United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

MILITARY 

PERSONNEL 

DOD and the Services 

Need to Take 

Additional Steps to 

Improve Mobilization 

Data for the Reserve 

Components 

September 2006 

 

GAO-06-1068 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 2006

MILITARY PERSONNEL

DOD and the Services Need to Take 

Additional Steps to Improve Mobilization 

Data for the Reserve Components 

Highlights of GAO-06-1068, a report to 

congressional committees 

GAO has previously reported on

the Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) ability to track reservists 

deployed to the theater of 

operations and made

recommendations. Reliable 

mobilization and deployment data 

are critical for making decisions 

about reserve force availability and 

medical surveillance. Because of 

broad congressional interest, GAO 

initiated a review under the 

Comptroller General’s authority to 

conduct evaluations on his own 

initiative to determine (1) what 

DOD data indicate are the number 

of reservists mobilized and 

deployed in support of the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the 

selected demographic and 

deployment characteristics of 

those deployed and (2) whether 

DOD’s reserve deployment and

mobilization data and analyses are 

reliable. GAO analyzed data and 

data analyses from DOD’s 

Contingency Tracking System 

(CTS) and interviewed agency

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is recommending that DOD 

standardize the use of key terms;

provide required data, such as 

location; and document its internal

procedures, processes, and 

assumptions for analyzing and 

verifying data analyses. DOD

generally concurred except for the 

need for DMDC to document its 

assumptions. GAO believes that

basic key assumptions should be

documented. 

GAO’s analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have 

been mobilized in support of GWOT as of June 30, 2006, and more than 

378,000 reservists, or 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been 

deployed. The number of reservists deployed increased through fiscal year 

2003 and remained stable through fiscal year 2005. The majority of reservists

have been deployed once. GAO’s analysis further indicates that of the more 

than 378,000 reservists who have deployed in support of GWOT, 81 percent 

have spent a year or less deployed and 17 percent of reservists have spent 

more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed. Of those who deployed, 

almost 98 percent were U.S. citizens. Since GWOT began, about 78 percent 

of reservists who were deployed were White, about 14 percent were Black or 

African American, and almost 90 percent identified themselves as nonHispanic and 8 percent as Hispanic. Of those who were deployed, 89 percent 

were male and 11 percent were female. There were three variables—

volunteer status, location deployed, and unit deployed—required by DOD 

policy for which the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) could not 

provide data because the data either did not exist or were not reliable 

enough for the purposes of GAO’s report. 

GAO found the deployment and mobilization data used to be reliable for 

providing descriptive information. However, the mobilization data, some 

deployment data fields, and DMDC’s processes for data analyses need

improvement. DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve 

the reliability of mobilization data; however, additional steps are needed to 

make mobilization data more reliable. DMDC and the services have 

undertaken a large-scale, challenging effort to replace all previous serviceprovided mobilization data in DMDC’s CTS database with new data from the 

services, referred to as “rebaselining.” To date, the Air Force has certified 

that it has rebaselined its data and Navy officials say they have validated 

their personnel files and established a common baseline of data with DMDC. 

The Army, which has mobilized the largest number of reservists, has not 

completed its rebaselining effort and has not set a deadline for completion. 

Also, DOD has not fully addressed other data issues that could affect the 

accuracy and completeness of the data, such as standardizing the use of key

terms and ensuring that the services address data issues identified by DMDC 

as well as provide data for all required data fields, such as location, to 

DMDC. Also, because the data analyses DMDC provided had numerous 

errors, GAO questions the effectiveness of its verification procedures and 

other supporting procedures, all of which DMDC has not documented. Until 

DOD addresses data issues and DMDC documents the internal control 

procedures it uses to analyze data and verify its analyses of the data, the 

information provided to decision makers within Congress and DOD may be 

unreliable and decision makers will not be in the best position to make 

informed decisions about reserve force availability and reservists’ exposure 

to health hazards. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1068.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Derek Stewart 

at (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 6

DOD Data Show Demographic and Deployment Characteristics of 

Hundreds of Thousands of Reservists Deployed in Support of 

GWOT 10

DOD and the Services Have Taken Steps to Improve the Reliability 

of Reserve Component Data, but More Needs to Be Done 25 

Conclusions 34

Recommendations for Executive Action 35 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 35 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 42 

Appendix II Data on Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT 

through June 30, 2006 47 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 51 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 54 

Tables 

Table 1: Citizenship Status of Reservists Deployed in Support of 

the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through 

June 30, 2006 20 

Table 2: Race of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War 

on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 21 

Table 3: Ethnicity of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global 

War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 21 

Table 4: Gender of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global 

War on Terrorism by Reserve Component through June 30, 

2006 22 

Page i GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Table 5: Reserve Component Categories for Reservists Deployed in 

Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year 

through June 30, 2006 47 

Table 6: State, Territories, and Armed Forces Areas of Residence 

for Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism through June 30, 2006 48 

Figures 

Figure 1: Organizational Hierarchy for DOD’s Defense Manpower 

Data Center 9 

Figure 2: Reservists Mobilized and Deployed in Support of the 

Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 12 

Figure 3: Reservists Mobilized in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006 13 

Figure 4: Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 2006 14 

Figure 5: Number of Reservists Who Have Deployed One, Two, or 

Three or More Times in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism through June 30, 2006 16 

Figure 6: Number of Reservists Who Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 

to 2 Years, or More Than 2 Years Deployed in Support of 

the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 17 

Figure 7: Percentage of Reservists Deployed in the Selected 

Reserve in Support of the Global War on Terrorism 

through June 30, 2006 18 

Figure 8: Citizenship Status of Reservists at the Time of Their Most 

Current Deployment in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism through June 30, 2006 19 

Figure 9: Number of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global 

War on Terrorism by State through June 30, 2006 23 

Page ii GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Abbreviations 

CTS Contingency Tracking System 

DEERS Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System 

DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

DIMHRS Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System 

DMDC Defense Manpower Data Center 

DOD Department of Defense 

GWOT Global War on Terrorism

RCCPDS Reserve Components Common Personnel Data System 

USD (P&R) Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page iii GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

September 20, 2006 

Congressional Committees 

Since President Bush signed an Executive Order establishing the Global 

War on Terrorism (GWOT)1

 on September 14, 2001, hundreds of thousands 

of National Guard and Reserve servicemembers2

 have been activated, 

mobilized, and deployed3

 in support of efforts in, among other places, 

Afghanistan and Iraq. As the Department of Defense (DOD) continues to 

rely on about 1.3 million reservists to carry out its military operations 

domestically and abroad, there continues to be congressional interest in 

the impact of GWOT on reserve employment, income change, medical and

health status of reservists, and other issues. 

For decades, DOD has been collecting and reporting information on active 

duty and reserve component servicemembers. However, it was not until 

October 2001, less than a month after the terrorist attacks, that DOD 

emphasized the need for the services to specifically report information 

about mobilized and deployed reservists who support contingencies.4

 1

 GWOT includes missions such as Operation Enduring Freedom with operations in and 

around Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom with operations in and around Iraq. 

2

 National Guard and Reserve servicemembers include the collective forces of the Army 

National Guard and the Air National Guard, as well as the forces from the Army Reserve, 

the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve. They are known 

collectively as the reserve component. This report does not address the Coast Guard

Reserve because it comes under the day-to-day control of the Department of Homeland 

Security rather than the Department of Defense (DOD). The Coast Guard does, however, 

assist DOD in meeting its commitments and DOD data indicate that 7,053 Coast Guard 

reservists were mobilized and 204 were deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 

2006. 

3

 According to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, a

servicemember is activated when he or she is ordered to full-time duty in the active military 

of the United States. A servicemember is mobilized when he or she becomes part of the

process of assembling and organizing personnel and equipment, activating or federalizing 

units and members of the National Guard and Reserves for active duty, and bringing the 

armed forces to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. A servicemember 

is deployed when he or she becomes part of the process to relocate forces and materiel to 

desired operational areas. For the purposes of this report, the term mobilized will refer to

reservists who have been activated, mobilized, or both in support of GWOT. 

4

 Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 

memorandum, “Reporting of Personnel Data in Support of the National Emergency by 

Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks,” October 4, 2001. 

Page 1 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
While DOD has been collecting this information, several reports have 

emphasized information about reservists who have been mobilized, not 

deployed. Further, some of our prior reports5

 have raised concerns about 

DOD’s ability to effectively track reservists who are being deployed to the 

theater of operation. Information about reservists’ deployments is needed 

to assess reserve force availability and to link reservists’ locations with 

exposure to medical hazards. Our past work has also confirmed that it is 

critical that DOD collect, maintain, and report reliable information on 

deployed reservists. In our experience, the data that DOD has reported in 

the past about the number of reservists who have been mobilized and 

deployed have not been consistent because, for example, the data used 

came from different or varied sources and the analyses performed were 

based on different analytical assumptions. 

This report, initiated under the Comptroller General’s authority to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative, addressed the following issues: (1) what 

DOD data indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in 

support of GWOT and the selected demographic and deployment 

characteristics of those deployed and (2) whether DOD’s reserve 

deployment and mobilization data and analyses are reliable. 

For this report, we used data provided by the Defense Manpower Data 

Center (DMDC), which is DOD’s repository for departmentwide data. We 

outline the major assumptions we used to analyze the data in the scope 

and methodology section of this report (see app. I). Specifically, to 

address our objectives, we obtained and analyzed data from DMDC’s 

Contingency Tracking System (CTS). CTS is DMDC’s system that brings 

together data about GWOT from many sources and, according to a senior

DMDC official, is the only source of these data within DOD. The Joint 

Staff’s Manpower and Personnel office is working toward using only CTS 

data to determine reserve force availability for future operations. We also 

performed reliability assessments on the data after obtaining an 

understanding of the data file structure and the sources of the data.

 5

 See, for example, GAO, Defense Health Care: Medical Surveillance Improved Since Gulf

War, but Mixed Results in Bosnia, GAO/NSIAD-97-136 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 1997);

Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the Efficiency of Mobilizations for 

Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003); Military Personnel: DOD 

Needs to Address Long-term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and 

Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); and Defense

Health Care: Improvements Needed in Occupational and Environmental Health

Surveillance during Deployments to Address Immediate and Long-term Health Issues, 

GAO-05-632 (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005). 

Page 2 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Specifically, we (1) performed electronic testing of the data files for 

completeness (that is, missing data), out-of-range values, and dates outside 

of valid time frames; (2) assessed the relationships among data elements; 

and (3) worked with agency officials to identify data problems, such as 

which variables may be unreliable. We also analyzed the extent to which

data provided by DMDC changed during this review as a result of DMDC’s 

data cleaning effort, known as a rebaselining. Using applicable guidance,6

we interviewed knowledgeable officials at DMDC about internal control 

procedures and other matters. In addition to the officials at DMDC, we 

also interviewed knowledgeable officials from the services, the Office of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, and the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Manpower and Personnel office. The data we report are 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive 

information) with one caveat. Since the Army is in the process of updating

its mobilization data, we could not assess the reliability of the Army’s 

mobilization data to the same extent as those of the other services. In 

comparing our analyses of the data with the analyses reported by DMDC, 

we determined that DMDC’s analyses were not sufficiently reliable for this 

report. We performed our audit work from December 2005 through August 

2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. A more thorough description of our scope and methodology is 

provided in appendix I. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have 

been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000 reservists, or 

almost 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed in support 

of GWOT as of June 30, 2006. The Army National Guard has mobilized and 

deployed the greatest number of reservists—more than 230,000 have been 

mobilized and more than 163,000 have been deployed. The Navy Reserve 

had the fewest number of reservists mobilized—with about 29,000 

reservists—while the Marine Corps Reserve had the fewest number 

deployed with about 19,000 reservists. The number of reservists mobilized 

increased through fiscal year 2003 and has declined since then, while the 

number of reservists deployed increased through fiscal year 2003 and then

remained stable through fiscal year 2005. In addition, the majority of 

reservists have been deployed once, and of those deployed in support of 

GWOT, most—about 307,000 reservists, or 81 percent—have spent a year

Results in Brief 

 6

 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

Page 3 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
or less deployed. Alternatively, more than 65,000 reservists, or 17 percent,

have spent more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed, and about 

6,000 reservists, or fewer than 2 percent, have spent more than 2 years 

deployed. The majority of those deployed were part of the Selected

Reserve7

 and almost 98 percent were U.S. citizens. Since GWOT began,

about 78 percent of reservists who were deployed were White; about 14 

percent were Black or African American; about 2 percent were Asian, 

Native Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander; and about 1 percent were 

American Indian or Alaskan Native. Almost 90 percent identified 

themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as Hispanic. Of those deployed, 

89 percent were male and 11 percent were female, and 39 percent came 

from states in the southern8

 United States, 23 percent from the midwest,9

18 percent from states in the western10 United States, and 15 percent came 

from states in the northeast.11 There were three variables—volunteer 

status,12 location deployed, and deploying unit—required by DOD policy 

for which DMDC could not provide data either because the data did not 

exist or because they were not reliable enough for the purposes of this 

report. 

We found the deployment and mobilization data we used to be reliable for 

providing descriptive information. However, the mobilization data, some 

 7

 The Selected Reserve is composed of those units and individuals designated by their 

respective services and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as so 

essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority for training, equipment, and

personnel over all other reserve elements (10 U.S.C. § 10143). 

8

 The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition of the southern United

States: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 

Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and

West Virginia. The District of Columbia is also included.

9

 The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition of the midwestern 

United States: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska,

North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin. 

10 The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition of the western United 

States: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 

Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 

11 The Census Bureau includes the following states in its definition of the northeastern 

United States: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 

Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 

12 The legal authority used to involuntarily activate reservists in response to the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, limits the number that may be involuntarily activated to 

1,000,000 (10 U.S.C. § 12302(c)). 

Page 4 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
deployment data fields, and DMDC’s processes for data analyses need 

improvement. DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to 

improve the reliability of mobilization data; however, additional steps are 

needed to make mobilization data and DMDC’s analyses of mobilization 

and deployment data more reliable, as is required by DOD policy and 

federal government internal control standards. DMDC and the services 

have undertaken an effort to “rebaseline” or replace all previous serviceprovided mobilization data in DMDC’s database with new data from the 

services. To date, the Navy has validated its reserve component data file

and the Air Force has certified that it has rebaselined its reserve 

component data. However, the Army, which has mobilized and deployed 

the largest number of reservists, has not completed its rebaselining effort 

and has not provided a time frame for doing so. We recognize that the

rebaselining effort is a considerable undertaking replete with numerous 

challenges and that it is a positive step in improving the reliability of the 

data. However, even if the rebaselining effort were complete, outstanding

issues with certain data definitions across the services would continue to 

affect the accuracy and completeness of the data. For example, the use of 

the terms “activated,” “mobilized,” and “deployed” is not standardized 

within and among the services. Similarly, there is variability across the 

services in the completeness of other variables and data fields, such as 

volunteer status, deployment location, and deploying unit. Along with the 

rebaselining effort, ensuring that the services address these data issues 

and provide all required data to DMDC is an important step in improving 

the reliability of the data. With respect to DMDC’s quantitative analyses of 

its CTS data, DMDC has not documented many of its procedures, including

those for verifying the data analyses it provides to its customers. Because 

the data analyses DMDC provided to us had numerous errors—including 

overcounting the number of reservists’ deployments as well as 

overcounting the number of days some reservists were deployed—and 

were thus unreliable, we question the effectiveness of its verification 

procedures and other supporting internal control procedures for ensuring 

accurate reporting. Federal internal control standards require that data 

control activities, such as edit checks, verifications, and reconciliations, be 

conducted and documented to help provide reasonable assurance that 

agency objectives are being met. Until DOD addresses continuing data 

definition issues and DMDC documents the internal control procedures it 

uses to analyze data and verify its analyses of data, the information 

provided to decision makers within Congress and DOD may be unreliable. 

Without reliable data and analyses, decision makers will not be in the best 

position to make informed decisions that are grounded in accurate and 

complete information about reserve component force availability and 

medical surveillance issues. 

Page 5 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
We are making recommendations to the Secretary of Defense to provide 

guidance to the services to (1) better define and standardize the use of key 

terms, like deployment, and (2) provide all required data, such as 

volunteer status and location deployed, to DMDC as well as address data 

inconsistencies identified by DMDC. We are also recommending that 

DMDC document its internal procedures and processes, including the 

assumptions it uses in its data analyses. The Under Secretary of Defense, 

Personnel and Readiness provided written comments on a draft of the 

report. In its comments, DOD generally concurred with our 

recommendations, except for the recommendation to collaborate with 

other DOD offices on the reasonableness of the assumptions established 

and used by DMDC in its data analyses. DOD stated that DMDC is a 

support organization and that each organization that requests reports 

provides the assumptions that DMDC uses to develop the reports. 

However, our audit work showed that DMDC has established and uses 

some basic assumptions in analyzing data and that DMDC may not always

discuss these assumptions with other DOD offices, such as Reserve 

Affairs. As a result, we continue to emphasize the need for DMDC to 

document these assumptions and to collaborate with these offices to 

ensure a common understanding of these assumptions. DOD stated it has

taken some action on the other recommendations. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated in the report, as 

appropriate. DOD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix 

III of this report. 

In 1975, DOD implemented the Reserve Components Common Personnel 

Data System (RCCPDS)

13 to collect information on current and past 

members of the six reserve components—Army National Guard, Air 

National Guard, Army Reserve, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and

Air Force Reserve. This information included data on reservists’ personal 

characteristics, such as name, Social Security number, date of birth, 

gender, home address, and education, as well as data on their military 

characteristics, such as service, reserve component, prior service status, 

and date of initial entry into the reserve forces. According to the director 

Background 

 13 RCCPDS is an automated information system and associated database that was 

established as the official source of statistical tabulation of reserve component strengths

and related data for various users, to include DOD and Congress. 

Page 6 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
of DMDC, the services send daily, weekly, and monthly updated data 

submissions to DMDC in accordance with applicable guidance.

14

After the first Gulf War, in a May 15, 1991, memorandum,15 DOD identified 

16 recommendations requiring action by many offices within DOD 

regarding Desert Storm personnel data issues. For example, the 

memorandum said that DOD should consistently report on who 

participated in the operations and cites examples of key terms, such as in 

theater, that were being interpreted differently by DMDC, the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and the services. In December 1991,16 DOD reported 

on how DMDC provided information about operations Desert Shield and 

Desert Storm. This report cited areas for improvement. For example, the 

report indicated that DMDC created makeshift procedures to establish and 

maintain the new data sources and to accommodate varied data requests. 

The report cited that these procedures sometimes resulted in inconsistent 

or incomplete data being provided in response to a request. On May 2, 

2001, DOD updated guidance to the military services, among others, to 

maintain a centralized database of active duty personnel.17 In this 

guidance, DOD requires the services to report personnel information 

about all active duty military servicemembers as well as reservists who are 

ordered to active duty. While this instruction called for the services to 

report information about servicemembers on active duty in support of a 

contingency, the requirements for reporting contingency data were not 

specific. 

 14 DOD Instruction 1336.5, Automated Extract of Active Duty Military Personnel Records,

May 2, 2001, and DOD Instruction 7730.54, which has been updated several times since it 

was first released in 1975. 

15 DOD Manpower Data Center Memorandum, “Recommendations Based on Desert Storm 

Personnel Data Base Conference of 23-25 April 1991,” May 15, 1991. 

16 “Defense Manpower Data Center Support for Desert Shield/Desert Storm,” December 

1991. 

17 DOD Instruction 1336.5. 

Page 7 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
On October 4, 2001, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and 

Readiness (USD (P&R)),

18 issued a memorandum19 that required the 

services to report personnel information to DMDC on all active and 

reserve component personnel mobilized or deployed in support of GWOT, 

in accordance with DOD guidance.20 The purpose of GWOT data was, 

among other things, to establish eligibility for benefits and entitlements as 

a result of participation in the named contingencies.21 The information is 

critical because it provides a historical database with which to assess the 

impact of policies and processes, events, and exposures on the health of 

deployed reserve component servicemembers. DMDC was tasked with 

providing reporting guidance to the services for these data submissions. 

DMDC sent this guidance to the services on October 12, 2001.

DMDC is a civilian-led agency with a mission to deliver timely and quality 

support to its customers, and to ensure that data received from different 

sources are consistent, accurate, and appropriate when used to respond to 

inquiries. DMDC reports to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Program Integration, who is in the Office of the USD (P&R) (see fig. 1). 

 18 The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness is the principal staff 

assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 

Total Force Management, as relates to readiness, National Guard and Reserve component

affairs, health affairs, and personnel requirements and management. 

19 Department of Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness,

memorandum, “Reporting of Personnel Data in Support of the National Emergency by 

Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks,” October 4, 2001. 

20 DOD Instruction 1336.5. 

21 The data are also used for research, actuarial analyses, interagency, mobilization and 

contingency reporting, and evaluation of DOD programs and policies. 

Page 8 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 1: Organizational Hierarchy for DOD’s Defense Manpower Data Center 

In February 2002, USD (P&R) reminded the services in another 

memorandum of its earlier requirement for reporting personnel data to

DMDC and informed the services that they had 2 weeks to provide plans to 

DMDC on how they were going to correct any personnel data reporting 

problems. On August 6, 2004, DOD updated prior guidance regarding 

RCCPDS22 to include an enclosure23 that set out specific requirements for 

the services to report personnel information for all reserve component 

servicemembers supporting a named contingency, unlike previous 

guidance.

24 The purpose of the new enclosure was to ensure more accurate 

reporting on a named contingency, such as GWOT missions, as well as to 

establish eligibility for benefits and entitlements, and to develop a registry 

of participants for tracking in support of research and evaluation of DOD 

programs and policies. According to DOD officials, the services, in general, 

were still reporting data according to previous guidance for a few years 

after the new guidance was issued. 

 22 DOD Instruction 7730.54, March 15, 1999, was updated with enc. 11 on August 6, 2004. 

23 DOD Instruction 7730.54, enc. 11, August 6, 2004. 

24 DOD Instruction 1336.5, enc. 5, May 2, 2001. 

Page 9 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
In August 2004, DMDC began operation of its CTS database to address 

DOD’s reporting requirements, including those in the new enclosure (that 

is, enclosure 11). The CTS database is DOD’s repository for collecting 

activation, mobilization, and deployment data for reservists who have 

served and continue to serve in support of GWOT. The CTS database 

contains both an activation file, which contains mobilization data, and a 

deployment file. Both files are updated monthly by service submissions 

and cover GWOT from September 11, 2001, to the present. The purpose of

the activation file is to account for and provide medical and educational 

benefits for all reservists called to active duty in support of GWOT 

contingencies, and it allows DOD to provide data on the number of 

reservists who have been mobilized in support of GWOT. The purpose of

the CTS deployment file is to account for a deployed servicemember’s 

deployment date and location during each deployment event in support of 

deployment health surveillance and DOD guidance.25 The database is also 

used to track and report the number of reservists who have been deployed

in support of GWOT since September 11, 2001. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have 

been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000 reservists, or 

about 71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed in support 

of GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see fig. 2). The Army National Guard 

deployed the greatest number of reservists in support of GWOT from 

September 2001 through June 30, 2006, and, of those, the majority were 

deployed once. The data also indicate that the vast majority of reservists 

who deployed in support of GWOT were U.S. citizens, White, and male. 

Further, the data indicate that most of the reservists spent 1 year or less 

deployed. 

DOD guidance26 requires the services to report timely, accurate, and 

complete activation, mobilization,27 and deployment data. DOD guidance 

also requires DMDC to collect and maintain mobilization and deployment 

data from the services about the reservists. DOD is required by policy to 

report personnel data about reservists, such as service, service 

DOD Data Show 

Demographic and 

Deployment 

Characteristics of 

Hundreds of 

Thousands of 

Reservists Deployed 

in Support of GWOT 

 25 DOD Instruction 6490.03, Deployment Health, August 11, 2006. 

26 DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03. 

27 DMDC’s activation and mobilization data are contained in the CTS activation file. For the

purposes of this report, the term mobilized will refer to reservists who have been activated, 

mobilized, or both in support of GWOT. 

Page 10 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
component, reserve component category, race, ethnicity, gender, 

citizenship status, occupation, unit, and volunteer status regarding a 

current mobilization.28 In addition, DOD is required by policy to capture 

deployment information such as the location a reservist is deployed to and 

the dates the reservist was deployed to that location.29

DOD Data on Selected 

Demographic and 

Deployment Variables 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that more than 531,000 reservists have 

been mobilized in support of GWOT and more than 378,000 reservists, or 

71 percent of the number mobilized, have been deployed in support of 

GWOT through June 30, 2006 (see fig. 2). The number of mobilizations and 

deployments peaked in fiscal year 2003 with about 206,000 reservists 

mobilized and about 127,000 reservists deployed (see figs. 3 and 4). Since 

fiscal year 2003, the total number of mobilizations has declined, while the 

number of deployments remained stable through fiscal year 2005. The 

Army National Guard has mobilized and deployed the greatest number of

reservists—more than 230,000 mobilized and more than 163,000 deployed. 

The Navy Reserve had the least number of reservists mobilized—with 

about 29,000—while the Marine Corps Reserve had the fewest number 

deployed with about 19,000 reservists (see fig. 2). The percentage of the 

total reservists mobilized or deployed varies across the fiscal years (see 

figs. 3 and 4). For example, looking at the percentage of mobilizations by 

component each year, Navy Reserve, Air Force Reserve, and Air National 

Guard mobilizations occurred early in GWOT and have generally declined

over time. Conversely, the percentage of Army National Guard and Army 

Reserve mobilizations has generally increased over time. The greatest 

number of Army National Guard deployments—more than 60,000—

occurred in fiscal year 2005 (see table 5 totals in app. II), while also in 

fiscal year 2005, the Army National Guard represented the largest 

deploying component, with 52 percent of deployments belonging to it (see 

fig. 4). 

Number of Reservists 

Mobilized and Deployed 

 28 DOD Instruction 7730.54. 

29 DOD Instruction 6490.03. 

Page 11 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 2: Reservists Mobilized and Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

Note: Army mobilization data may change moderately upon completion of the Army’s rebaselining 

efforts with DMDC. Reservists were only counted once to identify the total number of individuals who 

have been mobilized and deployed in support of GWOT. Totals may not add to 100 percent because 

of rounding. 

Page 12 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 3: Reservists Mobilized in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal 

Year through June 30, 2006 

Notes: Army mobilization data may change moderately upon completion of the Army’s rebaselining 

efforts with DMDC. The sum of the number of reservists mobilized for each fiscal year will be different 

from the total number of reservists mobilized for all of GWOT because a reservist can be counted 

more than once (that is, for each fiscal year in which he or she began a mobilization). Totals may not 

add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

a

Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2001. 

b

Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. 

Page 13 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 4: Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal 

Year through June 30, 2006 

Notes: The sum of the number of reservists deployed for each fiscal year will be different from the 

total number of reservists deployed for all of GWOT because a reservist can be counted more than 

once (that is, for each fiscal year in which he or she began a deployment). Less than 1 percent of 

reservists deployed in fiscal year 2001 were Marine Corps Reserve servicemembers. Totals may not

add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

a

Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2001. 

b

Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. 

Although reservists usually deployed only once, some experienced 

multiple deployments (see fig. 5). For example, compared to the other 

reserve components, the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve 

had nearly half of their reservists deploying two and three or more times, 

but they tend to have shorter deployment cycles according to the Air 

Number of Reservists Who 

Have Deployed One, Two, or 

Three or More Times 

Page 14 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Expeditionary Force cycle. Under this cycle, reservists deploy for about 

120 days in a 20-month cycle. However, servicemembers assigned to 

stressed specialties deploy for longer periods of time and in greater 

frequency. At the unit level, some deployment rules have been modified to 

increase volunteerism or to add stability to key missions. The Army 

National Guard and the Marine Corps Reserve had the lowest percentage 

of reservists deploying two and three or more times, but they tend to have 

longer deployment cycles. In general, DOD policy30 stipulates that Army 

units spend 1 year “boots on the ground” in theater.31 This policy also 

states that Marine Corps units below the regimental or group level deploy 

for 7 months while regimental and group headquarters units and above 

deploy for 12 months. This policy also states that the Chief of Naval 

Operations’ goal is for servicemembers to have a 6-month deployment with 

12 months in a nondeployed status.

 30 Department of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, “Action

Memorandum: Force Deployment Rules for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom,” July 30, 2004. 

31 “Boots on the ground” is defined in a DOD action memo issued July 30, 2004, as the

window of time from when a unit physically arrives in theater until the unit physically 

departs from the theater. In addition to time spent “boots on the ground,” Army 

servicemembers usually have a period prior to mobilization in which they train at a

mobilization station and a time following deployment where they demobilize. 

Page 15 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 5: Percentage of Reservists Who Have Deployed One, Two, or Three or More 

Times in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

Notes: For the Marine Corps Reserve, very few reservists—less than 1 percent—served three or

more deployments. Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that across the services, the majority 

of reservists have been deployed once, and of those deployed in support of 

GWOT, most—about 307,000 reservists, or 81 percent—have spent a year

or less deployed. Alternatively, more than 65,000 reservists, or 17 percent,

have spent more than 1 year but less than 2 years deployed, and about 

6,000 reservists, or fewer than 2 percent, have spent more than 2 years 

deployed. The data also indicate that the Marine Corps Reserve had the 

highest percentage of reservists serving more than 2 years. In addition, the

data also indicate that very few—less than 1 percent—of Air National 

Guard reservists served more than 2 years (see fig. 6). 

Number of Reservists Who 

Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 to 

2 Years, or More Than 2 Years 

Deployed in Support of GWOT 

Page 16 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 6: Percentage of Reservists Who Have Spent 1 Year or Less, 1 to 2 Years, or

More Than 2 Years Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through 

June 30, 2006

Notes: For the Air National Guard, very few reservists—less than 1 percent—served more than 2 

years. Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that most reservists who have 

deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were members of the 

Selected Reserve (see fig. 7 and table 5 in app. II). The majority of units 

and individuals in each reserve component are part of the Selected 

Reserve. These units and individuals have been designated as so essential 

to the initial wartime mission that they have priority for training, 

equipment, and personnel over all categories of reservists. Congress 

authorizes end strength for Selected Reserve personnel each year. The 

authorized end strength for the Army National Guard has been about 

350,000 for the past several years. For fiscal year 2005, data provided by 

the services to DMDC indicate that the Army National Guard deployed

Reserve Component Categories 

for Reservists Deployed in 

Support of GWOT 

Page 17 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
more than 60,000 Selected Reserve servicemembers, which represents the 

highest number of Selected Reserve servicemembers deployed in a single 

fiscal year by a single reserve component since GWOT began. 

Figure 7: Percentage of Reservists Deployed in the Selected Reserve in Support of

the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

Although the services are authorized a maximum number of selected

reservists, the actual number of reservists will fluctuate when additional 

reservists are recruited or others leave the reserve component. In addition, 

reservists such as those in the Individual Ready Reserve, are also available

for deployment. In general, reservists are trained to have specific skills 

and specialties and may not be suited to deploy for a specific mission until 

additional training is provided. In addition, some reservists may not be

available for deployment because they are in training, on medical leave, or 

awaiting training. 

Page 18 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that almost 98 percent of reservists 

who have deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were U.S. 

citizens at the time of their most current deployment (see fig. 8). The data

indicate that about 1 percent of reservists were non-U.S. citizens or nonnationals at the time of their most current deployment. The citizenship 

status of more than 1,400 reservists was unknown. DOD data also indicate 

that 168 reservists’ citizenship status changed. Table 1 shows the 

citizenship status of reservists by reserve component by fiscal year. 

Citizenship Status of Reservists 

at the Time of Their Most 

Current Deployment in Support 

of GWOT 

Figure 8: Citizenship Status of Reservists at the Time of Their Most Current 

Deployment in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

Note: Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding. 

a

U.S. nationals are non-U.S. citizens who owe permanent allegiance to the United States, such as

persons born in American Samoa or Swains Island. 

Page 19 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Table 1: Citizenship Status of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year through June 30, 

2006 

 Fiscal year 

2001a2002 2003 2004 2005 2006b

Army National Guard U.S. citizen 3,622 6,868 40,083 47,477 59,513 23,542

 U.S. national 0 0 0 0 0 0

 Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 25 54 288 440 708 273

 Unknown 0 0 1 0 0 0

U.S. citizen 1,469 18,935 21,967 13,086 12,259 9,497

U.S. national 53 576 633 381 359 376

Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 0 3 0 9 11 9

Air National Guard 

Unknown 0 1 5 3 1 0

U.S. citizen 1,158 3,749 35,401 28,793 24,316 12,948

U.S. national 0 0 6 4 4 0

Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 17 77 766 588 473 201

Army Reserve 

Unknown 6 1,379 72 89 84 31

U.S. citizen 235 2,464 5,349 5,192 5,168 5,554

U.S. national 0 6 15 9 14 9

Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 2 23 84 91 77 131

Navy Reserve 

Unknown 8 87 207 222 158 149

U.S. citizen 8 1,252 9,440 5,697 3,177 895

U.S. national 0 1 33 14 15 0

Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 0 98 479 148 107 34

Marine Corps Reserve 

Unknown 0 0 0 0 0 0

U.S. citizen 508 11,630 11,795 8,927 8,407 6,469

U.S. national 0 0 0 0 0 0

Non-U.S. citizen or non-national 0 5 4 6 6 7

Air Force Reserve 

Unknown 0 2 4 3 0 0

Total 7,111 47,210 126,632 111,179 114,857 60,125

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Reservists can be counted more than once if they deployed more than once in different fiscal 

years. 

a

Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2001. 

b

Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that about 78 percent of those 

deployed for GWOT were White; about 14 percent were Black or African 

American; about 2 percent were Asian, Native Hawaiian, or Other Pacific 

Race and Ethnicity for 

Reservists Deployed in Support 

of GWOT 

Page 20 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Islander; and about 1 percent were American Indian or Alaskan Native 

(see table 2). Overall, about 5 percent of the deployed reservists declined 

to indicate their race. The Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, 

and the Air Force Reserve had the highest percentages of the reservists 

who identified themselves as White. Further, about 90 percent of those 

who responded identified themselves as non-Hispanic and 8 percent as 

Hispanic (see table 3). 

Table 2: Race of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

 

Army 

National 

Guard

Air National 

Guard

Army 

Reserve

Navy 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Air Force 

Reserve Total

White 131,686 44,759 66,609 13,905 14,096 23,432 294,487

Black or African 

American 

21,285 3,384 19,541 2,611 1,543 3,191 51,555

Asian/Native Hawaiian 

or other Pacific

Islander 

2,794 592 3,318 492 292 307 7,795

American 

Indian/Alaska Native 

1,193 471 497 138 130 122 2,551

More than one race 0 132 0 1,981 64 85 2,262

Declined to respond 6,586 1,836 5,127 1,288 3,163 1,632 19,632

Total 163,544 51,174 95,092 20,415 19,288 28,769 378,282

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Note: Although the1997 governmentwide requirements for the collection and reporting of information

on race and ethnicity were to have been implemented by January 1, 2003, DOD has not yet fully 

implemented the requirements and its internal monthly reports continue to use some of the former

racial and ethnic categories. 

Table 3: Ethnicity of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

 

Army 

 National 

 Guard

Air National 

Guard

Army 

Reserve

Navy 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Air Force 

Reserve Total

Non-Hispanic 152,350 48,497 84,498 15,003 11,531 26,970 338,849

Hispanic 11,193 2,579 10,465 1,851 3,054 1,699 30,841

Unknown 1 98 129 3,561 4,703 100 8,592

Total 163,544 51,174 95,092 20,415 19,288 28,769 378,282

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Page 21 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that about 338,000 reservists, or about 

89 percent of the number deployed, were male (see table 4). About 11 

percent of those deployed in support of GWOT were female. Of the 

approximately 163,500 Army National Guard servicemembers who have 

been deployed through June 30, 2006, more than 92 percent were male. 

Almost 98 percent of those deployed in support of GWOT through June 30, 

2006, for the Marine Corps Reserve were male, representing the highest 

percentage of males compared with females for all of the reserve 

components. 

Gender of Reservists Deployed 

in Support of GWOT 

Table 4: Gender of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Reserve Component through June 30, 

2006 

 

Army National 

Guard

Air National 

Guard Army Reserve Navy Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Air Force 

Reserve Total

Male 150,633 45,674 79,799 17,897 18,806 25,044 337,853

Female 12,910 5,500 15,276 2,518 482 3,725 40,411

Unknown 1 0 17 0 0 0 18

Total 163,544 51,174 95,092 20,415 19,288 28,769 378,282

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that California, Texas, Pennsylvania, 

and Florida had the highest numbers of reservists who have deployed in 

support of GWOT through June 2006 (see table 6 in app. II for the number 

of reservists deployed by state of residence by reserve component by 

fiscal year). The 4 states combined had more than 76,000 reservists in 

residence at the time of their deployments. Eleven states deployed more 

than 10,000 reservists each, accounting for more than 160,000 reservist 

deployments. Of those deployed, about 39 percent came from states in the 

southern United States, about 23 percent from the midwest, about 18 

percent from states in the western United States, and about 15 percent 

came from states in the northeast part of the country.32 More than 20,000 

reservists indicated California or Texas as their state of residence at the 

time they were deployed (see fig. 9). Nineteen states and 5 territories had 

fewer than 5,000 reservists in residence at the time of their deployment 

and 20 states and 1 territory had from 5,000 to 9,999 reservists in residence 

at the time of their deployment. 

State of Residence of 

Reservists Deployed in Support 

of GWOT 

 32 Totals may not add to 100 percent because of rounding and because we did not include

the percentage for territories or Armed Forces areas. 

Page 22 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Figure 9: Number of Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by State through June 30, 2006 

Page 23 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Our analysis of DOD data indicates that since GWOT began, the 

occupational areas33 of enlisted reservists deployed in support of GWOT 

have stayed somewhat consistent across all services. For example, the 

Army National Guard, the Air Force Reserve, and the Marine Corps 

Reserve have deployed reservists mostly in infantry occupational areas 

including such groups as infantry, air crew, and combat engineering. All 

six reserve components have deployed electrical and mechanical 

equipment repairers, such as automotive, aircraft, and armament and 

munitions. Three of the six reserve components—the Army National 

Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve—have deployed 

reservists who are service and supply handlers, such as law enforcement 

and motor transport. 

Occupational Information 

about Enlisted and Officer 

Reservists Deployed in Support 

of GWOT 

Since GWOT began, the occupational areas most deployed for reserve 

component officers have varied, but all reserve components primarily 

deployed tactical operations officers, to include ground and naval arms, 

helicopter pilots, and operations staff subgroups. The Army National 

Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Navy Reserve have deployed 

engineering and maintenance officers, such as the communications and 

radar and aviation maintenance occupational subgroups. The Air National 

Guard, the Army Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve have deployed 

reservists in the health care officer occupational areas, including 

physicians and nurses. The Army Reserve and the Marine Corps Reserve 

have deployed supply and procurement occupational areas that include 

transportation, general logistics, and supply occupational subgroups. The 

Air Force Reserve has also deployed intelligence officers in occupational 

subgroups such as general intelligence and counterintelligence. 

Data for the Volunteer 

Status, Location Deployed, 

and Unit Deployed 

Variables Were Either Not 

Available or Not Reliable 

We were unable to analyze the volunteer status variable because the data

do not exist for all of the reserve components. Similarly, we were unable 

to analyze the deployment location and deployment unit variables because 

we determined, in agreement with DMDC officials, that the data in these 

fields were not reliable. This issue is discussed further below. 

 33 Occupational areas, groups, and subgroups are defined by DOD’s Occupational Database. 

Examples given represent DOD’s areas, occupational groups or subgroups.

Page 24 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
While we found selected deployment and mobilization data to be 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive data), 

some of the data were not reliable enough for us to report, even for 

descriptive purposes. DMDC and the services, as required by DOD policy, 

have taken steps to improve the reliability of the mobilization data; 

however, more action is needed to improve the reliability of CTS data and 

DMDC’s analyses of those data. For example, (1) the rebaselining effort 

resulted in substantial changes being made to the mobilization data, and 

the Army—which has mobilized and deployed the largest number of 

reservists for GWOT—has not completed this rebaselining effort, which 

the Joint Staff tasked DMDC and the services to do in November 2005; 

(2) we identified data issues that DOD has not addressed that could 

further improve the reliability of the data, such as standardizing the use of 

key terms like deployment; and (3) DMDC does not have effective controls 

for ensuring the accuracy of its data analyses used to produce reports as 

required by federal government internal control standards. Although 

DMDC and DOD have undertaken a major data cleaning—or 

rebaselining—effort to improve the reliability of mobilization data, the 

effort does not address some fundamental data quality issues. While we 

recognize that such a large-scale effort, although replete with challenges, 

is a positive step toward better quality data, if data reporting requirements 

and definitions are not uniform, and if there are no quality reviews of 

DMDC’s analyses, some data elements and DMDC’s analyses of those data

may continue to be unreliable. A senior DMDC official stated that it 

emphasizes getting data to customers in a timely manner rather than 

documenting the internal control procedures needed to improve the 

reliability of the data and the data analyses produced. However, with 

proper internal controls, DMDC could potentially achieve both timeliness 

and accuracy. Without reliable data and analyses, DOD cannot make 

sound data-driven decisions about reserve force availability. Moreover, 

DOD may not be able to link reservists’ locations with exposure to medical 

hazards. 

We have found the deployment and mobilization data we used to be 

sufficiently reliable for our purposes (that is, providing descriptive data), 

and DMDC and the services have recently taken steps to improve the 

reliability of mobilization data. However, additional steps are needed to 

make mobilization data more reliable. As previously noted, DOD 

guidance34 requires the services to report timely, accurate, and complete 

DOD and the Services 

Have Taken Steps to 

Improve the 

Reliability of Reserve 

Component Data, but 

More Needs to Be 

Done 

DMDC and the Services 

Are Updating the 

Mobilization Data in CTS, 

but Concerns Remain 

 34 DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03. 

Page 25 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
activation, mobilization,35 and deployment data. DMDC officials 

responsible for overseeing the CTS database stated that a rebaseline of the 

deployment data was not necessary because the deployment data matched

the data in the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s (DFAS) 

systems36 by more than 98 percent. Although DMDC and the services 

rebaselining of the mobilization data in CTS has resulted in improvements, 

the Army, which has mobilized the greatest number of reservists for 

GWOT, has not completed its rebaselining effort. A senior-level DMDC 

official responsible for overseeing the CTS database said that the 

mobilization data in the CTS database prior to the rebaselining effort were 

less than 80 percent accurate for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, 

but that the Marine Corps’ data were generally considered to be accurate 

prior to the rebaselining effort. The official also stated that DMDC expects 

that the mobilization data within the CTS database will be 90 percent 

accurate because of this rebaselining effort, which was still ongoing 

through August 2006. While we recognize that this is a considerable 

undertaking, to date, only the Navy and the Air Force have validated or 

certified their mobilization data files. Navy officials said that the Navy has 

validated its personnel records and established a common baseline of data 

with DMDC. Air Force Reserve officials said that their data within CTS are

now 99 to 100 percent accurate. The Chief of the Personnel Data Systems 

Division for the Air National Guard certified that although file

discrepancies are still being reconciled, the data that were processed by 

DMDC on June 11, 2006, were the most accurate activation37 data and that 

data accuracy will improve with each future file sent to DMDC. The DMDC 

official said that the Marine Corps had only partially completed its 

rebaselining effort and would not be finished until the Marine Corps 

provided its August 2006 data file in September 2006. The Army National 

Guard and Army Reserve are still working to rebaseline their mobilization 

data, and the Army has not provided a time frame for completing the 

effort. 

However, we still have concerns regarding the reliability of the 

mobilization data, because the scope of the rebaselining effort changed 

 35 DMDC’s activation and mobilization data are contained in the CTS activation file. For the

purposes of this report, the term mobilized will refer to reservists who have been activated, 

mobilized, or both in support of GWOT. 

36 The DFAS systems contain data on special pays and allowances provided to

servicemembers including combat zone tax exclusions and imminent danger pay.

37 For this report, Air Force activation data are the same as mobilization data. 

Page 26 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
and the data changed substantially as a result of the rebaselining. At the 

beginning of our review, DMDC and the services referred to the 

rebaselining effort as a “reconciliation,” which, according to a DMDC 

official and a Reserve Affairs official, would have resulted in all data 

(current and past) being reviewed and corrected as needed. We 

acknowledge that some degree of change is expected in any data cleaning 

effort, especially with large-scale, multisource collection methods such as 

DMDC’s data collection process. However, our experience has shown that 

cleaning efforts that result in a large degree of change would suggest 

systematic error. Such error raises concerns about the reliability of both 

the original data and the “cleaned” data. If both the source data and the

cleaned data are populated with the same assumptions and information, 

any reconciliation of data points should result in relatively small change 

that correct simply for random error, such as from keypunch or data 

source errors. However, for some variables, the data changed substantially 

as a result of DMDC and the services’ rebaselining or data cleaning effort.

Our analysis shows that data from the period of September 2001 through 

December 2005 have changed by about 4 percent to as much as 20 percent. 

For example: 

• The number of reservists mobilized for GWOT through December 2005 

went from about 478,000 to about 506,000—an increase of more than 

27,000 reservists or a change of more than 5 percent. 

• The Army Reserve data sustained the greatest change during this time with 

a more than 19 percent increase in the number of reservists mobilized. The 

number of mobilized Army National Guard reservists increased more than 

7 percent. According to a senior DMDC official, the Army data are 

expected to continue to change, perhaps substantially enough to require

the rebaselining of the data again in the future. 

• The number of Air National Guard reservists mobilized decreased by more 

than 13 percent. 

• The Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Air Force Reserve 

data all changed about 5 percent. 

DOD officials stated that the rebaselining effort occurred because the 

Joint Staff tasked DMDC and the services with ensuring that the data the 

Joint Staff’s Manpower and Personnel office was using in CTS were the 

same data as the services were using to determine reserve force 

availability. According to a senior-level DMDC official responsible for 

overseeing CTS, the rebaselining effort’s scope changed because all of the 

services agreed that starting over and replacing all of the data would make 

more sense than trying to correct transactions already in CTS, because the 

Page 27 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
services found errors in the CTS files initially used for the reconciliation. 

Service officials said that some of the data discrepancies developed 

because of a DMDC quality check procedure that sometimes resulted in 

DMDC replacing the service-submitted data with data from other sources. 

DMDC officials said that they did this because the services were unable to 

report some of the required CTS data. According to DMDC officials, 

service submissions have become more complete over time, resulting in

DMDC now using the quality check procedures only to check the data

rather than to populate the CTS database. This DMDC official stated that 

DMDC expected the data to change substantially based on the issues 

identified with service data during the initial reconciliation effort and the 

subsequent rebaselining effort. 

Because the rebaselining effort is not complete and the Army—which has 

mobilized and deployed the largest number of reservists for GWOT—has 

not finished the rebaselining, we do not know how much the data will 

continue to change as DMDC and the services work to finish this effort. 

DOD data on reservists’ mobilizations and deployments are important 

because decision makers at DOD and in Congress need the data to make 

sound decisions about personnel issues and for planning and budgeting 

purposes. 

Prior to the rebaselining effort, some services recognized that there were 

data issues that needed to be addressed and took steps to do so, as DOD 

guidance38 requires the services to report accurate and complete

mobilization and deployment data. However, some data issues that would 

ensure more accurate, complete, and consistent mobilization and 

deployment data across the services in the future have not been fully 

addressed by DOD. Some examples of data issues being addressed include 

the following: 

DOD Has Not Fully 

Addressed Data Issues 

That Could Improve Data 

Reliability 

• The Air Force and the Navy were having difficulty tracking mobilizations 

based on reservists’ mobilization orders, which has resulted in both 

services independently working to develop and implement systems that 

write reservists’ orders. 

• The Army Reserve recently began to modify its mobilization systems, 

which Army officials expect will improve the collection of reservists’ 

mobilization data. 

 38 DOD Instruction 7730.54 and DOD Instruction 6490.03. 

Page 28 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
• The Air Force identified problems with the way in which the Defense 

Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System (DEERS) processed end dates for 

reservists’ mobilizations, which resulted in some reservists not receiving

appropriate benefits (for example, dental benefits). Air Force officials 

worked with officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and 

DMDC to identify and address the data processing logic issues. 

Despite these positive steps, service process improvements are not all 

complete, and further, there has been no comprehensive review across 

DOD to identify data issues that if addressed, could result in more 

complete, accurate, and consistent mobilization and deployment data 

across and within the services. Reserve Affairs officials in the office of 

Reserve Systems Integration said that a more sustainable fix to the 

processes of collecting data is needed to ensure that data captured in the 

future are accurate and more efficiently collected. We agree and have

identified some issues that may continue to affect data reliability, such as 

the following: 

• The use of terms, such as activated, mobilized, and deployed, has not been 

standardized across the services. Although the department has defined 

these terms in the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 

Associated Terms, the terms are used differently by the individual 

services. In the Air Force, “activation” can refer to the time when a 

reservist either volunteers or is involuntarily mobilized; however, the term

“mobilized” refers only to someone who is not a volunteer. Even within a 

single service, these words can have different meanings. For example, an 

Army National Guard official who participated in the rebaselining effort 

said that Army National Guard servicemembers who backfill active duty 

servicemembers are not considered deployed since they have not left the 

United States. However, according to this official, some staff in the Army 

National Guard use “deployed” to include reservists who are mobilized 

within the United States.

• There is no single data entry process that would minimize the potential for 

contradictory data about reservists in multiple systems. Currently, data 

about reservists are entered separately into multiple systems. 

• There is no mechanism for DMDC to ensure that the services are 

addressing the data inconsistencies DMDC identifies during its ongoing, 

monthly validation process, such as Social Security numbers that are 

duplicated in two reserve components. 

• DOD has taken an ad hoc, episodic approach to identifying data reporting 

requirements and to addressing data issues. DOD has periodically issued 

policies regarding its need to collect and report specific data, such as 

volunteer status and location deployed, about active duty servicemembers 

and reservists. As a result of changing requirements, many of these 

Page 29 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
policies have addendums that include these additional data requirements, 

which are not immediately supported by the services’ existing systems that 

are used to collect the data. Over time, this has led to disjointed policies 

that overlap and that require the services to modify their existing systems 

and processes, which can take months to complete. 

• There are incomplete data submissions across the services. Specifically, 

data for volunteer status was not available in CTS for all service 

components, and the location deployed and deploying unit data were not

reliable enough for the purposes of this report. Only three of the six 

reserve components—the Air National Guard, the Marine Corps Reserve, 

and the Air Force Reserve—provide information on a reservist’s volunteer 

status, which neither we nor DMDC report because it is not available for

all six components. Further, DMDC officials said that they consider CTS 

location data incomplete although the data are improving with each fiscal 

year. DMDC officials said that most unit information is based on the unit a

reservist is assigned to and may not represent the unit the reservist is 

currently deployed with in theater. For this reason, we did not consider 

these data reliable enough to report.

A DMDC official stated that DMDC does not have the authority to direct 

the services to correct data errors or inconsistencies or to address data 

issues. DMDC does, however, work with the services and tries to identify

and address data challenges. According to some service officials, the 

department plans to implement a new, integrated payroll and personnel 

system—Defense Integrated Military Human Resource System 

(DIMHRS)—and that the services have been diverting resources needed to 

modify their existing systems and relevant processes to support DIMHRS. 

However, our past work has shown that DOD has encountered a number 

of challenges with DIMHRS, which is behind schedule, and the current 

schedule has it available no sooner than April 2008, when the Army is 

scheduled to begin implementing the system. 

In general, service officials said that they are working to collect data on

volunteer status, location deployed, and deploying unit; however, Air 

Force officials stated that they do collect data on location deployed and 

deploying unit and that these data are accurate and are being provided to

DMDC. Army Reserve officials stated that they currently do not have plans 

to collect data on volunteer status. 

Page 30 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
DMDC has not documented (1) its procedures for verifying that the data

analyses it performs are correct and (2) the procedures for monthly 

validation of service data or the procedures used to perform analyses of 

data. Either of these issues could, if documented as part of DMDC’s 

verification process, address some of our concerns about internal 

controls. DMDC is required by policy39 to develop and produce reports 

about mobilization data and respond to requests for information about 

deployed personnel. DOD policy40 requires DMDC and the reserve 

components to ensure the accuracy of files and the resulting reports. 

Federal government internal control standards41 require that data control 

activities, such as edit checks, verifications, and reconciliations, be 

conducted and documented to help provide reasonable assurance that 

agency objectives are being met. 

DMDC officials said that they have internal verification procedures that 

require supervisors to review all data analyses used to generate reports, 

although these procedures are not documented. Specifically, the 

supervisors are to review (1) the statistical programming code used to 

generate the data analyses to ensure that the code includes the customer’s 

data analyses parameters (that is, the assumptions used to produce the 

analyses) and (2) the “totals” generated to ensure that these totals match 

the control totals that show the number of reservists currently or ever 

mobilized or deployed in support of GWOT. DMDC officials acknowledge 

the importance of verifying the accuracy of the data analyses prior to 

providing the reports to customers, and they stated that they had verified

the accuracy of the analyses provided to us. However, we found numerous 

errors in the initial and subsequent analyses we received of the GWOT 

data through May 2006, causing us to question whether DMDC verified the 

data analyses it provided to us and, if it did, whether the current process is 

adequate. For example, we found that DMDC had done the following: 

DMDC Does Not Have 

Effective Controls for 

Ensuring the Accuracy of 

Its Data Analyses Used to 

Produce Reports 

• Counted reservists with more than one deployment during GWOT also 

among those who deployed only once during GWOT, which resulted in 

overcounting the number of reservists’ deployments. 

 39 DOD Instruction 7730.54. 

40 DOD Instruction 7730.54. 

41 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

Page 31 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
• Used ethnicity responses to identify race despite having told us that the 

internal policy was changed in 2006 and that this was no longer an 

acceptable practice. 

• Counted reservists whose ethnicity was “unknown” as “non-Hispanic” 

although “unknown” does not necessarily mean someone’s ethnicity is 

“non-Hispanic” and there was a category for unknowns. 

• Repeatedly categorized data based on a reservist’s first deployment (when 

there was more than one) despite agreeing to modify this analytical 

assumption so that we could present data by the reservist’s most current 

deployment.

• Reported thousands of reservists as having changed citizenship status 

during GWOT although, in our analyses, we found that only 168 reservists 

had changed status. 

• Analyzed data by reserve component categories (for example, Selected 

Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve) rather than by reserve component 

as we had asked. By analyzing the number of days a reservist was 

deployed by reserve component category, a reservist could be counted 

multiple times within one component if he or she changed category. This 

error affected the way in which the total number of days a reservist was 

deployed was calculated. For example, if the same reservist served 350 

days as an Army National Guard Selected Reserve member and an 

additional 350 days as an Army National Guard Individual Ready Reserve 

member, he or she would be counted as two reservists who were each 

deployed for less than a year. However, our intent was to report that the 

same individual had been deployed for a total of 700 days. In our analysis, 

all of a reservist’s days deployed were totaled and counted once for each

reserve component, regardless of which category he or she belonged to 

when deployed. 

• Miscoded the end date for the analysis of how many days reservists were 

deployed for GWOT. This resulted in up to an additional 90 days of 

deployment being counted for reservists who were still deployed at the 

time the data were submitted to DMDC. 

In our discussions with DMDC officials, they readily acknowledged that 

errors had been made, although they stated that the analyses had 

undergone supervisory review prior to our receiving them. During these 

discussions, we also discovered that many of these errors occurred 

because DMDC had not used all of our data analyses parameters, although 

these officials had stated that this was one of the verification process steps 

followed. Although we were able to work with DMDC officials and identify 

the analytical assumptions they were going to use to complete our 

analyses, without documented analytical procedures, it is unclear to what 

degree the analyses DMDC provides to other users of the data also contain 

Page 32 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
errors since many may not similarly verify the analyses provided to them 

by DMDC. 

In addition, DMDC officials have not documented additional processes 

that would further support a verification process, such as (1) the ongoing,

monthly validation process of service-provided data42 and (2) the 

procedures to perform analyses and generate reports, including the 

assumptions DMDC uses when producing periodic and special reports for 

customers. In the past, according to the services, the ongoing, monthly 

validation process DMDC used resulted in two sets of data—one set of 

service data and one set of DMDC data—that may not have been the same. 

For example, we were told by the Air Force that, in some cases, service 

data were replaced with default values because of a business rule that 

DMDC applied to the data and that this change resulted in errors to the 

service-provided data. These inconsistent data caused the Joint Staff to 

request that the services and DMDC reconcile the data. As stated above, 

there were errors in the analyses performed to generate the reports DMDC 

provided to us, including DMDC’s not using many of the assumptions we 

agreed to for the analyses. DMDC also made errors that contradicted its 

own undocumented policy. 

A senior DMDC official said DMDC has not documented these procedures 

because the organization emphasizes getting data and reports to its 

customers in a timely manner rather than preparing this documentation. 

This official said that documentation is not a top priority because 

situations change rapidly, and it would be hard to keep these documents 

up-to-date. The official also said that the errors made in the analyses 

provided to us were caused by human error and the need to provide data 

quickly. Further, the DMDC official said that while there are standard data

requests that are generated frequently, GAO’s request was an ad hoc 

request, and the procedures for addressing such requests, in practice, are

not as well defined. While we agree that our requests met DMDC’s 

definition of an ad hoc request, we disagree that sufficient time was not 

allowed for DMDC to prepare the analyses. For the initial request, we 

worked with DMDC over the course of about 5 business days to define the 

analytical assumptions that would be used during the analysis. DMDC then 

took about 8 business days to complete the analysis and provide it to us. 

 42 During the ongoing monthly validation process, DMDC officials said that they apply a

series of undocumented business rules to identify and address inconsistencies in the data 

provided by the services and comparable data reported in DEERS and by DFAS. 

Page 33 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
DOD data analyses are important because decision makers at DOD and in 

Congress need the data to make sound decisions about reserve force 

availability, medical surveillance, and planning and budgeting. In the 

absence of documented procedures and the necessary controls to ensure 

that they are implemented, it is difficult for an organization to ensure that

it has established a robust process that is being consistently applied and 

that accurate results are being achieved. Joint Staff and Reserve Affairs 

officials are emphasizing the need to use one data source for most 

analyses to further reduce the inconsistencies in data analyses because 

service-produced analyses and DMDC-produced analyses could differ if 

both are not using the same set of data and assumptions. Otherwise, it is 

possible that the data analyses provided to decision makers at DOD or in 

Congress will be incomplete and inconsistent. If the data analyses are 

incorrect, users could draw erroneous conclusions based on the data,

which could lead to policies that affect reservists in unanticipated ways.

DOD recognizes the need for accurate, complete, and consistent data and

data analyses, and it has taken some preliminary, ad hoc steps to improve 

its data, including undertaking a considerable effort to rebaseline its 

mobilization data. It has not, however, addressed some of the 

inconsistencies in data and data analyses departmentwide, such as when

terms are used differently from one service to the next. Further, service 

officials stated that it is anticipated that a lot of these problems will be 

addressed when DIMHRS is implemented. However, the schedule for 

DIMHRS continues to slip, so it is unclear when this solution will be 

available. We recognize that the need for accurate, complete, and 

consistent data and data analyses about reservist mobilization and 

deployment is always important, and even more so during higher levels of

mobilization and deployment, such as is the case now with GWOT. This is 

especially true since, in general, there are restrictions on the maximum 

length of time a reservist can be involuntarily activated. Thus, having 

accurate and complete data on a reservist’s status is critical for 

determining availability for future deployments. This is especially true of

the CTS data since the Manpower and Personnel office in the Joint Staff 

and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

mostly use the data found in CTS. These data also help DOD and Congress 

to understand the potential impacts of policy decisions as they relate to

reservists who are eligible for TRICARE Reserve Select and educational 

benefits based on the number of days a reservist is deployed. DOD has not 

provided guidance to the services to better define and standardize the use 

of key terms. DOD also has not collected and maintained all essential data 

nor has it established a process for ensuring that data inconsistencies are 

Conclusions 

Page 34 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
resolved. Further, DOD has not documented key procedures and 

processes for verifying the data analyses it provides to its customers, thus

compromising its ability to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and 

consistency of these analyses. Until decision makers in DOD and Congress 

have accurate, complete, and consistent data and analyses, they will not be

in the best position to make informed decisions about the myriad of 

reserve deployment matters. 

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 

actions: 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to 

provide guidance to the services to better define and standardize the use 

of key terms, like activation, mobilization, and deployment, to promote the 

completeness, accuracy, and consistency of the data within CTS. 

• Direct the service secretaries to (1) take the steps necessary to provide all

required data to DMDC, such as volunteer status and location deployed, 

and (2) have the services address data inconsistencies identified by 

DMDC. 

• Direct the service secretaries to establish the needed protocols to have the 

services report data consistent with the guidance above. 

• Direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, to 

require DMDC to document its internal procedures and processes, 

including the assumptions it uses in data analyses. In doing this, the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should collaborate on the 

reasonableness of the assumptions established and used by DMDC in its 

data analyses with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff. 

The Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, provided 

written comments on a draft of this report and stated that we changed one 

of our original audit objectives and did not inform the department of this 

change. We disagree. While the scope of our audit did change after our 

initial notification letter of June 17, 2005, was sent to DOD, we notified the 

proper officials of this change in a December 2, 2005, email to the agencydesignated liaison within the DOD Inspector General’s office. In this email, 

we specifically said that we would be contacting DMDC and that we would 

be focusing on data for reserve component activation, mobilization, and 

deployment for GWOT. In accordance with generally accepted government 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

Page 35 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
auditing standards (GAGAS),43 GAO analysts are expected, as appropriate, 

to review an agency’s internal controls as they relate to the scope of the 

performance audit. Specifically, we are required by GAGAS44 to review the

reliability of the data and the data analyses provided to us. To assess the 

reliability of data and data analyses, we often review an agency’s internal 

controls that are put in place to ensure the accuracy of the data and 

analyses. As we discuss in our report, we found the data to be sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. However, over the course of the work, the 

analyses of the data DMDC provided to us continued to have errors. This 

raised concerns about the adequacy of DMDC’s internal controls for 

preparing and verifying these analyses, which DMDC stated were not 

documented. In accordance with GAGAS, when reporting on the results of 

their work, auditors are responsible for disclosing all material or 

significant facts known to them which, if not disclosed, could mislead 

knowledgeable users or misrepresent the results. Consistent errors in 

DMDC’s analyses led us to include an audit objective on the reliability of 

the data and the data analyses. 

In its written comments, DOD generally concurred with three of our 

recommendations and did not concur with one of our recommendations. 

DOD also provided technical comments, which we have incorporated in

the report, as appropriate. Regarding our recommendation that DOD 

provide guidance to the services to better define and standardize the use 

of key terms, DOD stated that this requirement has already been addressed 

because these terms are defined. We acknowledged in our draft report that 

these key terms are defined in the Department of Defense Dictionary of 

Military and Associated Terms. However, as we state in our report, our 

audit work indicates that the services are not operationalizing the use of 

the terms in a consistent manner. The intent of our recommendation is to 

have DOD standardize the use of the key terms across the services. 

DOD generally concurred with our recommendation that the services 

provide all required data to DMDC and address data inconsistencies, and 

stated that the services have been directed to provide all necessary data 

and are working to address data inconsistencies. While we agree that the

services are working with DMDC to address data inconsistencies with 

regard to the rebaselining of mobilization data, we also identified other 

data inconsistencies that DOD has not addressed, such as Social Security 

 43 GAO, Government Auditing Standards, GAO-03-673G (Washington, D.C.: June 2003). 

44 GAO-03-673G, sections 7.12 b, 7.31, and 7.59. 

Page 36 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
numbers that are duplicated in more than one reserve component. We 

agree with DOD that some requirements cannot be immediately supported 

by service data systems and modifications to them can take time to 

complete. However, as our report notes, some service officials stated that 

resources are being diverted from these efforts to the DIMHRS program, 

which we reported is behind schedule. We continue to observe the need 

for the services to provide all necessary data, to address these data 

inconsistencies, and to establish needed protocols to have the services 

report data consistent with DOD guidance, especially since the data are 

used to determine reserve force availability and for medical surveillance. 

DOD also generally concurred with our recommendation that DMDC

document its internal procedures and processes, including the 

assumptions it uses in data analyses. In its written comments, DOD stated 

that DMDC is in the process of developing documentation on its internal

procedures and processes and has a draft that addresses the processes 

used from receipt of the data from the service components to the final 

quality control of the consolidated file. DOD also stated that DMDC has a 

draft product regarding many of the data analyses procedures used. 

During this engagement, we asked if these procedures and processes were 

documented. As we say in the report, DMDC stated that they were 

undocumented and that documenting them was not a priority. Although 

DOD stated that it is in the process of drafting these procedures and 

processes, we were never provided a draft of these documents. DOD also 

stated that while DMDC attempts to document the assumptions made in 

resulting report titles and footnotes, the disclosure of assumptions used in 

data analyses remain the responsibility of the requester of the data 

analyses. Although we agree that the requesters of the data bear 

responsibility to disclose the analytical assumptions used in the data 

analyses, our audit work indicates that there are basic assumptions that 

DMDC establishes and uses that, if documented and discussed with those 

who request data analyses, would allow the users to understand how the 

information can be used, as well as the limitations of the data analyses. 

For example, during a discussion with a Reserve Affairs official, who uses 

the data analyses provided by DMDC to provide information to senior 

DOD officials, we stated that DMDC defaults to using a servicemember’s 

first deployment rather than the most current deployment when preparing 

data analyses. This official was unaware that DMDC used this assumption 

and stated that the expectation was that DMDC was using the most 

current deployment to generate the analyses. This official planned to 

discuss this issue with DMDC in the future. 

Page 37 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
In its written comments, DOD did not concur with what it characterized as 

our fourth recommendation. Specifically, DOD separated a single 

recommendation into two recommendations. In the draft report we sent to 

DOD, the recommendation read: “We recommend that the Secretary of 

Defense direct the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, 

to require DMDC to document its internal procedures and processes, 

including the assumptions it uses in data analyses. In doing this, the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Personnel and Readiness, should collaborate on the 

reasonableness of the assumptions used by DMDC in its data analyses 

with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs 

and the Joint Staff.” DOD stated that DMDC is a support organization that 

generates reports for a multitude of organizations and that each 

organization that requests reports provides the assumptions that DMDC 

uses to develop the reports. However, our audit work showed that DMDC 

has established and uses some basic assumptions in analyzing data and 

that DMDC may not always discuss these assumptions with other DOD 

offices, such as Reserve Affairs. As a result, we continue to emphasize the 

need for DMDC to document these assumptions and to collaborate with 

these offices to ensure a common understanding of these assumptions. 

Although DOD organizations can request data analyses using multiple 

assumptions, without written documentation other organizations may not 

be fully aware of the analytical assumptions used by DMDC and this may 

lead to miscommunication and, ultimately, the data analyses may not be 

valid in that it does not report what the user intended. We continue to 

believe that the assumptions used need to be documented and discussed 

with other DOD offices as we recommended. Based on DOD’s comments,

we modified this recommendation to clarify our intent. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force; the Commandant of 

the Marine Corps; the Under Secretary of Defense, Personnel and 

Readiness; and other interested parties. We will also make copies available 

to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions on this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Page 38 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix IV. 

Derek B. Stewart 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 39 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
List of Congressional Committees

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Lindsey Graham 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ben Nelson 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Personnel 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ted Stevens 

Chairman 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable John M. McHugh 

Chairman 

The Honorable Vic Snyder 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Military Personnel

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Page 40 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young 

Chairman 

The Honorable John P. Murtha 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Page 41 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Our objectives were to determine (1) what Department of Defense (DOD) 

data indicate are the number of reservists mobilized and deployed in 

support of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and the selected 

demographic and deployment characteristics of those deployed and 

(2) whether DOD’s reserve deployment and mobilization data and analyses 

are reliable.

We identified, based on congressional interest and our knowledge of DOD 

issues, selected demographic and deployment variables to review. We then 

worked with the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) to identify the 

data fields within DMDC’s Contingency Tracking System (CTS) that best 

provided information about the selected demographic and deployment 

variables we wanted to analyze. Although we wanted to analyze the 

locations to which reservists were deployed and the units with which 

reservists were deployed, DMDC officials said, and we agreed based on 

our review of the data, that the data were not reliable enough for those 

purposes. Our selected variables included 

• the number of deployed reservists who volunteered for at least one 

deployment;

• the number of deployed reservists who have served one, two, or three or 

more deployments; 

• the race and ethnicity of the deployed reservists; 

• the gender of the deployed reservists; 

• the state of residence of the deployed reservists; 

• the number of deployed reservists who were Selected Reserve, Individual 

Ready Reserve, Standby Reserve, or Retired Reserve; 

• the number of deployed reservists who were citizens at the time of their 

deployment;

• the number of days the reservists were deployed; and 

• the top occupational areas for reservists deployed in support of GWOT. 

To address objective 1, we obtained and analyzed data for September 2001 

through June 2006 from DMDC’s CTS. CTS consists of two files—the 

activation file, which tracks activations and mobilizations, and the 

deployment file, which tracks deployments. Using CTS data from both 

files, we analyzed the number of National Guard and Reserve

servicemembers mobilized and deployed in support of GWOT, as well as 

selected demographic and deployment variables, using statistical analysis 

software. 

To address objective 2, we performed a data reliability assessment on the 

data provided by DMDC from CTS’ activation and deployment files. We 

Page 42 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

requested DMDC reports that replicated our analyses and then compared

those report results to our analyses, and we reviewed the programming 

code DMDC used to generate those reports. To assess the reliability of 

CTS data, we obtained an understanding of the data, the file structure, the 

sources of the data, and relevant DOD guidance.

1

 Specifically, we 

(1) performed electronic testing of the data files for completeness (that is, 

missing data), out-of-range values, and dates outside of valid time frames; 

(2) assessed the relationships among data elements (for example, 

determining whether deployment dates were overlapping since each 

record in the deployment file is intended to represent one deployment); 

(3) reviewed existing information about the data and the systems that 

produced them; (4) interviewed department officials to identify known 

problems or limitations in the data, as well as to understand the 

relationship between the two files and how data are received from the 

services, cleaned (“rebaselined”), and processed by DMDC; and 

(5) compared “prerebaselined” mobilization data to “postrebaselined” 

mobilization data to determine the extent to which the data changed as a 

result of the cleaning effort.2 When we found discrepancies (for example, 

overlapping deployment dates), we worked with DMDC to understand the 

discrepancies. 

In our interviews with DMDC officials, we discussed the purpose and uses 

of CTS, the service data rebaselining effort and the internal controls for 

verifying data analyses, monthly validation of data, and performing data 

analyses. Similarly, we discussed data collection, processing, and 

reliability issues as well as service-specific data issues and the rebaselining 

effort with officials from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Reserve Affairs and from each of the reserve components, including 

the U.S. Army National Guard, the U.S. Air National Guard, the U.S. Army 

Reserve, the U.S. Navy Reserve, the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve, and the 

U.S. Air Force Reserve. We also discussed the reliability of the services’ 

data, the rebaselining effort, and the results of a previous Joint Staff 

review of the quality of service data within CTS with officials in the Joint 

 1

 DOD Instruction 6490.03, DOD Instruction 1336.5, and DOD Instruction 7730.54. 

2

 To assess the extent the data changed, we first received and analyzed data provided by 

DMDC in a December 2005 file about reservists deployed in support of GWOT. While 

DOD’s rebaselining effort was still being completed, we received updated data from DMDC

in a June 2006 file about reservists deployed in support of GWOT through June 2006, which 

allowed us to compare prerebaselined December 2005 data with postrebaselined December 

2005 data. We compared these two data submissions and analyzed the extent to which the

data had changed during the rebaselining effort. 

Page 43 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Chiefs of Staff Manpower and Personnel office. Finally, we interviewed 

officials from the Deployment Health Surveillance Directorate and the 

Army Medical Surveillance Activity about the quality of the deployment 

data and how they use the data. 

In the course of our review, we determined that some data fields were 

highly unreliable. For example, electronic testing indicated that data on

location and reservist unit information were missing in many cases. Based 

on our conversations with DMDC and our understanding of the data 

system, we decided not to conduct lower level analyses (for example, 

analyses of reservists’ assigned units) because the results would be less 

reliable than aggregate level analyses. Although we are reasonably 

confident in the reliability of most CTS data fields at the aggregate level,

because we could not compare source documentation from each of the

services to a sample of DMDC data, we could not estimate precise margins 

of error. Consequently, we used the data for descriptive purposes, and we 

did not base any recommendations on the results of our analyses. In 

addition, we presented only higher level, aggregate data from fields that 

we determined were sufficiently reliable for our reporting purposes. For 

these purposes, and presented in this way, the CTS data we use are 

sufficiently reliable with the following caveat: The Army had not 

completed its rebaselining effort for mobilization data before the 

completion of our review, and we could not, therefore, assess the 

reliability of Army mobilization data to the same extent as those of the 

other services. However, based on our electronic testing, data

comparisons, and interviews with officials, we believe that the data are 

sufficiently reliable to present as descriptive information. 

To assess the reliability of DMDC’s reports (that is, its own analyses) of 

CTS data, we compared our independent analyses of National Guard and 

Reserve servicemembers’ mobilization and deployment statistics with 

results that DMDC provided from its own analyses of the same data. To 

pinpoint differences in analytical assumptions, we reviewed the statistical

code DMDC used to produce its reports and compared it with our 

programming code. Through an iterative process, we noted errors in 

DMDC’s programs and requested changes and reruns of the data. We 

worked with DMDC to ensure that discrepancies were not caused by 

differences in our analytical assumptions. Where there were discrepancies,

we reached the following consensus on how to address them: 

• Removed the Coast Guard entries from our analyses of the CTS database 

since, as we state in this report, the Coast Guard Reserve is under the dayto-day control of the Department of Homeland Security rather than DOD. 

Page 44 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

• Combined a reservist’s Social Security number with his or her reserve 

component to create a unique identifier. DMDC officials said they do this 

because they are unsure where the source of the error is when they find 

that a Social Security number corresponds with two reserve components 

for a deployment during approximately the same time period. DOD’s 

policy,3

 when there is a duplicate Social Security number for more than 

one reserve component, is to count both transactions. However, the use of

duplicate Social Security numbers results in overcounting. Specifically, the 

June 2006 file had 38 reservists with overlapping mobilizations, 20 

reservists with overlapping deployments, and more than 800 deployed 

reservists who appeared to have legitimately changed components. To 

compensate for the 58 “errors” where DMDC did not know which 

mobilization or deployment to count, it double-counted all 58 reservists. 

Likewise, the 800 deployed reservists who changed reserve components 

during GWOT were also double-counted. 

• Removed reservists from all analyses when their reserve component 

category is unknown, so that the numeric totals across analyses would be 

consistent. DMDC officials said that this is an undocumented standard 

operating procedure. 

• Utilized the reservists’ information for most recent deployment to provide 

the most current information possible in cases where a reservist deployed

more than once. 

• Calculated the length of a reservist’s deployment by including both the day 

the deployment began and the day on which the deployment ended. Thus, 

the number of days deployed is inclusive of the beginning and end dates. 

• Combined the race categories for Asian, Native Hawaiian, and Other 

Pacific Islander because, prior to 2003, the distinction between these two 

groups was not captured in the data. 

After clarifying and agreeing on the analytical assumptions, we again 

reviewed DMDC’s code and compared its results with our own to 

determine whether and why there were remaining discrepancies. We also 

requested written documentation of DMDC’s internal control procedures 

for the CTS data and, when no documentation was available, interviewed

knowledgeable officials about existing internal control procedures. Using 

the framework of standards for internal control for the federal 

government,4

 we compared the information from those documents and 

interviews with our numerous, iterative reviews of DMDC’s statistical 

programs used to generate comparative reports to assess the reliability of

 3

 DOD Instruction 7730.54. 

4 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Page 45 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

DMDC-generated reports from CTS. We determined that the reports 

DMDC generated for our review were not sufficiently reliable for our 

reporting purpose. Thus, we completed our own data analyses. 

We performed our work from December 2005 through August 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 46 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in Support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 

Support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 

Our analysis of DOD data indicates that most reservists who deployed in 

support of GWOT through June 30, 2006, were part of the Selected Reserve 

(see table 5). In addition, California, Texas, Pennsylvania, and Florida had 

the highest numbers of reservists who have deployed in support of GWOT 

through June 30, 2006 (see table 6). 

Table 5: Reserve Component Categories for Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on Terrorism by Fiscal Year 

through June 30, 2006

 2001a2002 2003 2004 2005 2006b

Selected Reservec3,647 6,920 40,355 47,869 60,172 23,765

Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive 

National Guardd, e

0 2 17 48 49 50

Army National Guard 

Total 3,647 6,922 40,372 47,917 60,221 23,815

Air National Guard Selected Reserve 1,522 19,515 22,605 13,479 12,630 9,882

Total 1,522 19,515 22,605 13,479 12,630 9,882

Selected Reserve 1,172 4,994 35,181 27,915 21,884 11,531

Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive 

National Guard

9 189 951 1,427 2,853 1,516

Standby/Retired Reservef, g 0 22 113 132 140 133

Army Reserve 

Total 1,181 5,205 36,245 29,474 24,877 13,180

Selected Reserve 217 2,506 5,438 5,348 5,110 5,658

Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive 

National Guard

27 73 212 163 305 177

Standby/Retired Reserve 1 1 5 3 2 8

Navy Reserve 

Total 245 2,580 5,655 5,514 5,417 5,843

Selected Reserve 8 1,169 9,568 5,593 3,052 864

Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive 

National Guard

0 182 378 262 242 62

Standby/Retired Reserve 0 0 6 4 5 3

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Total 8 1,351 9,952 5,859 3,299 929

Selected Reserve 502 11,592 11,591 8,777 8,157 6,421

Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive 

National Guard

6 35 139 137 241 41

Standby/Retired Reserve 0 10 73 22 15 14

Air Force Reserve 

Total 508 11,637 11,803 8,936 8,413 6,476

Total 7,111 47,210 126,632 111,179 114,857 60,125

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Notes: Title 10 U.S.C. 10145(b) provides that the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard 

are to be in the Ready Reserve. Reservists can be counted more than once if they deployed more 

than once in different fiscal years.

a

Fiscal year 2001 data are for September 11, 2001, through September 30, 2001. 

Page 47 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in 

Support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 

b

Fiscal year 2006 data are for October 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006. 

c

The Selected Reserve, part of the Ready Reserve, is composed of those units and individuals 

designated by their respective services and approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as

so essential to initial wartime missions that they have priority for training, equipment, and personnel 

over all other reserve elements. 

d

The Individual Ready Reserve consists mainly of trained individuals who have previously served in 

active component units or in the Selected Reserve and who have a remaining military service 

obligation. 

e

The Inactive National Guard consists of National Guard personnel who are attached to a specific unit 

but are temporarily unable to participate in regular training. Currently, only the Army National Guard 

uses this category. 

f

The Standby Reserve consists of personnel who have completed all obligated or required service or 

have been removed from the Ready Reserve because of civilian employment, temporary hardship, or

disability. 

g

The Retired Reserve consists of personnel who have been placed in a retirement status based on

the completion of 20 or more qualifying years of active component or reserve component service. 

Table 6: State, Territories, and Armed Forces Areas of Residence for Reservists Deployed in Support of the Global War on 

Terrorism through June 30, 2006 

Residence of deployed

populationa

Army National 

Guard

Air National 

Guard

Army 

Reserve

Navy 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Air Force 

Reserve Total

Alaska 471 979 147 4 27 42 1,670

Alabama 5,301 1,380 2,484 387 332 596 10,480

Arkansas 3,891 830 1,078 49 139 132 6,119

Arizona 2,005 583 1,208 138 430 697 5,061

California 6,811 1,882 5,910 3,769 3,321 2,811 24,504

Colorado 939 889 1,441 27 223 759 4,278

Connecticut 1,753 627 738 141 206 226 3,691

District of Columbia 131 27 174 234 9 36 611

Delaware 502 386 252 10 39 438 1,627

Florida 5,232 683 4,478 1,347 929 2,448 15,117

Georgia 5,860 1,543 3,623 407 732 913 13,078

Hawaii 2,058 453 856 137 63 202 3,769

Iowa 3,963 941 1,431 19 153 33 6,540

Idaho 2,004 710 329 11 54 50 3,158

Illinois 4,032 1,910 3,272 103 683 454 10,454

Indiana 4,328 1,188 1,583 60 331 685 8,175

Kansas 2,394 978 1,760 87 100 287 5,606

Kentucky 2,803 628 1,347 33 190 90 5,091

Louisiana 5,877 416 1,271 112 435 613 8,724

Massachusetts 2,965 1,006 1,684 76 357 758 6,846

Page 48 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in 

Support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 

Residence of deployed

populationa

Army National 

Guard

Air National 

Guard

Army 

Reserve

Navy 

Reserve

Marine Corps 

Reserve 

Air Force 

Reserve Total

Maryland 1,839 1,195 2,215 584 432 487 6,752

Maine 1,407 647 417 79 26 22 2,598

Michigan 3,560 1,542 1,824 72 681 403 8,082

Minnesota 4,699 1,209 2,064 46 126 592 8,736

Missouri 4,199 1,032 2,605 110 262 580 8,788

Mississippi 5,647 1,308 1,263 219 126 190 8,753

Montana 1,302 582 472 5 35 25 2,421

North Carolina 6,287 935 2,909 284 697 755 11,867

North Dakota 1,627 167 173 2 4 28 2,001

Nebraska 2,007 687 1,262 16 73 58 4,103

New Hampshire 1,121 417 553 30 54 71 2,246

New Jersey 2,234 1,332 1,506 215 479 839 6,605

New Mexico 978 482 531 52 79 122 2,244

Nevada 612 541 335 73 153 137 1,851

New York 4,571 2,566 4,833 179 1,406 898 14,453

Ohio 4,047 2,552 4,452 125 613 1,402 13,191

Oklahoma 2,951 1,406 1,151 51 135 597 6,291

Oregon 3,112 301 419 49 223 302 4,406

Pennsylvania 6,053 2,368 5,415 269 828 1,322 16,255

Rhode Island 1,092 474 253 109 61 14 2,003

South Carolina 3,760 817 1,767 268 179 996 7,787

South Dakota 1,916 571 246 1 2 23 2,759

Tennessee 5,519 1,612 1,855 103 368 94 9,551

Texas 6,901 1,503 7,271 1,233 1,475 2,421 20,804

Utah 2,697 811 986 10 228 569 5,301

Virginia 3,238 879 3,756 1,759 905 585 11,122

Vermont 1,294 410 135 1 12 13 1,865

Washington 4,320 839 1,808 225 383 1,274 8,849

Wisconsin 4,177 1,291 2,257 39 282 603 8,649

West Virginia 1,975 879 1,137 6 45 75 4,117

Wyoming 694 407 115 4 9 16 1,245

Territories and Armed Forces 

areas 

4,366 670 3,390 4,701 15 243 13,385

Unknown or Not applicable 22 703 651 2,345 139 743 4,603

Total 163,544 51,174 95,092 20,415 19,288 28,769 378,282

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Page 49 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix II: Data on Reservists Deployed in 

Support of GWOT through June 30, 2006 

Notes: Territories include the District of Columbia, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands,

the Virgin Islands, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Armed Forces areas include Armed Forces of the

Americas, Armed Forces Europe, and Armed Forces Pacific. This population represents 13,385, or 

about 4 percent, of the total number of deployed reservists. 

a

Reservists who had more than one deployment are counted by the state of residence of record for 

the most current deployment. 

Page 50 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 51 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 52 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 53 GAO-06-1068 DOD's Deployment Data
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 54 GAO-06-1068

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Derek Stewart (202) 512-5559 or stewartd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Cynthia Jackson, Assistant 

Director; Crystal Bernard; Tina Kirschbaum; Marie A. Mak; Ricardo 

Marquez; Julie Matta; Lynn Milan; Rebecca Shea; and Cheryl Weissman 

made key contributions to this report. 

DOD's Deployment Data

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

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