IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-41439

Summary Calendar 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

JAMES RAY HUNT, JR., 

Defendant-Appellant 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas 

USDC No. 9:15-CR-26-1 

Before JOLLY, OWEN, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

A jury found James Ray Hunt, Jr., guilty of two counts of possession with 

the intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1) (Counts 1 and 3) and two counts of possession or sale of a stolen 

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j) (Counts 2 and 5). The jury acquitted 

Hunt of one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking 

crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count 4). Hunt advances two primary claims 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fif h Circuit

FILED

July 31, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 16-41439

2 

on appeal. First, Hunt claims that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying his motion to sever the controlled-substance charges from the firearm 

charges. Second, Hunt claims that the district court abused its discretion by 

admitting into evidence (i) testimony and an audiotape concerning a December 

1, 2015 telephone call between Hunt and Nekeba Lee (a confidential 

informant) and (ii) the testimony of David Lovett, which confirmed that the 

firearm subject to the § 924(c) charge had been stolen. 

I. Denial of Hunt’s Motion to Sever the Controlled-Substance Charges from 

 the Firearm Charges 

Even assuming arguendo that the joinder of the controlled-substance 

charges with the firearm charges1 was improper, Hunt’s general and 

conclusory statements that the jury “could not reasonably be expected to” 

analyze the evidence for each charge independently fails to establish “clear, 

specific, and compelling prejudice that resulted in an unfair trial.” United 

States v. Simmons, 374 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 2004). Moreover, any possible 

prejudice was cured by the jury instructions given by the district court. See 

United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1995). 

II. Admission of Evidence 

A. Evidence Concerning the December 1, 2015 Telephone Call 

Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting a telephone 

call between Hunt and Lee discussing the sale of cocaine, any theoretical error 

was harmless. See United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Other evidence discussing the sale was admitted without objection from Hunt, 

and the evidence of the telephone call was merely reiterative of and 

corroborated this other evidence. Finally, to minimize any prejudicial effect of 

 

1 Hunt sought to sever Counts 2 and 5 from Counts 1, 3, and 4, contending that he 

sought a distinction between drug charges and weapons charges. Count 4, however, was a 

weapons charge stemming from the sale that was the subject of Count 3–the two allegedly 

occurred on the same date and involved the same buyer.

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the subject evidence, the district court gave a limiting instruction. This court 

has deemed such instructions “significant” in allaying undue prejudice. United 

States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 917 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). 

B. Testimony of David Lovett 

Lovett’s testimony concerning the stolen nature of the firearm was 

relevant to whether Hunt possessed the firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking crime, as alleged in Count 4 (of which Hunt was acquitted). See 

United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, 

Hunt’s argument that the district court should have excluded Lovett’s 

testimony under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence finds no support 

in the record. Rule 404(b) pertains to the admission of evidence related to a 

defendant’s crimes, wrongs, or other acts for which he was not charged. Lovett 

testified that he did not know Hunt, and he did not testify that Lovett stole the 

subject firearm from his truck. As such, Lovett’s testimony did not implicate 

a separate act attributable to Hunt that would have been governed by Rule 

404(b).

Furthermore, even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting 

Lovett’s testimony, any such error was harmless because an officer separately 

testified—without objection from Hunt—that the firearm was stolen. See 

Stephens, 571 F.3d at 409. Finally, to minimize any prejudicial effect of 

Lovett’s testimony, the district court gave a limiting instruction. See Beechum, 

582 F.2d at 917.2 Based on the foregoing, Hunt has failed to establish that the 

district court abused its discretion in admitting the subject evidence. See 

Stephens, 571 F.3d at 409. 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. 

 

2 Belying any claim that the jury was rendered incapable of being fair by admission of 

this evidence, it acquitted Hunt of Count 4. 

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