China belongs to the people." Although the

preamble makes clear that the nation operates "under the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the guidance of

Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought," the trend has been

to enhance the role of the NPC.

The major functions of the NPC are to amend the state constitution and enact laws; to supervise the enforcement of the state constitution and the law; to elect the president and the vice president of the republic; to decide on the choice of premier of the State Council upon nomination by the president; to elect the major offi- cials of government; to elect the chairman and other members of

the state Central Military Commission; to elect the president of

the Supreme People's Court and the procurator-general of the

Supreme People's Procuratorate; to examine and approve the

national economic plan, the state budget, and the final state accounts; to decide on questions of war and peace; and to approve

the establishment of special administrative regions and the "systems to be instituted there."

The NPC may also remove key government leaders, including

the president and vice president and members of the State Council and state Central Military Commission. The 1982 State Constitution established the state Central Military Commission as the

key governmental body charged with "directing the armed forces."

While the party Central Military Commission provided the political

424
Party and Government

direction for military policy making, the state Central Military

Commission oversaw key military personnel appointments, managed PLA financial and material resources, developed regulations,

and implemented statutes to provide a more rational and professional organizational basis for the PLA. The chairman of the state Central Military Commission—in a departure from earlier practices that put either the state president or the party chairman in command—was designated as the commander-in-chief of the armed

forces. The 3,000 members of the NPC meet once a year and serve 5-year terms. Delegates are elected by the people's congresses at the provincial level as well as by the PLA. Provincial delegations

meet before each NPC session to discuss agenda items. There were

2,977 deputies at the First Session of the Sixth National People's

Congress held from June 6 to 21, 1983. Because of the infrequent

meetings, the NPC functions through a permanent body, the Standing Committee, whose members it elects (155 members in 1983).

The Standing Committee's powers were enhanced in 1987 when

it was given the ability to "enact and amend laws with the exception of those which should be enacted by the NPC," thus giving

this body legislative powers. The Standing Committee presides over

sessions of the NPC and determines the agenda, the routing of legislation, and nominations for offices. The NPC also has six permanent committees: one each for minorities, law, finance, foreign

affairs, and overseas Chinese and one for education, science, cul- ture, and health. Leaders of the NPC Standing Committee are invariably influential members of the CCP and leaders of major

mass organizations. The Standing Committee has within it a smaller

group that is led by the chairman of the Standing Committee (in

1987 Peng Zhen) and in 1987 included the vice chairmen and the

secretary of the Standing Committee, comprising a total of twenty- one members.

In addition to the NPC's formal function, the Standing Committee is responsible, among other things, for conducting the elec- tion of NPC delegates; interpreting the State Constitution and laws;

supervising the work of the executive, the state Central Military

Commission, and judicial organs; deciding on the appointment and

removal of State Council members on the recommendation of the

premier; approving and removing senior judicial and diplomatic

officials; ruling on the ratification and abrogation of treaties; and

deciding on the proclamation of a state of war when the NPC is not in session.

Although in 1987 the NPC played a greater role than in earlier years, it did not determine the political course of the country. This

425
China: A Country Study

remained the function of the CCP. Rather, the NPC played a consultative role. Another of its major funetions was to serve as a symbol of the Communist regime's legitimacy and popular base. But

with the emphasis in the mid-1980s on strengthening the democratic

aspects of democratic centralism, the NPC may assume even more

importance in decision making.

The State Council

In 1987 the top executive apparatus of the government was the State Council, the equivalent of the cabinet or council of ministers

in many other countries (see fig. 19). Although formally responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee in conducting a wide

range of government functions both at the national and at the local

levels, the State Council was responsive mainly to the CCP Secretariat, under the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. This

orientation was dictated by the fact that the senior members of the

State Council were concurrently influential party leaders—a tie that has facilitated the party's centralized control over the state apparatus. It also tended to obscure distinctions between the party and

the government, resulting in overcentralization of power in the

hands of a few, and arbitrary behavior by, key leaders. Both excesses were condemned by reform leaders. Deng's intention was to introduce some checks and balances into the party and government sec- tors by clarifying their separate functions with administrative codes

and regulations and by developing a legal base from which to enforce

them.

The State Council met once a month and had a standing committee meeting twice a week that included the premier, vice pre- miers, a secretary, and state councillors. It was headed by the

premier, Zhao Ziyang, who was re-elected to a five-year term in 1983. The membership of the State Council as of November 1986

included, in addition to the premier, five vice premiers (versus thir- teen in 1980), the secretary, and eleven state councillors. As the

chief administrative organ of government, its main functions were

to formulate administrative measures, issue decisions and orders,

and monitor their implementation; draft legislative bills for submission to the NPC or its Standing Committee; and prepare the

economic plan and the state budget for deliberation and approval

by the NPC. The State Council was the functional center of state power and clearinghouse for government initiatives at all levels. With the government's emphasis on economic modernization, the

State Council clearly acquired additional importance and influence.

The State Council was supported by leading groups, which

resembled institutionalized task forces and dealt with problems in

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Party and Government

the modernization program. For example, a leading group established in September 1986 was directed to investigate and suggest

ways to eliminate the obstacles to foreign investment in China. In addition to the leading groups were offices that dealt with matters

of ongoing concern. These included the Hong Kong and Macao

Affairs Office and the Special Economic Zones Office. In 1987 the

State Council structure also included thirty-two ministers in charge

of ministries, nine ministers in charge of commissions, twenty-nine

agencies for carrying out specialized functions, and eight major

banking institutions (see table 3, Appendix B). (In 1980 there had

been thirty-eight ministers presiding over ministries and eleven

ministers in charge of commissions. The NPC Standing Committee established the new Ministry of Supervision in December 1986.) In a bureaucratic reorganization carried out mainly in 1982, thousands of elderly officials had been retired and replaced by younger

and better educated officials. Reductions in leadership personnel

in the bodies under the State Council were accompanied by reductions in the staff of these bodies from 49,000 to 32,000 members.

The Judiciary

The State Constitution of 1982 and the Organic Law of the People's Courts that went into effect on January 1, 1980, provide for a four-level court system. At the highest level is the Supreme People's Court, the premier appellate forum of the land, which

supervises the administration ofjustice by all subordinate "local"

and "special" people's courts. Local people's courts—the courts of the first instance—handle criminal and civil cases. These people's courts make up the remaining three levels of the court sys- tem and consist of "higher people's courts" at the level of the

provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities; "intermediate people's courts" at the level of prefectures, autonomous

prefectures, and municipalities; and "basic people's courts" at the

level of autonomous counties, towns, and municipal districts (see

Court Structure and Process, ch. 13). In April 1986, at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, the General Principles of the Civil Code was

approved as "one of China's basic laws." Consisting of more than

150 articles, the code is intended to regulate China's internal and

external economic relations to establish a stable base conducive to trade and attractive to foreign investors. Many of its provisions

define the legal status of economic entities and the property rights

they exercise. The code clearly stipulates that private ownership

of the means of production is protected by law and may not be

seized or interfered with by any person or organization. It also

427
China: A Country Study

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

PRESIDENT

VICE PRESIDENT CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION

LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS COMMISSION

LEADING GROUPS

SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT

SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE

STATE COUNCIL

COMMISSIONS MINISTRIES

OFFICES

AGENCIES BANKS

PROVINCIAL, COUNTY, MUNICIPAL, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

NOTE: For a complete list of commissions, ministries, agencies, and other government

organizations, see table 3, List of Government Organizations, Appendix B.

Figure 19. The Structure of the Government, 1987

recognizes partnerships and wholly foreign-owned or joint-venture

enterprises (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). Local Administration

Governmental institutions below the central level are regulated

by the provisions of the State Constitution of 1982. These provisions are intended to streamline the local state institutions and make

them more efficient and more responsive to grass-roots needs; to stimulate local initiative and creativity; to restore prestige to the

local authorities that had been seriously diminished during the Cultural Revolution; and to aid local officials in their efforts to organize

and mobilize the masses. As with other major reforms undertaken

after 1978, the principal motivation for the provisions was to pro- vide better support for the ongoing modernization program.

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Party and Government

The state institutions below the national level were local people's congresses—the NPC's local counterparts—whose functions

and powers were exercised by their standing committees at and

above the county level when the congresses were not in session.

The standing committee was composed of a chairman, vice chairmen, and members. The people's congresses also had permanent

committees that became involved in governmental policy affect- ing their areas and their standing committees, and the people's congresses held meetings every other month to supervise provincial-level

government activities. In May 1984 Peng Zhen described the rela- tionship between the NPC Standing Committee and the standing

committees at lower levels as "one of liaison, not of leadership.

Further, he stressed that the institution of standing committees was aimed at transferring power to lower levels so as to tap the initia- tive of the localities for the modernization drive.

The administrative arm of these people's congresses was the local people's government. Its local organs were established at three levels: the provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities; autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous counties (called banners in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (Inner Mongolia)),

cities, and municipal districts; and, at the base of the administrative hierarchy, administrative towns (xiang). The administrative

towns replaced people's communes as the basic level of administration.

Reform programs have brought the devolution of considerable

decision-making authority to the provincial and lower levels. Nevertheless, because of the continued predominance of the fundamental principle of democratic centralism, which is at the base

of China's State Constitution, these lower levels are always vulnerable to changes in direction and decisions originated at the central level of government. In this respect, all local organs are

essentially extensions of central government authorities and thus

are responsible to the "unified leadership" of the central organs.

The people's congresses at the provincial, city, and county levels each elected the heads of their respective government organizations. These included governors and deputy governors, mayors

and deputy mayors, and heads and deputy heads of counties, districts, and towns. The people's congresses also had the right to recall these officials and to demand explanations for official actions. Specifically, any motion raised by a delegate and supported by three

others obligated the corresponding government authorities to respond. Congresses at each level examined and approved budgets and the plans for the economic and social development of their

respective administrative areas. They also maintained public order,

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China: A Country Study

protected public property, and safeguarded the rights of citizens

of all nationalities. (About 7 percent of the total population was composed of minority nationalities concentrated mainly in sensitive border areas.) All deputies were to maintain close and responsive contacts with their various constituents.

Before 1980 people's congresses at and above the county level did not have standing committees. These had been considered superfluous because the local congresses did not have a heavy workload

and in any case could serve adequately as executive bodies for the

local organs of power. The CCP's decision in 1978 to adopt the Four

Modernizations as its official party line, however, produced a criti- cal need for broad mass support and the means to mobilize that support for the varied activities of both party and state organs. In short,

the new programs revealed the importance of responsive government. The CCP view was that the standing committees were better

equipped than the local people's governments to address such functions as convening the people's congresses; keeping in touch with

the grass roots and their deputies; supervising, inspecting, appointing, and removing local administrative and judicial personnel; and

preparing for the election of local deputies to the next higher people's congresses. The use of standing committees was seen as a more

effective and rational way to supervise the activities of the local people's governments than requiring that local administrative authorities check and balance themselves. The proclaimed purpose of the

standing committee system was to make local governments more

responsible and more responsive to constituents.

The establishment of the standing committees in effect also meant

restoring the formal division of responsibilities between party and

state authorities that had existed before 1966. The 1979 reform mandated that the party should not interfere with the administrative

activities of local government organs and that its function should

be confined to "political leadership" to ensure that the party's line was correctly followed and implemented. Provincial-level party

secretaries, for instance, were no longer allowed to serve concurrently as provincial-level governors or deputy governors (chairmen

or vice chairmen in autonomous regions, and mayors or deputy

mayors in special municipalities), as they had been allowed to do

during the Cultural Revolution. In this connection most officials who had held positions in the former provincial-level revolutionary

committees were excluded from the new local people's governments.

Some provincial-level officials who were purged during the Cultural Revolution were rehabilitated and returned to power.

The local people's congresses and their standing committees were

given the authority to pass local legislation and regulations under

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Party and Government

the Organic Law of the People's Courts of 1980. This authority was granted only at the level of provinces, autonomous regions,

and special municipalities. Its purpose was to allow local congresses

to accommodate the special circumstances and actual needs of their

jurisdictions. This measure was billed as a "major reform" insti- tuted because "a unified constitution and a set of uniform laws

for the whole country have proved increasingly inadequate" in cop- ing with differing "local features or cultural and economic conditions." On July 17, 1979, Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) observed:

"To better enforce the constitution and state laws, we must bring

them more in line with the concrete realities in various areas and

empower these areas to approve local laws and regulations so that

they can decide certain major issues with local conditions in mind."

The law explicitly stated, however, that the scope of legislation must

be within the limits of the State Constitution and policies of the

state, and that locally enacted bills must be submitted "for the

record" to the Standing Committee of the NPC and to the State Council, which, according to the 1982 State Constitution, can annul

them if they are found to "contravene the Constitution, the stat- utes, or the administrative rules and regulations."

In 1987 the party and the government continued to stress the

importance of bringing about popular "supervision" over, for instance, the pivotal county-level administration. The importance

of maintaining close ties with the masses, listening to their opinions, being concerned with their welfare, and serving their interests was emphasized. Such concern was ensured with the adoption of

electoral procedures as part of the 1979 reform package that called

for instituting direct elections of deputies to the local people's congresses at the county level. Under the old procedure, the electorate's only choice had been to vote for a slate of candidates equal in number to the number of deputies to be elected. Additional reforms

provided for a more open process of nomination, a secret ballot with

a choice of candidates, and the possibility of primary elections. The

new election procedures were also extended to the election of government officials and of delegates to high-level people's congresses. (All

of these reforms taken together offered the potential, in those areas where they were adopted, for significant change.) Experiments

reportedly also were taking place in certain medium-sized cities, beginning in 1986, to increase participation by citizens in political

activities and decision making. In December 1986 Beijing municipal

authorities announced that the mid- 1987 municipal elections would

allow more than one candidate to run for election for each seat avail- able. This announcement came as extensive student demonstrations

in key urban centers were demanding broader democratic freedoms.

431
CCP general secretary and member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese

Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang

Courtesy

Xinhua News Agency

Official efforts to improve government performance at the grass- roots level continued in 1987. They had as a precedent a set of

regulations, first enacted in 1952 and 1954, covering the activities of what are officially referred to as "basic-level mass autonomous

organizations." Such organizations included the urban neighborhood committees, subdistrict offices, people's mediation committees, and public security committees. These regulations had been

reissued in January 1980 by the NPC Standing Committee in an

attempt to strengthen the grass-roots organizations. In addition,

the 1982 State Constitution had proclaimed the establishment of

residents' and villagers' committees to ensure public security and

preserve social order; to provide public health services and mediate civil disputes; and, most important, to carry information to and

from government organs. Another significant reform at the basic

level was the establishment of the administrative town (xiang)

China's paramount leader Deng Xiaoping

Courtesy

Xinhua News Agency

432
Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the Chinese

Communist Party and future premier of the State Council

Courtesy

President of the People 's Republic of China,

Yang Shangkun

Courtesy

Xinhua News Agency

Xinhua News Agency

government to replace the commune. This reform freed the com- mune to function solely as an economic unit.

Another administrative reform directly related to economic

modernization was the establishment in 1979 of the special economic

zones, which included Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou, all in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. Supervising China's special economic zones were the Guangdong provincial

committee in charge of the special economic zones, headquartered

in Shenzhen, and the Xiamen Construction and Development Corporation. The Guangdong provincial committee controlled Zhuhai,

Shenzhen, and Shantou and shared its authority over Shekou (a small

port zone within Shenzhen) with the China Merchant Steam Navigation Company. The latter was a Hong Kong subsidiary of China's

Ministry of Communications that had been empowered in 1979 to negotiate all foreign ventures in Shekou.

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China: A Country Study

The special administrative region, another administrative unit, was developed to serve foreign policy goals. Article 31 of the State Constitution of 1982 empowers the NPC to enact laws to establish

special administrative regions to accommodate local conditions.

Hong Kong will come under this rule when Britain transfers its sovereignty over its former colony to China on July 1, 1997, as delineated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong,

signed on September 26, 1984. Macao is slated to become a special administrative region on December 20, 1999, when Portugal

is to transfer governmental authority over Macao to China, as stipulated in the Joint Declaration on the Question of Macao, initialed on March 26, 1987 (see Nationalism, ch. 12). In 1986 and 1987

the State Council's Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office was draft- ing the Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative

Region, which would define Hong Kong's system of government.

The new law was due for completion in 1988.

The Cadre System

In 1987 the party and government cadre (ganbu) system, the rough

equivalent of the civil service system in many other countries, was

entering the final stages of a massive overhaul aimed at transforming

the bureaucracy into an effective instrument of national policy. The

term cadre refers to a public official holding a responsible or managerial position, usually full time, in party and government.

A cadre may or may not be a member of the CCP, although a person in a sensitive position would almost certainly be a party

member.

In an August 1980 speech, "On the Reform of the Party and

State Leadership System," Deng Xiaoping declared that power

was overcentralized and concentrated in the hands of individuals

who acted arbitrarily, following patriarchal methods in carrying

out their duties. Deng meant that the bureaucracy operated without

the benefit of regularized and institutionalized procedures, and he

recommended corrective measures such as abolishing the bureaucratic practice of life tenure for leading positions. In 1981 Deng

proposed that a younger, better educated leadership corps be

recruited from among cadres in their forties and fifties who had

trained at colleges or technical secondary schools.

The theme of "streamlining and rejuvenating" the bureaucracy was taken up by Zhao Ziyang in early 1980 when he announced

a major overhaul of the government. The number of vice premiers was reduced from 13 to 2, State Council agencies were cut by almost

half, and the number of ministers and vice ministers was reduced

from 505 to 167. The new appointees were younger and better

434
Wan Li was to become chairman of the Standing Committee of

the National People's

Congress in 1988

Courtesy

Xinhua News Agency

educated than their predecessors. In January 1982 Deng called for a "revolution" in the bureaucracy, starting with its top levels. At

that time, Deng envisioned reducing the size of the government

bureaucracy by one-quarter over a two-year period. By retiring

veteran cadres, the way could be opened for promoting younger,

professionally competent cadres to positions of authority and thereby

providing the effective leadership needed for China's modernization. In May 1982 the Central Committee reorganized and streamlined its internal structure by cutting staff in its 30 component

departments by 17.3 percent. Subordinate bureaus were reduced

by 1 1 percent. Almost half of the CCP Central Committee elected

in September 1982 were new members, and 83 percent of the

alternate members were newly elected. Reorganization of the provincial-level party and government

structures took place between late 1982 and May 1983. During this period, almost one-third of the provincial-level party first secretaries and all but three of the governors were replaced, most of

them moving into advisory positions. Almost two-thirds of

provincial-level leaders in 1986 were college or university educated.

During 1983 and 1984, these reforms reached the prefectural,

county, municipal, and town levels, reportedly resulting in a reduction in staff of 36 percent and an elevation in the percentage of

college educated leaders to 44 percent.

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China: A Country Study

Simultaneous with restructuring and rejuvenating the bureaucracy, a drive was begun to improve the party's working style and

consolidate party organizations. The Second Plenum of the Twelfth

Central Committee, held in October 1983, initiated such a program

for the years 1984-86. Some 388,000 party members participated

in the first stage of party rectification. These included high- and

middle-ranking cadres in 159 leading organs in the central departments, provinces, autonomous regions, special municipalities, and

PLA. This phase of the campaign lasted over a year and was accompanied by the recruitment of 340,000 technicians and 32,000 col- lege and university graduates and postgraduates into the CCP. In

addition, a campaign was launched to ferret out residual leftist influence from the Cultural Revolution period, factionalism, and

corruption. Discipline inspection committees were reinstituted.

Three kinds of party members were singled out as special targets:

followers of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) or of Lin Biao, factionalists, and persons who "beat, smashed, and looted" during

the Cultural Revolution. These members were to be expelled from

the party. Lesser offenders requiring correction included party

members with bureaucratic or patriarchal attitudes, those seeking

personal power and position, and those inept or lazy in their work.

The principal objective of the reform leadership was to establish a system of steady, predictable rule through the creation of a professional bureaucracy. An important aspect of the program was per- sonnel reform. Guidelines were issued that set age limits for key

offices. A limit of sixty-five years of age was imposed for government ministers, sixty for vice ministers and department chiefs, and,

for all other officials, sixty for men and fifty-five for women. The

effect of this key reform was to bring to an end the lifetime tenure system that had been fundamental to China's bureaucracy since

1949. There was the additional stipulation that officeholders in the

reconstructed bureaucracy be qualified both politically and professionally, that is, be both "red" and "expert." The reorganization

and streamlining of provincial-level party and government

bureaucracies followed the same procedures, including reducing the

staff sizes and number of offices, lowering the average age, and rais- ing the educational requirements for candidates for provincial-level

leadership. These changes were considered essential to providing

for a "third echelon" of leaders. This group could serve in positions of some authority, where they could be trained, observed, and

evaluated as to their suitability for increased responsibility. Below

the central level, the chosen age for leaders at the level of provinces,

autonomous regions, and special municipalities was fifty-five; at the

county level, between thirty and fifty years.

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Party and Government

The second stage of party rectification, having the same goals

as the first stage, began in the fall of 1984 and encompassed prefectural and county-level units. This stage involved some 13.5 million

cadres, or about one-third of the party's membership. The third

and final stage of the three-year party rectification campaign was

launched in November 1985 and targeted party units "below the

county level." This stage encompassed almost 20 million party

members, about half the total membership of the party. These members belonged to the more than 1 million party branches throughout the rural areas. The campaign worked from the higher to the

lower level organizations and proceeded methodically "in stages

and groups." But while party pronouncements at previous stages

of the rectification had complained about the perfunctory manner

in which the campaigns were being managed, at this final stage

the central authorities displayed notable leniency and caution. They

feared that extensive restructuring and rebuilding of the local leader- ship had the potential to disrupt both production and social order.

Even in cases of embezzlement, graft, and other "unhealthy practices," the party counseled circumspection and the employment

of moderate measures. Subjecting local leaders to condemnation

at mass meetings, a practice prevalent during the Cultural Revolution, was strictly forbidden.

In sum, the "revolution" being carried out in the bureaucratic

structures of power was meant to reorient the system away from

the style, procedures, and excesses of the Cultural Revolution and

toward the most efficient and potentially successful methods for China's modernization. This reorientation required the massive retire- ment of veteran cadres and the recruitment of those knowledgeable

in modern economics and technology to be trained in leadership

positions. It was an enormous task and one that obviously met significant resistance from those who either did not understand the new

requirements or saw them as a substantial threat to their position

and livelihood. Nevertheless, in early 1987 the reform leadership

appeared to be making very credible strides at fulfilling these goals.

The Media

Since 1978 the media had been one focus of the CCP's efforts to modernize key sectors of Chinese society, and it operated on

the premise that more responsible and factual reporting would help

to narrow the distance between the elite and the masses. The party

hoped in this way to enlist mass support for its nation-building pro- gram. In 1987 the official media continued to play its assigned role as a vehicle through which to inform, educate, indoctrinate, control, and mobilize the masses.

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China: A Country Study

Before 1978 the CCP used the mass media as a tool to "serve

the interest of proletarian politics" or the party's "class struggle"

and "mass line." Having these priorities, the party was concerned

neither with openness nor accuracy. What the CCP considered infor- mation was more often than not the interpretation of events or data

that would support the government's political, social, and economic

programs. Timeliness of content was far less important than political or ideological utility. Before 1976 the party allowed no dissenting

view to appear in print. The result was reporting and commentary

that made information and propaganda all but synonymous.

With the ascendancy of the Deng Xiaoping reformers in 1978,

the mass media began to display a different orientation and focus.

It began to play a significant part in the CCP drive to popularize,

first within the party, the notion of "practice being the only criterion

of truth" and of "seeking truth from facts," rather than from petrified formulations. After March 1978 the party press no longer printed

Mao's quotations in bold type. Moreover, it began to report more

shortcomings and expose more criticism of the central authorities. In 1987 there still were considerable limits on criticism in the offi- cial media, however. Party general secretary Hu Yaobang, in a 1986

speech published in the party's daily organ Renmin Ribao, instructed

editors that 80 percent of reporting should focus on achievements

in modernization and only 20 percent on shortcomings.

China's extensive communication system includes both official and unofficial channels. Official means of communication include

government directives and state documents, newspapers, periodicals, books, and other publications; radio and television; and drama,

art, motion pictures, and exhibitions. Unofficial channels include

handwritten wall newspapers, handbills, posters, street-corner skits, and theater (see Culture and the Arts, ch. 4). Of all these channels, the newspapers, periodicals, and electronic media continued

in 1987 to play the most important part in communications.

Among the principal national newspapers in 1987, Renmin Ribao

contained party and government directives, unsigned editorials,

commentaries, and letters to the editor. The latter were often criti- cal of local implementation of central policies. The PLA organ was

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily). Gongren Ribao (Workers'

Daily) dealt with labor matters, and Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily) provided coverage of science, culture, and education.

There were numerous other newspapers published both at the

provincial-level and at the mass organization-level, but none of these

had the prestige and authoritativeness associated with the party

and army newspapers. Starting in 1978, party authorities permitted newspapers from south China provinces to circulate outside

438
Party and Government

China; in 1983 north China newspapers were given foreign circulation. There were also many speeialty newspapers focusing on the

economy, trade and finance, agriculture, the arts, youth affairs,

and so on. By the end of 1984, post offices in China reportedly were distributing 734 different newspapers with a total circulation

of 112.9 million, or a newspaper for every eighth person in China.

Hongqi (Red Flag), a journal published by the CCP Central Committee, provides guidance on questions of current political theory,

explaining the direction of the party's Marxist analysis, setting forth the party line, and suggesting the proper methods for implementing it. A monthly until December 1979, Hongqi since has been published twice a month. The government also publishes its major

reports and documents. For example, Guowuyuan Gongbao (State

Council Bulletin), appearing three times a month, provides a sum- mary of directives, prints notices, presents agreements signed with

foreign countries, and registers central approval given to local government actions. In addition to open official and unofficial documents, there is another large category of materials that is classified for internal use (neibu), as opposed to for public use (gongkai). These materials

are published by party, government, academic, and professional

organizations. Some publications have additional restrictions, such

as for distribution only within the publishing unit. The most protected publication is entitled Cankao Ziliao (Reference Information)

and is distributed to around 1,000 high officials daily. A similar

internal use publication, but with a much wider readership, is the

Cankao Xiaoxi"(Reference News). This publication contains translations of selected foreign news articles, many of which are critical of China. These internally circulated materials generally are more

reliable and detailed than those found in the open press. The principal source of domestic news and the sole source of

international news for the mass domestic newspapers and radio is the Xinhua (New China) News Agency. This government agency

has departments dealing with domestic news, international news,

domestic news for foreign news services, and foreign affairs. It maintains an extensive network of correspondents in ninety overseas bureaus. Xinhua also releases the News Bulletin in English, French,

Spanish, Arabic, and Russian, totaling about 30,000 words per

day, and provides special features to newspapers and magazines

in more than 100 countries. Domestic branches of Xinhua can communicate with the head office over microwave communications.

Internationally, a telecommunications network has been established

linking Beijing with Paris, London, New York, Tokyo and Hong

Kong. Further, Xinhua has rented an international communications

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China: A Country Study

satellite to file news to foreign countries and exchange news with

foreign news agencies. It mails special features to newspapers and

magazines in more than 100 countries. Another news agency, China

News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe), provides news stories and

photographs to Chinese newspapers and some radio and television

stations in Hong Kong, Macao, and several foreign countries.

By 1984 electronic media included over 160 radio stations and

90 television stations (see Telecommunications, ch. 8). The Central People's Broadcasting Station, headquartered in Beijing and

subordinate to the Ministry of Radio, Cinema, and Television,

provided domestic service to every area of the country. Radio Beijing, China's overseas radio service, continued to expand its programming, initiating a news program in English for foreign resi- dents in Beijing in January 1985. Television service was available

in the major urban areas and was increasing its reach outside urban

centers. China's television broadcasting was under the control of

China Central Television (CCTV). In 1979 the network began an "open university" program. By 1984 China reported having "radio

and television universities" in 326 cities and 1,168 counties throughout 28 provinces, autonomous regions, and special municipalities,

making the use of television an important aspect of higher education in China (see Education Policy, ch. 4).

* * * The dynamic nature and pace of political and social change in China have inspired a number of new works by China specialists.

For discussion of the concepts basic to the cadre system, A. Doak

Barnett's Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China

is useful. Also useful is Franz Schurmann's Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Of specific relevance to this chapter is the State Constitution of 1982, which appears in Beijing Review,

December 27, 1982, and the Party Constitution of 1982, which

appears in Beijing Review, September 20, 1982. These two documents, as well as extensive summary material on other subjects,

also appear in People's Republic of China Year Book, 1985. China

Quarterly publishes in each issue a useful section entitled "Chronicle and Documentation" that contains factual information and

analysis of key official meetings, events, foreign relations, and so on. In addition, two useful articles appearing in this publication

are Melanie Manion's "The Cadre Management System Post- Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of

Party and State Leaders," and David S.G. Goodman's "The

National CCP Conference of September 1985 and China's

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Party and Government

Leadership Changes." Of particular use is James R. Townsend

and Brantly Womack's Politics in China, which explains China's

political and institutional framework and the governmental process. A similar and detailed work is Alan P.L. Liu's How China Is Ruled.

Political and structural reforms are dealt with in the first volume

of China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, published by the

United States Congress Joint Economic Committee. Another work

that summarizes these subjects and includes a wide variety of

selected documents covering key topics is Policy Conflicts in Po - Mao China, edited by John P. Burns and Stanley Rosen. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

441

Chapter 11. The Political Process
An Eastern Han dynasty (A.D. 25-220) cavalryman awaits battle armed

with a halberd. The bronze figure, about fifty-three centimeters high, was

part of a group of mounted soldiers discovered in Gansu Province.
CHINA'S "SECOND REVOLUTION," a far-reaching program

of reform designed by Deng Xiaoping, was initiated at the Third

Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.

It marked a major turning point in China's modern political his- tory, as it was intended to make China's institutions and political process supportive of the Four Modernizations, a national program

of social and economic development. The first step was to recruit

intellectuals and mobilize the population on a course of modernization. Ultimately, it was hoped, these efforts would produce what

became identified as "socialism with Chinese characteristics."

To realize this lofty goal, several obstacles had to be overcome. The Cultural Revolution, under Mao Zedong's direction between

1966 and 1976, had divided Chinese society into competing fac- tions. The deaths of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in 1976 left the

country without strong leadership and contributed further to social and political divisiveness. The need became obvious to replace

Mao's premise of "class struggle as the key link" —which emphasized class conflict and disruptive mass campaigns—with a pragmatic style that stressed stability and a problem-solving approach

to difficulties encountered in carrying out developmental programs.

The overly centralized political system, patterned after the Soviet

Union's Stalinist model, had to be revised to decentralize decisionmaking authority.

Probably the greatest impediment to the success of modernization was the unwieldy Chinese bureaucracy. Steeped in revolutionary tradition but advanced in age and largely untrained in modern administrative procedures, party and government cadres

operated through personal connections and patriarchal attitudes.

For the party and government to exercise effective control over modernization programs, these cadres would have to be replaced

by younger and better trained administrators, a development that not surprisingly would provoke considerable resistance from within

the bureaucracy. Finally, the means had to be found to engage

urban workers, peasants, and intellectuals in China's modernization process by separating them from their traditional and often

backward viewpoints and providing them with a more practical

and scientific basis for their actions.

The substantial revisions to China's social, political, and ideological system, required for the success of the "second revolution,"

caused serious tensions within the political system. The introduction

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China: A Country Study

of major economic reforms also caused considerable strains. But

the economic reform measures, first introduced in China's rural areas, provoked an enthusiastic response and a substantial following. With this success as a base, additional reform measures were

prepared in October 1984 for introduction into China's more

diverse and complicated urban sector. Concomitant with measures

to promote rural and urban development, plans were made for substantial revision and reorganization of the political and administrative structure in China, particularly the party and government

cadre system.

Because of the innovative nature of the political and economic

reform programs, each wave of reform stimulated a constituency

supporting its development. Beneficiaries of the new measures car- ried them out with enthusiasm, sometimes even taking them beyond

their originally intended scope. At the same time, a substantial seg- ment of the affected population found itself undercut and showed

varying degrees of opposition to the reform initiatives. The reform

measures, initially designed by China's top party leaders, took on

a dimension of spontaneity as they were implemented. The dynamics of the reform process, generating degrees of support and opposition, played a substantial role in shaping the political process in China after 1978.

Operating within this context, China's top party leaders had a twofold task. First, they had to preserve a consensus among the

senior party leadership (the Political Bureau) concerning the nature and content of reform measures and the pace at which they would

be introduced. Second, that consensus had to survive the continual

dislocations and permutations that accompanied the implementation process. Some reforms provoked instability by being zealously

pursued; others bogged down in resistance. By 1987 it appeared

that the resolution of these emerging issues and problems was

accomplished mainly by internal bargaining among key leaders,

who often represented major institutional interests, and by disciplinary measures. The latter case was exemplified by the forced resignation of party general secretary Hu Yaobang early in that year. In a more general sense, the major function of reform leadership was to maintain stability in the political system while preserving

the momentum necessary for perpetuating the overall reform program. In short, as in other developing societies, China's leaders

have had to manage the tensions inherent in a society undergoing

rapid and thoroughgoing change.

Finally, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought—the official state ideology—needed continual substantive revision and changes

in emphasis by China's political leadership. Under Mao Zedong's

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The Political Process

leadership, China's recognized ideal had been to create the true

"socialist man." In the 1980s Deng Xiaoping set for his government the perhaps equally idealistic goal of leading the enormous

population of this developing country, still imbued with "feudalistic" traditions, toward the achievement of a modern, developed

state by the year 2000. It was a goal that seemed to require fre- quent revision if it were ever to be achieved.

Political Realignments at the Party Center

Chairman Hua Guofeng presided over the historic Third Ple- num of the Eleventh Central Committee on December 18-22, 1978,

his authority rooted in his generally acknowledged claim to be Mao

Zedong's chosen successor. Viewed in historical context, Hua's

role was that of a relatively minor figure temporarily bridging the

gap between the radical leadership associated with Mao and the

Cultural Revolution and the emergence of new political leaders who

could consolidate national policy and assert credible authority (see

The Post-Mao Period, 1976-78, ch. 1). Hua's political weakness

was most graphically illustrated by the rehabilitation—for the second

time—of Deng Xiaoping, in July 1977, and Deng's subsequent

successful elevation of his proteges and initiation of a comprehensive reform program to realize the Four Modernizations.

This transitional period moved toward far-reaching reform and

even a reassessment of Mao Zedong Thought. Economic development and material rewards to motivate producers replaced the

Maoist emphasis on ideological goals and incentives. A stress on

political stability supplanted the call to "continuing revolution."

In Chinese academic circles, efforts were made to restore and raise

academic standards, and party leaders stressed the importance of

science and technology and the contribution of intellectuals in realiz- ing modernization. The liberalization of expression in intellectual

and cultural circles led to further questioning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's role, and Mao Zedong Thought.

Between 1979 and 1981 it became necessary to "readjust" some

of the reform programs and initiatives to effect a balance between

reformist and conservative forces. The major issues dividing these

forces were China's capacity to sustain rapid economic development and the political and cultural consequences of opening up

to the world and allowing liberalization of expression and behavior.

The retrenchment that followed was a readjustment and not an end to Deng Xiaoping' s reform agenda.

Deng Xiaoping Consolidates Power

Deng's second rehabilitation marked another milestone in the

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China: A Country Study

career of one of the party's most remarkable leaders. Born in Sichuan Province in 1904, Deng was the son of a wealthy landlord. A bright student, he went to France on a work-study program in 1920. There Deng, like many other Chinese students, was

radicalized and joined the nascent Chinese Communist Party. He

had returned to China by 1926 and, after the party was forced

underground in 1927, became involved in guerrilla activities (see

Republican China, ch. 1). Eventually he joined the main body of

the party and Red Army in Jiangxi Province. Deng participated

in the Long March (see Glossary) and rose through the ranks of

the Red Army to become a senior political commissar during the war against Japan (1937-45) and the Chinese civil war (1945-49).

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949,

he was assigned his home province of Sichuan, where he was made

first secretary of the Southwest Regional Party Bureau. In 1952

Deng was transferred to Beijing and given several key positions,

the highest of which was vice premier of the State Council —

remarkable development that he probably owed to Mao's favor. In 1956 Deng was promoted over several more-senior party leaders to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and became

secretary general of the party, that is, head of the party Secretariat.

As secretary general, Deng became involved in the day-to-day

implementation of party policies and had immediate access to the resources of the entire party bureaucracy. Consequently, Deng's

power grew immensely. Because he perceived Mao's radical eco- nomic policies to have been harmful to China's development after 1958, Deng began to work more closely with State Chairman Liu

Shaoqi. Deng's behavior irritated Mao, and his stress on results over ideological orthodoxy struck Mao as "revisionism" (see Glossary). During the Cultural Revolution, Deng was branded the

"number-two capitalist roader in the party" (Liu Shaoqi was the

"number-one capitalist roader," having allegedly abandoned social- ism, see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). In 1967

Deng was driven from power and sent to work in a tractor factory

in Jiangxi Province.

After the excesses of the Cultural Revolution and the shock of an attempted military coup in 1971 by Lin Biao, Premier Zhou

Enlai apparently recommended that Deng be brought back to aid

in dealing with increasingly complex domestic and international

issues. Mao agreed, and Deng returned in April 1973 as a vice

premier. He rejoined the Political Bureau in December, becoming more active in national affairs as Zhou Enlai 's health weakened.

By early 1975 he was in charge of the work of the Central Committee as one of its vice chairmen. From this powerful vantage point,

448
The Political Process Deng concentrated on moderating the effects of the more radical

aspects of the policies introduced during the Cultural Revolution

and on focusing national attention on economic development. He

also continued to build his own political influence through restor- ing to high office many old cadres who had been purged during

the Cultural Revolution. Mao again began to distrust Deng and,

after Zhou's death, decided that Deng should once again be

removed from his positions.

Deng has been described as aggressive, brash, impatient, and

self-confident. He inspired respect among Chinese officials as a capable administrator and a brilliant intellect. He did not, however,

inspire loyalty and devotion, and he admitted that his hard-driving

personality often alienated others. In contrast to Mao, Deng offered no expansive socialist vision. Rather, Deng's message was a practical one: to make the Chinese people more prosperous and China

a modern socialist state. Deng's pragmatic style arose primarily

from his dedication to placing China among the world's great

powers.

Deng consolidated his power and influence by removing his opponents from their power bases, elevating his proteges to key

positions, revising the political institutional structure, retiring elderly

party leaders who either were hesitant about his reform programs

or too weak and incompetent to implement them, and raising up

a replacement generation of leaders beholden to him and apparently enthusiastic about the reform program. As a first step toward

achieving these goals, Deng set out to remove Hua Guofeng,

apparently a firm believer in Mao's ideals, from the three pivotal

positions of chairman of the party and of its powerful Central Military Commission and premier of the State Council. At that time,

Deng was on the Political Bureau Standing Committee, vice chairman of the party Central Military Commission, and vice premier

of the State Council.

At the Third Plenum, four new members were elected to the

Political Bureau, all to varying degrees supporters of the reform

program. Hu Yaobang, an energetic protege of Deng Xiaoping, was elected, as was Wang Zhen, a Deng stalwart. Also elected were Deng Yingchao, widow of Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yun, architect

of China's 1950s economic policy. Chen also became head of the

newly established Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

(see Other Party Organs, ch. 10). Following the plenum, Hu Yaobang was appointed secretary general of the party and head of its Propaganda Department. Further personnel changes beneficial to Deng occurred at the Fifth Plenum, held February 23-29, 1980.

Hu Yaobang was elevated to the Standing Committee of the

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China: A Country Study

Political Bureau, as was another Deng protege, Zhao Ziyang. With

these promotions, accompanied by the forced resignations of members associated with the Cultural Revolution, the Standing Committee was comprised of seven members, four of whom were

strongly committed to party and economic reform.

Hua Guofeng's position was eroded further in mid- 1980, when

he was replaced as premier by Zhao Ziyang. A fast-rising provincial party official, Zhao spent his early career in Guangdong

Province, where he gained expertise in managing agricultural

affairs. Unlike Hua, whose political status had improved during

the Cultural Revolution, Zhao Ziyang was purged in 1967 for sup- porting the policies of Mao's opponents. After his rehabilitation

in 1972, Zhao worked briefly in Nei Monggol Autonomous Region

(Inner Mongolia) and then returned to Guangdong Province. In 1975, a peak period in Deng's influence, Zhao was sent to trou- bled Sichuan Province as party first secretary. Under Zhao's leader- ship Sichuan Province returned to political and economic health.

Zhao believed firmly in material incentives, and he promoted

experiments in returning decision-making authority to the local work units, rather than centralizing it exclusively in provinciallevel or central administrative bureaus.

Hua Guofeng's political isolation deepened when at the Central Committee's Sixth Plenum, in June 1981, he was replaced as party chairman by General Secretary Hu Yaobang. This key meeting reevaluated party history, including the Cultural Revolution,

and charged Mao with major errors in his later years. Hua, having been identified with the "two whatevers" group ("support

whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made and follow whatever

instructions Chairman Mao gave"), was marked for political

oblivion. At this same meeting, Deng Xiaoping assumed Hua's

former position as chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, advancing his goal of ridding the top military ranks of

reform opponents. With these developments, Deng was poised for an even more thorough consolidation of the reform leadership at the upcoming Twelfth National Party Congress.

Institutionalizing Collective Leadership

Following the Third Plenum, one of Deng Xiaoping's major

reform goals had been to produce an institutionalized and stable

political system that could promote economic development. Economic reform was to be accompanied by political reform that would

permit a greater range of personal and intellectual choices and

include the opening up of debate on key issues of local and national concern.

450
The Political Process A major part of this political reform had to do with implementing the concept of collective leadership. The cult of personality cul- tivated by Mao and those associated with him had made Chinese

society subject to the whims of an aging and increasingly irrational

revolutionary personality. To counter this style and project an image

of political maturity and regularity, Deng declined to assume the

party chairmanship. Even Hua Guofeng's demotion from senior

leadership positions was done gradually and was cushioned by

allowing Hua to retain his membership on the Central Committee. Overall, Deng's objective was to invert the practice of having

power vested more in individuals than in institutions and to modify

a decision-making process that operated by fiat, without regular

procedures or an adequate information base.

A major step toward institutionalizing collective leadership was

taken with the re-establishment of the party Secretariat in 1980

(see Secretariat, ch. 10). Its formation permitted the emplacement

of promising younger leaders to manage and master day-to-day

party affairs. Having supervisory authority over the various Central Committee departments, the Secretariat could provide the

Political Bureau and its presiding Standing Committee with additional expertise in making decisions. By 1987 the Secretariat

included eleven members, six of whom also served on the Political Bureau. The broad experience of its membership covered all major

substantive areas, including party, government, and military affairs,

agriculture, the national economy and planning, culture and

propaganda, and industry and trade. In addition to drafting the

major policy resolutions for Political Bureau deliberation and then

supervising the implementation of party policy, the Secretariat used

its expertise and organizational standing to exert pressure on the

cumbersome Chinese bureaucracy to achieve the desired results. The 1982 Party Constitution abolished the post of party chairman and expanded the base of political authority to include the

Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, party general secretary, chairman of the party's Central Military Commission, first secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, and

chairman of the Central Advisory Commission. The premier also served on the Standing Committee, which thus included in its policy-making ranks representatives of the three major institu- tions—party, government, and military.

Another measure that promoted a more balanced distribution

of power was the strengthening of senior governmental bodies. As

premier, Zhao Ziyang presided over the State Council, a body crucial to the implementation of economic reform measures and, like the party Secretariat, supported by an abundance of research

451
China: A Country Study

institutions to aid in decision making (see The State Council,

ch. 10). By 1987 the State Council, the chief administrative

organization of government and clearinghouse for government

actions, was composed of twenty-two members, including Premier

Zhao and five vice premiers who also served on the Political Bureau.

Its Standing Committee of seventeen included senior members with

long and recognized experience in all aspects of government. The

State Council directed the work of the various government ministries, commissions, and agencies and verified that relevant party

policies were being implemented.

The process of easing out unwanted leaders was institutionalized at the Twelfth National Party Congress in September 1982.

Deng Xiaoping developed and headed the new central body, the

party's Central Advisory Commission. Qualified members with

at least forty years of party service were honored by being named

to this body as consultants to the party and the government. This

institutional innovation was intended to remove the superannuated

veterans from real power positions while allowing them to remain

at least at the fringes of power.

Besides providing for the graceful retirement of old revolutionary heroes and elderly leaders, at the Twelfth National Party Congress the reform leadership successfully consolidated its control of

the party. Sixty percent of the members and alternate members

on the newly elected Central Committee were newcomers and probable supporters of the reform program. Most of those elected had

professional and technical qualifications, fulfilling another reform

goal of infusing the bureaucracy with competent and talented

officials. A Successor Generation

An even more remarkable shift in the composition of party leader- ship occurred at the National Conference of Party Delegates in September 1985. Over 100 senior party leaders submitted their

resignations, including 10 members of the Political Bureau and 64

members of the Central Committee. The officials reportedly gave

their reason for retiring as a desire to make way for younger and

better-educated leaders who were more equipped to lead China and

guide the reform program. In fact, these retiring leaders were a mixed group, some of whom lacked the vigor and skills necessary

to handle the complexities of reform, while others had reservations

concerning the direction and pace of the reform program. Some

even may have believed that it was best to turn over responsibilities to a younger leadership. In spite of this trend, Deng, who was

himself eighty-two years old, and several other senior leaders

452
The Twelfth National Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, September 1982

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

continued in office. Officially, he maintained that his requests to

retire had all been turned down. In fact, the progress of the reform

program was heavily dependent on Deng's continued central role. Hu Yaobang's demotion in 1987 also raised questions about the

quality of the selection process for top positions and even about

the stability of the reforming Chinese political system. Hu had been

viewed as Deng's successor as party leader, but he came under

attack from within the Political Bureau for what was described as indirectly encouraging questioning of the communist system, for pushing the economic reforms beyond their intended limits, and

for speaking out abruptly in international circles. Although Deng

reportedly apprised Hu of his errors, Hu was said to have failed

to change and thus was demoted in accordance with party disciplinary rules. Obvious attempts were made to ease the general shock

of Hu's demotion, including allowing him to retain his seat on the

Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and having him shown

in the press in attendance at key meetings. It seemed likely that

Hu would be demoted further, at the Thirteenth National Party

Congress scheduled for October 1987. This would correspond to the treatment a few years before of Hua Guofeng and preserve the

appearance that the party was handling leadership affairs rationally, in clear contrast to the era of Maoist purges.

The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84

In the process of introducing reforms, China's leaders for the

most part have acted cautiously and introduced new programs

incrementally. In the period of the Four Modernizations, they began

a broad search of foreign sources for ideas to introduce and test in the Chinese environment. Their pragmatic approach entailed

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China: A Country Study

following the progress of newly introduced concepts closely in order

to make any necessary mid-course corrections or deletions. Maintaining the momentum of the reform program required the leaders to interact constantly to meet the challenges, failures, and

setbacks inherent in their experiment.

The major changes introduced by key reforms inevitably provoked tensions in the political system. Strains developed between

those who would not benefit or could not adjust to the new conditions and those who saw the new opportunities afforded. The result- ing pressures on the system required constant attention of and

mediation by the top party leaders. The goals, contents, and

progress of the reform program reportedly were reviewed and dis- cussed regularly at the highest-level party meetings. Leaders on

the Political Bureau Standing Committee strove for consensus on

the contents of the reform program and its agenda and participated

in an ongoing process of bargaining to reconcile different policy

orientations and institutional interests. The competing interests that emerged throughout the country when a new wave of reform was

introduced appeared to have spokesmen or advocates in the highest

party circles. The issues that emerged were debated in authoritative party meetings with the aim of arriving at a consensus and

preserving harmony on the reform agenda. If this became impossible, personnel changes tended to follow, as was the case when

Hu Yaobang apparently broke the consensus, moving ahead of what

the cautious and stability-minded leadership could accept as a safe and reasonable course. In this way China, under Deng Xiaoping' s leadership, appeared

to follow the tenets of democratic centralism (see Glossary). Policies that originated at the authoritative party center were tested

and evaluated in practice, and reports of their results, including

problems and setbacks, were then channeled back to the system's

center for debate. In the 1980s it became something of a leadership art to keep the reform program going, balance the tensions

it provoked, and maintain the political system intact. Seen in this context, a key question became whether or not political leaders other

than Deng Xiaoping would have the prestige and political skill needed to direct and preserve this delicate balance, especially after Deng passed from the scene. The Opening Up Policy and Reform in the Countryside

The first reforms to affect China's economy were instituted

between 1979 and 1984. The programs were systemic economic

reforms aimed at revising China's foreign economic relations and

refocusing the country's agricultural system. The desire to purchase

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The Political Process

foreign equipment and technology needed for China's modernization led to a policy of opening up to the outside world that would

earn foreign exchange through tourism, exports, and arms sales (see Reform of the Economic System, Beginning in 1979, ch. 5). The opening up policy included sending large numbers of students

abroad to acquire special training and needed skills. The effect was

to make China more dependent on major sectors of the world econ- omy and reverse the Maoist commitment to the ideal of self-reliance. Not everyone was satisfied with this radical departure. The conservative reformers were especially apprehensive about the corrupting

cultural and ideological influences that they believed accompanied

foreign exposure and imports.

In China's rural areas, the economic reform program decollectivized agriculture through a contract responsibility system (see

Glossary) based on individual households (see Rural Society, ch. 3; Agricultural Policies, ch. 6). The people's communes (see Glossary) established under Mao were largely replaced with a system

of family-based farming. The rural reforms successfully increased

productivity, the amount of available arable land, and peasant per

capita income. All of these were major reform achievements. Their

success stimulated substantial support in the countryside for the

expansion and deepening of the reform agenda.

While the opening up policy and rural reform produced signifi- cant benefits to the Chinese economy and won enthusiastic support for the Deng reformers, they also generated substantial

problems and brought political opposition from conservative leaders. The Maoist ideal of self-reliance still had proponents among

the leadership in the 1980s, and many were openly critical of the

expanding foreign influences, especially in such areas as the special economic zones (see Glossary).

In rural areas, economic reform led to inequalities among eco- nomic regions and appeared in some instances to produce a new,

potentially exploitative class of rich peasants. The official press contained accounts of peasants who carried the profit motive far beyond

the intent of the reform program, engaging in smuggling, embezzlement, and blatant displays of newly acquired wealth. Thus, on

the one hand, top leaders fully supporting the reform agenda could

show major successes as they promoted further reform. On the other

hand, those more concerned with ideological continuity and social

stability could identify problems and areas of risk. The differing

perceptions and responses of these reformist and conservative groups

produced considerable tension in the political system.

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China: A Country Study

Rectification and Reform

These results of the opening up policy and rural reform programs

had important political repercussions at the national level. The question of borrowing from the West has been debated vigorously since

the early nineteenth century. The concern has always been the

impact of Western social, political, and cultural traditions, sometimes referred to derisively as the "'flies and insects" that blow in along with culturally neutral scientific and technical information.

This concern was especially prevalent among conservatives in the

highest leadership circles and extended to the possiblv corrosive

effect of Western traditions on the party's Marxist-Leninist ideological foundation. To meet this challenge, in October 1983 the

party launched a national program to improve '"party style."

organization, and ideology.

According to Chen Yun, a leading conservative and major figure

in party rectification, the question of party style was crucial for the organization's very survival, especially because of the party's

tarnished image and the perceived crisis of confidence and loss of

prestige during the Cultural Revolution period. Improving party

style required that organizational norms be restored, which entailed

ridding the party of factionalism. It also demanded that measures

be taken to counter corruption and the exercise of privilege. These

frequently had taken the form of abuses by cadres who used per- sonal relations and ""back-door" benefits to further their own

interests. Finally, improved party style required that political dis- cipline be enforced in implementing party programs.

These goals were accomplished over the next three years, accompanied by thorough ideological education. The Second Ple- num of the Twelfth Central Committee (October 11-12. 1983)

affirmed that the policy of opening up to the outside world was

entirely correct but condemned the "corrosive influence of decadent bourgeois ideology" that accompanied it and the ""remnant

feudal ideas" still pervasive within the party system, which required

thorough rectification. In effect, linking the attempt to '"clear away

cultural contamination" with improving party style meant rejecting both the radical left, or those who still carried the taint of

associations with the Cultural Revolution, and those on the right,

who were considered by some party leaders to have become too invok ed in the trappings of Western ideas and practices.

At the same time that the party was attempting to discipline its own ranks, a drive was initiated within Chinese society to crack

down on crime. Beginning in August 1983. the drive focused on

the increase in serious crimes against social order: murder, robbery.

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The Political Process

burglary, rape, and arson. Explanations for the crime wave included

the breakdown of law and order that had begun in the Cultural

Revolution period and corrupting influences that had slipped in with the opening up policy (see Return to Socialist Legality, ch. 13). A campaign against "spiritual pollution" was initiated by a speech given at the Second Plenum by Deng Xiaoping (see Policy

Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). The campaign targeted "decadent,

moribund ideas of the bourgeoisie" that questioned the suitability

of the socialist system or the legitimacy of the party's leading role.

It also sought to establish a basis for ideological continuity between

the emerging younger generation and the older, civil-war-era veter- ans. Conservative Political Bureau members attempted to use the

campaign to rectify what they considered decadent behavior and

corrosive liberal thought. Following this example, some lower-level

party cadres began to exhibit behavior similar to that of the mass

campaigns of the Cultural Revolution. Young men and women

with long hair or Western-style clothing were subjected to ridicule

and abuse. Peasants who had prospered were accused of selfish- ness; in response, some ceased to participate in rural reform.

Intellectuals were again under suspicion, and party and government cadres adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude to avoid making

political errors. To avert potential instability and stagnation of the reform program, the authorities began to place limits on the spiritual pollution campaign: it was not to be pursued in the countryside, it was

not to impede scientific research aimed at promoting modernization, and, most important, it was not to be implemented in the

mass-campaign style of the Cultural Revolution.

By the spring of 1984 the full-scale media treatment of spiritual

pollution had subsided, indicating that party leaders were able to confront the problems and build a consensus on how to contain

the excesses and return to the reform program. In May, in a bow

to the conservatives, Zhao Ziyang reported that although mistakes

had been made in implementing the spiritual pollution campaign,

the issue of spiritual pollution remained on the party agenda. The

reform leadership thus eased the tensions within the system by

acknowledging that reactions to the reform program would occur and by checking any obstructions, disruptions, or violence that

emerged. This essentially conciliatory approach was necessary at

least until opponents could be removed or reformed through a series of new appointments or through the continuing party rectification

program.

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China: A Country Study

The Second Wave of Reform, 1984-86

Reform of the urban industrial and commercial economy was

formally initiated with the landmark "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Reform of the Economic Structure" issued in October 1984. The radical changes

contained in the urban program were revealed as it unfolded, and

they heralded additional tensions. The urban program was accompanied by a less publicized but apparently spectacularly successful

program for developing rural industry. These programs presented

considerable challenges for the political system. The strain was

intensified by the fact that the urban reform system was being

implemented at a time when the party rectification program was

extending below the central level, into all areas of society.

The Repercussions of Urban Reform

The party leadership benefited from the success of the rural

reform program and the generally enthusiastic public response it generated. The leadership sought to use this success as a basis for tackling reform of the much more complicated and diverse urban

sector. The overall goal of the highly experimental urban reform

program has been to create a mixed economy in which the market

plays a significant role and in which state planning is concerned more with regulating than with directing the economy. This

approach, however, has led to tensions both in conceptualization

and in the effects of reforms on people.

At the conceptual level, the reform's emphasis on leasing industrial and commercial enterprises to individuals and collectives raised

the issue of diversification of ownership and challenged the orthodox concept of state ownership. The introduction of securities markets and stock exchanges raised the question of how many

Western-style reforms China could absorb and still call itself a

socialist country. The same question applied to the adoption of a controversial bankruptcy law. These emerging problems were bound to be troublesome to party leaders like Chen Yun, who

adhered to more orthodox socialist concepts.

At the level of implementation, questions emerged concerning

the speculation and exploitation that was believed to accompany

the operation of stock exchanges. The introduction of bankruptcy

provisions was viewed as contributing to unemployment and hardships for the workers. Also, the introduction of a labor contract system, while providing opportunities to motivated and competent

workers, might well threaten the livelihood of the less skilled. Even

the new value being placed on entrepreneurship challenged the

458
The Gate of Heavenly Peace (Tiananmen) in Beijing, entrance to the Forbidden City

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

previous way of life, in which the state made all decisions and

provided the means of sustaining life. Although these challenges were serious, the most important

dimension of the reform program was its distribution of power and

authority. This function can be viewed as the dominant political role of the urban reform program, affecting the structure and

organization of the party itself. The Decentralization of Power

To produce the desired "socialist planned commodity economy,"

China's reform leadership began to recognize the necessity of trans- ferring more authority over economic decision making to urban

factory managers. A "factory director responsibility system" was

developed to encourage more local initiative, more efficient use of

resources, and more skillful and judicious leadership by the frontline producers. The reform immediately met serious resistance from

party secretaries attached to the factories, who until then had been

responsible for factory management and especially for personnel

decisions. In their view, the reform threatened party perquisites

and usurped local party decision-making authority.

This major issue in industrial reform was introduced in the context of the party's ongoing efforts to redefine the proper party role,

especially vis-a-vis the government. In the mid-1980s it appeared

that party leaders would have to share power even further, this time with enterprise managers or economic reform managers. Midlevel party cadres, many of whom had become party members

during the Cultural Revolution decade, were particularly prone

to negative feelings, especially concerning the urban reform pro- gram. Their resistance and resentment found sympathy among

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China: A Country Study

national-level party and government conservatives like Peng Zhen,

Deng Liqun, and others and provided a substantial base of support for these leaders when they presented their own, similar views

in policy-making circles. At least the leaders at the top who advocated more gradual reform could point to this disgruntled mid-level

party group as a reason for revising the pace and content of the

reform agenda.

The Third Wave of Reform, Beginning in 1986

The reform program seems to have followed a logical sequence,

building a base of support in the countryside, where issues and

institutions were more clear-cut, and then moving on to the more

diverse and politically complex urban areas. As the reform pro- gram began to confront major obstacles in this setting, the reform

leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, began to emphasize the need to extend reform to political structures in order to make political

institutions and processes more supportive of the modernization

program.

The need for further political reform was underlined by the continuing difficulty in implementing the factory-director responsibility

system, a major goal of the reform program for 1986. Party cadres

had already lost the privilege of life tenure and been subjected to the rigors and requirements of the party rectification programs.

They would not easily forfeit operational control of economic

enterprises.

Political Reform

The August 1980 address on reform made by Deng to the Politi- cal Bureau became the basis in 1987 for changes in the party and

state leadership systems. In the 1980 speech, Deng had called for strengthening the people's congresses, separating party and government organizations, reforming the cadre system, and establishing an independent judiciary. By 1986 the leadership's apparently over- riding interest in Deng's plan was to curtail excessive party inter- ference in governmental and economic decision making, and it was

therefore bound eventually to provoke apprehension and resistance. In early 1986, with responsibility for political reform resting in the

party Secretariat, several reports were aired concerning party secretaries at lower levels who had refused to relinquish decision-making

power to benefit local economic reform management. Many local unit secretaries had succeeded in reclaiming authority previously

given up. While Deng and the central reform leaders emphasized

that party interference in government affairs actually weakened

party leadership, conservative leaders such as Peng Zhen continued

460
The Political Process

to speak about party unity and spirit and about the more gradual means to political change. Gradual means included additional legislation and the proper functioning of democratic centralism. In addition to the new emphasis on power sharing in economic

management, pressures increased to realize the goals of "socialist

democracy" by increasing participation in public affairs through

direct elections from a field of candidates. In fact, it was a student

protest over the local slate of officials for a people's congress elec- tion in Anhui Province that sparked the student demonstrations

that spread throughout the country in late 1986. In extending the

argument for increased freedoms and democratic practices, demonstrators began even to question the presiding role of the party in the political system. Demonstrations in at least seventeen cities,

with participants in the tens of thousands, also threatened to dis- rupt the urban economy and the continuation of the economic

reform program. The drive to decentralize power and to separate

party from government authority created political strains already

apparent from the fact that no authoritative statement on these key

issues ensued from the Sixth Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee held in September 1986. The student demonstrations that

followed lent credibility to conservative ideologues in the Secretariat,

such as Deng Liqun, who argued that continued political relaxation and reform would inevitably lead to social chaos.

Resistance and the Campaign Against Bourgeois Liberalization

In late 1986, during the critical period when the Chinese politi- cal system appeared threatened by student demonstrators burning copies of party official newspapers, General Secretary Hu

Yaobang failed to act to restore order. Hu refused to denounce

the demonstrators or their intellectual mentors or to retreat from

the political reform agenda. Instead, Hu favored the introduction

of more "democratization" or pluralism into the political system.

He called for more movement on political reform than the system

could bear. In effect, Hu had outstripped the consensus concerning the pace and content of the reform agenda. In response, Deng

Xiaoping had to make the difficult decision to remove his protege

from the post of party general secretary, a step taken by unani- mous decision at an extraordinary expanded Political Bureau meeting in January 1987. Hu was replaced by Zhao Ziyang, one of the

chief architects of the economic reform program, who explained

that democratic reforms in China required a "protracted" process

for their implementation.

At the same time that Hu Yaobang was removed from office, a campaign was initiated against "bourgeois liberalization." Given

461
China: A Country Study

heavy play in the official media, this campaign sought to discredit

Western political concepts and emphasize the importance of

adhering to the four cardinal principles (see Glossary). The campaign against bourgeois liberalization became the means for conservatives led by Political Bureau members Chen Yun, Peng Zhen,

and Hu Qjaomu to express their opposition to some of the reforms,

especially the pace of the reform agenda, and to the increased

democratization advocated by Hu Yaobang. Having responded to major conservative concerns, Zhao then emphasized the limits that had been placed on the campaign against bourgeois liberalization.

The ideological campaign was to be limited to the party, and it was neither to reach the rural areas nor to affect economic reform

policies. In addition, experimentation in the arts and sciences was

not to be discouraged by this campaign. The imposition of these

limits was inspired no doubt in large part by the need to avoid dis- ruptions such as those that had accompanied the spiritual pollution campaign in 1983 and 1984. Besides affirming his support for the ongoing campaign against bourgeois liberalization, within specified limits, Zhao stressed that the economic reform program —

including opening up to the outside world—would continue.

In March 1987 Deng Xiaoping made it clear that political reform

also was to continue and that a "tentative plan" for political reform

would be included on the agenda of the Thirteenth National Party

Congress in October 1987. Deng's revelation suggested that with

Hu Yaobang removed, China's senior leadership had reached a consensus on the sensitive issue of political reform, which had been

discussed by many of them in general and cautious terms for some

time. Even conservative senior leaders such as Li Xiannian and

Peng Zhen made statements supporting political reform. This

development did not limit the likelihood of very intense debate

before and during the next National Party Congress on the specific

implementation of this most sensitive program. But it did suggest

that, with Hu Yaobang's demotion, China's top leaders could dis- cuss key details of the future role of the party in China's reformed

political system at the upcoming congress.

The Politics of Modernization

In the years following the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Committee Central in 1978, certain key reforms set in motion a process

of systemic change in society. Successful continuation of the reform

program depended on the ability of China's senior leaders to respond to the constant challenges encountered in implementing

these changes. Although a significant portion of the political sys- tem underwent major reform, a central question remaining in the

462
The Political Process

late 1980s was whether or not the party could maintain stable central leadership. There was reason to question whether a consensus

could be built within China's top leadership circles without the

presence of a leader of the stature of Deng Xiaoping. With major

bureaucratic interests to contend with and satisfy, and differing

ideological orientations within the top leadership, strong central

direction seemed to be the basic requirement for continuing reform.

The Components of Reform

The major components of 1980s political reform emphasized col- lective leadership, the re-establishment of the party Secretariat to implement party policy and to train a group of senior-level successors, the strengthening of the government apparatus to enable

it to share more power and responsibility for the development of

the reform program, and the removal of the military from a major

and sustained role in politics. The introduction of direct elections

and multiple candidates for people's congresses up to the county

level broadened public participation in China's governmental and

political processes. Also, the electoral process provided an expanded

forum for assessing both the potential and the shortcomings of party

reform policies. The intent to involve the public in the process of

identifying and resolving problems that emerged in implementing

the reform program also was extended to vocational groups. For

example, workers' congresses were given increased leeway to examine, debate, and discuss the policies being carried out in factories

and even to evaluate the performance of factory managers. Even

though the governmental and vocational groups had no direct

political power, their new public voice on reform elevated the

political process at least one step above the secret, closed channels

of the Maoist era. In institutionalizing the reform debate, the party

also developed a more efficient means for shaping and channeling

public debate.

Competing Bureaucratic Interests The implementation of these components of political reform contributed to internal tensions and competition among the major

bureaucracies—the party, government, and military. The party's

status remained paramount within the system, but the delineation

of its role became increasingly vague. Theoretically, the party was

to act as the unifying force that would guide the society on the

difficult path to modernization. In practice, especially at the middle levels of the structure, it appeared in the mid-1980s that implementation of the reform program was greatly diluting the power

of party cadres. Many party members were retired to advisory

463
China: A Country Study

capacities, increased emphasis was placed on separating the functions of the party and government, and much of the decision-making

authority in the economic sphere was transferred to enterprise

managers. All these factors eroded the party's once pervasive

authority. Although the party continued to articulate the central

policy for all levels of society, it offered fewer opportunities for members to achieve recognition and rewards after 1978, when concrete

results became more important. All this brought widespread bureaucratic resistance to reform policies and their implementation.

Retirements, elevated entrance qualifications, and power sharing with enterprise managers also brought traumatic changes in government bureaucracy. Direct elections to people's congresses

added a new element of uncertainty about the cadre selection process

for government service. Wider public discussion of issues and more

extensive press coverage subjected state cadres to additional

demands and criticisms and sometimes to abuse. The new accountability offered opportunities for government cadres, but often they

perceived it as a threat or a burden. It soon became another major

source of the complaints conveyed to top leadership circles. In the late 1980s, the People's Liberation Army continued as a major player in political circles and had representatives on the

Political Bureau (see Civil-Military Relations, ch. 14). Its presence

within senior party bodies significantly declined in the 1980s,

however, as was apparent from the percentage of party Central

Committee memberships held by military personnel. Military

influence had reached a high point in 1969, when its representatives gained roughly half the seats on the party's Ninth Central

Committee, but declined at the Tenth Central Committee (1973)

and Eleventh Central Committee (1978). In 1982 full membership

on the Twelfth Central Committee held by People's Liberation

Army personnel dropped to around 20 percent. At the National

Conference of Party Delegates held in September 1985, about half

of those retired from the Central Committee were from the armed

forces, and civilians replaced seven members of the Political Bureau

who had military connections.

These trends reflected Deng Xiaoping' s military reform goals

of placing the People's Liberation Army under firm civilian leadership and transforming its ranks and organization into a modern,

professional military establishment. Owing partly to its size and

largely to its heavily Maoist revolutionary traditions, the military was essentially conservative and in 1987 continued to resist many

of the reformers' policies. It seemed possible that Deng's successors might experience strong pressure from a revitalized People's

Liberation Army to restore some of its lost political influence.

464
The Political Process Deng Xiaoping's Seminal Role

Although post-Mao pronouncements by the Chinese Communist

Party officially emphasized collective leadership, Deng Xiaoping

clearly occupied center stage and acquired unique political stature

in the party hierarchy (without even holding the titular numberone position). Following the consolidation of Deng's power at the

Twelfth National Party Congress in 1982, the party issued The

Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. The book was intended to provide

authoritative ideological backing for the reform program in progress and became required reading for party members. Another volume,

entitled Building Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, issued in 1985,

contained speeches and writings on economic policy, ideological

questions, and foreign policy written by Deng after the Twelfth

National Party Congress. A major purpose of the later work was

to support the dramatic reforms introduced at the Third Plenum

of that congress's Central Committee in October 1984. This book

was re-released in March 1987 with additional speeches and remarks on intervening events, purportedly with the intention of providing extensive guidance for reform. Given the volume and frequency

of publication, it became difficult for the reform leadership to avoid

the appearance of creating a cult of personality around Deng.

Deng was an effective bridge between China's legendary revolutionary generation and the generation engaged in carrying out the

Four Modernizations. At the same time, Deng's preeminence called attention to the succession issue. The resolution of problems emerging in the course of reform depended heavily on Deng's political

backing and on his authoritative reform pronouncements. In large

measure, Deng's published works would support later leaders by

providing them an authoritative source with which to bolster their

own reform measures. Like any body of writing, however, Deng's

thoughts are open to interpretation and thus might as easily be used

by an opposition group for its own ends.

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought Re-Thought

Continuous development of the means of production is a major

goal of all Marxist governments. Under Mao, however, that goal was pursued in a manner that subordinated economic policy to the

dictates of massive class struggle and, in the end, to political struggle

carried up to the Political Bureau level. Mao, who admitted his

own ignorance of economics, resented efforts to correct the problems

caused by hasty agricultural collectivization and the Great Leap

Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), and he initiated a political and

ideological "struggle" against the 1950s reformers. This political

465
China: A Country Study

campaign reached massive proportions during the Cultural Revolution, doing extensive damage to the economic, political, and social fabric of Chinese society. In contrast, the post-Mao leadership so emphasized the issue of

economic modernization that modernization began to shape the

political process itself. Economic modernization became the basis

of Deng Xiaoping's pragmatic reform policies. Despite disagreements over the content and pace of the reform program, Deng won

solid support from other senior Chinese leaders who recognized

the great danger of neglecting economic development and the well- being of the people.

The difference in political style between Mao and Deng was evi- dent in their approach to opposition. When Mao perceived that

party bureaucrats were blocking the full implementation of his radical programs, he set out in the early 1960s to purify the party. In

contrast, faced with similar opposition in the 1980s, Deng sought

points of agreement and built a coalition around an eclectic eco- nomic program.

The Role of Ideology

In the early 1950s, Mao borrowed Stalinist social and economic

principles in promoting development. When these methods failed

to produce immediate and spectacular results, Mao adopted a mass- campaign style of development derived from his experiences as a

guerrilla leader. When applied to post- 1949 problems, however,

the style produced chaos. Mao's writings and speeches degenerated

into rigid dogma that his followers insisted be followed to the let- ter. Deng, conversely, advocated a flexible and creative application of Marxist principles, even claiming that Marxism, as the

product of an earlier age, did not provide all the means for addressing contemporary issues. Rather, he advocated taking a highly

empirical approach known as "seeking truth from facts" in order

to find the most effective means of dealing with problems. In Deng's

approach, ideology itself was not the source of truth but merely an instrument for arriving at truth by experimentation, observation, and generalization.

To effect such a basic revision of Maoist ideology, Deng had

to de-mystify Mao and reduce the towering image of the "Great

Helmsman" to more human proportions. This was largely accomplished in June 1981, when the party's Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh

Central Committee reassessed Mao's place in the history of the

Chinese revolution. In the years after 1981, the leadership nevertheless continued to revere Mao's image as a revolutionary, nationalist, and modernizing symbol, especially when that image aided

466
The Chairman Mao Memorial

Hall in Tiananmen Square

with the Monument to the People's Heroes in the foreground, Beijing

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

Billboard-sized pictures

and heroic statues of

Mao Zedong once prevalent throughout China

became less common in the 1980s. This one was

prominently located at

the front gates of the Beijing Iron and Steel College, Beijing, in 1986.

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

SB

1

467
China: A Country Study

development of Deng's reform program (see China and the Four

Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). Ideology and the Socialist Man

An important goal of Maoist ideology was the inculcation of cer- tain prescribed values in party members and, by extension, in society as a whole. These included selfless dedication to the com- mon good; an egalitarian concern with the uncomplicated expression of ideas in maxims or brief phrases understandable to all; and

fervent commitment to ideal social behavior. In contrast, state ideol- ogy in the hands of Deng Xiaoping had a different purpose. The

orientation was practical and less doctrinaire, aimed at fulfilling

the goals of modernization. The official ideology was to be used

to channel the individual's attempts to understand and practice

modern concepts and methods. For example, in early 1987 the concept of village committees was introduced to give the massive rural

population direct experience in self-management. It did not appear

that these new bodies were meant to have substantive power but

rather that they were intended to indoctrinate the population with

modern approaches to social and political relations.

Paralleling this use of ideology as a cognitive tool was the party's

policy of "emancipating the mind' ' and allowing debate to extend

into subjects once considered "forbidden zones." China's schol- ars have argued publicly over issues such as the value of the com- mune system, the need for market concepts in a socialist economy,

the historical impact of humanism, and even the current relevance

of Marxism-Leninism. Student demonstrators in the mid-1980s

went too far, however, by questioning the preeminent role of the

party. At that point, the immediate official response was to subordinate creativity and experimentation to public recognition of the

presiding role of the party and its ideology.

Ideology and Social Change

Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978, party reformers have been committed to channeling the increased political awareness and energies of the population into a strengthened movement for change. The tensions that have emerged during each successive wave of reform have required

intervention and policy decisions at senior party levels. These sometimes have taken the form of new initiatives. At other times, ten- sions have precipitated a conservative response. Overall, this

political process has seemed to support a gradual but forward move- ment of the reform program.

Modernization, by its very nature, is a socially disruptive process.

468
The Political Process

In 1987. with many of the functions of the party apparatus still unclear even to party members and the question of Deng Xiaoping's successor still unsettled, the success of China's reform program was by no means assured.

* * *

Relatively few book-length studies of post-Mao politics are avail- able. One of the more notable is John Gardner's Chinese Politics and the Succession to Mao, the major points of which are summarized

and updated in his lengthy article "China under Deng." Key offi- cial documents for much of the post-Mao period can be found in The People's Republic of China, 1979-1984, edited by Harold Hinton. A valuable survey of the period is provided by A. Doak

Barnett's "Ten Years after Mao."

Harry Harding's "Political Development in Post-Mao China,"

in Barnett and Ralph Clough's Modernizing China: Post-Mao Reform

and Development, contains useful information on the post- 1978

political scene. Articles by Harding, Carol Hamrin, and Christopher Clarke in the United States Congress Joint Economic Committee's China 's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000 also are helpful

in understanding the post-Mao era. Andrew J. Nathan's Chinese Democracy skillfully analyzes the evolution of the Chinese conception of "democracy." Michel Oksenberg

and Richard Bush, in "China's Political Evolution, 1972-1982,"

give extensive descriptions of the Chinese bureaucracy. Melanie

Manion's "The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The

Appointment, Promotion, Transfer, and Removal of Party and State Leaders" is a good examination of the cadre management system.

David S. G. Goodman's "The National CCP Conference of September 1985 and China's Leadership Changes" presents extensive

data on leadership developments in the mid-1980s.

Mao 's China and After by Maurice Meisner and Politics in China

by James R. Townsend and Brandy Womack provide general background on the post- 1978 political history of China. Barnett's older

Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China and Richard

H. Solomon's Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture give

excellent background on contemporary Chinese politics. Also, Franz

Schurmann's seminal work, Ideology and Organization in Communist

China, provides clear and extensive discussion on the basic elements

of the Chinese political system.

Biographies of key Chinese leaders can be found in works by

David Chang, Jerome Chen, Stuart Schram, and Dick Wilson.

(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

469

Chapter 12. Foreign Relations
Waiting in eternity for battle, this terra-cotta archer was entombed with tens of thousands of similar figures toward the end of the Qin dynasty (221-

207 B.C.) near XVan, Shaanxi Province.
IN THE 1980s CHINA pursued an independent foreign policy,

formally disavowing too close a relationship with either the United

States or the Soviet Union. The stated goals of this policy were

safeguarding world peace, opposing all forms of hegemony, and

achieving economic modernization at home. Chinese statements

repeatedly emphasized the interrelation among these goals. In other

words, China needed a peaceful international environment so that adequate resources could be devoted to its ambitious development

plans for the rest of the twentieth century. The goal of economic

modernization was a driving force behind China's increasingly

active participation in world affairs, exemplified by its policy of

opening up to the outside world, which greatly expanded Chinese

economic relations with foreign countries. As part of what it called an "independent foreign policy of peace," Beijing had joined numerous international organizations, and it maintained diplomatic

relations with more nations than at any time since the founding

of the People's Republic of China in 1949. By mid-1987, China

had diplomatic relations with 133 nations, and—in contrast with

earlier periods—was willing to interact with governments of different

social systems or ideologies on a basis of peaceful coexistence and

mutual respect.

Although Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has had distinctive

characteristics, the forces that shape Beijing's foreign policy and

many of its overall goals have been similar to those of other nations.

China has sought to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity

and to achieve independence of action, while interacting with both more powerful and less powerful countries. As with most other

nations, Beijing's foreign relations have been conditioned by its historical experiences, nationalism and ideology, and the worldview of its leaders, as well as by the governmental structure and

decision-making process. At times China's domestic policies have

had wide-ranging ramifications for its foreign policy formulation.

Another characteristic Chinese foreign policy has had in com- mon with that of many other countries is that the actual conduct

of foreign relations sometimes has been at odds with official policy.

Beijing's stress on ideology and principles in its official statements

at times makes the contrast between statements and actions particularly noticeable. In addition, a nation's leaders must often make

decisions in reaction to events and circumstances, rather than simply

formulating a rational foreign policy based on their goals. The need

473
China: A Country Study

to react to what has happened or what may happen adds an ele- ment of unpredictability to foreign policy decision making, as has

been the case at several crucial junctures in Chinese foreign rela- tions since 1949.

In addition to the aspects of foreign policy formulation and implementation that China has in common with other countries, China's foreign policy from 1949 to the late 1980s has had these

characteristics: contrast between practicality and adherence to principles; fluctuation between militancy and peacefulness; tension

between self-reliance and dependence on others; and contrast between China's actual and potential capabilities. These contradictory characteristics have created a confusing picture of Chinese for- eign policy: is Chinese foreign policy basically pragmatic or primarily based on principles and ideology? Is China peace-loving

or intent on fomenting world revolution? Is China's ultimate goal

to be self-sufficient or economically interdependent with the rest of the world? And is China basically a poor, developing country

that is at most a regional power or actually a nascent economic

and military giant deserving of superpower status? The response to these questions is that since 1949 Chinese for- eign policy has reflected all of these contrasting features. Beijing

has emphasized principles and ideology above everything else in foreign relations, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, but Chinese

leaders have also shown a practical side that gave them the flexi- bility to change policies, sometimes drastically, when they deemed

it in China's best interest. One of the most dramatic changes was

the shift from an alliance with the Soviet Union against the United

States and Japan in the 1950s to an explicitly anti-Soviet policy

and rapprochement with Japan and the United States in the 1970s.

Since 1949 Chinese foreign policy has fluctuated between periods

of militancy, for example during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76),

when China called for worldwide revolution, and periods when Beijing has been a chief proponent of peaceful coexistence among

nations, such as during the mid-1950s and again during the 1980s.

How self-reliant or dependent on others China should become in order to modernize has been a constant dilemma in Chinese policy

since the nineteenth century. As this policy fluctuated, Chinese for- eign relations have alternated between a tendency toward isola- tion and periods of openness to foreign assistance and influence.

Finally, the contradiction between China's actual capabilities since

1949 and its perceived potential has been another salient and dis- tinctive feature of its foreign relations. China's tremendous size,

population, natural resources, military strength, and sense of his- tory have placed it in the unusual position of being a poor,

474
Foreign Relations

developing country that has often been treated as a major global

power having a special relationship with the United States and the

Soviet Union.

Evolution of Foreign Policy

Understanding the origins and forces shaping China's foreign

policy provides a framework in which to view both the changes

and the continuities in Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to the late 1980s. The origins of China's foreign policy can be found in its size and population, historical legacy, worldview, nationalism, and

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. These factors have combined with China's economic and military capabilities, governmental structure, and decision-making processes to make certain foreign

policy goals prominent: security, sovereignty and independence,

territorial integrity and reunification, and economic development.

Historical Legacy and Worldview

China's long and rich history as the world's oldest continuous

civilization has affected Chinese foreign relations in various ways.

For centuries the Chinese empire enjoyed basically unchallenged

greatness and self-sufficiency (see The Imperial Era, ch. 1). China

saw itself as the cultural center of the universe, a view reflected

in the concept of the Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo, the Chinese

word for China). For the most part, it viewed non-Chinese peoples as uncivilized barbarians. Although China was occasionally overrun and ruled by these "barbarians," as during the Yuan

(1279-1368) and Qing (1644-1911) dynasties, the non-Chinese

usually retained enough Chinese institutions to maintain a continuity of tradition. Because the Chinese emperor was considered

the ruler of all mankind by virtue of his innate superiority, rela- tions with other states or entities were tributary, rather than state- to-state relations between equals. Traditionally, there was no

equivalent of a foreign ministry; foreign relations included such

activities as tributary missions to the emperor made by countries

seeking trade with China and Chinese military expeditions against

neighboring barbarians to keep them outside China's borders. The

first Europeans who sought trade with China, beginning in the six- teenth century, were received as tributary missions and had to con- form to the formalities and rituals of the tribute system at the

Chinese court. China's view of itself as the undisputed center of

civilization —a phenomenon called sinocentrism—remained basically unchanged until the nineteenth century, when the Qing

dynasty began to deteriorate under Western pressure.

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China: A Country Study

A traditional concept related to China's view of itself as the Middle Kingdom that continues to have relevance is the idea of "using

barbarians to control barbarians." In modern times, this practice

has taken the form of using relations with one foreign power as a counterweight to relations with another. Two examples are China's policy of "leaning to one side" in the Sino-Soviet alliance of

the 1950s for support against the United States and Beijing's rap- prochement with the United States in the 1970s to counteract the

Soviet threat China perceived at the time. China's strong desire

for sovereignty and independence of action, however, seems to have

made Chinese alliances or quasi-alliances short-lived.

Another effect of China's historical legacy is its tendency toward

isolationism and an ambivalence about opening up to the outside

world. In imperial times, China's foreign relations varied from

dynasty to dynasty—from cosmopolitan periods like the Tang

dynasty (A.D. 618-907) to isolationist periods such as the Ming

dynasty (1368-1644), when few foreigners were allowed in the country. Overall, the sinocentric worldview and China's history of centuries of self-sufficiency favored isolation, which contributed to China's difficulty when confronted by expansionist Western powers in the nineteenth century. The debate over self-reliance and

possible corruption by foreign influences or opening up to the outside world in order to modernize more quickly has continued for over a century and was still an issue in the late 1980s.

Nationalism

The importance of sovereignty and independence of action in Chinese foreign policy since 1949 has been closely related to Chinese

nationalism. Just as Chinese national pride has been a natural out- growth of China's long and rich historical tradition, the nationalism of Chinese leaders also has derived from the injustices China

suffered in more recent history, in particular, China's domination

by foreign powers from the nineteenth century until the end of

World War II (see Emergence of Modern China, ch. 1). During

this time, which China refers to as "the century of shame and

humiliation," the formerly powerful imperial government devolved

to what China calls "semicolonial" status, as it was forced to sign

unequal treaties and grant foreigners special privileges of extraterritoriality. Foreign powers divided China into spheres of influence.

Most debilitating and humiliating was the foreign military threat

that overpowered China, culminating in Japan's invasion and

occupation of parts of China in the late 1930s. The bitter recollec- tion of China's suffering at the hands of foreign powers has continued to be a source of Chinese nationalistic sentiment since 1949.

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The suspicion of foreign powers, opposition to any implication of

inferior status, and desire to reassert sovereignty and independence

have strongly influenced Chinese foreign policy. Examples of this attitude are Mao Zedong's statement in 1949 that "the Chinese

people have stood up" and Deng Xiaoping' s 1982 pronouncement

that "no foreign country can expect China to be its vassal or expect

it to swallow any bitter fruit detrimental to its interests."

A foreign policy goal closely related to nationalism has been the

desire to achieve territorial integrity and to restore to Chinese

sovereignty areas previously considered a part of China. Although

China as of 1987 had not resolved border disputes with several of

its neighbors, including India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam

(including islands in the South China Sea), Beijing had concluded

boundary settlements with other nations, including Pakistan,

Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, the Democratic People's Republic of

Korea (North Korea), and the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia). Negotiations on border issues, held intermittently with the

Soviet Union since 1949 and with India since the early 1980s, con- tinued to be held in 1987. The difficulty of resolving these issues

seemed to reflect their relation to sensitive questions of national

pride both in China and in neighboring countries and sometimes

to questions of China's perceived national security interests (see

Physical Environment, ch. 2). For example, Qing control over Outer Mongolia (present-day Mongolia) had lapsed long before

1949 and had been supplanted by Russian and then Soviet influ- ence. Although it was most likely with reluctance and regret, China

recognized Mongolia as a separate nation in 1949. By contrast,

asserting sovereignty over another outlying area, Xizang (Tibet), was considered such an important strategic goal that military force was used to gain control there in 1950 and to reassert it in 1959.

Two other Chinese areas under the control of foreign powers

are Hong Kong and Macao. According to Chinese statements, these

"problems left over from history" were the result of imperialist

aggression and the incompetence of Chinese rulers. Macao, the

first European enclave on the Chinese coast, was occupied by Portugal in 1557 and ceded to Portugal under an 1887 treaty. Britain

gained control of Hong Kong island and adjacent territory through

three treaties with China in the nineteenth century. In the mid-1980s

China concluded formal arrangements with Britain and Portugal

for the return of these areas to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 (Hong

Kong) and 1999 (Macao). Both agreements were made under a

policy of "one country, two systems" (see Glossary), giving the

areas a high degree of autonomy as "special administrative regions"

of China. From the perspective of Chinese nationalism, negotiating

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China: A Country Study

the return of both Hong Kong and Macao to Chinese sovereignty

before the end of the twentieth century was undoubtedly one of

the major foreign policy accomplishments of Chinese leaders in the

1980s.

The most crucial of the issues of national reunification, however,

remained unresolved in the late 1980s: the issue of Taiwan. Chiang

Kai-shek and his forces lied to Taiwan after the founding of the

People's Republic of China in 1949. The government they established there, the "Republic of China," continued to claim authority

as the government of the Chinese nation almost four decades after the founding of the People's Republic. Although China's goal of

reunifying Taiwan with the mainland remained unchanged, the

previous, more militant Chinese policy of "liberating Taiwan" was

replaced in the 1980s by the concept of reunification under the "one

country, two systems" policy. The agreements on Hong Kong and

Macao were considered by many observers as possible precedents

for reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. Because of the legacy

of mistrust between the leaders of the two sides and other complex

factors, however, this difficult and long-standing problem did not appear close to resolution in the late 1980s.

The Influence of Ideology

An important influence on Chinese foreign policy that has

especially affected China's interpretations of world events has been

ideology, both Marxist-Leninist and Maoist. The ideological components of China's foreign policy, whose influence has varied over

time, have included a belief that conflict and struggle are inevitable; a focus on opposing imperialism; the determination to advance

communism throughout the world, especially through the Chinese

model; and the Maoist concept of responding with flexibility while

adhering to fundamental principles.

One of the most basic aspects of China's ideological worldview

has been the assumption that conflict, though not necessarily mili- tary conflict, is omnipresent in the world. According to MarxistLeninist analysis, all historical development is the result of a process of struggle, between classes within a nation, between nations themselves, or between broader forces such as socialism and imperialism. A basic tenet of Chinese leaders holds that the international

situation is best understood in terms of the "principal contradictions" of the time. Once these contradictions are understood, they can be exploited in order to, as Mao said, "win over the many,

oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one." China has

amplified the Leninist policy of uniting with some forces in order

to oppose others more effectively in a united front (see Glossary).

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Chinese leaders have urged the formation of various united fronts

as they have perceived the contradictions in the world to change

over time.

Perhaps because of the belief in struggle as necessary for progress,

for most of its history after 1949 China considered world war

inevitable. This changed in the 1980s, when Chinese leaders began

to say that the forces for peace in the world had become greater

than the forces for war. One reason for growing world stability was

seen in "multipolarization," that is, the growth of additional forces,

such as the Third World and Europe, to counterbalance the ten- sion between the United States and the Soviet Union. China's

description of world events as a struggle between opposing forces,

however, remained unchanged.

Opposition to imperialism —domination by foreign powers—is another major ideological component of Chinese foreign policy.

The Leninist emphasis on the struggle against imperialism made

sense to Chinese leaders, whose nationalism had evolved in part

in reaction to China's exploitation by foreign powers during the

nineteenth century. Although opposition to imperialism and hegemony has remained a constant, the specific target of the opposition has changed since 1949. In somewhat oversimplified terms,

China focused on opposing United States imperialism in the 1950s; on opposing collusion between United States imperialism and Soviet

revisionism in the 1960s; on combating Soviet social-imperialism

or hegemony in the 1970s; and on opposing hegemony by either

superpower in the 1980s.

The extent of China's determination to advance communism

throughout the world is another component of its foreign policy

that has fluctuated since 1949. In the early 1950s and during the

1960s, Chinese leaders called for worldwide armed struggle against

colonialism and "reactionary" governments. China supplied revo- lutionary groups with rhetorical and, in some cases, material support. Central to support for leftist movements was the idea that

they should take China as a model in their struggle for national

liberation. Chinese leaders expressed the belief that China's experi- ence was directly applicable to the circumstances in many other

countries, but they also stressed the importance of each country's

suiting its revolution to its own conditions—creating ambiguity

about China's position on "exporting" revolution. For most of

the time since 1949, China's dedication to encouraging revolution

abroad has appeared to receive a lower priority than other foreign

policy goals.

Militancy and support for worldwide revolution peaked during

the Cultural Revolution, when China's outlook on liberation

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China: A Country Study

struggles seemed to take its cue from Lin Biao's famous 1965 essay

"Long Live the Victory of People's War!" This essay predicted

that the underdeveloped countries of the world would surround and

overpower the industrial nations and create a new communist world

order. As a result of alleged Chinese involvement in subversive

activities in Indonesia and several African countries in the late 1960s, those nations broke off diplomatic relations with Beijing (see

table 4, Appendix B).

By the 1980s China had lessened or discontinued its support for most of the revolutionary and liberation movements around the

world, prominent exceptions being the Palestine Liberation Organization and resistance fighters in Cambodia and Afghanistan.

Despite its shift toward cultivating state-to-state relations with

established governments, many other countries continued to be sus- picious of China's intentions. Especially in Asia, where Beijing

previously supported many local communist parties, China's image

as a radical power intent on fomenting world revolution continued

to affect the conduct of its foreign relations into the late 1980s.

One of the major characteristics of Chinese foreign policy since

1949 has been its claim of consistently adhering to principles while

particular interpretations and policies have changed dramatically.

A statement by Mao Zedong seems to summarize this apparent

contradiction: "We should be firm in principle; we should also have

all flexibility permissible and necessary for carrying out our principles." Although claiming that, on the whole, China has never

deviated from such underlying principles as independence and

safeguarding peace, Chinese leaders have made major shifts in for- eign policy based on their pragmatic assessment of goals and the

international situation. Aiding this interpretation of the primacy

of principles in Chinese foreign policy has been the emphasis on

long-term goals. According to Chinese leaders, China has pursued

a long-term strategy and is "definitely not swayed by expediency

or anybody's instigation or provocation. " In keeping with the view

of Chinese foreign policy as constant and unvarying, Chinese

pronouncements often describe their policy with words such as "always" and "never."

An example of how certain principles have provided a framework of continuity for Chinese foreign policy since 1949 is found

in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (see Glossary) embodied in an agreement signed by China and India in 1954. The five principles played an important role in the mid-1950s, when China

began to cultivate the friendship of newly independent nations of

Asia and Africa. By the time of the Cultural Revolution, however,

China was involved in acrimonious disputes with many of these

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same nations, and their relations could have been described as anything but "peacefully coexistent." The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were reemphasized in the 1980s, were considered

the basis for relations with all nations regardless of their social sys- tems or ideology, and were made a part of the 1982 party constitution.

Decision Making and Implementation

Understanding the intricate workings of a government can be

difficult, especially in a country such as China, where information

related to leadership and decision making is often kept secret. Although it still was not possible to understand fully the structure

of Chinese foreign-policy-related governmental and nongovernmental organizations or how they made or implemented decisions, more

was known about them by the late 1980s than at any time

previously.

After 1949 China's foreign relations became increasingly more

complex as China established formal diplomatic relations with more

nations, joined the United Nations (UN) and other international

and regional political and economic organizations, developed ties between the Chinese Communist Party and foreign parties, and

expanded trade and other economic relations with the rest of the

world. These changes had affected foreign relations in significant

ways by the late 1980s. The economic component of China's inter- national relations increased dramatically from the late 1970s to the

late 1980s; more ministries and organizations were involved in foreign relations than ever before; and the Chinese foreign policy

community was more experienced and better informed about the

outside world than it had been previously.

Despite the growing complexity of Chinese foreign relations, one fundamental aspect of foreign policy that has remained relatively constant since 1949 is that the decision-making power for the most

important decisions has been concentrated in the hands of a few

key individuals at the top of the leadership hierarchy. In the past,

ultimate foreign policy authority rested with such figures as Mao

Zedong and Zhou Enlai, while in the 1980s major decisions were

understood to have depended on Deng Xiaoping. By the late 1980s,

Deng had initiated steps to institutionalize decision making and

make it less dependent on personal authority, but this transition was not yet complete.

In examining the workings of a nation's foreign policy, at least three dimensions can be discerned: the structure of the organizations involved, the nature of the decision-making process, and the

ways in which policy is implemented. These three dimensions are

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China: A Country Study

interrelated, and the processes of formulating and carrying out

policy are often more complex than the structure of organizations

would indicate.

Government and Party Organizations

By the late 1980s, more organizations were involved in China's

foreign relations than at any time previously. High-level party and

government organizations such as the Central Committee, Political Bureau, party Secretariat, party and state Central Military Commissions, National People's Congress, and State Council and such

leaders as the premier, president, and party general secretary all were involved in foreign relations to varying degrees by virtue of

their concern with major policy issues, both foreign and domestic

(see Chinese Communist Party; The Government, ch. 10). The

party Secretariat and the State Council together carried the major

responsibility for foreign policy decisions. In the 1980s, as China's contacts with the outside world grew,

party and government leaders at all levels increasingly were involved

in foreign affairs. The president of the People's Republic fulfilled a ceremonial role as head of state and also was responsible for offi- cially ratifying or abrogating treaties and agreements with foreign

nations. In addition to meeting with foreign visitors, Chinese leaders, including the president, the premier, and officials at lower lex - els, traveled abroad regularly. In the late 1980s, the Political Bureau, previously thought of as the major decision-making body, was no longer the primary party

organization involved in foreign policy decision making. Instead,

the State Council referred major decisions to the Secretariat for resolution and the Political Bureau for ratification. Under the party

Secretariat, the International Liaison Department had primary

responsibility for relations between the Chinese Communist Party

and a growing number of foreign political parties. Other party

organizations whose work was related to foreign relations were the

United Front Work Department, responsible for relations with overseas Chinese (see Glossary), the Propaganda Department, and the

Foreign Affairs Small Group.

Of the Chinese government institutions, the highest organ of state power, the National People's Congress, appeared to have only

limited influence on foreign policy. In the 1980s the National People's Congress was becoming more active on the international scene by increasing its contacts with counterpart organizations in for- eign countries. Through its Standing Committee and its Foreign

Affairs Committee, the National People's Congress had a voice

in foreign relations matters and occasionally prepared reports on

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Foreign Relations

foreign policy-related issues for other party and government bodies.

As the primary governmental organization under the National

People's Congress, the State Council had a major role in foreign

policy, particularly with regard to decisions on routine or specific

matters, as opposed to greater questions of policy that might require

party involvement. As in the past, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the most important institution involved in conducting day-today foreign relations, but by the 1980s many other ministries and

organizations under the State Council had functions related to for- eign affairs as well. These included the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of

National Defense, Bank of China, People's Bank of China, and

China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. In addition, over half of the ministries, overseeing such disparate areas

as aeronautics, forestry, and public health, had a bureau or department concerned explicitly with foreign affairs. These offices pre- sumably handled contacts between the ministry and its foreign

counterparts.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Since 1949 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been one of China's most important ministries. Each area of foreign relations,

divided either geographically or functionally, is overseen by a vice

minister or assistant minister. For example, one vice minister's area

of specialty was the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, while another was responsible for the Americas and Australia. At the next level,

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was divided into departments, some

geographical and some functional in responsibility. The regionally

oriented departments included those concerned with Africa, the

Americas and Oceania, Asia, the Middle East, the Soviet Union

and Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Taiwan, and Hong Kong

and Macao. The functional departments were responsible for administration, cadres, consular affairs, finance, information, inter- national laws and treaties, international organizations and affairs,

personnel, protocol, training and education, and translation. Below

the department level were divisions, such as the United States

Affairs Division under the Department of American and Oceanian

Affairs.

A recurring problem for the foreign ministry and the diplomatic

corps has been a shortage of qualified personnel. In the first years

after the founding of the People's Republic, there were few prospective diplomats with international experience. Premier Zhou Enlai

relied on a group of young people who had served under him in various negotiations to form the core of the newly established foreign

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China: A Country Study

ministry, and Zhou himself held the foreign ministry portfolio until 1958. In the second half of the 1960s, China's developing foreign

affairs sector suffered a major setback during the Cultural Revolution, when higher education was disrupted, foreign-trained schol- ars and diplomats were attacked, all but one Chinese ambassador

(to Egypt) were recalled to Beijing, and the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs itself practically ceased functioning.

Since the early 1970s, the foreign affairs establishment has been

rebuilt, and by the late 1980s, foreign affairs personnel were

recruited from such specialized training programs as the ministry's

Foreign Affairs College, College of International Relations, Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, and international studies departments at major universities. Foreign language study still was

considered an important requirement, but it was increasingly sup- plemented by substantive training in foreign relations. Foreign

affairs personnel benefited from expanded opportunities for education, travel, and exchange of information with the rest of the

world. In addition, specialists from other ministries served in China's many embassies and consulates; for example, the Ministry

of National Defense provided military attaches, the Ministry of For- eign Economic Relations and Trade provided commercial officers,

and the Ministry of Culture and the State Education Commission

provided personnel in charge of cultural affairs. Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade

Since the late 1970s, economic and financial issues have become

an increasingly important part of China's foreign relations. In order

to streamline foreign economic relations, the Ministry of Foreign

Economic Relations and Trade was established in 1982 through

the merger of two commissions and two ministries (see Organization of Foreign Trade, ch. 8). By the late 1980s, this ministry was

the second most prominent ministry involved in the routine conduct of foreign relations. The ministry had an extremely broad mandate that included foreign trade, foreign investment, foreign aid,

and international economic cooperation. Through regular meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Foreign

Economic Relations and Trade participated in efforts to coordinate

China's foreign economic policy with other aspects of its foreign

policy. It was unclear how thoroughly this was accomplished.

Ministry of National Defense

In any nation, the interrelation of the political and military aspects

of strategy and national security necessitates some degree of mili- tary involvement in foreign policy. The military's views on defense

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Foreign Relations

capability, deterrence, and perceptions of threat are essential components of a country's global strategy. As of the late 1980s, however,

little information was available on foreign policy coordination

between the military and foreign policy establishments. The most

important military organizations with links to the foreign policy

community were the Ministry of National Defense and the party

and state Central Military Commissions. The Ministry of National

Defense provides military attaches for Chinese embassies, and, as of 1987, its Foreign Affairs Bureau dealt with foreign attaches and

military visitors. Working-level coordination with the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs was maintained when, for example, high-level mili- tary leaders traveled abroad. In addition, the Ministry of National

Defense's strategic research arm, the Beijing Institute for Inter- national Strategic Studies, carried out research on military and

security issues with foreign policy implications. In the late 1980s, the most important link between the military

and foreign policy establishments appeared to be at the highest level,

particularly through the party and state Central Military Commissions and through Deng Xiaoping, who was concurrently chairman of both commissions (see Central Military Commission,

ch. 10; Military Organization, ch. 14). The views of the commissions' members on major foreign policy issues were almost cer- tainly considered in informal discussions or in meetings of other

high-level organizations they also belonged to, such as the Politi- cal Bureau, the Secretariat, or the State Council. It was significant, though, that compared with earlier periods fewer military

leaders served on China's top policy-making bodies during the

1980s.

' 'People-to-People

7 Diplomacy

Since 1949 a significant forum for Chinese foreign relations has

been cultural or "people-to-people" diplomacy. The relative iso- lation of the People's Republic during its first two decades increased

the importance of cultural exchanges and informal ties with people of other countries through mass organizations and friendship

societies. In some cases, activities at this level have signaled important diplomatic breakthroughs, as was the case with the AmericanChinese ping-pong exchange in 1971. In addition to educational

and cultural institutions, many other organizations, including the

media, women's and youth organizations, and academic and professional societies, have been involved in foreign relations. Two insti- tutes responsible for this aspect of Chinese diplomacy were

associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and staffed largely

by former diplomats: the Chinese People's Association for

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China: A Country Study

Friendship with Foreign Countries and the Chinese People's

Institute of Foreign Affairs.

The Decision-Making Process The most crucial foreign policy decisions in the mid-1980s were made by the highest-level leadership, with Deng Xiaoping as the

final arbiter. A shift was underway, however, to strengthen the

principles of collective and institutional decision making and, at the same time, to reduce party involvement in favor of increased

state responsibility. In line with this trend, the State Council made

foreign policy decisions regarding routine matters and referred only

major decisions either to the party Secretariat or to informal deliberations involving Deng Xiaoping for resolution. When called upon

to make decisions, the Secretariat relied largely on the advice of

the State Council and members of China's foreign affairs community. The importance of the Political Bureau appeared to have les- sened. Although individual members of the Political Bureau exerted

influence on the shaping of foreign policy, the Political Bureau's

role as an institution seemed to have become one of ratifying decisions, rather than formulating them. The division between party

and government functions in foreign affairs as of the mid-1980s

could therefore be summarized as party supremacy in overall policy

making and supervision, with the government's State Council and

ministries under it responsible for the daily conduct of foreign

relations.

These high-level decision-making bodies comprised the apex of an elaborate network of party and government organizations and

research institutes concerned with foreign policy. To support the

formulation and implementation of policy, especially in a bureaucracy as complex and hierarchical as China's, there existed a net- work of small advisory and coordination groups. These groups

functioned to channel research, provide expert advice, and act as a liaison between organizations. Perhaps the most important of these

groups was the party Secretariat's Foreign Affairs Small Group.

This group comprised key party and government officials, including the president, the premier, state councillors, the ministers of

foreign affairs and foreign economic relations and trade, and various

foreign affairs specialists, depending on the agenda of the meeting. The group possibly met weekly, or as required by circumstances. Liaison and advisory functions were provided by other

groups, including the State Council's Foreign Affairs Coordination Point, the staff of the premier's and State Council's offices,

and bilateral policy groups, such as one composed of ministers and

vice ministers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry

486
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping

meets American guest

Courtesy Liaowang

CPPCC chairman

Deng Yingchao engages in a

' 'people-to-people

'

exchange with a Japanese

visitor to China.

Courtesy Liaowang

487
China: A Country Study

of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, which met at least every

few months.

In the late 1980s, the decision-making process for foreign policy matters followed a fairly hierarchical pattern. If a particular ministry was unable to make a decision because the purview of other ministries was involved, it would attempt to resolve the issue through

informal discussion or through an interagency group. If that was

not successful or if higher-level consideration was needed, the

problem might be referred to the Foreign Affairs Coordination Point

or to select members of the State Council for review. Certain major

decisions would then be discussed by the Foreign Affairs Small

Group before consideration by the party Secretariat itself. If the

issue was extremely controversial or important, the final decision

would be directed to the highest-level leadership, particularly Deng

Xiaoping.

An Overview of China's Foreign Relations

Affected by the confluence of a myriad of factors, including its historical legacy, worldview, nationalism, ideology, the decisionmaking process in Beijing, and the international situation, China's foreign relations have had a rich and varied development in the years since 1949. Two aspects of Chinese foreign policy that

have led to wide fluctuations over time are the degree of militancy

or peacefulness Beijing has espoused and its ambivalence in choosing

between self-reliance and openness to the outside world. Although

dividing something as complex as foreign policy into time periods

necessarily obscures certain details, Chinese foreign relations can

be examined roughly by decades: the Sino-Soviet alliance of the

1950s, isolation and radicalism in the 1960s, increased international

involvement in the 1970s, and the independent foreign policy of

the 1980s. During each of these periods, China's relations with the

rest of the world underwent significant changes.

Sino-Soviet Relations

After the founding of the People's Republic, the Chinese leadership was concerned above all with ensuring national security, consolidating power, and developing the economy. The foreign policy course China chose in order to translate these goals into reality was

to form an international united front with the Soviet Union and

other socialist nations against the United States and Japan.

Although for a time Chinese leaders may have considered trying

to balance Sino-Soviet relations with ties with Washington, by

mid- 1949 Mao Zedong declared that China had no choice but

"leaning to one side" —meaning the Soviet side.

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Foreign Relations

Soon after the establishment of the People's Republie, Mao

traveled to Moscow to negotiate the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty of

Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Under this agreement, China gave the Soviet Union certain rights, such as the con- tinued use of a naval base at Liida, Liaoning Province, in return

for military support, weapons, and large amounts of economic and

technological assistance, including technical advisers and machinery. China acceded, at least initially, to Soviet leadership of the

world communist movement and took the Soviet Union as the

model for development. China's participation in the Korean War

(1950-53) seemed to strengthen Sino-Soviet relations, especially

after the UN-sponsored trade embargo against China. The SinoSoviet alliance appeared to unite Moscow and Beijing, and China

became more closely associated with and dependent on a foreign

power than ever before.

During the second half of the 1950s, strains in the Sino-Soviet

alliance gradually began to emerge over questions of ideology, security, and economic development. Chinese leaders were disturbed

by the Soviet Union's moves under Nikita Khrushchev toward

de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence with the West. Moscow's

successful earth satellite launch in 1957 strengthened Mao's belief

that the world balance was in the communists' favor—or, in his

words, "the east wind prevails over the west wind" —leading him

to call for a more militant policy toward the noncommunist world

in contrast to the more conciliatory policy of the Soviet Union.

In addition to ideological disagreements, Beijing was dissatis- fied with several aspects of the Sino-Soviet security relationship:

the insufficient degree of support Moscow showed for China's recov- ery of Taiwan, a Soviet proposal in 1958 for a joint naval arrangement that would have put China in a subordinate position, Soviet

neutrality during the 1959 tension on the Sino-Indian border, and

Soviet reluctance to honor its agreement to provide nuclear weapons

technology to China. And, in an attempt to break away from the

Soviet model of economic development, China launched the radical policies of the Great Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary),

leading Moscow to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China in 1960. In retrospect, the major ideological, military, and economic rea- sons behind the Sino-Soviet split were essentially the same: for the

Chinese leadership, the strong desire to achieve self-reliance and

independence of action outweighed the benefits Beijing received

as Moscow's junior partner.

During the 1960s the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute deepened

and spread to include territorial issues, culminating in 1969 in bloody armed clashes on their border. In 1963 the boundary dispute

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China: A Country Study

had come into the open when China explicitly raised the issue of

territory lost through "unequal treaties" with tsarist Russia. After

unsuccessful border consultations in 1964, Moscow began the

process of a military buildup along the border with China and in Mongolia, which continued into the 1970s.

The Sino-Soviet dispute also was intensified by increasing competition between Beijing and Moscow for influence in the Third

World and the international communist movement. China accused

the Soviet Union of colluding with imperialism, for example by

signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the United States

in 1963. Beijing's support for worldwide revolution became increasingly militant, although in most cases it lacked the resources to pro- vide large amounts of economic or military aid. The Chinese

Communist Party broke off ties with the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union in 1966, and these had not been restored by mid- 198 7. During the Cultural Revolution, China's growing radicalism and

xenophobia had severe repercussions for Sino-Soviet relations. In 1967 Red Guards besieged the Soviet embassy in Beijing and

harassed Soviet diplomats. Beijing viewed the Soviet invasion of

Czechoslovakia in 1968 as an ominous development and accused

the Soviet Union of "social imperialism." The Sino-Soviet dis- pute reached its nadir in 1969 when serious armed clashes broke

out at Zhenbao (or Damanskiy) Island on the northeast border (see

fig. 3). Both sides drew back from the brink of war, however, and

tension was defused when Zhou Enlai met with Aleksey Kosygin,

the Soviet premier, later in 1969. In the 1970s Beijing shifted to a more moderate course and began

a rapprochement with Washington as a counterweight to the per- ceived threat from Moscow. Sino-Soviet border talks were held

intermittently, and Moscow issued conciliatory messages after Mao's death in 1976, all without substantive progress. Officially,

Chinese statements called for a struggle against the hegemony of

both superpowers, but especially against the Soviet Union, which

Beijing called "the most dangerous source of war." In the late 1970s, the increased Soviet military buildup in East Asia and Soviet

treaties with Vietnam and Afghanistan heightened China's awareness of the threat of Soviet encirclement. In 1979 Beijing notified

Moscow it would formally abrogate the long-dormant Sino-Soviet

Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance but proposed bilateral talks. China suspended the talks after only one

round, however, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.

In the 1980s China's approach toward the Soviet Union shifted once more, albeit gradually, in line with China's adoption of an

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independent foreign policy and the opening up economic policy.

Another factor behind the shift was the perception that, although

the Soviet Union still posed the greatest threat to China's security,

the threat was long-term rather than immediate. Sino-Soviet consultations on normalizing relations were resumed in 1982 and held

twice yearly, despite the fact that the cause of their suspension,

the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, remained unchanged. Beijing

raised three primary preconditions for the normalization of rela- tions, which it referred to as "three obstacles" that Moscow had

to remove: the Soviet presence in of Afghanistan, Soviet support

for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, and the presence of Soviet

forces along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia. For the first half of the 1980s, Moscow called these preconditions "third-country

issues" not suitable for bilateral discussion, and neither side reported

substantial progress in the talks. Soviet leadership changes between 1982 and 1985 provided openings for renewed diplomacy, as high-level Chinese delegations

attended the funerals of Soviet leaders Leonid Brezhnev, Yuriy

Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko. During this time, SinoSoviet relations improved gradually in many areas: trade expanded,

economic and technical exchanges were resumed (including the

renovation of projects originally built with Soviet assistance in the

1950s), border points were opened, and delegations were exchanged

regularly.

The Soviet position on Sino-Soviet relations showed greater flexi- bility in 1986 with General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev's July

speech at Vladivostok. Among Gorbachev's proposals for the AsiaPacific region were several directed at China, including the

announcement of partial troop withdrawals from Afghanistan and

Mongolia, the renewal of a concession pertaining to the border dis- pute, and proposals for agreements on a border railroad, space

cooperation, and joint hydropower development. Further, Gorbachev offered to hold discussions with China "at any time and

at any level." Although these overtures did not lead to an immediate

high-level breakthrough in Sino-Soviet relations, bilateral consultations appeared to gain momentum, and border talks were resumed

in 1987. In the late 1980s, it seemed unlikely that China and the

Soviet Union would resume a formal alliance, but Sino-Soviet

relations had improved remarkably when compared with the previ- ous two decades. Whether or not full normalization would include

renewed relations between the Chinese and Soviet communist parties, as China had established with the East European communist

parties, was uncertain as of mid- 1987.

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Sino-American Relations

China's relations with the other superpower, the United States, also have followed an uneven course. Chinese leaders expressed an interest in possible economic assistance from the United States during the 1940s, but by 1950 Sino-American relations could only

be described as hostile. During its first two decades the People's

Republic considered the United States "imperialist" and "the com- mon enemy of people throughout the world."

The Korean War was a major factor responsible for setting

relations between China and the United States in a state of enmity

and mistrust, as it contributed to the United States policy of "containing" the Chinese threat through a trade embargo and travel

restrictions, as well as through military alliances with other Asian

nations. An important side effect of the Korean War was that

Washington resumed military aid to Taiwan and throughout the

1950s became increasingly committed to Taiwan's defense, making the possibility of Chinese reunification more remote. After the

United States-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1954,

Taiwan became the most contentious issue between the United

States and China, and remained so in the late 1980s, despite the

abrogation of the treaty and the subsequent normalization of rela- tions between Beijing and Washington in 1979.

In 1955 Premier Zhou Enlai made a conciliatory opening toward

the United States in which he said the Chinese people did not want war with the American people. His statement led to a series of offi- cial ambassadorial-level talks in Geneva and Warsaw that continued

fairly regularly for the next decade and a half. Although the talks failed to resolve fundamental conflicts between the two countries,

they served as an important line of communication.

Sino-American relations remained at a stalemate during most

of the 1960s. Political considerations in both countries made a shift toward closer relations difficult, especially as the United States became increasingly involved in the war in Vietnam, in which

Washington and Beijing supported opposite sides. China's isola- tionist posture and militancy during the Cultural Revolution

precluded effective diplomacy, and Sino-American relations reached

a low point with seemingly little hope of improvement.

Several events in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, led

Beijing and Washington to reexamine their basic policies toward

each other. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia

in 1968 and the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, China saw its major threat as clearly coming from the Soviet Union rather than

the United States and sought a closer relationship with Washington

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as a counterweight to Moscow. When President Richard M. Nixon

assumed office in 1969, he explored rapprochement with China

as part of his doctrine of reduced United States military involvement in Asia. Moves in this direction resulted in an American pingpong team's trip to China and Henry A. Kissinger's secret visit,

both in 1971, followed by Nixon's dramatic trip to China in 1972.

The Shanghai Communique, a milestone document describing the new state of relations between the two countries, and signed by

Nixon and Zhou Enlai, included a certain degree of ambiguity that allowed China and the United States to set aside differences, especially on the Taiwan issue, and begin the process of normalizing

relations.

After the signing of the Shanghai Communique, however, move- ment toward United States-China normalization during the 1970s saw only limited progress. The United States and China set up

liaison offices in each other's capitals in 1973, and bilateral trade

grew unevenly throughout the decade. "People's diplomacy"

played an important role, as most exchanges of delegations were

sponsored by friendship associations. Chinese statements continued

to express the view that both superpowers were theoretically adversaries of China, but they usually singled out the Soviet Union as the more "dangerous" of the two. In the second half of the 1970s, China perceived an increasing

Soviet threat and called more explicitly for an international united

front against Soviet hegemony. In addition, rather than strictly

adhering to the principle of self-reliance, China adopted an eco- nomic and technological modernization program that greatly

increased commercial links with foreign countries. These trends

toward strategic and economic cooperation with the West gave

momentum to Sino-United States normalization, which had been

at an impasse for most of the decade. Ties between China and the

United States began to strengthen in 1978, culminating in the

December announcement that diplomatic relations would be established as of January 1, 1979. In establishing relations, Washington reaffirmed its agreement that the People's Republic was the

sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was an inalienable part of China. Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States the

following month was symbolic of the optimism felt in Beijing and

Washington concerning their strategic alignment and their burgeoning commercial, technical, and cultural relations. In the 1980s United States-China relations went through several

twists and turns. By late 1981 China appeared to pull back some- what from the United States as it asserted its independent foreign

policy. Beijing began to express increasing impatience with the lack

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of resolution on the Taiwan issue. One of the main issues of contention was the Taiwan Relations Act, passed by the United States Congress in 1979, which provided for continuing unofficial rela- tions between Washington and Taipei. In late 1981 China began

to make serious demands that the United States set a firm timetable for terminating American arms sales to Taiwan, even threatening to retaliate with the possible downgrading of diplomatic

relations. In early 1982 Washington announced it would not sell Taiwan more advanced aircraft than it had already provided, and

in August, after several months of intense negotiations, China and

the United States concluded a joint communique that afforded at least a partial resolution of the problem. Washington pledged to increase neither the quality nor the quantity of arms supplied to Taiwan, while Beijing affirmed that peaceful reunification was China's fundamental policy. Although the communique forestalled fur- ther deterioration in relations, Beijing and Washington differed

in their interpretations of it. The Taiwan issue continued to be a "dark cloud" (to use the Chinese phrase) affecting United States- China relations to varying degrees into the late 1980s. In addition to the question of Taiwan, other aspects of United

States-China relations created controversy at times during the

1980s: Sino-American trade relations, the limits of American

technology transfer to China, the nature and extent of United States- China security relations, and occasional friction caused by defections or lawsuits. Difficulties over trade relations have included

Chinese displeasure with United States efforts to limit imports such

as textiles and a degree of disappointment and frustration within

the American business community over the difficulties of doing busi- ness in China. The issue of technology transfer came to the fore

several times during the 1980s, most often with Chinese complaints

about the level of technology allowed or the slow rate of transfer. China's dissatisfaction appeared to be somewhat abated by the

United States 1983 decision to place China in the "friendly, nonaligned" category for technology transfer and the conclusion of a

bilateral nuclear energy cooperation agreement in 1985.

Determining the nature and limits of security relations between

China and the United States has been a central aspect of their

relations in the 1980s. After a period of discord during the first years of the decade, Beijing and Washington renewed their interest

in security-related ties, including military visits, discussions of

international issues such as arms control, and limited arms and

weapons technology sales. Beginning in 1983, Chinese and United States defense ministers

and other high-level military delegations exchanged visits, and in

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1986 United States Navy ships made their first Chinese port call since 1949. The United States approved certain items, such as aviation electronics, for sale to China, restricting transfers to items that would contribute only to China's defensive capability. As of the

late 1980s, it appeared that American assistance in modernizing

China's arms would also be limited by China's financial constraints

and the underlying principle of self-reliance. Despite the issues that have divided them, relations between the

United States and China continued to develop during the 1980s

through a complex network of trade ties, technology-transfer

arrangements, cultural exchanges, educational exchanges (including

thousands of Chinese students studying in the United States), mili- tary links, joint commissions and other meetings, and exchanges

of high-level leaders. By the second half of the 1980s, China had

become the sixteenth largest trading partner of the United States,

and the United States was China's third largest; in addition, over

140 American firms had invested in China. High-level exchanges,

such as Premier Zhao Ziyang's visit to the United States and President Ronald Reagan's trip to China, both in 1984, and President

Li Xiannian's 1985 tour of the United States demonstrated the

importance both sides accorded their relations.

Relations with the Third World

Next in importance to its relations with the superpowers have

been China's relations with the Third World. Chinese leaders have

tended to view the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin

America as a major force in international affairs, and they have

considered China an integral part of this major Third World force. As has been the case with China's foreign relations in general, policy

toward the countries of the developing world has fluctuated over

time. It has been affected by China's alternating involvement in and isolation from world affairs and by the militancy or peacefulness of Beijing's views. In addition, China's relations with the Third

World have been affected by China's ambiguous position as a developing country that nevertheless has certain attributes more

befitting a major power. China has been variously viewed by the

Third World as a friend and ally, a competitor for markets and

loans, a source of economic and military assistance, a regional power

intent on dominating Asia, and a "candidate superpower" with

such privileges as a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

China's relations with the Third World have developed through

several phases: the Bandung Line of the mid-1950s (named for a 1955 conference of Asian and African nations held in Bandung,

Indonesia), support for liberation and world revolution in the 1960s,

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the pronouncement of the Theory of the Three Worlds and support for a "new international economic order" in the 1970s, and

a renewed emphasis on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

in the 1980s. In the first years after the founding of the People's Republic,

Chinese statements echoed the Soviet view that the world was

divided into two camps, the forces of socialism and those of imperialism, with "no third road" possible. By 1953 China began reas- serting its belief that the newly independent developing countries

could play an important intermediary role in world affairs. In 1954

Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India agreed on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the underlying

basis for conducting foreign relations. China's success in promoting these principles at the 1955 Bandung Conference helped China

emerge from diplomatic isolation. By the end of the 1950s, however,

China's foreign policy stance had become more militant. Statements

promoting the Chinese revolution as a model and Beijing's actions

in the Taiwan Strait (1958) and in border conflicts with India (1962)

and Vietnam (1979), for example, alarmed many Third World

nations.

During the 1960s China cultivated ties with Third World countries and insurgent groups in an attempt to encourage "wars of

national liberation" and revolution and to forge an international

united front against both superpowers. China offered economic,

technical, and sometimes military assistance to other countries and

liberation movements, which, although small in comparison with

Soviet and United States aid, was significant considering China's

own needs. Third World appreciation for Chinese assistance

coexisted, however, with growing suspicions of China's militancy.

Such suspicions were fed, for example, by Zhou Enlai' s statement

in the early 1960s that the potential for revolution in Africa was

"excellent" and by the publication of Lin Biao's essay "Long Live

the Victory of People's War!" in 1965. Discord between China

and many Third World countries continued to grow. In some cases, as with Indonesia's charge of Chinese complicity in the 1965 coup

attempt in Jakarta and claims by several African nations of Chinese

subversion during the Cultural Revolution, bilateral disputes led

to the breaking off of diplomatic relations. Although the Third

World was not a primary focus of the Cultural Revolution, it was

not immune to the chaos this period wrought upon Chinese for- eign relations. In the 1970s China began to redefine its foreign policy after the

isolation and militancy of the late 1960s. China reestablished those

of its diplomatic missions that had been recalled during the Cultural

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Revolution and began the process of rapprochement with the United

States. The People's Republic was admitted into the UN in 1971

and was recognized diplomatically by an increasing number of

nations. China's major foreign policy statement during this time was Mao's Theory of the Three Worlds, which was presented publicly by Deng Xiaoping at the UN in 1974. According to this the- ory, the First World consisted of the two superpowers—the Soviet

Union and the United States—both "imperialist aggressors" whose

rivalry was the greatest cause of impending world war. The Third

World was the main force in international affairs. Its growing

opposition to superpower hegemony was exemplified by such world

events as the Arab nations' control of oil prices, Egypt's expulsion

of Soviet aid personnel in 1972, and the United States withdrawal

from Vietnam. The Second World, comprising the developed countries of Europe plus Japan, could either oppress the Third World

or join in opposing the superpowers. By the second half of the 1970s,

China perceived an increased threat from the Soviet Union, and

the theory was modified to emphasize that the Soviet Union was

the more dangerous of the two superpowers.

The other primary component of China's Third World policy

in the early 1970s was a call for radical change in the world power

structure and particularly a call for a "new international economic

order." Until the late 1970s, the Chinese principles of sovereignty,

opposition to hegemony, and self-reliance coincided with the goals

of the movement for a new international economic order. Chinese

statements in support of the new order diminished as China began

to implement the opening up policy, allow foreign investment, and

seek technical assistance and foreign loans. China's critical opinion of international financial institutions appeared to change

abruptly as Beijing prepared to join the International Monetary

Fund and the World Bank in 1980. Chinese support for changes

in the economic order stressed the role of collective self-reliance

among the countries of the Third World, or "South-South cooperation," in the 1980s.

Also in the 1980s, China reasserted its Third World credentials

and placed a renewed emphasis on its relations with Third World

countries as part of its independent foreign policy. China stressed

that it would develop friendly relations with other nations regardless of their social systems or ideologies and would conduct its relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

Beijing exchanged delegations with Third World countries regularly, and it made diplomatic use of cultural ties, for example, by

promoting friendly links between Chinese Muslims and Islamic

countries. Officially, China denied that it sought a leadership role

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in the Third World, although some foreign observers argued to the contrary. Beijing increasingly based its foreign economic rela- tions with the Third World on equality and mutual benefit,

expressed by a shift toward trade and joint ventures and away from

grants and interest-free loans.

By the second half of the 1980s, China's relations with Third

World nations covered the spectrum from friendly to inimical.

Bilateral relations ranged from a formal alliance with North Korea,

to a near-alliance with Pakistan, to hostile relations with Vietnam

marked by sporadic border conflict. Many relationships have

changed dramatically over time: for example, China previously had

close relations with Vietnam; its ties with India were friendly during the 1950s but were strained thereafter by border tensions. Particularly in Southeast Asia, a legacy of suspicion concerning China's

ultimate intentions affected Chinese relations with many countries.

As of 1987 only a few countries in the world lacked diplomatic

ties with Beijing; among them were Honduras, Indonesia, Israel,

Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the Republic of Korea, and

Uruguay. Some of these had formal ties with Taiwan instead. China's growing interest in trade and technical exchanges, however,

meant that in some cases substantial unofficial relations existed

despite the absence of diplomatic recognition.

Relations with the Developed World

Since 1949 China's overriding concerns have been security and

economic development. In working toward both of these goals,

China has focused on its relations with the superpowers. Because

most of the developed world, with the exception ofJapan, is fairly

distant from China and is aligned formally or informally with either

the Soviet Union or the United States, China's relations with the

developed world often have been subordinate to its relations with

the superpowers. In the 1950s China considered most West European countries "lackeys" of United States imperialism, while it sided with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As China's rela- tions with the superpowers have changed, so have its ties with other

developed nations. An example of this is that more than a dozen

developed countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany,

Spain, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, all established diplomatic relations with China after the Sino-American rapprochement

in the early 1970s.

The developed nations have been important to China for several reasons: as sources of diplomatic recognition, as alternative sources

of trade and technology to reduce reliance on one or the other

superpower, and as part of China's security calculations. In the

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1980s China stressed the role of developed nations in ensuring peace

in an increasingly multipolar world. Australia and Canada were

important trading partners for China, but Beijing's most important relations with the developed world were with Japan and

Europe.

Japan

Japan is by far the most important to China of the nonsuperpower developed nations. Among the reasons for this are geographical proximity and historical and cultural ties, China's perception

ofJapan as a possible resurgent threat, Japan's close relations with

the United States since the end of World War II, and Japan's role as the third-ranking industrialized power in the world. Japan's

invasion and occupation of parts of China in the 1930s was a major

component of the devastation China underwent during the "century of shame and humiliation." After 1949 Chinese relations with

Japan changed several times, from hostility and an absence of contact to cordiality and extremely close cooperation in many fields. One recurring Chinese concern in Sino-Japanese relations has been

the potential remilitarization of Japan.

At the time of the founding of the People's Republic, Japan was

defeated and Japanese military power dismantled, but China continued to view Japan as a potential threat because of the United

States presence there. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alli- ance, and Mutual Assistance included the provision that each side

would protect the other from an attack by "Japan or any state allied with it," and China undoubtedly viewed with alarm Japan's role as the principal United States base during the Korean War. At

the same time, however, China in the 1950s began a policy of

attempting to influence Japan through trade, "people's diplomacy,"

contacts with Japanese opposition political parties, and through

applying pressure on Tokyo to sever ties with Taipei. Relations

deteriorated in the late 1950s when Chinese pressure tactics escalated. After the Sino-Soviet break, economic necessity caused China

to reconsider and revitalize trade ties with Japan.

Sino-Japanese ties declined again during the Cultural Revolution, and the decline was further exacerbated by Japan's growing

strength and independence from the United States in the late 1960s.

China was especially concerned that Japan might remilitarize to compensate for the reduced United States military presence in Asia

brought about under President Nixon. After the beginning of SinoAmerican rapprochement in 1971, however, China's policy toward

Japan immediately became more flexible. By 1972 Japan and China

had established diplomatic relations and agreed to conclude a

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separate peace treaty. The negotiations for the peace treaty were

protracted and, by the time it was concluded in 1978, China's pre- occupation with the Soviet threat led to the inclusion of an "antihegemony" statement. In fewer than three decades, China had

signed an explicitly anti-Japanese treaty with the Soviet Union and

a treaty having an anti-Soviet component with Japan.

From the 1970s into the 1980s, economic relations were the centerpiece of relations between China and Japan. Japan has been China's top trading partner since the 1960s. Despite concern in the

late 1980s over a trade imbalance, the volume of Sino-Japanese

trade showed no sign of declining. Relations suffered a setback in 1979 and 1980, when China canceled or modified overly ambitious

plans made in the late 1970s to import large quantities ofJapanese

technology, the best-known example involving the Baoshan iron

and steel complex in Shanghai. Lower expectations on both sides

seemed to have created a more realistic economic and technological partnership by the late 1980s.

Chinese relations with Japan during the 1980s were generally

close and cordial. Tension erupted periodically, however, over trade

and technology issues, Chinese concern over potential Japanese

military resurgence, and controversy regarding Japan's relations

with Taiwan, especially Beijing's concern that Tokyo was pursuing a "two Chinas" policy. China joined other Asian nations in criticizing Japanese history textbooks that deemphasized past

Japanese aggression, claiming that the distortion was evidence of

the rise of militarism in Japan. By the late 1980s, despite occasional outbreaks of tension, the two governments held regular consultations, high-level leaders frequently exchanged visits, Chinese

and Japanese military leaders had begun contacts, and many

Chinese and Japanese students and tourists traveled back and forth. Europe

Although it had been the European powers that precipitated the

opening of China to the West in the nineteenth century, by 1949

the European presence was limited to Hong Kong and Macao.

Europe exerted a strong intellectual influence on modern Chinese

leaders (Marxism and Leninism of course originated in Europe),

and some leaders, including Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping,

studied in Europe early in their careers. Nevertheless, China's

geographic distance from Europe, its preoccupation with the super- powers, and the division of Europe after World War II have meant

that China's relations with European nations usually have been

subordinate to its relations with the Soviet Union and the United

States.

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East European nations were the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1949, following the Soviet Union's

lead. In the early 1950s, through the Sino-Soviet alliance, China

became an observer in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

(Comecon), and Chinese relations with Eastern Europe included

trade and receipt of limited amounts of economic and technical aid. The Sino-Soviet dispute was manifested in China's relations with

certain East European countries, especially China's support for Albania's break with the Soviet Union in the late 1950s. After the

Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the only East European nations maintaining significant ties with China until the late 1970s were Albania, Romania, and Yugoslavia. By the late 1980s, however, as Beijing's relations with Moscow improved and relations with

governments and parties on the basis of "mutual respect and peaceful coexistence" were renewed, China's ties with the other nations

of Eastern Europe also had improved noticeably, to include communist party ties. China's ties with Western Europe were minimal for the first two

decades of the People's Republic. Several West European nations,

mostly in Scandinavia, established diplomatic relations with China

in the early 1950s, and Britain and the Netherlands established

ties with China at the charge d'affaires level in 1954. In the late 1950s, Britain became the first Western nation to relax the trade

embargo against China imposed during the Korean War. The

establishment of diplomatic relations between China and France

in 1964 also provided an opening for trade and other limited Chinese

contacts with Western Europe until the 1970s.

China's relations with Western Europe grew rapidly in the 1970s,

as more nations recognized China and diplomatic relations were

established with the European Economic Community in 1975. In

the second half of the 1970s, China's emphasis on an international

united front against Soviet hegemony led to increased Chinese sup- port for West European unity and for the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Ties with Western Europe also were

featured prominently in Beijing's independent foreign policy of the

1980s. Furthermore, China's opening up to foreign trade, investment, and technology beginning in the late 1970s greatly improved

Sino-European ties. One of the few major problems in China's

relations with Western Europe in the post-Mao era was the downgrading of diplomatic ties with the Netherlands from 1981 to 1984

over the latter' s sale of submarines to Taiwan.

China's Role in International Organizations

Participation in international organizations is perceived as an

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important measure of a nation's prestige as well as a forum through

which a nation can influence others and gain access to aid programs and sources of technology and information. The People's

Republic was precluded from participating actively in most mainstream international organizations for the first two decades of its existence because of its subordinate position in the Sino-Soviet

alliance in the 1950s and the opposition of the United States after China's involvement in the Korean War. China repeatedly failed

to gain admission to the UN. In 1971 Beijing finally gained China's seat when relations with the United States changed for the

better. Taipei's representatives were expelled from the UN and

replaced by Beijing's.

After becoming a member of the UN, China also joined most

UN-affiliated agencies, including, by the 1980s, the World Bank

and the International Monetary Fund. China's willingness, under

the policy of opening up to the outside world beginning in the late 1970s, to receive economic and technical assistance from such agencies as the UN Development Program was a significant departure

from its previous stress on self-reliance. In 1986 China renewed

its application to regain its seat as one of the founding members

of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

By the late 1980s, China had become a member of several

hundred international and regional organizations, both those of

major significance to world affairs, including the International

Atomic Energy Agency, the World Intellectual Property Organization, and the International Olympic Committee, and associations or societies focused on such narrow subjects as acrobatics or

the study of seaweed. Besides providing China a forum from which

to express its views on various issues, membership in the 1970s

and 1980s in increasing numbers of international groups gave

Chinese foreign-affairs personnel wider knowledge and valuable

international experience.

It is notable that by the late 1980s Beijing had not sought formal

membership in several important international organizations

representative of Third World interests: the Group of 77, the

Nonaligned Movement, and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. Despite the emphasis China placed on Third World

relations, China's independent foreign policy and special position

as a somewhat atypical Third World nation made it seem unlikely

in the late 1980s that China would seek more than observer status

in these groups.

By the second half of the 1980s, China's participation in inter- national organizations reflected the two primary goals of its independent foreign policy: furthering domestic economic development

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through cooperation with the outside world and promoting peace

and stability by cultivating ties with other nations on an equal basis. As expressed by Zhao Ziyang in a 1986 report to the National People's Congress, "China is a developing socialist country with a population of over 1 billion. We are well aware of our obligations

and responsibilities in the world. We will therefore continue to work

hard on both fronts, domestic and international, to push forward

the socialist modernization of our country and to make greater contributions to world peace and human progress."

* * *

In the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese foreign policy was the subject

of numerous books and articles reflecting diverse perspectives and

disciplinary approaches. Excellent coverage includes A. Doak Barnett's China and the Major Powers in East Asia, King C. Chen's China

and the Three Worlds (which includes many relevant documents),

Wang Gungwu's China and the World since 1949, Melvin Gurtov

and Byong-Moo Hwang's China under Threat, Michael B. Yahuda's

China's Role in World Affairs, and Robert C. North's The Foreign

Relations of China. Richard H. Solomon's chapter in The China Factor covers China's relations with many countries in addition to its primary focus on United States-China relations. China and the World,

edited by Samuel S. Kim, provides a comprehensive view of many

facets of Chinese foreign relations. Barnett's The Making of Foreign

Policy in China is a pathbreaking study of a subject previously little understood outside China.

The following periodicals often contain informative or analytical articles on Chinese foreign policy and relations with specific

countries or regions: Asian Survey, Asia Pacific Community, Asiaweek,

China Quarterly, Current History, Far Eastern Economic Review, Foreign

Affairs, Issues &Studies, Journal ofNortheast Asian Studies, Pacific Affairs

,

Problems of Communism, Washington Quarterly, and World Today. (For

further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

503

Chapter 13. Criminal Justice and Public Security
This crossbowman is one of tens of thousands of warriors buried to guard

Shi Huangdi, founder of the Qin dynasty (221-207 B. C), in his afterlife. The figure's weapon did not survive the two millennia underground.
SWEEPING REFORMS IN CHINA'S legal system were an- nounced at the Second Session of the Fifth National People's

Congress held in June and July 1979. New laws on courts,

procuratorates, crime, and trials were promulgated. The changes,

effective as of January 1, 1980, reflected the leadership's conviction that if economic modernization was to succeed, the people

who had suffered through the humiliations, capricious arrests, and

massive civil disorders of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)—had

to be assured that they no longer would be abused or incarcerated on the basis of hearsay or arbitrary political pronouncements.

From the perspective of the leaders of the Chinese Communist

Party, moreover, codified laws and a strengthened legal system were

seen as important means of preventing a possible return of radical

policies and a repetition of the era when the Gang of Four ruled

by fiat and inconsistent party regulations. Aside from establishing a legal code that would be more difficult for corrupt officials to manipulate, the new laws made the courts responsible for applying all but minor sanctions and made the police answerable to the

courts. Procuratorates, which had fallen into disuse during the Cultural Revolution, were reinstituted to prosecute criminal cases, review court decisions, and investigate the legalify of actions taken

by the police and other government organizations. A greater role

for the courts and independent investigations were expected to make

it more difficult to introduce politically colored testimony into the

courtrooms.

Hard labor still was the most common form of punishment in China in the 1980s. The penal system stressed reform rather than

retribution, and it was expected that productive labor would reduce

the penal institutions' cost to society. Even death sentences could

be stayed by two-year reprieve. If a prisoner was judged to have

reformed during that period, his or her sentence could be com- muted to life or a fixed term at labor.

Neighborhood committees in the 1980s continued to be heavily

involved in law enforcement and mediation of disputes at the local

level. Among the enforcement procedures these committees used

to influence both thought and behavior were criticism and collec- tive responsibility. In the period between 1980 and 1987, important progress was made in replacing the rule of men with the rule of law. Laws originally passed in 1979 and earlier were amended and augmented,

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and law institutes and university law departments that had been

closed during the Cultural Revolution were opened to train lawyers and court personnel. It was only a beginning, but important

steps had been taken in developing a viable legal system and making the government and the courts answerable to an objective

standard.

The Legal System

Imperial China

Contemporary social control is rooted in the Confucian past. The

teachings of Confucius have had an enduring effect on Chinese

life and have provided the basis for the social order through much

of the country's history. Confucians believed in the fundamental

goodness of man and advocated rule by moral persuasion in accor- dance with the concept of li (propriety), a set of generally accepted

social values or norms of behavior. Li was enforced by society rather

than by courts. Education was considered the key ingredient for maintaining order, and codes of law were intended only to supplement li, not to replace it (see The Hundred Schools of Thought,

ch. 1; Traditional Society and Culture, ch. 3). Confucians held that codified law was inadequate to provide

meaningful guidance for the entire panorama of human activity,

but they were not against using laws to control the most unruly

elements in the society. The first criminal code was promulgated

sometime between 455 and 395 B.C. There were also civil statutes, mostly concerned with land transactions.

Legalism, a competing school of thought during the Warring

States period (475-221 B.C.), maintained that man was by nature

evil and had to be controlled by strict rules of law and uniform

justice. Legalist philosophy had its greatest impact during the first imperial dynasty, the Qin (221-207 B.C.; see The Imperial Era,

ch. 1). The Han dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) retained the basic legal

system established under the Qin but modified some of the harsher

aspects in line with the Confucian philosophy of social control based on ethical and moral persuasion. Most legal professionals were not lawyers but generalists trained in philosophy and literature. The

local, classically trained, Confucian gentry played a crucial role as arbiters and handled all but the most serious local disputes.

This basic legal philosophy remained in effect for most of the

imperial era. The criminal code was not comprehensive and often not written down, which left magistrates great flexibility during

trials. The accused had no rights and relied on the mercy of the

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court; defendants were tortured to obtain confessions and often

served long jail terms while awaiting trial. A court appearance,

at minimum, resulted in loss of face, and the people were reluctant and afraid to use the courts. Rulers did little to make the courts more appealing, for if they stressed rule by law, they weakened

their own moral influence. In the final years of the Qing dynasty (1644-191 1), reform advocates in the government implemented certain aspects of the modernized Japanese legal system, itself originally based on German judicial

precedents (see The Hundred Days' Reform and the Aftermath,

ch. 1). These efforts were short-lived and largely ineffective.

The Republican Period

Following the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1911, China came under the control of rival warlords and had no government

strong enough to establish a legal code to replace the Qing code.

Finally, in 1927, Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang forces were able

to suppress the warlords and gain control of most of the country

(see Republican China, ch. 1). Established in Nanjing, the Guomindang government attempted to develop Western-style legal and

penal systems. Few of the Guomindang codes, however, were implemented nationwide. Although government leaders were striving

for a Western-inspired system of codified law, the traditional

Chinese preference for collective social sanctions over impersonal

legalism hindered constitutional and legal development. The spirit

of the new laws never penetrated to the grass-roots level or provided

hoped-for stability. Ideally, individuals were to be equal before the

law, but this premise proved to be more rhetorical than substantive. In the end, most of the new laws were discarded as the

Guomindang became preoccupied with fighting the Chinese Communists and the invading Japanese.

Developments after 1949

Ideological Basis

According to Chinese communist ideology, the party controlled

the state and created and used the law to regulate the masses, realize socialism, and suppress counterrevolutionaries. Since it was the

party's view that the law and legal institutions existed to support

party and state power, law often took the form of general principles and shifting policies rather than detailed and constant rules. The Communists wrote laws in simple enough language that every

individual could understand and abide by them. Technical language and strict legal procedures for the police and the courts were

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dispensed with so as to encourage greater popular appreciation of

the legal system.

Moreover, Mao Zedong maintained that revolution was continuous, and he opposed any legal system that would constrain it. Whereas Western law stressed stability, Mao sought constant change, emphasized the contradictions in society, and called for

relentless class struggle. In this milieu, the courts were instruments

for achieving political ends, and criminal law was used by the party

to conduct class struggle. The emphasis was shifting constantly,

and new "enemies" were often identified. Mao believed it unwise

to codify a criminal law that later might restrain the party.

The Maoists wanted the administration ofjustice to be as decentralized as possible in order to be consistent with the "mass line"

(see Glossary). Neighborhood committees and work units, supervised by local officials, used peer pressure to handle most legal

problems in consonance with current central policies. The police

and courts were left to handle only the most serious cases. In both

traditional and contemporary China, political and legal theory

tended to support such methods. Mao was unconcerned that a per- son contesting the result of a group decision had nowhere to go

for redress.

After 1949 the party also greatly altered the character of the legal

profession. A number of law schools were closed, and most of the

teachers were retired. Legal work was carried on by a handful of

Western-trained specialists and a large number of legal cadres hastily

trained in China. From the beginning these two groups disagreed over legal policy, and the development of the legal system reflected

their continuous debate over both form and substance.

The Western-trained specialists were Guomindang-era lawyers

who chose to cooperate with the Communists. Because they were

considered politically unreliable, the party initially ignored most

of their arguments for a modern legal system. As the 1950s

progressed, however, this group was instrumental in China's adoption of a legal system based on the system of the Soviet Union.

In general, the specialists wanted codified law, enforced by a strict Soviet-style legal bureaucracy. Without such procedures, they felt, there would be too much arbitrariness, and eventually the legal

system would become ineffective. Many of these specialists passed

from the scene when the Soviet model was abandoned in the late 1950s, but some became party members and gained influential

positions. In the first thirty years of the People's Republic, the new legal

cadres—chosen more for their ideological convictions than legal

expertise —conducted the day-to-day legal work. These cadres

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favored the Maoist system of social and political control and

regarded themselves as supervisors of the masses who subscribed

to a common set of communist values. The new cadres saw this common ideology as providing better overall direction than strict legal controls could. They believed that China was too large to be

governed by any single set of fixed rules or a legal bureaucracy.

They preferred to administer justice by simplified directives tailored

to the needs of local communities so that the people (and the new

cadres) could participate fully in their implementation. As part of

this plan, the cadres organized "study groups" to familiarize every

citizen with current directives and circulars.

Most cultures agree that the purpose of criminal law is to control deviancy—the Chinese traditionally have sought to do so through peer groups rather than through the courts. This practice

continued after 1949. Ideally, peers helped the deviant through criti- cism or shuofu (persuading by talking). The stress was on education and rehabilitation (see Glossary), a policy linked to the

Confucian and Maoist tenet that, with patience and persuasion,

a person can be reformed.

Early Years of the People's Republic, 1949-53

In 1949 the Communists abolished all Guomindang laws and

judicial organs and established the Common Program, a statement

of national purposes adopted by a September 1949 session of the

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (see Glossary),

as a provisional constitution. Under the Common Program, 148

mainly experimental or provisional laws and regulations were

adopted to establish the new socialist rule. The most important and

far-reaching of these laws dealt with marriage, land reform, counterrevolutionaries, and corruption. A three-level, single-appeal court system was established, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate

and local people's procuratorates were instituted. The procuratorates were established to ensure that government organs at all levels,

persons in government service, and all citizens strictly observed

the Common Program and the policies, directives, laws, and decrees

of the people's government. They also were to investigate and prosecute counterrevolutionary and other criminal cases; to contest illegal or improper judgments rendered by judicial organs at every level; and to investigate illegal measures taken by places of detention and

labor-reform organs anywhere in the country. They were to dis- pose of cases submitted by citizens who were dissatisfied with the

decision of "no prosecution" made by the procuratorial organs

of lower levels and to intervene in important civil cases and administrative legal actions affecting the national interest.

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The period 1949-52 was one of national integration, which came

in the wake of decades of disunity, turmoil, and war, and included

efforts to bring the diverse elements of a disrupted society into line with the new political direction of the state. The land reform move- ment of 1949-51 was accompanied, in 1950, by the movement to suppress counterrevolutionaries. In 1952 the san fan ("three anti")

movement opposed corruption, waste, and bureaucratism, while

the wufan ("five anti") movement rallied against bribery, tax evasion, theft of state assets, cheating on government contracts, and

theft of state economic secrets. During this period, few cases were

brought to court (see The People's Republic of China, ch. 1). Instead, administrative agencies, especially the police, conducted mass trials during which large crowds of onlookers shouted accusations. Hundreds of thousands were executed as a result of those

"trials" and many more were sent to prison or to labor camps.

In the relatively few cases that were tried in formal courts, it was

difficult to discern what laws were used as a basis for the judgment.

In 1952 the authorities launched a nationwide judicial reform

movement "to rectify and purify the people's judicial organs at every level politically, organizationally, and ideologically, and to strengthen the party's leadership of judicial work." Guomindangera judges were purged from the courts, and those who remained,

having been tacitly cleared of charges of "flagrant counterrevolution" and sworn to uphold the mass line injudicial work, continued

to press for a more regularized Soviet-style legal system. These

judges were confident that the mass movements shortly would end

and that the communist-run government eventually would see that

it needed a more formal judicial structure. Indeed, at the instigation of the legal specialists, in 1953 the state began to promulgate

separate criminal laws.

The Legal System under the 1954 State Constitution

The state constitution promulgated in September 1954 attempted

to set down in legal form the central tasks of the country in the

transition period of the mid-1950s and to regulate China's strides toward socialism. The state constitution provided the framework

of a legal system much like that in effect in the Soviet Union from

1921 to 1928. Much of the Soviet legal code was translated into

Chinese, and Soviet legal experts helped rewrite it to suit Chinese

conditions.

The 1954 state constitution gave the Standing Committee of the

National People's Congress the power to appoint and dismiss

judicial personnel and to enact legal codes. The state constitution

protected individuals from arrest and detention unless approved

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by the people's procuratorates, and it granted eitizens freedom of

speech, correspondence, demonstration, and religious belief. Citizens could vote and could run for election. They also acquired

the right to an education, work, rest, material assistance in old age, and the ability to lodge complaints with state agencies. Each citizen was granted the right to a public trial and to offer a defense aided

by a "people's lawyer." Citizens were granted equality before the

law, and women were guaranteed equal legal rights. Under the

1954 state constitution, local procuratorates that had been responsible both to the procuratorate at the next higher level and to the

government at the corresponding level were responsible only to the

procuratorate at the next higher level. Technically, the judiciary

became independent, and the Supreme People's Court became the

highest judicial organ of the state. Additionally, a law codification commission was set up to draft

the first criminal code of the People's Republic and to describe

criminal liability in detail. A set of rules for the proper conduct

for police and judicial personnel was established, and it became

the "political task" of the courts to determine what was or was

not an offense. A criminal law, a code of criminal procedure, and

a civil code were drafted, but none of these were enacted until

twenty-five years later. To cope with the anticipated need for more lawyers, law schools

expanded and revamped their curricula. A large quantity of legal

books and journals reappeared for use by law students. Although

all lawyers were supposed to be conversant in the current ideology,

many developed into "legal specialists" with more concern for the

law then for ideology. Although this viewpoint would be condemned

in 1957 when the Soviet-style legal system was rejected, in 1954

it appeared that China had taken a first step toward an orderly

administration of justice.

Between 1954 and 1957, much effort was expended to make the

legal system work, but the underlying conflict between the specialists

and the cadres, who were more concerned about ideology than the

legal system, remained. By 1956 the situation had polarized. The

specialists argued that the period of intense class struggle was over and that all people should now be considered equal before the law

and the state constitution. The cadres, on the other hand, contended

that class struggle would never end and that separate standards

should be applied to class enemies. They saw the specialists as obstructing the revolution —trying to subvert the new state and

restore the rights of old class enemies.

In 1956 Mao personally launched a mass movement under the

classical slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let the hundred

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China: A Country Study

schools of thought contend" (see The Transition to Socialism,

1953-57, ch. 1; Policy Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). His essay "On

the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, ' ' published in early 1957, encouraged people to vent their criticisms as long as they were "constructive" ("among the people") rather than

"hateful and destructive" ("between the enemy and ourselves").

Mao was anxious to defuse the potential for a backlash against communist rule such as had occurred in Hungary and Poland.

The legal specialists were among the most vociferous critics of

party and government policies. They complained that there were

too few laws and that the National People's Congress was slow in enacting laws already drafted. They felt that legal institutions were maturing too slowly and that the poorly qualified cadres were

obstructing the work of these institutions to suit their own politi- cal ends. The legal experts also spoke out against those, especially

party members, who thought themselves above the law.

By August 1957 the criticisms of party and state policies were

too broad and penetrating to be ignored. Mao and his supporters

labeled the critics "rightists" and launched a campaign against

them. Among the first victims of the Anti-Rightist Campaign were

the specialists and their legal system. Mao objected to this system

for several reasons—among them, his views that the Soviet model

was too Westernized for China and that the judicial system was

too constraining.

The specialists' proposals for a judiciary free from party and

political interference were denounced and ridiculed. Mao did not want a judiciary that stood as an impartial arbiter between the party

and anyone else. The principle of presumption of innocence was

spurned, as was the notion that the law always should act "in the

interest of the state and the people" rather than the party.

Many specialists were transferred to nonjudicial jobs and replaced

by party cadres. All codification commissions stopped work, and

no new laws were drafted. The number of law schools dropped

sharply as most universities shifted their curriculum to more politically acceptable subjects. Later, during the Cultural Revolution

(1966-76; see Glossary), almost all the remaining law schools were

closed.

With the Anti-Rightist Campaign of mid-1957 and the Great

Leap Forward (1958-60; see Glossary), a new mass line emerged.

The Anti-Rightist Campaign halted the trend toward legal professionalism, which was seen as a threat to party control. The party

leadership resolutely declared its power absolute in legal matters. The Great Leap Forward sought to rekindle revolutionary spirit

among the people. The mass line, as it affected public order,

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advocated turning an increasing amount of control and judicial

authority over to the masses. This meant greater involvement and

authority for the neighborhood committees and grass-roots mass

organizations.

The Anti-Rightist Campaign put an end to efforts that would

have brought about some degree of judicial autonomy and safe- guards for the accused, and the country moved toward police domination. By 1958 the police were empowered to impose sanctions

as they saw fit. The party gave low priority to the courts, and, as many judicial functions were turned over to local administrative

officials, few qualified people chose to stay with the still-operating courts. The number of public trials decreased, and by the early

1960s the court system had become mostly inactive. One unexpected by-product of the shift from formal legal organs to local administrative control was that criminal sentences became milder.

Persons found guilty of grand theft, rape, or manslaughter were

sentenced to only three to five years' imprisonment, and the death

penalty rarely was imposed.

During the Great Leap Forward, the number of arrests, prosecutions, and convictions increased as the police dispensed justice

"on the spot" for even minor offenses. Still, the excesses of the

Great Leap Forward were milder than those of the 1949-52 period,

when many of those arrested were summarily executed. Persons

found guilty during the Great Leap Forward were regarded as educable. After 1960, during a brief period of ascendancy of the

political moderates, there was some emphasis on rebuilding the

judicial sector, but the Cultural Revolution nullified most of the

progress that had been made under the 1954 state constitution.

The Legal System under the 1975 State Constitution

The state constitution adopted in January 1975 overwhelmingly

drew its inspiration from Mao Zedong Thought. It stressed party

leadership and reduced the power of the National People's Congress. The streamlined document (30 articles compared with 106

in 1954) reduced even further the constitutional restraints on the

Maoists. The sole article in the new state constitution that pertained

to judicial authority eliminated the procuratorate and transferred

its functions and powers to the police. The marked increase in police

power suited the radical leaders in the party hierarchy who wanted

public security forces to have the power to arrest without having

to go through other judicial organs.

The National People's Congress theoretically was still empowered

to enact laws, select and reject state officials, and direct the judiciary.

The party, however, was the ultimate arbiter, and the Supreme

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China: A Country Study

People's Court was no longer designated the highest judicial body

in the land but was only mentioned in passing as one of the courts exercising judicial authority.

Equality before the law, a provision of the 1954 state constitution, was eliminated. Moreover, people no longer had the right

to engage in scientific research or literary or artistic creation nor

the freedom to change residences. Some new rights were added,

including the freedom to propagate atheism and to practice religion.

Citizens also gained the "four big rights": the right to speak out

freely, air views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character

posters (see Glossary). These "new" forms of socialist revolution

along with the right to strike were examples of radical political

activism popularized during the Cultural Revolution that were

revoked in 1979 (see The Government, ch. 10).

"Socialist legality" under the 1975 state constitution was characterized by instant, arbitrary arrest. Impromptu trials were con- ducted either by a police officer on the spot, by a revolutionary

committee (the local government body established during the Cultural Revolution decade), or by a mob. Spur-of-the-moment cir- culars and party regulations continued to take the place of a code

of criminal law or judicial procedure. For example, during demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in early 1976, three

demonstrators were seized by police and accused of being counterrevolutionaries in support of Deng Xiaoping. The three were

"tried" by the "masses" during a two-hour "struggle meeting,"

a session where thousands of onlookers shouted their accusations.

After this "trial," during which the accused were forbidden to offer a defense (even if they had wished to), the three were sentenced

to an unspecified number of years in a labor camp. In contrast

to the milder sentences of the 1957 period, sentencing under the

state constitution of 1975 was severe. Death sentences were handed

down frequently for "creating mass panic," burglary, rape, and

looting.

Following the death of Mao in September 1976 and the arrest of the Gang of Four (see Glossary) less than a month later, the

government took its first steps to set aside the 1975 state constitution and restore the pre-Cultural Revolution legal system. In January 1977 Premier Hua Guofeng directed legal experts to begin

rebuilding judicial institutions in the spirit of the 1954 state constitution. The Chinese press began to carry stories about the vir- tues of the 1954 document and the Gang of Four's abuse of it. Later

in the year, Hua announced that China had eight important tasks

to fulfill, among them the reconstruction of formal legal institutions. During the fall of 1977, the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

516
A policeman directs rush-hour traffic in Beijing.

The slogan reads "Pay attention to Safety. "

Courtesy Robert L. Worden

and militia began turning over the responsibility for public security

to the civilian sector. Judicial and public security workers held meetings to seek ways "to strengthen the building of the legal

forces . . . and socialist legal systems." A theoretical study group

from the Supreme People's Court affirmed that the courts and the

public security organs were solely responsible for maintaining public

order, and they called on the people to accept the views of superior

authorities.

The government set out to reorganize completely all judicial

procedures and establish codes of criminal law and judicial procedure as quickly as possible. Law schools were reopened, professors were rehired to staff them, and legal books and journals

reappeared. By the end of 1977, the legal system and the courts

reportedly were stronger than at any time since the 1954-56 period.

Return to Socialist Legality

Developments under the 1978 State Constitution

A new constitution intended to provide a structural basis for the return to socialist legality was adopted at the Fifth National People's Congress in March 1978. Legal reform was deemed essential not only to prevent a return to power of the radicals but also

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China: A Country Study

to provide the legal structure for the economic development of the

country envisioned by the party leadership.

The 1978 state constitution reaffirmed the principle—deleted in the 1975 state constitution —of the equality of all citizens before

the law. It guaranteed the right to a public trial, except in cases involving national security, sex offenses, or minors, and reaffirmed

a citizen's right to offer a defense—also omitted in 1975.

The National People's Congress called for new criminal,

procedural, civil, and economic codes as quickly as possible, using

the new state constitution as a guide. The delegates quoted Mao

as having said in 1962 that "we not only need a criminal code but

also a civil code," and they invoked Mao's authority against those

who viewed regularizing the legal system as counterrevolutionary.

In November 1978 the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy

of Social Sciences, working in conjunction with the Legal Affairs

Commission of the National People's Congress proposed strengthening the socialist legal system, which, it explained, was based on

democracy, socialist principles, and the worker-peasant alliance.

The institute added that the system should be formulated, enforced,

and used by the people for economic development and against

groups such as the Gang of Four. The 1978 state constitution gave

the National People's Congress sole authority to interpret, promulgate, and change laws. It also reestablished the people's procuratorates and made them responsible both to the procuratorate at the next higher level and to the people's government at the same level, as they had been before 1954. In mid- 1979 China promulgated a series of new statutes that

included the country's first criminal law, the first criminal procedure law, and updated laws on courts and procuratorates. Extensive preparations preceded the announcements. Beginning in early

1979, for example, the media hosted debates on subjects such as judicial independence, presumption of innocence, and equality of

all citizens before the law. A national conference of procuratorates

in January 1979 stressed the need for thorough investigations in

all cases and respect for evidence. The participants in the confer- ence warned that extorted confessions would no longer be accepted

and that the police could not make arrests without procuratorate

approval. If circumstances did not permit prior approval, the

approval had to be obtained after the fact or the detainee had to be released.

Judicial work conferences were held throughout China to make

recommendations to the National People's Congress concerning

an independent judiciary. According to the recommendations,

Chinese courts in the future would base their judgments on the

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law, while continuing to "work under unified leadership of the local party committees." In short, party policy no longer would be the

equivalent of the law, but judicial independence in China could

still be modified by party guidance.

Peng Zhen, director of the Legal Affairs Commission and active

in the reform efforts of the early 1960s, announced the new laws

in June 1979 and had them published shortly thereafter. According to Peng's announcement, the laws were based on 1954 and 1963

drafts and provided a foundation for the socialist legal system and,

ultimately, social democracy. He affirmed that the judiciary would

be independent and subject only to the law; that all individuals, no matter how senior, would be equal before the law; and that party

members and cadres would have to forego special treatment and

set an example for the people. In November 1979 Peng was

appointed secretary general of the Standing Committee of the Fifth

National People's Congress, a position from which he could control the reconstruction of the legal system.

Among the laws approved by the Second Session of the Fifth

National People's Congress to take effect January 1, 1980, was the

Organic Law of the Local People's Congresses and the Local People's Governments. The revolutionary committees, which had

assumed judicial authority in the 1967-76 period, were eliminated;

their authority was assumed by local people's governments, and

judicial responsibility was returned to the appropriate courts. The Electoral Law for the National People's Congress and Local

People's Congresses, also to take effect January 1, 1980, provided

for the direct election of some procurators and judges. The Organic

Law of the People's Courts was designed to create a more orderly

environment and to assure the people that the chaotic years of the

Cultural Revolution, with no courts and no legal guarantees, were

over. The law, a revised version of 1954 drafts, guaranteed the

accused equality before the law regardless of race, nationality, sex, social background, or religious beliefs and gave people the right

to a lawyer. In certain cases, the lawyer would be court-appointed.

The law called for independence of the judiciary from political

interference. Courts were free to establish judicial committees to

assist them in difficult cases, and there were provisions for citizens

to be elected as assessors to participate with judges in adjudicating

cases. The local language was to be the medium for conducting

court proceedings and writing court decisions. Cases involving the

death penalty were to be reviewed by the Supreme People's Court,

and all defendants were entitled to appeal to the next higher court. The Organic Law of the People's Procuratorates, an amended

version of a 1954 law, made procurators responsible for supervising

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China: A Country Study

law enforcement by the police, courts, and administrative agencies. The procuratorate was linked to China's past in that it functioned like the censorial system of imperial China. It served as the

eyes and ears of the government, just as the censorial system was

the watchdog for the emperor.

The procurators were elected by local people's congresses and

approved by the next higher procuratorial level to handle only criminal cases. The independence of the procuratorates was constitutionally guaranteed. Still, their responsibilities were difficult,

especially in any case involving a high party official. According

to the new law, procuratorates at all levels had to establish

procuratorial committees, practice democratic centralism (see Glossary), and make decisions through discussion. Ideally, a procuratorate at a lower level would be led, rather than dictated to, by one

at the next higher level. Each procuratorate was responsible to the

standing committee of the people's congress at the corresponding

level. The 1980 Criminal Law was intended to protect state property

as well as the personal and property rights of citizens against unlawful infringement by any person or institution. It safeguarded the

fundamental rights stipulated in the 1978 state constitution and

prescribed penalties for counterrevolutionary activities (crimes

against the state) and other criminal offenses. Prevention of crime

and rehabilitation through education (taking into account actual

conditions in China in 1979) were stressed. Illegal incarcerations,

fabrications, prosecutions, and intimidation were forbidden, but

the provisions of the law did not apply retroactively.

The Criminal Law contained a provision prohibiting the criminal prosecution of a person who had "reactionary," that is, antiparty, ideas but who had committed no "reactionary" actions. As

Peng Zhen pointed out in late 1979, because "most contradictions were among the people," involving constructive criticism not

antagonistic to the party or state, punishment was inappropriate

(see Policy Toward Intellectuals, ch. 4). As in some other areas of the law, the actual judicial disposition appeared at times to be

at variance with this particular principle.

The law defined criminal acts and distinguished between actual

crimes and accidents. It also established a statute of limitations both

to demonstrate the "humanitarian spirit" of the penal code and

to permit law enforcement officials to concentrate on crimes for which evidence was still available. The law retained the important

legal principle of analogy, according to which acts not specifically

defined might be considered crimes. Criminal charges could not be brought unless there was evidence that a crime had been

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Criminal Justice and Public Security

committed; the sole basis for prosecution was verifiable evidence.

The law also defined basic understandable rules of evidence. The

death penalty could be imposed for flagrant counterrevolutionary

acts and for homicide, arson, criminal intent in causing explosions,

and other offenses of this nature. The 1983 revision of the law considerably increased the number of offenses punishable by the death

penalty.

The Law on Criminal Procedure was promulgated to reform

judicial procedures in enforcing the Criminal Law. It was designed

to educate citizens, establish judicial jurisdictions, and streamline

judicial appeal and review. The law described the relationship

between public security organs (investigations and provisional

apprehensions), the procuratorates (arrest approvals, possible procuratorial investigations, prosecutions, and supervision of the police

and penal institutions), and the courts (trials and sentencing). It also guaranteed the accused the right to make a defense at a public trial with an advocate present.

The public security organs, procuratorates, and courts had to base their judgments on verified evidence using the law as a measure. There were strict time limits on court and police actions to prevent overly lengthy detention.

Legal Reforms in the 1982 State Constitution

In late 1982 the National People's Congress adopted a new state constitution, which was still in effect in mid- 1987 (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 10). The 1982 State Constitution incorporates many provisions of the laws passed since 1978 and

distinguishes between the functions of the state and of the party,

mandating that "no organization or individual may enjoy the

privilege of being above the Constitution and the law" (Article 5). This article has been interpreted by Chinese observers to include

party leaders. The State Constitution also delineates the fundamental rights and duties of citizens, including protection from defamation of character, illegal arrest or detention, and unlawful search. The National People's Congress and the local people's congresses

continued to enact legislation to meet the juridical and other needs

of their jurisdictions. The draft Law on Civil Procedure, in force

from October 1982, provides guidelines for hearing civil cases. These cases constitute the majority of lawsuits in China, and in the 1980s the number was growing rapidly. In some of the lower

courts almost all cases were civil. A major problem in implementing new criminal and civil laws was a critical lack of trained legal personnel. In August 1980 the

Standing Committee of the National People's Congress had sought

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to remedy this shortage by passing the Provisional Act on Lawyers of the People's Republic of China, which took effect on January 1, 1982. Before the law went into effect, there were only 1,300

legal advisory offices and 4,800 lawyers in China. By mid-1983

the number had increased to 2,300 legal advisory offices staffed by more than 12,000 lawyers (approximately 8,600 full time and

3,500 part time). To meet the growing demand for lawyers, law

institutes and university law departments that had been closed during the Cultural Revolution were reopened, and additional ones were established. By mid- 1985 approximately 3,000 lawyers per

year were graduating from the 5 legal institutes and 31 university

law departments located throughout the country.

The law also established legal advisory offices at every level of

government and established the duties, rights, and qualifications

of lawyers. Any Chinese citizen with the right to vote who has passed

a professional competency test after formal training or after two

to three years of experience in legal work can qualify as a lawyer.

Lawyers are expected to act as legal advisers to government and

nongovernment organizations and as both public and private liti- gants in civil suits, to defend the accused in criminal cases on request

of the defendant or upon assignment of the court, and to offer legal

advice at a nominal charge to anyone requesting it. The 1982 law

guarantees that in carrying out these duties lawyers will be per- mitted to meet and to correspond with their clients without inter- ference from any organization or individual. The law seems to have

had a positive effect. Although there was a serious shortage of lawyers and great disparity in professional competence among those

practicing, China in the mid-1980s was making progress in developing a corps of lawyers to meet its legal needs.

Court Structure and Process

Between the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957 and the legal

reforms of 1979, the courts—viewed by the leftists as troublesome

and unreliable —played only a small role in the judicial system.

Most of their functions were handled by other party or government organs. In 1979, however, the National People's Congress

began the process of restoring the judicial system. The world was

able to see an early example of this reinstituted system in action

in the showcase trial of the Gang of Four and six other members

of the "Lin-Jiang clique" from November 1980 to January 1981

(see China and the Four Modernizations, 1979-82, ch. 1). The

trial, which was publicized to show that China had restored a legal

system that made all citizens equal before the law, actually appeared

to many foreign observers to be more a political than a legal exercise.

522
Criminal Justice and Public Security

Nevertheless, it was intended to show that China was committed

to restoring a judicial system.

The Ministry of Justice, abolished in 1959, was reestablished

under the 1979 legal reforms to administer the newly restored

judicial system. With the support of local judicial departments and

bureaus, the ministry was charged with supervising personnel

management, training, and funding for the courts and associated

organizations and was given responsibility for overseeing legal

research and exchanges with foreign judicial bodies.

The 1980 Organic Law of the People's Courts (revised in 1983)

and the 1982 State Constitution established four levels of courts

in the general administrative structure. Judges are elected or appointed by people's congresses at the corresponding levels to serve

a maximum of two five-year terms. Most trials are administered

by a collegial bench made up of one to three judges and three to

five assessors. Assessors, according to the State Constitution, are

elected by local residents or people's congresses from among citizens over twenty-three years of age with political rights or are appointed

by the court for their expertise. Trials are conducted in an inquisitorial manner, in which both judges and assessors play an active

part in the questioning of all witnesses. (This contrasts with the

Western adversarial system, in which the judge is meant to be an

impartial referee between two contending attorneys.) After the judge

and assessors rule on a case, they pass sentence. An aggrieved party can appeal to the next higher court. The Organic Law of the People's Courts requires that adjudication committees be established for courts at every level. The committees usually are made up of the president, vice presidents, chief

judges, and associate chief judges of the court, who are appointed

and removed by the standing committees of the people's congresses

at the corresponding level. The adjudication committees are charged

with reviewing major cases to find errors in determination of facts or application of law and to determine if a chief judge should withdraw from a case. If a case is submitted to the adjudication committee, the court is bound by its decision. The Supreme People's

Court stands at the apex of the judicial structure (see fig. 20).

Located in Beijing, it has jurisdiction over all lower and special

courts, for which it serves as the ultimate appellate court. It is directly responsible to the National People's Congress Standing

Committee, which elects the court president (see The Judiciary,

ch. 10).

China also has special military, railroad transport, water transport, and forestry courts. These courts hear cases of counterrevolutionary activity, plundering, bribery, sabotage, or indifference to

523
China: A Country Study

PEOPLE'S COURT SYSTEM 1 PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES2 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

LEVEL

SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT

CRIMINAL BENCH

CIVIL BENCH PROVINCIAL LEVELECONOMIC BENCH

HIGHER

PEOPLE'S COURTS

CRIMINAL BENCH

CIVIL BENCH

INTERMEDIATE

PEOPLE'S COURTS

CRIMINAL BENCH

CIVIL BENCH

COUNTY

LEVEL

ECONOMIC BENCH

BASIC PEOPLE'S COURTS

CRIMINAL BENCH TOWNSHIP

LEVEL

CIVIL BENCH

PEOPLE'S MEDIATION COMMITTEES

SUPREME PEOPLE'5 PROCURATORATE

SPECIAL PEOPLE'S COURTS

SPECIAL PROCURATORATES

PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES

DIVISIONAL PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES

PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATES

1 0rganization of a people's court : President, vice presidents, presiding judges, deputy presiding judges, judges,

judicial committees, people's assessors, marshals, legal-medical experts, interpreters, and bailiffs. Components of a people's court in session : Collegial bench of judges and assessors, public prosecutor, defense lawyer

or publicly appointed defender, and defendant.

2 Organization of a people's procuratorate : Chief procurator, procurators, departments for economic cases and for criminal cases, and others as needed.

Figure 20. Organization of the People's Courts and People's Procuratorates, 1987

duty that result in severe damage to military facilities, work units, or government property or threaten the safety of soldiers or workers.

Military courts make up the largest group of special courts and

try all treason and espionage cases. Although they are independent of civilian courts and directly subordinate to the Ministry of

National Defense, military court decisions are reviewed by the

524
Criminal Justice and Public Security

Supreme People's Court. Special military courts were first established in 1954 to protect the special interests of all commanders,

political commissars, and soldiers, but they ceased to function during the Cultural Revolution. Military courts and procuratorates were reinstituted in October 1978, and open military trials resumed

in December of that year. Law Enforcement

An extensive public security system and a variety of enforcement procedures maintained order in China in 1987. Along with

the courts and procuratorates, the country's judicial and public

security agencies included the Ministry of Public Security and the

Ministry of State Security, with their descending hierarchy of

departments, bureaus, subbureaus, and stations.

Historical Background

Pre-Qin to 1949

However much the public security system may have been influ- enced by communist ideology and practice, it remained rooted

directly in the traditional Chinese concept of governmental control through imposed collective responsibility. Even in the pre- imperial era, a system was proposed to organize the people into

"groups of families which would be mutually responsible for each

other's good behavior and share each other's punishments." The

Qin (221-207 B.C.) and Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) dynasties made

use of the concept, and the Song dynasty (960-1279) institutionalized it on a nationwide basis in the baojia (tithing) system. It entailed

the organization of family households into groups of ten, each unit

being organized successively into a larger unit up to the county

level of administration. Each family sent a representative to the

monthly meeting of its unit, and each unit elected a leader to represent it at the next higher level. Since the head of each unit was responsible to the next higher level for the conduct of all members of his unit, the system served as an extension of the central

government. Eventually, each group of families also was required

to furnish men to serve in the militia. Bao jia, which alternately

flourished or languished under later rulers and usually existed more

in theory than in practice, was reinstituted during the Qing dynasty

(1644-1911).

During the Qing period, the people's aversion to legalistic procedures and the rulers' preferences for socially and collectively

imposed sanctions continued. Technically, the magistrate was to hear even minor criminal cases; but local elders and village leaders

525
China: A Country Study

were allowed to handle most disputes, freeing the magistrate for more important work and saving the government expense. The

people preferred to handle matters in this way, outside the intimidating court system.

Other practices for maintaining public order in China during

the imperial era included the formation of mutual aid groups of

farm households, which over time came to assume police functions. In a manner similar to twentieth-century means of ideological control, the Qing bureaucracy organized mass lectures that stressed

the Confucian principle of obedience. Still another traditional form

of policing was the appointment of censors to investigate corruption and misconduct up to the highest levels of government. Doing

that job too well cost many censors their lives. In 1932 Chiang Kai-shek's Guomindang government reinstituted

the baojia system. In the Guomindang' s revised bao jia system, in addition to the chief, there were two officers of importance within

each 100-family unit. The population officer maintained the records

and reported all births, deaths, marriages, moves, and unlawful

activities to the district office. The bao jia troop commander headed

a self-defense unit and was responsible for maintaining law and

order. In rural China, however, the local village was generally a self-contained world, and the peasants remained aloof from dis- tant and higher-ranking centers of authority.

The Japanese were introduced to the baojia system on Taiwan

when they assumed control of the island after the Sino-Japanese

War (1894-95), and they found the system highly suitable for administering occupied areas. They instituted modified versions

of it in north China after 1937. The Japanese imposed severe

restrictions on the population, and the system aided in taking the census, restricting movement, and conducting spot checks. Each

household had to affix a wooden tablet on the front door with the names of all inhabitants inscribed. Anyone missing or not on the

list during an inspection by Japanese troops was assumed to be

an insurgent. Since there were not as many Japanese troops in south

China as in the north, the local leaders assisted the Japanese in administering the areas. They also disseminated propaganda at neighborhood meetings and established self-defense and youth

corps. Developments Since 1949

The Communists were themselves products of Chinese society,

and when they came to power in 1949 they liberally borrowed from

these historical examples. They extensively organized the population and maintained the principles of mutual surveillance and

526
Criminal Justice and Public Security

mutual responsibility. They also retained the concept of self-defense

forces. Communist control, however, exceeded that of bao jia or any other traditional system and extended into virtually every household. Under communist rule, the family was not considered an

effective control mechanism. To achieve near-total control, a large

number of administrative agencies and social organizations were

established or adapted. Police forces resembling the Soviet police

in organization, power, and activities were organized with the aid

of Soviet advisers.

From 1949 to 1953, the newly established government of the People's Republic made use of the PLA, militia units made up of

demobilized soldiers and other civilians, the police, and loyal citizens to put down resistance and establish order. Remnants of the Guomindang armed forces remained in pockets on the mainland, and

communist efforts to enforce tax laws and agricultural rules pro- voked disturbances and riots. Extending responsibility for public

order to include the police, military, and citizenry proved to be

a highly effective arrangement, and the concept was written into

the Common Program that preceded the 1954 state constitution.

The PLA and the militia continued to share responsibility for internal security and public order under the 1954 state constitution. The PLA's involvement in internal affairs was most extensive during the more turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution

(see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). Mao

Zedong, perceiving that the public security cadres were protecting precisely the party leaders he wished to purge, directed youthful Red Guards to crush the police, courts, and procuratorates as

well. The minister of public security, Luo Ruiqing (who concurrently served as the chief of staff of the PLA), was purged, soon

followed by heads of the courts and procuratorates.

Initially, the military tried to remain uninvolved. But on Mao's

orders, the PLA, which had once been told to support (actually

to acquiesce to) the Red Guards, moved in to quell the chaos that

Mao had inspired. The PLA gradually took over public security

functions by establishing military control committees to replace the

government bureaucracy. Revolutionary committees were set up

as provincial-level and local administrative organs, usually with

a PLA cadre in charge, and order gradually returned. By the sum- mer of 1968 the Red Guards were being disbanded, and mass trials were used to punish and intimidate rioters. With nineteen of China's twenty-nine provincial-level people's

revolutionary committees headed by PLA commanders, the mili- tary again was in charge of administration and security throughout the country, but it badly needed help from experienced police

527
China: A Country Study

officers. A policy of leniency toward most former officials evolved,

and some public security cadres returned to work. The PLA also recruited inexperienced people to form auxiliary police units. These

units were mass organizations with a variety of names reflecting

their factional orientation. Perhaps the best known unit was the

"Attack with Reason, Defend with Force Corps" named for the

militant slogan of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing. Public security forces were composed largely of nonprofessionals and lacked the disciplined

informant networks and personnel dossiers previously used to maintain order.

Beginning in 1968, the authorities called upon the PLA to help remove millions of urban dwellers from the overcrowded cities and

relocate them to the countryside and to transport cashiered offi- cials to special cadre schools for indoctrination and labor. The

migration to the country mostly involved students and other youths

for whom there were not enough jobs or places in the school sys- tem within the cities. Yet despite the discontent these campaigns

caused, reported crime declined after 1970. Increased concern over

the threat from the Soviet Union in the wake of armed clashes on

the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 forced the PLA gradually to return

to barracks, and control of the country reverted to the civilian

leadership (see Civil-Military Relations, ch. 14).

The Beijing-based Central Security Regiment, also known as the 8341 Unit, was an important PLA law enforcement element.

It was responsible over the years for the personal security of Mao

Zedong and other party and state leaders. More than a bodyguard

force, it also operated a nationwide intelligence network to uncover

plots against Mao or any incipient threat to the leadership. The

unit reportedly was deeply involved in undercover activities, dis- covering electronic listening devices in Mao's office and performing surveillance of his rivals. The 8341 Unit participated in the

late 1976 arrest of the Gang of Four, but it reportedly was deactivated soon after that event. The militia also participated in maintaining public order in the

1970s. Their involvement was especially evident in the 1973-76

period. In 1973 the Gang of Four, concerned over the transformation of the PLA into a more professional, less political, mili- tary force, took control of the urban militia from the PLA and placed

it under local party committees loyal to them. For the next three

years, the urban militia was used extensively to enforce radical

political and social policies. It was the urban militia, along with

the public security forces, that broke up the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square honoring the memory of Zhou Enlai in April

1976—the event that served as the pretext for the second purge

528
Criminal Justice and Public Security

of Deng Xiaoping (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76,

ch. 1). In rural areas the militia was more under the control of

the PLA.

Public Security Forces

The Public Security System

In 1987 the Ministry of Public Security was the principal police

authority. The ministry had functional departments for areas such

as intelligence; police operations; prisons; and political, economic,

and communications security. Subordinate to the ministry were

provincial-level public security departments; public security bureaus

and subbureaus at the county level (the bureaus located in the

prefectures and large cities, the subbureaus in counties and municipal districts); and public security stations at the township level (see

fig. 21). While public security considerations had a strong influence

at all levels of administration, the police appeared to wield progressively greater influence at the lower levels of government.

The organization of local public security stations could be inferred

from the tasks with which the police were charged. Generally, each

station had sections for population control, pretrial investigations,

welfare, traffic control, a detention center, and other activities. In the 1980s the public security station—the police element in

closest contact with the people—was supervised by the public security subbureau as well as by local governments and procuratorates.

The procuratorate could assume direct responsibility for handling

any case it chose, and it supervised investigations in those cases

it allowed the public security station to conduct. A great deal of

coordination occurred among the public security organs, the

procuratorates, and the courts, so that a trial was unlikely to produce

a surprise outcome.

The public security station generally had considerably broader

responsibilities than a police station in the West, involving itself in every aspect of the district people's lives. In a rural area it had

a chief, a deputy chief, a small administrative staff, and a small

police force. In an urban area it had a greater number of administrative staff members and seven to eighteen patrolmen. Its criminal

law activities included investigation, apprehension, interrogation,

and temporary detention. The station's household section maintained a registry of all persons living in the area. Births, deaths,

marriages, and divorces were recorded and confirmed through ran- dom household checks. The station regulated all hotels and required

visitors who remained beyond a certain number of days to register. All theaters, cinemas, radio equipment, and printing presses also

529
China: A Country Study

CENTRAL

GOVERNMENT

LEVEL

PROVINCIAL

LEVEL

COUNTY

LEVEL2

LEVEL

MINISTRY OF

PUBLIC SECURITY1

PUBLIC SECURITY DEPARTMENT

PUBLIC SECURITY BUREAU

TOV\WSHI P PUBLIC SECURITY

STATION

PEOPLE'S

MEDIATION COMMITTEE

SECURITY DEFENSE

COMMITTEE

OTHER COMMITTEES

PEOPLE'S ARMED

POLICE FORCE

The Ministry of State Security and other ministries within the State Council share public security responsibilities with the Ministry of Public Security. Includes prefectures, autonomous prefectures, counties, autonomous

counties, and municipalities.

Figure 21. Organization of the Public Security System, 1987

were registered with the local public security station, permitting

it to regulate gatherings and censor information effectively. It also regulated the possession, transportation, and use of all explosives,

guns, ammunition, and poisons.

Another important police function was controlling change of resi- dence. Without such controls, large numbers of rural residents

undoubtedly would move to the overcrowded cities in search of

better living standards, work, or education (see Migration, ch. 2; Urban Society, ch. 3). In April 1984 the State Council issued the

Tentative Regulations Governing People's Republic of China Resident Identity. The regulations, to be implemented over a period

of years, required all residents over sixteen years of age, except

530
Criminal Justice and Public Security

active-duty members of the PLA and the People's Armed Police

Force and inmates serving sentences, to be issued resident identity

cards by the Ministry of Public Security. The picture cards indicated the name, sex, nationality, date of birth, and address of the

bearer. Cards for persons sixteen to twenty-five years of age were

valid for ten years; those for persons between twenty-five and fortyfive were valid for twenty years; and persons over forty-five were

issued permanent cards. As of early 1987, only 70 million people

had been issued identity cards, well below the national goal. Also, even those with resident identity cards preferred to use other forms

of identification. In the 1980s secret police operations employed agents, informers, and "roving spies." Police surveillance apparently was

restricted to probation and parole. Plainclothes agents were posted

at bus and railroad stations and other public places. Police informers

denounced "bad elements" and assisted in surveillance of suspected

political criminals. Roving spies were a special category of informant in the factories and work units and were ever watchful for dissidence or sabotage. Youths aspiring to be Communist Youth

League members, or league members aspiring to be party members, sometimes cooperated as informants and agents for the police.

Public security officials also made extensive use of the authority

granted them to impose administrative sanctions by two sets of documents. These were the 1957 Regulations on Reeducation Through

Labor, which were reissued in 1979 with amendments, and the

1957 Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order, which were rescinded and replaced in 1986 by regulations of the same

name. Offenders under the Regulations on Reeducation Through

Labor might include "vagabonds, people who have no proper

occupation, and people who repeatedly breach public order." The

police could apprehend such individuals and sentence them to reeducation through labor with the approval of local labor-training

administration committees. The 1957 regulations placed no limit on the length of sentences, but beginning in the early 1960s three or four years was the norm. The 1979 amended regulations,

however, limited the length of reeducation through labor to three

years with possible extension for extraordinary cases. The Regulations Governing Offenses Against Public Order empowered the

police to admonish, fine, or detain people for up to fifteen days.

Goods illegally in the possession of an offender were to be confiscated, and payment was imposed for damages or hospital fees in the event injury had been caused.

The criminal laws in force after January 1, 1980, restricted police

powers regarding arrests, investigations, and searches. A public

531
China: A Country Study

security official or a citizen could apprehend a suspect under emer- gency conditions, but a court or procuratorate was required to approve the arrest. The accused had to be questioned within twentyfour hours and his or her family or work unit notified of the detention "except in circumstances where notification would hinder the

investigation or there was no way to notify them." Any premeditated arrest required a court or procuratorate warrant. The time

that an accused could be held pending investigation was limited

to three to seven days, and incarceration without due process was

illegal.

Two officials were needed to conduct a criminal investigation.

They were required to show identification and, apparently, to

inf orm the accused of the crime allegedly committed before he or

she was questioned. The suspect could refuse to answer only those

questions irrelevant to the case. Torture was illegal.

The 1980 laws also provided that in conjunction with an arrest the police could conduct an emergency search; otherwise, a warrant was required. They had the right to search the person,

property, and residence of an accused and the person of any injured

party. They could intercept mail belonging to the accused and order an autopsy whenever cause of death was unclear. In July 1980 the government approved new regulations governing

police use of weapons and force. Police personnel could use their

batons only in self-defense or when necessary to subdue or pre- vent the escape of violent criminals or rioters. Lethal weapons, such

as pistols, could be used if necessary to stop violent riots, to lessen

the overall loss of life, or to subdue surrounded but still resisting

criminals. The regulations even governed use of sirens, police lights,

and whistles.

The relationship between the police officers assigned to neighborhood patrols and the people was close. Police officers lived in a neighborhood on a long-term assignment and were expected to know all the residents personally. Their task was not only to pre- vent and punish crime but to promote desirable behavior by counseling and acting as role models. This positive side of the police

officer's duties was a constant responsibility, but the bond between

the public security units and the people was strengthened annually

by means of "cherish-the-people" months, during which the police

officer made a special effort to be of help, especially to the aged

and the infirm.

Police were drawn from every segment of the population without

restriction as to sex or ethnic origin. Selection was based on politi- cal loyalty, intelligence, and health, as it was for the PLA. Most

recruits had Communist Youth League backgrounds or were former

532
Criminal Justice and Public Security

PLA personnel. There was at least one police school in every

provincial-level unit, and others were operated by municipalities.

Usually those police designated for leadership positions attended

the police schools, and patrolmen were trained at the unit and on

the job. Legal training was emphasized as a method of improving

the quality of the police forces. In 1985 three institutions of higher

learning for police personnel —the University of Public Security,

the University of Police Officers, and the Institute of Criminal

Police—offered more than twenty special courses. Students were

recruited from senior-middle-school graduates under twenty-two

years of age, with a waiver to twenty-five years of age for those

having a minimum of two years' experience in public security work.

The People's Armed Police Force

The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF), after a trial period

in selected jurisdictions, was officially established at the national

level in 1983. In line with the general policy of reducing the size of the armed forces and transferring responsibilities to the civilian

sector, the newly established force was formed from internal security units reassigned from the PLA to the Ministry of Public Security and from border defense (customs) and fire-fighting units (see

Military Modernization, ch. 14). In 1985 the PAPF consisted of

approximately 600,000 volunteers and conscripts. With a general

headquarters at the national level and subordinate division-level

provincial or specialized units, regimental-level detachments, and

battalion-level brigades, it retained its military organization.

PAPF units assigned to internal security were responsible for guarding party and state organizations and foreign embassies and

consulates, as well as for responding to emergencies and maintaining

law and order. Border defense units performed standard customs

duties, such as inspecting vehicles and ships entering and leaving

the country, and maintained surveillance against smugglers and

drug traffickers. PAPF firefighting units were responsible for fire- prevention education as well as for fighting fires. PAPF units at every level worked in close cooperation with the armed forces and

other public security organizations.

State Security In June 1983 the National People's Congress, perceiving a growing threat of subversion and sabotage, established the Ministry of

State Security under the State Council. This new ministry was

charged with ensuring "the security of the state through effective measures against enemy agents, spies, and counterrevolutionary

activities designed to sabotage or overthrow China's socialist

533
China: A Country Study

system." At its inception, the ministry pledged to abide by the state constitution and the law and called upon the citizenry for their

cooperation, reminding them of their constitutional obligations to "keep state secrets" and "safeguard the security" of the country.

The Ministry of State Security reportedly acted in close coordination with the Ministry of Public Security, but as of mid- 1987 little had been revealed about the actual workings of this counterintelligence organization.

Grass-Roots Organizations

Aspects of Chinese society also have contributed to shaping the

contemporary structure for maintaining public order (see Urban

Society, ch. 3). Urban and rural dwellers rarely change their resi- dences. Amid the sprawling cities, neighborhoods remain close- knit communities. For the 80 percent of the population that lives in the countryside, home and place of work are the same. With

little physical mobility, most villagers stay put for generations and

know each other intimately. In such close-knit environments, where

everyone is likely to know everyone else and notice most of what

happens, mutual surveillance and peer pressure can be extremely

effective (see Rural Society, ch. 3). The structure of the public security system remained extensive

in the 1980s, and the authority of its forces exceeded that of most

police forces in the West. Nevertheless, public security agencies

required and received the assistance of a wide-ranging network of

grass-roots organizations to mobilize residents' responses to the

government's call for observance of laws, lead the people in maintaining social order and public security, and settle disputes among

residents. In urban areas an average of 1 1 patrolmen were responsible for controlling an area containing 15,000 or more residents. A patrolman could not know all the people and their particular problems;

he needed help. The local people's governments and congresses

shared responsibility for public order but had no special personnel

for the task. The armed forces were available, but they had other

primary concerns and would be called out only in the most extreme

circumstances.

To provide security beyond what could be provided by the police

and to extend government control, a system of neighborhood or

street committees had been established on a nationwide basis in 1954. The committees were charged with the responsibility of assist- ing the government in maintaining order. They usually controlled

from 10,000 to 20,000 people and consisted of 3 to 7 full-time cadres.

In the late 1970s, the size and functions of neighborhood committees

534
Inspecting the People's

Armed Police Force

Courtesy

Jiefangjun Huabao

were expanded. The neighborhood committees were specifically

responsible for maintaining public order and were accountable to the local people's congress.

Residents' committees and residents' "small groups," also estab- lished in 1954, were subordinate to neighborhood committees.

These were the genuine grass-roots organizations, staffed by unpaid

local residents elected by their neighbors. They directly involved

the people in controlling their neighborhoods, and they reduced

the demands on formal state institutions by maintaining surveillance for the public security forces and mediating most civil dis- putes and minor criminal cases for the judiciary. A residents'

committee supervised from 100 to 600 families with a staff of 7 to 17 members, one from each subordinate residents' small group.

A residents' small group controlled fifteen to forty households. The

public security organization in the countryside was also pervasive.

From the 1950s to the early 1980s, it was structured along military lines. The people's commune (see Glossary) was the lowest

level of government organization, with its administrative committee on a legal par with the local people's government in the urban

areas. People's communes were subdivided into production brigades

(see Glossary) and production teams (see Glossary). Each team

elected a people's public security committee, which sent a representative to the committee at the brigade level. Physical control was

mostly the responsibility of the militia units organized at the team,

535
China: A Country Study

brigade, and commune levels. In the winter of 1982-83 communes

were replaced by township governments, and grass-roots committees were patterned after urban committees (see Rural Society,

ch. 3). These rural grass-roots committees were given legal status by the Draft Organic Regulations for Villagers' Committees

approved by the National People's Congress in April 1987.

Residents' committees and small groups were staffed originally

by housewives and retired persons but involved others as their functions expanded. Their pervasive presence made them a primary means for disseminating propaganda, and their grass-roots nature

allowed for effective use of peer pressure in mediating disputes and

controlling troublemakers. Perhaps 4 or 5 percent of the adult population exercised some authority in what Western experts have

described as "participatory democracy in an extended form." The

functional subunits, the residents' committees and residents' small

groups, were particularly important in controlling the people.

People's mediation committees, guided and supervised jointly

by the basic people's court and the public security station, performed an important function within the residents' committees. They set- tled minor disputes and disagreements using conciliation and peer

pressure. Mediation committees were established originally in communist areas during the Chinese civil war (1945-49) as a natural

outgrowth of traditional preferences for local mediation of disputes.

Upon taking over the major cities of China in 1949, the Communists

were confronted with a tremendous backlog ofjudicial cases. Mediation committees provided a means of resolving disputes while

actively propagandizing and involving the people in the new government. Beginning in 1954 mediation committees were set up in neighborhoods, stores, schools, enterprises, factories, and workshops in the cities and in the production brigades and teams in the

countryside.

In the 1980s the five- to eleven-member people's mediation committees were elected by popular vote to two-year terms with the

option of being reelected. Members served without pay and could

be removed at any time by the electors for dereliction of duty . They

were responsible for settling disputes, strengthening popular unity,

promoting production and order, and conducting propaganda activities. Parties in dispute came voluntarily to the mediation committee; people seemed to feel they should try mediation before

proceeding to a lawsuit. Mediators' duties ranged from acting as go-betweens for parties who refused to talk to one another to defining issues, deciding questions of fact, and issuing tentative or advi- sory decisions. Mediation committees also exerted strong political,

economic, social, and moral pressures upon one or both parties

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Criminal Justice and Public Security

to gain "voluntary" compliance with the decisions. In addition

to mediation committees, other officials, police officers, party members, and work supervisors were expected to serve as mediators.

Members of the residents' committees and small groups who were

not members of the mediation committees were also involved in the mediation process. The Penal System

The Criminal Law that took effect on January 1, 1980, removed

criminal punishment from the discretion of officials, whose arbitrary

decisions were based on perceptions of the current party line, and

established it on a legal basis. The specific provisions of that law

listed eight categories of offenses. The Statute on Punishment for Counterrevolutionary Activity

approved under the Common Program in 1951 listed a wide range

of counterrevolutionary offenses, punishable in most cases by the

death penalty or life imprisonment. In subsequent years, especially

during the Cultural Revolution, any activity that the party or government at any level considered a challenge to its authority could

be termed counterrevolutionary. The 1980 law narrowed the scope

of counterrevolutionary activity considerably and defined it as "any

act jeopardizing the People's Republic of China, aimed at over- throwing the political power of the dictatorship of the proletariat

and the socialist state." Under this category it included such specific

offenses as espionage, insurrection, conspiracy to overthrow the

government, instigating a member of the armed forces to turn trai- tor, or carrying out sabotage directed against the government.

Other offenses, in the order listed in the 1980 law, were trans- gressions of public security, defined as any acts which endanger people or public property; illegal possession of arms and ammunition;

offenses against the socialist economic order, including smuggling

and speculation; offenses against both the personal rights and the

democratic rights of citizens, which range from homicide, rape, and

kidnapping to libel; and offenses of encroachment on property,

including robbery, theft, embezzlement, and fraud. There were also offenses against the public order, including obstruction of official business; mob disturbances; manufacture, sale, or transport of ille- gal drugs or pornography; vandalizing or illegally exporting cul- tural relics; offenses against marriage and the family, which include

interference with the freedom of marriage and abandoning or maltreating children or aged or infirm relatives; and malfeasance,

which specifically relates to state functionaries and includes such

offenses as accepting bribes, divulging state secrets, dereliction of

duty, and maltreatment of persons under detention or surveillance.

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China: A Country Study

Under the 1980 law, these offenses were punishable when criminal liability could be ascribed. Criminal liability was attributed to intentional offenses and those acts of negligence specifically provided

for by the law. There were principal and supplementary penalties.

Principal penalties were public surveillance, detention, fixed-term

imprisonment, life imprisonment, and death. Supplementary penalties were fines, deprivation of political rights, and confiscation of

property. Supplementary penalties could be imposed exclusive of

principal penalties. Foreigners could be deported with or without

other penalties.

China retained the death penalty in the 1980s for certain seri- ous crimes. The 1980 law required that death sentences be approved

by the Supreme People's Court. This requirement was temporarily

modified in 1981 to allow the higher people's courts of provinces,

autonomous regions, and special municipalities to approve death

sentences for murder, robbery, rape, bomb-throwing, arson, and

sabotage. In 1983 this modification was made permanent. The death

sentence was not imposed on anyone under eighteen years of age

at the time of the crime nor "on a woman found to be pregnant

during the trial." Criminals sentenced to death could be granted

a stay of execution for two years, during which they might demonstrate their repentance and reform. In this case the sentence could

be reduced. Mao was credited with having originated this idea,

which some observers found cruel although it obviated many executions.

The overwhelming majority of prisoners were sentenced to hard

labor. There were two categories of hard labor: the criminal

penalty—"reform through labor" —imposed by the court and the

administrative penalty—"reeducation through labor" —imposed

outside the court system. The former could be any fixed number

of years, while the latter lasted three or four years. In fact, those

with either kind of sentence ended up at the same camps, which

were usually state farms or mines but occasionally were factory pris- ons in the city.

The November 1979 supplementary regulations on "reeducation through labor" created labor training administration committees consisting of members of the local government, public security

bureau, and labor department. The police, government, or a work

unit could recommend that an individual be assigned to such reeducation, and, if the labor training administration committee agreed,

hard labor was imposed without further due process. The police

reportedly made heavy use of the procedure, especially with urban

youths, and probably used it to move unemployed, youthful, potential troublemakers out of the cities.

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Criminal Justice and Public Security

In the early 1980s, the people's procuratorates supervised the

prisons, ensuring compliance with the law. Prisoners worked eight

hours a day, six days a week, and had their food and clothing

provided by the prison. They studied politics, law, state policies,

and current events two hours daily, half of that in group discussion. They were forbidden to read anything not provided by the

prison, to speak dialects not understood by the guards, or to keep

cash, gold, jewelry, or other goods useful in an escape. Mail was

censored, and generally only one visitor was allowed each month.

Prisoners were told that their sentences could be reduced if they

showed signs of repentance and rendered meritorious service. Any

number of reductions could be earned totaling up to one-half the

original sentence, but at least ten years of a life sentence had to be served. Probation or parole involved surveillance by the public

security bureau or a grass-roots organization to which the convict

periodically reported.

Crime by youthful offenders has been a matter of grave con- cern to the post-Mao leadership. In common with most societies,

nearly all those charged with violent crime have been under thirtyfive years of age. Criminal law makes special provisions for juvenile

offenders. Offenders between fourteen and sixteen years of age are

to be held criminally liable only if they commit homicide, robbery,

arson, or "other offenses which gravely jeopardize public order,"

and offenders between fourteen and eighteen years of age "shall

be given a lighter or mitigated penalty." In most cases juvenile

offenders charged with minor infractions are dealt with by neighborhood committees or other administrative means. In serious cases juvenile offenders usually are sent to one of the numerous refor- matories reopened in most cities under the Ministry of Education

beginning in 1978. In 1987 the crime rate remained low by international standards,

and Chinese cities were among the safest in the world. The court system had been reestablished, and standard criminal, procedural,

civil, and economic codes had been developed. Law schools, closed

since the late 1950s, had been reopened, and new ones had been

established to meet the growing need for lawyers and judges. Law

enforcement organizations had been reorganized, civilianized, and

made answerable to the courts and the procuratorates. But it would

be unrealistic to assume that the old system of rule by party fiat could be changed in a short period of time. Opposition to the

changes was pervasive at every level of the party and the government. Even its strongest supporters insisted that the legal system

must be developed in accordance with the four cardinal principles

upholding socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the

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China: A Country Study

leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and MarxismLeninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Given these limitations, it was

clear that although much progress had been made in replacing the

Mao era's arbitrary rule with a solid legal system, much still remained to be done.

* * *

Readers interested in further information on law in traditional

China should consult Law and Society in Traditional China by Ch'ii

T'ung-tsu and Law in Imperial China by Derk Bodde and Clarence

Morris. Readers interested in studying traditional legal practices

still in use in China should consult Phillip M. Chen's Law andJustice and Fu-shun Lin's Chinese Law Past and Present. Justice in Communist China by Shao-chuan Leng and The Criminal

Process in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1963 by Jerome Alan

Cohen are good sources on legal developments in the early years

of the People's Republic, and Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah

Chiu's CriminalJustice in Post-Mao China is an indispensable source

for Chinese legal developments in the 1980s. Other extremely useful

articles providing information on the criminal justice and penal

systems can be found in various issues of Beijing Review, China News

Analysis, Faxue Yanjiu (Studies in Law), and Foreign Broadcast

Information Service, Daily ReportiChina. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

540
Chapter 14. National Defense
Twofoot soldiers, one carrying a long bow, the other with a sword and shield. The artist's version is based on part of a decorative clay tilefound in a tomb

of the Southern and Northern Dynasties period (A.D. 420-588) at Dengxian,

Henan Province.
CHINA HAS A LONG and glorious military tradition, dating

back to the earliest days of recorded history. The martial exploits

of kings and emperors, loyal generals and peasant rebels, and

strategists and theorists are well known in Chinese high culture

and folk tradition. Throughout the centuries, two tendencies have

influenced the role of the military in national life, one in peacetime and the other in times of upheaval. In times of peace and stability, military forces were firmly subordinated to civilian control.

The military was strong enough to overcome domestic rebellions

and foreign invasion, yet it did not threaten civilian control of the

political system. In times of disorder, however, new military leaders and organizations arose to challenge the old system, resulting

in the militarization of political life. When one of these leaders

became strong enough, he established a new political order ruling

all China. After consolidating power, the new ruler or his successors subordinated the military to civilian control once again. In

the past 150 years, a third factor entered the Chinese military

tradition —the introduction of modern military technology and

organization to strengthen military capabilities against domestic

and foreign enemies. Since the beginning of the twentieth century,

all three tendencies have been discernable in the role of the mili- tary in national life. These factors have been particularly apparent in the role of the People's Liberation Army in the rise to power

of the Chinese Communist Party, in the military's role in the politics

of the People's Republic of China, and in the efforts of Chinese

leaders to modernize the armed forces. After decades of development from a peasant guerrilla force to a conventional military organization capable of achieving longsought national liberation, the People's Liberation Army pursued

further technical competence and improved organization, with

Soviet assistance, in the 1950s. Political involvement in the Great

Leap Forward (1958-60) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76)

delayed these efforts until the late 1970s, when the People's Liberation Army embarked on a military modernization program, which

had three major focuses. First, military modernization required

both the strengthening of party control over the military and the

continued disengagement of the armed forces from politics. These

steps were necessary to ensure that a politically reliable yet professionally competent military would concentrate on the task of mili- tary reform. Second, defense modernization attempted to achieve

543
China: A Country Study

improved combat effectiveness through organizational, doctrinal,

training, educational, and personnel reforms (including recruitment, promotion, and demobilization). These reforms emphasized

the development of combat capabilities in waging combined arms

warfare. Third, military modernization was aimed at the trans- formation of the defense establishment into a system capable of

independently sustaining modern military forces. This transformation necessitated the reorganization and closer integration of

civilian and military science and industry and also the selective use

of foreign technology.

Since the 1960s China had considered the Soviet Union the principal threat to its security; lesser threats were posed by long-standing

border disputes with Vietnam and India. Beijing's territorial claims

and economic interests made the South China Sea an area of stra- tegic importance to China. Although China sought peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, it did not rule out the use

of force against the island if serious internal disturbances, a declaration of independence, or a threatening alliance occurred.

The scope of foreign military cooperation has evolved gradually.

In the 1950s China dealt only with communist nations and insurgencies. In the 1960s it began to provide military assistance to Third

World nations to counteract Soviet and United States influence.

Beginning in the late 1970s, China shifted its arms transfer policy

away from military assistance in favor of commercial arms sales and began developing military ties with Western Europe and the

United States. Chinese military contacts with foreign countries

expanded rapidly with the introduction of the military modernization program and the policy of opening up to the outside

world. In the late 1980s, People's Liberation Army forces consisted of

the various arms of the ground forces, and the Air Force, Navy,

and Strategic Missile Force (also known as the Second Artillery

Corps). The ground forces were divided into group armies and

regional forces. Ground force equipment was largely of Soviet

design and obsolescent, although some weaponry had been

upgraded with foreign technology. The Air Force had serious technological deficiencies despite incremental improvements of aircraft. The Navy was developing a blue-water capability and sea-based

strategic forces. China possessed a small but relatively credible

nuclear deterrent force with an incipient second-strike capability.

Paramilitary forces consisted of the militia, reserve service system,

Production and Construction Corps, and People's Armed Police Force.

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National Defense

Historical Development, 1927-79

From the Founding of the People's Liberation Army to the Korean

War

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was built on several millennia of tradition and a century of Western military innovations. It traces its origins to the August 1 , 1927, Nanchang Uprising in which

Guomindang troops led by Chinese Communist Party leaders Zhu

De and Zhou Enlai rebelled following the dissolution of the first Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party united front earlier that year. The survivors of that and other abortive communist insurrections, including the Autumn Harvest Uprising led by Mao

Zedong, fled to the Jinggang Mountains along the border of Hunan

and Jiangxi provinces. Joining forces under the leadership of Mao

and Zhu, this collection of communists, bandits, Guomindang

deserters, and impoverished peasants became the First Workers'

and Peasants' Army, or Red Army—the military arm of the

Chinese Communist Party. Using the guerrilla tactics that would

later make Mao Zedong internationally famous as a military

strategist, the Red Army survived several encirclement and suppression campaigns by superior Guomindang forces. But party

internal politics forced the Red Army temporarily to abandon guerrilla warfare and resulted in the epic Long March of 1934-35 (see

Nationalism and Communism, ch. 1). The Red Army's exploits

during the Long March became legendary and remain a potent

symbol of the spirit and prowess of the Red Army and its successor, the PLA. During that period, Mao's political power and his

strategy of guerrilla warfare gained ascendancy in the party and

the Red Army.

In 1937 the Red Army joined in a second united front with the

Guomindang against the invading Japanese army (see AntiJapanese War, ch. 1). Although nominally cooperating with the

Guomindang, the Chinese Communist Party used the Red Army

to expand its influence while leading the anti-Japanese resistance

in north China. By the end of the war, the Red Army numbered

approximately 1 million and was backed by a militia of 2 million.

Although the Red Army fought several conventional battles against

the Japanese (and Guomindang troops), guerrilla operations were

the primary mode of warfare.

Mao's military thought grew out of the Red Army's experiences

in the late 1930s and early 1940s and formed the basis for the "people's war" concept, which became the doctrine of the Red Army

and the PLA. In developing his thought, Mao drew on the works

of the Chinese military strategist Sun Zi (fourth century B.C.) and

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China: A Country Study

Soviet and other theorists, as well as on the lore of peasant uprisings, such as the stories found in the classical novel Shuihu Zhuan

(Water Margin) and the stories of the Taiping Rebellion (see Emergence of Modern China, ch. 1). Synthesizing these influences with

lessons learned from the Red Army's successes and failures, Mao

created a comprehensive politico-military doctrine for waging

revolutionary warfare. People's war incorporated political, eco- nomic, and psychological measures with protracted military struggle

against a superior foe. As a military doctrine, people's war emphasized the mobilization of the populace to support regular and guerrilla forces; the primacy of men over weapons, in which superior

motivation compensated for inferior technology; and the three

progressive phases of protracted warfare—strategic defensive, stra- tegic stalemate, and strategic offensive. During the first stage,

enemy forces were "lured in deep" into one's own territory to over- extend, disperse, and isolate them. The Red Army established base

areas from which to harass the enemy, but these bases and other

territory could be abandoned to preserve Red Army forces. In the

second phase, superior numbers and morale were applied to wear down the enemy in a war of attrition in which guerrilla operations

predominated. During the final phase, Red Army forces made the

transition to regular warfare as the enemy was reduced to parity

and eventually defeated. In the civil war following Japan's defeat in World War II, the

Red Army, newly renamed the People's Liberation Army, again

used the principles of people's war in following a policy of strategic

withdrawal, waging a war of attrition, and abandoning cities and

communication lines to the well-armed, numerically superior Guomindang forces (see Return to Civil War, ch. 1). In 1947 the PLA

launched a counteroffensive during a brief strategic stalemate. By

the next summer, the PLA had entered the strategic offensive stage,

using conventional warfare as the Guomindang forces went on the

defensive and then collapsed rapidly on the mainland in 1949. By

1950 the PLA had seized Hainan Island and Xizang (Tibet).

When the PLA became a national armed force in 1949, it was

an unwieldy, 5-million-strong peasant army. In 1950 the PLA

included 10,000 troops in the Air Force (founded in 1949) and

60,000 in the Navy (founded in 1950). China also claimed a militia

of 5.5 million. At that time, demobilization of ill-trained or politically unreliable troops began, resulting in the reduction of mili- tary strength to 2.8 million in 1953.

China's new leaders recognized the need to transform the PLA,

essentially an infantry army with limited mobility, logistics, ord- nance, and communications, into a modern military force. The

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National Defense

signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and

Mutual Assistance in February 1950 provided the framework for defense modernization in the 1950s. However, the Korean War

was the real watershed in armed forces modernization. The Chinese

People's Volunteers (as the military forces in Korea were called)

achieved initial success in throwing back United Nations (UN)

troops and, despite the PLA's first encounter with modern fire- power, managed to fight UN forces to a stalemate. Nevertheless,

China's Korean War experience demonstrated PLA deficiencies

and stimulated Soviet assistance in equipping and reorganizing the

military. The use of "human wave tactics" (unsupported, concentrated infantry attacks) against modern firepower caused serious

manpower and materiel losses. Chinese air power also suffered

heavy losses to superior UN forces. Finally, shortcomings in trans- portation and supply indicated the need to improve logistics capabilities. Military Modernization in the 1950s and 1960s

Large-scale Soviet aid in modernizing the PLA, which began

in the fall of 1951, took the form of weapons and equipment,

assistance in building China's defense industry, and the loan of

advisers, primarily technical ones. Mostly during the Korean War

years, the Soviet Union supplied infantry weapons, artillery, armor,

trucks, fighter aircraft, bombers, submarines, destroyers, and gunboats. Soviet advisers assisted primarily in developing a defense

industry set up along Soviet organizational lines. Aircraft and ord- nance factories and shipbuilding facilities were constructed and by

the late 1950s were producing a wide variety of Soviet-design mili- tary equipment. Because the Soviet Union would not provide China

with its most modern equipment, most of the weapons were out- dated and lacked an offensive capability. Both Chinese dissatis- faction with this defensive aid and the Soviet refusal to supply China

with nuclear bomb blueprints contributed to the withdrawal of

Soviet advisers in 1960 (see Perception of Threat, this ch.; SinoSoviet Relations, ch. 12). In the early 1950s, China's leaders decided to reorganize the mili- tary along Soviet lines. In 1954 they established the National

Defense Council, Ministry of National Defense, and thirteen mili- tary regions. The PLA was reconstituted according to Soviet tables of organization and equipment. It adopted the combined-arms concept of armor- and artillery-heavy mobile forces, which required

the adoption of some Soviet strategy and tactics. PLA modernization according to the Soviet model also entailed creation of a professional officer corps, complete with Soviet-style uniforms, ranks,

547
China: A Country Study

and insignia; conscription; a reserve system; and new rules of dis- cipline. The introduction of modern weaponry necessitated rais- ing the education level of soldiers and intensifying formal military

training. Political education and the role of political commissars

lost their importance as the modernization effort progressed.

The military's new emphasis on Soviet-style professionalism

produced tensions between the party and the military. The party

feared that it would lose political control over the military, that

the PLA would become alienated from a society concentrating on

economic construction, and that relations between officers and sol- diers would deteriorate. The party reemphasized Mao's thesis of

the supremacy of men over weapons and subjected the PLA to several political campaigns. The military, for its part, resented party

attempts to strengthen political education, build a mass militia sys- tem under local party control, and conduct economic production

activities to the detriment of military training. These tensions cul- minated in September 1959, when Mao Zedong replaced Minister

of National Defense Peng Dehuai, the chief advocate of military

modernization, with Lin Biao, who deemphasized military professionalism in favor of revolutionary purity (see The Great Leap For- ward, 1958-60, ch. 1). The ascension of Lin Biao and the complete withdrawal of Soviet

assistance and advisers in 1960 marked a new stage in military

development. The Soviet withdrawal disrupted the defense industry and weapons production, particularly crippling the aircraft

industry. Although the military purchased some foreign technology

in the 1960s, it was forced to stress self-reliance in weapons production. Lin Biao moved to restore PLA morale and discipline and

to mold the PLA into a politically reliable fighting force. Lin reor- ganized the PLA high command, replaced the mass militia with

a smaller militia under PLA control, and reformulated the Maoist

doctrine of the supremacy of men over materiel. Lin stated that

"men and materiel form a unity, with men as the leading factor,

giving ideological justification to the reemphasis on military training. Political training, however, continued to occupy 30 to 40 per- cent of a soldier's time. At the same time, Lin instituted stricter party control, restored party organization at the company level,

and intensified political education. In 1964 the prestige of the PLA

as an exemplary, revolutionary organization was confirmed by the

"Learn from the PLA" campaign. This campaign, which purported

to disseminate the military's political-work experience throughout

society, resulted in the introduction of military personnel into party

and government organizations, a trend that increased after the Cultural Revolution began.

548
China 's National Defense Science and Technology University in Beijing

Courtesy Jiefangjun Huabao

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the PLA fought one internal

and one external campaign: in Xizang against Tibetan rebels, and

on the Sino-Indian border against India. In the first campaign,

PLA forces overwhelmed poorly equipped Tibetan insurgents who

rebelled in 1958-59 against the imposition of Chinese rule. The

Sino-Indian border war broke out in October 1962 amid the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations and mutual accusations of intrusions into disputed territory. In this brief (one month) but decisive

conflict, the PLA attacked Indian positions in the North-East

Frontier Agency (later called Arunachal Pradesh), penetrating to the Himalayan foothills, and in Ladakh, particularly in the Aksai

Chin region. After routing the Indian Army, the PLA withdrew

behind the original "line of actual control" after China announced

a unilateral cease-fire. Both campaigns were limited conflicts using

conventional tactics. The People's Liberation Army in the Cultural Revolution

The PLA played a complex political role during the Cultural

Revolution (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). From 1966 to 1968, military training, conscription and demobilization, and political education virtually ceased as the PLA was

ordered first to help promote the Cultural Revolution and then to reestablish order and authority. Although the Cultural Revolution

initially developed separately in the PLA and in the party apparatus, the PLA, under the leadership of its radical leftist leader, Lin

Biao, soon became deeply involved in civilian affairs. In early 1967

the military high command was purged, and regional military forces were instructed to maintain order, establish military control, and

support the revolutionary left. Because many regional-force

549
China: A Country Study

commanders supported conservative party and government offi- cials rather than radical mass organizations, many provincial-level

military leaders were purged or transferred, and Beijing ordered

several main-force units to take over the duties of the regional-force

units. In the summer of 1967, regional military organizations came

under leftist attack, Red Guard factions obtained weapons, and

violence escalated. By September the central authorities had called

off the attack on the PLA, but factional rivalries between regional- and main-force units persisted. Violence among rival mass organizations, often backed by different PLA units, continued in the first half of 1968 and delayed the formation of revolutionary committees, which were to replace traditional government and party organizations. In July 1968 Mao abolished the Red Guards and ordered

the PLA to impose revolutionary committees wherever such bodies previously had not been established.

Worries over military factionalism caused the leadership to curtail the Cultural Revolution and to initiate a policy of rotating mili- tary commanders and units. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,

the enunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Soviet military buildup in its Far Eastern theater, and Sino-Soviet border clashes in the spring of 1969 brought about a renewed emphasis on some of

the PLA's traditional military roles. In 1969 Lin Biao launched an extensive ' 'war preparations' ' campaign; military training was

resumed, and military procurement, which had suffered in the first years of the Cultural Revolution, rose dramatically. Military pre- paredness was further advanced along China's frontiers and particularly the Sino-Soviet border when the thirteen military regions were reorganized into eleven in 1970.

The PLA emerged from the more violent phase of the Cultural

Revolution deeply involved in civilian politics and administration.

It had committed 2 million troops to political activities and reportedly suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties. Regional military forces were almost completely absorbed in political work. PLA

units did not withdraw fully from these duties until 1974. Following the sudden death of Lin Biao in 1971, the military began to disengage from politics, and civilian control over the PLA was reas- serted. Lin's supporters in the PLA were purged, leaving some

high-level positions in the PLA unfilled for several years. PLA

officers who had dominated provincial-level and local party and

government bodies resigned from those posts in 1973 and 1974.

Military region commanders were reshuffled, and some purged mili- tary leaders were rehabilitated. Military representation in the

national-level political organizations, following an all-time high at the Ninth National Party Congress in 1969, declined sharply at

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National Defense

the Tenth National Party Congress in 1973 (see The Cultural Revolution Decade, 1966-76, ch. 1). Along with the reassertion of civilian control over the military

and the return to military duties came a shift of resources away

from the defense sector. Defense procurement dropped by 20 percent in 1971 and shifted from aircraft production and intercontinental ballistic missile development to the modernization of the ground

forces and medium-range ballistic missile and intermediate-range

ballistic missile development.

Military Modernization in the 1970s

In January 1974 the PLA saw action in the South China Sea

following a long-simmering dispute with the Republic of Vietnam

(South Vietnam) over the Xisha (Paracel) Islands (see Vietnam,

this ch.). South Vietnamese and PLA naval forces skirmished over

3 islands occupied by South Vietnamese troops, and the PLA successfully seized control of the islands in a joint amphibious operation involving 500 troops and air support.

By the mid-1970s concerns among Chinese leaders about military weakness, especially vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, resulted in a decision to modernize the PLA. Two initial steps were taken to promote military modernization. First, in 1975 vacant key positions in the military structure and the party Central Military Commission were filled. (The state Central Military Commission was

not founded until 1982; see the National People's Congress, ch. 10).

Nonetheless, to ensure party control of the PLA, civilians were

appointed to key positions. Deng Xiaoping was appointed chief

of general staff, while Gang of Four member Zhang Chunqiao was

appointed director of the General Political Department. Second,

in the summer following Premier Zhou Enlai's January 1975 proclamation of the Four Modernizations (see Glossary) as national policy,

the party Central Military Commission convened an enlarged meeting to chart the development of military modernization. The military modernization program, codified in Central Directive No. 18

of 1975, instructed the military to withdraw from politics and to concentrate on military training and other defense matters. Factional struggles between party moderates and radicals in 1975 and

1976, however, led to the dismissal of Deng from all his posts and

the delay of military modernization until after the death of Mao

Zedong. Within a month of Mao's death, military leaders headed

by Minister of National Defense Ye Jianying cooperated with party

chairman Hua Guofeng to arrest the Gang of Four, thus ending

a decade of radical politics.

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China: A Country Study

The Chinese leadership resumed the military modernization pro- gram in early 1977. Three crucial events in the late 1970s shaped

the course of this program: the second rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, the major civilian proponent of military modernization; the

re-ordering of priorities in the Four Modernizations, relegating

national defense modernization from third to fourth place (following agriculture, industry, and science and technology); and the SinoVietnamese border war of 1979. In July 1977, with the backing

of moderate military leaders, Deng Xiaoping reassumed his position as PLA chief of general staff as well as his other party and

state posts. At the same time, Deng became a vice chairman of

the party Central Military Commission. In February 1980 Deng

resigned his PLA position in favor of professional military com- mander Yang Dezhi; Deng improved his party Central Military

Commission position, becoming chairman of it at the Sixth Plenum

of the Eleventh Central Committee in June 1981. With enormous

prestige in both the military and the civilian sectors, Deng vigorously promoted military modernization, the further disengagement

of the military from politics, and the shift in national priorities to economic development at the expense of defense. In 1977-78 military and civilian leaders debated whether the mili- tary or the civilian economy should receive priority in allocating resources for the Four Modernizations. The military hoped for additional resources to promote its own modernization, while

civilian leaders stressed the overall, balanced development of the

economy, including civilian industry and science and technology.

By arguing that a rapid military buildup would hinder the economy

and harm the defense industrial base, civilian leaders convinced

the PLA to accept the relegation of national defense to last place

in the Four Modernizations. The defense budget accordingly was

reduced. Nonetheless, the Chinese military and civilian leadership

remained firmly committed to military modernization.

The 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border war, although only sixteen

days long, revealed specific shortcomings in military capabilities

and thus provided an additional impetus to the military modernization effort. The border war, the PLA's largest military operation since the Korean War, was essentially a limited, offensive,

ground-force campaign. China claimed victory, but the war had

mixed results militarily and politically. Although the numerically

superior Chinese forces penetrated about fifty kilometers into Vietnam, the PLA sustained heavy casualties. PLA performance suf- fered from poor mobility, weak logistics, and outdated weaponry.

Inadequate communications, an unclear chain of command, and

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National Defense

the lack of military ranks also created confusion and adversely

affected PLA combat effectiveness.

Military Modernization

The military modernization begun in the late 1970s had three

major focuses. First, under the political leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the military became disengaged from civilian politics and,

for the most part, resumed the political quiescence that characterized its pre-Cultural Revolution role. Deng reestablished civilian

control over the military by appointing his supporters to key military leadership positions, by reducing the scope of the PLA's domestic nonmilitary role, and by revitalizing the party political structure and ideological control system within the PLA.

Second, modernization required the reform of military organization, doctrine, education and training, and personnel policies

to improve combat effectiveness in combined-arms warfare. Among

the organizational reforms that were undertaken were the creation

of the state Central Military Commission, the streamlining and

reduction of superfluous PLA forces, civilianization of many PLA

units, reorganization of military regions, formation of group armies,

and enactment of the new Military Service Law in 1984. Doctrine,

strategy, and tactics were revised under the rubric of "people's war under modern conditions," which envisaged a forward defense

at selected locations near China's borders, to prevent attack on

Chinese cities and industrial sites, and emphasized operations using

combined-arms tactics. Reforms in education and training emphasized improving the military skills and raising the education levels of officers and troops and conducting combined-arms operations.

New personnel policies required upgrading the quality of PLA

recruits and officer candidates, improving conditions of service,

changing promotion practices to stress professional competence,

and providing new uniforms and insignia.

The third focus of military modernization was the transformation

of the defense establishment into a system capable of independently

maintaining a modern military force. As military expenditures

remained relatively constant, reforms concentrated on reorganizing the defense research-and-development and industrial base to integrate civilian and military science and industry more closely.

Foreign technology was used selectively to upgrade weapons.

Defense industry reforms also resulted in China's entry into the

international arms market and the increased production of civilian goods by defense industries. The scope of PLA economic activities was reduced, but the military continued to participate in

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People's Liberation Army chemical-biological-radiological warfare training

Courtesy Jiefangjun Huabao

A unit of the People's Liberation Army armored force Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

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National Defense

infrastructure development projects and initiated a program to pro- vide demobilized soldiers with skills useful in the civilian economy.

Civil-Military Relations

Lines between civilian and military leadership and institutions

in China are indistinct. All high-ranking military leaders have highlevel party positions, and many high-ranking party officials have some military experience. When military leaders participate in national policy making, therefore, it is not clear whether their

positions reflect PLA corporate interests or the interests of groups

that cut across institutional lines. In general, in times where there was national leadership consensus on national policy, such as in

the 1950s, the PLA was politically quiescent. Once the PLA was drawn into civilian politics during the Cultural Revolution, the mili- tary became divided along the lines of civilian factions. As long

as the national leadership remained divided on a number of policy

issues, the PLA, fearing factional struggles and political instability, was reluctant to leave the political scene. When Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated in 1977, however, the stage was set for the withdrawal of the military from politics and a partial return to the PLA's

previous political passivity.

Political Role of the People's Liberation Army

Deng Xiaoping' s efforts in the 1980s to reduce the political role of the military stemmed from his desire to reassert civilian control over the military and to promote military modernization. To accomplish his objectives, Deng revitalized the civilian party apparatus

and leadership and built a consensus on the direction of national

policy. He also established personal control over the military

through personnel changes, and he reduced the scope of the PLA's

domestic political, economic, and social roles. Finally, he strengthened party control over the military through institutional reforms

and political and ideological education. The revitalization of the

party and the establishment of a consensus on national policy

assured top military leaders of political stability and a vigorous party

capable of handling national and regional affairs without extensive military participation (see China and the Four Modernizations,

1979-82, ch. 1). Deng's personal political control was established over the military

through his assumption of the position of chairman of the party

Central Military Commission in June 1981 and through his appointment of his supporters to key positions in the party Central Military Commission, Ministry of National Defense, and the PLA's

General Staff Department, General Political Department, and

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China: A Country Study

General Logistics Department. Occasional replacement of military

region and military district commanders also strengthened Deng's

hand. Military leaders who objected to Deng's policies were replaced

with more amenable personnel.

The creation of the state Central Military Commission in 1982

aimed to further strengthen civilian control over the military by

stressing the PLA's role as defender of the state and by establishing another layer of supervision parallel to party supervision. The

civilianization of several PLA corps and internal security units

reduced the size of the PLA and the scope of its involvement in

civilian affairs. The placement of defense industries under civilian

control and the transfer or opening up of military facilities, such

as airports and ports, to civilian authorities also limited the PLA's

influence in economic and political matters. Propaganda using the

PLA as a model for society also diminished, and emphasis was

placed on the PLA's military rather than political role. Party Control

In addition to making personnel changes, Deng revitalized party

control over the PLA and diffused the military's political power

by designating provincial-level, municipal, district, and county

party committee secretaries to serve concurrently as the first politi- cal commissars of their equivalent-level units in the regional PLA.

The percentage of PLA personnel permitted to join the party was

limited by restricting party membership to military academy graduates. Political and ideological training stressed the military rather

than the social, ideological, or economic role of the PLA. Special

effort was made to discredit the PLA's role in the Cultural Revolution; the PLA's support for the left was described as incorrect

because it caused factionalism within the military. While emphasizing the necessity and appropriateness of reforms to modernize the

military, political education also sought to guarantee military support for Deng's reform agenda. Beginning in 1983 a rectification

campaign (part of the party-wide rectification campaign aimed

primarily at leftists) reinforced this kind of political and ideological training (see The First Wave of Reform, 1979-84, ch. 11).

Beginning in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping succeeded in decreasing military participation in national-level political bodies. Military representation on the Political Bureau fell from 52 percent in 1978 to 30 percent in 1982, and military membership in the party

Central Committee declined from 30 percent in 1978 to 22 per- cent in 1982. Most professional military officers shared common

views with the Deng leadership over military modernization and

the fundamental direction of national policy, and they willingly

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limited their concerns to military matters. Nonetheless, some ele- ments in the PLA continued to voice their opinions on nondefense

matters and criticized the Deng reform program. Dissent centered on prestigious military leaders, notably Ye Jianying, who feared

that ideological de-Maoification, cultural liberalization, and cer- tain agricultural and industrial reforms deviated from Marxist

values and ideals. The Deng leadership contained these criticisms

with the help of the personnel changes, political education, and

the rectification campaign just mentioned. In this way it was able

to keep military dissent within bounds that did not adversely affect civil-military relations.

Popular Attitudes Toward the People's Liberation Army

Starting in the late 1970s, popular attitudes toward the PLA also underwent considerable changes. In the 1950s and 1960s, the military's prestige was very high because of its wartime exploits, because

it was held up as a role model for society, and because of its participation in civilian construction projects. But the power gained

by the PLA during the Cultural Revolution reawakened civilian

resentment of military privileges and abuses of power. By the early

1980s, with the circumscription of the PLA's domestic role and

the implementation of agricultural reforms offering greater opportunities for rural youth, the PLA's reputation as a prestigious, elite, Marxist-model organization and a promising channel for social

mobility was severely tarnished. Society's perception of the military appeared to be returning to the traditional viewpoint that "one

doesn't make nails out of good iron; one doesn't make soldiers out

of good men." To restore this damaged image in the late 1980s,

the media extolled the PLA's martial virtues and the great strides

made in military modernization in recent years. Military Organization

By 1987 changes in military organization indicated the importance Chinese leaders attached to structural reform in building mili- tary forces capable of waging modern, combined-arms warfare.

These reforms included the creation of the state Central Military

Commission parallel to the party Central Military Commission,

reduction in force, reorganization of military regions, formation

of group armies, enactment of the new Military Service Law, and

reorganization of defense industries. State and Party Central Military Commissions

At the apex of Chinese military organization stood two bodies

the state and party Central Military Commissions (see fig. 22).

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China: A Country Study

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE

NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

NATIONAL DEFENSE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND

INDUSTRY COMMISSION

CENTRAL MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE

CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

(STATE COUNCIL) PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

GENERAL

LOGISTICS DEPARTMENT

GENERAL

STAFF DEPARTMENT

GENERAL

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT SERVICE ARMS

STRATEGIC

MISSILE FORCE

MILITARY

EAST SEA

FLEET NORTH SEAFLEET SOUTH

SEA

FLEET

GUANGZHOU

GUI2HOU SICHUAN

XIZANG YUNNAN

HEBEI

NEI MONGGOL

SHANXI

HENAN SHANDONG

MILITARY DISTRICTS GUANGDONG

GUANGXI

HAINAN

HUBEI HUNAN

ANHUI

FUJIAN JIANGSU

JIANGXI ZHEJIANG GANSU

NINGXIA QINGHAI SHAANXI

XINJIANG

HEILONGJIANG

JILIN LIAONING

COORDINATION

Figure 22. Organization of Military Establishment, 1987

The 1982 state Constitution created the state Central Military Commission as the state organ subordinate to the National People's

Congress responsible for "directing the country's armed forces"

(see Central Military Commission, ch. 10). The state Central Military Commission was the state's decision-making body in military

affairs and directed and commanded the armed forces. The state Central Military Commission consisted of the chairman, who was

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National Defense

commander in chief of the armed forces, an executive vice chairman, two vice chairmen, and four other members.

The party Central Military Commission, elected by the party

Central Committee, exercised de facto, authoritative policy-making

and operational control over the military. In addition to the chairman, the party Central Military Commission in 1987 included a permanent vice chairman who was concurrently secretary general,

two vice chairmen, and four deputy secretaries general. The leadership of the state and party Central Military Commissions was identical, but the membership of the party Central Military Commission

below the top leadership was thought to include regional commanders and service chiefs. Because the PLA has been under party

control since its inception, the leadership of the party over the

military did not change with the establishment of the state Central

Military Commission. Although parallel leadership blurred the dis- tinction between the two groups, the party Central Military Commission retained its traditional, preeminent position in charge of

military affairs. Ministry of National Defense and National Defense Science,

Technology, and Industry Commission

Beneath the two Central Military Commissions were the Ministry

of National Defense and the National Defense Science, Technology,

and Industry Commission (NDSTIC), which separately took orders

from the two Central Military Commissions but had no operational

control over the PLA. The Ministry of National Defense was

responsible for military modernization and provided administrative support for the PLA. It was responsible for planning, manpower, budget, foreign liaison, and training materials, but it possessed no policy-making or implementation authority. The

NDSTIC—formed in August 1982 by merging the National

Defense Science and Technology Commission, National Defense

Industries Office, and Office of the Science, Technology, and

Armaments Commission of the party Central Military Commission—was responsible for military research and development,

weapons procurement, and coordination of the defense and civilian economic sectors (see Defense Industry and the Economic Role of

the People's Liberation Army, this ch.).

Operational Control

In 1987 operational control of the PLA ran from the two Central Military Commissions to the PLA's three general departments:

General Staff Department, General Political Department, and

General Logistics Department. Below the department level ran

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China: A Country Study

parallel chains of command for operational, political, and logisti- cal matters, each with its own separate communications facilities. Military policy originated in the party Political Bureau or the party

Central Military Commission, became an operational order at the

General Staff Department level, flowed through the military regions,

and arrived at a main-force unit. Orders to regional forces also passed through the military district (provincial) level. General Staff Department

The General Staff Department carried out staff and operational

functions for the PLA and had major responsibility for implementing military modernization plans. Headed by the chief of general

staff, the department served as the headquarters for the ground

forces and contained headquarters for the three other armed ser- vices: Air Force, Navy, and Strategic Missile Force. The General

Staff Department included functionally organized subdepartments

for artillery, armored units, engineering, operations, training, intel- ligence, mobilization, surveying, communications, quartermaster

services, and politics. Navy Headquarters controlled the North Sea

Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet. Air Force Headquarters generally exercised control through the commanders of the seven military regions. Nuclear forces were directly subordinate

to the General Staff Department. Conventional main, regional,

and militia units were controlled administratively by the military

region commanders, but the General Staff Department in Beijing

could assume direct operational control of any main-force unit at

will. Thus, broadly speaking, the General Staff Department exercised operational control of the main forces, and the military region

commanders controlled the regional forces and, indirectly, the

militia. General Political Department

The General Political Department was responsible for ideological indoctrination, political loyalty, morale, personnel records, cul- tural activities, discipline, and military justice, and it provided the

party structure for the PLA. It also publishedJiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), the PLA's influential newspaper. The General

Political Department director was at the head of a system of politi- cal commissars assigned to each echelon in the PLA. One of the

primary tasks of the political commissar was the supervision of the

party organization through party committees at the battalion level and above or through party branches in companies. Virtually all high-ranking officers in the military were party members. Until

the early 1980s, when party membership in the PLA was restricted,

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National Defense

an effort was made to have a party or Communist Youth League

member in every unit down to the smallest maneuver element.

Political commissars were equal in rank and authority to the com- mander of their echelon in peacetime but theoretically deferred to the commander during war. Commissars assumed many timeconsuming chores, such as personnel problems, relations with

civilians, and troop entertainment.

General Logistics Department

The General Logistics Department, headed by a director, was

responsible for production, supply, transportation, housing, pay,

and medical services. Historically, much of this support came from

the civilian populace, and before the establishment of the General

Logistics Department it was organized most often by commissars.

PLA logistical resources in 1980 were far fewer than those of

Western or Soviet forces; in the event of war the Chinese military

would be heavily dependent upon the militia and civilians. In 1985

the General Logistics Department was reorganized, its staff cut by

50 percent, and some of its facilities turned over to the civilian

sector. Streamlining and Reduction in Force

Efforts began in the 1980s to streamline the PLA and organize

it into a modern fighting force. The first step in reducing the

4.5-million-member PLA in the early 1980s was to relieve the PLA

of some of its nonmilitary duties. The Railway Engineering Corps

and the Capital Construction Engineering Corps were civilianized,

and in 1983 the PLA internal security and border patrol units were

transferred to the People's Armed Police Force. In 1985 China reorganized its 11 military regions into 7 and

began a 2-year program to reduce the force by 1 million. Eight

military regions were merged into four—Chengdu, Jinan, Lanzhou,

and Nanjing—and three key regions—Beijing, Guangzhou, and

Shenyang—remained intact (see fig. 23). The PLA accomplished

its 1 -million-troop cut by streamlining the headquarters staffs of

the three general departments, the military regions, and the military districts; reducing the size of the Air Force and the Navy; retir- ing older, undereducated, or incompetent officers; and transferring

county- and city-level people's armed forces departments, which

controlled the militia, to local civil authorities.

The PLA also reorganized its field armies (main-force armies)

into group armies to increase its capability to wage combined-arms

warfare. Breaking with the previously triangular organization of

military units, the group armies combined formerly independent

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China: A Country Study

arms or services into a comprehensive combat unit. Group armies

consisted of infantry and mechanized infantry divisions, tank

divisions or brigades, and a number of artillery, antichemical, air defense, engineer, signal, reconnaissance, electronic countermeasure, and logistics troops. In the late 1980s, some group armies

also had helicopter, air support, or naval units. In 1987 PLA strength was about 3 million. Ground forces numbered about 2.1 million—the world's largest standing army; the

Navy about 350,000 —including those assigned to Naval Aviation,

Coastal Defense Forces, and Marine Corps; the Air Force about

390,000; and the Strategic Missile Force about 100,000. The PLA

was supported by an estimated 4.3 million basic (armed and trained)

militia and 6 million ordinary (poorly armed and trained) militia. According to the 1984 Military Service Law, the militia, which was being combined with a newly developed reserve system, and

the People's Armed Police Force also formed part of the Chinese

armed forces (see Paramilitary Forces, this ch.). In 1986 reserve

forces were included officially in the organizational system.

Doctrine, Strategy, and Tactics

From the early 1950s until the mid-1970s, people's war remained

China's military doctrine. The PLA's force structure, however,

which came to include nuclear weapons as well as artillery, combat aircraft, and tanks, did not reflect the concept of people's war.

In the late 1970s, Chinese military leaders began to modify PLA

doctrine, strategy, and tactics under the rubric of "people's war

under modern conditions." This updated version of people's war

lacked a systematic definition, but it permitted Chinese military

leaders to pay tribute to Mao's military and revolutionary legacy

while adapting military strategy and tactics to the needs of modern

conventional and nuclear warfare. Elaborating on Mao's concept

of active defense—tactically offensive action with a defensive

strategy—Chinese strategy was designed to defeat a Soviet invasion before it could penetrate deeply into China. Chinese strategists

envisaged a forward defense, that is, near the border, to prevent

attack on Chinese cities and industrial facilities, particularly in north

and northeast China. Such a defense-in-depth would require more

positional warfare, much closer to the border, in the initial stages

of a conflict. This strategy downplayed the people's war strategy

of "luring in deep" in a protracted war, and it took into account

the adaptations in strategy and tactics necessitated by technological advances in weaponry. The PLA emphasized military operations using modernized, combined arms tactics for the dual purpose

of making the most effective use of current force structure and

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National Defense

Source: Based on U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, China: Military Regions, 1986.

Figure 23. Military Regions and Fleet Commands, 1986

of preparing the armed forces for more advanced weaponry in the

future.

The doctrine of "people's war under modern conditions" also incorporated the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

China's own nuclear forces, which developed a second-strike capability in the early 1980s, provided Beijing with a credible, if minimum, deterrent against Soviet or United States nuclear attack. China repeatedly has vowed never to use nuclear weapons first, but it has promised retaliation against a nuclear attack. Chinese

strategists also evinced an interest in tactical nuclear weapons, and

the PLA has simulated battlefield use of such weapons in offensive and defensive exercises.

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China: A Country Study

Education and Training

Reforms in training and education constituted an important part

of the military modernization program in the 1980s. Senior offi- cials recognized that improving the military skills and raising the

education levels of both officers and troops were necessary prerequisites for the utilization of more advanced weaponry and the

conduct of combined-arms operations. The PLA leadership focused

education reforms on the military academy system and altered train- ing to emphasize the officer corps, mechanized warfare, and combined arms operations.

Revitalization of the Military Academy System

Beginning in 1978, the PLA began to revive the military academy

system, which the Cultural Revolution had devastated. By 1984

the system had over 100 institutions and consisted of 2 kinds of

schools: command schools and specialized technical training centers. The PLA increased funding for military education, incorporated

the study of foreign military experiences into the curriculum, and

expanded contacts with foreign military academies. The rejuvenation of the military academies highlighted the emphasis placed on officer training. The PLA stipulated that most new officers should be military academy graduates, set minimum education levels for all officers, and established special classes to help officers meet those standards. Education and military-academy training

thus became criteria for promotion, in addition to seniority, per- formance, and experience.

In 1986 the PLA introduced three measures that further strengthened the military academy system. First, at the top level the PLA's

Military Academy, Political Academy, and Logistics Academy

merged to form the National Defense University, China's senior

military training and research institution. Second, a new, threelevel training system for command officers was announced, whereby

command officers would receive regular training at junior, middle, and higher military command academies. Third, noncommissioned officer (NCO) training entered the military academy system

with the establishment of a naval academy for petty officers and

an air force NCO academy and the creation of NCO classes in over forty ground force academies.

Training Reforms

Before the military modernization program began, PLA training was highly politicized and emphasized single-unit infantry troop

training. Training reforms started with the depoliticization of

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training, whereby troops spent 80 percent of their time on military activities and 20 percent on political training. The scope of

training then changed to concentrate on training officers capable

of directing combined-arms warfare. Improved military education

in the rejuvenated military academies provided some of this officer training. In addition, large-scale combined-arms exercises, which

served to raise officer capabilities in commanding and coordinating combined-arms operations under combat conditions, occurred on a regular basis. These exercises stressed defense against attacking tanks, paratroopers, and aircraft and on occasion involved the

simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons. The PLA also began

using simulation equipment in training and in 1985 held its first completely simulated combat exercise. In 1986 the PLA training

system underwent further reforms that complemented changes in military organization. A combined-arms tactical training center was

created for training the newly formed group armies (former field armies) on a rotational basis. The training center coordinated group

army exercises and utilized laser devices and simulation equipment

in its training. The PLA also established a systematic training program for new recruits, replacing the old system in which inductees

received basic training in their units. Under the new system, before

new recruits were assigned to PLA units, they completed four

months of training by a training regiment attached to a group army.

The training regiments also trained squad leaders.

Personnel

Defense modernization brought changes to military personnel

policies and practices. Personnel reforms emphasized upgrading

the quality of recruits, improving conditions of service, altering

promotion practices to stress professional competence over seniority or political loyalty, and providing new uniforms and insignia. The

1984 Military Service Law codified some of the changes in per- sonnel policies and set the stage for further changes, such as the

restoration of ranks.

Recruitment

The Military Service Law provided the legal basis for conscription, and it combined compulsory and voluntary service. All citizens between eighteen and twenty-two, regardless of sex, nationality,

profession, family background, religion, or level of education, were

obliged to perform military service. Almost 10 million men reached

conscription age each year, but the PLA chose less than 10 per- cent of those eligible. A very small number of women were inducted

annually. In the 1980s the PLA attempted to upgrade the quality

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China: A Country Study

of its inductees by changing recruiting practices. The PLA previously drew its recruits from rural youth of politically acceptable

families. But the Military Service Law, the introduction of rural

reforms offering greater economic opportunities for rural youth,

and the PLA's requirements for higher educational levels caused

recruitment to draw more recruits from better educated urban

youth. Officers were drawn from military academy graduates;

enlisted men and women who completed officer training in offi- cially designated institutions and passed officer fitness tests; graduates of universities and special technical secondary schools; and

civilian cadres and technical personnel recruited by nonmilitary

units in the PLA. As a result of the new conscription and officer

recruitment practices, the level of education in the PLA was much

higher than that of the general population. In 1987 approximately 100,000 women served in the PLA and

represented one-tenth of the officer corps and one-quarter of the

specialized technicians. Women served primarily in scientific research, communications, medical, and cultural units. Members

of China's ethnic minorities also served in the PLA, but their per- centage within the military was probably considerably lower than

their proportion in the general population, partly because of their

lower level of education and partly because of government and party

suspicion of their loyalties.

Conditions of Service

The Military Service Law stipulated changes in conditions of

service. Compulsory terms of service were three years for the ground

forces and four for the Air Force and Navy. Soldiers could elect another term of one or two years in the ground forces and one year

in the Navy and Air Force. After completing five years of compulsory service, a soldier could switch to voluntary service and could

serve an eight- to twelve-year term until the age of thirty-five. The

conscription law also made provisions for limited preferential treat- ment of service personnel and their families. However, military

service was regarded by some as a hardship because of low pay,

poor food, lowered marriage prospects, and difficulties in finding

jobs after demobilization. To alleviate the unattractive aspects of

military service and to help local economic development, the PLA

instituted a program of dual-use training, whereby soldiers learned

skills useful in civilian life in addition to military training (see

Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the People's Liberation Army, this ch.).

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Promotion

In the late 1970s, the PLA began altering its promotion practices to reflect the new emphasis on professional competence. Previously, there had been no retirement system in effect, and junior

and field-grade officers had remained at their posts for many years

with little opportunity for advancement. When promotion occurred,

it was based on seniority, political rectitude, or a patron-client rela- tionship. Officers advanced up a single chain of command, remaining in the same branch or service for life. In 1978 the PLA

reinstituted the retirement system established by the 1955 Military Service Law and promulgated officer service regulations, which

set retirement ages for military officers. Thus the PLA began a two-pronged effort to retire older officers and to promote younger, better educated, professionally competent officers. Older

officers, including many over seventy years of age, were offered

generous retirement packages as inducements to retire. The PLA

also formulated new promotion standards that set minimum education levels for officers and emphasized education in military academies as a criterion for promotion. Officers below the age of forty

had to acquire a secondary-school education by 1990 or face

demotion. Furthermore, past promotion practices were to be dis- carded in favor of greater emphasis on formal training, higher education levels, and selection of more officers from technical and

noncombat units. With the reduction in force begun in 1985, professional competence, education, and age became criteria for demobilization as well as promotion. By 1987 the PLA's promotion practices were based more on merit than they had been a decade earlier; nevertheless, political rectitude and guanxi (personal connections)

continued to play an important role in promotion, and no centralized personnel system had been established.

Ranks, Uniforms, and Insignia

The 1984 Military Service Law also stipulated that military ranks

would be reintroduced to the PLA. Military leaders justified the

restoration of ranks as improving organization, discipline, and

morale and facilitating coordinated operations among different arms and services, thus serving to modernize and regularize the military. The PLA's experience in the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese border

war, in which the absence of ranks led to confusion on the battlefield, was another factor leading to the restoration of ranks.

However, the rank system was not immediately implemented

because "preparatory work" still needed to be done. Implementation was delayed by disputes in higher echelons in the PLA over

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China: A Country Study

who would receive what rank and by the long process of reducing

the size of the military. In mid- 1987 the PLA still had not restored

its system of ranks. The ranks for officers reportedly were to be

based on the 1955 rank system, which included one supreme marshal and ten marshals at the very top. Ground force and Air Force

ranks were to be senior general, general, lieutenant general, major

general, senior colonel, colonel, lieutenant colonel, major, senior

captain, captain, first lieutenant, and second lieutenant. Naval

officer ranks were to be senior admiral, admiral, vice admiral, rear admiral, senior captain, captain, commander, lieutenant commander, senior lieutenant, junior lieutenant, and ensign.

Although the restoration of ranks was delayed, in 1985 PLA per- sonnel were issued new uniforms and service insignia. Officers at and above regimental level wore woolen and blended woolen uniforms; officers at battalion level and below and soldiers wore cot- ton uniforms. All personnel wore visored military caps, new collar insignia, and shoulder boards. The cap emblem was round with

a design of five stars and the ideographs bayi (August 1st, the

anniversary of the 1927 Nanchang Uprising) surrounded by wheat

ears and cog wheels. Uniform colors were olive green for the ground

forces; dark blue in winter, and a white jacket and dark blue trousers

in summer for the Navy; and an olive green jacket and dark blue

trousers for the Air Force. Officer jackets had epaulets and golden

buttons with the five-star and August 1st design. Collar badges were

red for the ground forces, black for the Navy, and blue for the Air

Force. Personnel of the intraservice Strategic Missile Force wore

distinctive patches but otherwise retained the uniform of their parent

service. The new uniforms replaced the baggy, green fatigue uniforms that had made it hard to distinguish between officers and

soldiers. The change in uniforms served the needs of military

modernization by raising morale, strengthening discipline, and

facilitating command and organization.

Defense Industry and the Economic Role of the People's

Liberation Army

The transformation of China's defense establishment into a sys- tem capable of independently sustaining modern armed forces was

one of the major goals of the military modernization program. In

the late 1970s and 1980s, defense spending remained relatively constant despite the shift in resources in favor of overall economic

development. Reforms focused on reorganizing the defense

research-and-development and industrial base, more closely inte- grating civilian and military science and industry, and selectively

utilizing foreign technology. China sold arms for hard currency

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National Defense

to provide additional funds for defense industries. The PLA con- tinued to play its role in economic development by participating

in selective construction projects, providing dual-use training, and

producing most of its food needs.

Military Expenditures

In the 1980s Chinese statistics indicated that defense spending

represented a decreasing percentage of government expenditures,

falling from 16 percent in 1980 to 8.3 percent of the state budget

in 1987. However, United States Department of Defense studies

suggested that the published budget figures understated defense

spending by about one-half. With the growth of the Chinese econ- omy under the modernization program, defense spending also represented a smaller percentage of the gross national product (GNP)

than previously. United States Central Intelligence Agency analysts

estimated that defense expenditures in 1978 absorbed 8 to 10 per- cent of GNP; in 1986 United States Department of Defense analysts

estimated that China's military expenses fell within the range of 6 to 8 percent of GNP. Comparison of indices of defense procurement

spending and industrial production from 1971 to 1983 revealed that the former increased by 15 percent, whereas the latter rose by

170 percent. These studies indicated that Chinese leaders have indeed

subordinated military modernization to economic development.

United States Department of Defense officials in 1986 estimated

Chinese defense spending by resources and force categories for the

1967 to 1983 period. Roughly 50 percent of defense expenditures were for weapons, equipment, and new facilities; 35 percent for operating costs; and 15 percent for research, development, and test- ing and evaluation. By service, these costs broke down to 25 per- cent for the ground forces; 15 percent for the Navy; 15 percent

for strategic air defenses; 5 percent for ballistic missile forces;

5 percent for tactical air forces; and about 35 percent for command,

logistics, personnel, intelligence, medical care, administration,

research, development, testing and evaluation, and other support.

Beginning in the late 1970s, China devoted more resources to its Strategic Missile Force, indicating an effort to increase its strategic

security while modernizing the economy, and to national command

and support activities, reflecting an emphasis on modernization

of the defense structure. Military Research and Development and the National Defense Science,

Technology, and Industry Commission

The NDSTIC was the coordinating body for military research

and development and industrial production. The NDSTIC reported

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China: A Country Study

to the party Central Military Commission's National Defense

Industries Committee and the State Council's Leading Group for Science and Technology. The NDSTIC supervised weapons

research and development, coordinated military production of

defense industries, and controlled funding for weapons procurement. The establishment of the NDSTIC was a reform measure

designed to break down the barriers between civilian and military

research and development and industry. Military science and

industry previously had been secretive, segregated, and privileged

sectors, having material, financial, and personnel resources superior

to those available to the civilian sector. The creation of the NDSTIC

was one measure by which Chinese leaders hoped to facilitate the

transfer of technology between the military and civilian sectors. The NDSTIC, in particular through its trading arm, China Xinshidai Corporation, coordinated procurement of foreign technology for military purposes.

Defense Industry

Beginning in 1978, Chinese leaders set out to transform the

defense industries, which had a huge excess capacity and were criti- cized for having a "golden rice bowl" (rich but always begging

for more). To utilize this excess capacity better and to break down

the barriers between military and civilian industry, the machinebuilding ministries were reorganized, and civilians were appointed

to manage them. The civilianized, renamed ministries and their

responsibilities consisted of the Ministry of Nuclear Industry

nuclear weapons; Ministry of Aeronautics—aircraft; Ministry of

Electronics Industry—electronics; Ministry of Ordnance Industry—munitions and armaments; Ministry of Astronautics—ballistic missiles and space systems; and China State Shipbuilding

Corporation—naval construction. In 1986 the Ministry of Machine

Building, which produced civilian heavy machinery and industrial

equipment, and the Ministry of Ordnance Industry were consolidated into the new State Machine-Building Industry Commission

as a way to strengthen the unified management of the national

machine-building and weapons enterprises. In 1987 little information was available about this new commission or its relationship

to the NDSTIC or to the State Economic Commission, whose

Defense Bureau coordinated the civilian production of the defense

industry. Further changes in defense industry structure occurred

in 1986 and 1987, when inland defense enterprises were either relo- cated closer to transportation links or cities, closed down, or trans- ferred to local civilian control and production.

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Weapons Production

In 1987 China adopted a new contractual system for weapons

research, development, and production. It was not clear from avail- able information how this contract system would affect the role of

the NDSTIC as the coordinating body for defense science and

industry. Previously, the NDSTIC controlled procurement funding, reviewed proposals for weapons requirements funneled through

the General Staff Department's Equipment Subdepartment, and

coordinated with defense industries to produce the needed equipment. Under the new system, the state divided defense research

and development funds into three categories: military equipment

research, basic and applied sciences research, and unidentified tech- nological services. The first type of appropriation went to military arms and services, which signed contracts with research institutes or enterprises to develop and manufacture the required weapons.

The contract system involved the PLA, which had been removed

to a large extent from such activities, in the development and manufacture of the weapons it would use. The second category of funds was devoted to basic research and applied science to help modernize the defense industry. The third category went to technological

services necessary for research programs. This reform was another measure designed to integrate military and civilian industry by placing the military production of defense industries within the framework of the planned-commodity economy. The new system further

sought to provide the military with better equipment at a minimum cost, to force the defense industry to upgrade weapons designs

and improve production, to improve the management of weapons

research and development through state application of economic

levers, to promote cooperation between research institutes and factories, and to increase the decision-making powers of the enterprises.

Procurement of weapons and equipment represented 45 percent

of the defense budget during the 1967 to 1983 period. This figure

included 25 percent for aircraft, 15 percent for ground forces

weapons, and about 10 percent each for naval and missile systems.

China's military-industrial complex, the third largest in the world,

produced a wide variety of weapons, including light arms and

ammunition, armor, artillery, combat aircraft, fast-attack craft,

frigates, destroyers, conventional and nuclear submarines, elec- tronic equipment, tactical missiles, and ballistic missiles. With the

notable exception of China's indigenously produced nuclear submarines, nuclear missiles, and satellites, most Chinese weaponry

was based on Soviet designs of the 1950s and 1960s. Much of this equipment was obsolete or obsolescent, and beginning in the late

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China: A Country Study

1970s China made great efforts to upgrade the equipment by changing indigenous designs or by incorporating Western technology.

The greatest weaknesses were in conventional arms, precisionguided munitions, electronic warfare, and command, control, communications, and intelligence. China attempted to address these

weaknesses by focusing military research on electronics—essential

to progress in the previously mentioned areas—and by selectively

importing key systems or technologies.

The Role of Foreign Military Technology

Following the withdrawal of Soviet aid and advisers in 1960,

which crippled the defense industry and weapons production for several years, China stressed self-reliance in developing its own

weaponry. The acquisition of foreign military technology became

a contentious issue at times, particularly in the 1970s, when Maoists

stressed complete self-reliance and more moderate leaders wished

to import some foreign technology. The signing of an agreement

to coproduce Rolls Royce Spey engines in 1975 signaled the reso- lution of that debate in favor of selective importation. Beginning

in 1977, Chinese military delegations traveled abroad, particularly

to Western Europe and, in the 1980s, to the United States, to visit Western defense manufacturers and to inspect the state of the art in military equipment. Chinese representatives showed great interest in a wide variety of weapons systems, but they made few purchases

of complete weapons systems, concentrating instead on acquisition

of selective components, equipment, or technologies and on con- cluding coproduction agreements.

China's selective approach to acquiring foreign military technology stemmed from the limited funds available for military modernization and the desire of Chinese leaders to avoid dependence on any one supplier. The selective approach also reflected the

knowledge that assimilation of foreign technology could present

problems because of the low level of Chinese military technology

and lack of qualified personnel. Finally, the leadership realized that

China's past emphasis on modifying foreign weapons and on reverse engineering had greatly limited China's weapons development

capacity. To overcome weapons deficiency in the short run and

achieve indigenous military research, development, and production in the long run, China's leaders combined the selective import

of weapons and technology with improved technical training of

defense personnel and development of the civilian economy.

China primarily was interested in obtaining defensive weapons

from abroad to correct the PLA's most critical weaknesses. These

weapons and equipment included antitank and antiaircraft missiles,

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armor-piercing ammunition, helicopters, trucks, jeeps, automobiles, and tank fire-control systems, engines, and turrets for the

ground forces; antiship missiles, air defense systems, antisubmarine

warfare systems, and electronic countermeasures systems for the

Navy; and avionics, including fire control and navigation systems,

for the Air Force. Observers opined that the entire military needed

improved command, control, communications, and intelligence

equipment and computers for command and logistics.

Arms Sales

China's entrance into the international arms market in the 1980s was closely related to reforms in the defense industry and the leadership's desire to acquire the foreign technology needed to modernize PLA weaponry. Before 1980 China provided arms to friendly

Third World countries at concessionary prices (see Relations with

the Third World, ch. 12). Because China transferred arms based on ideological and foreign policy considerations, terms were generous. Around 1980 China decided to sell weapons for profit to absorb

excess capacity in the defense industry, make defense enterprises more economically viable, and earn the foreign currency required

to purchase foreign military technology. China continued to sell military hardware at generous terms to some of its traditional friends

and weapons customers, such as Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), Egypt, Sudan, and

Somalia. Hard-currency sales to Middle Eastern countries, however, particularly Iran and Iraq, accounted for the rapid increase

in Chinese weapons sales in the 1980s. United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency studies indicated that from 1979 to 1983 Chinese arms sales ranked eighth in the world, for a total of about US$3.5 billion, of which an estimated US$2. 1 billion went

to Middle Eastern countries. In 1979 arms sales accounted for 0.9 percent of total exports; in 1983 arms sales rose to 6.3 percent

of total exports. By 1987 China had jumped to fifth place, ranking

behind the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, and France.

In the 1980s the defense industry and the PLA established a number of trading corporations to sell Chinese military hardware and

to acquire foreign technology. The most prominent of these corporations were the China Xinshidai Corporation, affiliated with the

NDSTIC; China Northern Industrial Corporation (commonly

known as NORINCO), affiliated with the State Machine-Building

Industry Commission; China National Aero-Technology Import and

Export Corporation (CATIC), affiliated with the Ministry of Aeronautics; Great Wall Industrial Corporation and China Precision

Machinery Import and Export Corporation, both affiliated with the

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China: A Country Study

Ministry of Astronautics; China Electronics Import and Export

Corporation, affiliated with the Ministry of Electronics Industry;

China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation, affiliated with the China

State Shipbuilding Corporation; and China Xinxing Corporation,

affiliated with the PLA General Logistics Department. In 1984 these

corporations began promoting Chinese weapons, actively seeking

technology transfer and coproduction agreements with Western

defense companies at international defense exhibitions in 1984.

Civilian Production

In late 1978 China initiated a policy of integrating civilian and

military industry more closely in order to promote overall civilian

economic development. This policy entailed civilianizing the

machine-building ministries to make the defense industry more

responsive to civilian control and needs; increasing defense industry production of civilian goods, particularly consumer goods; and

transferring technology from the more advanced defense sector to the civilian sector of the economy. Production of civilian goods

totaled 6.9 percent of total defense industry output in 1975. In 1980

it rose to 18 percent, and by 1985 it had jumped to 41.8 percent

of total output. Chinese officials predicted that by 1990 about

80 percent of defense industry output would be civilian goods. The

large excess capacity of the defense industry, resulting from declining orders from the PLA, made possible the rapid growth in civilian output. The defense industry manufactured a wide variety of goods

for civilian use, including motor vehicles, optical equipment, tele- vision sets, electrical appliances, pharmaceuticals, and medical

instruments and prostheses. Many of these products were consumer

goods in high demand. For example, in 1985 the Ministry of Ordnance Industry manufactured 500,000 motorcycles, representing

two-thirds of total motorcycle output, as well as 250,000 cameras,

450,000 bicycles, and 100,000 refrigerators.

Following the formulation of regulations and mechanisms for such transfers, defense industries began transferring technology to civilian industries on a large scale in the mid-1980s. Technology

transfers provided defense enterprises with additional, lucrative sources of income and furnished civilian enterprises with a wide

range of useful, advanced technology to modernize production. For

example, the Ministry of Astronautics disseminated aerospace tech- nology to light industry and to the petroleum, chemical engineering, machine-building, textile, communications, medical, and

electronics industries.

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Economic Roles of the People's Liberation Army

The PLA played a role in economic development practically from

its inception. Beginning in the late 1930s and early 1940s, when

the party was headquartered in Yan'an, the Red Army raised its own food. After 1949 the PLA became involved in economic reconstruction tasks—building railroads and factories, reclaiming wasteland, digging irrigation canals, establishing state farms, and

participating in disaster relief operations. The PLA accepted its role as a force in economic construction and devoted segments of

its structure, such as the Engineering Corps, Railway Engineering Corps, Capital Construction Engineering Corps, Signal Corps,

and Production and Construction Corps, to building up the national

infrastructure. However, PLA regional- and main-force units

played a much smaller role in aiding the civilian economy.

This pattern continued into the 1980s. The PLA remained self- sufficient in food, participated in selective infrastructure development projects, and aided in disaster relief. From 1981 to 1985, the

PLA contributed 110 million workdays to 44,500 construction

projects, including the diversion of river water from the Luan He

to Tianjin, construction of the Shengli oilfield in Shandong Province

and the Huolinhe open-cut coal mine in Shaanxi Province, expansion of Zhanjiang port in Guangdong Province, and afforestation

work involving the planting of 290 million trees. The PLA contributed to economic development in two additional

ways. First, in November 1984 the government decided to transfer some military facilities to civilian control or joint military-civilian use. These facilities included airfields, ports, docks, railroads, depots

and warehouses, and recreational areas. The devolution of these

facilities to civilian control helped to alleviate problems that plagued

the civilian economy. Second, beginning in the late 1970s, the PLA

operated a large-scale program of dual-use training, whereby PLA

personnel learned skills useful to the growing economy. Under this program, officers and soldiers received military training and training

in specialized skills, such as livestock breeding, cultivation, processing, construction, machine maintenance, repair of domestic appli- ances, motor vehicle repair, and driving. In 1986 the PLA trained more than 650,000 soldiers in 25,000 training courses at over 6,000

training centers. In early 1987 surveys indicated that over 70 per- cent of demobilized PLA personnel left the armed forces with skills they could use as civilians. Perception of Threat

In the late 1980s, China viewed the Soviet Union as its principal

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China: A Country Study

military opponent. Simmering border disputes with Vietnam and

India were perceived as lesser threats to security. China's burgeoning opening up policy, its claims to the Xisha (Paracel) and Nansha

(Spratly) Islands, and the presence of offshore oil deposits made

the South China Sea an area in which Beijing saw potential threats

to its interests. Finally, although it did not regard Taiwan as a mili- tary threat, China nevertheless refused to rule out the use of force

as a means of achieving reunification with Taiwan.

The Soviet Union

Despite common ideological roots, considerable Soviet assistance

in the past, and warming relations since 1982, China in 1987

regarded the Soviet Union's military strength and foreign policy

as the major threat to its security. Tensions in relations between

the two countries had begun to escalate in the mid-1950s (see SinoSoviet Relations, ch. 12). The 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the buildup of Soviet forces in the Soviet Far East

raised Chinese suspicions of Soviet intentions. Sharp border clashes

between Soviet and Chinese troops occurred in 1969, roughly a decade after relations between the two countries had begun to deteriorate and some four years after a buildup of Soviet forces

along China's northern border had begun. Particularly heated

border clashes occurred in the northeast along the Sino-Soviet

border formed by the Heilong Jiang (Amur River) and the Wusuli

Jiang (Ussuri River), on which China claimed the right to navigate

(see fig. 3). Border provocations occasionally recurred in later years—for example, in May 1978 when Soviet troops in boats and

a helicopter intruded into Chinese territory—but major armed

clashes were averted. In the late 1970s, China decried what it perceived as a Soviet

attempt to encircle it as the military buildup continued in the Soviet

Far East and the Soviet Union signed friendship treaties with Vietnam and Afghanistan. In April 1979 Beijing notified Moscow that

the thirty-year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assis- tance—under which the Soviets aided the PLA in its 1950s

modernization—would not be renewed. Negotiations on improving Sino-Soviet relations were begun in 1979, but China ended

them when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan late that year. In 1982 China and the Soviet Union resumed negotiations on nor- malizing relations. Although agreements on trade, science and tech- nology, and culture were signed, political ties remained frozen

because of Chinese insistence that the Soviet Union remove the

three obstacles to improved Sino-Soviet relations. Although Chinese

leaders publicly professed not to be concerned, the Soviet base at

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National Defense

Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, Soviet provision of MiG-23 fighters

to North Korea, and Soviet acquisition of overflight and port call- ing rights from North Korea intensified Chinese apprehension about

the Soviet threat. Soviet Communist Party General Secretary

Mikhail S. Gorbachev's 1986 offer to withdraw some troops from

Afghanistan and the Mongolian People's Republic (Mongolia) were

seen by Beijing as a cosmetic gesture that did not lessen the threat

to China.

In the mid-1980s the Soviet Union deployed about one-quarter

to one-third of its military forces in its Far Eastern theater. In 1987

Soviet nuclear forces included approximately 171 SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, which China found particularly

threatening, and 85 nuclear-capable long-range Backfire bombers.

Approximately 470,000 Soviet ground force troops in 53 divisions were stationed in the Sino-Soviet border region, including

Mongolia. Although 65 percent of these ground force divisions were

only at 20 percent of full combat strength, they were provided with

improved equipment, including T-72 tanks, and were reinforced

by 2,200 aircraft, including new generation aircraft such as the

MiG-23/27 Flogger fighter. Chinese forces on the Sino-Soviet

border were numerically superior—1.5 million troops in 68

divisions—but technologically inferior. Although the PLA units in the Shenyang and Beijing military regions were equipped with some

of the PLA's most advanced weaponry, few Chinese divisions were

mechanized. The Soviet Union held tactical and strategic nuclear

superiority and exceeded China in terms of mobility, firepower,

air power, and antiaircraft capability. Chinese leaders reportedly

did not consider a Soviet attack to be imminent or even likely in

the short term. They believed that if the Soviets did attack, it would

be a limited strike against Chinese territory in north or northeast

China, rather than a full-scale invasion (see Doctrine, Strategy,

and Tactics, this ch.).

Vietnam

China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously

in the mid-1970s (see An Overview of China's Foreign Relations,

ch. 12). After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty

of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978,

China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the

treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese

border increased in frequency and violence. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot

regime, and overran the country. In February 1979 China attacked

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China: A Country Study

along virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border in a brief, limited

campaign that involved ground forces only. In March Beijing

declared its "lesson" finished and withdrew all its troops (see

Historical Development, 1927-79, this ch.).

After the war, both China and Vietnam reorganized their border

defenses. The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s

as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships

enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and

Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots

in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters. In 1986

China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam

thirty-two divisions along their common border. Nevertheless, most

observers doubted that China would risk another war with Vietnam in the near future.

India

Beijing considered recurring Sino-Indian border clashes a potential threat to its security. Negotiations since the 1962 Sino-Indian

border war failed to resolve the conflicting border claims, and each

side improved its military and logistics capabilities in the disputed

regions. Since the war, China has continued its occupation of the

Aksai Chin area, through which it built a strategic highway link- ing Xizang and Xinjiang autonomous regions. China had a vital military interest in maintaining control over this region, whereas

India's primary interest lay in Arunachal Pradesh, its state in the

northeast bordering Xizang Autonomous Region. In 1987, although

India enjoyed air superiority, rough parity on the ground existed

between the two military forces, which had a combined total of

nearly 400,000 troops near the border. The Indian Army deployed

eleven divisions in the region, backed up by paramilitary forces,

whereas the PLA had fifteen divisions available for operations on

the border. After a 1986 border clash and India's conversion of

Arunachal Pradesh from union territory to state, tensions between

China and India escalated. Both sides moved to reinforce their capabilities in the area, but neither ruled out further negotiations of

their dispute. Most observers believe that the mountainous terrain,

high-altitude climate, and concomitant logistic difficulties made it unlikely that a protracted or large-scale conflict would erupt on

the Sino-Indian border.

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National Defense

South China Sea

The South China Sea area was strategically important to Beijing because of the discovery of offshore oil in China's 200-nauticalmile exclusive economic zone, increased foreign trade in the South

China Sea, and China's territorial claims there. The Xisha and

Nansha islands also were claimed, and some occupied, by Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia. Beijing's claims to these island groups predated all others except those by the Guomindang authorities. In 1974 the PLA Navy ousted South Viet- namese forces from the Xisha and occupied some of the islands,

which were valuable as Chinese fishing bases and guano sites. Although Chinese occupation of the Xisha effectively expanded its exclusive economic zone, the discovery of offshore oil deposits near Hainan Island intensified China's interest in both island groups.

With the expansion of Chinese foreign trade, Beijing's interest grew

in maintaining a naval presence in the Xisha Islands, which sit astride the strategic Hong Kong-Singapore shipping route. Chinese

fishermen also used the Nansha Islands, but most of these were

occupied by Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. In the 1980s

the PLA Navy built up the South Sea Fleet, strengthened its naval

facilities and deployments in the Xisha Islands, and conducted naval

exercises in the South China Sea. To strengthen its military position in the Xisha Islands and protect itself against the Soviet base

at Cam Ranh Bay, Beijing also reinforced its claim to the Nansha

Islands.

Taiwan

Taiwan does not pose a military threat to China, despite Taipei's

vow to "recover the mainland." Tensions in the Taiwan Strait

decreased beginning in the late 1970s, when China called for peaceful reunification with Taiwan and reduction of PLA forces in Fujian

Province opposite Taiwan. Nevertheless, Beijing refused to rule

out the use of force against Taiwan in the event that Taiwan had

serious internal disturbances or declared independence. In the late 1980s, a Chinese attack against Taiwan was considered unlikely

by most observers. The Navy lacked the amphibious forces necessary to mount a full-scale invasion. The Navy had the capability

to mount a blockade of Taiwan, but this measure also was considered unlikely.

Foreign Military Cooperation

In the 1950s China limited its military cooperation almost entirely

to communist nations and to insurgent movements in Southeast

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China: A Country Study

Asia. The Soviet Union provided China with substantial assistance,

and with advice in modernizing the PLA and developing China's

defense industry (see Military Modernization in the 1950s and

1960s, this ch.). China provided North Korea with arms and

assistance, and the PLA and the Korean People's Army developed

close ties because of their association in the Korean War. In 1961

China and North Korea signed a mutual defense agreement, and

Chinese-North Korean military cooperation continued in the late 1980s. China also provided weapons and military and economic

assistance to Vietnam, which ended in 1978 when relations between

the two countries soured. In the 1950s and 1960s, China provided

weapons to communist insurgent groups in Laos, Cambodia,

Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. In the 1960s and 1970s, China began developing military ties with Third World nations in Asia and Africa, while maintaining

or promoting cooperation with North Korea, the Democratic

Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), and Albania. Chinese mili- tary cooperation with North Korea and North Vietnam stemmed

from security considerations. Chinese military assistance to Third

World countries arose from attempts to extend Chinese influence

and counteract Soviet and United States influence. China became

increasingly anti-Soviet in the 1970s. In the 1980s China developed

close military ties and provided considerable military assistance to Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka in South Asia; Egypt in the

Middle East; and Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Zaire, and Zambia

in Africa. In the late 1970s, the scope and tenor of foreign military cooperation changed with the shift to commercial arms sales, attempts to gain some influence in Eastern Europe, and improvement in rela- tions with the United States and Western Europe. Chinese military assistance to communist insurgents, especially in Southeast

Asia, tapered off. Nevertheless, China continued to provide weapons both to the Khmer Rouge and to noncommunist Cambodian

resistance groups, and it developed close relations with and sold

weapons to Thailand. Traditionally friendly states in South Asia

continued to have close military ties with China and to purchase

Chinese military hardware under generous terms. ChineseAlbanian relations deteriorated in the 1970s, and Beijing terminated all assistance in 1978. But at the same time, China began

to exchange military delegations with two other East European

countries—Yugoslavia and Romania. Chinese military relations

with these two countries were limited and, especially in the case of Romania (a Warsaw Pact member), served to irritate the Soviet

Union.

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The Chinese Navy's Huangfeng class fast-attack craft Courtesy Conmilit

A major change in foreign military cooperation occurred when

China began developing military contacts with West European

nations and the United States in the late 1970s and the 1980s. This

change reflected China's desire to counter Soviet influence, especially in Europe, as well as to develop relations with modern armed

forces. China needed advanced hardware and technology and

organizational, training, personnel, logistics, and doctrinal concepts for modernizing the PLA. Chinese military ties with West

European countries were strongest with Britain, France, and Italy.

Chinese military relations with the United States developed rapidly

in the 1980s and included exchanges of high-level military officials and working-level delegations in training, logistics, and education.

The United States sold some weapons to China for defensive purposes, but China was unlikely to purchase large amounts of American arms because of financial and political constraints (see

Sino-American Relations, ch. 12).

Beginning in 1979, when China introduced its policy of opening up to the outside world, military exchanges with foreign countries grew substantially (see Historical Legacy and Worldview,

ch. 12). The PLA hosted 500 military delegations from 1979 to 1987 and sent thousands of military officials abroad for visits, study,

and lectures. China received port calls from thirty-three foreign

warships, including United States, British, French, and Australian

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China: A Country Study

ships, and it sent two naval ships to visit Pakistan, Bangladesh,

and Sri Lanka in 1985. PLA departments, academies, and research

institutes opened their doors to foreign military visitors. In 1987

China had ties with eighty-five foreign armies, posted Chinese mili- tary attaches in sixty countries, and hosted forty military attaches

in Beijing.

Force Structure

Ground Forces

The PLA ground forces consisted of conventionally armed main

and regional units and in 1987 made up over 70 percent of the

PLA. It provided a good conventional defense but had only limited

offensive potential and was poorly equipped for nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare. Main forces included about 35 group

armies, comprising 118 infantry divisions, 13 armored divisions,

and 33 artillery and antiaircraft artillery divisions, plus 71 independent regiments and 21 independent battalions of mostly support

troops. Regional forces consisted of 73 divisions of border defense

and garrison troops plus 140 independent regiments.

Under the old system, a field army consisted of three partially

motorized infantry divisions and two regiments of artillery and

antiaircraft artillery. Each field army division had over 12,000 per- sonnel in three infantry regiments, one artillery regiment, one armored regiment, and one antiaircraft artillery battalion. Organization was flexible, the higher echelons being free to tailor forces

for combat around any number of infantry divisions. At least theoretically, each division had its own armor and artillery—actual

equipment levels were not revealed and probably varied—and the

assets at army level and within the independent units could be

apportioned as needed.

The new, main-force group armies typically included 46,300

troops in up to four divisions, believed to include infantry, armor,

artillery, air defense, airborne, and air support elements. Although

the new group armies were supposed to reflect a move to combined- arms operations, because of a lack of mechanization they continued

to consist of infantry supported by armor, artillery, and other units. The 13 armored divisions each had 3 regiments and 240 main battle tanks but lacked adequate mechanized infantry support. There was

little evidence of the use of armored personnel carriers during the

Sino-Vietnamese border conflict in 1979, and tanks were used as mobile artillery and as support for dismounted infantry. Artillery

forces emphasized towed guns, howitzers, and truck-mounted multiple rocket launchers. In the 1980s some self-propelled artillery

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National Defense

entered service, but the PLA also produced rocket launchers as a cheaper but not totally effective alternative to self-propelled guns.

There was a variety of construction equipment, mobile bridging,

trucks, and prime movers. A new multiple rocket launcher for scat- tering antitank mines appeared in 1979, but mine-laying and mineclearing equipment remained scarce. Regional forces consisted of full-time PLA troops organized as independent divisions for garrison missions. Garrison divisions were

static, artillery-heavy units deployed along the coastline and borders

in areas of likely attack. Regional forces were armed less heavily

than their main-force counterparts, and they were involved in train- ing the militia. They were the PLA units commonly used to restore order during the Cultural Revolution.

In 1987 the PLA ground forces, which relied upon obsolescent

but serviceable equipment, were most anxious to improve defenses

against armored vehicles and aircraft. Most equipment was produced from Soviet designs of the 1950s, but weapons were being

incrementally upgraded, some with Western technology. One

example of upgraded, Soviet-design equipment was the Type 69

main battle tank, an improved version of the Type 59 main battle tank, itself based on the Soviet T-54. The Type 69 main battle tank had improved armor, a gun stabilizer, a fire control system

including a laser range finder, infrared searchlights, and a 105mm

smooth-bore gun. In 1987 the existence of a new, Type 80 main

battle tank was revealed in the Western press. The tank had a new

chassis, a 105mm gun, and a fire control system. Production of

the Type 80 tank had not yet begun. The PLA was believed to have atomic demolition munitions, and there were unconfirmed

reports that it also had tactical nuclear weapons. In any case, nuclear

bombs and missiles in the Chinese inventory could be used in a

theater role. The PLA had a scarcity of antitank guided missiles,

tactical surface-to-air missiles, and electronics to improve communications, fire control, and sensors. China began production of the

Soviet Sagger antitank missile in 1979 but lacked a more powerful, longer range, semiautomatic antitank guided missile. The PLA

required a mobile surface-to-air missile and an infantry shoulderfired missile for use against helicopters and certain other aircraft

(see Appendix C).

Air Force

The primary mission of the PLA Air Force was the defense of

the mainland, and most aircraft were assigned to this role. A smaller

number of ground attack and bomber units were assigned to inter- diction and possibly close air support, and some bomber units

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National Defense

could be used for nuclear delivery. The force had only limited mili- tary airlift and reconnaissance capabilities.

The Soviet Union helped to establish the Air Force in 1949 and

began to provide aircraft in late 1951. Production technology came

two years later. By 1956 China was assembling F-4s (copies of

MiG-15s) and eight years later was producing both the F-5

(MiG-17) and the F-6 (MiG-19) under license. Meanwhile, Soviet

instructors were training the new pilots in Soviet tactics. The withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 crippled China's aircraft industry. The

industry declined markedly through 1963, further hindered by the

high priority accorded to the competing missile and nuclear weapons

program. The aircraft industry began to recover in about 1965,

however,, when China began providing F-4s and F-5s to North

Vietnam.

Chinese pilots saw considerable action in the Korean War and,

to a lesser extent, during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958. During

the China-Vietnam border conflict of 1979, the Chinese avoided

air battles, probably at least partly because they lacked the confidence to challenge Vietnam's air force, which though far smaller was better armed and trained.

The Air Force underwent reorganization and streamlining as part of the reduction in force begun in 1985. Before the 1985 reor- ganization, the Air Force reportedly had four branches: air defense,

ground attack, bombing, and independent air regiments. In peacetime the Air Force Directorate, under the supervision of the PLA

General Staff Department, controlled the Air Force through air army headquarters located with, or in communication with, each

of the seven military region headquarters. In war, control of the

Air Force probably reverted to the regional commanders. In 1987

it was not clear how the reorganization and the incorporation of

air support elements into the group armies affected air force organization.

The largest Air Force organizational unit was the division, which

consisted of 17,000 personnel in three regiments. A typical air defense regiment had three squadrons of three flights; each flight

had three or four aircraft. The Air Force also had 220,000 air defense personnel who controlled about 100 surface-to-air missile

sites and over 16,000 antiaircraft guns. In addition, it had a large

number of early-warning, ground-control-intercept, and air-base

radars manned by specialized troops organized into at least twentytwo independent regiments.

In the 1980s the Air Force made serious efforts to raise the education level and improve the training of its pilots. Superannuated

pilots were retired or assigned to other duties. All new pilots were

584
An Air Force pilot with his F- 7/Fishbed jet fighter

Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

at least middle-school graduates. The time it took to train a qualified pilot capable of performing combat missions reportedly was

reduced from four or five years to two years. Training emphasized

raising technical and tactical skills in individual pilots and participation in combined-arms operations. Flight safety also increased. In 1987 the Air Force had serious technological deficiencies

especially when compared with its principal threat, the Soviet

Union—and had many needs that it could not satisfy. It needed more advanced aircraft, better avionics, electronic countermeasures

equipment, more powerful aircraft weaponry, a low-altitude surfaceto-air missile, and better controlled antiaircraft artillery guns. Some

progress was made in aircraft design with the incorporation of

Western avionics into the F-7 (a copy of the MiG-21) and F-8

(an indigenous model derived from various Soviet designs), the

development of refueling capabilities for the B-6D bomber and the

A-5 attack fighter, increased aircraft all-weather capabilities, and

the production of the HQ-2J high-altitude surface-to-air missile

and the C-601 air-to-ship missile.

Navy

Although naval personnel comprised only 12 percent of PLA

strength, the PLA Navy ranked in 1987 as the third largest navy

in the world. In 1987 the Navy consisted of the naval headquarters

585
China: A Country Study

in Beijing; three fleet commands—the North Sea Fleet, based at Qingdao, Shandong Province; the East Sea Fleet, based at Shanghai; and the South Sea Fleet, based at Zhanjiang, Guangdong

Province—and about 2,000 ships. The 350,000-person Navy

included Naval Air Force units of 34,000 men, the Coastal Defense

Forces of 38,000, and the Marine Corps of 56,500. Naval Headquarters, which controlled the three fleet commands, was subordinate to the PLA General Staff Department.

China's 1,500-kilometer coastline was protected by more than

100 diesel-powered Romeo- and Whiskey-class submarines, which

could remain at sea only a limited time. Inside this protective ring

and within range of shore-based aircraft were destroyers and frigates

mounting Styx antiship missiles, depth-charge projectors, and guns

up to 130mm. Any invader penetrating the destroyer and frigate

protection would be swarmed by almost 900 fast-attack craft. Stormy weather could limit the range of these small boats, however,

and curtail air support. Behind the inner ring were Coastal Defense

Force personnel operating naval shore batteries of Styx missiles

and guns, backed by ground force units deployed in depth. In 1949 Mao asserted that "to oppose imperialist aggression,

we must build a powerful navy." The Naval Academy was set up

at Dalian in March 1950, mostly with Soviet instructors. The Navy

was established in September 1950 by consolidating regional naval

forces under General Staff Department command. It then consisted

of a motley collection of ships and boats acquired from the Guomindang forces. The Naval Air Force was added two years later. By

1954 an estimated 2,500 Soviet naval advisers were in China

possibly one adviser to every thirty Chinese naval personnel—and

the Soviet Union began providing modern ships. With Soviet assis- tance, the navy reorganized in 1954 and 1955 into the North Sea

Fleet, East Sea Fleet, and South Sea Fleet, and a corps of admirals

and other naval officers was established from the ranks of the ground

forces. In shipbuilding the Soviets first assisted the Chinese, then

the Chinese copied Soviet designs without assistance, and finally

the Chinese produced vessels of their own design. Eventually Soviet

assistance progressed to the point that a joint Sino-Soviet Pacific

Ocean fleet was under discussion.

Through the upheavals of the late 1950s and 1960s the Navy

remained relatively undisturbed. Under the leadership of Minister

of National Defense Lin Biao, large investments were made in naval

construction during the frugal years immediately after the Great

Leap Forward. During the Cultural Revolution, a number of top

naval commissars and commanders were purged, and naval forces were used to suppress a revolt in Wuhan in July 1967, but the

586
National Defense

service largely avoided the turmoil. Although it paid lip service

to Mao and assigned political commissars aboard ships, the Navy

continued to train, build, and maintain the fleets. In the 1970s, when approximately 20 percent of the defense

budget was allocated to naval forces, the Navy grew dramatically.

The conventional submarine force increased from 35 to 100 boats,

the number of missile-carrying ships grew from 20 to 200, and the

production of larger surface ships, including support ships for ocean- going operations, increased. The Navy also began development

of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN) and nuclear-powered

ballistic missile submarines (SSBN).

In the 1980s the Navy was developing into a regional naval power

with some blue-water capabilities. Naval construction continued

at a level somewhat below the 1970s rate. Modernization efforts encompassed higher educational and technical standards for personnel; reformulation of the traditional coastal defense doctrine and

force structure in favor of more blue-water operations; and training in naval combined-arms operations involving submarine, surface, naval aviation, and coastal defense forces. Examples of the

expansion of China's blue-water naval capabilities were the 1980

recovery of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the

Western Pacific by a twenty-ship fleet, extended naval operations

in the South China Sea in 1984 and 1985, and the visit of two naval

ships to three South Asian nations in 1985. In 1982 the Navy con- ducted a successful test of an underwater-launched ballistic missile; in 1986 the Navy's order of battle included two Xia-class

SSBNs armed with twelve CSS-NX-4 missiles and three Han-class

SSNs armed with six SY-2 cruise missiles. The Navy also had some

success in developing a variety of ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, shoreto-ship, and air-to-ship missiles. In the late 1980s, major deficiencies reportedly remained in antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare,

naval electronics (including electronic countermeasures equipment),

and naval aviation capabilities.

Nuclear Forces

In the late 1980s, China was the world's third-largest nuclear

power, possessing a small but credible nuclear deterrent force of

225 to 300 nuclear weapons. Beginning in the late 1970s, China

deployed a full range of nuclear forces and acquired an incipient

nuclear second-strike capability. The nuclear forces were operated

by the 100,000-person Strategic Missile Force, which was controlled

directly by the General Staff Department.

China began developing nuclear weapons in the late 1950s with

substantial Soviet assistance. When Sino-Soviet relations cooled

587
China: A Country Study

in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Soviet Union withheld plans

and data for an atomic bomb, abrogated the agreement on trans- ferring defense technology, and began the withdrawal of Soviet

advisers in 1960. Despite the termination of Soviet assistance, China

committed itself to continue nuclear weapons development to break

"the superpowers' monopoly on nuclear weapons," to ensure Chinese security against the Soviet and United States threats, and

to increase Chinese prestige and power internationally.

China made remarkable progress in the 1960s in developing

nuclear weapons. In a thirty-two-month period, China successfully

exploded its first atomic bomb (October 16, 1964), launched its first nuclear missile (October 25, 1966), and detonated its first hydrogen bomb (June 14, 1967). Deployment of the Dongfeng-1

conventionally armed short-range ballistic missile and the

Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)

occurred in the 1960s. The Dongfeng-3 (CCS-2) intermediaterange ballistic missile (IRBM) was successfully tested in 1969.

Although the Cultural Revolution disrupted the strategic weapons

program less than other scientific and educational sectors in China,

there was a slowdown in succeeding years. In the 1970s the nuclear weapons program saw the development

of MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM capabilities and marked the beginning of a minimum deterrent force. China continued MRBM

deployment, began deploying the Dongfeng-3 IRBM, and successfully tested and commenced deployment of the Dongfeng-4 (CSS-3)

limited-range ICBM.

By 1980 China had overcome the slowdown in nuclear development caused by the Cultural Revolution and had some spectacular successes in its strategic weapons program. In 1980 China

successfully test launched its full-range ICBM, the Dongfeng-5

(CSS-4); the missile flew from central China to the Western Pacific,

where it was recovered by a naval task force. The Dongfeng-5 possessed the capability to hit targets in the western Soviet Union and

the United States. In 1981 China launched three satellites into space

orbit from a single booster, indicating that China might possess

the technology to develop multiple, independently targetable reentry

vehicles (MIRVs). China also launched the Xia-class SSBN in 1981,

and the next year it conducted its first successful test launch of the

CSS-NX-4 submarine-launched ballistic missile. In addition to the development of a sea-based nuclear force, China began considering the development of tactical nuclear weapons. PLA exercises featured the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons in

offensive and defensive situations beginning in 1982. Reports of

588
Surface-to-air missiles in transit Courtesy Xinhua News Agency

589
China: A Country Study

Chinese possession of tactical nuclear weapons remained unconfirmed in 1987.

In 1986 China possessed a credible minimum deterrent force with

land, sea, and air elements. Land-based forces included ICBMs,

IRBMs, and MRBMs. The sea-based strategic force consisted of

SSBNs. The Air Force's bombers were capable of delivering nuclear

bombs but would be unlikely to penetrate the sophisticated air defenses of modern military powers such as the Soviet Union.

China's nuclear forces, in combination with the PLA's conventional forces, served to deter both nuclear and conventional attack. Chinese leaders repeatedly have pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and they have accompanied the no-first-use

pledge with a promise of certain nuclear counterattack if nuclear

weapons are used against China. China envisioned retaliation

against strategic and tactical attacks and would probably strike countervalue rather than counterforce targets. The combination of

China's few nuclear weapons and technological factors such as range, accuracy, and response time might further limit the effec- tiveness of nuclear strikes against counterforce targets. China is seeking to increase the credibility of its nuclear retaliatory capability by dispersing and concealing its nuclear forces in difficult terrain, improving their mobility, and hardening its missile silos. Paramilitary Forces

Militia

The role of the militia and the degree of party and PLA control over it have varied over the years. During the 1940s the militia

served primarily as a PLA support force. After 1949 the party consolidated control over the country and gradually used the militia

to maintain order and help the PLA with defense of the borders

and coast. In the mid-1950s Minister of National Defense Peng

Dehuai attempted to build a reserve system incorporating the

militia. Peng's efforts were thwarted when the party expanded the

militia, assigning it duties as a production force and internal security force during the Great Leap Forward. Lin Biao reduced the

size of the militia and reemphasized military training in the early

1960s. The militia was fragmented during the early years of the

Cultural Revolution, but in the 1970s it was rebuilt and redirected

to support the PLA. The Gang of Four attempted to build up the

urban militia as an alternative to the PLA, but the urban militia

failed to support the Gang of Four in 1976, when Hua Guofeng

and moderate military leaders deposed them. The militia's logistical

support of the PLA was essential during the Sino-Vietnamese

590
National Defense

border war of 1979. In the 1980s Chinese leaders undertook to improve the militia's military capabilities by reducing its size and

its economic tasks. In 1987 the militia was controlled by the PLA at the military

district level and by people's armed forces departments, which

devolved to civilian control at the county and city levels as part

of the reduction in force. The militia was a smaller force than previously, consisting of 4.3 million basic or primary—armed—militia,

and the 6-million-strong general or ordinary militia. The basic

militia was comprised of men and women aged eighteen to twentyeight who had served or were expected to serve in the PLA and

who received thirty to forty days of military training per year. The

basic militia included naval militia, which operated armed fishing

trawlers and coastal defense units, as well as specialized detachments, such as air defense, artillery, communications, antichemical, reconnaissance, and engineering units, which served the PLA.

The ordinary militia included men aged eighteen to thirty-five who

met the criteria for military service; they received some basic military training but generally were unarmed. The ordinary militia

had some air defense duties and included the urban militia. Efforts were made to streamline militia organization and upgrade militia

weaponry. By 1986 militia training bases had been established in over half the counties and cities in the nation.

The militia's principal tasks in the 1980s were to assist in production, to undergo military training, and to defend China's frontiers

in peacetime. In wartime, the militia would supply reserves for mobilization, provide logistical support to the PLA, and conduct

guerrilla operations behind enemy lines. Reserve Service System

The 1984 Military Service Law stipulated the combination of

the militia and the reserve service system. Military training for senior middle-school and college and university students com- menced in 1984 as China sought to provide additional qualified

reserve-service officers. The reserve force consisted primarily of

the militia and was organized into reserve-service divisions and regiments. In 1987 China began to make reference to the National

Defense Reserve Force, which apparently consisted of reserve sol- diers (including all militia, demobilized soldiers, and specialized

technical personnel registered for reserve service) and reserve officers (including demobilized officers and soldiers assigned to reserve

officer service, college and university graduates, and civilian cadres

and specialized technicians).

591
An air-defense shelter in Beijing is turned into an

underground inn. Courtesy

China Reconstructs

Production and Construction Corps

Before the Cultural Revolution, the Production and Construction Corps was a paramilitary organization of 3 to 4 million people under joint government, party, and PLA control. The

Production and Construction Corps was used in remote and unproductive areas to build roads, reclaim land, construct defense and

water works, and operate mines, state farms, and industrial plants.

A secondary role was border defense, and some units were armed

with light infantry weapons. All received basic military training.

Unlike the militia, Production and Construction Corps personnel were full time and uniformed. The PLA took over the Production

and Construction Corps during the Cultural Revolution, then

civilianized it in the 1970s. In the 1980s the corps appeared to have

been abolished except in Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region.

There it operated under regional party and government organizations, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and Fishery.

People's Armed Police Force

The People's Armed Police Force was formed in 1983 when the

PLA transferred its internal security and border defense units to the Ministry of Public Security (see Public Security Forces, ch. 13). In wartime, the armed police, as part of China's armed forces,

592
National Defense

presumably would perform border defense and support functions

in assisting the PLA.

Accomplishments and Prospects

Beginning in the late 1970s, China's military modernization pro- gram achieved success in increasing China's status as a regional

power. The PLA disengaged itself from politics and concentrated

its attention on military tasks. Reforms in organization, doctrine,

education and training, and personnel practices brought the PLA

much closer to its objective of molding a modern combat force capable of waging combined-arms warfare. Defense science and industry

became more closely integrated with their civilian counterparts and

began producing more civilian goods in addition to modernizing

PLA weaponry with foreign technology. Nevertheless, PLA capabilities still lagged behind advanced world levels, and the presence

of potent adversaries on China's borders meant that defense modernization would be a long-term program, probably lasting well

into the next century.

Beginning in the late 1970s, the volume of information published on the Chinese military increased greatly. Ellis Joffe's The Chinese

Army After Mao provides a good introduction to military modernization and changes in the PLA in the 1980s. The role of politics

in PLA development is delineated in Harlan W. Jencks' From

Muskets to Missiles; Harvey W. Nelsen's The Chinese Military System;

and Monte R. Bullard's China's Political-Military Evolution. The

Jencks and Nelsen books also contain valuable information on PLA

organization and force structure in the early 1980s. The United

States Defense Intelligence Agency's 1984 Handbook of the Chinese

People's Liberation Army is another good source on PLA organization, equipment, and tactics. Various aspects of military reforms

in defense policy, doctrine, training and education, defense industry, weapons modernization, and force structure are dealt with in

The Chinese Defense Establishment, edited by Paul H. B. Godwin;

Chinese Defence Policy, edited by Gerald Segal and William T. Tow;

and China's Military Reforms, edited by Charles D. Lovejoy and

Bruce W. Watson. These books also deal with the international

implications of Chinese military power. China's involvement in foreign conflicts is covered in Segal's Defending China. Chinese mili- tary assistance and arms sales are treated in China and the Arms Trade

by Anne Gilks and Segal. China as a Maritime Power by David G.

593
China: A Country Study

Muller, and Eighth Voyage of the Dragon by Bruce Swanson provide

good overviews of the PLA Navy.

Articles on the Chinese military appear in the general, scholarly,

and military periodical literature. Far Eastern Economic Review and

Asiaweek offer the most articles among weekly news publications.

China Quarterly, Asian Survey, and Problems of Communism feature

occasional articles on the PLA. Useful military publications include

Jane's Defence Weekly, Asian DefenceJournal, International Defense Review

Aviation Week and Space Technology , and Flight International. (For fur- ther information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

594
Appendix A

Tabic

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Provincial-Level Units and Selected Urban Centers, Pinyin

Form and Wade-Giles Form

3 Selected Place-Names, Pinyin Form and Conventional Form

4 Climatic Statistics for Twenty Selected Stations

5 Age Structure, 1982 Census

6 Population, 1953-87. Reconstructed Data Model

7 Estimated Distribution of Population by Region, 1987

8 Cities with Populations over 1 Million, 1982

9 Size and Distribution of Minority Nationalities, 1982

10 Number of Schools and Students, Selected Years, 1957-85

1 1 Composition of Gross Value of Agricultural Output, Selected

Years, 1955-85

12 Manufactured Agricultural Inputs, Selected Years, 1955-85

13 Grain Production and Per Capita Consumption of Selected

Products, Selected Years, 1955-85

14 Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985

15 Production, Use, and Import of Major Commodities, Selected

Years, 1952-85

16 Gross Value of Industrial Output, by Region, 1952, 1957,

and 1983

17 Composition of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-85

18 Major Trading Partners, 1986

595

Appendix A

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

Millimeters 0.04 inehes Centimeters 0.39 inehes Meters 3.3 feet Kilometers 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2

) 2.47 acres Square kilometers 0.39 square miles Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet Liters 0.26 gallons Kilograms 2.2 pounds Met rie tons 0.98 long tons

' 1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

Degrees Celsius 9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

597
China: A Country Study

Table 2. Provincial-Level Units and Selected Urban Centers, Pinyin Form and Wade-Giles Form

Wadc-Gik Pimm

Provincial-Level Units Anhui An-hui

Beijing Pei-ching

Fujian Fu-chien Gansu Kan-su Guangdong Kuang-tung

Guangxi-Zhuang . . . Kuang-hsi-Chuang

Gui/.hou Kui-chou

Hcbei Ho-pei

Heilongjiang Hei-lung-chiang Henan Ho-nan

Hubei Hupci Hunan Hu-nan

Jiangsu Chiang-su

Jiangxi Chiang-hsi

Jilin Chi-lin Liaoning Liao-ning Nei Monggol Nei-meng-ku

Ningxia-Hui Ning-hsia-Hui

Qinghai Ch'ing-hai Shaanxi Shcn-hsi Shandong Shan-tung

Shanghai Shang-hai Shanxi Shan-hsi Sichuan Ssu-ch'uan

Tianjin Tien-chin

Xinjiang- Hsin-chiangUygur Wci-wu-crh Xizang Hsi-tsang Yunnan Yun-nan

Zhcjiang Chc-chiang

An-hui Anhui

Chc-chiang Zhcjiang

Chiang-hsi Jiangxi

Chiang-su Jiangsu

Chi-lin Jihn

Ch'ing-hai Qinghai

Fujian

Heilongjiang Henan

Hcbci

Xinjiang

Uvgur

Fu-chien Hci-lung-chiang Ho-nan

Ho-pci

Hsin-chiang- Wci-wu-crh . Hsi-tsang . Xizang Hu-nan Hunan

Hupci Hubci

Kan-su Gansu

Kuang-hsi- GuangxiChuang Zhuang

Kuang-tung Guangdong

Kui-chou Guizhou

Liao-ning Liaoning

Nei-mcng-ku Nei Monggol

Ning-hsia-Hui Ningxia-Hui

Pei-ching Beijing Shang-hai Shanghai

Shan-hsi Shanxi Shan-tung Shandong

Shcn-hsi Shaanxi

Ssu-ch'uan Sichuan

Tien-chin Tianjin Yun-nan Yunnan

Selected Urban Centers Changchun Ch ang-ch un Chengdu Ch'eng-tu

Chongqing Ch'ung-ch'ing

Dalian Ta-lien Guangzhou Kuang-chou

Harbin Ha-erh-pin

Lucia* Lii-Ta Nanjing Nan-ching

Qingdao Ch'ing-tao

Shenyang Shen-yang

Taiyuan T'ai-yuan

Wuhan Wu-han

Uriimqi Wu-lu-mu-ch'i

Xi'an Hsi-an Yan'an Yen-an

Ch'ang-ch'un Changchun

Ch'eng-tu Chengdu

Ch'ing-tao Qingdao

Ch'ung-ch'ing Chongqing

Ha-erh-pin Harbin

Hsi-an Xi'an Kuang-chou Guangzhou

Lii-Ta* Liida Nan-ching Nanjing

Shcn-yang Shenyang

T'ai-yuan Taiyuan

Ta-lien Dalian Wu-han Wuhan

Wu-lu-mu-ch'i .... Uriimqi Yen-an Yan'an

ula/Lii-Ta comprises the twin

ariant: Daircn).

itics of Liishun/Lu-shun (variant: Port Arthur) and Dalian/Ta-lien

Source: Based on information from United States Department of Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China: Pinyin to Wade-Giles, WadeGiles to Pinyin, Washington. July 1979.

598
Appendix A

Table 3. Selected Place-Names, Pinyin Form and Conventional Form

Pinvin*

to Conventional Form Convemiona

(o Pinvin*

Beijing Peking

Chang Jiang Yangtze River Da Hinggan Greater Khingan

Ling Range

Dongbei

Pingyuan Manchurian Plain Ergun He Argun River Gangdise Shan .... Kailas Range

Guangzhou Canton Guangxi-Zhuang Kwangsi-Chuang

Zizhiqu Autonomous

Region

Heilong Jiang Amur River Huang He Yellow River Junggar Pendi Dzungarian Basin Karakorum

Shankou Karakoram Pass Kunlun Shan Kunlun Mountains Laneang Jiang Mekong River Mu Us Shamo .... Ordos Desert Nei Monggol Inner Mongolian

Zizhiqu Autonomous

Region (Inner Mongolia

Ningxia-Hui Ninghsia-Hui

Zizhiqu Autonomous

Region

Nu Jiang Salween River Qaidam Pendi Tsaidam Basin Qingdao Tsingtao

Qinghai Hu Koko Nor

Qing-Zang

Gaoyuan Tibet, Plateau of Qin Ling Tsinling Mountains Qiongzhou

Haixia Hainan Strait Shantou Swatow

Sichuan Pendi Szcchwan Basin Songhua Hu Sungari Reservoir Songhua Jiang Sungari River Taklimakan Takla Makan

Shamo Desert Tarim He Tarim River Tarim Pendi Tarim Basin

Tianjin Tientsin Tian Shan Tien Shan Tumen Jiang Tumen River Turpan Pendi Turfan Depression Wanli Changchcng Great Wall Wusuli Jiang Ussuri River Xiamen Amoy

Amoy Xiamen

Amur River Heilong Jiang

Argun River Ergun He

Brahmaputra Yarlung Zangbo

River Ji ang Canton Guangzhou

China, People's Zhonghua Rcnmin

Republic of Gongheguo

Dzungarian Basin . . Junggar Pendi

Great' Wall Wanli Changchcng

Greater Khingan Da Hinggan

Range Ling

Hainan Strait Qiongzhou Haixa

Inner Mongolian Autonomous

Region (Inner Nei Monggol

Mongolia) Zizhiqu

Kailas Range Gangdise Shan Karakoram Pass . . . Karakorum

Shankou

Kashgar Kashi Koko Nor Qinghai Hu

Kunlun

Mountains Kunlun Shan Kwangsi-Chuang Autonomous Guangxi-Zhuang

Region Zizhiqu

Lesser Khingan Xiao Hinggan

Range Ling

Manchurian Plain . . Dongbei

Pingyuan

Mekong River Laneang Jiang

Ninghsia-Hui Autonomous Ningxia-Hui

Region Zizhiqu Ordos Desert Mu Us Shamo

Pearl River Zhu Jiang

Peking Beijing Red River Yuan Jiang Salween

River Nu Jiang

Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Xinjiang-Uygur

Region Zizhiqu

Sungari

Reservoir Songhua Hu

Sungari River Songhua Jiang Swatow Shantou Szcchwan Basin .... Sichuan Pendi Takla Makan Taklimakan

Desert Shamo

Tarim Basin Tarim Pendi

599
China: A Country Study

Table 3. —Continued.

to Conventional Form

Conventional Form to Pinyin* Xiao Hinggan Lesser Khingan

Ling Range

Xinjiang-Uygur Sinkiang Uighur

Zizhiqu Autonomous

Region

Xizang Tibetan

Zizhiqu Autonomous

Region (Tibet) Yalu Jiang Yalu River Yarlung Brahmaputra

Zangbo Jiang .... River Yuan Jiang Red River Zhonghua Renmin China, People's Gongheguo Republic of Zhu Jiang Pearl River

Tarim River Tarim He

Tibetan Autonomous Xizang

Region (Tibet) . . . Zizhiqu

Tibet, Plateau of ... Qing-Zang

Gaoyuan

Tien Shan Tian Shan

Tientsin Tianjin

Tsaidam Basin .... Qaidam Pcndi

Tsingtao Qmgdao

Tsinling Mountains Qin Ling

Tumen River Tumen Jiang Turfan

Depression Turpan Pendi

Ussuri River Wusuli Jiang Yalu River Yalu Jiang

Yangtze River Chang Jiang

Yellow River Huang He

*Including generic parts of Chinese place-names.

Source: Based on information from United States Department of Interior, Board on Geographic Names, Gazetteer of the People's Republic of China, Pinyin to Wade-Giles, WadeGiles to Pinyin, Washington, July 1979, 915-16:

600
Appendix A

s

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^5 «j £ g g g $.g * $ § * g

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oco'Xi^tcvtNKmts^oitNcn'aioor^'D'in

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id -^^NtNOi^intvrNCNCvir; CM ^ OI « CM C>

I _ _ _ _ _ ^ | III — — I CM I

- 5 J= = = * C C 3 X I X X X ^ jjtfflll

I

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601
China: A Country Study

Table 5. Age Structure, 1982 Census

Population Percentage Age-Group (in thousands)* of total* 0-4 94,704 9.43 5-9 1 10,736 1 1.03 10-14 131,811 13.13 15-19 125,366 12.49 20-24 74,363 7.41

25-29 92,564 9.22 30-34 72,958 7.27 35-39 54,222 5.40 40-44 48,438 4.82 45-49 47,403 4.72 50-54 40,816 4.07 55-59 33,894 3.38 60-64 27,362 2.73 65-69 21,260 2.12 70-74 14,348 1.43 75-79 8,617 0.86 80-84 3,705 0.37 85-89 1,088 0.11

90 and over 257 0.03 TOTAL 1,003,912 100.02

* Approximate because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)],

Beijing, March 1985, 272-81.

602
Appendix A

Table 6. Population, 1953-87. Reconstructed Data Model

Crude Crude Rale of Total Infant Birth Death Natural Fertility Mortality Midyear Rate Rale Increase Rate 1, ile- Rate

Populat n >n (per (per (per filer w ir (thousands) ( hwusand) thousand) thousand) thousand) al Buth thousand)

1 953 . 584,191 42.24 25.77 16.47 6.05 40.25 175 1954 . 594,725 43.44 24.20 19.24 6.28 42.36 164 1955 . 606,730 43.04 22.33 20.71 6.26 44.60 154 19.% . 619,136 39.89 20.1

1

19.78 5.86 46.99 143

1 957 . 633,215 43.25 18.12 25.13 6.40 49.54 132

1 958 . 646,703 37.76 20.65 17.1

1

5.68 45.82 146 1959 . 654,349 28.53 22.06 6.47 4.31 42.46 160 I960 . . . . . 650,661 26.76 44.60 -17.84 4.02 24.56 284

1961 . 644,670 22.43 23.01 -0.58 3.29 38.44 183 1962 . 653,302

' 41.02 14.02 27.00 6.03 53.00 89

1 963 . 674,249 49.79 13.81 35.98 7.51 54.91 87

1 964 . 696,065 40.29 12.45 27.84 6.18 57.08 86

1 965 . 715,546 38.98 1 1.61 27.37 6.07 57.81 84

1 966 . 735,904 39.83 11.12 28.71 6.26 58.59 83 1967 . 755,320 33.91 10.47 23.44 5.32 59.41 82

1 968 . " 776,153 40.96 10.08 30.88 6.45 60.29 81

1 969 . 798,641 36.22 9.91 26.31 5.73 60.84 76 1970 . 820,403 36.98 9.54 27.44 5.82 61.41 70

1971 . 842,456 34.87 9.24 25.63 5.45 61.98 65 1972 . 863,439 32.45 8.85 23.60 4.99 62.55 60

1973 . 883,020 29.85 8.58 21.27 4.54 62.96 56 1974 . 901,318 28.08 8.32 19.76 4.17 63.37 52 1975 . 917,899 24.79 8.07 16.72 3.58 63.79 49 1976 . 932,671 23.05 7.84 15.21 3.23 64.21 45

1977 . 946,100 21.04 7.65 13.39 2.85 64.63 41 1978 . 958,766 20.73 7.52 13.21 2.72 65.06 37 1979 . .... 971,786 21.37 7.61 13.76 2.75 64.98 39 1980 . 983,379 17.63 7.65 9.98 2.24 64.89 42

1981 . 994,905 21.04 7.73 13.31 2.69 64.80 44

1 982 . 1,008,175 21.09 7.89 13.20 2.71 64.72 46 1983 . 1,020,722 18.66 7.93 10.73 2.28 65.05 42 1984 . 1,032,814 17.52 7.79 9.73 2.11 65.46 40

1985 . 1,043,203 17.82 7.72 10.10 2.12 65.75 39 1986 . 1,053,716 17.43 7.69 9.74 2.03 65.99 38

1987 . 1,064,147 17.38 7.65 9.73 2.00 66.24 37 *Data iri this tabic may vary from offie ally reported statistics. Based on information from computer reconstruction provided by Judith Banister, China Branch, Center for International Research, U.S. Bureau of the Census, January 1987.

603
China: A Country Study

Table 7. Estimated Distribution of Population by Region, 1987

Density Population Area (people Region* (in (in square per square

Provincial -Level Unit thousands) kilometers) kilometer) Northeast Heilongjiang 33,945 460,000 74

jilin 23,230 180,000 129 Liaoning 37,203 140,000 266

North

Beijing 10,200 16,807 607 Hebei 56,364 180,000 313

Nci Monggol 20,689 1,200,000 17 Shanxi .7 26,724 150,000 178

Tianjin 8,396 11,305 743

KastAnhui 52,225 130,000 402

Fujian 27,708 120,000 231 Jiangsu 62,622 100,000 626

jiangxi 35,135 160,000 220 Shandong 78,231 150,000 521 Shanghai 12,323 6,185 1,992 Zhcjiang 40,695 100,000 407

Central-South Guangdong 63,987 210,000 305 Guangxi .' 39,928 230,000 174 Henan 78,440 160,000 490 Hubei 49,802 180,000 277 Hunan 57,229 210,000 272

Southwest Guizhou 30,102 170,000 177 Siehuan 103,201 570,000 181 Xizang 2,062 1,200,000 2 Yunnan 34,728 390,000 89

Northwest Gansu 20,875 450,000 46 Ningxia 4,266 60,000 71 Qinghai 4,237 720,000 6 Shaanxi 30,277 190,000 159 Xinjiang 14,108 1,600,000 9

* Regional divisions are tor descriptive purposes only and have no official administrative significance.

Source: Based on information from China Handbook Editorial Committee. China Handbook Series: Geography, Beijing, 1983, 131-253.

604
Appendix A

Table 8. Cities with Population over 1 Million, 1982

Total Population of Suburban

Provincial- Population City Districts Population

City Level Unit (in thousands)* (in thousands)* (in thousands)* Shanghai . . . Shanghai 6,321 6,321

Beijing . . . Beijing 5,598 2,418 3,180

Tianjin . . . Tianjin 5,143 3,943 1,999 Shenyang . . . Liaoning 4,003 2,658 1.345 Hubei 3,252 2,624 628 Guangzhou . . . . . . . Guangdong 3,148 1,943 1,205 Chongqing .... . . . Sichuan 2,634 456 2,179 Harbin . . . Heilongjiang 2,543 2,543 Chengdu . . . Sichuan 2,467 1,238 1,229 Zibo . . . Shandong 2,232 2,232 Xi'an . . . Shaanxi 2,197 1,227 969 Nanjing . . . Jiangsu 2,134 1,206 928

Liupanshui .... . . . Guizhou 2,090 2,090 Taivuan , . . Shanxi 1,775 1,240 534 Changchun .... . . . Jilin 1,757 1,307 450

Dalian . , , Liaoning 1,479 967 512 Zhengzhou .... . . . Hcnan 1,428 900 527 Kunming . . . Yunnan 1,426 581 845 Lanzhou . . . Gansu 1,416 1,183 234

Jinan . . . Shandong 1,338 876 462 Tangshan Hebei 1,338 1,338 Guivang . . . Guizhou 1,319 740 579

1,270 1,270 Zaozhuang . . .

.

-do- 1,238 1,238

. . . Jiangxi 1,225 265 960

Qiqihar . . . Heilongjiang 1 ,224 1,224 Anshan . . . Liaoning 1,214 888 326 Fushun -do- 1,193 1,050 142 Hangzhou . . . . . . . Zhejiang 1,192 1,192 Qjngdao . . . Shandong 1,174 1,174 Fuzhou . . . Fujian 1,129 787 342 Shaoxing . . . Zhejiang 1,107 134 973

Jilin . . . jilin 1,079 804 275 Changsha . . . Hunan 1,076 834 243 Baotou . . . Nci Monggol 1,070 1,070 Shijiazhuang . . Hebei 1,066 1,066

. . . Jiangxi 1,061 832 230 Huainan . . . Anhui 1,025 1,025

d.o. —ditto

* Approximate because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)],

Beijing, March 1985, 64-85.

605
China: A Country Study

Table 9. Size and Distribution of Minority Xationalities, 1982

Minority Approximate

Nationality Population Major Areas of Distribution Zhuang 13,400,000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region: Yunnan.

Guangdong. Guizhou provinces

Hui 7,200,000 Xingxia-Hui Autonomous Region: Gansu, Henan.

Qinghai, Yunnan. Hcbci. Shandong provinces; Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Uygur 6,000,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region: Hunan

Province Yi 5,500,000 Yunnan, Sichuan. Guizhou provinces: GuangxiZhuang Autonomous Region

Miao 5,000,000 Guizhou. Hunan. Yunnan. Sichuan provinces: Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region

Manchu 4,300,000 Liaoning. Heilongjiang. Jilin. Hcbci provinces; Nci Monggol Autonomous Region: Beijing Municipality Zang (Tibetan) . . . 3.800,000 Xizang Autonomous Region; Sichuan. Qinghai. Gansu provinces

Mongolian 3,400,000 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region: Liaoning

Province: Xinjiang-Uvgur Autonomous Region

Tujia 2,800.000 Hubei. Hunan. Sichuan provinces

Buyi 2,100,000 Guizhou Province Korean 1.800.000 Jihn. Heilongjiang. Liaoning provinces

Dong 1.400.000 Guizhou. Hunan provinces: Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region Yao 1.400.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region; Hunan.

Yunnan. Guangdong provinces

Bai 1,100,000 Yunnan Province Hani 1,100,000 -do- Kazak 900,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Li 890.000 Guangdong. Guizhou provinces Dai 840,000 Yunnan Province

Lisu 480,000 -do- She 370.000 Fujian. Zhejiang provinces Lahu 300,000 Yunnan Province Va 300,000 -do- Shui 290,000 Guizhou Province Dongxiang 280.000 Gansu Province: Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous

Region

Naxi 250,000 Yunnan Province Tu 160,000 Qinghai Province

Kirgiz 114.000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Qiang 100,000 Sichuan Province Daur 95,000 Xei Monggol Autonomous Region: Heilongjiang

Province Jingpo 93,000 Yunnan Province Mulao 90.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region Xibe 84.000 Liaoning Province: Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous

Region

606
Appendix A

Table 9. —Continued.

Minority Approximate

Nationality Population Major Areas of Distribution Salar 69,000 Qinghai, Gansu provinces

Bulang 58,000 Yunnan Province Gelao 54,000 Guizhou Province Maonan 38.000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region

Tajik 27,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Pumi 24,000 Yunnan Province Nu 23,000 -do- Achang 20,000 -do- Ewcnki 19,000 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region; Hcilongjiang Province Jing 13,000 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region: Guizhou,

Guangdong provinces

Bcnglong 12,000 Yunnan Province Uzbek 12,000 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Jinuo 12,000 Yunnan Province Yugur 11 ,000 Gansu Province Baoan 9,000 -do- Drung 4,600 Yunnan Province

Tartar 4,100 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Oroqcn 4,100 Nei Monggol Autonomous Region; Hcilongjiang

Province Russian 2,900 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region Gaoshan 1,700 Fujian, Guizhou provinces Hezhe 1,500 Hcilongjiang Province Moinba 1,140 Xizang Autonomous Region Lhoba 1,100 -do- Other 800,000 Guizhou, Yunnan provinces

d.o. —ditto Source: Based on information from Zhongguo 1982 Nian Renkou Pucha Ziliao (Dianzi Jisuanji Huizong) [1982 Population Census of China (Results of Computer Tabulation)],

Beijing, March 1985, 218-31.

607
China: A Country Study

Table 10. Number of Schools and Students, Selected Years, 1957-85

Kind of School 1957 1965 1975 1985 Number of schools

Institutions of higher

learning 1 229 434 387 1,016 Secondary schools Regular

Technical

Agricultural and

vocational

11,096 728

592

. . n.a.

18,102 871 394

61,626

123,505

1,326 887

n.a.

93,221 2,529

1 028

28,070

Total secondary

schools 12,474 2 80,993 125,718 104,848 Primary schools 547,306 1,681,939 1,093,317 832,309

Kindergartens 16,420 19,226 171,749 172,262

Schools for blind and

for deaf students 66 266 246 350

umber of students i

Institutions ol higher

learning 1 44.1 67.4 50.1 170.3

C 1 „„1 1„ secondary schools Regular

Technical Teacher training Agricultural and

vocational

628.1

48.2 29.6

n.a.

933.8

39.2

15.5 443.3

4,466.1 40.5

30.2

n.a.

4,706.0

101.3 55.8 229.5

Total secondary

schools 708.1 2 1,431.8 4,536.8 5,092.6 Primary schools 6,428.3 11,620.9 15,094.1 13,370.2 Kindergartens 108.8 171.3 620.0 1,479.7

Schools for blind and

for deaf students 0.8 2.3 2.7 3.8

n.a. —nol available.

1 Institutions of higher learning include colleges and universities, professional colleges, and scientific research institutions. They do not include adult education, spare-time colleges, or correspondence schools.

- Total as provided in original source.

1 Tens of thousands. Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Statistical Yearbook of

China, 1986. Oxford, New York, Tokyo: Oxford University Press, 1986, 623, 626.

608
Appendix A

Table 11. Composition of Gross Value of Agricultural Output,

Selected Years, 1955-85

(in percentage)

Snior 1955 1965 1975 1985 Crops . 81.8 75.8 72.5 49.8

Livestock 12.2 14.0 14.0 14.5 Forestry 1.2 2.0 2.9 3.8 Fishery 0.4 1.7 1.5 1.8 Sideline production 4.4 6.5 9.1 30.1 TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau. Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1985 and 1986, various pages.

Table 12. Manufactured Agricultural Inputs, Selected Years, 1955-85

Item Unit 1955 1965 1975 1985 Chemical Fertilizer Production Use

thousands of tons thousands of tons 255 200

1,726

1,942 5,2475,369

13,350 17,758

Tractors Large

Small thousands

thousands

5 73

4 345599 8643,810 Rural electrical power

millions of

kilowatt hours 104 3,710 18,310 51,200 Chemical pesticides production thousands of tons 26 193 422 205

means negligible

Source: Based on information from United States, Department of Agriculture, Economic

Research Service, Agricultural Statistics of the People's Republic of China, 1949-82, Statisti- cal Bulletin No. 714. October 1984, 29-34; and China, State Statistical Bureau.

Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1986. 147-49.

609
China: A Country Study

Table 13. Grain Production and Per Capita Consumption

of Selected Products, Selected Years, 1955-85

19.r>.r

>

1 1965 1975 198")

Grain Production 2 Wheat 22,965 25.220 45,310 85.810

78.025 87.720 1 25,560 168.857

r • 20. .'"520 23,660 47,220 63.830

9,529 7. 100 1 0. 7.50 5,610

10,276 6,200 7. 1 50 5.980

1 ^ 1 90 1 o ft^n j y ,oou Zo.J /

1 na run Soybeans 9,120 6,140 7,240 10.509 Other 18.580 18.625 12.765 12,474

Total strain production .... 183,935 194.525 284.565 379.1 10

Vr capita consumption ;

Grain 195.0 183.0 190.0 254.0

Edible oil 2.2 1.7 1.7 5.1 Pork 4.9 6.3 7.6 14.0 Beef and mutton 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.3 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.6 Eggs 1.2 1.4 1.6 5.0 Aquatic products 4.0 3.3 3.3 4.9

1.1 1.7 2.3 5.6 Total per capita consumption 274.7 198.8 209.6 291.5

KsiimaU'. Thousands ol ions. Kilograms.

>ourcc: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearboo k). Beijing, 1986.

610
Appendix A

Table 14. Agricultural Exports and Imports, 1985

(in millions of United States dollars)

Value

Exports

Textile fibers 1,163 Fresh and frozen meat 987

Fruits and vegetables 984

Grain 782

Coffee, tea, and spices 524

Oilseed and nuts 502 Crude animal and vegetable materials 494

Live animals 329 Other 747 Total exports 6,512

Imports

Textile fibers 1,576 Grain 1 ,050 Wood 647 Crude rubber 315 Sugar 216 Tobacco 201 Other 655

Total imports 4,660

Source: Based on information from United States Central Intelligence Agency, China:

International Trade, Fourth Quarter, 1985, Research Paper, No. EA CIT 86-001 . July

1986, 8-11.

Table 15. Production, Use, and Import of Major Commodities,

Selected Years, 1952-85

(in millions of tons)

Grain Cotton Chemical Fertilizer Grain Year Output Output Use Imports 1952 161 1.3 0.078 0.0 1957 191 1.6 0.373 0.2 1965 195 2.1 1.942 6.4 1970 240 2.3 4.266* 5.4 1975 275 2.4 5.369 3.7 1980 321 2.7 12.694 13.4 1985 379 4.2 17.758 5.7

* Estimate.

Source: Based on information from China, State Statistical Bureau, Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook), Beijing, 1981-86, various pages; and Zhongguo Nongye

Nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook), Beijing, 1980-86, various pages.

611
China: A Country Study

Table 16. Gross Value of Industrial Output, by Region,

1952, 1957 and 1983

(in millions oi 1952 yuan) 1

Region - Provincial-Level Unit 1952 19.r>7 1983 :i 1983 1

Northeast Heilongjiang 1,189 3,930 34,406 28,850

Jilin 1,102 2,378 24,704 16,507 Liaoning 4,523 1 1,710 71,549 51,664

Total northeast 6,814 18,018 130,659 97,021

North

Beijing 825 2,300 39,954 25,060

He'bei 1,342 2,805 33,660 25,269

Nei Monggol 192 757 9,195 7,534 Shanxi . . 643 1,832 19,055 15,187

Tianjin 1,836 4,300 34,830 22,920

Total north 4,838 11,994 136,694 95,970

EastAnhui 628 1,501 20,348 16,069

Fujian 414 1,224 13,276 9,581 Jiangsu 2,584 4,553 81,970 56,945

Jiangxi 575 1,173 13,945 10,620 Shandong 2,091 4,068 53,625 40,558 Shanghai 6,510 12,969 102,629 67,858

Zhcjiang 1,099 2,374 37,783 26,81 1 Total east 13,901 27,862 323,576 228,442

Central-South Hcnan 881 1,705 31,033 23,664 Hubei 955 2,799 43,268 31,266 Hunan 770 1,819 28,574 29,586 Guangdong 1,745 3,812 44,016 30,594 Guangxi 343 798 12,585 9,488

Total central-south 4,694 10,933 159,476 124,598

612
Appendix A

Table 16. —Continued.

Region 2 Provincial-Level Unit 1952 1957 1983 4 1983 1 Southwest Guizhou ' 269 605 8,569 6,223 Sichuan 1,649 4,873 46,706 33,997 Xizang --- 10 154 130 Yunnan 333 1,101 11,270 8,916

Total southwest 2,251 6,589 66,699 49,266

Northwest Gansu 230 560 12,132 8,811 Ningxia •: 10 25 2,145 1,612 Qinghai 837 101 1,928 1,427 Shaanxi 381 1,263 18,538 12,945 Xinjiang 175 446 5,947 5,349

Total northwest 1,633 2,395 40,690 30,144

Total 34,031 77,791 857,797 599,232

means negligible.

1 For value of yuan —see Glossary.

- Regional divisions are for descriptive purposes only and have no official administrative significance.

' Actual.

1 To make (he shares of output comparable and the output indexes measure real growth, the data for

198!! are converted from 1980 prices to 1952 prices by deflating the output of industrial branches of industry within each provincial-level unit by the national price indexes for the respective branches. Source: Based on information from Robert Michael Field, "China: The Changing Structure of Industry," pages 526-27, in United States Congress, 99th, 2d Session, Joint Economic Committee, ed., China's Economy Looks Toward the Year 2000, 1: The Four

Modernizations, Washington, 1986.

613
China: A Country Study

Table 17. Composition of Trade, Selected Years, 1970-85 1 (in percentage)

1970 1975 1980 1985

Exports Food and live animals

Beverages and tobacco Crude materials (including

textiles, fibers, and wastes) . Petroleum and petroleum

products

Edible oils Chemicals Manufactured goods (including

finished textiles and iron and steel products) Machinery and transport equipment

Miscellaneous manufactures . Other

Total exports 2

30.6 28.7 17.0 12.5 0.9 1.1 0.6 0.4

17.6 11.8 9.6 9.4

2.8 14.4 23.3 23.0

1.2 0.8 0.4 4.2

5.3 5.0 6.2 5.1

27.4 23.1 23.3 19.8

3.5 3.6 3.2 3.8 10.4 11.2 15.9 21.3

0.2 0.4 0.3 4.2 99.9 100.1 99.8 103.7

Imports

16.1 11.9 14.8 4.1 Crude materials (excluding

fuels) 1 1.5 10.7 17.2 8.4 Petroleum and petroleum

2.0 1.9 0.9 1.3 Edible oils 0.2 0.6 0.9 1.3 15.2 11.9 11.3 9.3 Manufactured goods (including

iron and steel products) 33.7 32.1 23.7 27.5 Machinery and transportation

19.8 29.4 27.7 41.5

1.2 1.1 2.5 6.2 Other 0.4 0.9 1.5 97.7 100.0 99.9 101.1

- - - means negligible.

1 Free on board.

- Totals do no! add to 100 percent because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from United States Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook

of Economic Statistics, 1986, September 1986, 106-107.

614
Appendix A

Table 18. Major Trading Partners, 1986

lYircnlagv of Trade

Kxports Hong Kong 31.6 Japan 15.3 United Slates 8.5 United Kingdom 4.6 Soviet Union 4.0 Singapore 3.9 Jordan 3.4 West Germany 3.3 Netherlands 1.5 Poland 1.5 Other 22.4 Total exports 100.0

Imports Japan . . 28.9 Hong Kong 13.1 United States 10.8 West Germany 8.4

Soviet Union 3.4

Australia 3.2

Italy 2.6 United Kingdom 2.3 Canada . 2.3 France 1.7 Other 23.3 Total imports 100.0 Source: Based on information I'rom China, General Administration of Customs, Chinese Customs Statistics, No. 1 (1987) [Hong Kong], April 1987, table 4, in Business China [Hong Kong], June 22, 1987, 92.

'

615

Appendix B

( :hn>nolos>y and I .isis

1 Chronology of Chinese Communist Party National Party Congresses and Plenums, 1921-87

2 Selected Foreign-Trade Corporations and Enterprises, 1987

3 Government Organizations, 1987

4 Diplomatic Relations, 1949-87

617

Appendix B

Table 1 . Chronology of Chinese National Party Congresses

and Plenums, 1921-87

Congr

Signifi

First Shanghai First July 1921 Attended by thirteen representatives; elected general secretary and

three-man Central Bureau; developed

general political pro- gram. Mao Zedong

recording secretary. Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) had fifty- seven members.

Second

Shanghai First July 1922 Adopted concept of democratic centralism (sec Glossary), elected Central Executive Committee (in 1927 shortened

to Central Committee), and decided to join Comintern (see Glossary). Accepted united

front with Guomindang, although opposed

by some, as temporary

expedient to combat

warlords and foreign imperialism. Party grew to 123 members.

Third Guangzhou First June 1923 Under Comintern pressure, formally sanc- tioned united-front

policy made CCP

members concurrently Guomindang members.

Tension built as CCP

attempted to fulfill conflicting goals of national and social revolutions. Party had

432 members in 1923.

619
China: A Country Study

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Significance Fourth Shanghai First January 1925 CCP's activist role in Beijing Second October 1925 labor and peasant cir- Bcijing Third July 1926 cles augmented by explosive anti-imperialist

social movements. Growing CCP influ- ence increased strains in united front. Secretariat established to handle documentation and communications.

Party had 950 members by 1925.

Fifth Wuhan First April-May 1927 Elected CCP's first Political Bureau. Tensions mounted within

party over concessions

to maintain united

front. After abandon- ment of united front policy in mid-July, the August 7 Emergency

Conference elected new party leadership, emphasized tight organization and party dis- cipline, and called for armed struggle against Guomindang. Over

10,000 party members

on rolls.

620
Appendix B

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Significance

Sixth Moscow First June-July 1928 Conflict arose among

Shanghai Second November 1929 leaders concerning

Shanghai Third September 1930 proper course for the Shanghai Fourth January 1931 Chinese revolution: Ruijin Fifth January 1934 revolutionary move- Yan'an Sixth October 1938 ment responsive to Yan'an Seventh April 1945 local—mainly ruralconditions; urban revolution; or strict adher- ence to Moscow's

instructions. Mao

Zedong, a leader in rural-oriented group, emerged dominant by

1935, bolstered by his military skill during the Long March (1934-

35). Mao Zedong

Thought formally adopted at the Seventh Plenum. The Sino- Japanese War (1937-

45) and the concomitant second united

front with Guomindang

against Japan became

sources of inner-party

tension. Party grew

from 40,000 in 1928 to

1.2 million by 1945. Seventh Yan'an First April-June 1945 Party Constitution of Xibaipo Second March 1949 1945- stressed greater Beijing Third June 1950 centralism. After defeat Beijing Fourth February 1954 of the Guomindang

Beijing Fifth April 1955 and establishment of

Beijing Sixth October 1955 the People's Republic

Beijing Seventh September 1956 of China in October on indoctrination, rectification, and mass

campaigns was supple- mented with economic

recovery and consolidation programs. Focus

of party work shifted from countryside to cities. Party membership

totaled 10.2 million by

1956.

621
China: A Country Study

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Signilicance Eighth [First Session] September 1956 _ .. r irst oeptember lyjo \A A A "

IVlao advocated strug" Second novtmuei i j ju gle between the two

Beijing Third SfT^r fin r»f» r

oonoq 1 r~\ (j 1 1 npp ranin October 1957 communization and

Rpi iin(j Fourth May 1958 continuing revolution which he favored and

fC A C 1 [oecond oessionj IV! lvidy a v IQ^R i jjo central planning, rcli- dllCC <Jll p<iiiy ui gain

• Beijing Fifth IVldy 1 .7 JO zations and limited Wuchang Sixth November— individual incentives. Fiprpmnrr ' 1

1 11C n f* Tailiirf IdllLllC1 ofUl rnp lli 1 - 1958 Great Leap Forward

Seventh April 1959 (1956-60) led to a Lushan Eighth August 1959 temporary ascendancy

Beijing Ninth January 1961 of Liu Shaooji, Deng

Tenth Sentemher 1962 Yiannincr and othpr^

Rpi nnrr Eleventh August 1966 who stressed planned

Beijing Twelfth Ortrihrr V^/CLUUCI 11 QfiR J7UO development. In reofJUllot., ennn^p lvlaU \/| o o turnpH IU1 11CU toIU Lin Biao who was

hinlnmo' uuiiLiiiig z\ Pf^oolf* q a. r cupic J> Liberation Arriiy (PLA) power base, and reverted to fac- tionalism, calling his opponents "revisionists." The ensuing

Cultural Revolution (1966-76) eventually required the PLA to restore stability be- cause party and state organizations had been

disrupted. CCP membership reached 20

million by 1966.

622
Appendix B

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Significance Ninth

Beijing Lushan

First Second

April 1969 September 1970

Party constitution of 1969 named Lin Biao

as Mao's successor. Mao continued as chairman with Lin as vice chairman. Mao

Zedong Thought extolled. New Central Committee included 45 percent military representation (27 per- cent on the Eighth

Central Committee).

Political outcome was

to empower three fac- tions: the Maoists;

administrators around Zhou Enlai; and the PLA around Lin Biao. After Lin's 1971 at- tempted coup, PLA

influence was reduced. Party membership was

28 million by 1973.

Tenth

Beijing First August 1973

Beijing Second January 1975

Beijing Third July 1977

Zhou's Enlai 's policies strengthened with

rehabilitation of purged

leaders, notably Deng

Xiaoping. After Zhou's

death (January 1976), tensions increased. Mao's death in Sep- tember 1976 precipi- tated open confrontation. Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, arrested the Gang of Four and attempted to consolidate his position. But by July 1977, Hua

faced a challenge from Deng Xiaoping, who

regained all his posts at the Third Plenum.

Party members in- creased to 35 million in 1977.

623
China: A Country Study

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Significance Eleventh

Beijing First August 1977 Hua Guofeng continued

Beijing Second February 1978 party chairman. New

Beijing Third December 1978 party constitution of

Beijing Fourth September 1979 1977 approved. Deng

Beijing Fifth February 1980 Xiaoping confirmed as Beijing Sixth June 1981 party vice chairman,

giving him a platform from which to advocate reform. Hua's

links to the Maoist

legacy undercut his

ability to lead, and at the Third Plenum,

Deng's practical approach set the CCP

on a course of reform

instead of class struggle. Deng's forces assumed command

with the rise of Zhao

Ziyang and Hu Yaobang; reassessment of Mao's role preserved

Mao Zedong Thought

but condemned his mistakes in later years. Hua's resignation as party chairman was

accepted and Hu

Yaobang became

chairman, as well as secretary general of

the restored Secretariat. Party ranks

increased to 40 million by 1981.

624
Appendix B

Table 1. —Continued.

Congress

Location Plenum Date Significance Twelfth

Beijing First September 1982 With emphasis on collec- Beijing Second October 1983 tive leadership, the new

Beijing Third October 1984 party constitution of Beijing Fourth September 1985 1982 abolished the post Beijing Fifth September 1985 of party chairman.

Beijing Sixth September 1986 Deng further consoli- dated the reform lead- ership's position with

high-level appointments and retirements of

party veterans to new

Central Advisory Commission. Party rectifica- tion and key urban

economic reforms initi- ated. Additional elderly leaders retired and

younger, better educated ones elevated at September 18-23, 1985

National Conference of Party Delegates. Hu

Yaobang demoted at enlarged Political Bureau meeting in January 1987 for fail- ing to control student demonstrations and

thereby undermining

party discipline and

predominance. Party membership reached 46

million by 1987.

625
China: A Country Study

Table 2. Selected Foreign- Trade Corporations and Enterprises, 1987

Corporation Subordinate to China Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC) Ministry of Electronics Industry

China Light Industrial Corporation for Foreign

Economic and Technical Cooperation

(LIGHTIND) Ministry of Light Industry

China National Aero-Technology Import and

Export Corporation (CATIC) Ministry of Astronautics China National Agricultural Machinery Import State Machine-Building Industry and Export Corporation (AGRIMEX) Commission

China National Arts and Crafts Import and Ministry of Foreign Economic

Export Corporation (ARTCHINA) Relations and Trade China National Cereals, Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic

(CEROILFOOD) Relations and Trade China National Chemicals Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Economic

Corporation (SINOCHEM) Relations and Trade China National Foreign Trade Transportation

Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic (SINOTRANS) Relations and Trade China National Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic

of Medical Health Products (MEHECO) . . . Relations and Trade China National Instrument Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Relations Corporation (INSTRIMPEX) and Trade China National Light Industrial Products Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic

(INDUSTRY) Relations and Trade China National Machinery and Equipment

Import and Export Corporation State Machine-Building Industry

(EQUIMPEX) Commission

China National Machinery Import and Export Ministry of Foreign Economic

Corporation (MACHIMPEX) Relations and Trade China National Metallurgical Import and Ministry of Metallurgical Export Corporation (CMIEC) Industry

China National Metals and Minerals Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic (MINMETALS) Relations and Trade China National Native Produce and Animal

Byproducts Import and Export Corporation Ministry of Foreign Economic

(CHINATUHSU) Relations and Trade

626
Appendix B

Table 2. —Continued.

Corporation China National Offshore Oil Corporation

(CNOOC)

China National Packaging Import and Export Corporation (CHINAPACK)

China National Publications Import and Export Corporation (PUBIMPORT)

China National Seed Corporation (CNSC)

China National Technical Import and Export Corporation (TECHIMPORT)

China National Textiles Import and Export Corporation (CHINATEX)

China Northern Industrial Corporation

(NORINCO)

China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation

(CNIEC)

China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) . . China Oriental Scientific Instruments Import and Export Corporation (ASCHI)

China Petrochemical Corporation

(SINOPEC)

China Scientific Instruments and Materials Corporation (CSMIC)

China State Shipbuilding Corporation

(CSSC)

Great Wall Industrial Corporation (GWIC) . . .

Subordinate to

Ministry of Petroleum Industry

Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade

State Science and Technology

Commission

Ministry of Agriculture, Animal

Husbandry, and Fishery

Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade

Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade

State Machine-Building Industry

Commission

Ministry of Nuclear Industry

Ministry of Communications

Chinese Academy of Sciences

State Council

State Science and Technology

Commission

State Council

Ministry of Astronautics

627
China: A Country Study

Table 3. Government Organizations, 1987*

Leading Groups

Central Job Titles Reform Commodity Prices Electronics Industry Invigoration

Enterprise Consolidation Foreign Funds and Management

General Survey of China's Industry

Nationwide "Safety Month" Activities Nuclear Power Plants Rural Energy Development

Science and Technology

Sea, Land, and Air Ports

Ministries Aeronautics

Agriculture, Animal Husbandry, and

Fishery Astronautics Chemical Industry

Civil Affairs Coal Industry

Commerce

Communications

Culture

Electronics Industry Finance

Foreign Affairs Foreign Economic Relations and Trade

Forestry Geology and Minerals

Justice

Labor and Personnel

Light Industry

Metallurgical Industry National Defense

Nuclear Industry Petroleum Industry

Posts and Telecommunications

Public Health

Public Security

Radio, Cinema, and Television Railways

State Security

Supervision

Textile Industry

Urban and Rural Construction and

Environmental Protection Water Resources and Electric Power

Commissions

National Defense Science, Technology, State Nationalities and Industry State Planning

State Economic State Physical Culture and Sports

State Education State Restructuring of Economic System

State Family Planning State Science and Technology

State Machine-Building Industry

628
Appendix B

Table 3. —Continued.

Agencies

Auditing Administration China Council for the Promotion of

International Trade China Shipping Inspection Bureau China Travel and Tourism Bureau China Welfare Fund

Foreign Experts Bureau

General Administration of Civil Aviation General Administration of Customs

Nuclear Safety Administration

Press and Publications Administration

Religious Affairs Administration

State Administration of Exchange

Control

State Archives Bureau

State Building Materials Industry Administration

State Commodities Prices General

Administration

State Environmental Protection Bureau

State Import and Export Commodities

Inspection Administration

State Materials and Equipment Bureau

State Meteorological Administration

State Oceanography Bureau

State Patent Bureau

State Pharmaceutical Administration

State Seismological Administration

State Standardization Bureau

State Statistical Bureau

State Supplies Bureau

State Tobacco Monopoly Administration

State Weights and Measures Bureau Trade Mark Bureau Xinhua (New China) News Agency

Offices Central Greening Commission

China Rural Development Research Center

Chinese Olympic Committee

Counselors Office Economic Legislation Research Center Economic, Technological, and Social Development Research Center Environmental Protection Commission Government Offices Administrative Bureau

Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Media and Publications Office National Academic Degree Committee

National Antarctic Survey Committee

Northeastern Economic Zone Planning

Office

Special Economic Zones Office

State Commission for Guiding the Examination of Economic Management Cadres

State Language Work Committee

Banks

Agricultural Bank

Bank of China

China Industrial and Commercial Bank

China Investment Bank

Communications Bank

People's Bank of China

People's Construction Bank

People's Insurance Company of China

The organizations in this list are subordinate to the State Council.

629
China: A Country Study

Table 4. Diplomatic Relations, 1949-87 1

Year Country Established 2

Afghanistan 1955 Albania 1949

Algeria » 1958 Angola 1983 Antigua and Barbuda 1983 Argentina 1972

Australia 1972

Austria 1971 Bangladesh 1975 Barbados 1977 Belgium 1971

Belize 1987 Benin 4 1964

Bolivia 1985 Botswana 1975

Brazil 1974

Bulgaria 1949 Burkina Faso 1973 Burma 1950 Burundi 4 1963 Cambodia 5 1958 Cameroon 1971 Canada 1970 Cape Verde 1976

Central African Republic 4 1964 Chad 1972

Chile 1970 Colombia 1980 Comoros 1975 Congo- 1964 Cote d'l voire 1983 Cuba 1960 Cyprus 1972 Czechoslovakia 1949 Denmark 1950

Djibouti 1979 Ecuador 1980 Egypt 1956

Equatorial Guinea 1970

Ethiopia 1970

Fiji 1975

Finland 1950 France 1964 Gabon 1974 Gambia 1974 Germany, East 1949 Germany, West 1972 Ghana 4 1960 Greece 1972 Grenada 1985 Guinea 1959 Guinea-Bissau 1974

Year

Country Established 1 Guyana 1972 Hungary 1949

Iceland 1971 India 1950

Indonesia 6 1950

Iran 1971

Iraq 1958

Ireland 1979

Italy 1970 Jamaica 1972 Japan 1972 Jordan 1977 Kenya 1963

Kiribati 1980 Korea, North 1949 Kuwait 1971 Laos 1962 Lebanon 1971 Lesotho . 1983

Liberia 1977 Libya 1978 Luxembourg 1972 Madagascar 1972 Malaysia 1974 Maldives 1972 Mali 1960 Malta 1972 Mauritania 1965 Mauritius 1972 Mexico 1972 Mongolia 1949 Morocco 1958 Mozambique 1975 Nepal 1955 Netherlands 7 1954 New Zealand 1972 Nicaragua 1985 Niger 1974

Nigeria 1971 Norway 1954 Oman 1978

Pakistan 1951 Papua New Guinea 1976 Peru 1971

Philippines 1975 Poland 1949

Portugal 1979 Romania 1949 Rwanda 1971 San Marino 8 1971 Sao Tome and Principe 1975

Senegal 1971

Seychelles 1976

630
Appendix B

Table 4. —Continued.

Country

Year

Established - Country

Year

Established -

Tanzania

Thailand Togo . .

.

Trinidad and Tobago

Tunisia 4

Sierra Leone

Somalia . . . , Soviet Union

Spain

Sri Lanka . , Sudan

Suriname . . Sweden . . . . Switzerland . Syria

1971 1960

1949

1973

1957 1959

1976 1950

1950 1956

1964

1975

1972 1974

1964

Turkey

Uganda

United Arab Emirates United Kingdom 7

. . United States Vanuatu

Venezuela Vietnam

Western Samoa

Yemen, North Yemen, South

Yugoslavia

Zaire 4 Zambia

Zimbabwe

1971 1962 1984

1954

1979

1982

1974

1950

1975 1956

1968

1955

1961 1964

1980

1 Israel (1950) and Bhutan (1971) have recognized China, but diplomatic relations have not been

established. China and Singapore have exchanged commercial representative offices since 1981, but have no formal diplomatic ties.

2 When a disc repancy exists between the year of recognition and the year in which full diplomatic rela- tions went into effect, the latter date is given.

s China established diplomatic relations with the provisional government of Algeria in 1958 before Algerian independence in 1962.

4 China's relations with six African nations were broken off in the 1960s and reestablished in the 1970s: Benin (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1972), Burundi (broken off, 1965, resumed, 1971), Central Afri- can Republic (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1976), Ghana (broken off, 1966, resumed, 1972), Tunisia

(broken off, 1964, resumed 1971), and Zaire (broken off, 1961, resumed, 1972). The Chinese embassy

in Zaire closed soon after it opened in 1961.

5 Beijing recognizes the exiled Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea led by Prince Norodom

Sihanouk.

" Beijing's ties with Jakarta were broken off in 1967 after Indonesian accusations of Chinese involve- ment in a coup attempt. Diplomatic relations had not been restored as of mid-1987.

7 China's relations with the Netherlands and the United Kingdom were at the charge d'affaires level from 1954 until 1972, when they were upgraded to the ambassadorial level. In 1981 China reduced

its level of representation in the Netherlands to charge d'affaires to protest the sale of Dutch sub- marines to Taiwan. Ambassadorial relations were reestablished in 1984.

8 Consular relations only.

631

Appendix C

THE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AT A GLANCE

Ground Forces

Strength: 2,110,000

Group armies (main forces)

35 armies, comprising:

118 infantry divisions

13 armored divisions

17 artillery divisions

16 antiaircraft artillery divisions

At least 71 independent regiments and 21 independent battalions (artillery, antiaircraft artillery, signal, antichemical warfare, reconnaissance, and engineer)

Regional forces

73 divisions

140 independent regiments

Major weapons systems

Armor

Type 80 main battle tank—105mm gun, 38 tons, had not yet

entered production in 1987

Type 69 main battle tank—105mm gun, 36 tons, improved

Type 59 tank

Type 59 main battle tank—100mm gun, 36 tons, improved

copy of Soviet T-54 tank

Type 63 light tank—85mm gun, 18 tons, improved version

of Soviet PT-76 amphibious light tank

Type 62 light tank—85mm gun, 21 tons, reconnaissance ver- sion of Type 59 tank

T-34 main battle tank—85mm gun, 32 tons, Soviet manufacture, may be given to regional forces

M-1984 armored personnel carrier—6 x 6 wheeled type with

23mm gun

M-1974 armored personnel carrier—2 crew, 20 passengers,

12.7mm machine gun, tracked, amphibious

M-1967 armored personnel carrier—4 crew, 10 passengers,

tracked, amphibious

633
China: A Country Study

Artillery

152mm gun—Type 83, entered service in 1980s

152mm self-propelled howitzer—Type 83, entered service in 1980s

152mm gun/howitzer—Type 66, towed, copy of Soviet D-20

152mm howitzer—copy of Soviet M- 1943

130mm field gun—Type 59-1, towed, same chassis as 122mm

gun

122mm gun/howitzer—Type 83, copy of Soviet D-30

122mm gun—Type 60, towed, copy of Soviet D-74

122mm howitzer—Type 54, towed, copy of Soviet M-1938

122mm self-propelled howitzer—Type 54 howitzer mounted

on M-1967 armored personnel carrier

85mm antitank gun—Type 55, towed, copy of Soviet D-44

130mm rocket launcher—Type 70, 19-tube, armored-personnel-carrier-mounted

130mm rocket launcher—Type 63, 19-tube, truck-mounted

122mm rocket launcher—Chinese version of Soviet BM-21

107mm rocket launcher—Type 63-1, 12-tube, towed

M-1979 antitank minelaying rocket launcher—10 tubes

Antiaircraft artillery

100mm antiaircraft gun—Type 59, radar, towed, copy of

Soviet KS-19

85mm antiaircraft gun—radar, towed, copy of Soviet KS18

57mm antiaircraft gun—Type 59, radar or optic, towed, copy

of Soviet S-60

37mm antiaircraft gun—Type 65, optic, towed, twin-barrel

37mm antiaircraft gun—Type 55, optic, towed, copy of Soviet

M-1939

14.5mm antiaircraft machine gun—Type 58, optic, towed,

4-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-2

14.5mm antiaircraft machine gun—Type 56, optic, towed,

twin-barrel copy of Soviet ZPU-4

Air Force

Strength: 390,000, including 220,000 air defense personnel

Combat elements organized in group armies of varying numbers of air divisions

634
Appendix C

Weapons

100 surface-to-air missile sites 16,000 antiaircraft guns

Aircraft

30 F-8/Finback fighters (indigenous model derived from

Soviet designs)

200 F-7/Fishbed fighters (copy of MiG-21)

3,000 F-6/Farmer fighters (copy of MiG-19)

400 F-5/Fresco fighters (copy of MiG-17)

500 F-4/Fagot (copy of MiG-15) and A-5/Fantan (derived

from F-6) ground attack fighters

120 B-6/Badger bombers (copy of Tu-16 intermediate-range

bomber)

500 B-5/Beagle bombers (copy of 11-28 medium-range bomber)

550 transports (Y-5, Y-7, Y-8, 11-14, 11-18, Tridents, etc.)

400 helicopters (Z-5/6, Z-9, Alouette, Super Frelon, Bell,

Super Puma, and Sikorsky)

Navy

Strength: 350,000 including Coastal Defense Forces, Naval Air

Force, and Marine Corps

Ships and boats

Submarines

2 Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines

(SSBN) (See Strategic Missile Force)

3 Han-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN)

1 Golf-class ballistic missile submarine (SSB) (trials)

90 Romeo-class diesel attack submarines (SS)

20 Whiskey-class diesel attack submarines (SS)

2 Ming-class training submarines (SS)

Surface combatants

11 Liida-class destroyers

4 Anshan-class destroyers

20 Jianghu-class frigates

2 Jiangdong-class frigates

4 Chengdu-class frigates 5 Jiangnan-class frigates

635
China: A Country Study

14 patrol combatants

181 patrol craft —large and river/coastal

877 fast-attack craft (gun, missile, or torpedo)

33 mine warfare ships

613 amphibious warfare ships and craft 49 support ships

Naval Air Force

50 B-6/Badger bombers

130 B-5/Beagle bombers

600 fighters, including F-4, F-5, F-6, and F-7

Strategic Missile Force

Strength: 100,000 in 6 or 7 divisions

Nuclear warheads: estimated between 225 and 300

Missiles

50 Dongfeng-2 (CSS-1) medium-range ballistic missiles

(MRBM) (650nm)

60 Dongfeng-3 (CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missiles

(IRBM) (l,620nm)

4 Dongfeng-4 (CSS-3) limited-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (3,780nm)

2 Dongfeng-5 (CSS-4) full-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) (8,100nm)

Submarines

2 Xia-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN),

each with 12 CSS-NX-4 IRBMs (l,190nm to l,620nm)

Source: Based on information from United States Defense Intelligence Agency, Handbook

of the People's Liberation Army, Washington, 1984, various pages; and International

Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1986-87, London, 1986, 140-45.

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Copper, John F. "China's Military Assistance." Pages 96-134 in John F. Copper and Daniel S. Papp (eds.), Communist Nations'

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Corr, Gerard H. The Chinese Red Army . Reading, Berskhire, United

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Daniel, Donald C, and Harlan W. Jencks. "Soviet Military Confrontation with China: Options for the USSR, the PRC, and

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Dreyer, June Teufel. "China's Military in the 1980's," Current

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697

Glossary

barefoot doctor—Especially during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.), a paramedical worker possessing minimal formal training who

provided part-time medical service, primarily in rural areas. Promoted basic hygiene, preventive health care, and family

planning, and treated common illnesses. Acted as a primary

health-care provider at the grass-roots level. big-character posters (dazibao) —Posters, limited-circulation newspapers, excerpted press articles, pamphlets, and blackboard news using large-sized ideographs and mounted on walls as a popular form of communication. Used in China since imperial

times but more commonly since literacy increased after the 1911

revolution. Used more frequently after 1949 to publicize party

programs and as a means of protest. Became ubiquitous during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.); guaranteed as one of the

"four big rights" in the 1975 state constitution.

cadre—Person who holds any responsible position (usually in administrative work) in either the party or the governmental

apparatus throughout the nation. Term often denotes, in a more

restricted sense, a person who has been fully indoctrinated in party ideology and methods and uses this training in his or her

work.

China Proper—Used broadly to mean China within the Great Wall,

with its eighteen historic provinces. Divisible into two major,

sharply contrasting regions, north China and south China. The

dependencies on the north and west—Manchuria (now usually

referred to as northeast China), Mongolia, Xizang (Tibet), and

Xinjiang or Chinese Turkestan—were known in the imperial

era as Outer China.

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)

A quasi-constitutional united front (q.v.) organization that provides an institutional framework for interaction between party

and state leaders and representatives of mass groups and

democratic parties (q.v.). Members include distinguished scholars, educators, and intellectuals, key representatives of religious

and minority nationality groups, and leading members of

political parties loyal to the Chinese Communist Party during

the anti-Guomindang years. The first CPPCC convened in 1949, the second in 1954, the third in 1959, the fourth in 1964,

the fifth in 1978, and the sixth in 1983, the seventh was scheduled for 1988. The CPPCC's 1949 Common Program served

699
China: A Country Study

as the law of the land until superseded by the 1954 state constitution.

class struggle—In Marxist terms, the conflict waged by the masses

of the workers and the oppressed under the leadership of the

communist party against the privileged, oppressive, and

property-owning ruling class. Until late 1978, class struggle was the official line of the Chinese Communist Party.

Comintern—Short form for Communist International or the Third

International, which was founded in Moscow in 1919 to coor- dinate the world communist movement. Officially disbanded

in 1943, the Comintern was revived as the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) from 1947 to 1956.

county (xiari) —Rural administrative unit below the provincial level. Cultural Revolution—A slogan introduced by Mao Zedong in 1940,

noted again by Liu Shaoqi in 1958, and used more frequently

in connection with leftist attacks on the "cultural front" in late 1965 and early 1966. The expression was used to denote the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, a political campaign

officially inaugurated in August 1966 to rekindle revolutionary fervor of the masses outside formal party organizations.

The Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76) can be divided into

three periods: 1966-69, from the militant Red Guard (q. v.) phase to the Ninth National Party Congress; 1969-71, the

period of the zenith and demise of Lin Biao; and 1971-76, the

period of Mao's declining health and the ascendancy of the

Gang of Four (q.v.). At the August 1977 Eleventh National

Party Congress, the Cultural Revolution was declared officially to have ended with the arrest in October 1976 of the Gang of

Four.

danwei (work unit) —The basic-level organization through which

party and government officials control social, political, and eco- nomic behavior of residents. The danwei typically controls the

allocation of housing, grain, edible oil, and cotton rations; the

issuance of permits to travel, to marry, and to bear or adopt

children; and permission to enter the army, party, and university, and to change employment.

"Democracy Wall" —A wall in the Xidan district in Beijing where,

beginning in December 1978, in line with the party's policy

of "seeking truth from facts," activists in the democracy move- ment recorded news and ideas, often in the form of big-character

posters (q.v.). These activists were encouraged to criticize the

Gang of Four and previous (failed) government policies, but

the wall was closed in December 1979 when the leadership and

the communist party system were being criticized along with

700
Glossary

past mistakes and leaders. The shutdown eoincided with suppression of political dissent.

democratic centralism —A system through which the people influ- ence the policies of the government and party members influ- ence the policies of the party; the government and party maintain

centralized administrative power to carry out the policies

demanded by their constituents. Within both representative and

executive organizations, the minority must abide by the decisions of the majority, and lower bodies must obey the orders

of the higher level organizations. The concept, derived from the

organizing principles of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union, was called for as early as 1928 by Mao Zedong.

democratic parties —Eight political parties that have been loyal to the communist government since 1949. They are China Association for Promoting Democracy, China Democratic League,

China Democratic National Construction Association, China

Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interest), Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, Jiusan (September Third)

Society, Guomindang Revolutionary Committee, and Taiwan

Democratic Self-Government League.

''expert" —Term usually juxtaposed with "red" (q.v.). Denotes

special knowledge or skills, or both, relating to economic management, science, and technology. Cadres are required to be

both red and expert, the emphasis on one or the other depending on the current political milieu.

fiscal year (FY) —January 1 to December 31. Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence—Mutual respect for each

other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual nonaggression; mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Originated with a 1954 agreement between Zhou Enlai and India's

Jawaharlal Nehru.

four cardinal principles—Socialism; dictatorship of the proletariat;

supporting the party leadership; and Marxism-Leninism-Mao

Zedong Thought. In vogue in China since 1979.

Four Modernizations—The core of a development strategy aimed

at turning the country into a relatively advanced industrialized nation by the year 2000. The modernizations are those

of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national

defense. The concept was embodied first in the Third FiveYear Plan (1966-70), launched in earnest by Zhou Enlai at the Fourth National People's Congress (1975), and adopted

as the official party line at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh

Central Committee (December 1978).

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China: A Country Study

Gang of Four—Term used by the post-Mao leadership to denote

the four leading radical figures—Jiang Qing (Mao's fourth

wife), Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen

who played a dominant political role during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.) decade (1966-76) until Mao's death in September 1976 and their arrest several weeks later. Their "antiparty"

deeds are often linked with Lin Biao, an early leader of the

Cultural Revolution, who also has been discredited.

Great Leap Forward—A drive to increase industrial and agricultural production following the suspension of Soviet aid and the

desire to catch up with the advanced nations of the world. The

campaign was conceived by Mao Zedong in late 1957, adopted

by the National People's Congress (q.v.) in 1958; it continued

through 1960. Emphasis was placed on accelerated collectiviza- tion of agriculture, national self-sufficiency, and labor-intensive

methods. The campaign resulted in widespread waste of resources and was partially responsible for famine in 1960 and

1961.

Great Proletarian Cultural RevolutionSee Cultural Revolution.

gross national product (GNP)—The total value of final goods and

services produced in the economy. The "estimated GNP"

figures used in the text are estimates by United States government analysts of Chinese GNP according to the U.S. definition, which includes personal consumption, gross investment,

all government expenditures, and net exports. Through

mid- 1987, Chinese calculations of national income excluded

government and personal services, passenger transportation,

and depreciation investment.

Han—Also Han Chinese. Term used to designate the ethnic majority, which constitutes 93 percent of the population. The fifty- five minority nationalities make up the remainder.

Hundred Flowers Campaign—Also Double Hundred Campaign.

Party-sponsored initiative to permit greater intellectual and

artistic freedom. Introduced first into drama and other arts in the spring of 1956 under the official slogan "Let a hundred

flowers bloom, let the hundred schools of thought contend."

With Mao's encouragement in January 1957, the campaign

was extended to intellectual expression and, by early May 1957, was being interpreted as permission for intellectuals to criti- cize political institutions of the regime. The effect was the large- scale exposure and purge of intellectuals critical of party and

government policies.

"iron rice bowl" —A Chinese idiom referring to the system of

guaranteed lifetime employment in state enterprises, in which

702
Glossary

the tenure and level of wages are not related to job perfor- mance. Long March—The 12,500-kilometer-long trek made by the Red

Army in the face of the Guomindang's "annihilation campaigns." Began in October 1934 in Jiangxi Province and ended

in October 1935 in Shaanxi Province. Some 100,000 persons

left the communist base area in Jiangxi but only about 28,000

arrived in Yan'an, Chinese Communist Party headquarters for the next decade. It was during the Long March that Mao

Zedong gained his preeminent role in the party.

Mao Zedong Thought—Sayings and writings of Mao that served

as a major source of national ideology until his death in 1976

and since then have undergone a cautious but critical reappraisal. By 1980 the meaning of the term had expanded to include the collective thoughts of all key party leaders.

"mass line" —Term for party policy aimed at broadening and cul- tivating contacts with the masses of the people and to accentuate the leadership role of the Chinese Communist Party. mass movement—Derived from the concept of "mass line" (q. v.). Party-directed campaign designed to mobilize the masses in support or execution of major policies. Such movements were

characteristic of the 1950s through the 1970s and were controlled and coordinated by permanent mass organizations.

National People's Congress—Highest organ of the state, elected in accordance with the principles of democratic centralism (q.v.).

As of 1987, six congresses had been held, the first (1954), second

(1959), third (1965), fourth (1975), fifth (1978), and sixth (1982),

the seventh was scheduled for 1988; annual sessions were held

most years except during the Cultural Revolution (q.v.). The

Standing Committee is the permanent organ of the National

People's Congress and functions between annual sessions.

neighborhood—Term in general use in China for the urban administrative unit usually found immediately below the district level,

although an intermediate, subdistrict level exists in some cities. Neighborhoods encompass 2,000 to 10,000 families. Within

neighborhoods, families are grouped into smaller residential

units of 100 to 600 families and supervised by a residents' committee; these are subdivided into residents' small groups of

fifteen to forty families.

New Culture Movement—Refers to the period between 1917 and

1923, which was marked by student and intellectual ferment

and protests against the warlord government. Culminated in the May Fourth Movement of 1919.

703
China: A Country Study

one country, two systems—A policy originating in the early 1980s

that promotes reunification of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan with the mainland and offers them a high degree of

autonomy as special administrative regions of China. Through

separate agreements with Britain and Portugal, Hong Kong

and Macao are to revert to Chinese control in 1997 and 1999,

respectively. overseas Chinese—Term usually used to refer to any person of

Chinese origin living abroad on a permanent basis, without

regard to his or her current citizenship. Overseas Chinese

minorities are concentrated principally in Southeast Asia but

are also found in other parts of Asia, the Middle East, Europe,

North America, South America, and the Caribbean. Overseas

Chinese have long been important to the government in power

in China as a source of business contacts and of financial and

moral support from abroad. The majority of foreign investment in China is by overseas Chinese, and more than 90 percent of all foreign tourists who visit China are overseas Chinese.

Also used in China to refer to persons living in China who have

returned from sojourns abroad.

people's commune—Formerly the highest of three administrative

levels in rural areas in the period from 1958 to 1982-85, when

they were replaced by townships (q.v.). Communes, the largest collective units, were divided in turn into production

brigades and production teams (q.v.). The communes had governmental, political, and economic functions.

production brigade—Formerly the intermediate administrative level

in the people's commune system, the organizational structure of the collective sector in agriculture. The highest level was the

commune; the lowest, the production team. Most brigades were

transformed into townships or villages in the period from 1982

to 1985. (See also people's commune, production team, townships, villages.)

production team—Formerly the basic accounting and farm production unit in the people's commune system. Production teams were largely disbanded during the agricultural reforms of

1982-85. In the administrative hierarchy, the team was the

lowest level, the next higher levels being the production brigade

and people's commune. Typically the team owned most of the

land and was responsible for income distribution. Since 1984

most teams have been replaced by villages. (See also people's

commune, production brigade, village.)

putonghua—The common spoken language; also called guoyu (national

language). The official spoken language of China, used in its

704
Glossary

various forms by more than 70 percent of the population. The

People's Republic government started promoting putonghua in 1956 for use in schools, the cultural arena, and daily life as a means of bringing about the standardization of the language

used by the Han (q.v.) nationality. Putonghua is based on the

northern dialect, and uses Beijing pronunciations as its standard.

"red" —A term referring to political and ideological attitudes pre- scribed by Maoist doctrine. Usually juxtaposed with "expert"

(q.v.), the term was seldom used in the 1980s.

Red Guards—Generally used to refer to young people—primarily

students —in their teens and twenties who began in May 1966

to support the leftist intraparty struggle then emerging against

Liu Shaoqi and others. They made world famous the "little red book," Quotations from Chairman Mao, and were known for their use of big-character posters {q.v.) during the Cultural

Revolution (q. v.. Acting under the leadership of Mao and his radical adherents, Red Guards were the "soldiers" and the

vanguard of the Cultural Revolution. The term Red Guard

was derived from the early days of the Chinese Communist

Party's armed struggle.

rehabilitation—A practice dating from the early years of the Chinese

Communist Party. Denotes the reinstatement in positions of

responsibility of former government and party officials and mili- tary personnel who had been accused of wrongdoing. Rehabilitations sometimes take place posthumously to clear a former

leader's name and reputation.

responsibility system—A practice, first adopted in agriculture in 1981 and later extended to other sectors of the economy, by

which local managers are held responsible for the profits and

losses of the enterprise. This system partially supplanted the

egalitarian distribution method, whereby the state assumed all profits and losses. revisionism—As used by communists, term refers to political, eco- nomic, and social tendencies that stray to the right of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The Chinese communists long insisted that these tendencies were counterrevolutionary and that internal and external enemies (such as the Soviet Union) were

infected by this negative phenomenon.

Socialist Education Movement—Inaugurated in September 1962

at the Tenth Plenum of the Eighth National Party Congress

Central Committee as a mass ideological campaign for both

party cadre and the general population. The movement was

patterned along the lines of the Yan'an rectification campaign

705
China: A Country Study

of 1942-45 and was intended to increase ideological "correct- ness" and consciousness, especially in regard to reversing

"capitalist" and "revisionist" tendencies perceived in social and economic life. The Socialist Education Movement, which

continued at least until 1965, is considered a precursor of the

Cultural Revolution (q.v.).

special economic zones—Small coastal areas established beginning

in 1979 to promote economic development and introduction

of advanced technology through foreign investment. Special

preferential terms and facilities are offered to outside investors

in taxation, land-use fees, and entry and exit control for joint

ventures, cooperative ventures, and enterprises with sole for- eign investment. Special economic zones have greater decisionmaking power in economic activities than provincial-level units. Market regulation is primary.

township (xiang) —The basic government administrative unit below

the county level in rural areas. Townships existed before people's communes were organized in 1958 and were reconstituted

when production brigades and communes were disbanded during the period 1982-85. Each township has a people's congress

and an elected chairman. In the mid-1980s, townships were

about the same size as the communes they had replaced. (See

also county, people's communes, production brigades.)

united front—Chinese Communist Party strategy that attempts to

utilize an organization or movement for the purpose of building a consensus and an organized following for party-supported

programs and goals. Historically, the term is associated with

the Guomindang-Chinese Communist Party first united front

(1923-27) and second united front (1937-45).

village (nongcun)—Replaced production brigades (q.v.) from 1982

to 1985 as the lowest-level semiofficial government entity. They

provide bureaucratic coordination and welfare payments and

settle disputes. Party branches are usually organized at the vil- lage level. yuan (¥) —China's monetary unit, which in mid-1987 had an exchange rate of US$1 to ¥3.72, or¥l to US$.269. The yuan

is divided into 100 fen, and 10 fen constitute 1 jiao. The cur- rency is known as renminbi (RMB), meaning the people's cur- rency. The inscription renminbi (or renminbiao) appears on bank

notes as well as yuan, and the terms renminbi andyuan are used

synonymously in quoting exchange rates. In transactions the

terms are universally replaced by the word kuai (piece). Beginning in the early 1980s, the standard currency was paralleled

706
Glossary

by a special currency called Foreign Exchange Certificates,

which were issued in exchange for "hard" foreign currencies.

707

Index

Academia Sinica, 376, 377

acupuncture, 95, 382

Afghanistan, 64; boundary issues, 477;

foreign policy, 480; Soviet invasion of, 490, 491, 576

Africa {see also under names of individual

countries): military cooperation, 580;

alleged subversive activities in, 480, 496 Agrarian Reform Law ofJune 28, 1950,

41, 271-72

Agricultural Bank, 243, 244, 245, 351;

policy role, 278

agriculture, {see also communes; grain; land reform), xxiii-xxiv, 61, 267-97; advanced producers' cooperatives, 215, 272; ancient period, 5-7; animal hus- bandry, 291-92; collectivization, 41,

42, 125, 208; communes, 44, 217, 231-32, 272-73; contract responsibility system, 126, 207, 224, 225, 231, 232, 275-76, 337-38, 455; cotton, 277, 289-90; credit arrangements, 244, 280;

crops, 267, 268-70, 281, 286-91;

domestic trade, 212, 337-40; economic

organization, 231-34, 278-81; fertiliz- ers, 274, 281-82; fisheries, 292; foreign

trade, 294-97; forestry, 292; govern- ment role, 127-28, 218-19, 230, 271-81; and gross national product

(GNP), 231, 268; investments in, 216, 271, 272, 276-77; irrigation, 2, 216,

270, 274, 284; labor force, 90, 208,

231, 234, 268, 270-71; land ownership,

126, 208, 234; marketing organization,

225-26, 277, 279-80; mechanization,

231, 281, 282-83; pest control, 284-85;

pricing policies, 219, 224, 248, 277, 280; private plots, 219, 232; production, 216, 219, 221, 223-24, 277, 286-94; regional disparities, 212-13;

research and training, 285-86; seed

varieties, 285; shortage of arable land,

xxiii, 260, 268; "specialized households," 224, 232, 258; state farms, 234, 272, 278; state procurement system,

337, 338; taxation, 242

air force, 544, 560, 569; campaigns, 584; manpower, 546, 562; rank system, 568;

Soviet assistance, 584; structure and

equipment, xxvii, 583-85; terms of

service, 566; training, 584-85; uni- forms, 568

airports and aviation, xxv, 237, 356, 363-64; aircraft production, 316; pas- senger traffic, 357

Aksai Chin, 45-46, 65, 578

Albania, 501, 580

Alexandria, 12 All-China Federation of Industry and

Commerce, 418, 421 All-China Federation of Literary and Art

Circles, 421 All-China Federation of Trade Unions,

418, 420

All-China Federation of Youth, 421 All-China Students' Federation, 421 All-China Women's Federation, 418, 421

Altai Mountains, 67 Altun Shan, 67 Amur River. See Heilong Jiang

Analects {Lunyu), 186

ancestor worship, 132, 146 Andropov, Yuriy, 491 Anhui Province, 343, 362, 388, 461;

industry, 325 Annam {see also Vietnam), 26 Anshan, 305; iron and steel complex, 308, 310, 313, 316, 392

Anti-Rightist Campaign, 42, 181; legal profession, 514; police domination, 515

Antioch, 12 Anyang, 5, 6 Aomen. See Macao

Argentina, 295 Argun River. See Ergun He

armed forces {see also defense industry; national defense; police), xxvii-xxviii, xxxvi-xxxvii, 543-75; air force, 544,

546, 560, 562, 569, 584; Central Military Commissions, 424-25, 557-59; and the Chinese Communist Party,

116, 416, 548; civil-military relations, 548, 555-57; civilianization of activities, 551, 561, 575; conditions of service, 122, 566-68; contacts with foreign

countries, 544; courts, 524-25; defense 709
China: A Country Study

expenditures, xxviii, 569; doctrine,

strategy and tactics, 553, 562-63; education and training, 564-65, 575; equipment, xxvii, xxxvii, 582-90; for- eign technology, 544, 570, 572-73; ground forces, 544, 582-83; historical development, 24, 29, 545-47; manpower, 546, 562; military regions, 547, 550, 561; Military Service Law, 553,

557, 565, 566, 567; militia, xxviii, 544, 590-91; modernization programs, 464, 543-44, 547-49, 551-55; navy, 544,

546, 566, 585-87; nuclear capabilities, 560, 563, 587-90; organization of, 557-62; paramilitary forces, xxviii, 544, 562, 590-93; people's war principles, 546, 562-63; political education,

548, 556; Production and Construction Corps, 592; promotion, 567; public

attitudes towards, 108, 115-16, 557;

ranks, 567-68; recruitment, 565-66;

reductions in force, 561-62; reserve

service system, 591; retirement, 567;

self-reliance policies, 548; Soviet model, 547-48; Strategic Missile Force, 544, 587; training, 548, 553, 584-85;

uniforms, 568 Asian countries {see also under names of

individual countries): foreign relations, 480; military cooperation, 580

Asian Development Bank, 348

Australia, 581; foreign relations, 498;

trade with, 295, 324, 499

Austria, 330 automotive industry, 315, 360-61 Autumn Harvest Uprising, 34, 35, 545

Bajin, 188 Baghdad, 12 Bai Hua, 182-83 Baijuyi, 187 Bangladesh, 580, 582 Bank of China, xxiv, 230, 243, 244, 348, 351, 483 bankruptcy laws, 458

banks and banking, 243-46; agricultural

sector, 280; foreign exchange, 230, 244, 347; investment loans, 226, 242; nationalization, 42, 214, 243; personal

savings accounts, 246

bao jia (tithing), 525, 526

baogan (household production responsibility), 275-76 Baohuang Hui (Protect the Emperor Society), 28 Baoshan, 313, 500

Baotou, 306 Bay of Hangzhou, 71

Beijing, xxi, 48, 52, 61, 81, 177, 199, 431, 440; import-export companies, 349;

industry, 235, 314, 315, 319; international airport, xxv; machinery centers, 314; military region, 561; population,

82; shopping, 343-44; university, xxii, 201; visitor regulations, 80; during

Yuan dynasty, 17 Beijing Foreign Languages Institute, 484

Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, 485

Beijing Research Academy, 377

Beijing Research Laboratory, 377

Beijing Review, 184, 185 Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan Economic

Zone, xxiii, 342

Beiping {see also Beijing), 28 Bhutan, U.S. forces in, 65

bicycles, 301, 322 Bo Hai Gulf, 68, 69; oil reserves, 327 Bo Yibo, 46 Book of Changes {Yijing), 185-B6

border disputes: with Burma, 65; with

India, 45, 65, 477, 496, 544, 578; set- tlements, 477; with Soviet Union,

21-22, 49, 64-65, 477, 489-90, 491, 492, 576; with Vietnam, 55, 477, 496,

544, 552-53, 577

Borodin, Mikhail, 33 Boxer Uprising, 28-29 Brahmaputra River, 65 Brezhnev, Leonid, 491

Brunei, 65 Buddhism. See religion budget, 242-43

bureaucracy. See cadre system

Burma, 26, 65; military ties with, 580

cadre system {see also government), 53, 238, 434-37; abolishment of tenure, 410, 434, 436; accountability of, 464;

centralization, 11, 15; examination sys- tem, 106, 107-8, 180; imperial period, 11-12, 14, 15, 106-8; job assignments,

143; legal cadres, 510-11, 513; and 710
Index

mass organizations, 418; personnel

reform, 436-37; prestige, 115-16; in public security, 527-28; "red" and

"expert" criteria, 436; reorganization

of, 410, 445, 446, 463-64; retirement,

122, 436; rural areas, 127-28; wages and benefits, 114-15, 122

calligraphy. See cultural developments

Cambodia, 480; and France, 26; invasion

of, 577, 578; military cooperation, 580 "Cambulac," 17. See also Beijing Canada: technical assistance, 330; trade

with, 295, 499

Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News), 200, 439

Cankao Ziliao (Reference Information),

200, 439 Canton. See Guangzhou

Cao Yu, 192

Capital Construction Engineering Corps,

561, 575

census. See population

Central Advisory Commission, 411, 416, 451; establishment of, 452

Central Commission for Discipline In- spection, 449, 451 Central Committee, 50; economic planning, 239; foreign policy role, 482; membership, 413, 556; staff reductions, 435; United Front Work Department,

418

Central Military Commissions: and for- eign policy, 482; party, 415; State, 424-25

Central People's Broadcasting Station, 366, 368, 440

Central Radio and Television University, 178 Changjiang, xxii, 6, 68, 237, 245, 284, 328, 330, 355; freight traffic, xxv, 361-62 Changjiang Basin, 289 Chang Jiang Delta, 69 Chang Jiang Valley, 37, 119, 269;

agricultural crops, 288, 289; forestry products, 292; industry, 235; population, 78 Chang'an {see also Xi'an), 11, 14 Changchun, 159, 314 Changsha, 34

chemicals industry, 221, 317-18 Chen Boda, 48, 56 Chen Duxiu, 188 Chen Junsheng, xxxix

Chen Xilian, 55 Chen Xitong, xxxix Chen Yun, xxxv, xxxvii-xxxviii, 46, 54, 413, 449, 456, 458; opposition of, 462 Chengdu, 314, 561 Chernenko, Konstantin, 490 Chiang Ching-kuo, xl Chiang Kai-shek, xxxii, 33, 37, 39, 419, 478, 509, 526; Northern Expedition, 33-34 Chin-men. See Jinmen

China Association for Promoting Democracy, 419 China Association of Science and Technology, 394-95, 396 China Central Television (CCTV), 366,

368, 440 China Council for the Promotion of Inter- national Trade (CCPIT), 351-52, 483

China Daily, 200 China Democratic League, 419 China Democratic National Construction

Association, 419 China Electronics Import and Export

Corporation, 574 China Industrial and Commercial Bank,

243, 351; education loans, 173 China International Economic Consultants Corporation, 350 China International Trust and Invest- ment Corporation, 351 China Investment Bank, 243, 351 China Merchant Steam Navigation Company, 433 China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation (CATIC), 573 China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 327 China National Seed Company, 285 China News Service (Zhongguo Xinwenshe), 199, 440 China Northern Industrial Corporation

(NORINCO), 350, 573 China Ocean Shipping Company

(COSCO), 356 China Precision Import and Export Corporation, 573 China Proper, 6,11, 69, 268; population

density, 78 China Publishing House (Zhonghua

Shuju), 198, 199 China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation, 574 711
China: A Country Study

China Shipping Inspection Bureau, 362 China State Shipbuilding Corporation, 570 China Travel and Tourism Bureau, 229, 351 China Xinshidai Corporation, 570, 573 China Xinxing Corporation, 574 China Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public

Interest), 419 Chinese Academy of Sciences, 387-88; emphasis on basic research, 388; export companies of, 401; founding of, 377; membership, 388; privileged position

of, 393; Soviet cooperation, 378, 396

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 5; Law Institute, 518

Chinese Communist Party (CCP) {see also government), 4, 39, 409-21; attitude towards religion, 145; Central Advisory

Commission, 411, 416; Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, 416; Central Committee, 50, 239, 413; Central Military Commission, 57, 391, 415, 451, 485, 551, 555; constitution, xxxvii-xxxviii, 411-12, 422; control of

the People's Liberation Army, 556-57; and the Cultural Revolution, 49, 57; decentralization of authority, 41 1

; dis- cipline, 416, 436, 456; economic goals, 213, 230, 412; and education, xxxviii, 156; elections, 417; "four cardinal prin- ciples," 154; and government, 460-61; and the Great Leap Forward, 217; and

the Guomindang, 34, 37, 38-39; intel- lectuals and, 42; job assignments, 143;

judicial role, 515, 519; land reform, 271-72; and the mass media, 438; and

mass organizations, 418-21; membership, 116-17, 417; and the military,

1 16, 416, 548, 556; minority nationalities, 88; Party Congresses, 50, 51-52,

53, 57, 412-13; party rectification pro- gram, 417-18, 436-37, 456-57; Politi- cal Bureau, xxvi, xxxvii-xxxviii, 36,

50, 54, 413-14; political realignments, 447-50; populist-style leadership, 46-47; prestige, 117; Propaganda

Department, 54, 185, 366; purges, 42,

55; reevaluation of party history, 450; retirement of senior leaders, xxxviixxxviii, 452-53; role in modernization, 463-64; rural areas, 279, 416; Secretariat, 409, 415; Soviet support, 32-33;

ties with foreign parties, 481, 482, 490; and work units, 116-17, 120-21 Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party, 419 Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, 421, 485-86

Chinese People's Institute of Foreign

Affairs, 486 Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), xxxviii, 418-19;

constitutional framework, 422; membership, 418; minority nationalities, 100; science policy, 377 Chinese People's Volunteers, 547 Chinese Turkestan. See Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region

Chinese University of Science and Technology, 388 Chongqing, 199, 245; industry-, 305, 314, 318

Chuci (Songs of Chu), 186 Chun Qiu (Spring and Autumn), 186 Ci Xi, 25, 28 Cihuai Canal, 362 CITIC Group, 351

civil aviation. See airports and aviation

civil bureaucracy. See cadre system

civil law. See judicial system

civil rights: abolishment of the "four big

rights," 422-23; constitutional develop- ments, 513, 516, 518, 519, 521; imperial period, 508-9

civil wars and dissension, 13, 30-31; ancient period, 11, 14; Civil War, xxxii, 240, 302, 310, 448, 546; against Japan,

32; Lhasa riots, xxxix; 19th century,

21, 23-24; post-World War II, 38-39; Republican Revolution of 191 1, 29-30;

student demonstrations, xxxv, 461; Taiping Rebellion, 23-24

Classic of Documents {Shujing), 186

Classic of Poetry {Shijing), 186

climate, xxii, 61, 71

coal, 301, 324; reserves, 309 Cochin China. See Republic of Vietnam

collectives: agriculture, 41, 42, 125, 208, 234; benefits, 115, 122; constitutional

rights, 423; industry, 235-36; public works responsibilities, 234

College of International Relations, 484

colleges. See universities and colleges Comintern, 33, 34, 36 712
Index

Commercial Press (Shangwu Yinshuguan), 198, 199 communes, 44-45, 112; agriculture, 125, 217, 231-32, 272-73; dissolution of, xxxiii, 164, 207, 225, 275; family plan- ning activities, 76-77; and household

unit, 125, 130; income distribution, 232; non-agricultural, 44; public order

responsibilities, 535; social conse- quences of, 133-34; structure of, 46, 217, 231-32; and upward mobility, 125 communications, xxv-xxvi, 35, 209, 212, 304, 366-69; facsimile and computer

services, 368; foreign broadcasting,

196, 200, 369, 439-40; foreign circulation, 438-39; historical development, 365-66; Intelsat membership, 367; in- ternational network, 366; labor force, 236; limits on criticism, 438; newspapers, 199-200, 438-39; post-World

War II, 214; radio, 196, 368, 440; re- stricted publications, 439; satellites, 367, 439-40; services for minority

groups, 368; telecommunications, 365-

69, 439; telegraph, 367-68; telephone

services, 366-67; television, 196, 368-

69, 440; use as propaganda tool, 438 Communications Bank, 243 Communist Youth League, 418, 420-21; and armed forces involvement, 531, 561; membership, 420

computers. See electronics industry

Confucianism, 145; and the civil service, 11-12, 17; classics, 8, 16, 104, 185; influence on intellectuals, 376; and

social control, 508; values of, 104-6

Confucius, 5, 8, 10; shrine, 146; writings

of, 186

constitutional developments {see also State Constitution of 1982): civil rights, 422-

23, 513, 516; Common Program, 511;

to facilitate modernization, xxxviii, 409, 421; "four big rights," 49, 516;

influence of Mao Zedong Thought,

515; party constitution, 411-12, 451;

State Constitution of 1954, 42, 512-15;

State Constitution of 1975, 515-17;

State Constitution of 1978, 517-21

construction industry, 318-19; funding,

14, 244, 323, 575; housing, 254-55, 322-23 consumer goods and services: availability, 228, 301-2; bicycles, 136, 322; household goods, 254, 322; inflation, xxxvi, 249-50; prices, 246-49; processed food, 321-22; rationing, 120, 230, 252, 344;

retail sales, 343-44; rural areas, 277,

344; service sector, 237-38; televisions, 136, 322, 368-69; urban-rural differ- ences, 258, 344; and work units, 122 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), 501, 577

courts {see also procuratorates), 522-25;

adjudication committees, 523; military, 524-25; Organic Law, 519, 523; Su- preme People's Court, 513, 515-16,

517, 523 crime and punishment {see also judicial system), 207, 228, 262, 515, 516; cate- gories of offenses, 537-38; for counter- revolutionary activities, 520; crime

rate, 456-57, 539; death penalty, 507,

521, 538; juveniles, 539; mediation

committees, 536-37; mutual surveil- lance, 526-27; penal system, 507, 539;

penalties, 538

crops. See agriculture; grain

Cuba, 295

cultural developments {see also Confucianism; society), 185-202; ancient period,

6, 12, 14, 16, 17; Beijing Opera, 190-

92; and the Cultural Revolution, 188-

96; drama, 190-92; folk and variety

arts, 197-98; foreign influences, 189-

90, 192, 193-94; libraries and archives, 200-2; literature, 185-88, 188-90; "the

literature of the wounded," 189; motion pictures, 195-96; music, 192-94;

newspapers, 199-200; painting and cal- ligraphy, 194-95; post-Mao, 154, 189-

90; publishing, 198-99; radio and tele- vision, 196; socialist realism, 188-89,

195; Soviet influences, 188, 193, 195 Cultural Revolution, xxxiii, 47-53, 99; army role, 549-51; attitude towards

intellectuals, 181, 379, 383; cultural

activity during, 188-96; economic

effects, 220-21, 239, 303; educational

policies, 141-42, 153, 163; elimination of service sector, 237; foreign policy

repercussions, 474, 480-81, 484, 490, 492, 496; impact on science and tech- nology, 373, 374, 380, 386; internal migration during, 79; labor force

'effects, 220, 309, 514; Mao's "four big

rights," 49; political effects, 445; 713
China: A Country Study

reassessment of, 4, 55, 57, 422, 447,

450; and religion, 145-46; role of youth

in, 48-49; wage equality, 115

currency, 7, 214

Czechoslovakia, Soviet invasion of, 490,

492, 550, 576

Dagang, 326

Dalai Lama, xxxix-xl, 45

Dalian, xxv, 228, 309, 348 Damanskiy Island. See Zhenbao Island

danwei {work units), 114-16, 120-24, 128; economic limitations of, 148, 149; per- mission to marry, 139; organizational

structure, 120, 147-48; research insti- tutes as, 387; social responsibilities,

1 15, 120; specialization of, 147; wages and benefits, 121-22

dao (Way), 10 Daoism. See Taoism

Daqing, 326, 328 Datong, 324 Daya Bay, 331 Dazhai, 274

defense industry (see also armed forces), 375, 390-91; accomplishments, 391; arms sales, 573-74; budget, 569; civil- ianization of, 570-71; concentration of

skilled personnel, 387; equipment pro- duction, 332, 571-72; funding reform,

400; integration with civilian industries, 332, 544, 553, 568-69, 574; privileged

position of, 393; research and develop- ment, 569-70; selective importation of

foreign technology, 572-73; trading

corporations, 573-74

democratic centralism, xxvi, 411, 426, 454, 461, 520; and local administration, 429

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (see also Korea): arms sales to, 573; boundary issues, 477; exports to, 295; foreign

relations, 498; military cooperation, 580 Democratic Republic of Vietnam (see also Republic of Vietnam; Vietnam), 580 demography. See population

Deng Liqun, 183, 460, 461 Deng Xiaoping, xxxi, xxxiii, xxxiv,

xxxviii, 42, 46, 52, 55, 181, 304, 413, 416; agricultural reforms, 79; back- ground, 448; Building Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics, 465; and the Chinese Communist Party, 46-47, 52,

53, 448; civil bureaucracy reforms, 434-35; and the constitution. 421: cult of personality, 465; and the Cultural Revolution, 48, 49; economic policies, 51, 208, 213, 222, 225. 346, 445. 447. 449; education policies, 154-56. 167: foreign policy, 477, 481, 486; leader- ship style, 449, 454, 466; Mao's ideol- ogy and, 47, 448: and military

modernization, 464, 551. 552, 553. 555; and minority nationalities, 88;

political reforms, 460-61; purged from

power, 49, 52, 222; rehabilitation, 53. 447-48, 552; and religion, 146; resig- nation from Political Bureau, xxxvii; science and technology policy, 373, 374, 382-83; The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 465; "spiritual pollu- tion" campaign, 183-84, 457; use of ideology, xxxiv, 466. 468; visit to United States, 493 Deng Yingchao, 449

development plans: 1953-57, 41, 215-16.

240, 301, 302, 306, 346: 1958-62, 43. 216, 240; 1966-70, 240: 1971-75, 240, 303; 1976-80. 240; 1981-85, 240: 1986-90, 153, 166, 240. 304, 310. 315. 316, 323, 356-57, 415; annual plans. 240-41; regional plans, 342; target

allocations, 240-41 Deyang, 315

dissension. See civil wars and dissension domestic trade. See internal trade Dongbei Plain, 68 Double Hundred Campaign. See Hundred

Flowers Campaign

down to the countryside movement (xia- fang), 43-44. 47-48 Dream of the Red Chamber. See Hong Lou Meng

Du Fu, 187

dynasties (see also names of individual

dynasties), history: ancient period, 5-10; Han, 10, 11-13; Jin, 13; Ming.

18; Qin, 11; Qing, 18-20; Shang, 5-6; Song, 14-15; Sui, 13-14; Tang, 14; Three Kingdoms, 13; Xia, 5; Yuan.

16-17; Zhou, 6-7, 10

East China Sea, 69. 71 Eastern Europe (see also under names of individual countries): foreign relations. 714
Index

500-1; scientific cooperation, 396;

trade with, 501

Eastern Zhou dynasty, 7, 11, 185 economy (see also agriculture; industry),

xxiii-xxiv, 207-62; budget, 242-43;

capital investments, 210-11; capitalism, xxxiv, 224; centrally planned economy,

207, 208; Civil Code stipulations, 427-

28; control mechanisms, 223, 229-30,

232; development planning, 215-16,

238-42; development zones, 226, 228, 342-43; Four Modernizations program,

54-58; gross national product, 208; in- flation, 207, 214, 228, 249-50; market

exchanges, 124, 149; 19th century, 21;

policies, 207, 213-28, 223; post-Mao,

222-23; post-World War II, 37-38, 213-14; pricing policies, xxxvi, 209, 246-49, 302; reduction of central planning, 223, 242; reform programs, xxxvxxxvi, 149, 207, 209, 222-28, 454-55;

Soviet model, 215-16, 301; statistical data, 109-10; structure of, 228-50; subsidies to minorities, 86, 101; urban re- forms, 458-59

education (see also universities and colleges),

xxii, 153-80; administration of, 155-56,

157, 158; adult, 177-79; compulsory,

153, 155, 157-59, 160; and Confucianism, 104; and the Cultural Revolution, 141-42; enrollment rates, 160, 161-62,

164, 165, 166; examination system, 142, 143; foreign language study, 161; for- eign training, 62, 83, 154, 173, 375; funding of, 159, 160, 174; key schools, 159; labor force, 176, 177, 238; and

literacy, 179-80; Maoist policies, 141-

42; National Conference on Education

(1985), 156-57; "nonformal" courses, 177-79; parental involvement, 140; policies, 154-56; political and moral training, 161; preschool, 162; primary, 160-

62; productive labor requirements, 161; reform of, xxxvi, 47- 48, 153, 156-57;

rural-urban distinctions, 119, 259, 270;

school systems, 156-67; science and

technology, 153, 154; secondary, 163-

66; spare-time schools, 178; special schools, 163; teacher training, 176-77; and upward mobility, 110, 112; via tele- vision, 178- 79; vocational and technical, 163, 164-66

Egypt, military ties with, 573, 580

elections, 461; Party, 417; procuratorates, 520; state, 410

electronics industry: computers, 306, 332; consumer products, 317; labor force, 317; limitations of, 308; research, 392

elite groups. See intellectuals; society emigration, 38, 62, 83; labor force exports, 83; Tibetan refugees, 45

energy, xxiv; coal, 310; consumption, 209, 283; electricity, 283, 330; foreign assis- tance, 330; hydroelectricity, 260, 302,

328, 329-30; nuclear power, 302, 330-

31; oil and natural gas, 326-28; power

shortages, 310, 328; thermal power

plants, 329

Engineering Corps, 575 Enlightenment Daily. See Guangming Ribao Ergun He, 64

ethnic groups. See Han Chinese; minority

nationalities Europe. See Eastern Europe; under names

of individual countries; Western Europe

exports, xxiv, 223, 297; agricultural products, 270, 295, 321, 346; alcoholic beverages, 322; crude oil and petroleum, 326, 352-53; manufactured goods, 352; mili- tary equipment, 332; rare metals, 309;

tea and silk, 290; textiles, 320, 353

fa (School of Law), 8, 10, 508

family life: ancestor worship, 132, 146;

birth control programs, 62, 75-78; effect of communes on, 44; kinship principles, 131-32; marriage, 131, 132, 139; and

nonstandard family forms, 130, 131;

role of the household, 126-27, 130-32,

138, 139-40; rural society, 130-32; size, 130, 138; and social stratification, 109-10; urban areas, 138-40 Fan Memorial Biological Institute, 377 Fang Yi, 384, 394

Federal Republic of Germany. See West Germany

feudalism, 6-7

film industry, 195-96

First Workers' and Peasants' Army. See Red Army

fisheries, 292

"five anti" movement. See "wu fan" movement

Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, 45, 480-81; and Third World relations, 497 715
China: A Country Study

five-year plans. See development plans food {see also grain): consumption, 209, 251-52, 288; and internal migration, 79-80; post-World War II, 214; production, 321-22; rationing system, 118; shortages, 44, 210, 218, 273

Foreign Affairs College, 484

Foreign Affairs Small Group, 482, 486, 488

foreign debts, 348

foreign exchange, 209; administration of, 230, 244, 351; credit card for, 245;

reserves, 347 Foreign Investment and Control Commission, 349

foreign investments, 221; categories of, 348; and the Civil Code, 427-28; constitutional framework, 424; government

policy, 218; industry loans and credit, 309; joint ventures, xxxiii, 207, 226,

260, 309, 433; legalization of, 226; special economic zones for, 226, 228

foreign policy, xxvii, xl-xli, 473-503;

Chinese nationalism and, 476-78; constitutional framework, 424; decision- making processes, 481-88; developed

nations, 498-501; diplomatic relations,

xli, 473; economic modernization as

basis, 473; embassies and consulates, 484; Europe, 500-1 ; Five Principles of

Peaceful Coexistence, 45, 480-81, 497;

influence of ideology, 478-81; international organizations, 501-3; Japan,

499-500; Mao's Theory of the Three

Worlds, 497; opening up policy, xxxvi, 455; opposition to imperialism, 479; organizations involved in, 482-88;

"people-to-people" diplomacy, 485-

86; pragmatic shifts in, 480; Soviet Union, xl, 46, 488-91; special administrative regions, 434; support for world- wide revolution, 479-80; Taiwan, xl, 45; territorial cessions, 26; territorial integrity goals, 477; Third World,

495-98; training of personnel, 484; United States, xli, 45, 51, 492-95; with

the West, 51 foreign technology. See scientific and tech- nological developments

foreign trade, xxiv, 21, 22, 209, 344-54;

ancient period, 12-13, 17, 18, 345; banking structure for, 351 ; corporations and enterprises, 349, 350, 351-52;

decentralization of, 349-50; expansion

of, 224-25, 226, 346; export-import

patterns, 352-53; and gross national product (GNP), xxiv, 345-46; historical overview, xxxii, 344-47; "open

cities," 348; opening up policy, 346-

47; organization, 349-52; policy, 230, 347-48; post-Mao, 222; reform policies, 454-55; special economic zones, 348; trade deficits, 347; trading partners, 353-54; world ranking, 347

foreigners, 3, 476; campaigns against,

28-29, 40-41; early assimilation of, xxxii, 3; rejection of Western philosophies, 375-76; traditional view of, 4, 475; unequal treaties with, xxxii, 476

forestry, 292 Four Modernizations, xxxiii-xxxvii, 54-

58, 62, 221, 275, 409; economic poli- cies, 222-23; education policies, 153-54, 168-69; effect on local administration, 430; historical antecedents,

xxxi; ideological basis, xxxiv; industry, 304; labor force changes, 409; national defense, 552; politics of, xxxv, 445,

446, 454, 462-65; and population

growth, 76; role of intellectuals, 182, 409; science and technology policy, 308, 373, 382-83

France, 21, 330, 501; exports from, 295;

military ties with, 581; and Vietnam,

26 Freedom Land (Kalayaan), 65 Fu Xi, 186

Fujian Province, 226, 234, 269, 433, 579;

agricultural crops, 290; import-export

companies, 349 Fushun, 305, 324

Gang of Four, 53, 55, 57, 88, 142, 190, 213, 240, 383, 507, 518; arrest of, 551;

control of militia, 528; economic goals, 221-22, 239; effect on industry, 303-4;

trial of, 56, 522 Gangdise Shan, 67 Gansu Corridor, 68 Gansu Province, 11, 68, 213; industry, 325; population, 78; rural incomes, 258 Gao Gang, 42 General Administration of Civil Aviation

of China (CAAC), xxv, 229, 356, 363-64 716
Index

General Administration of Customs, 230, 350, 351 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 348, 502 geography, xxi, 62-71; boundaries, 64-

65; size, xxi, 64; terrain and drainage, 65-71; territorial waters, 69, 71 Germany, war with, 32 {see also West Germany)

Gongren Ribao (Workers' Daily), 184, 185 Gorbachev, Mikhail S., xl, 491; on

border disputes, 64-65

government {see also cadre system; Chinese Communist Party (CCP); local administration; National People's Congress

(NPC); State Council), xxvi, 39- 41, 409-10, 421-34; administrative structure, xxvi, 81, 88, 100-1; agricultural

role, 127-28, 271-81; Central Military

Commission, 424-25, 485, 553, 556; and Confucianism, 17; decentralization of authority, 411; economic role, 228-

31; elections, 410; establishment of the People's Republic, xxxii, 39-40; estab- lishment of the republic, xxxii; international recognition, 40; judicial system, 427-28; Legalism doctrine, 8, 10; under Mao, 39-53; and minority nationalities, 86-88; under the Nationalists, 34-39; post-Mao, 53-54

grain {see also agriculture): consumption

rates, 251; corn, 288-89; hybrid rice, 285; imports, 273, 288; pricing policy, 246, 248-49, 277; production, 251,

272, 286-90; rice, 268, 288; soybeans,

289; wheat, 269, 270, 288, 295 Grand Canal, 14, 17, 18, 68 Great Britain, 21, 501; and Burma, 26; and Hong Kong, 26, 434, 477-78; mili- tary ties with, 581; trade with, 22-23; and Xizang, 31 Great Leap Forward, xxxii-xxxiii, 43-46,

99, 216-18, 240; and agriculture, 44; economic management, 216-18, 239; economic repercussions, 44-45, 272-

73, 465; education policies, 153; effects on science and technology, 373, 380;

industry, 44, 302-3, 312; and judicial system, 514-15; literary restrictions, 188-89; political consequences, xxxiixxxiii, 45; Soviet reactions to, 489 Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

See Cultural Revolution

Great Wall, 11, 14, 36, 68 Great Wall Card, 245 Great Wall Industrial Corporation, 350, 573

Greater Hinggan Range, xxii, 66, 68 Group of 77, 502 Guangdong Province, xxxix, 71, 226, 234, 269, 355, 433; agricultural crops, 290; economic growth, 128, 149; for- estry products, 292; import-export

companies, 349; standard of living, 119; textile production, 320

Guangming Ribao (Enlightenment Daily),

199, 438 Guangxi-Zhuang Autonomous Region,

355; agricultural crops, 290; economic

subsidies, 86; population, 84, 85; textiles, 320 Guangxu, 28 Guangzhou, 228, 245, 348; industry, 318;

military region, 561; as seat of govern- ment, 32, 33, 34; textiles, 321; trade, 21, 22 Guizhou Province, 24; agricultural crops, 290; economic subsidies, 86; population

settlement, 84, 85; textile production, 320 Gulf of Tonkin (Beibu Wan), 327 Guo Moruo, 188 Guomindang, xxxii, 30, 31, 32-33, 34-

35; and Chiang Kai-shek, 33-34; and

the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),

37, 38-39; and intellectuals, 180; legal system, 509; public policing, 526; Red

Army support, 545; Revolutionary

Committee, 419; scientific policy, 376-

77; suppression of warlords, 509 Guowuyuan Gongbao (State Council Bulletin), 439

Hai He, 69 Hainan Island, xxi, 71, 81, 84, 328, 579; change in status of, xxxix; PLA seizure

of, 546 Han Chinese {see also minority nationalities), 12, 24, 84; attitudes towards

minorities, 87, 99-100; diversity and

unity of, 101-3 Han Dynasty, xxxi, 10, 11-13, 14, 525;

cultural developments, 186-87, 197;

legal system, 508 Han Fei, 8, 10 717
China: A Country Study

Han Yu, 187 Hangzhou, 198 Hao, 6 Hao Jianxiu, 420

Harbin, 61; industry, 314, 315, 316, 319

health care, xxii, 62, 90-96; AIDS pro- grams, 92; barefoot doctor system, 91, 94-95; facilities, 94; personnel, 92, 238; preventive measures, 91; rural areas, 91, 94-95, 259; traditional medicine, 95- 96; urban areas, 259 Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace {see also Taiping Rebellion), 24 Hebei Province, 52; industry, 324; textiles, 320

Hefei, 388 Heilong Jiang, xxi, 21, 26, 64, 71, 576

Heilongjiang Province, xxi, 11, 64, 71, 81, 234; agricultural crops, 290; mining industry, 324 Henan Province, 5, 7, 69, 343, 396;

agricultural crops, 290 Himalayas, 65, 66, 67

historiography, 12; Marxist model, 4; post-Mao Zedong, 4-5 Honduras, 498 Hong Kong, 23, 418, 500; arrangements

for return of, 477-78; Joint Declaration

on, 434; joint ventures with, 33 1 , 348; migration to, 83; trade relationship, xxiv, 353 Hong Lou Meng (Dream of the Red Chamber), 187-88 Hong Xiuquan, 23-24

Hongqi (Red Flag), 439 Hongshui He, 330

household production responsibility. See baogan

housing: construction, 254; egalitarian standards, 136; income subsidies, 256; investments in, 276-77, 322-23; living space, 254-255, 322; private ownership, 255; shortage, 136; urban society, 135, 136-38; and work units, 122 Hu Qiaomu, 183, 462 Hu Qili, xxxvii, 184 Hu Shi, 188 Hu Yaobang, xxxvii, 53, 54, 56, 185,

192, 409, 413, 415, 438, 449, 453, 454;

as chairman, 57; political reforms, 461;

resignation of, xxxv, 228, 262, 446, 462 Hua Guofeng, 52, 53, 55, 240, 447, 551, 590; economic policies, 222; judicial

reforms, 516; removal of, 449, 450;

resignation as chairman, 57; science

policy, 384 Huabei, 327 Huai He, 69, 362 Huai He Plain, 362 Huaihai Economic Zone, 343 Huang Hai, 68, 71 Huang He, xxii, 3, 64, 68, 330; embank- ment concerns, 68 Huang He Valley, 5 Huang Xing, 29 Huangpu, xxv; military academy {see also Whampoa), 33 Hubei Province, 30; industry, 306, 325;

textiles, 320 Hunan Province, 24, 34, 35, 545 Hundred Days' Reform, 28-29 Hundred Flowers Campaign, 42-43, 181, 513-14; cultural developments, 190; and scientists, 379 Hundred Schools of Thought, 7-10; contributions to literature, 186 Huolinhe, 575

immigration, 83-84

Imperial China, 11-13; civil bureaucracy,

106-8; civil rights, 508-9; dynastic gov- ernments, 11-30; foreign policy, 476,

479; legal system, 508-9, 525-26; mutual aid groups, 526; tributary sys- tem, 13 Import-Export Control Commission, 349

imports, xxiv; aircraft, 316; barley, 295; chemical fertilizer, 282; chemicals, 318;

18th century, 22-23; food, 352; grains, 210, 218, 288, 295; iron and steel, 312, 313, 352; machinery and equipment,

219, 221, 222, 352, 403; metals, 309;

minerals, 326; opium, 22-23; pulp and

paper, 320; raw cotton, 289; sugar, 290, 295; textiles, 352 income, 255-59; agricultural, 226, 257-

58; benefits and subsidies, 235, 255-56; bonus system, 224; collectively owned

industries, 236; disparities, 119, 207, 228, 257-58, 262; equalization goals, 115, 213; and family size, 130-31; growth rate, 216; minority areas, 86; nonagricultural rural enterprises, 258-59; private sector, 256-57; rural

areas, 126, 277; state-owned industries, 718
Index

235, 255; urban society, 135, 256; work

units, 121-22

India, 14; border dispute, 45-46; foreign

relations, 496, 498; People's Liberation Army activities in, 549; as security

threat, 578; Tibetan refugees in, 45

Indonesia, 498, 580; alleged subversive

activities in, 480, 496

industry {see also defense industry), xxiii, 301-33; chemical fertilizer plants, 282;

collective ownership, 235-36, 305; construction, 322-23; economic reforms,

119, 224, 226, 301; energy, 326-31;

energy shortages, 302, 310; geographical distribution, 234-35, 305-6, 307; government policies, 215, 304, 306; and gross national income, 234; handicrafts, 215; heavy, deemphasis of, 223-

24, 225, 301; historical trends, 302-4;

internal trade, 340-42; investments in, 118, 135, 216-17, 226, 303, 304, 308-

9; "iron rice bowl" system, 302; labor

force, 234-36, 309; manufacturing,

310-22; market forces, 301, 304; mining, 324-26; nationalization, 42, 112,

114, 214; organization of, 305; ownership of, 235, 305; post-World War II, 302; pricing policies, 248; production

rates, 216, 219, 221, 222-23, 302-4; raw materials, 309-10; research and

development, 306-8; resource alloca- tion system, 229-30; rural, 331-32;

"rural economic unions," 236; service, 304; small-scale, 219; sources of capital, 308-9; Soviet influence, 41; state ownership, 235, 305; taxation, 242; technology level, 208, 261, 306-8

inflation, 207, 214, 228, 249-50

Inner Mongolia {see also Nei Monggol Autonomous Region), 32

Institute of Criminal Police, 533

intellectuals; "antibourgeois liberaliza- tion," 182-83; campaigns against, 4, 41, 182-83; and the Chinese Communist Party, 42, 116; Confucian in- fluences, xxxi, 376; and the Cultural

Revolution, 181; exodus of, 180; under Four Modernizations, 181, 409, 447; government policy towards, 180-85; and the Hundred Flowers Campaign,

181; limits on free expression, 184; manual labor, 47-48, 115; post-Mao

encouragement of, 154, 182-85, 383;

"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183-

84, 457

Intelsat, 367

internal migration, xxxiii, 78-81, 117-18,

271; frontier regions, 81; limitations, 80; political expulsions, 79

internal security, 47, 525-37; citizen's involvement in, 527, 534-37; counterintelligence operations, 533-34; grassroots organizations, 534-37; mediation

committees, 536-37; militia units, 527, 528; mutual surveillance, 534; revolu- tionary committees, 527; security sys- tem, 529-33

internal trade, 209, 337-44; agricultural

goods, 337-40; commercial depart- ments, 214, 338; economic zones, 342-

43; free-market activities, 228, 338, 340; industrial goods, 340-42; lateral economic cooperation, 342-43; nationalization, 42; pricing policies, 338, 340, 342; rationing, 338; retail sales, 343-

44; state distribution system, 340, 342

International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), 502

International Monetary Fund (IMF),

497; membership, 347-48, 502

International Olympic Committee, 502

Iran, military exports to, xli, 332, 573

Iraq; arms sales to, 573; labor force requests, 83

iron and steel industry, 310-13; reserves, 309

"iron rice bowl," xxxiii, 392; system, 302

irrigation, 216, 270, 274, 284; origins, 7 Israel, xli, 498

Italy, military ties with, 581

Jammu, 65 Japan, 3, 16, 18, 26; Chinese students in, 375; foreign relations, xxvii, 474, 498;

influences of, 29; invasion of China,

499; joint ventures with, 348; and

Manchuria, 36; peace treaty with, 499-

500; scientific cooperation, 396; and

Taiwan, 499, 500; technology exports from, 308, 330; trade with, 219, 295,

313, 326, 353, 500; unequal trade

treaties, 345; wars with, xxxii, 31-32,

-36-38, 180, 448

Ji Dengkui, 55 Jiamusi Airport, 364 719
China: A Country Study

Jiang Jieshi. See Chiang Kai-shek Jiang Qing, 48, 50, 53, 56, 57, 189, 190, 528 Jiangnan, 308, 376

Jiangsu Province, 343; economic growth,

128, 149; industry, 308, 327; textiles, 320, 321

Jiangxi Province, 35, 36, 45, 234, 417, 545

Jianyang, 198

Jiefangjun Bao (Liberation Army Daily), 182, 183, 199, 438

Jiefangjun Wenyi (Liberation Army Liter- ature and Art), 182

Jieziyuan Huazhuan (Manual of the Mustard Seed Garden), 195

Jilin Province, 81, 234; agricultural crops, 290; industry, 318

Jin dynasty, 13 Jinan, 561 Jinggang Mountains, 545 Jinmen, 45

Jinxi, 318

Jiulong. See Kowloon

Jiusan (September Third) Society, 419-20

Journal of Radio and Television ( Wuxiandian Yu Dianshi), 196

judicial system, xxvi-xxvii, 427-28,

507-40; Civil Code, 427-28; civil rights, 513, 516, 518; Common Pro- gram, 511; courts, 427, 522-25; crimi- nal code, 508, 513; ideological basis, 509-11; law enforcement, 525-37; legal profession, 510-1 1 , 521-22; legal stat- utes, 518-21, 537-38; legal training, 507, 513, 539; local level, 507; Organic

Law, 427, 431; penal system, 537-40;

procuratorates, xxvii, 507, 511, 518, 519-20, 529; public education, 511; reforms, xxxvi, 507-8, 512, 516-17;

Soviet model, 510, 512; under the State Constitution, 515-22 Junggar Basin, 67, 327

junzi (ruler's son, gentleman), 8

Kaifeng, 198

Kailas Range, 66

Kailuan, 312, 324 Kalayaan (Freedom Land), 65 Kang Sheng, 50, 56 Kang Youwei, 28 Kashi Airport, 364

Kashmir, 65 Kazaks, 84, 86, 88

Kexue (Science), 376 Khmer Rouge, support for, 580 Khrushchev, Nikita, 45, 489 Kinmen. See Jinmen

Kissinger, Henry A., 493 Kong Zi. See Confucius Korea, 3, 13, 14, 16; and Japan, 26; Koreans in China, 86 Korean War, 499, 502, 584; Chinese

involvement in, 40, 489; PLA deficiencies in, 547; trade repercussions, 501; Unites States stance on, 492 Kosygin, Aleksey, 490 Kowloon, 26 Kublai Khan, 16 Kunlun Mountains, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 Kuomintang (KMT). See Guomindang

Kuwait, 330

labor force {see also cadre system; income; "iron rice bowl"; scientific and technical personnel), 88-90; age break- down, 90; agriculture, xxiii, 90, 208,

231, 268, 270-71; building materials

industry, 319; and the Chinese Communist Party, 116-17, 148; contract system, 458-59; educational level, 90;

electronics industry, 317; hereditary job

transmission, 142-43; industrial sector,

xxiii, 234-36, 309; job assignments,

140-42, 172-75, 398; job mobility,

148; lawyers, 508; nonagricultural rural enterprises, 234, 259, 271; private sector, 256; productivity, 210; rural unemployment, 80, 81; service sector, 135,

136, 138, 238; shortage of skilled workers, 209, 221, 261-62, 309; state farms, 234; state vs. collective employment,

115-16; trade and transportation sectors, 337; trade unions, 420; urban unemployment, 309; women, 74, 135, 144-45; work units (danwei), 114-16

lakes, salt, 68

land reform, 41, 55, 112, 214, 267; administrative structure, 127-28;

Agrarian Reform Law of 1950, 41, 271-72; collectivization, 124-25, 272; and corruption, 128; decollectivization, 125-26, 127-28, 134; establishment of

state farms, 272; goals of, 124-25,

720
Index

271-72; mutual aid system, 214, 272;

social consequences of, 112, 133-34

language, 35; Han Chinese, 101; minority, 87; pinyin, 179; putonghua (common

spoken language), 161, 179; reform

plan, 179; spoken, 102; telegraph trans- mission of, 367; written, 102, 179 Lanzhou, 561; industry, 314 Lao Zi (Old Master), 10 Laos, military ties with, 580

leadership, 413, 415; ancient kings, 6; collective, 411, 450-52, 463; constitutional framework, 423; cult of personality, 451; need for central control, 462-63;

prohibition of cults, 411; succession

issue, 465; tianming doctrine, 6 Leading Group for Science and Technology, 394 League of Left- Wing Writers, 188 League of Nations, 36

Legal Affairs Commission, 519

legal statutes: civil cases, 521; counterrevolutionary activities, 537; criminal, 518, 520-21, 537; Electoral Law, 519; of limitation, 520; Organic Law, 519

Legalism. See School of Law (fa) Legation Quarter, 29

Lhasa: airport, 364; riots, xxxix

li (propriety), 508

Li Bai, 187

Li Guixian, xxxix

Li Hongzhang, 25

Li Peng, xxxvii, xxxix

Li Si, 10 Li Teng-hui, xl Li Xiannian, xxxvii, xxxviii, 53, 413, 462; visit to United States, 495 Liang Qichao, 28

Liaohe, 327 Liaohe Basin, 326

Liaoning Province, 81, 234, 245, 309,

392; industry, xxiii, 308, 310, 324; textiles, 320

Liberation Army Daily. SeeJiefangjun Bao

Liberation Army Literature and Art. See Jiefangjun Wenyi

libraries and archives, 200-2; foreign access to, 202

Liji (Record of Rites), 186 Lin Biao, 45, 47, 48, 50, 57, 181, 213,

586, 590; death of, 51; "Long Live the Victory of People's War," 480, 496;

military coup by, 448; military policies,

51, 548; political involvement of, 549,

550; trial of associates, 56; "war prepa- rations" campaign, 550 Lin Zexu, 22

Linyi, 328

literacy, 110; adult classes, 178; rate, 179; rural areas, 159, 270

Literary Gazette. See Wenyibao Liu Shaoqi, 42, 46, 57, 448; chairman,

45; and the Cultural Revolution, 48, 49; economic policies, 213; Mao's

ideology and, 47; reinstatement of, 56

livestock, xxiv; dairy and poultry sector, 291; draft animals, 291; feed mills, 291-92; hogs, 291

local administration (see also government), 428-34; constitutional provisions, 428,

432; decision-making authority of, 429, 430-31; elections, 431; mass organizations, 432; people's congresses, 429-30;

reforms, 431-34, 436-37; special eco- nomic zones, 433; staffing reorganization, 435; standing committees, 429,

430; xiang (administrative towns), 429, 432 Long March, 416, 448, 545 Lu Xun, 188

Liida, 328; industry, 318; Soviet Union

naval base at, 489

Lunyu (Analects), 186 Luo Ruiqing, 527 Luoyang, 7, 13, 396; industry, 314, 319 Lushan, 45 Ma Ding. See Song Longxian

Ma-tsu. See Mazu

Macao, 21, 418, 500; arrangements for return of, 477-78; Joint Declaration on, 434

machine-building industry, 313-17; electric power equipment, 315; electronics equipment, 317; machine tools, 314-

15; metallurgical equipment, 316; modernization efforts, 314-15; plants, 314;

technological limitations, 313; transportation equipment, 315-16

Malaysia: military cooperation, 580; sovereignty claims, 65 Manchukuo, 36 Manchuria, 21; and Japan, 32; secession

of, 26; Soviet troops in, 26, 38 Manchurian Plain, 68 721
China: A Country Study

Manchus. 18-20, 29: and Hundred Days'

Reform opposition. 28: invasion of China. 4: and Russia. 21 "mandate of heaven." See tianming

Manual of the Mustard Seed Garden

{Jieziyuan Huazhuan), 195 manufacturing industry: building materials. 318-19; chemicals. 317-18: con- sumer goods. 322: food processing. 321-22: iron and steel. 310-13: machine building. 313-17; pulp and

paper. 319-20: textiles. 320-21 Mao Dun. 188 Mao Zedong, xxxii. 4. 5. 34. 167. 213.

215. 304. 445: agricultural policies. 277; as chairman, 42; and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 37. 39. 47; condemnation for Cultural Revolution.

57: death of. xxxiii, 52-53: earthquake

prediction interest. 382: and the econ- omy. 216: education policies. 47-48,

141-42: foreign policv. 477. 480. 481.

497; Great Leap Forward program. 44,

45: ideology, 446-47, 465-66; military

strategy. 545-46, 548; mobilization of peasantry. 35-36: "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." 181 . 514; opposition to legal system. 510. 514; personal security

force. 528: political style, 466: population growth policies. 75-76: Quotations from Chairman Mao. 49: reassessment of. 56. 409. 422. 447. 466; science and

technology policies. 378: self reliance

policies. 455: and the Socialist Education Movement. 47: and Soviet rela- tions. 488-89: "Yan'an Talks on

Literature and Art." 188 Mao Zedong Thought, xxvi. 37. 54. 410: and constitutional developments. 515; and foreign policy. 478-81: reassess- ment of, 446-47. 465-69: social values. 468

maritime shipping. See ports and shipping

Marshall, George C 39 Marxism-Leninism, xxvi. 410, 456: and

foreign policv. 478-81: under Mao

Zedong. 37: reassessment of, 446-47, 465-69 mass organizations (see also under names

of organizations). 418-21; constitutional framework. 422; local level, 432; mobilization of, 43; origins of. 114;

support for modernization program.

420, 421 Master Kong. See Confucius May Fourth Movement. 32. 35. 198 Mazu. 45 media. See communications

Meishan. 198 Mencius. 8. 186 Meng Zi. See Mencius

metallurgical industry. See mining industry

Miao people. 85 Middle East. 14. 16 Middle Kingdom, xxxi, 4. 475, 476

migration. See emigration; immigration:

internal migration

military technology. See defense industry

minerals. See mining industry- Ming dynasty. 18. 476; cultural develop- ments. 195: science and technology. 374-75 mining industry, 6. 324-26: coal, 260, 324; equipment production. 316: exports. 309: iron and iron ore. 7. 260. 324-25: mechanization level, 324;

resources, xxiii, 67. 325-26: technological innovations, 308; transportation, 324; uranium. 326

ministerial portfolios, xxxviii-xxxix;

agriculture, animal husbandry, and

fishery, 229, 278. 592; astronautics, 570. 574: coal industry, 390; communications. 356. 433: culture. 183. 198. 484; education. 157. 539: electronics industry, 390. 570: finance. 229. 243. 390. 483: foreign affairs. 483-84. 486; foreign economic relations, xxiv, 224,

230. 349. 350. 351. 483. 484. 488; for- eign trade. 224. 349: justice, 523: machine-building industry, 313; metallurgical industry. 313: national defense. 483. 484-85. 524, 547, 555, 559: nuclear industry-, 570: ordnance industry. 350. 570. 574: posts and telecom- munications, 364, 366; public health.

75. 90-91: public security, xxviii, 525, 529, 531, 592; radio, cinema, and tele- vision. 178. 196. 366: 440: railways, 316. 356: state security, 525, 533-34;

supervision. 410. 427: water resources and electric power. 229. 284. 330

minority nationalities (see also Han

Chinese), xxii; armed forces involve- ment. 566: assimilationist policies, 722
Index

87-88, 99-100; and border security, 86; economic assistance to, 86; education system, 159; government policy

towards, 87-88, 100-1, 430; and Han

dominance, 101; Kazaks, 84, 86, 88; Korean, 86; Miao, 85; Mongol, 86; radio services, 368; settlement patterns, 61, 84-86; Shan, 86; Tibetans, xxii, xxxix, 84, 85, 88; Uygurs, 84, 86; Yao,

86; Yi, 85; Zhuang, 85 Mo Zi (Mo Di), 10, 186 modernization movements (see also Four

Modernizations; Great Leap Forward);

effect of traditional attitudes, 105-6; Hundred Days' Reform, 28-29; role of education, 155-56; Self-Strengthening

Movement, 24-26 Moism, 10 monetary system. See currency Mongolian People's Republic, xl, 20; autonomy of, 31; boundary issues, 477; Chinese control of, 477; Chinese recognition of, 477 Mongols, 18, 86; invasion of China, 3-4, 16-17

Multi-Fiber Agreement, 348 Muslim Rebellion, 24 mythology, 3

Nan Ling, 69 Nanchang, 34; uprising, 545, 568

Nanjing, 13, 18, 24, 30, 34, 328; chemical industry, 318; military region, 561; research laboratory, 376; treaty of, 23; university, 184 Nanjing Regional Economic Cooperation

Association, 343 Nanning, 319 Nansha Islands, xl, 65, 576, 579

National Book Coordination Act of 1957, 200

National Conference of Party Delegates

(1985), 413, 415

national defense (see also armed forces), xxvii-xxviii, xxxvi-xxxvii, 543-93; for- eign cooperation, 579-82; foreign port

calls, 581-82; India and, 578; security

threats, 575-76; Soviet Union and, 576-77; Taiwan and, 579; Vietnam

and, 577-78

National Defense Council, 547

National Defense Industries Office, 391

National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission (NDSTIC),

305, 400; responsibilities, 390-91, 559, 569-70

National Defense University, 564

National Library of China, 201 National Natural Science Foundation,

399, 400

National Party Congress, xxvi, 50, 51-52,

53, 57, 412-13; eleventh, 409, 412;

twelfth, 412, 452, 465; thirteenth, xxxiv, xxxvii National People's Congress (NPC), 42,

45, 421, 424-26; committees, 410, 425; economic planning, 229, 239; elections, 410; Foreign Affairs Committee, 482;

foreign policy role, 482, 482-83; fourth, 52, 221; fifth, 54, 56, 57-58, 222; functions, 424; judicial role, 512-13, 518;

local-level congresses, 429-30; membership, 425; minority representation,

88; Organic Law of, 519; reduction of power, 515; sixth, 159; seventh,

xxxviii; Standing Committee, 425, 482

National People's Party. See Guomindang

National Revolutionary Army, 33 National Science Conference, 383-84, 384

nationalism (see also Guomindang), 33, 108, 180; and foreign policy, 476-78

natural disasters, 68

natural resources, xxxiii, 260, 309-10, 325-26 navy (see also armed forces), 544, 560; blue-water capabilities, 587; defense

expenditures, 569; force structure and

equipment, xxvii, 585-87; manpower,

546, 562; Naval Academy, 586; rank

system, 568; South China Sea activities, 579; Soviet assistance, 586; terms

of service, 566; uniforms, 568 NDSTIC. See National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 496

Nei Monggol Autonomous Region (see also Inner Mongolia), xxiv, 64, 71, 213, 234, 269, 270, 429; agricultural crops, 270, 290; economic subsidies, 86; housing conditions, 255; industry, 306, 318, 325; population, 78, 84, 85; supported

migration to, 81 Nei Monggol Plateau, 68

Nepal, 477 723
China: A Country Study

Netherlands, 501 New China Booksellers (Xinhua Shudian), 198 New China (Xinhua) News Agency, 199, 439 New Culture Movement, 32, 188; influ- ence of Western music, 193; Western

painting techniques, 195 "New Long March," 384 New Territories (see Kowloon)

New Zealand, 498

newspapers, 199-200 Nian Rebellion, 24 Ningxia-Hui Autonomous Region, 68, 86 Nixon, Richard M., 499; visit to China,

51, 367, 493 Nonaligned Movement, 502 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 501 North China Plain, 66, 68, 69, 283;

agricultural crops, 270, 288, 289; irri- gation needs, 284; population, 78 North Korea. See Democratic People's

Republic of Korea

Northeastern Economic Zone, 342 Northern Song dynasty, 15 Norway, 330 NPC. See National People's Congress

(NPC)

nuclear science, 330, 391; industry applications, 330-31; Soviet weapons agree- ment, 46; weapons production, 301,

306, 587-88

Office of the Science, Technology, and Armaments Commission, 391

oil and natural gas: exports, 326; foreign

explorations, 327; offshore exploration, 327, 328; pipelines, 328; refineries, 328; reserves, 310, 326, 327, 328; South China Sea, 579 Opium War, 22-23, 345

Organization of Petroleum Exporting

Countries, 502 Outer Mongolia. See Mongolian People's

Republic

overseas Chinese, 419; radio broadcasts to, 368; support for 1911 revolution, 29-30; United Front Work Department, 482

Pakistan, 64; boundary issues, 477; for- eign relations, 498; military ties with, 573, 580, 582

Palestine Liberation Organization, support for, 480 Pamir Mountains, xxi, 64, 67 Pangu, 5 paper industry, 319-20 PAPF. See People's Armed Police Force (PAPF)

Paracel Islands. See Xisha Islands Paraguay, 498

Pearl River. See Zhu Jiang

peasants (see also rural areas), xxxiii, 108-9; and the Chinese Communist Party, 42; community structure, 133- 34; family

life, 130-32, 139; mobilization of, 35-36, 43-44; settlement patterns, 61;

"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183-84,

457; stratification, 109 penal system. See crime and punishment

Peng Dehuai, 45, 54, 57, 548, 590 PengZhen, 46, 425, 429, 460, 462, 520;

judicial reforms, 519 Penghu Islands, 26

People's Armed Police Force (PAPF),

533, 544, 561, 562, 592-93

People's Bank of China, xxxix, 214, 243,

351, 483; economic planning role, 229, 240, 244

People's Communes. See communes

People's Construction Bank, 243, 244, 351

People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), 199, 431, 438

People's Insurance Company of China,

243, 352

People's Liberation Army (PLA) (see also armed forces), xxvii, 39, 220, 415; campaigns, 549, 551; and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 543; Chinese

People's Volunteers, 40; civilian atti- tudes towards, 557; Cultural Revolution and, 48, 49, 549-51; discord in, 50-51; 8341 Unit, 528; General Logistics Department, 556, 559, 561; General Political Department, 555, 559, 560-61; General Staff Department,

555, 559, 560; law enforcement responsibilities, 516-17, 527; manpower, 544,

562; newspaper, 199, 438, 560; origins, 545; promotion of professionalism, 51; rank system, 567-68; revolutionary

committees, 550; role in politics and

government, 464, 550-51, 555-56;

Sino-Indian border deployments, 578; 724
Index

Sino-Soviet border deployments, 577; uniforms and insignia, 568; weapons

production, 571

People's Literature Publishing House,

199

People's Publishing House, 199 petroleum, 260

Philippines: imports from, 295; military

cooperation, 580; sovereignty claims, 65

philosophical developments {see also Confucianism): Hundred Schools of Thought, 7-10; Neo-Confucianism,

16, 20 PLA. See People's Liberation Army (PLA)

police, xxviii, 507; Anti-Rightist Campaign mandate, 515; auxiliary units, 528; People's Armed Police Force, 533, 544, 561, 562, 592-93; powers and

responsibilities, 511, 515, 527, 529-32;

recruitment, 532-33; residential control, 530-31; secret police, 531; Soviet model, 527; training, 533; use of weapons and force, 532

Political Bureau, xxxvii-xxxviii; foreign

policy role, 482; membership, xxxvii, 413, 556; Standing Committee, 413, 451

political developments {see also Chinese Communist Party (CCP); govern- ment), xxvi, 445-69; cadre system, 434-37, 463-64; campaign against

"bourgeois liberalization," 461-62;

centralization, 42; collective leadership, 450-52, 463; decentralization of power,

445, 459-60; democratic centralism

principle, 411, 426, 454, 461, 520; di- rect elections, 461 ; economic emphasis,

54, 447; imperialism, 11-30; MarxismLeninism-Mao Zedong Thought, 410, 446, 447, 456, 465-66; militarization

of, 463, 464, 543; opening up policy, 454-55; political consciousness, 213;

political parties, 419- 20, 422; public

participation, 418-21, 461, 463; re- forms, 450-52, 453-55, 460-62; republicanism, 29-31, 39-40, 509; role of

ideology, 466-69; "spiritual pollution"

campaign, 457; stability vs. revolution, 447; transition to socialism, 41-43

Polo, Marco, 17 population, xxii, xxxiii, 61-62, 72-88;

birth control programs, 75-78, 131;

birth rates, 74-75; density and distri- bution, 78-84, 231; growth rates, 261;

infant mortality rates, 209; life expectancy, xxii, 90, 209, 240; minority

groups, 61; mortality rates, 74, 94; 1982 census, 61-62, 72-74; 1953 census, 41; urbanization, 81-83

ports and shipping, xxv, 21; construction

projects, 357; container ship fleet, 362; inadequacies, 356, 362-63

Portugal, 21; and Macao, 434, 477-78

postal services, 364-65; labor force, 236

procuratorates {see also judicial system),

xxvii, 518; elections, 520; functions, 511, 529; Organic Law of, 519-20

Production and Construction Corps, 575 Propaganda Department, 482

Protect the Emperor Society. See Bao- huang Hui

Protocol of 1901, 29

public order. See internal security

publishing industry, 198-99; nationalization, 198; restrictions, 198

Puyi, 30, 36

Qaidam Basin, 67, 327 Qiao Shi, xxxvii Qilian Shan, 67 Qin dynasty, 11, 13, 508, 525; cultural developments, 193 Qin Jianxian, 185 Qin Ling, 69, 268 Qing dynasty, xxxi, xxxii, 18-30, 365, 475, 509; cultural developments, 190;

legal system, 525-26; science and tech- nology, 374-75 Qing Zang Plateau, xxii, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71 Qingdao, xxv; industry, 305; textiles, 321 Qinghai Province, 65, 328; chemical

industry, 318; economic subsidies, 86; minority riots, xxxix; population, 78, 85; supported migration to, 81 Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. See Qing Zang

Plateau Qinghua University, xxii, 172 Qinhuangdao, xxv, 319, 328 Qinshan, 331 Qu Yuan, 186 Quemoy. See Jinmen

725
China: A Country Study

radio and television. See communications

Radio Beijing, 366, 368; foreign language

broadcasting, 368

railroads, xxv, 236, 357-58; imported

technology, 316; investments in, 315-

16, 358; passengers, 357 Railway Engineering Corps, 561, 575

rainfall, 71, 268 Rao Shushi, 42 Reagan, Ronald, 495 Record of Rites (Liji), 186 Red Army (see also People's Liberation Army (PLA)), 37; Long March, 36, 545; political alignments, 545; theatrical productions, 192 Red Flag. See Hongqi

Red Guards, 166, 220, 527. 550; Mao

Zedong and, 48-49; origins, 48 Reference Information. See Cankao Ziliao Reference News. See Cankao Xiaoxi reform movements. See modernization movements

religion, 145-46; anti-Christian campaigns, 28-29, 40-41; Buddhism,

xxxii, 13, 14. 16. 145, 146: Christianity, 146; and Confucianism, 104; and

the Cultural Revolution. 101; Islam,

17; Jesuits in China, 22: Lamaism

(Tibetan Buddhism), 17; Nestorians,

17; political organizations, 421; Protestants, 145; rituals, 146; Roman

Catholicism, 17, 22, 145; Taoism. 145. 146 Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). 199. 431. 438

Republic of Korea. 498

Republic of Vietnam (see also Democratic

Republic of Vietnam; Vietnam); and

France, 26; PLA actions, 551

research (see also scientific and technological developments): agriculture, 285-86; Chinese Communist Party role, 308,

382; colleges and universities, 391-92;

duplication of, 387; emphasis on applied

work, 382, 384; funding. 392; industry, 306-8; institutes, 387, 387-92; military

sector, 390-91; peasants mobilization

for, 382; planning, 392-93; in productive enterprises, 392

roads, xxv, 237, 357, 360 Roman Empire, 13 Romania, 501, 580

ru (School of Literati). 8

Ruijin, 36

rulers. See leadership

rural areas (see also agriculture; peasants): cadres, 127-28; class labelling, 125: community structure, 133-34; con- sumer services, 344; corruption, 128; education, 160, 162, 164; family organization. 126-27, 130-32; household

investments, 276-77; incomes, 257-59;

industrial enterprises, 331-32; marketing system, 277; marriage, 132; nonagricultural concerns, 232, 234, 278, 292, 294; regional inequalities, 455; and religion. 146; township govern- ments. 279 Russia (see also Soviet Union): imperialist

actions, 26; and Outer Mongolia. 31: trade with, 21; unequal treaties with. 490

san fan ("three anti") movement, 41. 512

san min zhuyi (Three Principles of the People). 29-30

satellites, 301. 306. 332. 366. 367. 390: ground stations, 367

Saudi Arabia. 498; military exports to. xli School of Law (fa). 8, 10, 508

School of Literati (ru), xxxi. 8 Science Society of China. 376

scientific and technical personnel, 386-87. 401-3; consulting work, 402; emigration of, 377; employment rewards, 398. 399; exchanges with Soviet Union. 378: job assignment system, 398, 402; job

mobility. 401-3: lowering of professional standards, 380; misemployment

of, 398; overseas training and research. 395. 396: professional bodies. 394-95: "reds" versus "experts," xxxiii-xxxiv. 379-82: shortages, 386, 404

scientific and technological developments

(see also research), xxvi, 373-404;

achievements, 373; in agriculture, 211,

231; ancient period, 12, 13, 14: applications to industry, 377-78, 398; commercialization of, 398-99, 400; coordinating

bodies, 393-95; emphasis on practical

benefits, 385; exchange agreements and

joint projects. 384. 396-97. 400-1.

403-4; funding. 398-99. 400: historical developments. 374-86: in industry. 211. 306-8: institutions, 376-77. 387-92: 726
Index

international ties, 384, 395-97; Joint Commissions, 378, 396; under Mongol rule, 17; organization/administration of, 379, 387-95; planning, 378, 384-85, 392-93; popularization of, 376, 395; pre-1949, 374-77; reforms,

xxxvi, 382-86, 397-403, 447; role of

politics, 383; 1950's, 377-79; separation of research from production, 378;

Soviet influences, 377-79, 385, 491; technology markets, 400^1; technology

transfer, xxiii, 378, 403-4; Western

influences, 24-25 Second Artillery Corps. See Strategic Missile Force "second revolution." See Four Modernizations

Secretariat, 409; foreign policy, 482; functions, 451; International Liaison Department, 482; membership, 415;

reestablishment of, 415, 451, 463

Self-Strengthening Movement, 24-26;

scientific developments, 375 Sha Yexin, 192 Shaanxi Province, 6, 36, 68, 213, 274,

357, 417; industry, 325 Shan people, 86 Shandong Province, 146, 270, 328, 343;

agricultural crops, 277, 290; industry, 325; and Japan, 31-32; textiles, 320 Shang dynasty, 5-6

Shanghai, 33, 52, 61, 81, 195, 199, 228,

237, 245, 348; aircraft production

plants, 316; education system, 159; import-export companies, 349; in- comes, 258; industry, xxiii, 235, 305,

314, 315, 318; population, 82; textiles, 320, 321 Shanghai Communique, 493 Shanghai Economic Zone, 342 Shanghai Municipal Library, 201 Shanghai People's Art Theater, 192 Shangwu Yinshuguan (Commercial

Press), 198, 199 Shantou, 34, 226, 348, 433 Shekou, 433

Shengli, 326, 327, 575 Shenyang, 159, 199, 245; industry, 305,

314, 316, 318; military region, 561; population, 78, 82 Shenzhen, 159, 226, 348, 433

ShijieJingji Daobao (World Economic Journal), 185

Shijing (Classic of Poetry), 186

shipbuilding, 316

Shuihu Zhuan (Water Margin), 546

Shujing (Classic of Documents), 186

Siberia, 21 Sichuan Basin, 69, 269; population, 78 Sichuan Province: agricultural crops, 290;

industry, 306, 315, 318, 324; natural gas reserves, 327; textiles, 320

Signal Corps, 575 Sima Qian, 12 Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty, 65

sinocentrism, 4, 6, 13, 475; and foreign

policy, 475-76

socialism. See political developments

Socialist Education Movement, 47, 153

society {see also cultural developments;

family life; Han Chinese; income; minority nationalities; religion; standard of

living), xxii, 99-150; attitudes towards government, 105-6; class structure, 15, 39; and communist party membership,

11*6-17; and Confucianism, 104-6; elite groups, 106, 107; ethnic tension, 101; government control, 112-14; guanxi (per- sonal connections) system, 122-24; in- equalities, 147, 149; language, 101; moral deterioration, 228; 1950's trans- formation of, 112-14; organizational

units, 114-16; partible inheritance sys- tem, 106; political life, 121; reeducation

of, post-Mao, 445; role of women, 143;

rural, 124-34; social stratification, xxxixxxii, 108-10; "spiritual pollution"

campaign, 183-84, 457; traditional cul- ture, 103-12; upward mobility, 109,

110, 112, 117, 120, 125; urban, 134-43;

urban-rural distinctions, 117-19, 212,

231; welfare programs, 115, 122; and work units, 120-24

Society of Righteousness and Harmony,

28-29

Somalia, 573, 580 Song Defu, 420 Song dynasty, xxxi, 14-16, 525; cultural developments, 187, 194 Song Jiaoren, 30 Song Longxian, 184-85 Song Yu, 186 Songs of Chu (Chuci), 186 Songhua Jiang, 326 South Africa, 498 727
China: A Country Study

South China Sea, 71, 544, 551, 576; oil reserves, 327; strategic importance of, 579

Southern Song dynasty, 15 Southwestern Economic Zone, 342

Soviet Union {see also Russia), 64; border

disputes, 21-22, 49, 64-65, 477, 489-90, 491, 492, 576; and Chinese

warlords, 32-33; economic assistance, 215; foreign relations, xxvii, 46, 474, 488-91; ideological differences, 489-90;

industrial assistance, 215, 302; invasion of Czechoslovakia, 49; labor force requests, 83; and Manchuria, 38; mili- tary cooperation, 547, 580; normalization of relations, 491; nuclear energy

assistance, 330; political support, 32-33; scientific and technical assis- tance, 306, 377-79, 396; as security

threat, 490, 544, 575-77; and Sino- Indian border dispute, 46; suspension

of aid from, 46; and Taiwan, 46; trade

with, 44, 295, 346, 353, 491; war reparations, 214

Spain, 21, 498

Special Economic Zones Office, 351

"spiritual pollution" campaign, 183-84, 457

Spratly Islands. See Nansha Islands Spring and Autumn {Chun Qiu), 186 Spring and Autumn Period, 7-10

Sri Lanka, military ties with, 580, 582

standard of living, 209, 250-59; clothing, 252, 254; cost of living, 257; food con- sumption, 251-52; government ser- vices, 136; and increased expectations, 147; minority areas, 86; regional variations, 117-18, 119, 259; rural society, 126-27; urban society, 117-18, 259

State Administration of Exchange Control, 351

State Administrative Council {see also State Council), 39

State Capital Construction Commission,

240

State Constitution of 1982 {see also consti- tutional developments), 421-24; articles

of, 422-24; civil rights, 521; economic

provisions, 228-29; foreign policy provisions, 434; legal reforms, 521-22;

local administration provisions, 428

State Council, xxvi, 42, 426; birth control activities, 75; economic role, 229,

239; Foreign Affairs Coordination

Point, 486, 488; foreign policy role, 482, 483; foreign trade organizations, 349, 351; Hong Kong and Macao Affairs

Office, 426, 434; and industry organization, 305; job contract system, 148; membership, 426, 427, 452; restructur- ing of, xxxviii; role in decision making,

451-52; science and technology responsibilities, 388; Special Economic Zones

Office, 426; task forces, 426-27

State Council Bulletin. See Guowuyuan

Gongbao

State Economic Commission, 229, 240,

278, 392; foreign trade role, 351;

science policy role, 390

State Education Commission, 153, 155,

157, 166, 176, 178, 484; research funding, 392

state farms, 234, 272, 278

State Import and Export Commodities

Inspection Administration, 351

State Machine-Building Industry Commission, 229, 305, 570

state-owned enterprises: farms, 234, 272, 278; income, 235, 255; industry, 235, 305; labor force, 309

State Planning Commission, 350, 392;

agriculture and, 278; economy and,

229, 240; foreign trade planning, 351;

science policy role, 390

State Science and Technology Commission, 385, 388, 402; responsibilities, 388, 390, 392; science policy role, 303, 390

State Statistical Bureau, 209; agriculture and, 278; economy and, 229, 240; labor

force statistics, 90, 386

stock exchanges, 245, 458

Strategic Missile Force (Second Artillery Corps), 544; equipment, xxvii; expenditures, 569; manpower, 562; nuclear

forces, 587-90 subway system, 358, 360 Sudan, military ties with, 573, 580 Suez Canal Authority, 362

Sui dynasty, 13-14 Sun Yat-sen, 29, 30, 32-33 Sun Yixian. See Sun Yat-sen Sun Zi, 545 Sungari River. See Songhua Jiang

Supreme People's Court, xxvi, 513, 515-16, 517, 523; military trial responsibilities, 524-25 728
Index

Taihang Shan, 66

Taipei, 39 Taiping Rebellion, 23-24, 25, 546 Taiwan, xxxii, 39, 45, 416, 418, 498, 544; and Chinese national defense, 579; and

Japan, 26, 499, 500; reunification goal,

xl, 478; as security threat, 576; sover- eignty claims, 65; Soviet stance on, 489; United States assistance to, 492 Taiwan Democratic Self-Government

League, 420

Taiyuan, 305, 314, 318

Talas, 14 Tanaka, Kakuei, 367 Tang dynasty, 14, 476; cultural develop- ments, 187, 194 Tangshan, 52, 68; earthquake, 222, 304, 312, 324; industry, 235, 312 Tanzania, 580 Taoism, 10; cultural influences, 187; Mongol persecution, 17 Tarim Basin, 12, 67, 327

taxation, xxxvi, 242; revenue sharing, 243

technological developments. See research;

scientific and technological develop- ments

technology transfer. See scientific and tech- nological developments

telecommunications. See communications

Television University, 369

televisions. See communications; con- sumer goods and services

textiles, 301, 304; cotton, 320-21; production, 320, 321; silk, 320, 321 Thailand, 295, 580 Third World (see also under names of

individual countries): arms sales to, 573; Bandung conference, 495, 496; China/Soviet Union competition in, 490; Chinese militancy in, 496; cultural

ties with, 497; foreign relations, 495-

98; military ties with, 332, 544, 580;

trade with, 354, 498

"three anti" san fan movement, 41, 512 Three Kingdoms (Wei, Shu, and Wu), 13 Three Principles of the People (san min

zhuyi), 29-30 Tian Jiyun, xxxix Tian Shan, 67 Tiananmen Square, 53, 54; demonstrations, 52, 516, 528

Tianjin, xxv, 24, 29, 38, 81, 228, 348; education system, 159; import-export

companies, 349; industry, 235, 305,

314, 318; population, 82; textiles, 321

tianming ("mandate of heaven"), 6, 8, 52

Tibet. See Xizang Autonomous Region

Tibetan people, 84, 85, 88

tithing. See bao jia Tongmeng Hui (United League), 29-30 Tongzhi Restoration, 25 topography, xxii tourism, xxiv, 17, 354; travel restrictions, xxxix

trade. See foreign trade; internal trade trade unions, 420; strike rights, 422-23

transportation, xxv, 209, 212, 236-37,

354-64; aircraft production, 316; auto- motive industry, 315; bridges, 361; civil aviation, 363-64; development projects, 304, 356-57; disruptions during

Cultural Revolution, 220; freight traffic, 355-56; inadequacies, 119, 354;

inland waterways, 355, 361-62; invest- ments in, 356; labor force, 236; mari- time shipping, 316, 356, 362-63;

non-motorized vehicles, 361; ownership and control, 356; passenger traffic, 356; post-World War II, 214; railroads, 315-16, 355, 357-58; roads, 355-56, 360-61; subways, 355, 358, 360

Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance, 40, 50, 489, 547; termination of, 55, 576

Treaty of Kiakhta, 21 Treaty of Nanjing, 23 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 21, 26 Treaty of Shimonoseki, 26 Triad Society, 21

tributary system, 13 Twenty-One Demands, 31-32

Ulanhu, 88 unemployment. See labor force United Front Work Department, 482 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United League (Tongmeng Hui), 29-30

United Nations (UN): economic and tech- nical assistance from, 502; and the Korean War, 40; membership of, 481, 497, 502; scientific activities, 396 United States: aid to Nationalist govern- ment, 38-39; Chinese students in, 83, 173, 375, 386; diplomatic recognition

by, 55; emigration policies, 83; foreign

729
China: A Country Study

relations with, xxvii, xli, 492-95; joint ventures with, 348; military ties with, 544, 581; normalization of relations, 51, 474, 490, 492, 493; nuclear energy

agreement, 494; "open door" Chinese

policy, 26, 28; scientific and technological cooperation, 308, 330, 396; security

ties, 494; technology transfer limitations, 495; Three Mile Island incident, 330; trade with, xxiv, 295, 353-54,

494, 495; troops in China, 38

universities and colleges (see also education), 166-67, 376; administration of, 168; admission rates, 170; adult stu- dents, 171; during Cultural Revolution, 221, 380; enrollment plans and

policies, 167, 169-73; funding of, 168-69; institutions, 171; minority

groups, 170, 171; political criteria for admission, 167; prestige, 169, 174; radio and television services, 440;

research, 391-92; scholarship and loan system, 173; staffing, 172; student exchanges, 222; study abroad, 173-74

University of Police Officers, 533

University of Public Security, 533 urban areas: administrative barriers, 118; ancient period, 15; cost of living, 257;

decentralization of power, 459-60; economic subsidies, 136; education sys- tem, 162; family life, 138-40; house- hold registers, 134-35; housing, 135, 136-38; reforms, 458-59; service sec- tor shortages, 136, 138 Uruguay, 498; diplomatic relations with,

xli Ussuri River. See Wusuli Jiang

Uygurs, 84, 86

Vavilov, Sergei I., 378 Vietnam (see also Democratic Republic of Vietnam; Republic of Vietnam), xl, 3, 13, 16, 18; border wars with, 55, 552-53; as security threat, 577-78;

sovereignty claims, 65; War, 492

Wan Li, xxxix wan xi shao campaign, 74 Wang Dongxing, 53, 55 Wang Hongwen, 50, 56 Wang Mang, 13

Wang Meng, 185 Wang Zhen, 449

warlords, xxxii, 13, 31, 509; opposition

to, 32-34 Warring States Period, 7, 186, 508; philo- sophical developments, 7-10 Water Margin (Shuihu Zhuan), 546

waterways, xxv, 69, 236-37; freight traffic, 361-62 Way (dao), 10 Wei Valley, 6 welfare programs. See society Wenyibao (Literary Gazette), 183

the West (see also under names of individ- ual countries), 20; adoption of Western

technology, 24-25; attitudes towards,

4, 51; cultural contamination, 455, 456;

cultural influences, 207; trade relation- ship, 21, 22; travel in China, 17 West Germany: foreign relations, 498;

labor force requests, 83; technology

imports from, 308; trade relationship, xxiv, 354 Western Europe (see also under names of

individual countries): Chinese students

in, 375; foreign relations, 500-1; mili- tary ties with, 544, 581; scientific cooperation, 396; trade relationship, 219, 354 Western Han dynasty, 344-45 Western Zhou dynasty, 7 Whampoa Military Academy, 33 White Lotus, 21

wildlife, 71-72 women, 143-45; armed forces, 565, 566; discrimination, 144-45; education,

143, 144; labor force, 74, 135, 144-45;

status, 143-44, 513 work units. See danwei (work units) World Bank, 160, 209, 314, 351, 373, 497; membership, 347, 502; research

assistance, 392 World Economic Journal. See Shijie Jingji Daobao World Intellectual Property Organization, 502 World War I, 31-32

writing system, 3, 6 Wu De, 55 Wu Di, 12, 193 wu fan ("five anti") movement, 41, 512 Wu Han, 48 Wu Xueqian, xxxix, xli 730
Index

Wuchang, 30 Wuhan, 34, 199, 245; industry, xxiii, 305, 306, 313, 314, 319; revolt, 586 Wusuli Jiang, 26, 49, 64, 576 Wuxi, 308

Wuxiandian Yu Dianshi (Journal of Radio

and Television), 196

xenophobia, effects of, 221 Xia dynasty, 5 xiafang (down to the countryside), 43-44; and school reform, 47-48 Xiamen, 159, 226, 348, 433 Xiamen Construction and Development

Corporation, 433

Xi'an {see also Chang'an), 6, 37, 199, 245; industry, 314, 316 Xianggang. See Hong Kong

Xie Fuzhi, 50, 56 Xinhua (New China) News Agency, 199, 439 Xinhua Shudian (New China Booksellers), 198 Xinjiang Military District, 592 Xinjiang-Uygur Autonomous Region,

xxii, 12, 26, 71, 234, 270, 328, 592;

agricultural crops, 290; economic subsidies, 86; ethnic tensions, 88, 101; housing conditions, 255; population,

78, 84; strategic importance of, 578; supported migration to, 81 Xisha Islands, 65, 576, 579; PLA actions, 551 Xizang Autonomous Region, xxii, 20, 40, 45, 65, 270; alleged human rights violations, xli; autonomy of, 31; control

of, 477; economic subsidies, 86; ethnic

tensions, 101; housing conditions, 255; minority discontent, xxxix, 88; PLA

activities, 546, 549; population, 78, 84;

strategic importance of, 578 Xun Zi, 8

Yalii Jiang River, 40

Yalta Conference, 38 Yan'an, 36, 37 Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art, 193 Yang Dezhi, 552 Yang Shangkun, xxxviii Yangtze River. See Chang Jiang

Yangzhou, 69

Yanshan, 392 Yao people, 86 Yao Wenyuan, 48, 50, 56 Yao Yilin, xxxvii, xxxix Yarlung Zangbo Jiang. See Brahmaputra

River Ye Jianying, 53, 55, 413, 551, 557 Yellow River. See Huang He

Yellow Sea. See Huang Hai

Yi people, 85 Yihetuan (Society of Righteousness and

Harmony), 28-29

Yijing (Book of Changes), 185-86 Yin dynasty. See Shang dynasty

Yin Shan, 68

yin-yang philosophy, 10 Ying He, 362 Yining Airport, 364 young people: armed forces involvement,

531, 561 ; and crime, 539; and the Cultural Revolution, 48-49; mass organizations, 161, 418, 420-21; support for Deng Xiaoping, 54 Young Pioneers, 161, 421 Yuan dynasty, 16-17, 475; cultural devel- opments, 190 Yuan Shikai, 28, 30-31

Yugoslavia, 501, 580 Yunnan-Guizhou Plateau, 66, 69; stan- dard of living, 119 Yunnan Province: agricultural crops, 290; economic subsidies, 86; industry, 325; population settlement, 84, 85

Zaire, 580 Zambia, 580 Zeng Guofan, 24 Zengmu Shoal, xxi Zhang Chunqiao, 50, 56, 551 Zhanjiang, 575 Zhao Ziyang, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 56, 409, 413, 450, 451; background, 450; and Chinese Communist Party, 461;

civil bureaucracy reforms, 434-35; eco- nomic policies, 450; foreign policy, 503; premier, 56, 450; science policy, 394,

397; "spiritual pollution" campaign,

457; visit to United States, 495

Zhejiang Province, 332; industry, 327;

textiles, 320, 321 Zhenbao Island, 49, 490 Zhongguo. See Middle Kingdom

731
China: A Country Study

Zhongguo Xinwenshe (China News Service), 199, 440 Zhonghua Shuju (China Publishing

House), 198, 199 Zhonghua Xinwenshe. See China News

Service Zhongyuan Basin, 328 Zhou dynasty, 6-7, 10; cultural develop- ments, 193 Zhou Enlai, xxxi, 39, 50, 57, 181, 215,

221, 304, 448, 545, 551; and the Cultural Revolution, 48; death of, 52, 222, 445; economic policies, 51, 213, 221, 222; foreign policy, 481, 483-84, 490, 496; Four Modernizations program,

52; nuclear energy policy, 330; and the People's Liberation Army, 50-51; pre- mier, 42; scientific policy, 382-83;

trade policy, 346 Zhou Weizhi, 182 Zhu De, 35, 57, 545; death of, 52 Zhu Houze, 185 Zhu Jiang, xxv, 69, 355 Zhu Jiang Basin, 330 Zhu Jiang Delta, 327, 343; population, 78 Zhu Xi, 16 Zhuang people, 85 Zhuang Zi, 10, 186 Zhuhai, 226, 348, 433 Zuo Zongtang, 25

732
Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550-65 Afghanistan 550-174 Guinea

550-98 Albania 550-82 Guyana

55O-44 Algeria 550-151 Honduras

550-59 Angola 550-165 Hungary

550-73 Argentina 550-21 India 550-169 Australia 550-154 Indian Ocean

550-176 Austria 550-39 Indonesia 550-175 Bangladesh 550-68 Iran 550-170 Belgium 550-31 Iraq 550-66 Bolivia 550-25 Israel 550-20 Brazil 550-182 Italy 550-168 Bulgaria 550-69 Ivory Coast 550-61 Burma 550-30 Japan

550-50 Cambodia 550-34 Jordan

550-166 Cameroon 550-56 Kenya

550-159 Chad 550-81 Korea North

550-77 Chile 550-41 Korea, South 550-60 China 550-58 Laos

550-26 Colombia 550-24 Lebanon

550-33 Commonwealth Caribbean, 550-38 Liberia

Islands of the 550-91 Congo 550-85 Libya 550-90 Costa Rica 550-172 Malawi

550-152 Cuba 550-45 Nlalaysia 550-22 CvDrus 550-161 Mauritania 550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-79 Mexico

550-52 Frn aHnr 550-49 1VXLII UL-CLI 550-43 Egypt 550-64 Mozambique

550-150 El Salvador 550-88 Nicaragua 550-28 Ethiopia 550-157 Nigeria 550-167 Finland 550-94 Oceania

550-155 Germany, East> 550-48 Pakistan 550-173 Germany, Fed. Rep. of 550-46 Panama

550-153 Ghana 550-156 Paraguay

550-87 Greece 550-185 Persian Gulf States 550-78 Guatemala 550-42 Peru
550-72 Philippines 550-62 Tanzania

550-162 Poland 550-53 Thailand 550-181 Portugal 550-89 Tunisia 550-160 Romania 550-80 Turkey

550-51 Saudi Arabia 550-74 Uganda

550-70 Senegal 550-97 Uruguay

550-180 Sierra Leone 550-71 Venezuela 550-184 Singapore 550-32 Vietnam

550-86 Somalia 550-183 Yemens, The

550-93 South Africa 550-99 Yugoslavia 550-95 Soviet Union 550-67 Zaire 550-179 Spain 550-75 Zambia

550-96 Sri Lanka 550-171 Zimbabwe

550-27 Sudan

550-47 Syria

irU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1989 -0- 242-444 00001





PIN: 004228-000