Opinion filed September 19, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-12-00161-CR

__________

JASON ROBERT PARRICK, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 29th District Court

Palo Pinto County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 14692

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The jury convicted Jason Robert Parrick of the second-degree felony offense 

of burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft. The jury assessed 

punishment at confinement for five years, and the trial court sentenced Appellant 

accordingly. In one issue on appeal, Appellant asserts that there is insufficient 

evidence he burglarized a “habitation.” We affirm.
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I. The Offense

Appellant was convicted of burglary of a habitation under Section 30.02 of 

the Texas Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02 (West 2011). A person 

commits the offense of burglary if he enters a habitation or a building not then 

open to the public with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault. Id. 

§ 30.02(a)(1). The offense of burglary is a second-degree felony if the burglary is 

of a habitation and a state jail felony if it is of a building other than a habitation. 

See id. § 30.02(c).

II. Evidence at Trial

Amanda Parker did not recognize the man who took a washer and dryer 

from a neighbor’s house. Parker knew that her neighbors had moved out one to 

two weeks prior to the incident and had left some personal items, which they 

intended to retrieve. Parker testified that, as far as she knew, the house was “still 

liveable.” Parker called the property manager, Denise Barker, who arrived at the 

residence while the man was still there. Barker went to the house, recognized and 

confronted Appellant, and called the police. Barker testified that David and Amy 

Bell had moved out of the house but could return and occupy the house because 

they had paid rent on a month-to-month basis through the time the burglary 

occurred. As a part of her duties as property manager, Barker had checked the 

condition of the house and the locks on the doors four or five times since the Bells 

moved.

Jeremy Hamscher, a detective with the Mineral Wells Police Department,

responded to Barker’s call, conducted a brief investigation, and arrested Appellant 

for burglary of a habitation. Detective Hamscher said that the inside of the house 

looked like someone was “in the process of moving out,” and he identified the 

washer, dryer, and a speaker as items taken from the house.
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Amy Bell testified that she, her husband, and their two children lived in the 

house until around two weeks prior to the burglary. Bell said that they left some 

personal property in the house—a desk, a washer and dryer, and other 

miscellaneous items—and that they intended to retrieve the personal property. 

Bell said that they also left a speaker, tools, and a dolly in a storage shed that was 

attached to the carport and connected to the house by a roof. As far as Bell knew, 

her family took all the clothes, food, cooking utensils, hygiene items, and bedding 

when they moved. Bell testified that, at the time of the burglary, she would not 

have slept in the residence “without an air mattress or something to lay on” but 

could have resided in the house if she wanted.

III. Standard of Review

We review a sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review 

set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 

893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. 

App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). We review all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We defer to the 

jury’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight their 

testimony is afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899. This standard accounts for the 

factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to 

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). When the 

record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the 

conflicts in favor of the prosecution and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.
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IV. Analysis

Appellant concedes there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 

the lesser included offense of burglary of a building; therefore, the sole issue on 

appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the 

house Appellant burglarized was a “habitation” within the meaning of the statute. 

A “habitation” means a structure that is adapted for the overnight 

accommodation of persons. PENAL § 30.01(1). In this context, “adapted” means 

suitable. Blankenship v. State, 780 S.W.2d 198, 209 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (op.

on reh’g); see Salazar v. State, 284 S.W.3d 874, 878 (Tex. Crim App. 2009). 

Whether a structure is or is not suitable for overnight accommodation is a 

“complex, subjective factual question fit for a jury’s determination.” Blankenship, 

780 S.W.2d at 209. Relevant factors for this inquiry, none of which are necessarily 

essential or dispositive, include whether someone was using the structure as a 

residence at the time of the burglary; whether the structure “contained bedding, 

furniture, utilities, or other belongings common to a residential structure”; and 

whether the structure was of such character that it was likely intended to 

accommodate persons overnight. Id. The jury’s determination of whether a 

burglarized structure is a “habitation” will be overturned on appeal only if no 

reasonable trier of fact could have found the structure to have been adapted for the 

overnight accommodation of persons beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 209–10.

We have reviewed all the evidence under the foregoing standard, and we 

conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could have determined, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that the house was adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons. At 

the time of the burglary, the house had been vacant for one to two weeks. 

Although the house contained scant furniture and no bedding, food, cooking 

utensils, or hygiene items, it was a completed house with a kitchen, living room, 

bathroom, and bedrooms. The house was wired for electricity and equipped for 
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utility service. In addition, a property manager actively checked the condition of 

the house. Finally, the Bells retained a possessory right to occupy the house and 

could have slept there overnight. We conclude that the record contains sufficient 

evidence from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable

doubt that the house was a “habitation.”

Appellant also contends that the storage shed connected to the house by the 

carport, which contained the speaker taken by Appellant, was “definitely a building 

and not a habitation” because “sheds are not generally used for overnight 

accommodation.” But Section 30.01 expressly includes “each structure 

appurtenant to or connected with the structure,” and the jury was free to determine

that the storage shed fit within the definition of a “habitation” under the statute. 

See PENAL § 30.01(1)(B); see also Darby v. State, 960 S.W.2d 370, 371–72 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding term “habitation,” as used in 

burglary statute, covered unattached garage in which victim stored personal items). 

Moreover, Appellant was charged with and convicted of a single count of burglary, 

and the parties do not dispute that Appellant removed a washer and dryer from the 

house itself. Because a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the house was a “habitation” under the statute, we hold that the evidence 

is sufficient to support the conviction. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled. 

V. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON

September 19, 2013 JUSTICE

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson, J.