alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Joe L. Collazo, Appellant, v John Wilmot, as *656Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility, Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered April 23, 1979 in Chemung County, which dismissed the petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, seeking to annul a determination in a disciplinary proceeding. The petitioner was charged with being involved in misconduct in the nature of joining in a melee and assaulting a corrections officer on July 9, 1978. As a result of such charges, disciplinary proceedings were held, and upon a finding of guilt, punishment was imposed. This proceeding, pursuant to CPLR article 78, was brought to review the determination and seeks to have the findings of guilt and the punishment imposed annulled and expunged from petitioner’s record. The respondent submitted documentary evidence upon the return and such evidence refutes the allegation of the petitioner as to an unconstitutional denial of due process in the conduct of the instant proceeding. (See *Matter of Amato v Ward, 41*NY2d 469, 472-473; *Matter of Hicks v Le Fevre,*59 AD2d 423.) As to the allegation that the procedure did not comply with a requirement of the regulations (7 NYCRR 253.3) allowing a choice of representatives at the hearing, it is sufficient to note that no objection was made by petitioner at the hearing *(Matter of Hicks v Le Fevre, supra).*Judgment affirmed, without costs. Greenblott, J. P., Sweeney, Main, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.
|                                            |
|--------------------------------------------|
|                                            |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|                                       |   |   |   |   |   |
|                                       |   |   |   |   |   |
|                                       |   |   |   |   |   |
|                                       | For the Year Ended December 31, |
|                                       | 2017 | 2016 | 2015 | 2014 | 2013 |
| Fixed charges:                             |   |   |   |   |   |
| Interest expense                           | 4,030,550 |  | 3,730,768 |  | 3,382,543 |  | 923,350 |  | 1,028,841 |  |
| Total Fixed charges                        | 4,030,550 |  | 3,730,768 |  | 3,382,543 |  | 923,350 |  | 1,028,841 |  |
|                                       |   |   |   |   |   |
| Earnings available for fixed charges:      |   |   |   |   |   |
| Pre-tax income                             | 1,760,801 |  | 6,068,078 |  | 6,412,406 |  | 9,439,209 |  | 4,122,161 |  |
| Add: Fixed charges                         | 4,030,550 |  | 3,730,768 |  | 3,382,543 |  | 923,350 |  | 1,028,841 |  |
| Total Earnings available for fixed charges | 5,791,351 |  | 9,798,846 |  | 9,794,949 |  | 10,318,832 |  | 5,151,002 |  |
|                                       |   |   |   |   |   |
| Earnings to fixed charges                  | 1.44 |  | 2.63 |  | 2.90 |  | 11.22 |  | 5.01 |  |

|        |
|--------|
|        |  |  |
|   | (1) |   |
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-7373

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus DAVID M. ROBINSON, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. William M. Nickerson, District Judge. (CR-95-479-WMN, CA-99-374-WMN) Submitted: December 16, 1999 Decided: December 30, 1999Before MURNAGHAN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David M. Robinson, Appellant Pro Se. Lynne Ann Battaglia, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).* Although the district court’s order is marked as “filed” on September 21, 1999, the district court’s records show that it was entered on the docket sheet on September 22, 1999. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date the order was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the district court’s decision. See Wilson v. Murray, 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1986). 2 PER CURIAM: David M. Robinson seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See United States v. Robinson , Nos. CR-95-479- WMN; CA-99-374-WMN (D. Md. Sept. 22, 1999). * We deny Robinson’s motions to expedite the appeal, for bail pending appeal, and for judgment on the pleadings. We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
###### Editorial Note on Subpart A of Part 989

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 989 appear at 83 FR 53973, Oct. 26, 2018.

#### § 989.24a Non-normal outlets.

*Non-normal outlets* means outlets other than those customarily used for commercial disposition of raisins meeting the then applicable minimum standards for natural condition raisins or packed raisins.

[29 FR 9483, July 11, 1964]
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-12-00295-CR

John Manuel CASTILLO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2012-CR-2756W

Honorable Mary D. Roman, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Phylis J. Speedlin, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 25, 2012

DISMISSED

The trial court signed a certification of defendant’s right to appeal stating that this “is a 

plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal” and “is one in which the defendant 

has waived his right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Rule 25.2(d) provides, “The 

appeal must be dismissed if a certification that shows the defendant has the right of appeal has 

not been made part of the record under these rules.” TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d). Accordingly, on 

June 5, 2012, this court issued an order stating this appeal would be dismissed pursuant to Rule 
04-12-00295-CR

- 2 -

25.2(d) unless an amended trial court certification that shows defendant has the right of appeal 

was made part of the appellate record. See Daniels v. State,110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2003, order); TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(d); 37.1. 

No amended certification has been filed; therefore, this appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish
#### § 97.151 Authorization.

Only attorneys or agents specified by the applicant shall be allowed to inspect papers or take action of any kind, on behalf of the applicant, in any pending application or proceedings.
```

[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 1045 Engrossed in House (EH)]

H. Res. 1045

                In the House of Representatives, U. S.,

                                                    September 28, 2006.
    Resolved, That it shall be in order at any time through the legislative day 
of September 29, 2006, for the Speaker to entertain motions that the House 
suspend the rules. The Speaker or his designee shall consult with the Minority 
Leader or her designee on the designation of any matter for consideration 
pursuant to this resolution.
            Attest:

                                                                          Clerk.
```
§ 1013.22 Exchange of witness lists, statements and exhibits. ( a ) At least 15 days before the hearing or at such other time as may be ordered by the ALJ, the parties shall exchange witness lists, copies of prior statements of proposed witnesses, and copies of proposed hearing exhibits, including copies of any written statements that the party intends to offer in lieu of live testimony in accordance with § 1013.33(b) of this part. At the time the above documents are exchanged, any party that intends to rely on the transcript of deposition testimony in lieu of live testimony at the hearing, if permitted by the ALJ, shall provide each party with a copy of the specific pages of the transcript it intends to introduce into evidence.
( b ) If a party objects, the ALJ shall not admit into evidence the testimony of any witness whose name does not appear on the witness list or any exhibit not provided to the opposing party as provided above unless the ALJ finds good cause for the failure or that there is no prejudice to the objecting party.
( c ) Unless another party objects within the time set by the ALJ, documents exchanged in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed to be authentic for the purpose of admissibility at the hearing.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

OWEN J. ROGAL, D.D.S., P.C., 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

SKILSTAF, INC., 

 Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-cv-00711-VPM 

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

Charles A. Stewart III, Amelia T. Driscoll, and the law firm of Bradley Arant Rose & 

White LLP, hereby give notice of appearance as counsel for Skilstaf, Inc., the Defendant in this 

cause, and ask that the Court and Plaintiff serve them with copies of all pleadings, orders, 

discovery, and other documents at the below address: 

Charles A. Stewart III 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP 

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Amelia Driscoll (DRI016) 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP 

One Federal Place 

1819 Fifth Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Dated this the 18th day of August, 2005. 

Respectfully submitted, 

/s/ Charles A. Stewart, III 

Charles A. Stewart, III (STE067) (asb-4955-a56c) 

Case 3:06-cv-00711-MHT-WC Document 14 Filed 08/18/2006 Page 1 of 2
2

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP

The Alabama Center for Commerce 

401 Adams Avenue, Suite 780 

Montgomery, AL 36104 

Telephone: (334) 956-7700 

Facsimile: (334) 956-7701 

Email: cstewart@bradleyarant.com 

Amelia T. Driscoll 

Bradley Arant Rose & White LLP 

One Federal Place 

1819 Fifth Avenue North 

Birmingham, AL 35203 

Phone: (205)521-8000 

Fax: (205)521-8800 

Email: adriscoll@bradleyarant.com 

Attorneys for Defendants 

Bama Budweiser, Inc. of Montgomery 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on August 18, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing with the 

Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to the 

following: 

Robert E. Cole 

437 Chestnut Street, Suite 218 

Philadelphia, PA 19109 

Beth A. Friel 

Jeanne L. Bakker 

Mongtomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads 

123 South Broad Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19109 

and I hereby certify that I have mailed by U. S. Postal Service the document to the following 

non-CM/ECF participants: None. 

/s/ Charles A. Stewart, III 

1/1482818.1

Case 3:06-cv-00711-MHT-WC Document 14 Filed 08/18/2006 Page 2 of 2
Denied and Opinion Filed November 8, 2016 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01268-CV 

No. 05-16-01270-CV 

IN RE CHARLIE PUENTES, Relator 

Original Proceeding from the County Court at Law No. 4 

Collin County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause Nos. 004-83427-2015 and 004-83429-2015 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Francis, Fillmore, and Stoddart 

Opinion by Justice Francis 

Before the Court is relator’s October 25, 2016 petition for writ of mandamus in which he 

asks the Court to order the trial court to rule on his motion for speedy trial and motion for bench 

warrant. Also before the Court is relator’s October 25, 2016 motion for leave to file petition for 

writ of mandamus. 

To be entitled to mandamus relief in a criminal case, a relator must show that he has no 

adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm, and what he seeks to compel is a ministerial 

act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. 

Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). 

A defendant seeking to compel the dismissal of an indictment or complaint on speedy trial 

grounds has an adequate remedy at law, and therefore, is not entitled to mandamus relief. Smith 

v. Gohmert, 962 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). Accordingly, relator is not entitled to 
 –2– 

mandamus relief as to his request for a speedy trial because he has an adequate remedy on 

appeal. 

Consideration of a motion that is properly filed and before the court is a ministerial act. 

State ex rel. Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (orig. proceeding). A 

relator must establish the trial court (1) had a legal duty to rule on the motion; (2) was asked to 

rule on the motion; and (3) failed to do so. In re Keeter, 134 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. App.—

Waco 2003, orig. proceeding); In re Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, 

orig. proceeding). It is relator’s burden to provide the court with a record sufficient to establish 

his right to relief. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.1992); TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k), 

52.7(a). Here, the record is insufficient to establish that the motions for which relator seeks a 

ruling were properly filed, that the trial court was requested to rule, and that the trial court 

refused to rule. Although relator attaches copies of a motion for speedy trial and a motion for 

bench warrant, the motion for speedy trial is not file-stamped and he includes no evidence 

showing that he has requested the trial court to rule on the motions. Absent proof that the trial 

court has been requested to rule on the motions, relator has not established his entitlement to the 

extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus. See In re Florence, 14-11-00096-CR, 2011 WL 

553241, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 17, 2011, no pet.). 

Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. We also deny relator’s motion 

for leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus as moot. 

161268F.P05 

/Molly Francis/ 

MOLLY FRANCIS 

JUSTICE
Exhibit 32.1





Certification of Chief Executive Officer


Pursuant to


Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)





In connection with this Annual Report on Form 10-K (the “Report”) of Harvest Capital Credit Corporation (the “Registrant”), as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I, Richard P. Buckanavage, the Chief Executive Officer of the Registrant, hereby certify, to the best of my knowledge, that:





(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Registrant.





/s/ Richard P. BuckanavageName:Richard P. BuckanavageDate:March 15, 2016
#### § 984.1 Secretary.

*Secretary* means the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, or any other officer or employee of the United States Department of Agriculture who is, or who may be, authorized to perform the duties of the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States.
Editorial Note on Part 1
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 1 appear at 78 FR 34247, June 7, 2013.

§ 1.11 The Commission. ( a ) The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, composed of five members, one of whom is designated by the President as Chairman, is established pursuant to section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended. The Chairman is the principal executive officer of the Commission, and is responsible for the executive and administrative functions with respect to appointment and supervision of personnel, except as otherwise provided by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980 (45 FR 40561); distribution of business; use and expenditures of funds (except that the function of revising budget estimates and purposes is reserved to the Commission); and appointment, subject to approval of the Commission, of heads of major administrative units under the Commission. The Chairman is the official spokesman, as mandated by the Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1980. The Chairman has ultimate authority for all NRC functions pertaining to an emergency involving an NRC Licensee. The Chairman's actions are governed by the general policies of the Commission.
( b ) The Commission is responsible for licensing and regulating nuclear facilities and materials and for conducting research in support of the licensing and regulatory process, as mandated by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended; and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978; and in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and other applicable statutes. These responsibilities include protecting public health and safety, protecting the environment, protecting and safeguarding nuclear materials and nuclear power plants in the interest of national security, and assuring conformity with antitrust laws. Agency functions are performed through standards setting and rulemaking; technical reviews and studies; conduct of public hearings; issuance of authorizations, permits, and licenses; inspection, investigation, and enforcement; evaluation of operating experience; and confirmatory research. The Commission is composed of five members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.
( c ) The following staff units and officials report directly to the Commission: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Secretary, Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication, Office of International Programs, and other committees and boards that are authorized or established specifically by the Act. The Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards and the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste also report directly to the Commission.
( d ) The Offices of Congressional Affairs and Public Affairs report directly to the Chairman.
[52 FR 31602, Aug. 21, 1987, as amended at 57 FR 1639, Jan. 15, 1992; 59 FR 63882, Dec. 12, 1994]
#### § 966.2 Act.

*Act* means Public Act No. 10, 73d Congress, as amended and as reenacted and amended by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended (48 Stat. 31, as amended; 7 U.S.C. 601 *et seq.;* 68 Stat. 906, 1047).
The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge

1

for the Eastern District of Arkansas.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 95-4262

___________

Roosevelt Watson, Jr., *

 *

Appellant, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Alcoa Aluminum, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: March 21, 1997

 Filed: April 7, 1997

___________

Before HANSEN, MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Roosevelt Watson, Jr., appeals from the district court's entry of

1

judgment as a matter of law to defendant following a bench trial in his

employment discrimination action. Because Watson has not provided a

transcript of the trial proceedings, we cannot review the district court's

factual findings. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(b); Meroney v. Delta Int'l Mach.

Corp., 18 F.3d 1436, 1437 (8th Cir. 1994); Schmid v. United Bhd. of

Carpenters & Joiners, 827 F.2d 384, 386 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1071 (1988). Accepting the district court's factual

findings as true, 
-2-

we agree that judgment for Alcoa was proper. See Harvey v. Anheuser-Busch,

Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff may demonstrate

discrimination by showing proffered reason is pretextual or discriminatory

motive is more likely; summary judgment properly granted where black

plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support claim that

proffered reason was pretextual because similarly situated white employee

had previously been less severely disciplined). 

 To the extent Watson complains of counsel's performance below, we note

that a civil litigant has no constitutional right to effective assistance

of counsel. See Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536, 541 (8th Cir. 1988). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT
32.1


Certification


Pursuant
To Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002




Pursuant
to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of
section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of GTX Corp (the ''Company’’), does hereby certify, to such
officer’s knowledge, that:




The
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2009 (the ''Form
10-K’’) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and the information
contained in the Form 10-K fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:
      March 30, 2010
                
                /s/ Patrick E. BertagnaChief
      Executive OfficerDated:
      March 30, 2010
                
                /s/ Murray WilliamsChief
      Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Case 3:06-cv-00687-WHA-DRB Document 8 Filed 09/07/2006 Page 1 of 1
Subpart 1350.1 - Extraordinary Contractual

Actions

Parent topic: PART 1350 - EXTRAORDINARY CONTRACTUAL ACTIONS

1350.102 Delegation of and limitation on exercise of

authority.

1350.102-1 Delegation of authority.

(a) The designee authorized to approve requests to obligate the government in excess of $55,000

under the extraordinary emergency authority set forth in CAM 1301.70. Such authority may not be

delegated below the secretarial level for requests to obligate the Government in excess of $55,000.

(b) The designee authorized to approve any amendment without consideration that increases the

contract price or unit price is set forth in CAM 1301.70.

(c) The designee authorized to indemnify against unusually hazardous or nuclear risks, including

extension of such indemnification to subcontracts, is set forth in CAM 1301.70.
2914.408-1 General.       (a) When only one bid is received in response to an invitation for bids, such bid may be considered and accepted if the contracting officer makes a written determination that:          (1) The specifications used in the invitation were not unduly restrictive;          (2) Adequate competition was solicited and it could have been reasonably assumed that more than one bid would have been submitted;          (3) The price is reasonable; and          (4) The bid is otherwise in accordance with the invitation for bids.          (b) Such a determination must be placed in the contract file.    **Parent topic:** Subpart 2914.4 - Opening of Bids and Award of Contract