SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4653-18T2

MICHAEL ELIAS, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, POLICE 

AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT 

SYSTEM,

Respondent-Respondent.

Argued November 12, 2020 – Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from the Board of Trustees of the Police and 

Firemen's Retirement System, Department of the 

Treasury, PFRS No. 3-108858.

Timothy J. Prol argued the cause for appellant 

(Alterman & Associates, LLC, attorneys; Stuart J. 

Alterman and Timothy J. Prol, on the briefs).

Thomas R. Hower argued the cause for respondent 

(Robert Seymore Garrison, Jr, attorney; Melissa H. 

Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Porter 

R. Strickler, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

January 27, 2021
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A-4653-18T2

PER CURIAM

Michael Elias appeals from a May 14, 2019 final agency decision rendered 

by the Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System of New 

Jersey (PFRSNJ), imposing a total forfeiture of his five years, eight months of 

service credit at the Bergen County Sheriff's Department (BCSD). The total 

forfeiture made Elias ineligible for ordinary disability retirement benefits. We 

now vacate and remand to PFRSNJ.

We direct the agency to add to its analysis Elias's military service-based 

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and drug problems. This reconsideration 

must include a full discussion of the second Uricoli factor, given that less than 

a week before he filed for ordinary disability, Elias was found unfit for duty due 

to his mental health status by BCSD's own clinical psychologist. See Uricoli v. 

Bd. of Trs., Police & Firemen's Ret. Sys., 91 N.J. 62, 77-78 (1982); N.J.S.A. 

43:1-3(c)(2). PFRSNJ also indicated, contrary to the record, that Elias had no 

other public employment and service, the Uricoli sixth factor. See Uricoli, 91 

N.J. at 78; N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(6). The agency should have weighed in the 

balance petitioner's prior honorable service in the Marine Corps, including 

significant combat experience. Ibid. The Board did not consider that the nature 

of the offenses, Uricoli factor seven, may have been "strongly mitigated by 
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appellant's psychological background." T.J.M. v. Bd. of Trs. of Police & 

Firemen's Ret. Sys., 218 N.J. Super. 274, 280 (App. Div. 1987); see Uricoli, 91 

N.J. at 78; N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(7). Nor does the record appear to support the 

PFRSNJ finding regarding the ninth Uricoli factor. See Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 78; 

N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(9). Elias's misconduct did not result in personal gain, nor 

did it involve moral turpitude. Ibid. Additionally, PFRSNJ found the eleventh 

factor weighed in favor of forfeiture—which is not supported by the record. See

Uricoli, 91 N.J. at 78; N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(11). That factor requires consideration 

of the petitioner's "personal circumstances . . . as they bear upon the justness of 

the forfeiture." Ibid. 

Elias served in the United States Marine Corps from August 2003 to 

November 2007. He spent seven months in active duty in Iraq, where he was 

injured at least twice. At the time of his discharge, Elias received a partial

disability pension for hearing loss and a knee injury. He married a woman he 

met while stationed in Japan. The couple divorced, and despite the award of 

joint legal custody, Elias's wife returned to her native country with the parties'

children. Elias has not seen them for years, and despite his efforts, has not been 

able to compel her return.
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When Elias underwent a fitness for duty evaluation in July 2015, after 

having been found sleeping in his car in the parking lot when he should have 

been reporting for duty at the jail, he told the psychologist he had nightmares 

and flashbacks from his time in Iraq. While in Iraq, Elias was shot twice and

was a passenger in a truck exploded by a roadside bomb. He claimed sixteen 

"kills." Elias was diagnosed as suffering from "active psychopathology and 

elevated risk for significant substance dependence . . . [and] a high probability 

for [PTSD]." The report also stated he was "unfit for duty for an indefinite, and 

likely, extended period of time." 

Before the incident that triggered the evaluation, Elias accumulated an 

extensive disciplinary history within a very short period of time. Between 

October 29, 2014, and December 13, 2014, Elias failed to conduct post checks

and inspections, documented post checks that were not completed, failed to 

engage in the distribution of razors to the inmates at the jail, was observed using 

his cell phone at a supervision post while a nurse dispensed medication to 

inmates, and showed his personal cell phone to an inmate classified as "highest 

security" during the inmate's scheduled hour out. As a result of these 

documented infractions, occurring over eleven days in less than two months, a 

preliminary notice of disciplinary action was issued against him, a settlement 
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agreement was reached, and he was suspended for 120 working days without 

pay. When Elias fell asleep in his car on July 13, 2015, he had completed his 

suspension. One month after the fitness for duty examination, he resigned from 

the BCSD.

On July 27, 2015, petitioner filed an ordinary disability retirement benefits 

application, citing the fitness evaluation and his PTSD diagnoses as conditions 

making him unable to continue to work. As of October 2015, a Veteran's 

Administration doctor increased petitioner's disability rating to 100%. 

After the July 12, 2016 PFRSNJ denial of the petition based on total 

forfeiture of his service and salary, citing to "the egregious nature of [his] 

misconduct[,]" the matter was transferred to the Office of Administrative Law 

as a contested case. See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; N.J.S.A. 52:14F-1 to -13. 

The Administrative Law judge (ALJ) disagreed. 

Applying the Uricoli factors, as codified in N.J.S.A. 49:1-3, the ALJ

concluded that Elias should not forfeit any benefits, and should be permitted to 

apply for an ordinary disability pension. He found as a fact that defendant had 

honorably served in the United States Marine Corps, that there was "not a 

scintilla of evidence that any of petitioner's actions" resulted in personal gain, 

or constituted acts of moral turpitude. The ALJ reasoned that, by a 
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preponderance of the credible evidence, Elias's disciplinary infractions "were 

caused by PTSD." For a petitioner with no prior disciplinary history, the 

forfeiture of all service time was unwarranted, and not in accord with Uricoli, 

which directs the forfeiture of pension benefits "is reserved for the most 

egregious cases."

Elias raises three points on appeal:

POINT I. THE BOARD ERRED AS A MATTER OF 

LAW BY ORDERING THE TOTAL FORFEITURE 

OF APPELLANT'S SERVICE CREDIT BECAUSE 

SAME IS AN EXCESSIVE SANCTION NOT 

SUPPORTED BY THE TOTALITY OF THE 

EVIDENCE.

POINT II. AS A MATTER OF LAW THE BOARD 

INCORRECTLY APPLIED THE URICOLI 

FACTORS AS CODIFIED IN N.J.S.A. 43:1-3 AND 

THEREFORE THE TOTAL FORFEITURE OF 

APPELLANT'S CREDIT SHOULD BE REVERSED.

POINT III. THE BOARD'S DECISION 

EVIS[C]ERATING APPELLANT'S PENSION 

CREDIT WAS ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, AND 

UNREASONABLE AND WAS NOT SUPPORTED 

BY SUBSTANTIAL CREDIBLE EVIDENCE IN THE 

RECORD, THEREFORE THE BOARD'S DECISION 

MUST BE REVERSED.

We are mindful of the highly deferential standard of review of 

administrative decisions. "Ordinarily, an appellate court will reverse the 

decision of an administrative agency only if it is arbitrary, capricious, or 
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unreasonable or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record 

as a whole." Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). "The 

precise issue is whether the findings of the agency could have been reached on 

substantial credible evidence in the record, considering the proofs as a whole." 

In re Hess, 422 N.J. Super. 27, 34 (App. Div. 2011). In this case, PFRSNJ's 

discussion omitted portions of the record. 

The incomplete application of the Uricoli and statutory factors requires a 

remand for the Board to take into account Elias's full history. Without 

considering his prior honorable military duty, and the fact his PTSD and its 

aftermath likely caused his disciplinary infractions, the Board was able to

characterize Elias's conduct over the course of one and one-half months as 

egregious. We do not mean by this remand to minimize the gravity of his 

disciplinary infractions—they plainly could have jeopardized the safety of both 

inmates and co-workers at the facility.

Uricoli factors, however, "must be balanced and then weighed in terms of 

the goals to be achieved under the pension laws . . . to induce people to enter 

public employment and continue faithful and diligent employment and to furnish 

public employees with employment stability and financial security." Uricoli, 91 

N.J. at 78; N.J.S.A. 43:1-3(c)(12). "It is virtually axiomatic that statutory 
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pension provisions are to be liberally construed in favor of public employees." 

Widdis, 238 N.J. Super. at 78. Thus, we remand for the Board to take a second 

look at Elias's history and status, viewed through the prism of the Uricoli factors, 

before deciding the issue of forfeiture. 

Vacated and remanded for reconsideration in accord with this decision. 

We do not retain jurisdiction.