DOE’S REVISED SCHEDULE FOR 

YUCCA MOUNTAIN 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY 

OF THE 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JULY 19, 2006 

Serial No. 109-118 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house 

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30-416PDF 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

JOE BARTON, Texas, Chairman 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

 Vice Chairman 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

CLIFF STEARNS, Florida 

PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio 

NATHAN DEAL, Georgia 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

 Vice Chairman

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

ROY BLUNT, Missouri

STEVE BUYER, Indiana 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

LEE TERRY, Nebraska 

MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, Idaho 

SUE MYRICK, North Carolina 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 Ranking Member 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

BART GORDON, Tennessee 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

BART STUPAK, Michigan 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JAY INSLEE, Washington 

TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

BUD ALBRIGHT, Staff Director 

DAVID CAVICKE, General Counsel

REID P. F. STUNTZ, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY 

RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chairman 

MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia 

BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico 

JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona 

CHARLES W. “CHIP” PICKERING, Mississippi 

VITO FOSSELLA, New York 

GEORGE RADANOVICH, California 

MARY BONO, California 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

MIKE ROGERS, Michigan 

C.L. “BUTCH” OTTER, Idaho 

JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

(EX OFFICIO) 

RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 

 Ranking Member 

MIKE ROSS, Arkansas 

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

TED STRICKLAND, Ohio 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MIKE DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

TOM ALLEN, Maine 

JIM DAVIS, Florida 

HILDA L. SOLIS, California 

CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas 

JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan 

 (EX OFFICIO)

(II)
CONTENTS 

Page 

Testimony of: 

Sproat III, Hon. Edward F., Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy.................................................................... 15 

Additional material submitted for the record: 

Sproat III, Hon. Edward F., Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management, U.S. Department of Energy, response for the record.............................. 45 

(III) 

(1) 

DOE’S REVISED SCHEDULE FOR 

YUCCA MOUNTAIN 

THURSDAY, JULY 19, 2006 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND AIR QUALITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in Room 

2322 of the Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Ralph M. Hall 

[Chairman] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Hall, Norwood, Shimkus, 

Wilson, Radanovich, Bono, Otter, Murphy, Barton (ex officio); Boucher, 

Wynn, Allen, Gonzalez, and Dingell (ex officio). 

Staff Present: David McCarthy, Chief Counsel for Energy and 

Environment; Elizabeth Stack, Policy Coordinator; Annie Caputo, 

Professional Staff Member; Peter Kielty, Legislative Clerk; Sue 

Sheridan, Minority Senior Counsel; and Alec Gerlach, Minority 

Research Assistant. 

MR. HALL. Okay. I thank everyone. We will come to order. 

I might announce first that we are expecting a vote any time, and I 

am not sure how many votes we will have, anywhere from one to three 

maybe. But we will vote as quickly as we can and get back to where we 

were so we don’t waste as much time or, for the attorneys in the crowd, 

that doesn’t run your hours up too much. I have been asked to do that by 

the folks that you work for. We are going to get you in and out of here 

just as quick as we can. 

The main ones are here, Mr. Rick Boucher, who is the leading 

gentleman from the great State of Virginia. 

I will make an opening statement, and probably by the time I finish 

my opening statement the buzzer will go off, and we will start voting. 

Mr. Sproat, we are very happy to have you, and the subcommittee 

will come to order, and I want to welcome you. I had a chance to visit 

with you. I know of you. As Director of the DOE Office of Civilian 

Radioactive Waste Management, you have a big job in front of you. 

I was just talking to one of the young men that worked for me back 

in 1983 when we started working on this legislation, trying to put it 

together. I was so naive then that I thought we had to hurry up and get it 

together, get it printed up and get it voted on where we could get it 

behind us. And here it is 2006, and we are still working on it. 
2

But I have read your background and some of your opening 

statement, and you are about as straightforward as anybody I have come 

across yet. You have a huge job, and we really wish you well. 

Without objection, the subcommittee will proceed pursuant to 

committee rule 4(e) which allows members the opportunity to defer 

opening statements for extra questioning time; and the Chair will 

recognize himself for an opening statement. 

First, I want to thank Ranking Member Rich Boucher--Rick 

Boucher. I know your name, Rick. And Chairman Barton is usually 

here and, if he is not here, he will be here; and when he is here, we will 

open up and let him ask his questions where he can be underway with his 

major duties as Chairman of the Energy and Commerce Committee. 

But I want to thank you, Mr. Boucher, Chairman Barton, and 

Ranking Member Dingell of the full committee for their help in setting 

up this hearing. 

Yucca Mountain is a necessary solution for how to dispose of our 

Nation’s nuclear waste. We have known that a long time. As I have said 

before, we can’t allow this program to falter any more. We owe it to our 

children and to our grandchildren to live up to the commitment to build a 

safe and secure repository. It is my sincere hope that this new schedule 

is the last time that Yucca Mountain gets delayed. 

I am a strong supporter of nuclear energy, and I am anxious to see 

new plants get built for that to happen. The public needs confidence that 

DOE will build the repository and meet their obligation to dispose of 

spent fuel. Otherwise, the lack of process at Yucca Mountain will 

jeopardize new plant construction; and we need that. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity for us to examine the revised 

schedule for Yucca Mountain. I have noticed that there is no funding 

profile accompanying this schedule. It is difficult to assess this new 

schedule without knowing what resources are necessary to accomplish it. 

So, Mr. Sproat, I would like for you to provide that funding profile to the 

committee as soon as you possibly can. 

I encourage my colleagues to use this hearing to gain a better 

understanding of the issues before us in preparation of possible 

legislative action, and I remind all members of the opportunity to ask 

questions for the record. They will be answered and sent to you. And, 

Mr. Sproat, I ask you to respond as quickly as possible to the questions; 

and I look forward to working with you and listening to your testimony 

today. 

I recognize Mr. Boucher. 

[Prepared Statement of the Hon. Ralph Hall follows:] 
3

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. RALPH HALL, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

AND AIR QUALITY

The Subcommittee will come to order. I would like to welcome Mr. Ward Sproat, 

Director of DOE’s Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, to this Committee. 

Without objection, the Subcommittee will proceed pursuant to Committee Rule 4(e), 

which allows Members the opportunity to defer opening statements for extra questioning 

time. 

The Chair recognizes himself for an opening statement. First, I want to thank 

Ranking Member Rick Boucher, and Chairman Barton and Ranking Member Dingell of 

the Full Committee for their help is setting up this hearing. 

Yucca Mountain is a necessary solution for how to dispose of our nation’s nuclear 

waste. As I’ve said before, we can’t allow this program to falter. We owe it to our 

children and grandchildren to live up to the commitment to build a safe and secure 

repository. It is my sincere hope that this new schedule is the last time that Yucca 

Mountain gets delayed. 

I am a strong supporter of nuclear energy and I’m anxious to see new plants get 

built. For that to happen, the public needs confidence that DOE will build the repository 

and meet their obligation to dispose of the spent fuel. Otherwise, the lack of progress at 

Yucca Mountain could jeopardize new plant construction. 

Today’s hearing is an opportunity for us to examine the revised schedule for Yucca 

Mountain. I’ve noticed that there is no funding profile accompanying this schedule. It’s 

difficult to assess this new schedule without knowing what resources are necessary to 

accomplish it. I’d like you to provide that funding profile to the Committee as soon as 

possible. 

I encourage my colleagues to use this hearing to gain a better understanding of the 

issue before us in preparation for possible legislative action. I remind all Members of the 

opportunity to ask questions for the record following the hearing. I have asked the 

committee staff to help pull together those questions that come in quickly. Mr. Sproat, I 

ask you to please respond to questions as soon as you can. I look forward to working 

with you, and listening to your testimony today. 

MR. BOUCHER. Well, thank you very much, Chairman Hall. I 

appreciate your work with our side of the aisle as together we made 

preparations for this hearing, and I appreciate your scheduling the 

hearing today. 

The subject of the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository is a 

matter of great concern to many stakeholders, including the electricity 

consumers who are each year financing the Nuclear Waste Fund. As a 

follow-up to our March hearing, it is appropriate that we learn today 

about the Department of Energy’s recent review of the program and the 

revised schedule for development of the repository. 

I would note, Mr. Chairman, and I think you would agree, that there 

is a bipartisan commitment on this committee to move the Yucca 

Mountain project forward as rapidly as is possible. 

In March, we were told that the Department was undertaking a 

review of the design of the repository and was unable to provide any 

updated estimates of when the license application would be filed or when 

the depository might open and start receiving waste. 
4

Since that time, the Department has concluded its review and 

prepared a revised schedule for the submission of a license application to 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and subsequent construction and 

opening of the facility. The announcement of a revised schedule is 

highly significant, and we welcome a presentation of it today. 

In 2002, Yucca Mountain was certified as the site for the Nation’s 

repository of spent nuclear fuel. But the project has experienced 

numerous delays. The Nuclear Waste Act set the original goal of 1998 

for opening the repository, and by missing that date the Department of 

Energy was found to be in breach of its original obligations. 

More recently, the Department had hoped to file a license of 

application with the NRC by 2004 and begin accepting waste in 2010. 

The target for the application was missed, and the Department now sees 

2017 as the earliest date for opening of the facility. 

In addition, the long standing matter of funding for the Yucca 

Mountain project continues to be of concern, while the balance in the 

Nuclear Waste Fund is currently approximately $19 billion and annual 

appropriations for the Yucca Mountain project represent only a fraction 

of the amount that is annually contributed by the ratepayers. This year, 

for example, the Administration has proposed $156 million for civilian 

nuclear waste disposal, but $750 million in ratepayer contributions will 

enter the Nuclear Waste Fund this year. These moneys are not walled off 

in the budget and protected and are therefore being spent for other 

purposes. 

Over the past several years, a number of legislative proposals to 

address the funding mechanism and provide protection for the monies 

entering the Nuclear Waste Fund have been proposed and debated and 

approved in this committee. However, given the objections of other 

committees, no resolution has been reached on this matter. 

An issue of long standing concern is the funding mechanism, and I 

look forward to hearing from Mr. Sproat today regarding the funding 

system which will be required in order to meet the revised schedule and 

any comments that he may have regarding the adequacies or 

inadequacies of the existing funding system. Funding is a central focus 

of this committee’s work with regard to Yucca Mountain. I know it is 

central concern of yourself, also, Mr. Sproat. 

With those comments, let me say that I very much look forward to 

your testimony; and, Chairman Hall, thank you again for convening 

today’s hearing. 

MR. HALL. Thank you. 

Recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Vice Chair of this committee, 

Mr. Shimkus. 
5

MR. SHIMKUS. I will yield for my 8 minutes. But there is a formal 

statement I have to make based upon the Director’s presence and his 

daughter in the room. I just have to formally say, “Beat Navy,” and I 

yield back. 

MR. HALL. With those instructions, we have read the background of 

our witness and you are the only witness that has been asked to come 

here today. 

I didn’t see my friend from Texas, Mr. Gonzalez. 

MR. GONZALEZ. I will waive opening. Thank you. 

MR. HALL. Thank you for doing that. 

Now as I was saying before I was interrupted, we recognize you for 

your opening statement. 

Mr. Dingell just showed up. The Ranking Member is worth waiting 

for. I recognize you for an opening statement. 

MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your courtesy; and 

thank you for holding this hearing. I believe it is timely, and it provides 

the committee an opportunity to hear and the Department of Energy a 

chance to honor the commitment it made to the subcommittee in March. 

I am encouraged and I find it an encouraging sign for DOE to meet the 

deadline it predicted for setting forth its revised Yucca Mountain 

program. I hope this trend will continue. 

As the Department acknowledged in March testimony, there has 

been speculation about whether or not we still need Yucca Mountain--I 

agree with DOE; the answer is yes--and the trust that it can demonstrate 

today that this long-delayed program can be put on a sound footing. For 

several reasons, the program now stands at a critical juncture. I would 

observe that that is not new and it has been going on for more than a little 

while. 

First, as has often been noted, if we were to retain the nuclear option 

in this country, DOE must demonstrate that it can fulfill its statutory 

obligation to file a solid license application to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, the NRC, within a credible timeframe. 

Second, the Federal government has a moral duty to use the millions 

of dollars that ratepayers have contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund as 

Congress intended. Thus, the funds should not be diverted to more 

speculative alternatives. 

As you know, the U.S. Treasury is and likely will continue paying 

out billions of dollars--and I repeat--billions of dollars for breaching its 

contracts with the utilities, an indefensible situation. A change in the use 

of the Fund during the appropriations process could undermine the 

remaining confidence that States, regulatories, and industry may have 

that Yucca Mountain will ever open; and we will send a disturbing signal 
6

to communities around the nuclear plants who bear the burden of on-site 

storage. 

Finally, I am mindful that the Department set up legislation in April 

which our Chairman has introduced by request. At the subcommittee’s 

last Yucca Mountain hearing, I indicated that absence of clear 

understanding of the Department’s recent revamping of the program as 

scheduled for filing an application with NRC and the revised cost 

applications. It would be impossible for Congress to assess whether or 

not new legislation is needed. 

My impression is that there is plenty of room for DOE to do things 

while the Congress weighs these developments, starting with the 

information in today’s testimony. 

I am a strong supporter of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, but I am 

open to considering the need for changes. The Department’s legislative 

proposal, however, does not appear to directly affect the NRC 

application process; and the Department would be ill-advised to carry--

rather, to tarry in completing this task. As we have seen, destined failure 

to file an application tends to create a vacuum into which all manner of 

strange ideas might take root and blossom. 

In summary, the ratepayers have paid into the fund for so many 

years, utilities have counted on Yucca Mountain, and the potential 

investors in the nuclear industry need a clear signal that DOE can put this 

program right. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and I 

thank my colleagues for their attention, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for this hearing. Thank you. 

MR. HALL. Mr. Chairman, we thank you. 

Recognize the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Wilson, for 

opening statement. 

MS. WILSON. I will pass. 

MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes Tom Allen, the gentleman from 

Maine, for opening statement. 

MR. ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing and 

for the bipartisan way in which you and Chairman Barton have dealt with 

the Yucca Mountain issue. 

Mr. Sproat, I am glad you are here today and that you have met your 

Department’s commitment to give us revised timetables for submitting a 

license application for Yucca Mountain as well as a revised timetable for 

construction and opening of the repository. 

I applaud your commitment to the Yucca Mountain Program and to a 

reform of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. There 

is clearly much work to do. Even with your timetable, the Yucca 

Mountain license application will be 6 years late and the opening of the 
7

repository will be at best 19 years beyond the deadlines set by the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

I am troubled by several parts of your prepared testimony. 

First, I question the value of making further assessments of the draft 

license application. If these assessments make the application 

significantly stronger, then there is value to them. But they must not 

delay the time table for filing the license application itself. The 

overriding goal has to be to file the application on time. 

Second, I am concerned about the Department’s failure to meet its 

contractual obligations to take possession of the spent nuclear fuel at 

nuclear power plants. 

In Maine, we have no active nuclear power plants, but we do have 

spent nuclear fuel. Maine ratepayers have paid and continue to pay 

millions of dollars into the Nuclear Waste Trust Fund, ostensibly to 

provide funding for Yucca Mountain. These payments continue, even 

though Maine consumers no longer use nuclear power to generate their 

electricity. 

As taxpayers, Mainers are paying into the Department of Justice’s 

judgment fund which will be used to cover the enormous damages the 

utilities will inevitably be entitled to because of the Department’s breach 

of contract. In effect, Maine taxpayers will be reimbursing Maine 

ratepayers and utilities with hundreds of millions of dollars in a financial 

shell game that will do nothing to achieve the ultimate goal: the transfer 

of Maine’s nuclear waste to Yucca Mountain. 

In your prepared testimony you acknowledge the need for a portfolio 

of legal and financial solutions to address these problems and indicate 

that you intend to work with Congress on these issues. I would like more 

specifics as we go forward. 

Finally, I am a little surprised that your timetable does not include 

revised budget estimates. We need that information to make informed 

policy judgments, and I hope that that information will soon be 

forthcoming. 

And the bottom line, Mr. Sproat, is that I am pleased to have you 

here and look forward to your testimony. 

MR. HALL. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes the Chairman of Energy and Commerce, 

Mr. Barton. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Boucher, for having this hearing. 

I feel very strongly about this issue, and I remain committed to 

caring out our Nation’s nuclear energy policy and building a repository 

at Yucca Mountain. It is a critical step of that policy. 
8

Today, we have before us the long-awaited, much-anticipated new 

schedule for Yucca Mountain. In 1982, Congress directed DOE to begin 

operating the repository by January 31st, 1998. So even as we are 

holding this hearing, we are already over 8 years late. 

The revised schedule projects filing the license application in June of 

2008, the commencement of operation in 2017, 11 years from today. If 

that happens, it is only going to be 19 years late. 

There are those that hope and believe that late means never. 

Frustration over these continued delays prompts questions on whether 

Congress should just give up on Yucca Mountain and look for other 

options. 

I am frustrated by lack of progress at Yucca, but I am not giving up, 

because I am not aware of any credible alternative to permanent disposal 

in a deep geologic repository. Interim storage and reprocessing are 

attracting discussion today, but they don’t eliminate the need for 

repository for final disposal. I am not convinced that interim storage or 

reprocessing could be implemented any sooner than a faithful effort to 

finish Yucca Mountain. 

Future generations may develop technology that provides more 

sophisticated solutions to the problem, and I hope that they do, but it is 

our job today to complete the one facility that remains necessary in any 

fuel cycle currently imagined. We in Congress have an obligation to 

finish what we started in 1982. 

I think it is ironic that today, 2006, I am Chairman of the Energy and 

Commerce Committee. In 1982, I was a White House Fellow with the 

Department of Energy; and I was on one of the briefing teams that then 

briefed then Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards on the first proposal 

about Yucca Mountain back in 1982. 

We owe it to everybody in this country who is getting electricity 

generated by nuclear power and who has already paid for the disposal 

because of their past contributions and who are paying for it today at the 

rate of over a billion dollars a year to build and maintain Yucca 

Mountain on the most feasible timeline possible. 

Again, that deadline was supposed to have been 8 years ago in 1998. 

There are a lot of reasons and excuses to explain why progress on the 

repository has been so slow, but there is no better time than the present to 

be exploring what actions are necessary to begin operations as soon as 

possible. 

Mr. Sproat, I met you in my office not too many days ago. I respect 

your resolve, I respect your energy, I respect your enthusiasm, your 

commitment to achieving progress on the repository license. As I told 

you then and I am telling you now, you have got your work cut out for 

you. But I really hope that you can succeed; and, if at all possible, I am 
9

going to do everything I can as Chairman of this committee to help you 

succeed while so many other efforts have failed in the past. I look 

forward to hearing your testimony today. 

[Prepared Statement of the Hon. Joe Barton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. JOE BARTON, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ENERGY 

AND COMMERCE

Thank you, Chairman Hall and Ranking Member Boucher for having this hearing. 

As you know, I feel very strongly about this issue and remain committed to carrying out 

our nation’s nuclear energy policy and building a repository at Yucca Mountain is a 

critical step. 

Today we have before us the long-awaited, much-anticipated new schedule for 

Yucca Mountain. In 1982, Congress directed DOE to begin operating the repository by 

January 31, 1998, so we’re nearly eight years late today. 

The revised schedule projects filing the license application in June of 2008 and 

commencement of operations in 2017. It will be 19 years late, and there are some who 

hope and believe that late means never. The frustration over these continuing delays 

prompts questions on whether Congress should give up on Yucca Mountain and look for 

other options. 

I am frustrated by the lack of progress at Yucca Mountain, but I’m not giving up. I 

am not aware of any credible alternative to permanent disposal in a deep geologic 

repository. Interim storage and reprocessing are attracting discussion, but they don’t 

eliminate the need for a repository for final disposal. And I am not convinced that 

interim storage or reprocessing could be implemented sooner that a faithful effort to 

finish Yucca Mountain. Future generations may develop technologies that provide more 

sophisticated solutions to this problem, and I hope they do. But it’s our job to complete 

the one facility that remains necessary in any fuel cycle currently imagined. 

We in Congress have an obligation to finish what we started in 1982. We owe it to 

the many states that are now storing the nuclear waste and spent fuel destined for disposal 

at Yucca Mountain. We owe it to all those electricity ratepayers who have paid for 

disposal. And we owe it to all the taxpayers who are paying approximately a billion 

dollars a year because of DOE’s failure to meet the 1998 deadline. 

There is a mountain of reasons and excuses to explain why progress on the 

repository has slow. But there is no better time than the present to begin exploring what 

actions may be necessary to begin operations as soon as possible. 

Mr. Sproat, I respect your resolve and commitment to achieving progress on the 

repository license. You have your work cut out for you, but I really hope you can 

succeed where so many others have not. I look forward to hearing your testimony. 

MR. HALL. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from California, 

Ms. Bono, for opening statement if she likes. 

MS. BONO. Thank you for holding this hearing, and I will waive. 

MR. HALL. Mr. Murphy, do you have an opening statement? 

MR. MURPHY. I will waive. 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follows:] 
10

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. CHARLIE NORWOOD, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS 

FROM THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Mr. Chairman, 

 Thank you for holding this hearing on Yucca Mountain, which is not only important 

to our nuclear industry, but also to our overall energy security, diversity and reliability. 

 The nuclear energy industry is doing its job. It provides clean, cheap, reliable power 

for about 20% of our electricity needs. One uranium pellet smaller than my thumb equals 

about 17,000 cubic feet of natural gas, nearly one ton of coal, or 149 gallons of gas. And 

it does this without any harmful emissions. The industry’s safety record is impeccable 

for both plants and also waste transportation and storage. In a time of rising energy 

costs, expanding nuclear power should be a no brainer. The Energy Policy Act included 

good policy to help expand nuclear power, and industry is prepared to do so. But as is 

the case with most good ideas, one simple thing stands in the way. 

In order to move forward, in order to meet the growing need for power, the federal 

government is going to need to live up to its commitment on waste disposal. Yucca 

Mountain--after decades of study, after billions of dollars, after years of court battles--

needs to be operational. Most people here today refer to that concept as “waste 

confidence.” But we have been around this block a number of times with no resolution. 

Frankly, instead of waste confidence what we still lack is Administration 

confidence. I have been on this panel as long as I have been in Congress and this debate 

seems to continue endlessly. But we can’t afford to give up, because this piece of the 

puzzle is critical to our nation. Yucca Mountain must open because our power needs 

aren’t going to go away. China and India aren’t going to stop aggressively pursuing 

fossil fuels like oil and gas, keeping their costs high. And leaving the current waste in 

place all around the nation in temporary sites isn’t safe in the long term. 

Just as Congress shouldn’t ignore its promises to veterans, or its promises to retirees, 

it cannot ignore its promise in this area now. We need a schedule and need to stick to it. 

I believe Mr. Sproat can do this job, and I continue to have faith that this 

Administration wants to do this work. I look forward to hearing about how the 

Department is going to take action, not another timeframe for another study to see what 

the timeframe ought to be to start work. 

Thank you and I yield back my time. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN 

CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this afternoon’s hearing. 

Today we will hear the latest estimates from the Department of Energy regarding its 

schedule for moving forward to seek a license from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

to store all of the nation’s high-level radioactive nuclear waste in Yucca Mountain. 

The nuclear waste program has been one of the longest running jokes in Washington 

for the last thirty years. The Department of Energy and its predecessor agencies started 

out studying more than 30 potential sites back in the 1970s. After passage of the 1982 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, the search was narrowed to a dozen potential sites for two 

permanent waste repositories--9 potential sites for the first repository and 12 sites in 7 

states for the second. One repository was to be West of the Mississippi and the other East 

of the Mississippi. In 1986, DOE (for political reasons) dropped the search for the 

second repository, nominated 5 sites as suitable for the first repository, and (again for 

political reasons) focused on 3 potential sites in the West for actual site characterization. 

In 1987, Congress (again for political reasons) put the second repository on permanent 

hold and further limited the search for the first repository down to a single site: Yucca 

Mountain, Nevada. 
11

That decision was not based on science. It was based on politics, on the fact that the 

Congressional delegations from the other states previously under consideration were able 

to use their political muscle pass the Nuclear Queen of Spades on over to the State of 

Nevada. The Department of Energy was then left with a fool’s errand: come up with a 

post-hoc technical and scientific rationalization for a policy that was based entirely on 

politics. It is an unenviable task. 

While the testimony we will hear today expresses optimism that a license 

application can be submitted to the NRC by September 2008 and that the repository itself 

can begin receiving waste by March 2017, there is good reason to doubt that the 

Department will be able to meet these objectives. Consider some of the problems that 

have come to light about this program over the course of the last two years: 

• In 2004, the Court threw out EPA’s first Radiation Protection Standards 

because they were not strong enough to protect the public from radiation 

exposure, and they failed to follow recommendations of the National Academy 

of Sciences. 

• In 2005, EPA responded to this Court decision by issuing draft new standards 

for the Yucca Mountain site which are wholly inadequate, do not meet the 

law’s requirements, and do not protect the public healthy and safety. In fact, 

unless EPA substantially revises its proposal, the Yucca Mountain site will 

have the least protective public health radiation standard in the whole world. 

• Also in 2005, numerous scientific and quality assurance problems, 

transportation problems, corrosion of casks, effectiveness of materials, and 

many other issues caused DOE to suspend work on the surface facilities and the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to issue a stop order on the containers. 

• In 2006, the NRC issued a report that found Bechtel, the main contractor at 

Yucca Mountain, had failed to accurately measure and estimate the amount of 

corrosion likely in the casks DOE wants to use to store the nuclear waste. 

Because of this problem, the Department issued a stop work order on cask 

research. 

Even some of the biggest boosters of the nuclear industry in the Congress now 

appear to doubt that Yucca Mountain will ever be licensed. Over the last few months, 

pro-nuclear majorities on the Appropriations Committees in both the House and Senate 

have shifted funding into nuclear reprocessing and above-ground interim storage of 

nuclear waste – actions which appear to be driven by a conviction that Yucca Mountain is 

dead. In fact, the Appropriators over in the Senate have proposed to essentially rewrite 

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to set up regional above ground “interim” waste dumps all 

around the country. I look forward to hearing the Department’s views on this proposal, 

and its impact of both the funding for and the administration of the high-level nuclear 

waste program. 

I would suggest that if Yucca Mountain is dying or dead, it is because ultimately the 

scientific and technical realities at the site can no longer be ignored, and because 

ultimately politics cannot trump science when it comes to finding a solution to the 

problem of safely storing all of the nation’s most deadly nuclear wastes. 

MR. HALL. All right. We will pick up again. 

To start off, thank you for everything. We recognize you prepared 

written testimony. We ask you to summarize as much as you can. You 

were kind enough and thoughtful enough to give us your opening 

statement. 
12

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD F. SPROAT III, 

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE 

MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

MR. SPROAT. Thank you very much for the hearing here today. 

I heard the frustration and the statements from all of the members. 

Believe me, not only do I fully understand it and appreciate it, but I share 

it. One of the reasons that I took this position and accepted the 

President’s offer to be nominated and take this position is because I share 

not only that frustration but a firm conviction that nuclear energy needs 

to be a strategic option in our energy portfolio going forward. This 

project and the issue of disposal of high level nuclear waste and spent 

fuel has to move forward now in order to make that a reality, and that is 

why I took this job. 

I hope in my discussions with you today that that commitment on my 

part will come through to you in talking a little bit about what I plan to 

do and how I plan to bring my experience and my expertise that I have 

gained in the private sector in the nuclear industry over the years into this 

project to move it forward smartly in the time that I am in this job, and 

that is my commitment to you. 

Let me say that it has been about 5 years since I have been in front of 

this subcommittee. When I was here last, I was Vice President of a 

generation of international projects at Exelon Generation. I came here 

and I talked about the PBMR. I spent a year in South Africa as Chief 

Operating Officer of the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor project in South 

Africa, and I am happy to say that South Africans are moving forward. 

After that, I started to do some work on the NGNP Next Generation 

Nuclear Plant project. But when I stepped back and took a look at what 

needs to happen now, my feeling was I could best serve the country by 

getting involved with this project and try to get the Yucca Mountain 

project unstuck; and that is why I am here. 

As you know, Deputy Secretary Sell was here on March 15th and 

committed to you that we would come here this summer and make a 

commitment to a schedule for Yucca, and that is why I am here today. 

I know you have had a chance to read it so I am not going to go 

through all of the testimony, but I would like to talk about where I am 

going to take or try to take this program and my organization with my 

four strategic objectives. 

Number one is get a docketable license application into the NRC no 

later than Monday, June 30th, 2008. I know the date, and I am not 

planning on working that weekend. We are going to have a very tight, 

very driven schedule to drive that. 
13

Mr. Allen, I understand your concern about the assessment and 

whether or not that would impact that date. I am telling you today that 

assessment will not impact that date. That assessment is being done so I 

can fully understand what the gaps are between what I need to have to 

submit a docketable, credible license application versus what I have 

sitting on the shelf right now--which I don’t know what I have sitting on 

the shelf right now, having only been there for 4 weeks, but that is what 

that assessment is about. We have enough time in 23 and a half months 

to close those gaps and put in a good license application, and that is why 

we are doing it. 

But let me talk about more than just the date. Just getting a license 

application in on that date is not a measure of success. It has got to be a 

license application that the NRC will accept and docket, and it has got to 

be an application that will ultimately lead to receiving a license to build 

and operate Yucca Mountain. I have five criteria I mentioned in my 

testimony that that application needs to meet before I am willing to sign 

it off and send it to the NRC, and my entire office knows what these five 

criteria are. 

We have to have a design that meets the regulatory requirements, we 

have to have an application that is written that clearly reflects that 

design, the data upon which the design is based needs to be based on 

quality assured data; the application needs to address all of the issues that 

the NRC is looking for, and the people who are writing this need to stand 

up and be held accountable and willing to sign off and say their part of 

the application is correct and they are willing to stand behind it. So that 

is really important. 

The one other thing I would say about the application is that I know 

there are going to be people who are going to say now we have seen their 

schedule, we think it is overly aggressive, and it shows that they are not 

committed to safety and quality. And what I will tell you is, based on 

my experience in the private sector and in the organizations I have been 

in, the issue of safety, quality, and schedule discipline are not mutually 

exclusive. I unequivocally believe that, and my office is going to believe 

that if they don’t so far, and that safety and quality are not going to be 

things that we are going to pass up, but we are not going to bypass 

schedule discipline either on getting this application in. 

The schedule I have attached to the testimony talked about 

best-achievable date. I wanted to be very clear on what that means. It is 

predicated on that the legislative package that the Administration sent up 

to the Hill back in the spring gets passed by the Congress; and I would 

respectfully request that the Congress look at that legislation, debate it, 

engage us in dialogue and take it up this year. Because issues that are 

fundamentally required to allow me and the project to meet this schedule 
14

are tied up with the corrective actions, if you will, that we have requested 

in that legislation, particularly access to the waste fund revenues and 

receipts, land withdrawal in Nevada, and certain other key issues that are 

listed in there; and I can talk about that later. So I would like to reiterate 

the importance of that legislation in allowing me to meet those dates that 

are in that schedule. 

Of the three other strategic objectives, the second one has to do with 

the organization itself, the organization now that I am heading up. In 

order to be seen as a credible NRC licensee, there are certain skills, 

competencies, behaviors, and culture that that organization needs to 

have; and I am just in the early stages in my assessment of where that 

currently stands. I can tell you that it is not where it needs to be. But I 

can also tell you that I can get it a long way in getting to where it needs 

to be in the time I am going to be in this position, and I certainly intend 

to do that. 

The third strategic objective is around the issue that several of you 

brought up already about how do we get the issue of the mounting 

government liability off of top dead center around the delays associated 

with Yucca Mountain and the failure of the Department to perform per 

the standard contract. 

As some of you may know, I was the person who was the lead 

negotiator for PECO Energy in negotiating the settlement for the DOE 

for the Peach Bottom spent fuel contract. We were the first settlement 

with the Government on the failure to perform on the spent fuel contract. 

So I understand the agreement, I understand the contract, and I 

understand what we can do, and that is one of the tools in the portfolio of 

solutions I was talking about as a way of moving forward to minimize 

government liability. 

The fourth and final strategic objective is around transportation. We 

can get this thing moving. We can get it licensed. We can get it built. 

But if we can’t get the fuel there, we haven’t accomplished anything. 

The whole issue of transportation has been underfunded and not enough 

attention paid to it; and my commitment to you is it is going to get a lot 

more attention real fast, with a very heavy emphasis on local 

involvement in the planning of the transportation routes and 

understanding the energy procedures and processes that need to go into 

transporting high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel to the repository. 

So, in summation, I am very happy to be here, I understand the 

challenge that sits in front of me, and I am excited about going to make it 

happen. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. 

MR. HALL. Thank you. 
15

[The prepared statement of Hon. Edward F. Sproat III follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the invitation to appear 

before the Committee to discuss the current status of the Yucca Mountain Project and my 

plans over the next two and one-half years. 

It has been more than five years since I last appeared before this Committee as a 

vice president of Exelon Generation and testified about the Pebble Bed Modular Reactor 

(PBMR) project in South Africa. During 2002 I was in South Africa as the Chief 

Operating Officer of PBMR assisting the South Africans in determining the feasibility of 

commercializing that technology. I am pleased to report that the South African 

government has decided to proceed with demonstration and commercialization of the 

PBMR. 

More recently, I was involved with forming a consortium to compete for the Next 

Generation Nuclear Plant project to demonstrate the cogeneration of electricity and 

hydrogen from the PBMR. While that technology and demonstration project holds much 

promise, I see a more urgent near-term need for this Nation’s energy security; that is to 

move the issue of the disposition of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste 

forward with a sense of urgency. It is for that reason that I accepted President George W. 

Bush’s appointment to serve as the Director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste 

Management (OCRWM). 

I have now been in my new position as Director for about five weeks. During this 

period I have been conducting a thorough assessment of the Yucca Mountain Project, and 

that assessment has not yet been completed. I continue to gather data on functional areas 

of the Project to determine the performance gaps between the current state and the levels 

of performance that will be necessary for the successful execution of this Project. 

In order to expedite this assessment process, I have instructed my Office to issue 

Requests for Proposals for independent assessments of the draft License Application, the 

Quality Assurance programs and their implementation by DOE and its major contractor, 

and of the engineering processes and procedures being utilized by DOE and its major 

contractor. While I am not yet prepared to give you a full report of my assessment, I can 

tell you that there are a number of very good people working on this Project who can 

form the nucleus of a high-quality team needed to successfully design, license, build and 

operate the Yucca Mountain repository and the waste acceptance and transportation 

systems. I also can tell you that there are a number of process and organizational issues 

which must be addressed, all of which are correctable. 

There are four strategic objectives that I intend to pursue and implement during my 

tenure as Director. Let me explain these objectives and why they are important. 

My first objective is to submit a high-quality and docketable license application to 

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) no later than Monday, June 30, 2008. 

 This objective is my first priority and will receive my full management attention. 

Success in meeting this objective is not measured only by the calendar, but also by the 

quality and completeness of the application. Before I will allow the application to be 

submitted, I must be satisfied that: 

1. There is a repository design which meets the licensing requirements; 

2. The application accurately reflects the design; 

3. The data which are used to justify the design in the application are accurate and 

were generated in compliance with Quality Assurance requirements; 

4. The application adequately addresses all of the guidance of the Yucca Mountain 

Review Plan (NUREG 1804); and 
16

5. The writers of the application have attested to the accuracy and completeness of 

their sections. 

I am certain there will be those who will question how these criteria can be met with 

such an aggressive schedule. I can tell you unequivocally that the concepts of safety, 

quality and schedule discipline are not mutually exclusive. This concept is demonstrated 

by world class nuclear organizations on a daily basis and I intend to hold my organization 

and its contractors to the same standards. 

With a license application submittal on June 30, 2008, the best-achievable schedule 

for Yucca Mountain would lead to receipt of a license to begin to receive and possess 

spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste at Yucca Mountain in 2017. Attached 

is a more detailed set of schedule milestones for your information. 

Let me define what I mean by “best-achievable schedule.” The schedule after the 

Department submits the License Application is predicated on 1) appropriations consistent 

with the Administration’s requests and passage of our proposed legislation entitled the 

“Nuclear Fuel Management Disposal Act”; and 2) an NRC construction authorization 

decision that is consistent with the timelines contained in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

There are a number of uncertainties currently beyond the control of the Department that 

have the potential to significantly delay the opening date for the repository and cannot be 

accurately predicted. The most important is the ability of the Department to have access 

to the Nuclear Waste Fund to support the cash flows needed to implement the Project. I 

respectfully ask Congress to pass the Administration’s proposed legislation to address 

this issue; access to the Fund is key to moving the Project forward. 

Other factors that have the potential to delay the Project include: 1) the length and 

outcome of any derivative litigation, 2) Congressional approval of the permanent 

withdrawal of the lands needed for the operational area of the repository, and 3) obtaining 

any necessary Federal or state authorizations or permits for the repository and the 

transportation system. The Administration’s proposed legislation addresses most of these 

uncertainties and will go a long way in reducing schedule risk and the cost uncertainties 

of the Yucca Mountain Project while still fully protecting public and worker health and 

safety. 

My second objective is to design, staff, and train the OCRWM organization such 

that it has the skills and culture needed to design, license, and manage the construction 

and operation of the Yucca Mountain Project with safety, quality, and cost effectiveness. 

I am still in the process of assessing the current state of my organization and the skill 

gaps that may exist compared to what is needed to meet this objective. I do know that 

additional skills and competencies are required to enhance the current organization and 

that attracting and retaining individuals with these skills will be a major challenge. I have 

been encouraged, however, by the Department’s Office of Human Capital Management 

and its help in meeting this challenge. 

My third objective is to address the Federal Government’s mounting liability 

associated with unmet contractual obligations to move spent fuel from nuclear plant sites. 

What seems to have been lost in the Yucca Mountain debate over the last several 

years is that the U.S. Government has legally binding contracts with all owners of nuclear 

power plants to take possession of and remove their spent fuel. There are two major 

implications of the Government’s inability to perform per the contract requirements: 1) 

the financial liability borne by America’s taxpayers for non-performance of the contract 

continues to grow every year, and 2) the ability of this country to depend on nuclear 

energy as a strategic energy option for the long term is in jeopardy because spent fuel 

continues to accumulate at existing plants. There is no one solution to these problems. It 

will require a portfolio of legal and financial solutions to address these problems; but it 

can be done, and I intend to work with the Congress and the contract holders to try to 

break this impasse. 
17

My fourth objective is to develop and begin implementation of a comprehensive 

national spent fuel transportation plan that accommodates state, local and tribal concerns 

and input to the greatest extent practicable. 

I believe that the planning of the transportation system for the country’s spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste has been underfunded and not given the 

attention and resources that it demands. The recent National Research Council’s report 

on spent fuel transportation concluded that, while there are no technical barriers to the 

safe transportation of spent nuclear fuel, there are a number of social and institutional 

challenges that must be addressed before large-scale shipments commence. I agree with 

this conclusion and I intend to put into place processes which maximize the ability of the 

public to understand the risks and mitigating safety precautions, and to influence as 

appropriate the selection of transportation routes in their areas. Some work has already 

been done in this area with local planning groups, but much more needs to be done at an 

accelerated pace. 

In summary, these four strategic objectives will form the basis of planning and 

resource allocation during my tenure. I believe that these areas must be addressed today 

to move forward on the issue of final disposal of spent nuclear fuel and to prepare the 

Project for long-term success in meeting the mandated direction of the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act. I will do my best to make this a reality. 

Attachment 

Yucca Mountain Repository Schedule 

Milestone Date 

Design for License Application Complete 30 November 2007 

Licensing Support Network Certification 21 December 2007 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Issued 30 May 2008 

Final License Application Verifications Complete 30 May 2008 

Final Rail Alignment EIS Issued 30 June 2008 

License Application Submittal 30 June 2008 

License Application Docketed by NRC 30 September 2008 

Best-Achievable Repository Construction Schedule 

Start Nevada Rail Construction 5 October 2009 

Construction Authorization 30 September 2011 

Receive and Possess License Application Submittal to NRC 29 March 2013 

Rail Access In-Service 30 June 2014 

Construction Complete for Initial Operations 30 March 2016 

Start up and Pre-Op Testing Complete 31 December 2016 

Begin Receipt 31 March 2017 

The schedule above is based on factors within the control of DOE, appropriations 

consistent with optimum Project execution, issuance of an NRC Construction 

Authorization consistent with the three year period specified in the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act, and the timely issuance by the NRC of a Receive and Possess license. 

This schedule also is dependent on the timely issuance of all necessary other 

authorizations and permits, the absence of litigation related delays and the 

enactment of pending legislation proposed by the Administration. 
18

MR. HALL. Mr. Boucher and I have agreed to recognize the 

Chairman of Energy and Commerce first and the ranking Democrat, 

Mr. Dingell, next for questions. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Barton. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. You caught me right before I was walking out 

the door. I have got a hearing on global warming downstairs that has 

been going on all morning and probably going on all afternoon, so I 

appreciate it. 

You talked about your legislative package. The problem I have with 

trying to move it is--I have told you in my office--it doesn’t seem to have 

a high prospect of being moved in the Senate. So what is the 

Administration’s plan if Mr. Dingell and I decided that we could move 

either the Administration’s proposal or some version of that on a 

bipartisan basis through the House that we could get a reciprocal action 

in the other body? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, being a political neophyte on the Hill, I may not 

know all of the typical ways of working these kinds of issues up here, but 

what I will tell you is that what I find very encouraging is that the 

appropriations language in both the House and the Senate bills fully 

recognizes the issue of the importance of moving spent nuclear fuel 

forward, and the fact that there seems to be at least the consensus that the 

issue is important enough that it needs to be addressed in both houses is 

extremely encouraging to me. 

What is also obvious, reading both the appropriation languages, is 

that there is not a clear consensus on exactly what should be done to 

move it forward. And my commitment to you, Mr. Chairman, is that if I 

am given the opportunity I would like to play a role in trying to facilitate 

that discussion between the two organizations. Because I have some 

ideas, the Department has ideas, clearly you do, and clearly the Senate 

does. I think we have a unique opportunity here over the next 4 or 

5 months to actually make something happen if we can get the right 

people in the room at the same time to talk about it. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. What happens to your plan if we don’t move 

the legislative package? What is Plan B in terms of meeting that 

deadline of having the licensing application to the NRC by June of 2008? 

MR. SPROAT. Based on the funding levels that are being proposed in 

both houses for the coming year, I expect no impact whatsoever in terms 

of funding impact on being able to submit that license application by 

2008. 

Now having said that, the other key issue is the remaining impact on 

the remaining program in terms of the long-term certainty of the funding 

stream, how long the project will take to build, which directly impacts 

the cash flows on an annual basis in the total cost of the project and it 
19

also impacts the ability to predict what the liabilities are associated with 

predicting when we can actually move spent fuel. 

So not having that legislation clearly impacts the ability to predict 

with any kind of certainty how this project will move forward. But in the 

very short term, over the next 12 months it really won’t have an impact. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Does moving forward with the 

Administration’s proposal on GNEP impact the Yucca Mountain 

schedule and emphasis? 

MR. SPROAT. It absolutely will not. Personally, I believe GNEP is 

important. Closing the fuel cycle is important for the future of this 

country, and we are going to have to do it. When it is going to occur and 

how long it is going to take, I think there are a lot of diverse points about 

that, and I am not going to speculate. 

But what is clear is that, number one, regardless of what happens 

with GNEP, there are waste forms and spent fuel forms that we currently 

have responsibility for to dispose that can’t be recycled. They have to go 

to repository. They have to go to disposal. 

As for the commercial spent nuclear fuel, whatever gets recycled 

through GNEP eventually will be a different waste form that comes out 

of the tail end of that process; and when we have that better defined, 

which may be sometime in the future, we will be able to design a waste 

package to handle that, qualify that waste package to put in the 

repository and submit a license application of the NRC to get permission 

to put that waste form in the repository at that point in time. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Do we have the Administration’s support and 

promise that they will not support any diversion of funds from the 

Nuclear Waste Fund that is supposed to go for Yucca to the GNEP 

program? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

CHAIRMAN BARTON. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

MR. HALL. I thank the Chairman. 

I see the President has just issued a veto rejecting the bill to expand 

Federal research on stem cells obtained from embryos. And they reset 

the time for the next vote, Mr. Chairman, about 3:30. Then an hour from 

then they are going to take up the veto message and debate it and then 

have some votes at 5:00, so we will be interrupted from time to time 

here. 

Mr. Dingell, the Chair recognizes you for as much time as you take, 

sir. 

MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, you are most courteous. Thank you. 

I will try and stay within my time limit here. 

First, for my information alone, would you please submit to me, not 

for the record, but submit to me a statement of all of the problems that 
20

you anticipate with regard to completing your scheduled construction 

and completion of the Yucca Mountain facility? I might want to put it in 

the record, but I don’t intend to tip over any garbage cans and inform 

people who might be out to delay or to stop the project from having you 

essentially be advising them on what they may do to slow the process. 

MR. SPROAT. Just so I understand, what you are asking for is really 

a risk assessment of what are the key risks that I see to moving the 

project forward from where it is today to repository opening. 

MR. DINGELL. Yes. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. DINGELL. Now, with regard to the licensing schedule, if the 

Administration bill is not enacted, can DOE still submit an application to 

the NRC by 2008? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. DINGELL. You can? 

MR. SPROAT. Assuming that--obviously, appropriations for fiscal 

years 2008 and 2009 will have some impact on that; and, obviously, I 

can’t without access to the waste fund because I wouldn’t have that 

legislation. I am at the will of the Congress in terms of what 

appropriations I would get legislated in that fiscal year 2008 which 

would cover that last part. 

MR. DINGELL. Do you feel an enactment of the legislation bill is 

necessary to meet the best achievable goal of opening Yucca Mountain 

in 2017? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. I will give you one example. 

MR. DINGELL. Will you tell us why? 

MR. SPROAT. One specific example--and I am not an attorney, and I 

don’t pretend to understand this. But, for example, we have requested 

the Congressional authority which we need for land withdrawal. Right 

now, the Yucca Mountain site is on the Nevada test site which is owned 

by the U.S. Government. But we need to be able to withdraw that land 

from public use on a permanent basis so we can assure the NRC that we 

will have control of that site, both access and future activities on it. 

Right now, we don’t have that--we can’t give them that assurance, so that 

one issue just by itself-- 

MR. DINGELL. Is that regulatory or statutory action? 

MR. SPROAT. I believe that is statutory, as I understand it; and that is 

one example. 

MR. DINGELL. I would suggest if that be the case you get legislation 

up here as soon as possible. 

MR. SPROAT. That is actually in that legislative package that we sent 

up earlier this year, sir. 
21

MR. DINGELL. Now with regard to DOE’s liability of breach of 

contract with the utilities, your testimony lists a number of concerns 

related to DOE’s inability to meet its contractual obligation to be 

accepting waste. You stated at page 6 there is no single solution. But 

then you go on to say, “It will require a portfolio of legal and financial 

solutions to address these problems,” close quote, and that you will, 

quote, “work with the Congress and the contract holder to try and break 

this impasse.” 

Can you tell us exactly what is this impasse? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, impasse is my term that I use because, as I said, 

I started working on this issue when I was with PECO Energy back in 

2000 or 2001. The impasse is that we still have the vast majority of the 

commercial nuclear plant license holders who have contracts with the 

DOE that we are basically in litigation with, and the potential liability to 

the taxpayer is continuing to mount. We are making very slow progress 

in terms of moving that issue off of where it has been stuck. 

What I learned from my involvement in this issue back when I 

negotiated the PECO settlement was that there is no one solution. In 

other words, one fix doesn’t--the industry is-- 

MR. DINGELL. I was going to say you have got a lot of problems. 

MR. SPROAT. There are the issues with the shut-down plants, for 

example. They are out of the business. They want to get rid of the fuel 

and get rid of the liability. There are other companies that are planning 

to stay in the nuclear industry for a long period of time, and they are in it 

for the long haul, and then there are others who are still trying to figure 

out what is an appropriate settlement for them. 

So the quick answer is there is a portfolio of I think legal settlement 

and possibly technology issues that can possibly help here, but there is 

no one quick fix that fixes all of this, I don’t believe. 

MR. DINGELL. Now I think you are telling us that we should expect 

a second legislative proposal in addition to that which you set up in April 

of 2006, is that correct? 

MR. SPROAT. I wouldn’t say that yet. I don’t know if I need any 

additional legislation. It is certainly a possibility. But what I would like 

to say is I would like to have an opportunity to have more dialogue and 

negotiations on this with all of the interested stakeholders first. 

MR. DINGELL. Now you had mentioned the impasse and the contract 

holders. How do you propose to work with the contract holders on this 

matter? 

MR. SPROAT. I am still--having only been here for 4 weeks, I really 

haven’t laid out a full plan about that yet. 

MR. DINGELL. But you are going to have to do that? 

MR. SPROAT. I am going to have to do that. No doubt about that. 
22

MR. DINGELL. I am not going to expect any miracles from you 

today. Tomorrow, yes, but not today. 

Over many years, DOE provided this committee with summaries of 

projected spending for Yucca Mountain which outlined future budget 

needs. While some past summaries have indicated that DOE may need 

to tap the corpus of the Nuclear Waste Fund to open Yucca Mountain, 

others have suggested that the program could be squeezed by using only 

annual contributions to the fund. 

Now, questions. Now that you have established revised timetables 

for filing a license application and for opening repository, can you tell 

me whether or not DOE will need to tap the corpus of the fund between 

now and the time the repository opens? 

MR. SPROAT. No, I can’t, but let me clarify that. There is no doubt 

in my mind that during the life of this project--assuming we get an 

authorization to construct and a license to operate, there is no doubt in 

my mind we will have to tap the corpus of the fund during that time 

period. In terms of do I need it to build it, my best answer is--right now 

is I don’t know, because I haven’t had the time to take a look at the 

projected cash flows and challenge them from a management 

perspective. Yet to say this is the right set of cash flows through the 

construction period and can I meet those cash flows with receipts and 

interest or do I need corpus, I just can’t answer that question yet, sir. 

MR. DINGELL. All right. Will you provide the committee with the 

best updated version of the projected program costs you can give us? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, I will. 

[The information follows:] 

We are currently in the process of re-calculating the cash flows for the Yucca 

Mountain Program based on the CD-1 recently approved scope. We anticipate having the 

revised cash flows available to provide to the Committee by the end of CY 2006. 

MR. DINGELL. Mr. Chairman, I have got other good questions, but I 

am loathe to consume the time of the committee. I don’t want to cause 

problems here. 

MR. HALL. The Chair thinks it is worthwhile to grant you another 

5 minutes. 

MR. DINGELL. Then I’ll wait. Thank you, Mr.-- 

MR. HALL. No. Go ahead now while you are on a run. 

MR. DINGELL. I understand that your tenure at DOE has been brief, 

but I am concerned that your plan to issue new requests for proposals for 

independent assessments of the repository program could lead to further 

delays. How do these new studies square with your goal of filing the 

license application with NRC by 2008? How will you avoid getting 
23

bogged down in new reviews? NRC is not known for the blinding speed 

with which it processes its business. 

MR. SPROAT. Very good question, sir. 

As I stated in my opening statement, the issue for me is not 

necessarily by itself getting an application in no matter what it says or no 

matter what its quality by that date. I have to have the quality and the 

completeness by that date. And the only way I can assure myself that I 

have addressed the issues that need to be addressed by this program--by 

my program by the time that application goes in is I need to do some 

additional independent assessments around pieces of this program that I 

have concerns about, and those concerns are based on what is available 

in the public record that I was able to read and study up on while I was 

awaiting confirmation. 

It is very clear this program has had a poor history of quality 

assurance implementation and issues. So I think it is extremely 

important that I get in a set of outside independent eyes of very qualified 

people to take a look at the programs at DOE, its primary contractor, and 

the key national labs to tell me either how good or how bad those 

programs are so I can get them fixed before that application goes in. 

MR. DINGELL. Now I applaud this, but how are you sure this is not 

going to slow the project down? 

MR. SPROAT. I won’t let it. 

MR. DINGELL. Then let us pray. 

Given the existence of a Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, 

why are new assessments initiated through requests for proposals 

necessary? Could involvement by the Board save time? 

MR. SPROAT. No, it won’t. The Board has a very specific set of 

expertise that is geared to look at the science and the probabilistic risk of 

the repository. These issues that I am doing, these independent 

assessments on are more of a programmatic nature; and the Board 

doesn’t have the right skill mix to do them adequately, in my opinion. 

MR. DINGELL. Now I observe here and I concur with your statement 

on page 4 that it is critical for DOE to have access to the Nuclear Waste 

Fund to support cash flows to implement the project. I agree with that. I 

have no particular objection to the legislative reclassification to which 

you refer, which was included in the Administration’s proposed bill. 

However, I believe this is only a partial solution since it addresses only 

future rate payers’ contributions to the fund. 

Now the question. I reluctantly voted against past legislation that did 

not safeguard the existing corpus of the waste fund. Why does DOE not 

support this clearly needed reform? 

MR. SPROAT. I am sorry. Doesn’t support which? 
24

MR. DINGELL. People are raiding this fund left and right. It is being 

spent for all matters and purposes inconsistent with that which Congress 

established the fund for. It would appear to me that a responsible and 

needed reform to this matter would be to say to these other people they 

need to keep their cotton-picking hands off of it and break their knuckles 

every time they reach so you can see to it that the fund is spent for the 

purposes for which the Congress set it up. 

MR. SPROAT. I am from a State that has the second-most amount of 

spent nuclear fuel in the country, and I personally have contributed a lot 

of money into that Nuclear Waste Fund, and Mr. Shimkus-- 

MR. DINGELL. There is a whole bunch of people that have. 

MR. SPROAT. And Mr. Shimkus is from a State that has the most 

spent nuclear waste in the country. We are all on the same page that that 

fund needs to be used for the purpose for which it was intended. 

MR. DINGELL. But there are lots of light-fingered folks who are 

putting their hands in the till and taking that out for other purposes. How 

are we and why are we not going to insist that that fund be protected 

instead of dissipated for purposes inconsistent with what the Congress set 

it up for? 

MR. SPROAT. I think that is a very legitimate question, and I am not 

well versed enough on the budget process and the budgetary procedures 

and laws around that. I guess all I can commit to you is that I understand 

exactly what your position is, and with the legislative package we put up 

here we think it is a good start in moving in that direction and-- 

MR. DINGELL. Start but not a finish. 

MR. SPROAT. Maybe not. 

MR. DINGELL. And I am troubled because, again, good-hearted folk 

are spending this thing for all manners of other purposes. It starts with 

OMB, the President’s Office, it goes on down through the 

Appropriations Committee and the Budget Committees; and nobody can 

stop these rascals from doing it. We set the trust fund up so there would 

be money to address these problems; and, lo and behold, they are using it 

for different purposes so it is not available. 

MR. SPROAT. In terms of--I can’t speak for how the accounting in 

government works, but in terms of disbursements from the fund, it is 

very clear it can only be used for Yucca Mountain. And there are--at 

least I am not aware of other programs that are actively taking 

withdrawals out of the fund for other programs. I don’t believe that is 

the case. 

MR. DINGELL. We will send you information in that regard. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy. 
25

MR. HALL. Thank you, sir. We always allow the Chairman and 

Ranking Member all of the necessary time that they can take because of 

their schedule. 

At this time, I have just a question or so to ask you. 

The total system life-cycle cost estimate has not been updated since 

2001. Now that DOE has a revised schedule, if I missed it--you may 

have already said it--but when do you plan to issue a revised estimate? 

MR. SPROAT. I understand, sir. We are currently working on that. I 

would expect that to be probably early fall timeframe, and we will have 

that ready for examination. 

MR. HALL. Will the current one mil per kilowatt hour charge be 

adequate to fund that? 

MR. SPROAT. Based on everything I have seen so far--and let me 

couch this by saying I haven’t done a detailed review, but based on my 

preliminary discussions with the staff, there is no indication that that 

needs to change. 

MR. HALL. The previous DOE testimony before the committee 

indicated that DOE estimates that liability costs may reach 

approximately $500 million per year plus another $500 million per year 

for continued storage of defense waste. What can DOE do to mitigate 

these costs to the American taxpayer? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, clearly, by my third strategic objective that I 

outlined, I clearly understand the importance of moving this issue 

forward. Our protection right now--just to give you the numbers that I 

have in front of me--that if we were to open the repository in early 2017, 

the total liability we are projecting at that point in time is about 

$7 billion--billion with a “b” total. 

I think there are things we can probably do both in terms of 

settlement with people as well as maybe some other things that we may 

not have legal authority to do right now to help drive that down. Clearly, 

the other things we can do, assuming we get the funding and the other 

issues in our legislative package that we have asked for, that upon which 

our best achievable schedule is predicated, assuming we can get those, I 

think you know there may be an opportunity to further compress the 

construction schedule but I am not really ready to commit to that today 

yet. 

MR. HALL. I am going to try to be around to hold you to that 2017 

deal. George Burns said he didn’t buy green bananas. 

All right. Who is next here? Ranking Member Boucher, the Chair 

recognizes you for 5 minutes. 

MR. BOUCHER. Thank you, Chairman Hall. I am totally confident 

that you will be around in 2017 in order to bless the opening of this 
26

project, and I notice that you normally do buy green bananas. So thank 

you for recognizing me. 

Mr. Sproat, I am very impressed with your confidence and with your 

determination. I applaud your analytical approach and the determination 

that you exhibited in your statement here today; and I certainly wish you 

well with what, as Chairman Barton indicated, will be a very difficult 

task. I realize you have been here 4 weeks so, obviously, you didn’t 

totally complete the schedule on your own, and I am sure it was well in 

the process of formulation at the time you arrived. 

Let me ask if you are totally comfortable with the schedule. Do you 

believe this represents a realistic timeframe for moving forward? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir, it does. I would not have brought it up here 

if I didn’t believe that. And if you will notice the timeframe of the 

license applications submittal which is 23 and a half months off now, I 

still plan to be here by that date. I know that if I miss that date I am 

probably going to get hauled up here and have to explain it, and I don’t 

intend to go through that. 

MR. BOUCHER. Mr. Dingell has propounded many of the questions, 

I also noted, about budgeting, but let me just extend a couple of those. 

Referencing the budget that you will need in order to complete the 

preparation and submission of the license to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, I believe $156 million has been requested for fiscal year 

2007. Do you believe that amount is adequate for that year and what 

amount do you think will be necessary for fiscal year 2008 to let you 

complete this work successfully? 

MR. SPROAT. That is a very good question, and I am really not 

prepared to answer. I would have to say that I know that in the total 

budget that I have available to me in fiscal year 2007 and what we would 

hopefully anticipate in fiscal year 2008 there should be more than 

sufficient funds in there to complete those submissions. 

In terms of the allocation of the funds within the budget, in terms of 

license applications versus other activities, I am very clear my first 

priority is the license application preparation, in getting it done; and if I 

need some relief from Congress in terms of moving some funds around 

in my budget to allow that to happen, I intend to come back and ask for 

it. 

MR. BOUCHER. Then in the fall you are going to present further 

budgetary information and we will have an opportunity to question you 

more carefully with that. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. BOUCHER. Let me ask, as you prepare for that appearance here, 

to give some attention to a very key question which Mr. Dingell 

propounded, and let me emphasize this, and that is the point at which you 
27

are going to need to start dipping into the Nuclear Waste Fund and have 

monies available to you that exceed the annual $750 million dollars that 

ratepayers are contributing into the fund. 

I frankly find it hard to imagine that you will not need that corpus. 

Over the approximately 10 years that separate now from your projected 

opening date only about $10 billion would come into the fund. Add 

another 10 percent in interest and if you can get that these days and that 

gives you maybe $11 billion. I can’t believe you could actually build 

this facility and do the other work and engage in the settlements that you 

are going to have to address for $10 billion. 

MR. SPROAT. That is a very good point; and, as I said before, I am 

not quite ready to defend the cash flows yet. 

However, let me say there is a piece on the other side of that 

equation, having come from the private sector on large projects like this 

where I believe there is a limit to what a project can effectively spend 

and manage on an annual basis. This project has the potential, if it is not 

appropriately managed and led, to spend a lot of money and not 

accomplish a lot. 

So as I take a look at the cash flows on this project during the 

construction years, because we are going to be building a rail line and be 

building the repository and then whatever other capital investments we 

need to do in order to get the fuel from wherever it is on that rail line to 

the mountain, you are right. It is not beyond the realm of credibility that 

we are going to need more than $800 million a year. 

But, at the same time, I have got to make sure I put in place the 

management processes with the right people to be able to effectively 

manage a project that can handle cash flows that large or larger; and I 

will tell you right now I don’t think we are there yet. 

MR. BOUCHER. And we are also not there in terms of protecting 

these monies from intrusion from other sources, including the $19 billion 

that currently resides in the fund which is available for expenditure. 

And, in fact, I would differ with your statement earlier. That money, in 

fact, has been expended; and walling off that amount, just having a 

decision by the Congress to say we are going to protect $19 billion, we 

are going to put it aside and make it available to finish this program is, in 

my personal view, of the utmost importance. As you are preparing your 

future budgetary projections to us, bear in mind that that money is not 

guaranteed. It is not assured, given the current legal structure. 

A couple of other questions. Are we going to need some kind of 

interim storage between now and 2017? That is still a long time. That is 

10 years for waste to continue to pile up at reactor sites. What are we 

going to do with it? 
28

MR. SPROAT. Let me try to answer the question this way. We 

currently have a lot of interim storage. We have interim storage at 126 

sites. Mr. Shimkus has a lot of interim storage in his State. I licensed 

one of our plants, and we’ve got a lot in Pennsylvania, and a lot of the 

people in this room have interim storage. So it is not a question of 

interim storage. 

It is a question of, number one, how do we reduce and minimize 

taxpayer liability associated with contract nonperformance by DOE. 

And, number two, it is about how do we provide waste confidence for 

the new wave of nuclear plants that are being considered now. This is a 

real issue for the people who want to build new plants. 

So that those are two key issues that further additional interim 

storage and in my term what I call centralized interim storage is a 

potential legitimate solution. 

Now, having said that, again coming back to looking at both the 

House appropriations bill and the Senate appropriations bill, there seems 

to be a recognition on both sides that we wanted to do something with 

this, but there is not a clear consensus on exactly what. I think that there 

are some opportunities to work there, but I would say that knowing what 

it takes to license a centralized interim storage facility in terms of citing 

whatever litigation that comes with it, the licensing process and the 

construction process, if we are able to get the legislative package that we 

have sent up to the Hill passed on Yucca Mountain and we are able to get 

Yucca Mountain opened up in the 2017 timeframe, I don’t think 

centralized interim storage is going to buy very much, I really don’t. 

MR. BOUCHER. So if we actually meet the 2017 schedule, that 

diminishes the need for interim? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. BOUCHER. Given your expertise, I am compelled to ask this 

question. I had followed a little bit the Pebble Bed exercise in South 

Africa. We heard a lot about it for a while in the early phase, and then 

we didn’t hear very much. At the time, probably 4 years ago, when this 

was a topical subject, some of the electric utilities in the U.S. were 

saying this might be the new model for going forward here in the U.S. as 

well. 

MR. SPROAT. That was me saying that. 

MR. BOUCHER. I thought I heard your name. So what happened to 

it? Did it pan out as you had expected? Does it add to safety? Does it 

add to efficiency? Is it lower cost than conventional technology? Is it 

possibly a model for going forward here in the U.S.? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, what happened to it was I went down to South 

Africa for a year to run the joint venture down there, and I went down 

because I was asked by the South African--by the board of directors to 
29

come down to get the project to the point where the investors could make 

an informed decision about cost, design, schedule, commercialization 

strategy. And basically I did that, and I finished that responsibility in the 

end of 2002. 

What has happened since that time, the South African Government 

has taken that body of work that we produced and made a decision at the 

Presidential level that the project is going forward in South Africa as a 

national strategic project. They have ramped the project up quite a bit 

from where I have left from a budget and a personnel standpoint, and 

they are planning on building a demonstration PBMR outside of Cape 

Town and to break ground on it sometime I think late next year is the 

latest schedule I have seen. 

So it is moving forward, and if they are successful in demonstrating 

it, part of their overall strategy is to get that license certified here in the 

U.S. with the NRC so that it could be another option for U.S. utilities 

who might decide they want a smaller modular reactor as opposed to a 

big megareactor. 

MR. BOUCHER. That would potentially add to safety, to efficiency, 

to reduce cost? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, it would. 

MR. BOUCHER. Thank you. 

MR. HALL. Thank you very much, Mr. Boucher. Because we have 

only one witness, and we have run over a little on the questions, and the 

Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Shimkus, the gentleman from Illinois --

his name has been taken not in vain, but referred to several times. I give 

you s3 extra minutes, and recognize you for 8 minutes. 

MR. SHIMKUS. Whoo hoo. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for 

being here, and, of course, we have had a lot of work on a lot of issues 

for a long time, and I am pleased to see you in your current position. 

And just in the line of--with my friend Mr. Boucher, we are also working 

on coal liquid applications, which South Africa--and actually the 

Government paid, invested, took the risk over decades. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. SHIMKUS. And now they are sitting in the catbird seat as the 

world is trying to find coal liquid technologies, and maybe that is the 

same thing with this eventually, and we don’t operate that way. Maybe 

we should. We may do the science here, but we definitely--it is just not 

in our nature to take on a major risky project. So I have to applaud them 

for their foresight. Hopefully it will pay off like the coal-to-liquid 

technology is paying off in South Africa now. 

MR. SPROAT. I hope so. 

MR. SHIMKUS. There is no bigger issue facing this country than 

opening Yucca Mountain. It just sends a signal of our desire to be 
30

independent to the market. It will address the waste, it will lower risk, 

and we look like fools up here. 

I will be honest with you, I was teaching high school, and Yucca 

Mountain was one of the case studies in the book. I remember--and I 

mentioned this in the hearings, and, you have got this American Indian, 

this horse sitting on top of Yucca Mountain, and the case study was 

seizing of land for this repository. And we operated on old textbooks, 

and this was 1986. 

So we just have to--I mean, I think what you hear from Members is, 

we applaud a schedule. There is some reticence to believing it. 

MR. SPROAT. I understand that. 

MR. SHIMKUS. And it is justifiable. 

MR. SPROAT. I understand that. 

MR. SHIMKUS. But let us know what we can do, and ask for 

assistance, and help hold us accountable to meet these standards, because 

you have a lot of support here, and in this new environment of the desire 

to really be diversified in electricity generation, that is my position, and 

have a lot of competing generators out there, living up to our 

responsibilities and our requirements under law, we need to be there as a 

partner to make sure that this happens. 

Do you believe the Department has the scientific information, a 

sufficient breadth and depth, to support a high-quality and defensible 

license application? 

MR. SPROAT. I think it certainly has the base of that. I don’t know 

yet whether or not it has all that it needs. 

MR. SHIMKUS. And that is why you are doing that? 

MR. SPROAT. One of the reasons I am doing that assessment. It is 

another reason why I spent several hours with the NWTRB members just 

this past week to take a look at their latest annual report to Congress of 

what their key technical issues are that they see, and my intent is to take 

those issues and incorporate them into my science program this year to 

make sure that I am focusing the organization on gathering information 

and doing analysis that will help address the NWTRB’s issues that they 

told us they still have concerns about. 

MR. SHIMKUS. As you do this assessment, that will probably help 

give you some guidelines as to what you plan to do; if there are some 

gaps, how you will address those. 

MR. SPROAT. Exactly. 

MR. SHIMKUS. I think also what Members would appreciate, that if 

in this assessment, in these shortfalls, you see where we can be engaged, 

then you, through the Department, should be up here-- 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 
31

MR. SHIMKUS.--as quick as possible. There will be continued 

finger-pointing if we do not meet schedules. 

MR. SPROAT. I understand. 

MR. SHIMKUS. Many of us don’t want to be on the end of that. We 

want to say we have done all we can. 

MR. SPROAT. Believe me, I have no doubt that if we don’t meet the 

schedule, the finger-pointing will be right at me. 

MR. SHIMKUS. That is that old one this way, five, four this way. 

One of the worst ideas that has come out of the Senate is 

Domenici-Reid and these 33 interim storage sites. Doesn’t that make 

your work additionally more complicated? 

And it is okay to bash the Senate while you are over here. You just 

have to be careful when you go back over there. 

MR. SPROAT. I am going to see Senator Domenici tomorrow 

afternoon. I don’t think it makes my job more difficult. And I want to 

go back to what I said in the beginning. I really am encouraged, the fact 

that both the House and the Senate have this issue on the table, that this 

recognition by both houses that this is an important issue that needs to 

move forward, and I view that as an opportunity more than a threat. And 

I would like to have more discussion with both houses around that 

because, quite frankly, I have got some experiences in terms of licensing 

interim storage and hopefully can inject some reality into the process and 

into the thinking so that hopefully we can come to some kind of 

consensus that hopefully make some sense. 

MR. SHIMKUS. We are already talking about Yucca Mountain, and 

we already know we are way behind there. There is already debate in the 

Department on the second repository. Then you are addressing 33 

interim sites. I know our colleague, now Governor of Maine, is already 

starting to raise some issues. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. SHIMKUS. I can see 33 other Governors raising some issue. I 

can see transportation debates, politicization of this issue. We just can’t-

-I am on record. That is the stupidest record I ever heard of, and we need 

not go there, and if I see Senator Domenici, I will tell him. I am sure he 

will tell me what-- 

MR. SPROAT. Let me just talk about the second repository just for a 

second because that is a very good point. In our legislation package that 

we sent up, one of the things that we asked for was relief on the 

administrative limit of 70,000 metric tons of uranium to put in the 

mountain. That was strictly an administrative limit that was put in the 

law. Technically the mountain can hold a lot more than that, probably 

close to double. And what we are asking for is relief from that 70,000 

metric ton limit and allow the NRC to make a determination as to what 
32

the maximum licensable limit of storage in the mountain is, based on the 

actual mountain configuration. 

If we get that, I think it is extremely defendable to say that it is 

unlikely we are going to need a second repository any time in our 

respective lifetimes. If we don’t get that relief, if we don’t get that 

legislation, I am going to have to come back to the Congress sometime 

while I am in this office and say, we need a second repository. 

MR. SHIMKUS. My last question. You understand because you have 

been in the private sector, the corporate culture. And talk about the 

corporate culture of the NRC--a DOE site that is going to be regulated by 

the NRC, and what are we doing in preparation of that? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, my second strategic objective I talked about was 

about getting the organization, the OCRWM organization, and DOE 

ready to become a credible NRC licensee, and it is all about culture. It is 

all about understanding safety, quality, integrity, continuous 

improvement, teamwork. And I am very clear--I was very heavily 

involved in leading a corporate culture change initiative at the old PECO 

Energy, Philadelphia Electric, when we changed it from a nuclear 

organization that had to shut down a plant because operators were found 

sleeping to being the premier nuclear operator in the country. And we 

engineered that turnaround of that culture change there, and we then did 

it for Philadelphia Electric, PECO Energy, across the entire corporation, 

and that let us become the organization that formed the basis of Exelon 

with the merger with ConEd. 

So I know what it looks like, I know how to do it, and I intend to go 

make major steps in moving us forward in the next 2, 2-1/2 years while I 

am here. 

MR. SHIMKUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will end, and I will just 

end on thanking you. And based upon the success of you and your wife 

raising a young lady to attend the United States Naval Academy, I am 

going to say all good things. And the success there bodes well for the 

success of this. And I yield back 

MR. SPROAT. Thank you very much. 

MR. HALL. Thank you. 

Recognize Mr. Wynn from the State of Maryland. 

MR. WYNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Sproat. 

Maybe about four questions. First of all, what is the advantage of 

putting the fund off budget? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, I am certainly not the right person to ask in 

terms of trying to explain the Federal budget process here, because I just 

don’t understand it. But the reason we are asking for it is because we 

believe that by giving us the right to receive the annual receipts being 
33

paid by the utilities into the Nuclear Waste Fund and giving us access to 

those funds directly to allow us to spend them in the years they are 

received, it eliminates that funding uncertainty that we have right now 

that up until now has had some impact on the program-- 

MR. WYNN. Feel certain about whether you will get the 

appropriations? 

MR. SPROAT. I am sorry? 

MR. WYNN. Is there uncertainty about whether you will get the 

appropriation? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. It is an uncertainty on whether we will get 

the appropriations, and particularly given the fact that based on the 

current--as I understand, and I may be wrong, but as I understand the 

current legislative requirements around budgets and the Federal--and the 

Federal deficit, that where I would go from spending around a half a 

billion dollars a year now to ramping up maybe during peak construction 

of maybe more than a billion a year, under the current process that would 

be very difficult for the House and the Senate and OMB to mark 

appropriately. And it is probably more than I understand about the 

process. 

MR. WYNN. Okay. What happens to the funds that have already 

been paid? Are they set aside for you, or are they subject again to 

appropriation? 

MR. SPROAT. They are-- 

MR. WYNN. I am trying to find out where this money is and get a 

handle on it. 

MR. SPROAT. There is a national trust fund that the Government has 

called the Nuclear Waste Fund, and it is accumulating interest. It is 

certainly intended to be used strictly for disposal of high-level nuclear 

waste material. 

MR. WYNN. Do you have authority over that fund? 

MR. SPROAT. No, I don’t. 

MR. WYNN. Who has authority over that fund? 

MR. SPROAT. Basically the Congress. 

MR. WYNN. So it is up to us. You don’t want that uncertainty? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. WYNN. That is fair. 

The other question I wanted to ask, there has been some suggestion 

that reprocessing might preclude the need for Yucca. Do you agree or 

disagree with that? 

MR. SPROAT. I totally disagree with that. It is very clear, no matter 

what we do with reprocessing, there are other waste forms, high-level 

waste from the weapons program and other spent nuclear fuel, probably 
34

spent naval nuclear fuel, that can’t be reprocessed and needs to go right 

into disposal. 

MR. WYNN. Okay. Thank you. 

Another question I have is a note that you say on about 30 June, 

2008, you believe you will have the final EIS rail alignment, EIS issue. 

Have you considered the potential litigation around the EIS in calculating 

this schedule? I know with road construction, I have seen delays as 

much as 10, 15, even 20 years just in terms of litigation over EIS. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. That is a very good question. And let me just be 

clear, that milestone that I put there indicates when we want and need to 

have that EIS issued. What is not factored into that schedule that I gave 

you is litigation that may occur, and we all have our own opinions of will 

it occur and how long will it take. We have not factored in contingency 

around litigation on that schedule on any of the milestones. 

MR. WYNN. Is there any way to get around that problem, because it 

seems to me that that could add another 10 years potentially to this issue, 

to the schedule. 

MR. SPROAT. I am not sure. I am not sure. 

MR. WYNN. And I guess the last question I have is, now, as a result 

of the suit by the utilities, DOE has some liability. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. WYNN. And it is my understanding that the Federal Judgment 

Fund is the only source you can tap into; is that correct? 

MR. SPROAT. That is correct. 

MR. WYNN. Is the Federal Judgment Fund sufficient? 

MR. SPROAT. That is administered by the Department of Justice, and 

I just don’t know what the funding mechanisms or budget mechanisms 

are for that, sir. I just don’t know. 

MR. WYNN. Two questions. One, do you know the amount of the 

liability, of DOE’s liability? 

MR. SPROAT. From what I believe as of today--and there are going 

to be differences between what the industry might say the liability is 

versus what we would calculate-- 

MR. WYNN. Ballpark. 

MR. SPROAT. But right now we believe the liability is probably in 

the neighborhood of about $3 billion, and by 2017 we believe it would be 

up to about $7 billion. 

MR. WYNN. Seven billion dollars. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. WYNN. Is it fair to say the Federal Judgment Fund doesn’t have 

that kind of money? 

MR. SPROAT. I don’t know. I just don’t know. 
35

MR. WYNN. If, in fact, the Federal Judgment Fund doesn’t have this 

kind of money, you are suggesting that there is a legislative fix to cover 

this liability. Do you have any suggestions for us as to how we might do 

this? Are we basically saying the taxpayers are going to have to fork 

over the money for the liability in addition to the money they paid as 

ratepayers into the fund? 

MR. SPROAT. If everything stays the same as it is now, the answer is 

yes, the ratepayers--I am sorry, the taxpayers need to fund that additional 

liability. That is why on my third strategic objective of trying to move 

this issue forward to trying to reduce that liability in some way or 

through a portfolio of solutions, I think that is really important. How 

successful we can be in the next 2, 3 years to do that, I just don’t know 

yet. 

MR. WYNN. Are there any settlement discussions with regard to 

perhaps utilities being willing to accept less? 

MR. SPROAT. There are settlement discussions going on, yes, and I 

was the first, when I was with PECO Energy, I negotiated the first 

settlement with the Department on that. 

MR. WYNN. Is it possible that we could be kept abreast of 

developments in the settlements, kind of either briefing us or-- 

MR. SPROAT. I would be more than happy to do that, absolutely. 

MR. WYNN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions. 

MR. HALL. Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Dr. Murphy. 

MR. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for being 

here as well. 

A couple questions I have, and I would like to follow up a little bit 

on some of these liability issues, but in general the cost. How much have 

we spent so far on all of the studies, and how much do we anticipate we 

will spend on everything involved with Yucca Mountain, the land, the 

preparation, the transportation, all these legal issues, et cetera. What 

have we spent, and what are we going to continue to need before we 

even move anything in there? 

MR. SPROAT. I had to get some help from the side. My 

understanding is that in terms of the Yucca Mountain project itself and 

the site characterization, about $5 billion, with a B, and the total program 

expenditures for all aspects of spent nuclear fuel disposal in Yucca 

Mountain and everything, probably about $8 billion total. 

MR. MURPHY. And then the liability issues are on top of that? 

MR. SPROAT. The liability issues are on top of that, yes, sir. 
36

MR. MURPHY. Now, this is being paid for by the utilities and 

folks who have the spent nuclear fuel and pass on to the ratepayers. Will 

all that be enough? 

MR. SPROAT. As of right now, based on the numbers that I have 

seen, again, which I haven’t had an opportunity to challenge and scrub, 

but based on everything I have seen so far, we believe the waste fund and 

its projected accumulated assets will be adequate to fund the entire 

project and its operation, assuming we get access to it in the corpus at the 

appropriate time. 

MR. MURPHY. And that leads to my next question then, because 

representing companies like Westinghouse Electric in my district, which 

we are waiting to start building several nuclear reactors, and, of course, 

there is a lot of steps-- Yucca Mountain is one of the steps in the process 

of approval. I am just trying to get a sense if the pieces are fitting 

together here in terms of the timeframe for Yucca Mountain, being able 

to move spent nuclear fuel there, and having the approvals for these new 

plants. As everything is moving together, it is like a chain being pushed 

up a hill. Are things moving together in sequence appropriately there? 

MR. SPROAT. There are things that have to happen that still, in my 

opinion, need some close attention. One is the whole issue about waste 

confidence, as I talked about a little bit earlier. The NRC needs to make 

a finding with these new license applications that there is a high 

confidence level that spent fuel will be disposed of, and at least we will 

have a way to dispose of it by 2025, a reasonable assurance of that. So 

waste confidence is clearly an issue. 

Secondly, the standard spent fuel contracts that the existing plants 

have written--I am sorry, have signed between the existing licensees and 

the Department of Energy will not be adequate for the new plants. And 

we, my organization, needs to put together a new standard contract and 

negotiate those with the new licensees. 

MR. MURPHY. And you will be able to give us ongoing reports of 

these things? Can you give us quarterly reports on the progress of all 

those issues there? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. MURPHY. Another area is the radiation standard that is 

currently under revision and likely to be finalized by the EPA later this 

year. Are you confident we can meet that? 

MR. SPROAT. Based on what I have been told, the draft standard that 

has been proposed and put out there in draft form we can meet. I need to 

see what the final version looks like and what it says before I am able to 

say in terms of going forward, yes, we absolutely can do it, but based on 

the draft, the answer is yes. 
37

MR. MURPHY. And you will again provide the committee with your 

updates on that? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes. 

MR. MURPHY. How about another issue here, too, because the 

liabilities also affect public confidence, and whenever there are some 

problems with regard to scientific studies done, it leaves us to be 

concerned. What is being done with regard to the USGS e-mails and 

failures of scientists to properly document water and filtration? 

MR. SPROAT. My understanding, as I have done a little research into 

this, very little in the short time I have been here. I think the Department 

has done all of the right things in order to address this. They have done 

investigations, talking to the people involved to understand exactly what 

was going on back in the--this timeframe was back in the late 1990s, I 

believe. So, I mean, this didn’t happen in the last 2 years or so. This is 

back in the late 1990s and specifically had to do with the work that was 

being done on predicting how water from rainfall would infiltrate 

through the mountain to the repository itself. 

What they did besides understanding what the e-mails meant and 

what the people who wrote them meant is they brought in some outside 

expertise to take a look at the model that those people did, that 

infiltration model, and benchmarked it against other work that other 

people have done that are not related to Yucca Mountain and had them 

take a look at it and say, is that model giving us reasonable results? And 

the answer was, yes, it is. It is giving us results that are consistent with 

these other independent models. 

In addition to that, we have commissioned a separate independent 

group of scientists to put together another independent infiltration model 

to make sure that their model comes up and gives us basically the same, 

consistent answers with the original model. So from somebody who is in 

the nuclear industry who has been very heavily involved with nuclear 

licensing and nuclear quality issues over my career, they have taken the 

right approach, and when all this is done, the issue should be well behind 

us. 

MR. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I know I am out of time. Can I ask one more 

question? 

MR. HALL. Of course. 

MR. MURPHY. It has to do with, I guess, a general sense of where 

we stand here with United States standards and storage of spent nuclear 

fuel compared with other countries, but also as it relates to existing laws 

and regulations about transportation and trying to anticipate other 

concerns that may come up in the future. But where would you gauge us 
38

and our standards when we are moving forward compared with other 

nations who are also dealing with this? 

MR. SPROAT. My sense is we are close to the front. I would say that 

the Scandinavian countries have done a lot of work in terms of 

geological repositories, and they have made some decisions in terms of 

their licensing regime and their approach that certainly have some appeal 

to us. If we are not equal with them, we are pretty darn close. For other 

countries, we are probably ahead. 

MR. MURPHY. I thank you very much, and I appreciate your candor 

on this and look forward to seeing some of those quarterly reports on the 

progress. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. HALL. Thank you. 

Chair recognizes Mr. Butch Otter, Idaho. 

MR. OTTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you very much for being here today. 

MR. SPROAT. You are welcome. 

MR. OTTER. I think Mr. Shimkus said it best. There is probably no 

issue that is of greater importance to us in the United States, especially in 

the area of energy, because the way we treat our waste today is going to 

be dependent on the success of a lot of the licensees that are coming 

along now and asking for new licenses for nuclear waste. 

MR. SPROAT. Absolutely. 

MR. OTTER. I have got a couple questions. Are you familiar with 

the 1995 Idaho settlement agreement? 

MR. SPROAT. I am aware it exists. I am aware there is a timetable to 

remove high-level waste and spent fuel, both naval and other, from INL 

and get it to the repository by, I think, starting in 2025, with a date by 

which it is supposed to all be removed, and that is about as far as my 

knowledge scope goes. 

MR. OTTER. The date is not too long after that, about 7 or 8 years. 

Is there anything in the Domenici-Reid proposal that would in any 

way infringe upon or reverse anything in that Idaho-- 

MR. SPROAT. Not that I am aware of. 

MR. OTTER. Under their proposal, it is suggested in there that there 

are certain requirements to be considered in an interim site or a regional 

site. Because of the nature of Idaho’s nuclear waste and how long it has 

been there, would Idaho be considered as a regional or interim site? 

MR. SPROAT. If I understand--I have read the appropriations 

language which contains this, and there were certain aspects of it I don’t 

fully understand. I haven’t had the opportunity to talk to Senator 

Domenici about it to get to clarifying it, but if I understand it correctly, it 

certainly tries to encourage the concept of regionalization, consolidation 
39

on a per-region basis. And I believe it is intended to direct the 

Department to try and reach agreements with certain host States as to 

whether or not they would be willing to host a regionalized consolidation 

interim storage site. 

Whether or not Idaho would be an appropriate place for that, I just 

don’t know. And I would hate to speculate on that because I just don’t 

know. All I can say is I can see some challenges in trying to make that 

happen. 

MR. OTTER. Can I be fairly comfortable in assuming that if, with 

your knowledge, although it may be not as deep as we would hope--I 

would hope that I had knowledge of it--that the Department won’t do 

anything to try to amend that agreement or change that agreement? 

MR. SPROAT. I certainly have no intent or plans to amend that 

agreement. I am working very clearly to a schedule that says I have 

commitments not only to the State of Idaho, but to the U.S. Navy and a 

number of other people to get this stuff moving and get it in a repository 

for disposal, and I intend to do that. 

MR. OTTER. If the timelines don’t work out, and having been in 

business for a long time before I came to this place, this isn’t what I am 

used to in business at this place. If you were up against a timeline, let’s 

say the Idaho timeline, on the removal of the waste, would an interim site 

be considered adequate, removal of the waste from Idaho to an interim 

site instead of to Yucca Mountain? 

MR. SPROAT. I just can’t answer that question, sir. I just don’t 

know. I don’t know what the right answer to that is. I can certainly take 

that question for the record and get back to you, but I just can’t answer it 

now. 

[The information follows:] 

The Idaho Settlement Agreement of 1995 requires the DOE to “. . . remove all spent 

fuel, including naval spent fuel and Three Mile Island spent fuel from Idaho by January 

1, 2035.” (Section C.1) Further “DOE shall treat all high-level waste currently at INEL 

so that it is ready to be moved out of Idaho for disposal by a target date of 2035.” 

(Section C-3) 

If Yucca Mountain were not available to meet the requirements to complete the 

removal of spent nuclear fuel from Idaho by 2035, to fulfill its commitment the 

Department could evaluate the potential to move the material to another site outside the 

State of Idaho. 

MR. OTTER. I see. 

In an answer to one of the previous questions, I think it was 

Mr. Rush or Mr. Wynn, you said that there were 70 million tons-- 

MR. SPROAT. Seventy thousand metric ton limit. 

MR. OTTER. Seventy thousand metric tons. Pardon me. 

MR. SPROAT. Seventy thousand metric ton limit on the mountain. 
40

MR. OTTER. I have got 70,000 metric tons and 126 sites. How many 

of those would be candidates for reprocessing? 

MR. SPROAT. I prefer to get back to you on that. I don’t know. 

[The information follows:] 

Potentially almost all commercial spent fuel could be reprocessed if recycling 

technologies and processes were successfully developed and commercially deployed in 

the U.S., however, economics will dictate the desirability of recycling older fuel which is 

currently in interim storage. 

MR. OTTER. Where I am headed with that is if we do get into 

reprocessing, I think Mr. Wynn’s question was an appropriate one, 

because if we do get into reprocessing, and we are not varying on 

97 percent potential fuel, it could be that Yucca Mountain would be large 

enough. Now, your answer to him was a rejection of that notion because 

you said no, because we still have military waste, we still have naval 

waste, we still have these other wastes. 

And so it would be, I think, an appropriate question to ask is, well, 

then, how much of that 70,000 metric tons, how much space would that 

take up? If you are asking to enlarge it, how much more space is going 

to be available? And then how much is not going to be needed out of 

these 126 sites if we do successfully establish reprocessing? 

MR. SPROAT. Sure. Well, where we stand right now, I am obligated 

under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act to come back to the Congress in the 

next 3 years, I believe, 3, 3-1/2 years, with a recommendation and an 

analysis of the need for a second repository and an analysis of do we 

need one. And I would say that if I don’t get that 70,000 metric ton limit 

removed through the legislation that we have sent up to the Hill, I 

probably can’t--given the uncertainties of the timeframes associated with 

closing the fuel cycle and how long it is going to take to start recycling 

that fuel, I would probably still have to come back and say I am going to 

need a second repository. 

MR. OTTER. Plus the fact that I am told there is something like 30 

license requests in right now for new plants, and so plus if we are not 

going to reprocess, someday we are going to be facing that waste. 

MR. SPROAT. Absolutely. Absolutely. 

MR. OTTER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that 

members of the committee who are here and who are not here be allowed 

to, by way of perhaps a letter to the Director, make additional inquiries, 

some of them on secondary questions that I would have, and then later, 

on receiving those replies, make them part of the record, this official 

record. 
41

MR. HALL. Without objection, I think we made that statement 

initially at the beginning and have asked for a timely return of those 

questions. 

MR. SPROAT. Certainly. 

MR. OTTER. Thank you. 

MR. HALL. Mr. Otter, do you yield back? 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Roland. 

MR. NORWOOD. Gee, I really appreciate that. 

MR. HALL. Dr. Norwood from Georgia. 

MR. NORWOOD. Dr. Roland would love to be here questioning this, 

I tell you. 

Mr. Sproat, welcome. 

MR. SPROAT. Thank you. 

MR. NORWOOD. I am curious how you felt when you were told you 

were going to come testify before this committee since you had been on 

the job for 4 weeks. What were your feelings like about that? 

MR. SPROAT. Actually, believe it or not, I welcome the opportunity, 

because I took this job because I have a very strong opinion about its 

need for the country, and I am committed to making it better. And any 

opportunity I get to get in front of a group like this and talk about it and 

talk about what I intend to do, I enjoy that opportunity. 

MR. NORWOOD. Well, I associate myself a lot with John Shimkus on 

this. There is not much more important than us getting this repository 

open. I can tell you what my feelings were. I wasn’t sure if I was in a 

nightmare or this was something special we were having. I can’t 

remember how many of these hearings that we have had in the last 12 

years where the Director sat there and assured us of this and that and this, 

and nothing has happened. 

MR. SPROAT. Yep. 

MR. NORWOOD. I find it unbelievable that since 1982, when we first 

decided to have a repository, and now 23 years later and saying, oh, well, 

just 11 more years. You come from the private sector. How are your 

feelings about that? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, clearly, number one, as I said when I opened up, 

I share the committee’s frustration with this. I absolutely do. That is one 

of the reasons why I decided to put myself through this process to come 

here and try and make this happen. 

I would say that--obviously, I can’t speak intelligently all the time 

about why we got ourselves to where we are. Clearly, number one, I 

think it was a lot harder than people thought it was going to be is one 

part. And secondly, I think, quite frankly, this project, to move it 

forward, to get an NRC license and to build this, requires skill sets of the 
42

person running the--of the program that may be a little different than the 

person--than the people who have been here in the past. 

MR. NORWOOD. Took us 23 years to figure that out, huh? It doesn’t 

say a lot for DOE, if you want to know the truth. 

MR. SPROAT. I can’t answer that. 

MR. NORWOOD. Last time I was at Yucca Mountain was 1995, 

1996, and they had dug some pretty good holes in that mountain then. 

All I can remember out of that whole trip was everybody was running 

around painting signs saying don’t run over the turtles, and that is the 

way we were spending most of our dollars and research about the turtles. 

The good thing about this to me is I think you might actually get 

something done. 

MR. SPROAT. I plan to. 

MR. NORWOOD. And I am all for you, and as Mr. Shimkus said, we 

want help. This is not just embarrassing, which it is. It is costing this 

country a great deal of money, and it is interfering, in my mind, greatly 

with our energy policies. In my part of the world, Georgia and South 

Carolina, where Savannah River Site is, I mean, we are trying to get in 

position to build three more reactors down there now, one at SRS and 

two with Southern Company. But we need the Department of Energy to 

actually do something, and if it takes 30 years to open up that mountain, I 

have got great concerns even with a man like yourself who is used to 

getting stuff done. You hadn’t been over there long enough to see all the 

traps. I mean, you have got bureaucrats around every corner digging a 

hole, hoping you fall in it so we can’t get this done. 

MR. SPROAT. Believe me, sir, I am going in to this with my eyes 

wide open. 

MR. NORWOOD. Well, you have friends on this committee who are 

not scared and who would be willing to help you, but we want to see you 

actually make this happen, and my question is, my gosh, is it going to 

take until, what did you say, 2017? 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. NORWOOD. Is it really going to take that long after all this 

time? 

MR. SPROAT. Well, let me say this about that. I do believe it is 

going to take--to get the quality application in to meet my standards to 

the NRC, I believe it is going to take me pretty close to that 2008 

timeframe. After that, if I haven’t had enough time yet, but in terms of 

the construction process and can we shrink once we get that license to 

build, can we shrink the construction timeframe, I bet we can, but I just 

haven’t had enough time to really go through the designs and challenge 

the planners yet around that. 
43

MR. NORWOOD. I have given up on this every other year, thinking, 

well, it will never happen, don’t waste your time on this. What have they 

been doing for construction in 23 years? They were digging as hard as 

they could dig in 1995. What are we trying to build yet? 

MR. SPROAT. They haven’t been building anything. It has been 

mainly a program to gather data about the geology of the mountain and 

to put together a license application that they think the NRC--would meet 

the NRC’s needs of 2004. 

MR. NORWOOD. Mr. Sproat, now, we won’t tell anybody. You 

really think it takes 23 years to gather data on the geology? 

MR. SPROAT. No, sir. 

MR. NORWOOD. I don’t either. I think somebody is playing games. 

I hope you can get around them best you can. 

One last question, Mr. Chairman. I hope we have made it clear, we 

are for you, and we are with you. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. NORWOOD. As the Director of Radioactive Waste, does MOX 

fuel come under your bailiwick? 

MR. SPROAT. No, it does not. 

MR. NORWOOD. If you want that mountain to be filled up overnight, 

all we have got to do is listen to the Chairman of the Appropriations 

Subcommittee for Energy and Water that wants to liquify all of our 

nuclear waste in this country, and we will fill your mountain up so fast 

that you won’t know what to do. You know what liquification is of 

nuclear fuels--nuclear waste, I mean? 

MR. SPROAT. Quite frankly, I have not heard of that concept. 

MR. NORWOOD. Well, I want you to be interested in it a little bit 

because there are alternatives. We have tried very hard to put a MOX 

fuel plan up to reprocess this so that 90 percent of this waste we can burn 

up in reactors and only send you 10 percent, and there are folks trying to 

stop that and want to turn it into glass logs. They are as big as that table 

over there, and it will fill your mountain up real quick. So I hope you 

will look at that enough to know it is going to affect where you are going 

to be down the road a little bit. 

MR. SPROAT. Yes, sir. 

MR. NORWOOD. Hopefully. And believe me, we on this side don’t 

depend on the Senate very often, but hopefully the Senate is going to put 

the money in this MOX fuel thing so we can actually send you 

10 percent of all that waste and not 100 percent of it. 

Good luck. I admire you taking this on. I hope you can do it. 

MR. SPROAT. Thank you. 

MR. NORWOOD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

MR. HALL. Dr. Norwood. 
44

MR. NORWOOD. Yes, sir. 

MR. HALL. We thank you. 

And Dr. Roland is another dentist, and we put him in charge of the 

turtles. 

MR. NORWOOD. I will tell Dr. Roland you asked about him. 

MR. HALL. I have one other question, just one last question I want to 

get in the record. What else can be done to accelerate the schedule and 

begin receiving spent fuel at Yucca Mountain? 

MR. SPROAT. I think, Mr. Chairman, that my best answer to that 

right now is I need to complete the assessment of the program that I am 

currently doing and understand and really push and challenge the 

organization to compress the schedules that they have given me as I have 

walked in the door, and it is going to take me a little while to do that. I 

need to make sure they have got a good, credible design first and then 

really push them on compressing that, both the design schedules as well 

as the construction schedules. 

And then, quite frankly, the other thing is the key critical path goes 

through the NRC licensing process, and working with the NRC 

management so that we end up with a 3-year licensing process and not a 

10-year licensing process is really important. 

MR. HALL. My last question: Can you think of anything we can do 

legislatively up here that will support a guy with a program that you have 

laid out, that I respect and Dr. Norwood respects? And you don’t have 

an unfriendly committee in front of you here. We are for you. 

MR. SPROAT. I would say--I would just requestfully--I am sorry, 

respectfully request that the committee give serious consideration to the 

legislative package we have already sent up, and as part of my 

assessment with the program here over the next 3 to 6 months, if I need 

something else, you will hear from me. 

MR. HALL. Mr. Boucher, other questions? 

MR. BOUCHER. No. 

MR. HALL. We thank you for your time, preparation, your 

background and your service to this country. 

We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
45

RESPONSE FOR THE RECORD OF THE HON. EDWARD F. SPROAT III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE HALL 

Yucca Mountain

Q1. Previous DOE testimony before this Committee indicated that liability costs 

may reach approximately $500 million per year plus another $500 million per 

year for continued storage of defense waste. What can DOE do to mitigate 

these costs to the American taxpayer? 

A1. The surest way for the Department to mitigate liability is to open the Yucca 

Mountain repository. The Department recently announced a schedule for 

commencing operation of the Yucca Mountain repository by 2017. This 

schedule is premised on a number of factors including adequate funding, 

issuance of a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) construction 

authorization consistent with the three year period specified in the Nuclear 

Waste Policy Act, the timely issuance of a license amendment to receive and 

possess, the timely issuance of all other necessary authorizations and permits, 

the absence of litigation related delays and the enactment of pending legislation 

proposed by the Administration. 

Q2. I understand that the DOE is currently paying damages to 3 contract holders 

under negotiated settlements or court awards. When do you expect to begin 

paying damages to the other contract holders? 

A2. The Department of Justice has entered into settlement agreements with three 

contract holders and pays settlement amounts from the Judgment Fund pursuant 

to those agreements. Money damages awarded by a court also would be paid 

from the Judgment Fund. The government cannot predict whether or when 

additional settlement agreements with contract holders will be completed or 

when payments pursuant to those agreements would begin. Similarly, the 

Department cannot predict if or when courts will enter damage awards in those 

pending cases that are tried to judgment. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BARTON 

Yucca Mountain

Q1. Can DOE implement interim storage faster that [sic] Yucca Mountain can be 

finished? 

A1. The Department recently announced a schedule for commencing operations of 

the Yucca Mountain repository by 2017. Assuming the elimination of the 

constraints imposed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act on interim storage, the 

Department does not believe that off-site interim storage could be deployed 

appreciably sooner than 2017. 
46

Q2. What are the biggest barriers to docketing the Yucca Mountain license? What 

will you do to address them? Can anything be done legislatively to resolve 

them? 

A2. The Department recently announced a schedule for docketing the Yucca 

Mountain license application by the end of 2008. In order to meet this 

schedule, the Department must complete work on (1) an updated Total System 

Performance Analysis (TSPA) that takes into account a number of 

developments including an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards 

for the post-10,000 year period and replacement of the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) infiltration model, and (2) completion of surface facility designs to 

incorporate the clean-canistered approach. This schedule is not dependent on 

the passage of new legislation, but is dependent on adequate funding and the 

absence of litigation related delay. In addition, timely finalization of the 

rulemaking on the EPA standards is essential since completion of the license 

application is dependent on knowing how that rulemaking will address the 

uncertainties that become increasingly large in post-10,000 year period. 

Q3. Licensing Yucca Mountain will be a significant first of a kind undertaking. 

Are there ways to improve the NRC licensing process that could improve the 

chances of success, consistent with protecting public health and the 

environment? 

A3. The Administration has included provisions in its legislation to streamline the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process and improve the 

Projects’s chances of success, consistent with protecting public health and the 

environment. We are evaluating whether or not there are other potential 

improvements in the current NRC processes which could further promote this 

effort. The Department strongly encourages Congress to pass the 

Administration’s Yucca Mountain bill. 

Q4. What else can be done to accelerate the schedule and begin receiving spent fuel 

at Yucca Mountain sooner? Could anything be done legislatively? 

A4. Maintaining or accelerating the announced schedule depends to a large extent 

on adequate funding for construction of the repository, development and 

procurement of canister, and construction of the Nevada rail line. We are 

evaluating whether there are legislative actions in addition to those in the 

Administration’s Yucca Mountain bill that would assist in accelerating the 

opening of the Yucca Mountain repository. 

Q5. The Yucca Mountain EIS says that the repository should be kept open for 

monitoring and potential retrieval of the waste for a period of 50-300 years. 

Will the design allow for retrieval of spent fuel for reprocessing if the 

technology is successfully developed? How might this period be utilized to 

improve the effectiveness of the repository over time? 

A5. The Yucca Mountain design will allow for the retrieval of spent nuclear fuel 

while the repository is open. The NRC requirement to maintain a minimum 

monitoring period of 50 years is to ensure that the system has performed as 
47

expected and that waste could be retrieved, if required. The Department is 

currently designing repository subsurface systems to last up to 300 years to 

allow future generations more flexibility in taking steps to improve the 

efficiency of the repository and in defining when the repository should be 

sealed and ultimately closed. While the design would permit the retrieval of 

spent fuel for recycling, the Department has no current plans to emplace spent 

fuel in the repository with the intent to retrieve it for recycling. Recycling 

technology most likely will be deployed to deal with spent fuel on an ongoing 

basis rather than with legacy spent fuel generated prior to the deployment of 

recycling technology. 

Q6. Being regulated by the NRC requires a workforce with a unique skill set, 

including strict adherence to procedures and quality assurance. Since DOE has 

never been regulated by the NRC, how do you plan to adapt the workforce 

culture to enable it to succeed under NRC scrutiny both as the license applicant 

for Yucca Mountain and ultimately, as the repository operator? Is there any 

additional authority you need to meet this workforce challenge? 

A6. The Department currently holds two NRC licenses for spent fuel storage 

facilities at the Idaho National Laboratory and can apply that knowledge to 

Yucca Mountain. The Yucca Mountain Program is in the process of 

developing a nuclear culture and following prescribed NRC procedures, 

requirements and regulations which are necessary to become an NRC licensee. 

The NRC will only issue a license to construct a repository or operate facilities 

if the Department demonstrates that NRC requirements are being met. The 

Department will be conducting a skills management evaluation to identify 

future requirements for Federal and contractor staff skills and competencies, 

and is confident that its workforce will meet all NRC requirements as a 

licensee. The Department is not seeking any additional authority to meet these 

workforce requirements at this time. 

Q7. Currently there are plans to build 4 new reactors in Texas and additional plants 

may be built in the future. There are two significant conditions that license 

applicants must meet related to spent fuel. First, license applicants must meet 

the requirements of the waste confidence rule. That will be possible if DOE 

maintains the 2017 schedule and Congress raises the capacity limit on Yucca 

Mountain to allow room for spent fuel from new plants. Secondly, under the 

Nuclear Waste Policy [sic] license applicants must sign standard contracts with 

DOE for spent fuel disposal. Considering that DOE is in the midst of litigation 

over the vast majority of the existing contracts, does DOE intend to sign new 

contracts with license applicants? 

A7. Yes. The Department intends to enter into contractual arrangements with 

license applicants that will meet the requirements of the Nuclear Waste Policy 

Act and support the issuance of licenses to construct and operate new reactors. 

 

Q7a. Will DOE need any additional legislative authority? 

A7a. No. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act already authorizes the Secretary to enter 

into contracts for the disposal of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
48

waste from civilian nuclear power reactors. The Department does not require 

and is not seeking any additional legislative authority. 

Q7b. When will DOE begin negotiations with companies interested in building new 

plants? 

A7b. The Department expects to announce its plans in the near future. The 

Department is committed to undertaking a course of action that does not delay 

companies from applying for and receiving licenses to construct and operate 

new reactors. 

Q7c. In what ways do you think new contracts might differ from the current 

generation of contracts? 

A7c. The Department has started, but not completed its evaluation of the current 

Standard Contracts between utilities and the Government to review which 

provisions may need modification. 

Q8. Please provide the Committee with a quarterly report on the Departments [sic] 

progress toward meeting the various program milestones that are necessary to 

submit the license application by June 30, 2008. 

A8. The Department will provide the Committee a quarterly report on the 

Department’s progress toward meeting Program milestones to submit the 

license application by June 30, 2008. Attached for the record is a list of the 

anticipated milestones to license application submittal. 

Attachment 

Yucca Mountain Repository Schedule 

Milestone Date 

Design for License Application Complete 30 November 2007 

Licensing Support Network Certification 21 December 2007 

Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Issued 30 May 2008 

Final License Application Verifications Complete 30 May 2008 

Final Rail Alignment EIS Issued 30 June 2008 

License Application Submittal 30 June 2008 

License Application Docketed by NRC 30 September 2008 

The schedule above is based on factors within the control of DOE, appropriations 

consistent with optimum Project execution, issuance of an NRC Construction 

Authorization consistent with the three year period specified in the Nuclear Waste 

Policy Act, and the timely issuance by the NRC of a Receive and Possess license. 

This schedule also is dependent on the timely issuance of all necessary other 

authorizations and permits, the absence of litigation related delays and the enactment 

of pending legislation proposed by the Administration. 
49

Q9. Can Yucca Mountain meet the radiation standard that is currently under 

revision and likely to be finalized by EPA late this year? 

A9. The Department believes it can meet the EPA radiation protection standards in 

the draft rule issued last year. Any revisions to the draft rule would need to be 

evaluated. While the Department is confident the repository will provide 

adequate protection up to and beyond the point of peak dose, increasing the 

compliance period by a hundred fold greatly increases the uncertainties 

associated with modeling performance and most likely will prolong the 

licensing process. 

Q10. What is being done with regard to the USGS emails and the failure of their 

scientists to properly document their water infiltration studies? How long will 

it take to resolve that issue? 

A10. The infiltration estimates produced by USGS are corroborated by independent 

data from around the United States. Still, we recognize that it is essential that 

the technical basis for the Yucca Mountain repository meet DOE’s quality 

assurance requirements and be without the appearance of question or 

qualification; therefore, the modeling work performed by the USGS employees 

who exchanged the emails will be replaced and supplemented, as necessary, 

and supporting documentation will be reviewed and verified. We have tasked 

Sandia National Laboratories to review the existing infiltration model and 

prepare a new model. This new model and the results will be used as part of 

the technical basis for the license application. 

After Sandia completes this task, the models and results will be independently 

checked by experts outside the Department to ensure the technical soundness 

and quality assurance traceability, which are required for the license 

application. 

Q11. The “Clean Canister Approach,” using one canister design for transportation 

and disposal, sounds a lot like the old Multi-Purpose Canister proposal that 

failed. What makes the clean canister approach any more likely to succeed? 

A11. The previous multi-purpose canister (MPC) did not fail, but was cancelled for 

budgetary and political reasons as noted in an extensive report in 1997 by the 

Electrical Power Research Institute. Based on the scientific and technical 

information now available, the Department believes it can successfully develop 

and incorporate a canister approach that can support transport, aging, and 

disposal requirements for the overall waste management system. 

Q11a. How will DOE handle spent fuel that has already been packaged in 

transportable canisters, especially at decommissioned plants where handling 

facilities no longer exist? 

A11a. The Department expects most such spent fuel to be repackaged in the new 

canisters at reactor sites. There will be some capability, however, to repackage 

such spent fuel at the Yucca Mountain repository. While the Department will 

work with utilities to facilitate the transfer of spent fuel, the Department does 
50

not believe it is obligated under the Standard Contract to accept spent fuel 

packaged in transportable canisters. The issue of the Department’s acceptance 

of those systems is currently a matter in litigation. 

Q12. What is the status of the Defense contribution for the cost of disposing of 

defense waste and spent fuel in the repository? Is the government on schedule 

to meet its financial obligation to the project? 

A12. The Defense contribution for the disposal of the defense waste is approximately 

$15 billion of the total life cycle cost of the Program. The Government 

contribution is on schedule to meet its financial obligation to the Project. 

QUESTIONS REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS 

Yucca Mountain

Q1. Last November, the Department announced an initiative to develop a multipurpose canister that could be loaded at reactor sites, transported, and disposed 

at Yucca Mountain thus eliminating the need for repackaging and multiple 

handling of used fuel. These canisters were called TADs – for transportation, 

aging, and disposal. Does the Department remain committed to the TAD 

initiative? How is this initiative progressing? How does the development of this 

canister support the licensing of Yucca Mountain? 

A1. The Department has adopted a canister-based approach for the repository and is 

currently re-designing the surface facilities to reflect this new initiative. 

Industry has responded positively to this new approach. The Department 

intends to contract with private industry for the development of the TAD 

systems. We plan to release a performance specification for the TAD system in 

November of this year and anticipate that conceptual designs of TAD canisters 

will be available early next year. The Department recently released its schedule 

to submit the license application to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 

in June of 2008. This schedule is premised on the ability to use more efficient 

and simpler surface facilities because of the canister-based approach. 

Q2. I understand the Department will be making a Critical Design Decision soon 

regarding the redesign of the repository surface facility (consistent with the 

simplified approach [sic] in provided by the TAD initiative), what is the status 

of this decision? 

A2. The Department’s internal Critical Decision to adopt the canister-based 

approach was made in July of this year. 

Q3. The Yucca Mountain Environmental Impact Statement says that Yucca 

Mountain should be kept open for monitoring and potential retrieval of the 

waste for a period of 50-300 years. Do you see this period providing an 

opportunity to improve the effectiveness of the repository over time? 
51

A3. Yes. The NRC requirement to maintain a minimum monitoring period of 50 

years is to ensure that the system has performed as expected. The Department, 

however, is currently designing the underground tunnels to last up to 300 years, 

which will allow future generations more flexibility in taking steps to improve 

the efficiency of the repository and in defining when the repository should be 

sealed and closed. The ability to keep the repository open for 300 years will 

permit the emergence of new technologies that might improve the long-term 

performance of the repository. 

Q4. Transportation of spent fuel is an area that has obvious challenges. In Michigan, 

one of the concerns has been barging of spent fuel on the Great Lakes. While 

the Department has stated a preference for rail in shipping spent fuel to Yucca 

Mountain, the Environmental Impact Statement does contemplate barging spent 

fuel on the Great Lakes. What are the Department’s plans for moving forward 

and addressing local or regional concerns so that they can be put aside as 

obstacles to moving the Yucca Mountain project forward? 

A4. Any decision to use barge transport would be made only after thorough 

consultations with stakeholders, including State, Tribal, local and utility 

representatives. DOE will work with the appropriate State Regional Groups as 

part of its transportation planning and mode selection process. 

QUESTIONS FROM REPRESENTATIVE OTTER 

Q1. I understand that the first facility that will be in operation at Yucca Mountain is 

the initial fuel handling facility. Will both Navy and DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel 

from Idaho be received at this facility as soon as it opens? 

A1. Currently we are evaluating surface facility designs and no final decisions have 

been made with regard to those facilities. As a general matter, our planning 

assumption is that, subject to construction sequencing and assuming the capability 

to transport spent nuclear fuel to the repository site, that commercial, Naval and 

DOE spent nuclear fuel will be able to begin to be accepted at the site at the time 

the repository opens, or shortly thereafter. The Department’s recently announced 

Best-Achievable Repository Construction Schedule estimates that the Department 

would begin receipt in March 2017. 

Q2. Are there any Research and development needs that must be addressed before 

deploying the Transport, Aging, and Disposal (TAD) canister, if so what is the 

schedule for addressing these needs? 

A2. No, the Department does not believe that any research and development needs 

must be addressed before deploying the Transport, Aging, and Disposal (TAD) 

canister. 

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