Dry vs. wet: canal breach, 

New Orleans

Commercial satellite imagery provided 

by GeoEye, www.geoeye.com
149

“Th e New Orleans Scenario”: 

State and Local Preparations

Preparations by Louisiana State Government

Th e seeds of Louisiana’s failure to prepare were sown long before Hurricane Katrina approached the state. As detailed in other chapters,1

 Louisiana had been on notice of its 

vulnerability to catastrophic hurricanes for decades, but over the long term had never fully 

upgraded its emergency-response systems to the level necessary to protect its citizens from 

those events. Based on its own models and experience, it could have foreseen the inadequacy of many of its plans and resources, particularly its plans to evacuate people without 

personal transportation and the staffi ng of its state emergency-preparedness offi ce.2

In short, when it received warnings of Katrina’s approach, the state had reason to know that 

its emergency response systems were likely to fail, however diligently they were implemented. And fail they did. 

Th e National Response Plan (NRP) makes clear that responsibility for seeing that state 

response systems function properly lies with the Governor. Th e plan states, “As a State’s 

Chief Executive, the Governor is responsible for the safety and welfare of the people of that 

State. ... [and] for coordinating State resources to address the full spectrum of actions ... to 

prepare for [and] respond to ... natural disasters.”3

Th e days before Katrina struck showed a state striving to mount an eff ective response with 

stretched resources. State offi cials had monitored the storm since its birth as a tropical 

depression.4

 Terry Ryder, Governor Blanco’s Executive Counsel, had standing instructions from the Governor to notify her whenever he learned of a tropical depression. Ryder 

informed Governor Blanco about Katrina sometime prior to August 26, before the storm 

even had an offi cial name.5

 Th e State’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F), its lead 

agency for search and rescue, also started preparing early, reviewing emergency-preparedness manuals and “boarding up the hatches, bringing in the equipment that needed to be 

brought in and immovable equipment we tied down as best we could.”6

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) activated a team to coordinate emergency response at 2 p.m., Th ursday, August 25.7

 Twenty 

minutes later, LOHSEP issued an electronic alert warning state agencies and parish emergency offi cials about the approach of Katrina.8

 Th e LOHSEP coordination team began 

working with state and local offi cials to organize evacuations and sheltering of special-needs 

patients.9

 Th e Louisiana National Guard also began preparations on Th ursday aft ernoon, 

positioning fuel tankers at Hammond Airport, about 30 miles northwest of New Orleans.10

Preparations accelerated on Friday, August 26. At 11:30 that morning, a senior offi cial 

of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), the agency with 

primary responsibility for transportation out of a disaster area for people in need, instructed 

agency staff to prepare and be on standby for hurricane response.11

Shortly before 4 p.m. on Friday, Major General Bennett Landreneau’s Chief of Staff , Colonel 

Steven Dabadie of the Louisiana National Guard, notifi ed senior Guard offi cials of a conference call to take place at 6 p.m. to review support requirements and activate the Guard’s 

response operations.12 At 4 p.m., Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency, placing 

the National Guard and state agencies on full alert.13 At 5 p.m., the fi rst conference call of 

the southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force, which included emergency-management ofChapter 11
Chapter 11

150

fi cials from all the southeastern parishes, took place.14 Th e Louisiana State Police gave notice 

that it would open its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) the next morning.15 LOHSEP 

said that it would activate its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge at “Level 

III,” implying full staffi ng, by early Saturday morning.16

On Saturday, August 27, the Louisiana National Guard set up its Joint Operations Center 

(JOC) at Jackson Barracks, its permanent state headquarters in the Lower Ninth Ward of 

New Orleans; established backup JOCs at two other bases; and began coordinating the arrival of advance National Guard parties from Florida and Texas.17 Governor Blanco, who 

had set up her base of operations at the LOHSEP EOC Saturday morning, spent the weekend commuting between the LOHSEP EOC and the Greater New Orleans EOC to meet 

with public offi cials and the press and survey the evacuations.18

On both Saturday and Sunday, Governor Blanco sent letters to President Bush requesting 

federal assistance under the Federal Staff ord Act19 and its implementing regulations.20 Th ose 

authorities contain separate provisions for “emergencies” and “natural disasters;” the latter 

are considered more signifi cant and justify higher levels of assistance. Th e letter sent on 

Saturday requested that the President issue an “emergency” declaration, specifying $9 million in anticipated support needs.21 It also contained some notable errors, such as omitting 

Orleans Parish from the list of parishes wishing to receive federal assistance.22

With predictions of increasingly severe storm damage, the letter sent on Sunday sought an 

“expedited natural disaster” declaration, with a request of $130 million in aid; this letter 

corrected the previous letter and added Orleans Parish to the list of parishes needing assistance.23

Both letters included statements, required for funding under the Staff ord Act, that the 

Governor anticipated an incident “of such severity and magnitude that eff ective response is 

beyond the capabilities of the state and aff ected local governments.”24 Neither letter asked 

for transportation assets to assist in the evacuation, or for any other assets that might be 

useful for emergency response. President Bush promptly issued both of the requested declarations.25

While Governor Blanco’s letter sounded a note of urgency, she and other state offi cials 

missed other critical opportunities over the weekend to convey the extent to which the 

state’s response capabilities were likely to be overwhelmed. Most important, in a video 

teleconference of federal, state, and local offi cials on Saturday, Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting 

Deputy Director of LOHSEP, answered a question from former FEMA Director Michael 

Brown of whether the state had “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you 

that you need” in the negative:

Mike Brown: Any questions? Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you need or —

Colonel Smith: Mike, no. [Inaudible] resources that are en route, and it looks 

like those resources that are en route are going to – to be a good fi rst shot. 

Naturally, once we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I’m sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of 

even our best planners hadn’t even thought about. So I think fl exibility is going 

to be the key.26

Brown later testifi ed that he was seeking information from the state on what it needed 

at that moment only,27 and Colonel Smith later tried to downplay the signifi cance of his 

response.28 But his remarks refl ect an underestimation of the state’s level of unprepared-
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

151

ness. Given the frenzied eff orts over the 

weekend to get hold of the incomplete 

draft s of plans under development from 

the Hurricane Pam exercise, it should 

not have taken Louisiana’s “best planners” to identify shortfalls in ongoing 

preparations.

Th roughout the weekend, LOHSEP 

invoked its standard operating procedures, which included a lengthy checklist for coordination of state agencies, 

non-governmental organizations (such 

as the American Red Cross), and parish authorities.29 State Police, National 

Guard, and DOTD offi cials concentrated on evacuation eff orts, which 

began in earnest on Saturday morning.30

Evacuation using contrafl ow – a system 

that expedites evacuation by converting 

incoming highway lanes to outgoing 

– began at 4 p.m. on Saturday. New 

Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued his 

mandatory evacuation order, with the 

Governor’s support, on Sunday morning. (See Chapter 16 for more about 

pre-storm evacuations.) 

As Katrina approached the Gulf Coast, 

the National Guard had 5,700 troops in 

Louisiana, most of whom were reservists; by landfall all would be on alert. 

Additional members of the Louisiana 

Guard were due to return from Iraq 

shortly.31 (Previously, the Louisiana National Guard’s largest hurricane-related 

deployment – 2,500 troops – was prior 

to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.) 32

By Sunday aft ernoon, General Landreneau, Adjutant General of Louisiana, established a 

command structure for the National Guard’s response activities (Task Force Pelican) with 

General Gary Jones in charge. General Landreneau placed fi ve separate task forces under 

General Jones’ command to address each major responsibility: aviation, security, search and 

rescue, logistics, and engineering.33

Th e National Guard’s emergency-response plan requires key troops to be positioned at key 

locations around the state. It can be amended as needed by fragmentary orders or “fragos.”34

As National Weather Service (NWS) reports provided updated guidance on Katrina’s severity and direction, “constant order production FRAGO mode” kept refi ning the pre-positioning of Guard units.35 Th e Guard also actively staged vehicles and aviation assets to be ready 

for search-and-rescue activities, movements of commodities, and evacuation assistance.36

Lining up at the Superdome

FEMA photo
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152

Preparations by Local Government

Preparing the Superdome as a Special-Needs Shelter

Th e City of New Orleans has used the Superdome as a special-needs shelter since Hurricane 

Georges in 1998.37 Th e Louisiana Department of Social Services has been responsible for 

running special-needs shelters in eight of nine defi ned regions in the state,38 but the City of 

New Orleans Health Department has run the special-needs shelter in the Superdome39 as 

part of its general municipal responsibilities. Th e city agreed to the special-needs eligibility 

criteria in the Region 1 plan for Orleans, Jeff erson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes.40

Th e Region 1 special-needs shelter plan defi nes special-needs people as those who are able 

to provide for their own basic care but have a medical condition requiring occasional assistance, intermittent access to electricity for medical treatments, or refrigeration of medications. Th e plan warns that “It is not appropriate to admit individuals to these shelters who 

require constant care or who require constant electricity to support machines necessary to 

maintain their life.”41

Neither the Health Department nor any other city agency had compiled a comprehensive 

list of Orleans Parish (which has the same boundaries as the City of New Orleans) residents 

who qualifi ed with special needs.42 Planning at the special-needs shelter was determined 

by previous experience and Superdome capacity. Th e Region 1 plan called for preparations 

to receive 200 to 400 special-needs individuals.43 Each was expected to bring a caregiver, 

meaning a total of 400 to 800 individuals.44 Hurricanes Isidore and Ivan had each resulted 

in about 30 special-needs people, plus caregivers.45 As a result of the plan, past experience, 

and the capacity of the Superdome, Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the City’s Health Department, set up the shelter to accommodate approximately 1,200, comprising 600 specialneeds people plus their caregivers. 46

Preferring that special-needs patients leave the city entirely, the city issued a press release 

directing such individuals to two special-needs shelters outside New Orleans; toll-free telephone numbers were provided so citizens could call for information.47 In a second release, 

Mayor Nagin added that the Superdome would not open for special-needs individuals until 

8 a.m. on Sunday.48 Th e release instructed special-needs citizens to call a special telephone 

number to confi rm their eligibility.49

Both press releases added: “Anyone planning to spend time in a shelter should bring three 

to four days’ worth of food, sleeping gear, and medical supplies including oxygen, medicine, 

and batteries for any necessary devices.”50 Th e releases also gave contact information for six 

ambulance services for non-emergency transportation.51

Pre-landfall preparations included staffi ng the shelter and checking inventory to determine 

what supplies would be needed.52

Th roughout Saturday, City Health Department offi cials staged supplies – including cots, 

water, food, medications, phone lines, and generators – at the Superdome.53 Provisions 

included ready-to-eat foods like peanut butter, crackers, water, juice, and cereal; the sheriff ’s 

department agreed to provide hot food as long as was feasible.54

Saturday evening, city and state personnel operated a 10-line telephone triage service for 

potential special-needs individuals,55 guiding callers to the Superdome for evaluation, hospitals, or other destinations.56 Callers with transportation were encouraged to leave the city.57

At about 6 p.m., Saturday, Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), called Dr. 

Stephens to see if he needed help. Dr. Stephens said he did not.58
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

153

At 8 a.m. on Sunday, the Superdome opened, as planned, for special-needs patients.59

Approximately 1,000 special-needs patients arrived throughout the day,60 plus an undetermined number of caregivers. Colonel Pat Prechter, Deputy Commander of the National 

Guard’s Louisiana Medical Command, noticed that some patients arriving in the shelter, 

following processing through registration and triage, required dialysis or constant oxygen, 

which would normally disqualify them as candidates for special-needs shelter admission.61

Following this observation, and at the city’s request, National Guard medical offi cials began 

assisting with triage.62 Of the approximately 1,000 individuals who arrived at the specialneeds shelter, 450 to 500 of the most critical were evacuated63 to a special-needs shelter in 

Baton Rouge.64

Despite the pre-staging of substantial assets, offi cials realized on Sunday that additional 

supplies were necessary.65 Th e city provided more medical oxygen66 and large quantities of 

other supplies ranging from saline solution to adult diapers.67 When Simonson called again 

on Sunday, Dr. Stephens accepted the help,68 which included a FEMA Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team (DMAT) and material from the HHS’s Strategic National Stockpile of 

emergency medical supplies.69 While FEMA was able to get military-style rations, water, 

and ice to the Superdome, the DMAT had to stop in Baton Rouge because the Texas State 

Police had denied two requests for police escorts; once in Louisiana, the team met worsening weather conditions.70 Th e team didn’t make it to the Superdome before landfall.

Preparing the Superdome as a Refuge of Last Resort

In prior hurricanes, the Superdome had served as a refuge for those needing to ride out 

the storm for a few hours before returning home.71 During Katrina, thousands would stay 

for days.

Sheltering in the Superdome

FEMA photo
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154

Long-Term Planning for the Superdome as a Shelter of Refuge or Last Resort

For at least three years before Katrina hit, the city had initiated critical measures to prepare 

the Superdome for longer stays, but failed to follow through. Long-term planning began 

with an eff ort to get more people out of the city in the fi rst place to ease eventual demands 

on the Superdome.72 Soon aft er his inauguration in 2002, Mayor Nagin unsuccessfully urged 

New Orleans and Louisiana’s Congressional delegation to fi nd a way to develop a $200 

million light-rail network to evacuate the 100,000 city residents without their own means 

to leave.73 City offi cials also worked throughout 2004 and 2005 to develop memoranda of 

understanding (MOUs) between the city and transportation providers, but those initiatives 

were not completed before Katrina. (See Chapter 16.)

Limited shelter space outside the city placed additional pressure on the Superdome as well. 

Th e American Red Cross decided not to set up shelters south of I-10, the east-west interstate running north of two-thirds of New Orleans, because they would have been too close 

to what the Red Cross deemed a fl ood zone.74

 In 2004, recognizing the need for greater shelter capacity, Mayor Nagin requested $850,000 

from the New Orleans Congressional delegation for “a study ... to determine the feasibility of upgrading the Louisiana Superdome, or any other facility, to serve as a refuge of last 

resort.”75 Th e city made similar requests to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2005.76 Th ese funding requests 

were denied, although the record does not indicate why. Th e city did not appeal to the state 

because of the perception that the state lacked the capability to help, and the city was planning on upgrading the Superdome under FEMA – not state – regulations.77 Th e upgrade 

would have taken at least two more years (and cost $7 million to $17 million).78

The Superdome with its 

storm-damaged roof

U.S. Coast Guard photo
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

155

The City Prepares and Opens the Superdome as a Refuge of Last Resort

Fearing that announcing the Superdome’s availability too early might dissuade citizens 

from leaving the city,79 the city waited until Saturday to announce that the Superdome 

would open on Sunday as a refuge of last resort.80 Since 2004’s Hurricane Ivan, the city’s 

plan has been to use Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses to deliver those without transportation to the Superdome.81 Bus service began on Sunday at noon.82 City offi cials believe 

that the majority of the population at the Superdome before landfall had come by bus.83

By late Sunday evening, about 10,000 people had shown up at the Superdome.84 Th e 

Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned 900,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) rations 

and water for its staff ’s needs (though most were ultimately given to the storm victims).85

Offi cials realized that even that cache would need augmenting, and rushed out requests 

for 350,000 additional MREs from the city and additional food and water from the state.86

FEMA and the Louisiana National Guard were able to move in more rations and water 

before landfall.87

No one had made arrangements for portable toilets, however.88 Dr. Stephens tried to contract directly with individual vendors on Saturday, August 27, but could not reach them.89

Several Superdome witnesses interviewed considered this omission a central failure in prestorm planning.90

Th e large number of people at the Superdome also required a signifi cant security presence.91

Th e New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) under Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain, was in 

charge, fi rst with 40 offi cers and later with double that number.92 In support of NOPD, the 

Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned considerable troops to assist with security, as well 

as other missions, such as engineering functions, communications, and food distribution.93

Pre-landfall security mainly entailed screening walk-ins and bus arrivals, searching for 

weapons.94 When the downpour started around 6 p.m. Sunday, security screening moved 

inside the building.95 Th is made it harder for city police to ensure that no one entered with 

a weapon.96 Th e National Guard also pre-positioned about 10 high-water vehicles at the Superdome.97 Th ese trucks proved invaluable aft er many of the streets around the Superdome 

fl ooded.

When the Superdome opened to the general population, National Guard offi cers there 

asked the LOHSEP and the Texas and Florida National Guards for additional support. 

NOPD Deputy Chief Swain also requested additional police offi cers to assist at the Superdome.98

At Katrina’s landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the Superdome’s special-needs shelter and refuge of last resort housed over 10,000 people who would ride out the storm in its 

cavernous interior.99

1 See: Chapter 6: Emergency Management: Louisiana, and Chapter 16: Pre-Storm Evacuations.

2 See: Chapter 6: Emergency Management: Louisiana.

3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

p. 8 [hereinaft er NRP].

4 Committee staff interview of Col. Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police and Deputy Secretary, 

Department of Public Safety Services and Corrections, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 25.

5 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 
Chapter 11

156

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Gov. Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce 

of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline].

6 Committee staff interview of Sec. Dwight Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on 

Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 17-20. 

7 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina Integrated Timeline, p. 5. See also: Committee staff 

interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 32.

8 LOHSEP Chronology, p. 4. Provided to Committee.

9 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2006, p. 32.

10 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events for Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee.

11 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 6; LOHSEP, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–1–1.

12 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7; Committee staff interview of Col. David Aycock, Operations Offi cer, Louisiana 

Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript pp. 91-93.

13 Committee staff interview Andy Kopplin, former Chief of Staff , Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 6, 

2006, transcript p. 30; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 2.

14 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7. See also: Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness 

Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 109.

15 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7.

16 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 8. LOHSEP activation levels range from I to V, with levels of staffi ng for emergencies increasing as the activation level decreases. Level III staffi ng consists of a “Crisis Action Team” on 24-hour call 

augmented with additional staffi ng as required. Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, EOC Standard Operating 

Procedures, May 28, 2002, p. 2 [hereinaft er LOEP, Standard Operating Procedures].

17 Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 

2005, transcript pp. 62-63; Col. Aycock interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 95, 100-102, 105; LANG Timeline, p. 4.

18 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 3; Committee staff interview of Denise Bottcher, Press 

Secretary, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 46-53.

19 “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. [hereinaft er 

“Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5121]. Th e purpose of the Act is “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance 

by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suff ering 

and damage which result from such disasters.” – Staff ord Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).

20 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.31-206.48.

21 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee. Neither this letter 

nor a similar letter of August 28, 2005, from Governor Blanco to the President requesting declaration of an “expedited 

major disaster” for Louisiana and raising the requested Staff ord Act aid total to $130 million, requested federal military 

assistance. 

22 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee.

23 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee.

24 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Sept. 20, 2005. Provided to Committee.

25 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005) (Louisiana; Emergency and Related Determinations); 70 Fed. Reg. 53803 (Sept. 7, 

2005) (Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations).

26 Michael Brown, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19. Provided to Committee.

27 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

62-67.

28 Col. Perry Jeff Smith (Ret.), affi davit, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 8. Provide to Committee.

29 Committee staff interview of James Ballow, Senior Operations Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript 

p. 6; LOEP, Standard Operating Procedures, EOC Hurricane/Major Event Checklist, pp. 1-10. 

30 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 2; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 38.

31 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 60. Roughly 40 to 50 percent of Louisiana’s National Guard troops were in Iraq 

at that time. Source: Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, 

Feb. 2, 2006; Committee staff interview of Col. FG Dowden, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Regional Liaison, New Orleans 

Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety, LA, conducted on Nov. 11, 2005, transcript p. 91. On Saturday 

morning, Governor Blanco approved the fi rst call up of 2,000 Guardsmen; by landfall, all 5,700 would be called up. 

Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco’s Actions in Preparation 
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

157

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, pp. 5-6 (Dec. 2, 2005). A National Guard summary dated Sept. 1, 2005, indicated 

that the then current committed forces included 5,176 Louisiana Guard troops. Th e reason for the discrepancy between 

that fi gure and the 5,700 troops reported by the Governor as having been called up by August 29 is unknown. Source: 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 5-6.

32 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities 

and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 68. 

33 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6, 61-62. 

34 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 14-15. 

35 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 79-80.

36 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 152-54 (stating that the Guard pre-deployed high water vehicles, boats, and 

aviation assets, including helicopters). Col. Curtis explained the potential use for these assets: “Th ey’re pre-positioned for 

whatever the mission becomes. I mean, it can be search and rescue, it can be, you know, commodities, delivering food 

and water, that type thing. It can be not search and rescue, but it can be evacuation where people are caught behind, you 

know, in high water that they can’t drive out of and et cetera. And we’ll drive in, pick them up and bring them out, which 

a lot of that happened.” Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2006, p. 154. 

37 Col. Pat Prechter, Louisiana National Guard Medical Command, recalls responding to the Superdome to help staff 

the Special Needs Shelter for Hurricane Georges [in 1998]. Committee staff interview of Col. Pat Prechter, State Chief 

Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard and Deputy Commander, Louisiana Medical Command, conducted on Jan. 6, 

2006, transcript p. 8.

38 Committee staff interview of Kitty Lapeyrolerie, Regional Manager, Louisiana Rehabilitative Services and Emergency 

Preparedness Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 51-52.

39 Committee staff interview of Avis Gray, Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public Health, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript p. 48.

40 Committee interview of Kevin Stephens, M.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

9, 2005, transcript p. 16. See also: City of New Orleans, City of New Orleans Special Needs Shelter Plan, Mar. 2003, p. 2 

[hereinaft er Region 1 Plan, Mar. 2003]

41 It should be noted that the plan’s defi nition of “special needs” diff ers at the margins with other city and state offi cials’ 

interpretations of the defi nition. For example, Dr. Stephens defi ned special needs patients as those “who require electricity on an intermittent basis for sustaining life – not a continuous basis – patients who require additional special care to 

sustain their life.” Source: Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 6. Louisiana Secretary of Health and Hospitals Dr. 

Fred Cerise said: “Th ose shelters are for individuals who basically have special health care needs and are not – would 

not be adequately taken care of in the general shelters...people with chronic medical conditions. We see people that are 

on medications that would need assistance with that. We have people who are on oxygen at home and who would need 

some special assistance. People that may be on dialysis and so they would need a place to go and coordinate that care. So 

people that can take care of themselves at home but require some assistance.” Source: Committee staff interview of Sec. 

Fred Cerise, M.D., Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 16. A Region 

1 offi cial, Avis Gray, off ered this defi nition: “Special needs population are those individuals that are at home and are able 

to be cared [for] at home but they have health care issues that maybe they can’t go in a regular shelter. Th is could be a 

diabetic who can’t medicate themselves or people with some respiratory who don’t need continuous O2.” Source: Gray 

interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 24.

42 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 32.

43 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 46-47. 

44 Contemplation of a caretaker accompanying each patient is found in: Written Statement of Kevin Stephens, M.D., 

Director, New Orleans Health Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane 

Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006, p.3; Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 25; Region 1 Plan, Mar. 2003, p. 3.

45 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 48. 

46 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 46-49 (“I don’t want to plan for 30 and 40 ... and have six hundred show up, 

and then you’re totally overwhelmed.”). 

47 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” press release, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare 

for Hurricane Katrina.”]. On Saturday, August 27, the State of Louisiana opened two special -needs shelters outside of the 

City of New Orleans, in Alexandria and Monroe. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, timeline. Provided to 

Committee.

48 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible,” press release, Aug. 27, 

2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.”].

49 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 

50 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor 

Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 
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51 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor 

Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 

52 Ninety-six hours prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina, Dr. Stephens convened a staff meeting to create a preparations time line for the special-needs shelter at the Superdome. Th e staff reviewed the updated Region 1 Hurricane Plan 

and began an inventory of supplies the Department needed to operate the shelter. Source: Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 

9, 2005, pp. 11, 13-14. Staffi ng plans for the SNS included 50 Health Department employees, 25 to 30 personnel from Region 1, and approximately 200 National Guard medics and armed personnel for security. Source: Dr. Stephens interview, 

Nov. 9, 2005, p. 48. Col. Pat Prechter, Deputy Commander of the Guard’s Louisiana Medical Command, was ordered 

to provide 71 medical personnel to the SNS beginning at 8 a.m. on Sunday, August 28. Source: Col. Prechter interview, 

Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 29-30. Col. Prechter provided the following break-down of LANG personnel assigned to the SNS: 41-42 

from Medical Command (MedCom), 18 from the 159th Air Guard (medical unit), and 11-12 from Company A1-11. 

Source: Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 28. 

53 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 30.

54 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 61-62. Kitty Lapeyrolerie, the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for the 

Louisiana Department of Social Services, also noted that the city’s prison was supposed to provide food for the Superdome’s special-needs shelter and did so before landfall. As a result, the Louisiana Department of Social Service offi cials said 

they did not ask for more food, even aft er the Superdome was opened to the general population on Sunday, because they 

expected the prison to continue to provide food for the special-needs shelter. But the prison was ultimately fl ooded and 

thus unable to provide any more food aft er landfall. Lapeyrolerie interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 103, 137. 

55 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2005, p. 5. 

56 Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 168.

57 Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 97-98.

58 Committee staff interview of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 37-38. 

59 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2005, p. 5 (photo of white board). See also: 

Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 59, 72. City and state personnel registered, triaged, and evaluated arrivals and 

a fl oor plan was developed to designate SNS areas for certain patients, such as asthmatic or congestive heart failure 

patients. 

60 Dr. Stephens, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 67. Th e SNS plan didn’t include sheltering nursing-home residents, who were supposed 

to be handled through nursing homes’ evacuation plans. One nursing home sent a busload of residents without a staff 

manager to the Superdome. While wondering why the bus hadn’t headed out of the city instead, the SNS staff accepted 

the people in view of the worsening weather. Committee staff interview of Irby Hornsby, former Special-Needs Shelter 

Manager, New Orleans Region, Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 21-22, 

86-88.

61 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 42-43. Th ere appears to be confusion regarding whether dialysis patients 

would be admitted. According to a transcript of Mayor Nagin’s press conference on August 28, the Mayor stated, “Th is 

morning, the Superdome has already opened for people with special needs. If you have a medical condition, if you’re on 

dialysis or some other condition, we want you to expeditiously move to the Superdome.” Source: “New Orleans Mayor, 

Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN Breaking News, Aug. 28, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. http://transcripts.cnn.

com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2005 [hereinaft er “Mayor Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold 

Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.]

62 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 40.

63 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 70.

64 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006, p. 5.

65 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 45.

66 Both Dr. Stephens and Col. Prechter noted the need for oxygen. Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 65-67; Col. 

Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 43.

67 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 45.

68 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 39.

69 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 39-40. 

70 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 59. With regard to the DMAT, Ronald Martin with FEMA/NDMS-1, noted 

that the Oklahoma DMAT, which reported to Houston, was dispatched from Houston to the Superdome of Sunday, 

August 28, but did not reach the Superdome until Monday night for a number of reasons: (1) Two requests to the Texas 

State Police to provide a police escort for the caravan were denied; (2) the Houston City Police, which provided escort 

aft er the Texas State Police did not, could only get the team as far as the interstate; (3) the Louisiana State Police escort, 

which picked up the caravan at the Louisiana state line, and the DMAT had to stop in Baton Rouge due to deteriorating 

weather conditions, including high winds. Committee staff interview of Ronald Martin, Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 35-42.

71 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 
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Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9 (defi ning refuge of last resort as follows: “Th e refuge of last 

resort is a concept that we instituted full well knowing that we were going to have – all the studies showed us that we 

were not going to get everybody out of this town in the number of hours that we had, and there were going to be naysayers who would wait, expecting a change, and the eleven hour when it didn’t change, lives would be at risk. So the concept 

of refuge of last resort is a facility that will insure that when the eye of the hurricane passes and the storm goes away, you 

will be alive. Th at’s the only integral important item that the refuge of last resort brings with it.”); Col. Ebbert interview, 

Jan. 10, 2006, p. 9 (distinguishing the refuge of last resort from a shelter: “It was not a shelter, we weren’t going to provide services. We knew we couldn’t do that. But the refuge of last resort was set up to insure that those people were in a 

location where they would survive the water and the wind and the brunt of the hurricane. And we knew that if we had a 

bad hurricane, we were going to have a second phase of evacuation, that was a known fact.”).

72 Evacuation needs to be the number one priority in advance of a catastrophic hurricane. Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 

10, 2006, pp. 41-43 (“evacuation is your number one priority and is where you need to concentrate your eff orts because 

everybody that’s out of here is a nonproblem for us.”).

73 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, letter to the Honorable Sen. Mary Landrieu, Oct. 1, 2002, p. 2 (recognizing that as many as 

100,000 people in New Orleans “have no means of transportation, rendering it impossible for them to evacuate the City” 

and requesting $200 million to develop a light rail system, which the Mayor deemed “necessary to facilitate the evacuation”); Garey Forster, e-mail to Julie Harris and others, “Landrieu Letter: Isidore,” Sept. 29, 2002, 6:15 p.m. (urging staff 

to draft a letter on behalf of Mayor Nagin to Sen. Landrieu to refl ect the points he made to her and Sen. Jim Jeff ords, 

including the need for “Light Rail to exit 100k people.”). Th e Committee does not know whether the city received 

responses to these letters.

74 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 34 (stating that one of the “specifi c problems” with sheltering that hindered 

the city was “the abandonment at the federal and state level of sheltering south of I-10,” which he described as “a pretty 

arbitrary decision.”). Additional shelters inside New Orleans and just outside of it would have eased the strain at the 

Superdome, but it is not clear that those additional shelters would have fared much better in Katrina or some other 

catastrophic hurricane approaching New Orleans. On the one hand, Col. Ebbert claimed “there are buildings [south of 

I-10] that can sustain Cat 4 and Cat 5 hurricane hits.” Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 34 (“All you have to 

do is look around the city and know that the engineering is pretty suffi cient in some of these.”). On the other hand, Col. 

Ebbert could not say with confi dence that the Mississippi River levees would hold in subsequent storms, thereby jeopardizing certain structures which the city might consider as potential shelters or refuges, such as the Morial Convention 

Center. Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 41 (“Mother Nature could sink the Titanic, it can do away with 

most anything we can design.”). See also: Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast 

Louisiana Chapter, American Red Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 14-18.

75 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52-53 ( “the lesson I took from Pam is that we had to have a way to shelter 

people, and we did.”). In October 2004, the Mayor sent letters to the City’s Congressional delegation: “New Orleans faces 

the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory evacuation in advance of a Category 3, 4 or 5 hurricane. Even 

under the best conditions evacuation will leave at least 150,000 people in harm’s way. Currently, no city shelters are designated for a major hurricane and neither the Red Cross nor any other agency provides shelters.” Source: Mayor C. Ray 

Nagin, letters to Honorable Mary Landrieu, Honorable John Breaux, Honorable David Vitter, Honorable Richard Baker, 

Honorable Rodney M. Alexander, Honorable William J. Jeff erson, Honorable Jim McCrery, Honorable Chris John, and 

Honorable W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, Oct. 27, 2004 [hereinaft er Mayor Nagin, letters to Louisiana Congressional delegation, 

Oct. 27, 2004]. Th e City’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety projected that the study would cost $850,000. 

Source: City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland 

Security Appropriations. Provided to Committee (requesting FY06 funding of $850,000 for “fi nal feasibility and planning and design eff orts for upgrading the Louisiana Superdome, or any other facility, to serve as a refuge of last resort 

for major hurricane and other natural and manmade disaster events”). See also: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

pp. 53-68 (stating that the city requested this funding from the federal government); Mayor Nagin, letters to Louisiana 

Congressional delegation, Oct. 27, 2004 (“Th e study should include, but not be limited to: upgrading and elevation of 

back up power systems with capacity to power all internal systems, structural hardening for Category 3 or higher winds, 

upgrade of elevated enclosed HVAC systems, upgrade of water and sewer systems to be able to function with loss of city 

water and power, expanded elevated parking to house larger city emergency vehicles, expanded storage areas to hold 

stockpiled emergency equipment and supplies, other security, pumping command and control requirements.”); Brenda 

Hatfi eld, e-mail to Col. Terry Ebbert, Sept. 28, 2004, 9:42 a.m. (discussing eff ort to seek “funding to retrofi t the Super 

Dome as a shelter of last resort”).

76 City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security 

Appropriations. Provided to Committee; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 53-58, 65.

77 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 62-63 (“Th e state really doesn’t have any – that’s a commission. Th ey barely 

live off of the maintenance that they make on the lease on that building, so the state didn’t have any capability to do that, 

and they’re not going to have any capability to do it in the future because we’re going to rebuild it under FEMA regulations. Again, this is where you get caught up. Why do you have a system that hampers me from improving the capability 

and spending millions of dollars fi xing the Superdome, but I can’t bring it up one dollar better than it was before on the 

28th of August? And that’s what – you know, that still doesn’t make any sense to me. And I can cite you fi ft een examples 

of that. You want me to put my same old broken radio system in because I’m going to spend millions of dollars on an 

old radio system rather than putting millions of dollars into a new radio system.”). 

78 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 66 (stating that implementation of the plan would have cost between $7 million and $17 million.). Since it would have taken at least two years to enact the appropriation for the $850,000 that would 
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have funded the plan, work on the implementation of the could not have begun until that time.

79 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 63, 79 (“if you opened that Dome up on Saturday, you’d have had 65,000 

people in there and nobody would have gotten on the highways and left .”).

80 Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 28-29, 31. According to the press releases that accompanied the 1 p.m. and 

5 p.m. press conferences on Saturday, August 27, 2005, and the internal talking points for both press conferences, the 

only notations regarding the Superdome refer to it as a special needs shelter and do not mention that it might or will be 

opening at any point as a refuge of last resort. Source: Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for 

Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin urges Citizens to Evacuate if Possible”; City of New Orleans, 

Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Event: Katrina Update, Talking Points Follow,” Aug. 27, 2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee; City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Event: Katrina Update, Talking Points Follow,” Aug. 27, 2005, 5 p.m. 

Provided to Committee. During the press conference on Sunday morning, August 28, Mayor Nagin announced: “Th is 

morning, the Superdome has already opened for people with special needs. If you have a medical condition, if you’re on 

dialysis or some other condition, we want you to expeditiously move to the Superdome. At noon today, the Superdome 

will then be opened up as a refuge of last resort, where we will start to take citizens that cannot evacuate.” Source: “Mayor 

Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.

81 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 81; Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, former Deputy Director, New 

Orleans Fire Department and Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 

2005, transcript pp. 44-45 (stating that – dating back to Ivan – the city planned to stage buses “to move people to the 

Superdome and potentially even to the Convention Center, although I had some serious misgivings about whether or 

not that building would hold up.”).

82 “Mayor Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.

83 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 81-82.

84 Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 39 (“Dome management was able to tell us that we now have everybody sitting in 

these seats, we don’t have any more people standing outside, we don’t have any more around the concourse, standing or 

whatever, we have about 10,000 people.”).

85 Th e Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special 

needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops. Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 

2005, pp. 86-87. 

86 When NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain arrived at the Superdome on Sunday, he immediately called the City’s 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and requested food and water, which Deputy Chief Swain said the Louisiana National 

Guard ultimately delivered before landfall. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 44-47; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

p. 113 (“We made a request [for food and water], and the National Guard brought it in when they came and brought in 

both water and food into the Dome the night before the storm.”). 

87 Louisiana National Guard offi cials stated that their requests for additional food and water before landfall were met. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 69-74 (“Th ere was a quantity of food and water. I can’t tell you exactly 

how much it was. ... I believe it got there by 18-wheeler, and it was unloaded by the combination of guardsmen and Superdome management personnel.”). Gen. Jones quickly put out a call for MREs and found enough from nearby National 

Guard contingency stocks to supply people with two servings a day until Tuesday aft ernoon. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 88. LANG Col. Glenn Curtis recalled that on “Sunday we (LANG) delivered 9,792 MREs and 

13,440 one-liter bottles of water of our contingency stock to the Superdome in support of shelter operations.” Source: 

Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 128-130. 

88 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9. 2005, p. 94; Hornsby interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 31.

89 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 94.

90 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 112-113, 127; Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: How is FEMA Performing Its Mission at Th is Stage of Recovery?, October 20, 2005 (“Imagine no toilet 

facilities for 25,000 confi ned people for fi ve days. Women and children were forced to live outside in 95-degree heat 

because of the horrid smell and conditions inside. Hallways and corridors were used as toilets, trash was everywhere, and 

amongst it all children – thousands of them. It was sad, it was inhumane, it was heart-breaking, and it was so wrong.”). 

91 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 114 (“Most of the security operation [at the Superdome] deal with the refuge 

of last resort.”).

92 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 32; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 112-113. Th e offi cers commanding 

Louisiana National Guard (LANG) troops at the Superdome before and aft er landfall agreed that NOPD was the lead 

agency at the Superdome, and LANG was at the Superdome to support NOPD. Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 

64 (“I clearly saw our role to support the New Orleans Police Department, because this was a civil authority’s shelter and 

we were augmenting their eff orts.”); Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript, p. 65 (“Th at is the relationship ... that we 

support the NOPD there.”).

93 Committee staff interview of Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National 
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Guard, and Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 

2005, transcript pp. 48, 64-65; Committee staff interview of Col. Steve Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National 

Guard, conducted on Jan.12, 2006, transcript pp. 67-68; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 113-117. Ultimately, the 

total LANG pre-landfall presence comprised 71 medical offi cers, 140 Army National Guard, 140 Air National Guard, 

and 46 Special Response Team members. Source: Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 48-50 (“For the security missions, we have a requirement to provide soldiers to the Superdome, about 140, from the 527th engineering battalion ... 

the most important place I felt I needed to be was in the Dome because that’s where the most activity was because not 

only was it the 140 engineer soldiers, it was 140 air guardsmen, our 40- or 50-man SRT team was there ... and about 90 

from ... the medical command); Col. Beron interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 50 (stating that LANG sent 46 Special Response 

Team members to the Superdome); Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 9-10 (“Th e plan calls for us to provide 

manpower, so like this year, we were to supply ... 71 personnel to work alongside the City Health Department people to 

help man the Special Needs section, and that’s what traditionally we have done. We have provided manpower to work 

alongside the City, and the State, I’m sure has been there, too, but the City is who I have known.”). Col. Doug Mouton 

was in command of the National Guard security forces before landfall. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 40-41; 

Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 61.

94 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 36, 114.

95 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 35-39 (“Gotta get these people on the inside; can’t leave ’em out here getting wet. 

You can’t leave ’em out here in the wind. So we tried to speed up the process as much as possible, but it became apparent 

that we can’t get these people into the Dome as quickly as we need to based on the conditions that are out here. ... Once 

the weather really starts to deteriorate, we brought ‘em in and looped ‘em around on that concourse on the inside. Th ey 

were not allowed to go into ... the seating area of the Dome until they were actually checked for weapons.”). 

96 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 35-39.

97 Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 116.

98 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 48-49 (“I had to request additional personnel, and once those individuals came in, 

determined who exactly they are, make sure that they are teamed up with supervisors and put everything in place and again 

coordinate that with the National Guard and to ensure that we were able to get all these evacuees into the Dome as quickly 

as possible and to make sure that we searched ‘em and did all the necessary things to ensure their safety as well as ours.”).

99 LOHSEP, Sitrep, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee (stating 

that 10,342 were in the Superdome); Sally Forman, Communications Director, New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline 

and Notes, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee (“Dome opens as shelter of last resort – 10,000 gather”); Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 62 (stating that Col. Ebbert told her 15,000 to 20,000 people were at the Superdome before landfall.); 

Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52, 112 (estimating 12,000 to 15,000 were in the Superdome before landfall).