a

GAO

United States Government Accountability Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee 

on National Security, Emerging Threats 

and International Relations, Committee 

on Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

September 2006 COMBATING 

NUCLEAR 

TERRORISM

Federal Efforts to 

Respond to Nuclear 

and Radiological 

Threats and to Protect 

Emergency Response 

Capabilities Could Be 

Strengthened

GAO-06-1015
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

COMBATING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear 

and Radiological Threats and to Protect 

Emergency Response Capabilities Could 

Be Strengthened 

Highlights of GAO-06-1015, a report to the 

Chairman, Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations, Committee on 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

The Department of Energy (DOE)

maintains an emergency response 

capability to quickly respond to 

potential nuclear and radiological 

threats in the United States. This

capability has taken on increased 

significance after the attacks of

September 11, 2001, because there

is heightened concern that

terrorists may try to detonate a

nuclear or radiological device in a 

major U.S. city. This report 

discusses (1) the capabilities and 

assets DOE has to prevent and 

respond to potential nuclear and 

radiological attacks in the United

States, (2) the physical security 

measures in place at DOE’s two

key emergency response facilities 

and whether they are consistent 

with DOE guidance, and (3) the

benefits of using DOE’s aerial

background radiation surveys to 

enhance emergency response 

capabilities. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends, among other 

things, that (1) DOE review the 

physical security measures at its 

two key emergency response 

facilities to determine whether 

additional measures should be 

taken to protect the facilities and 

(2) DOE and the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) evaluate

the costs, benefits, and limitations 

of making greater use of aerial 

background radiation surveys of

U.S. cities. DHS agreed and DOE 

neither agreed nor disagreed with

our recommendations. DOE raised 

concerns about our finding on 

security measures. 

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear 

or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams

to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to 

help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. These 

capabilities are primarily found at DOE’s two key emergency response 

facilities—the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, 

Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. 

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of 

physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 

capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological 

emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are not 

concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of critical 

capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories 

and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to quickly prevent 

and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities 

include the most highly trained teams for minimizing the consequences of a 

nuclear or radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can 

readily help locate nuclear or radiological devices or measure contamination 

levels after a radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have 

not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 

sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation 

surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare 

changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. 

cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological

attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the 

benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has 

mission responsibility for conducting these surveys, and there are no plans 

to conduct additional surveys. 

DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey 

Source: DOE.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1015.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Gene Aloise at 

(202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Contents

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to 

a Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States 8

DOE’s Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to 

Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities 14

Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation 

Surveys, They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor 

DHS Has Mission Responsibility for Funding and Conducting 

Them 20

Conclusions 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29

Appendixes

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy 32

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Table Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a 

Nuclear or Radiological Attack 9

Figure Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial 

Background Radiation Survey 22
Contents

Page ii GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Abbreviations

AEC Atomic Energy Commission

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

DOE Department of Energy

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

NEST Nuclear Emergency Search Team

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NYPD New York City Police Department 

RAP Radiological Assistance Program 

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Page 1 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

September 21, 2006 Letr

The Honorable Christopher Shays

Chairman

Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats

and International Relations

Committee on Government Reform

House of Representatives 

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Department of Energy (DOE) has maintained an emergency response 

capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats 

in the United States. This capability has taken on increased significance 

after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is heightened 

concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials 

into the United States and detonate a nuclear or a radiological dispersal 

device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a major U.S. city. Detonating 

either type of device would have serious consequences for our national and 

economic interests, including potentially causing numerous deaths and 

undermining citizens’ confidence in the government’s ability to protect the 

homeland. 

To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise to 

search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S. 

cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a radiological incident 

by, among other things, measuring the extent of contamination. After 

September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response 

capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical capabilities 

and assets are primarily concentrated at two key facilities, known as 

Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, 

and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two facilities house, among 

other things, specialized search teams that locate and identify nuclear and 

radiological devices; planes and helicopters used to measure 

contamination; and research and development laboratories that design 

specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be adequately
Page 2 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

protected with security measures to defend against potential terrorist 

attacks.1

One of DOE’s unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background 

radiation surveys. These surveys are conducted by using helicopters or 

planes equipped with radiation detectors to fly over an area and collect 

information on existing background radiation sources, such as granite 

statues in a city or medical isotopes located at hospitals. This can help DOE 

establish baseline radiation levels against which future radiation levels can 

be compared in order to more easily detect new radiation sources that may 

pose a security or public health threat. 

DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear and 

radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for 

developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to detect 

and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at U.S. 

points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is also 

responsible for helping state and local governments improve their 

capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological materials. If 

DHS cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials into 

the United States, it relies on DOE’s emergency response capabilities to 

search for and locate the materials. 

In this context, this report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets DOE 

has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological attacks in 

the United States, (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE’s two 

key emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with 

DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE’s aerial background 

radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities.

To address these objectives, we collected and analyzed documentation 

related to DOE’s emergency response capabilities and assets and the 

physical security guidelines and plans for its two key emergency response 

facilities. We interviewed officials from DOE’s Office of Emergency 

Response and the Office of Independent Oversight. We also interviewed 

program managers and security officials from the Remote Sensing 

1

DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its facilities. The levels of 

protection are specific to the type of security interests and the significance of the targets. 

They are provided in a graded fashion in accordance with potential risks. 
Page 3 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Laboratories at Nellis and Andrews Air Force Bases, and we received a tour 

of these facilities to view the physical security measures and obtain a 

demonstration of their radiation detection equipment. In addition, we 

analyzed documents and interviewed officials from DOE’s national 

laboratories at Brookhaven (in New York), Sandia (in New Mexico), and 

Savannah River (in South Carolina), where emergency response assets 

have been dispersed. To obtain information on aerial surveys, we analyzed 

documents and interviewed officials from the Counter Terrorism Bureau of 

the New York City Police Department who requested an aerial background 

radiation survey of New York City. We also collected documentation and 

interviewed officials from DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and 

Office of Grants and Training to obtain information on DHS’s role in 

conducting and funding aerial background radiation surveys. We 

conducted our work from January to August 2006 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear 

or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams 

to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices and to 

help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. These 

capabilities are primarily found at DOE’s two key emergency response 

facilities—the Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, 

Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. DOE also draws upon the 

technical expertise of scientists, engineers, and technicians from the 

national laboratories, including Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence 

Livermore. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of clandestine 

and discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors carried in 

backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect and locate 

radiological sources. In fiscal year 2005, DOE conducted about 30 search 

missions to address potential radiological threats or to assist local and 

state officials in monitoring large public events such as the Super Bowl and 

the State of the Union address. DOE officials cautioned, however, that it 

may be difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological 

materials. In order to deploy teams more quickly, since the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond the 

Remote Sensing Laboratories to include eight other emergency response 

sites across the country. In the event of a nuclear or radiological attack, 

DOE also maintains capabilities to minimize the consequences. DOE can 

deploy teams that use radiation-monitoring equipment, including sensors 

mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure radiation 

contamination levels and provide information to state and local officials on 
Page 4 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

what areas need to be evacuated. DOE can also coordinate federal 

activities related to monitoring contamination levels and mobilize medical 

personnel to treat injuries resulting from radiation exposure. 

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 

of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 

emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the 

country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE policy 

guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005, 

DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of physical security if 

their capabilities and assets exist at other locations and can be easily and 

quickly reconstituted. However, we found that there are a number of 

critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing 

Laboratories and their loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to 

quickly prevent or respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. 

Specifically, the capabilities and assets that are located only at the 

laboratories include, among other things, the most highly trained teams 

that help manage and minimize the consequences of a nuclear or 

radiological attack and the only helicopters and planes that can readily help 

locate nuclear or radiological devices and measure contamination levels 

after a radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets have not 

been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 

sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under DOE’s 

physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of physical security 

can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but no other physical 

security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at 

Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, vehicle barriers, or any 

other protective measures around the building, but DOE has determined 

that it meets physical security requirements. Furthermore, while the 

laboratories’ location on Air Force bases may appear to provide an 

additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force 

Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with federal government 

identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases 

multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their identification. Security 

officials told us that the laboratories are not designed to withstand certain 

types of terrorist attacks. However, officials have not taken any steps to 

strengthen security because of DOE’s assumption that their capabilities 

and assets are fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has not developed 

contingency plans that would identify capabilities and assets that would be 

used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were 

attacked. 
Page 5 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation 

surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used to compare 

changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. 

cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a 

radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. 

Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey of a major U.S. city 

because neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting 

the surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat, if a city had a completed 

survey, DOE could then conduct a new survey and compare baseline 

radiation data from the previous survey to identify locations with new 

sources of radiation. Focusing their attention on these new locations, law 

enforcement officials may be able to locate a nuclear or radiological device 

more quickly. In addition, using baseline information from a prior survey, 

DOE could assess contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist 

cleanup efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from the surveys 

could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts 

could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other areas up to preexisting levels of radiation rather than fully removing all traces of radiation. 

Without baseline information from the surveys, law enforcement officials 

may lose valuable time investigating pre-existing sources of radiation that 

do not pose a threat, and the time and cost of cleanup after an attack may 

increase significantly. DOE officials explained that surveys do have some 

limitations, noting that it is difficult to detect certain nuclear or wellshielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building 

being surveyed may also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological 

devices. 

Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked 

DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of the 

survey—about $800,000—was funded through DHS grants. NYPD officials 

indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because it identified 

more than 80 locations with radiological sources that required further 

investigation to determine their risk. In addition to identifying potential 

terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us that a secondary benefit of the 

survey was identifying threats to public health. While investigating the 80 

locations, they found an old industrial site contaminated with radium—a 

radiological material linked to diseases such as bone cancer—and used this 

information to close the area and protect the public. Despite these benefits, 

neither DOE nor DHS have embraced mission responsibility for funding 

and conducting surveys or notifying city officials that such a capability 

exists. DOE officials told us they are reluctant to conduct additional 

surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that are needed 
Page 6 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

for emergency response functions, and told us that it is DHS’s mission to 

protect cities from potential terrorist attacks. DHS officials disagreed with 

DOE, stating they do not have the expertise or capability to conduct 

surveys. However, DHS does have a program to help state and local 

governments detect illicit nuclear and radiological materials, and in fiscal 

year 2006, approximately $2.5 billion was available in grant funding to state 

and local governments for terrorism preparedness. In the absence of clear 

mission responsibility, there are no plans to conduct additional surveys, in 

part, because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of 

these surveys. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DHS for comment. DHS 

agreed with our recommendations and provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated, as appropriate. DOE neither agreed nor disagreed 

with the report’s recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our 

findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that 

physical security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be sufficient 

to protect them against terrorist attacks. While we recognize that DOE is 

complying with physical security requirements, the Remote Sensing 

Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of physical security, even 

though the laboratories have unique capabilities and assets that exist at no 

other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. DOE also 

provided technical comments, which we incorporated, as appropriate.

Background DOE’s predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a 

program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies in 

1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device in Boston 

unless he received $200,000.2

 Even though the threat turned out to be a 

hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the capability to quickly respond to a 

nuclear or radiological incident. To address this deficiency, AEC 

established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) to provide 

technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the 

Department of State, which is the lead federal agency for terrorism 

response outside the United States. Under the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI 

is responsible for investigating illegal activities involving the use of nuclear 

materials within the United States, including terrorist threats. The NEST 

program was designed to assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and 

2

DOE was established in 1977. 
Page 7 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

deactivating nuclear and radiological devices. However, the deployments of 

search teams were large scale and often slow because they were designed 

to respond to threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the 

device. 

With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 2001, 

DOE’s capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to nuclear and 

radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent terrorists from 

detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the core mission, DOE’s 

emergency response activities have expanded to include actions to 

minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological incident. For 

example, DOE maintains an aerial capability to detect, measure, and track 

radioactive material to determine contamination levels at the site of an 

emergency. DOE has used this capability to conduct background radiation 

surveys of most nuclear power plants in the country for the Environmental 

Protection Agency and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of 

an accident at a nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be 

performed to help determine the location and amount of contamination. 

There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from 

the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories dedicated to 

preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In fiscal year 

2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for emergency response 

activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the 

Office of Emergency Response manages DOE’s efforts to prevent and 

respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern that 

terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the 

United States. These materials could be used to produce either an 

improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known as a 

dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb made 

with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation experts 

estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have yields in 

the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT). 

A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the yield of the bomb that 

destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart of a medium-size U.S. 

city and result in thousands of casualties and radiation contamination over 

a wider area. 
Page 8 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with 

radioactive material,3

 using explosive force to disperse the radioactive 

material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. The extent of 

contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of 

the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and 

weather conditions. While much less destructive than an improvised 

nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could cause radiation 

sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic costs and 

psychological and social disruption associated with the evacuation and 

subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no terrorists have 

detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists placed a canister 

containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid-1990s. Although the 

device was not detonated and no radioactive material was dispersed, the 

incident demonstrated that terrorists have the capability and willingness to 

use radiological materials as weapons of terror.

DOE Has Unique 

Capabilities and Assets 

to Prevent and 

Respond to a Nuclear 

or Radiological Attack 

in the United States

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear 

or radiological attack in the United States. These include specialized teams 

and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or radiological 

devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear or radiological 

attack. To prevent an attack, search teams use a variety of clandestine and 

discreet methods, including the use of radiation sensors carried in 

backpacks and mounted on vehicles and helicopters, to detect and locate 

radiological sources. In the event of a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE 

would, among other things, use radiation-monitoring equipment, including 

sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure radiation 

contamination levels and provide information to state and local officials on 

what areas need to be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE’s capabilities 

and assets to prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack.

3

Different types of radioactive material that could be used by terrorists for a dirty bomb 

include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium-238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90.
Page 9 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a Nuclear or Radiological Attack

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information.

Purpose

Capabilities Mission

Prevent a nuclear 

or radiological 

attack or 

detonation

Respond to and manage 

the consequences of an 

attack

Search Search for and identify nuclear or radiological devices 

with radiation detectors mounted in backpacks, 

vehicles, and helicopters

X

Deactivation Deactivate and dispose of nuclear or radiological 

devices by viewing the components of a bomb with 

specialized equipment, deactivating booby traps, and 

packaging the devices for safe transport

X

Recovery of U.S. nuclear 

weapons

In the event of an accident involving a U.S. nuclear 

weapon, assess the damage, stabilize internal 

components, and package the weapon for safe 

transport

X

Radiological Assistance 

Program

First responders to search for devices with radiation 

detectors mounted in backpacks and on vehicles or 

to measure contamination levels after an attack or 

accident with environmental sampling and 

specialized devices

X X

Aerial detection Planes and helicopters with radiation detection 

equipment and sophisticated onboard computers to 

search for devices, conduct background radiation 

surveys, or measure contamination after a nuclear or 

radiological incident

X X

Computer modeling of radiation 

release

Prediction of the extent of contamination with 

advanced computer modeling of wind, topography, 

and atmospheric conditions

X

Consequence management Monitor and assess contamination from a large-scale 

nuclear or radiological attack and set up an 

operations center to coordinate response activities in 

the field

X

Medical support Quickly mobilize medical personnel to provide advice 

and assistance for treating injuries resulting from 

radiation exposure 

X
Page 10 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

DOE Has Specialized Teams 

That Use a Variety of 

Methods and Equipment to 

Prevent a Nuclear or 

Radiological Attack

To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams to 

search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These teams are 

manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on either civilian 

or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing Laboratories within 4 hours of 

notification from the FBI. To detect and locate nuclear or radiological 

devices, the teams use a variety of clandestine and discreet methods, 

including the use of radiation detectors carried in backpacks that silently 

transmit information to the searcher’s earphone and radiation detectors 

mounted in vehicles and helicopters. 

While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify 

devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation 

detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of time—

which is particularly important when the exact location of a device is 

unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once deployed, the 

searchers can also send information they are collecting from radiation 

detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and technicians at the 

national laboratories to help them identify nuclear or radiological material 

and determine whether the material poses a threat. If the search teams 

need additional support to cover a large area, they can train and equip local 

responders, such as law enforcement and firefighters, to conduct search 

missions. Up to 16 people can become proficient in basic search techniques 

in less than an hour. 

Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons 

scientists, technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories as well 

as the FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be deployed to 

deactivate the device and prepare it for safe transport away from populated 

areas to the Nevada Test Site.4

 This would involve, among other things, 

clearing booby traps and separating the high explosives from the nuclear 

material. It also would involve the use of specialized equipment, such as a 

portable X-ray machine, to peer under a bomb’s outer shell and view the 

bomb’s components, identify the device, and determine the best way of 

deactivating it. This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of 

nuclear and radiological weapon design information for identifying and 

properly deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely 

4

The Nevada Test Site is approximately 1,375 square miles—larger than the state of Rhode 

Island. Since it is isolated and far from populated areas, DOE uses the site for, among other 

things, hazardous chemical spill testing, emergency response training, conventional 

weapons testing, and waste management and environmental studies.
Page 11 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

transported, scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site 

would disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances, 

the team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be 

necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential spread of 

radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a nylon tent 

around the device and filling it with thick foam. 

Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond 

the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other 

emergency response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the 

country.5

 These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams traditionally 

have assisted state and local governments with responding to facility or 

transportation accidents involving radioactive material that may cause 

contamination and affect public health. Since these teams have experience 

and expertise in responding to nuclear emergencies—and are located in 

different regions across the country—their mission was expanded to 

include searching for nuclear or radiological devices. The RAP teams can 

drive to most cities in their geographic area and do not have to rely on air 

transport. In addition, since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are 

located on the East and West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster 

response to cities located in the center of the country. 

In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote Sensing 

Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search missions. Most 

of these missions involved assisting local and state officials in monitoring 

large public events, such as the Super Bowl and the State of the Union 

address, to provide assurance that no devices were hidden in the stands or 

inside the building before the event. A number of these missions also 

involved intelligence-driven searches to address potential radiological 

threats in U.S. cities. Despite the teams’ expertise and specialized 

equipment, DOE officials cautioned that it may still be difficult to detect 

nuclear or radiological devices. Radiation detection equipment may not 

detect nuclear materials with relatively low levels of radioactivity or 

radiological materials that are well-shielded. In addition, without good 

intelligence on the location of the device, search teams may not have time 

to find the device. 

5

The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams are located in nine different parts of the 

country, including one at the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews and eight additional 

emergency response sites. 
Page 12 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also 

responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon. 

A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians, health 

physicists, and safety professionals from the national laboratories and 

nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to respond within 4 hours 

of notification of an accident, such as the crash of a military airplane 

transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a scenario, the team would assess 

the damage, if any, to the weapon by using, among other things, 

radiography to examine the weapon’s internal structure, and how best to 

recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons contain chemically reactive 

materials and radioactive elements, great care must be taken in gaining 

access to them. For damaged weapons, the team has special techniques to 

stabilize the internal components. After weapons are safe to move, they can 

be packaged and prepared for transport. 

DOE Has a Critical Role to 

Play in Minimizing the 

Consequences of a Nuclear 

or Radiological Attack

DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or 

radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to 

respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from a 

terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine different 

parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the situation and 

determining what additional resources would be necessary to manage the 

emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site of an emergency 

within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological assessment of the 

area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial assistance to 

minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, and the 

environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use radiation 

detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination and help 

state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination.

Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would 

require the deployment of consequence management teams from the 

Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are 

responsible for setting up an operations center near the site of the 

emergency to coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment 

activities, conduct monitoring and assessment activities with specialized 

equipment, and collect and analyze data from the field on the type, amount, 

and extent of radiological release. This information would be used by state 

and local governments to determine what areas should be evacuated and 

how to properly respond to the emergency and by other federal agencies 

involved in decontamination and other cleanup activities. These teams 
Page 13 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

would monitor the area where radioactivity was released until the area was 

fully evaluated and the effects known. 

In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would 

collect information on the extent of contamination, using not only planes 

and helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also sophisticated 

computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and helicopters at 

the Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure, and track 

radioactive materials to determine contamination levels. The aircraft can 

provide real-time measurement of low levels of ground contamination. 

They can also provide detailed imagery analysis of an accident site. The 

planes are deployed first to determine the location and extent of ground 

contamination. The helicopters are then used to perform detailed surveys 

of any ground contamination.6

 This information is used to decide where to 

send ground monitoring teams. Based on information from the aircraft, 

scientists are able to develop maps of the ground hazards. In addition to 

their ability to track radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the 

aircraft have also been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material 

and to locate medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as 

occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not 

endanger the public.

Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by 

the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences 

of a radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes. 

Based on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions, the 

model can predict the extent to which the material can spread and estimate 

the amount of the release. As technicians receive information from field 

teams, they can update the model. 

Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from 

radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours a day 

and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and local 

governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts also 

track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct medical 

follow-ups. 

6

These helicopters are the same ones used by the search teams to find nuclear or 

radiological devices in urban areas.
Page 14 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

DOE’s Current Physical 

Security Measures May 

Not Be Sufficient to 

Protect Its Key 

Emergency Response 

Facilities

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 

of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 

their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed 

across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. However, 

we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets 

that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose loss would 

significantly hamper DOE’s ability to quickly respond to a nuclear or 

radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets have not been 

fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient 

for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

DOE Is Protecting Its Key 

Emergency Response 

Facilities with the Lowest 

Level of Physical Security 

Measures Allowed under 

DOE Guidance Because 

Some Capabilities and 

Assets Have Been Dispersed 

DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest level 

of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE 

officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency 

response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country 

and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance for 

safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005 required a 

review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security to 

determine whether they were “mission critical.” Mission critical facilities 

have capabilities and assets that are not available at any other location and 

cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under DOE guidance, facilities 

designated as mission critical must be protected at a higher level of 

physical security. For example, DOE Headquarters was designated as 

mission critical because the loss of decision makers during an emergency 

would impair the deployment and coordination of DOE resources. As a 

result, DOE strengthened the physical security measures around DOE 

Headquarters by, among other things, adding vehicle barriers around the 

facility. 

In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the capabilities 

and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found that they were 

not mission critical because if either one or both laboratories were 

attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily reconstitute their 

capabilities and assets to meet mission requirements. Since September 11, 

2001, DOE has dispersed some of the assets and capabilities once found 

exclusively at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has 

expanded its search mission to include the RAP teams that are located at 

eight sites across the country. These teams receive training and equipment 

similar to the search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as 

radiation detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also 
Page 15 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

participated in a number of search missions, including addressing potential 

threats at sporting events and national political conventions, or assisting 

customs officials with investigating cargo entering ports and border 

crossings. 

DOE Has Not Fully 

Dispersed the Capabilities 

and Assets at These 

Facilities, and Their Loss 

Would Significantly Hamper 

DOE’s Ability to Respond to 

Nuclear and Radiological 

Threats

Contrary to DOE’s assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories’ 

capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the 

country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique 

emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would significantly 

undermine DOE’s ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological threat. The 

critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the laboratories include (1) 

the teams that help minimize the consequences of a nuclear or radiological 

attack, (2) the planes and helicopters designed to measure contamination 

levels and assist search teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, 

and (3) a sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the 

location of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP 

teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or radiological 

devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories remain the most 

highly trained and experienced search teams.

The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24 

hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote Sensing 

Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized equipment for 

monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of contamination. 

They are responsible for establishing an operations center near the site of 

contamination to coordinate all of DOE’s radiological monitoring and 

assessment activities and to analyze information coming from the field, 

including aerial survey data provided by helicopters, planes, and ground 

teams monitoring radiation levels. Without this capability, state and local 

governments would not receive information quickly about the extent of 

contamination to assess the impact on public health and private property 

and how best to reduce further contamination. 

DOE’s emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect, 

measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or 

radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a limited 

number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at the Remote 

Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a sophisticated 

radiation detection system to gather radiological information and produce 

maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. It is anticipated that the 

planes would arrive at an emergency scene first and be used to determine 
Page 16 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

the location and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters would 

then be used to perform more detailed surveys of any contamination. 

According to DOE officials, the planes and helicopters can gather 

information on a wide area without placing ground teams at risk. Without 

this capability, DOE would not be able to quickly obtain comprehensive 

information about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be 

used by search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities. 

The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time than 

teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct 

secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels identified 

by the helicopter. 

The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a 

sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence 

management teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or 

radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and 

helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses 

this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of 

contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to 

quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response 

capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear or 

radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help find 

nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are detonated. 

DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that are 

unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE’s ability 

to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local governments 

would not receive information—such as the location and extent of 

contamination—that they need in a timely manner in order to manage the 

consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public health and 

property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and assets, DOE has 

not developed contingency plans identifying capabilities and assets at other 

locations that could be used in the event that one or both Remote Sensing 

Laboratories were attacked. Specifically, DOE has not identified which 

RAP team would assume responsibility for coordinating contamination 

monitoring and assessment activities in the place of the consequence 

management teams from Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly 

defined roles may hamper emergency response efforts. 

DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and assets of 

both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could mobilize 

and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or national 
Page 17 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, such as 

Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure 

contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing 

Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national laboratories 

would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large-scale 

contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do not 

have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and analyze 

data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In April 2006, 

DOE’s Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible for 

independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of DOE’s 

programs, reported that the RAP teams, during performance tests, could 

not quickly provide state and local governments with recommendations on 

what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public’s exposure to radiation 

and whether to evacuate contaminated areas.7

 In addition, DOE officials 

told us that, based on training exercises, the demands of responding to two 

simultaneous nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE’s 

capabilities to manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the 

consequence management teams at Nellis could not respond and there 

were multiple, simultaneous attacks, DOE’s capabilities to minimize the 

impact of a nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered.

DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked, their 

aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless the aircraft 

at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, DOE policy 

generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed at Andrews 

remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top government decision 

makers and other key government assets. During a nuclear or radiological 

emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited airborne capability to 

measure contamination levels. In addition, if there were multiple 

simultaneous events, there would be considerable delay in providing 

information to state and local governments about the extent of 

contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a time.

Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available to 

provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it with 

radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that DOE 

would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not designed 

7

Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, Independent 

Oversight Inspection of the Radiological Assistance Program (Washington, D.C., April 

2006).
Page 18 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE has a 

memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and other 

federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes for transport 

and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely that DOD or any 

other agency would provide them with aircraft during an emergency 

because those agencies’ priority would be to carry out their own missions, 

not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with helicopters, DOE does 

not have spare radiation detectors like those found on its own helicopters, 

and even if it did have spares, it would not have time to mount radiation 

detectors on the exterior of the aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation 

detectors, like those found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an 

airplane or helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be 

significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector. 

Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the 

actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to the 

Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on 

helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale 

contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the 

consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that all 

of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of consequence 

management teams and the planes and helicopters from the Remote 

Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it would be 

able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities and assets of 

the Remote Sensing Laboratories. 

Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching for 

nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have the 

most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the search 

teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams trained to 

conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate potential 

nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at a U.S. port. The 

search teams can also repair radiation equipment for search missions in the 

field. Furthermore, these search teams are more prepared than the RAP 

teams to enter environments where there is a threat of hazards other than 

those associated with radiological materials, such as explosives. If there is 

a threat of explosives in an area where a search mission would be 

conducted, these teams have specialized equipment to detect explosives 

and can more quickly request FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to 

complete their search mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent 

Oversight reported that the RAP teams did not always complete their 

search missions when there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP 
Page 19 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

team members from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams 

refused to perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a 

device was removed and others completed the mission only after certain 

safety criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams 

had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team 

members against their ability to complete the search mission because there 

was a lack of guidance on how to respond. 

Current Physical Security 

Measures May Not Be 

Sufficient to Protect the 

Facilities against Terrorist 

Attack 

Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in the 

lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences, walls, and 

doors.8

 According to DOE officials, a facility can have, at a minimum, walls 

and doors and be in compliance with the guidance. Adding additional 

measures, such as fences and vehicle barriers, are under the discretion of 

the security officer in charge of the facilities. According to DOE security 

officials, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base exceeds 

current physical security requirements because DOE placed a fence around 

the facility and a vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These additional 

measures were taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing Laboratory 

was built, these measures were required.

In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base 

does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located along the 

executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries when they 

land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this route must 

meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of certain 

physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these limitations, DOE 

security officials told us that the laboratory still meets the minimum 

security requirements. According to these officials, the Office of 

Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing DOE’s emergency 

response capabilities, would have to classify the facilities as mission 

critical before more stringent measures would be required.

While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE 

guidance and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of 

classified government documents, these measures may not be sufficient to 

protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Security officials told us that 

current physical security measures at the Remote Sensing Laboratories 

8

DOE Order 470.4-2, Physical Protection (Aug. 26, 2005).
Page 20 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

have not been hardened or designed to withstand certain types of terrorist 

attacks. Security officials told us that the physical security measures 

protecting these facilities have not been strengthened because, if there 

were credible intelligence that the facilities faced the risk of terrorist 

attack, DOE could take additional measures to protect the facility, such as 

deploying protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access to 

the parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials would have 

to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In addition, under 

DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or substantial 

quantities of special nuclear material that could be used in nuclear 

weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other protective 

measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have nuclear 

weapons or special nuclear material, additional security measures are not 

required unless the facilities are classified as mission critical. 

While the laboratories’ location on Air Force bases may appear to provide 

an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force 

Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government 

identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards do not inspect 

every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air Force security 

guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should be searched. In 

fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no 

scrutiny of their identification, and their vehicles were never searched. 

Despite the Benefits of 

Conducting Aerial 

Background Radiation 

Surveys, They Remain 

Underutilized Because 

Neither DOE Nor DHS 

Has Mission 

Responsibility for 

Funding and 

Conducting Them 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background radiation 

surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can later be used to 

compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats 

in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure radiation levels after a 

radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. 

Despite the benefits, there has been a survey of only one major U.S. city. 

Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for funding and 

conducting surveys, there are no plans to conduct additional surveys or to 

inform cities about their benefits. 
Page 21 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Completing Baseline Aerial 

Surveys Can Later Help to 

Detect Radiological Threats 

in U.S. Cities and Measure 

Radiation Levels in the 

Event of a Radiological 

Attack

DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the 

location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing radiation 

levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from a variety of 

sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in buildings, statues, or 

cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; and areas treated with high 

amounts of fertilizer, such as golf courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted 

with external radiation detectors and equipped with a global position 

system to fly over an area and gather data in a systematic grid pattern. 

Figure 1 illustrates a helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting 

information on radiation sources in a city. 
Page 22 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation Survey

Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the 

helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians and 

scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high radiation 

concentrations, also known as “hot spots.” DOE uses helicopters rather 

than airplanes because their lower altitude and lower speed permits a more 

precise reading. While conducting the baseline survey, DOE ground teams 

and law enforcement officials can investigate these hot spots to determine 

whether the source of radiation is used for industrial, medical, or other 

routine purposes. DOE officials told us that this baseline information 

6

Hot spots

1

1

Hospital

Cemetery

Golf course

Industrial sites

Granite statue

Unknown radiation source

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

6

Source: GAO.
Page 23 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

would be beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials 

could immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or 

radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an 

emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts. For 

example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in 

Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law enforcement 

officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation sources and 

ensure the Mall area was safe for the public. 

Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect 

new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb threat, 

DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that radiation 

data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with new sources of 

radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a nuclear or radiological 

device would focus their attention on these new locations and might be 

able to distinguish between pre-existing sources and potential threats in 

order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device more quickly. Conducting 

baseline surveys also provides a training opportunity for DOE personnel. 

DOE officials told us that regular deployments helped to keep job 

performance standards high for pilots, field detection specialists, and the 

technicians who analyze the data. 

DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in radiation 

levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup efforts. A follow-up 

survey could be taken afterward to compare changes against the baseline 

radiation levels. This information can be used to determine which areas 

need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, DOD funded a survey of the 

area around the Pentagon in Northern Virginia in order to assist with 

cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or radiological attack. While no study has 

reliably determined the cleanup costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an 

urban area, DOE estimates that cleaning up after the detonation of a small 

to medium-size radiological device may cost tens or even hundreds of 

millions of dollars. DOE officials estimated that information from 

background radiation surveys could save several million dollars in cleanup 

costs because cleanup efforts could be focused on decontaminating 

buildings and other areas to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a 

baseline radiation survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to 

which they would have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely 

clean areas with levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings 

or hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive. 
Page 24 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have limitations 

and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or radiological devices. 

Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded 

radiological materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being 

surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness of detection systems. 

Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good intelligence to find a device. 

Law enforcement officials would need intelligence information to narrow 

the search to a specific part of a city. Lastly, according to DOE officials, 

baseline background radiation surveys may need to be conducted on a 

periodic basis because radiation sources may change over time, especially 

in urban areas. For example, new construction using granite, the 

installation of medical equipment, or the heavy use of fertilizer all could 

change a city’s radiation background. Despite these limitations, without 

baseline survey information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable 

time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating 

pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if there 

were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline radiological data 

would likely make the cleanup more costly and time consuming.

DOE Has Conducted a 

Survey of Only One Major 

City

In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to 

conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were 

aware that DOE had the capability to measure background radiation and 

locate hot spots by helicopter because DOE used this capability at the 

World Trade Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS 

provided the city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a 

regional radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to 

spend part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. 

DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, 

requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about $800,000. 

According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey 

exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant 

benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident. First, 

NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey, they 

identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological sources. Teams 

of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and technicians 

investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether they posed a 

danger to the public. While most of these were medical isotopes located at 

medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD officials, awareness of 

these locations will allow them to distinguish false alarms from real 

radiological threats and locate a radiological device more quickly. Second, 
Page 25 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

NYPD officers are now trained in investigating hot spots and they have reallife experience in locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now 

have a baseline radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts 

in the event of a radiological release. 

In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary benefit of 

the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of the over 80 

locations with a radiological signature was a local park that was once the 

site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD officials, the survey 

disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by large quantities of 

radium.9

 Brush fires in the area posed an imminent threat to public health 

because traditional fire mitigation tactics of pushing flammable debris into 

the middle of the park could release radiological contamination into the air. 

Investigating locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by 

the aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this threat, 

and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material. 

Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes 

over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide 

money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to 

get a better understanding of how and to what extent background radiation 

changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue identifying 

radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant training to their 

officers. 

Despite the Benefits, 

Neither DOE Nor DHS Has 

Mission Responsibility for 

Aerial Background 

Radiation Surveys, Which 

Has Discouraged Both 

Agencies from Informing 

Cities about the Surveys

Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither DOE 

nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting 

surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city officials of the 

potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a capability exists. 

According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is the only city where a 

background radiation survey has been completed. 

DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of 

additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that 

are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological 

emergencies. Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient 

funding to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, 

9

According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term exposure to radium 

increases the risk of developing diseases such as lymphoma, bone cancer, and leukemia.
Page 26 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

the emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was 

approximately $11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft 

maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on 

federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys. 

However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New 

York’s case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include costs 

associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the 

extra costs could not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to 

the city because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate 

money from year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, 

DOE officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland 

security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist 

attacks, not as part of their emergency response mission. However, DOE 

officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise, they 

would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost 

of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE’s equipment. 

DHS officials told us that it is not DHS’s responsibility to conduct aerial 

background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. DHS’s 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have the 

expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are DOE’s 

responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state and local 

governments’ efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological 

materials and to develop mobile detection systems. DNDO has not 

evaluated the benefits and limitations of background surveys and does not 

plan to conduct background surveys as part of this effort. DHS officials 

also told us that it is DHS’s responsibility to advise cities about different 

radiation detection technology and to help state and local officials decide 

which technologies would be most beneficial. However, DNDO does not 

currently advise cities and states on the potential benefits of background 

surveys. 

DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local 

governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic events, 

including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 2006, there was 

about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state and local 

governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could be used for 

radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, according to DHS 

officials, the agency has not received any requests for funding other than 

the 2005 request by New York City. While it is DHS’s responsibility to 

inform state and local governments about radiation detection technology, it 

has neither an outreach effort nor does it maintain a central database for 
Page 27 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

informing cities and states about background radiation surveys. DHS 

maintains a lessons-learned information-sharing database, which is a 

national online network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan 

and prepare for a terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of state 

and local governments to enter information into this database, and DHS 

officials told us they were not aware if New York City officials had added 

any information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS 

officials, it is DOE’s responsibility to inform cities and states about the 

surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them. 

In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to conduct 

additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in part, because 

DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys. 

Conclusions Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or injure 

many people and severely disrupt the nation’s economy depends, in part, 

on DOE’s ability to search for and deactivate a device with little or no 

warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure and the spread 

of contamination in the event of a nuclear or radiological explosion also 

depends, in part, on DOE’s capability to determine what parts of a U.S. city 

have been contaminated and provide this information to local and state 

governments to help evacuate citizens that are at risk of exposure and to 

administer medical aid. A number of critical capabilities and assets for 

preventing and responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at 

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to disperse 

emergency response capabilities and assets to other regions, the Remote 

Sensing Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE’s ability to search 

for and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize the 

consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and 

assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence 

management teams that provide information to state and local 

governments about the extent of contamination; the planes and helicopters 

used to locate lost or stolen nuclear or radiological materials and measure 

contamination levels; and a sophisticated mapping system that contains 

information on the locations of radiological sources in U.S. cities. In 

addition, the Remote Sensing Laboratories house specialized teams that 

are highly trained in clandestine search techniques and can conduct 

physically demanding search missions, such as maritime boarding. Despite 

the importance of the assets and capabilities located at these facilities, the 

Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at DOE’s lowest level of 

physical security. If DOE’s emergency response capabilities were fully 
Page 28 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

dispersed, then providing only minimal security may be sufficient. 

However, since several DOE emergency response capabilities remain 

unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories, we believe that the physical 

security measures around those facilities may not be sufficient to protect 

their capabilities. We recognize that physical protection measures may be 

costly and that DOE security officials must prioritize where to spend 

limited resources in a fiscally constrained environment. However, in our 

view, a modest improvement in security at the Remote Sensing 

Laboratories, such as installing vehicle barriers, would significantly 

enhance the protection of highly valuable assets against a terrorist attack. 

In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on all 

of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that remains 

underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These surveys 

establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to more quickly 

detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure changes in 

contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to better focus and 

reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and relatively low cost, there 

has been a survey of only one major metropolitan area. Since neither DOE 

nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for performing the surveys, 

they have not evaluated the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting 

the surveys for metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist 

attack. While DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the 

department is reluctant to encourage cities to request the surveys because 

it has a limited number of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally 

reserved for emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for 

assisting state and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or 

radiological attack and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve state 

and local governments’ capacity to do so, has not considered aerial surveys 

to be part of its efforts to protect cities against such an attack. With no 

agency assuming responsibility for informing cities about the benefits of 

these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an opportunity to be better prepared 

for a terrorist attack.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and used to 

prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or radiological attack, 

we are making the following three recommendations:

• The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response 

program within DOE, should review the physical security measures at 

the Remote Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional 
Page 29 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

measures should be taken to protect the facilities against a loss of 

critical emergency response capabilities or whether it is more costeffective to fully disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of 

the country. 

• The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security 

should evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting aerial 

background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially those 

that are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack; determine 

whether they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or 

radiological attack; and report the results to the Congress.

• If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security 

determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear 

or radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop a 

strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing this 

strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1) the 

costs and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing grant 

program for state and local governments or through other means and (2) 

ways to inform state and local government officials about the benefits 

and limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that these 

government officials can make their own decision about whether they 

would benefit from the surveys.

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their review 

and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither agreed 

nor disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns about one of 

our findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that 

the physical security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be 

sufficient to protect them against terrorist attacks. According to DOE, 

physical security measures at these two facilities are sufficient because (1) 

two senior-level managers diligently reviewed the physical security 

measures around the facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2) 

the laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these 

rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge that 

current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing 

Laboratories are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are 

protected at the lowest level of physical security. This means that a facility 

can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but no other physical 

security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at 

Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers, but 
Page 30 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

security officials told us that it still meets the minimum security 

requirements. Further, DOE’s justification for protecting the laboratories at 

the lowest level of physical security is that their emergency response 

capabilities and assets have been dispersed across the country and are not 

concentrated at the laboratories. However, although we found that DOE 

had dispersed some of its emergency response capabilities and assets, a 

number of critical emergency response capabilities and assets still exist 

only at the laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not 

been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 

sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

Second, the security officials responsible for developing security plans for 

the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force personnel to 

protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we reported, while the 

laboratories’ location on Air Force bases may appear to provide an 

additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews Air Force 

Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal government 

identification may gain entry. Furthermore, guards at these installations do 

not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as discussed in our report, GAO staff 

gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of their 

identification, and their vehicles were never searched. 

In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in performing 

additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE was 

concerned that existing mission requirements may limit DOE’s ability to 

conduct aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has limited resources 

to conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency does have the expertise 

and that there is funding potentially available under DHS’s grant program 

for state and local governments. If neither DOE nor DHS assume mission 

responsibility for conducting the aerial surveys and do not inform cities 

about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities will miss an important 

opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack. 

DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have limitations. 

For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-shielded 

radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in our report. 

However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey information from 

an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when 

searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre-existing 

sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if there were a 

nuclear or radiological attack, the lack of baseline radiological data would 

likely make the cleanup more costly and time consuming.
Page 31 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE’s NNSA are 

reprinted in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments, 

which we incorporated, as appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the 

Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and interested 

congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others 

upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

Gene Aloise

Director, Natural Resources

and Environment
Page 32 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Appendix I

Comments from the Department of Energy AAppenednxidexiIs
Appendix I

Comments from the Department of Energy 

Page 33 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism
Page 34 GAO-06-1015 Combating Nuclear Terrorism

Appendix II

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath, 

Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea, 

and Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report.

(360657)
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