NIST GCR 16-917-39
 

Critical Assessment of 

Lifeline System 

Performance: 

Understanding Societal 

Needs in Disaster 

Recovery 

By

Applied Technology Council 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.GCR.16-917-39
 

Disclaimers 

This report was prepared for the Engineering Laboratory of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) under 

Contract SB1341-13-CQ-0009, Task Order 14-499. The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views and 

policies of NIST or the U.S. Government. 

This report was produced by the Applied Technology Council (ATC). While endeavoring to provide practical and accurate 

information, the Applied Technology Council, the authors, and the reviewers assume no liability for, nor express or imply any 

warranty with regard to, the information contained herein. Users of information contained in this report assume all liability 

arising from such use. 

Unless otherwise noted, photos, figures, and data presented in this report have been developed or provided by ATC staff or 

consultants engaged under contract to provide information as works for hire. Any similarity with other published information is 

coincidental. Photos and figures cited from outside sources have been reproduced in this report with permission. Any other 

use requires additional permission from the copyright holders. 

Certain commercial software, equipment, instruments, or materials may have been used in the preparation of information 

contributing to this report. Identification in this report is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is 

it intended to imply that such software, equipment, instruments, or materials are necessarily the best available for the purpose. 

NIST policy is to use the International System of Units (metric units) in all its publications. In this report, however, information 

is presented in U.S. Customary Units (inch-pound), as this is the preferred system of units in the U.S. engineering industry. 

Cover image – Emergency generators en route to Montgomery, Alabama following April 2011 tornadoes (Photo credit: FEMA). 

Drinking water distribution following Hurricane Sandy, November 2012 (Photo credit: FEMA) 
 

 NIST GCR 16-917-39
 

Critical Assessment of Lifeline 

System Performance: 

Understanding Societal Needs in 

Disaster Recovery 

Prepared for 

U.S. Department of Commerce 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Engineering Laboratory 

Gaithersburg, MD 20899 

By 

Applied Technology Council 

201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 

Redwood City, CA 94065 

This publication is available free of charge from: 

http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.GCR.16-917-39 

April 2016 

U.S. Department of Commerce

Penny Pritzker, Secretary 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

 Willie E. May, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and 

Technology and Director 

NIST GCR 16-917-39
 

Participants 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

Therese (Terri) P. McAllister, Group Leader, Community Resilience Group 

Steven L. McCabe, Research Structural Engineer and Group Leader, Earthquake Engineering Group 

Materials and Structural Systems Division, Engineering Laboratory 

www.NEHRP.gov 

Applied Technology Council 

201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 

Redwood City, California 94065 

www.ATCouncil.org 

Program Management 

Jon A. Heintz (Program Manager)
 

Christopher Rojahn (Project Manager) 

Veronica Cedillos (Associate Project Manager)
 

Project Technical Committee 

Laurie Johnson (Project Director and Lead Report Editor) 

Thomas D. O’Rourke (Project Co-Director) 

Stephanie Chang 

Craig A. Davis 

Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio 

Ian Robertson 

Henning Schulzrinne 

Kathleen Tierney 

Program Committee on Seismic 

Engineering 

Jon A. Heintz (Chair) 

Michael Cochran 

James R. Harris 

James Jirsa 

Roberto Leon 

Stephen Mahin 

James O. Malley 

Donald Scott 

Andrew Whittaker 

Project Review Panel 

Bruce Ellingwood 

Timothy J. Lomax 

Douglas J. Nyman 

Dennis Ostrom 

Jon Peha 

Kent Yu (ATC Board Contact) 

Preface 

In September 2014, the Applied Technology Council (ATC) commenced a task order 

project under National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Contract 

SB1341-13-CQ-0009 to assess current societal expectations of acceptable lifeline 

performance levels and restoration timeframes that are informed by the phases of 

response and recovery, distinguishing those that are hazard independent and those 

that are specific for seismic (including tsunami), wind (including hurricane and 

tornado), flood, snow/ice, and wildfire hazard events. 

The project included consideration of the social institutions and societal needs that 

should drive lifeline system performance levels and recovery timeframes and the 

assessment of current system guidelines/standards and performance criteria so that 

deficits could be identified and potentially addressed through better awareness and 

definition of community requirements and goals as part of the overall NIST 

Community Resilience Planning process. 

The starting point for the project was an initial effort by the ATC-appointed Project 

Technical Committee to summarize key guidelines, standards, and current 

performance criteria, and to identify critical social considerations and system 

interdependencies. Those and subsequent efforts helped identify and form a set of 

overarching considerations and recommendations, which were then refined through 

several rounds of review by an ATC-appointed Project Review Panel. 

The culminating effort was the development of this report, which contains: 

	 Detailed analyses of a broad range of societal considerations; 

	 Lifeline assessments and reviews of standards, guidelines, and performance 

criteria for electric power, natural gas and liquid fuel, telecommunication, 

transportation, water and wastewater systems; 

	 A review and analysis of available information on lifeline interdependency issues; 

and 

	 Findings, conclusions and recommendations that identify needed developments 

in lifeline codes, standards, and guidelines; needed research; modeling 

opportunities; and needs related to lifeline system operations and operational 

design. 

GCR 16-917-39	 Preface v 
 

ATC is indebted to the leadership of Laurie Johnson, who served as Project Director 

and Lead Editor, to Thomas D. O’Rourke, who served as Project Co-Director, and to 

the members of the Project Technical Committee, consisting of Stephanie Chang, 

Craig A. Davis, Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio, Ian Robertson, Henning Schulzrinne, and 

Kathleen Tierney, for their contributions in developing this report and the resulting 

recommendations. ATC similarly appreciates and recognizes the attentive review and 

input of the Project Review Panel, which consisted of Bruce Ellingwood, Timothy J. 

Lomax, Douglas J. Nyman, Dennis Ostrom, Jon Peha, and Kent Yu (ATC Board 

Representative). The affiliations of these individuals are provided in the list of 

Project Participants. 

ATC also gratefully acknowledges Therese P. McAllister (NIST Technical Point of 

Contact), and Steven L. McCabe (Contracting Officer’s Representative) for their 

input and guidance throughout the project development process. ATC staff members 

Veronica Cedillos provided project management support and Amber Houchen and 

Carrie Perna prepared draft and print-ready versions of this report. 

Christopher Rojahn (Project Manager) 

ATC Director Emeritus 

vi Preface GCR 16-917-39 
Table of Contents
 

Preface .................................................................................. v 

List of Figures ...................................................................... xiii 

List of Tables ......................................................................... xv 

Executive Summary ...............................................................xvii 

1. Introduction................................................................ 1-1
 

1.1 Impetus for the Project .................................................................... 1-1 

1.1.1 NIST Community Disaster Resilience Program and 

Community Resilience Planning Guide ............................. 1-2 

1.1.2	 NIST Research, Development, and Implementation 

Roadmap for Earthquake Resilient Lifelines ..................... 1-3 

1.2 Project Scope and Purpose.............................................................. 1-5 

1.3 Report Organization ........................................................................ 1-6 

2. Societal Considerations .................................................. 2-1
 

2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 2-1 

2.2 Factors Affecting Lifeline Performance Expectations .................... 2-3 

2.2.1 Hazard-Related Considerations ......................................... 2-3 

2.2.2 Risk Perception and Communication Considerations ........ 2-4 

2.2.3	 Public Opinion Regarding Lifeline Service Providers: 

Outrage and Recreancy...................................................... 2-8 

2.2.4 Substitutability and Need ................................................... 2-9 

2.2.5 Relevance of Resilience Concepts ................................... 2-10 

2.3	 Impacts of Lifeline Service Disruptions on Health and 

Health-Care Systems: Societal Considerations ............................. 2-11 

2.3.1 Human Health Considerations in Recent Events ............. 2-11 

2.3.2 Impacts on the Health-Care Sector .................................. 2-14 

2.3.3 Climate Change, Lifeline Services, and Health 

Considerations ................................................................. 2-16 

2.4	 Economic Impacts of Lifeline Service Disruption: Societal 

Considerations .............................................................................. 2-17 

2.4.1 Introduction...................................................................... 2-17 

2.4.2 The Societal Significance of Electrical Power ................. 2-17 

2.4.3 Business-Level Impacts of Lifeline Disruption: Societal 

Considerations ................................................................. 2-19 

2.4.4	 Community Level and Regional Impacts: Societal 

Considerations ................................................................. 2-20 

2.4.5	 Societal Considerations Involving
 

Low-Probability/High-Consequence Events ................... 2-24 

2.5	 Potential Indicators of Societal Expectations for Lifeline 

System Performance ..................................................................... 2-26 

GCR 16-917-39	 Table of Contents vii 
3.

4. 

2.5.1 Emergency Management Advisories ...............................2-26 

2.5.2 Utility Providers and Restoration Targets ........................2-27 

2.5.3 Power Outage Trackers and Situational Awareness .........2-28 

2.5.4 Post-Event Restoration Information.................................2-29 

2.5.5 Other Reflections of Community Expectations................2-29 

2.6 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations ...........................2-31 

2.6.1 Review of Key Points.......................................................2-31 

2.6.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs...........................2-32 

2.6.3 Research Needs ................................................................2-32 

2.6.4 Modeling Needs ...............................................................2-34 

2.6.5 Lifeline Systems Operational Needs ................................2-34 

2.6.6 Future Considerations and Trends ....................................2-36 

 Electric Power..............................................................3-1
 

3.1 System Overview ............................................................................3-2 

3.2	 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements ...................................................................................3-3 

3.3 Societal Considerations ...................................................................3-6 

3.4 Interdependencies............................................................................3-8 

3.5 Disaster Lessons ..............................................................................3-9 

3.6	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance
 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations ..................................3-16 

3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations ..............................................3-16 

3.7.1 Review of Key Points.......................................................3-16 

3.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs...........................3-17 

3.7.3 Research Needs ................................................................3-18 

3.7.4 Modeling Needs ...............................................................3-19 

3.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs ..................................3-20 

3.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends ....................................3-20 

Gas and Liquid Fuel .......................................................4-1
 

4.1 Systems Overview ...........................................................................4-1 

4.2	 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements ...................................................................................4-3 

4.2.1	 49 CFR Part 192 Transportation of Natural and Other 

Gas by Pipeline ..................................................................4-5 

4.2.2 49 CFR Part 195 Transportation of Hazardous Liquids 

by Pipeline..........................................................................4-6 

4.2.3	 ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping 

Systems ..............................................................................4-7 

4.2.4	 ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for 

Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids............................4-8 

4.2.5	 API Recommended Practice 1162 Public Awareness 

Programs for Pipeline Operators ........................................4-8 

4.2.6 Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of 

Natural Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines .................4-9 

4.2.7 Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas 

Pipeline Systems ................................................................4-9 

4.2.8	 Performance Requirements and Restoration
 

Timeframes ......................................................................4-10 

4.3 Societal Considerations .................................................................4-10 

4.4 Interdependencies..........................................................................4-12 

viii Table of Contents	 GCR 16-917-39
4.5 Disaster Lessons ........................................................................... 4-14 

4.5.1 2005 Hurricane Katrina ................................................... 4-14 

4.5.2 2012 Hurricane Sandy ..................................................... 4-15 

4.5.3	 2010 San Bruno, California, Pipeline Rupture and
 

Fire................................................................................... 4-15 

4.5.4 2002 Denali Fault Earthquake ......................................... 4-16 

4.6	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance
 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations .................................. 4-17 

4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................. 4-18 

4.7.1 Review of Key Points ...................................................... 4-18 

4.7.2 Lifelines Standards Development Needs ......................... 4-18 

4.7.3 Research and Modeling Needs......................................... 4-19 

4.7.4 Lifeline System Operational Needs ................................. 4-19 

5. Telecommunications ..................................................... 5-1
 

5.1 System Overview ............................................................................ 5-1 

5.1.1	 Use of Communication Infrastructure after 

Hazard Events.................................................................... 5-1 

5.1.2 Multiple Systems, Layers, and Diversity ........................... 5-3 

5.1.3 System Elements and Hazards ........................................... 5-9 

5.2	 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements ................................................................................ 5-13 

5.2.1 Measuring Reliability and Performance .......................... 5-13 

5.2.2 Service Level Agreements ............................................... 5-15 

5.2.3 Regulatory Environment .................................................. 5-16 

5.2.4 Codes, Standards, and Guidelines.................................... 5-18 

5.3 Societal Considerations ................................................................. 5-21 

5.4 Interdependencies ......................................................................... 5-26 

5.5 Disaster Lessons ........................................................................... 5-28 

5.5.1 2005 Hurricane Katrina ................................................... 5-28 

5.5.2 2011 Hurricane Irene ....................................................... 5-30 

5.5.3 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake .................................. 5-31 

5.5.4 2012 Midwest and Mid-Atlantic Derecho ....................... 5-31 

5.5.5 2012 Hurricane Sandy ..................................................... 5-33 

5.6	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance
 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations .................................. 5-34 

5.7 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................. 5-36 

5.7.1 Review of Key Points ...................................................... 5-36 

5.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs........................... 5-37 

5.7.3 Research Needs ................................................................ 3-38 

5.7.4 Modeling Needs ............................................................... 5-39 

5.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs ................................. 5-39 

5.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends ................................... 5-41 

6. Transportation ............................................................. 6-1
 

6.1 System Overview ............................................................................ 6-1 

6.1.1 Transportation Infrastructure ............................................. 6-1 

6.1.2 Multimodal Transportation ................................................ 6-4 

6.2	 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements .................................................................................. 6-5 

6.3 Societal Considerations ................................................................... 6-5 

6.4 Interdependencies ........................................................................... 6-9 

GCR 16-917-39	 Table of Contents ix 
6.5 Disaster Lessons ............................................................................6-11 

6.5.1 Performance during Past Earthquakes ..............................6-11 

6.5.2 Performance during Past Tsunamis ..................................6-13 

6.5.3 Performance during Past High Wind Events ....................6-14 

6.5.4 Recovery and Reconstruction ...........................................6-14 

6.6	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance
 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations ..................................6-18 

6.7 Conclusions and Recommendations ..............................................6-20 

6.7.1 Review of Key Points.......................................................6-20 

6.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs...........................6-20 

6.7.3 Research Needs ................................................................6-21 

6.7.4 Lifeline System Operational Needs ..................................6-21 

6.7.5 Future Considerations and Trends ....................................6-21 

7.	 Water and Wastewater ...................................................7-1
 

7.1 Systems Overview ...........................................................................7-1 

7.1.1 Water Systems ....................................................................7-1 

7.1.2 Wastewater Systems ...........................................................7-3 

7.1.3 Storm Water and Flood Control Systems ...........................7-3 

7.2	 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements ...................................................................................7-5 

7.2.1 Existing Standards and Performance Objectives ................7-5 

7.2.2 Recent Developments .........................................................7-9 

7.3 Societal Considerations .................................................................7-10 

7.3.1 Societal Service Functions for Recovery Phases .............7-10 

7.3.2 System Societal Services and Interactions .......................7-11 

7.3.3 Accessibility Services ......................................................7-13 

7.4 Interdependencies..........................................................................7-14 

7.5 Disaster Lessons ............................................................................7-16 

7.5.1 1971 San Fernando Earthquake ........................................7-16 

7.5.2 1983 New York City Garment District Incident ..............7-17 

7.5.3 1994 Northridge Earthquake ............................................7-18 

7.5.4 1995 Kobe Earthquake .....................................................7-19 

7.5.5 2001 World Trade Center Disaster...................................7-19 

7.5.6	 2010-2011 Canterbury, New Zealand Earthquake 

Sequence ..........................................................................7-20 

7.5.7 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami .............7-22 

7.5.8 2012 Hurricane Sandy......................................................7-23 

7.6 Gaps and Deficiencies: Codes, Standards, Performance
 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations ..................................7-24 

7.7 Conclusions and Recommendations ..............................................7-27 

7.7.1 Review of Key Points.......................................................7-27 

7.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs...........................7-28 

7.7.3 Research Needs ................................................................7-29 

7.7.4 Modeling Needs ...............................................................7-30 

7.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs ..................................7-31 

7.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends ....................................7-32 

8.	 Interdependent Infrastructure Systems ..............................8-1
 

8.1 Introduction to Interdependent Infrastructure Systems ...................8-1 

8.1.1 Classifying the Mechanisms of Interdependencies 

Among Infrastructure .........................................................8-4 

x Table of Contents	 GCR 16-917-39 
8.1.2	 Methods for Modeling Interdependencies Among 

Infrastructure...................................................................... 8-5 

8.2 Trends Across Interdependent Infrastructure Systems ................... 8-7 

8.3 Practical Tools and Case Studies for Interdependent 

Infrastructure Management ........................................................... 8-10 

8.4	 Challenges and Opportunities in Interdependent Infrastructure 

Systems for Community Resilience .............................................. 8-14 

8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................. 8-15 

9.	 Findings and Recommendations ....................................... 9-1
 

9.1 Findings .......................................................................................... 9-1 

9.1.1 Lifeline Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements ..................................................................... 9-1 

9.1.2 Key Societal Considerations and Expectations of
 

Lifeline System Performance ............................................. 9-3 

9.1.3 Critical Interdependencies ................................................. 9-5 

9.1.4 Disaster Lessons ................................................................ 9-8 

9.1.5	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements and Societal Considerations ...................... 9-10 

9.1.6 Future Considerations and Trends ................................... 9-11 

9.2 Recommendations ......................................................................... 9-12 

9.2.1 Lifeline Codes, Standards, and Guidelines ...................... 9-13 

9.2.2 Research........................................................................... 9-16 

9.2.3 Modeling.......................................................................... 9-21 

9.2.4 Lifeline System Operations ............................................. 9-23 

Appendix A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis ...................... A-1
 

A.1 Designing for Hazard Loads .......................................................... A-1 

A.2 Current Measures of System Performance .................................... A-3 

A.2.1 Electric Power Sector........................................................ A-3 

A.2.2 State and Local Governments: Utility Regulation, 

Energy Security ................................................................ A-4 

A.3 Power Outages: Multi-Event Trends and Models.......................... A-8 

A.4 Industry Practices Regarding Restoration of Service .................. A-12 

Appendix B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis ................ B-1
 

B.1 Regulatory Framework ...................................................................B-1 

B.2 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines ...........................................B-2 

B.2.1 Code of Federal Regulations..............................................B-2 

B.2.2 ASME Standards................................................................B-5 

B.2.3 API Recommended Practice 1162: Public Awareness 

Programs for Pipeline Operators........................................B-8 

B.2.4 Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of 

Natural Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines ..............B-10 

B.2.5 Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas 

Pipeline Systems ..............................................................B-11 

Appendix C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis ...................... C-1
 

C.1 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines ...........................................C-1 

C.1.1 AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications ...........................C-1 

C.1.2 American Railway Engineering and 

Maintenance-of-Way Association (AREMA) Manuals .....C-2 

GCR 16-917-39	 Table of Contents xi 
 

 C.1.3 Airport Design ................................................................... C-3 

C.1.4 Port Design ........................................................................ C-3 

C.1.5 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7-10, 

Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other 

Structures........................................................................... C-4 

C.1.6 American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, Building Code 

Requirements for Structural Concrete, and 

Commentary ...................................................................... C-4 

C.1.7 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) 

Manuals............................................................................. C-4 

C.2 Estimating Recovery Time............................................................. C-4 

Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis ........... D-1
 

D.1 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines .......................................... D-1 

D.1.1 Buildings and Other Structures ......................................... D-5 

D.1.2 Dams, Levees, and Tunnels............................................... D-7 

D.1.3 Pipelines ............................................................................D-7 

D.1.4 Mechanical Equipment .................................................... D-10 

D.1.5 Water and Wastewater System Assessment and 

Performance .................................................................... D-11 

D.1.6 Security ........................................................................... D-14 

D.1.7 Water Systems and Fire Hazards ....................................D-15 

D.1.8 Water and Wastewater System Plans and Preparations 

for Emergencies ..............................................................D-16 

D.1.9 Water and Wastewater Treatment Plants ........................D-17 

D.1.10 Wastewater Management ................................................ D-17 

D.1.11 Societal Performance Needs............................................D-18 

D.2 Performance Requirements ..........................................................D-18 

D.2.1 Performance Criteria for Water Systems......................... D-19 

D.2.2 Performance Criteria and Objectives for Wastewater 

 Systems ...........................................................................D-25 

Appendix E: Supplement to Interdependent Infrastructure Analysis ...E-1
 

E.1 Details of Current Research in the Interdependent
 

Infrastructure Field......................................................................... E-1 

E.2 Source Data from Utilities and Cities that Can Serve as 

“Proxies” for Societal Expectations of Infrastructure
 

Performance and Restoration Times .............................................. E-8 

E.3 Sample Base for Interdependent Infrastructure and Restoration 

Times Array ................................................................................. E-11 

E.4 Literature Reviewed in the Study of Interdependent
 

Infrastructure Trends and Models ................................................ E-12 

List of Acronyms ....................................................................F-1 

References .......................................................................... G-1
 

Project Participants ............................................................... H-1
 

xii Table of Contents	 GCR 16-917-39
List of Figures 

Figure 1-1 Disaster recovery continuum in the National Disaster Recovery
 

Framework ...................................................................................... 1-3 

Figure 1-2 Hypothetical examples of estimated current restoration times for 

community functionality conditions versus desired percent 

restoration levels for transportation infrastructure and critical 

facilities in an extreme flood ........................................................... 1-4 

Figure 2-1 Emergency management advisories and utility providers 

projected restoration times ............................................................ 2-26 

Figure 2-2 Average length of electric power outages in a typical year .......... 2-28 

Figure 2-3	 Spatio-temporal distribution of electric power outage counts 

and their durations across the Houston region after Tropical 

Storm (TS) Bill ............................................................................. 2-28 

Figure 2-4 Typical utility restoration curves for power, mobile, and 

landline telecommunication systems in the aftermath of 

(a) the 2010 Chile earthquake; and (b) the 2011 Tohoku, Japan 

earthquake..................................................................................... 2-29 

Figure 4-1 Map of U.S. natural gas interstate and intrastate transmission 

system ............................................................................................. 4-2 

Figure 5-1 Key communication relationships after disasters............................ 5-1 

Figure 5-2 Simplified illustration of telecommunication 

interdependencies.......................................................................... 5-27 

Figure 5-3	 Cell site recovery following the 2012 Midwest and 

Mid-Atlantic Derecho ................................................................... 5-33 

Figure 5-4 Causes of cell site disruption following the 2012 Midwest and
 

Mid-Atlantic Derecho ................................................................... 5-33 

Figure 6-1	 Temporary bridge restoring coastal highway in Minamisanriku, 

Japan, and more substantial replacement bridge built 4 months 

later .............................................................................................. 6-15 

Figure 6-2	 Temporary bridge restoring coastal highway in Rikuzentakata, 

Japan, and bridge repaired within one year................................... 6-16 

Figure 6-3	 Temporary steel girder bridge over river in Koizumi, Japan, 

just North of Utatsu, Japan, completed 107 days after the 

March 11, 2011 tsunami ............................................................... 6-16 

GCR 16-917-39	 List of Figures xiii 
Figure 7-1 Los Angeles water system service restorations following the 

1994 Northridge earthquake ............................................................7-9 

Figure 8-1 Number of papers and citations per year on “interconnected
 

critical infrastructure” .....................................................................8-3 

Figure 8-2 Schematic of interdependent lifeline systems .................................8-5 

Figure 8-3 Percent change in the types of infrastructure systems analyzed 

between documents published in 2010-2015 relative to 

2005-2010 .......................................................................................8-8 

Figure 8-4 Hypothetical multi-dimensional array illustrating the dependency 

of various community and institutional needs on the provision of 

utility, lifeline and other services, expressed in terms of the time 

required to restore services after a disaster has occurred ..............8-15 

Figure A-1 Electric power restoration curves................................................. A-10 

Figure A-2 Modeled restoration curves when the performance levels are 

measured by different metrics ...................................................... A-11 

Figure E-1 Types of infrastructure systems prominent in the literature ........... E-2 

Figure E-2 Percent change in the types of infrastructure systems analyzed 

between documents published in 2010-2015 relative to 

2005-2010 ...................................................................................... E-2 

Figure E-3 Percentage of publications per model type in the interdependent 

infrastructure literature ................................................................... E-3 

Figure E-4 Percent change in methods of analysis between papers published
 

in 2010-2015 relative to 2005-2010 ............................................... E-4 

Figure E-5 Percentage of publications per type of hazard modeled................. E-6 

Figure E-6 Percentage of publications per type of analysis ............................. E-7 

Figure E-7 Percentage of publications per source ............................................ E-7 

Figure E-8 Array example to accelerate the study of interdependent 

critical infrastructure systems and processes ................................ E-11 

xiv List of Figures GCR 16-917-39 
List of Tables
 

Table 3-1 Descriptive Statistics for Outages by Cause, Natural Hazards, 

1984-2006 ....................................................................................... 3-9 

Table 4-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Gas and 

Liquid Fuel Systems ....................................................................... 4-4 

Table 4-2 Class Locations and Design Factors in 49 CFR Part 192 ............... 4-6 

Table 5-1 Layers in Telecommunication Systems .......................................... 5-5 

Table 5-2 Major Telecommunication Infrastructure Components and 

Impact of Hazards ......................................................................... 5-12 

Table 5-3 Reliability and Unavailability Grades ........................................... 5-14 

Table 6-1 Cargo Shipping Equivalencies ........................................................ 6-4 

Table 6-2 U.S. Codes, Standards, and Guidelines Governing Transportation 

Systems ........................................................................................... 6-6 

Table 6-3 Expert Opinion on Public Expectations of Transportation
 

System Recovery Times after an Extreme Event, Compared 

with Engineering Estimates of Recovery Time ............................ 6-19 

Table 7-1 Major Potable Water Subsystems ................................................... 7-2 

Table 7-2 Major Wastewater Subsystems....................................................... 7-4 

Table 7-3 Summary of Design Performance Requirements for Hazard
 

Events ............................................................................................. 7-6 

Table 7-4 Primary Water and Wastewater System Performance Categories 

Provided by Infrastructure Networks .............................................. 7-7 

Table 7-5 Water Service Categories Provided through Built Infrastructure 

Networks......................................................................................... 7-8 

Table 7-6 Wastewater Service Categories Provided through Built
 

Infrastructure Networks .................................................................. 7-8 

Table 7-7 Societal Serving Functions during Disaster Recovery of Core 

Water Services Provided through the Infrastructure Systems ...... 7-11 

Table 7-8 Societal Serving Functions during Disaster Recovery of Core 

Wastewater Services Provided through the Infrastructure 

Systems ......................................................................................... 7-12 

GCR 16-917-39 List of Tables xv 
Table 7-9 Japan Citizen Response on Lack of Water Following 1995
 

Kobe Earthquake ...........................................................................7-19 

Table 7-10 Water System Service Restoration Comparison Between
 

Societal Expectations and Anticipated System Recovery for 

About 90% of Service Area for a Design Earthquake Event on 

the U.S. West Coast.......................................................................7-26 

Table 8-1 Frequency of Infrastructure System Publications Mentioning
 

Infrastructure Systems .....................................................................8-9 

Table A-1 Levels of Energy Shortages ............................................................ A-7 

Table A-2 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Winds and Selected Impacts ................A-9 

Table C-1 Expert Opinion on Expectations of Transportation System 

Damage and Recovery Times ........................................................ C-5 

Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water
 

and Wastewater Systems ................................................................ D-1 

Table D-2 EBMUD Water System Service Goals – Probable Earthquake ... D-20 

Table D-3 EBMUD Water System Service Goals – Maximum 

Earthquake....................................................................................D-20 

Table D-4 CCWD Reliability Criteria – Raw Water System ........................D-21 

Table D-5 CCWD Relationship Between Reliability and Seismic 

Criteria..........................................................................................D-22 

Table D-6 HBMWD Water System Service Goals – Maximum 

Earthquake....................................................................................D-23 

Table D-7 HBMWD Water System Service Goals – Probable 

Earthquake....................................................................................D-23 

Table D-8 SFPUC Water System Improvement Program Goals ...................D-26 

Table D-9 SFPUC Sewer System Level of Service Goals ............................ D-28 

Table E-1 Frequency of Modeling and Analysis Methods in Publications 

Mentioning Certain Infrastructure Systems ................................... E-5 

Table E-2 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Utility 

Companies ...................................................................................... E-8 

Table E-3 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Public 

Entities............................................................................................ E-9 

xvi List of Tables GCR 16-917-39 
Executive Summary 

Resilience involves the ability of people and communities to adapt to changing 

conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruptions (Executive Office of 

the President, 2011). At the community level, this concept is complex and multidimensional, relying on contributions from social science, engineering, earth 

sciences, economics, and other disciplines to improve the ways communities prepare 

for, resist, respond to, and recover from disruptions caused by either natural hazards 

or manmade causes. Resilience is intended to reduce the impact of hazards by 

restoring a community to normal function in a specified timeframe, and in turn, 

reducing the duration and cost of recovery. This requires planning for recovery and 

restoration prior to hazard events. 

Disasters can substantially reduce a community’s resilience by interfering with the 

operation of infrastructure, such as electric power, natural gas and liquid fuel, 

telecommunication, transportation, and water and wastewater systems (herein 

collectively referred to as “lifelines”). Lifelines are often distributed over large 

geographic regions and have numerous interdependent levels of operation, making 

them especially exposed to the impacts of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other hazards 

that affect broad areas. As a result, lifelines can experience distress and malfunction 

at many locations which, in turn, can impede response and recovery. Lifeline system 

failures and disruptions can displace people, obstruct the social and economic 

institutions that comprise communities, and in the worst cases lead to death and longterm negative societal consequences. 

This study of lifeline system performance was undertaken to better understand 

societal needs during recovery. The study was conducted as part of the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Community Resilience Program, a 

multi-year, multi-faceted program responding to the call for action laid out in The 

President’s 2013 Climate Action Plan (Executive Office of the President, 2013b). 

The assessment described herein is intended to inform the Community Resilience 

Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (NIST, 2015). The Guide 

defines a six-step voluntary process for engaging stakeholders and representatives to 

define key social and economic needs and community functions; develop an 

inventory of the community’s building stock and infrastructure systems; establish 

performance goals for buildings and infrastructure to serve key social and economic 

needs over a range of different hazard types; identify and evaluate gaps between the 

desired and anticipated performance of buildings and infrastructure; and set priorities 

GCR 16-917-39 Executive Summary xvii 
and define strategies to reduce risks and improve the resilience of buildings and 

infrastructure systems in their community. The Guide recommends that communities 

identify and plan for the prevailing hazard types (e.g., wind, earthquake, inundation, 

fire, snow or rain, and technological or human-caused) that may have a significant 

effect on their built environment. It also recommends consideration of a range of 

hazard levels defined as: Routine (occurs frequently and is below the design level); 

Design (often based on codes and standards); and Extreme (above the design level 

and sometimes referred to as the maximum considered event). 

The primary purpose of this study was to assess current societal expectations of 

acceptable lifeline performance levels and restoration timeframes that are informed 

by the phases of response and recovery, distinguishing those that are hazard 

independent and those that are specific for seismic (including tsunami), wind 

(including hurricane and tornado), flood, snow/ice, and wildfire hazard events. An 

additional goal of the study was to identify gaps between the desired and anticipated 

performance of lifeline systems to enable communities and lifeline system operators 

to set priorities and define strategies to reduce risks and improve lifeline resilience. In 

addition, this study was intended to provide a technical foundation for firstgeneration systems-based models that can be used to analyze community resilience 

and account for interdependencies among lifeline systems and the social and 

economic functions that they support. 

This work included a series of assessments of electric power, natural gas and liquid 

fuels, telecommunications, transportation, water and wastewater systems, and more 

broadly examined the societal considerations and interdependencies associated with 

the performance of these systems. Each lifeline assessment summarizes current 

codes, standards, guidelines, manuals and performance requirements as well as 

societal considerations and critical infrastructure interdependencies. Each assessment 

also describes system performance, summarizes disaster lessons, discusses key gaps 

and deficits between expected lifeline system performance and the performance 

required to support societal needs, and makes recommendations for improvements. 

Findings 

The findings address the current state of lifeline codes, standards, guidelines, and 

performance requirements; overarching societal considerations; critical 

interdependencies; disaster lessons (short- intermediate- and long-term recovery); 

key gaps and deficits; and future trends and considerations. 

A.	 Current State of Lifeline Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and 

Performance Requirements 

The study provides a survey of the many codes, standards, guidelines, and manuals of 

practice that govern the design, construction and performance of lifeline systems and 

xviii	 Executive Summary GCR 16-917-39 
system components. While these instruments can serve as approximate indicators of 

societal expectations with respect to lifeline system performance, there are critical 

gaps. In particular, the great majority of lifeline system performance standards relate 

to normal day-to-day lifeline system operations and do not cover their performance 

during hazard events. Thus, they offer little guidance for communities wishing to 

understand how lifeline systems are likely to perform during and after a hazard event. 

Other issues of interest with respect to lifeline codes and standards include: the gaps 

in codes and standards for some lifeline systems and system components; lack of 

consistency in the performance requirements for lifeline systems and system 

components; uneven treatment of hazards and hazard levels; emphasis on 

component-level instead of system-wide performance or interdependent function; 

emphasis on engineering and operational concerns relative to societal concerns; and 

the need for consistent standards development processes across lifeline systems. 

B. Overarching Societal Considerations 

Empirical data and research literature on societal expectations for lifeline system 

performance are scarce. Without such data, inferences have to be made about those 

expectations. Gauging societal expectations across the United States is challenging 

given the diversity of social and economic demographics and vulnerabilities, 

variations in hazard exposures and levels of vulnerability, and the physical 

vulnerability of different lifeline systems. Societal expectations and tolerances for 

lifeline service disruptions are also dynamic and likely to be shaped by both risk 

perception and risk communication that are in turn influenced by prior experience 

with disasters and lifeline outages, understanding of the risks, redundancy and 

dependency on lost services, and available information about disruptions. 

Using terminology from vulnerability science and resilience research, different 

segments of the population and sectors of the economy are differentially exposed and 

differentially sensitive to lifeline service disruptions. They are also different in their 

adaptive capacities when disruptions occur. The growing reliance on 

telecommunications and electric power systems can lead to performance expectations 

that exceed system capabilities. A gap between expectations and service capability 

makes the community more vulnerable when hazard-related disruptions occur. 

Human health and safety, the functionality of health-care systems, and economic 

well-being are priority issues that this study has used in assessing and characterizing 

societal expectations for lifeline performance. Emphasis is also given to the shortterm recovery phase (measured in days) following a major hazard event or other 

lifeline disruption since it is within this timeframe that societal impacts, such as 

deaths, injuries, and business interruption losses, are generally most acute. Also, 

GCR 16-917-39 Executive Summary xix 
practically speaking, the study found more data on short-term than on long-term 

disruptions. 

C. Lifeline Interdependencies 

The study also investigated the interactions between lifeline systems during normal 

operations and system restoration after hazard-related events. Dependent and 

interdependent relationships among lifeline systems have evolved over time. 

Although they provide efficiency and other benefits during normal operations, they 

also introduce unique and largely unknown behaviors in hazard-related events and 

system disruptions. 

There is a growing body of research on system modeling pertaining to lifeline system 

interdependencies that can be leveraged to improve resilience across lifeline systems. 

However, the vast majority of lifeline interdependency studies and tools tend to focus 

on the technical aspects of systems and the impacts of hazards on them. More 

emphasis on risk reduction, system restoration, and societal impacts are needed. 

There is also a lack of unified performance and restoration goals across multiple and 

interdependent systems. Rigorous and readily implementable theories and methods 

for the study of lifeline system interdependencies are similarly lacking. 

The assessments provided in this report reveal a number of critical dependencies and 

interdependencies across lifeline systems. Virtually every lifeline system depends on 

electric power and telecommunications for system control and monitoring. All 

lifeline systems also depend on fuel and transportation, particularly for service 

restoration and system repairs. Fuel is a critical contingency for power when outages 

occur. Water is critical for cooling in the generation processes for electric power. 

Water also helps with pollution control, and supports other infrastructure, such as 

natural gas and liquid fuel systems. 

The colocation of multiple lifelines also increases the likelihood that failure in one 

system can damage and interrupt others. Because information is typically not shared 

among different lifeline operators, many areas of colocation are unknown. It is also 

important to recognize that some interdependencies are increasing with time, such as 

the expanding role that telecommunications play in monitoring and remote control of 

electric power, gas and liquid fuel, transportation and water systems. 

D. Disaster Lessons 

In general, there is a substantial body of literature on the social and economic impacts 

of lifeline service disruptions, spanning studies on actual events—both hazard and 

non-hazard related—and scenario-based and probabilistic loss projections. The 

lifeline assessments found great variability in both the quantity and quality of data 

available for lifeline systems, hazard types and severity, and across the various 

xx Executive Summary GCR 16-917-39 
 

phases of disaster-related response and recovery. Most studies of disaster related 

impacts on lifeline systems are event-specific; systematic, multi-event studies are 

generally rare. Also, in general, there is more information and a more complete 

understanding of the societal impacts and restoration patterns of short-term rather 

than longer-term disruptions. 

In terms of recovery timeframes, disaster experiences show that most lifeline system 

outages generally last from hours to weeks (short- to intermediate-term recovery). In 

the most severe cases, outages can last for months or years. The long-term outages 

are associated with the most destructive events when critical and/or multiple 

components of lifeline systems that are time consuming to replace, such as buildings, 

bridges, piping, and essential equipment, must be reconstructed or replaced to restore 

system operability. 

E. Key Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

Overall, this assessment found uneven study and treatment of societal considerations 

in the codes and standards governing lifeline systems performance for different 

hazards. As previously noted, lifeline codes, standards, guidelines and manuals of 

practice are largely associated with the performance and safe operation of 

components rather than system response and levels of service. And even less 

common are efforts to consider interoperability issues across various lifeline systems 

(upstream and downstream interdependencies). In a few instances, system owners or 

operators have established system-level performance objectives or targets for a 

limited number of hazards. Most guidance does not address the range of hazard types 

considered in this study, particularly the low-probability/high-consequence events. In 

general, more is known about the lifeline impacts and performance objectives for 

earthquakes and wind-related hazard than for other hazards. 

Strategies to enhance resilience will invariably require difficult investment decisions 

in the face of limited resources. To make rational decisions, lifeline owners and 

operators need to consider the tradeoff between risk reduction and financial 

investment. Quantitative uncertainty and risk analysis therefore need to be an integral 

part of performance requirements and criteria. In addition, risk communication needs 

to be an essential part of the overall dialogue, including public messaging. 

Also, there is little information on societal expectations of system performance 

during routine, design, and extreme hazard events for most lifeline systems. Some 

potential “proxies” and informants for societal expectations of lifeline performance 

and recovery timeframes are available, including outage reporting thresholds and 

criteria, post-event reviews of utility performance, regulatory changes made 

following disruptions, societal and economic losses, and state and local energy 

GCR 16-917-39	 Executive Summary xxi 
assurance plans. Societal expectations may also be indirectly reflected in industry 

practices for service restoration following outages. 

Currently there is a lack of systematic research or accepted methods for quantifying 

or even bounding the gap between the disaster capabilities of lifeline systems and the 

societal expectations of their performance. The study identified some important 

examples for how the gap between prescriptive performance and societal 

expectations can be filled, which include: community planning programs and 

stakeholder engagement in risk reduction planning and practices, as well as high 

quality system design, detailed risk assessments coupled with appropriate emergency 

planning, system monitoring, well-communicated emergency response procedures, 

and robust contingency planning and design. 

F. Future Considerations and Trends 

This study identifies a number of considerations outside its scope as well as 

important trends that are likely to shape future lifeline system design and 

performance and societal expectations. As has been noted previously, societal 

expectations for lifeline system performance are changing, with decreasing societal 

tolerance for outages in general and lower thresholds for outage durations. Increasing 

interdependencies among lifeline systems, urbanization and the growing inventory of 

aging and deteriorating infrastructure increase the risk of system damage and 

disruption in future hazard-related events as well as the potential for cascading 

effects. 

Future work both in research and applications related to community resilience needs 

to consider the following issues: 

	 Increasing social vulnerabilities due to an aging population, urbanization, and 

policies that are increasingly enabling disabled persons to remain in their homes 

where they are especially vulnerable to the loss of lifeline services; 

	 Economic vulnerabilities caused by the ongoing shift from a manufacturing to an 

information economy, growth of “cloud” based information technology, rising 

use of “just-in-time” strategies in inventory control and maintenance, and data 

storage, e-commerce and the expansion of the financial service sector, increases 

in telecommuting; and cost-cutting and efficiency measures in business and 

inventory management; 

	 Increasing vulnerabilities to distant lifeline disruptions caused by the continued 

rise of globalization, supply chains, and the interdependencies inherent in modern 

manufacturing and finance; 

	 Dependency of all lifeline systems on electric power and telecommunications for 

system control and monitoring; 

xxii Executive Summary	 GCR 16-917-39 
	 Increasing availability of renewable and distributed energy resources, grid 

modernization, decentralized power management, energy storage, and changes in 

the traditional structure of the electric power industry; 

	 Increasing physical and social vulnerability caused by the effects of climate 

change; and 

	 Lifeline system performance issues caused by theft of essential equipment (e.g., 

copper wire used in telecommunication systems), cyber-attacks, and other 

security threats. 

Finally, the study cautions that unanticipated societal impacts will likely present 

themselves in future hazard events due to existing lifeline system vulnerabilities that 

remain poorly understood, absence of guidance on hazard resilient construction and 

installation practices, unknown and unfavorable states of repair, issues with system 

functional capacity, and ongoing changes in technology. 

Recommendations 

Recommendations resulting from this study are organized to identify the needs 

associated with: (a) codes, standards, and guidelines; (b) research; (c) modeling; and 

(d) systems operations. These needs target lifeline operators, practitioners, regulators, 

and researchers concerned about societal considerations in hazard-related system 

performance and potentially involved in lifelines standards and code development 

related activities. The following set of overarching recommendations was derived 

from the individual assessments of the study team. They were then discussed and 

prioritized with the review panel. All recommendations shown below were deemed 

high priority. Additional recommendations are provided in Chapters 2 through 8. 

A. Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

This study reveals critical gaps in the codes, standards, and guidelines that govern the 

design, construction, and performance of various lifeline systems and system 

components. Ten recommendations are offered to address needs related to lifeline 

codes, standards, and guidelines. The priority rankings reflect organizational and 

framework needs, available information, new knowledge needs, guidelines and 

standards development needs, and scoping breadth, with recommendations that 

pertain to broad issues and improving community resilience considered higher 

priorities than recommendations for specific lifelines. 

A1.	 Identify or establish an organization and process for advocating, harmonizing 

and unifying the consensus procedures for lifeline guidelines and standards 

development. 

A2.	 Develop more consistent terminology for lifeline standards. 

GCR 16-917-39	 Executive Summary xxiii 
 

A3.	 Develop an up-to-date and complete suite of codes, standards, and guidelines 

for all lifeline systems to reflect the current state of practice, knowledge, and 

performance requirements. 

A4.	 Develop a methodology to combine component-based design criteria into 

system level performance targets. 

A5.	 Develop lifeline system performance requirements that relate to community 

resilience and better reflect societal considerations. 

A6.	 Develop consensus-based guidelines and standards for the design of new 

lifelines and the retrofit of existing lifelines that reflect community resilience 

performance requirements and societal considerations. 

A7.	 Develop guidelines to inform the design, interoperability, and upkeep of 

lifeline system dependencies. 

A8.	 Reduce inconsistencies in the compendium of codes and standards that guide 

design, construction and resilience of the built environment, such as fire codes, 

building codes, and lifelines codes, standards, and guidelines. 

A9.	 Develop consistent policy and standards on accessing information and 

databases about critical infrastructure systems that is coordinated with 

Department of Homeland Security critical infrastructure activities. 

A10. Provide updated guidance for evaluating gas and liquid fuel pipeline and 

facility response to seismic hazards, floods, coastal storms, and tsunami-related 

inundation. 

B. Research 

The study has identified a number of gaps in data and knowledge necessary to 

improve the fundamental understanding of acceptable lifeline performance. Fifteen 

recommendations with respect to systematic study and research needs are offered. All 

are considered high priority, with those encompassing all lifelines and broader topics 

listed before those related to only one lifeline. 

B1. Gather information on and systematically study the relationships between 

service disruptions, and societal impacts and expectations to better understand 

lifeline system performance. 

B2. Develop and conduct a targeted research program to assess societal expectations 

associated with lifeline system performance. 

B3. Systematically study and compare the array of design approaches and methods 

for addressing societally-based performance requirements within current codes, 

standards and guidelines for lifeline systems. 

xxiv Executive Summary GCR 16-917-39 
 

B4. Investigate the differential vulnerability among social groups to lifeline system 

outages. 

B5. Systematically collect and review various “proxies” and secondary evidence for 

societal expectations of lifeline performance and restoration timeframes. 

B6. Assess the various lifeline performance programs and practices for public safety 

and develop guidance on their application to other critical lifelines, including 

multiple, interdependent systems and collocated facilities. 

B7. Conduct research on needed service restoration times, including how system 

operability as a performance metric supports community resilience. 

B8. Study lifeline system operator organizational issues and how they affect 

community-scale lifeline performance and resilience planning. 

B9. Enhance the understanding of infrastructure-related failures and cascading 

effects resulting from low-probability/high-consequence events. 

B10. Develop post-event data collection protocols to assess lifeline system recovery 

and restoration timeframes and improve the understanding of restoration 

processes across individual and interdependent lifeline systems. 

B11. Develop tools to identify interdependent infrastructure systems and services 

along with their restoration criteria. 

B12. Establish procedures to quantify hazards for spatially distributed systems. 

B13. Enhance the understanding of lifeline system supply sources and end-point 

facilities and their role in system performance, restoration, and community and 

regional recovery with the goal of improving databases and modeling of such 

sources and facilities. 

B14. Perform studies on changes in water demand considering an array of hazards as 

well as seasonal and longer-term climate variability, like drought. 

B15. Improve knowledge, databases and modeling for the impact of widespread 

flooding and storm damage on regional fuel supplies. 

C. Modeling 

There is a growing body of system modeling for lifeline systems and their 

interdependencies that can be leveraged to improve resilience across lifeline systems, 

but there are also notable limitations in scope, outputs, integration, and validation that 

need to be addressed. Three modeling related recommendations are offered. All are 

considered high priority, with those encompassing all lifelines and broader topics 

listed before those related to only one lifeline. 

GCR 16-917-39	 Executive Summary xxv 
 

 

C1. Aggregate the existing suite of infrastructure modeling tools and create a userfriendly interface so communities can properly assess their lifeline-related 

system performance and restoration risks, including uncertainty. 

C2. Develop first-generation models and practical tools to analyze community 

resilience that account for lifeline system dependencies and interdependencies. 

C3. Improve numerical modeling of water and wastewater systems, with emphasis 

on validation of models, developing the most effective simulation procedures, 

and applications in real systems. 

D. Lifeline System Operations 

The study also identifies a number of needs related to lifeline system operations and 

operational design. These too must be addressed in order to improve community 

resilience and bridge the gap between the post-event capabilities of lifeline systems 

and the societal expectations of their performance and restoration. Five 

recommendations are offered. All are considered high priority. 

D1. Develop a process for major utilities to conduct self-assessments of their 

preparedness for various natural hazard events, as a basis for prioritizing 

improvement to system robustness and post-event response. 

D2. Develop guidance for lifeline service providers on how to engage and 

collaborate with communities, including emergency management agencies and 

other key community institutions, in developing resilience strategies and 

preparing system restoration and contingency plans. 

D3. Develop guidance for local planning (e.g., for fuel delivery to emergency 

responders and critical infrastructure). 

D4. Develop guidance for lifeline service providers to evaluate the effects of system 

component failures, both in isolation and in combination, and considering 

upstream and downstream dependencies. 

D5. Design protocols for lifeline service providers, working with emergency 

management and other community institutions, to communicate to the public the 

likely impacts of different hazard events on service provision and disruption. 

xxvi Executive Summary GCR 16-917-39 
Chapter 1 

Introduction 

Electric power, natural gas and liquid fuel, telecommunication, transportation, and 

water and wastewater systems are commonly referred to as “lifelines” because they 

sustain modern communities and are vital for the economic well-being, security, and 

social fabric of the people they serve (NIST, 2014). Lifelines are often distributed 

over large geographic regions and have numerous interdependent levels of operation, 

making them especially exposed to the impacts of earthquakes, hurricanes, and other 

hazards that affect broad areas. As a result, lifelines can sustain distress and 

malfunction at many locations which, in turn, can impede response and recovery. 

Lifeline system failures and disruptions can displace people, degrade the social and 

economic institutions that comprise communities, and in worst cases lead to deaths, 

injuries, and long-term negative societal consequences. 

Resilience involves the ability of people and communities to adapt to changing 

conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruptions (Executive Office of 

the President, 2011). With respect to lifelines, community resilience involves a 

complex interaction among the people who depend on lifeline systems and the 

physical characteristics, operation, and management of those systems. People need 

access to the resources and services supplied by lifeline systems to withstand and 

recover from hazard-related disruptions. Also, the rate at which the functionality of 

lifeline systems is restored can have a major influence on a community’s recovery 

trajectory and outcomes. 

1.1 Impetus for the Project 

The long-term social and economic hardships caused by the devastation of Hurricane 

Katrina in 2005, Hurricane Sandy in 2012, and other recent disasters have led to a 

number of initiatives and activities to improve community disaster resilience that 

have been supported by federal, state and local governments, as well as by the private 

sector, including non-profit organizations. They include the resilient city framework 

developed by the San Francisco-based civic organization SPUR (2009a), Baseline 

Resilience Indicators for Communities (BRIC) (Cutter et al., 2010), the Community 

and Regional Resilience Institute community resilience system (CARRI, 2013), 

Oregon Resilience Plan (OSSPAC, 2013), United Nations International Strategy for 

Disaster Reduction’s Disaster Resilience Scorecard for Cities (IBM and AECOM, 

2014), and City Resilience Framework developed by the Rockefeller Foundation and 

Arup (2014). 

GCR 16-917-39 1: Introduction 1-1 
1.1.1	 NIST Community Disaster Resilience Program and Community 

Resilience Planning Guide 

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Community Disaster 

Resilience Program is a multi-year, multi-faceted research and development program 

that also responds to The President’s 2013 Climate Action Plan (Executive Office of 

the President, 2013b). The main objective of the NIST program is to develop 

guidance to assist communities in developing both short- and long-term measures to 

enhance resilience through improvements to buildings and infrastructure systems that 

the community depends upon for its social and economic functions. Examples of 

these functions include the provision of shelter, food, and water; access to health 

care; financial security; educational opportunities; and employment. 

A central facet of the NIST program is the Community Resilience Planning Guide for 

Buildings and Infrastructure Systems (NIST, 2015), which was released by NIST in 

October 2015. The Guide defines a six-step voluntary process for engaging 

community stakeholders and representatives to define key social and economic needs 

and functions of their community; inventory the community’s building stock and 

infrastructure systems; establish goals for the desired performance of buildings and 

infrastructure to serve the community’s key social and economic needs and functions 

in a series of hazard types; identify and evaluate gaps between the desired and 

anticipated performance of buildings and infrastructure; and set priorities and define 

strategies to reduce risks and improve the resilience of buildings and infrastructure 

systems in their community. 

Specifically, the Guide suggests that communities define desired performance goals 

for both safety and functionality of buildings and infrastructure systems. Community 

performance goals are based on social and economic functions, such as education, 

healthcare, and banking needs. It also recommends that functionality goals be 

organized by timeframes, using the sequential disaster response and recovery phases 

defined by the National Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 2011). As shown in 

Figure 1-1, they are: Short-term Recovery (focused on rescue and stabilization and 

generally lasts days following a disaster); Intermediate-term Recovery (focused on 

restoration and lasts weeks to months); and Long-term Recovery (focused on 

rebuilding and reconstruction and possibly lasts many months to years). 

Once performance goals are established, the Guide also recommends that 

communities determine the anticipated performance of existing buildings and 

infrastructure systems and prevailing hazard types (e.g., wind, earthquake, 

inundation, fire, snow or rain, and technological or human-caused) that may 

significantly impact the built environment within a range of hazard levels. These 

hazard levels are defined as: Routine (events that occur frequently and are below the 

design level); Design (events typically addressed in codes and standards); and 

1-2 1: Introduction GCR 16-917-39 
Figure 1-1	 Disaster recovery continuum in the National Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 

2011). 

Extreme (events that exceed design levels and are sometimes referred to as maximum 

considered events). When goals and performance are compared, there are likely to be 

gaps between the anticipated and desired performance of buildings and infrastructure 

systems; those gaps can then be used to develop alternative temporary and permanent 

solutions and implementation strategies to enhance the resilience of buildings and 

infrastructure systems. Following the Guide, Figure 1-2 shows a hypothetical 

community example of the anticipated versus desired performance goals for 

transportation infrastructure and critical facilities in an extreme flood. In this 

example, the anticipated performance of key elements of the community’s 

transportation infrastructure is generally lower and takes longer to recover its 

community functions than the desired restoration targets in the different phases of 

recovery. 

In addition to its development of the Guide, the NIST Community Disaster 

Resilience Program has launched a Community Resilience Panel for Buildings and 

Infrastructure Systems that will bring together a diverse set of stakeholders to 

continue developing guidance metrics and tools needed to develop community 

resilience (for more information, see www.crpanel.org). In February 2015, NIST also 

announced establishment of a Community Resilience Center of Excellence that is 

focusing on tools to support community resilience, including the development of 

integrated, systems-based computational models to assess community infrastructure 

resilience and guide community-level resilience investment decisions. The center, led 

by Colorado State University, in collaboration with 10 other universities (for 

additional information, see resilience.colostate.edu/), will also develop a data 

management infrastructure, as well as tools and best practices to improve the 

collection of disaster and resilience data. 

1.1.2	 NIST Research, Development, and Implementation Roadmap for 

Earthquake Resilient Lifelines 

The NIST Community Resilience Program is part of a broader disaster resilience effort 

that includes the oversight of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 

(NEHRP), which was established by the U.S. Congress with its passage of the 

Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (USA Public Law 95-124, 1977). 

GCR 16-917-39	 1: Introduction 1-3 
 

- 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Disturbance 1 

Hazard Type Flood 

Hazard Level Extreme 

Affected Area Regional 

Disruption Level Severe 

Restoration Levels 2,3 

30% Function Restored 

60% Function Restored 

90% Function Restored 

X Anticipated Performance 

Transportation Infrastructure Support 

Needed4 

Design Hazard Performance 

Phase 1 

Short-Term 

Phase 2 

Intermediate 

Phase 3 

Long Term 

Days Weeks Months 

0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+ 

Ingress (goods, services, disaster relief) 

Local Roads R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

State Highways and Bridge R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Egress (emergency egress, evacuation, etc) 

Local Roads R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

State Highways and Bridge R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Regional Airport R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Community resilience 

Critical Facilities 

Hospitals R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Police and Fire Stations R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Emergency Operational Centers R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Emergency Housing 

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Emergency Responder Housing R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Public Shelters R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Housing/Neighborhoods 

Essential City Service Facilities R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Schools R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Medical Provider Offices R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Community Recovery 

Residences R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Neighborhood retail R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Offices and work places R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

Non-emergency City Services R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

All businesses R, S 30% 60% 90% X 

2 30% 60% 90% 

3 X 

Footnotes: 

1 Specify hazard type being considered 

Specify hazard level – Routine, Design, Extreme 

Specify the anticipated size of the area affected – Local, Community, Regional 

Specify anticipated severity of disruption – Minor, Moderate, Severe 

Desired restoration times for percentage of elements within the cluster 

Anticipated performance for 90% restoration of cluster for existing buildings and infrastructure systems 

Cluster recovery times will be shown on the Summary Matrix 

4 Indicate levels of support anticipated by plan 

R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local) 

Figure 1-2	 Hypothetical examples of estimated current restoration times for community functionality 

conditions versus desired percent restoration levels for transportation infrastructure and critical 

facilities in an extreme flood (NIST, 2015). 

1-4 1: Introduction GCR 16-917-39 
NIST has served as the lead NEHRP agency since 2006, and has conducted 

numerous projects to meet NEHRP goals, including the development of improved 

techniques for reducing earthquake vulnerabilities of facilities and systems. In 2014, 

NIST released the NIST GCR 14-917-33 Report, Earthquake Resilient Lifelines: 

NEHRP Research, Development, and Implementation Roadmap (NIST, 2014), which 

identified a wide range of needed studies and is intended to guide the investments 

made by NIST and other NEHRP agencies in generating national performance and 

restoration goals and accompanying guidelines, manuals, and standards for lifeline 

systems and components. 

Element I of the Earthquake Resilient Lifelines Roadmap identifies the priority 

research, development and implementation topics necessary for establishing national 

lifeline system performance and restoration goals. Topic 2 of Element I of the 

Roadmap specifically calls for a national assessment of societal expectations of 

acceptable lifeline performance levels and restoration times as a high-priority and a 

necessary part of the development of resilient design and construction goals for 

interdependent lifeline components, systems, and the communities those systems 

serve. While this roadmap specifically addresses resilience issues in the context of 

earthquakes, those priority research and development topics, including Topic 2, are 

valid for other hazards as well. 

1.2 Project Scope and Purpose 

NIST asked the Applied Technology Council (ATC) to address Topic 2 of the NIST 

GCR 14-917-33 Report, with an expansion of scope to address all hazards, with the 

goal of supporting NIST’s efforts to develop tools and guidance as part of the NIST 

Community Disaster Resilience Program. The NIST Task Order specifically called 

for ATC to: Assess current societal expectations of acceptable lifeline performance 

levels and restoration timeframes that are informed by the phases of response and 

recovery, distinguishing those that are hazard independent and those that are 

specific for seismic (including tsunami), wind (including hurricane and tornado), 

flood, snow/ice, and wildfire hazard events. An additional goal of the project was to 

provide a technical foundation for first-generation systems-based models that will 

analyze community resilience and account for interdependencies among 

infrastructure systems and the social and economic functions that they support. 

This ATC study included a series of assessments of electric power, natural gas and 

liquid fuels, telecommunications, transportation, water and wastewater systems, and 

more broadly considered the societal considerations and interdependencies associated 

with the performance of these systems. Among other things, these assessments 

summarize current codes, standards, guidelines, manuals, and performance 

requirements for each lifeline system. Consistent with the Earthquake Resilient 

GCR 16-917-39 1: Introduction 1-5 
Lifelines Roadmap, the following definitions for codes, standards, guidelines, and 

manuals also apply in this study: 

	 Codes: Legally binding requirements that are adopted by entities having 

jurisdiction over the system or project, and that specifically state what must be 

done. 

	 Standards: Voluntary design requirements that are written in mandatory language 

and specifically state what needs to be done to meet the requirements of the 

standards. 

	 Guidelines: Design requirements that are written in non-mandatory language by 

subject matter experts, groups or organizations having appropriate expertise and 

experience relevant to the topic covered. Application of all or part of the 

guideline is at the discretion of the user. Guidelines often form the basis for prestandard documents that are then taken through the consensus process to become 

standards. 

	 Manuals: Practical instructions to assist designers in the use of guidelines, 

standards, or codes. They often include techniques for applying the procedures, 

key assumptions that need to be made, and design examples. 

Each lifeline assessment also examines the societal expectations, considerations, and 

lifeline interdependencies associated with system performance; disaster lessons; and 

key gaps and discrepancies between anticipated lifeline system performance and the 

performance required to support societal needs. Each assessment also makes a series 

of recommendations for improvements. 

1.3 Report Organization 

The report is organized as follows. Chapters 2 through 8 contain detailed analyses of 

societal considerations and expectations, interdependencies, and assessments for 

electric power, natural gas and liquid fuel, telecommunication, transportation, water 

and wastewater systems. The discussion on societal considerations and expectations 

(Chapter 2) uses terminology that may be new to some readers (see Terminology 

Notes sidebar, next page) and addresses a variety of issues, including societal 

expectations for the performance of lifelines both during and after natural hazard 

occurrences. Chapter 9 synthesizes the findings from Chapters 2 through 8 to form a 

common picture of current lifeline system performance requirements, societal 

considerations, lifeline interdependencies, disaster lessons, gaps between lifelines 

performance requirements and societal considerations, and future considerations and 

trends that are beyond the scope of this study but merit further attention over time. 

Chapter 9 also provides a series of recommendations that identify the needs 

associated with: lifeline standards, research, modeling, and lifeline system operations. 

A series of appendices contains supplemental materials from the analyses as well as 

1-6 1: Introduction GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

additional, detailed information about codes, standards, guidelines, manuals, and 

practices associated with various lifelines. 

Terminology Notes 

“Societal considerations,” as addressed in Chapter 2 and elsewhere in this report, 

pertains to a variety of issues related to life-safety, health, and economic impacts of 

lifeline performance. 

“Societal expectations,” as used here, refers to what different groups within the 

population want or hope for with respect to lifeline performance and post-disaster 

restoration times. 

The term, “disaster,” as used herein, is defined as “a sudden calamitous event bringing 

great damage, loss, or destruction (per the Merriam-Webster Dictionary definition); in 

some instances the term may pertain to a past event occurrence that was officially 

declared a disaster by the Federal government, or a state government. It is also used as 

a general term for significant past or potential future disruption to lifeline and 

community functions due to a hazard event. 

A “hazard event” is a disruptive occurrence caused by an earthquake, hurricane, flood, 

or other natural, technological, or human-made hazards. 

GCR 16-917-39 1: Introduction 1-7 

Chapter 2 

Societal Considerations 

2.1 Introduction 

A primary focus of this report is the assessment of societal considerations and 

expectations pertaining to the performance of lifelines following hazard-related 

disruptions, taking lifeline interdependencies and various hazard types into account. 

Carrying out such assessments is challenging in part because of the almost total lack 

of empirical data on what members of the general public regard as acceptable lifeline 

performance following hazard-related disruptions. Gauging societal perceptions of 

lifeline performance is also challenging because U.S. society is highly diverse. A 

disaster-induced eight-hour power outage might be tolerable for a resident of a 

suburban home, but less so for a wheelchair-bound occupant of a high-rise building 

who is dependent on the use of an elevator. The same power outage would be 

intolerable and life threatening for a disabled individual who is living alone and in 

need of electrically-operated life-support equipment. In general, members of the 

public are differentially affected, depending on factors such as age, physical health, 

weather conditions, built environment characteristics, and conditions at their 

locations at the time of the outage. These kinds of differences clearly influence 

performance expectations. 

Similarly, some businesses may be able to sustain their operations during a power 

outage of that duration, while others, which are highly dependent on power, 

telecommunications, and the cyber-infrastructure, would likely have to suspend 

operations and sustain business interruption losses unless they made alternative plans. 

Surveys conducted in the 1990s indicate that businesses in general are highly 

dependent on electrical power. A survey on a randomly-selected sample of 

businesses in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee found that across the board 

businesses were more dependent on power than on other lifelines and that 59% of 

them would have to shut down immediately if they lost power (Tierney and 

Dahlhamer, 1997). Businesses of all types nationwide are increasingly dependent on 

information technology, which in turn requires electric power, and as a consequence, 

those numbers are certainly higher today than they were twenty years ago when the 

survey was conducted. The appropriate way of conceptualizing “society,” then, is to 

think in terms of different sub-populations and utility service users with diverse 

needs. 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-1 
Public perceptions of the importance of different types of buildings and lifelines and 

willingness to pay for upgrades are reflections of societal expectations. A survey 

conducted in 1999 with a randomly selected sample of Alameda County, California, 

residents sought to determine the importance residents assigned to various elements 

of the built environment that are at risk from seismic hazards and to gauge their 

willingness to support seismic upgrades. Of twenty types of structures and systems, 

including various lifelines and facilities, survey respondents placed the highest 

priority on the continued functionality following an earthquake of major hospitals, 

natural gas pipelines, electrical power, water utilities, and public safety buildings 

(Tierney, 2001). These assigned importance factors are clearly related to the priority 

the public places on life safety and the basic needs of everyday life. Willingness to 

pay for the seismic rehabilitation of different elements of the built environment, 

including lifeline systems, varied in this survey as a function of factors such as 

education, gender (with women expressing greater willingness to pay), trust in 

government, and other factors—again indicating that societal views on continuity of 

lifeline performance are diverse (Tierney and Sheng, 2001). While somewhat 

informative, these findings are location- and earthquake-specific, and they contain no 

information on the duration of lifeline outages members of the public would find 

acceptable. 

Public expectations are shaped by available information on the impacts of disruption, 

and expectations might change if members of society had access to more complete 

information on the various ways in which the disruption of lifeline services can affect 

community life. Greater societal understanding of these aspects of lifeline service 

provision and interruption will no doubt have an influence on performance 

expectations. Obtaining such information is an important challenge for both research 

and risk communication. 

In addition to taking into account societal expectations—what different groups within 

the population want or hope for with respect to lifeline performance and post-disaster 

restoration times—this chapter also focuses on a broader set of societal 

considerations, or the impacts to life-safety, health, and economic well-being that 

may result from lifeline service disruptions. These effects are documented in the 

research literature. As the NIST Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings 

and Infrastructure Systems (NIST, 2015) points out, buildings and lifelines exist to 

support community institutions, which include family and kinship, the economy, 

government, health, education, community service organizations, religious and 

cultural institutions, and the media. All these institutions and the functions they serve 

contribute to community well-being and quality of life. However, the Guide 

emphasizes that some needs are more fundamental than others. Using a modification 

of Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” framework, physical survival is the most basic 

human need, followed by needs related to safety and security, “belonging” (that is, 

2-2 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
 

having friends and social networks), and growth and achievement. Consistent with 

that framework, when discussing societal considerations, this chapter focuses on how 

lifeline disruptions threaten the most basic needs and community institutions: human 

health, health-care institutions, and economic activity. 

The NIST Guide also distinguishes among short-term (days), intermediate-term 

(weeks to months) and longer-term (months to years) response and recovery needs 

that planning activities must take into account. While recognizing that all three time 

periods are important, this chapter focuses primarily on the short-term period and 

immediate impacts, disruption, and responses, again with respect to health and the 

economy. 

The rationale for limiting the discussion of societal considerations to life-safety, 

health, and economic impacts and a short-term time frame is threefold. First, life 

safety and health are overriding values for communities. Economic activity follows 

life safety as a priority for communities. As indicated in the NIST Guide, economic 

activity provides the means through which a wide range of community needs are 

satisfied; other institutions depend in major ways on the functioning of the economy. 

Educational, religious, and cultural institutions are clearly critical for communities, 

but are not as directly tied to basic needs. Second, although the consequences of 

lifeline disruption can increase over time, impacts such as deaths, injuries, and 

business interruption losses are generally most acute during the immediate postimpact period. Finally, more research exists on shorter-term than on longer-term 

disruptions. With this rationale in mind, the chapter will focus primarily on how 

lifeline performance and disruptions can have deleterious effects on life safety, health 

and economic well-being during the post-impact response period. 

2.2 Factors Affecting Lifeline Performance Expectations 

2.2.1 Hazard-Related Considerations 

An important question is whether societal expectations pertaining to lifeline 

performance vary as a function of hazard type. There is a lack of information on that 

question, as well as considerable variation in the hazard-specific and lifeline-specific 

information on societal considerations that is currently available. A targeted research 

program that directly addresses societal expectations associated with specific lifelines 

across various types of extreme events is needed. 

However, even in the absence of direct empirical data, it seems likely that the 

public’s expectations will take disaster characteristics—if not disaster types—into 

account. The NIST Guide classifies expected hazard levels as routine, design, and 

extreme; these levels of severity are likely to be related to societal expectations. 

Other things being equal, disruptions may be tolerated for longer periods in very 

severe and catastrophic events than in less serious ones because the public will likely 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-3 
 

be more willing to accept that such events are more difficult for lifeline service 

providers to anticipate and mitigate. The public may also be more understanding of 

disruptions stemming from events that are atypical and unexpected in specific 

community settings, reasoning that providers should be cognizant of and prepared for 

familiar and common hazards, but not necessarily as well-prepared for lowprobability events. 

2.2.2 Risk Perception and Communication Considerations 

Public expectations regarding lifeline performance are shaped by both risk perception 

and risk communication activities. Perceptions of risk include attitudes and beliefs 

regarding the likelihood of various disaster events, as well as their perceived impacts. 

A voluminous research literature has identified factors that influence the perception 

of natural and technological risks. That literature also points to factors that can 

prevent members of the public from accurately assessing risk. One body of research 

identifies cognitive heuristics and biases that influence hazard-related perceptions. 

For example, when the probability of a disaster is seen as low, individuals may 

ignore that risk, even if the consequences of an event would be catastrophic if it 

should occur.1

 This is thought to happen because such events do not reach a threshold 

level of concern. The availability heuristic refers to people’s tendency to 

overestimate the likelihood of an event that has occurred in the recent past or of an 

event that made a strong emotional impression, while underestimating the likelihood 

of other types of events that may be equally or more likely. The anchoring heuristic 

refers to the tendency to “anchor” perceptions of future risks in information that is 

based on experience or that has previously been communicated. For example, some 

people who did not evacuate when Hurricane Katrina threatened New Orleans 

referred to the fact that they had experienced Hurricanes Camille and Betsy decades 

before and believed that Katrina would be no worse than those disasters. Another 

example of this tendency occurred when Hurricane Rita struck the Houston, Texas, 

area a month after Hurricane Katrina; in that case, masses of people took to the roads 

in an attempted evacuation of Houston, recognizing the consequences of Hurricane 

Katrina (Lomax, personal communication). Myopia is the term researchers use to 

describe the tendency toward short-term, as opposed to long-term thinking with 

respect to hazards. Myopia can lead people to underestimate the risks associated with 

low-probability/high-consequence hazard events, such as earthquakes, or those 

hazard events whose effects are perceived in the distant future, such as climate 

change. 

1

 There are exceptions to this pattern with respect to other types of risk, however. For example, 

Lichtenstein et al. (1978) showed that people overestimate the frequency of rare causes of death. 

Barberis (2013) suggests that while the general tendency is to underestimate the likelihood of low 

probability events, the availability heuristic can cause overestimations as well. 

2-4 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
Residents may have a general sense that their community could experience an 

earthquake or a flood without necessarily feeling personally at risk; this is referred to 

in the literature as the optimistic bias—the idea that “it won’t happen to me.” 

According to the “risk as feelings” perspective, emotions also play a role in risk 

perception. Feelings of worry and anxiety can stimulate concern about hazards and 

may even lead those who are anxious to overestimate the likelihood of certain 

disaster events. Emotional reactions are one dimension of the availability heuristic; 

we generally overestimate risks when events have dramatic, shocking content, such 

as when an airline accident kills all on board and leads members of the public to 

believe that the risk of airplane crashes is higher than it actually is. Highly emotional 

reactions to hazards, however, are relatively uncommon during normal conditions; 

hazards may not even be salient enough to raise levels of concern to a point where 

individuals will take precautionary action. 

Other factors that have been shown to influence risk perception include gender, race 

and ethnicity, and trust in institutions. Women, members of minority groups, and 

those who place less faith in the institutions that are charged with managing risk tend 

to show more concern about risks of various kinds. (For representative research and 

discussion of factors influencing risk perception, see: Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; 

Kahneman et al., 1982; Flynn et al., 1994; Slovic, 1999, 2010; Michel-Kerjan and 

Kunreuther, 2011; Tierney, 2014). 

Although there is scarce research in the area, there is evidence that in addition to 

often misunderstanding the likelihood of events, people have difficulty perceiving 

what the impacts of disasters will be—that is, the types and severity of losses and 

disruptions they will experience in a hazard event. This is especially true when 

people lack prior experience with particular types of disruptions, such as lowprobability/high-consequence events. Recent research on the perception of flood 

hazards among residents of New York City floodplains suggests that individuals tend 

to underestimate the magnitude of the losses they will suffer in floods, even when 

they overestimate the likelihood that they will experience flooding. The researchers 

who conducted the study concluded that this may be one reason people fail to 

purchase flood insurance when they should do so, and also why they do not invest in 

hazard mitigation. One of the conclusions of this research was that “it is important 

that residents in flood-prone areas are more actively provided with information on 

objective flood damage, including worst-case scenarios” (Botzen et al., 2015, p. 379). 

If people have a tendency to underestimate their losses from flooding, they may also 

underestimate the severity of impacts of other types of events, including disasterinduced lifeline disruptions—particularly disruptions that last for long periods. Even 

if most people have some experience with electric power outages that last from 

minutes to hours, such experiences may not provide a basis for understanding the 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-5 
impacts of extended outages or for knowing what to do to cope under such 

circumstances. Prolonged lifeline service disruptions, especially those associated 

with power and water, can have profound and cascading effects on communities and 

vulnerable populations, requiring residents to respond and adapt in a variety of ways, 

but there is virtually no current research on public understanding of these impacts or 

of appropriate coping strategies. 

Risk communication involving hazards is another area in which there is a large body 

of research that can only be briefly addressed here. Risk communication strategies 

are guided by theories in a variety of disciplines, including communication, 

psychology, social psychology, sociology, crisis management, and anthropology. 

Insights from empirical research in these fields have resulted in the development of a 

wide variety of models and practical guidance focusing both on risk communication 

under normal conditions and on warnings and crisis communication during disaster 

events (see, for example Mileti and Sorensen, 1990; Morgan et al., 2002; Wood et al., 

2012; Mileti et al., 2011; Sheppard et al., 2012). 

Communication regarding hazard-related risks takes place throughout the hazard 

cycle: under normal conditions, in the warning period preceding disaster impact, 

during and immediately after impact, and during restoration and recovery. 

Communications regarding risk take a variety of forms, including elaborate and 

detailed scenarios used for public education, public service announcements, webbased guidance, and terse warning messages that appear on mobile phones before 

disaster impact. Ideally, risk communication activities should seek to accomplish a 

number of objectives: explaining the likelihood of events of different magnitudes; 

identifying hazard zones—that is, locations of greatest threat; providing information 

on potential hazard impacts; providing early warnings and expedient pre-impact 

warnings; informing members of the public what they need to do to reduce their risk 

at various stages of the hazards cycle (mitigation, preparedness, response, and 

recovery); specifying when they need to take such actions; providing information on 

populations and locations that are not at risk, as well as when those who have been at 

risk can stop taking protective action (e.g., when it is safe to return after an 

evacuation); and correcting erroneous information regarding risks. 

Risk communication strategies and processes have changed markedly over time. 

Original models of risk communication saw information as originating from an 

authoritative source, having specific message content, being distributed over specific 

channels, to designated recipients. Owing in part to advances in information 

technology and social media, this centralized, linear approach to risk communication 

has been replaced by decentralized dissemination processes involving multiple 

information sources, diverse message content, multiple two-way communication 

channels, and heterogeneous groups of recipients. Particularly during disasters, the 

ability of authorities to exercise tight control over risk communication processes has 

2-6 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
diminished. Given all these challenges and the dynamic nature of disasters, it is easy 

to understand why risk communication is so difficult and how mistakes can be made. 

Like risk communication in other areas, risk communication involving disasterinduced lifeline disruptions should be thought of as a collaborative activity that at 

various stages involves a variety of participants, including physical scientists, social 

scientists, and engineers with expertise regarding specific hazards; risk 

communication experts; lifeline and infrastructure service providers; emergency 

managers; public officials; conventional media; social media; and representatives of 

interested publics. Risk communication strategies should build on one another across 

the stages of the disaster cycle. Communication under normal conditions should seek 

to convey information on hazard-related lifeline risks and impacts, as well as 

appropriate self-protective measures. Such information provides community residents 

with the basic context through which they will interpret subsequent risk-related 

information. During and after crises, warning information and guidance should be 

timely and specific with respect to who is (and who is not) at risk and what actions to 

take to avoid or reduce risk, and when. For example, with respect to “boil water” 

orders, risk communication messages should include information such as which 

geographic locations and populations are affected by the order, how long water 

should be boiled, which uses require boiled water, how long the order will be in 

effect, and other key details. Information will need to be disseminated and updated 

frequently and through multiple channels. 

Addressing the expectations of households, businesses, and community institutions is 

a key element in disaster risk communication. When disasters strike, both the demand 

for information and the amount of information that needs to be conveyed increase 

dramatically. Regarding lifelines, members of the public will want to know, among 

other things, which lifelines are affected, how severe the impacts are, how long 

disruptions are likely to last, what risks are associated with disruption, what to do to 

reduce those risks, what resources are available to help cope with disruptions, and 

how to access those resources. Providing this kind of detailed information requires 

collaboration between lifeline service providers and the range of organizations that 

are involved in managing the disaster. 

In addition to addressing societal needs, risk communication often also aims at 

managing them. For example, for decades local emergency management agencies 

have been telling community residents not to expect immediate assistance in a hazard 

event and that they should anticipate being on their own for at least 72 hours after the 

event. More recently, there has been a trend toward emphasizing that in some cases, 

such as catastrophic events, aid will be unavailable for even longer periods. 

Similarly, agencies that are responsible for wildfire disaster management have been 

informing residents of at-risk communities that firefighters may not be able to save 

their homes—and indeed may not even attempt to—should a fire break out. Both of 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-7 
these risk communication activities aim at ensuring that members of the public have 

reasonable expectations about agency performance, so they can plan accordingly. A 

key lesson of disaster risk communication is that the public can handle bad news if it 

is communicated appropriately by authoritative and credible sources. However, the 

public has little tolerance for withholding of information, over-promising, or 

communication that appears deceptive. The section that follows focuses more 

specifically on public expectations regarding the performance of lifeline service 

providers during disasters and what can happen if those expectations are not 

addressed. 

2.2.3 Public Opinion Regarding Lifeline Service Providers: Outrage 

and Recreancy 

What lifeline customers expect and will tolerate is also likely to be influenced by 

public confidence in lifeline service providers, which is in turn likely to be linked to 

providers’ previous performance during both routine operations and past disasters. To 

avoid damaging public confidence, infrastructure owners and managers must be 

viewed as engaging in good faith efforts to provide reliable services and to restore 

services when they are disrupted. Circumstances that negatively affect public 

perceptions regarding providers’ competence and honesty will also affect public 

expectations. 

Members of the public may be especially dissatisfied if they believe that providers 

should have learned lessons and improved their performance based on past 

emergencies. For example, Connecticut Power and its parent company Northeast 

Utilities were criticized by the public when there were problems with power 

restoration following Tropical Storm Irene in 2011 and then again in a nor’easter that 

occurred later that same year (Cox, 2011). The following year, the Connecticut 

legislature passed Public Act 12-148 with the intent of improving utility system 

performance in emergencies; the passage of this law can be seen as a reaction to the 

2011 events and an expression of the public’s expectations regarding lifeline 

performance. (Chapter 3, which covers electrical power systems, provides additional 

information on regulatory changes at the state level that have followed recent 

disaster-related disruptions). 

Similarly, in 2012 the Potomac Electric Power Company (Pepco) was criticized for 

being slow to respond to a derecho—a widespread, long-lived wind storm— when 

there was also a perception that the company had skimped on routine maintenance in 

previous years. Additionally, Pepco restoration times were noticeably longer than 

those of other providers in the affected region, and the situation was made worse by 

the fact that the outages occurred during very hot weather (Easterbrook, 2012). 

These examples also highlight the importance of how service providers communicate 

with consumers in the context of crisis-related service disruptions. Part of the public 

2-8 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
outrage against Connecticut Power following the 2011 outages stemmed from the 

fact that the utility provided vague information and over-promised on restoration 

times. A study by Emergency Preparedness Partnerships (EPP, 2012) found that 

many criticisms of lifeline service providers following Tropical Storm Irene centered 

on poor communication with the public about electrical power restoration times. As 

indicated in preceding discussions on risk communication, members of the public 

will react negatively if they believe that authorities are not being truthful about how 

long it will actually take to deal with disruptions. 

Nearly three decades ago, risk communication specialist Peter Sandman (1989, 1993) 

identified the “outrage factor” as a key element in public risk perception. Causes of 

outrage include the imposition of risks and losses on members of the public by 

outside entities—which could include lifeline service providers. The outrage factor is 

related to the sociological concept of recreancy, or the loss of trust in entities that 

have fiduciary responsibilities in areas such as the management of technology 

(Freudenburg, 1993). This research indicates that perceptions of risk and feelings of 

outrage are closely tied to perceptions about the institutions that are responsible for 

managing risk. Public indignation results when institutions are perceived as behaving 

in an irresponsible, untrustworthy, or deceptive manner. The public reaction to the 

2010 PG&E San Bruno pipeline explosion contained a strong element of outrage and 

recreancy that not only focused on the disaster itself but also carried over into 

negative public views on the utility’s close relationship with its regulator, executive 

compensation, the cost of utility improvements, and PG&E’s Smart Grid program 

(Johnson, 2011; Johnson and Rogers, 2011). 

Once the public loses trust in an institution, regaining trust is very difficult (Slovic, 

1993) but not impossible. An exception is when the loss of trust occurs as a result of 

what is perceived as deceptive behavior on the part of an institution, in which case 

trust may never be regained (Schweitzer et al., 2006). Institutions of all types, 

including utility providers, run the risk of losing the public’s trust when they do not 

communicate in a straightforward manner and when they are seen as withholding 

information that the public needs. Because trust is difficult to regain, public 

perceptions stemming from past events may continue to influence expectations over 

time. 

2.2.4 Substitutability and Need 

Societal expectations pertaining to lifeline performance will also likely be influenced 

by the extent to which substitutes are available for lost services and the degree to 

which a particular service is needed following a disaster. Although the loss of 

drinking water due to a disaster is a serious problem, the public may not see that 

disruption as unacceptable as long as other potable water sources are made available 

in a timely manner to those who are affected. Damage to the natural gas distribution 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-9 
system may be acceptable if gas is used mainly for heating and if the damage occurs 

during warm-weather parts of the year. Expectations will be highest when substitutes 

and work-arounds are not available and when current needs are high. 

2.2.5 Relevance of Resilience Concepts 

Societal expectations regarding lifeline performance can thus be characterized as 

diverse, variable, situation- and hazard-specific, and subject to a variety of 

contingencies. Using terminology from vulnerability science and resilience research, 

different segments of the population and sectors of the economy are differentially 

exposed and differentially sensitive to lifeline service disruptions, and they also differ 

in their adaptive capacities when disruptions occur. Regarding population 

vulnerability, exposure and sensitivity are generally inversely related to socioeconomic status, while adaptive capacity increases with socio-economic status. 

Community residents living at or below the poverty level, members of racial and 

ethnic minority groups, low-income women-headed households, and marginalized 

populations, such as undocumented immigrants, are more likely to live in 

substandard housing that is susceptible to damage, to lack the financial means to 

prepare adequately for disasters, and to have fewer resources with which to cope after 

a disaster strikes. Those in higher positions on the socio-economic ladder are better 

able to take pre-disaster preventive actions and to respond and recover in a resilient 

manner when disasters occur (Tierney et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 2013). Disaster 

vulnerability and dependence on lifeline system performance also varies as a function 

of age and physical condition. 

These factors can be expected to influence disaster-related needs and performance 

expectations. For example, an affluent retired couple that has the financial means to 

purchase a large generator for their home may be relatively indifferent to the 

potential for an eight-hour electrical power outage because the couple has a source of 

continuous power, will not suffer a diminished quality of life if an outage occurs, and 

can survive comfortably for days on generated power without requiring additional 

fuel. Severely disabled persons who are living in the community and require 

electrically-powered medical devices and individuals who are receiving in-home 

hospice care may be unable to tolerate even short-term outages. In addition to the 

need for electricity to power assistive devices, many medications require 

refrigeration, which is in turn dependent on power. 

The situation is similar with businesses. Larger businesses are likely to be in a better 

position to protect themselves against lifeline service disruptions than smaller ones— 

for example by purchasing generators, having business continuity plans, and having 

backup locations from which to operate should outages occur. Although all 

businesses depend on robust lifeline system performance, some businesses are more 

likely than others to sustain losses in the event of disruption. A manufacturing facility 

2-10 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
may be able to make up for lost production following a day-long electrical power 

failure, but the same is generally not the case for a hotel or restaurant that loses a 

day’s worth of revenues. Health regulations may require restaurants to dispose of 

perishable items following a power outage, causing further losses. Businesses in the 

e-commerce and financial sectors depend critically on uninterrupted power and 

telecom services and thus are highly vulnerable to disruptions. 

Lifeline outages have disparate economic effects in other ways as well. Workers who 

are paid on an hourly basis and who cannot do their jobs because of lifeline 

disruption lose income, while salaried workers typically do not. In the case of 

localized outages, some employees may simply be asked to telecommute until service 

is restored, while others whose jobs are tied to the business location may be out of 

work, often for extended periods. A financial planner or an engineer may be able to 

work from home when lifeline services are lost at his or her place of business, but a 

janitor or window-washer cannot. Many low-wage households and those in which 

there is a single breadwinner struggle to make ends meet on a day-to-day basis, and 

in those circumstances the loss of even a few days of wages can be a serious financial 

blow. 

The needs and performance expectations of households and businesses are thus 

linked to their vulnerabilities and adaptive capacities. Households and businesses 

with greater exposure and sensitivity and lower adaptive capacity are especially 

dependent on continued lifeline performance both under normal conditions and in 

disruptive situations, and this dependency can be expected to influence their 

performance expectations. Additionally, as noted earlier, expectations cannot be 

viewed in isolation from other public attitudes and beliefs, such as views on whether 

service providers are trustworthy and engaging in good-faith efforts to manage risk; 

these views are also likely to differ across population subgroups. 

2.3 Impacts of Lifeline Service Disruptions on Health and HealthCare Systems: Societal Considerations 

2.3.1	 Human Health Considerations in Recent Events 

It is difficult to link specific health outcomes to the disruption of lifeline services in 

disasters. Statistics on disaster-related deaths and injuries are available, but typically 

the specific causes of those outcomes are not tallied in systematic ways. This section 

discusses studies and reports that have documented the health effects of electrical 

power and water outages, first discussing the 2003 blackout and then moving on to 

the impacts of other U.S. disasters. 

The massive power outage that struck parts of the eastern and midwestern United 

States and Canada in August 2003 is perhaps the best-documented case of electrical 

power service disruption, in terms of its effects on health and health-care systems. It 

GCR 16-917-39	 2: Societal Considerations 2-11 
also provides a number of examples of how failures in electrical power systems can 

have cascading effects. The blackout began with a series of small events that led to 

progressive degrading and total failure of power systems in eight eastern U.S. states 

and the Canadian province of Ontario. It started around 2 pm on August 14, and it 

wasn’t until the morning of August 17 that the entire affected system was restored 

and operating reliably. Approximately 50 million people were affected by the 

blackout, including residents of large cities such as New York City, Toronto, 

Cleveland, and Detroit. 

Several reports and studies have focused on the impacts of the blackout on 

interdependent infrastructure systems in New York City, where according to one 

report (DOT, 2004, p. 2): 

“Subways were stopped in their tunnels, airports halted operations, and elevators 

stalled mid-ride. Water systems shut down. The communications network was 

disrupted; cellular telephones ceased to work; emergency response networks 

were hampered; and automatic teller machines went dark. Many restaurants and 

shops shuttered their doors, and streets were rapidly overwhelmed by vehicles 

and pedestrians trying to find their way home. Without air conditioning, many 

buildings rapidly became stifling. Stranded commuters spent the night in train 

stations, hotel lobbies, and emergency shelters.” 

Four hundred thousand people were trapped on New York subways when the power 

failed. The city lost all of its 11,000 traffic signals, and no mass transit was able to 

operate, except for water ferries and buses. There was congestion on streets, 

sidewalks, and bridges as residents and commuters tried to make their way home. 

Eight hundred people trapped in elevators had to be rescued. High-rise buildings 

lacked water because they lost pumping capacity. Raw sewage was released because 

of the loss of power at wastewater treatment plants (DOT, 2004). 

The blackout caused 90 excess deaths in New York City alone—a rise in mortality of 

28%, with those aged 65-74 most affected (Anderson and Bell, 2012). Hospital 

emergency department visits and admissions due to respiratory problems increased, 

especially among women, elderly persons, and those suffering from chronic 

bronchitis (Lin et al., 2011). Respiratory illnesses were made worse by the hot 

August weather, poor air quality resulting from the blackout as people took to the 

roads in automobiles, and the extra exertion required by residents to get around 

without elevators and public transportation. Food spoilage and other factors led to an 

increase in diarrheal illnesses, and calls increased to 911 and other emergency 

services, including poison control centers (Lin et al., 2011). 

At the same time, the blackout made the management of illnesses more difficult. 

Pharmacies were forced to close, making it impossible to access prescription drugs, 

2-12 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
and hospital operations were compromised. Based on their research, Anderson and 

Bell (2012) concluded that the impacts of electrical power outages on mortality and 

morbidity have been underestimated. 

Studies involving disaster-induced electrical power outages shed additional light on 

the health impacts of such failures. Among all forms of poisoning, carbon monoxide 

(CO) poisoning is responsible for the most fatalities in the United States. When 

winter storms and other disasters cause power outages, the incidence of CO 

poisoning can increase as those affected seek other means of heating and cooking. 

One study conducted in Maine following the historic 1998 ice storm illustrates this 

pattern. Over 600,000 people in Maine lost electrical power in that event, and many 

residents turned to gasoline powered-generators and fuel-powered space heaters in 

order to keep warm. A survey conducted after the event found that 100 cases of CO 

poisoning were reported in the hardest-hit part of the state (Daley et al., 2000). A 

more recent study that focused on a January 2009 ice storm in Kentucky found that 

ten deaths occurred from CO poisoning in that state in the two weeks after the storm. 

The most common cause of death was the use of gasoline-powered generators. CO 

poisoning also accounted for 202 hospital emergency visits and 26 admissions in that 

event. Minority group members suffered disproportionately from severe CO 

poisoning; many of those cases were associated with burning charcoal indoors 

(Lutterloh et al., 2011). 

A review sponsored by the Center for Disease Control of studies on disaster-related 

CO poisonings in the United States found that between 1991 and 2009 there were 

362 such incidents reported in the literature, accounting for approximately 1,900 

cases of disaster-related CO poisoning, of which 75 were fatal. Half of the cases 

involved hurricanes, 46% occurred as a consequence of winter storms, and 4% were 

flood-related. The most common cause of both cases and fatalities was the use of 

generators (Iqbal et al., 2012). This review includes only published accounts and thus 

almost surely underestimates the severity of the problem. 

Even where exact statistics are unavailable, reports clearly recognize that power 

outages are significant contributors to disaster mortality and morbidity. A literature 

review focusing on the health impacts of windstorms identified several effects of 

storm-related power outages on health, including electrocution, fires and burns, CO 

poisoning, and infections resulting from reduced levels of sanitation (Goldman et al., 

2014). Another review on the health effects of coastal storms and flooding in urban 

areas of the United States (Lane et al., 2013) noted that mortality and morbidity in 

such events are the result of multiple factors, including direct exposure to storm 

impacts; evacuation-related health problems; hazards stemming from utility outages; 

problems associated with displacement and subsequent health care service disruption; 

impacts on mental health; and cleanup- and recovery-related hazards. Health-related 

hazards associated with power outages that were cited by the authors included the 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-13 
following: CO poisoning; increased physical demands posed by non-functional 

transportation systems; lengthened ambulance call times; closed pharmacies and 

retail outlets; and increased air pollution leading to respiratory problems. The review 

noted that power outages typically result in increased emergency medical services 

calls and demands on hospital emergency departments on the part of community 

residents who rely on electrically-powered medical equipment, and that the health of 

frail elderly persons in nursing homes and similar facilities can be seriously 

compromised when electrical power service is disrupted. It also called attention to the 

increased risks borne by other institutionalized populations, such as inmates. Homing 

in on power-related problems that emerged during and after Hurricane Sandy in New 

York City, one study cited sequelae that included CO-poisoning-related emergency 

calls and emergency department visits, hypothermia-related emergency department 

visits, exacerbation of chronic illnesses, and vulnerability to foodborne illnesses 

(Lane et al., 2013). 

2.3.2 Impacts on the Health-Care Sector 

In the Alameda County study discussed in Section 2.1, residents indicated that they 

considered major hospitals to be the most important elements in the built 

environment—that is, that they placed the highest priority on hospitals remaining 

operational in the event of an earthquake. Experiences in U.S. disasters indicate that 

hospitals are extremely vulnerable to disaster-induced electrical power and water 

system disruptions and that outages have significantly curtailed the ability of 

hospitals to perform their functions in disasters and have forced hospital evacuations. 

In 2001, Tropical Storm Allison had a major impact on facilities at the Texas Medical 

Center in Houston, the world’s largest medical complex. A combination of flooding, 

power loss, and inoperable generators resulted in hospital evacuations and the loss of 

research data, laboratory facilities, and tens of thousands of experimental animals. 

Patient care was rendered untenable in several Texas Medical Center hospitals, and 

patients had to be evacuated manually because elevators and escalators ceased to 

function. 

In Hurricane Katrina in 2005, New Orleans hospitals lost power, communications, 

water, and sewer services and were unable to re-supply drugs, blood, food, and other 

supplies. As temperatures reached 100 degrees Fahrenheit, hospitals had no cooling 

capacity, resulting in sweltering conditions for occupants. Nearly 2,000 patients and 

8,000 staff and family members were trapped in the 11 most seriously affected 

hospitals. There was no power for lighting, telephones, electronic devices for IV 

equipment, laboratory and x-ray equipment, dialysis machines, and ventilators. 

Patient evacuations, including evacuations of intensive care units and hospice 

patients, had to be undertaken under the worst possible conditions. There were 

2-14 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
dozens of deaths in New Orleans hospitals, including alleged mercy killings by staff 

at Memorial Hospital (Fink, 2013). 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Sandy in 2012, flooding and power service disruption 

forced the evacuation of five New York City hospitals. At New York University’s 

Langone Hospital, 260 patients had to be evacuated, including more than 20 

newborns in the hospital’s neonatal intensive care unit (Cohen, 2012). 

Following Hurricane Sandy, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 

conducted a survey of 174 hospitals and carried out site visits in ten selected 

Medicare-certified hospitals in Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey. The study 

found that 69 hospitals in the sample reported electrical power outages and that 

generators did not function reliably in 28 of the affected hospitals. Hospitals reported 

that due to electrical power disruptions, they had problems accessing medical 

records; evacuees from other hospitals arrived without medical records because those 

hospitals had lost power; fuel for generators was difficult to obtain, often because gas 

stations could not pump gas; and hospitals experienced an influx of oxygendependent community residents who had lost power at home (DHHS, 2014). 

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Sector Resilience Report for 

hospitals (DHS, 2014) assesses hospitals’ dependence on various infrastructure 

systems. Based on site visits and interviews, the report indicates that the hospitals 

included in the study would experience a loss of 67-99% of their core operations 

within five minutes of losing electrical power unless they could continue operations 

using generated power; within ten minutes without information technology; and 

within two hours after the loss of water and wastewater services. Regarding the use 

of generators, the report notes that “many hospitals do not have large on-site fuel 

reserves nor guaranteed fuel contracts, and during prolonged, widespread power 

outages such as those following a hurricane or severe winter storm, fueling the 

backup generators may be problematic” (DHS, 2014, p. 7). The Joint Commission, 

which is responsible for hospital accreditation, requires hospitals to have the capacity 

to function on emergency generator power for 72 hours, but it is unclear whether 

many hospitals affected by extreme events will be able to do so in light of the issues 

cited in the DHS assessment, the problems associated with hospital generators in 

recent U.S. disasters, and the potential for very long power outage times in major 

disasters. 

Nursing homes constitute another setting in which the need for reliable utility 

services is great. An estimated 70 residents died in thirteen nursing homes during and 

after Hurricane Katrina (Laditka et al., 2008). Because of the Katrina experience, 

DHHS has been monitoring emergency preparedness activities in Medicare- and 

Medicaid-certified nursing homes around the country. A recent DHHS report 

documents serious and ongoing deficiencies in nursing home emergency planning 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-15 
and training. Because federal law requires it, the vast majority of nursing homes have 

some sort of written emergency plan, but planning activities are by no means 

comprehensive. Among many problems identified are deficiencies in planning for 

power outages. An in-depth DHHS study of 24 nursing homes found that 19 lacked 

sufficient fuel for power generation in the event of an outage, despite the fact that 

many of their plans called for sheltering-in-place in the event of a disaster (DHHS, 

2012). The Katrina experience also showed that nursing homes outside the impact 

area were not well prepared to receive evacuees (Laditka et al., 2008). Moving 

elderly persons for any reason can result in negative health impacts, but these data 

suggest that many nursing homes will be forced to evacuate patients if lifeline 

services are disrupted for extended periods in future disasters. 

Risks are also high for elderly and disabled persons living in the community. A 

recent article noted that there are currently an estimated 54.4 million people in the 

United States with functional needs and that with the passage of the Affordable Care 

Act, people with functional needs will increasingly be remaining in their 

communities, whereas in the past they might have required institutional care (Jan and 

Lurie, 2012). The article notes that “[w]ith or without a major emergency, the ability 

of people with functional needs to remain in their community setting depends on a 

stable electrical grid” (Jan and Lurie, 2012, p. 2272). It also cites some of the kinds 

of issues that developed among residents with functional needs in Hurricane Sandy 

because of electrical power outages: 

“Some residents depend on the electrical grid for refrigerating critical 

medications or for powering lifesaving medical equipment. Many residents, 

particularly those requiring ongoing respiratory care, streamed into emergency 

rooms to receive respiratory treatments, refill oxygen tanks, or recharge batteries. 

Some residents whose medical needs had not escalated but who needed to 

recharge medical equipment were turned away from shelters whose operators 

believed their needs could not be met in a general shelter.” (Jan and Lurie, 2012, 

p. 2272) 

2.3.3 Climate Change, Lifeline Services, and Health Considerations 

The U.S. National Climate Assessment (NCA) provides information on how future 

climate conditions are likely to affect the energy supply and energy consumption 

demands. Among its most general findings is that “projected impacts of climate 

change will increase energy use in the summer and pose additional risks to reliable 

energy supply” (Melillo et al., 2014, p. 114). NCA projections indicate an increase in 

extreme weather events such as heat waves and wildfires; more intense drought 

conditions and heavy precipitation events; and more high water in coastal areas. As 

periods of extreme heat increase over time, the demand for energy for cooling will 

increase; at the same time, with fewer cold days, the demand for heating will decline. 

2-16 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
In addition to challenges associated with increasing peak energy demands and 

extreme weather events, the NCA concludes that energy production is threatened by 

water supply problems that can affect production, as well as by sea level rise. It notes 

that a significant proportion of the infrastructure for producing and distributing 

energy is located in low-lying and coastal areas and that “[r]ising sea levels, 

combined with normal and potentially more intense coastal storms, an increase in 

very heavy precipitation events, and local land subsidence, threaten coastal energy 

equipment as a result of inundation, flooding, and erosion” (Melillo et al., 2014, 

p. 119). 

With approximately 80% of the U.S. population living in cities and metropolitan 

regions, the NCA sees climate change as particularly challenging for urban areas. 

Climate change is expected to add to the already existing vulnerabilities of urban 

populations, particularly those associated with poverty, disabilities, and chronic 

health problems such as asthma (Cutter et al., 2014). 

In the United States, extreme heat is the natural hazard that results in the most 

fatalities; its negative impacts on life and health were highlighted in the recent NCA 

report on climate change and human health. Many health conditions are worsened by 

high heat, including cardiovascular and respiratory diseases. Extreme heat has its 

greatest effects on the very young and very old. Additionally, research indicates that 

members of minority groups are disproportionally exposed to the negative effects of 

extreme heat and urban heat islands (Harlan et al., 2006, 2012). Electrical power 

failures occurring during heat waves—whether or not they are disaster-induced—will 

constitute an increasingly significant threat to human life and health. 

2.4 Economic Impacts of Lifeline Service Disruption: Societal 

Considerations 

2.4.1 Introduction 

This section focuses to a significant degree on economic and societal considerations 

associated with the electrical power grid, because more research has been done on the 

economic impacts of disruptions in that lifeline system than on others and because 

electrical power is relied upon by other infrastructure systems. The high dependence 

of communication systems (e.g., cell phone technology, the internet) on electric 

power, economic impacts of disruptions of water supply systems and drinking water 

contamination, as well as transportation systems, are also discussed. 

2.4.2	 The Societal Significance of Electrical Power 

In assessing societal needs and functions associated with power and the other systems 

that depend on it, it is important to take into account the broader societal context and 

ongoing economic trends. The demand for high reliability in electrical power systems 

GCR 16-917-39	 2: Societal Considerations 2-17 
 

has grown significantly in U.S. society and is likely to increase. The shift from a 

manufacturing to an information economy; the growth of e-commerce; the expansion 

of the financial services sector, which relies on continuous power and virtually 

instantaneous communications capabilities; the growth of “cloud”-based services that 

require functioning communication links; increases in telecommuting; and costcutting and efficiency measures such as the movement toward just-in-time 

inventories, are major contributors to that demand. With the rise of globalization, 

economic activity is increasingly reliant on global telecommunications networks for 

tasks ranging from collaborative work to banking and investing—networks that are in 

turn dependent on lifeline services, particularly power. A report by the National 

Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) notes that: 

“There is a growing awareness that continuous power supply and improved 

power quality are critical underpinnings of the nation’s post-industrial, digital 

economy. That economy is increasingly based on the continuous real-time flow 

of information and increasingly dependent on machines controlled by digital 

components, such as microprocessors. This can also translate into increasing 

vulnerability. For many high-tech businesses, power outages are unacceptably 

expensive.” (NREL, 2003) 

That report went on to note that based on data from the early 2000s, firms in the U.S. 

digital economy lost $13.5 billion a year on average to electrical power outages, that 

the U.S. economy as a whole lost between $119 and $188 billion annually from 

outages and power quality issues (see also Lineweber and McNulty, 2001), and that 

industries are increasingly taking power reliability and quality into account in their 

facility siting decisions.2 

Considering the ways in which the economy has been transformed by changes such 

as those cited above, there is no doubt that societal views on lifeline performance 

have become less forgiving. Disruptions that may have been tolerated in the past are 

much less likely to be tolerated in the present and going forward because of the 

extent to which economic activity depends on highly reliable service provision. 

At the same time, changes in the regulatory environment and in industry structure 

present new challenges for risk management in the electric power sector. Power 

generation, transmission, and distribution are less integrated and more de-coupled 

from one another than they have been in the past. Ideally, performance capabilities 

should be assessed on a “whole system” basis, but de-coupling has made such 

assessments more difficult. Additionally, with greater industry consolidation and 

service provision at larger geographic scales, corporations that are responsible for 

2

 A Los Angeles Times article indicated that in 2001, Intel’s then-CEO Craig Barrett stated that 

because of California’s power crisis and the grid’s lack of reliability, Intel would be avoiding 

California in its plans to expand (see LA Times, 2001). 

2-18 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
power provision are increasingly far removed from the communities they serve and 

thus may be less aware of the hazards that local communities face and less responsive 

to local community concerns. 

2.4.3 Business-Level Impacts of Lifeline Disruption: Societal 

Considerations 

Many accounts of how lifeline outages affect businesses are anecdotal or case studies 

of individual businesses. While instructive, such accounts do not provide a basis for 

generalizing about the overall impacts of infrastructure disruption. Surveys with 

representative samples of businesses in disaster-affected areas, from which it is 

possible to generalize, indicate that lifeline service disruptions are major contributors 

to business interruption. For example, in the fall of 2013, the Federal Reserve Bank 

of New York surveyed 950 small businesses in New Jersey, New York City, the 

Hudson Valley, and coastal Connecticut to gauge how they were affected by 

Hurricane Sandy. The study found that one-third of the businesses in the sample 

incurred financial losses. Of that number, 43% attributed their losses to utility service 

disruption (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). 

2.4.3.1 Water and Power Systems 

Water and power are critical for business operations, and disruptions in those services 

are major contributors to business losses, even when businesses escape other types of 

damage. For example, a business survey conducted in Des Moines/Polk County, 

Iowa following the 1993 Midwest floods found that while relatively few businesses 

were flooded, 80% of businesses were without water because the flooding inundated 

the Des Moines Water Works. Additionally, 40% of businesses lost sewer and 

wastewater treatment, and one-third were without electricity. Forty-two percent of 

the businesses surveyed were forced to shut down for at least some period of time; 

64% of the businesses that closed indicated that the loss of water was the reason for 

closure, followed by 42% who cited the loss of electrical power and 35% who cited 

the loss of sewer and wastewater services (Tierney, 1997). 

A similar survey conducted in Los Angeles following the 1994 Northridge, 

California earthquake found that 56% of businesses closed for at least some period of 

time, and of that number, 59% cited electrical power service disruption as a reason 

for having to close. Loss of power was the second most frequently mentioned source 

of business interruption in the earthquake, after closure in order to clean up debris at 

the business location (Tierney, 1997). 

Survey data collected in Santa Cruz, California following the 1989 Loma Prieta 

earthquake and in Los Angeles following the 1994 Northridge earthquake found that 

the loss of electricity and water was among the most significant predictors of 

business financial losses. In Los Angeles, when power outages lasted longer than 24 

GCR 16-917-39	 2: Societal Considerations 2-19 
hours, losses began to escalate significantly (Dahlhamer et al., 1999). As noted 

earlier, a survey conducted in Memphis/Shelby County, Tennessee during normal 

conditions found that businesses are highly dependent on lifeline services, 

particularly electrical power, with nearly 60% indicating that they would have to 

close immediately in the event of a power system failure. 

A survey conducted by the Ohio Manufacturers’ Association following the 2003 

blackout estimated the direct cost to Ohio manufacturers at approximately $1.1 

billion. An estimated 12,300 manufacturing companies, or about 55% of all 

manufacturers in the state, were affected, with average direct costs of nearly $88,000 

each. Power outages to these manufacturing firms averaged 36 hours (cited in 

Electricity Consumers Resource Council, 2004). 

2.4.3.2 Transportation Systems 

Two studies on the impact of transportation system disruptions resulting from the 

Northridge earthquake provide information on how such disruptions affect 

businesses. One study surveyed over 2,000 firms in the Los Angeles metropolitan 

area, as well as firms in Orange County, California, which was farther from the 

earthquake’s epicenter. That study found that damage to transportation networks was 

a significant source of business losses, contributing nearly 40% to losses, and was 

roughly equivalent to that of structural damage (Boarnet, 1998). Another study found 

that business interruption losses totaled approximately $6.5 billion (Gordon et al., 

1998). Of that amount, an estimated $1.5 billion was attributable to transportation 

disruptions. Job losses due to transportation damage were estimated at more than 

15,700 person-years. Damage affected businesses in various ways, such as restricting 

customer and employee access and disrupting shipping. 

2.4.4 Community Level and Regional Impacts: Societal Considerations 

2.4.4.1. Water and Power Systems 

As noted elsewhere in this report, water systems serve a variety of societal functions, 

ranging from firefighting to cooling, industrial processing, irrigation, and human 

consumption, and different demands for water quantity and quality are associated 

with these functions. Analyses indicate that disruptions of water supplies supporting 

these diverse community needs can result in substantial economic losses. For 

example, for benefit-cost analysis purposes, the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) estimates the economic cost of total potable water outage at a per 

capita rate of $97 per day (in 2011 dollars) for community residents and businesses 

(FEMA, 2010). One study carried out analyses to help FEMA make assumptions 

about the cost of water disruptions more precise (Aubuchon and Morley, 2013). They 

found that those costs can range from $67 to $457 per day. Clearly disaster-induced 

water supply disruptions, particularly in large population centers, can be extremely 

2-20 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
 

costly, especially in light of the fact that outages can be lengthy because it takes 

considerable time to repair water system damage. 

Using residential interviews and focus groups in four different sites, one study 

conducted research on the costs to households of routine water service disruptions, 

including contamination, leaks, and loss of pressure (Heflin et al., 2014). Their study 

took into account how community residents adapted to water service disruptions and 

the costs of those adaptations. Many affected residents purchased bottled water or 

boiled or bleached tap water. Cooking and food consumption changed. Even though 

service disruptions resulted in the closure of restaurants, some residents reported 

eating out or purchasing take-out food more often. Travel increased as people made 

extra trips related to lodging and bathing; some residents relocated completely as a 

result of outages. Service disruption also had an impact on children’s schooling and 

on work-related activities. Taking these impacts into account, average household 

costs were approximately $94; economic impacts ranged widely, from savings of 

over $1,400 (mainly from some households eating out less and some employees 

working longer hours than usual) to costs of over $1,000. This was a study of routine, 

non-disaster-related disruptions. It is reasonable to assume that disruptions resulting 

from disasters would be even more costly for households, because other damage and 

disruption (e.g., transportation system damage, school closures, and household 

damage) would make adapting to water loss even more difficult. 

Costs associated with water contamination can be quite substantial, particularly when 

the contamination endangers public health. Walkerton, Ontario, a town of about 

5,000, experienced a severe E. coli water contamination crisis that began in May of 

2000. Seven people died of contamination-related illnesses, and an estimated 1,600 

adults and 551 children became ill—just over 40% of the population. The 

contamination was so pervasive and severe that households and businesses were 

unable to use municipal water for eight months. Subsequent research estimated that 

the economic costs to Walkerton households totaled $6.7 million (Canadian), 

including costs associated with purchasing over-the-counter medication, 

contaminated food, eating takeout and restaurant food, and other bills households 

incurred. Among other major costs, remediation and repair of the system cost over $9 

million, obtaining drinking water for the duration of the crisis cost $4 million, and 

business costs and lost production totaled $2.6 million. Overall costs associated with 

the contamination event were estimated at $64.5 million, or nearly $13,000 per 

resident (Livernois, 2001). 

Studies employing loss estimation methodologies also highlight the large economic 

losses that can result from disruption of water services. One study focused on 

potential business and residential losses in the San Francisco Bay Area resulting from 

water supply disruption in a magnitude-7.1 Hayward Fault and a 7.9 San Andreas 

Fault event. For the Hayward event, residential losses were estimated at $37 million, 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-21 
 

and business losses were estimated at $9.3 billion. For the San Andreas event, those 

losses were $279 million and $14.4 billion, respectively (Brozovic et al., 2007). One 

study estimated losses from earthquake-induced water supply disruptions in 

Memphis, using a suite of six New Madrid Fault earthquake scenarios (Chang et al., 

2002). Calculations took into account earthquake magnitude, average peak ground 

acceleration, physical damage to the system, and repair times. Mean losses ranged 

from $5 million to $2.4 billion, depending on the scenario. 

Another study estimated the total regional economic losses in Los Angeles County 

resulting from water supply disruptions caused by an earthquake in the Northern 

California Delta that would shut down the California Aqueduct (Rose et al., 2012). 

The scenarios that were used took into account a number of factors, including the 

timing of the disruption, hydrologic conditions, resilience measures that might be 

undertaken, and system restoration times. The estimated losses varied considerably. 

For example, a six-month closure of the aqueduct at a time when hydrologic 

conditions are normal, and when resilience tactics such as conservation and 

production recapture are employed, would have almost no negative economic impact. 

On the other hand, a 24-month shutdown under adverse hydrological conditions 

could result in $160 billion in gross domestic product (GDP) losses and 1.6 million 

job-years of employment. Other factors such as water-pricing policies, would also 

affect loss levels. 

Economic loss estimates were calculated for the U.S. Geological Survey’s ShakeOut 

Scenario for Los Angeles, which covered an eight-county region in Southern 

California. That scenario was based on a magnitude-7.8 earthquake occurring on the 

Southern San Andreas Fault. Total economic losses from the scenario earthquake 

were estimated at $191 billion in the affected region. Total direct and indirect effects 

of property damage were estimated at $112.7 billion. Significant for this discussion, 

total business interruption losses stemming from earthquake-induced disruption of 

the water and electrical power systems alone were projected to be $24.2 and $22.4 

billion, respectively, or around one-fourth of all losses (Rose et al., 2011). 

Turning next to electrical power service disruptions, various studies have focused on 

the economic losses that resulted from the August 2003 electrical power blackout. 

ICF Consulting (2003) estimated that the blackout caused $7-10 billion in losses. The 

U.S. Department of Energy’s estimate was $6 billion at the time the blackout 

occurred (Parks, 2003). These losses are substantial. Put into context, that amount 

totals $7.74 billion in 2014 dollars. Hurricanes Charley and Ivan, both of which 

occurred in 2004, the year after the blackout, caused total economic losses in 2014 

dollars of $18.7 and $17.2 billion, respectively. 

Many loss estimation studies involving electrical power disruptions have focused on 

earthquake-induced outages. A loss estimation study on potential power system 

2-22 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
disruptions in Memphis and Shelby County, Tennessee resulting from earthquakes in 

the New Madrid Seismic Zone found that direct economic losses would be “quite 

severe across all industries in the economy” (Chang, 1997, p. 92), with most 

industries experiencing an average of 40-50% loss in production immediately after 

disruption occurs. Subsequent impacts would vary across different economic sectors. 

Service restoration times would also vary, and as a consequence different industries 

would rebound at different rates. Focusing on the same community and taking into 

account indirect losses, another study estimated that gross regional product and gross 

output would be reduced by 59% and 62%, respectively (Rose and Benevides, 1997). 

A study of business interruption losses that could result from a terrorist attack on the 

electric power system in the City of Los Angeles (Rose et al., 2007) analyzed the 

resilience of electrical power customers—for example, their use of substitute energy 

inputs and production re-scheduling—as well as the resilience of the larger regional 

economy. Even with the implementation of resilience strategies, the total negative 

impact of a two-week disruption of the power supply would be a loss of $20.5 billion 

in economic activity, or just under 4% of the county’s yearly economic output. 

Keeping in mind that this simulation focused only on business interruption losses and 

not impacts on life and health, on property, or on infrastructure repair costs, electrical 

power disruption could result in significantly larger losses. 

2.4.4.2 Transportation Systems 

There has been substantial research on the potential human and economic impacts 

that could result from transportation system disruption in an earthquake in the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone (Elnashai et al., 2009; CUSEC, 2000). A major New Madrid 

earthquake is the prototypical low-probability/high-consequence event. Research by 

the Mid-America Earthquake Center indicates that a magnitude-7.7 New Madrid 

earthquake would damage 3,500 bridges and result in the closure of fifteen bridges in 

the eight-state impact area (Elnashai et al., 2009). Ports, highways, and airports 

would be damaged and disrupted. Oil and natural gas pipelines that traverse the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone would sustain major damage; estimates suggest that there could 

be as many as 425,000 breaks and leaks in interstate and local pipelines. Loss 

scenarios indicate that approximately 40,000 personnel would be needed just to carry 

out search and rescue activities, but extensive transportation system disruption would 

make the movement of those personnel extremely difficult. Although not directly 

related to transportation systems, estimates from this study also indicate that there 

would be widespread and lengthy electrical power outages throughout the impact 

region. These outages would cause massive direct and indirect losses and 

compromise emergency response efforts. 

There are large gaps in the existing literature on the economic impacts of 

transportation system disruption. More is known about transportation system 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-23 
disruption resulting from earthquakes than from other hazards, raising questions 

about how much can be generalized from previous findings. The 2011 Tohoku 

earthquake and tsunami in Japan had a serious negative impact on the global supply 

of semiconductors and automobile parts, and the 2011 floods in Thailand crippled the 

global computer hard drive supply for months. Both of these events raised questions 

regarding the impact of both physical damage and transportation disruptions on 

supply chains. 

Given the prevalence of global supply chains, disasters that are geographically distant 

can now have far-reaching national, regional, and local effects. There are substantial, 

ongoing studies of supply chain management (e.g., Shefi, 2005), from which it is 

clear that loss of transportation and other lifeline services is a major contributor to 

supply chain disruption. Within the transportation sector, the Transportation Research 

Board (2012) has developed methodologies for exploring how disruptions both 

within and across transportation modes affect supply chains and has provided a series 

of brief case studies that include the Northridge earthquake and the September 11, 

2001 terrorist attacks, as well as the 2002 shutdown of the ports of Los Angeles and 

Long Beach. At a general level, the economic impact of transportation-related supply 

chain disruptions is seen as varying as a function of commodity characteristics 

(value, volume, and time sensitivity); the characteristics of the disruption (duration, 

geographic scale, availability of alternative routes and modes, sector-specific 

impacts); and associated costs for transport, inventory, and lost output and 

productivity. 

2.4.5 Societal Considerations Involving Low-Probability/HighConsequence Events 

The NIST Guide distinguishes among three levels of hazard events communities may 

face: routine events that may occur frequently but that do not disrupt infrastructure 

systems or community functions; design level events in which buildings and lifelines 

should remain functional at a level to support response and recovery; and extreme or 

maximum considered events in which structures and infrastructure systems should 

remain at least minimally functional and should perform at a level that protects life 

safety. Most events that communities experience will fall somewhere along this 

continuum. However, societal considerations also include the potential for lowprobability/high-consequence events, which may exceed those defined as extreme, 

such as the nuclear disaster that occurred at the Fukushima Daichi reactors following 

the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan. The tsunami-induced flooding of 

the nuclear power plant resulted in loss of on-site backup generators to power the 

plant cooling systems. As that example shows, loss of water for reactor cooling or 

electrical power for pumping water can result in reactor core meltdown and the 

release of nuclear material, leading to catastrophic impacts. 

2-24	 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
Loss of water for firefighting following a major disaster, such as an earthquake, could 

potentially result in catastrophic losses, as seen in the 1906 San Francisco 

earthquake. During the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, both the primary water supply 

and the auxiliary water supply in San Francisco—meant for fighting fires—lost 

functionality. Fire losses were only contained because the city was able to employ a 

portable firefighting system and because there was almost no wind on the evening the 

earthquake occurred. While the magnitude-6.9 earthquake of 1989 was a design level 

earthquake, the cascading impacts caused by water system disruption could have 

been catastrophic. 

Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans was a catastrophic event that was caused by 

infrastructure failures: numerous breaches of levees that were intended to provide 

protection from flooding. The vast majority of those who perished in Katrina were 

not able to evacuate and drowned as a result of the levee failures. Additionally, as 

discussed earlier, many of the deaths that occurred as a result of Katrina can be traced 

to electrical power system disruptions. Analyses indicate that similar impacts could 

result from an earthquake or major flood event in the Northern California Delta, 

where numerous levees are vulnerable and where population growth behind levees 

has been substantial (Tierney, 2014). These events highlight the need to take a 

“whole system” view that incorporates flood protection systems (e.g., levees, sea 

barriers) at the same level as other parts of the water and wastewater systems. 

The 1995 Chicago heat wave resulted in the deaths of nearly 800 people—and 

lifelines were functioning during that period. The 2003 heat wave in Europe killed 

more than 70,000 people. Heat is the nation’s deadliest natural hazard, and extreme 

heat accompanied by power outages could lead to high death tolls in many U.S. 

urban areas. 

Low-probability/high-consequence disasters can be expected to have both immediate 

and far-reaching impacts. By their very nature, such events can result in large-scale 

mortality, morbidity, damage, loss, community disruption, population displacement, 

and permanent demographic shifts. As seen in the Fukushima incident, they can also 

result in public loss of trust and confidence in government and other societal 

institutions—outrage and recreancy—and in major shifts in public opinion. 

Additionally, they can stimulate significant legal, policy, and other forms of social 

change. While planning activities may center largely on design level events, and 

while mitigating against very low-probability but high-consequence events may not 

be economically feasible, it is still reasonable to direct some attention to the societal 

implications of rare but catastrophic disasters. 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-25 
2.5 Potential Indicators of Societal Expectations for Lifeline 

System Performance 

Although there are virtually no current data on societal expectations for the 

performance of lifelines under various disaster conditions, there are other indicators 

and types of information that can influence and reflect societal considerations under 

the right circumstances. These include information provided by emergency managers 

and utility providers as well as real-time outage trackers that provide situational 

awareness and information about post-outage restoration. Other broad indicators of 

societal concern include legislation and standards. 

2.5.1 Emergency Management Advisories 

One point of reference community residents can use to calibrate their expectations 

regarding post-event disruption is risk communication from emergency management 

offices and other community organizations. As noted earlier in Section 2.2.2 on risk 

communication, residents of communities around the country are typically told that 

they should expect to be on their own for 72 hours or more following major disaster 

events. As shown in the histogram in Figure 2-1 (a), a survey of emergency 

management recommendations to residents of 22 U.S. cities indicates that most 

emergency management agencies are telling residents of their communities to 

prepare for three days without services, although the duration of disruption could be 

seven days or more in some cities vulnerable to significant hazards, including Seattle, 

Los Angeles, Houston, and Miami. These advisories may have an influence on 

societal expectations, but there is a lack of direct evidence on how much influence 

they actually have on public perceptions and whether they are having an impact on 

mitigation and preparedness behavior. Appendix E, Table E-3 lists publicly disclosed 

recovery expectations from public entities. 

Figure 2-1	 Emergency management advisories and utility providers projected 

restoration times: (a) recommendations to communities given by 22 local 

emergency management agencies on number of days to expect to be 

without services following a disruption; and (b) projected electric power 

restoration times from 22 utility service providers. 

2-26	 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
2.5.2 Utility Providers and Restoration Targets 

Electric power networks are among the most critical infrastructure systems that 

jumpstart community recovery after disasters. Restoration times for these systems are 

mainly shaped by operational concerns and are used by power companies to estimate 

customer reliability indices. These indices use methodologies that rely on historical 

averages (typically 5 years), while monitoring deviations from them. Major event 

days resulting from extreme events are typically handled separately to maintain 

useful customer reliability indices’ averages (IEEE, 2004), whereas the restoration 

times tend to be governed by scenario events, such as the largest disruptions 

experienced in the region or the most recent disaster. 

As a consequence of disaster experience, utility providers are starting to share 

restoration targets, which may identify gaps between providers’ expectations and 

users’ expectations. For example, CenterPoint Energy in the Houston region indicates 

that power will be restored 7-10 days after a Category 1 hurricane and 6-8 weeks 

after a Category 5 event (Prochazka, 2009). Such estimates may be misleading, 

however, because restoration is typically incremental, with service being provided in 

some areas sooner than estimated and, in other areas, restoration takes longer than 

estimated, depending on localized damage and restoration priorities. In another 

example, Sumter Electric Cooperative in Florida recommends that each individual 

store 7 days of water, which may suggest to members of the public that they should 

anticipate a 7-day restoration schedule (Sumter Electric Cooperative, 2007). Figure 

2-1 (b) shows the electric power recovery expectations disclosed to the public by 22 

utility companies, reinforcing the notion that citizens can potentially expect 

restoration times to range between 3-7 days in key cities across the United States. 

(Appendix E, Table E-2 lists publicly disclosed recovery expectations from utility 

companies.) 

There is an important caveat, however, regarding restoration data: most utilities do 

not make information on projected restoration times available to the public, while 

others instead opt for live updates after an actual event. Although live updates may 

comfort consumers because they will know when power will be restored (mainly for 

small events), this does not help them plan ahead for disruptions. 

Figure 2-2 shows that 95% of observed power outages last less than four hours in a 

typical year, indicating that the vast majority of power outages that people experience 

are caused by ordinary operational interruptions. As noted earlier in Section 2.2.2 on 

risk perception, these experiences may “anchor” risk perceptions and thus are 

unlikely to be helpful in terms of motivating community residents to prepare for more 

lengthy outages. 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-27 
Figure 2-2	 Average length of electric power outages in a typical year. Reprinted 

from Lineweber and McNulty, 2001. 

2.5.3 Power Outage Trackers and Situational Awareness 

Raw data based on monitoring the natural and built environment are becoming 

available at unprecedented rates. One example comes from power outage trackers 

across major cities in the United States. These trackers report outage locations and 

restoration estimates, and because they are updated frequently (typically at 15-minute 

intervals), analysts can establish electric power restoration times with a high degree 

of accuracy. Figure 2-3 depicts such an effort for the Houston region after Tropical 

Storm Bill in 2015, highlighting hot spots and recurrent problems across the city. 

Such data could be useful in communicating with the public and managing 

expectations in disaster situations. 

Outage Count 

Figure 2-3	 Spatio-temporal distribution of electric power outage counts and their 

durations across the Houston region after Tropical Storm (TS) Bill 

(Courtesy: Rice University). 

2-28	 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
 

2.5.4 Post-Event Restoration Information 

Empirical studies that build upon various correlation analysis methods using postevent restoration data provide yet another reference point with respect to performance 

goals and restoration times. Analytic approaches range from the use of expert 

judgement (Ho Oh et al., 2010), to point estimates of pairwise restoration correlations 

(Mendonça and Wallace, 2006), to time-series analyses (Dueñas-Osorio and 

Kwasinski, 2012), to spatial-temporal varying approaches (Chan and Dueñas-Osorio, 

2014; Paredes-Toro et al., 2014; Wu et al., 2012). Figure 2-4 shows typical 

restoration curves, where outages decrease rapidly early in the post-event restoration 

process, and then are reduced at a decelerating rate, typically because crews and 

system operators have to deal with more challenging distribution-level cases. 

Systematic meta-analyses of post-event restoration cases and local improvement 

services projects provide indicators that indirectly encapsulate decision making 

processes, resource availability, and, more broadly, community resilience, as evinced 

in recent earthquakes (EERI, 2015). 

(a) (b) 

Figure 2-4	 Typical utility restoration curves for power, mobile, and landline 

telecommunication systems in the aftermath of (a) the 2010 Chile 

earthquake; and (b) the 2011 Tohoku, Japan earthquake (DueñasOsorio and Kwasinski, 2012). (Note: O(t) = Outage ratio of postevent to pre-event service; LL = Land line system; Mob = Mobile 

system; Mob-brm = Mobile systems but removing base-stations and 

service areas destroyed; Biobio and Maule refer to affected regions 

in Chile.) 

2.5.5 Other Reflections of Community Expectations 

Modeling, Scenarios, and Performance Expectations. Providing information to 

other utilities, government agencies, and the general public is a key goal for service 

providers following disaster-induced disruptions. During normal times, another 

important goal is the development of computational simulation tools and scenarios 

that help government agencies, private organizations, and the public better 

understand what to expect when disasters occur. Some studies have found that gaps 

GCR 16-917-39	 2: Societal Considerations 2-29 
exist between what models predict and what the public expects with regard to lifeline 

performance—as shown by recent Chile, Japan, and New Zealand disasters, among 

others (Araneda et al., 2010; Cyranoski, 2011; Dueñas-Osorio and Kwasinski, 2012; 

Kongar et al., 2015; Rudnick et al., 2011). For example, the public in New Zealand 

assumes the high-voltage transmission system is highly resilient, but recent 

experiences show that the system on average is only moderately resilient and locally 

vulnerable. If members of the public act on their assumptions regarding system 

performance, they are likely to under-prepare for power outages (National 

Infrastructure Unit, 2014). In the San Francisco Bay Area, SPUR, a research and 

planning organization, seeks to identify performance expectation gaps, with the goal 

of obtaining resources to bring performance more in line with public expectations 

(SPUR, 2009b). 

Policies and Resource Allocations. Local, state, and national level laws and policies 

also reflect judgments regarding preferred performance and restoration times. In 

Houston, for example, frequent flooding led to the institution of a drainage fee that 

created a fund for infrastructure projects despite being unpopular among many 

ratepayers (Kimley-Horn and Associates Inc., 2012). Willingness to pay for system 

improvements—for example, through additional taxes and fees—is at least a crude 

indicator of societal preferences. 

Guidelines and Standards. Guidelines and standards can also serve as rough 

indicators of public expectations regarding lifeline performance. Within the 

telecommunications arena, for example, consensus documents from the International 

Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) (IEC, 2003) advance standards for the design of 

automated electrical substations that rely on telecommunication protocols running 

over high-speed networks for fast response times and secure interoperability. IEC’s 

principles have been applied to various other energy fields such as wind (IEC 61400-

25) and hydro power (IEC 61850-7-410). Also, the Centre for Energy Advancement 

through Technological Innovation (CEATI) started issuing best practices for 

telecommunications in power system automation (Smart Grid Task Force (SGTF) - 

CEATI, 2015), providing industry surveys and recommendations for selecting 

technologies appropriate to smart distribution applications. 

Other chapters in this report identify various lifeline-specific codes and standards. 

However, it is important to note that the vast majority of these standards relate to the 

normal day-to-day operations of lifeline service organizations and not to their 

performance during disaster events. They thus offer little guidance for communities 

wishing to better understand how well service providers will perform during and after 

disasters. 

Exercises and Scenarios. Many organizations, such as the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) and the California Geological Survey (CGS) have developed scenarios for 

2-30 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
earthquakes, a major flood event in Northern California, and a tsunami affecting 

West Coast ports that are aimed at informing the public and community institutions 

about a range of likely disaster impacts and improving mitigation, preparedness, 

response, and recovery activities. Used appropriately, such scenarios can lead to 

greater public understanding of event impacts and cascading effects. Similarly, the 

NIST Guide is meant to initiate a process that will enable communities to better 

understand the potential impacts of disasters, identify gaps between expectations and 

performance, and address those gaps. 

2.6 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 

2.6.1 Review of Key Points 

This chapter focuses on the limited information available on societal expectations 

regarding lifeline performance in extreme events, as well as on broader societal 

considerations. Other chapters discuss expectations that are embedded in codes and 

standards, but here the focus is on information gleaned from several surveys that 

have addressed the topic. In keeping with the “hierarchy of needs” model used in the 

NIST Guide (NIST, 2015), the focus has been on the ways in which lifeline service 

interruption can negatively affect human health, health-care institutions, and the 

economic well-being of disaster-stricken communities. The following are key points 

emphasized in this chapter: 

	 There is a lack of empirical data on societal expectations for lifeline 

performance; 

	 The best strategy for assessing performance expectations is through studies that 

employ randomly-selected representative samples of units of analysis that are of 

interest, such as households and businesses; 

	 Societal expectations are likely to be related to the vulnerability and resilience of 

community residents and commercial entities; 

	 Expectations are also likely to be related to event severity and probability, 

service alternatives and immediate needs, and public perceptions of the 

trustworthiness and competence of lifeline service providers; 

	 Impacts on life safety and human health resulting from lifeline service 

disruptions are significant; 

	 Members of the public assign high priority to the continued operation of 

hospitals, but hospital operations can be seriously compromised by lifeline 

service interruptions, particularly those involving electrical power and water; 

	 Elderly and disabled persons—both those living in institutional settings and those 

living in their communities—are highly vulnerable to service disruptions, 

particularly those associated with electrical power; 

GCR 16-917-39	 2: Societal Considerations 2-31 
 

	 Based both on actual events and on loss estimation studies, business and 

community-wide economic impacts resulting from service disruptions can be 

costly; 

	 Increased economic dependence on a continuous supply of electrical power 

means that disruptions result in even greater losses in the future; 

	 The effects of climate change have the potential for exacerbating the impacts of 

lifeline service disruption on the health and economic well-being of community 

residents, and also for threatening the nation’s energy supply; and 

	 Low-probability/high-consequence scenarios should be considered in 

assessments of societal needs and considerations. 

2.6.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs 

Subsequent chapters in this report discuss codes, standards, and performance goals 

for individual lifeline systems and also discuss their limitations. As indicated in the 

chapters that follow, some general concerns include an emphasis on component 

performance, as opposed to overall system performance; the tendency for standard 

development processes to be reactive and based on past data, rather than on future 

projections; variations in regulation and enforcement; variations in the hazards that 

are considered; and in particular a focus on everyday performance, as opposed to 

performance during and restoration after extreme events. Standards take into account 

societal considerations such as life safety, environmental protection, and emergency 

response requirements. However, they do not consider disparate impacts on social 

groups, economic sectors, or key service-providing institutions. As this chapter and 

those that follow emphasize, current measures of lifeline performance are deficient in 

that they do not account for the full range of societal impacts resulting from 

disruptions, differences in vulnerability and resilience within the U.S. population, and 

the ways in which societal needs and expectations have evolved and will continue to 

evolve over time. 

Additionally, current standards, performance objectives, and restoration plans do not 

take into account lifeline system interdependencies, the potential for cascading 

impacts, or potential “choke points” that can amplify interdependencies. 

2.6.3 Research Needs 

The literature on lifeline service disruption resulting from extreme events is uneven, 

both with respect to research on the services themselves and with respect to the 

events that have been studied. Perhaps as a consequence of the National Earthquake 

Hazards Reduction Program, more is currently known about the lifeline impacts of 

earthquakes, compared with other hazards. As already noted, even less is known 

about societal expectations regarding such disruptions. The situation is further 

2-32	 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
 

complicated by the fact that a service such as water supply is complex, and different 

community sectors assign different levels of importance to water for drinking, 

firefighting, irrigation, and other uses. Transportation systems are even more diverse. 

Even given the patchwork nature of the literature, it is clear that the societal 

considerations associated with lifeline service disruptions are numerous and 

significant. Because of lifeline dependencies, threats to the electrical power supply 

also threaten the continued operation of other lifeline services. Power system failures 

have direct impacts, but they also have indirect ones because of their potential for 

triggering cascading failures. Such disruptions compromise the operations of the very 

institutions that the public values most highly in disaster situations—hospitals and 

other health-care organizations. At the same time, as illustrated in cases such as the 

2003 northeastern blackout, disruptions increase the demand for health-care services 

by negatively affecting the health of community residents. Among natural hazards, 

heat waves are the largest contributors to hazard-related mortality in the United 

States. Electrical power service disruptions are correlated with periods of extreme 

heat. In the context of a changing climate, an aging population, an aging 

infrastructure, and policies that are increasingly enabling elderly and disabled persons 

to remain in their homes, vulnerability is increasing, particularly in urban areas and 

inner-city neighborhoods. Because vulnerability and resilience vary as a function of 

exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, risks associated with lifeline service 

interruptions are not borne equally by all members of society but are imposed 

disproportionately on already vulnerable populations. It is important that research 

takes into account changing and variable societal vulnerabilities as well as the 

physical vulnerabilities of infrastructure systems. 

As discussed previously, the loss of lifelines can have substantial local, regional and 

national economic consequences. As illustrated by the Tohoku earthquake and 

tsunami, damage to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant led to closure of all 

54 nuclear reactors in Japan, with only two returned to service as of the preparation 

of this report. Moreover, the Fukushima disaster led to policies being enacted in 

Germany and Switzerland to reduce their dependency on nuclear power, and also 

resulted in increased risk assessment and attendant costs worldwide for nuclear 

power. Given the close relationship between lifeline functionality and economic 

impact, continued research into the economic effects of lifeline disruption is needed. 

Such research should focus on improved collection and assessment of data on 

economic losses associated with various hazards, improved modeling of the 

economic consequences of lifeline disruptions and the spatial distribution of lifeline 

and economic losses, and improved modeling to quantify the economic 

improvements associated with community resilience. 

Many earlier research findings are now out of date as a consequence of social and 

technological change. For example, as noted in the chapter on telecommunications, 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-33 
research requires updating in light of the rapid pace of change in the nation’s 

communications infrastructure. What are the consequences of lifeline service 

disruptions as medical records are increasingly stored in electronic form, when 

medical conditions are monitored remotely, when so many more disabled people are 

living in U.S. communities, and when business enterprises increasingly rely on 

cloud-based information technology services? Questions like these can only be 

answered through systematic pre- and post-event studies. 

2.6.4 Modeling Needs 

As noted throughout this report, despite many recent advances, lifeline 

interdependencies are still not well understood. Studies such as San Francisco’s 

Lifelines Interdependency Study (City and County of San Francisco, 2014) represent 

a good start, but more research of this type is needed. The National Science 

Foundation has moved in the direction of funding various interdependent 

infrastructure modeling efforts, mainly through two of its programs: Resilient 

Interdependent Infrastructure Processes and Systems (RIPS) and Critical Resilient 

Interdependent Infrastructure Systems and Processes (CRISP). Some of the research 

that is being funded under the new CRISP program takes into account both 

interdependencies among infrastructure systems and how those interdependent 

systems are related to the populations they serve. Infrastructure-population 

interactions are an important topic that should be a major focus for research and 

modeling efforts. 

Integrated modeling of lifeline vulnerabilities related to hazards, population, 

buildings, and the environment could lead to a better understanding of where 

problems with service delivery and severe societal consequences are most likely. 

This kind of modeling is already being performed in a basic way for some lifelines 

and hazards—for example, through HAZUS (FEMA, 2012). What is needed is a 

“next generation” approach that models vulnerabilities related to lifeline dependency 

relationships while also modeling vulnerabilities associated with structural and 

environmental factors (e.g., urban heat island effects) and the characteristics of 

exposed populations (e.g., race, class and poverty, gender, age, and social capital). 

Such modeling efforts will require intensive engagement of multi- and 

interdisciplinary teams. They should also address cost-effective strategies for 

reducing vulnerabilities. 

2.6.5 Lifeline Systems Operational Needs 

Other chapters in this report discuss operational needs that are specific to different 

lifelines and hazards. Viewed from the perspective of societal needs and 

considerations, at a minimum lifeline systems should perform in ways that do not 

lead to additional deaths, injuries, and disabilities and that limit lifeline-related 

2-34 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
economic losses to the extent feasible. In geographic areas and in hazard contexts in 

which lifeline failures are likely to represent threats to life and health, lifeline service 

providers should engage with other key community institutions, such as emergency 

management agencies, to develop contingency plans to minimize those threats. Such 

measures could include heatwave warning and response plans such as those that exist 

for several U.S. cities and (to the extent possible) the development of restoration 

plans that take community vulnerabilities into account. 

As discussed in Section 2.2.2 on risk communication, service providers should work 

with emergency management and other community institutions to communicate with 

the public about the likely impacts of different hazard events on service provision and 

disruption, the potential consequences and cascading effects of outages, and what 

members of the public can do to cope with such outages. Because research suggests 

that community residents have a tendency to either ignore or underestimate how 

hazards can affect them, and also to anchor their expectations on past experience, 

guidance to the public should be specific with regard to potential outage times for 

different disasters and levels of severity. Communications should include information 

on how disaster-induced lifeline disruptions differ from the occasional outages during 

normal conditions. Guidance should be provided to the public across all phases of the 

hazards cycle—during normal times, during impact, and during the restoration and 

recovery period—and should be made available in multiple formats and in the 

languages spoken by community residents. Just as emergency management agencies 

routinely inform the public that emergency services will not be able to respond 

immediately to their needs when major disruptions occur, service providers should 

provide information on what the public can reasonably expect in the event of 

disaster-induced service disruptions. Where there are barriers to the disclosure of 

such information, those barriers should be addressed. 

Recent research on risk communication (see Wood et al., 2012) emphasizes that a 

key element in all risk communication is informing community residents about what 

they can do to reduce their risks and manage the consequences of disaster-related 

disruptions. Risk communications should be tailored to help residents understand 

both how they will be affected and what measures they should take in order to avoid 

danger and inconvenience. In the case of anticipated power outages, such measures 

could include making sure generators are in working order and that they have 

sufficient fuel; keeping additional cash on hand in case automatic teller machines are 

not operational; fueling the car when a hurricane warning is issued to make it easier 

to evacuate in case service stations are inoperable; and checking with neighbors who 

may need assistance. Many such measures require little time and effort but can 

increase household and business resilience. These kinds of detailed, practical 

advisories are also important for businesses and other types of organizations, such as 

GCR 16-917-39 2: Societal Considerations 2-35 
community- and faith-based organizations that will be expected to provide services 

following hazard events. 

2.6.6 Future Considerations and Trends 

This chapter has emphasized a number of changes and trends that are shaping societal 

expectations pertaining to the performance of lifelines and that warrant increasing 

emphasis. It has also focused on broader societal considerations that must be taken 

into account in planning for and management of disaster-induced lifeline disruptions. 

Significant trends include climate change, which will affect both population health 

and well-being and lifeline service provision; the aging of both the U.S. population 

and lifelines; increased societal reliance on electrical power and telecommunications 

for both economic activity and life-safety-related services; an increase in public 

needs for better performance and recovery of lifeline systems; and the disparate 

effects of lifeline service disruption on different groups within the population. As 

indicated in Section 2.6.3, social and technological change is so rapid and farreaching that many earlier research findings—for example, findings on the economic 

impacts of service disruption—may be out of date. An emphasis on societal needs 

and considerations requires an aggressive program of research on topics addressed 

here and elsewhere in this report. 

2-36 2: Societal Considerations GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

Chapter 3 

Electric Power 

The frequency and severity of electric power outages are a growing concern for local, 

state, and federal governments. Power outages can cause substantial economic loss 

and societal disruption in part because virtually all other lifeline systems are 

dependent upon electric power. The importance of power is further confirmed by 

assessments such as the Energy Assurance Plan produced by Portland, Oregon: from a 

statewide assessment of economic interdependencies in the energy sector, it was found 

that “disruptions to the electricity supply have the greatest economic impact” and 

would be more significant than natural gas or oil supply disruptions (City of Portland, 

2012). 

According to the Executive Office of the President (2013a), between 2003 and 2012, 

power outages due to severe weather3

 cost the U.S. economy an average of $18-33 

billion per year. In years with major storms, these costs can be substantially higher. 

In 2008 (with Hurricane Ike), power outages cost the economy $40-75 billion, and in 

2012 (with Hurricane Sandy), the estimates are $27-52 billion. Other estimates using 

different methods yield similar results. A Congressional Research Service study 

estimated that weather-related outages cost the economy $25-70 billion per year 

(Campbell, 2012, cited in Executive Office of the President, 2013a). Research by the 

Berkeley National Laboratory found the cost of power outages to be in the range of 

$30-130 billion annually, at a yearly average of $80 billion (Eto and LaCommare, 

2005, cited in Executive Office of the President, 2013a). Economic losses include 

repair costs to the electric power grid, spoiled inventory, lost output and wages, 

delayed production, and inconvenience. 

The approach taken here, therefore, is to outline current performance guidelines and 

standards for power systems, review different approaches to assessing power systems 

performance in hazard events, and summarize how power systems have performed in 

actual natural hazard events. Throughout, attention is paid to available information on 

societal expectations, including indirect evidence. 

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 provides an 

overview of electric power systems. Section 3.2 provides an overview of codes, 

3

 Severe weather (e.g., thunderstorms, hurricanes, and blizzards) is the leading cause of blackouts 

in the United States; since 2002, it has accounted for 87% of outages that affected over 50,000 

customers (DOE, Form OE-417, cited in Executive Office of the President, 2013a). In the decade 

2003-2012, some 679 widespread outages occurred because of severe weather. The frequency of 

such incidents is increasing (Executive Office of the President, 2013a). 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-1 
 

standards, guidelines, and performance requirements that shape current industry 

practice in the electric power sector. It finds that current practice is geared towards 

designing components for hazard loads rather than for system performance, and that 

industry measures of systems-level performance are narrowly defined. Section 3.3 

summarizes several key aspects of social considerations, including available direct 

and indirect information on societal expectations in disasters, key societal serving 

functions of electric power across the phases of recovery, and differential 

vulnerability of social groups to power outages. Section 3.4 provides a brief overview 

of interdependencies between electric power and other lifeline systems. Section 3.5 

summarizes relevant lessons on electric power system performance in disasters, 

especially recent events in the United States. It confirms that information and models 

are dominated by storm events, that basic outage information is readily available 

(e.g., customers without service, time to restoration), but that information is very 

sparse on societal impacts that are most relevant to societal expectations. Section 3.6 

identifies gaps and deficits, and Section 3.7 provides conclusions and 

recommendations. 

3.1 System Overview 

Electric power infrastructure is composed of generation, transmission, and 

distribution systems (Executive Office of the President, 2013a; NIST, 2015). 

Electricity is generated at central power stations or by distributed generation where 

fuel sources (e.g., coal, natural gas, hydro, solar, wind) are converted into electric 

power4

. It is then transmitted over long distances on transmission system lines. 

Transmission system assets consist of high-voltage substations, towers, and lines. 

Nearer the point of consumption, the transmission system substation “steps down” 

the power to sub-transmission voltages and transmits this power to distribution 

substations. Distribution system assets consist of distribution-voltage substations and 

lines. The distribution substations then “step-down” the voltage further to distribution 

voltages and distributes the power through a network of distribution lines (either 

carried overhead by poles or buried underground) to the consumer. In the United 

States, the electric power system or grid connects 5,800 major power plants via 

450,000 miles of transmission lines to over 144 million customers. Within the United 

States, there are three major AC High Voltage systems/regions (Eastern, Western, 

and Texas) between which electricity transfer is limited. Regulatory constraints (e.g., 

California’s regulations regarding renewable power shares) limit transfers of electric 

power across state lines. 

The electric power system is a substantially private but highly regulated sector. 

Ownership of utilities can be public, private (investor-owned), or by cooperatives. 

While some 62% of utilities are public, 68% of customers are served by investor4 Generation assets are outside the scope of this report. 

3-2 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
 

owned utilities (American Public Power Association, cited in Executive Office of the 

President, 2013a). Nationwide, the transmission grid is overseen by the North 

American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), which is responsible for bulk 

power reliability in the United States and Canada as well as the development and 

enforcement of reliability standards. NERC is in turn overseen by the Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC). Because of deregulation, ownership of the 

infrastructure varies, with generation and transmission controlled by the same utility 

in some states and separately in others. Individual states have their own public 

service commissions that also regulate utility operations. Regulation at the state and 

federal levels seeks to balance goals of low prices, safety, and reliability. 

3.2 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

Numerous codes, standards, guidelines and manuals related to natural hazards shape 

current practice in the electric power industry. The primary codes and standards used 

for design and construction in the electric power industry are the National Electric 

Safety Code (NESC) for transmission system assets and the Rural Utilities Service 

(RUS) design standards and manuals for distribution system assets. The American 

Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) Standard 7, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings 

and Other Structures (ASCE, 2010), is also referenced and increasingly used (NIST, 

2015). IEEE 693, Recommended Practice for Seismic Design of Substations (IEEE, 

2005), is currently being used when specifying transmission equipment. 

The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) provides a thorough review and discussion of these 

codes and standards (see in particular, Volume II Section 13.5 on Codes and 

Standards and Section 13.6 on Strategies for Implementation of Plans for Community 

Resilience). In addition, the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP), a privatepublic partnership established by NIST in 2009 to identify and address gaps in 

current standards, maintains an extensive Catalog of Standards (SGIP, 2015). 

The NIST Guide promotes consideration of current design criteria in relation to 

various levels of loading (e.g., design event, extreme event) that are defined in that 

document. Based on current design practice, system performance in a design event5 

could expect few failures to new electric power assets taller than 18 meters (60 feet) 

if they were designed for ASCE 7 wind and ice hazards. Distribution assets less than 

18 meters (60 feet), however, are more likely to experience failures in a design ice or 

wind event, and some limited failures can also be expected in a routine event. 

5

 The NIST Guide “recommends using three hazard levels: routine, design, and extreme. These 

address a range of potential damage and consequences, and are helpful in formulating response and 

recovery scenarios. Where defined by building codes, the design hazard event (e.g., for earthquake, 

high winds) is the level used to design structures.” (NIST, 2015, p. 18) 

GCR 16-917-39	 3: Electric Power 3-3 
 

Several issues related to codes and standards are especially relevant from the 

perspective of societal expectations pertaining to electric power system performance 

in natural hazard events: (For further details, see Appendix A, Section A.1.) 

	 The design philosophy is based on constructing individual assets or components 

(e.g., transmission towers) for specified loads, rather than on designing the entire 

system to meet a specified level of service delivery (see also NIST, 2014); 

	 Load criteria in codes and standards are primarily governed by wind and ice 

loading, with seismic hazards treated separately; 

	 Transmission systems remain most vulnerable to earthquake loads even through 

their assets are generally designed to higher standards than distribution systems; 

	 For wind and ice hazards, transmission assets are generally less likely to 

experience damage than distribution assets due to higher design standards; 

	 Because of changes in codes and standards in the last few decades, newer assets 

are likely to sustain less damage than older assets; 

	 The time lag between code development and code adoption and enforcement can 

be substantial in many localities; codes and standards tend to be prescriptive and 

based on past information; and they are often not up-to-date with the most recent 

information regarding hazards (e.g., in the case of transmission towers, the 2012 

NESC uses wind maps from ASCE 7-05, rather than the more recently revised 

maps in ASCE 7-10 (NIST, 2015); 

	 Design of electric power assets and systems has also been influenced by factors 

such as floodplain management practices that are not addressed in industry 

codes6

; 

	 In addition to design-related codes and standards, numerous factors affect the 

performance of electric power systems in hazard events (e.g., deterioration of 

transmission and distribution system components, or failure of nearby lifelines 

and non-utility facilities, may disrupt electric power service); 

	 Electric power utilities are required to report certain measures of system 

performance to regulators, but these are operational measures and often exclude 

performance in extreme events; 

	 Existing measures of system performance in the industry are not directly 

informed by or linked to societal expectations; and 

	 Societal expectations may be indirectly reflected in industry practices regarding 

restoration of service following outages. 

6

 Utility commission regulations have also encouraged substation relocation (DOE, 2010). 

3-4 3: Electric Power	 GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

In addition to codes and standards, as reflected in the design of infrastructure assets, 

numerous factors affect the performance of electric power systems in hazard events. 

(For a review of electric power system performance in disasters, see Section 3.5.) In 

this discussion, system performance refers generally to physical damage, service 

disruption (i.e., power outages and brown-outs), and time to restore service. 

Performance will, in the first instance, be affected by characteristics of the hazard 

event, such as wind speeds or ground shaking and the geographic extent of the 

affected area. It will also be affected by system design attributes and condition at the 

time of the hazard event as well as location of assets and whether distribution lines 

are overhead or buried underground. While overhead lines are more vulnerable to 

wind or ice events, underground distribution lines may be more vulnerable to 

earthquakes (from liquefaction or ground displacement) or flooding (e.g., from storm 

surge). Since overhead lines are easier to access and repair than buried infrastructure, 

overhead distribution infrastructure may sustain more widespread failures but 

typically require shorter times to restore service. Maintenance programs related to 

tree-trimming will affect distribution system damage, and emergency management 

related to repair crews, resources, and response plans will also affect the speed of 

restoration (NIST, 2015; Fenrick and Getachew, 2012; EEI, 2014b). It should be 

noted, however, that some types of failures and the implications of some types of 

decisions are not yet well understood; for example, the implications of burying cables 

underground or of using new materials. 

System performance that is routinely assessed and reported by the electric power 

industry is largely operational and often excludes performance in design events or 

even routine hazard events. For recent California earthquakes, there are examples of 

utility performance reported in terms of outage percentages over time after the main 

shock. Standard metrics of electric power grid reliability include: System Average 

Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index 

(SAIDI), Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), and Customer 

Average Interruption Frequency Index (CAIFI).7 

The purpose of the standard industry indices is to measure system operation, absent 

any unusual event, for the reason that the utilities and regulators want to know how 

systems compare with each other using a simple rating number. Many jurisdictions 

require utilities to report reliability indicators (often in publicly accessible formats), 

and in such cases, SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI are almost always required (Fenrick 

and Getachew, 2012). SAIFI refers to the average number of outages for a given 

period; SAIDI indicates the average outage duration; and CAIDI refers to the average 

duration of a single outage event. Reporting criteria for reliability statistics differ, 

7

 SAIDI = (∑i minutes customer i is without service) / (total number of customers) 

 SAIFI = (∑i frequency that customer i is without service) / (total number of customers)

 CAIDI = SAIDI / SAIFI 

 (Fenrick and Getachew, 2012) 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-5 
however, across jurisdictions; for example, several states exclude extraordinary 

events or “major event days,” which primarily arise from major storms. Moreover, 

state regulatory commissions differ in their definitions of what constitutes a “major 

event day” (see also Eto et al., 2012). Some utilize the IEEE standard 1366-2003, 

IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices (IEEE, 2003),which 

defines a major event day as when outages on a given day exceed 2.5 standard 

deviations from the “normal day,” where the latter is determined by data from the 

past three years. Others use different definitions, such as when over 10% of 

customers experience outages lasting longer than 24 hours (Fenrick and Getachew 

2012; see also NIST, 2015). 

These existing standard measures of system performance in the industry are of 

limited use when considering societal expectations of electric power performance in 

hazard events. As noted above, data reporting practices and definitions differ by 

jurisdiction and often exclude outages caused by extreme events such as major 

storms. Furthermore, the performance measures themselves are not directly informed 

by or linked to societal expectations. For example, the vast majority of state 

commissions do not require utilities to compensate customers for outages (Costello, 

2012). However, system performance measures are sometimes used in reliability 

regulation and legislation and may be intended as a reflection of societal expectations 

(see further discussion below). 

It should be noted that utilities’ knowledge about their systems’ performance 

capacity, while high for normal service conditions, may in some cases be quite low 

for hazard events. Large utilities may have sophisticated models for anticipating 

outages under different hazard conditions, but this capacity is not common among 

small utilities. 

3.3 Societal Considerations 

Electric power is used in virtually all aspects of modern life and community 

functioning. It may be helpful to consider electric power as providing two key 

societal serving functions: (1) energy for operating other lifelines and essential 

facilities; and (2) energy for consumption by end users such as households and 

businesses. Thus, power outages disrupt society by causing failures to dependent 

infrastructures (e.g., outages rendering water system pumps inoperable; see Section 

3.4) as well as by directly affecting end users (e.g., outages causing loss of 

refrigeration and food spoilage). 

As noted in the NIST Guide (NIST, 2015), the societal issues and needs associated 

with power outages differ across the three phases of disaster recovery. In the shortterm recovery phase of a disaster, which is typically expected to last for days, power 

outages may be widespread. Infrastructure operators and essential facilities such as 

3-6 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

hospitals would activate their emergency response plans and resort if possible to 

backup power, typically from on-site generators. Because emergency generators are 

usually intended to only meet a fraction of the normal electricity demand at a facility 

such as a hospital, and because they would need to be refueled within days during a 

time of potential fuel shortage, disruptions to dependent infrastructures and essential 

facilities may become more severe over time if an electric power outage is prolonged. 

In the short-term recovery phase, power outages will disrupt households and 

businesses in many ways, such as through loss of lighting, heating, cooling, and other 

building functions, or loss of power for communications such as internet access and 

cell phone charging. The effects of these disruptions can range from merely 

inconvenient to life-threatening, depending on season and weather conditions, fuel 

alternatives available, and the needs of highly vulnerable populations such as those 

dependent on electrically powered medical equipment (see also Chapter 2). In the 

intermediate recovery phase, which typically lasts from weeks to months, remaining 

power outage would hamper activities to restore fully functional neighborhoods, for 

example, reopening businesses, restoring jobs, providing services (e.g., by grocery 

stores), enabling people to shelter in their neighborhoods, and facilitating rapid 

recovery of the community. Redundancy and alternate power sources can supply 

temporary or interim solutions while final repairs are being made. Power outages in 

natural disasters typically last from hours to days, or in severe cases, to weeks; hence, 

the societal issues in the long-term recovery phase (months to years) may be few or 

limited to issues such as power restoration to neighborhoods that were severely 

damaged. 

Societal expectations are also being shaped by the increasing use of renewable 

energy sources California, for example, has set a goal for its electric power providers 

to obtain 50% of their power from renewables by 2030 (California Energy 

Commission, 2016). The use of distributed energy resources (DER) involves the 

combined use of solar panels, small-scale turbines, wind towers, storage devices and 

microgrid systems. The disruptive entrance of DER into the electricity industry is 

changing the way power is managed, distributed and used, shifting to a decentralized 

model from a centralized one (Sawyer et al., 2015). The distributed model involves 

more participation from customers, who can generate electricity from solar panels 

and store and recharge power with electric cars, and businesses, which can generate 

electricity from wind and small-scale turbines. Decentralization and the growing 

deployment of smart grid technologies will substantially increase societal interaction, 

changing perceptions and expectations. Additional information on treatment of 

renewables and decentralized power is provided in Section 3.7.6. 

There is a lack of data available on societal expectations of acceptable electric power 

performance levels and recovery timeframes. Appendix A, Section A.2 reviews 

current approaches to measuring electric power system performance, emphasizing 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-7 
whether and how they reflect societal expectations of acceptable lifeline performance 

levels and recovery timeframes. The review examines the approaches of the power 

industry itself and those of state and local governments (through their roles in utility 

regulation and energy security planning). Briefly, the findings are: 

	 Industry measures of electric power system performance (e.g., SAIDI) have 

limited applicability for hazard assessment. Not only do many utilities omit 

major disruption events from their statistics, but the measures themselves do not 

consider societally important aspects such as differential impacts related to 

duration and customer types; 

	 State regulatory activities—including outage reporting thresholds and criteria, 

post-event reviews of utility performance, and post-event changes in 

regulations—may provide some insights into societal expectations of electric 

power disruption and recovery in hazard events; 

	 In rare cases, policy and regulations may provide direct evidence of societal 

expectations; for example, the State of Maryland requires that in major events, at 

least 95% of outages be restored within 50 hours; 

	 Societal expectations of outages and restoration may be changing, so that 

disruptions are becoming less tolerated; and 

	 Energy assurance plans (EAPs) demonstrate how communities are trying to 

prepare for and mitigate against the adverse effects of power outages. 

3.4 Interdependencies 

Almost all other types of infrastructure systems are dependent upon electric power 

(see NIST, 2015; and Chapters 4 through 8 of this report). For example, 

transportation systems rely on electric power to operate traffic signals, gas station 

pumps, airports and rail stations, moveable bridges, lighting in tunnels, and electrical 

rail and subways. Communications systems are highly dependent on electric power 

for operating telecommunications, internet, cable television, and other systems, and 

for cooling critical equipment in buildings. Communications and power infrastructure 

are also often physically co-located, with wires being carried on common utility 

poles; damage to both systems can occur from a single source such as a falling tree. 

Water and wastewater systems require electricity to run pumps, operate treatment 

processes, and maintain laboratory and office operations; only some of these 

functions may be supported by backup generators. Credit card transactions also 

depend on electric power, thereby exposing commercial activities to hazard-related 

disruptions. 

Electric power itself is dependent upon other infrastructure systems, particularly in a 

post-disaster situation. For example, debris-obstructed roads or traffic congestion can 

impede electric power crews from rapidly making repairs. The crews also need 

3-8 3: Electric Power	 GCR 16-917-39 
communications systems to coordinate and prioritize their repairs, and their vehicles 

require fuel. Under normal and disaster situations, electric utility operations and 

control centers rely on communications systems to monitor and to some extent 

control different elements of the system. (Although generation is beyond the scope of 

this report, it should be noted that some generation systems rely on water for storage 

and cooling, and on rail, barge, or pipelines to bring in fuel in the form of coal, 

refuse, or natural gas.) 

As noted in the NIST Guide (NIST, 2015), well-defined governance processes 

between and among infrastructure providers and government emergency managers 

are needed to coordinate system restoration according to priorities that best serve the 

interests of the community, especially when recommended restoration sequences may 

not be optimal for the infrastructure provider. For example, restoration of power after 

earthquakes may need to be coordinated with repair of natural gas systems to avoid 

electric sparks causing fire ignitions. 

3.5 Disaster Lessons 

Most large blackouts in North America have been caused by storms or other weather 

events. Of the 15 largest power outages that occurred between 1984 and 2006, seven 

were caused by hurricanes, three by ice storm and winter storms, and the remainder 

by cascading failures (Hines and Talukdar, 2009). Table 3-1 provides descriptive 

statistics for outages caused by different types of natural hazards. Outages caused by 

hurricanes affect by far the largest number of customers, on average, and are 

relatively frequent. Blackouts due to ice storms are also frequent but affect fewer 

customers. Earthquake-related outages affect relatively large areas, on average, but 

are infrequent. 

Table 3-1	 Descriptive Statistics for Outages by Cause, Natural Hazards, 1984-

2006 (after Hines and Talukdar, 2009) 

Percent of Outage Mean Size 

Natural Hazard (see Note) Mean Size (MW) (No. of Customers) 

Wind/rain 31.4 679 235,840 

Ice storm 11.1 1,664 431,184 

Hurricane or tropical 10.1 2,684 912,870 

storm 

Other cold weather 8.8 1,045 271,924 

Lightning 8.8 794 200,617 

Tornado 3.6 721 227,073 

Earthquake 1.6 1,124 526,260 

Note: For other types of sources, see original table in Hines and Talukdar (2009). Data include only 

events affecting more than 50,000 customers. Some event sizes interpolated. 

MW: Megawatt 

GCR 16-917-39	 3: Electric Power 3-9 
The number of customers losing power is affected by the damage type and extent. 

Hurricane-force winds represent the main cause of electric utility infrastructure 

damage, with about 90% of outages occurring in distribution systems (DOE, 2010; 

Eto et al., 2012). Widespread outage typically occurs because of the size of the area 

affected by strong winds. Because of the structure of the electric power grid, 

however, outages caused by point-source disruption to the transmission system can 

also affect extremely large areas and communities that are located very far from the 

damage location. For example, a series of electrical, human, and computer incidents 

in northern Ohio on August 14, 2003, led to cascading failures that affected Ontario, 

Canada, and multiple states in the Northeast and Midwest of the United States—an 

area populated by over 50 million people (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task 

Force, 2004). Local damage to electrical distribution systems, in contrast, can be 

more directly linked to customer outage areas. 

Appendix A, Section A.3 provides an overview of trends in electric power system 

performance in natural hazard events, especially recent disasters in the United States, 

with an emphasis on the relationship to societal expectations. It is anticipated that 

such information can help to inform societal expectations regarding damage extent 

and recovery rates that are typical in U.S. disasters. Briefly, the main findings are as 

follows: 

	 Information on system performance for hazard events is most commonly 

available in three forms: (1) SAIDI and related industry measures; (2) peak 

number of customers without power; and (3) time to restore power to all (or 

almost all) customers; 

	 The preponderance of outage events and data pertain to storm (and other 

weather-related) events; data on peak number of customers without power and 

time to fully restore service are readily available; 

	 A few empirical models of power outage have been published, almost all for 

hurricanes and ice storms; these have been used for both predictive and 

explanatory purposes; 

	 Substantial detailed data are available for major outage events, particularly with 

regard to technical aspects of component and system failure and restoration; 

information on societal impacts and expectations is available for some events, but 

not consistently or from a single source; 

	 A few models have been developed for societal impacts of power outages, 

especially in earthquakes; and 

3-10	 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

 Key information gaps include: data on spatial patterns8 of outage (especially in 

relation to societally important aspects such as service to critical facilities and 

vulnerable populations), information on societal impacts and consequences, and 

sufficient data on power outages in hazard types other than storms (e.g., floods, 

earthquakes). 

More detailed data, including that pertaining to societal considerations, are available 

on an ad hoc basis for power outages in large disasters. A few such events are 

highlighted here. These demonstrate lessons in terms of the durations of power 

outages in different types of hazard events, disruptions that commonly occur to 

dependent lifelines, and some key types of societal impacts. 

Hurricanes have caused some of the most extensive and lengthy power outages in the 

United States. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports that in 2005 Hurricane 

Katrina, the peak number of customers without power was 2.7 million across four 

states (DOE, 2009). Within two weeks of first landfall, power was fully restored in 

Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi; however, over 40% of customers in Louisiana 

were still without power. Because of flooding, power was not fully restored in New 

Orleans for several months. In some neighborhoods, residential housing and 

businesses losses were so severe that electric power was not restored for lack of 

customers. The utility, Entergy New Orleans, faced repair costs of $260-325 million 

and lost revenue of $147 million, filed for bankruptcy about a month after the 

hurricane, and emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in May 2007. Power restoration 

curves for Entergy New Orleans after both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are provided 

by O’Rourke (2010). 

Hurricane Rita in 2005 struck less than a month after Katrina, causing 1.3 million 

customers to lose power. New outages were restored within 3 weeks (DOE, 2009). 

Rita is notable as a storm event in which there was substantial transmission as well as 

distribution system damage. Reed et al. (2010a) provide an analysis of power system 

damage and restoration in this storm. Failures included: transmission towers, which 

were difficult to access for repairs because of their location in marshy areas; 

substations where essential equipment, raised above the floodplain, were damaged by 

airborne debris; and distribution systems, for which repair was hampered by tree 

failures and related debris. One utility, Entergy Gulf States, Inc., lost all its 

transmission connections between Louisiana and Texas, but was able to restore 

power to all who could receive it within 3 weeks. Another utility, East Texas Electric 

Cooperatives, also experienced lengthy outage: restoration times to its 106,000 

customers took 11 days on average but ranged from 16 hours to 36 days. 

8

 Many utilities, especially large ones, have geographical information system (GIS) data (and 

sometimes specialized software platforms) that allow outage data to be viewed and analyzed 

spatially. Social media provides another potential source of data on outage occurrences, 

including locations and impacts. 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-11 
Power outages in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita affected other energy supply systems 

such as oil refineries and petroleum pipelines. Delays in restarting refineries affected 

regional fuel supply, cost of goods produced at the refineries, the cost of gasoline, 

and ultimately the national economy (Reed et al., 2010b). Refinery and pipeline 

shutdowns caused regional petroleum shortages as far away as North Carolina (North 

Carolina Energy Office, 2013). The Louisiana Offshore Oil Port reportedly did not 

sustain much damage but delayed restarting because of electric power outage. Power 

outages also exacerbated health issues arising from flooding-triggered mold growth, 

which is usually controlled with air conditioning and fans. 

Hurricane Wilma in 2005 caused blackouts to 3.5 million customers in Florida; in 

Miami, power was lost to 98% of Florida Power & Light’s customers, along with 

major airports, hospitals, and Port Everglades. All but 100,000 customers were 

restored within two weeks (DOE, 2009). 

Power outages in the 2008 Hurricanes Gustav and Ike were similar in size to Katrina 

and Rita, but restoration was faster (DOE, 2009). Interestingly, Gustav (1.3 million 

customers without power) appears to have affected power generation by disrupting 

waterborne fuel deliveries to and river access for cooling at the plants, although this 

did not lead to power outages. Flooding also impaired the mobility of restoration 

crews. Ike caused the largest blackout (3.9 million customers in 9 states) in North 

America since the August 14, 2003, great Northeast blackout. Much of Houston was 

still without power over 10 days after landfall. Power was restored within 3 weeks. 

As in 2005, electricity outages in the 2008 hurricanes disrupted refineries, gas 

processors, pipelines, and ports, and prolonged power outages delayed their 

restoration. 

Other types of storms have also caused major power outages. In June 2012, a 

derecho—intense straight-line winds over large geographical regions—affected 

multiple states in the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic states, leading to power outages to 

4.2 million customers in 11 states and the District of Columbia, exceeding the outage 

size in most hurricanes (DOE, 2012). Restoration took 7 to 10 days in many cases 

and was slower than other severe spring and summer storms in the region, in part due 

to new storms that occurred shortly after the derecho and caused additional power 

outages. Restoration rates varied considerably by state. One factor that may have 

lengthened restoration times was that utilities had little warning of the derecho, in 

contrast to hurricane warnings received days in advance. 

Hurricane Irene in 2011 and Hurricane Sandy in 2012 caused some of the largest 

power outages on record. Across multiple states, some 6.69 million customers lost 

power in Irene and 8.66 million in Sandy (and the Nor’easter that followed) (DOE, 

2013). Other sources estimate that Irene caused power outage to about 9 million 

customers, and Sandy to approximately 10 million customers in 24 states (EEI, 

3-12 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
2014). Restoration to 95% of customers took 5 days following Irene, and 10 days 

after Sandy (DOE, 2013). In Hurricane Sandy, widespread gasoline shortages in the 

New York City area were experienced; while caused by supply problems at 

petroleum product terminals, they were exacerbated by power outages to retail gas 

stations. 

Ice storms have also caused large-scale power outages. The 2013 Toronto Ice Storm 

caused transmission and distribution system damage that led to over 1 million 

customers losing power in the city, some for 10 days. The storm caused CAN$11.9 

million in damage and CAN$1 million in revenue loss for the utility, Toronto Hydro 

(QUEST, 2015). 

The 1998 ice storm that affected Quebec and areas of eastern Ontario caused damage 

to 40% of the distribution system owned by the utility, Ontario Hydro. Some 

CAN$140 million in damage was suffered by Ontario Hydro and CAN$800 million 

by Hydro-Québec. Some 150,000 people lost power for up to three weeks (QUEST, 

2015). Chang et al. (2007) gathered media reports on the societal impacts of the ice 

storm, focusing on infrastructure failure interdependencies related to power outage. 

Among the most significant societal impacts of power outage were: major employers 

shutting down for up to two weeks; communication difficulties among emergency 

service providers; fuel shortages caused by temporary closure of two refineries; and 

Hydro Québec’s request that businesses voluntarily close to allow more rapid power 

system repairs. Numerous other impacts ranged from hospital disruptions to CAN$25 

million in lost revenues to farmers, and 28 deaths from hypothermia, carbon 

monoxide poisoning, and fires (Chang et al., 2007). Following the disaster, a public 

commission gathered information from numerous parties affected by the ice storm 

and included information on psychosocial impacts (Nicolet Commission, 1999, cited 

in Chang et al., 2007). 

Snowstorms have also caused power outages by damaging transmission and 

distribution lines. In 2009, heavy snow caused power loss to nearly 100,000 

customers of Appalachian Power Company, some for 18 days. Restoration was 

hampered by a second powerful snowstorm following upon the first. A subsequent 

review “acknowledged mistakes but noted that the utilities handled the vast scale of 

the disruption well” (Commonwealth of Virginia, 2012). 

A period of unusually cold and windy weather in February 2011 in the Southwestern 

U.S., while not pertaining to winter storms, caused widespread power outages to a 

region unaccustomed to such weather. Damage was suffered to generation and 

transmission systems that triggered several controlled load sheds and rolling 

blackouts. In the peak outage event, 1.3 million customers lost power, and some 4.4 

million were affected over the course of three days (FERC and NERC, 2011). 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-13 
 

There are few reports of power outages caused by floods (aside from coastal flooding 

in hurricanes). Because of their failure modes (e.g., substation flooding) and spatial 

concentration, power outages caused by flooding tend to be more limited in size than 

those caused by wind storms or earthquakes. In one recent case, the 2013 flood in 

Calgary, floodwaters caused temporary loss of a distribution substation that supplied 

critical power to a hospital in the city (QUEST, 2015). Some 35,000 customers lost 

power for up to eight days. The utility, ENMAX, suffered CAN$9.6 million in direct 

damages. As a result of the losses, ENMAX plans to install more smart meters in 

flood risk areas to allow remote disconnections and reconnections in future floods. 

Outage reports related to wildfires are also sparse. Mitchell (2013) discusses the 

performance of electric power systems in wildfires, including issues of ignition, 

outage probabilities, and mitigation. Wind speeds are a key factor. 

While there are relatively few significant earthquake events, these are often welldocumented. In the 1994 Northridge earthquake, power was lost to nearly 2.5 million 

customers; it was the first time the entire city of Los Angeles had lost power (EERI, 

1995). Damage occurred to several transmission towers and high voltage substations 

from ground shaking, but distribution system damage was light. Restoration was 

rapid: most customers had power within 12 hours, 93% within 24 hours, and 99% 

within three days. Grid interconnectedness led to some disruptions far afield; for 

example, to 150,000 customers in rural Idaho for three hours (EERI, 1995). 

Performance was considered better than in the 1971 San Fernando earthquake that 

had struck the same area, and partly credited to changes made in the ensuing time 

(EERI, 1995). In the 2001 Nisqually earthquake in Washington State, which can be 

considered a design level event, outages were minor: of the three distribution utilities 

affected, the most disrupted system entailed power loss to 200,000 or 924,000 

customers, virtually all of which had power restored within six hours (Heubach, 

2001). 

Observations from earthquakes in other countries with similar power infrastructure to 

the United States provide valuable lessons, since seismic events occur infrequently. 

Generally speaking, electric power outages in earthquakes tend to be widespread, as 

in storms, but relatively brief in duration. Transmission system damage is generally 

minor, with most outages deriving from distribution system damage. The power 

outage was extensive in the catastrophic 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake, but service 

was restored within several days, much more quickly than water and natural gas 

(which required several weeks), rail (which took several months) and highway 

transportation (which took about 21 months) (Chang and Nojima, 2001). The power 

outage in Kobe led to numerous interdependent infrastructure failures, including 

malfunction of traffic signals, loss of satellite emergency communications, hospital 

shutdowns, loss of water filtration plants and pump stations, loss of water and 

elevators in high-rise buildings, urban fires (when electricity restoration caused 

3-14 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
sparks that ignited leaked natural gas), and lack of heating at emergency shelters 

during winter conditions (Nojima and Kameda, 1996). In the less severe 1999 Niigata 

Ken Chuetsu earthquake in Japan, power was lost to 300,000 customers but 94% 

were restored within four days and all by the 11th day (Scawthorn et al., 2006). 

In the 2010-2011 Canterbury series of earthquakes in New Zealand, power was lost 

to 80% of the Christchurch metropolitan area, but outages were relatively brief, with 

service mostly restored within one day. The exception was the February 2011 

earthquake: while transmission damage was minor and service restored within 4.5 

hours, damage was more extensive in the distribution system. Cable failures were 

highly correlated with liquefaction-induced ground deformation, rather than high 

levels of ground shaking. Some 90% of customers had power within 10 days, when a 

temporary 66 kilovolt (kV) line was put into service. Damaged 66 kV and 11 kV 

underground cables were a cause of the longer outages that affected the availability 

of power during the subsequent winter months. (There is a need for national and 

international seismic design guidelines for buried power cables.) The minimal 

damage to power systems, despite strong ground shaking, has been credited to 

seismic upgrading implemented in the decade prior to the earthquakes (Kwasinski et 

al., 2014). 

Performance and impact information is also available to a limited degree from outage 

events other than natural disasters. Miles et al. (2014) documents the broad range of 

interdependent lifeline and societal impacts arising from a 2011 power outage that 

affected 3.5 million people in San Diego for up to 12 hours. While not caused by a 

natural hazard, and while the outage duration was short, the impacts of the power 

outage are nonetheless very relevant. Particularly notable disruptions were related to 

fuel access and gas station serviceability, sewage spills from wastewater treatment 

plant failures, and food-related socioeconomic impacts. 

Studies on societal impacts of electric power outages are relatively sparse. McDaniels 

et al. (2007) and Chang et al. (2009a) analyzed infrastructure failure 

interdependencies and their societal consequences in several major power outage 

events: the 2003 northeastern North American blackout, the 1998 Quebec Ice Storm, 

and three 2004 Florida hurricanes. The impact pattern in the Northeast blackout was 

distinct from those in the storm events in terms of causing more pronounced 

economic impacts and transportation problems. Power outages in the storm events, 

by contrast, caused more significant health-related impacts and disruption to 

emergency services and building support systems such as heating, ventilation, and air 

conditioning (HVAC). This contrast may derive from seasonal and outage duration 

differences. 

In a review of recent power outages worldwide, Zeng et al. (2015) found the 

following common types of impacts: traffic paralysis, including transit; 

GCR 16-917-39 3: Electric Power 3-15 
communication interruption; social disorder; financial and stock market interruptions; 

industrial safety issues; and government and health sector issues. 

Although these cases document impacts in actual power outage events, it should be 

noted that the severity of impacts can be reduced, in part through more rapid 

restoration. A key need is therefore to explore how repairs can be strategically 

sequenced in order to rapidly restore power to where it is needed most for community 

recovery. 

3.6 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

With regard to natural hazards, engineering design in the electric power sector is 

governed by codes and standards at the individual asset or component level, primarily 

for extreme wind and snow/ice loads. While utilities are required to report on 

systems-level performance to regulators, the performance measures that are used 

(e.g., SAIDI) are largely operational, often excluding hazard events. When hazard 

events are included, definitions differ across reporting jurisdictions. Moreover, such 

measures are not based on societal expectations of electric power performance in 

hazards. It is also important to recognize that codes and standards are not the only 

influence on power system design; factors such as voluntary measures to exceed 

standards, injunctions of regulatory authorities to improve performance in hazard 

events, and floodplain management practices also influence the physical resilience of 

electric power systems. 

While there is no evidence of societal performance expectations directly influencing 

electric power system codes, standards, or design, it may be useful to search for 

indirect evidence. For example, post-disaster utility performance reviews, sometimes 

reflecting detailed consultation with stakeholders on the impacts of power outages, 

can provide evidence of outage tolerance thresholds. Also, as shown in Chapter 2, 

electric power supply to critical facilities such as hospitals is an important societal 

consideration. Many utilities do have plans to prioritize hospitals and other key 

facilities in the restoration process (see Appendix A, Section A.4 for more detail). 

3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 

3.7.1	 Review of Key Points 

Electric power outages disrupt communities by affecting both direct consumption by 

end users (e.g., households and businesses) and the operation of nearly all other 

lifeline infrastructure systems. Current practice in the electric power industry is 

geared toward designing components for hazard loads, rather than for system 

performance. There is an urgent need for quantitative measures and comprehensive 

data collection on actual and potential performance of power systems in natural 

3-16	 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
hazard events (e.g., across all major hazard types, in relation to different failure 

modes, and with spatio-temporal detail regarding outage and restoration), as well as 

on societal aspects such as impacts and performance expectations. Several 

recommendations are made below. 

3.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs 

Following are key recommendations to improve electric power system codes, 

standards, and guidelines: 

	 Gather comprehensive data on system performance of electric power. While 

data from actual disasters provide the most direct evidence on performance, other 

sources such as disaster preparation exercises should also be tapped, as they can 

also provide valuable information on potential power outages in areas that have 

not experienced recent disasters. Such data on systems performance will be 

important for understanding current vulnerabilities, making the case for reducing 

those vulnerabilities, and developing systems-based lifeline standards. 

	 Develop and use consistent metrics to enable comparisons across events, 

utility companies, states, and other factors. Agreement on what types of data 

should be gathered and how electric power system performance can be 

consistently and meaningfully measured would in itself represent an important 

advance. 

	 Define system performance measures for electric power that relate to 

community resilience and reflect societal expectations. Available information, 

while sparse, indicates several aspects of societal expectations that are important, 

as follows: 

1.	 Performance measures should reflect outage characteristics that reflect 

societal considerations. Outage characteristics include not only the number 

of customers affected and duration, but also characteristics such as 

seasonality (e.g., summer vs. winter time) and service to critical facilities 

such as hospitals. For example, one measure could be the percentage of 

hospitals in the affected area with power available/restored within 24 hours. 

2.	 Performance measures need to consider “downstream” effects on other 

infrastructure. For example, hospital operations can be impeded by a power 

outage. Although hospitals are required to have resources for 72 hours of 

operations for essential functions following a power outage (FEMA, 2014), 

emergency power may service only limited operations and may also fail. A 

DHS survey of 222 hospitals found that while most had backup power in the 

form of an electric generator, generator power was sufficient to operate only 

a portion of hospital functions for a short period (i.e., hours to a few days) 

(DHS, 2014). Indeed, it was estimated that hospitals would suffer 67% to 

GCR 16-917-39	 3: Electric Power 3-17 
99% degradation of core operations within five minutes of an outage if no 

backup sources were available. Notably, 75% of the surveyed hospitals had 

arrangements with their electric power provider for priority in restoration. 

3.	 Performance measures should consider electric power service to 

vulnerable populations. Society is not homogeneous, and different groups 

suffer differential losses in the same outage. For example, populations with 

special health needs such as those reliant on electrically powered medical 

devices are especially at risk in outages. Moreover, different population 

groups have different risk perceptions, resources, preparedness, and other 

considerations. 

4.	 People and organizations have an inherent adaptability and capacity to 

withstand power outages, which in turn has societal consequences. Rose 

(e.g., Rose, 2007) has written extensively on business’ ability to undertake 

resilience actions such as finding alternative suppliers, delaying production, 

and shifting schedules. Fujimi and Chang (2014) found that after Japan’s 

2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, prolonged power supply 

reduction due to loss of nuclear power generation did not create an economic 

crisis; rather, businesses demonstrated a remarkable capacity to curtail 

electric power consumption. The loss of nuclear power did have macroeconomic effects as Japan substantially increased acquisition of external fuel 

supplies. Such industrial adjustments in response to power reduction are 

noteworthy, and emphasize the importance of public education, business 

continuity planning, and other pre-disaster preparation efforts that increase 

the capacity of people and organizations to withstand power outages. 

5.	 Societal impacts and expectations are strongly influenced not only by the 

actual severity of outages, but also by availability (or lack) of 

information and how information is communicated. Better information 

(e.g., regarding expected outage durations) can facilitate pre-disaster 

planning. Immediately prior to and during an outage, good information is 

important for emergency response. Numerous post-disaster reviews of 

electric utility performance have emphasized the need to improve 

communications (e.g., EPP, 2012). 

3.7.3 Research Needs 

Following are key research recommendations: 

	 Systematically gather and assess secondary data (e.g., from industry 

restoration priorities and post-disaster utility performance reviews) on 

societal expectations pertaining to acceptable electric power outages and 

restoration timeframes. It is important to keep in mind, however, that societal 

3-18	 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
 

considerations may be changing; in particular, that disruptions may be becoming 

less tolerable. 

	 Conduct focused studies that engage in direct data collection (e.g., surveys) 

regarding key aspects of the relationship between electric power outages, 

societal impacts, and expectations. Such studies are important for certain key 

aspects of performance, when secondary data may be unavailable or insufficient. 

One such aspect is duration: it will be important to document and understand 

how the impacts of blackouts scale up with the duration of outage. For example, 

what are key thresholds beyond which loss of infrastructure functionality, 

adverse impacts to vulnerable populations, losses to businesses, or public 

tolerance rapidly deteriorate? Such understanding may allow translation of 

outage duration, which is commonly reported, into outage impacts. They may 

also encourage the development of duration-related standards that reflect societal 

impacts and expectations. 

	 Conduct studies to investigate the differential vulnerability among social 

groups to power outages. For example, it can be hypothesized that populations 

that are “off grid,” that is, who have independent sources of power, are different 

than grid-dependent populations in ways that are relevant to disaster 

vulnerability, such as having higher financial resources and better health overall. 

3.7.4 Modeling Needs 

Following are recommendations pertaining to key modeling needs: 

	 Develop first-generation systems-based models to support exploration of 

resilience-enhancing options by utilities and communities. Such models 

should account for: 

1.	 Alternative response and restoration strategies that utilities might take, 

including aspects such as prioritization, mutual aid; and 

2.	 Alternative pre-event measures and investments that utilities can undertake to 

enhance the performance and recovery of networks during and after hazard 

events. These include not only engineering design for improved performance 

during the event and improved functionality after the event, but also 

approaches such as relocating substations out of floodplains, grid 

GCR 16-917-39	 3: Electric Power 3-19 
 

 

modernization9, and changes to network configurations such as microgrids10. 

Several recent reports provide detailed recommendations on how to 

strengthen the resilience of electric power systems, including but not limited 

to hardening components (see Executive Office of the President, 2013a; EEI, 

2014a; QUEST, 2015). 

3.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs 

Electric power utilities across the nation differ greatly in their understanding of how 

their systems may perform and recover under natural hazards, particularly extreme 

events. While large utilities may have sophisticated models to simulate system 

performance under different hazard conditions, many smaller utilities do not have 

such capabilities. The industry as a whole would benefit from data on actual 

performance and societal expectations, performance objectives, and guidelines that 

reflect system performance, recovery, and key societal functions that use electric 

power. 

3.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends 

Although beyond the scope of this report, several future considerations and trends are 

important to consider in further work. They include: 

	 The changing nature and context of electric power systems. Aspects include 

increasing available of renewable energy sources, distributed energy, grid 

modernization (independent of utilities’ resilience strategies), as well as 

increasing dependence on telecommunications and aging and deteriorating 

infrastructure. (For examples of the use of renewable energy for community 

resilience, see NASEO, 2009. See also Bay Area Council Economic Institute, 

2015). Changes in technology are shifting electricity distribution and 

management from a centralized approach to a decentralized system (e.g., 

distributed energy resources, renewable energy, microgrids, and reconfiguring 

parts of system to “island them”). 

9

 Grid modernization can involve the use of smart grid technology to remote control and automate 

activities to better monitor and operate the grid. Such technologies have been credited with more 

rapid power restoration in events such as Hurricanes Irene and Sandy. For example, “the Potomac 

Electric Power Company (PEPCO) said it was able to restore power to 130,000 homes in just two 

days after Sandy thanks to advanced meter infrastructure (AMI) [that it recently] deployed... With 

smart meters and AMI... PEPCO received “no power” signals that allowed them to quickly 

pinpoint outage locations.” (Executive Office of the President, 2013a, p.10). 

10 “A key feature of a microgrid is its ability during a utility grid disturbance to separate and isolate 

itself from the utility seamlessly with little or no disruption to the loads within the microgrid. Then, 

when the utility grid returns to normal, the microgrid automatically resynchronizes and reconnects 

itself to the grid in an equally seamless fashion. Technologies include advanced communication 

and controls, building controls, and distributed generation, including combined heat and power 

which demonstrated its potential by keeping on light and heat at several institutions following 

Superstorm Sandy.” (Executive Office of the President, 2013a, p.14-15) 

3-20	 3: Electric Power GCR 16-917-39 
	 The traditional industry structure is also changing as renewable power sources 

become more prominent and distributed generation (e.g., power plants built to 

serve a specific manufacturing facility) and demand-side management (e.g., 

energy efficiency and storage) become more common (NIST, 2015). These 

changes are stressing a physical infrastructure beyond its original design; for 

example, with systems intended to carry electrical flows in one direction now 

transmitting them in multiple directions depending upon supply and demand 

conditions at different times of the day. Numerous transmission upgrading 

projects are being pursued—many involving telecommunications and new 

technologies—to increase the resilience of the U.S. electrical grid. 

	 Societal expectations pertaining to electric power performance under hazard 

conditions may be changing, with decreasing tolerance for outages generally, 

lower thresholds for acceptable outages, and less tolerance for greater disruptions 

from outages when they occur. 

GCR 16-917-39	 3: Electric Power 3-21 

Chapter 4 

Gas and Liquid Fuel 

4.1 Systems Overview 

Gas and liquid fuel systems include the equipment and facilities needed for 

conveyance, such as pipe, valves, fittings, pumps, compressors, storage tanks, 

pressure regulators, monitoring equipment, and the surface or underground structures 

required to house these facilities. Pump stations are needed for petroleum and refined 

products pipelines to overcome flow friction and move the liquids to higher 

elevations. Pressure reducing stations may be needed when moving the fluids to 

lower elevations in mountainous terrain. Compressor stations are needed for gas 

transmission lines to pressurize the gas during transportation. In addition to pipeline 

systems and associated facilities, the transportation of liquid fuel also involves 

shipment by barge, tanker, and railroad of crude oil and refined products as well as 

truck transportation of gasoline to service stations. Liquefied natural gas is 

transported by specially constructed ocean vessels. 

Gathering pipelines transport gas and petroleum from production areas to 

transmission pipelines. Gathering lines for petroleum production are generally on the 

order of 2 to 8 inches (in.) in diameter. 

Transmission pipelines transport crude oil and natural gas from gathering systems to 

processing, refining, and storage facilities. They also transport refined petroleum 

products, such as gasoline and natural gas liquids to distribution terminals. 

Transmission pipelines vary in diameter typically from 8 to 36 in., although some are 

as large as 48 in., such as those in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. The operating 

pressures of transmission lines vary from relatively low pressures (< 100 pounds per 

square inch (psi)) to over 1,000 psi. 

Distribution pipelines transport natural gas from transmission facilities to customers. 

Their diameters vary typically from 4 to 12 in., although lines as large as 36 to 48 in. 

are found in large urban communities. Cast iron distribution mains are often operated 

at low pressures equivalent to about 0.4 to 0.5 psi. Steel and plastic (typically high 

and medium density polyethylene) distribution mains are operated at maximum 

pressures frequently ranging from 60 to 100 psi. Gas is conveyed from distribution 

lines to customers by service lines or services, which are typically 0.5 to 1.0 in. in 

diameter. 

GCR 16-917-39 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-1 
 

U.S. statistics for natural gas show there are a total of 303,663 miles (mi.) of 

transmission lines that supply 22% of U.S. energy consumption per year (PHMSA, 

2015). Figure 4-1 shows the spatial distribution of the nation’s system. For example, 

pipelines originating in Louisiana and crossing the Mississippi Valley are subject to 

disruption by hurricanes, river flooding, and earthquakes originating in the New 

Madrid Seismic Zone. These lines convey natural gas essential for heating and 

cooling in heavily populated areas of the Northeast and Midwest. Many liquid fuel 

transmission lines follow similar routes and are subject to the same disruptions. They 

transport fuel essential for all modes of transportation, as well as heating, into the 

Northeast and Midwest. Some locations, like Portland, Oregon, are serviced by a 

single line as shown on the map. More than 90% of Portland’s refined petroleum 

products follow a similar route through a 6-mile stretch of the Willamette River that 

is at risk from liquefaction-induced ground failure during an earthquake (NIST, 

2015). 

Cushing, Oklahoma is a location of special note for the U.S. liquid fuel transmission 

system. It has been described as the most significant trading hub for crude oil in 

North America with a strategic location that controls oil transmission from Gulf 

Figure 4-1 Map of U.S. natural gas interstate and intrastate transmission system (NIST, 2015). 

4-2 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
Coast oil ports to Midwest and Northeast U.S. customers (Oklahoma Office of the 

Secretary of Energy, 2005). 

Besides the main transmission lines, natural gas systems also include 17,591 mi. of 

gathering lines, 1,263,987 mi. of distribution lines and an estimated 67,199,258 

services accounting for 901,209 mi. of service lines. 

Liquid fuel pipelines include those that convey petroleum, refined fuel products, 

highly volatile liquids (HVLs), and carbon dioxide (CO2). The HVLs include 

propane, butane, and ethylene, which are gases that liquefy under pressure. U.S. 

statistics for liquid fuels show there are a total of 192,414 mi. of transmission lines, 

which include 60,902 mi. for petroleum, 63,549 mi. for refined products (including 

ethanol), 62,768 mi. for HVLs, and 5,195 mi. for CO2 (PHMSA, 2015). 

One study pointed out that refineries and processing facilities are often engineered as 

separate complexes and thus treated as end nodes and not modeled as part of the gas 

and fuel delivery system (NIST, 2014). Consistent with previous treatment, this 

chapter focuses on transmission of fuels. Refineries, however, are an important part 

of the regional fuel supply chain and their disruption by flooding and/or loss of 

electricity had a major impact on the restoration of transportation capabilities after 

Hurricane Sandy (City of New York, 2013a) and fuel prices after Hurricane Ike 

(Ailworth, 2008). For these reasons, a recommendation is made at the end of this 

chapter to improve knowledge, databases, and modeling of refineries and their impact 

on regional recovery. 

4.2 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

The regulatory framework for gas and liquid fuel systems is based on the Natural Gas 

Pipeline Act of 1968, Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Act of 1979, Pipeline Safety 

Improvement Act of 2002, and Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Safety and 

Enforcement Act of 2006. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration (PHMSA) was created in 2004 to administer the Department of 

Transportation national regulatory program for the transportation of natural gas, 

petroleum, and other hazardous fluids by pipeline, including regulations pertaining to 

the safety of pipelines and associated facilities. It also oversees the implementation of 

risk management by pipeline operators and provides technical and resource 

assistance for state pipeline safety programs. State regulatory agencies also provide 

oversight. For example, California operators are regulated by the California Public 

Utilities Commission (CPUC) whose rules affecting pipeline systems are codified 

under State of California Rules Governing Design, Construction, Testing, Operation, 

and Maintenance of Gas Gathering, Transmission, and Distribution Piping Systems 

as part of General Order 112E (NTSB, 2011). 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-3 
 

Table 4-1 summarizes the codes, standards, and guidelines governing gas and liquid 

fuel pipeline systems that affect community resilience. Key features of codes, 

standards, and guidelines and related performance requirements are discussed in this 

section. A more detailed review of the regulatory framework and a detailed 

description of key codes, standards, and guidelines associated with gas and liquid 

fuels systems are presented in Appendix B. 

Table 4-1	 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Gas and 

Liquid Fuel Systems 

Category 

Code 

Code 

Standard 

Standard 

Standard 

Guidelines 

Guidelines 

Title General Description 

49 CFR Part 192 Transportation 

of Natural and Other Gas by 

Pipeline (Office of the Federal 

Register, 2013a) 

49 CFR Part 195 Transportation 

of Hazardous Liquids by 

Pipeline (Office of the Federal 

Register, 2013b) 

ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission 

and Distribution Piping Systems 

(ASME, 2014) 

ASME B31.4 Pipeline 

Transportation Systems for 

Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other 

Liquids (ASME, 2010) 

API Recommended Practice 

1162 Public Awareness 

Programs for Pipeline Operators 

(API, 2010) 

Guidelines for the Seismic 

Design and Assessment of 

Natural Gas and Liquid 

Hydrocarbon Pipelines (PRCI, 

2004) 

Guidelines for the Seismic 

Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline 

Systems (ASCE, 1984) 

Minimum safety requirements for pipeline 

facilities and transportation of natural gas 

promulgated by the federal government. 

Minimum safety and reporting requirements for 

pipeline facilities used in the transportation of 

hazardous liquids promulgated by the federal 

government. 

Requirements for the design, materials, 

construction, assembly, inspection, and testing 

of pipelines transporting liquid fuels. 

Requirements for the design, fabrication, 

installation, inspection, testing, safety aspects of 

operation, and maintenance of facilities used for 

the transportation of gas. 

Guidance for pipeline operators on the 

development, implementation, and evaluation of 

public awareness programs. 

Recommended procedures and methods for the 

assessment of new and existing natural gas and 

liquid hydrocarbon pipelines subject to seismicrelated loading conditions. 

Guidelines for the seismic design of buried oil, 

gas, or refined petroleum product pipelines and 

surface facilities, such a pumping and 

compressor stations, storage tanks, and 

miscellaneous terminal facilities. 

Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 190-199 address gas and 

liquid fuel pipeline systems. The most important and extensive parts of these 

regulations are 49 CFR Part 192 Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by 

Pipeline (Office of the Federal Register, 2013a) and 49 CFR Part 195 Transportation 

of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline (Office of the Federal Register, 2013b). The CFR 

sets minimum requirements, and additional requirements may be promulgated 

through state administrative codes, which are enforced by public utility or public 

4-4 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel	 GCR 16-917-39 
service commissions. Various professional society standards are incorporated in 49 

CFR Parts 192 and 195 by reference. The most extensive and frequently referenced 

standards in 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 are ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and 

Distribution Piping Systems (ASME, 2014) and ASME B31.4 Pipeline 

Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids (ASME, 2010), 

respectively. In addition to ASME B31.8, 49 CFR Part 192 references over 40 

standards developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), 

American Petroleum Institute (API), American Society for Testing and Materials 

(ASTM), Pipeline Research Council International (PRCI), Manufacturers 

Standardization Society for Valve and Fitting Industry (MSS), National Fire 

Protection Association (NFPA), Plastics Pipe Institute (PPI), National Association of 

Corrosion Engineers International (NACE), and the Gas Technology Institute. 

Standards pertaining to public awareness programs for hazardous pipelines are 

provided by API Recommended Practice 1162 Public Awareness Programs for 

Pipeline Operators (API, 2010). Guidelines for the earthquake design of gas and 

liquid fuel pipelines are contained in Guidelines for the Seismic Design and 

Assessment of Natural Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines (PRCI, 2004) and 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems (ASCE, 1984) 

developed by the Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) of 

the American Society of Engineers (ASCE). 

Brief descriptions of the codes, standards, and guidelines summarized in Table 4-1 

are provided in the following subsections. 

4.2.1	 49 CFR Part 192 Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by 

Pipeline 

49 CFR Part 192 is the federal regulation that prescribes minimum safety standards 

for pipeline facilities for the transportation of natural gas. The regulations are detailed 

and extensive, and address: pipe materials; pipe and component design; welding in 

steel pipelines and joining of other types of pipe; general construction requirements; 

customer meters and services; corrosion control; test requirements; uprating pipelines 

to a higher internal pressure; operations; maintenance; personnel qualification; and 

gas transmission and distribution integrity management. The code includes protection 

from hazards, by requiring the operator to take all practical steps to protect each 

transmission pipeline from washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, or hazards that 

may cause the pipeline to move or to sustain abnormal loads. Offshore pipelines must 

be protected from damage by mudslides, water currents, hurricanes, anchor dragging, 

and fishing operations. Operational requirements covered by the code include 

surveillance and damage prevention programs, emergency plans, and public 

awareness programs that comply with API Recommended Practice 1162, which is 

discussed in Section 4.2.5. 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-5 
Four class locations defined in 49 CFR Part 192 are summarized with respect to 

design factors in Table 4-2. Each design factor represents the percentage of steel 

yield strength that can be allowed as pipe circumferential (hoop) stress for each class 

location. For example, design factors of 0.72 and 0.40 apply for pipe in Class 1 and 4 

locations, respectively, and indicate that the pipe must be designed with sufficient 

wall thickness to limit hoop stress to 72% and 40% of yield strength in Class 1 and 4 

locations, respectively, before other reductions are applied depending on the presence 

and type of longitudinal welds and operating temperature. From Table 4-2, it can be 

seen that the class representing the greatest population density (Class 4) results in a 

reduction in allowable stress to nearly one-half that permitted for the lowest 

population density (Class 1). 

Table 4-2	 Class Locations and Design Factors in 49 CFR Part 192 (Office of 

the Federal Register, 2013a) 

Class 

Location* Description Design Factor 

1 10 or fewer buildings intended for human occupancy. 0.72 

2 More than 10 but fewer than 46 buildings intended for 

human occupancy. 

0.60 

3 46 or more buildings intended for human occupancy; or an 

area where a pipeline lies within 100 yds. of either a 

building or a small, well-defined outside area (such as a 

playground, recreation area, outdoor theater, or other place 

of public assembly) that is occupied by 20 or more persons 

on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks in any 12-month 

period. 

0.50 

4 Buildings with four or more stories are prevalent. 0.40 

*

An onshore area that extends 220 yds. either side of the centerline of any contiguous 1-mi. length 

of pipeline. 

4.2.2	 49 CFR Part 195 Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by 

Pipeline 

49 CFR Part 195 is the federal regulation that prescribes minimum safety standards 

and reporting requirements for pipeline facilities used for the transportation of liquid 

fuels. The code includes by reference 40 standards developed by the ASME, API, 

ASTM, PRCI, MSS, NFPA, PPI, and NACE. The code addresses annual accidentand safety-related condition reporting, design requirements, construction, pressure 

testing, operation and maintenance, qualification of pipeline personnel, and corrosion 

control. 

Similar to 49 CFR Part 192, the code for gas liquid fuel pipelines establishes the 

design pressure for steel pipe, or maximum allowable operating pressure, on the basis 

of hoop stress, and prescribes methods for determining the tensile strength of the pipe 

steel as well as a design factor and longitudinal joint factor. The design factor is 0.72 

4-6 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel	 GCR 16-917-39 
except that a design factor of 0.60 is used in offshore and inland waterway locations. 

A design factor of 0.56 is specified for certain fabrication and heating conditions. The 

regulations require that pipeline design account for external loads, such those related 

to earthquakes, vibration, and thermal expansion/contraction. 

Public awareness programs that comply with API Recommended Practice 1162 see 

Section 4.2.5) are required. The program must include provisions to educate the 

public, appropriate government organizations, and persons engaged in excavation 

activities. In addition, each operator must carry out a written program to prevent 

damage from excavation activities and adjacent construction disturbance. 

The code requires operators to develop a written integrity management program that 

addresses the risks affecting pipelines in high consequence areas. Such areas include 

navigable waterways, highly populated areas (as defined in the regulations), and 

areas that would be unusually sensitive to a liquid hydrocarbon release (e.g., wetlands 

and water supply sources). 

4.2.3 ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems 

ASME B31.8 covers the design, fabrication, installation, inspection, and testing of 

pipeline facilities for the transportation of natural gas. It also covers safety aspects of 

the operation and maintenance of gas pipeline facilities. It is referred to extensively 

in 49 CFR Part 192 and is one of the backbone standards that supports the federal 

code with respect to natural gas pipeline safety. The standard covers materials and 

equipment; welding, piping system components and fabrication details; design, 

installation, and testing; operating and maintenance procedures; corrosion control; 

offshore gas transmission; and sour gas (gas containing significant amounts of 

hydrogen sulfide) service. It applies predominantly to gas transmission and 

distribution systems, service lines, and some gathering lines. 

The maximum allowable operating design pressure equation is identical to that in 49 

CFR Part 192, which is derived from the ASME B31.8 code. In addition to design 

based on allowable hoop stress, ASME B31.8 also provides design procedures for 

fracture control as well as equations for longitudinal stress design. The standard also 

calls for protection of pipelines and mains from natural hazards, such as washouts, 

floods, unstable soil, landslides, earthquake-related effects, or other conditions that 

may cause serious movement of, or abnormal loads on, the pipeline. The standard 

identifies protective measures for natural hazards, such as increased wall thickness, 

construction of revetments, erosion control, and anchors. Little additional guidance is 

given for how to deal with natural hazard conditions. 

GCR 16-917-39 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-7 
 

4.2.4	 ASME B31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid 

Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids 

The ASME B31.4 standard (ASME, 2010) covers the design, materials, construction, 

assembly, inspection, and testing of pipelines transporting liquids between production 

facilities, tank farms, natural gas processing plants, refineries, pump stations, 

ammonia plants, terminals, and other delivery and receiving points. It is referred to 

extensively in 49 CFR Part 195 and is one of the backbone standards that supports 

the federal code with respect to liquid fuel pipeline safety. The standard covers 

design; materials; dimensional requirements; construction, welding, and assembly; 

inspection and testing; operation and maintenance procedures; corrosion control; and 

offshore liquid pipeline systems. 

ASME B31.4 classifies loads as sustained, occasional, construction-related, and 

transient. Sustained loads include internal pressure, external hydrostatic pressure, 

self-weight, residual loads, and those resulting from subsidence. Occasional loads 

include earthquake effects related to ground vibrations, soil liquefaction, landslides, 

and active faulting. 

The standard calls for consideration of slope failure at locations of potential 

mudslides, steep slopes, and areas of seismic slumping. Also, design for earthquakeinduced soil liquefaction is required for areas of known or expected occurrence. If it 

is not practical to design the pipeline system to survive slope failure, the pipeline 

shall be designed for controlled breakaway with provisions to minimize the loss of 

pipeline contents. In earthquake prone areas, including active fault crossings, 

consideration shall be given to flexibility by means of breakaway couplings, slack 

loops, flexible pipe sections, and other means. Little additional guidance is given for 

how to deal with natural hazard conditions. 

4.2.5	 API Recommended Practice 1162 Public Awareness Programs for 

Pipeline Operators 

API Recommended Practice 1162 provides guidance for pipeline operators to 

develop and manage public awareness programs to promote safety for communities 

near gas and liquid fuel pipelines. It is contained in 49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 by 

reference in Sections 192.616 and 195.440, respectively. The principal objectives of 

the standard are to provide a framework for pipeline operators to establish and 

manage a public awareness program, as well as a process for periodic program 

evaluation. 

API Recommended Practice 1162 is intended to help pipeline operators comply with 

49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 through public education, emergency responder liaison 

activities, and damage prevention. As described in the standard, a public awareness 

program consists of five activities: (1) define objectives; (2) obtain management 

4-8 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel	 GCR 16-917-39 
commitment; (3) establish program administration; (4) identify pipeline assets; and 

(5) identify stakeholder audiences. The standard addresses the frequency and 

methods of message delivery. Delivery methods include operator web sites, media 

news coverage, community and neighborhood newsletters, drills and exercises, open 

houses, community events, operator employee participation, and pipeline markers. 

The standard covers program implementation, which involves the actions of a 

pipeline operator to plan, conduct, review, evaluate, document, and improve public 

awareness programs. Program evaluation includes pre-test effectiveness of public 

awareness materials, including focus groups with in-house and external participants. 

Program evaluation includes formal annual assessment of the program, using internal 

self-assessment, third-party assessment, or regulatory inspection. It also includes 

measures of program effectiveness, such as surveys that are operator-designed and 

conducted, surveys pre-designed by a third party or industrial association, and trade 

association conducted surveys. The standard contains example forms for annual, selfassessment and additional information on conducting surveys. 

4.2.6	 Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas 

and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas and Liquid 

Hydrocarbon Pipelines (PRCI, 2004) provide recommended procedures and methods 

for the assessment of new and existing natural gas and liquid hydrocarbon pipelines 

subject to seismic-related loading conditions. They provide guidance for determining 

pipeline response to specific seismic hazards. They are intended to be an update of 

the Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems (ASCE, 1984; 

see Section 4.2.7) to account for improvements in knowledge and more recent 

research findings. 

The guidelines address general provisions, quantification of seismic hazards, pipeline 

performance criteria, pipeline analysis procedures, and mitigation options. Seismic 

hazards include surface faulting, liquefaction, landslides, seismic wave propagation, 

and transient ground movements related to narrow valleys with weak soils and sites 

experiencing liquefaction in soil confined by non-liquefiable material. 

4.2.7	 Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline 

Systems 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems were issued as a 

collaborative effort among pipeline system operators, consultants, and academic 

researchers, and were accepted as an informal standard for seismic design within the 

gas and oil industry for over 20 years. The guidelines address seismic hazards; 

quantification of seismic hazards; design criteria for pipeline systems; differential 

ground movement effects on buried pipelines; wave propagation effects on buried 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-9 
 

pipelines; seismic response and design of liquid fuel tanks; seismic response analysis 

of structures, equipment, and aboveground pipelines; and operations and 

maintenance. Although they are a valuable supplement to the Guidelines for the 

Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines, 

access to these guidelines is limited since they no longer are available in published 

form through ASCE. 

4.2.8 Performance Requirements and Restoration Timeframes 

Public safety and environmental protection are de facto performance requirements for 

gas and liquid fuel lifelines established by federal code under 49 CFR Part 192 and 

49 CFR Part 195. Gas and liquid fuel code requirements and standards involve core 

practices for public safety that can be adapted more broadly for resilience programs 

addressing multi-hazard conditions. As required by federal code, the identification of 

high consequence areas, pipeline integrity management programs, emergency 

response plans, and public awareness programs (with reference to API 

Recommended Practice 1162) provide a framework and necessary starting point for 

addressing public safety in community resilience. 

The restoration time frame for gas and liquid fuel transmission facilities is driven by 

economics and management commitment to public safety, environmental protection, 

and business continuity. For example, loss of service of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 

System after the 2002 Denali Fault earthquake resulted in an estimated loss of $1 

million per hour in accordance with crude oil prices at the time (Honegger et al., 

2004). Thus, there is ample economic incentive to recover operations quickly. The 

restoration-of-service goal is to return to functionality as rapidly as possible after 

confirming pipeline system integrity and safety. 

The restoration of gas and liquid fuel service in urban areas involves complex 

interactions with other lifeline systems, which in turn require integrated 

understanding and planning for interdependencies. Such interdependencies involve 

risks resulting from physical proximity and inter-operational relationships among the 

different lifelines, as discussed in Section 4.4 with respect to the restoration of 

electric power after the 1995 Kobe and 1989 Loma Prieta earthquakes. 

4.3 Societal Considerations 

Gas and liquid fuel systems are critical for modern industrial societies as a primary 

source of energy. They are fundamentally important for commercial enterprise and 

economic well-being. They support local, national, and international competiveness. 

They are potentially hazardous due to the combustible and/or polluting nature of the 

fuels, and require high standards of design, maintenance, and operation to ensure 

public safety, health, and environmental protection. 

4-10 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
The main purpose for establishing and maintaining a fuel supply is to provide 

geographically distributed energy for widespread public and private uses that is safe 

and can accommodate environmental concerns. Gas and liquid fuel systems generally 

serve the following functions: 

1.	 Providing distributed energy for all modes of transportation, heating and cooling, 

electric power, manufacturing, commerce, and public and private services. 

2.	 Providing a safe and protected fuel supply throughout land, coastal, and oceanbased environments, as well as the rural and urban communities that require gas 

and liquid fuel resources. 

Gas and liquid fuel systems are critical for all three phases of disaster recovery 

(NIST, 2105). In short term recovery (lasting days), fuel is required for emergency 

response. In intermediate term recovery (lasting weeks to months), gas and liquid 

fuel are needed to address basic transportation requirements as well as provide 

heating to support life safety in winter. In long term recovery (lasting months to 

years), the restoration of fuel delivery is essential for commercial and economic 

recovery, and electric power generation. 

Societal considerations pertaining to gas and liquid fuel lifelines are strongly 

influenced by concerns about public safety and environmental protection. Such 

concerns are reinforced by accidents, especially those that receive significant media 

coverage and merit investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board 

(NTSB). In exceptional circumstances, such as those related to the San Bruno 

pipeline rupture and fire (described in Section 4.5), public reaction can be severe. 

Uninterrupted access to gasoline and diesel fuel is expected for emergency 

responders, and reliable fuel supply is expected for heating in the winter. The 

availability of gasoline at local service stations is anticipated as soon as there is 

sufficient restoration of roads, bridges and tunnels for safe travel. Hazard-specific 

needs for fuel include ice storms, when fuel is required for heating, and earthquakes, 

when leaking gas pipelines represent a source of ignition for fire following 

earthquakes. 

A comprehensive study of pipeline safety and land use practices was conducted by 

the Transportation Research Board (2004) with recommendations for PHMSA. To 

address those recommendations PHMSA supported the establishment of the Pipelines 

and Informed Planning Alliance (PIPA), which is a broad stakeholder initiative to 

improve safety through risk-informed land use and development near gas and liquid 

fuel transmission pipelines (PIPA, 2010). The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) points out 

that PHMSA (2013) has identified five areas for local governments to improve 

protection of pipelines and increase the resiliency of the gas and liquid fuel 

transmission system: (1) pipeline awareness (education and outreach); (2) pipeline 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-11 
 

mapping; (3) excavation damage prevention; (4) land use and development planning 

near transmission pipelines; and (5) emergency response to pipeline accidents. 

Recommended practices are presented by PIPA (2010) for risk-informed land use 

planning in relation to two scenarios: (1) baseline recommended practices 

implemented by stakeholders in preparation for future land use and development; and 

(2) new development recommended practices implemented by stakeholders when 

specific new land use and development projects are proposed. Each recommended 

practice includes a practice title, brief statement about the practice, stakeholder 

audience to implement the practice, practice details, and references if applicable. 

State Energy Assurance Guidelines are available through the National Association of 

State Energy Officials (NASEO, 2009) to assist states in the design, development, 

and writing of state energy assurance plans. This document provides state energy and 

emergency officials with a standard set of guidelines for understanding and 

evaluating how their jurisdictions respond to energy outages and to promote the 

protection of critical energy infrastructure associated with electric power and gas and 

liquid fuel systems. Specific measures that can be taken during gas and liquid fuel 

outages are presented. Guidance on preparing energy assurance plans are also 

provided by the Public Technology Institute (PTI, 2011). 

4.4 Interdependencies 

Key upstream dependencies for gas and liquid fuel systems include electric power for 

pumping and compressor stations and diesel fuel for emergency generators and 

pumps. Key downstream dependencies involve the need for fuel in all modes of 

transportation. Especially important is fuel for vehicles operated by emergency 

responders. Gas and liquid fuels are also used for the generation of electricity at 

power plants. Couplings and pairings between different systems involve the 

interaction between leaking gas and electric power as a source of ignition after a 

disaster and the availability of water supply for fire protection, given the risk of 

ignition from leaking gas and fuel. 

As previously indicated, the safe operation of gas and liquid fuel pipeline facilities is 

a major interdependency factor in the post-disaster performance of lifelines, 

including plans and schedules for restoration. The restoration of electric service, for 

example, needs to be carefully coordinated with the restoration of gas and liquid fuel 

pipelines. This need was illustrated by O’Rourke (1996) with respect to the 

restoration of electric power after both the 1995 Kobe and 1989 Loma Prieta 

earthquakes. Disruption in the recovery of electric power after the 1995 Kobe 

earthquake was caused by post-earthquake fires that burned overhead electric power 

lines and buildings that collapsed on exposed distribution cables. The rapid 

4-12 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
restoration of electric power, which is an ignition source, contributed to postearthquake fires in areas of leaking gas. 

In Kobe, electric power and natural gas facilities are operated by two independent 

companies, Kansai Electric Power and Osaka Gas, both of which compete in the 

same energy market. Community resilience must therefore consider the 

organizational constraints among separate commercial entities in developing an 

integrated plan. In contrast, electric power and natural gas facilities in San Francisco 

are operated by the same company. Full restoration of electric power in San 

Francisco after the Loma Prieta earthquake took approximately two days while gas 

leak surveys were conducted by company personnel (O’Rourke, 1996). 

The close interdependency in restoration between electric power and gas distribution 

systems is important for hazards that cause damage to gas distribution pipelines. As 

illustrated by past earthquakes affecting Kobe and San Francisco, permanent and 

transient ground deformation will damage gas distributions systems with vulnerable 

lines. Field surveys and inspections for leaking gas may take days, thus delaying 

electric power restoration. In such cases, the restoration of power will be linked with 

that of the gas system. Coordinated planning at the local level is required between 

electric power and gas providers to ensure safe and time-effective restoration of 

service. 

Damage to underground pipelines will generally be less severe after wind storms and 

flooding, except where erosion-related undermining occurs. The upstream 

dependencies are most important in these cases, where loss of electricity can lead to 

loss of functionality at pump and compressor stations. To offset electric power losses, 

it is possible in principle to provide combustion engines for pumping with sufficient 

fuel storage to maintain operation even under prolonged power outages. In practice, 

however, stations generally have diesel generators to power critical electronics, 

control systems, etc., but not to drive mainline pumps and compressors. Flooding can 

lead to prolonged loss of transportation routes and fuel shortages, which must be 

considered with respect to sustained pumping capacity. 

A study on the 1989 train derailment near Cajon Pass, just north of metropolitan Los 

Angeles, California illustrated the importance of colocation (NIST, 2014). The 

derailment was followed by a catastrophic fire when a damaged gasoline 

transmission pipeline near the railroad tracks exploded, destroying a number of 

homes and causing several deaths (FEMA, 1991). In response to the tragedy, 

Congress authorized FEMA to investigate lifeline interdependencies in the Cajon 

Pass, where a large number of critical lifelines are co-located, and to consider the 

broader vulnerability issues of colocation for lifeline systems elsewhere in the United 

States (FEMA, 1991, 1992a, 1992b). 

GCR 16-917-39 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-13 
The proximity and potential effects of hazards on gas and liquid fuel pipeline 

facilities are core issues with respect to colocation. These issues are addressed in 

federal code requirements and ASME standards regarding high consequence areas 

and pipeline integrity management programs to enhance public safety related to 

corrosion and third-party damage. Because high consequence areas and pipeline 

integrity management programs include the identification of important colocation 

areas, they provide a baseline from which community resilience plans can be 

expanded to consider multi-hazard effects. 

There is currently a gap between the need to identify the locations of gas, liquid fuel, 

and other critical infrastructure and the actual access to information about these 

facilities from lifeline system operators. The absence of readily accessible 

information also includes electric power and telecommunication systems. As 

discussed later in this chapter, PHMSA has developed a Pipeline Information 

Management Mapping Application that has the potential for identifying areas of high 

consequence where hazardous pipelines are located in proximity to other 

underground facilities, including electric power and telecommunication cables. 

4.5 Disaster Lessons 

Community resilience involves a complex interaction between the people affected by 

critical infrastructure and the physical characteristics, operation, and management of 

those systems that supply needed resources and services. It is important, therefore, to 

examine how gas and liquid fuel lifelines have performed in terms of previous 

accidents and response to natural hazards. Four key events, in particular, are 

reviewed: Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, San Bruno pipeline rupture and fire, 

and the Denali Fault earthquake effects on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. 

4.5.1 2005 Hurricane Katrina 

After Hurricane Katrina, the supply of crude oil and refined petroleum products was 

interrupted because of a loss of electric power at the pump stations for three major 

transmission pipelines: the Colonial, Plantation, and Capline Pipelines (O’Rourke, 

2010). As a result of Katrina, major lines of crude oil and refined products were not 

available for delivery to southern and eastern states, and gasoline and diesel 

production in the Midwest was seriously affected by lack of supply. 

The interruption of crude oil and refined petroleum product pipelines after Hurricane 

Katrina points out the vulnerability of critical liquid fuel supplies for the Midwest 

and Northeast United States. Some of the same lines are also vulnerable to 

earthquakes in the New Madrid Seismic Zone. The seismic vulnerability of crude oil 

pipelines to soil liquefaction and landslides near or adjacent to the Mississippi River 

has been identified in several studies (e.g., Beavers et al., 1986; Ariman et al., 1990). 

The multi-hazard exposure of critical liquid fuel transmission lines in the Mississippi 

4-14 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
Valley and adjacent riverine areas is a major source of vulnerability for U.S. regional 

fuel supplies. 

4.5.2 2012 Hurricane Sandy 

Hurricane Sandy demonstrates the impact of widespread flooding and storm damage 

on regional fuel supplies. After Sandy, disruptions occurred at nearly every level of 

the fuel supply chain, reducing all fuel flow into and within the New York City 

metropolitan area. Disruption in the fuel supply is described in detail in A Stronger, 

More Resilient New York (City of New York, 2013). Storm surge damage to 

electrical equipment at two of six refineries reduced regional refining capacity by 

26%. Electric power outages in New Jersey caused the Colonial and Buckeye 

transmission pipelines to shut down for four days, reducing total supply of fuel in the 

region by another 35% to 40%. Eight to ten days after the hurricane, 21% of the New 

York metropolitan fuel terminals were shut down, with dramatic effects on supply to 

gas stations. Within one week of Sandy’s landfall less than 20% of vehicle service 

stations were able to sell fuel at any given time. The loss of fuel not only affected the 

general population, but created severe refueling difficulties for entire fleets of 

supporting personnel critical for storm response. 

4.5.3 2010 San Bruno, California, Pipeline Rupture and Fire 

On September 9, 2010, a 30-in.-diameter segment of an intrastate natural gas 

transmission pipeline, operated by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) 

ruptured in a residential area of San Bruno, California (NTSB, 2011). The ensuing 

fire destroyed 38 homes and damaged 70. Eight people were killed and many others 

were injured. Fire-fighting operations continued for two days. 

The NTSB found that rupture was caused by a fracture in a partially welded 

longitudinal seam in pipe that did not meet generally accepted quality control and 

welding standards when constructed. The NTSB found that the pipeline integrity 

management and public awareness programs were deficient. It was also determined 

that the CPUC failed to detect inadequacies in the operator’s integrity management 

program. Of particular significance, the NTSB found that the San Bruno pipeline 

rupture and fire was an organizational accident in that it arose from a multitude of 

inadequate operational procedures and management controls that persisted over time 

until the pipeline rupture occurred. 

Graphic news coverage had a large impact on public perceptions and opinion. Media 

exposure was further amplified by subsequent actions in which the Lieutenant 

Governor made a state of emergency declaration. Litigation was initiated by multiple 

plaintiffs. The PG&E Chief Executive Officer and CPUC Chair resigned their 

positions, and a federal grand jury in the U.S. District Court, San Francisco, indicted 

the operator for multiple violations of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968. 

GCR 16-917-39 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-15 
 

The CPUC fined PG&E $1.6 billion, a record amount. The accident also led to 

PHMSA requiring and enforcing stricter and more comprehensive pipeline integrity 

management programs, including improved public awareness. 

4.5.4 2002 Denali Fault Earthquake 

The effects of the 2002 Denali Fault earthquake on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System 

have been described by Hall et al. (2003) and Honegger et al. (2004), and only the 

salient aspects of those reports are presented here. The Denali Fault earthquake 

effects on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System are unique in that fault rupture and 

seismic wave interaction with the pipeline system were sustained at levels consistent 

with the maximum conditions envisioned in design. The earthquake represents a fullscale test of the design process and operating procedures adopted for seismic 

resilience of the system. 

The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System is operated by the Alyeska Pipeline Service 

Company. Over its 800-mi.-long route, the 48-in.-diameter pipeline is exposed to 

numerous seismic hazards. Major seismic design requirements were adopted that 

stipulate that the entire pipeline system should be capable of withstanding all 

reasonably anticipated effects of earthquakes without impairing the structural 

integrity of the oil pipeline or associated pressure containing system components 

(Nyman et al., 2014). 

Hall et al. (2003) reports that ground motions approached the seismic design criteria 

for the section of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System in the vicinity of the Denali fault. 

The fault rupture passed beneath the pipeline producing approximately 18 feet of 

right lateral offset and 2 feet of vertical displacement. There was no damage to the 

pipeline or release of oil. Limited displacements of underground portions of the 

pipeline occurred in liquefaction areas, but no damage was observed in the pipeline 

as verified by excavation at a remote gate valve where surface liquefaction effects 

were noted and subsequently by in-line inspection. Incidental damage to the aboveground support system was observed proximate to the fault rupture. 

Emergency response and post-earthquake inspections were administered in 

accordance with an Earthquake Preparedness Program developed by Alyeska. 

Emergency response was governed by an oil spill contingency plan in combination 

with the Incident Command System that addresses command, plans, operations, 

logistics, and finance. An emergency monitoring system (EMS) was developed for 

guiding field reconnaissance and facility recovery after an earthquake, and was used 

in the post-earthquake response (Nyman et al., 2003). Using the EMS data in 

conjunction with detailed checklists, damage assessment teams, consisting of 

engineers paired with local maintenance personnel, were dispatched to the field. The 

use of the EMS-supported field inspection, which was guided by real-time 

4-16 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
measurements of ground motion, contributed to oil flow restoration after only 66 

hours of shutdown. 

4.6 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

To bridge the gap between societal needs and safety performance, standards and 

community planning programs have been promoted for gas and liquid fuel systems. 

Standards, such as API Recommended Practice 1162 and PHMSA-supported 

stakeholder groups, such as PIPA, are examples with respect to gas and liquid fuel 

lifelines that involve community engagement in risk reduction planning and 

practices. They provide a framework that can support community resilience. 

The heavy reliance on gasoline and mobility drives societal expectations for reliable 

local and regional vehicular fuel supplies. There are corresponding expectations for 

cooling and air conditioning in summer, and the outright dependence on heating for 

health and safety in the winter. As Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy and risks in the 

New Madrid Seismic Zone demonstrate, there is a serious gap between expectations 

for the availability of fuel and the threat to fuel supplies from hurricanes, floods, and 

earthquakes in individual cities and regions of the country. 

There are gaps between codes and standards and the design and operation of gas and 

liquid fuel systems for natural hazards. Although ASME B31.8 and ASME B31.4 

identify natural hazards, such as washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, and 

earthquake-related effects, there is little explicit guidance for how to design, 

maintain, and operate gas and liquid fuel systems for these conditions. Although 

guidelines are available for evaluating pipeline response to seismic hazards, similar 

guidance is not available for floods, coastal storms, and tsunami-related inundation. 

The gaps between codes and standards and societal expectations can be closed by 

appropriate emergency planning and project design. After its World Trade Center 

(WTC) disaster experience in 2001, Verizon had trucks available to deliver diesel 

fuel to its facilities with emergency generators. After the Verizon Building at the 

WTC site was flooded by Hurricane Sandy, an emergency fuel truck replaced fuel 

tanks that were damaged and disconnected in the flooded basement. The emergency 

fuel fed a generator on the 10th floor of the building that supplied power to this 

critical central office (personal communication from Verizon management to T. 

O’Rourke during reconnaissance after Hurricane Sandy, 2012), thereby providing the 

data services needed to reactivate the New York Stock Exchange. 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-17 
 

4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 

4.7.1 Review of Key Points 

The performance of Trans-Alaska Pipeline System after the 2002 Denali fault 

earthquake shows the effectiveness of modern, high-quality design and seismic 

hazard assessment coupled with an earthquake preparedness plan, remote monitoring 

and well-communicated and rehearsed emergency response procedures. Moreover, 

the adoption of an oil spill contingency plan in combination with the Incident 

Command System demonstrates that the operator was well prepared for emergency 

conditions arising from a variety of causes. As previously indicated, 49 CFR Part 195 

requires operators to have a written integrity management program that addresses the 

risks affecting pipelines in high consequence areas, including drinking water and 

ecological resource areas. Potential synergies therefore exist between code 

requirements and hazard preparation that may be utilized in the development of 

community resilience programs. 

Identifying pipeline locations and entering the information into the National Pipeline 

Mapping System (NPMS) is an important step in community resilience planning 

(NIST, 2015). PHMSA has developed the Pipeline Information Management 

Mapping Application for use by pipeline operators and federal, state, and local 

government officials (PHMSA, 2013). The application contains sensitive pipeline 

and critical infrastructure information. Recognizing the public needs to know the 

location of transmission pipelines, the NPMS Public Viewer allows users to access 

pipeline maps without disclosing sensitive pipeline information. This application 

deserves further study to assess how it is working at the community level and to 

determine if it provides a framework for other lifeline systems, including combined 

systems and collocated facilities. 

4.7.2 Lifelines Standards Development Needs 

Following are key recommendations to improve codes, standards, and guidelines 

pertaining to gas and liquid fuel systems: 

 Provide additional guidance for evaluating gas and liquid fuel pipeline and 

facility response to seismic hazards, floods, coastal storms, and tsunamirelated inundation. Such guidance would help fill existing gaps between codes 

and standards and the design and operation of gas and liquid fuel systems for 

natural hazards. 

 Develop consistent policy and standards on accessing information and 

databases about critical infrastructure systems. There is currently a gap 

between the need to identify locations and functions of critical infrastructure to 

support safety and resilience planning and the actual access to information about 

these factors from lifeline system operators. As discussed above, the Pipeline 

4-18 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
Information Management Mapping Application developed by PHMSA may 

provide a framework for sharing information about potentially sensitive 

hazardous pipelines and facilities, including information about combined systems 

and collocated facilities. 

4.7.3 Research and Modeling Needs 

Following are key recommendations pertaining to research and modeling needs: 

	 Study how the standards and community planning programs that have been 

developed for gas and liquid fuel systems compare to those for other 

lifelines, such as electric power systems as well as multiple, interdependent 

systems and collocated facilities. Standards, such as API Recommended 

Practice 1162 (API, 2010), and PHMSA-supported stakeholder groups, such as 

PIPA provide a model for developing community resilience programs as applied 

to other lifelines and their interdependent behavior. Research and development of 

best practices and advanced methods, based on gas and liquid fuel community 

engagement standards and stakeholder groups, could be advantageous for other 

lifeline systems. 

	 Improve knowledge, databases and modeling on the impacts of widespread 

flooding and storm damage on regional fuel supplies. Fuel supplies involve 

multi-modal transportation systems including pipelines, shipping, port facilities, 

and truck transport on the upstream side and gasoline stations, jet fuel delivery, 

airport operation, train service, and automobile usage on the downstream side. 

Research is needed to understand these complex transportation interactions and 

to account better for the restoration of crucial services that depend on fuel as well 

as on regional economic recovery. Analytical models that simulate these systems 

would provide the means for reliability-based analyses of the most effective 

protective measures and operational improvements. 

	 Improve knowledge, databases, and modeling of refineries and their impact 

on regional recovery. As discussed in this chapter, refineries are an important 

part of the regional fuel supply chain and their disruption by flooding and their 

strong dependence on electric power have a major impact on the intermediate and 

long term phases of recovery (NIST, 2015). 

4.7.4 Lifeline System Operational Needs 

Following are key recommendations pertaining to system operational needs: 

	 Develop a process for major utilities to conduct self-assessments of their 

preparedness for various natural hazard events. Guidance should be provided 

with support for assessments to provide some consistency of approach among 

lifelines. Each utility should have reasonable knowledge of their customer base 

GCR 16-917-39	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel 4-19 
and relative importance and priority for continuity of service. The results of selfassessments could then be used to prioritize improvements to system robustness 

and post-event response. Improvements to community resilience can be best 

accomplished by taking immediate steps to get the utilities to develop an 

understanding of the problem, assess vulnerability of their systems, and 

undertake an action plan. 

	 Develop local plans for fuel delivery to emergency responders and critical 

infrastructure. As recent hurricanes demonstrate, there is a serious gap between 

expectations for the availability of fuel and the threat to fuel supplies from 

hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. Guidance for local planning to close these 

gaps is needed, with emphasis on securing fuel for emergency responders and 

critical infrastructure, such as telecommunication hubs, compressor stations, and 

pump stations for liquid fuel and water supplies. 

4-20	 4: Gas and Liquid Fuel GCR 16-917-39 
Chapter 5 

Telecommunications 

5.1 System Overview 

Communication infrastructure differs from other infrastructure in three crucial 

aspects: (1) it has multiple layers of functionality; (2) it has more dependencies than 

other infrastructure; and (3) infrastructure and services are often provided 

competitively, rather than by a public utility, and may not be regulated. All of these 

aspects impact available performance criteria and societal expectations. Just as 

transportation systems rely on a diverse set of modalities and technologies, 

communication systems encompass a large set of diverse modes of interaction and 

technologies, with these systems operating in many cases largely independently. 

However, previously distinct systems are now converging on using technologies 

based on Internet Protocols (IP). Thus, this chapter focuses on IP-based and cellular 

networks and, to a lesser extent, on legacy circuit-switched landline voice networks. 

It also refers to other types of communication infrastructure, such as broadcast and 

land mobile radio, where they differ significantly. 

5.1.1 Use of Communication Infrastructure after Hazard Events 

Communication networks affect other lifelines in profound ways. Figure 5-1 

illustrates some of the dependencies involved in maintaining or restoring 

communication capabilities after natural disasters. One can view communication 

after natural disasters as involving the public, civic authorities, dispatch (typically, 

but not necessarily, co-located with a public safety answering point) and first 

responders, as illustrated below. 

Figure 5-1 Key communication relationships after disasters.
	

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-1 
 

The public reaches first responders primarily using the 911 system, but may also 

obtain emergency-related information via 211 (social services) and 311 (general 

municipal services) that are implemented in some metropolitan areas. Traditionally, 

the 911 system only supports voice calls, but since about 2013, an increasing number 

of cell carriers and public safety answering points (PSAPs) can receive Short 

Message Service (SMS) text messages sent to 911 (“text-to-911”). Public safety 

authorities primarily use three means to alert residents: Wireless Emergency Alerts 

(WEA) to cell phones, the Emergency Alert System (EAS) via radio and television, 

and, in some locations, automated phone calls, emails and text messages via alerting 

systems11. After a disaster, maps (e.g., Google crisis maps), web sites and 

television/cable scrolls and announcements update the public about available 

resources such as shelters, and school and road closings. 

WEA “is a public safety system that allows customers who own certain wireless 

phone models and other enabled mobile devices to receive geographically-targeted, 

text-like messages alerting them of imminent threats to safety in their area” as 

defined by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) website. It can rapidly 

disseminate short text messages, via cell broadcast, to subscribers. It complements 

EAS, which distributes audio alerts using radio and TV, regardless of whether the TV 

signal reaches the home over the air, via CATV (cable) or direct broadcast satellite. 

EAS relies partially on distributing alerts via a chain of radio transmitters and thus 

can continue to function even after terrestrial communication links have been 

disrupted. 

As one example, after Hurricane Sandy, Internet services like town mailing lists and 

Twitter played major roles in disseminating information, not just from civic 

authorities or public safety to the public, but also between residents in the affected 

area. Residents shared information about grocery stores that were open, gas stations 

that had fuel or neighbors willing to share generators. Network tools, like those 

available from the Sahana Software Foundation, are used to maintain situational 

awareness for non-government organizations and public authorities. 

In addition, communication systems are increasingly needed to keep other crucial 

community services operational. For example, gas stations monitor the fuel level in 

their tanks remotely, and cannot safely pump gas if they cannot determine the fill 

level in their underground tanks. Automated teller machines (ATMs) and credit card 

machines require communication links to validate account credentials. 

Maintaining or quickly restoring communication services to homes and businesses 

can also avert or reduce secondary economic impacts from disasters as employees in 

many service-oriented occupations can continue to work from home or alternate 

11 A popular name for such systems is “reverse 911,” a trademark of Cassidian Communications. 

5-2 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

remote locations, either provided by emergency response providers, or through 

temporary locations. For example, libraries were used as impromptu remote 

“telework” sites after Hurricane Sandy. Employees of financial services companies in 

the New York City metro area doubled up in other offices after the September 11, 

2001 terrorist attacks. Telework can significantly reduce the pressure on both public 

transportation and road networks, and can allow families to deal better with 

disruptions that are common after disasters, such as school closings. 

Amateur and short-wave radio have limited commercial use, but can play a crucial 

role after disasters, particularly extreme ones that disrupt a substantial part of the 

infrastructure or affect a large area. According to Townsend and Moss (2005, p. 16): 

“Amateur high-frequency and short-wave radio are generally the first 

communications services to be restored, and the last to be destroyed, in any 

disaster scenario. Amateur radio is particularly important in isolated, underdeveloped disaster areas. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, a 

handful of ‘hams’ provided the only communications link between the 

Andaman and Nicobar islands in the Indian Ocean. However, hams play a 

vital role in developed nations as well. When hurricanes strike in the 

Caribbean and southeastern United States, hams routinely step in to provide 

lifeline communications.” 

Also, in the first days after the Northridge earthquake, the only link the Granada Hills 

Community Hospital had with the outside world and city government was through 

amateur radio maintained and operated by a group of volunteers, known as the Los 

Angeles County Disaster Communications Services whose equipment is co-located at 

sheriff’s offices throughout the county (Townsend and Moss, 2005). 

5.1.2 Multiple Systems, Layers, and Diversity 

Traditionally, communication infrastructure is largely thought of as copper wires 

providing plain old (voice and voice data) telephone service, including trunk lines 

connecting telephone switches. However, that model does not describe the 

complexity of modern communication systems, and has not been an appropriate 

model for at least two decades, even as that legacy infrastructure continues to exist 

and serve important societal functions. 

Unlike the electric grid or the natural gas grid, which delivers essentially the same 

service at different power/voltage or gas pressure levels to all end users, the U.S. 

communication public infrastructure consists of several intertwined infrastructures, 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-3 
 

 

each with their own history, regulatory environment, and impact on public safety. 

These include12: 

	 Broadband (high-speed) consumer Internet access, possibly with facilities-based 

voice services (VoIP) and entertainment video, using fiber, hybrid fiber-coax, 

copper (DSL), fixed wireless or satellite; 

	 Ethernet-based business data services, either for Internet access or 

interconnecting branch offices; 

	 Dark fiber13 connectivity for businesses; 

	 TDM14-based voice services, either single lines or trunks of 24 (T1) or 720 (T3) 

voice circuits, or data; 

	 Cellular networks delivering voice, text and data services; 

	 Consumer cable TV delivery using hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) plant; 

	 Trunked land mobile radio (LMR), primarily for public safety and dispatch; 

	 Specialized low-rate data networks for machine-to-machine (Internet of Things) 

communications; and 

	 AM, FM and TV broadcast networks.15 

Some of these networks share the same layer-0 and layer-1 infrastructure (see Table 

5-1). For example, both cable TV and consumer broadband may use the same hybrid 

fiber-coax infrastructure. Similarly, DSL, some Ethernet and TDM services may all 

rely on the same copper loops. All data networks that provided Internet connectivity 

share the same small set of nationwide backbone networks; these, in turn, may share 

the same conduit or run along the same right-of-ways such as along pipelines, 

highways or railway tracks (Durairajan et al., 2015). For example, collocation led to 

widespread outages after the 2001 Baltimore train tunnel fire (DOT, 2002) as well as 

multi-network disruptions in Los Angeles after fiber cables sharing the same manhole 

were cut (LA Times, 2015b). Increasingly, even “traditional” networks rely on IP 

connectivity. For example, many radio and TV stations now use data circuits to 

connect smaller studios in smaller broadcast markets to their production facilities or 

12 Only services that are available, for a fee or for free, to the public or local governments, rather 

than all the specialized closed networks that are operated for smaller closed user communities, 

such as military communications networks, are covered here. 13 Dark fiber refers to optical fiber where the opto-electronics is provided by the end user 

(customer), typically a large business, rather than the telecommunication provider. 14 TDM (time-division multiplexing) provides digital voice and data circuits over copper or fiber, 

dividing the overall channel capacity into time slots assigned to different calls or connections. 15 Approximately 10% of households use a TV antenna to receive local stations; about 46% cable 

TV service, 12% video services provided by the local telecommunications provider, 30% by
	

satellite, and 2% are broadband only (Nielsen, 2014b). 

5-4 5: Telecommunications	 GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

may use such circuits to connect their studios to their antenna plant. Thus, outages of 

IP connectivity may affect services that are not viewed as Internet-related. 

Communication infrastructure also combines both public and private networks, with 

various combinations of the two. For example, the U.S. military, some U.S. states 

and municipalities and large corporations may buy or lease “dark fibers” or may be 

assigned radio spectrum that they then use to build their own private, closed 

networks. Well-known examples include LMR for public safety and gas, water and 

electric utilities and private fiber networks for large Internet and industrial 

companies, or U.S. higher education (Internet2). Recently, the public safety 

community has been planning FirstNet, a cellular (LTE) network operating on its 

own set of radio frequencies. FirstNet, once completed, will serve as a data network 

for first responders, but may also lease excess capacity to commercial carriers or may 

be used by gas, water and electric utilities. This combination of private and public 

services does not seem to have an equivalent for other lifelines. 

Table 5-1 Layers in Telecommunication Systems 

Example Hardware and 

Layer Common Name Software Components Functionality (simplified) 

0 Infrastructure Poles, ducts and conduits, 

towers, fiber, radio spectrum, 

satellites, data centers; power 

(commercial and backup) 

Physical infrastructure for 

communication services (field and 

data centers) 

1 Physical layer (PHY) SONET, PON; optical crossconnects and splitters Turn physical quantities (photons, 

electrons) into information bits 

2 Link layer (MAC) Ethernet; switches Package bits into packets 

3 Network layer IPv4 and IPv6; routers Routes packets across networks 

4 Transport layer UDP and TCP16; firewalls, 

home gateways 

Address applications; provide 

end-to-end reliability 

“upper” Application layer HTTP, SMTP, SIP; cloud Supports applications such as 

(5-7) services; BGP; AAA VoIP, web and video; includes 

NG911 capabilities for public 

safety 

There are many ways to characterize the components of the overall communication 

infrastructure, depending on whether economic, regulatory or technical 

considerations drive the classification effort. Despite well-known limitations, a 

layered approach has been used in resiliency discussions, with different layering 

granularity (see Table 5-1). The layering approach separates different actors within 

the communication infrastructure, i.e., it defines “business interfaces,” which have 

16 UDP (User Datagram Protocol) and TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) are two common 

network protocols that offer different services to the upper layers. UDP delivers data segments 

without reliability and without adjusting its transmission rate, while TCP delivers a stream of byte 

reliably and adjusts its sending rate to take network congestion into account. 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-5 
 

been relatively stable over decades. Generally and traditionally, upper layers depend 

on lower layers; however, increasingly, network components are controlled by 

operations at the application layer. Thus the continued operation of a router, for 

example, may depend on the availability of an authentication, authorization and 

accounting (AAA) server located in a data center hundreds of miles away, and 

reached using all layers of the network stack. Recently, the communication industry 

has started to discuss software-defined networks (SDNs) and network function 

virtualization (NFV). The former, roughly speaking, separates the lower-layer 

transport functionality from the control functionality, allowing them to be 

geographically separated. NFV moves away from dedicated “boxes” that serve one 

purpose to a common cloud-based infrastructure that implements common network 

control functions in software. 

Communication infrastructure differs from other lifelines in another key aspect: 

many residential and commercial users have more choices. For any given address, 

there is likely only to be one wastewater option, one electric (distribution) option and 

one water option. However, depending on the location, households and, in particular, 

larger enterprises may have access to: 

	 between one (typically two) and four national cellular providers with 3G or 4G 

data service; 

	 between one and two (and rarely, three) consumer high-speed broadband 

offerings with more than 10 Mb/s bandwidth; 

	 a DSL low-bandwidth Internet access provider, typically below 5 Mb/s; and 

	 a broadband satellite provider. 

These options are not equivalent, as they may differ in available speeds, cost per 

month, data caps (i.e., how much data a subscriber may use), reliability, and latency. 

Except for fill-in, all new construction of fixed communication lines is likely to be 

fiber, either aerial or buried. Coaxial cable and copper are rarely used for new 

construction, even in residential areas. Despite higher initial construction costs, 

buried fiber is often chosen by service providers that are subject to service level 

agreements (see below) and thus suffer economically if outages occur; almost all 

middle-mile and long-haul fiber is buried, with possible exceptions for permafrost 

areas. Last-mile fiber tends to use the same installation method as electric utilities for 

that area. Buried fiber has a number of advantages, which should be weighed against 

the increased initial cost and possible trade-offs for specific hazards: 

	 Internet service providers may avoid paying pole attachment fees to electric 

utilities. 

5-6 5: Telecommunications	 GCR 16-917-39 
 

	 Buried fiber avoids failures due to flooding, wind loading and tree debris impact, 

and is sufficiently flexible to survive earthquakes. Buried fiber deployments may 

be substantially more reliable than aerial routes, especially where poor weather 

and the potential for wind or ice damage is common. However, repair may be 

more difficult, particularly with direct burial methods, rather than methods that 

place the fiber in ducts, so that in some cases, temporary aerial bypass routes may 

be built (NTT East, 2011). There does not appear to be any direct evidence, 

either way, whether buried fiber better survives earthquakes than aerial 

installations. 

	 Separating electric utilities and fiber communication cables simplifies the 

restoration process after disruptive events since work can more likely proceed in 

parallel. Often, with shared poles, the electric utility has to restore the poles and 

may destroy surviving communication cables in the process. 

	 Since it carries no current, it is largely impervious to water, even when ducts are 

flooded. 

	 It is better protected against copper thieves who mistake fiber communication 

cables, which are worthless as scrap, for copper lines. 

There appears to be limited data comparing the reliability and time-to-repair of 

buried and aerial fiber installations. Verbrugge et al. (2005) compared the mean time 

between failures for 1 kilometer (km) of fiber as 175,000 hours for aerial versus 2.63 

million hours for buried installations, without specifying the location of the 

installation and the nature of hazards encountered. Hart et al. (1991) analyzed a cable 

affected by the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and found that the armored cable 

survived a bridge collapse. Yamazaki et al. (2008) describe how to improve the 

resilience of underground fiber facilities and identify common failure modes. Sakaki 

et al. (2014) compared the damage rates of various types of conduit, finding that oldstandard conduit subjected to peak ground velocity (PGV) of 90 cm/s and above 

suffered failure rates of 3%, while conduit conforming to the newer standards 

suffered failures rates of 0.5%, despite higher peak ground acceleration. Conduit 

buried in reclaimed land, subject to liquefaction, was shown to be particularly 

vulnerable. In general, many aerial fiber routes use ducts to traverse bodies of water, 

complicating the overall design trade-off analysis. 

Corning, a major manufacturer of fiber optic cables, indicates that there is no 

“earthquake-proof” fiber, and recommends planning on “10% slack, concentrating on 

critical junctures, such as bridge and river crossings, aerial to underground 

transitions, and ends of long runs”, and including “fail-over” links (Hintz, 2011). 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-7 
 

 

 

The ITU-T, an international telecommunication standards body, describes hazards 

and their impact on fiber optic lines, identifying natural and man-made causes of 

failure for both aerial, buried and ducted fiber (ITU-T, 2009, p.28). 

NTT East used temporary aerial fiber after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake 

damaged, among other facilities, 90 trunk line routes, 2,700 km of aerial cables and 

28,000 telephone poles (NTT East, 2011). “The Sanriku Railway line took a trunk 

line with it when it was swept away by the tsunami. We erected 11 telephone poles 

alongside the railway and strung cables to restore the trunk line” (p. 23). “Kesen 

Bridge was swept away by the tsunami, taking a trunk line with it. We rerouted the 

line upstream to string a cable across the river where it was narrower” (p. 24). 

Large institutions may also be able to leverage point-to-point wireless and optical 

links to recover from local “last-mile” (access circuit) outages. For example, a public 

safety answering point (PSAP) might be able to maintain a point-to-point link to a 

nearby government or university building that can offer fallback Internet access. 

Optical links can typically traverse distances of about 750 meters to 6 km at singlelink speeds of 250 Megabytes/second (Mb/sec)17, while directional wireless 

transmission may cover distances of up to 100 km and speeds of 1.2 

Gigabytes/second (Gb/s) (5 Giga-hertz (GHz) unlicensed band). 

Note that the diversity of choices differs greatly between locations. For example, 

high-speed cable is available to approximately 93% of households (Rodriguez, 2010), 

but many small businesses in more rural areas still only have low-speed DSL or even 

satellite as an option. Also, these services are typically offered on a monthly 

subscription basis, so that maintaining a primary and backup Internet service provider 

incurs significant recurring costs. In many cases, tethering18 to a cellular device is 

likely the only economically-viable secondary Internet access option for private 

households and small businesses. Many carriers serve smaller population centers with 

only one fiber, so that a single middle-mile fiber cut may disconnect a whole town. 

Larger enterprises and office buildings with multiple tenants may have access to 

commercial fiber offerings by companies like Cogent, Level 3 or Zayo, or, 

increasingly, the business-oriented offerings of cable providers. They may also be 

able to bundle multiple copper loops to achieve total access speeds of up to 80 Mb/s. 

Thus, in some cases, enterprises and, to a lesser extent, residential users can create 

physically diverse access solutions, e.g., subscribe to a cable broadband provider for 

17 A tutorial on free-space optics (as of 2002) can be found at https://www.fcc.gov/events/tutorialfree-space-optical-communications. 18 Tethering for mobile devices makes cellular Internet connectivity available to nearby laptops or 

other smartphones, typically via USB, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Not all cellular devices support 

tethering and some cellular providers may charge extra for tethering. 

5-8 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

day-to-day needs and use 4G tethering as a backup to maintain the ability to accept 

credit cards. 

Public safety agencies relying on LMR for voice and low-speed data communications 

typically self-provision, i.e., they operate the infrastructure such as radio towers and 

transmitters, and thus have limited physical diversity since they cannot switch to 

alternate, equivalent networks. In the past few years, many public safety agencies 

seem to have started using commercial cellular service as a supplement or back-stop 

to LMR, in some cases using the wireless priority service (WPS) described in Section 

5.2.3 to ensure that calls are completed even when the commercial cellular network is 

congested. 

5.1.3 System Elements and Hazards 

Despite the differences between the communication infrastructures summarized 

above, key elements are common, whether physically shared or just similar in 

engineering and construction. 

	 Last mile (access). Last mile wired connections are primarily copper twisted 

pairs (for voice, DSL and legacy data services), coax (for cable TV) and fiber 

(for cable TV, business data services, cellular backhaul and Internet access). In 

addition to natural hazards, copper communication cables have been subject to 

theft, particularly since the risk of electrocution is much lower. Recently, 

however, even buried fiber optic cable has been subject to human-caused 

hazards, such as theft of cables (Greenberg, 2015). 

	 Middle mile. Middle mile is a term most often referring to the network 

connection between the last mile and the Internet. For instance, in a rural area, 

the middle mile would likely connect a town’s network to a larger metropolitan 

area where it then links in with major carriers. 

	 Core (backbone) network. Backbone networks connect major points-ofpresence, typical in larger cities, by long-distance fiber, often deployed along 

existing rights of way such as railroads, pipelines or major highways. 

	 Transoceanic fiber cables. All operational transoceanic links are fiber cables. 

Such fibers and their landing sites are subject to multiple risks: ship anchors, 

sharks, earthquakes, other near-shore use such as pipelines and oil and gas 

exploration (CSRIC, 2014a). 

	 Data centers and central offices (COs). In the telephone era, central offices 

were the end point for local copper loops and housed switching equipment as 

well as long-distance loops. More recently, data center-like buildings are used 

both for hosting telecommunication facilities such as optical switches and 

network routers, either of a single carrier or multiple carriers (“carrier hotel”), or 

servers used for IT operations, such as public and private cloud services. 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-9 
 

 

Regardless of their use, their physical structure and susceptibility to hazards is 

similar, although free-standing data centers located in more rural areas19 are 

likely to be subject to somewhat different risks than urban ones. 

	 Towers. Four tower types are in common use for communication services: 

monopoles of 100-200 feet for cellular services, lattice towers of 200 to 400 feet 

height for cellular services and LMR, guyed towers reaching between 200 and 

2,000 feet primarily for television and radio broadcasting and, less commonly, 

cellular services and, lastly, “stealth” towers integrated into church steeples, 

clock towers or other tall structures. A single tower is often shared between 

communication services, such as cellular, LMR and FM radio, while AM and TV 

towers tend to be single-purpose. Typical cell towers have heights of 50 to 200 

feet, while radio and TV powers can exceed 1,500 feet, such as the mast for the 

TV station with call sign KVLY (FCC, 2015a). Towers often house transmission, 

switching and power backup equipment at ground level and thus may be subject 

to inundation. The transmission equipment may require air conditioning. 

	 Rooftop antennas. In urban areas, television and radio stations often use a small 

number of tall buildings to host their transmission antennas. For example, most 

broadcasters in New York City now use the Empire State Building and may 

move back to One World Trade Center. Thus, the failure of a single building may 

disrupt over-the-air broadcast services for a metropolitan area, as happened after 

the September 11, 2001 attacks. According to Townsend and Moss (2005): 

“Following the collapse of the north tower of the World Trade Center, some 1500 

rooftop antennas were destroyed, many of which served the region’s television 

and radio broadcasters. The roof of the towers was an ideal broadcast platform, 

with clear line of sight 100 miles in every direction. Of the seven primary 

broadcast television networks serving the New York metropolitan area, only one 

network (WNYW-5) whose primary broadcast facility was on the Empire State 

Building, was unaffected.” 

	 Building cell sites. Increasingly, commercial buildings in urban and suburban 

areas host cellular antennas, typically near their roofline. For example, about 

60% of all cell base station antennas in Los Angeles are attached to buildings 

(LA Times, 2015a). Recently, concerns have been voiced that many cell sites are 

attached to aging structures that may not meet the seismic requirements of 

modern building codes. 

	 Satellite earth stations. Satellite earth stations send and receive data to satellites. 

	 Software. Communication systems rely on specialized software for routing, 

management, access control and many other functions, located either in routing 

19 For example, a large part of the Internet traffic of the eastern United States traverses a set of data 

center facilities operated by Equinix near Ashburn, Virginia. 

5-10	 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
or switching equipment or separate servers. Software functionality is distributed 

throughout the network, including customer premises equipment. Large-scale 

software failures (examples as of late 1998 are documented in Schneider et al., 

1998) or configuration errors (Hunter, 2008) are recurring events, with malicious 

(cybersecurity) attacks as a more recent concern, e.g., to redirect Internet traffic. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designates certain communication 

assets as part of critical infrastructure (DHS, 2010). In particular, it identifies “high 

capacity assets” such as “major switching centers, major underwater cable landings, 

telecommunication hotels that are deemed to provide critical mission support on a 

regional or national scale.” They are divided into Level 1 and Level 2 lists. 

All wired networks are subject to hazards that affect their hosting rights-of-ways. For 

example, the Baltimore Howard Street Tunnel Fire (July 18, 2001) affected fiber 

bundles strung along the tunnel walls. According to the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (2002): 

“The Howard Street Tunnel houses an Internet pipe serving seven of the 

biggest U.S. Internet Information Service Providers (ISPs), which were 

identified as those ISPs experiencing backbone slowdowns. The fire burned 

through the pipe and severed fiber optic cable used for voice and data 

transmission, causing backbone slowdowns for ISPs such as Metromedia 

Fiber Network, Inc.; WorldCom, Inc.; and PSINet, Inc. Reports were 

received from up and down the East Coast about service disruptions and 

delays (for example, the Hearst Corporation lost e-mail and its main links to 

its Web pages on the Internet), and even the U.S. embassy in Lusaka, 

Zambia, in Africa experienced problems with sending and receiving e-mail. 

In addition to the more severe Internet problems, the flood resulting from the 

water main break disrupted phone service to two downtown office towers in 

Baltimore City and caused other temporary communication problems within 

the City.” 

The hazard event levels of routine, design and extreme events defined by NIST 

(2015) are not commonly used in assessing the resiliency of communication systems. 

This may be due in part to the impact of different hazards on different parts of the 

communication infrastructure, as discussed below. Also, this classification does not 

readily account for the geographic impact of a particular hazard. As an example, a 

tornado may be ranked as “extreme” in its impact and probability of occurrence, but 

may have very limited impact on the overall communication infrastructure in a 

county or state. (Indeed, cellular infrastructure may not be affected at all or can be 

restored within hours with mobile cell towers, such as cells-on-wheels (COWs) as 

long as the number of cell sites affected remains small.) Thus, for 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-11 
 

telecommunications, the most challenging disaster events, with the longest recovery 

period, are likely ones that affect key shared infrastructure components such as 

carrier hotels, submarine cables or a large geographic area. 

Similarly, given the distributed and diverse nature of communication systems, 

dividing the recovery periods into short, intermediate and long term does not appear 

to figure prominently in the telecommunications resilience literature. As an 

approximation, carriers may informally divide recovery into restoring priority 

telecommunication services for first responders and other critical national 

security/emergency preparedness (NS/EP) infrastructure (“short term”)20, restoring 

operational capacity that may involve temporary solutions such as truck-based 

mobile switching centers (MSC), alternate broadcast antenna sites and backup data 

centers (“intermediate”), and longer-term restoration of sustainable and economically 

efficient system capacity. As noted in Section 5.3, Townsend and Moss (2005) 

distinguishes four key phases of post-event recovery: emergency response, 

restoration and repair, reconstruction, and redevelopment. 

Table 5-2 summarizes the impact of common hazards on key elements of 

communication networks. Impact levels are characterized as low (L) or high (H), 

where “low” indicates that most elements will continue to function after the hazard, 

while “high” impact hazards are likely to render a large fraction of the network 

Table 5-2 Major Telecommunication Infrastructure Components and Impact of Hazards 

Wind Earthquake Inundation Fire Snow/Rain Human-Caused 

Submarine 

fiber cables 

May affect 

landing sites 

H - - - Landing sites; ship 

anchors 

Last mile, H H L H H H (copper theft) 

copper aerial 

Last mile, L H H (shorting) L - L 

buried copper 

Backbone, L unknown L - - H (manholes) 

middle & last 

mile, buried 

fiber 

Data centers L P P P - P 

and COs 

Towers P P L L L P 

Software - - - - - Cyber risks 

Note: Impact levels are characterized as low (L) or high (H); P denotes “preventable” (i.e., no impact, when design 

follows appropriate code and standards). 

20 An example is the telecommunications service priority (TSP) program. 

5-12 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

element inoperative, even if the mechanical destruction of the element is locallycontained. For example, an earthquake is likely to cause only a few submarine fiber 

cable breaks along its whole length, but a single break is sufficient to take the whole 

cable out of service. The notation “P” denotes “preventable” when design follows 

appropriate code and standards (i.e., the elements are likely to remain unaffected by 

these hazards as long as the codes and standards reflect the actual severity of the 

potential hazard). The impact of earthquakes on buried fiber is unknown and may 

strongly depend on the ground displacement (e.g., whether a fiber crosses a fault line, 

or is in a liquefaction zone). 

The restoration of submarine fiber cables after a cut may take seven to ten days for 

each fault (LaPerrière, 2007). For example, it took ten days to restore service to the 

San Juan Islands, Washington (Washington UTC, 2014). 

5.2 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

5.2.1 Measuring Reliability and Performance 

Measuring reliability for communication services has traditionally relied on outage 

probabilities, expressed as uptime percentages or availability. As discussed later, the 

referenced time frame may or may not include hazard impacts, depending on how the 

metric is used, and the level of hazard included or excluded may differ. Thus, they 

may not directly measure resilience to hazards, but, given the infrequent occurrence, 

offer an indicator function. The developers of this report are not aware of any studies 

that establish a clear correlation between general uptime percentages, packet loss and 

other metrics discussed in this section on the one hand and hazard resilience on the 

other. However, the engineering measures used to ensure high uptime values, such as 

redundancy and fast recovery from faults, are also likely to be helpful during hazard 

events. Similarly, a network that suffers from high packet loss during normal loads is 

unlikely to perform well when parts of the infrastructure are destroyed. While rather 

imperfect, these indicators seem to be the only ones available at the moment, except 

retrospective analyses of specific hazard events, which may or may not have 

predictive power for future hazards that are likely to differ in cause, location and 

magnitude. Attempting to correlate pre-event uptime metrics with post-event 

performance appears to be a promising avenue for research. 

These percentages are used in two ways: as a measure of historical performance, and 

as a threshold that triggers contractual penalties for the provider (“service level 

agreement” or SLA). For example, many commercial ISPs offer an SLA availability 

of 100%, which simply implies that the provider owes a partial refund to the 

customer for any outages. SLAs are described in more detail in Section 5.2.2. 

Commonly used reliability grades are identified in Table 5-3. 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-13 
 

 

Table 5-3 Reliability and Unavailability Grades 

Unavailability 

Uptime % per Year Example 

99% 3.65 days Consumer-grade (implied) 

99.5% 1.82 days Web hosting 

99.9% 8.8 hours Azure web services, Google applications 

99.999% (“5 nines”) 5 minutes Classical telecommunications goal 

For packet networks, computing reliability is more complex since the network 

behavior cannot always be cleanly divided into “up” and “down” states, but the 

network may suffer from periods of degraded performance. This performance is 

commonly measured through packet loss and latency (delay), commonly averaged 

over a month. Typical SLAs for backbone networks are 0.1% packet loss and latency 

similar to speed-of-light propagation speed21. Some providers also specify an average 

and maximum jitter, i.e., packet delay variation. For some real-time applications, 

such monthly metrics may not predict the “quality of experience” (QoE) (i.e., the 

quality experienced by the human or service end user). For example, a delay spike of 

1,000 milliseconds (ms) over a 240-minute interval in a month, with the remainder of 

the month at a more typical 50 ms, only yields an average delay of 55.3 ms for the 

month, but drops the service usability to 0.994 for those applications (i.e., below the 

100% availability SLA advertised). While rare for core networks, such delay spikes 

can occur in access networks, partially due to large buffers in access routers. 

For traditional voice networks, service reliability is measured by call-oriented metrics 

such as answer seizure ratio, the fraction of answered calls compared to the total call 

volume. 

Typically, the service providers measure reliability for their own networks. However, 

increasingly, third parties can crowd-source network performance and outage data. 

For example, Heidemann et al. (2012) used network probe packets to track the impact 

of Hurricane Sandy, while Renesys (2012) used Internet routing table data. The FCC 

maintains a network of approximately 8,000 home routers as part of its Measuring 

Broadband America project and makes the measurement data publicly available. Its 

primary use is to measure residential Internet throughput and delay performance 

during normal conditions, but it can also provide reliability indicators. Bajpai and 

Schonwalder (2015) survey network measurement platforms. Efforts at 

crowdsourcing cellular performance are starting to emerge (e.g., CrisisSignal 

mentioned in the OpenSignal Blog on December 17, 2014). 

There does not appear to be architectural metrics that characterize the resilience of 

local networks, for example by enumerating single points of failure, such as a fiber 

21 In fiber, this is roughly 0.66 times the free-space speed of light of 300,000 km/s. 

5-14 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

access link to a community without a backup (KHON, 2015), or elements that are 

likely to suffer correlated failures. 

5.2.2 Service Level Agreements 

For services offered to commercial entities, carriers may offer SLAs that stipulate 

reliability targets. Most SLAs, however, are likely to exclude events due to force 

majeure. There is no uniform definition of force majeure, but elements of the 

principles and rules of international law22 are commonly used in contracts. A key 

concept is that “neither the impediment nor its consequences could have been 

avoided or overcome by the non-performing party.” Typical lists include “war, 

whether declared or not, civil war or any other armed conflict, military or nonmilitary interference by any third party state or states, acts of terrorism or serious 

threats of terrorist attacks, sabotage or piracy, strike or boycott, acts of governments 

or any other acts of authority whether lawful or unlawful, blockade, siege or 

sanctions, or accidents, fires, explosions, plagues, or natural disasters such as but not 

limited to storm, cyclone, hurricane, earthquake, landslide, flood, drought” 

(TransLex, 2016). In other words, almost all hazard events discussed here are likely 

to meet the force majeure definition. Thus, customers generally have no recourse, 

either monetary or contractual, to force restoration within a given time interval after 

such events. As noted earlier for uptime metrics, whether networks that offer any 

SLA at all, or more stringent SLAs, also do better after hazard events remains an 

open research question. Given that many of the engineering and operations 

approaches that improve everyday service levels are likely to also be helpful after 

hazards, such a correlation is plausible. 

With that limitation in mind, as an example, Palo Alto Networks (2015) defines the 

typical components of an SLA as: 

	 A description of the service being provided. This describes the maintenance of 

areas such as network connectivity, domain name servers, and dynamic host 

configuration protocol servers. 

	 Reliability. This indicates when the service is available (percentage uptime) and 

the limits outages can be expected to stay within. 

	 Responsiveness. This refers to the punctuality of services to be performed in 

response to requests and scheduled service dates. 

22 “TransLex-Principles are a systematic online-collection of principles and rules of transnational 

commercial law, the New Lex Mercatoria. They are being used by counsel and arbitrators in 

international arbitrations as well as contract drafters, academics and participants of moot court 

competitions in international arbitration across the globe.” (http://trans-lex.org/purpose-concept) 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-15 
 

 

	 Procedure for reporting problems. This includes who can be contacted, how 

problems will be reported, procedure for escalation, and what other steps are 

taken to resolve the problem efficiently. 

	 Monitoring and reporting service level. This includes who will monitor 

performance, what data will be collected and how often, as well as how much 

access the customer is given to performance statistics. 

	 Consequences for not meeting service obligations. This may include credit or 

reimbursement to customers, or enabling the customer to terminate the 

relationship. 

	 Escape clauses or constraints. These indicate circumstances under which the 

level of service promised does not apply. An example could be an exemption 

from meeting uptime requirements in circumstance that floods, fires, or other 

hazardous situations damage the ISP’s equipment. 

Missing the reliability targets may entitle the customer to a reduction in their 

payment. For example, the Cogent SLA (2013) for reliability reads: 

“If Customer experiences Network Unavailability for an On-Net Service for 

more than 15 consecutive minutes, Customer will receive, at Customer’s 

request, one (1) day Service Credit for each cumulative hour of Network 

Unavailability in any calendar month. Provided the COGENT Network 

experiences at least one (1) hour of Network Unavailability in any given 

calendar month, additional Network Unavailability of less than one (1) hour 

will result in a proportional Service Credit. (Example: 2 hours, 15 minutes of 

Network Unavailability will result in 2.25 days Service Credits.) Customer 

may obtain no more than one (1) month Service Credit for any given month.” 

5.2.3 Regulatory Environment 

For voice services, states have regulated telecommunication service quality for many 

years (Davis et al., 1996; Holloway, 2015), but with the transition to IP and local 

competition, many state legislatures have removed the power of their public utilities 

commission to regulate telecommunication services. Thus, broadly speaking, while 

there has been a long tradition of regulating price, service quality and entry/exit for 

voice telephony, the performance and reliability of IP-based communication services 

is not regulated at the federal, state or local level. In a small number of states, public 

utility commissions may continue to regulate repair times and other characteristics 

for classical voice services. 

Federal regulations for telecommunication services are based on Title II of the 

Telecommunications Act, last substantially modified in 1996 (Public Law 104-104). 

However, the Act does not specify any particular resilience or restoration obligations 

5-16	 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
of telecommunication carriers, except in the general context of “just and reasonable” 

practices called out in Section 201(b). The Act also generally sets out the purpose of 

the Act as “For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in 

communications by wire and radio so as to make available, ..., a rapid, efficient, 

Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate 

facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for the 

purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio 

communications, ..., there is hereby created a commission to be known as the 

“Federal Communications Commission,” which provides the FCC with authority 

related to emergency communications.” Recently, the 2015 Open Internet Order 

classifies so-called broadband Internet access services as telecommunication services 

under Title II of the Act, but the descriptions in 47 CFR 8, Protecting and Promoting 

the Open Internet (FCC, 2015c), do not address reliability, resilience or restoration. 

Franchise agreements may regulate certain aspects related to reliability, such as the 

right of customers to obtain a refund when cable TV service is disrupted. However, 

as far as the authors can tell, none of the local, state and federal regulations refer to 

any specific standards for quantitative performance, acceptable damage levels, and 

service restoration or recovery timeframes for general telecommunication services. 

For 911 services, the FCC has recently codified (see 47 CFR Part 12.4, Resiliency, 

Redundancy and Reliability of Communications Systems, Reliability of Covered 911 

Service Providers, Office of the Federal Register, 2015a) key recommendations with 

“respect to critical 911 circuit diversity, central office backup power, and diverse 

network monitoring” to improve the reliability of 911 systems (Office of the Federal 

Register, 2015a), requiring providers of 911 service to certify annually that they 

follow these best practices or have taken alternative measures (FCC, 2013c; FCC, 

2015b). 

Even in the absence of performance standards, telecommunication providers are 

obligated (see 47 CFR Part 4, Disruptions to Communications, Office of the Federal 

Register, 2015b) to report major outages to the FCC (Office of the Federal Register, 

2015b), where major outages are defined, for example, as 900,000 user minutes of 

telephony service, e.g., an outage of 30 minutes affecting 30,000 customers (see 47 

CFR Part 4.9, Disruptions to Communications, Outage Reporting Requirements— 

Threshold Criteria, Office of the Federal Register, 2015b). Currently, an initial 

outage report has to be filed within 120 minutes, with a final report explaining the 

cause of the outage within 30 days. All reports are confidential. During major 

outages, carriers can voluntarily report outages via the FCC Disaster Information 

Reporting System (DIRS) instead. DIRS information is disseminated to other Federal 

agencies that are authorized participants on the Emergency Support Function-2 team 

(FCC, 2007). 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-17 
The Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) program is meant to facilitate 

restoration of key communication lifelines. According to the Department of 

Homeland Security (2015): 

“Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP) is a program that authorizes 

national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) organizations to 

receive priority treatment for vital voice and data circuits or other 

telecommunications services. The TSP program provides service vendors a 

Federal Communications Commission mandate to prioritize requests by 

identifying those services critical to NS/EP. A TSP assignment ensures that it 

will receive priority attention by the service vendor before any non-TSP 

service. ... Eligible services must meet at least one of the following criteria: 

serves our national security leadership; supports the national security posture 

and U.S. population attack warning systems; supports public health, safety, 

and maintenance of law and order activities; maintains the public welfare and 

the national economic system; or is critical to the protection of life and 

property or to NS/EP activities during an emergency.” 

In addition, the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and 

Wireless Priority Service (WPS) provide priority access to landline and cellular 

communications services if these networks are congested after a disaster. As of 

October 21, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security website states, “WPS 

supports Federal, State, local, tribal and territorial governments; critical infrastructure 

sectors in industry; and non-governmental organizations in performing their national 

security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP) missions.” 

5.2.4 Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

Codes, standards, and guidelines cover a variety of telecommunication-related 

components, from central offices and data centers to switching equipment and cell 

towers. Design standards are not mandated by law, but may be incorporated by 

reference into building codes, siting permits for towers or commercial contracts. In 

some cases, financial auditing obligations may invoke technical standards, e.g., for 

data center reliability. There does not appear to be any data on whether resiliencyrelated standards and best practices are widely followed by the communication 

industry. In particular, it is unclear to what extent outside plant, including fiber 

communication facilities, and central offices follow resiliency-related standards. 

Many of these originated with the Bellcore (later Telcordia) recommendations for the 

Bell Operating Companies and which led to the Network Equipment Building System 

5-18 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

(NEBS) levels of performance23. These are sometimes supplemented by carrierspecific requirements. For example, GR-63 (Telcordia, 2012) and GR-1089 

(Telcordia, 2011) codify, inter alia, vibration resistance during earthquakes, fire 

resistance and thermal margin testing, while ATIS 0600329 (“Network Equipment – 

Earthquake Resistance”) (ATIS, 2014) describes test methods and performance 

requirements for earthquake resistance. These standards appear to be voluntary, with 

no code enforcement. 

TIA-222-G (TIA, 2012) contains cell tower design standards, including wind and ice 

loading, with many older towers built according to TIA-222-F (TIA, 1996; NIST, 

2015, Vol II). Recently, the City of Los Angeles recommends upgrading the 

requirements for new free-standing cell towers (City of Los Angeles, 2014). TIA222-G divides tower structures into three classes, depending on whether they may 

present a hazard to human life and whether the services provided are optional or 

essential. For example, a Class III tower is based on a 100-year return period of peak 

wind speeds. Cell siting commissions or local building codes may require following 

TIA-222-G. 

For fire alarms, NFPA 72 (NFPA, 2016) mandates in Section 10.6.7.2, that alarm 

systems, including communication components, can maintain operation on secondary 

power for 24 hours. NFPA fire codes are often included, by reference, in local 

building codes. 

As noted earlier, data centers now play a critical role in operating communication 

networks and services. The resilience of data center construction is divided into four 

tiers, and data centers typically advertise their tier level. For example, “Tier IV 

provides site infrastructure capacity and capability to permit any planned activity 

without disruption to the critical load. Fault-tolerant functionality also provides the 

ability of the site infrastructure to sustain at least one worst-case unplanned failure or 

event with no critical load impact” (TIA, 2014, Section G.2.9.1). Audit and 

contractual requirements, such as those in SSAE16 (AICPA, 2011) may require 

companies to contract with third parties, such as data centers, meeting resiliency 

criteria. 

In addition to these construction and equipment recommendations, the 

Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council (CSRIC) advises 

the FCC and provides general operational guidelines that affect reliability. CSRIC is 

re-chartered every two years; working groups write reports on specific topics and 

maintain a list of recommended best practices that are posted on the FCC website. As 

noted in CSRIC (2014b): “This report reinforces previous guidance that industry Best 

23 NEBS is the most common set of safety, spatial, and environmental design guidelines applied to 

telecommunications equipment in the United States. It is an industry requirement, but not a legal 

requirement. 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-19 
Practices are voluntary in nature and may not apply in every situation due to the need 

for flexibility, innovation, and control in the management of different carriers’ unique 

business models, cost, feasibility, resource limitations, or other factors.” 

To illustrate the style and nature of the recommendation, Best Practice 9-6-1006 

(CSRIC, 2014c) recommends: “Network Operators, Service Providers and 

Equipment Suppliers should consider establishing a designated Emergency 

Operations Center. This center should contain tools for coordination of service 

restoral including UPS, alternate means of communication, maps, and documented 

procedures to manage business interruptions and/or disasters.” 

In some cases, CSRIC recommendations have become the foundation for obligations 

codified in Federal regulations, e.g., if failure to follow the best practices causes 

high-impact outages of safety-critical systems. For example, CSRIC best practices 

related to 911 circuit diversity, backup power and network monitoring (FCC, 2013c) 

were codified into 47 CFR 12.4, requiring covered 911 service providers to certify 

compliance annually. 

Some state laws such as Act 12-148 (Connecticut, 2012) mandate closer cooperation 

between electric and telecommunication utilities. 

As noted in Section 5.3, backup power for residential and small business network 

equipment is crucial to maintain and restore communication capabilities at scale. 

Currently, the power consumption of such devices (e.g., 17 watts for a common 

optical network termination unit) makes battery backup logistically challenging and 

costly. The EnergyStar specification (EPA, 2014) provides power allowances for 

broadband modems (e.g., 5.7 watts for a cable modem) that allow powering such 

devices by rechargeable batteries that could be re-charged in public charging stations 

or vehicles. For example, a 20,000 milliampere hour (mAh) USB power bank could 

sustain such an EnergyStar-compliant modem for approximately 17 hours. However, 

EnergyStar is a voluntary program only. 

Recent work by Zorn and Shamseldin (2015) provides estimates of recovery times 

for various lifelines, including telecommunications, based on observations of 

disruptive hazard events that took place from 1978 to 2012. The paper shows that 

telecommunication infrastructure is typically restored first, with 90% functional 

restoration as the benchmark, followed by electricity and water, while gas takes 

significantly longer. For a hypothetical major earthquake in Wellington, New 

Zealand, that destroys 75% of the telecommunication capacity, the model predicts 

90% restoration for telecommunications within ten days, while restoring electricity 

would take 45 days. The paper does not, however, distinguish between different parts 

of the communication infrastructure, such as cellular and residential access, and does 

5-20 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

not consider the impact on broadcast and specialized communication systems such as 

land mobile radio. 

5.3 Societal Considerations 

The societal impact of full or partial loss of communication depends on the recovery 

phase, the severity of the disruption, the area affected and the availability of 

alternatives. Townsend and Moss (2005) summarize the impacts in four phases: 

emergency response, restoration and repair, reconstruction, and redevelopment24: 

“The emergency phase occurs when the integrity of communications is at the 

greatest risk. Physical damage is difficult to accurately assess and repair, 

electrical power is likely to be disrupted, and congestion overwhelms 

systems optimized for more predictable usage patterns. With lives at risk, it 

is also the phase where the consequences of failure are the greatest. We can 

identify three main consequences of telecommunications breakdowns in 

disaster: paralyzing official responses, challenging containment, and delaying 

mobilization of broader relief efforts.” 

As noted in NIST (2015) and depicted in Figure 5-1, telecommunication needs in the 

short term recovery phase (zero to three days) relate to communication to coordinate 

emergency response. For example, emergency management agencies at the local, 

state and federal level need to inform the public how to avoid imminent danger to life 

and property (alerting and warning) and to provide post-incident information about 

resources such as food, shelter and medical care as well as restrictions and advisories 

such as road closures, health alerts or boil-water advisories. These are traditionally 

provided by the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and Wireless Emergency Alerts 

(WEA), as well as broadcast stations. Increasingly, Internet-based mechanisms, 

described below, supplement these traditional mechanisms. 

First responders and emergency management agencies rely on communication 

systems to coordinate their response, typically via land mobile radio within the 

immediate affected area as well as Internet-based systems for intra- and inter-agency 

coordination beyond the immediate affected area. This includes all 15 emergency 

support functions enumerated by FEMA, spanning both the private and public sector, 

including transportation, public works and engineering, firefighting, emergency 

management, mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human services, 

logistics management and resource support, public health and medical services 

(including hospitals), search and rescue, oil and hazardous material response, 

agriculture and natural resources, energy, public safety and security, long-term 

community recovery, and external affairs (e.g., public information, media and 

24 As noted earlier, other authors combine the third and fourth phase to distinguish short, medium 

and long term. 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-21 
 

community relations, congressional and international affairs, tribal and insular 

affairs). Naturally, the importance of each of the emergency support functions 

changes, depending on the nature of the incident and the time after the incident. 

The public relies on communication systems to coordinate within families and other 

close-knit communities, as well as to check on the safety and whereabouts of 

immediate family, relatives, friends and work colleagues. The public also uses 

emergency calls (911) to request emergency assistance. 

Merchant et al. (2011) describe how social media have become part of the disaster 

response effort. After Hurricane Sandy, Burger et al. (2013) investigated information 

sources used by residents in New Jersey: 

“Both [Jersey Shore and Central New Jersey] groups obtained most of their 

information regarding safety from television, radio, friends and web/email. 

Information sources on health varied by location, with central Jersey 

respondents using mainly TV and the web, and Jersey shore respondents 

obtaining health information from the radio, and TV (before the storm). For 

information on evacuation routes, Jersey shore respondents obtained 

information from many sources, while central Jersey respondents obtained it 

from TV. Information on mold was largely obtained from friends and the 

web, since mold issues were dealt with several weeks after Sandy. The 

reliance on traditional sources of information (TV, radio, friends) found in 

this study suggests that the extreme power outages rendered web, cell 

phones, and social media on cell phones less usable, and suggests the need 

for an integrated communication strategy with redundancies that takes into 

account prolonged power outages over large geographical areas.” 

During power outages, TVs are largely useless, and, anecdotally, fewer people 

maintain battery powered transistor radios for emergencies as most home radios are 

now line-powered. However, in 2014, about 92% of U.S. residents 12 years and older 

still listened to radio at least once a week (Nielsen, 2014a). The number of 

households having a battery-powered radio is unknown. Some cell phones include 

FM radio capabilities. Also, many radio stations are now mostly airing syndicated 

national content, with no local reporting or announcer resources. Spence et al. (2011) 

found that “larger stations had more training and resources to cover a crisis event, but 

were less likely to have actually provided coverage once a crisis took place; these 

results are similar to the findings in the previous study. In the original study, results 

indicated that stations in larger markets were less likely to have a plan to respond to a 

localized crisis.” Solymossy (2013) describes the usage of “high-tech, low-tech, notech” solutions after major hazard events, including Twitter, AM and FM radio, 

amateur radio, and message runners. 

5-22 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
Communication outages may also directly cause loss of life or other health threats. 

Disruptions to 911 services may delay or prevent emergency response. Athey and 

Stern (2000) investigated the impact of 911 technology changes on survival rates for 

patients with cardiac diagnoses. O’Reilly et al. (2005) estimate the impact of 

sustained outages on health outcomes: “For a blackout lasting approximately 30 

hours, for metropolitan area of 5 million people, the incremental economic cost is 

estimated at $36M. Note that the comprehensive costs to society will be greater, 

probably by a factor of 3 ... The additional scenario with both blackout and telecom 

disruption to the whole network lasting from 8 am to 10 pm of day 1 of our two day 

period, knocking out 75% of the network capacity costs are increased to $63M over 

baseline, almost double that of the blackout only scenario.” 

As immediate health and safety concerns are addressed, in the intermediate time 

frame of one to twelve weeks, economic considerations and a restoral of normal 

everyday activities such as education and work assume greater importance. At least 

so far, communication outages have not extended beyond this time horizon, with the 

exception of islands, as for the case of Fire Island discussed in the context of 

Hurricane Sandy (see Section 5.5.5). 

There appear to be no systematic studies of the impact of sustained communication 

outages, beyond the after-event reports described in Section 5.5. Given the changes in 

technology and technology use, systematic studies may also have a limited useful 

life. For example, if somebody had performed such a study a decade ago, it would 

have likely focused on voice services and ignored emerging cellular data networks. 

As the Internet connects more of our infrastructure to networks, the impact of 

communication outages are likely to increase. Many critical services that may have 

been able to function effectively with only minimal communication now rely on 

external information resources. For example, medical facilities may store electronic 

medical records in cloud services off-site. Patients may rely on remote monitoring of 

chronic conditions. 

Any impact assessment would need to consider at least three facets: economic 

impacts on individuals and enterprises, impact on the restoration of other lifeline 

services, and health and safety concerns. Interdependencies with other lifelines are 

covered in detail in Section 5.4, while the other facets are covered in this section. 

Just as the increasing number of household devices and business operations that 

depend on electric power has likely decreased the tolerance for disruption of 

commercial power, it seems plausible that the reliance on cell phones and Internet 

services has made sustained communication outages less tolerable. For example, 

many IT services that used to run on computers located in a computer room in the 

same building, or on a desktop personal computer, now depend on cloud services. 

Thus, an office building is likely to be essentially useless until communication 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-23 
 

 

services have been restored. (On the positive side, the use of cloud services—located 

in geographically diverse and generally well-protected facilities—also enables 

companies to resume their operations by moving people to other facilities.) For 

example, after Hurricane Sandy “at JPMorgan Chase, about 25,000 employees 

worked remotely on Monday... On a typical day, about 2,000 to 3,000 employees 

work through the bank’s remote computer system” (Schwartz, 2012). Working from 

home may also reduce the pressure on disrupted local ground transportation systems. 

Approximately 44% of U.S. households now rely exclusively on wireless telephone 

service25 (Center for Disease Control, 2014). This likely has increased the 

expectation of reliable service under all circumstances particularly since alternatives 

such as home (wired) or payphone service are no longer available and since there is 

now the expectation of anytime, anywhere reachability. For example, Hoffner et al. 

(2015) surveyed young adults to determine their reaction to being involuntarily 

without their mobile phone. “Overall, more than two thirds of the sample (69.5%) 

reported experiencing negative emotional responses to the loss of their phone.” 

Sustained communication outages are likely to cause significant economic harm to 

individuals and enterprises. For example, freelancers may not be able to work at all 

and thus suffer a loss of income, while many businesses will have to either shut down 

(e.g., banks and other financial institutions) or reduce their services even if electric 

power is restored. For example, many merchants may have to operate on a cash-only 

basis since their credit card terminals rely on Internet or telephone service (Isaacson, 

2012; Daugherty, 2012). Indirectly, the ability of employees to work remotely relies 

on restoring home Internet service or at least high-quality mobile data services. A 

report by the Ponemon Institute (2013) estimates the cost of data center outages: “On 

average, the cost of an unplanned outage per minute is likely to exceed almost $8,000 

per incident.” 

With the transition to wireless and IP-based communication services, one of the longlasting societal expectations for communication services is being upended, namely 

that the telephone network provides essentially a second, special-purpose electric 

grid, operating at 48 volts (20 to 50 milliamp current) and backed up by lead-acid 

batteries and diesel generators in the phone company central office. Most providers 

of IP-based communication solutions offer their customers the option to purchase a 

battery for their cable or DSL modem or optical network termination (ONT) that can 

power telephone voice services, but not Internet access, for up to eight hours, 

typically using small lead-acid batteries. A recent FCC decision codified in 47 CFR 

Part 12.5 (Office of the Federal Register, 2015a) mandates that carriers make eight25 The U.S. Center for Disease Control releases semi-annual statistics on the use of wired and 

wireless telephony service; see http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/ 

wireless201506.pdf. 

5-24 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

hour backup power solutions available for all new installations, and provides a 24-

hour solution within three years. The mandate has a sunset date of ten years. It is 

hoped that the 24-hour solution allows backup power for residential landline voice 

that remains particularly important for areas with spotty cell phone coverage, for 

households without cell phones (approximately 8% (Center for Disease Control, 

2014)) or where the cell phone service itself is interrupted after a disaster. 

Communication service providers have limited economic incentives to improve 

resilience and post-disaster recovery. Due to interdependence with electric power, 

such efforts may in some cases appear to be wasted since their customers may not be 

able to use landline services until power has been restored. Similarly, since 

consumers have no good way of predicting which mobile operator infrastructure will 

best survive a hazard event like a hurricane, they cannot factor post-disaster 

performance into their purchase decision for mobile services. In addition, 

extrapolating results from Hartman et al. (1991) pertaining to residential electric 

service26, reliability might not be able to properly priced. Different carriers have 

different policies for supplying backup power to cell sites, for example, but it is 

likely impossible for consumers to know about the different network architecture 

decisions or to predict the impact during a storm. FCC Disaster Information 

Reporting System (DIRS) outage data provides an approximate measure of 

survivability and recovery across carriers, but the data are not available to the public. 

(Carriers report cell tower outages on a daily basis; due to overlapping coverage and 

coverage regions that differ in size, cell tower outages can only approximate the 

number of customers affected.) 

In addition, residential ISP and cable TV providers already suffer from weak 

consumer satisfaction, placing last among 43 industries. “Sixty-one percent of U.S. 

households have just one or no high-speed Internet provider servicing their region 

and the lack of customer choice contributes to weak customer satisfaction. Even as 

Internet usage grows, customer satisfaction with ISPs remains unchanged at an 

American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) score of 63 and tied with subscription 

TV for last place among 43 industries. Customers are frustrated with unreliable 

service, slow broadband Internet speeds and rising subscription prices – and they 

resent being locked into service contracts” (American Customer Satisfaction Index, 

2015). It is unclear whether this provides an incentive to rapidly recover from 

outages. 

Recent large-scale storms have yielded a significant number of articles that were 

critical of the service provider preparedness (as an example, see Smith, 2013), but 

26 Hartman et al (1991) noted “More importantly, customers do not seem to be willing to pay for 

marginal reliability increases; rather, they require compensation for reliability increases that 

involve movements from the status quo” when discussing residential electric service. 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-25 
 

 

 

even within the same service territory, experiences can vary significantly across 

providers and by geography. For example, if a local cell tower exhausts its backup 

fuel supply or did not have a backup generator, customers served by that tower may 

experience service disruptions while others a mile away may not. 

5.4 Interdependencies 

The overall communication infrastructure depends on commercial power, but also 

less directly on road transportation following a disruptive event.27 For example, 

during outages of commercial power, switching facilities, data centers, TV/radio 

transmitters and cell towers rely on the delivery of diesel fuel by truck to sustain 

backup generators. After Hurricane Sandy, Verizon used up to 1,500 generators, 

consuming 100,000 gallons of fuel each day (Cheng, 2012). Typical cell sites are 

equipped with a 20-60 kWatt generator (Balshe, 2011). Use of multiple fuel sources, 

such as solar, diesel, and natural gas fuel cells (Kuwata et al., 1996), may reduce the 

dependency on the transportation system or liquid fuel supplies. 

Figure 5-2 shows a simplified set of dependencies, distinguishing three key physical 

components of communication systems, namely, the outside plant such as fiber and 

copper loops, central offices and data centers and, finally, towers and antenna 

systems for cellular, broadcast, and land mobile radio applications. Transportation 

systems are necessary to supply fuel and spare parts to cell towers and radio and TV 

antennas. Pipelines may share rights-of-ways with outside plant, in particular fiber. 

Electric power is likely to share poles with the outside plant of telecommunication 

systems. 

Conversely, almost all other lifelines depend on communication services for control 

and monitoring. Electric generation and transmission facilities need to be monitored 

using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. Smart meters 

monitor residential and commercial electric energy consumption and initiate load 

control. Pipelines require remote operation of leak detectors and valves. Railroads, 

whether they carry passengers or freight, increasingly rely on automatic train control, 

operating over a fiber-connected wireless transmitter network, to ensure their safe 

operation. Commercial air transportation would not be possible without a nationwide 

voice and data network that connects air-to-ground radio transmitters, air traffic 

control facilities, and radar sites. 

27 Most terrestrial-wide area communication facilities are typically located near major 

transportation arteries, such as along railroad rights-of-ways, highways, and pipelines. Thus, 

disruptions of these lifelines may also physically affect the fiber buried next to the railroad tracks, 

highway, or pipeline. 

5-26 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

Figure 5-2 Simplified illustration of telecommunication interdependencies. CO 

denotes central offices, DC denotes data centers, RoW indicates 

Right of Way; orange decagon indicates telecom-related 

components; rounded rectangles refer to other critical infrastructures 

and how they can impact aspects of telecommunication systems (for 

example, water main breaks may flood central offices (CO) and data 

centers (DC). 

In the past, road transportation could function without an extensive communication 

infrastructure. As telematics and intelligent transportation systems rely on vehicle-toinfrastructure communication for everything from collecting road tolls to alerting 

vehicles to road hazards, even road transportation could be severely disrupted if 

communication services fail. 

Beyond the direct technical dependencies in managing and controlling the operation 

of lifelines, communication networks are also vital to coordinate the work of public 

safety and utility personnel. This is pointed out in a Long-Term Power Outage 

tabletop exercise report (Wisconsin Emergency Management, 2010): 

“Communication challenges were a key barrier identified during the TTXs 

[Long-Term Power Outage tabletop exercise reports]. The extent of the impacts 

on communication systems during a LTPO [Long-Term Power Outage] event 

was not fully known or explored in the limited time available. Additional 

communication planning and training for Public Information Officers is needed, 

including pre-established messages for use during such an event.” 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-27 
Since electric and communication utilities share the same poles and, to a lesser 

extent, duct space, restoration needs to be closely coordinated. 

While all lifeline infrastructures have geographic dependencies (i.e., disruptions in 

one location may affect users of that infrastructure far beyond the locus of the 

physical disruption itself), these dependencies are particularly pronounced for 

communication networks, and not always obvious and predictable. For example, the 

U.S. Internet is connected via transoceanic fiber links to other continents, and traffic 

from these other continents may pass through North American fiber links, e.g., from 

Europe to South America. Many higher-layer services are housed in a small number 

of data centers so that the temporary unavailability of a data center in Virginia may 

prevent users in California, Canada or the Czech Republic from sending email or 

conducting electronic commerce transactions. Communication services for traditional 

public safety functions such as 911 are being centralized in a small number of 

physical locations, so that a single outage can affect multiple states (Public Safety 

and Homeland Security Bureau, 2014). Often, telecommunication carriers and their 

customers may not be aware of the interdependencies within their own networks or 

other networks. For example, due to “circuit grooming,” carriers may inadvertently 

route circuits that were meant to be geographically diverse through the same physical 

cable or fiber. O’Rourke (2007) provides several additional examples of how other 

lifelines affect telecommunication services. 

5.5 Disaster Lessons 

Telecommunications impacts and lessons resulting from the following recent largescale disasters within the United States are briefly summarized: Hurricane Katrina in 

2005, Hurricane Irene in 2011, the June 2012 derecho, and Hurricane Sandy in 2012. 

Disasters that occurred earlier than about 2005 are likely to be less informative given 

the significant changes in technology, interdependencies, industry structure, and 

consumer behavior. The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (2014) report 

that covers the April 2014 multistate 911 telecommunication outage caused by a 

software failure may also be of interest, but outside the scope of this study. 

In general, there does not appear to have been any systematic follow-up whether and 

to what extent the recommendations of the reports cited below have been translated 

into practice. Where known, the current implementation status is described. For 

example, there do not appear to be regular government-industry exercises that focus 

on communication resilience and restoration. 

5.5.1 2005 Hurricane Katrina 

The Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 

Communication Networks (2006) noted a number of lifeline interdependencies for 

communication networks, in particular with electric power and transportation. It 

5-28 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

noted that generators for cellular base stations were designed to operate for 24 to 48 

hours, and portable first-responder radios and backup batteries for eight to ten hours. 

In some cases, the flooding impacted transportation options and prevented fuel 

transport and thus the refueling of generators. 

The Panel (2006) noted a bimodal distribution of service restoration: 

“Nevertheless, ten days after Katrina, nearly 90 percent of wireline 

customers in the Gulf region who had lost service had their service restored. 

However, the vast majority of these customers were in the less impacted 

regions of the Gulf; regions that were harder hit sustained more infrastructure 

damage and continued to have difficulty in restoring service. ... However, 

within one week after Katrina, approximately 80% of wireless cell sites were 

up and running. Consistent with other systems, the 20 percent of base 

stations still affected were in the areas most impacted by Katrina. ... 

Approximately 28 percent of television stations experienced downtime in the 

storm zone; approximately 35 percent of radio stations failed in one fashion 

or other. In addition, in New Orleans and the surrounding area, only 4 of the 

41 broadcast radio stations remained on the air in the wake of the hurricane. 

... Nevertheless, within three weeks after Katrina, more than 90 percent of 

the broadcasters were up and running in the affected region. However, in the 

areas most affected by the storm, the vast majority of stations remained down 

much longer.” 

The Panel’s (2006) report made the following key recommendations related to 

lifelines: 

	 The communications industry should develop business continuity plans that 

include power reserves, cache of essential replacement equipment, adequate 

sparing levels, credentialing, emergency center operation coordination, training 

and disaster drills, and appropriate disaster preparedness checklists. It should 

conduct exercises to evaluate these plans and train personnel, develop and 

practicing a communication plan to identify “key players” and multiple means of 

contacting them, and routinely archive critical system backups and providing for 

their storage in a secure off-site facility. 

	 Public safety should be educated on the availability and capabilities of nontraditional technologies that might provide effective back-up solutions. 

	 The FCC should automatically grant certain types of waivers or special 

temporary authority for affected areas. 

	 The FCC should collect outage data once a day and share it with appropriate 

government entities. (This led to the Disaster Information Reporting System 

(DIRS) described earlier.) 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-29 
 

	 Repair staff for all communication infrastructure providers should be 

credentialed and be afforded emergency responder status so that they can gain 

access to the affected areas. 

	 States should designate post-disaster coordination areas for communication 

infrastructure providers where credentialing, security, escorts and further 

coordination can be achieved. 

	 States should include communication facilities on the priority list for commercial 

power restoration and electric utilities should coordinate power restoration 

activities with communication restoration. 

	 The FCC should work with the National Communications System (NCS) to 

promote GETS, WPS, and TSP to all eligible government, public safety, and 

critical industry groups. 

	 The FCC should encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and maintain, 

including through arrangements with the private sector, a cache of equipment 

components that would be needed to immediately restore existing public safety 

communications. The FCC should also work with the NCC to develop 

inventories of alternative communication assets. 

	 The FCC should take several steps to facilitate interoperability among first 

responder communications. 

	 PSAPs should maintain diverse facility routes and 911 selective routers. (This led 

to the FCC 2013 Report and Order (FCC, 2013c)). 

5.5.2 2011 Hurricane Irene 

Hurricane Irene caused significant telecommunication impacts, primarily to cellular 

systems. According to Plumb (2011): “On Sunday [August 28], ... Irene had brought 

down around 1,400 cell sites in North Carolina and Virginia. After the storm moved 

northward through Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont, an updated report stated 

that 6,500 cell sites were down along the East Coast. Recent updates show Vermont 

with 44 percent of its cell sites down... FCC reported Monday that only 11 percent of 

cell sites in North Carolina are down, an improvement of 14 percent from Sunday’s 

numbers. The FCC’s Sunday afternoon report also said 130,000 wirelines were down 

and 500,000 cable subscribers were without service. A day later, those numbers rose 

to 210,000 and 1 million, respectively.” 

Irene illustrated the relationship of bridges and fiber lines, in the report by Plumb 

(2011): “Our redundant fiber rings were cut on both the western and eastern sides of 

Vermont, and also en route to Boston, and also west-to-east connecting Springfield to 

Wallingford, and also north-to-south connecting Springfield to Hartland, Chester to 

Grafton, and Wallingford to Killington. In cases where our fiber is (or was) on 

5-30	 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

bridges that washed away, or under roads that eroded, the repairs require 

coordination. By far, the most-isolated of our service area is Killington, where our 

fiber ring follows Route 4 and Route 100, and both roads washed out.” 

5.5.3 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake 

NTT East (NTT East, 2011) summarizes the damage caused by the Great East Japan 

Earthquake: “This infrastructure suffered unprecedented damage as a result of the 

Great East Japan Earthquake. The tsunami in particular caused enormous damage 

that far surpassed the impacts of the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake of 

1995. The widespread and prolonged power outages prompted by the earthquake also 

affected 990 exchange buildings at the peak of the crisis, incapacitating many of 

them. As a result, approximately 1.5 million lines in the Tohoku region and adjacent 

areas were affected.” The earthquake and tsunami incapacitated 385 buildings, 

disrupted 90 trunk routes, completely destroyed 16 exchange buildings and flooded 

12 more, and as noted earlier, damaged 28,000 telephone poles in the coastal areas 

and took down approximately 2,700 km of aerial cables in the coastal areas. 

Restoration took approximately 50 days (NTT East, 2011, p. 7). 

“Trunk lines that connect exchange buildings to each other also suffered 

unprecedented damage, some being severed when the bridge under which they ran 

collapsed, and others being swept away with the railway lines alongside which they 

were laid.” “The access lines that connect the customer premises to NTT East 

exchange buildings suffered widespread damage. A great many telephone poles were 

swept away by the tsunami, while liquefaction and land subsidence caused others to 

lean or topple over. Underground ducts also suffered from submergence and 

mudslides caused by the tsunami” (NTT East, 2011). 

NTT East has drawn a number of lessons from the 2011 earthquake, including 

strengthening trunk line backup systems by subdividing network loops, creating a 

ladder-like structure; creating new inland routes in tsunami areas; and laying ducts 

under riverbeds in locations where cables strung along bridges were swept away or 

severed (NTT East, 2011, p. 35). 

5.5.4 2012 Midwest and Mid-Atlantic Derecho 

The derecho that hit portions of the Midwest and Mid-Atlantic regions of the United 

States on June 29 and 30, 2012 affected both wireline and cellular communications, 

and, in particular, 911 systems. Unlike other major storms, it hit with relatively little 

warning. The FCC published a report (Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 

2013) summarizing the impact and lessons: 

“The 2012 derecho severely disrupted 911-related communications. Seventyseven 911 call centers (also known as PSAPs) serving more than 3.6 million 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-31 
people in six states lost some degree of connectivity, including vital 

information on the location of 911 calls, mostly due to service provider 

network problems. From isolated breakdowns in Ohio, New Jersey, 

Maryland, and Indiana, to systemic failures in northern Virginia and West 

Virginia, 911 systems and services were partially or completely down for up 

to several days. Seventeen PSAPs in three states lost service completely, 

affecting the ability of more than 2 million people to reach 911 at all. ... In 

total, more than 1.2 million wireline communications customers in twelve 

states experienced outages (not counting other residents affected by the 

inability to reach 911 on all platforms). In addition more than 30,000 high 

capacity transport lines (“DS3s”) were affected... The bulk of those outages 

occurred in Ohio, with more than 170,000 wireline customers affected for 

periods ranging from one hour to more than five days, and in Maryland, 

where roughly 100,000 wireline customers lost service for as long as six 

days.” 

The derecho illustrated an interdependency between power and communication 

lifelines, namely power quality: “A significant amount of transport equipment failed, 

according to Verizon, because of power surges and low voltages in central offices. 

For example, more than 200 circuit boards in one of Verizon’s digital cross-connect 

systems failed and had to be replaced” (Public Safety and Homeland Security 

Bureau, 2013). 

According to the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (2013) report, 

initially, “just about 11 percent of all cell sites in the affected area (were) down at the 

peak and (there was) a rapid restoration of service from July 2 through July 4... The 

two main reasons reported for cell site outages were loss of power and the disabling 

of transport facilities that carry calls from cell sites to mobile switching centers. Cell 

sites were as likely to fail because of disruptions to landline backhaul 

communications as due to backup power exhaustion in the first days following the 

derecho.” Verizon reported that about 7% of its generators in central offices did not 

function properly; similarly, Frontier reported generator failures. The Public Safety 

and Homeland Security Bureau (2013) report states that “Although Frontier deployed 

mobile generators in some locations, as many as twenty were stolen from Frontier 

facilities in the storm’s aftermath, causing additional backup power failures.” 

Figure 5-3 shows how cell sites recovered; Figure 5-4 illustrates the causes for cell 

site outages, illustrating how power issues may become increasingly prevalent as 

easier-to-restore cell sites recover. The report notes several failures to implement 

Communications Security, Reliability and Interoperability Council best practices as 

likely contributing to the scope, severity, and duration of outages. Just as in the 

Katrina report, the Derecho report recommends that PSAPs maintain multiple 

alternate means of communication. In 2013, the FCC required providers of 911 

5-32 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

Figure 5-3 Cell site recovery following the 2012 Midwest and Mid-Atlantic 

Derecho (Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 2013). 

Figure 5-4 Causes of cell site disruption following the 2012 Midwest and MidAtlantic Derecho (Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, 

2013). 

services to implement best practices related to circuit diversity, circuit monitoring 

and backup power (FCC, 2013c). 

5.5.5 2012 Hurricane Sandy 

Hurricane Sandy also caused widespread cell tower outages, with up to 25% of cell 

sites across the ten states affected out of service, with up to half in the hardest hit 

counties, according to the Chief of the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau 

(Turetsky, 2013). A workshop report by NYU Polytechnic (2013) analyzes some of 

the lessons for wireless and other communication networks, such as better 

coordination between electric utilities and telecommunication providers through a 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-33 
 

common geographic information system, undergrounding of utilities, and low-power 

consumer and small business network elements that can operate on battery power for 

extended periods of time. Recently, the White House Broadband Opportunity 

Council (Broadband Opportunity Council, 2015) recommended that “Federal 

Agencies that fund significant infrastructure investments should work together to 

further promote ‘Dig Once’ policies.” Two FCC workshops (FCC, 2013a, 2013b) 

reflected on experience and lessons learned, as well as longer-term technology 

options, but there appears to have been no systematic follow-up. A report by the 

Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force (2013) recommends developing “a resilient 

power strategy for wireless and data communication infrastructure and consumer 

equipment.” The City of New York (2013a) Hurricane Sandy After Action Report 

makes similar recommendations: 

	 “Work with telecommunication providers to get accurate, regular data on the 

status of phone, internet, and data availability throughout the City. 

	 Carrier reporting, pursuant to FCC DIRS, should be a requirement and not 

voluntary. The FCC should ensure any relevant information collected that affects 

a severely-impacted community be shared immediately with first responders 

responsible for serving those communities. 

	 Develop a plan along with carriers to pre-stage COWs (cells on wheels) and 

other critical telecommunication assets where they could be needed following a 

coastal storm. 

	 Work with carriers to extend backup power time at cell sites in flood-prone areas. 

	 Work with the FCC to establish minimum performance standards for carriers for 

voice and text messaging services during high-volume call times.” 

In each of the four large-scale disasters described above, large-scale disasters seemed 

to be followed by two different types of recovery: the “routine” recovery, where 

replacement of facilities and equipment followed a well-known operational pattern, 

yielding 80 to 97% cell site recovery within roughly three days after Hurricane Sandy 

(Albanesius, 2012). Some disruptions, however, such as the flooding of the Verizon 

central office on Broad Street in lower Manhattan took much longer to repair. In that 

case, the carrier chose to replace copper loops with fiber, rather than simply replacing 

like-with-like. On Fire Island, the copper loop infrastructure was almost completely 

destroyed and it took six months to restore service using a replacement network. 

5.6 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

As described in Section 5.3, there are estimates of the economic and health and safety 

impact of prolonged communication outages, but the increasing complexity of 

communication networks and applications make a more precise prediction difficult. 

5-34	 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
For example, a complete loss of all non-satellite and non-high frequency radio is 

likely going to have a very different impact than, say, the outage of residential 

broadband service or a single mobile carrier. Similarly, restoring a small number of 

fiber circuits to a data center is likely faster and easier than restoring service to 

millions of homes. 

While there are performance standards (as summarized in Section 5.2) for individual 

components of communication systems up to the level of a data center, there appear 

to be no simulation tools that estimate the influence of design choices and recovery 

strategies, provide resources for overall lifeline performance, or predict the likely 

recovery timeline. For example, the number of technician teams working in parallel 

and the difficulty of resourcing spare parts or replacements may influence recovery 

times. Besides mostly manual tabletop exercises, protocols do not appear to be 

available for practicing emergency operations with all entities likely to be affected by 

a major disaster. A Monte-Carlo simulation approach to the whole system may allow 

the carrier as well as possibly third parties to estimate the likely lifeline resilience. 

Currently, the collection of data about communication system outages is best 

characterized as anecdotal. There does not appear to be a systematic approach to 

recording outage information over time so that researchers can, for example, compare 

the effectiveness of different approaches or determine whether organizations learned 

from previous incidents. Similarly, data exchange during an outage is largely manual, 

presumably in spreadsheets, rather than standardized data feeds that allow 

communication providers to track recovery of related services or the deployment of 

repair resources. 

The various after-action reports make helpful recommendations, but there does not 

appear to be a systematic effort to track whether these recommendations have been 

translated into action, particularly where this requires action by widely distributed 

entities such as 911 PSAPs, telecommunication providers or localities. Data centers 

appear to be the only communication-related entities that have a comprehensive, 

verifiable set of standards, with auditing, such as SSAE16 SOC 2 (AICPA, 2010). 

For other entities, self-assessment or third-party audit checklists, like the Payment 

Card Industry Data Security Standard tools for entities that accept credit cards, may 

facilitate validating that all current best practices are being followed or that 

compensating alternatives are in place. 

Several of the “lessons learned” reports cited indicated that backup plans did not 

work as anticipated or that assumed redundancy either never did exist or had 

disappeared due to engineering changes, leading to a false sense of resiliency. Thus, 

rather than waiting for a real disaster to test resiliency, it may be prudent to follow 

the “Chaos Monkey” approach pioneered by Netflix to test the resilience and 

recoverability of their cloud computing services. According to the Netflix Tech Blog 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-35 
(2012), “(t)he service has a configurable schedule that, by default, runs on nonholiday weekdays between 9 am and 3 pm. In most cases, we have designed our 

applications to continue working when an instance goes offline, but in those special 

cases that they don’t, we want to make sure there are people around to resolve and 

learn from any problems.” This approach may ferret out problems within a single 

service provider, but is less likely to be applicable to failures that occur due to the 

interaction of multiple interdependent organizations. If the risk of affecting customers 

is seen as too high, it may be possible to simulate systems in table top exercises that 

span multiple organizations, including local, state and federal governments. 

As noted earlier for Verizon’s lower Manhattan central office, the best recovery 

strategy may well involve replacing a legacy infrastructure with current technology, 

particularly since older components may not be manufactured anymore and spare 

parts may be difficult to procure quickly. (For example, all major manufacturers of 

telephone circuit switches have either ceased manufacturing these systems or are no 

longer in business.) 

Since the old model of regulating telecommunication carriers via state public utility 

commissions is unlikely to be revived, there is a need to identify incentives and 

penalties, whether contractual, through insurance mechanisms, franchise agreements 

or Federal regulatory, that appropriately capture the externalities of communication 

system outages after disasters. 

5.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 

The recommendations below extend and summarize those mentioned in Sections 5.5 

and 5.6. 

5.7.1 Review of Key Points 

Unlike traditional utilities, telecommunications consists of multiple overlapping 

systems that have evolved independently over decades, but are slowly converging on 

an Internet Protocol (IP) platform. Unlike electricity, water, and gas, Internet-based 

services can often be delivered by several different providers, using diverse 

technologies ranging from fiber and copper loops to cellular wireless and satellite. 

The number of competitive offerings differs greatly between geographic areas, with 

typical urban areas having more offerings than rural areas. Similarly, households can 

receive over-the-air radio and television signals from dozens of stations (at least in 

densely-populated areas) that are operated independently. 

Unlike other lifeline systems, communication systems exhibit a layered architecture, 

where multiple higher-layer services share a single underlying infrastructure or, 

conversely, where an application-layer service such as email or telephone may use 

multiple different network and physical-layer technologies. 

5-36 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

Specialized networks such as land mobile radio and broadcast networks offer services 

that are more restricted in functionality (e.g., voice-only or one-way transmission) or 

are limited to smaller user groups (e.g., amateur radio or government-only systems). 

Despite their diversity in technology and infrastructure, these communication 

systems may share points of failure, both well-known and hidden, that are likely to 

cause widespread outages during and after hazard events. 

Compared to other lifelines, Internet-based communication systems are lightly 

regulated in terms of their performance requirements. There are component-level 

design guidelines and standards for some telecommunication system components 

such as cell towers, central offices or data centers, but law or regulation does 

generally not mandate adherence to these standards and the degree of adherence is 

unknown to outside observers, probably including customers of the carriers. 

Organizations such as the FCC’s Communications Security, Reliability and 

Interoperability Council provide best-practice guidance, but emphasize their 

voluntary nature. Large commercial customers may be able to obtain binding service 

level agreements, but these do not cover performance during disasters. Widespread 

outages of residential voice and Internet service have to be reported to the FCC. 

Experience from past disasters has shown that communication systems are restored 

relatively quickly compared to other lifelines, but lack of communication systems can 

severely disrupt not just economic activities and everyday life, but also make it much 

more difficult for first and second responders to be effective and efficient. Thus, 

society expects communication systems, at least with partial functionality or reduced 

capacity, to remain operational during and after the disaster. Many economic 

activities cannot effectively resume until businesses, medical facilities and public 

buildings have access to voice and Internet services. In particular, 911 emergency 

systems are crucial during disasters as a way for the public to reach first responders 

and request assistance. Emergency alerting systems, whether using traditional 

broadcast or cellular technology, can help inform the public of imminent threats to 

life safety. First and second responders rely on land mobile radio to coordinate 

activities within each organization, between services and with incident command 

systems (ICS). 

Telecommunication systems depend strongly on other lifelines, in particular electric 

power and road transportation. Increasingly, these other lifelines also rely on either 

dedicated or commercial (public) telecommunication services for operation, fault 

diagnosis and coordinating restoration activities. 

5.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs 

There are three broad areas that could benefit from additional lifeline-related 

standards and performance metrics: for telecommunication systems in general, for 

GCR 16-917-39 5: Telecommunications 5-37 
 

specific communities and to ensure interoperability among first responders. First, as 

noted in Section 5.2.3, there are no general hazard-related guidelines, standards, and 

performance criteria for many key elements of telecommunication systems, nor are 

there metrics characterizing the resilience after hazard events. (For example, there is 

no common metric to estimate the impact of cell tower outages or fiber loops, e.g., in 

terms of area, capacity or population affected.) This leads to the second gap— 

communities and enterprises often make plans using anecdotal past experience, i.e., 

predicting the future based on the last storm, flood, earthquake or wildfire, even 

though the technology and infrastructure are changing rapidly, rather than on 

probabilistic predictions based on possible hazards. Communities would benefit from 

knowing, for example, whether they depend on one fiber route or one cell tower for 

their commercial services. Finally, common standards for first responders at the 

local, state and federal level would ensure that the available communication channels 

can be used effectively after a hazard event. 

Specific recommendations are: 

	 Develop metrics that allow customers, communities and regulatory bodies to 

assess the resiliency of communication systems, e.g., in their ability to 

withstand a particular set of hazard intensities or to provide (capacity-reduced) 

functionality after loss of physical assets. 

	 Develop quantitative metrics that capture the impact of hazard events and 

the speed of recovery in communication systems, e.g., by measuring the 

impact on network reach (coverage) and capacity. 

	 Develop standards or guidance to help facilitate interoperability among first 

responder communication systems. 

5.7.3 Research Needs 

Following are key research needs: 

	 Conduct research to better understand the economic impact of sustained 

communication outages. Except for anecdotal information from recent disasters, 

little is known about the economic impact of outages. Improved insights into the 

likely economic impact will allow communities and enterprises to better plan and 

allocate resources, e.g., for backup systems or more resilient communication 

system elements. Such research will be possible only if system performance 

metrics both for the initial impact and the recovery are recorded with sufficient 

granularity during and after disasters and if such data are made available to 

researchers. 

While the Federal Communications Commission gathers data about large-scale 

network outages both during normal operation and after hazard events, the data 

are currently not available for root-cause analysis or to estimate recovery times, 

5-38	 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
nor to compare the effects of different design choices. Recommendations from 

after-action reports also do not appear to be systematically studied to know if 

they are implemented or whether they were indeed effective. 

	 Develop protocols and systems that allow large-scale monitoring to improve 

the ability of carriers to diagnose and correct faults. Network systems, 

particularly for small businesses and homes, typically have limited remote 

monitoring and diagnostics capability. 

	 Conduct studies to compare mean time between failure and mean time to 

repair buried fiber versus aerial installations. While industry practice and 

limited published data appear to suggest that burying fiber is likely to yield 

higher reliability and resilience than aerial installation (Verbrugge et al., 2005), 

particularly for weather-related hazards, there do not appear to be any recent 

peer-reviewed studies comparing mean time between failure and mean time to 

repair (MTTR) of the two options. Such studies should be based on field 

experience both during regular operation and after disasters. 

	 Conduct research to identify a potential range and effectiveness of incentives 

and penalties for key “systemically important” actors, whether contractual, 

through insurance mechanisms, franchise agreements or federal regulations. 

Such measures should appropriately capture the externalities of communication 

system outages after disasters. 

5.7.4 Modeling Needs 

One key modeling need is as follows: 

	 Develop computational models and tools for simulating the impact of 

disruptive hazard events on telecommunication systems. Combined with 

realistic recovery assumptions, such simulations can help quantify the trade-offs 

between cost, survivability and recovery for different parts of the communication 

lifeline infrastructure. 

5.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs 

The following are considerations for addressing lifeline system operational needs: 

	 Critical services such as hospitals, utility emergency management centers 

and public safety facilities (including PSAPs) should maintain as many 

diverse communication facilities as possible, including multiple wireline and 

cellular data services, free-space optical, point-to-point wireless and satellite 

connections. 

	 Fiber lines, particularly to critical services such as PSAPs and hospitals, 

should be buried to reduce the impact of wind and ice events, although this 

does typically increase the cost. Undergrounding can be made more affordable 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-39 
 

by routinely burying shared PVC conduit when building or resurfacing roads, 

water and sewer pipes or rail tracks (“dig once”). 

 Consider replacing copper with fiber optic communications lines to increase 

system resilience. Fiber optic communication lines are more likely to survive 

submersion than copper loops, including coaxial cable, and are not susceptible to 

corrosion at connection point. Since they are non-conducting, they can also be 

lashed to distribution and transmission power lines. While such replacement is 

costly, some telecommunication providers are systematically replacing copper 

with fiber, even for voice-only customers (Sanderson, 2014). 

 Consider adding resilient communications capabilities to gas, water and 

electric systems, both for distribution and end users. This may allow 

operators of these other lifelines to obtain a better situational awareness of 

outages, recovery and post-event performance. 

 Develop resilience metrics and requirements for the communications 

industry. Data centers often advertise their conformance to industry standards 

that include in-depth resiliency provisions, allowing their customers to have 

some confidence that their critical computational needs will be met even during 

disasters. The communications industry similarly needs metrics and 

requirements, possibly reinforced by appropriate state or federal regulation for 

system components constituting and affecting other critical infrastructures, on 

developing business continuity plans that include power reserves, cache of 

essential replacement equipment, adequate sparing levels, credentialing, 

emergency center operation coordination, training/event drills, and appropriate 

disaster preparedness checklists. It should include requirements on conducting 

self-assessments as well as exercises to evaluate these plans and train personnel, 

develop and practice a communication plan to identify “key players,” and 

multiple means of contacting them, and routinely archiving critical system 

backups and providing for their storage in a secure off-site facility. Some 

elements of such planning may require interaction with local and state emergency 

planners to pre-plan credentialing, access and designated post-disaster 

coordination areas, pre-plan the staging of COWs (cells on wheels) and other 

telecommunication assets and priority listing all key communication facilities for 

power restoration. 

 Communication system operators should work with the communities they 

serve to improve community resilience in the face of communication system 

disruptions. 

 Consider using multi-fuel and hybrid backup power systems to provide 

additional resiliency for smaller cell sites if natural gas pipelines remain 

operational after hazard events, even if liquid fuels cannot be delivered. 

5-40 5: Telecommunications GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

	 Carriers should work to extend the backup power time at cell sites in 

hazard-prone areas where post-disaster access may be particularly 

challenging, such as floodplain and coastal locations. 

	 Consider ways to reduce power consumption of consumer customer 

premises equipment, such as DSL and cable modems. If the power 

consumption of consumer customer premises equipment can be reduced to no 

more than 5 watts, it becomes feasible to power such equipment indefinitely by 

rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, possibly combined with small solar panels. 

	 Deploying text-to-911 allows individuals to reach 911 even when the voice or 

data telecommunication networks are overloaded due to increased call 

volume or reduced capacity. 

	 Regularly exercise the impact of component failures, with appropriate 

safeguards and coordination, both in isolation and in combination (e.g., via 

“Chaos Monkey” or realistic simulation exercises), to improve the resiliency 

of individual operators of communication systems as well as entities that 

interconnect and depend on them. 

	 Promote better coordination between electric utilities and 

telecommunication providers in response and restoration planning. If they 

agree in advance to share data about the status of distribution facilities, they can 

better coordinate repair efforts and avoid tearing down communication lines 

when repairing power lines on the same utility poles. They could also develop 

mutual strategies for undergrounding of utilities. Federal agencies that fund 

infrastructure investment could also further promote “dig once” policies. 

	 Plan for restoration of road access and commercial power to key 

communication resources such as central offices, cell towers and data 

centers in an effort to accelerate recovery. 

	 Promote the automated and continuous measurement of landline and 

communication and data services, as well as PSAPs, before and during 

major disasters. Such measurements can provide communities, emergency 

operations centers and researchers with up-to-date and consistent information 

about the impact and recovery of key communication services. 

5.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends 

It appears likely that the different communication modalities such as broadcast, 

private two-way radio services, private data services, circuit-switched telephony, 

cable TV and Internet will converge onto a single platform based on Internet 

protocols within the next decade, at least in densely populated areas of the country. 

GCR 16-917-39	 5: Telecommunications 5-41 

Chapter 6 

Transportation 

6.1 System Overview 

Transportation systems provide the means by which people and goods move around 

the country and the world. They are essential for the maintenance and growth of 

modern commerce and standards of living. Multiple modes of transportation often 

serve complementary functions, which create redundancy and enhance inherent 

resilience in the overall transportation network. The performance of transportation 

systems during a natural hazard event will depend on both the intensity of the event 

and the condition of the system at the time of the event. Older and poorly maintained 

transportation infrastructure will generally perform worse than newer wellmaintained infrastructure when subjected to the same intensity event. 

During a routine or design hazard event, failure of a few individual components of 

the overall transportation network will result in inconvenience, delays, and economic 

losses, but alternative routes are generally available to maintain an adequate flow of 

people and goods. However, during extreme hazard events, more substantial damage 

to the transportation systems can threaten life safety and result in major economic 

consequences. 

Transportation system recovery time after a natural hazard event will also depend on 

the intensity of the event and the condition of the system at the time of the event. 

Alternative modes of transportation can often be utilized in the short-term recovery 

phase (lasting days); however, repairs and reconstruction of damaged components of 

the transportation network are typically intermediate- to long-term recovery activities 

(lasting weeks to months and even years). Because of the greater extent of damage 

anticipated after an extreme event, a shortage of available contractors to repair or 

rebuild the transportation infrastructure may extend the recovery time. 

Community resilience to natural hazards can be improved by strategies such as 

hardening existing transportation systems through mitigation or retrofit projects, 

performance-based design of new transportation components, and enhancement of 

transportation system redundancy. 

6.1.1 Transportation Infrastructure 

Transportation infrastructure is generally considered to include highway, rail, airport, 

shipping, and intermodal systems, each of which is discussed under a subheading that 

follows. 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-1 
6.1.1.1 Highway Transportation Systems 

These systems consist of roadways ranging from local residential streets to interstate 

freeways, and everything in between. Most roads are built on grade, but rely on 

bridges to cross rivers, railway lines and other highways. Road tunnels are used to 

pass below central business districts or through mountainous terrain and below 

waterways. The highway system is used to transport both people and goods locally, 

regionally and nationally. A majority of vehicles currently rely on petroleum or diesel 

fuel, so well-supplied fuel stations are critical to maintaining a functioning vehicular 

transportation system. 

The weak links in the highway transportation system are often the bridge structures, 

including the approach embankments at each end of the bridge. During earthquakes, 

bridge structures are particularly susceptible to damage or collapse (Cooper et al., 

2015). Coastal inundation and wave loading during past tropical storms and tsunamis 

has also resulted in numerous bridge failures (Douglass and Krolak, 2008; Saatcioglu 

et al., 2005; Chock et al., 2013). Damage to tunnels and on-grade roadways can also 

occur during various hazard events (Chock et al., 2013). Generally in urban areas 

there is sufficient redundancy in the highway network to accommodate closure of 

some roadways, but loss of major arterial freeways can lead to severe traffic gridlock. 

Rural areas may be serviced by only one or a limited number of highways, making 

these routes more critical for emergency responders after a damaging hazard event. 

Community-based planning is required to identify critical roadways that need to meet 

transportation requirements during and after all possible hazards to improve highway 

transport resilience for future hazard events. 

6.1.1.2 Railway Transportation Systems 

Railway systems consist of both heavy and light rail, each made up of roadbeds and 

tracks, associated bridges and tunnels, and railway system facilities (e.g., control 

buildings, switching gear, electrical power supply lines, and fuel facilities). Heavy 

rail lines are predominantly used to transport cargo, though some passenger traffic 

also uses rail. Amtrak reported more than 31.2 million passengers in 2012, while 

freight railroads transport almost half the nation’s intercity freight and approximately 

a third of its exports (NIST, 2015). Freight rail systems also contribute to the 

intermodal transportation of containerized cargo and imported automobiles from 

ports on both east and west coasts to the interior of the U.S. (NIST, 2015). 

Mass transit systems such as light rail, commuter rail and subways provide essential 

commuter transportation from suburban communities to the city core. Disruption of 

these rail-based mass transit systems after the Loma Prieta earthquake (Penzien et al., 

2003) and Hurricane Sandy (New York City, 2013a) led to significant disruptions in 

economic activity in the affected metropolitan areas. However, the lack of damage to 

6-2 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system during the Loma Prieta earthquake 

meant that it was available to satisfy some of the excess demand resulting from the 

closure of the Bay Bridge connecting San Francisco to the East Bay communities 

(Penzien et al., 2003). 

The roadbeds, bridges and tunnels making up the rail network are susceptible to 

similar damage as those in the highway system. However, the rail network generally 

has significantly less redundancy than the highway system, so failure of only a few 

components can cause major disruption and delays (NIST, 2015; City of New York, 

2013). 

6.1.1.3 Airport Transportation Systems 

Air travel allows for rapid transport of people and goods over long distances, but at 

considerable cost compared with alternative ground transportation systems. The air 

transport network is based on various size airports, each of which consists of 

runways, terminal buildings, control tower(s) and associated radar and lighting 

systems, fuel facilities, maintenance and hanger facilities, and parking structures. 

Runways are exposed to similar damage as highways and roadbeds, but are more 

difficult to repair because of the lower tolerance for imperfections to provide 

adequate safety during takeoff and landing (FAA, 2009). Terminal buildings, control 

towers, parking structures and other buildings are exposed to damage during most 

hazard events. Earthquake damage to ceilings and other non-structural components 

led to closure of the Santiago International Airport for five days after the February 

27, 2010 earthquake (Resnicoff, 2010). Earthquake and tsunami damage caused by 

the March 11, 2011 earthquake in Japan resulted in closure of the Sendai Airport for 

over a month (Chock et al., 2013). Only limited military and relief aid flights were 

possible during this closure due to lack of power and damage to the terminal 

building. Loss of power to operate radar and lighting systems makes an airport 

virtually unusable until power is restored. Loss of a major airport hub can result in 

ripple effects of delayed and cancelled flights throughout the country as demonstrated 

by the closure of all three major airports in New York City during Hurricane Sandy 

(City of New York, 2013). 

6.1.1.4 Shipping Transportation Systems 

Shipping transportation systems consist of ocean-going cargo and cruise vessels, 

barge traffic on inland and intracoastal waterways, and ferry transport on coastal or 

inland waterways. These systems rely on ports equipped with waterfront structures 

(e.g., wharves, piers, and seawalls), port control centers, cranes and bulk cargo 

handling equipment, fuel facilities, shipping container storage areas and warehouses. 

The vast majority of import and export trade in the United States relies on ocean 

shipping, which is dependent on ports around the coastline. U.S. seaports are 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-3 
responsible for moving more than 99 % of the country’s overseas cargo by volume 

and 65 % by value (AAPA, 2015). Closure of a single port due to a natural disaster 

can lead to major economic consequences for the immediate community around the 

port, as occurred in Kobe, Japan, after the 1995 earthquake. Ships can often use 

alternate ports, but this may still lead to delays and loss of perishable cargo. 

A significant amount of internal cargo transport is performed by barges traveling on 

inland riverine and great lake waterways and the Gulf and Atlantic Intracoastal 

waterways. Shallow draft navigation (e.g., barges) serves 87 % of all major U.S. 

cities, and accounts for 79 % of all domestic waterborne freight. The U.S. Maritime 

Administration estimates that if inland waterways became unavailable for transport, 

truck traffic on rural highways would increase by approximately 33% (58 million 

truck trips annually) and rail transport, by tonnage, would increase by 25%. Increases 

of these magnitudes would put tremendous stress on land-based infrastructure (NIST, 

2015). This system of natural and manmade waterways, canals and locks allows for 

cargo shipping throughout the Central and Eastern United States. There is a distinct 

lack of redundancy in this waterway network. Damage to a single lock or collapse of 

a bridge spanning one of these waterways can disrupt traffic for months. Because 

much of this cargo is transported in bulk form, requiring specialized equipment for 

rapid loading and unloading, it is often very difficult to use alternate port facilities to 

transfer the cargo to other forms of transportation. 

Table 6-1 provides a rough comparison of the cargo capacities of the various forms 

of shipping and other transport systems. The standard measure is a 20-foot-long 

equivalent shipping container, or TEU. Clearly replacement of a single river barge 

with road transportation would require a considerable number of vehicles. 

Table 6-1 Cargo Shipping Equivalencies 

Cargo Shipping Twenty-foot-long Equivalent 

Mode Unit (TEU)
 

Ocean Container Ships 1,500 – 12,000* 

River Barge 116** 

15-Barge Tow 1740** 

100-Car Train 870** 

Highway Truck 2 

*World Shipping Council, 2016 

**NIST, 2015 

6.1.2 Multimodal Transportation 

Large metropolitan areas generally maintain extensive and complex transportation 

systems that often rely on multimodal transport of both people and goods. People 

often use multiple modes of transportation on a daily basis, particularly in large urban 

6-4 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
centers (NIST, 2015). For example, individuals may use a car, bus, taxi, or bicycle to 

get to and from subway or commuter train stations during their daily commute to and 

from work. Similarly, transport of cargo often involves multiple modes of 

transportation. Such multimodal transportation is dependent on all components of the 

network functioning correctly. Loss of a single transportation mode could delay or 

potentially terminate the trip. 

At the same time, the presence of multiple modes of transport adds resilience by 

enabling modal replacement during and after a damaging event. Interruption to one 

mode of transport will lead to increased reliance on the other available modes, often 

straining or exceeding their capacity. For example, after the Loma Prieta earthquake 

in the San Francisco Bay area in 1989, closure of the Bay Bridge due to collapse of 

one deck span presented a major interruption to the normal flow of people and cargo 

across San Francisco Bay. Traffic that diverted to alternate routes to the North and 

South of San Francisco Bay experienced significant delays due to increased traffic on 

already busy thoroughfares. However, increased frequency of BART rail traffic and 

increased harbor ferry schedules helped to relieve some of this demand (SPUR, 

2010). Understanding the interdependencies of the overall transportation system is 

crucial for effective planning to increase transportation resilience. 

6.2 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

Table 6-2 summarizes the design codes, structural standards and guidelines 

governing transportation systems in the United States. It does not include a number 

of guidelines that deal with the capacity and flow side of transportation design. 

Typically these design provisions focus on individual components rather than on the 

transportation system as a whole. Designs for earthquake and high wind hazards 

generally focus on low-probability/high-consequence events (ASCE, 2010), while 

designs for riverine flooding, coastal storm inundation, and storm wave loading often 

consider shorter return period events, typically 100 years (e.g., ASCE, 2014a). 

6.3 Societal Considerations 

Major failures of transportation structures are not anticipated under normal 

conditions, so the sudden collapse in 2007 of the I-35W bridge over the Mississippi 

River in Minneapolis was unexpected. 

The loss of the I35W Mississippi Bridge in 2007, Minnesota’s second busiest bridge 

carrying 140,000 vehicles daily, had significant consequences for the local traffic 

network. The Minnesota Department of Transportation estimated the economic 

impact to Minnesota’s economy due to the loss of this important river crossing at 

about $17 million in 2007 and $43 million in 2008 (Minnesota DOT, 2008). These 

GCR 16-917-39	 6: Transportation 6-5 
Table 6-2 U.S. Codes, Standards, and Guidelines Governing Transportation Systems 

Category	 Title 

Standard American Association of State Highway and 

Transportation Officials (AASHTO) Load and Resistance 

Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge Design Specifications, 7th 

Edition with 2015 Supplement (AASHTO, 2014) 

Standard AASHTO Guide Specifications for LRFD Seismic Bridge 

Design, 2nd Edition, with 2012, 2014 and 2015 Interim 

Revisions (AASHTO, 2011) 

Standard AASHTO LRFD Bridge Construction Specifications, 3rd 

Edition, with 2010, 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015 Interim 

Revisions (AASHTO, 2010) 

Code American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way 

Association (AREMA) 2015 Manual for Railway 

Engineering (AREMA, 2015a) 

Code AREMA Communications and Signals Manual, 2015 

(AREMA, 2015b) 

Guidelines Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5300-13A - Airport Design 

(FAA, 2012) 

Standard AC 150/5320-6, Airport Pavement Design and Evaluation 

(FAA, 2009) 

Standard AC 150/5370-10, Standards for Specifying Construction 

of Airports (FAA, 2014) 

Code Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance 

Standards (MOTEMS) (CSLC, 2010) 

Guidelines Seismic Design Guidelines for Port Structures, World 

Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure 

(PIANC, 2001) 

Standard American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7-10, 

Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other 

Structures (ASCE, 2010) 

General Description 

Intended for use in the design, evaluation, and 

rehabilitation of highway bridges, and mandated by 

the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) for use 

on all bridges using federal funding. 

Guidelines for use of displacement-based design 

procedures for design of typical non-critical and 

non-essential bridges. Approved as an alternative to 

the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications. 

A companion to the AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design 

Specifications with specifications for material testing 

and acceptance criteria, material references, and 

recommended guidelines for construction loads. 

Contains principles, data, specifications, plans and 

economics information pertaining to the 

engineering, design and construction of the fixed 

plant of railways (except signals and 

communications), and allied services and facilities. 

Contains recommended practices for railway 

communications and signaling. Required by the 

Federal Railroad Administration for all U.S. 

railroads. 

Contains Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

standards and recommendations for the geometric 

layout and engineering design of runways, 

taxiways, aprons, and other facilities at civil airports. 

FAA pavement standard provides guidance on the 

design and evaluation of pavements at civil airports. 

The standards contained in this document relate to 

materials and methods used for airport construction. 

Items covered include general provisions, 

earthwork, flexible base courses, rigid base 

courses, flexible surface courses, rigid pavement, 

fencing, drainage, turfing, and lighting installation. 

This document was developed by the California 

State Lands Commission (CSLC) and is 

incorporated in the California Building Code (CBSC, 

2013). The provisions apply to all existing and new 

marine oil terminals in California. 

International design guidelines for seismic design of 

port structures. Non-mandatory guidelines 

developed by The World Association for 

Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC). 

ASCE Standard for loads and design procedures. 

Referenced by the International Building Code (ICC, 

2012), and therefore in force wherever the 

International Building Code is adopted by local 

communities. 

6-6 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
Table 6-2 U.S. Codes, Standards, and Guidelines Governing Transportation Systems (continued) 

Category	 Title 

Standard American Concrete Institute ACI 318-11 Building 

Code Requirements for Structural Concrete, and 

Commentary (ACI, 2011) 

Standard American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) 

Steel Construction Manual, 14th Edition (AISC, 

2010a) and Seismic Design Manual (AISC, 2010b) 

Standard ASCE 24-14, Flood Resistant Design and 

Construction (ASCE, 2014a) 

General Description 

ACI building code for concrete structures. 

Referenced by the International Building Code (ICC, 

2012) for design of all concrete structures. Includes 

comprehensive seismic design requirements. 

AISC manual for design of steel structures, with 

companion manual for seismic design of steel 

structures. Referenced by the International Building 

Code (ICC, 2012) for all steel construction. 

ASCE Standard for design loading due to riverine 

flooding and coastal inundation due to storm surge 

and wave action. Does not address tsunami loading. 

estimates were developed by assigning monetary values to business auto travel time 

and heavy commercial truck travel time, as well as to variable operating costs for 

both. The daily loss of an estimated $247,000 through longer commutes for 

individuals represents a significant burden for members of the community who 

previously relied on the bridge. Construction of a replacement bridge was completed 

as quickly as feasible, but still took over a year, at a cost of $140 million (Minnesota 

DOT, 2008). 

Effects on commuter behavior were surveyed and reported by Zhu et al. (2010). They 

found that immediately after the collapse, individual travel times for commuters who 

previously used the I-35W bridge increased 13 %, and 32 % of commuters adjusted 

their departure time to avoid anticipated congestion. 

The bridge collapse also blocked river traffic along the Mississippi River and rail 

traffic on a line parallel to the river that passed under the bridge for about a month 

until the bridge could be demolished and removed. While rail traffic could be 

diverted to other lines, river traffic was halted by the collapse. Delays in barge traffic 

resulted in layoffs for workers at an aggregate supply company (Wyant, 2007). 

Although not the result of a natural hazard, this collapse of a single bridge illustrates 

the significant effect on the transportation network and local economy. At the same 

time, the transportation agency response illustrated how design and operations 

strategies can adapt and overcome (at least to some extent) loss of function in 

transportation systems/networks. 

Public expectations of the performance of transportation systems during natural 

hazard events are likely to be based in large part on observations of performance 

during past events. Given this basis for expectations, the high wind events would not 

be perceived to cause structural damage to transportation infrastructure, although loss 

of power could result in down time for rail systems and traffic control systems for 

GCR 16-917-39	 6: Transportation 6-7 
highway traffic. Recovery after high wind events depends upon reinstatement of 

power and clearing of debris from rail lines and roadways. 

Coastal inundation due to storm surge and wave action during tropical cyclones and 

other storms can cause localized damage to transportation systems. During routine 

and design coastal storms and hurricanes the level of damage to transportation 

infrastructure is generally limited to downed power poles and trees, and limited 

damage to roadways and rail lines. Typically the debris can be removed and damage 

repaired within days. However, after extreme coastal flooding events such as during 

Hurricane Katrina, failure of a number of coastal bridges, both road and rail, 

hampered transport of people and goods along the Gulf Coast in Louisiana, 

Mississippi and Alabama for many months (Robertson et al., 2007). The availability 

of alternate inland routes alleviated this disruption. During Hurricane Sandy, another 

coastal flooding event, people in New York City experienced significant commuter 

transportation disruption due primarily to flooding of road, rail and subway tunnels 

(NYS, 2013). Alternative bus and ferry transport was able to alleviate some of this 

congestion. It took one to several weeks for all tunnels to be pumped dry and 

reopened to rail and road traffic. 

During past minor (routine) earthquakes, minimal structural damage has occurred to 

transportation networks. Localized bridge, road or rail failures have generally been 

repaired, at least temporarily, within days of the event. During design and extreme 

earthquakes, however, past performance has shown that bridge and port structures 

may be severely damaged (see Section 6.5). Public expectations of the performance 

of transportation infrastructure may, nevertheless, be somewhat optimistic, not 

understanding that current code approaches to seismic design anticipate a significant 

percentage (on the order of 5% to 10%) of code compliant structures will be severely 

damaged or destroyed during a design level or larger event (ASCE, 2010). The 

probability of collapse or severe damage for heritage structures that do not meet 

current codes and standards would likely be even higher. Recovery from these more 

damaging events can be expected to extend into the intermediate- to long-term phases 

of recovery. Structures that survive the event with less serious damage will still need 

to be closed during structural evaluations and implementation of any repairs required 

to reinstate their structural integrity, thereby reducing their functionality for some 

time after the event. 

During tsunami events that cause only minor inundation, coastal transportation 

systems are expected to experience damage similar to that during hurricane storm 

surge, though scour and debris accumulation may be more severe (Robertson et al., 

2010). Damage to commercial ports will also be limited, though recreational harbors 

may experience more severe effects (UH SeaGrant, 2013). During extreme tsunami 

events, public perception may anticipate that very little of the built environment will 

survive. In the case of transportation infrastructure, this is a fairly pessimistic view 

6-8 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
based on the relatively good performance of many transportation structures during 

the 2011 Tohoku, Japan tsunami (Chock et al., 2013). Based on field surveys 

performed after the earthquake and tsunami, a California Department of 

Transportation (Caltrans) team concluded that “most bridges suffered little or no 

damage from the tsunami that accompanied the Tohoku earthquake. This was despite 

bridges not being specifically designed for tsunami” (Yashinsky, 2011). However, it 

would be expected that coastal roads and railways will be interrupted by failure of 

individual components, and ports and harbors will sustain considerable debris 

damage due to shipping container and boats carried by water flow (Chock et al., 

2013). 

Subsequent to damaging natural hazard events, affected communities commonly 

focus on lessons learned and developing plans for improved resilience for similar 

future events. After the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, the State of California made 

considerable efforts to remove, replace or retrofit older critical bridges that were 

seismically vulnerable. This effort included removal of the elevated Embarcadero 

Freeway in San Francisco because of the collapse of the similar vintage Cypress 

Street Viaduct in Oakland. Many critical bridges were retrofitted to improve seismic 

performance, most notably the Golden Gate Bridge and the western span of the Bay 

Bridge. Other critical bridges were replaced with modern seismically designed 

structures, such as the new eastern span of the Bay Bridge and the South Approach 

Viaduct to the Golden Gate Bridge, both of which were opened in 2015. Although it 

took over 25 years to complete these and many other seismic upgrades, it is 

anticipated that the transportation system in the San Francisco Bay Area will perform 

significantly better during future earthquakes. Similarly, New York City and 

surrounding communities have learned from Hurricane Sandy. Considerable effort 

has been focused on improving resilience to future inundation events, for example by 

undertaking measures to prevent flooding of subway, road and rail tunnels (City of 

New York, 2013b; NYS, 2013). 

These community-based efforts have led to a number of recommendations to improve 

resilience of infrastructure systems, including a transportation study for San 

Francisco (SPUR, 2010) and several studies of facilities in New York City following 

Hurricane Sandy (City of New York, 2013b; NYS, 2013). These recommendations 

generally include a comprehensive community-based risk assessment, strengthening 

of existing critical transportation networks, increasing system redundancies, and 

implementation of enhanced guidelines, standards, policies, and procedures to build 

more resilient facilities. 

6.4 Interdependencies 

All transportation systems rely on other components of the civil infrastructure for 

their operation. Power and communication systems are required for operation of 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-9 
electric trains, rail and roadway signals, airport control systems, harbor cranes, and 

other transportation-related electrical equipment. Until power and telecommunication 

services are restored to an area, transportation systems will have limited 

functionality. 

Fuel supply is also essential for operation of airplanes, ships and most vehicles. 

Damage to refineries, fuel storage tanks, pump stations, and transmission pipelines 

will limit the fuel supply, and damage to road and rail networks will hamper alternate 

fuel deliveries. As highlighted in Section 4.5, Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy 

demonstrated the vulnerability of the fuel production and distribution systems and the 

consequences for recovery of the transportation system. 

A port has limited function if there is no road or rail connection leading inland from 

the port. The same applies to airports. Damage to rail or road network connections to 

airports or harbors could result in significant downtime following an extreme 

earthquake or tsunami, with repair and recovery time on the order of months. 

Pipelines are also a critical link for bulk cargo transportation between harbors and 

storage facilities or supply networks (see Chapter 4). At the same time, these systems 

are often complementary, making the overall transportation infrastructure more 

resilient. For example, loss of rail service can be augmented by truck and barge 

transport, while loss of air traffic to a particular location can be replaced by surface 

transport. Damage to a single port can generally be offset by redirecting traffic to 

adjacent ports. Damage to a bulk material pipeline can be replaced by road or rail 

transport. These substitutions will seldom be as efficient as the original system, and 

may become overwhelmed if the alternate means of transport themselves suffer 

damage or were initially near maximum capacity and do not have the ability to 

accommodate the increased traffic. 

If local rail or road networks are already near capacity, then dealing with 

emergencies that limit the available network is particularly difficult. For example, 

road networks that are already near capacity with frequent extended traffic jams will 

become inoperable with the loss of only a few bridges or roadways. Alternative 

routes or modes of transportation should be available to bypass anticipated failures in 

the existing transportation networks. For example, after the 1989 Loma Prieta 

earthquake, BART and harbor ferries were able to increase service during the 

closures of the Bay Bridge and San Mateo Bridge (SPUR, 2010). 

The ability of a local transportation network to function effectively after damage to 

some of its components will depend on the level of redundancy in the network. 

Shiraki et al. (2007) studied the effect of 47 scenario earthquakes on the state 

highway and freeway network in Los Angeles and Orange Counties, which they note 

is highly redundant. They observed that for all but the largest scenario events, the 

average effect on travel times due to bridge damage is less than five minutes per 

6-10 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
passenger car unit in the Greater Los Angeles area. This average suppresses the large 

variation in travel times for individual vehicles on different routes, but confirms that 

transportation system redundancy is a critical component of community resilience. 

In contrast, after the Maule earthquake in Chile in 2010 the lack of alternate 

transportation corridors to bypass the earthquake damage to bridges along NorthSouth Highway 5 resulted in delays in the flow of goods and people. Road 

connectivity was reestablished using Bailey bridges and alternate routes, where 

available (Dueñas-Osorio and Kwasinski, 2012). 

6.5 Disaster Lessons 

All transportation systems are susceptible to damage or disruption during natural 

hazard events. Earthquakes can damage almost all components of transportation 

systems except boats and ships that are either at sea or docked in a port (that is not 

impacted by a tsunami), airplanes in flight or on an open taxiway, and trucks and cars 

on grade level roadways. Tsunamis and coastal storm surge with associated wave 

action can damage or destroy bridges, coastal roadways, port facilities including 

ships and boats, and coastal airports. Potentially the least threatening hazards for 

transportation systems are high-wind hazard events, such as hurricanes and tornados. 

In these events, damage is likely to be limited to transportation-associated buildings, 

fuel facilities and electrical power supply for railroads, though some historical 

failures of bridges have resulted from wind loading. 

6.5.1 Performance during Past Earthquakes 

The occurrence of a design or extreme earthquake near a major city may be a rare 

event but its societal and economic impacts can be so devastating that it is a matter of 

national interest. Recent examples of earthquake disasters, and associated fatalities 

and damage and loss estimates, include: Northridge, California in 1994 (60 fatalities 

and $40 billion in losses); Kobe, Japan, in 1995 (over 5,500 fatalities and $100 

billion in losses); Kocaeli, Turkey, in 1999 (over 17,000 fatalities and $20 billion in 

losses); Taiwan in 1999 (over 2,300 fatalities and $14 billion in losses); Gujarat, 

India in 2001 (over 20,000 fatalities); Southeastern Iran in 2003 (over 31,000 

fatalities and $32 billion in losses); Pakistan in 2005 (over 86,000 fatalities and $5 

billion in losses); Sichuan, China, in 2008 (over 87,000 fatalities and more than $86 

billion in losses); Haiti in 2010 (over 300,000 fatalities and $8 billion in losses); 

Christchurch, New Zealand, in 2011 (181 fatalities and more than $15 billion in 

losses); and Nepal in 2015 (over 9,000 fatalities and approximately $5 billion in 

losses) (Earthquake Report, 2014). 

The 1971 San Fernando earthquake in California provided numerous lessons for 

structural and geotechnical engineers regarding the performance of bridge and 

roadway structures when subjected to severe ground shaking. It led to significant 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-11 
 

improvement of new design codes for almost all components of the transportation 

infrastructure. The impacts of that earthquake also led to the initiation of a state-wide 

seismic retrofit program by Caltrans that focused on the improvement of bridge 

expansion joints (Penzien et al., 2003). 

Following the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, which caused bridge failures on major 

routes in the San Francisco Bay area, Caltrans expanded their seismic retrofit 

program to address other seismic deficiencies revealed during that earthquake. The 

Caltrans Bridge Design Specification Manual (Caltrans, 1986) was also revised and 

improved, based on new knowledge and lessons learned (ATC, 1996). The collapse 

of the elevated Cypress Viaduct section of Interstate 880 in Oakland and closure of 

the Bay Bridge led to significant delays due to increased traffic on alternate 

thoroughfares (Penzien et al., 2003). 

During the Northridge earthquake in 1994, only nine bridges suffered major damage 

or collapse, out of an estimated 1,600 bridges that experienced ground shaking 

exceeding 0.25g (Mitchell et al., 1995). Much of this improved performance was 

attributed to past seismic retrofits. As noted by Cooper et al. (2015), “These failures 

did, however, create severe hardships for the traveling public, involving as it did 

some of the busiest freeways in the world, including the Santa Monica Freeway 

(Interstate Highway 10) and the Antelope Valley Freeway (state Route 14)-Golden 

State Freeway (I-5) interchange” in the Los Angeles area. 

Railway bridges are also susceptible to collapse as occurred during the 1995 Kobe 

earthquake. The Shinkansen (Bullet Train) service on the Hankyu line was disrupted 

for six months. Alternate service via a major detour resulted in a two-hour trip from 

Osaka to Kobe compared with the half hour trip by Shinkansen (Endstation, 1998). 

Highways and rail lines adjacent to steep slopes or passing through canyons are also 

susceptible to damage or blockage due to rock falls or landslides triggered by the 

earthquake. 

Earthquake damage to airports is typically associated with structural and 

nonstructural damage to the terminal and hanger buildings. However, runways can 

also suffer from liquefaction and shaking induced settlement of subgrade soils, which 

can be difficult to repair in order for planes to use the runways safely. During the 

Loma Prieta earthquake, approximately 900 meters of the western end of Runway 11-

29 of the Metropolitan Oakland International Airport (MOIA) was damaged due to 

liquefaction (Grogan and Vallerga, 2000). Fortunately the North runway was 

undamaged so air traffic could still be accommodated while repairs, which took two 

months, were made to the damaged runway. However, air-cargo carriers were 

required to reduce their loads because of the limited take-off distance (Grogan and 

Vallerga, 2000). 

6-12 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
Seaports are also susceptible to damage due to ground shaking, often related to 

liquefaction of loose granular fill behind wharves and under slab-on-grade aprons. 

Cargo cranes have sustained damage during past earthquakes either due to 

liquefaction induced distortion of the track supports, or structural damage to the crane 

itself. The Port of Kobe was essentially shut down due to severe damage caused by 

the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, requiring two years of repairs before the port 

was again fully operational. Prior to the disaster, Kobe ranked sixth among container 

ports worldwide. This ranking dropped to 17th by 1997 due primarily to diversion of 

foreign transshipment cargo to competing Asian ports (Chang, 2000). 

Harbor entry channels and riverine waterways that require dredging to maintain 

sufficient draft in the channel may be impacted by landslides or slips that reduce the 

draft and prevent vessels from entering or leaving the port, or using the waterway. 

Locks and associated mechanical systems may suffer damage during earthquakes that 

make them inoperable, resulting in closure of inland waterways. The riverine 

waterways and the Gulf and Atlantic intracoastal waterways are at risk of blockage 

due to collapse of bridges crossing these waterways. Water traffic would only be able 

to resume once the resulting debris has been cleared from the shipping channel 

(Wyant, 2007). 

6.5.2 Performance during Past Tsunamis 

Recent damaging tsunamis have highlighted the exposure of coastal communities 

around the world to high velocity inundation associated with tsunamis. In particular, 

the Indian Ocean tsunami caused by a 9.1-magnitude earthquake off the West Coast 

of Northern Sumatra in 2004 resulted in over 225,000 deaths in countries bordering 

the Indian Ocean (IOC, 2013). This was a wake-up call that led to development of 

tsunami warning systems throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans, as well as the 

Caribbean and other tsunami-prone coastlines. Subsequent damaging tsunamis 

affecting Samoa in 2009 (192 fatalities), Chile in 2010 (156 fatalities), and Tohoku 

Japan in 2011 (over 18,700 fatalities and approximately $235 billion in losses) (IOC, 

2013; Economist, 2011) reinforced the need for improved tsunami preparedness both 

in terms of warning systems and evacuation planning, but also in the form of 

enhanced resilience of coastal communities. While Chile has largely recovered from 

the 2010 tsunami, much of the damage in Samoa has not been repaired, and many 

communities in Japan are still struggling to recover from the devastating effects of 

the Tohoku tsunami four years afterwards. 

During the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, numerous road and rail bridges were damaged or 

destroyed by the high velocity flow, while others survived structurally with damage 

only to non-structural components. Damage to airport and port buildings in the 

inundation zone was also extensive, though piers and wharfs performed surprisingly 

well, probably as a result of their design for large live loads, including ship impact 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-13 
during berthing, and earthquake lateral loading. Pore pressure softening of soil due to 

inundation followed by rapid drawdown of water resulted in extensive scour and 

sediment transport around port structures, below concrete aprons and behind wharves 

(Chock et al., 2013). 

6.5.3 Performance during Past High Wind Events 

Transportation infrastructure is generally immune to damage during high wind events. 

However, there are some notable exceptions. In 1879, the Tay Bridge in Scotland 

collapsed during a winter storm with wind gusts estimated at 80 miles per hour (mph), 

partly attributed to underestimation during the design of design wind pressures. In 

1940, the first Tacoma Narrows Bridge collapsed as a result of vortex shedding 

vibrations induced by a steady 40 mph wind. Subsequent bridge designs benefitted 

from these and similar lessons, and current bridge design requirements include 

adequate consideration of wind loading effects to avoid similar failures in the future. 

Other components of transportation systems are more susceptible to wind induced 

damage, such as power lines over electric rail lines, traffic lights at road intersections, 

airport and port buildings, particularly large volume warehouses and hangers. High 

wind damage to power distribution systems can cut power to transportation systems, 

degrading their functionality. 

6.5.4 Recovery and Reconstruction 

The rate of recovery and reconstruction in Japan after the 2011 Tohoku earthquake 

and tsunami may provide a good indication of how an industrialized nation with good 

preparation for earthquake and tsunami disasters might respond after a design level or 

greater event. These observations can be applied to similar coastal communities in 

the five western U.S. states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, and Hawaii, 

which all have seismic design requirements and an appreciable tsunami threat. They 

can also be compared to water inundation impacts resulting from hurricanes and 

major flooding in the United States and elsewhere. It must be noted that seismic 

design in Japan is somewhat more conservative than that applied in the United States, 

with less reliance on post-yielding ductility in the Japan designs. 

6.5.4.1 Re-Opening of Roadways 

Immediately after the 2011 Tohoku tsunami, emergency responders in Japan found it 

difficult to access the damaged areas because of debris on the roadways. Tunnels and 

subway systems can become flooded during coastal inundation due to either tsunamis 

or storm surge and wave action. Flooding during Hurricane Sandy resulted in 

considerable disruption to the heavily used transportation network in New York City, 

resulting in significant economic losses (City of New York, 2013b). Debris 

6-14 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
   

obstructions on road and rail systems also occur during earthquakes and high wind 

events. 

Priority is normally given to clearing debris from major and then secondary roadways 

throughout the hazard zone. In Japan, this process took from days to weeks, 

depending on the size of the affected community, but was predominantly complete 

within the first month after the tsunami (Chock et al., 2013). After Hurricane Sandy, 

it took two weeks for the transportation system in New York to recover to pre-event 

capacity and travel times (City of New York, 2013b). 

6.5.4.2 Reconstruction of Highway Bridges 

The road network is critical for accessing damaged areas for emergency response and 

recovery after a tsunami. Rapid repair of critical bridges is an essential component of 

recovery efforts. At numerous locations in Japan where critical bridges failed, 

temporary bridge structures were installed within the first month after the tsunami 

(see Figures 6-1 and 6-2). Although generally only providing one lane of traffic, 

these temporary structures were able to re-connect critical coastal highways, allowing 

for the resumption of road transportation in and out of the coastal region. These 

temporary bridge options work for shorter span bridges, but are not always possible 

when multiple spans of a longer bridge have failed. More permanent structures were 

constructed at longer bridge crossings of the Kitakami River and a river mouth in 

Rikuzenkoizumi (see Figure 6-3). This construction takes significantly longer than 

the temporary bridges, but they provide the same traffic lanes as the original bridge, 

and will provide many years of service until permanent replacement bridges can be 

constructed. 

Figure 6-1	 Temporary bridge restoring coastal highway in Minamisanriku, Japan (N 38.673519, E 

141.443135) (left) (one month after March 11, 2011 tsunami); and more substantial 

replacement bridge built 4 months later (right). (Photos courtesy of Ian Robertson). 

GCR 16-917-39	 6: Transportation 6-15 
   

 

Figure 6-2	 Temporary bridge restoring coastal highway in Rikuzentakata, Japan (N 39.009206, E 

141.630195) (left) (one month after March 11, 2011 tsunami), and bridge repaired within 

one year (right). (Photos courtesy of Ian Robertson). 

Figure 6-3	 Temporary steel girder bridge over river in Koizumi, Japan (N: 38.67933, E: 141.50787), 

just North of Utatsu, Japan, completed 107 days after the March 11, 2011 tsunami. 

(Photos courtesy of Ian Robertson). 

6.5.4.3 Reconstruction of Railway Systems 

Railway lines are most commonly used for commuter rail and freight trains. Railway 

lines located on grade or on embankments generally consist of tracks supported by 

sleepers resting in a gravel bed. The tracks are rigidly connected to the sleepers to 

maintain the correct gage, but the sleepers are not fixed to the ground, except 

possibly at level crossings. Earthquake shaking can distort the alignment, and if the 

rails are inundated by fast moving water during storm surge or a tsunami, the rails 

and sleepers are often washed away with the gravel bed. Rail lines may also become 

covered with debris making them impassable immediately after the event. This debris 

is relatively easy to clear, and new tracks can be laid within days, if necessary. 

In Japan, because of extensive damage to the coastal Japan Rail (JR) rail line during 

the 2011 tsunami, freight traffic was diverted to inland rail lines and highway truck 

6-16	 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
transport once these systems were inspected for earthquake damage. Railway bus 

routes were established to provide temporary commuter transport along some 

portions of the impacted coast. Many of the coastal rail lines may not be restored 

because of the extensive damage to bridges and embankments (Chock et al., 2013). 

In some locations in Japan, the idea of a coastal railway has been abandoned and 

replaced by Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems located in the previous rail alignment. 

After Hurricane Sandy, New York City implemented emergency bus transport to 

bypass flooded subway tunnels (City of New York, 2013b). Recommendations were 

also made to add or enhance bus rapid transit systems to improve resilience after 

future hazard events. 

Damage to components of the railway network may prevent rapid restoration of rail 

service. As with road bridges, railway bridges are susceptible to damage or collapse 

during strong ground shaking. Railway tunnels may also be damaged during 

earthquakes, but are unlikely to be damaged during a tsunami or high wind event. 

Soil embankments can suffer geotechnical failures during an earthquake or can be 

eroded by the high velocity flow during a tsunami, leading to a loss of the rail line 

even though the tunnels and bridges remain structurally intact. If the deck of a 

railway bridge is elevated above the flow depth during storm surge or a tsunami, it 

will likely survive without damage. However, when the flow depth exceeds the level 

of the bridge deck, severe damage to the bridge superstructure can occur, as observed 

during Hurricane Katrina (Robertson et al., 2007) and the Tohoku tsunami (Chock et 

al., 2013). 

Reconstruction of railway systems is more difficult than highway systems. Replacing 

track that has been disturbed by ground shaking or water inundation is relatively 

easy, as is clearing debris from tracks and tunnels. However, most bridge failures 

have to be replaced with new structures since temporary structures are not commonly 

available to support heavy train loads. This reconstruction can take from months to 

years. 

6.5.4.4 Reconstruction of Harbor and Port Facilities 

Commercial ports are essential for both national and international trade, while fishing 

ports and yacht marinas support important industries for many coastal communities. 

Most port facilities are, by necessity, constructed at or near sea level. During 

earthquakes, soil failures due to liquefaction and lateral spreading can damage 

pavements, piers, and wharves. Cargo handling cranes can suffer damage or jump 

from their tracks. 

During storm surge or tsunami inundation, ships, barges and other floating vessels 

that were not able to evacuate from the harbor may break free from their moorings 

and potentially cause substantial damage to the port infrastructure. Shipping 

GCR 16-917-39 6: Transportation 6-17 
containers will also float and become fast moving debris that can damage nearby 

structures. Fuel storage tanks adjacent to ports may float if they are not full, and are 

easily ruptured by impacts with other structures or floating debris, resulting in fuel 

spills and increased potential for fires. 

Incoming tsunami and storm surge flows can also cause large uplift pressures below 

wharfs and piers. During the Tohoku tsunami, this uplift caused damage to the panels 

that connect the pile-supported wharf and the adjacent grade-supported apron. Once 

these panels failed, the uplift pressure on the adjacent pile supported wharf was 

reduced, possibly protecting the wharf from further damage. 

Scour around structures and under slab-on-grade aprons can also be significant 

during inundation events. If this scour results in structural collapse then repair could 

take considerable time. However, if the scour only results in soil removal around 

structural elements, it can generally be repaired relatively quickly. 

Before shipping operations can resume at a damaged port, it is important to survey 

the harbor basin and access channels for submarine slope failures, sunken ships, 

containers and other debris that may impede harbor traffic. Unmanned Autonomous 

Vehicles (UAVs) can be used for this purpose, as well as sonar scans from small 

boats. Damaged piers and wharfs may take some time to repair, while damaged 

cranes can be replaced at least temporarily using mobile cranes or cargo handling 

equipment. 

6.6 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

There is a lack of information on societal expectations of transportation system 

performance during routine, design and extreme events and the anticipated time for 

recovery of their function after the event. More research is needed to fill this gap in 

knowledge. The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) provides a methodology for individual 

communities to develop short- and long-term plans to enhance their resilience to 

future disasters. This process includes the development of a community-based 

expectation of damage levels and recovery times for various components of the built 

environment, including transportation systems. This will also require input from 

transportation system operators and owners to develop an informed assessment of 

expected damage and recovery. The outcomes of early application of such a 

methodology would be helpful as indicators of typical community perception of the 

likely performance of the built environment, and their anticipation of the recovery 

time required to restore systems to their pre-disaster functionality. It is anticipated 

that public perceptions will vary, based on the location and size of the community, 

but these data are not yet available. 

6-18	 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Until more reliable data are available relating to societal perceptions of transportation 

infrastructure performance and recovery times, the opinions of experts in the fields of 

transportation infrastructure engineering and disaster recovery planning provide an 

initial estimate of the gaps between societal expectations and engineering reality. 

Table 6-3 has been populated using expert opinions from two studies of infrastructure 

fragility and recovery estimates. The first of these studies assembled a group of 

transportation experts from Caltrans, academia and other organizations to estimate 

both the extent of damage and recovery time for transportation infrastructure during 

the November 13, 2008 ShakeOut Scenario developed for Los Angeles and 

neighboring communities (Jones et al., 2008). The second set of expert opinions was 

generated by tsunami researchers during the development of a Tsunami Module for 

the federally-funded and publicly-available disaster scenario loss estimation software, 

HAZUS-MH (FEMA, 2012). Because these studies each had a particular purpose and 

geographical focus in mind, their findings do not necessarily translate directly to 

estimates of damage and down time for future events. Nevertheless, they have been 

Table 6-3	 Expert Opinion on Public Expectations of Transportation System Recovery Times after 

an Extreme Event, Compared with Engineering Estimates of Recovery Time 

Transportation System Short-term (days) Intermediate (weeks) Long-term (months) 

Component 1 2-4 5-7 1-4 4-8 8-12 3-6 6-24 24+ 

Extreme Wind Event** 

Highways* 

Railways* 

Commercial Airports 

Commercial Ports 

Extreme Earthquake Event*** 

Highways* 

Railways* 

Commercial Airports 

Commercial Ports 

Extreme Tsunami Event**** 

Highways* 

Railways* 

Commercial Airports 

Commercial Ports 

Public Expectation Engineering Estimate 

* Including bridges and tunnels 

** Wind estimates are those of the authors of this report.
 

*** Earthquake estimates based on Jones et al. (2008). 

**** Tsunami estimates based on FEMA (2012).
 

GCR 16-917-39	 6: Transportation 6-19 
 

used here to provide a rough estimate of recovery time for a typical urban 

transportation system after an extreme hazard event. More detailed information is 

provided in Section C.2 and Table C-1 in Appendix C. 

The estimates in Table 6-3 are offered as a starting point to assess societal 

expectations of transportation system performance. They are based on years of postdisaster observation and engineering judgment. No surveys or systematic research 

data were available to inform these estimates. 

Additional research is required to establish a more comprehensive understanding of 

societal expectations of the performance of transportation infrastructure systems 

during future routine, design and extreme hazard events, and also to assess their 

expectations of the associated recovery times. Targeted scenario studies and public 

education can then be used to raise awareness of the likely consequences of various 

level hazards, and close the gaps between societal expectations and likely 

infrastructure performance and recovery times. 

6.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 

6.7.1 Review of Key Points 

Resilient transportation networks are an essential component to ensure rapid recovery 

of communities affected by natural hazards. Following a disaster, transportation 

networks provide the means to import resources, equipment and labor to assist in 

recovery efforts. They also facilitate the movement of people and goods within the 

affected community and to and from neighboring communities unaffected by the 

disaster. Resilience of transportation systems can be enhanced by various strategies, 

such as improved design of components of existing transportation systems through 

mitigation and retrofit projects, improving performance based design of future 

components, expanding design considerations to the entire system, and increasing 

both single-mode and multimodal redundancy. 

Community-based planning is required to identify critical components of local 

transportation networks. These planning efforts must be performed in collaboration 

with the respective transportation system owners and operators, and take into account 

all redundancies and potential alternate modes of transportation. Critical components 

identified through this process should be designed to meet community goals to 

minimize the possibility of loss of function after an extreme event. 

6.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs 

Following is the study team’s key recommendation: 

	 Expand design standards and procedures for transportation systems to 

consider the performance of the entire transportation network in addition to 

6-20	 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
individual components of the network. Current design standards relating to 

transportation systems focus almost exclusively on the individual components 

that make up each system. Although these design standards provide high 

reliability of good performance during routine and design natural hazard events, 

system performance needs to be addressed. There is a lack of guidance on 

planning and designing an entire transportation network to maintain its function 

of transporting people and goods immediately after a natural hazard event. 

6.7.3 Research Needs 

The following key study is recommended: 

	 Conduct focused research to determine societal considerations and 

expectations pertaining to the performance of transportation infrastructure 

during future routine, design and extreme hazard events. Relatively little is 

known about public perception of transportation system resilience and recovery 

expectations. Apart from some localized community planning efforts, little 

research has been performed to determine societal expectations of the 

transportation infrastructure performance during future hazard events. Accurately 

quantifying the gaps that occur between societal expectations and engineering 

reality will help to improve public education and planning for recovery and 

reconstruction after future hazard events. Better understanding of these gaps will 

help the community prioritize mitigation and retrofit projects, and also encourage 

them to identify alternative solutions that can satisfy the community’s 

transportation needs immediately after a disaster. 

6.7.4 Lifeline System Operational Needs 

The following key transportation network operational activity is recommended: 

	 Enhance network resilience through improved maintenance of the existing 

transportation infrastructure. Aging of the transportation infrastructure 

presents states and local communities with significant challenges, both with 

respect to regular maintenance of existing infrastructure, as well as the need to 

enhance resilience for future hazard events. Difficult decisions will need to be 

made to prioritize and fund these efforts so that the transportation system can 

continue to serve its intended function. 

6.7.5 Future Considerations and Trends 

Climate change over the coming decades is likely to place greater demands on coastal 

transportation infrastructure. Global warming with the associated sea level rise, and 

increased tropical storm frequency and intensity will adversely affect coastal 

transportation systems including ports, harbors, coastal bridges, highways, rail lines, 

and airports. 

GCR 16-917-39	 6: Transportation 6-21 
Future trends in distributed power generation and alternate fuel development may 

increase transportation system resilience. Increased use of alternative fuel 

transportation systems and the likelihood of driverless vehicles in the near future may 

alter road transportation significantly. The potential for dispersed power generation 

for charging electric vehicles or producing hydrogen for fuel cell engines could 

improve resilience when power and fuel distribution systems are interrupted. 

6-22 6: Transportation GCR 16-917-39 
Chapter 7 

Water and Wastewater 

7.1 Systems Overview 

The water systems described in this document provide domestic and industrial 

potable water service. The wastewater systems described provide sanitary and storm 

water sewer collection services. Where referenced, service connections for storm 

water drainage systems are essentially catch basins and other locations where storm 

water can enter the collection system. In the context of lifeline engineering, 

conventional treatment of storm water does not include all the facilities needed to 

protect communities against floods and inundation. However, flood control systems 

may be affected by storm water management. Water, wastewater, and storm water 

systems range from relatively small simple local networks to large complex 

geographically distributed networks. This section summarizes the main points related 

to societal expectations of acceptable system performance levels and restoration 

timeframes. Appendix D—Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis—provides 

additional supporting documentation referenced in this chapter. 

7.1.1 Water Systems 

The main purpose of establishing and maintaining a water system is to ensure a safe 

and reliable water supply. Water systems generally serve the following functions 

(Davis and Giovinazzi, 2015): 

1.	 Providing potable water supply for domestic, commercial, and industrial uses, 

including critical services (e.g., firefighting), emergency operations and 

evacuation centers, and for other lifeline systems; and 

2.	 Providing potable or non-potable water supply for cleaning, flushing, cooling, 

firefighting, irrigation, recreation, and environmental quality. 

This document addresses potable systems providing the above services. Water 

systems consist of several subsystems, including raw water supply, treatment, 

transmission, and distribution systems as described in Table 7-1. The division 

between the subsystems shown in Table 7-1 is not always clear. However, in general 

more advanced water systems have more distinct subsystems. System division into 

subsystems helps in the understanding and definition of the functions of planning, 

design, and operations. A hierarchical view of the subsystem structure allows for an 

assessment of major functions, their relative importance, and operational procedures, 

as well as overall water system serviceability and resiliency. Table 7-1 also identifies 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-1 
Table 7-1 Major Potable Water Subsystems (Modified from Davis and O’Rourke, 

2011; Davis and Giovinazzi, 2015) 

Subsystems Description Typical Facilities/Components 

Raw Water Supply Systems Systems providing raw water for 

local storage or treatment, 

including local catchment, 

groundwater, rivers, natural and 

manmade lakes and reservoirs, 

aqueducts. 

Reservoirs, pump stations, wells, 

bar screens, head works, intakes, 

pipelines, canals, tunnels, gates and 

valves, dams, levees; may also 

include desalination plants and 

wastewater treatment plants as 

water sources. Some systems 

include power plants, and other 

energy dissipating structures, such 

as regulating stations or cascading 

channels. 

Treatment Systems Systems for treating and 

disinfecting water to make it 

potable for safe use by 

customers. 

Treatment plants, filtration systems, 

screens, settling basins, ultra violet 

processes, chlorination stations, 

chloramination stations, and other 

chemical stations (e.g., fluoridation, 

hypo-chlorination, chloramine). 

Transmission Systems Systems for conveying raw or 

treated water. Raw water 

Medium to large diameter pipes, 

tunnels, reservoirs and tanks, 

transmission systems convey 

water from a local supply or 

storage source to a treatment 

point. Treated water 

transmission systems, often 

referred to as trunk line systems, 

convey water from a treatment 

or potable storage point to a 

distribution area. 

pumping stations, valves, regulating 

stations. Some systems include 

power plants, and other energy 

dissipating components. 

Distribution Systems Networks for distributing water to 

domestic, commercial, business, 

All pumping stations, regulating 

stations, tanks and reservoirs, 

industrial, and other customers. valves, and piping that are not 

defined as part of another system 

and form a network from 

connections at the transmission 

systems to points of service. 

Includes service laterals, hydrant 

laterals and fire hydrants, and 

meters. 

Notes: 

(1) Pump stations and treatment systems have their own site-specific subsystems made up of mechanical, 

electrical, and civil engineered subsystems and components. 

(2) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems are used to monitor and operate water systems. 

(3) Buildings and facilities, including central headquarters, operation and maintenance yards, pump station 

housings, treatment and disinfection system housings, and other components are also a part of a water 

system and each subsystem. 

7-2 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
 

typical facilities or components comprising the different subsystems. The structuring 

described here allows for many types of water systems with many different attributes 

to be addressed within a common framework. 

7.1.2 Wastewater Systems 

The main purpose of establishing and maintaining a wastewater system is to ensure 

reliable removal of fluid waste to promote public health and safety. Wastewater 

systems generally involve the removal of both sanitary waste and storm water and 

serve the following functions: 

1.	 Removing wastewater from domestic, commercial, and industrial buildings and 

facilities. 

2.	 Providing alternative reclaimed water supply sources for cleaning, flushing, 

cooling, firefighting, irrigation, recreation, environmental quality, direct potable 

reuse, groundwater recharge, and other uses. 

3.	 Providing surface or subsurface water drainage to protect people and 

infrastructure against flooding from storms and prevent water from ponding and 

causing public health problems. These functions include separate storm water 

drainage systems or combined storm and sanitation wastewater systems. 

4.	 Storm water capture for drainage systems (separate from or preceding its 

combination with sanitary sewer systems). This operation is also sometimes 

called rainwater harvesting. 

Wastewater systems consist of several subsystems, including collection, conveyance, 

treatment, and disposal systems as described in Table 7-2. The division between the 

subsystems shown in Table 7-2 is not always clear. However, in general more 

advanced wastewater systems have more distinct subsystems. As in the case of water 

systems (above), the division of wastewater systems into subsystems helps to define 

planning, design, and operational functions, their relative importance, and 

contributions to system serviceability and resiliency. Table 7-2 also identifies typical 

facilities and components comprising the different subsystems. The structuring 

allows for many types of wastewater systems, having many different attributes, to be 

addressed within a common framework. 

7.1.3 Storm Water and Flood Control Systems 

Drainage for beneficial land use and the management of storm water are important 

functions of water and wastewater management and an integral part of local and 

regional flood control systems. The collection, diversion, storage, and release of 

storm and drainage water involves a wide range of options. Under extreme 

conditions, storm water control may require substantial pumping capacity, as 

exemplified by the largest pump station in the world in New Orleans that is capable 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-3 
 

Table 7-2 Major Wastewater Subsystems (Davis, 2014b) 

Subsystems 

Collection Systems 

Conveyance 

Systems 

Treatment Systems 

Discharge/ Disposal 

Systems 

Description 

Networks for collecting wastewater 

from domestic, business, industrial, 

and other customers. 

Systems for conveying raw sewage or 

storm water. Raw water conveyance 

systems, sometimes referred to as 

trunk systems, convey sewage and 

storm water from, or within, service 

areas to points of treatment. 

Systems for treating and disinfecting 

sewage and storm water to make it 

safe for disposal or for recycling/ 

reclaiming water for alternate safe use 

by customers as part of a water 

system. 

Systems for discharging or disposing 

of treated sewage and storm water or 

for dispersing treated water for use by 

customers or long-term storage. In 

some cases these systems may also 

discharge untreated or partially treated 

sewage or storm water. 

Typical Facilities/Components 

All piping, manholes, pumping 

stations, force mains, and other 

components that are not defined as 

part of another system and form a 

network from customer connections 

to points in the conveyance system, 

including service laterals. 

Specific storm drainage facilities: 

laterals, drains, catch basins, 

channels, curb and gutter, streets. 

Pipelines, force mains, tunnels, 

interceptors, pumping stations 

(influent and satellite), manholes, 

drop and riser shafts, surge 

chambers, gates and valves, storage 

tanks and chambers. 

Specific storm drainage facilities: 

catch basins, drains, culverts, 

channels, curb and gutter, streets. 

Treatment plants, screens, grit 

chambers, sedimentation basins and 

tanks, bio-treatment, clarifiers, 

filtration systems, galleries, ponds 

and lagoons, levees, chlorine or other 

chemical disinfectant facilities, 

chlorination stations, pump stations 

not related to conveyance and 

discharge systems, digesters, solids 

processing, centrifuge. 

Outfalls (ocean, sea, lake), river and 

creek outlets, levees, diffusers, gates 

and valves, flaps, disposal pumping 

stations, weirs, channels, recharge 

basins (for reuse), and septic 

systems. 

Transmission lines to customers or 

storage locations that provide an 

interface with water systems where 

recycled water is used from 

wastewater treatment plants and 

storm water collection sources). 

Notes: 

(1) Pump stations and treatment systems have their own site-specific subsystems made up of mechanical, 

electrical, and civil engineered subsystems and components. 

(2) Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems are used to monitor and operate wastewater systems. 

(3) Buildings and facilities, including central headquarters, operation and maintenance yards, pump station 

housings, treatment and disinfection system housings are also a part of a wastewater system and each 

subsystem. 

7-4 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
 

of pumping 150,000 gallons/sec. (Reid, 2013). Wastewater management may also 

involve modifications in traditional land use to reduce the impact of new construction 

on natural hydrologic features (e.g., Williams and Wise, 2009). 

Davis (2014b) refers to inundation protection systems as the combination of storm 

water and drainage operations with regional flood management systems. Land use 

expansion into flood-vulnerable areas is often coupled with the construction of flood 

control systems that provide barriers to inundation, and collect, divert, store or detain 

water and debris. Although flood control systems are not regarded as part of water, 

wastewater, and storm water systems, the two are often closely linked. 

The increasing threats from climate change may be addressed by the development 

and improvement of flood protection systems, including a better understanding of the 

role provided by water, wastewater, and storm water management in preventing or 

reducing inundation. This role is frequently overlooked and thus represents an 

opportunity for broader, more integrative planning to promote community resilience. 

7.2 Summary of Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

This section first reviews existing performance requirements for water and 

wastewater systems and methods for evaluating system performance levels. This is 

followed by discussion of recent efforts to define system performance requirements. 

7.2.1 Existing Standards and Performance Objectives 

Appendix D, Section D.1 tabulates and summarizes 59 documents reviewed for this 

project. They include one code, 15 standards, 19 guidelines, and 24 manuals. Table 

7-3 summarizes water and wastewater system design performance requirements for 

hazard events drawing on the more detailed information provided in Appendix D. 

While the analysis focused on water and wastewater systems, many of these 

documents also apply to flood control systems. 

There is a wide range of existing performance requirements for various hazards 

related to water and wastewater systems. Table 7-3 includes, where information is 

available, many different components of water and wastewater systems listed in 

Tables 7-1 and 7-2. Table 7-3 summarizes the performance levels for different types 

of facilities or subsystems. Specialized structures including dams, levees, and 

tunnels, are also included in Table 7-3. 

As Table 7-3 shows, existing performance objectives are focused on life safety, 

public health, and fire protection. Life safety is addressed for buildings and 

structures, tanks and reservoirs, dams, tunnels, and mechanical and electrical 

equipment. Public health is addressed for the overall water and wastewater systems. 

Fire protection is addressed for water systems. 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-5 
 

Table 7-3 Summary of Design Performance Requirements for Hazard Events 

Existing Codes Guidelines Hazards Associated 

Component(s) Performance Jurisdictional and Standards and Manuals with Performance 

or Subsystem Level Authority (Yes or No) (Yes or No) Criteria 

Buildings and 

Other Structures 

Life Safety Building Code/Building 

authority 

Yes Yes, many but not 

presented herein. 

IBC, American Society of 

Civil Engineers (ASCE) 

7: flood, wind, snow, 

rain, ice, and seismic. 

Tanks and 

Reservoirs 

Life Safety Building code and 

other standards 

Yes Yes, many but not 

presented herein. 

ASCE 7: flood, wind, 

snow, rain, ice, and 

seismic. 

Water Retaining 

Dams 

Life Safety State Dam Safety 

organizations and 

Federal Energy 

Regulatory 

Commission (FERC) 

Yes, but mostly state 

of practice. 

Yes, many but not 

presented herein. 

Flood, earthquake, and 

others, as needed to 

ensure life safety. 

Levees None identified None identified, 

possible local 

authorities in some 

None identified Yes, mostly flood & 

earthquake but not 

presented herein. 

Flood and earthquake 

design, but not 

presented herein. 

areas 

Tunnels Life Safety Occupational Safety 

and Health 

Administration (OSHA) 

Yes, but mostly state 

of practice. 

Yes, many but not 

presented herein. 

Flood and earthquake 

design, but not 

presented herein. 

Pipelines None identified None identified None in U.S. address 

hazard performance. 

International 

Organization for 

Standards (ISO) 

standards exist. 

ASCE, ALA and 

MCEER for 

earthquake. 

Earthquake for pipe 

design guidelines. 

Mechanical 

Equipment 

Life Safety Building Code/Building 

authority for certain 

facilities only 

Yes, but none 

addressed herein, 

see American 

Lifelines Alliance 

Yes Earthquake 

qualifications. 

(ALA) (2004a) for 

listings. 

Electrical 

Equipment 

Life Safety Building Code/Building 

authority for certain 

facilities only 

Yes, but none 

addressed herein, 

see ALA (2004a) for 

listings. 

Yes Earthquake 

qualifications, possibly 

others. 

Water System Public Health Federal, state, local 

public health 

departments 

Yes, American Water 

Works Association 

(AWWA) (2010) but 

concerns addressed 

Yes, some address 

hazards. 

Standard (AWWA, 2010) 

and Guidelines cover 

earthquake, ground 

deformation, wind, 

in Appendix D. tornado, icing, flooding, 

and human threats. 

Wastewater 

System 

Public Health Federal, state, local 

public health 

departments 

Yes, AWWA (2010) 

but concerns 

addressed in 

Appendix D. 

Yes, some address 

hazards. 

Standard (AWWA, 2010) 

and Guidelines cover 

earthquake, ground 

deformation, wind, 

tornado, icing, flooding, 

and human threats. 

Water System Fire Protection State Health and 

Safety codes for fire 

Yes, but does not 

address hazards 

beyond fire. 

Yes, some address 

hazards and fire 

following earthquake. 

Earthquake (ASCE, 

2005a). 

7-6 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
 

There are no consistent hazard design criteria for components, except for buildings 

and structures. Pipelines have no hazard performance requirements, but some 

guidance is provided for earthquake hazards. Several documents provide guidance for 

earthquake systemic performance criteria based on the Uniform Building Code 

(UBC), which is no longer in use. Consistency is lacking on the hazards to be 

evaluated for the components of water and wastewater systems. Where performance 

goals are identified, they are set for a single hazard level. The sole exception pertains 

to earthquakes, for which earthquake performance goals are generally established for 

two or three seismic hazard levels. 

For the most part, there is no recommended restoration time for water and wastewater 

systems included with any of the performance criteria. The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) 

does, however, estimate recovery times implied by current codes. Appendix D, 

Sections D.2.1 and D.2.2, reviews performance goals/targets for four water systems and 

three wastewater systems located on the west coast showing how different targets are 

linked with restoration times. 

Davis (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) identifies water, wastewater, and inundation protection 

system core services (drainage and flood control) and how they relate to performance 

categories for these systems. These performance categories are identified in Table 7-4. 

Essentially, all the performance categories described in AWWA (1994), ALA (2004b, 

2005a, 2005b), ASCE (1999, 2002), KJC (1993), NIST (1997), WRF (2012) are 

grouped into the three categories shown in Table 7-4, except the accessibility services 

described below. There are five baseline service categories each for water and 

wastewater systems, which are summarized in Tables 7-5 and 7-6, respectively. 

Accessibility services provide customers access to the basic water or wastewater 

services through alternative sources or locations that are available for the period after 

an event when the services identified in Tables 7-4 to 7-6 cannot be obtained 

conventionally (e.g., potable water from kitchen faucet) through the infrastructure 

networks (Davis, 2014a). An example of a water accessibility service is the provision 

of pre-packaged water while potable water cannot be provided through the network. An 

example wastewater accessibility service is the provision of portable toilets. Some of 

Table 7-4	 Primary Water and Wastewater System Performance Categories 

Provided by Infrastructure Networks 

Performance Category	 Description 

Water and Wastewater Services Provision of water and wastewater services identified in 

Tables 7-5 and 7-6, respectively. 

Life Safety Preventing injuries and casualties from direct or indirect 

damage to system facilities; includes safety matters related 

to response and restoration activities.
 

Property Protection Preventing property damage as a result of damage to system 

components; also includes preventing system damage. 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-7 
Table 7-5 Water Service Categories Provided through Built Infrastructure 

Networks 

Service Categories Description 

Water Delivery The system is able to distribute water to customer service connections, but 

water delivered may not meet quality standards (requires water purification 

notice), pre-event volumes (requires water rationing), fire flow requirements 

(impacting firefighting capabilities), or pre-event functionality (inhibiting system 

operations). 

Quality The water quality at service connections meets pre-event standards. Potable 

water meets health standards (water purification notices removed), including 

minimum pressure requirements to ensure contaminants do not enter the 

system. 

Quantity Water flow to customer service connections meets pre-event volumes (water 

rationing removed). 

Fire Protection The system is able to provide pressure and flow of a suitable magnitude and 

duration to fight fires. 

Functionality	 The system functions perform at pre-event or improved reliability, including 

pressure (operational constraints resulting from the event have been 

removed/resolved). 

Table 7-6 Wastewater Service Categories Provided through Built Infrastructure 

Networks 

Service Categories Description 

Wastewater The system is able to collect and remove wastewater at the customer service 

Collection/Removal	 connections without sewage overflow, but the system may not be able to treat 

collected wastewater to meet quality standards, properly dispose of 

wastewater, or meet pre-event functionality (inhibiting system operations). 

Quality Wastewater is treated to pre-event volumes using available processes, while 

meeting public health standards. 

Disposal Entire wastewater volume is able to be properly disposed, protecting the 

environment, and meeting public health standards (including containment 

within pipe network). 

Reclaimed Source Wastewater is able to be treated and used as an alternative source of water 

supply (Note: This does not apply to all wastewater systems). 

Functionality The system functions perform at pre-event or improved reliability (operational 

constraints resulting from the event have been removed/resolved). 

the existing performance objectives summarized in Appendix D, Section D.2 include 

accessibility services. The scope of this project focuses on the water and wastewater 

infrastructure and therefore does not include accessibility services. However, the 

overall performance of water and wastewater systems relies on accessibility services 

in the days to months following an event. 

7-8 7: Water and Wastewater	 GCR 16-917-39 
 

                                                            

7.2.2 Recent Developments 

Davis (2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c) and Davis et al. (2012) provide guidance on how 

to identify and utilize core services for water, wastewater, and protection against 

inundation. The core services are related to system performance categories using 

common network components and topology. Davis et al. (2012) and Davis (2014a) 

show how these services are measured in existing systems using the Los Angeles 

Water System performance during the 1994 Northridge earthquake and the Table 7-5 

service definitions. The results are graphed in Figure 7-1 as the cumulative times 

needed to restore the services identified in Table 7-5. Davis (2014b and 2014c) 

presents a methodology to calculate system functionality for the subsystems 

identified in Tables 7-1 and 7-2. Hirayama and Davis (2013) describe how the 

procedure is useful for helping to quantify resilience improvements for the Kobe 

Waterworks Bureau implemented since the 1995 earthquake. 

Davis (2014a and 2014b) defines system operability and how important this metric is 

in supporting community resilience. As seen in Figure 7-1, operability is defined as 

the cumulative time needed to restore the services identified in Tables 7-5 and 7-6, 

respectively for each system, other than functionality.28 

Figure 7-1	 Los Angeles water system service restorations following the 1994 Northridge 

earthquake (Davis et al., 2012; Davis, 2014a). 

28 This project focuses on societal effects of system service losses and restoration which is more 

related to operability and, as a result, functionality will only be described in relation to the other 

services. 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-9 
Davis (2014a) also describes how system operation to address one service may affect 

and possibly inhibit the performance needed to support another service in a disaster. 

Using water system quality and fire protection services as an example, a system can 

usually be restored more rapidly when not accounting for water quality services to 

meet fire protection services. However, this requires non-potable water to be placed 

within the network, which is generally made accessible to all customers requiring that 

the system get permission from public health officials or violate public health laws. 

Alternatively, water restoration can be delayed (sometimes significantly, as occurred 

after the 1995 Kobe Japan earthquake) to provide water quality meeting public health 

requirements once restored, but at the sacrifice of not providing firefighting water 

supplies for the same duration. 

7.3 Societal Considerations 

Water and wastewater systems are essential for life, public health, firefighting, and 

industrial processes. Chapter 2 provides information on societal considerations for 

water following earthquakes. It is clear society relies on water and wastewater 

systems to provide basic water and sanitation services for life safety, public health, 

and economic wellbeing. Important societal services are identified in Tables 7-4 to 7-

6. In addition, some basic survival needs can be met with alternative sources to the 

networks through accessibility services, which may or may not be the responsibility 

of the utility owners and operators. The social needs must be met over time using a 

combination of the water and wastewater networks and alternative services; plans 

must include both. 

7.3.1 Societal Service Functions for Recovery Phases 

Tables 7-7 and 7-8 present the societal service functions of water and wastewater 

systems for the three recovery phases (short, intermediate, and long-term) proposed 

in the National Disaster Recovery Framework (FEMA, 2011). The levels of 

restoration for each of the core services identified in Tables 7-5 and 7-6, respectively, 

are described in Tables 7-7 and 7-8 for each phase of recovery in terms of the 

systemic support for community critical and non-critical facilities and lifelines. 

Hospitals, nursing homes, and emergency evacuation shelters need to remain 

operable, or resume operation as soon as possible after disaster occurs. While 

providing life safety and property protection, the restoration priorities for water and 

wastewater need to be established for critical community facilities as well as for other 

lifelines that support them. For example, water, wastewater, and electricity are 

needed to ensure that hospitals can operate, and thus priority should to be given to the 

restoration of these services. Restoration priorities will vary for each system. 

7-10 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
   

Table 7-7 Societal Serving Functions during Disaster Recovery of Core Water Services Provided 

through the Infrastructure Systems 

Short-term Phase Intermediate Phase Long-term Phase 

Service (days) (weeks to months) (months to years) 

Non-critical Facilities Critical Facilities & Lifelines 

Water 

Delivery 

Sufficient to meet fire 

protection services 

Note 1 

Sufficient to meet quality, 

quantity, and fire protection 

services 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable 

Quality Note 1 Potable services to all facilities 

requiring human consumption 

and health care 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable 

Note 1 

Quantity Note 1 

Governed by fire 

protection services 

Minimum volumes to meet facility 

purposes and fire protection 

services 

Notes 1 and 2 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable 

Fire 

Protection 

Requires minimum flow rate through combination of network 

and alternative sources at distances to firefighting sites. Need 

minimum pressure where network utilized (Note 4). 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Note 6 

Fully operable 

Functionality Sufficient to provide minimum state of operability for other 

services 

Minimum level to provide 

state of operability 

Fully restore 

Note 5 

Note 1. Individuals should be prepared and have storage of their own supplies sufficient to survive through the short-term as 

recommended by emergency management. 

Note 2. Minimum volumes to meet minimum health care functionality, emergency evacuation and other needs, such as those for 

mass care centers if alternative accessibility services are insufficient. 

Note 3. There is a transition period within the intermediate-term where water delivery, quality, quantity, and fire protection services 

gradually improve from that identified for short-term to that identified for fully operable. 

Note 4. Pressure needs to be sufficient to suppress fires in high-rise structures and to relay water to a distance no greater than the 

capability of existing firefighting equipment. 

Note 5. Known vulnerabilities need to be removed; may require reconstruction at locations where repairs were undertaken in shortterm and intermediate-term phases. 

Note 6. Fire underwriters generally require minimum operating pressure of 25 psi (140 kPa) to resist hose collapse when connected 

to hydrants during firefighting. 

7.3.2 System Societal Services and Interactions 

The loss of water and wastewater system services compromises basic survival, public 

health, personal dignity, and economic wellbeing. These two systems have 

interactions; Davis (2014a) identifies water service interactions that arise when the 

service categories described in Table 7-5 are provided by a single pipeline network. 

The loss of water delivery is crucial because it restricts the provision of virtually all 

water and wastewater services. Water service interactions between water delivery and 

quality as well as quality and quantity can have significant societal impacts. 

Declining water quality can result in health concerns that prevent water delivery 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-11 
 

Table 7-8 Societal Serving Functions during Disaster Recovery of Core Wastewater Services 

Provided through the Infrastructure Systems 

Short-term Phase
 

Service (days) 

Non-Critical Critical Facilities & 

Facilities Lifelines 

Wastewater Note 1 Sufficient for public health, 

Collection/ dignity, and operational 

Removal requirements 

Quality Decontaminate and monitor. Partially dictated by disposal 

services. 

Note 2 

Disposal Minimum volumes not able to be handled using 

alternative services; alternatives should not result in 

significant public health or environment degradation. 

Reclaimed Generally not needed Minimum volume and quality 

Source where providing services for 

essential functions (Note 4); 

see Table 7-7 

Functionality Sufficient to provide minimum state of operability for other 

services 

Intermediate Phase 

(weeks to months) 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable 

Note 3 

Fully operable for critical 

facilities and lifelines; 

partially operable for all 

other 

Minimum level to provide 

state of operability 

Long-term Phase 

(months to years) 

Fully operable 

Fully operable 

Fully operable 

Fully operable 

Fully restore 

Note 5 

Note 1. Individuals should be prepared and able to manage personal waste for the short-term.
 

Note 2. Quality can be compromised during short-term.
 

Note 3. There is a transition period within the intermediate-term where wastewater collection, quality, and disposal services gradually 

improve from that identified for short-term to that identified for fully operable. In some locations storm water drainage may 

not require full operability at intermediate-term phase if drainage can be achieved in alternate form without threatening 

public health, safety, or property damage. 

Note 4. Essential functions may include cooling for refineries, water for creating steam at electric power generator, firefighting, and 

other functions. 

Note 5. Known vulnerabilities need to be removed; may require reconstruction at locations where repairs were undertaken in shortterm and intermediate-term phases. 

(Davis, 2014a). This, in turn, can amplify the effects of other health hazards and 

restrict fire-fighting capabilities, compromising emergency response essential for 

community resilience. If there is sufficient volume to provide some water delivery 

services, then delivery may be allowed in combination with public information on 

water purification in extreme cases (e.g., CDPH, 2003). In this way, water can still be 

utilized for numerous activities such as the use of home toilets (if sanitary sewer 

collection service is available), treating water at point of use, heating, and cooling. 

Informed by numerous disasters impacting water quality, Adams (1999) points out 

that if “choices need to be made about increasing water quantity or improving water 

quality when time and resources are scarce, priority should always be given to 

increasing the quantity of water available, even if the water provided is 

contaminated,” pending available water. Adams (1999) notes “in many emergencies, 

7-12	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
the most important routes for the transmission of water- and excreta-related disease 

are linked to hygiene problems caused by insufficient quantity of water, rather than 

by contaminated water supplies.” Water quantity services can be partially met 

through reductions in customer demand. There are examples of water conservation 

and voluntary reductions in demand immediately after a disruptive event strikes. 

On a daily basis, society relies upon water systems to provide sufficient volume and 

pressure for fire suppression. Fires commonly ignite following other hazard 

occurrences, such as earthquakes and floods. Fires can be fought in many ways, but 

most times water is utilized from the distribution network. Communities can tolerate 

water loss in a system as long as it does not prevent firefighters from controlling 

fires, as was the case following the 1994 Northridge earthquake in Los Angeles. 

Although rare, the fires can result in conflagrations causing severe property loss and 

casualties. In such rare instances, the absence of water can be the cause of significant 

property loss and mortality, as was experienced following the 1906 San Francisco 

earthquake, 1923 Great Kanto earthquake in Tokyo, Japan, and 1995 Kobe, Japan 

earthquake. 

Society generally has high expectations for reliable water and wastewater services 

under normal conditions and in routine hazard events. There can be little tolerance 

for service outages after routine events. Chapter 2 explains how society can tolerate 

certain amounts of water and wastewater service losses for a limited time during and 

after extreme events, typically those exceeding routine events. This is true as long as 

people and property remain safe and system damage does not lead to cascading 

impacts (e.g., downstream inundation from dam failure following an earthquake or 

flood). After most relatively severe events, immediate water and basic sanitation 

needs can often be met using accessibility services—alternatives to the water or 

wastewater networks (e.g., bottled water and portable toilets). An exception to this 

consideration is the loss of wastewater system capability to provide drainage, leading 

to severe flooding. 

7.3.3 Accessibility Services 

The duration of acceptable water and wastewater service outage is related to 

accessibility services. The scope of this report does not include defining and 

investigating the accessibility services, but some descriptive examples are provided 

to show how they influence the restoration of water and wastewater services. 

Acceptable service outage durations are a function of accessibility to alternatives in 

both distance and allocation. For example, people may tolerate lengthier disruptions 

in potable water service delivery if bottled water is delivered to their homes. By 

comparison, if they have to go a significant distance each way every day to retrieve 

an allotted gallon of water per person they may not be as tolerable, especially if they 

live in an upper story of a multistory complex. Similarly, a person is more likely to 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-13 
accept using a portable toilet right outside their single story home as compared to 

someone who must descend six stories to access such ground floor facilities. 

The allocation of alternatives must meet basic survival needs for the duration of 

service outages. If the water delivery service is not restored for two weeks, but the 

allocation of bottled or other potable water as a supplement is exhausted in one week, 

then this condition would not be acceptable. This clarifies the need for establishing 

system performance criteria with consideration of accessibility services (i.e., 

available alternatives to the normal water and wastewater services). 

There are also limits on the duration of alternatives because (1) demand increases 

over time, (2) economics, and (3) a need for returning to pre-event functionality. 

Demand generally lowers after an event. Personal demand for water and wastewater 

services increases with time due to need to bathe, clean, and cook. Households and 

businesses tolerance will have limits and these can vary based on individual 

conditions. At some point demands for a return to “normalcy” will take hold in a 

community. Restoration of water and wastewater services is a strong indicator of 

normality. Every person, household, and community will have their own tolerance 

for returning to “normal,” making it difficult to define duration tolerances with any 

certainty. Information presented in Appendix D indicates that the practical time limits 

for restoring all service categories in Tables 7-5 and 7-6 is about 30 to 60 days for 

water systems and 70 days or more for some wastewater services, depending upon 

hazard level. However, some service reductions may be tolerable for longer 

durations. For example, water rationing may be tolerated for months following a very 

rare and extreme event severely impacting a water supply aqueduct, as long as 

households are able to function properly and economic wellbeing is not severely 

disrupted. 

In summary, the tolerance for water and wastewater service losses is a function of the 

potential consequences resulting from the service loss. Severe consequences are 

generally not acceptable, even if an extreme hazard event occurs. There is a societal 

expectation for good performance of water and wastewater infrastructure under 

normal conditions and after the occurrence of a routine hazard event. Disruptions, 

however, may be acceptable for a limited time following a hazard event as long as 

sufficient accessibility services are available and able to meet the time-dependent 

increases in demand necessary to support community resilience. 

7.4 Interdependencies 

Water and wastewater systems depend on other infrastructure systems. These 

relationships generally involve single dependencies, but may also entail 

interdependencies in which there are reciprocal relationships. Water and wastewater 

utilities, for example, rely on electric power to run pumps, treatment processes, 

7-14 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
laboratory, and other operations. Roadways, bridges, and highways are needed for 

access, installation, maintenance, repair, and operation of all types of facilities. 

Railways and shipping often transport bulk goods needed for water and wastewater 

systems, such as chemicals, pipe and fittings, mechanical and electrical equipment. 

Curbs and gutters along local roadways are used as part of the collection systems for 

many drainage systems. Telecommunications are required for passing information 

between staff and management, including landlines, cellular, radio, and microwave 

data. Most sizable water and wastewater system operations depend on supervisory 

control and data acquisition networks, which are internal networks that depend on 

external telecommunication services. 

Wastewater systems generally depend on water systems to operate because most 

waste can only be collected by running water. Water systems depend on wastewater 

systems for certain operations beyond general usage by employees, including 

disposal of treatment sludge in sewer systems and obtaining reclaimed water from 

sanitary sewer and storm facilities. 

Many other lifelines depend on water and wastewater systems. For example, power 

plants need water for cooling and steam, both of which can be disrupted by a 

damaged water system that requires electric pumps to restart water distribution. 

Water for cooling and steam generation, however, is not always obtained from a 

water network, and some gravity water systems may not require power to support 

distribution. Therefore, interdependent relationships should not be presumed, but 

investigated locally. 

Water is required by telecommunication systems for cooling; transportation systems 

for operation and maintenance; and gas and liquid fuel systems for processing, 

cooling, and transportation. All lifelines rely on drainage and waste disposal. In 

particular, highways and roads rely on wastewater systems for drainage to prevent 

disruption during storms and local flooding. Some utilities operate steam 

distributions systems for heating, cooling, restaurant and hotel service, and 

sterilization of medical equipment in hospitals. The Consolidated Edison Company of 

New York (Con Ed) uses cogeneration at fossil fuel plants to produce steam that is 

distributed throughout Manhattan by approximately 100 mi. (160 km) of high 

pressure/high temperature pipelines. 

There is a strong interdependency between water and wastewater systems and the 

communities they serve. These systems cannot operate financially without income 

from the customers paying their bills. There is an overall need for a community to 

function at a minimum level to allow the water and wastewater systems to meet 

minimum functionality and vice versa. Communities also depend on water and 

wastewater systems to help maintain basic life support (e.g., potable water and 

removal of waste for a contaminant free environment) and safety (e.g., fire 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-15 
protection) while the systems themselves depend upon societal functioning to 

maintain operations, such as the provision of healthcare for employees. Buildings 

depend on fire protection services, which in turn depend on water supply. 

The collocation of water and wastewater pipelines with other lifelines is also an 

interdependency concern. For example, water and wastewater pipelines are buried 

under roadways and attached to bridges for river and other crossings. Similarly, 

electric power and telecommunication conduits as well as gas and liquid fuel 

pipelines are collocated under roadways. Severe congestion of underground utilities 

frequently occurs in urban environments. As pointed out by O’Rourke (2010), 

congestion increases risk due to proximity. Damage to one facility, such as a cast iron 

water main, can cascade rapidly into damage in surrounding facilities, such as 

electric and telecommunication cables and gas mains, with system-wide 

consequences. Additional treatment of dependency relationships associated with 

water and wastewater systems, including colocation issues, is provided by NIST 

(2015), and discussed in Chapter 8. 

7.5 Disaster Lessons 

There are numerous documents describing performance of water and wastewater 

systems in past events. Many of these were prepared by the ASCE Technical Council 

on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) as a result of post-earthquake 

investigations (e.g., ASCE, 2005a). Eight key cases are described herein providing 

useful information on societal expectations and lifeline dependency relationships. 

NIST (2015, p. 223-224) describes other events, including several flood events of 

importance to this analysis. These cases identify key social issues useful for assessing 

needed water and wastewater system performance criteria. 

The NIST Guide recommends using three hazard levels—routine, design, and 

extreme—to address the range of potential damage and formulate response and 

recovery scenarios. The example events covered in this section were all above routine 

hazard levels and in general are characterized as being either extreme or some 

combination of design and extreme hazards. 

7.5.1 1971 San Fernando Earthquake 

Many of the widespread effects of the 1971 San Fernando, California, earthquake 

were unexpected when they occurred, but would be considered design to extreme in 

the current state of practice. Numerous problems not only affected water and 

wastewater systems, but all lifeline systems. The impact of the San Fernando 

earthquake on utilities and geographically distributed infrastructure was one of the 

principal reasons for establishing lifeline earthquake engineering as an area of 

specialized, multi-disciplinary research and practice, supported primarily by ASCE 

and the National Science Foundation (NSF). 

7-16 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
The many damaged water supply and storage facilities caused extensive service 

losses to customers. Key issues were damage to dams and reservoirs, storage tanks, 

pumping stations, chlorination stations, aqueducts, and mainline piping from a 

variety of geotechnical hazards, including ground shaking, landslides, liquefaction 

and lateral spreading, and fault rupture (NOAA, 1973). The acquisition/determination 

of restoration durations and total impacts on services was not possible during the 

development of this report and requires further effort. 

One significant consequence of the 1971 earthquake was the upstream slope failure 

of the Lower San Fernando Dam. Within minutes after the earthquake, 30 of the 35 

feet of freeboard was lost as a result of slope deformations. The remaining freeboard 

was cracked and started to leak, raising concerns for a potential catastrophic release 

of water and resulting in the evacuation of about 80,000 downstream residents. 

Fortunately, the dam was able to retain water until the reservoir was safely drained. 

The reservoir performance was unacceptably close to failure and is an example where 

water facilities need to be properly designed to withstand extreme events. There are a 

number of cases of dam failures caused by earthquake and flooding across the 

country and around the world that had devastating effects on downstream 

communities and the environment. 

7.5.2 1983 New York City Garment District Incident 

On August 10, 1983, a 12-inch (in.) diameter cast iron water main ruptured near the 

intersection of 38th Street and 7th Avenue in New York City. This may be 

considered a routine infrastructure hazard in terms of its cause, but extreme in terms 

of operational planning levels and design considerations. As described by O’Rourke 

at al. (2003), water from the burst main flooded an underground electric substation, 

shorting electric circuits and touching off an immense fire. Loss of the substation 

caused a black out of approximately 0.5 square miles of the city, including the 

Garment District and neighboring areas of the city. This involved over 10,000 

customers, including Macy’s and Gimbel’s Department Stores. The blackout affected 

a telephone company central office, interrupting telecommunication service to tens of 

thousands of customers until emergency power was switched on. Electric power was 

not fully restored in Midtown Manhattan for over five days. The loss of electricity 

interrupted track signaling and shut down all lines of the New York City subway 

passing through Mid-town, thereby affecting the entire system. 

Fire in the substation caused heat so intense that firefighters could not approach the 

blaze directly, but had to attack it with more than 60,000 cubic feet (ft3

) of foam. The 

blaze flared up an air shaft, igniting the roof of a 25-story building. Burning 

transformers released polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), thereby generating 

hazardous emissions. 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-17 
 

The accident occurred during Market Week in the Garment District, when most outof-town buyers come to New York City to order next year’s spring clothing lines. 

Direct and indirect business losses during this critical time have been estimated in the 

tens of millions of dollars. 

7.5.3 1994 Northridge Earthquake 

The magnitude-6.7 Northridge, California, earthquake of January 17, 1994 was a 

design to extreme hazard event, based on the ground motions experienced. Water 

service was disrupted over a large area by the earthquake as a result of damage to 

pipelines and system facilities. Water delivery was restored within seven days, and 

potable water within 12 days after the earthquake (Davis et al., 2012). These 

restoration times were found reasonably acceptable by customers given the overall 

extent of earthquake impacts. Two issues, in particular, resulting from the earthquake 

are helpful in defining institutional and social expectations: 

	 The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) raised concerns about non-potable 

water deliveries to the Los Angeles International airport (LAX) and were 

considering the need to shut down air traffic until potable supplies could be 

delivered. Aircraft need to provide potable water to passengers during flight for 

public health and safety. FAA concerns were raised at about two to three days 

after the earthquake, and four days after the earthquake water quality was 

confirmed to meet public health standards. LAX was not shut down due to water 

quality concerns. 

	 The Northridge Medical Center (NMC) and other critical care facilities in the 

north and western San Fernando Valley were out of water immediately after the 

earthquake. Non-potable water deliveries were restored to most in about three 

days and to all within seven days. NMC had potable water restored at 10 days. 

They were able to continue functioning throughout the emergency, but the 

duration for non-potable service deliveries was considered too long for assisting 

community resilience. 

For the most part, fires were able to be fought using alternative water sources when 

ignitions occurred in areas where water was not available from the distribution 

system (ASCE, 2005a). 

There were no significant wastewater system service disruptions following the 1994 

Northridge earthquake. Overall, the water and wastewater service restorations fell 

within the range shown in Tables 7-7 and 7-8, except for a few critical facilities and 

fire protection that were not restored to meet the short-term needs. Accessibility 

services were provided using bottled water, tanker trucks, and portable toilets as 

alternative sources. 

7-18	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
 

7.5.4 1995 Kobe Earthquake 

The 1995 Kobe, Japan, earthquake, was a design to extreme hazard event, based on 

the ground motions experienced. The event resulted in the loss of water to significant 

portions of the City of Kobe soon after the earthquake. It took approximately 90 days 

to restore water service, and for the most part, service restorations took longer than 

those shown in Tables 7-7 and 7-8. The loss of water soon after the earthquake 

allowed fires to burn significant portions of the city and caused numerous casualties. 

Approximately 67 blocks were severely burned primarily in the industrial parts of the 

city where fires were initiated by chemical reactions (Hamada et al., 1995). Although 

water loss was not the only factor contributing to the fires, the loss of water and 

inability to help suppress the fires was considered unacceptable. 

The five-week duration to restore water services to the community was also 

considered unacceptable. Kobe Waterworks Bureau performed surveys to better 

understand their customers’ perspective. The results are summarized in Table 7-9, 

which provides information about Japanese tolerance pertaining to the restoration of 

water services. As indicated in Table 7-9, the tolerance for loss of water service 

expressed by members of the Kobe community is less than five weeks. 

Accessibility services were provided using bottled water, portable toilets, and 

portable showers as alternative sources. Water was also imported by tank trucks, 

trailers, and ships. 

Table 7-9	 Japan Citizen Response on Lack of Water Following 1995 Kobe 

Earthquake (Matsushita, 1999) 

Week 1 Week 2 Weeks 3 & 4 Week 5 

Response Request for 

information 

Irritation Anxiety, 

impatience 

Anger 

Comments Situation? 

Tank truck? 

Want to take a 

bath 

Water supply is 

insufficient 

Very tired and 

exhausted 

Recovery date? 

7.5.5 2001 World Trade Center Disaster 

The World Trade Center (WTC) Disaster of September 11, 2001 was an extreme 

hazard event and beyond anticipated design levels. During the event, there was 

serious collateral damage to critical infrastructure due to flooding and water damage 

from ruptured water mains supplying the Twin Towers (O’Rourke et al., 2003; 

Bonneau et al., 2010). Ruptured mains accounted for about 55 million gallons of 

water loss per day, which flowed into underground sections of the WTC complex and 

flooded the Port Authority and Trans-Hudson (PATH) Tunnels beneath the Hudson 

River. Water flooded the cable vault of the Verizon Building at 140 West St., where 

70,000 copper pairs and fiber optic cables were located. Nearly 11 million gallons of 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-19 
water had to be pumped from the vault during recovery. As a result of the damage 

from debris impact coupled with flooding, Verizon lost 200,000 voice lines, 100,000 

private branch exchange lines, and 4.4 million data circuits. More than 14,000 

business and 20,000 residential customers were affected. 

The WTC disaster aftermath provides a graphic illustration of the interdependencies 

of infrastructure systems. The building collapses triggered water main breaks that 

flooded rail tunnels, a commuter station, and the vault containing all the cables for 

one of the largest telecommunication nodes in the world. Damage affected the 

Security Industry Data Network and the Security Industry Automation Corporation 

circuits used to execute and confirm block trades on the New York Stock Exchange 

(NYSE). Before trading resumed on the NYSE on Monday, September 17, 2001, the 

communications network had to be reconfigured. Hence, ruptured water mains were 

linked directly with the interruption of securities trading as well critical underground 

transportation facilities. 

7.5.6 2010-2011 Canterbury, New Zealand Earthquake Sequence 

The City of Christchurch and the Canterbury region of New Zealand were struck by a 

series of earthquakes in 2010-2011, known as the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence 

(CES), which resulted in substantial damage to both the water and wastewater 

systems. The most significant impacts arose from the February 22, 2011 earthquake, 

and the severity of shaking and extent of damage caused by that event was well 

beyond design levels. 

Water services after the February 22 event were restored in about six weeks, except 

to the Christchurch Central Business District, which was cordoned off to promote 

public safety while repairs were undertaken and damaged buildings removed. There 

were only a few fires, which were confined and extinguished by the fire department. 

Water quality was a concern. A boil water notice was in effect for about 41 days. The 

sewer system was severely damaged from liquefaction (described in more detail 

below) and caused concerns for cross contamination into the water system through 

wells and broken pipes. Decontamination was required at a few locations in the water 

system. Seven days after the February 22 event there were some reports of 

gastroenteritis. 

Initial water system restorations within weeks of the February 22, 2011 earthquake 

were able to provide winter water demand levels to all customers. However, the 

restoration of important reservoirs was unable to be completed for more than a year, 

and as a result, summertime rationing was required during 2011-2012.Summertime 

rationing had an impact on irrigation and domestic water use in neighborhoods 

heavily damaged by liquefaction and other areas served by the damaged tanks. 

7-20 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
The Christchurch sanitary sewer system was severely damaged and is still being 

restored in 2016. The greatest damage came from liquefaction induced ground 

deformations and the infiltration of sand and silt into broken pipelines. The 

differential ground movement changed pipeline gradients and the ability of the 

gravity system to transport sewage in some areas. Liquefaction caused significant 

damage to the Bromley Wastewater Treatment Plant, reducing its operational 

capacity for a long period of time. There were four main CES earthquakes, and the 

successive and collective damage from these shocks led to a continuing disruption of 

plant operations. 

As a result of the damage, raw sewage was pumped initially into local rivers and 

tertiary treatment lagoons, bypassing primary and secondary treatment operations in 

the plant. The lagoons are part of the final treatment process before the treated water 

enters an outfall pipeline and is conveyed offshore into the ocean. Placing the 

untreated sewage into the lagoons nearly depleted the oxygen required for aerobic 

breakdown of organics and required an emergency effort to prevent the destruction of 

the local ecosystem, which would have resulted in serious environmental and air 

quality problems. 

Conveyance of raw sewage into local rivers caused environmental damage and 

several reported illnesses that medical officials attributed to the sewage release. 

Fortunately, the local authorities were able to contain these problems. The difficulties 

experienced with sewage collection, conveyance, treatment and disposal are not 

considered acceptable system performance in Christchurch. 

The sand and silt that entered broken pipelines and conveyed into the wastewater 

treatment plant for many months following the February 22, 2011 earthquake had a 

negative effect on operations. The scrapers in the primary settling basins were 

damaged by large quantities of sand and silt. Inorganic solids entering the secondary 

treatment system affected the biological and chemical processes for decomposition of 

organics. Sand and silt abraded pumping equipment, thereby accelerating wear and 

tear and reducing efficiency. 

The repair of wastewater pipelines was very expensive. These types of pipelines are 

relatively deep, on the order 10 to 15 ft not only in Christchurch but in wastewater 

conveyance systems generally. Given the weak, potentially unstable soils in 

Christchurch a high water table (about 3 to 5 ft deep in many places), excavations to 

replace damaged pipelines needed trench box support and dewatering by well points. 

The cost of such construction on a large scale was substantial and contributed to 

depletion of available reserves in the Local Authorities Protection Plan, which is an 

insurance program to provide support for local authorities in New Zealand to restore 

public infrastructure after natural hazards. 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-21 
 

The storm water drainage system in Christchurch, for the most part, is separate from 

the sanitary sewer system. Storm water pipelines were damaged by liquefaction, with 

damage patterns similar to those of the sanitary sewer network. Repairs to the storm 

water system, however, were a lower priority than those of the sanitary sewer system. 

In addition, ground settlement in the relatively low-lying and flat terrain of 

Christchurch inhibited drainage. The storm water drainage system is part of a larger 

flood control system for Christchurch, which also includes local rivers and 

engineered channels to convey flows and runoff through the city to the ocean. 

The combination of damage to levees, changes in elevation and gradient to river 

beds, large local total and differential settlements, and impacts on local storm water 

collection and conveyance pipe networks, led to flooding in portions of the city. 

There were significant threats to overtopping levees within weeks of the February 22, 

2011 earthquake, requiring emergency construction activities. As a result of the 

Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, there is increased vulnerability to flooding in 

several areas of Christchurch. In March 2014, significant flooding occurred in 

relatively large areas of the city (GEER, 2014). The social impacts from earthquake 

damage of the local drainage network are considered unacceptable. 

Water and wastewater service restoration times are complicated by the combined 

effects of multiple earthquakes, but fall well beyond those shown in Tables 7-7 and 

7-8. Accessibility services were provided using bottled water, importing water in tank 

truck and trailers, rail cars, and using portable desalination plants as alternative 

sources. Portable toilets and portable showers were alternatives for wastewater. 

7.5.7 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami 

The Great East Japan earthquake (Tohoku earthquake) of March 11, 2011 was a 

design to extreme hazard event, with a tsunami surge that is considered an extreme 

hazard event. There were numerous effects on water and wastewater systems from 

the earthquake, tsunami, and the subsequent disaster at the Fukushima Nuclear Power 

Plant. While the impacts of that earthquake are too numerous to describe in this 

report, a few are highlighted below. 

In areas inundated by the tsunami, water system damages were extensive and 

significantly inhibited emergency response, recovery, and restoration activities. The 

effects in some areas were so extensive that even the local groundwater supply was 

contaminated by salt water intrusion and could not be utilized. 

Sewer treatment systems were severely damaged by the tsunami. Some treatment 

plants were completely unusable for months and raw sewage was conveyed directly 

to the ocean after receiving large doses of chlorine. Ground settlements along the 

coast reached several meters, changing the hydraulic grade relative to sea level and 

increasing sea water inundation potential. Some treatment plants could not dispose of 

7-22 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
sewage at demand level during high tide. The performance of sewage treatment 

plants following the tsunami was found to be unacceptable, as evidenced by 

subsequent code changes and increasing tsunami design requirements adopted in 

Japan and elsewhere. 

The Fukushima nuclear release had serious impacts on water and wastewater 

systems. Existing regulations did not ensure proper testing for contamination. The 

water and wastewater treatment waste was contaminated at high concentrations and 

unable to be disposed of in a timely manner. This resulted in a large buildup of waste 

materials that compounded health and air quality impacts. 

Many areas along the coastal regions have increased vulnerability to flooding 

following the earthquake as a result of damage to local drainage and larger flood 

control systems. This vulnerability extends to flooding from high tides, typhoons, and 

tsunami. The impact of the tsunami on water and wastewater management has been 

found unacceptable and require extensive changes in local drainage and flood control 

systems. Consistent with the lessons learned from Christchurch, New Zealand, the 

Japanese recognize the need for improved inundation protection systems to safeguard 

communities against runoff and flooding after major earthquake hazards. 

Accessibility services were provided using bottled water, importing water in tankers 

and trailers, portable toilets, portable showers, and pumping of drainage water as 

alternative sources. 

7.5.8 2012 Hurricane Sandy 

The main impact of Hurricane Sandy on the New York City (NYC) water distribution 

system was relatively modest with respect to reservoirs, treatment plants, pipelines, 

and the tunnel system (City of New York, 2013b). Significant problems, however, 

were experienced in supplying water in high-rise buildings, which experienced loss 

of utility supplied electricity and/or flooding of basements containing diesel 

generators, pumps, and fuel. In Manhattan, the storm surge overtopped protective 

barriers at the Con Ed East 13th Street complex, flooding two substations and 

resulting in the loss of electric power to the great majority of Con Ed customers south 

of 34th Street (City of New York, 2013b). Many pumps for water distribution in 

high-rise buildings failed, either because of disrupted utility power, loss of local 

generators, or both. The impact of water loss affected buildings over six stories 

high—buildings that are taller than the maximum elevation that can be reached by 

normal pressure in the water pipeline system. Buildings with water towers were able 

to provide water by gravity flow, but those were depleted over time. 

During Hurricane Sandy, ten of 14 wastewater treatment plants operated by the NYC 

Department of Environmental Protection were damaged or lost electric power, and 

released untreated or partially treated wastewater into local waterways (City of New 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-23 
York, 2013b). Three of these facilities were shut down completely, including Coney 

Island for two hours, North River for seven hours, and Rockaway for three days. 

Sandy also had an adverse impact on pumping stations, with 42 of 96 such stations 

sustaining damage or losing power (City of New York, 2013b). Most of the damage 

to wastewater facilities involved electrical equipment and systems, including 

substations, motors, control panels junction boxes, and instrumentation. Many 

treatment plants and pumping stations in wastewater systems are located in areas of 

low elevation adjacent to water bodies, including rivers, lakes, and bays. The 

exposure in these areas to flooding in combination with electrical equipment located 

at lower levels in the facilities makes wastewater systems especially vulnerable to 

storms and hurricanes. 

7.6	 Gaps and Deficiencies: Codes, Standards, Performance 

Requirements, and Societal Considerations 

There are several important gaps and deficiencies in the current approach to water 

and wastewater system resilience, several of which are summarized in this section. 

The information reviewed for this project indicates the performance criteria 

established to date are driven by engineering objectives and current water and 

wastewater agency capabilities, and only partially informed by community and social 

needs. The codes, standards, and manuals have an inconsistent approach to the design 

of water and wastewater components making up the systems. There is no established 

set of performance requirements for any hazards that the water and wastewater 

systems are expected to meet. As a result, only a few system owners and operators 

have established performance objectives or targets for a limited number of hazards 

(mostly earthquake, but some related to climate change). The AWWA (1994) 

guidance document, Minimizing Earthquake Damage: A Guide for Water Utilities, 

has been used to help guide the establishment of performance criteria, at least for 

earthquake hazards. However, the basis for these criteria (i.e., the Uniform Building 

Code) have long been outdated and need to be revisited. Due to the inconsistent 

codes and standards, there is no way to assess how the system as a whole is expected 

to perform when piecing together the components that make up the systems. 

Furthermore, there is no current methodology to help develop designs for all water 

and wastewater components in a consistent manner that accounts for the large 

geographic coverage of these systems and the hazard variation from a single event, 

much less from multiple events. Davis (2005, 2008) and ALA (2005a, 2005b) 

proposed methods to address these problems for water and wastewater design and 

performance. The current state-of-practice for water and wastewater system design 

and modification requires some reworking and much more development to ensure it 

can properly support community resilience. 

7-24	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
There is a gap between engineering practice for what is considered acceptable design 

levels, including what is defined as extreme events, and what communities find 

acceptable. The extreme hazard level has an implied link to maximum considered 

levels described in ASCE 7-10 (ASCE, 2010), which specifies ground motions 

having a 1% to 3% chance of exceedance in 50 years; this specification does not 

account for the other hazards that need to be considered by communities seeking 

improved resilience. For example, buildings designed using the maximum considered 

earthquake (MCE) ground motions in ASCE 7-10 have a 10% probability of collapse 

if impacted by the MCE; this translates to a 1% collapse risk in 50 years due to 

ground shaking. By comparison, liquefaction potential assessments, which are based 

on ground motions having a 2% chance of exceedance in 50 years, are concerned 

with consequences from a different type of hazard, with a different probability of 

occurrence. Similarly, the probabilities associated with liquefaction potential and 

building collapse risk are different from the probabilities of occurrence of landslides 

or fault surface rupture, which may have much lower probabilities and much greater 

consequences. Design criteria based on probabilities of occurrence of other natural 

hazards, such as extreme winds and coastal inundation, are similarly disparate, as are 

the consequences if a design level event occurs. Communities need to recognize that 

extreme design levels identified for one hazard type may cause consequences quite 

dissimilar to consequences for other specified extreme hazard design levels. 

Communities also need to understand clearly the consequences that can occur if the 

design level adopted by the community for a given hazard occurs, versus the 

consequences of a more rare event of the same hazard type or the consequences of 

other hazard types that could impact the community. 

For criteria established to address the highest design hazard level, lifeline systems 

should remain at least minimally functional, have the ability to restore functionality 

when needed to support the response and recovery of the community, and not result 

in furthering foreseeable cascading hazards. Lifeline systems should be evaluated for 

the consequences of plausible hazards rarer than that selected for design. Designers 

need to consider what may happen if an event exceeding the design level occurs and 

mitigate consequences unacceptable to the community. 

An important example of the need to design for high impact consequences is the 

2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami disaster. A tsunami generated by 

rupture along the entire Tohoku Subduction Zone was not accounted for in Japanese 

nuclear power plant design before the 2011 earthquake, and historical evidence for 

widespread tsunami inundation was not used by owners to re-assess tsunami risk 

(Hamada, 2014). 

Some infrastructure is too big and important to fail. Examples include the hurricane 

protection system in New Orleans and the nuclear power plant system in Japan, both 

of which failed with terrible consequences to the communities they served. Under 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-25 
 

 

 

 

 

 

such conditions, a higher performance level needs to be identified that accounts for 

community consequences and impacts. A security audit can check performance 

beyond the hazard probability adopted in design. A similar approach, known as 

“defense in depth,” is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for U.S. 

nuclear power facilities (NRC, 2015). No counterpart, however, exists for other 

critical infrastructure systems. Guidance and protocols for such an approach are 

needed. 

There are also important gaps between societal expectations for water and wastewater 

system performance and how the systems are anticipated to perform in reality. This is 

expressed through generalized, but informed estimates for water system restoration in 

Table 7-10. The societal expectations are based on information presented in this 

report. The anticipated water system performance levels are informed by SPUR 

(2009b), OSSPAC (2013), performance criteria summarized in Appendix D, and 

documented historic performance for similar events. The water services listed in 

Table 7-10 are described in previous sections of this chapter. Service provision to 

critical hospitals is also presented in the table. During the recovery period, 

communities will rely heavily on accessibility services, which are not detailed in this 

report. Table 7-10 identifies a significant gap between societal expectations of water 

services and the performance anticipated from the systems. 

There are inconsistencies in industry practice with terminology and system 

characterization that can inhibit the ability to create a common set of performance 

objectives and to implement water and wastewater system improvements. Examples 

include terminology that is used interchangeably, such as “performance goals” versus 

“performance targets,” and inconsistent naming of system components in various 

industry documents. 

Table 7-10	 Water System Service Restoration Comparison Between Societal Expectations 

and Anticipated System Recovery for About 90% of Service Area for a Design 

Earthquake Event on the U.S. West Coast 

Recovery Period 

Short-term (Days) Intermediate (Weeks) Long-term (Months) 

Service 0 1 1-3 1-4 4-8 8-12 4 4-24 24+ 

Fire Protection ? 

Water Delivery 

Water Quality 

Water Quantity 

Hospital Services ? 

Legend: 

 Expected: blue diagonal hatch

 Anticipated: red horizontal hatch 

7-26	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
Current categorizations of water and wastewater lifeline systems do not include all 

the facilities needed to protect communities against inundation hazards. Of special 

significance are flood control systems, which are not currently included as lifelines, 

but are fundamentally important for the resilience of all communities. The current 

view of water and wastewater systems, from a lifeline engineering perspective, does 

not specifically address the links to flood protection infrastructure, such as levees, sea 

walls, and dams built primarily for flood control. Water and wastewater systems 

focus on potable water supply and wastewater removal for public health and local 

drainage. Wastewater systems may incorporate storm water sewers, which in many 

large urban areas do not typically include the large storm conveyance channels 

needed for flood protection. Flood control measures, such as the Mississippi River 

levees, New Orleans Hurricane Protection System, Sacramento Delta levees, and 

local projects in New York City after Hurricane Sandy are considered independently 

of water and wastewater systems, thereby losing the opportunity to develop a 

broader, more integrated approach to community protection from flooding. 

Furthermore, the climate change impacts discussed in Chapter 2 provide additional 

reasons to focus on inundation protection as a key factor for improving community 

resilience by placing greater emphasis on drainage and flood control systems. 

Water and wastewater service restorations are coupled with accessibility services that 

are not part of daily operations and system hardware. The coupling of accessibility 

and restoration times of the core water and wastewater services, as described in 

Tables 7-5 and 7-6, will improve resiliency at the community level. 

7.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 

7.7.1 Review of Key Points 

A large number of existing codes, standards, guidelines, and manuals are applicable 

to water and wastewater systems. The performance objectives, where they exist, 

focus on life safety, public health, and fire protection; but there are no consistent 

hazard design criteria except for buildings and structures. No restoration times are 

recommended for any system in any documents reviewed. As a result, existing codes 

and standards tend to support the basic concepts of lifeline system resilience but fall 

short of creating water and wastewater systems to support community resilience. For 

example, there is no standard for seismic design of buried water and wastewater 

pipelines, although there are widely used guidelines from the gas and liquid fuels 

industry (ASCE, 1984; Honegger et al., 2004). Some documents provide guidance on 

earthquake performance criteria for lifeline systems (e.g., ALA, 2004b, 2005a, 

2005b; ASCE, 1999; AWWA, 1994), but guidance is absent for other hazards. The 

core water and wastewater service categories discussed previously in this chapter can 

be used as a framework for developing performance objectives. These core services 

can be linked with the phases of restoration and recovery. 

GCR 16-917-39 7: Water and Wastewater 7-27 
There is limited information on societal expectations for water and wastewater 

system performance. Furthermore, the performance of these systems cannot be 

properly established without full consideration of accessibility services (e.g., bottled 

water and portable toilets). System performance criteria and accessibility service 

targets must be planned and analyzed together to ensure there are no gaps in the 

provision of critical services. 

Water and wastewater systems are interrelated with each other and other lifelines. 

These interrelationships involve both one-way dependencies and interdependencies, 

the importance of which cannot be underestimated as illustrated in Section 7.4. 

In summary, there are a number of critical gaps and opportunities for improvement, 

including: 

	 Existing performance criteria are driven by engineering objectives and only 

partially informed by community and social needs; 

	 How society expects water and wastewater systems to perform and how the 

systems are actually designed to perform; 

	 The need to evaluate critical system performance beyond the hazard levels 

adopted in design; and 

	 Lack of wastewater system integration with regional flood control so that local 

drainage and storm water management become an integral part of inundation 

protection. 

7.7.2 Lifeline Standards Development Needs 

Following are recommendations to address lifeline standards development needs: 

	 Develop water and wastewater performance goals. Include guidance 

documentation on how to develop desired community-specific system 

performance. Such guidance can serve multiple purposes from helping 

communities become more resilient to setting targets for which codes and 

standards can be developed with consistent performance criteria. 

	 Address accessibility services in developing performance goals for water and 

wastewater services. Community resilience is defined in part by the ability of 

residents and businesses to deal with temporary reductions, alternative methods 

of supply/collection, and other modifications to normal water and wastewater 

services. Although water and wastewater system owners and operators routinely 

account for this type of community response, measures that support such 

activities are rarely quantified or even qualified relative to system performance 

goals. The water service categories (i.e., water delivery, quality, quantity, fire 

protection, and functionality) and wastewater service categories (i.e., wastewater 

collection/removal, quality, disposal, reclaimed source, and functionality), as 

7-28	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
defined in Tables 7-5 and 7-6, respectively, should be used in developing 

improved criteria that include accessibility (see Davis, 2014a for example). 

Accessibility services can fill gaps in service and thus should also be part of 

water and wastewater system performance goals. 

	 Modify existing water and wastewater standards and guidelines to achieve 

resilience-based performance goals. There currently are no consistent 

resilience-based performance goals in any standards or guidelines useful for 

implementing water and wastewater component designs. Procedures for setting 

local, regional, national, and international system performance goals need to be 

established. From these performance goals, there needs to be a methodology to 

ensure that individual system components can be designed to meet the systemwide performance goals. 

	 Develop a methodology to determine how component design levels 

established by codes and standards can meet the system level performance 

criteria. Currently, the design of system components based on codes and 

standards has no direct correlation with intended systemic performance targets. 

For example, designing pipelines and pumping stations to resist the effects of 

ground motions for design level seismic hazards does not mean the overall water 

or wastewater system will meet the social functions and performance goals, nor 

do such criteria indicate the extent to which the system is over or under designed. 

7.7.3 Research Needs 

Following are recommendations to address research needs: 

	 Establish procedures to quantify hazards over spatially distributed systems. 

As identified in the Earthquake-Resilient Lifelines: NEHRP Research, 

Development, and Implementation Roadmap (NIST, 2014), there is an important 

need to develop modeling procedures, guidance documents, and standards for 

hazard quantification across geographically distributed systems, including 

network-specific hazard maps. 

	 Develop performance goals for services that water and wastewater systems 

provide, as defined in Tables 7-4 to 7-6. Additionally, describe how to utilize 

the same services to address critical facilities and other facility clusters needing 

special attention within the service area. 

	 Develop guidance and protocols to check performance beyond the hazard 

levels adopted in design. Some infrastructure is too big and important to fail. 

Designers therefore need to consider what may happen if an event exceeding the 

design level occurs. A security audit is needed to check performance beyond the 

design hazard level for critical infrastructure that is essential for community 

security and economic stability. A similar approach is required by the NRC for 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-29 
U.S. nuclear power facilities, but does not exist for other critical infrastructure 

systems, including water supplies essential for regional and national security. 

	 Perform research to determine how to close the gap between societal 

expectations and anticipated performance of water and wastewater systems 

for both design and extreme events. See Table 7-10 for current comparisons of 

the societal expectations for restoration of water service following a design 

earthquake versus anticipated system recovery based on recent studies and 

documented system performance in prior similar design earthquakes. 

	 Perform research on needed service restoration times in relation to other 

lifelines and overall societal expectations. Give due consideration to 

accessibility services. 

	 Perform studies on changes in water demand considering an array of 

hazards as well as seasonal and longer-term climate variability, like drought. 

Loss of water due to hazard-related damage may be viewed as an imposed 

drought. Thus, a better understanding of community response to lack of water, 

including rationing and use of accessibility services, can be understood better by 

evaluating operator and customer response to actual drought conditions. For 

example, public response to the current California drought, manifested in 

significant reduction in water use, provides a unique opportunity to evaluate 

regional and local effects from actual reductions in supply, most effective 

measures for rationing, and successful public outreach and risk communication 

practices. 

7.7.4 Modeling Needs 

Following are recommendations to address modeling needs: 

	 Improve numerical modeling of water and wastewater systems, with 

emphasis on validation of models, developing the most effective simulation 

procedures, and applications in real systems. The complex performance of 

water and wastewater systems in response to hazards, including in particular 

severe earthquakes and floods, requires complex network modeling to capture the 

effects that pipeline leaks and breaks, as well as the structural damage to 

treatment, storage, and control facilities, have on network behavior. Substantial 

progress in modeling complex water distribution response to hazards has been 

made, including algorithms for quantifying flow and pressure in heavily damaged 

hydraulic networks based on satisfying required nodal demands (e.g., O’Rourke 

et al., 2008; O’Rourke, 2010). Hydraulic network analyses are currently being 

developed for the Auxiliary Water Supply System in San Francisco on the basis 

of pressure dependent demand analyses (e.g., Jun and Guoping, 2013; Abdy 

Sayyed et al., 2014), with the potential for providing a more refined assessment 

7-30	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
of post-hazard water available for firefighting in this smaller pipeline network. 

There is a continuing need to improve these models. 

	 Verify pipeline performance with the assistance of large-scale testing and 

develop the computational models for simulating the hazard response of the 

new generation of pipelines. The next generation of water supply pipelines is 

currently being developed in response to enhanced seismic requirements from 

U.S. and Canadian water system owners, operating along the West Coast. In 

general, these pipelines are composed of ductile iron, steel, or polyvinyl chloride 

with special joints that allow for enhanced expansion/contraction and rotation in 

response to ground deformations. High and medium density polyethylene 

pipelines were virtually undamaged in Christchurch, New Zealand, during the 

Canterbury Earthquake Sequence in 2010-2011 (O’Rourke et al., 2014). A 

testing program to confirm their demonstrated performance in ground 

deformation, and a coordinated related program to develop computational models 

for simulating the hazard response of such systems, has the real potential for 

encouraging their widespread future use. 

7.7.5 Lifeline System Operational Needs 

Following are recommendations to address water and wastewater system operational 

needs: 

	 Develop practical strategies to enable water and wastewater systems to meet 

community needs. Practical guidance is needed so that water and wastewater 

utilities can begin to develop resilient networks, for example, in a manner that 

allows for distinguishing between critical and non-critical facilities within the 

network. At present, all facilities located within a pressure zone are typically 

restored at a relatively equal pace, with no ability to fast track service to critical 

customers (e.g., hospitals) within the zone. 

	 Develop consistent terminology and system characterization for use in 

creating a common set of performance goals. Some terminology is often used 

interchangeably, even though there are specific differences in the technical 

definitions of the terms. Such terminology includes “performance objectives” 

versus “performance metrics” and “performance targets” versus “performance 

goals.” Also, more consistency is needed in the use of terminology to 

characterize infrastructure systems. For example, this chapter defines water 

system components as “raw water supply,” “treatment,” “transmission,” and 

“distribution” systems, and wastewater system components as “collection,” 

“conveyance,” “treatment,” and “discharge/disposal” systems. By contrast, 

ASCE (1999) generalizes system characteristics as “source,” “transmission,” and 

“terminal” and identifies typical water system components as “transmission” and 

“distribution” systems. ALA (2005b) characterizes water systems in terms of 

GCR 16-917-39	 7: Water and Wastewater 7-31 
“transmission,” “distribution,” “facilities,” and “key components” and ALA 

(2004b) characterizes wastewater systems in terms of wastewater “sources,” 

“collection systems,” and “treatment plants,” and describes components within 

each category and how they relate to each other. There are many other system 

characterization schemes in the references cited in this report. Greater 

consistency and precision in the terminology will help in planning, modeling, 

design, and community resilience communication. 

	 Foster a common understanding and use of the terms “dependency” and 

“interdependency.” Interdependency is often used imprecisely in reference to 

one-way lifeline dependencies. This use can overstate the interactions between 

some lifeline systems and detract from the recognition, modeling, and resilience 

of lifeline systems with more complex interdependent relationships. 

7.7.6 Future Considerations and Trends 

Understanding the role provided by water, wastewater, and storm water management 

in supporting flood protection represents an opportunity for broader, more integrative 

planning to secure critical infrastructure. Further exploration of the dependencies 

among storm drainage, wastewater management, and flood control systems will help 

in planning for community resilience. 

7-32	 7: Water and Wastewater GCR 16-917-39 
Chapter 8 

Interdependent Infrastructure

Systems 

Infrastructure systems such as electric power, gas and liquid fuel, telecommunication, 

transportation, and water and wastewater systems are essential for the safety, 

economic vitality, and well-being of communities. These systems continue to grow in 

response to demands, as well as to adapt to technological advances, resulting in 

increased operational dependencies of one system on another or vice versa. These 

interdependent systems not only share resources, but may also share rights of way, 

and influence each other’s management practices. They are influenced mutually by 

shared responsibilities, expectations of performance, and lifeline restoration times in 

the aftermath of a hazard event. Interdependencies generally increase reliability and 

efficiency during normal operation, but their effects in response to hazards are not 

fully understood. 

Research on interdependent lifeline systems has started to influence emergency 

response and regional planning activities, including the use of emergency response 

coordination rooms, improved collection of data, and use of computational models. 

These efforts help infrastructure owners, government agencies, and communities 

understand interdependencies so they can be managed to support restoration efforts 

and fulfill community service expectations. However, societal expectations of 

performance and utility owner estimates of restoration are highly variable and 

context-dependent. To link community resilience with these expectations requires 

additional empirical evidence as well as new interdisciplinary models and analytical 

methods. 

This chapter and Appendix E cover interdependent infrastructure systems, 

expectations of performance and restoration, emerging modeling approaches, and 

practical computational tools. It identifies gaps in research and implementation. It 

also assesses promising areas for future research, including interdependency 

management and emerging smart technologies to improve resilience. 

8.1 Introduction to Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 

The concept of interdependent infrastructure has changed over time. In the 1980s, 

concerns about aging public works led the National Council on Public Works 

Improvement (1988) to focus on public sector infrastructure, such as highways, 

roads, bridges, airports, public transit, water supply facilities, wastewater treatment 

GCR 16-917-39 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-1 
facilities, and solid-waste and hazardous-waste services. In the 1990s, as a result of 

increased international terrorism, infrastructure was redefined in terms of national 

security. The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, created in 

the summer of 1996, issued a report that emphasized critical infrastructure protection 

in the United States (Clinton, 1998; Marsh, 1997). After 9/11, the number of 

“critical” infrastructure sectors and key assets listed in the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan (NIPP) was expanded to 17. In 2013 the number of critical 

infrastructure sectors in the NIPP was changed to 16 (DHS, 2013), including 

chemical; commercial facilities; communications; critical manufacturing; dams; 

defense industry base; emergency services; energy; financial services; food and 

agriculture; government facilities; healthcare and public health information 

technology; nuclear reactors, materials, and waste; transportation systems; and water 

and wastewater systems. Each of these sectors is linked with a governmental agency. 

NIPP 2013 places great emphasis on interdependencies across critical infrastructure, 

particularly reliance on information and communications technologies. The effects of 

extreme weather are identified as a significant threat to critical infrastructure, 

including rising sea levels, more severe storms, drought, and severe flooding. For a 

brief history on critical infrastructure protection in the United States, Brown (2006) is 

an excellent source. 

As O’Rourke (2007) points out, the identification of numerous categories of critical 

interdependent infrastructure has provided for flexibility and adaptability, but has 

also led to ambiguities about which assets are critical and which criteria should be 

used to define them. To develop basic principles that govern performance and to 

clarify and understand interactions, it is helpful to consolidate thinking by focusing 

on a smaller number of sectors based on common traits. The lifeline systems covered 

in this report represent a subset of 16 NIPP critical infrastructure sectors and focus on 

the investigation of system interdependencies and associated societal expectations 

and considerations for their performance and restoration. 

The designers of electrical networks and telecommunication systems, as key 

infrastructure sectors, are cooperating to improve intersystem operability. An annual 

report published by the ABB Group (2014) indicates that power networks can 

improve the system average interruption duration index (SAIDI), a measure of 

network reliability at the customer level during normal operations, by installing 

modern telecommunication systems in a handful of strategic substations. These 

efficiency-boosting connections result in more interdependent networks. In general, 

most couplings produce positive effects (Nan and Sansavini, 2015; Ouyang et al., 

2015), mainly by allowing interdependent infrastructure systems to operate closer to 

their capacities, reduce contingency response times, increase situational awareness 

and control, reduce material and crew usage, and optimize task scheduling. 

8-2 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

When hazards occur, interdependencies can become a liability if not properly 

managed (Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio, 2011; Poljanšek et al., 2012). For example, 

during the 2003 Northeast blackout (Andersson et al., 2005), software and alarm 

systems failed, limiting awareness of system states, at a time when scenario-based 

and real-time contingency analyses were not routinely used after local failures (i.e., to 

assess system state and other contingencies). Multiple failures were triggered, which 

spread disproportionally from local events to system-wide loss of function. Operators 

could not contain these cascading failures, and the 2003 blackout spread throughout 

parts of the northeastern and midwestern United States and Ontario, Canada— 

ultimately affecting other infrastructure systems and many different communities 

(U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004). Another example of 

unexpected interdependency effects came after Hurricane Sandy in 2012, which 

caused damage to petroleum supply infrastructure and electrical systems, thus 

triggering widespread power outages at retail fueling stations and associated gasoline 

shortages (DOE, 2013). 

To account better for interdependency or coupling effects across systems, there is a 

need for design and operational standards as well as common performance goals that 

include reasonable restoration times. The development of standards is affected by the 

lack of data on performance and hazard event management across lifeline systems, as 

well as the absence of practical modeling and simulation methods for the study of 

interdependent infrastructure systems. 

Only recently has the development of methodologies for the analysis and design of 

interdependent infrastructure systems become an active area of research. For 

instance, Figure 8-1 shows the number of published contributions and total citations 

0

500

1000

1500

2000

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

Number of Citations

Number of Publications

1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013

Year

Number of Publications Number of Citations

Figure 8-1		 Number of papers and citations per year on “interconnected critical 

infrastructure” (compiled from data obtained from Thomson Reuter’s 

Web of Science, https://webofknowledge.com/). 

GCR 16-917-39	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-3 
per year in this field of study. The steady rise in the number of contributions, 

particularly over the past 10 years, shows the increasing interest in this field. 

The available literature suggests that the modeling and analysis of interdependent 

infrastructure systems is a rapidly growing subfield with both theoretical advances 

and practical applications. Given the interdisciplinary nature of interdependent 

infrastructure, joint contributions are needed from engineers, physicists, 

mathematicians, and applied social scientists. Such collaboration should advance the 

study of socio-technical systems (i.e., systems in which physical networks explicitly 

depend on actions from users and institutions that depend on services from 

infrastructure systems), their recovery processes, and their role in community 

resilience. 

Some of the promising topics being explored on the socio-technical aspects of 

infrastructure focus on understanding and managing interdependencies to ensure 

service continuity after disruptive events (Wallace et al., 2003). However, the 

scarcity of data inhibits these types of analyses, which require significant empirical 

evidence and calibration to guide recovery and mitigation plans (Dueñas-Osorio and 

Kwasinski, 2012). 

8.1.1	 Classifying the Mechanisms of Interdependencies Among 

Infrastructure 

Recent literature on characterizing interdependencies (Dudenhoeffer et al., 2007; 

Johnson, 2014; Lee II et al., 2007; Ulieru, 2007), aligns most closely with the 

classification proposed by Rinaldi et al. (2001), which presents a general description 

of interdependencies than can be adapted to a broad range of technical and social 

considerations. The interdependency mechanisms are physical, geographic, cyber, 

and logical, all of which are interrelated. 

Physical interdependence refers to the case when the performance of a given network 

depends on the outputs of other networks, such as power and telecommunication 

networks in which a power outage may impair some data centers and routers in the 

latter, in turn limiting power system state estimation. Geographic interdependence 

emerges when a local event influences the state of other networks through 

damage/interruption of components located nearby or along shared rights of way. For 

example, fixing an underground water pipeline can affect local transportation, 

slowing traffic and interfering with local businesses. Cyber interdependence occurs 

when the interdependence between two networks is based on shared information. The 

Smart Grid (Farhangi, 2010) is an example, wherein the telecommunication networks 

manage situational awareness information to maintain or restore electric power. 

Finally, there is logical interdependence when systems are interconnected through 

channels different from the previous ones. In particular, logical interdependence is 

8-4 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems	 GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

observed when human decisions affect the state of the networks, for instance when 

decision makers prioritize the recovery of a particular network over others. 

8.1.2 Methods for Modeling Interdependencies Among Infrastructure 

There are a number of model types used to simulate infrastructure interdependence. 

From a general perspective, such models can be grouped according to their goals in 

the following overlapping classes: performance evaluation, design, mitigation, and 

recovery models. 

Performance evaluation models focus on numerical or analytical tools to understand 

the behavior of a given system and how interdependencies affect performance and 

resilience. These models tend to rely on mean field theories, Monte-Carlo simulation, 

network and reliability theory, and economic input-output principles among others 

(Barker and Haimes, 2009; Brummitt, Souza, and Leicht, 2012; Johansson and 

Hassel, 2010; Kim, Kang, and Song, 2012; Zhang, Peeta, and Friesz, 2005). Detailed 

reviews of existing and promising modeling techniques for interdependent 

infrastructure systems are available elsewhere (Ouyang, 2014; Pederson et al., 2006; 

Satumtira and Dueñas-Osorio, 2010). Note that in this type of performance modeling, 

one-way dependencies are a special case of interdependencies (i.e., two-way 

dependencies) for which there is no coupling from one system to another (see Figure 

8-2). The figure shows fundamental features that contribute to interdependence, 

including types of interacting facilities (e.g., utility generation, transmission and 

distribution elements), geographical location of interactions, and intensity with which 

systems interact (e.g., via commodity flows), as captured in a normalized fashion 

(a) (b) 

Figure 8-2		 Schematic of interdependent lifeline systems: (a) typical coupling across 

systems composed of generation (G), transmission (T), and distribution (D) 

elements along with their coupling locations, density of interconnections, 

and direction of commodity flow; and (b) specific coupling parameters 

across systems S1 and S2, including the intensity with which systems 

depend on one another (i.e., interdependent strength, Istr). 

GCR 16-917-39	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-5 
 

 

with a parameter called interdependence strength, Istr. This parameter is particularly 

useful in computational modeling, as it captures one-way dependencies when Istr = 0 

in a specific direction, or full interdependencies when it is non-zero in both 

directions. Also, interdependence strength can vary with time, so Istr(t) would be 

able to reflect the evolution of interdependencies before, during and after 

contingencies occur. 

To account for the effects of interdependence analytically, some studies explored 

coupled networks and their vulnerability to collapse and catastrophic cascading 

failures (Buldyrev et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2013; Cellai et al., 2013). Alternatively, 

other studies used numerical methods to show the importance of including 

interdependence evolution, or time-dependence, when assessing multi-system 

response to hazards (Hernandez-Fajardo and Dueñas-Osario, 2011; Zhang et al., 

2016). Complex connections between different networks can lead to varying 

responses, including cascading failures. For instance, when hazard levels are low or 

routine, then disruptive effects are absorbed locally and interdependencies do not 

tend to amplify failures. When hazard levels are high or extreme, substantial system 

damage can occur, which predominates over adverse effects from interdependencies. 

To acknowledge the dynamics of interdependent systems, Ulieru (2007) presented a 

methodological approach based on self-aware networks able to identify 

vulnerabilities and reconfigure themselves. More specific to urban infrastructure 

networks, Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2011) presented an approach to design 

interface topologies across interdependent networks, focusing on minimizing 

cascading failures. Amin (2002) described the complexity of realistic interdependent 

networks (such as transportation, power, telecommunications, and financial, among 

others) and highlighted strategies to improve their security. Yagan et al. (2012) 

presented an approach for optimal allocation of interconnecting links between two 

cyber-physical networks to enhance their ability to withstand random attacks. 

Research has recently concentrated on the dynamics of network interdependency 

during recovery. Lee II et al. (2007) presented a general network flow model for 

infrastructure restoration from the field of operations research by using mixed integer 

linear programming. Such a model determines which components should be 

reconstructed to recover a damaged system, but does not include costs related to the 

reconstruction process or provide guidance on scheduling the reconstruction work. 

Cavdaroglu et al. (2013) used mixed integer linear programming models to jointly 

study network restoration and scheduling for interdependent infrastructure systems, 

in which an explicit time index is used to assign reconstruction periods. 

Although most restoration models are broad and consider functional 

interdependencies, they do not include colocation, limited availability of resources, or 

multiple recovery times. Recovery goals change from short-term to intermediate- to 

8-6 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
long-term, and this evolution requires models whose mathematical structures remain 

simple enough for general applications, yet suitable for addressing the hierarchical 

structures needed to support decision-making. 

The modeling and design of interdependent networks should account for sociotechnical constraints, evolving performance over time, and preparation for future 

hazards. The Interdependent Network Design Problem and its related models allow 

for such an initial approach (González et al., 2015). 

8.2 Trends Across Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 

There is growing interest from government and industry in enabling resilient 

interdependent infrastructure. The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015), for example, addresses 

interdependencies and cascading effects, as well as linkages between system 

performance goals and the built environment. Presidential declarations have 

designated September and November as the month for national preparedness 

(Obama, 2014b) and critical infrastructure security and resilience (Obama, 2014a), 

respectively. And national laboratories continue to invest resources on monitoring 

and modeling complex socio-technical systems (as detailed in the next subsection). 

Also, countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the 

United Kingdom have already adopted critical infrastructure and emergency 

management plans (Her Majesty’s Treasury, 2014; Ministry of Civil Defence and 

Emergency Management, 2015; Public Safety Canada, 2014; DHS, 2013). Yusta et 

al. (2011) provide additional perspectives on national-level initiatives towards 

interdependent critical infrastructure protection. 

Despite the growing interest in infrastructure protection and interdependencies, there 

are no unified performance and restoration goals, and no methodology to account for 

interdependencies within the appropriate social, physical and economic contexts. 

Lifeline systems are the backbone for smart cities where cyber-physical couplings 

support community well-being and resilience (Genge et al., 2015; Kelic et al., 2008). 

Smart city initiatives in progress include those for Chicago and Glasgow, where 

sensing systems are being installed to monitor and learn about the built environment 

(Mone, 2015). 

The great majority of studies to date about interdependent infrastructure have focused 

on the technical aspects of infrastructure and the impacts of hazards. The studies 

typically examine how long and what kind of resources are required for a given 

system to restore service, system-level risks posed by a critical component, or the 

expected monetary loss from a given hazard event. A literature survey of 140 

documents, with close to 75% of them published since 2010 in the general field of 

interdependent infrastructure systems (see Appendix E, Sections E.1 and E.4), shows 

GCR 16-917-39 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-7 
that risk assessment and management are the dominant themes of the studies, 

followed by interdependency effects, and cascading failures. 

Figure 8-3 presents a bar chart constructed after analyzing the surveyed papers, 

where the relative change in publication output between 2010 and 2015 is contrasted 

with the output between 2005 and 2010 in terms of the types of infrastructure 

systems studied. Recent work in the technical literature typically involves various 

combinations of power, water, transportation, and telecommunication systems. Also, 

studies involving natural gas systems and supervisory control and data acquisition 

(SCADA) technologies are becoming more prominent, whereas studies involving 

economics, social systems, and public health have decreased in the last five years, 

after a rapid increase in publications after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, and 

other contemporary disasters worldwide. Details regarding frequencies of 

infrastructure systems mentioning other systems, preferred mathematical and 

computational methods, hazard events, and the association of systems and methods of 

analysis are available in Appendix E, Section E.1. 

‐100%

‐50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

Percent change in system type

Figure 8-3 Percent change in the types of infrastructure systems analyzed 

between documents published in 2010-2015 relative to 2005-2010. 

ICIs: interdependent critical infrastructure systems. 

Table 8-1 summarizes frequencies of surveyed documents in which the infrastructure 

system publications (left column) also mention other infrastructure systems (listed in 

top row). From this summary, important pairings and their frequencies can be 

highlighted: electric power-water, where 54% of the documents focusing on electric 

power networks are also paired with water networks; wastewater-water-electric 

power, where the wastewater studies of the sample always include water and electric 

power networks; SCADA-electric power, where the SCADA sample literature 

always involves electric power networks; telecommunications-electric power, where 

telecommunications are almost always paired with electric power networks (92% of 

the time in this study’s sample); gas-electric power, where almost all gas papers 

involve electric power networks (93% of the time); and socio-economic, when 

8-8 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
 

Table 8-1 Frequency of Infrastructure System Publications Mentioning Infrastructure Systems 

Power SCADA Water Wastewater Telecomm. Gas Transport Health Cyber Other Economy Social

Power 100% 11% 54% 7% 35% 29% 32% 11% 3% 23% 15% 11%

SCADA 100% 100% 30% 0% 40% 20% 30% 30% 30% 20% 10% 20%

Water 96% 6% 100% 13% 38% 34% 38% 13% 4% 25% 13% 11%

Wastewater 100% 0% 100% 100% 71% 43% 71% 43% 0% 43% 29% 29%

Telecomm. 92% 11% 56% 14% 100% 25% 44% 17% 3% 36% 14% 11%

Gas 93% 7% 62% 10% 31% 100% 31% 14% 3% 17% 28% 14%

Transport 70% 7% 47% 12% 37% 21% 100% 21% 5% 51% 26% 16%

Health 77% 23% 54% 23% 46% 31% 69% 100% 8% 62% 31% 31%

Cyber 60% 60% 40% 0% 20% 20% 40% 20% 100% 20% 20% 20%

Other 59% 5% 35% 8% 35% 14% 59% 22% 3% 100% 16% 27%

Economy 67% 5% 33% 10% 24% 38% 52% 19% 5% 29% 100% 43%

Social 59% 12% 35% 12% 24% 24% 41% 24% 6% 59% 53% 100%

Note: Governing system publications are shown in the left column; infrastructure systems are listed in the top row; green shading 

denotes highest mention frequency and red shading denotes lowest frequency. For example, in the reviewed studies, 

SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) system documents always mention power systems, but never wastewater 

systems. 

sampled social systems are paired 53% of the time with economic networks. In 

general, all network categories share a strong relationship with electric power 

networks. 

There is a lack of research on cyber networks (and network security in general), when 

accounting for their interactions with other infrastructure systems. Specifically, the 

impact of cyber networks has not been widely evaluated for telecommunication, gas, 

wastewater, health, economic, and social networks. These connections require 

research. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Centre 

for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation (CEATI) are creating 

guidelines for telecommunications-electric power networks because these 

connections must be secured against cyber-attacks and network failures given their 

increasing interdependence. 

Papers studying health networks frequently make connections not only to lifeline 

systems, but also to commercial, residential and governmental buildings and services. 

This dependence suggests a need for research into health networks, their supply 

chains, and building portfolios. Additionally, transportation network studies are 

weakly linked to many other networks, despite how crucial transportation is for 

resilience, suggesting that transportation dependencies and their multiple modes 

require further investigation. 

In the future, other network pairings will become important. Telecommunications 

clearly depend on the electric power network. As technology advances, power 

systems will become more dependent on telecommunication technology. Although 

GCR 16-917-39 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-9 
 

telecommunications promote a more reliable power network under normal operating 

conditions, their benefits in disaster scenarios are still uncertain. 

The body of knowledge is still scarce regarding the socio-technical aspects of 

interdependent infrastructure, in which humans manage physical infrastructure 

systems and consume their commodities. Both communities and governments are 

unsure about optimal preparations for and response to hazards. Recent findings 

suggest that residents may be more sensitive to the seriousness of the risks as 

opposed to the types of risks (Morrow et al., 2015; Stein et al., 2013; Whitehead et 

al., 2000). Such studies suggest a useful approach that focuses first on overall 

expectations of performance at the community level, as opposed to expectations of 

technical performance for each lifeline system. 

Some general trends exist, which provide initial proxies for performance and 

restoration goals. These proxies include: (1) recommendations from local emergency 

management offices, (2) volunteered data from utility operators (restoration times 

based on past experience), (3) post-processed data from increasingly used outage 

trackers to determine spatial location of outages and their duration, and (4) 

restoration times from analyses of post-disaster functionality curves for different 

utilities. Other sources of information, which are less readily available, include 

various types of funded capital investment projects, upgrades to design guidelines 

and standards, and table top exercises. 

Appendix E, Section E.2 provides source data from utilities and municipalities that 

can serve as “proxies” for societal expectations of infrastructure performance and 

restoration times. Table E-2 lists publicly disclosed recovery expectations from utility 

companies, and Table E-3 lists publicly disclosed recovery expectations from public 

entities. 

8.3 Practical Tools and Case Studies for Interdependent 

Infrastructure Management 

A number of software packages and models have been produced to inform utility 

owners about the response of infrastructure systems to various hazards. Using a 

survey of modeling and simulation tools by Adam et al. (2011) and Haimes et al. 

(2005), in combination with the survey conducted for this report, several trends with 

respect to modeling capabilities and deficiencies have been identified. 

First, the vast majority of modeling tools available to researchers, governmental 

agencies, and communities can handle multiple systems. Almost all these models 

provide risk and damage assessments for hazards. The models, however, provide 

limited guidance on how to reduce risk and do not provide guidance on how to 

restore systems and communities after a disaster. In general, these tools do not 

8-10	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
 

account for the socio-technical aspects of infrastructure, especially the decisionmaking process by operators and users that influence infrastructure systems. 

Second, the vast majority of the models are calibrated and validated, to the extent 

possible, using case studies after disasters. Most of the case studies are from U.S. 

post-disaster experiences. Other popular test bed locations are New Zealand and the 

European Union. Additionally, many models use artificial case studies that are 

representative of actual infrastructure systems. 

Third, there is a wide variety of risk assessment tools available; many are privately 

developed and some are for public use (e.g., HAZUS or ResilUS), and can include 

resilience considerations (FEMA, 2012; Miles and Chang, 2007). However, it is not 

clear what tools a particular community should use. Efforts are needed to aggregate 

these tools, improve their input and output capabilities, expand scales of use, and 

create a user-friendly interface so that communities can actually use them in a 

consistent and effective way. Efforts are also needed to include social systems in 

these models so that they can be adapted to community characteristics and 

expectations, and be used to support decisions about real world processes. 

In addition, it is becoming clear that agent-based, system dynamics, and game 

theoretic modeling coupled with infrastructure system simulations provide a 

promising approach for merging social and technical systems. National laboratories 

are well equipped to handle the computational demands of these models. Work on 

interdependent infrastructure systems at six laboratories is reported below, including 

the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, Idaho National 

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, Pacific 

Northwest National Laboratory, and the Italian National Agency for New 

Technologies, Energy, and Sustainable Economic Development (ENEA). 

	 Los Alamos National Laboratory. Work at Los Alamos has concentrated on 

optimization-based restoration that casts the problem of interdependent system 

reconstruction into a mixed integer programming framework typically studying 

regional and city-level systems (Coffrin et al., 2012). As for integrative 

infrastructure modeling efforts, actor-based infrastructure tools as well as multiscale approaches have been pursued to cover operational coupling across energy 

infrastructure as well as malicious disruptions and multi-system responses (Quirk 

and Fernandez, 2005; Visarraga et al., 2005). McPherson and Burian (2005) 

focused on the simulation of potable water distribution systems, sewage 

collection and storm water infrastructure in collaboration with the National 

Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC). Recent work explores 

decision support tools for critical infrastructure protection, with applications to 

pandemics and in collaboration with the Sandia National Laboratories for the 

Department of Homeland Security (Fair et al., 2007). There are also ongoing 

GCR 16-917-39	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-11 
 


 





efforts studying the effects of large-scale global warming on infrastructure 

systems and the benefits of small scale microgrids for community resilience. 

Sandia National Laboratories. These laboratories developed functional 

modeling and simulation methods for infrastructure and attendant 

interdependencies through various computational strategies. For example, the use 

of system dynamics, nonlinear optimization, and reliability and risk analyses has 

been pursued in collaboration with NISAC for multiple infrastructure systems 

(Conrad et al., 2006; Min et al., 2007; Rinaldi, 2004). Agent-based 

macroeconomic models have been used to represent interactions between 

physical and institutional systems, such as electric power and its open market 

environment (Ehlen and Scholand, 2005). Other related simulation frameworks, 

such as complex adaptive systems, have been applied for capturing the multiple 

scales of infrastructure systems, ranging from individual users to an entire nation 

(Brown et al., 2004). Work in collaboration with NISAC and DHS includes the 

study of supply chains, particularly those disrupted when conveying chemicals, 

such as ethylene or chlorinated hydrocarbons, which are critical for a wide range 

of manufacturing (Pepple et al., 2011; Welk et al., 2010). This laboratory is also 

currently working on strategies to defend infrastructure systems against cyber 

attacks, as well as techniques to model complex systems with limited 

information. 

Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory. This laboratory 

provided some of the initial modeling for the simulation of interdependent 

infrastructure systems at the local level (Pederson et al., 2006). Also, this 

laboratory produced heuristic approaches for modeling infrastructure systems, 

together with the incorporation of uncertainty and decision support in integrated 

systems (Dudenhoeffer and Manic, 2008; Dudenhoeffer et al., 2007; Permann, 

2007). More recently, efforts have focused on the behavior of coupled 

infrastructure networks and industrial processes, their cyber support systems, and 

the challenges of distributed control (Rieger et al., 2012; Walsh et al., 2009). This 

laboratory also has access to the Critical Infrastructure Test Range—a physical 

electrical network the size of a small city—which allows performance testing on 

real-world infrastructure systems. 

Argonne National Laboratory. This laboratory was among the first to engage in 

regional infrastructure modeling via computational approaches, including the 

markets and economic sectors that are supported by infrastructure (DeMarco et 

al., 2001; North, 2001; Peerenboom and Fisher, 2007). Agent-based and complex 

adaptive system modeling tools were used to analyze cross-sector national 

interdependencies. More recently, this laboratory has focused on the risk 

assessment of interdependent waterway facilities and systems, including 

disruptions and cascading failure effects (Folga et al., 2009, 2010). 

8-12 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
 

	 Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. This laboratory has focused mainly on 

the modeling and simulation of electric power systems at various scales. A 

modular simulation environment is currently being pursued to include generation, 

transmission, sub-transmission, and distribution systems (Chassin et al., 2008). 

Topological analyses of these electricity systems have also been conducted 

(Chassin and Posse, 2005). This laboratory has recently emphasized real time 

system analysis and control for smart grid applications. 

	 Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy, and Sustainable 

Economic Development (ENEA). This institution has an active research 

program on multi-scale infrastructure interdependencies, which ranges from 

measuring the intensity of interdependence across regional systems, to the 

assessment of multi-system, multi-scale, and multi-domain simulation platforms 

(Bologna et al., 2003; Casalicchio et al., 2010; Ruzzante et al., 2010). Studies 

with practical risk analysis applications include electric power systems combined 

with telecommunications via SCADA (Bobbio et al., 2009). Also, ENEA has 

addressed the problem of incomplete data for modeling complex interdependent 

systems via heuristic optimization tools (Fioriti et al., 2009). 

In summary, modeling activities at national laboratories, universities, and affiliated 

institutions have focused on coupled infrastructure, quantification of coupling 

strength or intensity, distributed control of interdependent systems, supply chain 

disruptions, and the effects of uncertainty on data-intensive system problems. These 

complex problems are routinely addressed by computational simulation for decision 

support tools. Agent-based modeling, complex adaptive systems, and multi-domain 

simulation platforms are the preferred approaches for capturing the behavior of 

complex physical-institutional-user systems, mainly at regional and city-level scales. 

In terms of hazards of interest, the national laboratories focus on cyber and physical 

attacks, hazards with long-term effects such as global warming, and intermittency 

issues related to renewable energy. In comparison, the academic communities mainly 

study random failures and natural hazards, particularly earthquake events. 

The most commonly studied lifelines in computational simulation include electric 

power and telecommunication systems, water and wastewater networks, and 

waterway systems. Restoration and recovery processes are in the initial phases of 

development. 

Emerging needs of national importance include predicting the impacts of smart grid 

and microgrid technology, and determining the resilience of interdependent networks, 

especially when coupled with telecommunication and cyber technology. Natural gas 

networks are also particularly important, mainly due to their current role in the U.S. 

energy portfolio. 

GCR 16-917-39	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-13 
 

8.4 Challenges and Opportunities in Interdependent Infrastructure 

Systems for Community Resilience 

To assess community resilience, it is necessary to understand recovery processes and 

the use of modern post-disaster data. These databases in turn support first-generation 

computational models and enable meaningful scenario-based socio-technical 

simulations. The empirical approach calibrates the decision making process over time 

with respect to observed performance, while the computational approach reveals the 

mechanisms that lead to particular restoration patterns. These two complementary 

approaches are influenced by human dynamics and their effects on infrastructure 

system operations and decision making (Gómez et al., 2014a; Zhang et al., 2005). 

Practical modeling of interdependent infrastructure should include the failure process 

and the recovery process. Physical, geographical, cyber and logical couplings 

(Rinaldi et al., 2001) all affect performance and restoration times. 

An example of interdependent lifeline modeling involves the work of Paredes-Toro et 

al. (2014) in which spatial and temporal changes in interdependence between electric 

power and water networks were approximated by local correlations between the cities 

of Concepción and Talcahuano in the aftermath of the 2010 Chilean earthquake. The 

linear correlations for restoration times at various locations in the cities of 

Concepción and Talcahuano after the 2010 Chile earthquake were mostly positive, 

indicating that electric power and water networks were both recovering similarly as a 

function of time. Further research is needed with respect to the spatial and temporal 

evolution of lifeline services to provide more robust and comprehensive models for 

the restoration of interdependent infrastructure systems. 

Current models of interdependent infrastructure restoration often assume that 

recovery strategies can be developed and implemented through a unified and 

coordinated process. However, in practice there are significant institutional and 

operational differences across lifeline systems, with each infrastructure system being 

handled largely independently in highly decentralized decision making processes. 

Thus, it is imperative to optimize recovery processes with models that can simulate 

decentralized dynamics and socio-technical decision making during restoration 

(Gómez et al., 2014b; Rudnick et al., 2011; Shi et al., 2015). 

There are interdependencies among different utilities and the many community-level 

organizations that use them. Thus, it is desirable to assess how loss of function in 

utilities affects community services. To organize these relationships, an array may be 

helpful, as hypothetically shown in Figure 8-4 for possible utility and service pairs. 

Each pair of utilities and services describes a dependence strength (one-way 

dependence of a service on a utility system), and restoration time expectations from 

the view point of service requiring utility commodities (for other dimensions at the 

base of array, see Appendix E, Section E.3). 

8-14	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
Figure 8-4 Hypothetical multi-dimensional array illustrating the dependency of 

various community and institutional needs on the provision of utility, 

lifeline and other services, expressed in terms of the time required (in 

days) to restore services after a disaster has occurred. Variation in 

colors depicts strength of dependency. 

The idea behind the array is to capture the relationships between infrastructure 

systems and societal and institutional needs to help inform prioritization of resources. 

In the array shown in Figure 8-4, water and energy services show a high dependence 

on energy utilities (red color) and a day restoration time expectation. Financial 

systems are shown to affect government services (purple color), with governments 

expecting 7 days before financial systems recover functionality. 

Such an array could guide modeling efforts for interdependent infrastructure research 

and implementation (DHS, 2014; Lee, 2014). It could also be used to synthesize what 

is known and what is missing in terms of societal and institutional expectations of 

performance, interdependencies, and restoration times to support community 

resilience. 

8.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 

Interdependent infrastructure systems are integral to modern societies. These systems 

are typically influenced by physical infrastructure such as energy, 

telecommunication, and transportation networks, as well as financial, social, and 

information networks. Technology, with the promise of greater efficiency and safety, 

is expanding and linking these systems. Technology introduces benefits as well as 

unique and largely unknown behaviors (and possibly liabilities). Variations of 

interdependence in space and time, and the role of decision makers and users, all 

affect the performance of interdependent infrastructure systems, particularly in 

response to hazards. Thus, knowing the societal expectations of service restoration 

will contribute to community resilience planning. 

GCR 16-917-39 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-15 
Key recommendations to improve the understanding of interdependent infrastructure 

systems are presented below. Recommendations pertain to design, operations and 

research and are based on the discussions in this chapter and material in Appendix E. 

	 Develop practical tools for the modeling, analysis, visualization, and design 

of interdependent infrastructure systems at multiple scales. Researchers have 

been developing multi-scale models of infrastructure systems that address 

interdependencies from local to national scales. Recent programs and resources 

from government agencies clearly indicate the need for such tools to become 

practical for widespread use. Initial efforts have focused mainly on the 

integration of generation, transmission and distribution across electric power 

systems (including decision-making from the executive to service area manager 

level). Improvements in modeling and visualization for cyber, 

telecommunication, economic, and social systems are needed, all of which are 

essential for community resilience assessment and emerging smart cities. 

	 Develop a unified model for interdependent infrastructure systems. There are 

favored modeling approaches for each system. For instance, network and 

reliability theory are preferred for electric power systems, and input-output 

models are favored for regional economic interactions. There is a need for a 

unified model that addresses the interdependencies of systems in modern 

communities. Such a model may involve consideration of real-time data, 

including societal and institutional behavioral data, to make informed decisions 

about community interactions and restoration priorities. Socio-technical 

processes unfold at multiple spatial and temporal scales, which require novel 

methods to capture evolving interactions and nested hierarchies. 

	 Focus on understanding restoration processes across interdependent 

infrastructure systems. To support decision making and resource prioritization, 

there has been significant work quantifying and modeling the risks faced by 

communities subjected to hazard events. However, there is a distinct lack of 

integrated system modeling that includes interdependencies of community 

recovery processes. 

	 Develop tools to identify interdependent infrastructure systems and services 

along with their restoration criteria. Tools should be developed to help 

synthesize field data, societal expectations and considerations, expert opinion, 

best practices, and interdependent system models relative to community 

resilience restoration goals. For instance, a tool, such as the array presented in 

this chapter, can include desired and expected restoration times that are relevant 

to emergency management, utility operator information, outage trackers, and 

restoration curves. Such arrays could help organize the current body of 

knowledge, identify investment priorities, enable study of dependency strengths, 

8-16	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems GCR 16-917-39 
restoration times, and other pertinent information, and provide insight on 

interdependencies between infrastructure systems and services. 

	 Develop guidelines to inform the design, interoperability, and improvement 

of interdependent infrastructure systems. Guidelines are needed for 

interdependent infrastructure operation, protection, restoration, and interface 

design across systems. Some guidance for interdependent designs exists for 

electric power and telecommunication systems. For example, the International 

Electromechanical Commission (IEC, 2003) has developed standards for the 

design of automated electrical substations with telecommunication protocols for 

timely control and secure interoperability. Best practices and computational 

models that address interdependencies and restoration of services provide 

opportunities to advance the understanding of socio-technical systems and their 

role in community resilience. What-if scenarios can be used in models to inform 

decision processes and generate new data for further calibration, measurement 

and validation. 

Infrastructure systems are interdependent with each other and the communities they 

serve. Any changes to the systems, whether intentionally through upgrades or 

unintentionally after hazard events, will affect dependent systems and societal 

processes. Proper management of interdependencies will strengthen community 

resilience, particularly as smart technologies are integrated with infrastructure. 

Neglect of these issues can lead to cyber attacks, cascading failures and difficult 

restoration processes. Interdependent infrastructure systems provide many 

opportunities for research and implementation to improve decision-making at the 

community level. 

GCR 16-917-39	 8: Interdependent Infrastructure Systems 8-17 

 

Chapter 9 

Findings and Recommendations 

This chapter synthesizes the results of the assessments of lifeline system performance 

and the societal needs related to lifeline systems in hazard response and recovery. 

Specifically, Section 9.1 summarizes key findings related to the current state of 

lifeline codes, standards, guidelines, and performance requirements for different 

hazards and disruptions; the current state of knowledge about societal considerations 

and expectations for lifeline performance and recovery timeframes; critical 

interdependencies, both among different lifeline systems and the societal-serving 

functions that they enable; major disaster-related insights about lifeline performance 

and societal expectations; the key gaps and deficits between the current state of 

lifeline systems performance and recovery timeframes and our best understanding of 

societal expectations; and future considerations and trends that are beyond the scope 

of this study but merit further attention over time. Section 9.2 contains a series of 

recommendations organized to identify the needs associated with: lifeline standards, 

research, modeling, and lifeline system operations. 

9.1 Findings 

9.1.1	 Lifeline Codes, Standards, Guidelines, and Performance 

Requirements 

The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) provides a comprehensive review and discussion of 

codes, standards, guidelines and manuals for all the systems specifically reviewed in 

this study. The information provided in the NIST Guide has been referenced and 

augmented in some cases. 

Overall, the study surveyed many of the codes, standards, guidelines and manuals 

that govern the design, construction and performance of key lifeline systems and 

system components. They are developed in a variety of ways to achieve functionality 

and safety, and to address system performance and reliability. They vary 

considerably from system to system and they represent various levels of consensus— 

most typically among operators, regulators, and engineering experts. Codes for 

interdependent systems are also starting to emerge, particularly in the interoperability 

of automated electrical substations and telecommunication systems. 

Some commonalities and trends have emerged from this survey, which are relevant 

for improvements in community-scale resilience. In particular, there are gaps in 

codes and standards for the infrastructure systems reviewed. Codes, standards, 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-1 
guidelines and manuals tend to emphasize component-level rather than system-wide 

performance. They tend to cover minimum levels of safety or performance (e.g., for 

extreme loading conditions) of components as opposed to system response and levels 

of service. Most address day-to-day operations and do not cover the range of hazard 

types considered in this study, particularly the extreme, low-probability, highconsequence events. 

The processes by which lifeline codes, standards, and guidelines are developed tend 

to be reactive and based upon past information. This may result in significant time 

lags before the latest information on hazards is incorporated into updates. 

Furthermore, some standards and guidelines have not necessarily been developed 

following rigorous and systematic processes. 

The performance requirements within lifelines codes, standards, and guidelines tend 

to mainly address engineering for system design and construction and operational 

concerns, taking into account different, but a generally more limited set of societal 

considerations. Life safety, public health, public safety, emergency response, 

personnel safety, critical service provision, property and monetary loss prevention, 

and environmental protection are some of the most prevalent societal considerations 

identified in the performance requirements established by standards and codes for 

lifeline systems. In particular, failures in some lifeline systems (e.g., natural gas, 

liquid fuel, and transportation) and some lifeline service outages (e.g., power, 

telecommunication (911), natural gas, water, and wastewater) that can contribute to 

mortality and morbidity are given the greatest emphasis in codes and standards. 

For electric power, gas and liquid fuel systems, certain measures of system 

performance are routinely assessed and even required to be reported to regulators. 

These measures generally address outages during normal operations and operations 

and often exclude disruption caused by hazard events, which can distort the true costs 

and impacts of system disruption and restoration. For example, electric power 

providers routinely report System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI), 

System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), Customer Average 

Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI), and Customer Average Interruption Frequency 

Index (CAIFI)—which generally exclude data during disruptions due to hazard 

events. 

With possibly a few exceptions, most system performance measures are not directly 

informed by or linked to societal expectations, nor do they differentiate between 

customers or consider differential hardships imposed on society from varying 

durations of outage. The direct and indirect costs to customers will likely vary with 

the duration of system disruptions (i.e., mere inconvenience in the first few hours to 

severe hardship after weeks of lost service). One notable exception is the service 

level agreement (SLA) for telecommunication systems. SLAs establish thresholds for 

9-2 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

customer service and outages that trigger contractual penalties to the system 

providers. However, at present, disruptions caused by hazards such as earthquakes, 

hurricanes, and man-made threats are generally excluded from such agreements. 

The lifeline assessments also identify a number of examples of system restoration 

guidelines that are generally informed by an array of societal expectations that 

include: public safety, mobility, business continuity, and environmental protection. 

System restoration times and guidelines tend to be governed by scenarios often 

derived from recent disaster experience or the largest disruption in the region. They 

may not take a robust view of the range of potential hazard types or levels of hazard 

severity that could affect the system. 

The degree to which lifeline system codes, standards and guidelines address the 

provision of substitutions, temporary solutions and accessibility services (e.g., bottled 

water and portable toilets) for lost services also varies considerably by system. Such 

substitutions and temporary solutions (both within and between systems as well as 

those undertaken by society) can significantly affect performance outcomes and 

societal expectations, impacts and recovery following disruption. 

It is also important to recognize that codes and standards are not the only influence 

on lifeline system design; factors such as voluntary measures to exceed standards, 

injunctions of regulatory authorities to improve performance in hazard events, and 

other risk management practices also influence the resilience of lifeline systems. Also 

noteworthy is the considerable variability in lifeline system regulation and 

enforcement by system, hazard, and geography (i.e., national vs. state, state-to-state, 

and locally). Natural gas, liquid fuel, and electric power all have regulatory data 

requirements focused on safety and reliability. In particular, for gas and liquid fuel 

pipelines, there is a nationally-consistent regulatory framework defined by federal 

legislation. Federal regulations also guide telecommunication systems, whereas, few 

states now regulate Internet-based telecommunications. However, while most US 

jurisdictions adopt the latest codes and standards and some even add more stringent 

requirements to them, other jurisdictions may not adopt them in their entirety or may 

reduce some requirements. Even if codes and standards are adopted, their 

effectiveness may be jeopardized by poor enforcement during planning, design and 

construction of infrastructure components. This disparity in code adoption and 

enforcement can have significant consequences for community resilience. 

9.1.2 Key Societal Considerations and Expectations of Lifeline System 

Performance 

This study has been challenging in part because of the almost total lack of empirical 

data on what members of the general public regard as acceptable lifeline performance 

following disruptions. Without such data, the study team has had to make inferences 

about those expectations. Gauging societal expectations is also challenging because 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-3 
U.S. society is highly diverse. Expectations can vary across individuals, households, 

and businesses as a function of a number of factors, including: vulnerability and 

resilience characteristics; geographic location; hazard (including event severity, 

probability and duration); lifeline type; available information on the impacts of 

disruption; prior experience and knowledge about service disruptions; levels of 

resulting losses; public perceptions of the trustworthiness and competence of service 

providers; and the availability of substitutes and contingencies that can compensate 

for lifeline outages. 

It is also important to understand that public expectations and tolerances for lifeline 

service disruptions are dynamic and likely to be shaped by both risk perception and 

risk communication. Factors affecting risk perception include prior experience with 

hazards and lifeline outages, substitutability and dependency on lost services, and 

available information on the impacts of disruption. Other things being equal, 

disruptions may be tolerated for longer periods in severe and catastrophic events than 

in less serious ones, because the public will be more willing to accept that extreme 

hazard events are more difficult for service providers to anticipate and mitigate. 

Public confidence and the past performance of lifeline service providers (both during 

routine operations and prior hazard events) can also influence expectations and 

tolerances. 

Public perceptions and expectations are also shaped by communications regarding 

the risks associated with past disasters and lifeline outages. Lifeline service providers 

should work with emergency management, public safety, and other governmental 

agencies to ensure that risk communication messages reach and are understood by the 

affected public. Additionally, there is evidence to suggest that societal expectations 

and tolerances may be changing, as social and economic activity becomes more 

dependent upon highly reliable service provision, particularly with regard to electric 

power and telecommunication systems. 

Using terminology from vulnerability science and resilience research, various 

segments of the population and sectors of the economy are differentially exposed, 

differentially sensitive, and differentially adaptable to lifeline service disruptions. 

Because vulnerability and resilience vary as a function of exposure, sensitivity and 

adaptive capacity, risks associated with lifeline service disruptions are not borne 

equally by all members of society but are imposed disproportionately on already 

vulnerable social and economic groups. 

One approach to assessing likely societal expectations is to take a closer look at how 

lifeline performance and disruption can have deleterious effects on things that society 

members value most. This approach is consistent with the NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) 

which uses Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” framework to prioritize different building 

and infrastructure systems in communities. For this reason, human health and safety, 

9-4 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
the functionality of health-care systems and economic well-being are priority issues 

that this study has focused on in exploring societal considerations regarding 

performance. 

The NIST Guide also distinguishes among short-term (days), intermediate-term 

(weeks to months) and long-term (months to years) response and recovery needs that 

planning activities must take into account. While recognizing that all three time 

periods are important, this study has emphasized societal considerations for the shortterm period and immediate impacts, disruption, and responses, again with respect to 

human health and the economy. 

The rationale for this more limiting discussion is that: (1) life safety and health are 

overriding values for communities, with economic activity following as a community 

priority since it provides the means through which a wide range of other institutions 

and community needs are satisfied; (2) although the consequences of lifeline 

disruption can cascade over time, impacts such as deaths, injuries, and business 

interruption losses are generally most acute during the immediate post-impact period; 

and (3) practically speaking, more research exists on shorter-term than on longerterm disruptions. 

9.1.3 Critical Interdependencies 

This study also looked critically at the interactions among different lifeline systems 

during normal operations as well as restoration after hazard-related events. 

Dependent and interdependent relationships among lifeline systems have evolved 

over time with various systems and technology advances expanding and linking 

systems together. Although they provide efficiencies and other benefits during 

normal operation, they also introduce unique and largely unknown behaviors in 

hazard-related events and system disruptions. 

Because of interdependencies, some system failures can also trigger significant 

cascading failures and performance impacts on multiple lifeline systems, causing a 

number of additional direct and indirect societal impacts. The physical proximity and 

colocation of lifelines can provide for enhanced efficiencies but also increase societal 

risks for cascading failures, complex interactions in restoration, as well as risks posed 

by multi-hazard effects. Collocated lifelines may also require a cross-system, crossorganizational and integrated approach to planning that is difficult to implement. 

Within systems there can also be choke points that amplify interdependencies. 

Interdependencies also exist between lifeline systems and community-level 

processes. 

Rinaldi et al. (2001) offer a general classification of interdependency mechanisms as 

physical, geographic, cyber, and logical, emphasizing that they are not necessarily 

mutually exclusive. Physical interdependence exists when the performance of a given 

GCR 16-917-39 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-5 
 

network depends on the outputs of other networks. Geographic interdependence 

emerges from the colocation and close proximity of systems. Cyber interdependence 

occurs when the interdependence between two networks is based on shared 

information (e.g., the “smart grid” which relies on telemetry and situational 

awareness data). Finally, there is logical interdependence when systems are 

interconnected through channels different from those previously discussed, including 

human decisions related to restoration prioritization among systems. 

The body of research literature on interdependent critical infrastructure has grown 

over the past 20 years with risk assessment and system management dominating the 

themes of studies, followed by interdependency effects and cascading failures. 

Resilience-related studies of interdependent critical infrastructure are increasing but 

the volume of literature is still limited by comparison. 

The literature emphasizes studies of electric power, water, transportation, and 

telecommunication systems in varying combinations. Studies involving natural gas 

systems and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) technologies are 

becoming more prominent; while studies involving economic and social 

considerations, such as public health, have decreased in recent years. There is a 

distinct lack of research on cyber networks, network security and cyber interactions 

with other lifelines. 

There is also a growing body of system modeling for interdependent critical 

infrastructure systems that can be leveraged to improve resilience across lifeline 

systems. These models can be generally grouped according to their modeling goals of 

performance evaluation, design, mitigation and recovery. Performance evaluation 

models emphasize numerical or analytical tools to understand the behavior of a given 

system or how interdependencies impact system performance and resilience. Design 

models are used to help conceptualize and build lifeline systems and can be used to 

consider how to minimize the risk of cascading failures across interdependent 

systems. Mitigation models emphasize preparing systems to handle future hazards, 

reducing associated risks and enhancing system resilience. Recovery models tend to 

focus on restoring systems with failed components to a functional state and 

minimizing recovery timeframes and associated costs. 

The vast majority of interdependent infrastructure modeling tools that are currently 

available can handle multiple systems and different hazard inputs, but their outputs 

tend to emphasize risk and damage assessment of coupled infrastructures, 

quantification of coupling strength across systems, distributed control of such 

systems, supply chain disruptions, and the consideration of uncertainty effects; few 

look at risk reduction, system restoration, and societal impacts or considerations. 

Most are also calibrated and validated with U.S. post-disaster experiences or artificial 

case studies. While the recovery models are broad and consider functional 

9-6 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
interdependencies, they tend to exclude colocation, limitations in resource 

availability, and multiple and extended time horizons. Despite the noted research 

trends and modeling advances, there is also a lack of unified performance and 

restoration goals across multiple and interdependent systems. While a number of 

“proxies” for restoration times do exist for individual systems, only in a few cases 

have service providers linked up to develop unified goals. 

Rigorous and readily implementable theories and methods for the study of lifeline 

system interdependencies are similarly lacking. The vast majority of interdependent 

critical infrastructure studies and tools tend to focus on the technical aspects of 

systems and the impacts of hazards on them. There is less emphasis on societal 

expectations of the performance and recovery of interdependent systems, such as 

restoration times expected by the public versus restoration times estimated by utilities 

and actions taken by individuals and institutions to prepare for or cope with the 

hazard-related effects of interdependency. Agent-based modeling, complex adaptive 

systems, and multi-domain simulation platforms are the preferred approaches for 

capturing the emergent behavior of complex physical-institutional-user 

interdependent critical infrastructure systems. Some national laboratories are leading 

the development of these computationally intensive and multi-scale simulation 

approaches. There remains, however, a substantial need for fundamental data 

collection across multiple systems for the same locations at community and temporal 

scales to help develop better theories and methods. 

The lifeline-specific reviews reveal a number of critical system dependencies and 

interdependencies. Virtually every lifeline system depends on electric power and 

telecommunications for system control and monitoring. All lifeline systems also 

depend on fuel and transportation, particularly for post-disaster service restoration 

and system repairs. Fuel is also a critical contingency for power when outages occur. 

Water is critical for cooling in the generation processes for electric power. Water also 

helps with pollution control, and supports other infrastructure, such as natural gas and 

liquid fuel systems. 

Some lifeline systems are also inherently intra-dependent and interdependent, which 

can provide efficiency and other benefits during normal operations, but which can 

also mean that failures in one component of a system can result in loss of function to 

otherwise undamaged components in other systems. Such is the case with 

transportation systems. For example, ports and airports have limited functionality if 

connecting roads and rail lines are closed. In major metropolitan areas, multimodal 

transportation network planning and design are commonplace and the ability of the 

network to function effectively after a hazard event will depend upon the level of 

redundancy in the network. 

GCR 16-917-39 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-7 
 

There are also some important multiple system interactions that are critical in the 

post-disaster performance of lifeline systems. One is between electric power, gas and 

liquid fuel, and water supply. The interaction between leaking gas and electric power 

to ignite fires also requires the availability of water supply for fire suppression, and 

strict clearances from electricity providers. Similarly, wastewater systems generally 

depend upon water and electric power to operate. 

The colocation of multiple systems also creates physical interdependencies that 

increase the likelihood that failure in one system can damage and interrupt others. 

Some prime examples exist with electric power and telecommunication 

infrastructure, and transportation elements that also serve as corridors for buried 

infrastructure (e.g., pipes and conduits for water, wastewater, telecommunications, 

power and natural gas). However, because lifeline service providers often do not 

share system information, many areas of physical colocation are unknown. 

Some interdependencies are also increasing with time, such as the expanding role that 

telecommunications and electric power have in monitoring and remote control of 

lifeline systems, as well as household management, personal choices for renewable 

power, and community planning for decentralized energy. 

9.1.4 Disaster Lessons 

In general, there is a substantial body of literature on the social and economic impacts 

of lifeline service disruptions, spanning studies on actual events—both hazard- and 

non-hazard-related—and scenario-based and probabilistic loss projections. Each of 

this study’s lifeline-specific reviews looked at system performance in hazard events 

and across the three phases of disaster recovery—defined as short-term (days), 

intermediate-term (weeks to months) and long-term (months to years)—in the NIST 

Guide (NIST, 2015) and the National Disaster Recovery Framework: Strengthening 

Disaster Recovery for the Nation (FEMA, 2011). 

This study found great variability in both the quantity and quality of data available 

for the various lifeline systems, among hazard types and severity, and across the 

phases of disaster-related response and recovery. In general, there is more 

information and a more complete understanding of the societal impacts and 

restoration patterns of short-term rather than long-term disruptions. Also, most 

studies of disaster related impacts on lifeline systems are event-specific; systematic, 

multi-event studies are generally rare. It is noted that there appear to be few, if any, 

systematic studies of sustained telecommunications outages. There also do not seem 

to be any longitudinal (long-term) studies of lifeline system restoration and its 

support of long-term community recovery following extreme events. 

For electric power, most major and widespread outages have been caused by storms 

or other weather events. There is also more data on weather-related events than other 

9-8 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
hazards and more data on electric power outages in major hazard-related events, 

particularly with regard to technical aspects of component and system failure and 

restoration. Common information for electric power performance in hazard events 

includes: standard industry measures, peak number of customers without service, and 

time to restore service to all (or nearly all) customers. 

Gas and liquid fuel production, transmission and distribution systems are susceptible 

to damage due to all forms of hazard events. Loss of power to oil refineries and 

pipeline pump stations during high wind and coastal inundation events will result in 

loss of production and transmission, causing a lack of fuel supply for businesses and 

consumers. The high concentration of fuel refineries and major transmission lines 

along the central Gulf Coast and Eastern seaboard results in increased exposure to 

hurricanes. Ground faulting and liquefaction caused by earthquakes can lead to 

rupture of gas and fuel pipelines, though appropriate design measures can mitigate 

these effects as demonstrated by the good performance of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline 

System during the design level 2002 Denali Fault earthquake. 

Transportation systems are susceptible to damage or disruption during earthquakes, 

tsunamis and other forms of coastal inundation or riverine flooding. Common 

earthquake damage includes bridge failures and landslides that can hamper 

emergency response, particularly to remote communities. Scour induced by coastal 

inundation and riverine flooding can also result in bridge, rail and roadway failures. 

Weather events, involving wind, snow and ice, can cause disruptions but physical 

damage tends to be more limited. Consequently, data on transportation performance 

in earthquakes, tsunamis, coastal inundation and riverine flooding are more readily 

available. 

Water and wastewater systems are also more susceptible to damage or disruptions 

during earthquakes, tsunamis and other forms of inundation. Disruptions to water 

supplies can have serious impacts on fire-fighting capacity and sanitation that can 

result in serious public health, safety and economic consequences. Damage to 

wastewater treatment systems can lead to discharge of untreated sewage into 

waterways and the ocean, resulting in major environmental and public health 

concerns. The provision of accessibility services for these two systems is also 

essential for community-level resilience post-disaster. 

In terms of recovery timeframes, disaster experiences show that most lifeline system 

outages generally last from hours to weeks (short- to intermediate-term recovery). In 

the most severe cases, outages can last for months and longer. The longer-term 

outages are associated with the most destructive events when critical components of 

lifeline systems, such as buildings, bridges, piping, and essential equipment, must be 

reconstructed or replaced to restore system operability. 

GCR 16-917-39 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-9 
9.1.5	 Gaps and Deficits: Codes, Standards, Performance Requirements 

and Societal Considerations 

Overall, this assessment found uneven study and treatment of societal considerations 

in the codes and standards governing lifeline systems performance for different 

hazards. For example, water systems have different demands for water quantity and 

quality associated with various societal serving functions, such as potable water 

consumption, firefighting, cooling, industrial processing, recreation, and irrigation, 

but some of them are not addressed in current guidance. Similarly, 

telecommunication systems serve critical public safety and emergency response 

functions that are reflected in current guidance; however, guidance for the critical 

societal-serving functions of safety monitoring for other lifeline systems, commerce 

and banking, and business and employment is generally non-existent. 

As previously noted, lifeline codes, standards, guidelines and manuals are largely 

associated with the performance and safe operation of components rather than system 

response and levels of service. In a few instances, system owners or operators have 

established system-level performance objectives or targets for a limited number of 

hazards. Most guidance does not address the range of hazard types considered in this 

study, particularly the extreme, low-probability, high-consequence events. In general, 

more is known about the lifeline impacts and performance objectives for earthquakes 

and wind-related hazard than for other hazards. The characterization of earthquake 

hazards has benefitted from the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act, and the 

research funded as part of the National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program 

(NEHRP). 

Also, as previously noted, there is very little information on societal expectations of 

system performance during routine, design, and extreme hazard events for most 

lifeline systems. Potential “proxies” and informants for societal expectations of 

lifeline performance and recovery timeframes identified in the study include: outage 

reporting thresholds and criteria (for electric power and telecommunications); postdisaster reviews of utility performance; policies, legislation and regulations, 

particularly regulatory changes made following hazard-related disruptions; societal 

and economic losses; and state and local energy assurance plans (for electric power, 

gas and liquid fuel systems). Societal expectations may also be indirectly reflected in 

industry practices for service restoration following outages. 

While only a qualitative review, this study shows there is a substantial gap between 

the anticipated performance of different lifeline systems and societal expectations of 

lifeline performance. Currently, there is no systematic research or methods for 

quantifying or even bounding this gap. Examples of the potential differences between 

anticipated and expected system performance are offered in the lifeline assessments 

of transportation, water, and wastewater systems. These are mostly derived from the 

9-10	 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
opinions of experts in lifeline engineering and recovery planning and are based upon 

post-disaster observation and engineering judgment. Systematic research and surveys 

are not available. 

This study also identifies some important examples for how the gap between 

prescriptive performance and societal expectations can be filled. For gas and liquid 

fuel systems, some of this gap has been filled by standards requiring community 

planning programs and stakeholder engagement in risk reduction planning and 

practices. These practices provide a framework that deserves attention when 

developing programs for community resilience as applied to other lifelines and their 

interdependent behavior. The gaps can also be closed by high quality system design, 

detailed risk assessments coupled with appropriate emergency planning, system 

monitoring, well-communicated emergency response procedures, and robust 

contingency planning and design, such as ensuring hazard-safe locations for 

contingency-related equipment (e.g., generators) and supplies (e.g., fuel). 

Strategies to enhance resilience will invariably require difficult investment decisions 

in the face of limited resources. To make rational decisions, lifeline owners and 

operators need to consider the tradeoff between risk reduction and financial 

investment. Quantitative uncertainty and risk analysis therefore need to be an integral 

part of performance requirements and criteria. In addition, risk communication needs 

to be an essential part of the overall dialogue, including public messaging. 

9.1.6 Future Considerations and Trends 

This study identified a number of considerations outside its scope as well as 

important trends that are likely to shape future lifeline system design and 

performance as well as societal expectations. As has been noted previously, societal 

expectations for lifeline system performance are changing, with decreasing societal 

tolerance for outages in general, lower thresholds for acceptable outages, and greater 

disruptions from outages when they occur. Future work both in research and 

applications related to community resilience needs to consider the following issues: 

 Social vulnerabilities are increasing due to the country’s aging population, 

urbanization, and policy changes that are increasingly enabling disabled persons 

to remain in their homes where they are especially vulnerable to the loss of 

lifeline services. 

 Economic vulnerabilities are changing with the ongoing shift from a 

manufacturing to an information economy; the growth of “cloud” based 

information technology and data storage; the growth of e-commerce and the 

expansion of the financial service sector; increases in telecommuting; and costcutting and efficiency measures in business and inventory management. 

GCR 16-917-39 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-11 
	 The continued rise of globalization, supply chains, and the interdependencies 

inherent in modern manufacturing and finance also mean that community 

resilience can be significantly impacted by hazard-related lifeline disruptions 

occurring in distant places and outside the control of local resilience policy and 

investments. 

	 The interdependencies between electric power and telecommunications and other 

lifeline systems are likely to continue to increase as systems become “smarter” 

with technology-based operational controls. 

	 Aging infrastructure will increase the risk of system damage and disruption in 

future hazard-related events and also increase the vulnerability of all lifeline 

systems (regardless of their current resiliency) to the cascading effects of lifeline 

service performance and disruptions. 

	 For electric power, the increasing availability of renewable resources, distributed 

energy resources, decentralized power management, energy storage, and grid 

modernization may be enhancing resilience for service providers and individual 

users to operate independent of the grid after a hazard event. In some case, 

however, they may also be stressing physical infrastructure beyond its original 

design, which can affect future system design and performance as well. The 

traditional industry structure is also changing as a result of these trends. 

Transmission upgrading projects are also being undertaken—many involving 

telecommunications and new technologies—to increase the resilience of the U.S. 

electrical grid. 

	 The effects of climate change will add to existing social vulnerabilities and 

lifeline service performance and disruptions. Energy and water use are projected 

to increase, particularly in summer. Infrastructure located in low-lying and 

coastal areas and those systems that are water-dependent will also face new and 

added risks. 

	 Issues of theft, cyber-attacks, and other security threats may increase with time. 

Finally, the study cautions that unanticipated societal impacts will likely present 

themselves in future natural hazard events due to lifeline system vulnerabilities that 

remain poorly understood, the absence of guidance on hazard resilient construction 

and installation practices, unknown and unfavorable states of repair, issues with 

system functional capacity, and ongoing changes in technology. 

9.2 Recommendations 

Recommendations resulting from this critical assessment of lifeline system 

performance and the societal needs of lifeline systems in disaster recovery are 

discussed in the following sections. They are consistent with the NIST Community 

Disaster Resilience Program and its various components, including the NIST Guide, 

9-12	 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
the Community Resilience Panel, and research efforts. They also target lifeline 

operators, practitioners, regulators and researchers concerned about societal 

considerations in hazard-related system performance and potentially involved in 

lifelines standards and code development related activities. 

The following set of overarching recommendations was derived from the individual 

assessments of the study team. They were then discussed and prioritized with the 

review panel. All recommendations shown below were deemed high priority. 

Readers are reminded to review the full suite of recommendations that are provided 

in each of the chapters. 

9.2.1 Lifeline Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

As noted in Section 9.1.5, this study reveals critical gaps in the many codes, 

standards, guidelines and manuals that govern the design, construction, and 

performance of different lifeline systems and system components. The following ten 

recommendations are offered to address lifeline-standards-related needs emerging 

from the study. The priority rankings reflect organizational and framework needs, 

available information, new knowledge needs, guidelines and standards development 

needs, and scoping breadth, with recommendations that pertain to broad issues and 

improving community resilience considered higher priorities than recommendations 

for specific lifelines. 

A1. Identify or establish an organization and process for advocating, 

harmonizing and unifying the consensus procedures for lifeline guidelines 

and standards development. For nearly a decade, the U.S. lifelines 

community has lacked an oversight organization for lifelines guidelines and 

standards development and to lead the national process necessary to develop 

consensus among a wide range of users. More rigorous and systematic 

approaches to lifeline standards development, such as those defined by the 

American National Standards Institute (ANSI), are also needed. Such a process 

would include an organized investigation of the existing standards, guidelines 

and best practices from across the United States and internationally, the 

identification of gaps and deficiencies, the prioritization of needs, the 

development of pre-standards, and the designation of organizations to complete 

the development process. Innovations in the standards development processes 

that other countries, such as Great Britain, are employing also need to be 

evaluated. 

A2. Develop more consistent terminology for lifeline standards. More consistent 

terminology is needed so that it is possible to more easily compare standards 

and set future directions for the standards development of different lifeline 

systems. Example terminology that merits clarification include: performance 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-13 
A3. 

A4. 

A5. 

targets, goals, and objectives; system characterization terms such as 

transmission, distribution, and facilities; characterization of uncertainty; and 

system interdependencies versus dependencies. 

Develop an up-to-date and complete suite of codes, standards, and 

guidelines for all lifeline systems to reflect the current state of practice, 

knowledge, and performance requirements. This study has identified a 

number of critical systems and system components that lack codes, standards 

and performance requirements for important hazard events and hazard levels 

considered. Also, in some cases, current codes, standards, and guidelines were 

developed years ago and need to be updated to reflect current standards of 

practice, new knowledge, and treatment of uncertainty. For example, 

engineering design in the electric power sector is governed by codes and 

standards at the individual asset or component level, primarily for extreme 

wind and snow/ice loads. For, water and wastewater systems there is no 

established set of performance requirements for any hazards and, as a result, 

only a few system owners and operators have established performance 

objectives or targets for a limited number of hazards (mostly earthquake, but 

some related to climate change). 

Develop a methodology to combine component-based design criteria into 

system level performance targets. The design of system components based on 

codes and standards has no direct correlation to intended systemic performance 

targets. For example, designing pipelines and pumping stations to a 2% chance 

of exceedance in 50 years does not mean the system will meet the performance 

objectives set for an extreme hazard, nor does it indicate the actual design 

margin. 

Develop lifeline system performance requirements that relate to 

community resilience and better reflect societal considerations. Currently, 

there are no consistent resilience-based performance requirements for lifeline 

systems. In addition, consideration needs to be given as to how performance 

requirements can better account for the effects on the restoration of core 

community services that each lifeline system provides. Viewed from the 

perspective of societal expectations and considerations, at a minimum, lifeline 

systems should perform in ways that do not lead to additional deaths, injuries, 

and disabilities and minimize lifeline-related economic losses to the greatest 

extent feasible. Several important aspects of societal considerations are: outage 

characteristics that are important in causing societal impacts; “downstream” 

effects on other critical infrastructure; vulnerable populations; adaptability and 

capacity of people, businesses, and other organizations to cope with 

disruptions; integration of contingencies, substitutions, and accessibility 

9-14 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
services during system outages; and value of improved information both prior 

to and during outage, including communications regarding risk and uncertainty. 

A6. Develop consensus-based guidelines and standards for the design of new 

lifelines and the retrofit of existing lifelines that reflect community 

resilience performance requirements and societal considerations. The 

progression of technology development in the lifelines community is well 

served with the initial development of guidelines, which are typically based on 

currently available research and best practices, followed by the conversion into 

standards that reflect the input of the broader stakeholder community. Current 

guidelines and standards for lifeline systems mainly take into account life 

safety, environment protection, and emergency response requirements. In 

addition, most are intended for the design of new lifelines, as opposed to the 

retrofit of existing systems. Future guidelines and standards need to address 

both the design of new lifelines and the retrofit of existing lifelines as well as a 

broad range of societal considerations that address the requirements of social 

groups, economic sectors, and key service-providing institutions. Future 

guidelines and standards also need to consider a broader range of societal 

considerations than are currently considered by most standards: lifeline system 

dependencies and interdependencies; the potential for cascading impacts; and 

potential “choke points” that can amplify dependencies and interdependencies. 

A7. Develop guidelines to inform the design, interoperability, and upkeep of 

lifeline system dependencies. Guidelines are needed for dependent and 

interdependent lifeline system operation, protection, restoration, and interface 

design across systems, including data collection protocols that exploit modern 

technologies. An example standard dealing with power and telecommunication 

system interdependencies comes from the International Electromechanical 

Commission for the design of automated electrical substations and requires 

consistent telecommunication protocols for timely control and secure 

interoperability. 

A8. Reduce inconsistencies in the compendium of codes and standards that 

guide design, construction and resilience of the built environment, such as 

fire codes, building codes, and lifelines codes, standards, and guidelines. 

There are gaps and conflicts among the different codes and standards that need 

to be addressed for community resilience. As an example, fire codes often 

require diesel generators and/or local fuel tanks to be located in basements that 

may be vulnerable to flooding. 

A9. Develop consistent policy and standards on accessing information and 

databases about critical infrastructure systems that is coordinated with 

Department of Homeland Security critical infrastructure activities. There 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-15 
is currently a gap between the need to identify locations and functions of 

critical infrastructure to support safety and resilience planning and the actual 

access to information about these factors from lifeline system operators. The 

Pipeline Information Management Mapping Application developed by the 

Pipeline Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) may provide a 

framework for sharing information about potentially sensitive system 

components and facilities, including information about combined systems and 

collocated facilities. 

A10. Provide updated guidance for evaluating gas and liquid fuel pipeline and 

facility response to seismic hazards, floods, coastal storms, and tsunamirelated inundation. Such guidance would help fill existing gaps between 

codes and standards and the design and operation of gas and liquid fuel 

systems for natural hazards. 

9.2.2 Research 

The study has identified a number of gaps in data and knowledge necessary to 

improve the fundamental understanding of acceptable lifeline performance. Fifteen 

recommendations pertaining to systematic study and research needs are offered. All 

are considered high priority, with those encompassing all lifelines and broader topics 

listed before those related to only one lifeline. 

B1. Gather information on and systematically study the relationships between 

service disruptions, and societal impacts and expectations to better 

understand lifeline system performance. This study identifies some key 

information gaps about the fundamental research on system operations that 

would be useful to the standards development recommendations identified in 

Section 9.2.1. They include: data on spatial patterns of power outage 

(especially in relation to societally important aspects, such as service to critical 

facilities and vulnerable populations); information on societal impacts and 

responses to hazard events; and sufficient data on service outages in hazard 

types. Data should be gathered systematically, using consistent measures so as 

to enable comparisons across events, utility companies, states, and other 

factors. While data from actual disasters provide the most direct evidence on 

performance, other sources such as disaster preparation exercises should also 

be tapped, as they can also provide valuable information on, for example, 

potential power outages in areas that have not experienced recent disasters. 

Study needs include understanding how impacts scale up in outages and the 

thresholds for deterioration in functionality, impacts, losses and tolerances, and 

the role of contingencies and accessibility services (within and between lifeline 

systems and across society). Such data will be important for understanding 

current system vulnerabilities, making the case for reducing them, and 

9-16	 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
developing systems-based lifeline standards. The resulting insights may also 

encourage the development of duration-related standards that reflect societal 

impacts and expectations. 

B2. Develop and conduct a targeted research program to assess societal 

expectations associated with lifeline system performance. This social 

science-driven research is necessary to help close the gap between what is 

considered as acceptable design levels (including what is defined as extreme 

events) and what communities find to be acceptable performance. The research 

should be lifeline-specific and hazard-specific in order to understand whether 

societal expectations vary as a function of those differences. It should involve 

studies that employ randomly selected representative samples of units of 

analysis that are of interest, such as households and businesses. Since resilience 

building is a long-term process of investment, research to assess and enhance 

community resilience also must account for trends and future considerations 

related to both the physical vulnerabilities of infrastructure systems and 

changing social vulnerabilities. 

B3. Systematically study and compare the array of design approaches and 

methods for addressing societally-based performance requirements within 

current codes, standards and guidelines for lifeline systems. For example, 

gas transmission pipeline design factors must consider urban development and 

population density, and integrity management programs are required by codes 

for gas transmission pipelines in high consequence areas. High consequence 

areas include navigable waterways, highly populated areas, and unusually 

sensitive areas (involving drinking water and ecological resources). Also, gas 

and liquid fuel pipeline standards require operators to develop, manage and 

periodically evaluate public awareness programs to promote safety and raise 

awareness with stakeholders near pipelines. These programs must: define 

objectives, explain the concept of tradeoff between risk reduction and financial 

investment, obtain management commitment, establish program 

administration, identify pipeline assets, and identify stakeholder audiences. 

Communications systems have multiple layers of functionality with a range of 

societal-serving applications. Consideration should also be given to the 

performance-based design method in the ALA Seismic Guidelines for Water 

Pipelines, which present varying design requirements for different types of 

pipelines, depending on their overall importance to network performance. 

B4. Investigate the differential vulnerability among social groups to lifeline 

system outages. As earlier discussions have shown, some groups within the 

U.S. population are more vulnerable to outages than others. In the case of 

electric power outages, for example, of special concern are those who lack 

access to alternative energy sources such as generators; disabled persons and 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-17 
B5. 

B6. 

those suffering from chronic illnesses; and community residents who are 

dependent on electrical power for assistive devices and refrigeration. Generally 

speaking, electric power service outages can be expected to have a greater 

negative impact on the health and economic well-being of low-income 

community residents, hourly workers who may lose income as a result of 

power outages, and others whose livelihoods depend on uninterrupted lifeline 

services. Small businesses may be especially vulnerable to service disruptions, 

while larger businesses are more likely to have business continuity plans and 

access to backup services. Some types of businesses are more dependent on 

electrical power and telecommunications than others and thus may suffer larger 

proportional losses when these system outages occur. More research is needed 

to better understand these and other vulnerabilities, to determine how 

vulnerabilities are changing as a consequence of social, economic, and climate 

trends, and to make future projections. 

Systematically collect and review various “proxies” and secondary 

evidence for societal expectations of lifeline performance and restoration 

timeframes. Candidate proxies include electric power outage reporting 

thresholds and criteria, post-disaster utility performance reviews, policies and 

regulatory changes made following disaster-related disruptions, societal and 

economic losses from hazard events, and state and local energy assurance 

plans. Lifeline service providers, emergency management agencies, and other 

organizations collect and use this information to improve restoration processes 

for future disasters. In some cases, utility service providers have outage and 

restoration models, as well as restoration policies and procedures for some 

systems and some hazards that also may be useful in assessing and establishing 

societally-based performance requirements. It is important to keep in mind that 

societal expectations are likely to change and that tolerances for disruptions 

may be decreasing. 

Assess the various lifeline performance programs and practices for public 

safety and develop guidance on their application to other critical lifelines, 

including multiple, interdependent systems and collocated facilities. Some 

lifeline code requirements and standards involve programs and practices for 

public safety that can be adapted more broadly for hazard-related community 

resilience programs. For pipelines, they include the identification of highconsequence areas, pipeline integrity management and public awareness 

programs, and emergency response plans. For telecommunications, service 

level agreements are a market/penalty-based approach. For water and 

wastewater, the American Water Works Association (AWWA) risk and 

resilience assessment and management guidance offers a standardized process 

for reducing risk and increasing resilience to multiple hazards. Research and 

9-18 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
 

development of best practices and advanced methods could be advantageous 

for other lifeline systems. 

B7. Conduct research on needed service restoration times, including how 

system operability as a performance metric supports community 

resilience. System operability is defined as the cumulative time needed to 

restore the range of community services provided by a particular system, 

beyond its basic functionality. For example, water system domestic operability 

is fully achieved when water quality and quantity are restored throughout the 

system, not just water delivery. This is needed in relation to other lifelines and 

overall societal expectations, with due consideration of accessibility services. 

B8. Study lifeline system operator organizational issues and how they affect 

community-scale lifeline performance and resilience planning. In any given 

community, some systems may have a single operator (e.g., commonly this is 

the case for water and wastewater), while other systems have multiple operators 

(e.g., notably telecommunications and power). Also, some systems are typically 

publicly-owned (e.g., water and wastewater), while others operate in a highly 

competitive, private market place (e.g., liquid fuel and telecommunications in 

limited circumstances). There are also differences in the extent to which 

members of the public can exercise choice by opting out of particular services; 

for example, most households have limited choice in their selection of landline 

broadband providers. Ongoing changes in the regulatory environment and 

industry structures for different lifeline systems may also be affecting “whole 

system” performance and resilience efforts in new and different ways. 

B9. Enhance the understanding of infrastructure-related failures and 

cascading effects resulting from low-probability/high-consequence events. 

While it may not be economically feasible to mitigate against low probability 

but high consequence events, it is still reasonable to direct some attention to the 

societal implications of rare but catastrophic disasters. By their very nature, 

such events can result in large-scale mortality, morbidity, damage, loss, 

community disruption, population displacement, and permanent demographic 

shifts. They can also result in public loss of trust and confidence in government 

and other societal institutions as well as major shifts in public opinion that can, 

in turn, stimulate significant legal, policy, and other forms of social change. It 

is also noteworthy that system disruptions, especially in major or extreme 

hazard events, can go well beyond the location of the physical disruption, 

making it a multi-jurisdictional problem in which societal expectations and 

performance objectives can vary greatly. 

B10. Develop post-disaster data collection protocols to assess lifeline system 

recovery and restoration timeframes and improve the understanding of 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-19 
restoration processes across individual and interdependent lifeline 

systems. Realistic field conditions and observations are needed of the decision 

making processes and other societal and technical mechanisms that lead to 

particular restoration patterns following lifeline system disruptions and failures. 

While larger service providers may have models to simulate system 

performance under different hazard conditions, many smaller providers do not 

have such capabilities. The industry as a whole would benefit from data on 

actual performance. 

B11. Develop tools to identify interdependent infrastructure systems and 

services along with their restoration criteria. A repository is needed to 

synthesize what is known from field data, expert opinion, best practices, and 

technical modeling regarding community resilience expectations and 

community behavior. A multi-dimensional representation (as shown in Figure 

8-4) could help organize the current body of knowledge and can be constructed 

with the aid of first generation computational models along with promising 

proxies for societal expectations, which include emergency management 

preparedness recommendations, utility operator information, outage trackers, 

and restoration curves. Such representations could capture dependency 

strengths, restoration time gaps, and other pertinent information as a function 

of time and space as governed by physical systems and societal processes. 

They ultimately could help identify resilience investment priorities. 

B12. Establish procedures to quantify hazards for spatially distributed systems. 

This is Priority Topic 3 in the NIST Earthquake-Resilient Lifelines: NEHRP 

Research, Development, and Implementation Roadmap (NIST, 2014) report. 

Procedures from such a developmental effort should address the hazard 

quantification for multiple hazard types and hazard levels across large 

geographically distributed and interconnected lifeline networks. It also should 

define procedures to assess differential risks posed to system components and 

overall system performance by different hazards and hazard related effects, 

such as, in the case of earthquakes, liquefaction, fault movements, landslides 

and other forms of ground failure. 

B13. Enhance the understanding of lifeline system supply sources and end-point 

facilities and their role in system performance, restoration, and 

community and regional recovery with the goal of improving databases 

and modeling of such sources and facilities. Dams and large reservoirs for 

water supply, power plants for electric power systems, and refineries and 

processing plants for gas and liquid fuel are all sufficiently complex and selfcontained components that they have been regarded for practical purposes as 

separate systems. Nonetheless each is an important part of the lifeline supply 

chains and their disruption can have a major impact on overall system 

9-20 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
performance and restoration, as well as intermediate and long term phases of 

both community and regional recovery. 

B14. Perform studies on changes in water demand considering an array of 

hazards as well as seasonal and longer-term climate variability, like 

drought. Loss of water due to hazard-related damage is essentially an imposed 

drought. Current events (e.g., the current California drought) and changing 

behavior can be assessed to determine what is possible and the extent to which 

communities can adapt before having damaging impacts. Studies should 

include behavior change of institutions and individuals. 

B15. Improve knowledge, databases and modeling for the impact of widespread 

flooding and storm damage on regional fuel supplies. Fuel supplies involve 

multi-modal transportation involving pipelines, shipping, port facilities, and 

truck transport on the upstream side and gasoline stations, jet fuel delivery, 

airport operation, train service, and automobile usage on the downstream side. 

Research is needed to understand these complex transportation interactions and 

to account better for the restoration of crucial services that depend on fuel as 

well as on regional economic recovery. Analytical models that simulate these 

systems would provide the means for reliability-based analyses of the most 

effective protective measures and operational improvements. 

9.2.3 Modeling 

There is a growing body of system modeling for critical infrastructure and 

infrastructure interdependencies that can be leveraged to improve resilience across 

lifeline systems, but there are also notable limitations in focus, outputs, integration, 

and validation that need to be addressed. Three modeling related recommendations 

are offered. All are considered high priority, with those encompassing all lifelines 

and broader topics listed before those related to only one lifeline. 

C1. Aggregate the existing suite of infrastructure modeling tools and create a 

user-friendly interface so communities can properly assess their lifelinerelated system performance and restoration risks, including uncertainty. 

Currently, there are favored model types for different lifeline systems (e.g., 

electric power systems use network and reliability theory; economic networks 

favor input-output models) even though most models, in principle, can admit 

any system. There are also a number of tools available to researchers and 

governments to model multiple infrastructure systems. An aggregated suite of 

models is needed to capture lifeline interdependencies and their multiple 

processes at multiple spatial and temporal scales at once. Such models will be 

able to start supporting community resilience analyses, and identify ways to 

improve system performance and restoration times. 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-21 
C2. 

C3. 

Develop first-generation models and practical tools to analyze community 

resilience that account for lifeline system dependencies and 

interdependencies. Integrated modeling of hazard-related, population-related, 

building, environmental, and interdependent lifeline system vulnerabilities 

could lead to a better understanding of where severe problems with service 

delivery and severe societal consequences are most likely. This kind of 

modeling is already being done in a basic way for some lifelines and some 

hazards—for example, through the FEMA-developed HAZUS MH multihazard damage and loss estimation software, although it excludes restoration 

processes and their socio-technical nature. The academic community has led 

the development of interdependent lifeline systems modeling tools, but such 

tools have yet to become practical and offer quality visualizations for 

widespread use by communities. 

A “next generation” approach to modeling needs to account for vulnerabilities 

related to lifeline dependency relationships, vulnerabilities associated with 

structural and environmental factors, and the characteristics of exposed 

populations (e.g., race, class and poverty, gender, age, and social capital). Such 

modeling efforts will require intensive engagement of multi- and 

interdisciplinary teams. Models also need to be practical and flexible to allow 

exploration of resilience-enhancing operations and cost-effective strategies for 

reducing vulnerabilities by both lifeline service providers and communities. 

They also need to consider the different response and restoration strategies that 

can be taken and their effects on resilience, and sufficiently differentiate the 

pre-disaster measures and investments that can be taken to enhance lifeline 

system performance in hazard events. 

The evolving modeling processes should eventually be able to include humandriven restoration decisions as disasters and system disruptions unfold, feed the 

decisions back into the model, and further improve system recovery and 

restoration processes. These processes could also inform planning for system 

upgrades, expansions, and targeted decommissioning via what-if scenarios. 

Improve numerical modeling of water and wastewater systems, with 

emphasis on validation of models, developing the most effective simulation 

procedures, and applications in real systems. The complex performance of 

water and wastewater systems in response to hazards, including in particular 

severe earthquakes and floods, requires complex network modeling to capture 

the effects that pipeline leaks and breaks, as well as the structural damage to 

treatment, storage, and control facilities, have on network behavior. 

Improvements would be beneficial in existing modeling techniques, including 

algorithms for quantifying flow and pressure in heavily damaged hydraulic 

networks, and hydraulic network analytical methods that have the potential for 

9-22 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
providing a more refined assessment of post-hazard water available for 

firefighting in smaller pipeline networks. 

9.2.4 Lifeline System Operations 

The study also identifies a number of needs related to lifeline system operations and 

operational design. These too must be addressed in order to improve community 

resilience and bridge the gap between the disaster capabilities of different lifeline 

systems and the societal expectations of their performance. Five recommendations 

are offered. All are considered high priority. 

D1. Develop a process for major utilities to conduct self-assessments of their 

preparedness for various natural hazard events, as a basis for prioritizing 

improvement to system robustness and post-event response. Guidance 

should be provided with support from federal, state, and local government for 

these assessments to provide some consistency of approach among lifelines. 

Each utility should have reasonable knowledge of their customer base and 

relative importance and priority for continuity of service. The self-assessments 

should be mandatory first for utilities that have a relatively large customer 

base. As experience is gained with the process and lessons learned, selfassessments could be extended to smaller utilities and smaller localities. The 

results of self-assessments could then be used to prioritize improvements to 

system robustness and post-event response. Improvements to community 

resilience can be best accomplished by taking immediate steps to get the 

utilities to develop an understanding of the problem, assess vulnerability of 

their systems, and undertake an action plan. It is essential for appropriate 

organizations (e.g., NIST) to guide the process, and provide technical resources 

to assist and incentives to participate. 

D2. Develop guidance for lifeline service providers on how to engage and 

collaborate with communities, including emergency management agencies 

and other key community institutions, in developing resilience strategies 

and preparing system restoration and contingency plans. Practical guidance 

is needed to help service providers interact with communities to identify 

system performance expectations and work to address the gap between 

anticipated and expected performance in disasters. Communications regarding 

hazard related risks should take place throughout the hazard cycle: under 

normal conditions, in the period preceding disaster impact, during and 

immediately after impact, and during restoration and recovery. Providers also 

need guidance on how to work with communities to fund resilience efforts over 

reasonable timeframes; many providers already face significant financial 

pressures just to maintain existing systems. Providers also need guidance on 

how to better distinguish between critical and non-critical facilities and develop 

GCR 16-917-39	 9: Findings and Recommendations 9-23 
D3. 

D4. 

D5. 

plans that restore system operability according to community priorities and 

needs, and also minimize threats to life and health that hazard-related lifeline 

failures may cause. For example, post-earthquake power restoration can be 

coordinated with natural gas system repairs to avoid fire ignitions. The 

development of restoration and contingency plans (including the provision of 

accessibility services) also needs to take community vulnerabilities into 

account (to the extent possible). 

Develop guidance for local planning (e.g., for fuel delivery to emergency 

responders and critical infrastructure). As recent major hurricanes 

demonstrate, there is a serious gap between expectations for the availability of 

fuel and the threat to fuel supplies from hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes. 

Guidance for local planning to close these gaps is needed, with emphasis on 

securing fuel for emergency responders and critical infrastructure, such as 

telecommunication hubs, compressor stations, and pump stations for liquid fuel 

and water supplies. 

Develop guidance for lifeline service providers to evaluate the effects of 

system component failures, both in isolation and in combination, and 

considering upstream and downstream dependencies. For example, the 

assessment of disaster-related lessons for telecommunications systems found 

that backup plans did not work as anticipated or that presumed system 

redundancy either did not exist or had disappeared due to engineering changes, 

leading to a false sense of resiliency. The “chaos monkey” approach pioneered 

by Netflix runs on a configurable schedule and tests the resilience and 

recoverability of their cloud computing services to ensure that applications 

continue working under a variety of failures and disruptions. A similar 

approach could be used for testing lifeline system resilience. 

Design protocols for lifeline service providers, working with emergency 

management and other community institutions, to communicate to the 

public the likely impacts of different hazard events on service provision 

and disruption. Such communication guidance should be specific with regard 

to potential outage times for hazard-related disasters of different types and 

levels of severity, potential consequences and cascading effects of outages, 

associated uncertainties, and what members of the public can do to reduce their 

risks and cope with such hazard-related outages across all phases of the hazards 

cycle—during normal times, during impact, and during the restoration and 

recovery period. This communication should be made available in multiple 

formats and in the languages spoken by community residents. Barriers to the 

disclosure of such information should be addressed. 

9-24 9: Findings and Recommendations GCR 16-917-39 
Appendix A 

Supplement to Electric

Power Analysis 

The following sections supplement the material presented in Chapter 3—Electric 

Power—in the main body of the report. 

A.1 Designing for Hazard Loads 

For transmission system assets, which are mostly designed and constructed by 

investor-owned utilities, the sections of the National Electric Safety Code (NESC) 

(IEEE, 2012) most relevant to hazards pertain to grades of construction, loading 

requirements, and strength requirements (sections 24-26), as well as vegetation 

management. While NESC is intended as a safety code, in practice, it serves as an 

engineering design code (NIST, 2015). Individual utilities have developed standards 

for their own systems that meet or exceed the NESC baseline standards. As noted in 

NIST (2015, p. 143), however, “[T]he question... is whether the baseline set forth in 

the NESC addresses the performance desired for resiliency when considering all 

hazards (flood, wind, seismic, ice, and other natural hazards and man-made threats).” 

The NESC considers ice and wind hazards in their loading criteria. Basic loading 

pertains to combined ice and wind loads. Criteria for extreme wind loads, which 

typically occur along coastlines and during extreme events such as hurricanes, have 

been included since 1977 and apply to structures over 60 feet above the ground. 

Thus, transmission lines are generally designed for extreme winds, but most 

distribution system assets are not—“something that may need to be reconsidered 

depending upon performance of these systems during hurricanes and tornadoes over 

the past 2 decades” (NIST 2015, p. 144). For extreme ice events, most utilities have 

their own loading criteria; in addition, the 2007 NESC introduced a combined ice and 

wind criterion that accounts for extreme ice events. Thus, most transmission system 

assets will be designed for extreme ice but most distribution system assets will not. 

In the NESC, applicable extreme wind loads for structures over 60 feet are defined 

according to geographic location, and some utilities implement standards that exceed 

the NESC. For example, on the Gulf Coast, NESC wind loads near the coast are 150 

miles per hour (mph) and decrease to 120 mph further inland. At Entergy Louisiana, 

new transmission lines are designed for 150 mph on the coastal tip and 140 mph 

inland (DOE, 2010). 

GCR 16-917-39 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis A-1 
																																																								

Seismic design is addressed separately. ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for 

Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE, 2010), exempts electrical lines from seismic 

design. Generally, wind governs the design of transmission lines, though failures due 

to soil/foundation issues continue to occur. ASCE 113, Substation Structure Design 

Guide (ASCE, 2008), addresses seismic design criteria for electrical substations. 

IEEE 693, Recommended Practice for Seismic Design of Substations (IEEE, 2005), 

provides suggested loading and qualification measures that should be taken while 

evaluating or specifying transmission substation components. Utilities will often 

write their own design criteria that emphases their high risk hazards; these criteria 

often exceed national standard requirements or just enumerate/blend and follow more 

advanced existing standards. 

Distribution system assets are designed according to different design criteria than 

transmission assets. More effort goes into the seismic design of high voltage 

(transmission) equipment than in lower voltage (distribution) equipment. However, 

the loading environment that lower voltage equipment must withstand in its life 

includes loading that is much greater than seismic loading (e.g., loading from 

transport and handling of components); therefore, lower voltage equipment generally 

performs better than higher voltage equipment in earthquakes. The vulnerability of 

distribution system assets often lies in the way they are installed and/or anchored, 

vulnerabilities of non-utility entities they are near, or lack of deterioration mitigation. 

The cooperatives and municipalities that manage electric power distribution systems 

use design manuals and standards produced by the Rural Utilities Service (RUS), 

including RUS bulletins 1724-150 (USDA, 2014) through 1724-154 (USDA, 2003), 

to which more stringent wind and ice loads are applied (NIST, 2015). 

Other aspects besides design of assets for wind and ice loads also affect potential 

system failures in hazard events (NIST, 2015). Tree fall or debris is a major source of 

outages; tree-trimming and vegetation management is an area where codes, 

standards, and “industry-accepted best management practices” are needed (NIST, 

2015, p. 144). Independent of industry codes and standards, floodplain management 

practices and requirements have begun to also influence utility construction practices 

on the East Coast since Hurricane Sandy; for example, by encouraging elevating of 

structures at existing stations or relocating stations outside flood zones. 

Current codes and standards also do not apply to older electric power assets, which 

are more vulnerable to failure in hazard events (NIST, 2015). In many cases, they 

pre-date modern codes and were not specifically designed for hazard loads.29 Some 

hazard resistance may have been incorporated through practices such as siting based 

29 Some 70% of the U.S. electric power transmission lines and transformers are over 25 years old 

(Campbell, 2012, cited in Executive Office of the President, 2013a). 

A-2 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
on historical storm experience, conservative design, or use of hazard-resistant 

materials. 

The NIST Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure 

Systems (NIST, 2015) identifies some common ways in which older power assets are 

vulnerable in hazard events. For example, transformers may be clustered in 

underground vaults and below-grade substation yards that are vulnerable to flooding, 

not only in flood disasters but also in other events such as mudslides and earthquakes. 

Single poles may have been used at substations to carry both incoming and outgoing 

lines, creating a potential single point of failure. The cost-saving practice of using 

fuses rather than breakers and reclosers in many locations also reduces resiliency. 

Lack of automation hinders power restoration using alternate configurations, because 

switching would need to be done manually. 

On the other hand, newer infrastructure assets are highly dependent on the reliable 

operations of communications and control networks during hazards events (NIST, 

2015). These networks are themselves vulnerable in many ways. Newer systems may 

be especially vulnerable to communication systems failures if they rely on them for 

automated or remotely controlled outage-response tasks such as circuit switching, 

sectionalizing, and reconfiguration. Impaired communications in a hazard event can 

also reduce operators’ situational awareness about the damage and service status of 

infrastructure assets. As capacity demands increase and lead us into uncharted 

technical areas, new failure modes will most likely emerge. 

A.2 Current Measures of System Performance 

A.2.1 Electric Power Sector 

As noted in Chapter 3, the most commonly used measures of system performance by 

the electric power industry are System Average Interruption Frequency Index 

(SAIFI), System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), and Customer 

Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI). Many utilities regularly report their 

performance according to these reliability measures; however, extraordinary events 

such as storms and other natural disasters are often excluded. Moreover, they are not 

directly informed by or linked to societal expectations of electric power performance. 

Keogh and Cody (2013) provide an insightful critique of these measures from the 

perspective of resilience. They argue that measures such as SAIDI and SAIFI suffer 

from several key shortcomings. First, they focus on normal operating conditions; 

roughly half of utilities that report SAIDI and SAIFI omit major events, however 

defined, from these measures because they distort restoration cost calculations. 

Second, utilities using such measures do not consider the differential hardships 

imposed on society from different durations of outage. That is, “the duration 

formulas—SAIDI and CAIDI—value each lost kilowatt hour (kWh) equally across 

GCR 16-917-39 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis A-3 
 

time. But customers value costs differently in the first few hours of an outage, when 

it’s merely inconvenient, than they do after weeks of lost service, when modern life 

becomes simply impossible” (Keogh and Cody, 2013, p. 8). Relatedly, these 

measures do not differentiate between customer classes (e.g., residential, industrial, 

and commercial), even though the cost of disruption may differ between these 

groups. Furthermore, the measures do not consider the cause of outages. 

Keogh and Cody (2013) argue that new or modified measures are needed to address 

disaster resilience. While frequency-based measures such as SAIFI may be 

appropriate for normal conditions, duration-based measures such as SAIDI and 

CAIDI (including major events) are more suitable following disasters in the recovery 

period. New measures are needed, however, to meaningfully capture performance 

during an event (i.e., for the response period), reflecting such issues as differential 

cost or value across time and customer classes. A useful measure for major events 

would need to account for duration, scale (number of customers affected), and value 

of lost load to different groups of customers. 

 Little research exists on the latter topic, and more is needed to better understand 

differences between utilities’ costs of outages and the value of those outages to 

customers. 

A.2.2 State and Local Governments: Utility Regulation, Energy 

Security 

States regulate many of the activities of electric power utilities including, to varying 

degrees, performance in natural hazard events. The Edison Electric Institute (EEI, 

2014a), an association of all U.S. investor-owned electric utilities, provides a detailed 

compendium and review of state policies and regulations related to electric utilities’ 

storm hardening and resiliency. 

As major storms have become more frequent and disruptive in recent years, state 

regulatory activity has increased. In the last decade, several state utility commissions 

have issued rules and regulations—often following post-disaster reviews of utilities’ 

performance—that have led to actions by utilities to increase their systems’ 

hardening and resilience (see: DOE, 2010; EEI, 2014a). In some cases, “utilities must 

meet higher standards for performance that are aligned with higher customer 

expectations of reliability...” (EEI, 2014a, p. 27). Examples of regulatory changes 

include (EEI, 2014a): 

 A Connecticut law requiring state regulators to review a utility’s performance in 

responding to storms, set new performance standards, and identify the most costeffective levels of tree trimming and system hardening needed to achieve 

maximum system reliability and minimize outages. Financial penalties may be 

imposed for non-compliance with the performance standards. 

A-4 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis	 GCR 16-917-39 
 A Massachusetts law that expands the authority of the Department of Public 

Utilities to oversee utility storm restoration and set performance standards for 

emergency preparation and restoration of utility service. Financial penalties may 

be imposed for non-compliance with the performance standards. 

 Development by New York regulators of a process to change the regulatory 

model for achieving policy objectives that include assurance of system reliability 

and resiliency. The regulatory model will include performance and outcomebased incentives. 

 In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, the [New Jersey] legislature has introduced 

numerous bills... calling for the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities to establish 

performance standards in emergency situations... 

While it unclear whether societal expectations were rigorously assessed in support of 

such changes, policy and regulatory decisions do provide a potentially valuable—if 

indirect—indication of societal expectations. For example, in California, widespread 

power outages in a December 2011 windstorm led to a new law (AB 1650) that 

requires the California Public Utilities Commission to establish standards for 

emergency preparedness plans (EEI, 2014a), indicating that such outages (or at least 

the associated emergency planning and coordination) were not societally acceptable. 

In Connecticut, following Tropical Storm Irene and a snowstorm in 2011 that caused 

widespread power outages, the State enacted a law (SB 23) requiring the Public 

Utilities Regulatory Authority to review a utility’s performance when over 10% of its 

customers experience outage for over 48 consecutive hours (EEI, 2014a). This 

indicates a threshold that could perhaps be interpreted as societally unacceptable 

from the perspective of policy-makers. In Maryland, the Public Service Commission 

investigated a derecho storm in 2012 that caused widespread outages; it found a 

“disconnect” between the public’s expectations for distribution system reliability and 

the ability of the system to meet those expectations (EEI, 2014a). 

The New York Public Service Commission adopted a “scorecard” in 2013 to provide 

guidance to utilities regarding the Commission’s expectations and for assessing their 

performance in major storms (EEI, 2014a). The scorecard (New York PSC, 2013) 

assesses preparation, operational response, and communications. Specific guidance 

provides some indication of societal expectations, at least from the perspective of 

regulators and policy-makers. For example, specific communications guidelines are 

provided for outages of different expected durations: less than 48 hours, over 48 

hours (but five days or less), and over five days. Among many performance measures 

is one on “time it takes utility to restore power to 90% of customers affected,” 

however, no specific measurement criterion is specified for this. 

One of the most specific public policy statements regarding acceptable performance 

can be found in the Maryland Public Service Commission’s Rule-Making 43 

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(effective May 2012). The regulations “require at least 92% of sustained outages 

during normal events be restored w/in 8 hrs.” and “require at least 95% of sustained 

outages during “Major Events” of <400,000 or 40% of customers be restored w/in 50 

hrs.” (EEI, 2014a, p. 41 and p. 82). Such specificity is very rare, however, and may 

even be unique at the present time. It is unclear what penalties utilities would face if 

they do not meet these requirements. 

There is indirect or anecdotal evidence that societal expectations with regard to 

acceptable performance may be changing. For example, in association with summer 

storms in 2011, the Illinois Commerce Commission ruled that a utility could be liable 

for economic losses (e.g., food spoilage) resulting from power outages; although the 

legal statute had existed for 15 years, utility liability had previously been waived 

consistently “typically on the basis of findings that damage was unpreventable due to 

severity of weather” (EEI, 2014a, p. 38). The Centre for Resilience of Critical 

Infrastructure at the University of Toronto has found that “market tolerance for 

energy service interruptions has decreased significantly, from weeks in 2001 to hours 

in 2015” (personal communications with A. Hay, cited in Quest, 2015, p. 6). 

In addition to documented policies and legislation, another potential source of 

evidence on societal expectations regarding electric power performance is afteraction reports, investigations, and testimony following major power outage events. 

For example, the Emergency Preparedness Partnerships (EPP, 2012) gathered 

information from six public hearings, 110 interviews, and nearly 800 responses to 

data requests to assess the effectiveness of electric distribution companies following 

Tropical Storm Irene in 2011. Many of the criticisms of the utilities focused not on 

the actual restoration times, but on poor communication to the public and elected 

officials regarding estimated restoration times. Among other findings, the report 

recommended that “a common set of metrics must be established for the EDCs 

(electric distribution companies) to communicate the magnitude of outages and 

restoration efforts to the BPU (board of public utilities). When comparing the 

severity of an event, it is important to look at the percentage of customers out of 

service, as well as the peak number of customers impacted” (EPP, 2012, p. 14)30. 

In addition to state public utility commissions, another potential source of 

information on societal expectations consists of state and local efforts in planning for 

energy emergencies. Energy assurance planning has evolved since the oil crises of 

the 1970s, and has been given impetus by energy shortages in disasters such as the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 2003 Northeast Blackout, and numerous 

recent hurricanes including Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike (NASEO, 2009). In recent 

years, the number of state and local governments with response and recovery plans 

30 It may be useful to conduct a research project that extracts and synthesizes evidence on societal 

expectations from similar post-disaster testimony across many events. 

A-6 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

																																																								

for energy emergencies has grown. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 

2009 awarded over $8 million to 43 cities across the nation to engage in energy 

assurance planning (PTI, 2011). In some cases, energy assurance plans such as the 

California Energy Assurance Planning program have established performance goals 

for energy systems following a disaster (NIST, 2015). 

While a systematic collection and review of state and local Energy Assurance Plans 

is beyond the scope of the current report, examples and guideline documents for 

developing such plans suggest the kinds of insights on societal expectations that 

might be gained from such a study. For example, in a guideline document for states, 

the National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) defines four levels of 

energy emergencies (NASEO, 2009).31 The definition of these levels relates to 

petroleum, natural gas, and/or electric power supply, and the power-related criteria 

are shown in Table A-1, with the implication that states should plan for different 

types of responses according to different levels of shortages. 

Table A-1 Levels of Energy Shortages (after NASEO, 2009) 

Level Criteria 

Normal Conditions, Level 1 

Shortage Level 2, 

Mild Shortage 

Shortage Level 3, 

Moderate Shortage 

Shortage Level 4, 

Severe Shortage 

No discernable shortage. 

Localized storm damage causing short-term electric 

transmission/distribution loss.
 

Severe storm damage to electric transmission/distribution 

infrastructure. 

Electricity outages extend for several weeks.
 

The state of Virginia’s Energy Assurance Plan (Commonwealth of Virginia, 2012) 

notes that “Shortage Level 3 - Moderate Shortage” may apply when “[there is] storm 

damage to electric transmission/distribution infrastructure or a loss of electric power 

that will affect a large number of customers for at least 72 hours” (Commonwealth of 

Virginia, 2012, p. 2-11). In such a situation, media and public reaction may include: 

“Public begins losing patience with mild inconvenience. Some reports of economic 

impact published, mainly regarding retail commerce” (Commonwealth of Virginia, 

2012, p. 2-12). Appropriate responses may include instituting mutual aid agreements 

and encouraging reduction in electricity demand. 

The situation is considered a “Shortage Level 4 - Severe Shortage” if there are 

“widespread electricity outages extending for several weeks” (Commonwealth of 

Virginia, 2012, p. 2-14). Power outages may lead to failures in energy pipelines, 

water and wastewater infrastructure, and loss of pump capability at gas stations. If 

occurring in winter, “governments may need to open heated shelters and take other 

31 PTI (2011) provides guidelines for local-level energy assurance planning. 

GCR 16-917-39 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis A-7 
																																																								

measures to protect public health, welfare, and safety” and “media will follow events 

and critical editorials and op-ed columns can be expected” (Commonwealth of 

Virginia, 2012, p. 2-14). With long-term power disruptions, the expectation is that 

“Media attention is constant. Economic impact is widespread” (Commonwealth of 

Virginia, 2012, p. 2-16). Responses may include calls for voluntary and/or mandatory 

energy conservation. Impacts include: “Individuals using electric powered home 

medical devices may be affected” so health and social services offices “should be 

prepared to receive and process multiple requests for assistance” (Commonwealth of 

Virginia, 2012, p. 2-17). 

Insights into societal impacts and expectations can also be gleaned from local energy 

assurance plans. For example, the Portland (Oregon) Local Energy Assurance Plan 

notes that “Most hospitals are prepared for approximately three to seven days, 

depending on the energy disruption. ...Clinics have more limited resources; not all of 

them have back-up generators” (City of Portland, 2012, p. 39). 

A.3 Power Outages: Multi-Event Trends and Models 

Several studies have analyzed and developed models using outage and restoration data 

from many events. For the most part, these focus on storm-related outages since storms 

are the most common source of sustained electric power outages in the United States. 

Broadly speaking, some models and data sources focus on SAIDI and related industry 

performance measures while others consider performance in terms of customers 

without service and time to restoration. These two types are summarized in turn below. 

Several analyses have examined data on SAIDI and SAIFI.32 Eto et al. (2012) 

analyzed 10 years’ worth of these data (2000-2009) for 155 U.S. electric utilities, 

both including and excluding “major events.” They found that reported reliability has 

been declining modestly (at about 2% per year); however, the reasons for this are 

unclear. NERC data (cited in Castillo, 2014) show that number of weather-related 

power outages in the United States has increased from a range of 5 to 20 in the 1990s 

to 50 to 100 in the latter 2000s, due to greater storm durations and intensities 

(Castillo, 2014). 

Data on large outages are routinely reported and are useful for assessing trends and 

patterns. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the North American Electric 

Reliability Council (NERC) both require utilities to submit reports for disturbances 

exceeding specified thresholds, and the data demonstrate substantial agreement for 

blackouts greater than 300 megawatts (Hines et al., 2009). Analyzing trends over 

time, Hines et al. (2009) find statistical evidence to reject the hypothesis that blackout 

32 A few other models have analyzed trends and factors for SAIDI and SAIFI but omitting major 

event days. Factors include undergrounding of power lines, and size of utility, level of vegetation. 

See Fenrick and Getachew (2012). 

A-8 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
																																																								

frequency is decreasing over time, although insufficient evidence to demonstrate an 

increasing trend. They also found that blackouts are more frequent in summer and 

winter, as well as during mid-afternoon hours, and that the relationship between 

blackout size and frequency appears to follow a power-law statistical relationship. 

There is enough experience data to allow guidelines and models to be developed 

regarding power outages in hurricanes. The National Hurricane Center has developed 

a public information sheet33 (National Weather Service, 2015) that relates hurricane 

force to power outage severity, as shown in Table A-2. 

Table A-2	 Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Winds and Selected Impacts (Source: 

after National Weather Service, 2015) 

Category Winds Impact to Electric Power Systems 

1 74-95 mph Extensive damage to power lines and poles will likely result in 

power outages that could last a few to several days. 

2 96-110 mph Near-total power loss is expected with outages that could last 

from several days to weeks. 

3 111-130 mph Electricity will be unavailable for several days to a few weeks 

after the storm passes. 

4 131-155 mph Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. 

5 >155 mph Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. 

Liu et al. (2008) and Han et al. (2009) developed models to predict the occurrence of 

power outages based on hurricane and electric power system characteristics, as well 

as (in the case of Liu et al., 2008) a similar model for ice storms. A model by Winkler 

et al. (2010) is distinctive in explicitly addressing how network topology affects 

power system performance in storms. 

Models have also been developed to estimate restoration. Nateghi et al. (2014) 

develop a model of power outage duration and calibrate it on data from three Gulf 

Coast hurricanes; key predictive variables pertain to wind attributes of the storm and 

climate and geography of the service area. In one recent study, Zorn and Shamseldin 

(2015) gather data from 63 disasters worldwide on restoration of electric power, 

water, gas, and telecommunications infrastructures. They use these data to 

statistically develop restoration curves based on initial outages or earthquake shaking 

intensity to estimate time to restore 90% operability. Liu et al. (2007) developed 

models to predict power restoration times in hurricanes and ice storms, based on data 

from 14 U.S. East Coast events. Hines et al. (2009) found that, surprisingly, there is 

no evident correlation between blackout size and duration; however, they note that 

this result may derive in part to the insufficiency of reported data on outage duration. 

In Executive Office of the President (2013a), analysts were able to construct generic, 

33 Impacts to buildings and water systems are also described. 

GCR 16-917-39	 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis A-9 
scaled restoration curves for storms based on restoration data for 15 major U.S. 

events in the last decade. As shown in Figure A-1 below, while the storm durations 

ranged from three to 20 days, when normalized to peak customers without service, 

the profiles were similar. Reed et al. (2010b) also developed and compared 

restoration curves based on empirical data for various storms and other disasters 

using a different functional form. 

Figure A-1	 Electric power restoration curves (Executive Office of the President, 

2013a, p. 21). 

While these data sources and models provide valuable, relatively complete data on 

outages, they are limited in the degree to which to provide information relative to 

societal expectations. For example, for major power outages, the DOE data include 

information such as cause, physical characteristics of event, number of customers 

without power at peak outage, and time to restore full service (or sometimes, 

customers without power at a specific timeframe such as two days after the event) 

(DOE, 2015). For major outages, DOE also prepares Emergency Situation Reports 

(see http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/emergency_sit_rpt.aspx) that are publicly available 

and include details such as number of customers in different states that are without 

power at different points in time. However, they do not appear to include information 

such as impacts of outages to critical facilities, number of associated deaths, and 

estimated economic impact. 

In this sense, a model by Ouyang and Dueñas-Osorio (2014) is especially interesting, 

in that it adopts a resilience perspective. The model is composed of sub-models 

pertaining to the hurricane hazard, the damageability of system elements (component 

fragility), outage (power system response), and restoration. Notably, the restoration 

sub-model differs from many in the literature in that it is not statistically based; 

rather, it assumes a generic restoration process that considers different restoration 

A-10	 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
strategies, in terms of resource mobilization and restoration sequence. This is 

important in that it allows utility planning for restoration strategies to meet 

performance goals. Furthermore, different metrics of system performance are 

modeled: besides damage, outage (e.g., customers with power), and restoration times, 

the model considers the percent of critical facilities that have electric power (see 

Figure A-2). Economic loss in terms of repair costs and customer power interruption 

costs are also estimated. 

Figure A-2	 Modeled restoration curves when the performance levels are 

measured by different metrics. Points at a specific time in the figure 

represent the percentage of non-damaged and repaired transmission 

substations, the percentage of non-damaged and repaired 

distribution nodes, the percentage of critical facilities with power 

restored or without power outage, and the percentage of customers 

with power restored or without power outage (Ouyang and DueñasOsorio, 2014). 

The conditionality of restoration curves and timeframes on restoration processes is 

especially important to consider since there is anecdotal evidence (besides logical 

expectation) that utilities and other organizations learn from past outage experiences 

and improve restoration processes for future disasters. For example, DOE (2009) 

notes that electric power recovery in the major hurricanes of 2008 (Hurricanes Ike 

and Gustav) was “hastened by the actions of the energy industry and Federal, State, 

and local government agencies, which were better prepared to mount extensive 

restoration efforts after the experience gained from 2005” (DOE, 2009, p. 2). 

A similar argument can be made for utility mitigation actions that are spurred by 

damage and outages in disaster events. Disasters often instigate improvements in 

power systems, whether in terms of strengthening infrastructure or better emergency 

response and restoration plans. 

Aside from storms, several models of power outages have been developed for the 

earthquake hazard. These tend to be very system-specific rather than statistical, e.g., 

GCR 16-917-39	 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis A-11 
developed to simulate performance of a particular utility’s system, and in a few cases 

model not only damage and outage but also societal consequences such as economic 

disruption loss to businesses, population displacement, and impact on healthcare 

facilities (e.g., Shinozuka et al., 2007, Chang et al., 2009b, Yavari et al., 2010). 

A.4 Industry Practices Regarding Restoration of Service 

Societal expectations may, however, be indirectly reflected in industry practices 

regarding restoration of service following outages. The NIST Guide (NIST, 2015) 

recommends that restoration be prioritized to customers according to a three-tiered 

response scheme: the focus should firstly be on restoring services to critical and 

essential facilities, secondly on restoring critical public works and access for 

infrastructure repair crews, and thirdly on general system restoration for the 

community at large. This prioritization is similar to the typical restoration process in 

a utility’s storm restoration plan, as described by EEI: 

“...a utility will first assess affected power plants, transmission lines, and 

substations to determine the extent of any damage. Power is then restored to 

critical facilities, such as hospitals, police and fire stations, water and watertreatment facilities, and nursing homes; main thoroughfares that host 

supermarkets, gas stations, and other essential community services; and, finally, 

individual neighborhoods.” (EEI, 2014b, p. 2) 

Florida Power and Light maintains the following restoration order (PTI, 2011): 

	 hospitals; 

	 public service entities including emergency operations centers, critical 

government facilities, and Red Cross facilities; 

	 communications infrastructure serving emergency responders, including police 

and fire and others such as telecommunications and the media; 

	 water and sewage facilities; 

	 transportation infrastructure; 

	 gas supply utilities; 

	 electric company facilities; 

	 schools, nursing homes, and critical care facilities; and 

	 others as designated in coordination with government and the emergency 

operations centers. 

The extent to which the electric power sector adheres to such practices in all hazard 

events is unclear. 

A-12	 A: Supplement to Electric Power Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

Appendix B 

Supplement to Gas and

Liquid Fuel Analysis 

This appendix supplements the material presented in Chapter 4—Gas and Liquid 

Fuel—in the main body of the report. 

B.1 Regulatory Framework 

Congress passed the Natural Gas Pipeline Act of 1968 (USA Public Law 90-481, 

1968), which created the Office of Pipeline Safety within the U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT) to implement safety regulations for gas and liquid fuel 

pipelines. Subsequent legislation pertaining to gas and liquid fuel pipeline systems 

include the Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Act of 1979 (USA Public Law 96-129, 

1979), Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (USA Public Law 107-355, 2002), 

and the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Safety and Enforcement Act of 2006 (USA 

Public Law 109-468, 2006). The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 

Administration (PHMSA) was created in 2004 and is composed of the Office of 

Pipeline Safety and Office of Hazardous Materials Safety. Through the Office of 

Pipeline Safety, PHMSA administers the DOT national regulatory program for the 

transportation of natural gas, petroleum, and other hazardous fluids by pipeline, 

including regulations pertaining to the safety of pipelines and associated facilities. In 

addition to administration of the regulatory program, PHMSA oversees the 

implementation of risk management and risk based programs by pipeline operators 

and provides technical and resource assistance for state pipeline safety programs. 

Gas and liquid fuel pipeline system operators are also overseen by state regulatory 

agencies. For example, California operators are regulated by the California Public 

Utilities Commission (CPUC) whose rules affecting pipeline systems are codified 

under State of California Rules Governing Design, Construction, Testing, Operation, 

and Maintenance of Gas Gathering, Transmission, and Distribution Piping Systems 

as part of General Order 112E (NTSB, 2011). PHMSA certifies state regulatory 

agencies like CPUC annually and provides federal funds to improve performance and 

pipeline safety. As much as 80% of state pipeline safety programs are supported by 

PHMSA, including the cost of personnel and equipment. In 2009-2010, the CPUC 

received 64% of its annual funding from PHMSA (NTSB, 2011). Since 1986, the 

pipeline safety program at PHSMA has been funded by a user fee assessed on a per 

mile basis on each operator that is regulated. 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-1 
B.2 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

Detailed descriptions of the codes, standards, and guidelines summarized in Table 4-

1 in Chapter 4 are provided under the headings that follow. 

B.2.1 Code of Federal Regulations 

B.2.1.1 49 CFR Part 192 Transportation of Natural and Other Gas by Pipeline 

49 CFR Part 192 (Office of the Federal Register, 2013a) is the federal regulation that 

prescribes minimum safety standards for pipeline facilities for the transportation of 

natural gas. The regulations are detailed and extensive, and encompass over 110 

double-column pages in the October 2013 edition. The code addresses pipe materials; 

pipe and component design; welding in steel pipelines and joining of other types of 

pipe; general construction requirements; customer meters and services; corrosion 

control; test requirements; uprating pipelines to a higher internal pressure; operations; 

maintenance; personnel qualification; and gas transmission and distribution integrity 

management. 

The design pressure for steel pipe, or maximum allowable operating pressure 

(MAOP), is established on the basis of hoop stress, which is the stress in the 

circumferential direction of the pipe. 49 CFR Part 192 prescribes methods for 

determining the tensile strength of the pipe steel as well as a design factor, 

longitudinal joint factor, and temperature derating factor. The design factor is a 

reduction in the pipe pressure to lower the risk of excessive hoop stress according to 

class locations that are based on the density of dwellings and the presence of places 

where people assemble, such as playgrounds and recreational areas. Class locations 

are defined as onshore areas that extend 220 yards (yds) either side of a continuous 1-

mile (mi)-long section of pipeline. 

The four class locations defined in 49 CFR Part 192 are summarized with respect to 

design factors in Table 4-2 in Chapter 4. Each design factor represents the percentage 

of the steel yield strength that can be allowed for each class location. For example, 

design factors of 0.72 and 0.40 apply for pipe in Class 1 and 4 locations, respectively, 

and indicate that the pipe must be designed with sufficient wall thickness to limit 

hoop stress to 72% and 40% of yield strength in Class 1 and 4 locations, respectively, 

before other reductions are applied depending on the presence and type of 

longitudinal welds and operating temperature. From the table, it can be seen that the 

class representing the greatest population density (Class 4) results in a reduction in 

allowable stress to nearly one-half that permitted for the lowest population density 

(Class 1). 

Requirements for welding steel pipelines and joining plastic pipelines are specified. 

Nondestructive testing is required for at least 10%, 15%, and 90% (100% if practical) 

B-2 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
of steel welds, respectively, at Class 1, Class 2, and both Class 3 and 4 locations. 

Nondestructive testing targets of 100% of all welds also apply at major crossings of 

rivers, railroad and highway rights-of-way, tie-ins to other pipelines, and replacement 

sections. 

The code includes protection from hazards, by requiring the operator to take all 

practical steps to protect each transmission pipeline from washouts, floods, unstable 

soil, landslides, or hazards that may cause the pipeline to move or to sustain 

abnormal loads. Offshore pipelines must be protected from damage by mudslides, 

water currents, hurricanes, ship anchors, and fishing operations. 

The code contains requirements for corrosion control, including external protective 

coating, and cathodic protection. Compliance criteria for cathodic protection are 

listed. Methods for corrosion monitoring are specified. 

Methods for assessing the strength of steel pipelines by hydrostatic tests are provided. 

Test requirements for pipelines operated at various internal pressures and levels of 

steel yield stress in the circumferential direction are given. 

Operational requirements covered by the code include surveillance and damage 

prevention programs, emergency plans, and public awareness programs that comply 

with API Recommended Practice 1162 (API, 2010), which is described below. In 

addition, the code prescribes minimum requirements for an integrity management 

program for a gas transmission pipeline, as well as the integrity management of gas 

distribution lines. 

The integrity management program for a gas transmission pipeline is centered on the 

identification of high consequence areas (HCAs) where the pipeline is located near 

dwellings, buildings, and places at which people congregate. Methods for identifying 

these areas are specified. Implementation standards are incorporated by reference to 

the relevant sections of ASME B31.8 (ASME, 2014). In the integrity management 

program the operator is required to identify threats in HCAs such as corrosion, 

fabrication and construction defects, third-party and outside damage, and human 

error. The operator must conduct a risk assessment that follows the recommended 

practices in ASME B31.8 and uses the risk assessment to prioritize pipeline segments 

for baseline and continual assessments as well as preventative and mitigation 

measures. Corrective measures to address integrity issues are also provided. The 

operator must include in its integrity management program methods to measure 

whether the program is effective in evaluating various pipeline segments. Moreover, 

the operator must maintain, for the useful life of the pipeline, compliance with the 

integrity management program. Documentation required to support these activities is 

specified. 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-3 
B.2.1.2 49 CFR Part 195 Transportation of Hazardous Liquids by Pipeline 

49 CFR Part 195 (Office of the Federal Register, 2013b) is the federal regulation that 

prescribes minimum safety standards and reporting requirements for pipeline 

facilities used for the transportation of liquid fuels, including CO2. The regulations 

are detailed and extensive, and encompass over 68 double-column pages in the 

October, 2013 edition. The code includes by reference 40 standards developed by the 

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), American Petroleum Institute 

(API), American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Pipeline Research 

Council International (PRCI), Manufacturers Standardization Society for Valve and 

Fitting Industry (MSS), National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Plastics Pipe 

Institute (PPI), and National Association of Corrosion Engineers International 

(NACE). The code addresses annual accident and safety-related condition reporting, 

design requirements, construction, pressure testing, operation and maintenance, 

qualification of pipeline personnel, and corrosion control. 

The code prescribes requirements for periodic reporting and for reporting accidents 

and safety-related conditions. Each operator must annually complete and file a report 

with PHMSA for each type of liquid fuels facility in operation, including separate 

reports for crude oil, highly volatile liquids, refined products, and CO2 pipelines. An 

accident report is required for each failure in a pipeline which involves a release of 

contents that results in unintentional fire or exceeds 5 gallons. Each operator must 

also report safety-related conditions, including corrosion, material defects, 

malfunctions or operating errors, emergency leaks, and safety-related conditions that 

result in significant pressure reduction. Such reports also cover unintended movement 

or abnormal loading of a pipeline by environmental causes, such as an earthquake, 

landslide, or flood that impairs serviceability. 

Similar to 49 CFR Part 192, the code for gas liquid fuel pipelines establishes the 

design pressure for steel pipe, or maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP), on 

the basis of hoop stress, and prescribes methods for determining the tensile strength 

of the pipe steel as well as a design factor and longitudinal joint factor. The design 

factor is 0.72 except that a design factor of 0.60 is used in offshore and inland 

waterway locations. A design factor of 0.56 is specified for certain fabrication and 

heating conditions. The regulations require that pipeline design account for external 

loads, such those related to earthquakes, vibration, and thermal 

expansion/contraction. 

Minimum requirements are prescribed for constructing new pipeline systems with 

steel pipe, and for relocating, replacing, and changing pipeline systems with steel 

pipe. Requirements for welding steel pipelines are specified. Nondestructive testing 

is required for at least 10% of the girth welds (circumferential welds connecting 

adjacent sections of the pipeline) made each day by each welder. All girth welds must 

B-4 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
be tested by nondestructive means at locations of water bodies, state government 

subdivisions, railroad and highway rights-of-way, tie-ins to other pipelines, and 

populated areas such as residential subdivisions, schools, and shopping centers. 

Methods for assessing the strength of steel pipelines by hydrostatic tests are provided. 

Test requirements for pipelines operated at various internal pressures and levels of 

steel yield stress in the circumferential direction are given. 

The regulations require each operator to prepare and follow, for each pipeline system, 

a manual of written procedures for conducting normal operations and maintenance 

activities as well as handling abnormal operations and emergencies. Procedures that 

must be followed during an emergency are specified, such as notices to appropriate 

fire, police, and other public officials; response to notices; and emergency shutdown 

and pressure reduction. 

Public awareness programs that comply with API Recommended Practice 1162 

(described below) are required. The program must include provisions to educate the 

public, appropriate government organizations, and persons engaged in excavation 

activities. In addition, each operator must carry out a written program to prevent 

damage from excavation activities and adjacent construction disturbance. 

The code requires operators to develop a written integrity management program that 

addresses the risks affecting pipelines in high consequence areas. High consequence 

areas include navigable waterways, highly populated areas (as defined in the 

regulations), and unusually sensitive areas, which involve drinking water and 

ecological resources that are unusually sensitive to damage from a liquid fuel 

pipeline release. A risk analysis must be undertaken of pipeline segments in HCAs 

that identify additional actions to enhance public safety and environmental 

protection, such as damage prevention best practices, improved monitoring of 

corrosion control, shorter inspection intervals, remote control valves, and additional 

personnel training and emergency response drills. The operator must assess the 

integrity of each pipeline segment in an HCA every five years. 

The code contains requirements for corrosion control, including external protective 

coating, and cathodic protection. Compliance criteria for cathodic protection are 

listed. Methods for corrosion monitoring are specified. 

B.2.2 ASME Standards 

B.2.2.1 ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems 

ASME B31.8 (ASME, 2014) covers the design, fabrication, installation, inspection, 

and testing of pipeline facilities for the transportation of natural gas. It also covers 

safety aspects of the operation and maintenance of gas pipeline facilities. It is 

referred to extensively in 49 CFR Part 192 (Office of the Federal Register, 2013a) 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-5 
and is one of the backbone standards that supports the federal code with respect to 

natural gas pipeline safety. The standard covers materials and equipment; welding, 

piping system components and fabrication details; design, installation, and testing; 

operating and maintenance procedures; corrosion control; offshore gas transmission; 

and sour gas (gas containing significant amounts of hydrogen sulfide) service. It 

applies predominantly to gas transmission and distribution systems, service lines, and 

some gathering lines. 

The design pressure equation is identical to that in 49 CFR Part 192, which is derived 

from the ASME code. ASME B31.8 provides methods for determining the tensile 

strength of the pipe steel as well as a design factor, longitudinal joint factor, and 

temperature derating factor. 

The design factor varies in accordance with four class locations, which are the same 

as defined in 49 CFR Part 192 (see Table 4-2) except that Class 1 locations are 

further distinguished as Division 1 and 2, where design factors as high as 0.80 can 

used for Division 1 and the design factor for Division 2 is identical to 0.72 as 

specified in 49 CFR Part 192. 

In addition to design based on allowable hoop stress, ASME B31.8 also provides 

design procedures for fracture control as well as equations for longitudinal stress 

design. The standard indicates that conditions causing additional stress in any part of 

the line or its appurtenances shall be provided for, including long self-supported 

spans, unstable ground, mechanical or sonic vibration, weight of attachments, 

earthquake-induced stresses, stresses caused by temperature differences, and Arctic 

conditions. The standard also calls for protection of pipelines and mains from natural 

hazards, such as washouts, floods, unstable soil, landslides, earthquake-related 

effects, or other conditions that may cause serious movement of, or abnormal loads 

on, the pipeline. The standard identifies protective measures for natural hazards as 

increased wall thickness, construction of revetments, erosion control, and anchors. 

Little additional guidance is given for how to deal with natural hazard conditions. 

When pipelines are subject to ground displacement, the longitudinal and combined 

stress limits may be replaced by an allowable strain limit provided due consideration 

is given to the ductility and strain capacity of seam weld, girth weld, and pipe body 

materials, and to the avoidance of buckling, swelling, or coating damage. Maximum 

strain for continued serviceability (i.e., without interruption) is typically limited to 

2%; however, higher strain limits are often specified for extreme ground 

displacements such as fault surface rupture, for which the objective is to maintain 

pressure integrity but with recognition that the resulting deformation condition may 

require repair. 

B-6 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
The actual strain limit for strain-based design is established via qualification per 

testing, fracture mechanics, or other means. Limits of 2% or less are typical for 

pipelines that must remain serviceable. For extreme conditions (e.g., fault rupture), 

higher limits are sometimes used (e.g., 3.5% to 4.0%), but such limits come with the 

recognition that maintaining pressure integrity is the objective and that post-event 

repair likely will be required. 

ASME B31.8 covers operating and maintenance procedures for gas transmission and 

distribution systems, including written plans for operation and maintenance as well as 

emergency procedures. It calls for training programs for operator personnel, liaison 

with emergency responders and entities in or near pipeline rights-of-way, and 

educational programs for customers and the general public to recognize a gas 

emergency and report it to the appropriate officials. 

The standard provides minimum requirements and procedures for corrosion control 

of exposed, buried, and submerged metallic piping and components. Provisions for 

corrosion control are described for buried and submerged installations, above-ground 

piping exposed to the atmosphere, and internal pipe surfaces. 

B.2.2.2 ASME 31.4 Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons 

and Other Liquids 

The ASME B31.4 standard (ASME, 2010) covers the design, materials, construction, 

assembly, inspection, and testing of pipelines transporting liquids between production 

facilities, tank farms, natural gas processing plants, refineries, pump stations, 

ammonia plants, terminals, and other delivery and receiving points. It is referred to 

extensively in 49 CFR Part 195 (Office of the Federal Register, 2013b). The standard 

covers design; materials; dimensional requirements; construction, welding, and 

assembly; inspection and testing; operation and maintenance procedures; corrosion 

control; and offshore liquid pipeline systems. 

The standard classifies loads as sustained, occasional, construction-related, and 

transient. Sustained loads include internal pressure, external hydrostatic pressure, 

self-weight, residual loads, and those resulting from subsidence. Occasional loads 

include earthquake effects related to ground vibrations, soil liquefaction, landslides, 

and active faulting. Equations are given for calculating hoop stress from internal 

pressure, stress intensification factors, thermal expansion stress, and longitudinal 

stress in restrained and unrestrained pipe. Allowable wall thickness is determined 

from equations linked to hoop stress under internal pressure and various yield 

strengths, diameters, and weld joint factors. The design factor is defined similarly to 

that in ASME B31.8, and should not exceed 0.72. 

When pipelines are subject to ground displacement, the longitudinal and combined 

stress limits may be replaced by an allowable strain limit provided due consideration 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-7 
is given to the ductility and strain capacity of seam weld, girth weld, and pipe body 

materials, and to the avoidance of buckling, swelling, or coating damage. Maximum 

strain for continued serviceability (i.e., without interruption) is typically limited to 

2%; however, higher strain limits are often specified as described previously with 

respect to ASME B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems. 

The standard calls for consideration of slope failure at locations of potential 

mudslides, steep slopes, and areas of seismic slumping. Also, design for soil 

liquefaction is required for areas of known or expected occurrence. If it is not 

practical to design the pipeline system to survive slope failure, the pipeline shall be 

designed for controlled breakaway with provisions to minimize the loss of pipeline 

contents. In earthquake prone areas, including active fault crossings, consideration 

shall be given to flexibility by means of breakaway couplings, slack loops, flexible 

pipe sections, or other configurations. Little additional guidance is given for how to 

deal with these natural hazard conditions. 

Specifications are provided for pipeline materials by reference to appropriate ASTM 

standards, and dimensional requirements are referenced to appropriate ASME and 

MSS standards. Detailed construction, welding, inspection, and testing specifications 

are provided. 

The standard calls for written plans and training programs for employees that cover 

operating and maintenance procedures. Pipeline integrity assessments and repairs are 

specified utilizing hydrostatic tests and in-line inspection devices, followed by 

remediation of anomalies judged to be unfavorable for safety. 

A written emergency plan shall be established in the event of system failures, 

accidents, or other emergencies. The plan shall provide for training emergency 

personnel and for liaison with state and local agencies, such as fire and police 

departments, and entities in or near the pipeline right-of-way, such as utilities, 

highway authorities, and railroads. The standard calls for communications with 

residents along the piping system to recognize and report an emergency to the 

appropriate operating personnel. 

The standard contains minimum procedures for controlling external and internal 

corrosion of exposed, buried, or submerged metallic pipelines and components. The 

standard is applicable to new pipelines and associated pipeline systems as well as the 

operation and maintenance of existing pipelines and associated piping systems. 

B.2.3 API Recommended Practice 1162: Public Awareness Programs for 

Pipeline Operators 

API Recommended Practice 1162 (API, 2010) provides guidance for pipeline 

operators to develop and manage public awareness programs to promote safety for 

B-8 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
communities near gas and liquid fuel pipelines. It is contained in 49 CFR Parts 192 

and 195 by reference in Sections 192.616 and 195.440, respectively. The principal 

objectives of the standard are to provide a framework for pipeline operators to 

establish and manage a public awareness program, as well as a process for periodic 

program evaluation. API Recommended Practice 1162 was first issued in 2003, and a 

Second Edition was issued in 2010. The Second Edition contains updated guidance 

for aligning baseline messages (those operators must communicate) with core safety 

messages. The guidance is focused on promoting safety with regard to third-party 

damage in a pipeline right-of-way, including excavation disturbance and impact. It 

does not include communication during emergencies nor include reference to natural 

hazards. Nevertheless, the framework of the standard could be used as a basis for 

public risk communication and awareness programs related to community resilience. 

API Recommended Practice 1162 is intended to help pipeline operators comply with 

49 CFR Parts 192 and 195 through public education, emergency responder liaison 

activities, and damage prevention. As described in the standard, a public awareness 

program consists of five activities: (1) define objectives, (2) obtain management 

commitment, (3) establish program administration, (4) identify pipeline assets, and 

(5) identify stakeholder audiences. Public awareness programs should raise 

stakeholder awareness of pipelines in their communities as well as the role 

stakeholders can play in helping prevent pipeline emergencies and releases of gas or 

liquid fuel, including third-party damage. They should help stakeholders understand 

how to prevent and respond to a pipeline emergency. 

API Recommended Practice 1162 identifies the stakeholder community as people 

who live and work adjacent to a natural gas or liquid fuel transmission pipeline rightof-way, gas distribution pipelines, gathering lines, and major facilities, such as a tank 

farm, storage field, or pump/compressor station. It also identifies places where people 

assemble or work on a regular basis, such as schools, businesses, churches, hospitals 

and medical facilities, and parks/recreational facilities, including playgrounds. 

Emergency response stakeholders include fire departments, police, county and state 

emergency management agencies, and emergency dispatch and 911 centers. Public 

officials are part of the stakeholder community, and include planning and zoning 

boards, licensing and permitting departments, building code enforcement 

departments, city and county managers, public utility boards, and local governing 

councils. As mentioned above, the standard is focused on excavation disturbance and 

impact, and excavators are identified as part of the stakeholder community, including 

construction companies, excavation equipment rental companies, highway 

departments, landscapers, well drillers, utilities, land developers, and home builders. 

Two categories of messages are identified, involving baseline and enhanced 

messages. Baseline messages are core safety messages, which should be delivered to 

each stakeholder community. They involve messages about damage prevention, 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-9 
emergency preparedness, leak/damage recognition and response, pipeline location, 

potential hazards, and right-of-way encroachment. Enhanced messages go beyond 

core safety, and may involve messages about areas of high consequence, population 

density, land development, environmental considerations, and other issues. 

The standard addresses the frequency and methods of message delivery. Delivery 

methods include operator web sites, media news coverage, community and 

neighborhood newsletters, drills and exercises, open houses, community events, 

operator employee participation, and pipeline markers. 

The standard covers program implementation, which involves the actions of a 

pipeline operator to plan, conduct, review, evaluate, document, and improve public 

awareness programs. Program evaluation includes pre-test effectiveness of public 

awareness materials, including focus groups with in-house and/or external 

participants. Program evaluation includes formal annual assessment of the program, 

using internal self-assessment, third-party assessment, or regulatory inspection. It 

also includes measures of program effectiveness, such as surveys that are operatordesigned and conducted, surveys pre-designed by a third party or industrial 

association, and trade association conducted surveys. The standard contains example 

forms for annual, internal self-assessment and additional information on conducting 

surveys. 

B.2.4 Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas 

and Liquid Hydrocarbon Pipelines 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas and Liquid 

Hydrocarbon Pipelines (PRCI, 2004) provide recommended procedures and methods 

for the assessment of new and existing natural gas and liquid hydrocarbon pipelines 

subject to seismic-related loading conditions. They provide guidance for determining 

pipeline response to specific seismic hazards. They are intended to be an update of 

the Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems (ASCE, 1984; 

see Section B.2.5) to account for improvements in knowledge and more recent 

research findings. 

The guidelines are provided in two parts: Part I Guidelines and Recommended 

Procedures and Part II Commentary. Part I uses a format in which a concise set of 

general procedures is presented. Background information and references and more 

detailed discussion of the concise general procedures are presented in the 

Commentary. 

The guidelines address general provisions, quantification of seismic hazards, pipeline 

performance criteria, pipeline analysis procedures, and mitigation options. Seismic 

hazards include surface faulting, liquefaction, landslides, seismic wave propagation, 

B-10 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
and transient ground movements related to narrow valleys with weak soils and sites 

that undergo liquefaction in soil confined by non-liquefiable material. 

The guidelines provide methods for quantifying permanent ground movement effects 

associated with surface faulting, liquefaction-induced lateral spreading, and 

landslides, as well as seismic wave propagation effects. Analytical procedures for 

evaluating soil-pipeline interaction are provided, using the quantified ground 

movements in conjunction with two dimensional finite element analysis in which the 

soil reactions are modeled in the lateral, vertical, and longitudinal directions relative 

to the pipeline. Strain based criteria are used to evaluate pipeline performance. 

B.2.5 Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline 

Systems 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems (ASCE, 1984) 

were issued as a collaborative effort among pipeline system operators, consultants, 

and academic researchers, and were accepted as a de facto standard for seismic 

design within the gas and oil industry for over 20 years. The guidelines address 

seismic hazards; quantification of seismic hazards; design criteria for pipeline 

systems; differential ground movement effects on buried pipelines; wave propagation 

effects on buried pipelines; seismic response and design of liquid fuel tanks; seismic 

response analysis of structures, equipment, and aboveground pipelines; and 

operations and maintenance. Although they are a valuable supplement to the 

Guidelines for the Seismic Design and Assessment of Natural Gas and Liquid 

Hydrocarbon Pipelines (PRCI, 2004), access to these guidelines is limited since they 

no longer are available in published form through ASCE. 

GCR 16-917-39 B: Supplement to Gas and Liquid Fuel Analysis B-11 

Appendix C 

Supplement to Transportation

Analysis 

The following sections supplement the material presented in Chapter 6— 

Transportation—in the main body of the report. 

C.1 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

Table 6-2 in Chapter 6 summarizes the design codes, structural standards and 

guidelines governing transportation systems in the United States. The following 

sections provide greater detail on the approaches to designing for various hazards 

contained in some of the more important of these documents. 

C.1.1 AASHTO Bridge Design Specifications 

The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

(AASHTO) administers the primary codes for use in design of highways, bridges, 

tunnels and other structures associated with highway transportation. 

C.1.1.1 AASHTO Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge Design 

Specifications 

The AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications (AASHTO, 2014) are intended 

for use in the design, evaluation, and rehabilitation of highway bridges. These 

specifications employ the load and resistance factor design (LRFD) methodology 

using factors developed from current statistical knowledge of loads and structural 

performance. Since 2007, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and all U.S. 

states mandate that this LRFD standard be used to design all new and total 

replacement highway bridges. A new edition of these specifications is published 

every two years, with interim editions in the year after its release. 

AASHTO members are the 50 state highway or transportation departments, the 

District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Each member has one vote. The U.S. 

Department of Transportation (DOT) is a nonvoting member. Revisions are voted on 

by the AASHTO member departments prior to the publication of each new edition of 

the specifications and, if approved by at least two-thirds of the members, they are 

included in the next new edition as standards of the Association. They are then 

implemented by every state highway or transportation department for all future 

bridge design, evaluation and rehabilitation. 

GCR 16-917-39 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis C-1 
C.1.1.2 AASHTO Guide Specifications for LRFD Seismic Bridge Design 

This AASHTO Guide Specifications for LRFD Seismic Bridge Design covers seismic 

design for typical bridge types and applies to non-critical and non-essential bridges 

(AASHTO, 2011). It is an approved alternate to the seismic provisions in the 

AASHTO LRFD Bridge Design Specifications (AASHTO, 2014). It differs from the 

current procedures in the LRFD Specifications in its use of displacement-based 

design procedures, instead of the traditional force-based, R-Factor method. It 

includes detailed guidance and commentary on earthquake-resisting elements and 

systems, global design strategies, demand modeling, capacity calculation, and 

liquefaction effects. Capacity design procedures underpin the Guide Specifications’ 

methodology; and include prescriptive detailing for plastic hinging regions and 

design requirements for capacity protection of those elements that should not sustain 

damage (AASHTO, 2011). 

C.1.2 American Railway Engineering and Maintenance-of-Way 

Association (AREMA) Manuals 

Formed in 1997, AREMA was the result of a merger of four separate associations, 

namely the American Railway Bridge and Building Association, the American 

Railway Engineering Association, the Roadmasters and Maintenance of Way 

Association, and the Communications and Signals Division of the Association of 

American Railroads. AREMA publishes recommended practices for the design, 

construction and maintenance of railway infrastructure, which are requirements in the 

United States. 

C.1.2.1 AREMA Manual for Railway Engineering 

The Manual for Railway Engineering (AREMA, 2015a) is an annual publication 

released every April. The Manual consists of more than 5,000 pages of railway 

engineering reference material—the recommended practices for the industry. It 

contains principles, data, specifications, plans and economic information pertaining 

to the engineering, design and construction of the fixed plant of railways (except 

signals and communications), and allied services and facilities. The material is 

developed by AREMA technical committees and is published as a guide to railways 

to use in establishing their individual policies and practices relative to the subjects, 

activities and facilities covered in the Manual. Its main aim is to assist railways in 

engineering and constructing a railway plant that has inherent qualities of safe and 

economical operation as well as low maintenance cost. The Manual consists of four 

volumes covering track design and construction, bridge and other railway structure 

design, infrastructure and passenger facilities, and systems management. The volume 

on bridge structure design includes a chapter on “Seismic Design for Railway 

Structures.” 

C-2 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis	 GCR 16-917-39 
C.1.2.2 AREMA Railway Communications and Signals Manual 

The Communications and Signals Manual (AREMA, 2015b) is a manual of 

recommended practice written by AREMA technical committees in the interest of 

establishing uniformity, and promoting safety, efficiency and economy. No special 

attention is paid to the performance of communication and signal systems during 

wind or seismic hazards. 

C.1.3 Airport Design 

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) develops engineering, design, and 

construction standards for civil airports, heliports, and seaplane bases. They include 

standards for airfield pavement; airport lighting, marking, signs, and other visual aids; 

safety during construction; surveying and GIS data; deicing, aircraft rescue and firefighting, and other facilities; bird radar and foreign object detection systems; and more 

(FAA, 2009, 2012 and 2014). 

C.1.4 Port Design 

C.1.4.1 Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards 

(MOTEMS) 

California oil terminals are currently designed and maintained to the latest standards 

provided in the Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards 

(MOTEMS) (CSLC, 2010) incorporated into the California Building Code (CBSC, 

2013). The MOTEMS requirements include mechanisms for rapidly shutting down 

oil pipelines to minimize the risk of an oil spill during a seismic event. A similar 

approach would be used during a tsunami event. 

The purpose of this code is to establish minimum engineering, inspection and 

maintenance criteria for marine oil terminals in order to prevent oil spills and to 

protect public health safety and the environment. This code does not, in general, 

address operational requirements. Relevant provisions from existing codes, industry 

standards, recommended practices, regulations and guidelines have been incorporated 

directly or through reference, as part of this code. 

It is current practice within most ports in the United States to construct a containment 

dike or wall around tank farms and pipelines. These containment dikes are designed 

to retain any leakage within the designated area, but could also be designed to be of 

sufficient height to reduce or eliminate tsunami overtopping. 

C.1.4.2 World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure (PIANC) 

The performance-based Seismic Design Guidelines for Port Structures (PIANC, 

2001) are intended to address the limitations present in conventional design, and 

establish the framework for a new design approach. They are recommended for use 

GCR 16-917-39 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis C-3 
in conjunction with the legally adopted seismic design provisions in port 

jurisdictions. 

C.1.5 American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) 7-10, Minimum Design 

Loads for Buildings and Other Structures 

ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE, 

2010) provides loading and design provisions for design of buildings and other 

structures. It includes loads due to live, dead, wind, seismic, riverine and coastal 

flooding, ice and snow. The 2016 edition of ASCE 7 will for the first time also 

include a chapter on Tsunami Loads and Effects. ASCE 7 is incorporated by 

reference into the International Building Code (IBC), which has been adopted (in one 

version or another) by virtually all jurisdictions in the United States. Although local 

jurisdictions are permitted to modify, delete or add provisions to the IBC when 

adopting it as the local code, these amendments seldom impact the wind and seismic 

design provisions. 

C.1.6 American Concrete Institute (ACI) 318, Building Code 

Requirements for Structural Concrete, and Commentary 

ACI 318-11 Building Code Requirements for Structural Concrete, and Commentary 

(ACI, 2011) is referenced in the International Building Code (ICC, 2015) for use in 

the design of new concrete structures. It contains extensive design requirements for 

all loading conditions on reinforced concrete structural elements and systems, with 

comprehensive seismic design provisions. It is used by all U.S. jurisdictions through 

their adoption of the IBC. 

C.1.7 American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Manuals 

C.1.7.1 AISC Steel Construction Manual 

This consensus standard is produced by the AISC for use in the design of new steel 

structures. It is used by all jurisdictions in the United States through their adoption of 

the IBC. 

C.1.7.2 AISC Seismic Design Manual 

The AISC Seismic Design Manual, companion manual to the AISC Steel 

Construction Manual, specifically deals with design and detailing issues relating to 

the seismic design of steel structures. 

C.2 Estimating Recovery Time 

Table C-1 provides an example of expert opinion about the differences in the public’s 

perception of anticipated performance of primary transportation infrastructure 

components, compared with the anticipated engineering performance of these 

C-4 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis	 GCR 16-917-39 
Table C-1 Expert Opinion on Expectations of Transportation System Damage and Recovery Times 

Anticipated Damage State Recovery Time 

Transportation 

System Component Hazard 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Roadways 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Pavement 

cracking but 

passable 

Pavement 

washed away 

Localized 

pavement 

cracking 

Debris on 

roadway and 

some washout 

1 week 

1 month 

3-7 days 

1-2 weeks 

Highway 

Transportation 

Railway 

Transportation 

Highway 

Bridges 

Highway 

Tunnels 

Roadbeds and 

Tracks 

Railway 

Bridges 

Railway 

Tunnels 

Control System 

and Signals 

High Wind 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

None 

Occasional 

collapse 

All bridges 

washed away 

None 

None 

Some 

misalignment 

Debris on 

tracks 

Occasional 

collapse 

All bridges 

washed away 

None 

None 

Power failure 

Washed away 

Debris on 

roadway 

5-10% with major 

damage or 

collapse 

10-20% with 

major damage or 

collapse 

Potential 

landslides at 

tunnel entrance 

Debris in tunnel 

Horizontal and 

vertical 

misalignment 

Tracks washed 

away 

5-10% with major 

damage or 

collapse 

10-20% with 

major damage or 

collapse 

Potential 

landslides at 

tunnel entrance 

Debris in tunnel 

Power failure 

Water damage 

and overhead 

lines damaged 

1 day 

1 month 

6-12 months 

None 

None 

1 week 

1 week 

1-3 months 

6-12 months 

None 

None 

1-3 days 

3 months 

1-3 days 

1-3 months 

1-6 months 

1-5 days 

1-3 days 

1-3 weeks 

3-6 weeks 

6-24 months 

6-24 months 

1-5 days 

1-3 days 

1-5 days 

1-3 months 

GCR 16-917-39 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis C-5 
Table C-1 Expert Opinion on Expectations of Transportation System Damage and Recovery Times 

(continued) 

Anticipated Damage State Recovery Time 

Transportation 

System Component Hazard 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Waterfront 

Structures 

(wharf, pier, 

seawall) 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Limited 

cracking and 

deformation 

Extensive 

damage 

Damage due to 

liquefaction and 

component failure 

Damage to 

access panels 

and slab-ongrade aprons 

1-4 weeks 

6-12 months 

1-3 months 

1-3 months 

Cranes and 

Cargo 

Handling 

Equipment 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Limited 

damage 

All cranes 

washed away 

Jump tracks, 

major damage or 

collapse 

Water damage to 

mechanical and 

electric 

components 

1-4 weeks 

6-12 months 

1-6 months 

1-8 weeks 

Port Transportation 

Fuel Facilities 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Limited 

damage to 

pipes 

All tanks float 

away 

Pipe and tank 

ruptures, leading 

to fires 

Some tanks float 

and/or ruptured, 

leading to fires 

1-3 weeks 

6-12 months 

1-3 months 

3-6 months 

Boats and 

Ships 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

None 

All evacuate 

harbor prior to 

tsunami 

None 

Some remain in 

harbor – 

damaged or sunk 

None 

None 

None 

1-3 weeks 

Shipping 

Containers 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

None 

All washed 

away 

Some high stacks 

topple 

Washed into 

structures and 

sink in harbor 

None 

1 week 

1-3 days 

1-3 weeks 

C-6 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Table C-1	 Expert Opinion on Expectations of Transportation System Damage and Recovery Times 

(continued) 

Anticipated Damage State Recovery Time 

Transportation 

System Component Hazard 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Public 

Perception 

Engineering 

Anticipation 

Runways 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Pavement 

cracking but 

passable 

Pavement 

washed away 

Localized 

pavement 

cracking 

Debris on 

runways and 

some washout 

1 week 

1 month 

3-7 days 

1-2 weeks 

Airport 

Transportation 

Airport 

Buildings 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

Occasional 

collapse 

All buildings 

washed away 

5-10% with 

major damage 

or collapse 

10-20% with 

major damage 

or collapse 

1 month 

6-12 months 

1-3 months 

1-6 months 

Fuel Facilities 

Earthquake 

Tsunami 

None 

None 

Damage to 

pipes and 

storage tanks 

Damage to 

pipes and 

storage tanks 

None 

None 

1-5 days 

1-3 days 

structures assuming they are designed to current code requirements. Also provided are 

perceptions of both public and engineering anticipations of time required to restore the 

damaged component to functional operation. These data are offered as a starting point 

in efforts to assess societal expectations of transportation system performance. The 

earthquake estimates are based on Jones et al. (2008), and the tsunami estimates are 

based on FEMA (2012). The basis for wind event estimates provided in Table 6-3 is 

not included in Table C-1, as those estimates reflect the opinions of the authors of this 

report. No surveys or systematic research data were available to inform these estimates. 

GCR 16-917-39	 C: Supplement to Transportation Analysis C-7 

 

Appendix D 

Supplement to Water and

Wastewater Analysis 

The following sections supplement the material presented in Chapter 7—Water and 

Wastewater—in the main body of the report. 

D.1 Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines 

Table D-1 summarizes the codes, standards, guidelines, and manuals governing water 

and wastewater systems that are of highest significance for community resilience. As 

indicated in Table D-1, there are a wide variety of codes, standards, guidelines, and 

manuals provided by a number of different organizations related to different systemic 

aspects, specific components, preparedness, and response for hazards associated with 

water and wastewater systems and critical users for these services (e.g., fire 

departments and hospitals). 

Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water and Wastewater Systems 

Category Title General Description/Use 

Code 2015 International Building Code or 

applicable jurisdictional building code 

(ICC, 2015) 

Design of new structures (other than pipelines) including treatment 

plant office and laboratory buildings, pump stations, process tanks, 

water storage tanks and reservoirs. 

Standard ASCE 7-10, Minimum Design Loads for 

Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE, 

2010) 

Minimum load requirements for the design of buildings and other 

structures subject to building code requirements. 

Standard ASCE 24, Flood Resistant Design and 

Construction (ASCE, 2014a) 

Minimum requirements for design and construction of structures 

located in flood hazard areas and subject to building code 

requirements; applicable to water and wastewater system structures. 

Standard ASCE 41-13, Seismic Evaluation and 

Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings (ASCE, 

2014b) 

Deficiency-based and systematic procedures that use performancebased principles to evaluate and retrofit existing buildings to withstand 

the effects of earthquakes; applicable to existing water and 

wastewater system buildings. 

Standard ACI 350-06, Code Requirements for 

Environmental Engineering Concrete 

Structures (ACI, 2006) 

Structural design, materials selection, and construction of 

environmental engineering concrete structures used for conveying, 

storing, or treating liquid or other materials, such as solid waste; 

includes ancillary structures for dams, spill-ways, and channels. 

Standard ACI 371R-08, Guide for the Analysis, 

Design, and Construction of Elevated 

Concrete and Composite Steel-Concrete 

Water Storage Tanks (ACI, 2008) 

Recommendations for materials, analysis, design, and construction of 

concrete-pedestal elevated water storage tanks, including both the allconcrete tank and the composite tank, consisting of a steel water 

storage vessel supported on a cylindrical reinforced concrete 

pedestal. 

GCR 16-917-39 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-1 
Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water and Wastewater Systems 

(continued) 

Category	 Title 

Standard ACI 372R-03, Design and Construction of 

Circular Wire- and Strand-Wrapped 

Prestressed Concrete Structures (ACI, 

2003) 

Standard AWWA D100-11, Welded Carbon Steel 

Tanks for Water Storage (AWWA, 2011d) 

Standard AWWA D110-13, Wire- and StrandWound, Circular, Prestressed Concrete 

Tanks (AWWA, 2013) 

Standard AWWA D115-06, Tendon-Prestressed 

Concrete Water Tanks (AWWA, 2006a) 

Standard ISO 16134, Earthquake and Subsidence 

Resistant Design of Ductile Iron Pipes 

(ISO, 2006) 

Standard ASCE 15-98, Standard Practice for Direct 

Design of Buried Precast Concrete Pipe 

using Standard Installations (ASCE, 1998) 

Standard AWWA G100-11, Water Treatment Plant 

Operation and Management (AWWA, 

2011c) 

Standard AWWA G430-14, Security Practices for 

Operation and Management (AWWA, 

2014) 

Standard AWWA G440-11, Emergency 

Preparedness Practices (AWWA, 2011b) 

Standard AWWA J100-10, Risk and Resilience 

Management of Water and Wastewater 

Systems (AWWA, 2010) 

Guidelines ALA Guidelines for Implementing 

Performance Assessments of Water 

Systems (ALA, 2005a) 

Guidelines ALA Guidelines for the Design of Buried 

Steel Pipe (ALA, 2001a) 

Guidelines ALA Seismic Design and Retrofit of Piping 

Systems (ALA, 2002) 

Guidelines ALA Seismic Fragility Formulations for 

Water Systems (ALA, 2001b) 

General Description/Use 

Design and Construction of wrapped, circular, prestressed concrete 

structures (constructed of thin cylindrical shells of either concrete or 

shotcrete) commonly used for liquid or bulk storage 

Minimum requirements for the design, construction, inspection, and 

testing of new welded carbon steel tanks for the storage of water at 

atmospheric pressure. 

Recommended practice for the design, construction, inspection, and 

maintenance of wire- and strand-wound, circular, prestressed 

concrete water-containing structures for four types of core walls. 

Describes current and recommended practice for the design, 

construction, and field observations of concrete tanks using tendons 

for prestressing; applies to containment structures for use with 

potable water, raw water, or wastewater. 

Design of earthquake and subsidence resistant ductile iron pipes; 

provides means of determining and checking resistance of buried 

pipelines; applicable to buried ductile iron pipes and fittings with joints 

with expansion/contraction and deflection capabilities. 

Direct design of buried precast concrete pipe using Standard 

Installations; reviews the design and construction of the soil/pipe 

interaction system that is used for the conveyance of sewage, 

industrial wastes, storm water, and drainage. 

Management standard on critical requirements for the effective 

operation and management of drinking water treatment plants. 

Management standard on critical requirements for establishing and 

operating a protective security program for a water, wastewater, or 

reuse utility. 

Management standard providing minimum requirements to establish 

and maintain an acceptable level of emergency preparedness based 

on the identified and perceived risks facing utilities in the water sector. 

Sets the requirements for all-hazards risk and resilience analysis and 

management for the water sector and prescribes methods that can be 

used for addressing these requirements. 

Recommendations for evaluating and characterizing anticipated 

performance of water systems and for making risk management 

decisions for natural hazard and human threat events. 

Design provisions to evaluate integrity of steel buried pipe for a range 

of loads. 

Comprehensive guidance for the seismic design and retrofit of piping 

systems in essential facilities; describes seismic qualification of new 

or existing above ground piping systems. 

Detailed procedures that can be applied to any water transmission 

system in order to evaluate the probability of damage from 

earthquake hazards to various components of the system. 

D-2 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water and Wastewater Systems 

(continued) 

Category	 Title 

Guidelines ALA Seismic Guidelines for Water 

Pipelines (ALA, 2005b) 

Guidelines ALA Wastewater System Performance 

Assessment Guideline (ALA, 2004b) 

Guidelines ALA Guide for Seismic Evaluation of 

Active Mechanical Equipment (ALA, 

2004a) 

Guidelines ATC-25-1, A Model Methodology for 

Assessment of Seismic Vulnerability and 

Impact of Disruption of Water Supply 

Systems (ATC, 1992) 

Guidelines ASCE 12-05, Standard Guidelines for 

Design of Urban Surface Drainage (ASCE, 

2005b) 

Guidelines ASCE 13-05, Standard Guidelines for 

Installation of Urban Surface Drainage 

(ASCE, 2005c) 

Guidelines ASCE 14-05, Standard Guidelines for 

Operation and Maintenance of Urban 

Surface Drainage (ASCE, 2005d) 

Guidelines ASCE TCLEE, Guidelines for Seismic 

Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems 

(ASCE, 1984) 

Guidelines ASCE TCLEE Monograph 15, Guidelines 

for the Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade of 

Water Transmission Facilities (ASCE, 

1999) 

Guidelines NIST GCR 97-730, Reliability and 

Restoration of Water Supply Systems for 

Fire Suppression and Drinking Following 

Earthquakes (NIST, 1997) 

Guidelines Guide Document: Earthquake Vulnerability 

of Water Systems (KJC, 1993) 

Guidelines Minimizing Earthquake Damage: A Guide 

for Water Utilities (AWWA, 1994) 

Guidelines Business Continuity Planning for Water 

Utilities: Guidance Document (WRF, 2013) 

Guidelines Emergency Water Supply Planning Guide 

for Hospitals and Health Care Facilities 

(CDC and AWWA, 2012). 

Guidelines Guide for Municipal Wet Weather 

Strategies (WEF, 2013b) 

General Description/Use 

A cost effective approach to seismic design of water pipelines; three 

design methods are presented. 

Recommendations for evaluating and characterizing anticipated 

performance of wastewater systems and for making risk management 

decisions for natural hazard and human threat events. 

Recommendations for evaluating the seismic operability of valves, 

pumps, compressors, fans, air handling units, and chillers. 

A methodology for assessing water supply system earthquake 

vulnerability and the impact of failure and disruption. 

Design of urban subsurface drainage systems, covering topics such 

as site analysis, system configuration, filters and envelopes, 

hydraulics and hydrology, structural considerations, and materials. 

Installation of urban subsurface drainage and discusses subjects such 

as site inspection, soil erosion, excavation, foundation preparation, 

and inspection of materials, equipment, and construction. 

Operation and maintenance of urban subsurface drainage, including 

design criteria, maintenance procedures, safety, water quality, 

inspection, and rehabilitation. 

Guidelines for the seismic design of buried oil, gas, or refined 

petroleum product pipelines and surface facilities, such as a pumping 

and compressor stations, storage tanks, and miscellaneous terminal 

facilities; often used for design of water system components. 

Guidelines for the seismic evaluation and upgrade of water supply 

and transmission and wastewater conveyance and discharge 

facilities. 

Procedures to help quantify water system reliability using vulnerability 

evaluation techniques for pipelines and reservoirs, and mitigation 

measures for systems and components and alternatives for alternate 

water supplies. 

Guidance on assessing earthquake vulnerabilities of water systems 

and suggested performance objectives. 

Information to assess the effects of earthquake hazards on water 

purveyors. 

Guidance on how to prepare a business continuity plan for water and 

wastewater system operators. 

Information for health care facilities to develop an Emergency Water 

Supply Plan to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a total or 

partial interruption of the facilities’ normal water supply. 

Management of wet weather flows in the wastewater collection and 

treatment system 

GCR 16-917-39 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-3 
Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water and Wastewater Systems 

(continued) 

Category	 Title 

Manual AWWA M9, Concrete Pressure Pipe 

(AWWA, 2008a) 

Manual AWWA M11, Steel Pipe: A Guide for 

Design and Installation (AWWA, 2004b) 

Manual AWWA M19, Emergency Planning for 

Water Utilities (AWWA, 2001) 

Manual AWWA M23, PVC Pipe—Design and 

Installation (AWWA, 2002) 

Manual AWWA M31, Distribution System 

Requirements for Fire Protection (AWWA, 

2008b) 

Manual AWWA M41, Ductile-Iron Pipe and Fittings 

(AWWA, 2009) 

Manual AWWA M55, PE Pipe—Design and 

Installation (AWWA, 2006b) 

Manual Emergency Power Source Planning for 

Water and Wastewater (AWWA, 2004a) 

Manual AWWA M60, Drought Preparedness and 

Response (AWWA, 2011a) 

Manual Planning for an Emergency Drinking Water 

Supply (EPA, 2011) 

Manual MCEER-08-0009, Fragility Analysis of 

Water Supply Systems (Jacobson and 

Grigoriu, 2008) 

Manual MCEER Monograph No. 3, Response of 

Buried Pipelines Subject to Earthquake 

Effects (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999) 

Manual MCEER Monograph No. 4, Seismic 

Design of Buried and Offshore Pipelines 

(O’Rourke and Liu, 2012) 

Manual ASCE TCLEE Monograph 22, Seismic 

Screening Checklists for Water and 

Wastewater Facilities (ASCE, 2002) 

Manual ASCE TCLEE Monograph No. 26, Fire 

Following Earthquake (ASCE, 2005a) 

General Description/Use 

Design, selection, specification, installation, transportation, and 

testing of concrete pressure pipe in water service. 

Information for designing, installing, and maintaining steel pipe and 

fittings for potable water transmission and distribution. 

Guidance and tools for water and wastewater managers in preparing 

for either natural or human-caused emergencies. 

Design, installation, and maintenance of PVC pipe for drinking water 

systems. 

Designing water distribution systems to meet fire protection and 

suppression requirements. 

Specification, design, installation, and maintenance of ductile-iron 

pipe and fittings for potable water systems. 

Design, specification, installation, and maintenance of polyethylene 

(PE) water pipe. 

Guidance for assessing the vulnerability, condition, and reliability of 

primary electrical equipment; evaluating options for on-site electricalgenerating equipment; assessing placement locations to facilitate 

integration with the existing electrical systems; determining current 

and historical electrical load demands and estimating future electrical 

demands; and determining backup-power capacity needed to meet 

peak demand. 

Information to help water managers facing water shortages by 

illustrating how to employ tried-and-true strategies and tactics of 

drought mitigation, as well as new tools and methods. 

Development of an emergency drinking water plan by a local water 

utility. 

A procedure to assess the seismic performance of water supply 

systems. 

Reviews the behavior of buried pipeline components subjected to 

permanent ground deformation and wave propagation hazards, and 

existing methods to quantify pipeline response. 

Reviews behavior of buried pipeline components subject to 

permanent ground deformation and wave propagation hazards, as 

well as existing methods to quantify the response. 

Checklists to screen for seismically vulnerable water and wastewater 

facilities; the checklists facilitate seismic vulnerability assessment for 

water and wastewater system components, and provide useful 

information for improving loss mitigation programs. 

Covers the entire range of fire following earthquake issues, state-ofthe-practice insight on how to address the problem, and implement 

mitigations. 

D-4 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Table D-1 Summary of Key Codes, Standards, and Guidelines for Water and Wastewater Systems 

(continued) 

Category	 Title 

Manual Emergency Planning, Response, and 

Recovery (WEF, 2013a) 

Manual WEF MOP 28, Upgrading and Retrofitting 

Water and Wastewater Treatment Plants 

(WEF, 2005) 

Manual WEF MOP 8, Design of Municipal 

Wastewater Treatment Plants (WEF, 

2009) 

Manual WEF MOP FD-17, Prevention and Control 

of Sewer System Overflows (WEF, 2011) 

Manual WEF MOP 23, Design of Urban Storm 

Water Controls (WEF, 2012) 

Manual Recent Earthquakes: Implications for U.S. 

Water Utilities, Web Report #4408 (WRF, 

2012) 

Manual Domestic Water Quantity, Service Level 

Health (WHO, 2003) 

Manual Minimum Water Quantity Needed for 

Domestic Use in Emergencies (WHO, 

2005) 

Manual The Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian 

Charter and Minimum Standards in 

Humanitarian Response (The Sphere 

Project, 2011) 

General Description/Use 

Information to help utilities develop an emergency response plan to 

recover from events such as infrastructure failure, small- and largescale natural hazard events, and human-created incidents; includes 

case studies from around the world. 

Covers the latest upgrading and retrofitting procedures and shows 

how to avoid common pitfalls, cost overruns, and permit violations. 

Reference for contemporary plant design practices of wastewater 

engineering professionals, augmented by performance information 

from operating facilities. 

Up-to-date information necessary to help managers and engineers 

understand and analyze an overflow problem, and guidance on 

finding the most efficient, feasible, and cost-effective strategies to 

reduce or eliminate such overflows. 

Consolidates technologies under a comprehensive view of storm 

water management in an attempt to foster a convergence between 

traditional storm water controls and green infrastructure. 

Reviews water system performances in the 2010 Maul Chile 

Earthquake, 2010-2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence, and 2011 

Great East Japan Earthquake; provides recommendations for utilities 

and describes some utility performance goals. 

Requirements for water service level to promote health. 

Provides water quantities to meet basic human needs and how to 

calculate the volumes. 

Minimum standards for hygiene, water supply, excreta disposal, 

vector control, solid waste management, and drainage, as related to 

water and wastewater systems. 

Descriptions of the codes, standards, and guidelines summarized in Table D-1 are 

provided under the following subheadings: 

D.1.1 Buildings and Other Structures 

The design of new aboveground structures (e.g., treatment plant office and laboratory 

buildings, pump stations, process tanks, water storage tanks and reservoirs) is 

typically governed by local building codes and design standards. Most states in the 

United States adopt the International Building Code (IBC) (ICC, 2015), with possible 

modifications. Design loads are prescribed by a consensus-based standard, ASCE 7-

10 Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures (ASCE, 2010). ASCE 

7 sets minimum design provisions for dead, soil, live, hydrostatic uplift, flood, wind, 

snow, rain, ice, and seismic loads. Tsunami loads are currently being developed. The 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-5 
 

ASCE 7 standard uses the concept of Risk Category to increase the design force level 

for important structures. Typical buildings are assigned to Risk Category II. Water 

and wastewater treatment facilities are assigned to Risk Category III, because failure 

of these facilities can cause disruption to civilian life and potentially cause public 

health risks. Water storage facilities and pump stations required to maintain water 

pressure for fire suppression are assigned to the highest category, Risk Category IV. 

In addition, buildings and structures within the scope of the International Building 

Code proposed to be constructed in flood hazard areas must be designed in 

accordance with ASCE 24-14, Flood Resistant Design and Construction (ASCE, 

2014a). Many water and wastewater facilities are located in flood hazard zones by 

necessity of respectively collecting or discharging the waters. 

Standards dictating the design and construction of many types of tanks and reservoirs 

are governed by ACI 350-06, Code Requirements for Environmental Engineering 

Concrete Structures (ACI, 2006); ACI 371R-08, Guide for the Analysis, Design, and 

Construction of Elevated Concrete and Composite Steel-Concrete Water Storage 

Tanks (ACI, 2008); ACI 372R-03, Design and Construction of Circular Wire- and 

Strand-Wrapped Prestressed Concrete Structures (ACI, 2003); American Water 

Works Association (AWWA) D100-11, Welded Carbon Steel Tanks for Water 

Storage (AWWA, 2011d); AWWA D110-13, Wire- and Strand-Wound, Circular, 

Prestressed Concrete Tanks (AWWA, 2013); and AWWA D115-06, TendonPrestressed Concrete Water Tanks (AWWA, 2006a). These standards generally 

follow the same criteria outlined in ASCE 7 (ASCE, 2010). Thus, all new structures 

following these codes and standards should have the same or similar performance 

when subjected to the hazards for which loading criteria are provided. 

The International Building Code (ICC, 2015) intends for structures designed as Risk 

Category III or IV to remain operational or require only minor repairs to be put back 

into operation following a design level wind, seismic, or other event. By designing 

for this performance target for the design level event, water and wastewater systems 

should remain operational under a routine level event and may experience moderate 

to major damage during an unexpected or extreme level event. However, this 

understanding is based on the current knowledge level of the hazards. The design 

levels have been modified over the years as experience has been gained and 

knowledge has improved. As a result, buildings and other structures built in 

conformance with prior codes do not necessarily meet current code requirements. 

ASCE 41-13, Seismic Evaluation and Rehabilitation of Existing Buildings (ASCE, 

2014b) establishes procedures to evaluate existing structures, identify deficiencies, 

and apply systematic procedures to retrofit them to withstand the effects of 

earthquakes. ASCE 41-13 evaluations can be undertaken to target multiple 

performance objectives including those meeting current code provisions or a basic 

performance objective reaching a level at about 75% of the current code. 

D-6 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
D.1.2 Dams, Levees, and Tunnels 

Dams, levees, and tunnels generally require specialized geotechnical and structural 

engineering expertise and designs are modified to site-specific conditions. 

Historically, many levees were not engineered. State agencies generally have special 

requirements and jurisdictional oversight for high-risk dams. The Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) controls the design of dams associated with 

hydroelectric generation. The design and evaluation of dams are based on life-safety 

performance objectives. In many cases the safe performance of a dam can be 

achieved for flood and earthquake without the same level of functionality intended 

for critical facilities in ASCE 7. Thus, the life safety evaluation for dams and 

reservoirs does not imply a better performance than other structures within water or 

wastewater systems; to ensure common performance levels specific reviews need to 

be made. 

Unlike dams, levees generally do not have any jurisdictional oversight and no 

performance objective requirements related to critical hazards, other than to meet the 

design flow containment (which may not be clearly defined for many levees across 

the country). There are guidelines and manuals to aid the proper design of levees for 

floods, earthquakes and other hazards that have not been reviewed as part of this 

project. 

Tunnel construction is usually overseen by state occupational safety departments to 

ensure safe design and construction practices. Designs usually are based on proper 

state-of-the-practice engineering using experts in the field to properly incorporate 

hazards of concern (e.g., floods, earthquakes). Manuals and guidelines are available 

for water tunnels but have not been reviewed for this project. 

D.1.3 Pipelines 

Unlike for building structures, there are no existing codes or standards in the United 

States for pipeline designs to address earthquake or any other extreme hazard. 

Typical water and wastewater pipe design, installation, operation, and maintenance in 

the United States utilize the following standards, guidelines, and manuals: ASCE 12-

05, Standard Guidelines for Design of Urban Surface Drainage (ASCE, 2005b); 

ASCE 13-05, Standard Guidelines for Installation of Urban Surface Drainage 

(ASCE, 2005c); ASCE 14-05, Standard Guidelines for Operation and Maintenance 

of Urban Surface Drainage (ASCE, 2005d); ASCE 15, Standard Practice for Direct 

Design of Buried Precast Concrete Pipe using Standard Installations (ASCE, 1998); 

AWWA M9, Concrete Pressure Pipe (AWWA, 2008a); AWWA M11, Steel Pipe: A 

Guide for Design and Installation (AWWA, 2004b); AWWA M23, PVC Pipe— 

Design and Installation (AWWA, 2002); AWWA M41, Ductile-Iron Pipe and 

Fittings (AWWA, 2009); and AWWA M55, PE Pipe—Design and Installation 

(AWWA, 2006b). 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-7 
These guidelines and manuals cover many pipe materials and joints and the following 

typical loads: soil; traffic (roadway and railroads); construction; thermal; thrust; 

dead; internal and external pressures; and water hammer and surge pressures. The 

design of joints and fittings consistent with the prescribed load conditions is 

addressed, as well as protections against corrosion. None of the standards, guidelines 

or manuals cover the design for extreme hazards and little attention is given to how 

permanent ground movements affect pipes. To the contrary, some specifically 

identify how useful the pipe materials are for addressing these special considerations, 

without providing any direction on how to design for them, even though the pipe 

systems have certain known vulnerabilities to the hazards requiring specialized 

design procedures. For example, the following quote from AWWA M41, DuctileIron Pipe and Fittings (AWWA, 2009), has existed for many decades: 

“Special use considerations should be given to such situations as expansive soils, 

earthquakes, and other geologically hazardous conditions. Field studies have 

shown that certain clay soils can exhibit high swell pressures that can cause 

significant beam loading on underground pipe. It has been estimated that 50,000 

earthquakes occur annually throughout the world that are of sufficient magnitude 

to be felt or noticed without aid of instruments. Ductile-iron pipe’s inherent 

strength and the availability of specialized joints make it an excellent choice for 

such applications.” 

In this example, it is known that ductile iron pipes can withstand a certain amount of 

ground movement without failure. However, experience also shows how these pipes 

can be seriously damaged when subjected to extreme hazards. Such statements in 

standards, guidelines, and manuals need to be quantified with acceptable design 

procedures. The review undertaken for this project identifies how the commonly used 

pipe design guidelines and manuals do not address performance criteria for extreme 

events. Some of these guidelines and manuals (e.g., AWWA, 2009) imply an inherent 

adequate performance to extreme conditions without need for specialized design, 

which is contrary to what is needed for increasing water system, wastewater system, 

and community resiliencies. 

Some international standards do exist for the design of pipelines for extreme loads. 

The ISO 16134 standard, Earthquake and Subsidence Resistant Design of Ductile 

Iron Pipes (ISO, 2006), provides methodologies for designing and installing special 

seismic joints to accommodate ground movements through axial flexibility and joint 

rotation. This standard is not used in the United States for water or wastewater pipe 

design and the example from AWWA M41 (AWWA, 2009) given above was not 

intended to refer to such joint design. ISO 16134 (ISO, 2006) was developed for a 

special earthquake resistant ductile iron pipe (ERDIP) joint type, which until recently 

was only available in Japan. Features of the joint type include 1% axial extension or 

compression per pipe length and up to 8 degrees rotation at each joint. Earthquake 

D-8 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

resistant ductile iron pipe has the capability of improving water and wastewater 

system performance. It is not only helpful for resisting earthquakes, but also for many 

types of extreme conditions, including erosion, landslides, differential settlement, 

thermal strain, freezing ground, and other strain related conditions found across the 

country. The recent importing of earthquake-resistant ductile iron pipe by the City of 

Los Angeles and other cities along the West Coast has sparked interest in improving 

pipe performance capabilities, not only in ductile iron, but also other materials. There 

is a current movement by several ductile iron, PVC (polyvinyl chloride), and HDPE 

(high-density polyethylene) pipe manufacturers to improve product robustness for 

improved system resilience capabilities. This current effort will inevitably make its 

way into some, if not all, the above listed pipe design standards, guidelines, and 

manuals and influence the normal pipe design methodologies. 

Several guidelines and manuals do exist in the United States to address pipe design 

for earthquakes and a few other hazards. These include the Americana Lifelines 

Alliance (ALA) Guidelines for the Design of Buried Steel Pipe (ALA, 2001a); ALA 

Seismic Design and Retrofit of Piping Systems (ALA, 2002); ALA Seismic 

Guidelines for Water Pipelines (ALA, 2005b); ASCE Technical Council of Lifeline 

Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas 

Pipeline Systems (ASCE, 1984); MCEER Monograph No. 3, Response of Buried 

Pipelines Subject to Earthquake Effects (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999); and MCEER 

Monograph No. 4, Seismic Design of Buried and Offshore Pipelines (O’Rourke and 

Liu, 2012). These guidelines and manuals were issued over the past few decades by 

several different authors and organizations. They address seismic hazards, 

quantification of seismic hazards, design criteria for pipeline systems, differential 

ground movement effects on buried pipelines, wave propagation effects on buried 

pipelines, and aboveground pipelines. Some also address seismic response and design 

of liquid fuel tanks, seismic response analysis of structures, equipment, and 

operations and maintenance. All the documents provide simplified pipe analysis 

methods and a few present more advanced computer methods. All but the ASCE 

(1984) document are available online. 

In addition to earthquake and other common loads addressed in previous subsections, 

the ALA Guidelines for the Design of Buried Steel Pipe (ALA, 2001a) address 

surface impact loads, buoyancy, thermal expansion, mine subsidence, movement at 

pipe bends, nearby blasting, and fluid transients. These guidelines also provide 

suggested acceptance criteria, but do not present any significant hazard design level 

criteria. 

The ALA Seismic Design and Retrofit of Piping Systems (ALA, 2002) addresses 

earthquake inertial loads on piping systems in essential facilities, mostly pipes in 

buildings and other structures located above ground. Several load analysis methods 

are presented, including selecting seismic loads using the International Building 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-9 
Code procedures (ICC, 2015), which then establishes piping performance criteria 

consistent with those required for structures meeting that code. Qualification methods 

are presented for piping and anchorage systems falling within allowable limits. 

The ALA Seismic Guidelines for Water Pipelines (ALA, 2005b) provides a costeffective approach to seismic design of water pipelines applicable throughout the 

United States. As a result, it presents varying design requirements for different types of 

pipelines, depending on their overall importance to the network performance of the 

water utility and the localized earthquake risks. A performance-based design method is 

used that considers resilience and community impacts. Performance objectives are 

presented in terms of target performance levels and seismic hazard levels. Pipeline 

functions are identified using a Pipe Function Class, which defines pipeline importance 

in achieving the system performance goal and its needed reliability. Using the Pipe 

Function Class criteria for transient and permanent ground motions, landslide 

movements, liquefaction and lateral spreading, and fault rupture are defined. Ground 

motions are selected using procedures consistent with the International Building Code 

(ICC, 2015). Ground movements are selected for other hazards in a manner providing a 

uniform confidence of loads not being exceeded that is consistent with the ground 

motions. Hazard load criteria may be modified for multiple use, continuity, supply 

source, branch lines and isolation, and redundancy. More detailed descriptions on the 

process are provided in Davis (2005) and Davis (2008). 

The ASCE TCLEE Guidelines for Seismic Design of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems 

(ASCE, 1984) document is commonly referenced for seismic design of water and 

wastewater pipelines. The document provides seismic design criteria for two 

earthquake levels—a Probable Design Earthquake having recurrence intervals of 50 

to 100 years, and a Contingency Design Earthquake recurring on the order of 200 to 

500 years or more. The system should remain operable during and after a Probable 

Design Earthquake, while the Contingency Design Earthquake may cause limited 

damage. This document is described in more detail in Appendix B, Section B.2.5. 

MCEER Monograph No. 3, Response of Buried Pipelines Subject to Earthquake 

Effects (O’Rourke and Liu, 1999), describes how different types of piping systems 

behave when subjected to transient and permanent ground movements. Methods for 

assessing the seismic hazards are described, but no recommendations for design 

criteria are presented. MCEER Monograph No. 4, Seismic Design of Buried and 

Offshore Pipelines (O’Rourke and Liu, 2012), presents information in a similar 

manner and includes offshore pipelines. 

D.1.4 Mechanical Equipment 

The ALA Guide for Seismic Evaluation of Active Mechanical Equipment (ALA, 

2004a) document provides recommendations for evaluating the seismic operability of 

D-10 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
valves, pumps compressors, fans, air handling units, and chillers (active equipment 

with moving parts). The recommendations are in the form of seismic evaluation 

checklists, static and dynamic calculation methods and seismic testing protocols. The 

guide does not cover aspects related to ensuring power to the equipment. The seismic 

function is best specified as: (a) position retention, (b) leak tightness, or (c) 

operability. The seismic design of industrial equipment has generally followed the 

rules of the applicable building code, with the exception of equipment in nuclear 

facilities for which seismic design rules are specified in regulations such as the U.S. 

Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR, Part 50. The International Building Code 

(ICC, 2015) contains explicit rules for developing seismic input for the analysis and 

qualification of equipment. The consequence of their failure is deemed to represent a 

safety hazard. Thus, current state of practice establishes life safety performance. The 

ALA document also lists several civil, structural, mechanical, and electrical standards 

that can be used to qualify components needed in water and wastewater systems. 

D.1.5 Water and Wastewater System Assessment and Performance 

Several guidelines and manuals address the systemic performance of water and 

wastewater systems, some of which provide guidance on selecting performance 

criteria. These include ALA Guidelines for Implementing Performance Assessments 

of Water Systems (ALA, 2005a); ALA Wastewater System Performance Assessment 

Guideline (ALA, 2004b); ATC-25-1, A Model Methodology for Assessment of 

Seismic Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Water Supply Systems (ATC, 

1992); Minimizing Earthquake Damage, A Guide for Water Utilities (AWWA, 

1994); Guide Document Earthquake Vulnerability of Water Systems (KJC, 1993); 

NIST GCR 97-730, Reliability and Restoration of Water Supply Systems for Fire 

Suppression and Drinking Following Earthquakes (NIST, 1997); and ASCE TCLEE 

Monograph 15, Guidelines for the Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade of Water 

Transmission Facilities (ASCE, 1999). 

The ALA Guidelines for Implementing Performance Assessments of Water Systems 

(ALA, 2005a) and ALA Wastewater System Performance Assessment Guideline 

(ALA, 2004b) provide recommendations for evaluating and characterizing 

anticipated performance of water and wastewater systems, respectively. The 

documents focus on specific hazards, system vulnerabilities to different hazard 

levels, and potential system performance. Some guidance is given on the potential 

consequences of system performance. Seven hazards are included: earthquake, 

general ground deformation, wind, tornado, icing, flooding, and human threats. 

Earthquake hazards include shaking, fault rupture, liquefaction, landslide, and 

tsunami. General ground deformations include landslide, settlement, and frost heave. 

Criteria is provided for three realtive hazard levels: low, medium, and high. 

Recommendations are provided for three types of evaluation: 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-11 
 

	 A Level 1 analysis is simple and can be completed rapidly (within days to weeks); 

	 Level 2 is an intermediate, more quantitative analysis and can be completed 

within weeks to months; and 

	 Level 3 is considered the most detailed and quantitative, which can be performed 

within the state-of-the-practice and may take months to years to complete. 

Information is also included that can be used to inform or guide risk management 

decisions for natural hazard and human threat events (e.g., to provide water and 

wastewater system owners and operators with a defensible basis for risk management 

decisions). 

The ATC-25-1 Report, A Model Methodology for Assessment of Seismic 

Vulnerability and Impact of Disruption of Water Supply Systems (ATC, 1992) 

provides the means to conduct a preliminary “first phase” examination of the 

potential impacts of earthquakes on water system functionality at the local or regional 

level. Application of the methodology enables the user to develop estimates of direct 

damage to system components and the time required to restore damaged facilities to 

pre-earthquake usability. Performance goals are not addressed. Instead, ATC (1992) 

recommends using earthquake scenarios. 

The AWWA (1994), KJC (1993), NIST (1997), and ASCE (1999) documents 

provide information on: 

	 Past system and component performances, 

	 Geotechnical earthquake hazards, 

	 Performance goals, 

	 Risk analysis, and 

	 Seismic retrofitting and mitigation examples and/or alternatives. 

The documents focus only on geotechnical earthquake hazards and include ground 

shaking, liquefaction and lateral spreading, settlement, landslide, and fault crossings. 

ASCE (1999) describes methods for identifying associated evaluation and design 

values for each geotechnical hazard. AWWA (1994), KJC (1993), and NIST (1997) 

include system monitoring and control issues. KJC (1993) was a predecessor 

document to AWWA (1994). 

These four documents recommend using the same two earthquake levels, defined as: 

	 Operating Basis Earthquake, Moderate Earthquake, or Probable Earthquake. 

This is an earthquake likely to occur within the design lifetime of regularly 

constructed facilities and could be defined as a 50% chance of occurrence within 

a 50-year time frame, or about a 72-year recurrence interval. 

D-12 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 Design Basis Earthquake, Large Earthquake, or Maximum Earthquake. This is 

an earthquake that could possibly occur within the design lifetime of regularly 

constructed facilities and could be defined as a 10% chance of occurrence within 

a 50-year time frame, or about a 475-year recurrence interval. 

AWWA (1994) specifies that the basis for selecting these levels was consistency with 

the Uniform Building Code (UBC) (ICBO, 1997), which was the code in effect at the 

time the AWWA document was developed. As described by ASCE (1999), the 

Operating Basis, Moderate, or Probable Earthquake is not meant to guarantee that a 

water system will not sustain damage or service outages when the earthquake occurs. 

The Design Basis, Large, or Maximum Earthquake does not necessarily represent the 

maximum possible level of shaking from a Maximum Credible Earthquake. 

NIST (1997) focuses on issues related to water supply for firefighting. Several 

chapters are devoted to specific evaluation of tanks and treatment systems. Strategies 

for managing water between water systems and fire departments are also explored in 

detail. 

ASCE (1999) provides guidelines for the seismic evaluation and upgrade of water 

supply transmission and wastewater conveyance facilities. The document mainly 

focuses on water supply and transmission facilities with some information on 

wastewater facilities. In addition to that identified above, specific risk assessments 

performed by water system owners and operators are described in detail, including 

mitigation and retrofit programs, emergency operations, cost-benefit analysis, and 

examples on working with the customers and stakeholders for implementing 

improvements. 

The most important aspects of the AWWA (1994), KJC (1993), NIST (1997), and 

ASCE (1999) documents, as related to the purpose of this report, are the performance 

goals and criteria they describe; providing details on these aspects was beyond the 

scope of this report. 

The ASCE TCLEE Monograph 22, Seismic Screening Checklists for Water and 

Wastewater Facilities (ASCE, 2002) provides checklists to provide guidance on 

performing site-specific reviews of water and wastewater system facilities and 

components in preparation for a seismic performance evaluation. The document 

covers most types of facilities and equipment found in water and wastewater systems. 

A summary of water and wastewater system vulnerability assessments is provided 

and is relatively consistent with those previously described for other documents. 

There is a difference in the recommendations on how to include earthquake levels 

and performance goals. ASCE (2002) recommends that three levels of earthquake be 

considered in vulnerability evaluations as follows: 

 Lower Level Earthquake (e.g., 72-year return interval); 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-13 
 Upper Level Earthquake (e.g., 475-year return interval); and 

 Maximum Considered Earthquake. 

Additional documents have been prepared to assist in assessing the seismic 

vulnerabilities of water system components using fragility functions. Two documents 

providing recommended seismic fragility functions are: ALA Seismic Fragility 

Formulations for Water Systems (ALA, 2001b) and MCEER-08-0009, Fragility 

Analysis of Water Supply Systems (Jacobson and Grigoriu, 2008). However, none of 

these documents provide any guidance or recommendations on design or 

performance criteria, and therefore are not reviewed in more detail in this report. 

The Water Resource Foundation (WRF) document, Recent Earthquakes: 

Implications for U.S. Water Utilities Web Report #4408 (WRF, 2012), summarizes 

water system performances during the 2010 Maule, Chile earthquake, 2010-2011 

Canterbury, New Zealand earthquake sequence, and 2011 Great East Japan 

earthquake. In addition, and most important to this report, WRF (2012) provides 

information in an appendix describing performance goals by other water agencies, 

specifically those in the United States. The performance goals are described in 

Section D.2. 

D.1.6 Security 

AWWA has prepared a set of standards to aid in water and wastewater systems 

management and operations, as well as planning for and responding to emergencies 

related to a wide variety of hazards. These include AWWA G430-14, Security 

Practices for Operation and Management (AWWA, 2014), and AWWA J100-10, 

Risk and Resilience Management of Water and Wastewater Systems (AWWA, 2010). 

The AWWA (2014) standard deals with terrorist-type threats. It covers design and 

construction, threat level-based protocols, emergency response and recovery plans 

and business continuity plans, internal and external communications, partnerships, 

documentation, human resources, and equipment. 

The AWWA (2010) standard: deals with security as well as natural hazards; sets 

requirements for all-hazards risk and resilience analysis and management of water 

and wastewater systems; and prescribes methods to address the requirements set 

forth. The hazards addressed include manmade hazards or accidents, hurricanes, 

earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods. AWWA (2010) further recommends wildfire, ice 

storms, extreme cold weather, avalanche, tsunami, landslide, mud slide, and other 

hazards be included “if the probability of occurrence and the consequences are as 

high or higher than the four basic natural hazards in the specific location.” The 

procedure attempts to establish a common base for system risk and resilience 

assessment using the following equations: 

Risk = (Threat Likelihood) × (Vulnerability) × (Consequence) 

D-14 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Resilience = (Duration) × (Severity of Service Loss) × (Vulnerability) 

× (Threat Likelihood) 

There are some shortcomings to the process. The procedure assesses each asset or 

component individually and adds up total risk or resilience in a linear fashion, 

whereas water and wastewater systems usually are not linear. The document provides 

a separate method for reviewing system resilience in a simplified manner, which does 

not link back to the original standard risk and resilience analysis. The hazards are 

intended to cover an entire probability distribution from common to very rare with an 

established frequency for each event. However, the consequences and vulnerability 

assessments use worst reasonable case assumptions without regard to the 

uncertainties. As a result, the risks associated with each hazard cannot be compared 

on an equal basis as implied by the standard. 

The natural hazards were incorporated under the belief they are consistent with the 

ASCE 7 and IBC methodologies. Unfortunately, AWWA (2010) describes 

inconsistencies with the building code by “assuming that only initiating events that 

exceed the design basis would cause damage,” and “assume[ing] that the greater the 

difference between the design basis event and the actual event, the greater the 

expected damage.” Building codes are based on life safety and structures may be 

significantly damaged while continuing to protect life whereas AWWA (2010) is 

utilizing this philosophy to assume water and wastewater facilities may remain 

operable without consideration of the actual code-level design. Thus, these 

discrepancies can easily provide misleading results. 

The risk and resilience management step in the AWWA (2010) standardized process 

is identified as the most important to reducing risk and increasing resilience. In this 

step, managers are to “decide” what risk and resilience levels are acceptable for each 

asset-hazard pair. There is no guidance on asset or system performance levels. This, 

coupled with the inability to compare risks for each asset-hazard pair, can provide 

misleading results and a perceived high comfort level for utility owners and 

operators, potentially contrary to the reality of true risks that are not properly 

assessed. Nonetheless, this method can easily identify low-cost, easy-to-implement 

mitigation actions to reduce risks and improve resilience; unfortunately, these may 

not have a significant effect on the high-impact, low-frequency events. 

D.1.7 Water Systems and Fire Hazards 

The AWWA M31 document, Distribution System Requirements for Fire Protection 

(AWWA, 2008b), provides information for designing water systems to be able to 

provide water at sufficient volume and pressure to aid in fighting fire hazards under 

normal operating conditions. However, the document does not provide information 

on how to ensure the water system will be operable following an earthquake or other 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-15 
hazard event that may damage the system, potentially rendering it inoperable, and at 

the same time, result in cascading fire hazards. 

The ASCE TCLEE Monograph No. 26, Fire Following Earthquake (ASCE, 2005a), 

provides a comprehensive overview of fire following earthquake. It also describes 

fires occurring after other events and how fire hazards are increased when associated 

with wind and other hazards. The book reviews past fire following earthquake events 

and fires from non-earthquake events. Analysis and modeling for the fire following 

earthquake hazard is reviewed in detail. The impacts of fire department capabilities 

and water system performance are addressed. The occurrence of fires following 

earthquakes is capable of overwhelming fire department personnel because the 

number of potential ignitions, coupled with their primary role as first responders, 

stretches resources so thin that firefighting may not be the first priority. The role of 

water in firefighting is essential and loss of water system operability can greatly 

hinder fire suppression. The potential performance of gas, electric power, 

communications, and roadway systems in earthquakes is described, and the 

respective systemic roles in fighting fires following earthquakes are identified. 

Methods for mitigating fire following earthquake and retrofitting existing systems 

with inclusion of cost-benefit analysis are also presented. In addition, alternate water 

sources and auxiliary and secondary water supply systems are described, as well as 

approaches for dealing with specific earthquake hazards, such as fault rupture 

impacts on pipelines. Specific recommendations for design and performance criteria 

are not provided, but numerous references are given for standards, guidelines, and 

manuals. AWWA (1994) is referenced for water system performance standards. A 

primary message given throughout the monograph is how important water supply is 

after an earthquake to aid in fire suppression (using either the primary network or 

alternate sources). 

There are also state health and safety codes governing fire protection, including 

mechanical codes, and fire codes dealing with building structures. These are not 

specifically addressed in this report, but in general the state codes do not address fires 

following hazard events, such as earthquakes. 

D.1.8 Water and Wastewater System Plans and Preparations for 

Emergencies 

Several documents address water and wastewater system plans and preparations for 

emergencies. These include: Business Continuity Planning for Water Utilities (WRF, 

2013); AWWA G440-11, Emergency Preparedness Practices (AWWA, 2011b); 

AWWA M19, Emergency Planning for Water Utilities (AWWA, 2001); AWWA 

M60, Drought Preparedness and Response (AWWA, 2011a); Emergency Power 

Source Planning for Water and Wastewater (AWWA, 2004a); Planning for an 

Emergency Drinking Water Supply (EPA, 2011); Emergency Water Supply Planning 

D-16 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Guide for Hospitals and Health Care Facilities (CDC and AWWA, 2012); and 

Emergency Planning, Response, and Recovery (WEF, 2013a). None of these 

documents directly address system performance or design aspects. The WRF (2013a) 

business continuity planning document targets a 30-day restoration period for 

business recovery activities. AWWA (2004a) applies mostly to preparing for 

conditions once power is lost. Similarly, AWWA (2011a) applies mostly to preparing 

for conditions once a drought has ensued. 

EPA (2011) aids in helping water systems prepare for conditions that may result in 

the need for emergency drinking water. This document provides useful information 

on how alternate water supplies may be obtained for interim use when the system is 

unable to provide potable water. The information has limited use for developing 

performance criteria. It states its use is limited to outages on the order of 21 days, but 

notes the expectation of impacts from potential disasters in the United States lasting 

much longer than 21 days. It emphasizes the need to have a plan for emergency water 

that covers the gap between the existing population and the targeted level of postevent service. The document recommends planning for one gallon per day per person 

as a minimum based on basic survival needs, but notes there is wide range of 

recommendations on what is needed for basic survival; this aspect is covered in more 

detail in Section D.1.11 on societal performance needs. 

D.1.9 Water and Wastewater Treatment Plants 

Several standards and guidelines exist for the design, retrofit, management and 

operation of treatment plants. These include AWWA G100-11, Water Treatment 

Plant Operation and Management (AWWA, 2011c); Water Environment Federation 

(WEF) MOP 28, Upgrading and Retrofitting Water and Wastewater Treatment 

Plants (WEF, 2005); and WEF MOP 8, Design of Municipal Wastewater Treatment 

Plants (WEF, 2009). These documents do not address specifics on how to design, 

upgrade or retrofit treatment plants for specific types of hazard events. 

D.1.10 Wastewater Management 

Several standards, guidelines, and manuals exist that address storm water systems, 

management and controls. These include ASCE 12-05, Standard Guidelines for 

Design of Urban Surface Drainage (ASCE, 2005b); ASCE 13-05, Standard 

Guidelines for Installation of Urban Surface Drainage (ASCE, 2005c); ASCE 14-05, 

Standard Guidelines for Operation and Maintenance of Urban Surface Drainage 

(ASCE, 2005d); the WEF Guide for Municipal Wet Weather Strategies (WEF, 

2013b); WEF MOP FD-17, Prevention and Control of Sewer System Overflows 

(WEF, 2011); and WEF MOP 23, Design of Urban Storm Water Controls (WEF, 

2012). These documents do not specifically deal with hazards other than flood, as 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-17 
related to storm water controls (e.g., urban storm water runoff). Additionally, they do 

not generally deal with extreme events, but instead a standard 50- or 100-year event. 

D.1.11 Societal Performance Needs 

The World Health Organization (WHO) and The Sphere Project provide information 

for understanding the volumes of water needed by society and guidance on how to 

deliver in emergencies. These include the WHO Domestic Water Quantity, Service 

Level Health (WHO, 2003); WHO Minimum Water Quantity Needed for Domestic 

Use in Emergencies (WHO, 2005); and The Sphere Handbook, Humanitarian 

Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response (The Sphere Project, 

2011). The Sphere Project handbook also describes minimum humanitarian standards 

needed for hygiene and how to maintain basic public health and safety in areas where 

water and wastewater systems are nonfunctional. These documents are useful for 

providing guidance on minimum levels of performance that water and wastewater 

systems should have to meet basic human needs. Additional studies (e.g., Gleick, 

1996) provide valuable information on how to develop basic level and increased 

performance over time. These may be coupled with the use of alternative water 

sources similar to that described by EPA (2011). 

D.2 Performance Requirements 

Table 7-3 in Chapter 7 summarizes the performance levels for different types of 

facilities or subsystems based on specific documents dealing with water and 

wastewater system performance requirements. The regulatory framework within 

which systems operate help to dictate many performance requirements. NIST (2015, 

p. 216) provides a good summary of the regulatory framework of water and 

wastewater systems. This information is not repeated in this report, but is referenced 

to aid in understanding performance requirements. 

AWWA (1994) provides a practical outline for establishing seismic performance 

goals that has been used as a basis for many recommendations and applications. 

There are no similar performance recommendations for other hazards. ASCE and 

ALA present several different recommendations for performance requirements based 

on the original AWWA (1994). One key factor for the continued use of AWWA 

(1994) is the practical application to water and wastewater system operations and its 

form, which meets what is now called performance-based design. Further, it links 

system performance to expected performance of other community systems and 

buildings, and in doing so attempts to integrate water and wastewater systems to 

improve community resilience. Unfortunately, the foundation from which AWWA 

(1994) was created (i.e., the Uniform Building Code) is outdated. ALA (2005b) 

developed a set of performance objectives related to the International Building Code 

(ICC, 2015), which in some ways provides an updated and improved version of the 

D-18 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
AWWA (1994) performance targets, but is only intended to apply to the design of 

water pipelines. 

Additional shortcomings of AWWA (1994) and other similar performance objectives 

are described by Davis (2014a) and relate mostly to the lack of linking the 

performance to actual water system serviceability functions. An alternate set of 

services defined in Tables 7-5 and 7-6 can be used to define objectives for 

infrastructure performance. The services defined in Tables 7-5 and 7-6 are linked 

directly to actual system restoration strategies and how utilities can best make use of 

these strategies to improve community resilience. Application of these concepts are 

scalable from an individual service connection (e.g., hospital) to pressure zones, to 

entire service areas and have been verified as applicable through studies of the 1994 

water system performance in Los Angeles (Davis et al., 2012; Davis, 2014a). 

Performance targets relate a level of acceptable service losses and timeframe for 

restoring services in relation to hazard levels. NIST (2015) provides 

recommendations to investigate routine, design, and extreme hazards. In general, the 

graded criteria for good performance specifies limited damage for routine hazards, 

some acceptable service losses at design hazards, and more acceptable losses and 

longer recovery for extreme hazards; this is reasonable and matches societal 

expectations as described in several places in this report. 

Example performance targets implemented by several water and wastewater systems, 

many of which used AWWA (1994) as the basis from which to work, are provided in 

Section D.2.1 and D.2.2, respectively. 

D.2.1 Performance Criteria for Water Systems 

D.2.1.1 East Bay Municipal Utility District Water System – General 

Performance Goals 

Tables D-2 and D-3 provide the performance goals adopted by the East Bay 

Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) (WRF, 2012). The goals generally use the 

earthquake definition as provided by AWWA (1994) and ASCE (1999). WRF (2012) 

states: 

“Within EBMUD’s context, a “Probable” earthquake was considered to be a 

Magnitude 6 earthquake on the Hayward fault occurring somewhere within 

the EBMUD’s service area; or similar sized earthquakes on the Concord, 

Calaveras and other faults within the service area, or even larger magnitude 

earthquakes on faults located further away from the District’s service area. 

Within EBMUD’s context, a “Maximum” earthquake was considered to be a 

characteristic earthquake on the Hayward fault rupturing through the entire 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-19 
 

Table D-2 EBMUD Water System Service Goals – Probable Earthquake (WRF, 2012) 

Service Category	 Probable Earthquake 

General	 1 Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public 

2 Limit extensive damage to system facilities 

3 All water introduced into the distribution system minimally disinfected 

4 All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated 

Fire Service 5 Sufficient portable pumps and hose to provide limited fire service in all areas 

6 All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir) 

7 High risk areas have improved fire service (all facilities reliable, minimum fire reserves) 

8 Normal service to all hydrants within 20 days 

Hospitals and Disaster 9 Minimum service to affected area within 1 day (water available via distribution system near each facility) 

Centers 10 Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via distribution system to each facility, 

possibly at reduced pressures) 

Domestic Users 11 Potable water via distribution system or truck within 1 day 

12 Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via distribution system to each domestic 

user, possibly at reduced pressures) 

Commercial, Industrial 13 Impaired service to affected area within 3 days (water available via distribution system to each 

and Other Users commercial or industrial user, possibly at reduced pressures) 

Table D-3 EBMUD Water System Service Goals – Maximum Earthquake (WRF, 2012) 

Service Category Maximum Earthquake 

General 1 Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public 

2 Limit extensive damage to system facilities 

3 All water introduced into the distribution system minimally disinfected 

4 All water introduced into the distribution system fully treated 

Fire Service 5 Sufficient portable pumps and hose to provide limited fire service in all areas 

6 All areas have minimal fire service (one reliable pumping plant and reservoir) 

7 High risk areas have improved fire service (all facilities reliable, minimum fire reserves) 

8 Normal service to all hydrants within 100 days 

Hospitals and 

Disaster Centers 

9 

10 

Minimum service via distribution system or truck within 3 days 

Minimum service within 10 days (water available via distribution system near each facility) 

11 Impaired service within 30 days (water available via distribution system to each facility, possibly at 

reduced pressures) 

Domestic Users 12 Potable water at central locations for pickup within 3 days 

13 Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days 

Commercial, Industrial 

and Other Users 

14 

15 

Potable water at central locations for pickup within 1 week 

Minimum service to 70% of customers within 10 days 

16 Impaired service to 90% of customers within 30 days (water available via distribution system to 90% of 

commercial or industrial users, possibly at reduced pressures) 

D-20 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

length of the service area, or characteristic earthquakes on the Concord or 

Calaveras faults, rupturing within or very near the service area.”
 

D.2.1.2 Contra Costa Water District – Reliability and Seismic Criteria 

Tables D-4 and D-5 provide the “reliability criteria” adopted by the Contra Costa 

Water District (CCWD) (WRF, 2012; ASCE, 1999). WRF (2012) states: 

“The reliability criteria set goals for the post-earthquake restoration of 

different types of service, as defined in Table 9-2 [reproduced here as Table 

D-4], beginning with emergency fire service within 2-8 hours and ending
 

with permanent repair (as opposed to temporary fixes often used to quickly
 

restore service) of all damaged facilities within 2 years. 

Seismic criteria were developed in order to set forth a consistent and 

prioritized set of standards for the earthquake resistant evaluation and design 

of CCWD facilities, such as the Contra Costa Canal, necessary to meet 

reliability criteria. The seismic criteria establishes a four level facility 

classification system (Class I to Class IV) based on the importance of the 

facility remaining functional to meet post-earthquake fire service demands. 

Table D-4 CCWD Reliability Criteria – Raw Water System (WRF, 2012) 

Service Category	 Reliability Criteria - Raw Water (RW) 

General RW-1: No primary damage to District facilities that endangers the general public and CCWD staff. 

RW-2: No direct secondary damage to non-District facilities due to catastrophic failure of District facilities. 

RW-3: Temporary repairs to achieve emergency fire service and essential service as soon as possible. 

RW-4: Temporary repairs to achieve full service within 30 days. 

RW-5: Permanent repairs to all raw water facilities completed within 2 years. 

Wholesale Municipal RW-6: Emergency and normal fire service needs at user point of delivery within 2 days after earthquake. 

Customers utilizing storage or other services to fight fires in the interim. 

RW-7: Partial service within 10 days at user point of delivery after earthquake with periodic 3 day 

interruptions for repairs. 

RW-8: Full service within 30 days after earthquake. 

Industrial Users RW-9: Emergency and normal fire service needs at user point of delivery within 2 days after earthquake. 

Standby customers utilizing storage or other services to fight fires in the interim. 

RW-10: Restoration priority based on minimizing economic loss. 

RW-11: Partial service within 10 days at user point of delivery after earthquake with periodic 3 day 

interruptions for repairs. 

RW-12: Full service within 30 days after earthquake. 

Standby Users RW-13: Emergency and normal fire service needs at user point of delivery within 2 days after earthquake. 

Standby customers utilizing storage or other services to fight fires in the interim. Agricultural Users 

RW-14: Restoration priority based on minimizing economic loss.
 Landscape Users 

RW-15: Partial service within 10 days at user point of delivery after earthquake with periodic 3 day 

interruptions for repairs. 

RW-16: Full service within 30 days after earthquake. 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-21 
Table D-5 CCWD Relationship Between Reliability and Seismic Criteria (WRF, 2012) 

Seismic Related Criteria 

Criteria Reliability for Max. 

Facility Class Type of Criteria (see Duration Example District Facility System 

Class Description Service Table D-4) of Loss Facilities Reliability Reliability 

I Critical Emergency 

Firefighting 

RW-6 1-2 

days 

Contra Costa Canal 

Milepost 0.0 to 

26.0; Raw Water 

Storage Reservoirs 

99.5% 90% 

II Essential Emergency 

and Critical 

Care 

RW-3, RW-6, 

RW-9, RW-13 

2-5 

days 

Secondary 

Municipal and 

Industrial Laterals 

95.0% 80% 

III Important Partial and 

Sanitary 

RW-4, RW-7, 

RW-11, RW-15 

5-15 

days 

Contra Costa 

Canal Turnouts 

90.0% 50% 

IV Standard Full RW-1, RW-2, RW-8, 

RW-12, RW-16 

15-60 

days 

All Contra Costa 

Canal Facilities 

80.0% 0-30% 

Table 9-4 [reproduced here as Table D-5] illustrates these classifications and 

their relationship to the type of service and reliability criteria.” 

D.2.1.3 Humboldt Bay Municipal Water District Service Goals 

The Humboldt Bay Municipal Water District (HBMWD) is a water wholesaler 

serving the cities of Eureka, Arcata, McKinleyville and several other smaller 

communities around Humboldt Bay, California. HBMWD operates water treatment 

facilities and large diameter raw water and treated water pipelines. HBMWD delivers 

water to various retail water agencies. Tables D-6 and D-7 provide the performance 

goals adopted by this utility (WRF, 2012). The following describes the goals in more 

detail: 

1.	 Minimal Secondary Damage and Risk to the Public. Damage to the 

infrastructure should pose minimal risk to the public. For example, chlorine 

releases should not occur, and occupied buildings should not collapse. 

2.	 Limit Extensive Damage to System Facilities. Undue amounts of damage to 

HBMWD’s own facilities could result in the inability for the HBMWD to 

respond after an earthquake. Damage to critical facilities should be avoided (such 

as the designated areas for emergency operations coordination). Damage posing a 

life-safety threat to HBMWD’s own personnel should be avoided. 

3.	 All Water Introduced into the Potable Water Transmission System 

Minimally Disinfected. All water from the HBMWD raw water source should 

be at least minimally disinfected prior to introduction into the treated water 

transmission system, immediately after the earthquake. This means that no 

“untreated” water should be introduced. Minimal disinfection would include 

chlorination. 

D-22 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
Table D-6 HBMWD Water System Service Goals – Maximum Earthquake (WRF, 2012) 

Service Category Maximum Earthquake 

General 1 Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public 

2 Limit extensive damage to system facilities 

3 All water introduced into the distribution system minimally disinfected 

Fire Service 4 Provide 50% of average winter level flows to customer meters within 4 hours after earthquake. 

(Tentative goal for large customers) 

5 Provide 100% of average winter level flows to all customer meters within 3 days after 

earthquake. (Tentative goal for large customers) 

Domestic Water Service 6 Potable water via truck or accessible locations within 1 day to meet minimum consumption 

needs (1 gallon per person per day) 

7 Impaired service within 7 days 

8 Normal service within 60 days 

Raw Water Service 9 Impaired service within 7 days 

10 Normal service within 60 days 

Table D-7 HBMWD Water System Service Goals – Probable Earthquake (WRF, 2012) 

Service Category Probable Earthquake 

General 1 Minimal secondary damage and risk to the public 

2 Limit extensive damage to system facilities 

3 All water introduced into the distribution system minimally disinfected 

Fire Service 4 Provide 100% of average winter level flows to customer meters within 4 hours after earthquake. 

(Tentative goal for large customers) 

5 Provide 100% of average winter level flows to all customer meters within 3 days after 

earthquake. (Tentative goal for large customers) 

Domestic Water Service 6 Potable water via truck or accessible locations within 1 day to meet minimum consumption 

needs (1 gallon per person per day) 

7 Impaired service within 3 days 

8 Normal service within 20 days 

Raw Water Service 9 Impaired service within 3 days 

10 Normal service within 20 days 

Minimally Disinfected 11 Chlorination or better. 

Impaired Service 12 Provide water (adequate to meet winter time demands), possibly at lower pressure than normal. 

Normal service 13 Provide water at the same level of reliability as under “normal” pre-earthquake conditions. 

4.	 Provide 50% of Average Winter Level Flows to Domestic Customer Meters 

within 4 Hours after the Earthquake. This service goal reflects that after an 

earthquake, there may be multiple fires in HBMWD’s customer service areas. 

This will be compounded by damage within the customer distribution systems, 

which will rapidly deplete storage in local storage tanks and reservoirs. If no 

water can be re-supplied to the customer distribution systems, there can be an 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-23 
unacceptable high risk of fire spread, especially if it is windy at the time of the 

earthquake. 

The target restoration time for HBMWD to restore water service of four hours 

should be adequate for McKinleyville. This service goal may vary for other 

distribution system customers based on their own system needs. 

5.	 Provide 100% of Average Winter Level Flows to Domestic Customer Meters 

within 3 Days after the Earthquake. This service goal reflects that HBMWD 

should be able to restore its normal wintertime capacity to deliver water to major 

customer’s turnouts at normal pressures and flows, within three days after any 

earthquake. 

6.	 Potable Water via truck or Accessible Locations within 1 Day to Meet 

Minimum Consumption Needs. It is likely that many Humboldt Bay area 

residents will be unable to get potable water via their normal water distribution 

system following large earthquakes. This will include people who are forced out 

of their homes because of damage to those structures; and due to damage to the 

underground water distribution networks. In coordination with HBMWD’s 

distribution customers, suitable delivery points for distribution of potable water 

should be identified as part of an emergency response plan. Suitable facilities 

should be available to allow water tanker trucks to be filled from reliable sources 

of potable water. 

7.	 Impaired Service to all Domestic Water Customers within 7 Days. Impaired 

service is defined as the delivery of some amount of water (enough to meet 

winter time demands, allowing for mandatory curtailment of irrigation if 

necessary) via the transmission system. Occasional pressure fluctuations or brief 

outages are possible. 

8.	 Normal Service to all Domestic Water Customers within 60 Days. Normal 

service is defined as the delivery of water at the same level of reliability as under 

“normal” pre-earthquake conditions. 

9.	 Impaired Service to Industrial Water Customers within 7 Days. Impaired 

service is defined as the delivery of non-potable water to meet low level to 

average level operations via the transmission system. Occasional pressure 

fluctuations or brief outages are possible. This level of water should be sufficient 

for industrial customers to restore operations, albeit at somewhat less than 

maximum operating day capability. 

10. Normal Service to Industrial Water Customers within 60 Days. Normal 

service is defined as the delivery of water at the same level of service as provided 

prior to the earthquake. 

D-24 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

D.2.1.4 San Francisco Public Utilities Commission 

The San Francisco Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) is implementing a Water 

System Improvement Program (WSIP) that involves a broad range of projects 

varying in size and complexity covering all aspects of the water system—from dams, 

reservoirs, pipelines, and tunnels to treatment facilities, pump stations, and water 

storage tanks (SFPUC, 2008, Chapter 3). The goals and objectives for the WSIP were 

developed based on a planning horizon through 2030. The SFPUC (2008): 

“...selected the year 2030 because published population projections 

generally do not extend beyond 20 to 25 years, and the agency determined 

the 2030 forecasts to be the most reasonably foreseeable future condition. 

The goals and objectives are founded on two fundamental principles 

pertaining to the existing regional system: (1) maintaining a clean, unfiltered 

water source from the Hetch Hetchy regional water system; and (2) 

maintaining a gravity-driven system. 

The overall goals of the WSIP for the regional water system are to: 

 Maintain high-quality water and a gravity-driven system, 

 Reduce vulnerability to earthquakes, 

 Increase delivery reliability, 

 Meet customer water supply needs, 

 Enhance sustainability, and 

 Achieve a cost-effective, fully operational system. 

To further these program goals, the WSIP includes objectives that address 

system performance. Table 3-2 [reproduced here as Table D-8] presents these 

objectives as they relate to the WSIP goals. The system performance 

objectives describe and, in many cases, more specifically quantify, what the 

regional water system proposes to achieve under the WSIP, and thereby 

guide the water supply actions, facility improvements, operations, and 

maintenance requirements included in the WSIP.” 

D.2.2 Performance Criteria and Objectives for Wastewater Systems34

D.2.2.1 East Bay Municipal Utility District 

EBMUD provides “wholesale” transport and treatment of raw sewage for the cities of 

Alameda, Albany, Berkeley, El Cerrito, Emeryville, Kensington, Oakland, Piedmont, 

and part of Richmond California. They have one wastewater treatment plant. 

34 This information was provided by Don Ballantyne, Principal, Ballantyne Consulting LLC 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-25 
Table D-8 SFPUC Water System Improvement Program Goals 

Program Goal 

Water Quality – 

maintain high water 

quality 

Seismic Reliability – 

reduce vulnerability 

to earthquakes 

Delivery Reliability – 

increase delivery 

reliability and 

improve the ability to 

maintain the system 

Water Supply – 

meet customer water 

needs in nondrought 

and drought periods 

Sustainability – 

enhance 

sustainability in all 

system activities 

Cost-effectiveness – 

achieve a costeffective, fully 

operational system 

System Performance Objective 

 Design improvements to meet current and foreseeable future federal and state water quality 

requirements. 

 Provide clean, unfiltered water originating from Hetch Hetchy Reservoir and filter all other surface water 

sources. 

 Continue to implement watershed protection measures. 

 Design improvements to meet current seismic standards. 

 Deliver basic service to the three regions in the service area (East/South Bay, Peninsula, and San 

Francisco) within 24 hours after a major earthquake. Basic service is defined as average winter-month 

usage, and the performance objective for the regional system is 229 million gallons per day (mgd). The 

performance objective is to provide delivery to at least 70 percent of the turnouts (i.e., water diversion 

connecting points from the regional system to customers) in each region, with 104, 44, and 81 mgd 

delivered to the East/South Bay, Peninsula, and San Francisco regions, respectively. 

 Restore facilities to meet average-day demand of 300 mgd within 30 days after a major earthquake. 

 Provide operational flexibility to allow planned maintenance shutdown of individual facilities without 

interrupting customer service. 

 Provide operational flexibility to minimize the risk of service interruption due to unplanned facility upsets 

or outages. 

 Provide operational flexibility and system capacity to replenish local reservoirs as needed. 

 Meet the estimated average annual demand of 300 mgd for 2030 under the conditions of one planned 

shutdown of a major facility for maintenance concurrent with one unplanned facility outage. 

 Meet average annual water purchase requests of 300 mgd from retail and wholesale customers during 

nondrought years for system demands through 2030. 

 Meet dry-year delivery needs through 2030 while limiting rationing to a maximum 20 percent system-wide 

reduction in water service during extended droughts. 

 Diversify water supply options during nondrought and drought periods. 

 Improve use of new water sources and drought management, including use of groundwater, recycled 

water, conservation, and transfers. 

 Manage natural resources and physical systems to protect watershed ecosystems. 

 Meet, at a minimum, all current and anticipated legal requirements for protection of fish and other wildlife 

habitat. 

 Manage natural resources and physical systems to protect public health and safety.
 

 Ensure cost-effective use of funds. 

 Maintain gravity-driven systems.
 

 Implement regular inspection and maintenance program for all facilities.
 

Unlike the water system, EBMUD wastewater does not have a defined postearthquake Level of Service; they indicate that it would be dependent on the extent of 

damage. EBMUD only owns the interceptor and treatment facilities, and the 

collection systems are owned by the cities. Although there is a prioritized restoration 

plan, time ranges are not associated with it. The plan is to: (1) move raw sewage 

away from people; (2) move raw sewage to the wastewater treatment plant; and (3) 

treat sewage with disinfection, primary and secondary, and discharge it to the San 

Francisco Bay. There is some concern that pipe damage could allow inflow of salt 

D-26 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
water from the Bay into the interceptors, disrupting the treatment process (D. 

Ballantyne, personal communication). 

D.2.2.2 Portland Bureau of Environmental Services 

Portland Bureau of Environmental Services provides retail and wholesale service 

primarily to the residents of the City of Portland. They have two wastewater 

treatment plants. They were key participants in assembling the Oregon Resilience 

Plan (OSSPAC, 2013). They intend to develop and employ a resilience strategy with 

the following target: 

To be resilient enough to “restore 90% of core services within 3 months of a 

Cascadia Subduction Zone magnitude-9 earthquake by year 2065.” 

The Bureau of Environmental Services believes and has committed to an approach 

based on a framework that resiliency planning is best implemented with a phased 

approach over a number of years that should include, but not be necessarily limited 

to: 

	 Understanding the nature and degree of the likelihood and consequence of a 

Cascadia Subduction Zone magnitude-9 earthquake; 

	 Committing to determining the Level of Service with regard to the speed of 

recovery (e.g., “restore 90% of core services within 3 months of a Cascadia 

Subduction Zone magnitude-9 earthquake by year 2065”); 

	 Using notable GIS capabilities in determining the highest consequence assets in 

the sewer and storm water systems; 

	 Determining which of the Bureau’s assets are critical to providing the core 

functions of the Bureau following a natural hazard event; 

	 Using the Bureau’s substantial mapping capabilities, overlaying the condition 

and geologic information on a map, and looking for those points that are 

indicating a high likelihood and consequence of asset failure; and 

	 Enhancing the techniques that may be employed to meet the future level of 

service standards set by the Bureau/City for the magnitude of the event. 

Examples include: 

o	 Adding to standard specifications more earthquake resilient design elements 

in those areas of the system where a more robust asset is dictated; and 

o	 Adding a criterion for “earthquake resiliency” to the decision-making 

formula deciding on the priority, schedule and scope for asset rehabilitation. 

The Portland Bureau of Environmental Services use the International Building Code 

for design of their facilities. 

GCR 16-917-39 Appendix D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis D-27 
D.2.2.3 San Francisco Public Utilities Commission 

The SFPUC adopted a series of level of service goals for its sewer system 

improvement program (SFPUC, August 28, 2012 Board Meeting). These are 

provided in Table D-9. 

Table D-9 SFPUC Sewer System Level of Service Goals 

Sewer System Improvement 

Program Goals Levels of Service
 

Provide a Compliant, Reliable, Resilient, 

and Flexible System that can Respond to 

Catastrophic Events 

Integrate Green and Grey Infrastructure to 

Manage Storm water and Minimize 

Flooding 

Provide Benefits to Impacted Communities 

Modify the System to Adapt to Climate 

Change 

Achieve Economic and Environmental 

Sustainability 

Maintain Ratepayer Affordability 

 Full compliance with State and Federal regulatory requirement’s applicable to 

the treatment and disposal of sewage and storm water. 

 Critical functions are built with redundant infrastructure. 

 Primary treatment with disinfection must be on-line within 72 hours of a major 

earthquake. 

 Control and manage flows from a storm of the three hour duration that 

delivers 1.3 inches of rain. 

 Limit odors to within the treatment facility’s fence line. 

 Be a good neighbor. All projects will adhere to the Environmental Justice and 

Community Benefits policies. 

 New infrastructure must accommodate expected sea level rise within the 

service life of the asset. (i.e., 16 inches by 2050, 25 inches by 2070, and 55 

inches by 2100). 

 Existing infrastructure will be modified based on actual sea level rise. 

 Beneficial reuse of 100% Biosolids. 

 Use nonpotable water sources to meet 100% of Wastewater Enterprise 

facilities nonpotable water demands. 

 Beneficially use 100% of biogas generated by Wastewater Enterprise 

treatment facilities. 

 Stabilize lifecycle cost to achieve future economic stability. 

 Combined Sewer and Water Bill will be less than 2.5% of average household 

income for a single family. 

After the Commission endorses and validates the goals and levels of service, staff will proceed with the planning, design, and 

environmental review of Phase 1 of the Sewer System Improvement Program proposed projects. 

D-28 D: Supplement to Water and Wastewater Analysis GCR 16-917-39 
 

 

 

Appendix E 

Supplement to Interdependent

Infrastructure Analysis 

This appendix supplements the material presented in Chapter 8—Interdependent 

Infrastructure Systems, as well as in Chapter 2—Societal Considerations. 

E.1 Details of Current Research in the Interdependent 

Infrastructure Field 

Research on interdependent infrastructure systems, including both lifeline and 

information/data systems, has been rapidly increasing since the field gained traction 

over the past decade, particularly after major disasters and manmade events. From a 

selection of 140 papers (listed in Section E.4), as a subset of representative 

interdependent critical infrastructure documents, 74% of the papers have been 

published in 2010 or later. This indicates there is significant academic and 

professional interest in interdependent systems and many institutions want to 

understand such systems in more detail, the benefits from their coupling, and their 

associated liabilities today. 

The vast majority of papers analyzed (approx. 90%) study the interconnection 

between different kinds of systems, being mainly physical, but also economic and 

social. The most popular systems studied today are power grids at 60% and water 

systems at 35% (note that studies are not mutually exclusive). Power systems are 

popular because electricity is used in almost all facets of modern life. Surprisingly, 

supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA), telecommunications, and cyber 

systems are analyzed by only about a fourth of all papers, despite the overwhelming 

presence of communication and digital technology in today’s economy and society 

(this reflects an urgent need to study such systems today). Also, social, economic and 

institutional systems represent a fifth of these sample papers, which typically do not 

discuss user expectations of performance and restoration times. A full breakdown of 

analyzed systems can be seen in Figure E-1. 

Additionally, these systems analyzed have changed over time. As seen in Figure E-2, 

SCADA, gas, water, and electric power systems have become more popular in the 

literature in recent years (a welcome trend), while economic, health, and social 

systems, despite their urgency and relevance, have become less common in the body 

of publications. The proportion of papers studying interdependent systems, 

telecommunication, cyber, and transportation has remained relatively constant. 

GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-1 
100%
 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

Percentage of Publications

Figure E-1 Types of infrastructure systems prominent in the literature. 

ICIs: interdependent critical infrastructure systems. 

‐100%

‐50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

Percent Change in System Type

Figure E-2		 Percent change in the types of infrastructure systems analyzed 

between documents published in 2010-2015 relative to 2005-2010. 

Systems in the “Other” category include ports, nuclear facilities, and 

emergency systems. ICIs: interdependent critical infrastructure 

systems. 

E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-2 
When analyzing the literature of critical infrastructure, insightful patterns emerge, 

particularly the joint study of specific infrastructure systems across the literature. 

That is to say that, whenever a system is studied in a paper, it is likely that another 

specific system will be studied in the same paper. Table 8-1 in Chapter 8 summarizes 

the frequency of recurrent pairings of systems across studies. 

However, studying not only the infrastructure type, but also the method of 

interdependent critical infrastructure analysis in the literature unveiled interesting 

patterns and trends. Of the sample papers, the majority of them modeled their 

infrastructure systems with a network-based model. Of the papers using network 

analyses, they favor using probability-based network theory. Empirical models are 

also popular. Network and system reliability theory are commonly together because 

they can be abstracted and applied to many systems at once, where the mathematics 

mirror the physical system topology. Also, other models such as agent-based models 

and physical models may require industry-specific datasets that researchers cannot 

access, making them less widespread, yet these approaches offer a significant 

opportunity for modeling the complexities of socio-technical systems, including 

performance goal attainment and restoration times with user’s constraints. A full 

breakdown of models can be seen in Figure E-3. 

40%

35%

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Figure E-3 Percentage of publications per model type in the interdependent 

infrastructure literature. The “Other” category includes a variety of 

methods spanning Bayesian networks, Petri-nets, federated simulation, 

neural networks, game theory, and fuzzy logic, among other 

approaches, while hybrid approaches involve several tools integrated in 

custom ways per application. 

Percentage of Publications

GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-3 
 

 

As with the type of infrastructure system modeled, the type of analysis used has also 

varied in the last five years. Agent-based models, input/output models, and reliability 

models have fallen out of favor in the mainstream literature, while network flows, 

optimization, empirical, and hybrid among other models have gained in popularity 

since 2010. It is likely that the drop in agent-based models, system reliability models, 

and input/output models is due to their inclusion in flow-based, physics-based, and a 

variety of hybrid models. Additionally, discussions in Chapter 8 identified a shift in 

the use of agent-based models and input/output models towards institutions with 

large computational centers and national laboratories (Pederson et al., 2006). A full 

breakdown of the change in model use since 2010 can be seen in Figure E-4. 

‐100%

‐50%

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

Percent Change in Analysis Method

Figure E-4		 Percent change in methods of analysis between papers published in 

2010-2015 relative to 2005-2010. 

Model use can also be tied to specific infrastructure systems. Most systems except for 

health and economic systems are frequently modeled using some form of network 

analysis and system reliability theory. Also note that no other system uses network 

and system theory as frequently as power infrastructure. And most systems strive to 

inform their modeling with empirical methods. 

A full breakdown of model use by infrastructure type can be seen in Table E-1, 

which also suggests a variety of trends. For example, economic and social systems 

tend to use a different distribution of models than the more physical systems. Agentbased models mention SCADA systems 30% of the time, while agent-based models 

and input/output models are often used to simulate economic and social systems (at 

E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-4 
Table E-1 Frequency of Modeling and Analysis Methods in Publications Mentioning Certain 

Infrastructure Systems 

Power SCADA Water Wastewater Telecomm Gas Transport Health Cyber Other Economy Social

ABM 7% 30% 0% 0% 6% 3% 7% 23% 20% 16% 24% 24%

Input‐Output 7% 0% 8% 14% 11% 14% 14% 15% 0% 19% 38% 24%

CGE 1% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 2% 0% 0% 0% 5% 0%

Empirical 26% 10% 38% 57% 36% 31% 30% 31% 20% 24% 14% 18%

System Dynamics 4% 20% 2% 0% 3% 3% 5% 15% 40% 5% 10% 12%

Network Theory 10% 20% 8% 0% 6% 3% 9% 0% 20% 8% 0% 12%

Probability 24% 0% 25% 29% 11% 21% 0% 0% 20% 0% 0% 0%

Topological 18% 10% 15% 0% 11% 7% 12% 0% 20% 5% 0% 6%

Flows 18% 0% 17% 29% 19% 14% 7% 8% 20% 8% 5% 6%

Physical 5% 20% 2% 0% 6% 3% 2% 8% 20% 3% 0% 0%

Reliability 15% 20% 17% 14% 8% 17% 7% 15% 20% 3% 5% 6%

Optimization 17% 0% 15% 29% 17% 17% 9% 0% 0% 8% 14% 6%

Other 26% 50% 25% 0% 31% 28% 19% 0% 40% 35% 14% 35%

Hybrid 17% 30% 19% 0% 19% 21% 5% 8% 20% 16% 10% 29%

Note: Modeling and analysis methods are noted in the left column; infrastructure systems, including both physical lifelines and 

information/data systems, are listed in the top row; green shading denotes highest mention frequency and red shading 

denotes lowest frequency. 

ABM: agent-based model 

CGE: computable general equilibrium 

SCADA: supervisory control and data acquisition 

least 24% of the time), but these models are less frequently used to model other 

systems. Economic systems use several of the models in the “Other” category 

including game theory. Social systems differ in that they can be modeled with 

network theory and hybrid models. This indicates that if one wishes to model social 

systems with other systems, then using network models and hybrid models would be 

the best model choice, especially if agent-based models are too expensive or data 

intensive. 

The set of papers of this study were also classified by what type of hazards they 

considered. The vast majority of papers developed flexible models where several 

kinds of hazards can be input. This indicates an academic and professional interest to 

develop general purpose models. Twenty-eight percent of the papers considered the 

effects of random failures on interdependent critical infrastructure systems, indicating 

an interest to model the behavior of such systems in normal operating conditions as 

well. The most popular hazards to model are earthquakes. 

The abundance of flexible models shows that similar mathematical principles are 

used to represent post-hazard hazard impacts and to predict their effects. While these 

flexible models are useful, caution must be exercised when applying them to a 

specific hazard. A full breakdown of the modeled hazards can be seen in Figure E-5. 

The takeaway from this graph is that storm models and cyber-attack models are not 

common, which is a missed opportunity. This is because the frequency of storms is 

GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-5 
90%
 

Percentage of Publications 80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Figure E-5		 Percentage of publications per type of hazard modeled. Flexible 

indicates models that include a variety of hazard events. 

high, so that models based on them can be validated and calibrated more easily. 

Cyber-attacks are a rapidly emerging issue, unlikely to be incorporated into the 

hazard based flexible models, and yet needed as smart technologies permeate the 

totality of interdependent critical infrastructure systems in the years to come. 

These papers were further categorized by types of analyses covered within a 

publication. The majority of papers analyzed the risks of interdependent critical 

infrastructure systems in the face of different hazards. However, only 7% of the 

papers offered a visualization of their results. Without this visualization it is difficult 

to communicate effectively or for industry experts to evaluate the accuracy of these 

models, while making it difficult for individuals and governments to internalize 

model-based outputs. Also, only 21% of the papers considered interdependent critical 

infrastructure resilience or recovery processes. This indicates more research is needed 

to determine how systems respond after parts of them fail, and more importantly, 

how decision making processes evolve at the intersection of social and physical 

systems. A full breakdown of the types of analyses covered in the literature can be 

seen in Figure E-6. 

Figure E-7 shows the sources of these papers. Note that 94% of the analyzed papers 

come from academic sources. The other papers come from industry or governmental 

sources. This skew may be in part a result of using peer-reviewed databases, which 

leaves out industry and governmental advances that may be published as reports or in 

news outlets. However, industry and government collaborations with academia 

should increase to adopt and test these models, so as to bring together access to real 

data and advanced mathematical and computational models. 

E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-6 
Figure E-6 Percentage of publications per type of analysis. The “Other” category 

includes topics such as scheduling, sustainability, information flow, 

design, and computational complexity. 

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Percentage of Publications

Figure E-7 Percentage of publications per source. 

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

Percentage of

Publications

Papers in the interdependent infrastructure literature calibrated and validated their 

models using various data sources. Over 70% of papers used data from case studies, 

likely because the data were relatively abundant and publically available. The United 

States is the most popular data source, probably because of its geographical size and 

documented material after disasters. Many papers also used artificial case studies. 

These papers analyzed particular idealized locations, such as rural towns, to generate 

case examples with properties that mimic the characteristics of such locations. 

GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E-7 
E-8 E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E.2 Source Data from Utilities and Cities that Can Serve as “Proxies” 

for Societal Expectations of Infrastructure Performance and 

Restoration Times 

This section provides source data from utilities and municipalities that can serve as 

“proxies” for societal expectations of infrastructure performance and restoration times. 

Table E-2 lists publicly disclosed recovery expectations from utility companies, and 

Table E-3 lists publicly disclosed recovery expectations from public entities. 

Table E-2 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Utility Companies 

City 

Utility 

Name Estimation URL (Uniform Resource Locator) 

Houston, Texas Centerpoint 

Energy 

7-10 days to 6-

8 weeks 

(Hurricane 

Categories 

1 to 5) 

http://www.ci.clute.tx.us/doc_center/E-Forms-Documents/CenterPoint%20-

%20Hurricane%20Utility%20Info.pdf

Orlando, Florida SECO 7 days https://issuu.com/secoenergy/docs/seco_storm_guide_02c9473a4136b6

New York, New 

York NYSEG None Provided 

http://www.nyseg.com/MediaLibrary/2/5/Content%20Management/Shared/Usa

geAndSafety/PDFs%20and%20Docs/Combo%20Weathering%20Storm%20E

merg%20Broc.pdf

Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania Penn Power None Provided https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/dam/customer/get-help/files/Tips% 

20for%20Power%20Outages.pdf

Los Angeles, 

California 

LA Depart. of 

Water and 

Power 

3 days 

https://www.ladwp.com/ladwp/faces/ladwp/aboutus/a-inourcommunity/a-iocyoursafety/a-ioc-ys-earthquakepreparedness?_adf.ctrl-state=eg49cz8xw_ 

104&_afrLoop=1101342393827134

San Francisco, 

California PG&E 7 days http://www.pge.com/en/safety/preparedness/kit/index.page

Washington, 

D.C. Pepco None Provided http://www.pepco.com/uploadedFiles/wwwpepcocom/PepcoStormPreparation

Handbook.pdf

New Orleans, 

Louisiana Entergy 3 days http://www.entergy-neworleans.com/your_home/safety/ 

preparing_outages.aspx

Portland, Oregon 

Portland 

General 

Electric 

3-10 days https://www.portlandgeneral.com/outages/backup-generators

Seattle, 

Washington 

Seattle City 

Light None Provided http://www.seattle.gov/light/sysstat/powerOutage.asp

Miami, Florida Florida Power 

and Light 14 days https://www.fpl.com/storm/pdf/storm-guide.pdf

Jacksonville, 

Florida 

Jacksonville 

Electric 

Authority 

Links to many 

resources https://www.jea.com/Outage_Center/Storm_Safety/Before_the_Storm/

Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana Entergy 3 days http://www.entergy-neworleans.com/your_home/safety/ 

preparing_outages.aspx

Charleston, 

South Carolina SCE&G None Provided https://www.sceg.com/docs/librariesprovider5/default-document-library/ 

emergency_kit.pdf
GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent E-9 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

Table E-2 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Utility Companies (continued) 

City 

Utility 

Name Estimation URL (Uniform Resource Locator) 

Boston, 

Massachusetts EverSource None Provided https://www.eversource.com/Content/ct-e/residential/outages/stormpreparedness/before-a-storm

Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma OG&E None Provided 

https://oge.com/wps/portal/oge/outages/storm-prep/!ut/p/a1/pZLNDoIwDICfhiv 

rNjTE2wRDkMR_FHcxaHCSADOA8voO4oUoYGJvbb4vbdoijgLEs_AZi7CMZ

RYmdc7HJ5OABa5B5ktqG8AsvF3u6YwAwQo4KgA6gkHbdzwyA-bZ9nq0sr 

FLx2-_C1gYv_Xv8qd_-mrAto99rHzYLYBssGN9-J9An-_BgO_B0PwHxBuk 

7wK9N6hX3AuoHc4RF4k8N_9wZNmZmgLxPLpGeZTrj1yVb2V5LyYaaFBVlS

6kFEmkX2SqwTflJosSBW0S3VO_jgDiVXowC_YC_DLlVQ!!/dl5/d5/L2dJQSEv

UUt3QS80SmlFL1o2XzgyMEMwSTQySk8xVTEwQUMwVE4wMlIxR0Mx/

Kansas City, 

Missouri 

Kansas City 

Power and 

Light 

None Provided http://www.kcpl.com/outages-and-weather/weather-center/how-you-canprepare

Minneapolis, 

Minnesota Xcel energy Several days http://www.xcelenergy.com/Outages_and_Emergencies/Outages_FAQ

Denver, 

Colorado Xcel energy Several days http://www.xcelenergy.com/Outages_and_Emergencies/Outages_FAQ

Montreal, 

Quebec Hydro-Quebec None Provided http://poweroutages.hydroquebec.com/poweroutages/be-prepared-for-poweroutage/before-an-outage/

Toronto, Ontario Toronto Hydro 3 days http://www.torontohydro.com/sites/electricsystem/PowerOutages/Pages/bepre

pared.aspx

Vancouver, 

British Columbia BC Hydro 3 days https://www.bchydro.com/safety-outages/power-outages/prepare-for-outages/ 

prepare-your-home.html

Table E-3 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Public Entities 

City 

Public Entity 

Name Estimate URL (Uniform Resource Locator) 

Houston, Texas 

City of Houston’s Office of Emergency 

Management and Harris County Office of 

Emergency Management 

7 days 

http://www.houstonoem.org/external/content/docu

ment/4027/2168878/1/COH-DPG2015-ENG-WEB 

.pdf

Orlando, Florida Orange County Office of Emergency 

Management 3-7 days http://flgetaplan.com/Reports/ReportOutputFiles/

New York, New 

York 

New York City Office of Emergency 

Management 3 days http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/get_prepared/s

upplies.shtml

Pittsburgh, 

Pennsylvania 

Pittsburgh Office of Emergency Management 

and Homeland Security 3 days http://apps.pittsburghpa.gov//72_Hour_Kits.pdf

Los Angeles, 

California LA Office of Emergency Management 3-10 days http://www.lacoa.org/PDF/EmergencySurvivalGui

de-LowRes.pdf

San Francisco, 

California 

San Francisco Department of Emergency 

Management 3 days http://www.sf72.org/home

Washington, 

D.C. 

Homeland Security and Emergency 

Management Agency 3 days http://hsema.dc.gov/page/72-hours
E-10 E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

Table E-3 Publicly Disclosed Recovery Expectations from Public Entities (continued) 

City 

Public Entity 

Name Estimate URL (Uniform Resource Locator) 

New Orleans, 

Louisiana 

New Orleans Office of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness 3 days http://www.nola.gov/ready/hurricane/supplies/

Portland, 

Oregon 

Portland Bureau of Emergency 

Management 3 days http://www.portlandoregon.gov/pbem/article/4099

50

Seattle, 

Washington Seattle Office of Emergency Management 7-10 days http://www.seattle.gov/emergency-management/ 

what-can-i-do/prepare-yourself

Miami, Florida Miami-Dade County Emergency 

Management 3-14 days http://www.miamidade.gov/fire/emergency-supplykit.asp

Jacksonville, 

Florida Duval County Emergency Management 7 days 

http://www.coj.net/departments/fire-and-rescue/ 

docs/emergency-preparedness/2015-16-

emergency-preparedness-guide.aspx

Baton Rouge, 

Louisiana 

Baton Rouge Office of Emergency 

Preparedness 3 days http://brgov.com/dept/oep/pdf/FamilyDisasterPlan.

pdf

Charleston, 

South Carolina 

Charleston County Emergency Management 

Department 3 days http://www.charlestoncounty.org/departments/em

ergency-management/emergency-kit.php

Boston, 

Massachusetts Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management 3 days http://maps.cityofboston.gov/preparedness_plann

er/Default.aspx

Oklahoma 

City, 

Oklahoma 

Oklahoma Department of Emergency 

Management 3-5 days 

http://www.ok.gov/OEM/Programs_&_Services/Pr

eparedness/Preparedness_-_Create_an_ 

Emergency_Plan.html

Kansas City, 

Missouri 

Greater Kansas City region’s Metropolitan 

Emergency Managers Committee 3 days http://www.preparemetrokc.org/Be_Prepared/sup

plykit.asp

Minneapolis, 

Minnesota 

Minneapolis Office of Emergency 

Management 3 days 

http://www.ci.minneapolis.mn.us/www/groups/publ

ic/@regservices/documents/webcontent/convert_

282425.pdf

Denver, 

Colorado Denver Office of Emergency Management 3 days 

https://www.denvergov.org/oem/OfficeofEmergen

cyManagement/EmergencyPreparedness/tabid/39

1460/Default.aspx

Montreal, 

Quebec Montreal Emergency Preparedness Centre 3 days http://ville.montreal.qc.ca/portal/page?_pageid=76

37,82421604&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL

Toronto, 

Ontario Toronto Office of Emergency Management 3 days 

http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vg

nextoid=e0d36cbd2b95a410VgnVCM10000071d6

0f89RCRD

Vancouver, 

British 

Columbia 

North Shore Emergency Management Office 3-7 days http://nsemo.org/preparedness/emergency-kitssupplies
GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent E-11 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E.3 Sample Base for Interdependent Infrastructure and Restoration Times Array 

Figure E-8 Array example to accelerate the study of interdependent critical infrastructure systems and 

processes. Select services/processes shown in rows and enabler/utilities in columns. 
E-12 E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

E.4 Literature Reviewed in the Study of Interdependent 

Infrastructure Trends and Models 

Adachi, T., and Ellingwood, B. R., 2008, “Serviceability of Earthquake-Damaged 

Water Systems: Effects of Electrical Power Availability and Power Backup 

Systems on System Vulnerability,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 

Vol. 93, Issue 1, pp. 78-88. 

Akgun, I., Kandakoglu, A., and Ozok, A. F., 2010, “Fuzzy Integrated Vulnerability 

Assessment Model for Critical Facilities in Combating the Terrorism,” 

Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 37, Issue 5, pp. 3561-3573. 

ALA, 2006, “Power Systems, Water, Transportation and Communications Lifeline 

Interdependencies,” American Lifelines Alliance, draft report to the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency and the National Institute of Building 

Sciences, Washington, D.C. 

Alsubaie, A., Di Pietro, A., Marti, J., Kini, P., Lin, T. F., Palmieri, S., and Tofani, A., 

2013, “A Platform for Disaster Response Planning with Interdependency 

Simulation Functionality,” Critical Infrastructure Protection VII, Vol. 417, 

IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology series, pp. 

183-197. 

Anderson, C. W., Santos, J. R., and Haimes, Y. Y., 2007, “A Risk-Based InputOutput Methodology for Measuring the Effects of the August 2003 Northeast 

Blackout,” Economic Systems Research, Vol. 19, Issue 2, pp. 183-204. 

Asprone, D., Cavallaro, M., Latora, V., Manfredi, G., and Nicosia, V., 2013, 

“Assessment of Urban Ecosystem Resilience Using the Efficiency of Hybrid 

Social-Physical Complex Networks,” Physics and Society, http://arxiv.org/ 

pdf/1302.3263.pdf, last accessed on November 18, 2015. 

Balducelli, C., Bologna, S., Di Pietro, A., and Vicoli G., 2005, “Analysing 

Interdependencies of Critical Infrastructures Using Agent Discrete Event 

Simulation,” International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 2, No. 

4. 

Becker, T., Nagel, C., and Kolbe, T. H., 2013, “Semantic 3D Modeling of MultiUtility Networks in Cities for Analysis and 3D Visualization,” Lecture Notes 

in Geoinformation Cartography, Springer, Heidelberg, Germany, pp. 41-62. 

Bensi, M., Der Kiureghian, A., and Straub, D., 2015, “Framework for PostEarthquake Risk Assessment and Decision Making for Infrastructure 

Systems,” ASCE-ASME Journal of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering 

Systems, Part A: Civil Engineering, Vol. 1, Issue 1. 
GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent E-13 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

Bigger, J. E., Willingham, M. G., Krimgold, F., and Mili, L., 2009, “Consequences of 

Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies: Lessons from the 2004 Hurricane 

Season in Florida,” International Journal Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 5, 

No. 3, pp. 199-219. 

Brezhnev, E., Kharchenko, V., 2013, “BBN-based Approach for Assessment of 

Smart Grid and Nuclear Power Plant Interaction,” Proceedings of 2013 EastWest Design & Test Symposium, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers, Piscataway, New Jersey. 

Brown, T., Beyeler, W., and Barton, D., 2004, “Assessing Infrastructure 

Interdependencies: The Challenge of Risk Analysis for Complex Adaptive 

Systems,” International Journal of Critical Infrastructures, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 

108-117. 

Brummitt, C. D., D’Souza, R. M., and Leicht, E. A., 2012, “Suppressing Cascades of 

Load in Interdependent Networks,” Proceedings of the National Academy of 

Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 109, No. 12, pp. E680-689. 

Buldyrev, S. V., Parshani, R., Paul, G., Stanley, H. E., and Havlin, S., 2010, 

“Catastrophic Cascade of Failures in Interdependent Networks,” Nature, Vol. 

464, No. 7291, pp. 1025-1028. 

Buxton, R., Uma, S. R., and King, A. B., 2010, “Modelling Interdependences of 

Critical Infrastructure,” Proceedings of 2010 New Zealand Society of 

Earthquake Engineering Conference, Paper Number 24. 

Cagno, E., De Ambroggi, M., Grande, O., and Trucco, P., 2011, “Risk Analysis of 

Underground Infrastructures in Urban Areas,” Reliability Engineering and 

System Safety, Vol. 96, pp. 139-148. 

Cardellini, V., Casalicchio, E., and Galli, E., 2007, “Agent-Based Modeling of 

Interdependencies in Critical Infrastructures Through UML,” Proceedings of 

the 2007 Spring Simulation Multiconference, Vol. 2, Society for Computer 

Simulation International, San Diego, California, pp. 119-126. 

Casalicchio, E., Galli, E., Ottaviani, V., 2009, “MobileOnRealEnvironment-GIS: A 

Federated Mobile Network Simulator of Mobile Nodes on Real Geographic 

Data,” Proceedings of 13th IEEE/ACM International Symposium on 

Distributed Simulation and Real Time Applications, pp. 255-258. 

Casalicchio, E., Galli, E., and Tucci, S., 2007, “Federated Agent-Based Modeling and 

Simulation Approach to Study Interdependencies in IT Critical 

Infrastructures,” 11th IEEE International Symposium Distributed Simulation 

and Real-Time Applications, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers, Piscataway, New Jersey, pp. 182-189. 
E-14 E: Supplement to Interdependent GCR 16-917-39 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

Casalicchio, E., Galli, E., 2008, “Federated Agent Based Modeling and Simulation: 

an Approach for Complex Critical Systems Analysis,” 22nd Workshop on 

Principles of Advanced and Distributed Simulation, Institute of Electrical 

and Electronics Engineers, Piscataway, New Jersey. 

Castrucci, M., Neri, A., Caldeira, F., Aubert, J., Khadraoui, D., Aubigny, M., Harpes, 

C., Simoes, P., Suraci, V., and Capodieci, P., 2012, “Design and 

Implementation of a Mediation System Enabling Secure Communication 

Among Critical Infrastructures,” International Journal of Critical 

Infrastructure Protection, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 86-97. 

Cavallaro, M., Asprone, D., Latora, V., Manfredi, G., and Nicosia, V., 2014, 

“Assessment of Urban Ecosystem Resilience through Hybrid Social-Physical 

Complex Networks,” Computer-Aided Civil and Infrastructure Engineering, 

Vol. 29, Issue 8, pp. 608-625. 

Cavallo, A., and Ireland, V., 2014, “Preparing for Complex Interdependent Risks: A 

System of Systems Approach to Building Disaster Resilience,” International 

Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction, Vol. 9. 

Cavdaroglu, B., Hammel, E., Mitchell, J. E., Sharkey, T. C., and Wallace, W. A., 

2013, “Integrating Restoration and Scheduling Decisions for Disrupted 

Interdependent Infrastructure Systems,” Annals of Operations Research, Vol. 

203, No. 1, pp. 279-294. 

Cellai, D., López, E., Zhou, J., Gleeson, J. P., and Bianconi, G., 2013, “Percolation in 

multiplex networks with overlap,” Physical Review E – Statistical, 

Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, Vol. 88, Issue 5. 

Chan, C., and Dueñas-Osorio, L., 2014, “Spatial-Temporal Quantification of 

Interdependencies Across Infrastructure Networks,” Networds of Networks: 

The Last Frontier of Complexity, Understanding Complex Systems series, 

Springer International Publishing, Switzerland, pp. 323-340. 

Chang, S. E., McDaniels, T., Fox, J., Dhariwal, R., and Longstaff, H., 2014, “Toward 

Disaster-Resilient Cities: Characterizing Resilience of Infrastructure Systems 

with Expert Judgments,” Risk Analysis, Vol. 34, Issue 3, pp. 416-434. 

Chou, C. C., and Tseng, S. M., 2010, “Collection and Analysis of Critical 

Infrastructure Interdependency Relationships,” Journal of Computing in Civil 

Engineering, Vol. 24, Issue 6, pp. 539-547. 

Chunlei, W., Lan, F., and Yiqi, D., 2011, “National Critical Infrastructure Modeling 

and Analysis Based on Complex System Theory,” Proceedings, 2011 First 

International Conference on Instrumentation, Measurement, Computer, 

Communication, and Control, Institute of Electrical and Electronics 

Engineers, Piscataway, New Jersey, pp. 832-836. 
GCR 16-917-39 E: Supplement to Interdependent E-15 

 Infrastructure Analysis 

Cimellaro, G. P., Koh, Y., and Roh, H., 2014, “Applying Control Theories and ABM 

to Improve Resilience-Based Design of Systems,” Proceedings of the 10th

National Conference on Earthquake Engineering, Earthquake Engineering 

Research Institute, Oakland, California. 

Cimellaro, G. P., Solari, D., and Bruneau, M., 2014, “Physical Infrastructure 

Interdependency and Regional Resilience Index after the 2011 Tohoku 

Earthquake in Japan,” Earthquake Engineering & Structural Dynamics, Vol. 

43, Issue 12, pp. 1763-1784. 

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GCR 16-917-39 List of Acronyms F-1 

List of Acronyms 

AAA Authentication, authorization, and accounting 

AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 

ABM Agent-based model 

AC Advisory circular 

ACI American Concrete Institute 

AISC American Institute of Steel Construction 

ANSI American National Standards Institute 

API American Petroleum Institute 

AREMA American Railway Engineering and Maintenance of Way 

 Association 

ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 

ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers 

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials 

ATC Applied Technology Council 

ATM Automated teller machine 

AWWA American Water Works Association 

BPU Board of Public Utilities 

BRT Bus rapid transit 

CAIDI Customer average interruption duration index 

CAIFI Customer average interruption frequency index 

Caltrans California Department of Transportation 

CCWD Contra Costa Water District 

CBC California Building Code

CDC Center for Disease Control and Prevention 

CDE Contingency design earthquake 
F-2 List of Acronyms GCR 16-917-39 

CEATI Centre for Energy Advancement through Technological Innovation 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

CGE Computable general equilibrium 

CGS California Geological Survey 

CO Carbon monoxide 

CO2 Carbon dioxide 

COWs Cells on wheels 

CPUC California Public Utilities Commission 

CRISP Critical Resilient Interdependent Infrastructure Systems and 

Processes 

CSRIC Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council 

DHHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

DIRS Disaster Information Reporting System 

DOE U.S. Department of Energy 

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation 

DSL Digital Subscriber Line 

EAP Energy assurance plan 

EAS Emergency Alert System 

EBMUD East Bay Municipal Utility District 

EDC Electric distribution companies 

EEI Edison Electric Institute 

EMS Emergency monitoring system 

ENEA Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy, and 

Sustainable Economic Development 

EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

ERDIP Earthquake Resistant Ductile Iron Pipe 

FAA Federal Aviation Administration 

FCC Federal Communications Commission 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GCR 16-917-39 List of Acronyms F-3 

FFE Fire following earthquake 

FHWA Federal Highway Administration 

GDP Gross domestic product 

GETS Government Emergency Telecommunications Service 

GIS Geographic information system 

GTI Gas Technology Institute 

HBMWD Humboldt Bay Municipal Water District 

HCA High consequence areas 

HFC Hybrid fiber-coax 

HVAC Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

HVL Highly volatile liquid 

IBC International Building Code

ICS Incident Command System 

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 

IO Input-output models 

IOU Investor-owned utility 

IP Internet protocols 

IPS Inundation protection system 

IRD Infrastructure Resilience Division 

ISO International Organization of Standards 

ISP Information Service Providers 

IT Information technology 

KJC Kennedy/Jenks Consultants 

LAX Los Angeles International Airport 

LMR Land mobile radio 

LRFD Load and Resistance Factor Design 

LTPO Long-term power outage 

MAOP Maximum allowable operating pressure 

MCEER Multidisciplinary Center for Earthquake Engineering 

MILP Mixed integer linear programming 
F-4 List of Acronyms GCR 16-917-39 

MOP Manual of Practice 

MOTEMS Marine Oil Terminal Engineering and Maintenance Standards 

MRE Manual for Railway Engineering 

MSC Mobile switching centers 

MSS Manufacturers Standardization Society for Valve and Fitting 

Industry 

MTTR Mean time to repair 

NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers International 

NASEO National Association of State Energy Officials 

NCA National Climate Assessment 

NCS National Communications System 

NEBS Network Equipment Building Systems 

NERC North American Electric Reliability Council 

NESC National Electric Safety Code 

NFPA National Fire Protection Association 

NFV Network function virtualization 

NHC National Hurricane Center 

NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology 

NMC Northridge Medical Center 

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NPMS National Pipeline Mapping System 

NS/EP National security and emergency preparedness 

NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 

OPS Office of Pipeline Safety 

PATH Port Authority and Trans-Hudson 

PCBs Polychlorinated biphenyls 

PDE Probable design earthquake 

PE Polyethylene 

PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
GCR 16-917-39 List of Acronyms F-5 

PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

PIANC World Association for Waterborne Transport Infrastructure 

PIPA Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance 

PPI Plastics Pipe Institute 

PRCI Pipeline Research Council International 

PSAP Public safety answering points 

PURA Public Utilities Regulatory Authority

PVC Polyvinylchloride 

QoE Quality of experience 

RUS Rural Utilities Service 

SAIDI System average interruption duration index 

SAIFI System average interruption frequency index 

SCADA Supervisory control and data acquisition systems 

SDN Software-defined networks 

SEI Structural Engineering Institute 

SFPUC San Francisco Public Utilities Commission 

SGIP Smart Grid Interoperability Panel 

SLA Service level agreement 

SMS Short Message Service 

TAPS Trans-Alaska Pipeline System 

TCLEE Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering 

TDM Time-division multiplexing 

TEU Twenty-foot-long equivalent unit 

TSP Telecommunications Service Priority 

TTX Long-term power outage tabletop exercise 

UAV Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles 

UBC Uniform Building Code

UPS United Parcel Service 

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture 

VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol 
F-6 List of Acronyms GCR 16-917-39 

WEA Wireless Emergency Alert 

WEF Water Environment Federation 

WHO World Health Organization 

WPS Wireless Priority Service 

WRF Water Research Foundation 

WSIP Water System Improvement Program 

WTC World Trade Center 
GCR 16-917-39 References G-1 

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GCR 16-917-39 Project Participants H-1 

Project Participants

National Institute of Standards and Technology

Therese (Terri) P. McAllister 

Engineering Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

100 Bureau Drive 

Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899 

Steven L. McCabe 

Engineering Laboratory 

National Institute of Standards and Technology 

100 Bureau Drive, MS 8604 

Gaithersburg, Maryland 20899

Program Management 

Jon Heintz (Program Manager) 

Applied Technology Council 

201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 

Redwood City, California 94065 

Christopher Rojahn (Project Manager) 

Applied Technology Council 

201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 

Redwood City, California 94065

Veronica Cedillos (Associate Project Manager) 

Applied Technology Council 

201 Redwood Shores Parkway, Suite 240 

Redwood City, California 94065 

Project Technical Committee 

Laurie Johnson (Project Director / Lead Editor) 

Laurie Johnson Consulting and Research 

23 Portola Avenue 

San Rafael, California 94903 

Thomas D. O’Rourke (Project Co-Director) 

Cornell University 

School of Civil and Environmental Engineering 

273 Hollister Hall 

Ithaca, New York 14853-3501 

Stephanie Chang 

University of British Columbia 

School of Community and Regional Planning 

433-6333 Memorial Road 

Vancouver, British Columbia V6T 1Z2, Canada 

Craig Davis 

Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 

111 North Hope Street, Room 1345 

Los Angeles, California 90012

Leonardo Dueñas-Osorio 

Rice University 

Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering 

Ryon Laboratory, Room 212, MS 318 

6100 Main Street 

Houston, Texas 77005-1827 

Ian N. Robertson 

University of Hawaii at Manoa 

Dept. of Civil and Environmental Engineering 

2540 Dole Street, Holmes Hall 383 

Honolulu, Hawaii 96822 

Henning Schulzrinne 

Columbia University 

Department of Computer Science 

450 Computer Science Building 

500 West 120th Street 

New York, New York 10027-7003 
H-2 Project Participants GCR 16-917-39 

Kathleen Tierney 

Natural Hazards Center 

University of Colorado 

482 UCB 

Boulder, Colorado 80309 

Project Review Panel 

Bruce Ellingwood 

Colorado State University 

College of Engineering A221 

Campus Delivery 1372 

Fort Collins, Colorado 80523-1372 

Timothy J. Lomax 

Texas A&M Transportation Institute 

The Texas A&M University System 

College Station, Texas 77843-3135 

Doug Nyman 

D. J. Nyman & Associates 

12777 Jones Road, Suite 320 

Houston, Texas 77070

Dennis Ostrom 

City of Santa Clarita 

16430 Sultus Street 

Canyon Country, California 91387 

Jon M. Peha 

Carnegie Mellon University 

Department of Engineering and Public Policy 

5000 Forbes Avenue 

Baker Hall 129B 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213 

Kent Yu (ATC Board Contact) 

SEFT Consulting Group 

4800 SW Griffith Drive, Suite 135 

Beaverton, Oregon 97005