589

Findings 

Emergency Management Along The Gulf Coast: Federal, State, And 

Local – Louisiana 

1. First responders in Louisiana played an indispensable role in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina.

2. Th e Louisiana state government failed to provide suffi cient resources to the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). Its planning, preparedness and response to Katrina suff ered as a result.

3. LOHSEP failed to ensure that state agencies adequately understood their emergency-response obligations. 

Emergency Management On The Gulf Coast: State And Local 

– Mississippi

4. First responders in Mississippi played an indispensable role in the response to Katrina. 

5. Mississippi’s use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact interstate mutual-aid arrangement was vital to its response to Hurricane Katrina. 

6. Many residents found shelter conditions quite diffi cult because of shortages of food and 

water, and sanitation problems. Th ough their challenges regarding mass care were formidable, state and local governments and the American Red Cross could have prepared better 

for a catastrophic disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. In addition, state and local 

governments in Mississippi could have been better prepared to shelter the special-needs 

population on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Hurricane Pam: Katrina Is Predicted

7. Hurricane Pam was an elaborate planning exercise that anticipated many of the challenges of responding to Katrina. 

8. Hurricane Pam and other planning exercises put federal, state, and local offi cials on notice of the potential consequences of a hurricane of the magnitude of Katrina. 

9. Louisiana should have given greater consideration to fi lling gaps in federal funding of the 

Hurricane Pam exercise.

Legacy Effects Of Environmental, Engineering Changes 

10. Changes in Louisiana’s coastal landscape, including wetlands loss and soil subsidence, 

have made New Orleans and coastal Louisiana more vulnerable to hurricanes and may have 

contributed to damage from Hurricane Katrina. Th ese changes are in large part an unintended consequence of human activities that have altered the natural fl ow of the Mississippi 

River and other coastal processes. 

i

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
590

11. Until addressed, the continued subsidence, loss of wetlands, and other changes to the 

coastal landscape will make New Orleans and other regions of the Louisiana deltaic plain 

increasingly vulnerable to hurricanes.

12. Th e building of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) and the combined Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW/MRGO) channel resulted in substantial environmental damage, including a signifi cant loss of wetlands which had once formed a natural barrier against 

hurricanes threatening New Orleans from the east. 

13. MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO provided a connection between Lake Borgne 

and Lake Pontchartrain that allowed the much greater surge from Lake Borgne to fl ow into 

both New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Th ese channels further increased the speed and 

fl ow of the Katrina surge into New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard Parish, increasing the destructive force against adjacent levees and contributing to their failure. As a 

result, MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO resulted in increased fl ooding and greater 

damage from Hurricane Katrina. 

Levees 

14. Confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty characterized the perceptions of the Army Corps 

of Engineers, the local levee boards, and other agencies with jurisdiction over the levee 

system of their respective responsibilities, leading to failures to carry out comprehensive 

inspections, rigorously monitor system integrity, or undertake needed repairs. 

15. Louisiana law imposes on local levee boards the responsibility to protect their respective 

jurisdictions from fl ooding and gives them extraordinary taxing authority to carry out that 

duty.

16. Congress tasked the Army Corps of Engineers with designing and constructing a levee 

system in and around New Orleans, but that responsibility does not diminish the Orleans 

Levee District’s statutory duty to protect its jurisdiction from fl ooding.

17. Th e Orleans Levee District performed modest maintenance of the levees, such as mowing the grass. Nevertheless, ambiguities, confusion, and disputes between the Orleans Levee 

District and Army Corps of Engineers over responsibility led to inadequate maintenance of 

the levee system and to a lack of eff ective emergency plans and preparations. 

18. Local levee districts, including the Orleans Levee District, did not have the engineering 

expertise or diagnostic equipment to ensure that the hurricane-protection systems provided 

the level of protection for which they were designed.

19. Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development failed to fully carry out 

its responsibilities under state statutes, such as the need to: (a) train levee-board members 

and their appointed inspectors or watchmen on how to care for and inspect levees; and (b) 

review the emergency plans of local levee districts to ensure that the levee districts could 

adequately respond to emergency situations. 

20. Th e Orleans Levee District focused time, attention, and resources on business interests 

unrelated to levees, such as casinos, restaurants, a karate club, and a beautician school, to 

the detriment of fl ood protection.

21. Inspections of the Lake Pontchartrain Project administered jointly by the Army Corps 

of Engineers and the Orleans Levee District failed to ensure that the project provided the 

level of protection for which it was designed and constructed.

 Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

591

22. Th e forensic teams investigating the fl ooding have concluded that: (a) the fl ood walls 

along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals failed in that they did not withstand 

the forces for which they were supposedly designed or constructed; and (b) fl ooding was 

exacerbated as many levees and fl oodwalls were breached because of design and construction defi ciencies, including not having protection against the scour and erosion caused by 

overtopping.

23. In designing, constructing, and maintaining the hurricane-protection system, the Corps 

did not adequately address: (a) the eff ects of local and regional subsidence of land upon 

which the protection system was built; and (b) then-current information about the threat 

posed by storm surges and hurricanes in the region.

24. For several years, the Corps has inaccurately represented to state and local offi cials and 

to the public the level of protection that the hurricane system provided. Th e Corps claimed 

the system protected against a fast-moving Category 3 storm even though: (a) there was no 

adequate study or documentation to support this claim; and (b) information known to or 

provided to the Corps demonstrated that the claim was not accurate. 

Preparing For The Storm: State And Local Governments

25. Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin failed to meet expectations set forth in the National 

Response Plan to coordinate state and local resources “to address the full spectrum of actions” needed to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Funding shortages and 

inadequacies in long-term planning doomed Louisiana’s preparations for Katrina.

26. Governor Blanco submitted an inadequate and erroneous request for assistance to the 

President and generally failed to ask the federal government for suffi cient assistance before 

the storm.

27. Th e Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned too many resources at Jackson Barracks 

in the lower Ninth Ward, where many of them were lost to fl ooding.

Preparing For The Storm: Federal Government

28. DHS, the agency charged with preparing for and responding to domestic incidents, 

whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed to eff ectively lead the federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina.

29. In advance of landfall, Secretary Chertoff failed to make ready the full range of federal 

assets pursuant to DHS’s responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP). 

30. DHS leaders failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal government’s preparation 

for Hurricane Katrina.

31. Secretary Chertoff failed to appoint a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), the offi cial 

charged with overseeing the federal response under the NRP, until 36 hours aft er landfall.

32. Th e Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), intended to coordinate the federal response to a catastrophe, was not activated until the day aft er landfall, and then added 

little value to the federal response eff ort, leaving federal agencies without an intermediate 

inter-agency dispute resolution mechanism.
592

33. Secretary Chertoff failed to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the NRP, 

which could have led to a more proactive federal response. 

34. Secretary Chertoff appointed a fi eld commander, Michael Brown, who was hostile to 

the federal government’s agreed-upon response plan and therefore was unlikely to perform 

eff ectively in accordance with its principles. Some of Secretary Chertoff ’s top advisors were 

aware of these issues but Secretary Chertoff has indicated that he was not. Secretary Chertoff should have known of these problems and, as a result, should have appointed someone 

other than Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial. 

35. Although the Hurricane Pam exercise, among other things, put FEMA on notice that 

a storm of Katrina’s magnitude could have catastrophic impact on New Orleans, Michael 

Brown and FEMA leadership failed to do the necessary planning and preparations:

a. to train or equip agency personnel for the likely needed operations;

b. to adequately prearrange contracts to transport necessary commodities;

c. to pre-position appropriate communications assets; or

d. to consult with DOD regarding back-up capability in the event a catastrophe 

materialized, among other defi ciencies. 

36. National Hurricane Center (NHC) and National Weather Service (NWS) warnings 

–including a video-conference appearance by NHC Director Max Mayfi eld – put FEMA on 

notice as of August 26, 2005, for Katrina’s catastrophic potential as the hurricane moved 

toward the Gulf Coast. DHS notifi ed the White House of that potential.

37. FEMA did not adequately pre-position critical personnel and equipment before landfall.

38. Despite pre-positioning unprecedented amounts of relief supplies, FEMA’s eff orts were 

inadequate.

39. FEMA’s inadequate preparations for Katrina were in part a consequence of insuffi cient 

long-term catastrophic planning.

40. Before landfall, it does not appear that FEMA asked the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to employ its assets. 

DHS’s Roles And Responsibilities

41. Statutory authorities and presidential directives establish the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) as the central federal entity for preparedness for and response to disasters.

42. Th e Secretary of Homeland Security has a clear duty to lead and manage the federal 

response to disasters such as Katrina. 

43. When eff ective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the aff ected local 

governments, the Staff ord Act provides for federal assistance upon the request of the state 

and local governments.

44. Under our system of federalism, state and local governments bear the primary responsibility for responding to emergencies. As such, they generally manage the response to an 

incident in the fi rst instance. 

45. Following a catastrophic disaster, the traditional mode of operation may not work if 

state and local governments are so overwhelmed that they can’t eff ectively make specifi c 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

593

requests for assistance. In such circumstances the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic 

Incident Annex provides for a more proactive federal response.

46. Th e United States Coast Guard distinguished itself during the Hurricane Katrina emergency by protecting its vessels and aircraft from the initial attack of the storm, by anticipating the critical missions it would need to conduct, by immediately moving in as soon as 

conditions allowed, and by heroically sustaining a massive eff ort that rescued more than 

33,000 people from danger of death. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

47. FEMA was unprepared – and has never been prepared – for a catastrophic event of the 

scale of Katrina.

48. FEMA had been operating at a more than 15 percent staff -vacancy rate for over a year 

before Katrina struck. 

49. FEMA’s senior political appointees, including Director Michael Brown and Deputy 

Director Patrick Rhode, had little or no prior relevant emergency-management experience 

before joining FEMA.

50. FEMA’s emergency-response teams were inadequately trained, exercised, and equipped. 

51. FEMA failed to adequately develop emergency-response capabilities assigned to it under 

the National Response Plan. 

52. FEMA had budget shortages that hindered its preparedness.

53. Michael Brown, FEMA’s Director, was insubordinate, unqualifi ed, and counterproductive, in that he:

a. sent a single employee, without operational expertise or equipment and from 

the New England region to New Orleans before landfall;

b. circumvented his chain of command and failed to communicate critical 

information to the Secretary; 

c. failed to deliver on commitments made to Louisiana’s leaders for buses;

d. traveled to Baton Rouge with FEMA public-aff airs and congressional-relations employees and a personal aide, and no operational experts; 

e. failed to organize FEMA’s or other federal eff orts in any meaningful way; 

and

f. failed to adequately carry out responsibilities as FEMA’s lead offi cial in the 

Gulf before landfall and when he was appointed as the Principal Federal Offi cial aft er landfall. 

Government Response: The Role Of The White House

54. Th e White House knew or should have known that Hurricane Katrina could turn into 

the long-feared “New Orleans Scenario,” and could wreak devastation throughout the Gulf 

region. Th e White House also may have been aware that FEMA was not prepared for such a 

catastrophe.
594

55. Th e President did take extraordinary steps to prepare for the storm – such as issuing 

emergency declarations in advance of landfall – but could have done more to marshal federal resources.

56. Despite receiving information from multiple sources on the extent of the damage in 

New Orleans, the White House does not appear to have been aware that levees had broken 

and the city was fl ooding on the day of the storm and, indeed, appears to have been under 

the misimpression, for some time, that the levees did not break until the day aft er Katrina 

made landfall.

57. Th e initial response to Katrina was halting and inadequate, in part due to poor situational awareness. Ultimately, the President and his team brought the full resources of the federal 

government to bear on the catastrophe.

Evacuations: Pre-Storm

58. Before landfall, Louisiana successfully evacuated people with vehicles who wanted to 

leave. 

59. Prior to Katrina, New Orleans offi cials did not fulfi ll a commitment in their emergency 

plan to provide transportation for people without vehicles.

60. Mayor Nagin wasted time in waiting to order a mandatory evacuation until Sunday 

morning, while his staff worked out details of the order that should have been settled long 

before the crisis. 

61. Th e City of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the federal government failed to 

retain drivers for the pre-landfall evacuation, even though city offi cials informed state and 

federal offi cials of this need over a month before landfall.

62. Governor Blanco missed opportunities to ask the federal government to help evacuate 

New Orleans before landfall. For example, she failed to ask for transportation assistance in 

her request for an emergency declaration, which was promptly granted by the President.

63. Th e state’s lead agency for transportation, the Louisiana Department of Transportation 

and Development, failed to meet its responsibility under the state’s emergency operations 

plan as lead agency for identifying, mobilizing, and coordinating transportation to assist 

with a pre-landfall evacuation.

64. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness did not exercise suffi cient oversight to ensure that the Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development would fulfi ll its responsibilities under the state’s April 2005 plan.

65. Th e federal government did not engage state or local authorities about transportation 

alternatives for those lacking means for pre-landfall evacuation.

66. Th e federal government could have off ered assistance with pre-landfall evacuation without waiting for requests from state and local government.

67. Hurricane Katrina revealed that consideration of the needs of those with pets should be 

a factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering.

Findings
595

Communications Voids

68. Hurricane Katrina resulted in a pervasive and widespread breakdown in communications, signifi cantly aff ecting the ability of fi rst responders and government offi cials in their 

rescue and response eff orts.

69. Th e National Communications System failed to develop plans to support fi rst-responder 

communications, assess the damage to the communications systems, and maintain awareness of the federal government’s available communications assets. Local governments either 

had inadequate plans or were unable to rapidly repair damage to their fi rst responder communications systems. 

70. Th e response to Katrina was also hampered by the lack of data interoperability – that 

is, responders’ inability to electronically share data including patient medical records and 

information needed to track missing children and adults, to coordinate search-and-rescue 

operations, and to verify eligibility for benefi ts.

71. During Katrina, many of the 911 systems citizens call fi rst during emergencies failed. 

Because of widespread destruction of call centers, many calls could not be rerouted; when 

they were rerouted, there were no systems in place to share critical data, for example, about 

the call’s point of origin. Offi cials also had no plans to provide additional 911 operators 

needed to fi eld thousands of calls for help.

72. When terrestrial-based communications networks were damaged or destroyed, some 

responders were able to use satellite phones for limited communications capabilities. For 

example, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency provided satellite phones to all of 

its employees in the fi eld; it also had a mobile communications unit with satellite capability. 

73. Th e private sector deployed massive resources to restore their communications infrastructure, but their eff orts were hampered because (a) government did not provide repair 

workers with uniform credentials to gain access to devastated areas; (b) government sometimes diverted fuel resources needed for generators; and (c) industry was justifi ably reluctant to go into some areas without security, a principal responsibility of the government. 

Lack Of Situational Awareness

74. Michael Brown willfully failed to report key information directly to DHS leadership, 

instead reporting straight to White House offi cials. 

75. Th e Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) failed to take timely steps to create a 

system to identify and acquire all available, relevant information. 

76. Th e HSOC failed in its responsibility under the National Response Plan (NRP) to 

provide “general situational awareness” and a “common operational picture,” particularly 

concerning the failure of the levees, the fl ooding of New Orleans, and the crowds at the 

Convention Center. 

77. On the day of landfall, senior DHS offi cials received numerous reports that should have 

led to an understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans, yet they were not 

aware of the crisis until Tuesday morning. 

78. Louisiana was not equipped to process the volume of information received by its emergency operations center aft er landfall. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
596

79. Lack of situational awareness regarding the status of deliveries created diffi culties in 

managing the provision of needed commodities in Louisiana and Mississippi.

Critical Infrastructure; ESF-15, Public Affairs

80. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that it is an enormous and complex task for government to assess damage to critical infrastructure and work with the private sector to coordinate its restoration. At the time Katrina struck, the Department of Homeland Security 

had not completed its planning and assessment work to prioritize the protection of critical 

infrastructure; this plan might have been helpful in coordinating the restoration of critical 

infrastructure. 

81. Federal and state offi cials failed to fulfi ll their responsibilities under federal and state 

plans to disseminate timely and accurate information to the public.

Search And Rescue

82. Federal, state, and local agencies rescued approximately 60,000 people in the aft ermath 

of Katrina. Of this 60,000, the Coast Guard missions alone accounted for 33,000 rescues. 

Th e Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries (W&F), along with the out-of-state agencies that assisted the Department through the EMAC process, accounted for 21,000 rescues. 

Th e Coast Guard, DOD and the National Guard conducted an extensive helicopter searchand-rescue mission. 

83. Th e NRP does not adequately address the organizational structure and the assets needed 

for search and rescue in a large-scale, multi-environment catastrophe. Under the NRP, 

Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF-9, Urban Search and Rescue) is focused on missions 

to rescue people in collapsed structures. ESF-9 gives the U.S. Coast Guard a support role 

for water rescue. However, the NRP does not provide a comprehensive structure for water 

and air rescues, which constituted a signifi cant portion of the necessary search-and-rescue 

missions in the Katrina response. 

84. Th e lack of a strategic intergovernmental plan to address search and rescue in a disaster 

environment that required tactical planning and organization, communications, air traffi c 

control, and the reception of victims, led to ineffi cient employment of resources, hazardous 

fl ight conditions, and protracted waits by victims in need of rescue. 

85. Th e City of New Orleans left the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) and the New 

Orleans Police Department (NOPD) unprepared to conduct water search-and-rescue missions by repeatedly denying budget requests by those departments for watercraft . Consequently, the NOFD entered Katrina with no boats, and the NOPD entered Katrina with fi ve 

boats.

86. Th e Louisiana National Guard stationed many boats and high water vehicles at Jackson 

Barracks, one of the lowest points in the city. Jackson Barracks fl ooded during Katrina and 

rendered many of these assets unavailable for search-and-rescue missions. 

87. Th e individuals working on behalf of federal, state, and local agencies to rescue victims 

worked in chaotic situations oft en at great risk to themselves. Yet search-and-rescue resources, including boats and helicopters, were insuffi cient despite their accelerated deployment through the fi rst week of landfall. 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

597

88. Despite the large number of helicopters in the Gulf by the end of the fi rst week, the 

number of helicopters capable of performing search and rescue – the most critical of all 

missions – was still inadequate for the number of victims in immediate need of rescue.

89. Regarding the need for additional boats, the state asked for rubber raft s, but FEMA did 

not provide them because FEMA decided rubber raft s would not be sturdy enough to maneuver in debris-laden water. However, state offi cials disagree and believe these raft s would 

have been valuable for such things as towing groups of rescued victims behind regular 

boats. 

90. Planning and coordination by the designated lead federal and state agencies, FEMA, and 

the Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, were inadequate and impaired the overall 

eff ectiveness of the search-and-rescue mission. 

91. Th e Hurricane Pam exercise predicted fl ooding in New Orleans and called for boat- and 

helicopter-based rescues, but emergency planners at all levels of government did not anticipate before landfall the need for large-scale rescue operations. 

92. FEMA did not equip or train its SAR teams for water search and rescue. FEMA SAR 

teams did not begin search-and-rescue missions until Tuesday morning.

93. Communications failures abounded at the local, state, and federal level, undermining 

the ability of agencies and rescuers to coordinate their work.

94. Th e Emergency Management Assistance Compact proved to be a valuable resource for 

Louisiana to obtain necessary equipment and teams. However, bureaucracy related to and 

confusion over the approval process delayed its utility to the State of Louisiana. 

95. Concerns about lawlessness forced some FEMA and NOFD search-and-rescue teams to 

pull back their operations temporarily because they lacked security.

96. Th e Department of Homeland Security was slow to deploy equipment that could have 

assisted in the response to Katrina. For example, the Department did not deploy, until 

nearly a week aft er the storm, pre-positioned equipment “pods,” each of which was capable 

of providing lifesaving equipment to 150 fi rst responders. DHS waited until at least two 

days aft er landfall to advise either Louisiana or Mississippi of their availability.

Search And Rescue For Mississippi

97. Th e number of communities and the geographic area aff ected by Katrina created manpower and logistical diffi culties for search-and-rescue operations, especially given the timesensitive nature of the work.

98. Th e amount of debris hindered search-and-rescue operations. Mississippi National 

Guard engineering unit and others oft en had to clear debris before rescuers could access 

areas to conduct operations. 

99. Th e collapse of communications along the Gulf Coast made coordination diffi cult from 

the start and presented challenges for the duration of search-and-rescue missions.

100. Despite the many challenges, search-and-rescue operations proceeded successfully 

along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, with operations beginning even before the fl ood waters 

had receded. Search-and-rescue responders and assets were eff ectively marshaled from 
598

the ranks of Mississippi communities, FEMA, EMAC states, the Coast Guard, Mississippi 

National Guard, and other sources.

Post-Landfall Evacuation

101. Th e failure to eff ect a complete pre-landfall evacuation amplifi ed the challenges of the 

post-landfall evacuation.

102. While the need for post-landfall evacuation of New Orleans was foreseeable, no level of 

government took the steps necessary to prepare for it.

103. FEMA Director Michael Brown failed to follow through on his promise to Louisiana 

offi cials to arrange for speedy delivery of buses to evacuate New Orleans.

104. Lack of communication among city offi cials resulted in the missed opportunity to use 

as many as 200 safely positioned city buses to begin the evacuation of New Orleans shortly 

aft er Katrina passed.

105. Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development’s lack of preparedness 

contributed to the delay in locating in-state buses to evacuate New Orleans.

106. Delays in arranging transportation to evacuate New Orleans led to unnecessary suff ering of people stranded there.

107. Provisions for sheltering were inadequate, and the State of Louisiana was at least partially responsible.

108. Concerns about security slowed the post-landfall evacuation.

109. No level of government addressed the evacuation of the Convention Center until Friday, two days aft er large numbers of people began congregating there. 

Logistics 

110. DHS leaders knew or should have known that FEMA’s logistics system suff ered from 

signifi cant and long-standing problems, yet they did not take suffi cient steps to fi x the system. 

111. Prior to landfall, FEMA failed to pre-stage enough commodities in either Mississippi 

or Louisiana.

112. FEMA’s logistics system failed out of the box, but with revisions and assistance from 

DOD logistics specialists, the FEMA system began to improve in the second week aft er 

landfall.

113. Louisiana’s failure to adequately prioritize its requests to FEMA wasted FEMA’s time 

and limited resources.

114. Louisiana’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness failed to eff ectively coordinate the distribution of commodities. 

115. Th e ARF and E-Team methods by which response resources were requested were 

incompatible and ill-equipped to handle a disaster of this magnitude.

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

599

116. FEMA lacked the ability to track the shipment of commodities. Th e lack of visibility 

disrupted the ability to respond eff ectively to the aft ermath of Katrina. 

117. Fuel is a crucial commodity during the response to any disaster. In Katrina’s immediate aft ermath, a shortfall in the fuel supply hindered the response as early attempts to 

mitigate the disruptions appear to have been inadequate.

118. Th e Louisiana National Guard (LANG) failed to anticipate and adequately plan for the 

large-scale commodity distribution necessitated by Katrina. LANG did not have enough 

manpower and equipment available to complete its distribution mission.

119. During approximately the fi rst ten days following the storm, the federal logistics system was unable to provide the requested level of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) rations, water, 

and ice in Mississippi. 

120. Th e commodity pipeline Florida set up to bring supplies into south Mississippi was 

crucial to alleviating additional suff ering in that area. 

121. Early in the response, Mississippi recognized how severely Katrina had disrupted the 

state’s infrastructure, and the resulting inability of many residents of south Mississippi to 

travel to the Points of Distribution to acquire life-saving supplies. Th e resulting “push” of 

supplies by the National Guard to residents was crucial to preventing additional hardship in 

south Mississippi. 

Medical Assistance

Federal

122. Th e federal government’s medical response suff ered from a lack of planning, coordination, and cooperation, particularly between the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security.

123. Despite its lead role as the primary agency in charge of coordinating the federal medical response, HHS did not deploy its on-scene response-coordination teams as rapidly as it 

should have, and lacked adequate emergency-coordination staff and resources.

124. Th e federal agencies involved in providing medical assistance did not have adequate 

resources or the right type or mix of medical capabilities to fully meet the medical needs 

arising from Katrina, such as the needs of large evacuee populations, and were forced to use 

improvised and unproven techniques to meet those needs.

125. Unlike Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, the U.S. Public Health Service is not organized or equipped to serve as medical fi rst responders and have no pre-established, readily 

deployable teams, personnel practices, transportation and other logistical diffi culties.

126. Although FEMA eventually deployed virtually all of its National Disaster Medical 

System resources – having started with only a single team – there was a greater need for 

such teams than could be fi lled, and those teams that did deploy experienced diffi culties in 

obtaining necessary logistical, communications, security, and management support.

127. Despite eff orts by both FEMA and HHS to activate federal emergency-health capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health Service as 

Katrina approached the Gulf Coast, only a limited number of federal medical teams were 

actually in position prior to landfall to deploy into the aff ected area, of which only one (the 
600

Oklahoma – 1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team) was in a position to provide immediate 

medical care in the aft ermath of the storm.

128. Although a shipment of medical supplies was dispatched from the Strategic National 

Stockpile to Louisiana late on Sunday, August 28, in response to a last-minute request from 

the City of New Orleans, it was not possible to get it to Louisiana before landfall, and no 

other federal medical supplies were pre-positioned in the Gulf region. 

Louisiana

129. Th e State of Louisiana failed to ensure that nursing homes and hospitals were incorporated into the state’s emergency-planning process, and as a result failed to ensure that 

they had eff ective evacuation plans or were genuinely prepared to shelter their critical-care 

patients in place, causing loss of life and avoidable suff ering.

130. Louisiana failed to plan for known emergency medical-response needs, such as poststorm evacuation of patients from hospitals or moving large numbers of patients to medical-treatment facilities.

131. Louisiana State University failed to carry out its responsibilities under the state emergency-operations plan to ensure adequate emergency preparedness for health-care facilities, and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness failed to 

ensure that its functions were implemented. 

Public Safety And Security

132. Actual and perceived lawlessness hampered the emergency response during Katrina.

133. In statements to the media, New Orleans offi cials perpetuated unsubstantiated rumors 

about violent crimes that had not occurred.

134. Th e NOPD was overwhelmed by Katrina. Under extraordinarily diffi cult circumstances, most of its offi cers performed their duties.

135. Th e NOPD failed to adequately provision personnel or coordinate fully the pre-staging 

and pre-positioning of its assets, which reduced its eff ectiveness.

136. DHS and DOJ’s failure to understand, plan for, and implement their ESF-13 responsibilities in natural disasters prior to Katrina led to delays in providing law enforcement 

assistance. 

137. Neither DHS nor DOJ planned for or coordinated their joint ESF-13 roles and responsibilities relating to a natural disaster. 

138. Th e lack of advance planning by DHS and DOJ delayed the deployment of federal law 

enforcement into the Gulf region and New Orleans, in particular. 

139. Inadequate planning by local offi cials for the evacuation of detention facilities and the 

identifi cation of back-up facilities for new arrests contributed to the public-safety problems 

in New Orleans.

140. Th ere was insuffi cient coordination of the processes that procured and deployed National Guard and civilian law-enforcement assistance. 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

601

Military Operations

Overall

141. Th e National Guard and active-duty military troops and assets deployed during Katrina constituted the largest domestic deployment of military forces since the Civil War. Th e 

National Guard and active-duty military response saved lives; provided urgent food, water, 

shelter, and medical care to many hurricane victims; and helped restore law and order, reestablish communications, and rebuild damaged roads.

142. Although the Department of Defense’s preparations for Katrina were consistent with 

its procedures and prior practices in civil-support missions, they were not suffi cient for a 

storm of Katrina’s magnitude. Additional preparations in advance of specifi c requests for 

support could have enabled a more rapid response.

143. Th e deployments of National Guard and active-duty forces were not well coordinated. 

A major cause of this was that there was no pre-existing plan or process for the large-scale 

deployment of National Guard forces from multiple states in response to a catastrophic 

disaster. NORTHCOM did not have full and timely information on the capabilities of National Guard troops deploying to the Gulf Coast. 

144. In part because of the lack of a pre-existing plan for large scale deployments, some National Guard units arrived before there was established an adequate command-and-control 

structure for the number of forces deployed, resulting in a failure to effi ciently employ all 

available troops. 

145. While some active-duty and National Guard units are designed and structured to deploy rapidly as part of their military missions, the Department of Defense is not organized, 

funded, or structured to act as a fi rst responder for all domestic catastrophic disasters. 

146. Th e dual military-command structure in Katrina exposed a fundamental tension 

– inherent in our system of government – between the principles of unity of command and 

federalism.

147. DOD has unique resources and capabilities to provide humanitarian relief in a catastrophe. FEMA’s failure to request these assets sooner delayed the Department’s delivery of 

these critical assets.

148. On the whole, the performance of the individual Coast Guard personnel, sailors, 

soldiers, airmen, and Marines – active, Guard, and Reserve – was in keeping with the high 

professional standards of the United States military, and these men and women are proud 

of their service to help the victims of this natural disaster.

Pre-Landfall Preparation

149. Th e Department of Defense prepared for Hurricane Katrina in a manner consistent 

with its interpretation of DOD’s role under the National Response Plan, which is to respond 

to requests for assistance from FEMA. However, this approach was inadequate to prepare 

for a catastrophe of the magnitude of Katrina. 

150. Th e Department of Defense’s preparations prior to landfall largely consisted of deploying Defense Coordinating Offi cers and Defense Coordinating Elements, identifying 

staging bases, identifying some assets and units for potential disaster support, participating 

in conference calls and meetings led by FEMA, monitoring the progress of the storm, and 

identifying available commodities.
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151. Based on their previous experience in hurricanes, prior to landfall a number of commanders took additional actions to prepare assets for deployment in advance of any specifi c 

request or order for those assets. 

152. NORTHCOM and First Army commanders requested that certain DOD assets be 

identifi ed before landfall in anticipation of requirements, but the Joint Directorate of Military Support failed to respond in a timely manner.

153. Because the Department has denied the Committee access to NORTHCOM’s plans for 

its preparation for and response to domestic catastrophes, even though they are not classifi ed, the Committee was unable to assess their status and adequacy. Th e Committee has 

received directly contradictory testimony as to whether these plans are complete, so it is 

unclear to what extent the Department, especially NORTHCOM, had planned its response 

to Katrina or whether the plans would have addressed the problems of coordination identifi ed by this investigation. 

Initial Response After Landfall

154. During the initial 24 hours aft er landfall, the Department of Defense lacked timely and 

accurate information about the immediate impact of Hurricane Katrina. DOD and DHS did 

not coordinate adequately for the use of DOD assets to make such assessments during this 

period. 

155. During this initial period aft er landfall, a number of military commanders within the 

services were proactive, identifying, alerting, and positioning assets for potential response, 

prior to receiving requests from FEMA or specifi c orders. Many of these preparations 

proved essential to the overall response; however, they refl ected the individual initiative of 

various commanders rather than a pre-planned, coordinated response as is necessary for a 

disaster of this magnitude.

156. During this initial period aft er landfall, the offi ce of the Joint Director of Military Support took the position that DOD should provide support or mobilize assets only aft er DOD 

had received, evaluated, and approved a specifi c request for assistance from FEMA. As a 

result, DOD did not act quickly to process and approve the fi rst request it received from 

FEMA for two helicopters for rapid needs assessment. 

157. On Tuesday, August 30, as DOD offi cials became concerned about the extent of the 

damage, DOD prepared and mobilized many assets to be able to respond quickly to requests for assistance and provide military support to the hurricane response. Th e Acting 

Deputy Secretary of Defense gave direction that eliminated much of the internal review 

and approval process, and encouraged the deployment of assets that commanders deemed 

potentially necessary prior to receiving requests for such assets. Th e Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff provided guidance to the Service Chiefs on Tuesday to exercise their own 

judgment in pushing assets forward. Th e services followed this guidance. Some commanders moved quickly to mobilize and position assets for potential deployments in advance of 

formal requests or approvals. 

158. Not all deployments were fully coordinated among the services, NORTHCOM, and the 

Joint Task Force. NORTHCOM did not have a complete picture of the movement of troops 

and resources within its area of responsibility.

Responses to FEMA’s Requests for Assistance

159. DOD’s normal, “21 step” process for accepting assignments from FEMA to assist in 

responding to a disaster is cumbersome and unlike the processes followed by all other fedFindings
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603

eral agencies. It also caused tension between DOD and FEMA and slowed certain of DOD’s 

initial eff orts in the response.

160. On Tuesday, August 30, in an eff ort to speed DOD’s response, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense suspended the regular approval process, including the requirement that 

formal written approval by the Secretary of Defense precede the actual execution of a mission. Following this decision, DOD appears to have responded quickly to FEMA requests 

for assistance. 

161. Despite the assignment of numerous DOD liaison offi cers, some FEMA offi cials still 

did not have a good understanding of the assets and resources that DOD could provide. 

Similarly, some FEMA offi cials did not have a good understanding of the DOD’s processes 

for responding to FEMA requests for assistance. 

162. In many instances, discussions between FEMA or DHS offi cials and DOD offi cials were 

necessary to clarify requests for assistance or to ensure that DOD would be providing the 

most eff ective resources in response to the request. Some FEMA offi cials believed that these 

discussions and DOD’s approval process took too long. 

National Guard Troop Deployments

163. Th ere is no established process for the large-scale, nationwide deployment of National 

Guard troops in response to a governor’s request for large-scale deployment of troops for 

civil support. 

164. During Katrina, neither the State of Louisiana, the State of Mississippi, nor the Emergency Management Assistance Compact was able to manage the large-scale deployments of 

National Guard troops from all 50 states and four other jurisdictions.

165. Th e National Guard Bureau solicited the rapid deployment of National Guard troops 

from all 50 states and four other jurisdictions. Although this process successfully deployed 

a large number of National Guard troops, it did not proceed effi ciently, or according to any 

pre-existing plan or process.

Federal Troop Deployments

166. Some active-duty units, including elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Second Marine Expeditionary Force, are maintained on alert for rapid deployment, and were 

placed on higher alert on Wednesday, August 31. Th ese forces could have deployed sooner 

into Louisiana had the President or the Department of Defense made a decision to deploy 

them. 

167. Due to the restrictions placed by the White House and DOD on the Committee’s ability to interview White House and senior civilian and military offi cials within DOD about 

deployment decisions, the Committee has been unable to conclude why the President 

ordered the deployment of federal active-duty troops on Saturday, September 3, including reasons why the President did not order the deployment of federal active-duty troops 

sooner. However, the Committee has been able to make fi ndings about DOD offi cials’ views 

on these topics. 

168. Th e deployment of National Guard forces before active-duty troops was consistent 

with the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which relies on the National Guard in the fi rst instance for civil support.

169. Th e large numbers of National Guard troops that were deploying into Louisiana were 

a major factor in the Department of Defense’s decision not to deploy additional active-duty 
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troops prior to Saturday, September 3. DOD offi cials said that the choice to deploy National 

Guard troops fi rst was correct because the National Guard is designated as the fi rst military 

responder under the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and because National Guard forces, unlike active duty troops, are not restricted from performing 

law-enforcement duties under the federal Posse Comitatus Act.

170. Federal and state offi cials did not coordinate well the requests and consideration of 

requests for National Guard and active-duty troop deployments. Th e Governor of Louisiana 

asked for 40,000 troops, but federal offi cials did not interpret this as a specifi c request for 

active-duty troops.

171. Local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering perceptions of the numbers of federal 

troops that would be arriving and the appropriate command structure for all troops, causing confusion and diverting attention from response activities. In Louisiana, a stronger 

unifi ed command might have avoided this confusion and diversion of attention.

Poor Controls And Decisions In FEMA Spending

172. Taxpayer dollars meant for relief and recovery were lost to waste and fraud.

173. Wasteful practices and program-control weaknesses that FEMA indicated it had 

identifi ed and was addressing aft er the 2004 Florida hurricanes were not remedied prior to 

Katrina.

174. Due to a lack of planning and preparation, much of FEMA’s initial spending was reactive and rushed, resulting in costly purchase decisions and utilization of no-bid, sole-source 

contracts that put the government at increased risk of not getting the best price for goods 

and services.

Failures In Design, Implementation, And Execution Of The National 

Response Plan

175. DHS did not eff ectively implement the National Response Plan, although it was released in January 2005 and required to be implemented in April 2005. 

176. Th e NRP lacked clarity on a number of points, including the role and authorities of 

the Principal Federal Offi cial and the allocation of responsibilities among multiple agencies 

under the Emergency Support Functions, which led to confusion in the response to Katrina. 

Plan ambiguities were not resolved or clarifi ed in the months aft er the NRP was issued, 

either through additional operational planning or through training and exercises.

177. Although DHS was charged with administering the plan and leading the response 

under it, DHS offi cials made decisions that appeared to be at odds with the NRP, failed to 

fulfi ll certain responsibilities under the NRP on a timely basis, and failed to make eff ective 

use of certain authorities under the NRP.

178. By not implementing the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) in response 

to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of DHS did not utilize a tool that may have alleviated 

some of the diffi culties with the federal response. Th e Secretary’s activation of the NRP-CIA 

could have increased the urgency of the federal response and led the federal government to 

respond more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state 

and local governments. 

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179. DHS had not completed the Catastrophic Incident Supplement referred to in the 

NRP-CIA, had not engaged in adequate catastrophic planning, and had not developed 

regional or situation specifi c plans that could have improved the usefulness of the NRP in 

a catastrophe. 

180. In the absence of additional operational planning and without adequate implementation, the NRP was insuffi cient to address this catastrophic event. 

181. Th e Incident Command System doctrine includes the concept of Unifi ed Command, 

which is designed to allow all agencies with responsibility for an incident to work together 

eff ectively. It establishes a process through which strategies and objectives are determined 

collectively so that agencies under diff erent jurisdictional control can work under a single 

incident action plan toward common objectives.

182. FEMA, as well as other federal agencies, did not have an adequate number of personnel familiar with and trained in the Incident Command System and the principles of unifi ed 

command to be able to respond to a catastrophe of the magnitude of Katrina.

183. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness suff ered 

problems such as inadequate funding; not enough staff ; insuffi cient training, (demonstrated 

by the need of Louisiana offi cials to hire consultants to train EOC participants and National 

Guard members in basic NIMS ICS courses two days aft er Katrina made landfall); widespread lack of understanding of NIMS ICS and unifi ed command; an overall lack of preparation, and a lack of emergency-management capacity to respond eff ectively to Katrina. 

Together, these were the primary reasons for the failure to establish unifi ed command and 

establish an incident-command structure in Louisiana. 

184. Mississippi established a unifi ed command with FEMA, conducted joint planning prior 

to landfall, and was able to broaden the unifi ed command and establish an incident-command structure aft er a short period of chaos following Katrina.

185. Senior leaders and individuals in Mississippi with responsibilities for emergency management had been given extensive prior training on NIMS ICS, and FEMA’s senior personnel in Mississippi possessed a very high level of knowledge and understanding of NIMS ICS.

186. Where and when personnel with experience and training on NIMS ICS were in control 

with an adequate number of trained support personnel, coupled with the discipline to 

adhere to the doctrine of NIMS ICS, it made a positive diff erence in the quality and success 

of implementing an incident command structure, establishing a unifi ed command, and the 

response.