1

Filed 6/24/24 In re T.C. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re T.C.,

A Person Coming Under the Juvenile 

Court Law.

___________________________________

SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN 

SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

P.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A169859

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. DEP6464)

Appellant P.C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order 

terminating his parental rights as to T.C., following a Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.1 Father contends that the court 

erred in finding that T.C. was generally adoptable and in not applying the

beneficial relationship exception. We disagree and affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code unless otherwise specified.
2

I. BACKGROUND

A. Detention/Jurisdiction/Disposition Proceedings

On October 12, 2021, the Sonoma County Human Services Department 

(Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300 on behalf 

of then five-year-old T.C. He “was found to be in filthy condition, with grease 

and dirt caked onto his person, and a significant odor, as well as ingrown 

toenails.” The petition alleged that father failed to protect T.C. “from 

exposure to a chronic pattern of intimate partner violence against the child’s 

other father,” Thomas C., who was 80 years old at the time. As a result of 

father’s behavior, T.C. was alleged to be “at substantial risk of suffering 

emotional damage.” 

The petition also alleged that father failed to provide T.C. with a safe or 

adequate living environment “due in part to [] father’s mental health 

symptoms” and that T.C. “was kept ‘hidden’ in the family home, kept in 

garages and in cars despite the father owning multiple properties and renting 

them out.” The petition further alleged that Thomas C. was unable to 

provide for T.C.’s basic needs due to his age and physical decline.

In its detention report, the Department explained that T.C. was born 

via an unnamed surrogate in Nepal and that father was T.C.’s biological 

father. T.C.’s birth certificate does not list his biological mother. Thomas C. 

was married to father at the time of T.C.’s birth and adopted T.C. in 2016. 

The report noted that “[t]he fathers have an on-going pattern of domestic 

violence, and mutual allegations regarding abuse and neglect of [T.C.].” The 

report further noted suspected sexual abuse of T.C. as well as hazardous 

living conditions which threatened T.C.’s health and safety. The social 

worker who interviewed father observed that he “exhibited paranoid and 
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bizarre thoughts in discussion, and struggled to provide a linear narrative 

and remain present and oriented in time and place.” 

At the detention hearing, the juvenile court issued a detention order 

that removed T.C. from father’s and Thomas C.’s custody. The court also 

ordered DNA testing for father and a copy of T.C.’s birth certificate. 

In its November 2, 2021 jurisdiction report, the Department

recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petition and order a 

psychological evaluation of father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision 

(b)(2). The Department expressed concern for T.C.’s safety, noting that father 

“has unaddressed mental health and/or substance abuse issues that cause 

him to have paranoid thoughts, act violently towards Thomas [C.], and 

engage in arguments with various others, often when caring for [T.C.].” On 

December 17, 2021, Thomas C. passed away. 

At the March 18, 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the 

allegations in the Department’s petition to be true by a preponderance of the 

evidence and sustained the petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) 

and (c). The court offered reunification services to father and ordered that he 

complete two psychological evaluations. It also elevated father to presumed 

father status. 

In its disposition report, the Department recommended that the 

juvenile court declare T.C. a dependent of the court, order reunification 

services, and set a six-month review hearing. It also recommended the 

appointment of a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) for T.C. The 

Department noted that, pending the two court-ordered psychiatric 

evaluations, it would request termination of reunification services should 

father be found eligible for bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).
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The Department further noted that in September 2021, father was arrested 

for domestic violence and elder abuse. 

At the April 6, 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile court adopted the 

Department’s recommended findings and declared T.C. a dependent of the 

court. The court also concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not 

apply. 

On June 23, 2022, father filed a section 388 petition, requesting that

T.C. be returned to his care and custody or, in the alternative, that his visits

with T.C. be in person instead of by Zoom. In support, father claimed that he

had completed parenting classes and tested negative for all substances. 

Neither father nor his counsel appeared at the section 388 hearing. The

juvenile court found no changed circumstances and denied the petition. On 

August 31, 2022, the court appointed a CASA for T.C. 

B. Six-Month/12-Month/18-Month Status Reviews

On September 8, 2022, the Department submitted father’s 

psychological evaluation from April 29, 2022. The evaluation concluded that 

father “qualifie[d] for a bypass of services in that he has shown an inability 

and unwillingness to improve the quality of his parenting.” Among other 

things, the evaluation recommended that father be screened for dementia

and obtain alcohol and/or substance abuse support, individual therapy, as 

well as “parenting skills training.”

In its six-month status review report, the Department recommended

that reunification services be discontinued. The Department was concerned

that father would “continue to have significant mental health and/or 

substance abuse issues.” T.C. was attending individual therapy, and his 

therapist reported that T.C. was “pooping in his pants during many of the 

visits with his father and on zoom calls.” The therapist explained that this 
5

could occur when children “ ‘are feeling bigger feelings that they are not 

expressing verbally’ ” such as anxiety or stress. The Department noted that

father “has made some efforts to follow some of the elements in his case plan”

and has attended parenting classes and the CPI Dad’s Group. The 

Department also noted, however, that father refused to get a second 

psychological evaluation and that his psychological issues prevented him 

“from being capable of benefiting from services within the timelines of the 

Family Reunification Program.”

T.C.’s resource parents submitted a caregiver information form which 

reported that T.C. was doing great and “thriving in every aspect of his life.”

He occasionally referred to them as “ ‘mom’ ” and “ ‘dad’ ” and called himself 

their son. The six-month review hearing was continued multiple times

because father wished to substitute his attorney and because he contested 

the recommendations. In the interim, the Department filed a section 388 

petition, requesting termination of father’s reunification services and the 

setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The petition argued that father still 

refused to complete a second psychological evaluation and that T.C. was 

“thriving in the care of his resource parents.”

At the January 19, 2023 combined six/12-month review hearing, the 

juvenile court did not find that father substantially complied with the case 

plan but granted father an additional six months of services. On March 6, 

2023, the court granted the resource parents’ request for de facto parent 

status. 

In its 18-month status review report, the Department continued to 

recommend that father’s reunification services be terminated and a section 

366.26 hearing be set. The report stated that “when [T.C.] was with his 

father he missed a lot of school and was often exhausted, too tired to do any 
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work. Since being in his foster home [T.C.] arrived on time and was prepared 

to learn,” and “[t]he teacher reported that his mood improved so greatly that 

he was one of the most well-adjusted children in the class.” The CASA also 

reported that T.C. was “thriving in his resource home” and that he was 

“experiencing safety and stability” there. 

Although father attended parenting classes, the report concluded that 

“he has not been able to demonstrate . . . that he has gained the insight 

needed to understand and reflect how to change his behavior to address the 

safety concerns in this case.” Further, though father’s weekly supervised 

visits went well, T.C. was still going to the bathroom during every visit, 

which appeared to be “some sort of nervous response.” During one visit, 

father told T.C. that “he would be coming back home really soon and that he 

would be getting tons of presents.” This was after the social worker had 

asked father “to stop bringing presents to his visits for a few weeks.” T.C. 

told the social worker “that he would like to keep living with his foster 

parents because he felt safe there.” He also expressed that he would like to 

live with father, but when asked whether he felt safe with father, T.C. 

replied, “ ‘I don’t know, I don’t want to say anything bad about my dad.’ ”

At the contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court accepted 

the Department’s reports into evidence and took judicial notice of its court 

file. Father and the social worker both testified. After closing arguments, 

the court adopted the Department’s proposed findings and orders and set a 

section 366.26 hearing. 

C. Section 366.26 Hearing

The CASA and the Department both submitted reports before the 

section 366.26 hearing. The CASA received feedback from T.C.’s teacher that

the stability and support provided by his resource parents were “contributing 
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very positively to his current academic success and progress.” The CASA 

recommended that T.C. remain in his current placement. The Department

determined that T.C. was “likely to be adopted” and recommended 

termination of father’s parental rights and adoption as T.C.’s permanent 

plan. The Department evaluated T.C. to be “in good general health” and 

“developmentally on track for his age.” Mentally and emotionally, T.C. was

“generally stable” but could appear “unfocused, distracted, or dysregulated on 

occasion, which may be related to anxiety and his trauma history.”

With respect to whether T.C. would benefit from continuing his 

relationship with father, the Department observed that T.C. appeared “nonemotional about the relationship with his father” and “showed no concern . . .

when told his visits with his father would be decreased.” The Department 

concluded that father’s actions, including “bribing [T.C.] with gifts” and his 

“lack of physical boundaries [] during visits[,] . . . do not speak to a positive or 

healthy relationship that benefits [T.C.].” It further concluded that 

termination of father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to T.C. as he 

“has thrived in one stable placement” for the past two years. Meanwhile, 

father “failed to make substantial progress to ameliorate the issues that 

necessitated [T.C.]’s removal” and has been “unable or unwilling to view 

[T.C.]’s comfort or wishes as important or valuable.”

The Department determined that T.C. was an adoptable child with “no 

known needs that cannot be met with available interventions.” T.C. 

appeared “very comfortable with his caregivers and report[ed] he wants to 

remain in their care permanently.” The resource parents in turn were

“committed to providing [T.C.] a permanent home with them through 

adoption.” 
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On November 9, 2023, the resource parents updated the juvenile court 

that T.C. was “doing great” and was thriving in school. The CASA similarly 

reported to the court that T.C. was “really thriving,” has a lot of friends, and 

“has gained so much confidence” in the last two years.

On January 5, 2024, the juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing. 

At the hearing, the court received the Department’s section 366.26 report 

(366.26 report) into evidence and took judicial notice of its court file. The 

court also received into evidence a stack of photos from father, depicting 

moments father shared with T.C. before his removal. 

Father testified about his visits with T.C. and how T.C. looked forward 

to seeing him. He further testified that it would be to T.C.’s benefit to have 

continued contact with him because he is a “great dad who knows the needs 

of his son” and because T.C. “trusts and looks up to and loves and wants his 

dad to be around.” During closing arguments, the Department’s counsel

reiterated that T.C. did not have “a significant positive emotional 

attachment” to father and that father’s testimony focused more on what was 

best for him rather than T.C. T.C.’s counsel joined the Department’s 

argument and emphasized that T.C. was loving, affectionate, and “very 

adoptable.” Father’s counsel argued that T.C. should remain in foster care so 

his beneficial relationship with father could continue to grow.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated that it 

believed T.C.’s “long-term safety, [and] security, lies in adoption” as outlined 

by the Department’s findings. The court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that T.C. was likely to be adopted, terminated father’s parental 

rights, and ordered adoption as T.C.’s permanent plan. 

Father timely appealed. 
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II. DISCUSSION

Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that T.C. was 

generally adoptable and that the beneficial relationship exception did not 

apply. We find no error.

A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Adoptability Finding

As a threshold matter, father concedes that he has forfeited any 

challenge based on specific defects in the Department’s adoptability 

assessment. (See also In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [“While 

the parents may question whether substantial evidence supports the 

juvenile court’s findings of adoptability, by failing to object in juvenile court 

they have forfeited any challenge to specific defects in the report, such as 

omission of required content or insufficient discussion of required topics”].) 

In any case, even if there were defects in the report, which would go to the 

weight of the evidence, we do not find any defect “sufficiently egregious” so 

as to “impair the basis of a court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” (In 

re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) As a result, we only consider 

whether there is sufficient evidence to support the adoptability finding and 

conclude that there is.

“Before terminating parental rights, the court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence that it is likely that the child will be adopted within a 

reasonable amount of time.” (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.)

A finding of adoptability is “a low threshold” and is reviewed for substantial 

evidence. (Id. at p. 1292.) Indeed, we “review that finding only to determine 

whether there is evidence, contested or uncontested, from which a 

reasonable court could reach that conclusion.” (Ibid.)

The issue of adoptability focuses on “whether the minor’s age, physical 

condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to 
10

adopt the minor. [Citations.] Hence, it is not necessary that the minor 

already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive 

parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ ” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 

1649.) Moreover, “a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt

generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable 

time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Id.

at p. 1650.)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that T.C. was 

likely to be adopted within a reasonable amount of time. At the time of the 

section 366.26 report, T.C. was seven years old and had been living with his 

resource parents for two years. The social worker observed that T.C. was “in 

good general health,” “developmentally on track for his age,” and was not in 

need of any special education services at school. The CASA described T.C. 

as “a happy, healthy, young boy” after spending a considerable amount of 

time with him. The resource parents likewise described T.C. as “ ‘smart’, 

‘sweet’, and ‘charming’ ” and were committed to adopting him. This evidence 

is more than sufficient to establish T.C.’s adoptability.

Father nevertheless argues that the adoptability finding is not 

supported by substantial evidence. He points to a section of the 366.26

report which stated that T.C. “can appear unfocused, distracted, or 

dysregulated on occasion, which may be related to anxiety and his trauma 

history.” According to the report, T.C. was also “reluctant to discuss his own 

feelings” and at times “demonstrate[d] a low self-concept, making negative 

comments about himself when he feels he has done something wrong.” T.C.

attended weekly individual therapy to address these issues. The report then 

concluded that T.C. had “no known needs that cannot be met with available 

interventions.”
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Contrary to father’s argument based on T.C.’s various “behavioral 

issues,” there is nothing to suggest that the juvenile court failed to consider 

these issues in determining T.C.’s adoptability. The court received the 

366.26 report into evidence and took judicial notice of its file in this matter.

More importantly, these behavioral issues do not negate the ample evidence 

of T.C.’s adoptability.

2 (In re K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292 [“It is 

irrelevant that there may be evidence which would support a contrary 

conclusion”].)

B. The Beneficial Relationship Exception Did Not Apply

Father next contends that the juvenile court erred in not applying the 

beneficial relationship exception. We disagree. 

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides a number of exceptions 

under which “the parent may avoid termination of parental rights in certain 

circumstances defined by statute.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 

629 (Caden C.).) The beneficial relationship exception is one of them. 

(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception is “limited in scope” and requires 

that the parent establish three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, 

and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such 

that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the 

2 In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, a case father relies on, is 

easily distinguishable. There, the court of appeal found no substantial 

evidence to support the juvenile court’s adoptability finding because there 

was no adoption assessment report and only conclusory statements that the 

minor was “ ‘found to be a proper subject for adoption’ ” and was “adoptable.” 

(Id. at p. 624.) By contrast, T.C.’s young age, the glowing statements from 

the social worker and CASA about his demeanor, behavior, and ability to 

thrive, and the willingness of his resource parents to adopt him provide more 

than enough evidence to support the juvenile court’s adoptability finding.
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child.” (Caden C., at p. 631, italics omitted.) It is the parent’s burden to 

establish these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 636.)

A finding that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply is 

reviewed under a hybrid standard. “The first two elements involve factual 

determinations to which the substantial evidence standard of review applies. 

[Citation.] The final step, determining whether termination of parental 

rights would be detrimental to the child, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” 

(In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 26.)

1. Father Failed to Establish the Second Element

The Department concedes that father met the first element of regular 

visitation and contact but argues that there is substantial evidence to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that he did not meet the second element. 

As to that element, the regular visits must have “continued or developed a 

significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re 

Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) A positive attachment is one 

that “is nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and 

stability.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) It is also “one

where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate 

and [whose] interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or 

indifferent.” (Ibid.) In making this determination, “courts often consider 

how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.” 

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) 

We agree with the Department that there is substantial evidence that 

T.C. did not have a significant, positive emotional attachment to father. 

Father argues that his attachment with T.C. was “substantial and positive”

as evidenced by the photos he submitted to the juvenile court and his 

testimony at the section 366.26 hearing. Specifically, father testified that
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T.C. looked forward to seeing him during their visits and that T.C. trusted 

him and could tell him anything. The testimony of father alone, however, is 

insufficient to establish the second element, as the inquiry focuses on the 

child and not the parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

Although father’s initial visits with T.C. “went fairly well,” father fails

to address several negative aspects of those visits which indicated that T.C. 

did not feel secure or stable with father. For example, T.C. frequently used 

the bathroom during the visits even though he was offered bathroom breaks 

beforehand. This was observed as a potential “nervous response to the 

visits, or an attempt to escape or take a break from the visit.” Moreover, 

T.C. “separate[d] easily from [father]” and “showed no concern or emotion” 

when told his visits with his father “would be decreased.” T.C. also did not 

ask his resource parents about father. Further, in April 2023, T.C. and his 

resource parents had an unplanned encounter with father at a community 

event. After father asked T.C. for a hug, he pulled T.C. onto his lap and 

asked if T.C. wanted to come home with him. T.C. pulled away and 

retreated to his resource parents. This evidence is enough to support the 

juvenile court’s finding that father did not meet the second element of the 

beneficial relationship exception.

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion as to the Third 

Element

As to the third element—“whether ‘the termination would be 

detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide 

whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose 

adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court determines

“how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in 

effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the 
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parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) The court must act in the child’s best 

interest and “decide[] whether the harm of severing the relationship 

outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would 

confer.’ ” (Ibid.) 

We initially note that because we find that father did not establish the 

second element, we need not consider the third element. But even if we did, 

we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s holding that the 

termination of father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to T.C. 

Again, father relies primarily on his own testimony that T.C. needed him

and that any instability T.C. endured in foster care would be outweighed by 

his contact with father. These assertions are belied by the record. Not only 

does father fail to show a significant, positive emotional attachment which 

would benefit T.C., he also fails to acknowledge the tremendous progress 

T.C. has made while living with his resource parents. 

Both the social worker and the CASA observed that T.C. was thriving 

in his new home. He attended school regularly, played a variety of sports, 

and had a lot of friends. He “display[ed] comfort and affection” with his

resource parents and asked to stay with them permanently. He reported 

feeling safe with them and said, “ ‘they take good care of me.’ ” By contrast, 

when asked whether he felt safe with father, T.C. responded, “ ‘I don’t know, 

I don’t want to say anything bad about my dad.’ ” 

Given this evidence, the juvenile court did not err in terminating 

father’s parental rights and finding that the beneficial relationship exception 

did not apply.3

3 Father contends that it is “difficult to analyze the juvenile court’s 

rationale” because the court did not engage in a Caden C. analysis. Father 

cites to no authority and we are not aware of any which requires the juvenile 

court to “recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all 
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III. DISPOSITION

The January 5, 2024 order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

of the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 

1131, 1156.)
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CHOU, J.

We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.

BURNS, J.

In re T.C. / A169859