alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Smith *v.*The State.

November 12, 1913.

Indictment for murder. Before Judge Thomas. Lowndes superior court. July 14, 1913.

*Patterson & Copeland,*for plaintiff in error. *T. S. Felder, attorney-general,*and *J. A. Wilkes, solicitor-general,*contra.

Lumpkin, J.

1. The fact that the presiding judge, in addition to charging the jury that the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, added the rule applicable to eases of circumstantial evidence, that the guilt of the defendant must be proved to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis, was not injurious to the defendant, on the assignment of error that there was no legal evidence to authorize such charge. If the case was one involving the rule as to circumstantial evidence, the charge was right. If not, it' was not injurious to the accused, as it gave a rule more favorable than he could claim.

2. There was no error in charging as follows: “Legal malice is an intent unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature in a case where the law would neither justify, nor to any degree excuse, the intention should the killing take place as intended. Legal malice is not necessarily ill will or hatred. It is an unlawful intention to kill without justification, or mitigation, which must exist at the time of the killing, but it is not necessary for that intention to exist for any length of time before the killing. A man may form the intention to kill, do the killing instantly, and regret the deed as soon as done.”

3. The court should have excluded, on objection, certain testimony that a witness owned a gun which was stolen from his house about the time when the homicide occurred, and that after the homicide he identified it in the possession of another witness to whom it had been delivered by a third person; there being no legal evidence to show that the gun so stolen was that which was used by the accused in the commission of the homicide, or was in his possession, or was connected with the crime in any way. But, under the uncontradicted evidence, this error will not require a reversal.

4. The verdict was supported by the evidence, and there was no error in overruling the motion for a new trial.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 

) 3:06cr191-MHT

SPRING M. DAWSON )

)

ORDER

This case is now before the court on defendant Spring

M. Dawson’s second motion to continue trial. In light of

the fact that the government has no objections to the

continuance motion and for the reasons set forth below,

the court concludes that the continuance motion should be

granted.

While the granting of a continuance is left to the

sound discretion of the trial judge, United States v.

Stitzer, 785 F.2d 1506, 1516 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,

479 U.S. 823 (1986), the court is limited by the

requirements of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.

The Act provides in part:

Case 3:06-cr-00191-MHT-CSC Document 22 Filed 05/21/2007 Page 1 of 3
2

“In any case in which a plea of not

guilty is entered, the trial of a

defendant charged in an ... indictment

with the commission of an offense shall

commence within seventy days from the

filing date (and making public) of the

... indictment, or from the date the

defendant has appeared before a judicial

officer of the court in which such

charge is pending, whichever date last

occurs.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). The Act excludes from the 70-day

period any continuance based on “findings that the ends

of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy

trial.” § 3161(h)(8)(A). In granting such a continuance,

the court may consider, among other factors, whether the

failure to grant the continuance “would deny counsel for

the defendant ... the reasonable time necessary for

effective preparation.” § 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv).

The court concludes that, in this case, a continuance

is necessary because Dawson is still in the process of

pretrial diversion, awaiting her pretrial diversion “work

up.” Thus, the ends of justice served by granting a

Case 3:06-cr-00191-MHT-CSC Document 22 Filed 05/21/2007 Page 2 of 3
continuance outweigh the interest of the public and

Dawson in a speedy trial. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendant Spring M. Dawson’s motion to continue

(Doc. No. 21) is granted.

(2) Defendant Dawson’s trial and jury selection are

continued to the criminal term of court

commencing September 17, 2007, at 10:00 a.m., in

Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr.

United States Courthouse Complex, One Church

Street, Montgomery, Alabama.

DONE, this the 21st day of May, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:06-cr-00191-MHT-CSC Document 22 Filed 05/21/2007 Page 3 of 3
Case 1:06-cv-00737-WKW-SRW Document 54 Filed 03/12/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 1:06-cv-00737-WKW-SRW Document 54 Filed 03/12/2007 Page 2 of 2
EXHIBIT 32.2 - CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
               RULE 13a-14(b)

In connection with the Quarter Report of Gallery of History, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended December 31, 2006 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Rod Lynam, Chief Financial Office of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge, that:

1.	 The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.	The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.



/s/ Rod Lynam
-------------
Rod Lynam
Chief Financial Officer

February 13, 2007
Second Department,

April, 1980

(April 2, 1980)

#### In the Matter of Peter C. Filiberto, Appellant-Respondent, v Roosevelt Fire District, Respondent, and Raymond Berkeley, Respondent-Appellant.

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to, *inter alia,*set aside an election held on December 11, 1979, for the office of Fire Commissioner in the Roosevelt Fire District, petitioner appeals from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated February 19, 1980, as dismissed the petition. Respondent cross-appeals from that part of the *573judgment which stayed the enforcement of the judgment pending appeal. Judgment reversed, with costs to petitioner, petition granted, election set aside, and new election ordered. Special Term erred in holding that it was without power to set aside the election and order a new one (see *Matter of Mansfield v Epstein,*5 NY2d 70). In an election case, a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 is the proper vehicle when there is no disputed fact question *(Matter of Mapes v Swezey,*278 App Div 959). Following the instant election, the Commissioners of Elections certified that 156 persons who voted in the election were not registered voters. (The petitioner lost the election by 60 votes.) The law is clear that a person must be registered to vote under the system of permanent personal registration in order to vote in a fire district election *(Tatay*v *Tatay,*349 F Supp 1300; Town Law, § 175). The case relied upon by Special Term, *Matter of Corrigan v Board of Elections of Suffolk County*(38 AD2d 825, affd 30 NY2d 603) is not applicable. That case involved a *general*election for the office of county legislator in which the petitioner commenced an article 78 proceeding to inquire into, *inter alia,*the legality of votes cast on the voting machines, and alleged irregularities in the conduct of the voting and post-election proceedings relating to the canvass and security of the ballots. However, the instant case involves a special fire district election which is governed by section 175 of the Town Law. Moreover, unlike in *Corrigan,*there are no allegations of widespread irregularities in the conduct of the election herein. Rather, the only issue here, which is a purely legal one, concerns the failure of the election officials to check the registration of the voters, as required by section 175 of the Town Law. Accordingly, the election must be set aside and a new election ordered. Titone, J. P., Mangano, Rabin and Martuscello, JJ., concur.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-4390

_____________________________

KHALAF MILLER,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.

Tatiana Salvador, Judge.

March 11, 2019

PER CURIAM.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROWE, and MAKAR, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Khalaf Miller, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley B. Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
1303.906 Remedies.       The designee authorized to determine whether a contractor has subjected an employee to reprisal and to determine the appropriate remedy is set forth in CAM 1301.70.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 1303.9 - Whistleblower Protections for Contractor Employees
1448.102 Policies.

The HCA shall establish procedures for processing and evaluating VECP's as prescribed in FAR

Subpart 48.1 and 369 DM, Value Engineering.

Parent topic: Subpart 1448.1 - Policies and Procedures
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                           <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                 3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>             DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                  MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                        689,351
<SECURITIES>                  524,829                   <F1>
<RECEIVABLES>                 99,137
<ALLOWANCES>                  0
<INVENTORY>                   0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              0
<PP&E>                        12,155,434                <F2>
<DEPRECIATION>                3,087,039
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                10,715,911
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         231,700
<BONDS>                       6,279,889                 <F3>
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>         0
<PREFERRED>                   0
<COMMON>                      3,378,681                 <F4>
<OTHER-SE>                    0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>  10,715,911  
<SALES>                       0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              485,615                   <F5>
<CGS>                         0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                 212,400                   <F6>
<OTHER-EXPENSES>              66,958                    <F7>
<LOSS-PROVISION>              0           
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>            137,304
<INCOME-PRETAX>               0
<INCOME-TAX>                  0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>           0
<DISCONTINUED>                0
<EXTRAORDINARY>               0       
<CHANGES>                     0
<NET-INCOME>                  68,953
<EPS-PRIMARY>                 0
<EPS-DILUTED>                 0


<FN>
<F1>   "SECURITIES" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN JOINT VENTURE
<F2>   "PP&E" REPRESENTS INVESTMENT IN REAL ESTATE [LAND AND
BUILDING]
<F3>   "BONDS" REPRESENTS MORTGAGES PAYABLE
<F4>   "COMMON" REPRESENTS TOTAL PARTNERS CAPITAL
<F5>   "TOTAL REVENUES" REPRESENTS RENTAL, INTEREST, AND OTHER
INCOME
<F6>   "TOTAL COSTS" REPRESENTS TOTAL EXPENSES LESS INTEREST
EXPENSE
<F7>   "OTHER EXPENSES" REPRESENTS INTEREST IN JOINT VENTURES' NET
INCOME/LOSS
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Company's Consolidated Balance Sheet dated December 31, 1998 and its
Consolidated Statement of Operations covering the period from October 1,
1998 to December 31, 1998 and is qualified in its entirety by reference
to such financial statement and notes thereof.

</LEGEND>

       
<S>                            <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                           12501
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    88039
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    6543479
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                         2434894
<DEPRECIATION>                                 1361715
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 8554217
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        1586267
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                          5918
<OTHER-SE>                                     6426365
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   8554217
<SALES>                                         628502
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                628502
<CGS>                                           237641
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   237641
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                394295
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               44222
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (28070)
<INCOME-TAX>                                     (8161)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             (19909)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (28070)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 31.2
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Craig E. Holmes, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Intervoice, Inc.; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b)  [paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986];  c)  evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and  d)  disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a)  all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and  b)  any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: January 10, 2005              /s/ Craig E. Holmes   Craig E. Holmes   Executive Vice President and
Opinion issued February 13, 2014

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-13-00638-CV

———————————

MOHAN TANWAR D/B/A STAR FOOD MART, Appellant

V.

DIXIE FARM TEXACO, INC. D/B/A CITYWIDE ATM, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1015589

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Mohan Tanwar d/b/a Star Food Mart, has failed to timely file a 

brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.6(a) (governing time to file brief), 38.8(a) (governing 

failure of appellant to file brief). After being notified that this appeal was subject 

to dismissal, appellant did not adequately respond. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b) 
2

(allowing involuntary dismissal of case).

We dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution for failure to timely file a 

brief. We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Massengale and Huddle.
### SERVED: March 13, 2017
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC 

# ot.Pl\RiME~~i?J .

**1R~** 

## S?OR'

In The Matter Of: ) 

### ) ) ) ) ) 

## lU\1



# 1-\~R \S 

## p \2:



# ~3 

## OOCK£.1 

## O PE.Rf.l.l\0 I S Docket No. FAA-2016-4268 Peter Hantz Company Case No

. 2012S0700041 Respondent


### ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S SECOND UNOPPOSED REQUEST FOREXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO COMPLAINANT'S MOTION FORPARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT On January 31 , 2017, the Complainant filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgement. On February 15, 2017, the Respondent filed an unopposed request to extend the deadline for filing a response to Complainant' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment to March 15, 2017. On February 16, 2017, the request was granted. On March 8, 2017, the Respondent filed a unopposed request to again extend the deadline for filing a response to Complainant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, this time to March 29, 2017, in order to allow the parties to finalize settlement discussions.
Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. 

### §§ 13.205(a)(6) and 13.213(b), 

### IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. The Respondent's unopposed request is granted. 2. The Respondent's response to the Complainant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment shall be filed by March 29, 2017.

Attachment: Service List 

# -- DOUGLAS M. RAW ALD Administrative Law Judge

### SERVICE LIST

- BY U.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & 

### ONE COPY Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000 1



### ONE COPY Timothy I. 

### McCulloch, Respondent's Counsel 

### HINSHAW & 

### CULBERTSON LLP 2375 E. Camelback Rd. Suite 750 Phoenix, AZ 

### 85016 TEL: 602-631-4400 FAX: 602-631-4404 Ryan Landers, Complainant's Counsel 

### Enforcement Division, Southern Team Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region 1701 ColumbiaAvenue College Park, GA 30337 TEL: 404-305-5200 FAX: 404-305-5223 The Honorable Douglas M. 

### Rawald,Administrative LawJudge 

### Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200·NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-5121 StaffAssistant FAX: 202-366-7536 Docket No. FAA-2016-4268 (Civil Penalty Action)

1 Service was byU.S. Mail. For service in person orby expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.
1352.000 Scope of part.       This part sets forth solicitation provisions and contract clauses, in addition to those prescribed in FAR Part 52, for use in DOC acquisitions.    **Parent topic:** PART 1352 - SOLICITATION PROVISIONS AND CONTRACT CLAUSES
Exhibit 34.1

[LOGO] PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
                                                  PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
                                                  300 Madison Avenue
                                                  New York NY 10017
                                                  Telephone (646) 471-3000
                                                  www.pwc.com



             Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

To the Board of Directors of Residential Capital, LLC:

We have examined management's assertion, included in the accompanying
Management's Assertion Concerning Compliance with Regulation AB Item 1122
Servicing Criteria, that GMAC Mortgage, LLC (the "Company"), a subsidiary of
Residential Capital, LLC, complied with the servicing criteria set forth in
Item 1122(d) of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation AB for the
GMACM Private Platform (the "Platform"), as of and for the year then ended
December 31, 2006, excluding criteria 1122(d)(1)(iii); 1122(d)(2)(iv);
1122(d)(3)(i),(ii);and 1122(d)(4)(i),(ii), which the Company has determined
are not applicable to the servicing activities performed by it with respect to
the Platform. Appendix A to management's assertion identifies the individual
asset-backed transactions and securities defined by management as constituting
the Platform. Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with the
servicing criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on
management's assertion based on our examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. Our examination included testing of
selected asset-backed transactions and securities that comprise the Platform,
testing of selected servicing activities related to the Platform, and
determining whether the Company processed those selected transactions and
performed those selected activities in compliance with the applicable servicing
criteria. Our procedures were limited to the selected transactions and
servicing activities performed by the Company during the period covered by this
report. Our procedures were not designed to detect noncompliance arising from
errors that may have occurred prior to or subsequent to our tests that may have
affected the balances or amounts calculated or reported by the Company during
the period covered by this report. We believe that our examination provides a
reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a legal
determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, management's assertion that the Company compiled with the
aforementioned applicable servicing criteria as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2006, for the GMACM Private Platform is fairly stated, in all
material respects.


/s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
------------------------------

New York, New York
March 6, 2007