UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4057

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ADRIAN PARKER, a/k/a Great One, a/k/a Rock,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, 

Chief District Judge. (3:10-cr-00087-FDW-4)

Submitted: September 10, 2013 Decided: September 13, 2013

Before DUNCAN, SHEDD, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Haakon Thorsen, THORSEN LAW OFFICES, Charlotte, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, 

William M. Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, 

North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Adrian Parker pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. § 846 (2006). Prior to the sentencing, Parker sought to 

withdraw his guilty plea based on a change in the law announced 

by this court in United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th 

Cir. 2011) (en banc), which reduced the statutory mandatory 

minimum applicable to Parker’s conviction. The district court 

denied Parker’s motion. The court sentenced Parker to 210 

months of imprisonment and he now appeals. Finding no error, we 

affirm.

On appeal, Parker argues that the district court 

abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea.*

 We review a district court’s denial of a motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 237 (4th Cir. 2007). A defendant 

seeking to withdraw his guilty plea bears the burden of 

demonstrating “‘a fair and just reason’” for withdrawal of his 

plea. United States v. Faris, 388 F.3d 452, 456 (4th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)). In deciding whether to 

 * Parker also argues that the waiver of appellate rights 

contained in the plea agreement should not foreclose his appeal. 

The Government, however, has not sought enforcement of the 

appellate waiver so we decline to consider whether Parker’s 

appeal would be foreclosed by the waiver. 
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permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, a district court 

should consider:

(1) whether the defendant has offered credible 

evidence that his plea was not knowing or not 

voluntary; (2) whether the defendant has credibly 

asserted his legal innocence; (3) whether there has 

been a delay between the entering of the plea and the 

filing of the motion; (4) whether the defendant has 

had close assistance of competent counsel; (5) whether 

withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and 

(6) whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court 

and waste judicial resources.

Faris, 388 F.3d at 456 (citations omitted).

We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the 

relevant legal authorities and conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion. The court properly considered the 

above-listed factors and did not err in denying Parker’s motion 

to withdraw his guilty plea.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district 

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED