Improving the Prospects for Future

International Peace Operations: Workshop

Proceedings

September 1995
Recommended Citation: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment,

Improving the Prospects for Future International Peace Operations—Workshop

Proceedings, OTA-BP-ISS-167 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing

Office, September 1995).
iii

Foreword

he years following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent end of the Cold War

have seen a rapid expansion in both the number and scope of international peace operations. Most of

these endeavors have been carried out under the aegis of the United Nations, although there are some

notable exceptions. Many of these operations have been of the traditional peacekeeping type, in which a

truce, to which all parties agree, is maintained by the international force whose presence is accepted by all sides

(e.g., Cyprus, Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai). However, there has been an increasing tendency of

these operations to go well beyond this traditional mold. In these operations, there may be an inclination for the

international force to be caught up in processes that go well beyond maintaining a cease-fire or promoting a peace

settlement. Unfortunately, as the scope of these interventions has increased, the United Nations has been unable to

keep up with all the demands that they present. Severe setbacks in Somalia and Bosnia have demonstrated glaring

weaknesses in its responses. Difficulties have been in part due to a scarcity of resources and a major increase in the

number of operations to deal with. But another overriding problem has been an incoherence of organization, planning, doctrine, and policy on the part of the international body.

In 1994, the Office of Technology Assessment was asked by the House Armed Services Committee and by

members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to examine the role that technology could play in improving the

prospects for international peace operations. In June 1995, OTA convened a workshop that brought together some

of the world’s leading practitioners, academic experts, experienced diplomats, and leading technologists in order to

study and discuss this issue.

This report contains a summary of the results of the workshop, along with the original papers presented. The

chief conclusions are that the main problems with past peace operations have been political in nature. The participants suggested a number of means to deal with these issues, which are reported here, with the understanding that

they reflect not OTA conclusions, but a consensus among these individuals. Further, most participants agreed that,

although political and policy issues play a primary role in determining the performance of peace operations, the

proper application of technologies, both new and old, can add significantly to the prospects of success for an operation, should one be initiated. Technological contributions can be made in the areas of sensors (especially for monitoring in the more traditional types of peacekeeping operations), intelligence gathering, communications, data

fusion, countersniping technologies, mine clearance, and crowd control. Some technologies are well in hand, and

others are being rapidly developed and may be available in a very few years. The use of several options among the

less-than-lethal weapon categories may be quite effective, but will require some consideration of policy issues to

determine a) compatibility with current or future international treaties and b) the vulnerability of U.S. forces to

such weapons, if used against them.

ROGER C. HERDMAN

Director

T
iv

Workshop Participants

M. Gen. John O. B. Sewall, 

USA, (ret.)

Chairman

Deputy Director

Institute for Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Juergen Altmann

Professor

Institut Für 

Experimentalphysik III

Ruhr-Universitaet

Bochum, Germany

Gilles Courregelongue

Defense Conseil International

Paris, France

Milton Finger

Deputy Assistant Director

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory

Scott Gudgeon

Deputy Director

Multinational Force and 

Observers—Sinai

Rome, Italy

Virginia Gamba

United Nations Institute of 

Disarmament Research

Geneva, Switzerland

Lt. Col. Damien Healy

Staff Officer

Ministry of Defence

Australia

Adm. Jonathan Howe, USN 

(ret.)

Associate Director

Arthur Vining Davis 

Foundation

Dennis McLean

U.S. Institute of Peace

Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, 

Indian Army, (ret.)

Uttar Pradesh, India

General Sir David 

Ramsbotham, GCB CBE

British Army, (ret.)

London, United Kingdom

Lt. Col. Alan Roland-Price

Land Warfare Directorate

Ministry of Defence

United Kingdom

Steve Simon

National Security Council

Brig. Gen. Tryggve Tellesfen

Norway Defence Command

Oslo, Norway

Susan Woodward

Senior Fellow

Brookings Institution

Gerald Yonas

Vice President

Sandia National Laboratories

Prof. Mario Zucconi

Centro Studi di Politica 

Internazionale

Rome, Italy

&

University of Urbino

Urbino, Italy
v

Project Staff

Peter Blair

Assistant Director, OTA

Energy, Materials, and 

International Security 

Division

Alan Shaw

Program Director

International Security and 

Space

Anthony Fainberg

Project Director

Dean Cheng

Analyst

Xavier Maruyama

Detailee

CONTRACTORS

Alex Gliksman

Ivars Gutmanis

Lafayette Group

Thomas Neill

Mimi Turnbull

ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF

Jacqueline R. Boykin

Nathaniel E. Lewis

Donald Gallagher
vi

Contents

1 Introduction and Summary 1

Introduction 1

Workshop Highlights—The Context 2

Workshop Highlights—The Technologies 15

2 Organization and Planning Requirements: 

Lessons Drawn from Past Operations 23

Introduction 23

Organizational Requirements 23

Information/Intelligence 24

Command and Control 24

Operations 24

Organizational Applications 25

Force Strength 27

Planning Requirements 27

Requirements 28

Command and Control 28

Logistics 28

Public Relations 28

Operational Procedures 28

The Legal Aspects 28

Budget and Finance 29

Concluding Remarks 29

3 Case Study: The Multilateral Force in 

The Sinai 31

The Multinational Force and Observers 31

Technology in the Structure of Treaty CBMs 34

Training Programs 36
vii

4 Extended Peacekeeping: Planning and

Technical Requirements: Lessons from

Recent Operations 41

Introduction 41

Peacekeeping and Peace-Enforcement 42

International Intervention in Somalia 43

The United Nations in Former Yugoslavia 47

Peacekeeping on the Ground, Peace-Enforcement 

from the Air 49

Conclusions 50

5 Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United 

States Intervention 53

The Challenge for Peacekeeping 53

The Use of Force 54

Supporting Enhanced United Nations Intervention 55

6 New Zealand and Collective Security 63

Introduction 63

Thorough Preparation Pays Off 64

Future Operations Require Similar Commitment 64

International Commitment is Constantly Tested 65

International Consensus Exists 65

Smaller Countries also Play a Vital Role 66

The Peacekeeping Process Needs Reexamination 68

Put Peacekeeping Operations in Perspective 68

7 Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and 

Technical Requirements 69

Lessons from Recent Operations 69

Peace Enforcement Lessons 70

Peacekeeping Definitions 70

The UN Charter 70
viii

The Current and Future Security 72

The UN Response 73

Organization and Planning 

in the UN 74

Organization and Planning in the Field 76

Technology Requirements 76

Conclusion 78

8 UNOSOM II: Could Technology Have Made a 

Difference? 79

Operation was Far from a Failure 79

Can PeaceKeeping Be Accomplished by the UN? 80

The Challenge of a Chapter VII UN Force 80

Tasks for Technology 81

Conclusions 86

9 UNPROFOR and UNTAC: Lessons Learned as to 

Requirements for Planning, Training, and 

Equipment 87

Introduction 87

Training 89

Equipment 90

Bibliography 91

10 Technology and Peacekeeping: Too Good to Be 

True? 93

Money 95

Feasibility 96

Scope of the Requirement 97
ix

11 Mine Problems in Peacekeeping Operations 99

Introduction 99

What is a Mine? 99

The Implications of Today’s Demining Efforts 103

What Can We Do? 103

The Correct Use of Technology and the Correct Use of 

Hope 104

12 Technologies to Support Peacekeeping 

Operations 105

Introduction 105

Background 106

Sensors 106

Mine Detection/Clearing 108

Non-Lethal Weapons 110

Planning 111

Intimidate/Persuade 111

Perception/Reality of Invincibility 111

Immobilizing Engines of War 112

Remove Infrastructure 112

Neutralize Personnel/Temporary Incapacitation of 

Combatants 112

Summary of Non-Lethal Weapons 112

Conclusion 114

13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis 115

Purpose 115

Aim 115

Background 115

Definition and Classification 116

Utility 117

Types of Forces that Might be Equipped 118

An Approach to Using NLW 123
x

Factors and Principles Governing NLW Use 124

Principles 125

Selection of Non-Lethal Technologies 125

Interoperability 125

Logistics and Training 125

Summary 126

Conclusions 126

14 The Role of Technology in Peace 

Operations 127

Introduction 127

Policy Framework 128

Sensor Systems for Peacekeeping and Peace 

Enforcement 128

Less-than-Lethal Weapons 129

Mine Clearance 130

Conclusion 131

Appendix A: Workshop Agenda 133

Workshop on Improving the Prospects for Future Peace 

Operations: Tactics, Technology, Training 133

Appendix B: Advisory Panel 135
| 1

1

Introduction

and Summary

INTRODUCTION

s part of a study of the role of technology in peace operations, the Office of Technology Assessment conducted

a workshop on “Improving the Prospects for Future

Peace Support Operations: Tactics, Technology and

Training.” The workshop was held from June 12–16, 1995 at the

Rockefeller Foundation’s conference center in Bellagio, Italy.

The workshop helped OTA obtain the views of practitioners,

policymakers, technologists and analysts on the potential benefits and limitations of technology in enhancing the effectiveness

and reducing the risks and collateral effects of such operations.

Accordingly, OTA assembled a small but highly distinguished

international panel of experts that included the senior military

commanders and civilian directors or their senior aides responsible for several recent or ongoing operations, notably Bosnia,

Somalia, Cambodia, Macedonia and the Sinai. Perspectives on

technology were presented by high-level representatives from

U.S. national laboratories and by European technical specialists.

Issues of strategy and policy were addressed by senior American

and foreign officials and analysts, several of whom are or have

been responsible for directing or advising on such operations. A

complete list of participants appears in the front of this report.

This summary presents workshop discussion highlights, identifying observations and findings that were broadly endorsed by

the participants. Issues on which a significant divergence of

opinion was evident are also noted. Readers should be aware

that there was no attempt to poll the panel formally on their

views. These contents represent the rapporteurs’ summary of the

major issues as the panel discussed them. The summary is

by

Alex Gliksman 

and 

Anthony Fainberg

A
2 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

intended to complement, not substitute for a

reading of the papers presented during the meeting that are the bulk of this report.

The following workshop highlights deal first

with the panel’s view of policy issues, which sets

the context for the equipment and technologies

that may, as a result, be required in future peace

operations. After defining these issues, this

report presents those highlights dealing with the

relationship of technology to peace operations

and the prospects for newly developed equipment to improve future performance of international peace forces.

The views expressed are those of the panelists

and do not necessarily represent the views of the

Office of Technology Assessment, the Technology Assessment Advisory Council, or the Technology Assessment Board. Individual panelists

are not cited directly in their views, a policy

deliberately taken by the workshop organizers to

encourage openness among the panel.

WORKSHOP HIGHLIGHTS—THE 

CONTEXT

❚ Demands for International Involvement 

in Peace Operations Will Persist

Workshop participants agreed that, following the

end of the bipolar, post-Cold War period, the

world community will continue to encounter situations where conflicts and disasters arise that

will create pressures for international intervention. These situations will range in character.

Some will be consensual in nature. In such

cases, the parties to a dispute may look to other

countries or to international organizations to provide: a) their good offices and influence to help

resolve outstanding differences; and, b) the organizational and technical expertise and the technology and personnel required to monitor and

otherwise carry out a peace agreement. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), which

operates in the Sinai in support of the IsraelEgypt Peace Treaty of 1979 is a current example.

In the near future, there may be demands for a

similar mission in the Golan Heights, should the

ongoing negotiations between Israel and Syria

bear fruit.

Some of these situations will be humanitarian

in character. In the face of natural and, increasingly, manmade disasters, countries and international organizations will be compelled to respond

to demands for outside assistance. The manmade

famine in Somalia and the epidemic that followed the genocide in Rwanda are two recent

examples. With this era of instant global communications and imagery, the world’s attention may

increasingly be drawn to catastrophic situations

by the news media. Outside parties may feel

compelled by the outcry of domestic opinion to

act, responding more to the horrors conveyed in

television images than by pleas for help from the

victims or their spokespersons.

Other cases will involve conflicts between and

within states that require outside intervention to

reestablish calm and create an environment for

immediate conflict avoidance and eventual conflict resolution. Such intercessions may require

both diplomacy and a force of well-equipped

observers and peacekeepers. The long civil war

in the former Yugoslavia may be a case in point.

Yet other cases will involve situations in

which public safety and political legitimacy need

to be restored, if peace is to be firmly implanted

after a long period of conflict and insecurity. The

conditions surrounding the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) may

fall into this category. UNTAC was intended to

serve as a catalyst for national healing in Cambodia, under a political agreement, by underwriting

stability and safety for a free and fair election

and by providing technical expertise and

resources to ease socioeconomic recovery.

Finally, other instances may involve proactive

engagement in regions in conflict. The desire to

defuse tensions and to prevent the spread of a

conflict may lead to calls for intervention by outside parties. The intervention may include the

insertion of observers, equipped with monitoring

capabilities and, possibly, with weapons. The

preventive deployment of United Nations military observers to Macedonia in 1993 is an example of this category of intervention. Macedonia
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 3

contains many competing and, sometimes hostile, ethnic groups found in the Balkans. The

unstable situation elsewhere in former Yugoslavia caused concern that, unless a protective

buffer of peacekeepers were sent to Macedonia,

the Bosnia conflict could spread there, or, worse,

become the ignition point of a wider European

war.

Often, not one but a hybrid of several challenges will confront the world community in a

given location. This could increase pressure on

outside parties to intervene. Some participants

argued that in cases of extreme violence and

human suffering, pressures on individual governments and the United Nations to act could prove

determinant. As the above suggests, participants

believed that the news media are increasingly

playing a significant role in giving immediacy to

conflicts and tragedies occurring in remote

regions, continents away.

In helping OTA assess the role of technology,

workshop participants spent considerable time

addressing the requirements of effective peace

operations. To this end, workshop deliberations

sought to identify the key questions that must be

addressed whenever events that may demand

intervention appear on the horizon.

According to participants, whether to intercede is a question that cannot be fully answered

without also determining:

■ when to intercede; that is, when does an action

need to be launched to be effective?

■ how to intercede; that is, what form should the

intervention take to be effective?

■ who should intercede; that is, which party or

parties and organizations are best suited to

lead and/or contribute to an operation?

Some participants appeared to believe that in

the recent past, the international community and

its constituent parts have moved too quickly to

intervene in places or in ways that were less than

appropriate, although others felt that they often

moved too late.

❚ A Clear Definition of the Situation and 

its Challenges

Conferees agreed that clarity in defining a situation, including a grasp of its causes, is vital to

the success of any intervention that hopes to

improve human conditions, while simultaneously

limiting the risks faced by peacekeepers.

An accurate understanding of the situation is

vital to structure mission mandates that incorporate realistic operational goals, develop military

doctrine appropriate to the specific circumstances, and arrive at a full appreciation of the

possible consequences of particular courses of

action before the fact. In addition, thought must

be given at this stage to the problems of reconstruction after resolution of the conflict. Deficiencies in this area have been evident at the

United Nations.

Sometimes the absence of clarity may be due

to political differences among members of the

Security Council. However, panelists agreed that

the absence of clarity has often been the product

of a lack of: a) solid intelligence; b) adequate

awareness of historic and cultural contexts; and,

c) sound military advice reaching the highest

decision-making levels of the United Nations at

which operational mandates are written. Two

remedies to these problems recommended by

several conferees appeared to have the panel’s

endorsement: 1) when feasible, preparation of a

joint technical survey for predeployment planning purposes; and, 2) establishing the post of

Senior Military Adviser to the United Nations

Secretary General and Security Council. Panelists suggested several means for effectively instituting each remedy.

❚ A Joint Technical Predeployment 

Survey

Preparation of a joint technical survey for predeployment planning rests on having time to conduct this exercise in advance of action.

Participants recognized that time may not always

be available, but, given foresight in identifying

situations where future intervention might be

required, it would often be possible to gain time
4 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

for planning. Making predictions on future trouble spots is in itself a product of solid intelligence.1

Preparing a thorough planning survey requires

the participation of all components that would be

involved in executing a prospective operation,

including military advisers, civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations, political

experts who understand the politics and cultures

involved, and representatives of contributing

countries. Participants agreed that a predeployment planning survey should address all the following elements:

■ the nature of the conflict and its root causes;

■ the historic and cultural context;

■ the full range of military requirements for

intervention;

■ the costs of intervention—financial and otherwise;

■ the possible consequences of intervention;

■ a plan for post-conflict reconstruction, including its requirements; and

■ a list of mission-specific assets, identifying

sources of specialized skills, capabilities, and

equipment.2

❚ Post-Conflict Reconstruction

One participant thought it vital to emphasize the

importance of having a plan for post-conflict

reconstruction in hand before deployment. This

would help assure that those who write mission

mandates, for example, at the United Nations

Security Council, recognize from the outset the

long-term commitment of resources needed to

bring an operation to a successful conclusion.

In this panelist’s view, an operation is not

truly finished until it restores a country to membership in the community of nations. This goal

must be borne in mind from the beginning of the

1 Operational intelligence requirements—as distinct from indications and warning—are in the next section of this summary.

2 For instance, the list could be used to identify countries and organizations that are sources of essential, operation–specific communications systems, mission unique surveillance assets, transportation vehicles, demining systems, runway repair and other engineering tasks, and,

if required, specialized warfare skills and warfighting assets, including weaponry.

conflict resolution process. Among reasonable

goals of a restoration plan would, therefore, be to

reestablish “the normal conditions of law and

order.” This plan should be executed by “a preordained structure,” put in place during an early

phase of an operation—and well ahead of a conflict’s end.

Further, again in the view of this panelist, a

reconstruction plan in effect provides an exit

strategy. Too often in the past, the UN has found

it easy to get involved but impossible to disengage, even, in some cases, after decades. Citing

the ongoing UN mission in Cyprus as a case in

point, this panelist argued that open-ended

peacekeeping commitments are failures. A viable

reconstruction plan, that allows a country to

function without a foreign crutch, should be

given equal weight to military requirements in

intervention decisions.3 Using the restoration of

normal law and order as the criterion, this panelist judged that UNTAC left work unfinished. The

Transitional Authority ended after the formation

of the constitutional authority to which the elections, staged by UNTAC, had led. But elections

alone did not restore normality to Cambodia—

the instability persists. Ongoing international

involvement is still required, although in a different form.

One way to assure that post-conflict reconstruction receives the attention it deserves, in the

context of a given peace operation, is to establish

a Director of Reconstruction—as a standard feature of the organizational structure of peace operations, this participant argued. The panelist

envisioned this director as having equal standing

with the force commander and the humanitarian

relief coordinator.

A key role in preparing predeployment surveys would be played by an independent senior

military adviser, discussed below.

3 Several participants shared this assessment of Cyprus and other ongoing long term operations. They thought these open ended commitments drained limited resources and undermine support for intervention in cases where the need is more urgent. Other participants disagreed.

They thought that operations that continued for lack of alternative mechanisms for maintaining peace were worth the investment.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 5

❚ Senior Military Adviser

Participants noted that while there currently is a

military adviser for peacekeeping at the United

Nations, he reports to an Under Secretary General and not directly to the top echelon of the

organization (i.e., the United Nations Security

Council and Secretary General). The UN Charter

does, in fact, provide for a Military Staff Committee (Articles 45-47), which has never been

allowed to function. The Military Adviser could,

it was proposed, be the Chair of this reestablished Committee. The Committee itself could

consist of Chiefs of Staff of nations contributing

to UN missions, with each mission overseen by

the subset of members that from the nations

active in that particular mission. The force commander should have a direct relationship with the

Chair and the relevant members.

Currently, by the time military advice reaches

senior mandate writers, it potentially has undergone an organizational and bureaucratic filtering

process that may alter its content and reduce its

relevance to and impact on senior decision-makers. Furthermore, military advisers serving at the

United Nations are on temporary loan to the UN

Secretariat from member states. This can fetter

their ability to render truly independent advice—

if not in fact, then at least as perceived by recipients. Raising the adviser’s position to serve

directly the Secretary General and making the

adviser a direct hire of the United Nations are

key to obtaining military advice that is responsible and responsive to the Secretary General and

Security Council.

Participants cautioned that the influence of the

senior military adviser would not rest on independent status and position within the UN hierarchy alone. The appointee’s military standing and

stature with the major powers who sit on the

Security Council is equally important. Without

such recognition, his assessments would likely

be ignored.

Military participants, in particular, felt

strongly that military advice rendered to the Secretary General and Security Council needs to

address clearly the operational consequences of a

proposed mandate. These participants asserted

that at the United Nations, mandates are often

written in an operational vacuum by civilians

who may not fully appreciate the military implications of undertakings made with immediate

diplomatic and political considerations in mind.

The commitment to defend a series of so-called

“safe areas” in Bosnia was cited as a case in

point. Several participating military officials

thought that had United Nations mandate writers

recognized the operational difficulties posed by

safe areas, including the size and character of the

forces required to protect them, they might have

had second thoughts and moved to adopt other

less militarily challenging objectives.

Participants also felt that mandates built on a

clear understanding of the situation on the

ground and a militarily realistic view of operational realities were the best guarantee of avoiding “mission creep”—an incremental widening

of mission objectives, without an appreciation of

their advisability or practicality.

❚ The Commanders’ Requirements for 

Operational Intelligence

Once a mandate has been written, a mechanism

for assuring a continued flow of intelligence

throughout the course of an operation must be

established. Given the sensitive nature of intelligence sources and methods, countries have been

reluctant to provide intelligence to foreign

nationals involved in multinational operations.

This is reinforced by doubts among potential

intelligence providers that the information would

be used in ways they consider appropriate.

One panelist called for the routine preparation

of “Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements” (CCIR) as a way to overcome reticence

by intelligence providers. This procedure has

been developed within NATO and includes political, as well as military, information. The CCIR

would identify the intelligence that the Commander regards as indispensable to mission operations, and not just nice to have. In this view,

governments would more readily supply intelligence on a Commander’s priority list.
6 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Procedures for protecting sensitive information transferred to the UN are also crucial

in gaining intelligence support for peace operations. As one participant put it, this requires a

change of attitude away from the notion that “the

UN has no secrets.” However, there are secrets

and the UN must learn to manage sensitive information, if potential providers are to be forthcoming. One illustration of the problem was the trunk

of classified documents reportedly found by US

Marines, after having apparently been abandoned

by UN personnel in Mogadishu.

❚ Preventive Action

The question of the appropriate time for peacekeepers to intervene was addressed by several

participants. Opinion was divided between those

who saw great danger in intervening too late to

make a difference, potentially foregoing an

action that might stop the cancer before it grows

out of control, and those who saw grave risks in

intervening too early, potentially taking a step

that would compound the problems.

Those who saw a quick reaction to crisis as

posing the higher risk were concerned that

peacekeepers would be deployed and committed

to a mission before a situation was sufficiently

understood. This could expose the force to a danger for which it is not appropriately trained,

deployed or equipped. Others who favored erring

on the side of caution warned that a precipitous

dispatch of forces in and of itself could have the

adverse effect of igniting the hostilities that the

deployment was intended to contain.

One former commander strongly disagreed,

arguing that these considerations have weighed

too heavily in United Nations response to several

recent crises. The result has been an overly cautious reaction to situations where early action

could have made a difference. In emergencies,

such as Somalia and Rwanda, getting involved

“too much, too early” would have been the wiser

course, this participant asserted. In his view, it is

easier to “fine tune” a deployed robust force than

to introduce or augment forces after conditions

deteriorate. Several other panelists appeared to

share this assessment.

As a middle position, several participants suggested that, in many instances, intermediate measures could be adopted as the initial response,

which might avoid the dangers of either a premature or a belated force deployment.

Some panelists thought that preventive diplomacy was one step that should be taken as an

alternative to inaction during the initial phase of

a crisis. Preventive diplomacy held the potential

of defusing the conflict, perhaps making other

forms of intervention unnecessary. Failing that,

preventive diplomacy would at least buy the time

needed to evaluate the situation and learn which

further measures were best suited as a remedy.

Alternatively, humanitarian assistance—by

governments, international organizations or private non-governmental organizations—is, in

some instances, a potent form of preventive

action. Often conflicts arise from competition for

scarce resources in which potentially manageable environmental conditions or repairable economic difficulties are to blame. These problems

might improve through a proactive program of

assistance, a panelist held.

Several participants felt that the proactive

deployment of peacekeepers should itself be

viewed as a potent tool of preventive diplomacy.

As one participant argued, what better way to

show the interest and resolve of the international

community than the deployment of peacekeepers? Another panelist added that preventive

deployment can serve as a tool for obtaining the

ground truth required to better “inform the diplomatic process.”4

To be effective as an arm of diplomacy, much

depends on how the force is configured, the manner in which the deployment is executed, and the

way the force and its mission are portrayed. The

intervention in Macedonia was offered as a les4 One panelist included arms control of land mines and conventional weapons that could fuel the escalation of conflict as another form of

preventive action.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 7

son in how peacekeepers can be effectively used

to bolster diplomacy.

The successful deployment of peacekeepers

for preventive action rests on operational transparency, to assure all parties of the force’s impartial and nonbelligerent status. Conducting

briefings on the force’s mission and arranging

visits to peacekeeping units for all parties is

essential in establishing the non-offensive character of the force. Limiting the force’s weaponry

to light arms and establishing ongoing communications channels with the parties on the ground

are also keys in winning their confidence.

Training that prepares soldiers for a “change

in mind set ... from warfighting to peacekeeping”

and alters military operating posture from defensive to “visible and vulnerable” is essential for

preventive peacekeeping, a participant asserted.

Some U.S. military experts have stated, in fact,

that up to six months is required for training soldiers to participate in peace operations and then

to retrain them again for warfighting (although

the time estimates are somewhat controversial).

The panel took note that the Nordic countries

have specialized in training forces for this class

of peace operations.

❚ Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement: 

Operational Continuum or Dichotomy?

Throughout the course of workshop deliberations, participants repeatedly returned to address

the differences between peacekeeping and peace

enforcement. The expression “Mogadishu

line”—alluding to the shift in Somalia from

peacekeeping and humanitarian relief to an operation to subdue Somali warlords—became shorthand for addressing differences between the two

types of operations and their distinctively different operational requirements. The resulting consequences are often radically different in the two

cases.

Some participants warned that the division

between peacekeeping (operating with the consent of all the parties) and peace enforcement

(operating without the consent of some or all the

parties) amounted to a firebreak that should not

be breached lightly. Once crossed, the impartial

peacekeeper becomes a co-belligerent in a conflict and prospects are slim of ever reestablishing

the perception of impartiality. Other panelists

further argued that violence has a dynamic of its

own. Once used in a peacekeeping operation, the

use of force can spiral out of control as violence

breeds more violence.

But after further exploration, panelists who

had earlier drawn a divide between peacekeeping

and peace enforcement seemed to adopt a more

qualified assessment. In their view, peacekeeping should not be equated with passivity. In

some circumstances, the resort to force may

be required to maintain the ability of UN

peacekeepers to fulfill their mission. What is

crucial is that the use of force be confined to the

following circumstances. It must be used basically in self-defense, although the definition of

what constitutes self-defense may be stretched.

One participant emphasized that a clear consensus by all parties on this point will be required.

Force cannot be used in offensive operations.

Further, it is to be used strictly in response to

violations of pre-agreed understandings among

all parties on what constitutes acceptable and

expected forms of behavior. Also, the use of

force should be limited in scale and duration and

be unambiguously connected with fulfilling

peacekeeping and humanitarian relief objectives.

For instance, force was used, without compromising the peacekeeping mission, in Cambodia

against threats to the electoral process that

UNTAC was committed to safeguard. Several

participants noted that even in Bosnia, force has

been used without damaging the neutral standing

of peacekeepers, in instances where it was a last

resort in removing threats against activities that

are unambiguously connected to the peacekeeping mandate. Strikes against mortar positions

responsible for attacks on food convoys constitute an example.

One participant attempted to sum up the

panel’s thinking with the following observations:

between peacekeeping and peace enforcement

one will often find a gray area—“soggy zone.” In

this zone, force may be selectively applied in
8 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

response to direct challenges to the peacekeeping

mission.

Panelists suggested that problems arise when

force is used against targets that do not directly

threaten the international peace operations, say, a

remote arms storage site. However, one participant cautioned, that even when these guidelines

are followed that the risk of falling into a quagmire would remain. Another panelist added that

an attempt to operate simultaneously in both

regimes in one area—such as imposing a “no fly

zone” in the air over Bosnia, or in announcing

the creation of “safe areas” and weapons exclusion zones, while attempting peacekeeping on

the ground directly below—confuses the situation and can compromise the ground force’s neutral status.

❚ The United Nations Should Keep the 

Peace; Enforcement Is Best Left to Powers 

and Coalitions

This appears to be a controversial conclusion,

but, in fact, seemed to be the universal feeling of

the panelists. Peacekeeping and warfighting each

dictate different types of leadership, organization, and participation in executing a mission.

Each also sets different parameters for mission

training, force posture and equipment. Accordingly, the panel broadly agreed that from the outset of any operation an understanding of whether

an operation would be confined to peacekeeping

or whether it could involve substantial enforcement activities was crucial.

The panel strongly believed that the United

Nations is best suited for traditional peacekeeping, including humanitarian relief, rather

than other peace operations. The United Nations

Charter is a document that reflects the shared

views of 185 countries. This gives the organization a special license to troubleshoot worldwide

and offer its good offices and humanitarian assistance, among other things. As one panelist noted,

the UN is especially effective in sponsoring

peace operations in which the weight of its broad

membership is brought to bear, such as the 34-

nation contingent UNTAC operation.

Outside the UN, specialized bodies and

regional organizations can also play a role in

managing peacekeeping operations. The panel

specifically considered the work of the Multinational Force and Observers, an organization created specifically to monitor the Israel-Egypt

peace accord. Discussions suggested that it is

adopting cost-effective practices that the UN

would do well to follow, including staffing,

training, and procurement.

Regional organizations likely have an understanding of local conditions, including a familiarity with language, customs and personalities, and

the operational environment in their region,

unmatched by countries from outside. On the

negative side, regional groupings sometimes

carry political baggage that could make them

unacceptable to one or more of the parties to a

conflict. Further, countries in developing regions

may lack basic resources for peacekeeping.

❚ The United Nations’ Strengths are a 

Liability for Peace Enforcement

The disturbing experiences in Bosnia and Somalia formed a persistent theme throughout workshop deliberations. Participants repeatedly

looked to those cases for lessons on what can go

wrong in peace operations. Reflecting on that

experience, participants concluded that the

UN is structurally and organizationally illprepared to be an arm of peace enforcement.

According to several participants, the very

thing that is the source of the UN’s unique

strengths in peacekeeping—the organization’s

broad and diverse membership—is a liability for

peace enforcement. With 185 disparate members, each with distinct and often incompatible

military capabilities and practices, resource limitations, and competing stakes and interests in any

particular situation, the organization is not realistically able to conduct warfighting operations

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In theory, at least, the United Nations is a club

of coequals. In practice, the equality may be

restricted to the five permanent members of the

Security Council. But, even if only at this level,
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 9

decision–making is consensual in nature. This

state of affairs is incompatible with effective military operations that require a hierarchical command structure. Further, many organizational

components in the UN system appear to feel that

they have a right to override orders by direct

appeal to the Secretary General. Every national

military contingent of a UN operation can ignore

military directives (and many have done so,

although the practice may be frowned upon by

UN officials) by contacting its national capital

and invoking national command prerogatives.

Several panelists argued that such breakdowns

in command are not only possible but inevitable

in UN-led operations, since different countries

supply contingents for different purposes and

with different interests in mind. For instance, in

UNOSOM II—the UN-mandated enforcement

operation in Somalia—few UN member states

were willing to serve in policing operations, and

fewer still were prepared to participate in peace

enforcement. Even countries that initially

claimed a readiness to join in enforcement operations failed to do so when asked. Some made

commitments that were clearly limited in length

of time of participation. A few countries even

withdrew their military contingent when difficulties arose, midway through an operation, leaving

their partners terribly exposed to dangers. Were

it not for the fact that the Somali gangs “couldn’t

shoot straight,” many more UN troops would

have been killed, a participant claimed.

UN involvement in enforcement operations

undermines its credibility in peacekeeping and

related activities—a regime in which its expertise is unchallenged. One commander made a

particularly forceful case in this regard. In his

view, the United Nations’ credibility in peace

operations rests on having “no enemies but parties and partners.” Accordingly, UN participation

in enforcement operations is an action of virtual

suicide for the organization’s impartial status.

Furthermore, given the relatively vulnerable posture required for peacekeeping, wisdom dictates

that peacekeepers should be withdrawn, once

warfighting takes over. To “operate a peacekeeping force ... somewhere between peacekeeping

and large-scale enforcement is madness,” this

panelist argued. This remark was seconded by

others.

Among the countries that have shown a readiness to join in UN-led enforcement operation are

the world’s developing states. But contingents

provided by many of these countries often lack

rudimentary tools and training to seriously contribute to operations. For instance, some states

contribute troops who have never operated an

automobile to serve as drivers. Other contingents

arrive without essential fighting gear, expecting

the UN and wealthier nations to equip them and

provide on-the-spot training in weapons use.

Occasionally, some even arrive without appropriate clothing.

Many panelists emphatically held that,

once a peace enforcement operation is mandated, a single power, or else a small coalition

of powers, should lead it. Improvisation can be

deadly in enforcement operations. While countries may prefer to act in coalition rather than

alone—allowing countries to share resources and

spread the risks—coalitions should be built

around countries with well-established military

links, panelists said. Countries with shared memberships in defense alliances, e.g., the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are obvious candidates for executing enforcement operations.

Participants felt that even if enforcement is

best performed outside the United Nations structure, a mechanism for handing-over operations

to, as well as from, the United Nations needs to

be established. Given the organization’s special

qualification for undertaking peacekeeping and

post-war reconstruction, a process for disengaging and re-engaging the institution and its

resources when conditions warrant needs to be

instituted.

It is through the mandate-writing process that

a link between the UN and peace enforcement is

most effectively created, a participant said. The

UN may have limitations in conducting enforcement operations but, as discussed earlier, the

organization is uniquely suited to determine

when intervention is warranted and the form it
10 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

should take. Participants appeared to agree that

the Security Council’s authority under Chapter

VII of the Charter to mandate enforcement operations and then assign the execution to a lead

nation, a small group of nations, or a regional

organization needs to be sustained. For those

charged with conducting enforcement operations, having a UN mandate to invoke is an

invaluable instrument in legitimizing their mission.

❚ Operational Unity is Key to Mission 

Success

Panelists strongly agreed that operational unity is

indispensable for both peacekeeping and peace

enforcement. Conference participants identified

the absence of operational unity as a common

denominator of failed operations. The breakdown of operational unity in UNOSOM II in

Somalia has been mentioned in this context.

For military commanders, firm and unambiguous command authority is a fundamental

rule of operation. This holds equally for peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Assuring that

troops do not compromise mandates by taking

unilateral actions that stray from agreed missions

objectives is vital in either type of operation. In

particular, a tight rein on peace enforcement is

key to the precise orchestration of operations that

are successful, while keeping the use of force and

the dangers faced by troops to a minimum.

Peace enforcement is not intended to subjugate any of the parties. Its purpose is to create

conditions where nonviolent forms of conflict

resolution and the restoration of normality are

possible. The controlled use of minimum force is

more promising than the unleashing of massive

violence in keeping the door open to cooperation.

Operational unity is most easily achieved by

unity of command. However, unity of command

is practical only in operations where a single

power, with a clearly defined command structure, dominates. In multinational coalitions,

where countries will likely retain control of

national contingents, “unity of purpose” is a

more realistic operational goal, according to participants.

Among other things, unity of purpose requires

agreements among coalition partners, reached

before a deployment, that commanders of

national contingents will not at every turn seek to

renegotiate the terms of their participation with

the UN (or other lead) force commander, or

worse—appeal to their respective capitals to

overrule the force commander whenever it suits

them.5

Both civilians and military members of the

panel added that effective civil-military coordination is no less important in achieving unity of

purpose. Peace operations typically involve

major civilian components. In some operations,

civilians are in charge, as in Yugoslavia. Accordingly, there can be little hope of achieving unity

of purpose unless coordination encompasses

both civil and military components in the field.

In past UN operations, civilian and military staff

have sometimes never met before the inception

of an operation.

As has already been suggested, some participants were troubled that the UN operates as “a

stove-pipe operation.” Whether civilian or military, everyone who works for the organization

routinely contacts UN headquarters in New York

to make decisions and resolve disputes. Participants believed that, at a minimum, there should

be one person in the field with the authority to

coordinate the activities at least of all UN elements, if not also of the independent non-government organizations associated with an operation.

Another panelist suggested that “diplomatic

unity” was yet another ingredient necessary for

mission success. Behind diplomatic unity is a

commitment by the governments (responsible for

initiating an operation) and the military authorities (responsible for executing it) to work in unison.

5 The UNTAC Commander attempted to avoid the latter problem by asking all contingent commanders to keep him informed of developments in their countries relevant to the mission. The results of this initiative were mixed.
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 11

Parties to a conflict may, at one time or

another, be dissatisfied with a peace mission and

its objectives. In those instances, they may seek

to exploit fissures between coalition partners to

sabotage an operation. A sustained, unified diplomatic front is key to maintaining the pressure

on all parties on the ground. The common front

of the major powers and interested regional

states in support of UNTAC was indispensable in

bringing the mission to a successful conclusion, a

participant observed.

To address the various aspects of unity of purpose in peace operations, panelists held that the

following requirements had to be met:

■ a single command authority directing an operation;

■ a clear and agreed set of rules of engagement

for all forces;

■ a preexisting civil-military organization that

could rapidly be moved to the field to serve as

headquarters staff;6

■ a single command, control, communications

and intelligence structure (C3I), including the

technology to support it;

■ a unified doctrine, even if less than perfect,

addressing roles and responsibilities at strategic, operational and tactical levels of command;7

 and

■ serious commitments in advance by countries

participating in an operation to stay the course,

under the mandate, and not abandon their

peacekeeping partners, should conditions deteriorate.

Panelists viewed UNOSOM II as a lesson of

what can go wrong in a peace operation when

unity of purpose and the political and organizational underpinning are absent. UNTAC was

viewed as offering lessons in how unity of purpose can be established, sustained and effectively

put to use.

6 Participants strongly argued that practice rather than improvisation is essential. Accordingly, this organization should consist of people

with extensive experience working as a unit. Such experience takes months to acquire. Days or weeks are not enough. 7 As one participant put it, an imperfect doctrine is preferable to no agreed doctrine. See the paper of Lt. Col. Damien Healy and Lieutenant General J. M. Sanderson for a detailed discussion of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command in peace operations.

❚ Gearing Up for Peacekeeping

The panel was divided on how peacekeepers

should be equipped. As previously noted, some

commanders felt that the manner in which a

force arms itself sends a message to parties on

the ground. Vulnerability is proof of impartiality

and this should be transparently obvious.

Accordingly, troops should be deployed with

light weapons needed for peacekeeping, and not

much more. Otherwise, there is a risk that

“excesses will occur” or that the force may be

drawn into becoming a belligerent.

Other commanders took exception to this perspective. Peacekeepers may arrive with peaceful

intentions but this is no guarantee that all factions will share in the goodwill. Accordingly,

peacekeepers would be advised to be prepared

for “the worst case.” This means being equipped

to fight, if necessary. Recalling the earlier discussion on the “Mogadishu line,” a commander

added that since most situations tend to be

messy, operations rarely fit neatly into boxes

marked “peacekeeping” or “enforcement.” Given

the uncertainties inherent in peacekeeping, in this

view, prudence dictates arming the deployed

force.

Sharing Responsibilities and Dividing

the Labor

Participants appeared to agree on the need for a

division of labor among countries in participation and contribution to peace operations. One

non-American panelist argued that the inclination to look to the United States to lead and/or

partake in every operation had to be curtailed.

Over-reliance on the US is not advisable, for, in

the longer term, it could heighten American aversion to foreign involvement. The US has specialized and often unique capabilities, including

transportation, communications, intelligence

and special operations. Expecting the US to solve

every world crisis risks exhausting resources
12 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

(and good will) best kept in reserve for selective

use. The same can be said of overdependence on

the other major powers.

The provision of equipment is another area

where a division of labor is not only possible but

essential. Communications systems were at the

very top of the list of technologies viewed by

panelists as being critical to effective peace operations. Panelists warned of the dangers inherent

in routinely deploying operations that lack

interoperable communications. Similarly, we

cannot afford the cost and inefficiencies of

expecting troops to operate and maintain a host

of different types of equipment, and somehow

stock spares and repair gear associated with each.

This problem runs the gamut of provisions, from

major items, such as tanks, to expendable ones,

such as ordnance.

What one participant termed “a lead country

model” should be adopted for the provision of

assets. Under this concept, specific countries

would be given responsibility for the provision

of specific items or classes of items.

Professionalism in Training and Hiring

Panelists spoke repeatedly about the importance

of training and professionalism, viewing the current system as an Achilles’ heel of peace operations. They suggested several remedies for the

problems.

First, senior officers, especially those

expected to operate in headquarters, should exercise and, where possible, work together in

advance of operations. Such familiarization is

vital for smooth operations. As for senior commanders, they should, at a very minimum, have

the opportunity to confer before they are dispatched to the field. This would provide a much

needed opportunity to reach consensus on appropriate responses to possible challenges in

advance of their occurrence. Currently, senior

officers of different nationalities charged with

running an operation together typically meet one

another for the first time in the field.

Second, junior officer training is equally

important, in the panel’s view. Junior officers are

the front line of the mandate of any peace operation and are expected to shoulder a considerable

burden. They are typically given responsibility

for carrying out a mandate over large areas with

relatively small units. Their job requires mastery

of a variety of skills. Junior officers must have

the interpersonal and negotiating skills to defuse

conflicts and the restraint to avoid unnecessary

violence that would sabotage a peace operation,

whether by crossing the “Mogadishu line” in

peacekeeping or by an unwarranted escalation in

Chapter VII operations. Training must also prepare junior officers to undertake tasks unique to

peacekeeping, including establishing and operating checkpoints and roadblocks.

Officer training for peace operations should be

international in character, ideally involving the

United Nations. International training is key to

promoting familiarity with foreign counterparts

and their practices and to establishing standard

operating procedures for officers designated for

assignment to future peace operations. It should

also expose officers, particularly those from less

technologically advanced nations, to new equipment that may offer tactical advantages in peace

operations.

Conscript training is also important. The ethos

and, often, the practice of peace operations are

often closer to law enforcement than to warfighting. Accordingly, conscripts will need to learn to

act with appropriate restraint. The workshop discussion indicated that necessary conscript training should rest with contributing nations.

Civilians taking part in peace operations

should also participate in predeployment training. Civilians, as well as soldiers, can provide the

language and cultural skills that are essential for

headquarters operations. Often civilians are

charged with administrating field operations.

Training before operations is essential in promoting effective coordination between civilian and

military staffs that have no tradition of working

in tandem. Creating a rapidly deployable headquarters staff, with extensive experience working

together in advance of emergencies, was previously noted as a way to promote smooth civil–

military collaboration. One participant suggested

using political–military wargames as another
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 13

training device for both civilian and military personnel.

Panelists were quick to add that training is no

substitute for real-world experience. Longevity

of service in the field is the best training tool.

Unfortunately, many nations that contribute to

operations routinely reassign officers just when

they have gained the practical knowledge to be

of added value to a mission. A difficulty arises

when a nation has more serious commitments

than peacekeeping. This may then require

retraining soldiers back and forth from one mode

of operation (peace) to another (war).

Hiring practices are important to civilian professionalism in peace operations. The place to

start is to depoliticize the hiring process at the

UN, panelists held. Personnel need to be hired

for skill, not by means of a national job quota

system. Incompetence cannot be tolerated, especially in the field where it can endanger a mission. The same holds for military personnel. If

national contingents are not up to the task, they

should be sent home, a commander emphatically

urged. Another military panelist cautioned, however, that the diplomatic and practical implications would have to be weighed heavily in such a

case.

❚ Finances and Resources

Lack of finances is a major hindrance to future

operations. Panelists noted the negative mood in

the US toward funding international programs in

general and peace operations in particularly. This

perspective pervades Congress.8

 Support for

even the most successful operations is waning

for reasons of finance and use of significant manpower. The MFO is not immune from these pressures. Good or bad, it is viewed by some as a

persistent drain on resources, which has led to

calls for the US “to declare victory and walk

away from the Sinai.”

Even prior to recent demands for greater efficiency, the MFO adopted many practices that

8 See Steve Simon’s paper on the growing resistance to funding international programs.

could serve as a model for other organizations.

Among other things, the MFO:

■ uses commercial sources, selected on a competitive basis, for the provision of supplies to

avoid receiving inferior or outdated items

from contributing countries;

■ limits the number of suppliers for any one item

to the smallest number possible to ease training, and operations and maintenance;

■ contracts operations and maintenance activities to commercial firms, able to provide a

local work force;

■ is reducing personnel, and using technology

where applicable as a substitute; and

■ focuses on predeployment training and “training the trainers.”9

Further, creating a regional headquarters for

several operations in any one region was suggested as another potential cost saver.

❚ Where Technology Can Make a 

Difference: A Survey of Practitioners

Some interesting survey results were obtained by

the United Nations Institute for Disarmament

Research, as part of their project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution are relevant to the

question of what technologies would be most

useful for international peace operations. These

results were reported upon by Virginia Gamba,

who is director of the project. A detailed questionnaire, regarding many aspects of UN peace

operations was given to a large number of individuals with personal experience in them. These

included commanders, other military personnel,

and civilian practitioners. Several questions were

related to the potential or actual use of technologies, and the responses provide a useful indication of what may be needed in the field.

First, a strong minority (about 40 percent) of

those responding reported the use of sensors for

verification. In general, these individuals were

from technologically advanced countries. Also,

9 K. Scott Gudgeon’s paper provides a further discussion of MFO practices.
14 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

some 40 percent reported being trained at home

in verification technologies. Equipment used

included radar and infrared sensors, intelligencegathering equipment, communications systems,

countermine equipment, and intelligence fusion

aids.

Second, when asked whether on-site and

remote sensing equipment was adequate for verifying weapons control and disarmament missions within peace operations, the response was

evenly divided between yes and no; an interesting note was that the more technologically

advanced the country of the respondent, the less

satisfied he/she was. However, respondents overwhelmingly supported the potential benefit of

sensor systems in support of peace operations.

Likewise, a great majority of respondents

reported the view that satellite surveillance has a

role to play in peace operations.

Of greatest import to this conference, however, was the list, reported by the practitioners, of

the roles which sensor technologies could play in

peace operations. These included what one might

imagine: force protection; monitoring and

detecting weapon caches; monitoring of truce

agreements and cease-fires; monitoring and

controlling troop and weapon movements;

providing night vision capability to international forces; monitoring crowds; and aiding

in perimeter defense of installations.

❚ Where Technology Can Make a 

Difference: The Panel

Conference panelists identified several areas

where they agreed technology could make a difference in peace operations. Panelists hoped that

the workshop marked the start of a much-needed

dialogue that promotes “cross-talk” between

practitioners and technologists. An ongoing

exchange would serve two purposes. First, it

would make practitioners aware of technology

that holds the potential of enhancing operations.

Second, it could give direction to technologists in

developing systems that address practical problems faced by operators.

A brief look at technologies addressed by

practitioners (as opposed to the technologists)

follows. Much of the technology judged of highest value by practitioners is available off-theshelf. Therefore, from the perspective of the user,

appropriate technology, instead of high technology, should be the goal.

Communications

Communications systems were at the top of

many participants’ list of essential technologies.

Communications are vital for rapid decision–

making and maintaining tight reins over delicate

operations. The biggest problems are to assure

interoperability of communications among units

in the field, and to facilitate high speed and

secure communications between the field and

authorities overseas.

Commanders can expect to find the communications infrastructure in the field to be inadequate or nonexistent. This makes a self-contained

and rapidly fieldable communications system an

essential piece of technology for peace operations. Regarding field operations, panelists noted

deficiencies in both ground-to-ground and air-toground communications. Also noted were deficiencies in communications links between official

personnel and non-governmental organizations in

the field. Remedies are to be found in a change of

procurement practices as well as in technological

advances.

Sensors

Sensor systems were viewed as another category

of critical technologies for peace operations.

Sensors are especially useful, for example, in

peace monitoring. They hold promise in allowing

some missions to reduce personnel and associated costs. Some sensors could allow small

peacekeeping elements to patrol large parcels of

territory by detecting approaching intruders. In

this way, it may be possible to construct a

quickly deployable defense perimeter for peace

operators.

Sensors are also important to intelligence collection in the field, providing effective situa-
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 15

tional awareness for commanders who cannot be

at all places at all times. For intelligence purposes, it is essential to have 24 hour wide area

coverage that can quickly spot trouble and determine the veracity of intelligence claims, a participant suggested. One promising approach is to

use airborne systems, including unattended aerial

vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters. Panelists

agreed that airborne assets are likely beyond the

financial reach of international organizations.

Here, reliance on a lead country supplier to draw

these systems from national inventories when

needed, makes sense.

Demining

Demining systems received considerable attention from participants. Panelists were interested

in systems designed to locate mines intended to

harm peace operators and slow their movement,

and technologies that might be used in post-conflict restoration of mined areas for habitation.

Interfacing with the Media

Many developing countries are “oral societies,” a

participant noted. Getting the peacekeepers’

message out to the population is often best

achieved by the deployment of a radio transmitter and the distribution of cheap portable radios

to the population. The use of video recorders is

another media tool with proven utility in peace

operations.

In both Cambodia and Somalia, UN officials

resisted field commanders’ requests to set up a

public radio system. Initially, officials in New

York reflexively viewed the dissemination of

information as engaging in a propaganda campaign and feared that UN-sponsored radio broadcasts would be seen as psychological warfare.

Later, when New York’s political inertia was

overcome, the UN Finance Committee balked at

the cost and slowed the process further. In Somalia, the delay gave warlord Farah Aideed a considerable lead in getting out his message,

undermining the UN operation. On the other

hand, once distributed by UNTAC in Cambodia,

radios and videos aided in convincing the Cambodian people to trust the electoral process and

vote. UNTAC broadcasts have even been credited with producing Khmer Rouge defections.

Crowd Control

In the wake of UNOSOM II, the ability to operate against hostile forces that have no inhibition

in using civilians as shields has emerged as a

concern. In response, systems that allow peace

operators to separate combatants from women

and children and provide means for breaking up

crowds without harming the innocent are a priority.

Training

Tools that would allow commanders and civilians from around-the-world to train together

without traveling to a single location, such as distributed/interactive simulations were suggested

as both cost cutters and time savers. Other training tools noted in discussions included the use of

CD-ROM for disseminating data on culture, language and conditions in operating areas, and the

use of simulators for job training and mission

rehearsal purposes.

WORKSHOP HIGHLIGHTS—THE 

TECHNOLOGIES

❚ Introduction

Peace operations, including both peacekeeping

and peace enforcement, impose a broad set of

requirements for equipment and capabilities. A

rich field of emerging technologies exists that

could have many applications for these operations, if equipment based on these new possibilities can be brought to fruition in operationally

practical modes.

Although much equipment already exists,

there have been several cases (e.g., UNOSOM II

in Somalia) where even such fundamental offthe-shelf equipment as telephones were not

always available in adequate supply to the international force commanders. There has been a

major problem with the distribution and deployment of necessary equipment for many interna-
16 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

tional operations, including some humanitarian

relief efforts (e.g., Rwanda). Apparently, the

United Nations has not been optimally organized

in carrying out peace operations. As an extreme,

but not uncommon example, some contingents

even arrive in the field without adequate clothing, let alone weaponry. Such problems are due

both to insufficient resources and lagging contributions from member states in support of peace

operations on the one hand, and to inadequate

managerial tools and organization on the other.

The difficulty shown by the UN in deploying and

properly employing established and well-understood technology raises doubts about its capacity

in dealing with entirely new types of equipment.

If the UN is to be able to employ usefully radical new tools in future peace operations, radical improvements will be necessary in the

organization’s management ability. Further,

minimal levels of supply for each contingent,

must be assured.

This workshop, nevertheless, concerned itself

with discussing equipment and capabilities that

technology may provide for peace operations in

the near future, and with the question of how

such items may fit into likely scenarios for their

use in the field. Technology can provide both

improved and new capabilities for a wide variety

of equipment. Such equipment includes sensors,

weapons (including “less-than-lethal” weapons),

and mine detection and clearance techniques.

Some categories may be more useful for traditional peacekeeping, others for more proactive

operations.

The goals of applying technologies for peace

operations are several:

■ to increase the effectiveness of the operation;

■ to reduce the costs of the operation;

■ to reduce the number of personnel needed; and

■ to reduce casualties, among the international

force and civilians, but potentially, even

among adversaries, for both humanitarian and

political considerations.

Although technologies primarily raise technical, rather than political, questions, policy issues

connected with technologies will, on occasion,

also arise. There are several kinds of policy

issues that may arise.

First, increased prospects for success of an

operation may increase the prospects for the

intervention itself. Second, the availability of

more technical solutions to military problems

would present a military commander with more

options to pursue in a given situation. Third, in

the case of less-than-lethal weapons, use might

be read as a sign of weakness by an adversary,

possibly resulting in a rapid escalation to lethal

means. Fourth, the use of some technologies,

notably chemical and biological agents, and also

less-than-lethal laser weapons, may violate current or near-future international arms limitation

agreements, and thus would likely be unacceptable for an international peace operation. Finally,

some technologies may easily be replicated (or

reverse engineered) by many countries, not necessarily only advanced technical ones. The possibility of new military or peace enforcement tools

proliferating and being employed against the

international forces (or against the nation developing the technology) must be reckoned with.

Occasionally, mini-arms races, involving countermeasures and counters to those counters,

might occur. A related issue, raised by one participant, is the possibility of an entirely new set

of arms races starting, if the United States, as a

world leader in weapons research, begins to

develop and deploy some of the suggested

devices, especially laser weapons. The resistance

of technologies to countermeasures may be a

major criterion to consider in deciding whether

to pursue a given line of research.

From the purely operational viewpoint, a

number of factors need to be considered in deciding whether or not to develop a technical solution

to a military or police problem arising from

peace operations. One is the likelihood of the

technology succeeding, at least on a laboratory

level. If the likelihood of success within a reasonable time is remote, the technology cannot be

considered as a basis for planning in the near- to

mid-term.

Secondly, even if the proposed equipment is

demonstrated in the laboratory, a clear military
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 17

application must be conceptualized. The equipment must be developed into a military item that

has a well-defined doctrinal use. It must function

not just at normal room temperature and controlled humidity, but under a variety of environmental extremes. Also, if it needs substantial

amounts of power, the mating of the equipment

with the power source in the field must be

accomplished in an operationally feasible way.

Third, the cost must be affordable. In fact, the

proposed new equipment would be more acceptable if it could be shown to reduce, rather than

increase costs, as noted in the first set of criteria,

above. Cost will be a major factor in determining

the likely application of a given new tool to

peace operations.

Fourth, it must be feasible to train the personnel of an international force to use the equipment

effectively within a few weeks at most (a few

days would be preferable). It is likely that some

soldiers who have not received advanced technical training will have to operate the equipment.

In fact, some contingents that have participated

in peace operations have not received or, at least,

not demonstrated a high level of technical training. (As an aside, such problems are not confined

to third-world contingents; in fact, some such

contingents have displayed highly proficient levels of technical capabilities.) While, presumably,

all are able to learn to operate many sorts of standard military equipment, a “hi-tech” device, if

not appropriately user friendly, may take considerably more training effort. Techniques for training all potential users may have to be developed

in parallel with deployment, but a new item will

be far more probable to be useful if it is, in fact,

reasonably user friendly.

Finally, the measure-countermeasure game

must be thought out. How would the peace force

be able to respond to the use of such equipment

against them and how could they respond to possible countermeasures developed by their adversaries? Further, there seems universal agreement

that, if non-lethal weapons and devices are used,

they should always be backed up by lethal weapons, both to protect international forces and to

maintain a necessary, healthy respect for them by

potential adversaries.

❚ Technical Viewpoints

Several papers dealing with specific technical

issues applicable to peace operations were presented at the workshop. One, by Mr. Courregelongue, defined the problem and context of

mine clearing requirements, a principal concern

for peace operations and post-conflict reconstruction. He provided a summary description of

the variety of anti-personnel mines employed in

the world, the magnitude of the problem, and the

many potential candidate technologies that may

help solve this massive, worldwide problem.

Another, by Col. Roland-Price, discussed “non-”

or “less-than-lethal” weapons, in terms of their

application to peace operations, listing a large

number of generic applications—some devices

are already available and have been used by the

military, but most have not yet reached this stage

of development. A table in this paper lists different types of these weapons, with respective uses

and disadvantages. Two other technical experts,

Dr. Milton Finger from Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory and Dr. Gerold Yonas from

Sandia National Laboratories, presented an

intriguing variety of emerging technologies and

devices, covering mine detection, sensors, lessthan-lethal weapons and information and communications.

❚ Mine Clearance

Regarding mine clearance, there are several techniques that show promise in a variety of situations. However, there is no single “magic bullet”

that will solve the problem of finding mines in

all, or even most, environments. The eventual

solution is, therefore, likely to be a combination

of technologies, each of which will work in a

specified set of conditions.

There are currently estimated to be roughly

100,000,000 mines buried in the world and about

2,000,000 new ones are emplaced each year,

while only around 100,000 are removed. One

political means of dealing with this matter in the
18 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

long term would be to achieve a global agreement to produce only mines that automatically

deactivated themselves after a relatively short

(say, one year at most) period. Even if guerrillas

and renegade states did not comply, the size of

the problem would still eventually be greatly

reduced, if such an accord were reached.

The classic method of detection, employing

personnel who use nonmetallic earth probes, is

labor-intensive, time-consuming, and dangerous. Metal detectors, usually magnetometers,

only work when the mine contains metal. Some

all-plastic mines now exist, and many others only

use a few grams of metal. For these mines, it is

better to detect either the explosive, which is a

unique characterization of mines or other unexploded ordnance, or the anomaly in the soil, due

to the emplacement of a foreign object.

In many cases, explosives may be directly

detectable due to the minute amount of their

vapors leaking out of the mine. Dogs are very

sensitive detectors, probably 100-1000 times as

sensitive as any electro-mechanical device. They

have been used for many years to detect explosives as well as trace quantities of molecules

exuded by contraband materials (including

drugs). A mine detection system relying on

canines has been developed by commercial firms

in South Africa and the United States. It has been

used in South Africa and Mozambique and will

probably be used in Angola in the near future. A

certain amount of success has been reported;

apparently, this system is especially useful for

clearing roads. One method is to take air samples

over the road, using a vehicle that minimizes

danger to its operators. The dogs, at another location, sniff the samples, and may be later transported to the site to home in on any positive

detections among the samples. Another method

that looks directly at explosives, being developed

at Sandia National Laboratories, uses backscattering from x-rays, which can differentiate

between the lighter elements present in explosives and the heavier elements present in most

soil.

The two scientists from the U.S. National

Laboratories discussed other mine detection

options in various stages of development. One

technique uses multispectral analysis of radiation

in the infrared region to detect changes in the

soil’s emissivity and temperature, where it has

been disturbed by a (more or less recently)

emplaced mine. Ground penetrating radars of

several types have been tested. Anti-personnel

mines, the greatest danger to people, are relatively small (perhaps 10 cm in diameter), however, and hard to detect by radar, although they

are only located 5–10 cm below the surface.

Moist soil serves as a conductor and hampers or

stops ground penetrating radars. Nevertheless,

one technique, a microimpulse radar (using a

broad range of wavelengths at high radio frequencies), has, in tests, detected metallic and

plastic surrogate mines at depth of 5 to 10 cm in

moist soil.

The problem of mine deactivation is an

entirely different one. At present, the U.S. military insists on exploding mines to get rid of

them, sometimes after they are dug up by large

plows. One technique recently developed can

clear areas up to about an acre, using several

small shaped charges deployed on a net. Other

techniques, using helicopters or large vehicles

(often remotely operated) that drag plows, rollers, or flails, are in existence or are being developed.

❚ Less-than-Lethal Technologies

Many “less-than-lethal” technologies were

described in the various contributions. Uses of

these techniques in peace operations are

described in Col. Roland-Price’s paper. Obvious

potential uses could be for crowd control (especially when armed adversaries are interspersed

with women and children); special operations to

disable adversary equipment; protection of

enclosed perimeters, such as observation posts of

the international force or refugee camps. In many

contexts, a principal advantage of such weapons

would be the option to use less-than-lethal, but

effective, force in a situation where the infliction

of casualties by a peace force could further

inflame a situation, leading to an escalation of
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 19

violence. Panelists frequently cautioned, however, that less-than-lethal force should always

be supported by proximate lethal capability,

to deter an adversary from taking advantage

of perceived restraint by a peace force.

Less-than-lethal weapons may be divided into

anti–personnel and anti–materiel categories. As

one example of the latter, Dr. Finger suggested

that high power microwave weapons, delivered

by munitions, may be effective against an adversary’s military electronics and may be soon feasible for operational use. Regarding antipersonnel possibilities, he suggested that the

employment of acoustical weapons, causing nausea or discomfort, but not permanently disabling,

was a near-term possibility. There is a multitude

of other examples, some already in existence,

others only in early laboratory testing. Sandia

National Laboratories developed “sticky foams”

years ago for protecting fixed, highly sensitive

sites. These are able to immobilize intruders in

enclosed areas, although there has been some

investigation into their possible application for

crowd control purposes. Other anti-materiel

weapons mentioned were superlubricants

(which, if spread on the ground, would make it

difficult for many vehicles to operate or even for

people to stand upright and move about); supercaustics; chemicals that can jellify petroleum

products; chemicals to disable internal combustion engines (considered a very difficult problem); chemicals to attack many organic

compounds, such as rubber; and metal embrittlement chemicals. Effective utilization for most of

these suggested technologies would require the

development of specialized delivery systems,

except in the case of covert deployment by special forces.

Anti-personnel items include laser weapons

(for dazzling or blinding adversaries, or for disabling electro-optic equipment), acoustic weapons (which may cause severe nausea or other

extreme gastrointestinal distress), radio frequency weapons, entangling equipment, and sublethal munitions. The last are highly developed

and in the arsenal of many nations, mostly for

domestic police use.

There are also items that fit into the class of

less-than-lethal weapons by some definitions, but

are difficult to regard as real weapons. Equipment to aid in “psyops,” or psychological operations, may include banal technologies such as

radios, for example. Automated language translators, which may soon become practical, would

greatly ease the problems experienced by many

“blue berets” of the UN in dealing with local parties, often at relatively low ranks, on both sides.

It was not clear whether some of the abovementioned possibilities, currently researched at

the laboratory level, would be available for operational use in the near future. In the past, some

items that appeared promising in the laboratory

were not workable in the field. For example,

some superlubricants were rejected for use in

Northern Ireland by British forces, because the

material rapidly washed away in the rain.

❚ Sensors and Information

Advanced sensors will certainly be useful for

purely peacekeeping operations as well as for

any other type of military operation. When a

cease-fire accord or peace agreement is in place,

sensors could provide real-time information to

both parties, ensuring that each will be convinced

that the other is fulfilling his part of the bargain,

for example, regarding limitations on the deployment of military equipment or troops near lines

of demarcation. Suggestions have been made to

use unattended ground sensors to facilitate a

peace agreement between Israel and Syria that

may include the demilitarization of the Golan

Heights. These sensors might serve to make an

agreement more acceptable to both parties and

would reduce the number of third-party forces

needed to police the agreement, making it easier

to obtain the number of troops needed to carry

out such an accord. Another zone of conflict in

which sensors could serve to facilitate a peace

agreement could be around the Siachen Glacier

in Kashmir, where divisions of Indian and Pakistani soldiers face each other at altitudes over

5000 meters. The cost in resources and, even, in

lives, of this stand-off is considerable. There is
20 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

some reason to think both sides would accept the

presence of sensors, installed by neutral third

parties, with output available to both sides, to

assure each side of the other’s compliance with a

truce.

Sensors to monitor an agreement could also be

mounted on overhead platforms, such as airplanes, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), satellites,

or even aerostats. The appropriate architecture to

employ would depend heavily on the circumstances and on the physical environment governed by the agreement.

Dr. Yonas emphasized the importance of

information and of controlling information flow,

both in warfare and in peace operations. Sensors

already exist that can transmit detailed information on both adversary deployments and the current battlefield situation. They may be placed on

a variety of platforms, based in space, in the air,

or on the ground (where they could be unattended most of the time). Sensors would operate

over a broad part of the electromagnetic spectrum, including the visual range, near and far

infrared, and microwave. Synthetic aperture

radar is capable of providing high resolution data

through cloud cover with resolution independent

of altitude. A considerable advantage may lie in

placing sensors on UAVs, if practical from the

point of view of cost and power requirements.

This addition to the arsenal of a commander

could provide a powerful tool for obtaining reliable, real-time information from a relatively

cheap platform that could be difficult for an

adversary to detect and, therefore, to attack.

A unique promising sensor device is the

SAFEGUARD system, developed at Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory. This system can

detect a bullet or a mortar or artillery shell in real

time by means of an infrared staring array. With

the use of fast computing capability and clever

algorithms, the device can locate the position of a

sniper to less than a meter, even before the bullet

actually hits its target. This system device has

been tested outdoors under a variety of environmental conditions and needs to be tested under

realistic military scenarios. Funding for this work

has been limited thus far.

This system could facilitate countering snipers

directly by means of either conventional munitions or, even (at least at night) a dazzling laser,

which could prevent rapid refire. The last suggestion may be controversial, in that the use of

lasers for this purpose could be countermanded

by a future international convention; also, some

countermeasures might be developed. But, whatever riposte is chosen, equipment that can locate

a sniper virtually instantaneously would confer a

great advantage on its possessor. Its utility in situations like those in Mogadishu and Sarajevo

can be easily imagined.

❚ Training Technologies

Finally, in the field of training, technologies to

assist in training and simulation for the military

do exist, and many more, of increasing sophistication, are being developed. A subset could easily be designed with the purpose of training

peace operation forces in a number of relevant

techniques, ranging from negotiations, to use of

certain weapons and sensors systems, to operations in urban areas. Especially given the difficulty of some contingents (already noted) in

learning to operate unfamiliar systems, the use of

such techniques, especially if available in the

field, would be of great use to many UN operations.

❚ Conclusions on Technologies

A number of technologies and related equipment

currently in existence have the potential to radically alter the course of peace operations,

improving their chances for success. These

include many forms of sensors, sensor platforms,

less-than-lethal weapons, and information techniques (one key to improving sensor performance and to improve the ability to sift through

massive amounts of data rapidly is to rely on

remote pre–processing of information at the site

of the unattended sensor).

As to the ultimate benefits of new technologies for future peace operations, there was some

division of opinion on the panel. Many of the

technologists among them were, quite naturally,
Chapter 1 Introduction and Summary | 21

technological optimists. They appeared convinced that at least some, if not all, of the proposed technologies would turn out to be

technically feasible, operationally practical, and

cost effective in a variety of future operations,

including peacekeeping and peace enforcement

efforts and in war. Others were somewhat skeptical on a number of counts.

Skepticism was not directed so much at the

ability of the technology to develop the required

equipment: indeed, some of the items mentioned

(e.g., in the less-than-lethal area, sticky foam,

rubber bullets, superlubricants, and lasers)

already exist, and some have been used operationally, although not always in the context conceived for peace operations. Rather, some of the

problems seen were those implied in the criteria

listed at the beginning of this section. First, the

ability of peace forces (unless belonging exclusively to advanced industrialized powers) to purchase new, “hi-tech” equipment may be very

limited, unless the devices turn out to be inexpensive. Second, the operational need for some

equipment may not always be compelling. For

example, crowd control, which is a police-type

requirement that often surfaces during peace

operations, may often be well handled by an

appropriately trained and sized force without

need for recourse to the products of new technologies. Further, concern was expressed that some

contingents would have difficulty in handling

adequately some of the advanced equipment

envisioned, at least without a large amount of

training. Moreover, some items could be quite

lethal to children or the infirm, even though not

lethal, under most circumstances to a healthy

adult.

Finally, several panelists cautioned that some

possible new weapons might be too susceptible

to countermeasures, considerably reducing their

utility. Further, other technologies could be

appropriated by an adversary (by theft, or, in

some cases, where the technology was not very

difficult to reverse engineer, by indigenous manufacture) and lead to an escalation in violence, to

the detriment both of the peace force and of the

local population.

These cautions, however, did not imply a universal Luddite point of view. Rather, it meant

that the employment, and, in some cases, the

development of many possible new devices need

to be thought out quite carefully in advance.

Regarding laser weapons in particular, one panelist felt that a global prohibition on their use

was, on balance, a desirable and a feasible end,

notwithstanding the potential utility of such

devices, e.g., dazzling enemy snipers. Further,

the development of many less-than-lethal weapons could lead to their broad proliferation, and

the world, including peace operations of the

future, might eventually be the worse off for their

development. The pivotal role of the United

States was invoked, in that many other nations

were likely to follow the U.S. lead in deciding

whether or not to pursue many of these weapons.

The conclusion, in the view of this panelist, was

that the United States should be especially careful in choosing which path it should follow in

developing new military tools, since the repercussions could extend far beyond direct U.S.

concerns, but could have serious negative

impacts on a global scale.

Therefore, no consensus on the use of various

sorts of less-than-lethal weapons was expressed

by the panel. On the one hand, a raft of near–

term technologies appeared feasible, many of

which could add substantially to the “kit” available to the commander of a peace operations

force. Some appeared to have the potential for

exciting and radical changes in the business of

peace operations, especially in terms of protecting forces and civilians. On the other, for some

of the possibilities and for some of the panelists,

there were doubts that their application would be

practical in most cases likely to arise.

Also, there was a view that the main problems

that past peace operations have faced were not

primarily due to a deficiency of available technologies or equipment but more to inadequate

planning by the agency of intervention (usually

the UN), confusing mandates from the UN Security Council, and to inadequate coordination

among civilian and military commanders. In this

view, technology may continue to play only a
22 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

minor role in determining success or failure of

such missions.

However, regarding sensors, there was much

less skepticism. A consensus appeared to exist

that sensors were less likely to be provocative or

to cause some of the problems that could arise

from the utilization of certain less-than-lethal

weapons by peace forces. There would be no

issue of violation of international conventions or

of triggering an arms race. The greater transfer of

information to all parties, enabled by sensors,

could well function to reduce tensions in many

cases involving past or potential conflict by

greatly increasing transparency. Further, the possibility that sensors can actually facilitate as well

as help monitor future peace agreements has

made their development and perfection for such

purposes an attractive goal from any point of

view.
| 23

2

Organization

and Planning

Requirements:

Lessons Drawn

from Past

Operations

INTRODUCTION

t is an open question whether it is productive to draw conclusions from past operations for future thinking and planning. First, by the end of the cold war era there was an

explosive development in the number of peacekeeping missions without a fundamental discussion about possible changes

in force organization and methods for controlling the operation.

Second, the nature of conflicts has changed drastically from an

international character into a more interstate nature. Ethnic, religious, and national contrasts have created uncontrolled turbulence and violence. Third, UN finances exploded out of control

and put extra pressure on the Secretariat to find other ways to

organize and other means to save money.

Most of the peace operations from the past were established

under the cold war era with their specific presuppositions. Trying not to be too hypothetical, I’ll base my views on experiences

with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

operation. UNIFIL was selected mainly for two reasons: first,

this mission was established under the cold war era and second,

it has slowly changed its modus operandi into a better defined

concept of operation reflecting overall changes in the regional

situation.

ORGANIZATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The conflict per se, the time factor, and available troops will

together form the basis for the specific method of planning. With

some few exceptions, the forces have been structured along

functional lines and on the principle of minimal use of force.

“Follow on Forces,” operational, or strategic reserves have

by

Major General Trond 

Furuhovde

Headquarters, Defence 

Command, Norway

Presented at the Workshop, 

with amplification, by 

Brigadier General Trygve 

Tellefsen

Defence Command, Norway,

former Commander, 

UN Preventive Deployment 

Force in Macedonia

I
24 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

never been established by the UN—mainly

because it was almost impossible to find troops.

If we go back and examine the way UNIFIL

was established, the methodology employed was

ad hoc.1

The organizations are often structured with the

following elements:

■ Information/Intelligence

■ Command and Control

■ Operations

■ Support

INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

The information element is often very vaguely

defined and, consequently, vaguely executed.

The importance of exact and timely information-flow must again be underlined. In several

instances, information collection and intelligence

analysis were reduced to nearly useless activities.

But these are critical requirements for a commander. Exact and timely information is essential to safeguarding your troops and knowing the

actions taken by the belligerent.

This element of the organization has almost

never been subject to studies and professional

discussions. The sensitive nature of the information services is highly exaggerated—mostly for

the lack of understanding.

In my mind, we can only succeed making

“military information” real and effective through

realistic planning and training. The training must

cover tactical and strategic levels, and include

political analysis.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

It is natural to move from the organization’s

information-elements to command and control.

Like the main body of a UN-force, the command structure also reflects the multinational

character of the mission. The complexity and

sensitivity of peace-operations create unique situations at all command levels. International

1 For a systematic analysis of methods it would be useful to start with “An Agenda for Peace” and the description of “Wider Peacekeeping.”

media participation often increases the operation’s complexity, especially in the command

and control arena. Time factors make the command structure sensitive to media-actions. A

quick media action can affect the decision-making process. In other words, no commander

wants his superiors learning of an adverse situation first through a media report. Consequently,

the command and control structure must be

equipped with the right high-speed communication technology.

Incidents occurring locally can assume a high

profile in political terms. This fact underlines the

importance of having headquarters personnel

adept at accessing and analyzing information,

supported by integrated data processing systems.

The staff procedures must be direct and quick.

A disadvantage is that not all nations can participate in such a staff-environment.

OPERATIONS

In this examination, “peace enforcement” is

excluded based on doctrine and two assumptions:

1. the “rules of engagement” and “use of force”

are not adaptable to a peace-operation; and

2. to enforce peace is, in reality, to replace one

conflict with another.

Intervention could often be used as a synonym

for peace enforcement. Such operations are better left to groups of nations requested by the

Security Council and based on a Security Council Resolution.

In this case, only peace operations are examined. A fundamental examination consists of

three main elements:

1. the task,

2. analysis of the current situation and the

desired situation, and

3. needed improvements and support.

Based on tasks given to present and past

peacekeeping and peace-support missions, certain characteristic activities occur:
Chapter 2 Organization and Planning Requirements: Lessons Drawn from Past Operations | 25

■ observing and reporting

■ reacting

—erect checkpoints

—motorized patrols

—foot patrols

—blocking positions, on and off roads

—intercept

—tactical reinforcement (company/platoon)

■ escorting

■ defense

■ covering actions

■ tactical and general support

■ training

■ maintenance.

Further guidelines usually provided for the

operations will be to keep the operation at the

lowest possible cost with the lowest possible

casualty rate. The guidelines are generally

accomplished through the four following elements:

■ observation and reporting,

■ mobility,

■ reaction and show of force, and

■ protection.

A description of these elements will give a

good picture of the current situation and consequently lead to our ideas about future requirements.

The detection capability today is limited.

Equipment consists mainly of binoculars (day

and night), surveillance radars and thermal vision

equipment. Most of the observations are made

from fixed positions.

It is easy to hide from UN observation posts,

which means reduced UN control. UN checkpoints can easily be “outflanked,” due to the limited UN surveillance capacity. Today we

compensate for the lack of modern equipment

through manpower and, hopefully, being at the

right place at the right time with a patrol. The

cost-to-benefit ratio is very low. Analyses of

reports given also show that the situations are

often misunderstood or—worst case—there are

no reactions at all.

Based on accurate reporting, the UN units and

subunits are supposed to react adequately in the

situation. The UN reaction should also reflect a

balanced use of force and simultaneously avoid

the possibilities of escalation. This requires skills

and a very good understanding of the nature of

peacekeeping and peacekeeping techniques.

Concerning protection, most efforts have been

put into passive means. This is too expensive and

contains too many tactical disadvantages. More

mobile protective ideas create better tactical possibilities and protection for the local population.

ORGANIZATIONAL APPLICATIONS

To specify organizational requirements for future

operations could lead to a colorful picture. However, let’s draw from the above some central

ideas adaptable to modern organizations.

The normal modus operandi of a Security

Council resolution develops into an operational

concept, primarily described by its static

nature—generally a network of positions able to

observe, report, and react.

Changes are needed in the conceptual thinking

that would allow a reduction in manpower (to

make the operation less expensive), and also

increase the operational capability of the force.

These changes call for two main options:

1. Change to a more mobile concept. Where we

have activities between parties, it is advisable

to adjust from the traditional static model to a

semi-mobile concept. This is important for

two main reasons:

a. A mobile concept allows UN troops to patrol

more with a greater presence in villages, farmareas, along roads, in towns etc. This presence

creates better contact between the local population and UN troops resulting in increased

safety for the population and confidence in the

UN operation.

b. Better controls with the belligerents. Knowing

what is going on increases the possibilities of

making the right decisions and reacting adequately to incidents. This again results in

mutual confidence between the UN troops and

the belligerents.
26 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Two main factors must be introduced, namely:

increased communication between the troops and

the population, and impartial behavior.

2. Another method—maybe in combination with

the previous—is to introduce modern military

technology. One method of reducing manpower while also maintaining operational efficiency is to introduce a number of high

technology aids. With proper training, these

would more effectively allow the UN Force to

observe and report activities in its area. At battalion level such equipment could include portable ground surveillance radars and ground

sensors. For the Force as a whole consideration could be given to coastal radars, air surveillance radars, low light level television

(LLTV), thermal vision equipment, ground

sensors (seismic, acoustic, infrared, radio,

laser technology, etc.) with all components

combined into integrated systems. But, there

are limitations on how far the technology can

go.

The balance between moving troops on the

ground and technology is delicate and must favor

the presence of soldiers and the local population’s confidence in the troops. How the organization will look on a piece of paper will vary

with the national organizations and technical and

educational composition of the Force.

So far we have been occupied with examining

organizational requirements based on past and

present models. However, future international

crises and conflicts will probably change in

nature and represent new challenges to the peace

operations and their organizations.

To conclude this part a look into the future

might unveil new elements and organizational

thinking. Some analysts consider the old strategic elements; time, space and capacity to be too

narrow a framework for modern thinking.

Another limiting factor in present thinking is the

concentration on the regional perspective. The

problem—to find a balancing method between

local conflict-solutions and regional ones—is a

basic strategic and tactical challenge for the

future. This change in conceptual thinking can be

examined in light of regional conflicts like the

former Yugoslavia and the central Middle-East.

As we look into the future the basic strategic

elements in any regional conflict would include:

■ ground/sea,

■ air,

■ the ballistic missile sphere, and

■ the environment.

There are also serious problems like genocide

and other grave violations of international laws

and conventions. An expression like “ethnic

cleansing” should be abandoned because it is an

ethnic impossibility.

The first two elements could be called “old”

dimensions. The new elements reflect the need to

deal with the ballistic missile sphere, and environmental problems.

The environmental question must not be

underestimated, in particular the issues of water

and pollution. These are elements that can pose a

threat to one or more nations, and therefore have

security implications. Therefore it is one of the

elements that must be contained in any regional

security mechanism (e.g., the need to protect and

cultivate water resources will lead to either a

high level of cooperation or confrontation among

the region states).

Concerning the ballistic sphere, the last wars

in the Middle East (Iran-Iraq, Kurdistan, Gulf

War) have clearly shown that the traditional strategic concepts are almost obsolete. One important result is—as we approach the 21st century—

that “strategic depth” has little meaning. Medium

and long-range ballistic missiles have turned the

rear areas into the front line. Based on these new

realities, any overall security system must deal

with such ballistic weapons. Arms control and

arms reduction also become vital elements in the

picture.

Security systems that might be put in place

will serve both the local and the regional dimensions:

■ a local mechanism, based on bilateral and even

multilateral arrangements, and
Chapter 2 Organization and Planning Requirements: Lessons Drawn from Past Operations | 27

■ a regional mechanism, based on arrangements

where each nation is put in a regional context.

The first local mechanism serves as a deterrent to possible aggression and surprise attacks.

In this regard, a UN-force could fill a role as a

monitoring force in the mechanism. In addition,

the duties imposed by the regional mechanism

will help enforce activities supporting the peace.

This is because only regional arrangements will

lead to a dismantling of negative or threatening

power structures. And, further on, work toward

disarmament and arms control programs. For

example, a program can be carried out at the

regional level to collect data on military activities and the environmental situation. This data

can be reported to all parties involved, and

thereby ensuring stability.

These kinds of arrangements will have to

employ space satellites and operate in collaboration with the major powers.

Such mechanisms are probably the only way

of ensuring a reasonable level of regional and

national security in an era characterized by space

technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological

threats.

The UN appears to not have both the capability and capacity to operate such mechanisms. It is

therefore another argument to work with the

establishment of a General Staff at a central level

with subordinated regional headquarters.

A vital issue in the force structure is the determination of which weapon systems will characterize the force. In the situation evaluation, the

organizations and weapon systems that the belligerents possess and their ability to use the systems are essential to understand.

On the other hand, the structure of the UN

force decides the belligerents’ reaction to the

UN’s activities in the same way. The force’s

structure itself sends signals to the parties concerned.

The effectiveness of any peace operation necessarily depends on the degree to which the parties concerned are prepared to cooperate with the

force, and the manner in which the commander

and his personnel are able—by tact and firmness—to carry out their mandate.

FORCE STRENGTH

When the decision about force structure has been

made, the Secretary General decides the strength

of the force. Logically, this decision is based on

the mandate and the tasks of the proposed force.

The organization is not filled out without

mentioning the medical component, helicopter

capacity, logistic, and engineering components.

There are additional support functions, such as

humanitarian aid and the essential liaison to the

parties concerned. A highly active liaison unit is

vital in the confidence building activities; their

credibility rests on their integrity.

From ideas concerning the organization, we

now turn to the planning aspects.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

This examination will also point to the interaction between operational planning and force

organization. During the operational planning,

organizational requirements will fall out as part

of the conclusions.

Before going into the planning procedure in

more detail, we need to clarify the interactive

mechanisms between peace operations and

peacemaking activities. The interactions have

three main dimensions: geographical, organizational, and operational. Any changes in one or

more of these fields will cause political and/or

diplomatic reactions—and vice versa.

Theoretically, we agree on the principle that

no military action can be viewed as an end in

itself. A pragmatic analysis of recent conflicts,

and actions tells us this is not 100 percent true.

Military and civilian planners must therefore

recognize and allow for the subordination of military operations to diplomatic and humanitarian

activities and consider the likely effect of such

subordination on military objectives. The political goal or goals constitute the principle criteria

of the military plans.
28 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

REQUIREMENTS

The following applies to many important areas. It

is expressed in general terms and is only meant

as framework for the planning process.

Detailed guidance will always be developed

for each aspect of the operation—both military

and political. Detailed knowledge about the conflict concerned is vital.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The command and control structure derives from

the actual situation. In addition to the military

units’ chain of command, an overall regional

command should be identified (the force HQ)—

all organized into a single chain of command.

Military and civilian elements should be integrated.

A robust, high-performance communication

system must be available before reconnaissance

and deployment is undertaken. Most important is

to create interoperability, common language definitions, common procedures, and common message text formats.

The communications (signal unit) between the

Force Commander and the units should be provided by one nation.

Liaison should be established to the parties

from the earliest possible stage in the establishing process. Liaison and coordination may

require the force to deploy specialists to meet

requirements for translating and interpretation.

These elements are some of the cornerstones of

confidence building measures.

Information and intelligence are also vital elements in peace operations. Liaison is one of the

channels for military information. Consequently, the liaison activities have to be protected. Through intelligently organized liaison,

the force will build its integrity and its confidence. Therefore it is important that the sponsoring nations and organizations do not interfere

with information activities. These information

activities should only involve the force and the

single party of the conflict.

LOGISTICS

For smoothly running logistic services, one

nation should have complete logistic responsibility. The common working language is critical,

both internally for the force and to interface with

the local populace. To the medical units this is

vital, in order to build up the credibility of the

medical services. Civilian hospitals can provide

the higher echelon in the medical organization.

In other fields, it is not recommended to use

civilian contractors. The overall organization of

the logistics must be tailored to each mission.

PUBLIC RELATIONS

An offensive—as opposed to a reactive—relationship with the media is needed (i.e., initiative,

quick communication means, and adoption of

media techniques to control information). However, reliable information is essential. A positive

attitude toward the media will create a constructive atmosphere and lead to a more supportive

role.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

The establishment of standard operational procedures is extremely important. The rules of

engagement, education, training, and exercises,

and the use of force are the central chapters to

emphasize in these procedures. These are unique

for each force and are products of the mission,

the force, and the parties involved in military

actions.

THE LEGAL ASPECTS

The Force Commander should concentrate his

work along three lines:

■ internal, legal, and disciplinary aspects;

■ international law, conventions, and regulations; and

■ legal aspects of the relationship between the

force and the host-nation.
Chapter 2 Organization and Planning Requirements: Lessons Drawn from Past Operations | 29

BUDGET AND FINANCE

Special consideration should be given to the

funding issue, which must be resolved in the

early stages of the planning process. The political

authorities must establish a general policy on the

source of funds for such operations. Operational

commanders with budgetary responsibilities

need to know the policy and, in addition, when

funds will be made available. Due to the dynamic

nature of peace operations, renewal of funds will

probably be approved on a case-by-case basis.

Funding requirements for assets used jointly by

participating states and organizations need to be

resolved as quickly as possible, preferably in

advance.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Tensions, rivalries and conflicts are germinating.

Activities such as terrorism and mass migration

will call for peace keeping, preventive deployment, or humanitarian relief operations.

One of the risks to peace operations is the

reopening of hostilities in defiance of an agreed

cease-fire by one or more of the parties involved.

If peacekeeping forces are deployed in a buffer

zone they face an imminent and direct risk.

Potential crisis areas comprise the full spectrum, from direct hostilities in certain developed

regions to emerging political rivalries in more

remote areas. In general, a mixture of political

instability, economic failure or deadlock, and

over-armament, could influence dormant border

and ethnic disputes or form the basis for undemocratic expansionism.

Technological developments have affected

peace operations and humanitarian activities

considerably. Modern communications allow

direct access to crisis areas. Developments

within surveillance technologies allow continuous supervision of all kinds of terrain, troop

movements, natural resources, etc. in given

areas. All of this creates new challenges for military planners. Forces put into action in peace

operations should be tailored to each mission.

It can be dangerous to generalize from the lessons learned in earlier missions. It will therefore

take extra efforts from the planners to extract the

right elements from earlier missions when new

organizations are made.

However, certain principles can be laid down

as guidelines:

a. deployment of peacekeeping forces is based

on the consent of the parties directly involved;

b. deployment does not imply specific attitudes

toward the conflicting parties’ rights,

demands, or positions; and

c. weapons are only used in self-defense.

To the extent that deployments deviate from

one or more of these principles, the operation

assumes a more enforcing role.2

In practical terms, the more the deviation from

the above principles, the more there will be an

overall increase in requirements for actual combat power and survivability. Survivability is

determined by the unit size, equipment, operational concept, background training, and logistic

support. However, the same elements will also

characterize the force tailored for peace operations. 

The elements of the organization create political signals. Military means and political activities are interactive mechanisms.

The readiness for peace operations are built on

two pillars:

a. the material standards within the deployed

force; and

b. the level of tailored training among officers

and men for that particular peace operation.

“The professionals in violence” must put a lot

of work into peacekeeping techniques. Their professionalism will be measured against the training standard established for this particular job.

Success will be built on credibility and confidence.

2 Reference the United Nations Charters’ Chapters VI and VII.
| 31

3

Case Study: The

Multilateral

Force in The

Sinai

THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVERS

ince 1982, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)

has performed its peacekeeping mission under the 1979

Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, and the 1981

Protocol to the Treaty. The MFO’s uniqueness lies in its

role as a confidence-building measure (CBM) under a definitive

Treaty of Peace. As such, it is not an interim or transitional mission that fits under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The MFO was created by the Protocol to the Treaty, and

reports directly to the two Treaty Parties. It lies outside the

United Nations system, with its own independent international

legal personality pursuant to the Protocol. It has a Headquarters

Agreement with Italy and a network of participation agreements

with 11 troop contributing countries. This bilateral origin has

profound implications as to how Treaty-related confidencebuilding measures are structured, funded, and managed. The

MFO was originally modeled in the field along the lines of

familiar Chapter VI United Nations peacekeeping entities. However, over time the MFO has been free to evolve its own practice

and innovate in the areas of management, operations, logistics,

and finance.

For over 13 years, the MFO has discharged its mission as set

forth in the Treaty of Peace, specifically its Annex I concerning

security arrangements, and the Protocol. The accomplishment of

the MFO mission has been an anchor for the broader regional

peace process, and a potential model. The lessons learned from

the MFO experience are of interest to any future architects of

new peace treaties who contemplate their own, non-UN, confidence building measures. MFO’s successful liaison structure

by

Scott Gudgeon

Deputy DirectorGeneral, Multinational 

Force and Observers 

in the Sinai

S
32 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

grown up between the two formerly warring parties is a model worth copying.

❚ Shared Funding

The success of the MFO mission rests on the

underlying commitment of the Parties to the

peace and support of their own creature the

MFO. The MFO is funded primarily by the two

Treaty Parties themselves; the MFO budget of

$51 million is provided in equal measure by the

three Funds-Contributing States, Egypt, Israel,

and the United States, with smaller financial

donations by Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.

MFO finances are on a pay-as-you go basis

funded by draws against letters of credit or similar arrangements. The Parties have daily oversight, in the field, of what we do and how we do

it. This cost-conscious environment is both

healthy and interactive. As the United States, the

patron and witness of the peace, intended, the

MFO structure has helped to reduce the U.S.

financial burden, and shift the third-party role in

day-to-day support of peacekeeping to MFO

management. Visitors to the MFO have found a

private sector flavor to the MFO management

style, with our annual Trilateral Meeting compared more to a shareholders’ meeting than a

typical diplomatic conference.

The liaison system created by the Protocol has

fostered cooperation, and adjustments to the

Treaty regime consider political, economic, and

other developments. The Treaty and Protocol

mandate is clear, but the drafters could not foresee all the changes and situations the MFO has

faced on the ground over time. Through the liaison system, the drafters provided the mechanism

for necessary adaptation. In itself, it is a model

for regional cooperation.

The credibility of the MFO as an independent

agency has attracted durable participation from

countries that recognize the need for continuity

in support of a confidence building measure

under a permanent Treaty. Troop contributors

currently include Australia (which provides the

present Force Commander), Canada, Colombia,

Fiji, France, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the

United States, and Uruguay. The latter eight

countries have served in MFO uninterruptedly

since 1982; the Parties and MFO owe them a

great debt of gratitude. Hungary is completing

formalities to participate, replacing a contingent

from the Netherlands that served from 1982 until

April of this year. The U.K. was also a participant for the MFO’s first ten years. Support from

participants has included contributions of critical

specialties and, with the U.S., France, and Italy,

key capitol equipment [in the past, Australia and

Canada also contributed capitol equipment]. Previous Force Commanders have come from Norway, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.

❚ Organization

In Treaty Zone C, the MFO operates two main

camps, and 31 remote sites manned by personnel

of three light infantry battalions provided by

Colombia, Fiji, and the United States. These are

supplemented by mobile and foot patrols, and

temporary observation posts. Deployed in the

Strait of Tiran is a Coastal Patrol Unit of three

vessels provided by Italy. A small, 15-person

Civilian Observer Unit (COU) is the specialized

arm of the MFO that alone verifies Treaty compliance in all four of the Treaty Zones. The large

distances of the Sinai are covered by one DHC-6

aircraft provided by France, ten UH-1H helicopters provided by the United States, and the MFO

vehicle fleet. Except for vessels and aircraft, all

equipment is MFO-owned and procured, standardized where possible on one or two manufacturers, and interoperable by our contingents. We

perform many support activities through a U.S.-

based support services contractor, which in turn

subcontracts for labor with an Egyptian services

company. Logistics are done by a mix of soldiers, contractor personnel, and direct hire civilians. Most MFO procurement is by competitive

bidding from commercial sources in Egypt,

Israel, United States, and to a much lesser extent,

other sources. We also procure from the U.S.

Defense Department about 20 percent of our

total requirements, in particular aviation parts
Chapter 3 Case Study: The Multilateral Force in The Sinai | 33

and supplies, medical supplies, and food and

general supplies when cost-effective.

❚ Cost-Conscious Management

The attention of MFO management increasingly

has been directed toward reducing costs. With

the consent of both Treaty Parties and the United

States, coordinated through the annual Trilateral

Meeting, the MFO has steadily cut away at its

overhead, absorbing annual inflationary impacts

and reducing its cost to the contributors. The

MFO budget has declined 31 percent since MFO

FY 89.

Budget reductions have resulted from a number of initiatives. We have reduced personnel at

the Rome Headquarters (currently 25, down 41

percent since FY 89) and military strength at the

Force (currently 1,952, down 17 percent since

FY 90, and down 28 percent since its peak in FY

87). We have not adopted UN financial practices

for peacekeeping and we have arranged troop

contributions at less cost. The MFO has closed

nine of its original remote sites, reduced its aircraft fleet by 50 percent in FY 90, and reduced

the vehicle fleet by 24 percent since FY 88.

Logistical savings have been achieved by reliance on commercial, competitive procurement

(inverting the 80 percent dependence on the U.S.

DoD supply system that the MFO had at its

inception); by applying commercial warehouse

management concepts to stocking and inventory

management; and by reduction in the cost of our

support services contract. The quality of performance of our mission and our support for the

troops has remained high. Since 1986, the MFO

has sought to reduce further the burden on the

three Funds Contributors by seeking, with their

diplomatic support, other financial donors,

resulting in annual contributions by Germany,

Japan, and, last year, Switzerland. These collectively amount to just under $2 million per year.

At the same time, MFO disbursements in the two

Treaty Parties provide about a 60 percent

“return” on their MFO financial contribution,

and, in the U.S., exceed current U.S. “incremental costs” of participation as defined in a recent

study by the General Accounting Office, an arm

of the U.S. Congress.

The flexibility and independence of the

unique MFO management structure and its conscious political insulation, unfettered by quotas,

are two reasons for its successes. They allow

cost-effective innovation with a minimum of

intrusion by national political agendas and the

bureaucracy that hamper change in other environments. Constructive trilateral review of the

MFO has proven to be a continuing feature, with

a declining budget and personnel count as the

result.

The United States plays the combined roles of

troop-contributor, Funds-Contributing State, and

patron and formal witness of the Peace Treaty.

The MFO Director-General, nominated by the

State Department and appointed by the Parties,

embodies, day-to-day, the third-party assistance

implicit in the role of patron and witness in

ensuring the success of the peacekeeping mission. We draw the observers in the MFO’s allcivilian unit from the United States, as a further

reflection of the U.S. role as witness to the peace.

This does not in any way diminish the important

roles of other countries that contribute critical

specialties or equipment. But the MFO could not

have been created from scratch and taken up its

mission without the generous financial, diplomatic and military support provided by the

United States. Creating future MFO-like entities

would also entail the support of one or more key

external diplomatic, financial, and military

patrons to ensure that requirements are met.

Future creations would also require an existing

management structure like the MFO’s or the creation de novo of its analogue.

The MFO will continue to serve the two

Treaty Parties as long as we are called upon by

them to do so. The Governments of Egypt and

Israel, in light of the evolution of the peace process, will define the MFO’s future. They have

agreed that now is the time for stability in the

MFO, and continuity of its structure and participation, as the peace process expands in the face

of the ever-present setbacks and the hostility of

its enemies. Only time will tell if new peace trea-
34 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

ties in the region might produce similar, MFOlike entities to serve the interested parties.

TECHNOLOGY IN THE STRUCTURE OF 

TREATY CBMS

Any consideration of technology as an adjunct to

peacekeeping depends on many factors, including the context, mission, specific monitoring or

other objectives, terrain and environment, and

cost. The architecture of the Egyptian-Israeli

Peace Treaty presumes the development of a

strong, stable, peaceful, and “normal” relationship between the two former combatants. In a

material degree, this has been achieved, although

full normalization is still linked to regional issues

external to the bilateral process. The barometer

of bilateral political relations therefore goes up

and down, but within a band that for the Middle

East is rather normal looking indeed. The discussion of the use of technology for the EgyptianIsraeli Peace Treaty, as it relates to CBMs and to

aids to observation and verification, falls within

the framework of “traditional,” fully consensual

peacekeeping.

The Treaty presumption of development of

positive bilateral relations was bolstered by a

series of CBMs, the MFO being the key thirdparty mechanism. In the sphere of verification of

security arrangements contained in Annex I to

the Treaty, there are three levels of confidencebuilding and security measures, each with its

own technological assumptions.

First, the Parties themselves retain national

capabilities for early warning. These are explicitly recognized in Annex I to the Treaty; the presence of Early Warning Systems is expressly

sanctioned in two of the Treaty Zones in which

the implementation of the Treaty is supervised

by the MFO. The MFO Civilian Observer Unit

routinely calls at these sites in Zones A (in

Egypt) and D (in Israel). The Treaty places no

limitation on their size or capabilities within the

specified Zones, but associated military manning

and protective features fall within the general

military limitations articulated in the security

Annex I of the Treaty. Aerial platforms for

reconnaissance activity are also permitted in

these two Zones. Thus, national means are not

merely assumed, but are woven expressly into

the fabric of security arrangements.

Second, by agreement among Egypt, Israel,

and the United States, U.S. high-altitude surveillance flights periodically take images of the

Treaty Zones, and a narrative report of the interpretation resulting from the raw data is shared

with Egypt, Israel, and the MFO. This activity is

reflected in the Appendix to Annex I to the

Treaty, and in side letters to the Treaty dated

March 26, 1979.

Third, the MFO itself, is, by design, a lowtechnology force and observer unit, relying primarily on visual, on-the-spot verification

throughout the Treaty Zones.

The decision not to endow the MFO with

sophisticated radar, sensor, or other monitoring

assets was conscious. This decision was taken

fully in light of previous experience in the Sinai

with such assets. The U.S.-sponsored Sinai Field

Mission (SFM) from 1976–1980 assisted the two

Parties with monitoring of the strategic Giddi

and Mitla Passes. The SFM used four unattended

ground sensor fields, TV and infrared scanner

technology to supplement human effort in monitoring the passes, which separated Israeli and

Egyptian Forces at that time during the staged

withdrawal process.

There are several relevant factors behind this

decision:

■ Most importantly, the symbolic, political role

of the MFO required a Force size that had

credible political “weight,” a consideration not

directly linked to strict operational or technical

criteria. The operational concept becomes

meshed with the political requirement. From a

technical point of view, there are many possible theoretical variations for accomplishing a

mission like the MFO’s; the drafters of the

Protocol intentionally picked a model that was

manpower- and not technology-intensive.

■ The existence of the technical means discussed above diluted the need to endow the

MFO itself with advanced technology. In par-
Chapter 3 Case Study: The Multilateral Force in The Sinai | 35

ticular, the third-party assistance of the United

States in conducting aerial photographic

reconnaissance provides a synergy with the

MFO. Weaknesses of photographic interpretation, particularly when it comes to counting

personnel, identifying unit affiliations, distinguishing civil from military construction, or

differentiating between certain types of equipment, are well complemented by the strengths

of ground-based observation by the MFO.

■ There were also structural factors. The MFO

covers a large mission area (56,000 km2),

which includes multiple historical access and

invasion routes; the SFM used technology in

the Sinai to monitor only two of these during

its existence. The MFO mandate does not

include security, per se, of the border between

Egypt and Israel. Anti-smuggling and antiterrorist protection of the frontier is the responsibility of Egyptian and Israeli authorities, not the

MFO. There are areas along the border where

sensor equipment is useful to the Parties in

dealing with such intrusions, but the MFO role

regarding unauthorized crossings is an incidental one as we carry out our other functions.

Moreover, the MFO has no focus on particular

plants, facilities, sites, or processes, like those

the subject of UN surveillance equipment in

Iraq, although it does have checkpoints focused

on specific road monitoring.

Technology is present, in a supporting role, in

the MFO. Communications are essential to any

force, and the more so in our large and environmentally hostile mission area; we have redundant

HF (high frequency), VHF (very high frequency), and telephone communications, with all

sites having at least two communications means.

Computers are now as standard in our staff functions as the typewriter used to be. As a safety

feature, global positioning satellite (GPS) systems are installed in our COU vehicles, and on

the French and American aircraft in MFO service. Our remote sites have night vision goggles,

as do our American helicopter aviators. GPS and

marine radar are on our three Italian coastal

patrol unit vessels, and we have had groundbased commercial radar at one site near the Strait

of Tiran. This ground-based radar has proven

costly to maintain for the relatively limited benefit it provides us. It will be turned off and sold,

and we are considering whether we will replace

it with some other equipment. We have basic

mine detection capabilities, since the Sinai is

awash with mines that we must clear from the

areas of our sites and foot patrol/temporary

observation post missions, and that we must dispose of when Bedouin bring unexploded ordnance to our locations, which happens

frequently.

❚ Visual Observation Is Key

But the focus of the MFO mission is on people

and their visual observation, usually assisted by

no more than binoculars. If, for example, our personnel think they observe an aerial intrusion over

the international boundary, successful identification and violation confirmation depends on such

factors as aircraft altitude, speed, heading, and

markings, as our personnel attempt to make

visual recognition and find out if the aircraft has,

in fact, strayed over the boundary. Obviously,

not every sighting will lead to a certain conclusion, but we can still raise with the Parties cases

that do not result in formal Treaty violations.

These kinds of technical limitations reflect the

will of the two Parties, and in context, do not

materially limit the MFO in accomplishing its

mission.

It is our ability, based on our freedom of

access throughout the Treaty Zones, to be physically present and verify any site that is key. This

is the bottom line for any system of verification,

no matter what technology may be usefully

deployed to assist the mission, as it was also for

the SFM.

Our experiences with the equipment we have

has led us to several conclusions. Equipment

must work in the relevant environment. In our

case, heat extremes and sand infiltration constitute the norm; all our equipment must work

under such conditions. There are many, more

significant environmental factors in terms of a

wider use of technology. The SFM, to which I
36 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

have referred, had two hundred “alerts” a day on

its sensors, a good cure for operator boredom.

However, the registrations primarily consisted of

wildlife, illegal economic activity (the Sinai has

been a smuggling and military corridor), aircraft

overflights, Bedouin movements, UN and SFM

members, and authorized personnel of the Parties, including joggers. By contrast, in four years

of monitoring of the two passes, SFM reported

only 90 violations.

Equipment must be user-friendly. Our military personnel are from several different countries, they rotate frequently (maximum tour

lengths are one year, but many serve less than

that), and prior familiarity with our largely commercial equipment may be minimal. Training

requirements, operation, and operator-level

maintenance must be straightforward—the

famous “KISS” (keep it simple, stupid) principle.

Other levels of maintenance must be locally supportable (by the Force itself or local vendors, not

always feasible in a remote location). Hardy,

rather than hypersensitive, equipment is the goal.

The benefit the MFO has derived from using

MFO-owned equipment, standardized in terms of

procurement of parts and maintenance effort, and

interoperable by all our contingents, cannot be

overemphasized.

Given MFO’s inspector-based verification and

our practice, any proposal to add new technology

faces strict scrutiny on operational, financial,

technical and policy grounds. Equipment needs

must be fully justified. The maintenance cost tail

of a procurement decision, as well as the purchase price resulting from competitive bidding,

must be recognized up-front. Vendor warranties

and capabilities to deliver on local servicing

commitments are no less important.

These considerations may seem clinically

obvious, but in practice they are not; sadly, some

of this knowledge comes only with experience,

some of it expensively acquired.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Relentless turnover of military personnel is a

reality in any peacekeeping environment, but it is

a critical operational consideration. The discontinuity it provokes impinges on operational efficiency, and on evaluation of new technological

assets. We combat the effects of this phenomenon on two tracks. One is the emphasis on civilian personnel in key positions at the

Headquarters, at the Force, and in our Cairo and

Tel Aviv offices to provide institutional memory

and seasoned experience to support the military

officers and personnel to whom much of the mission is entrusted. The other is an emphasis on

training to maximize the contribution of military

personnel to the MFO and to ensure a proper

transition of thinking from the arts and science of

war to those of peacekeeping.

The MFO is a well-established mission with a

relatively clear mandate. We have had the time in

place and experience to develop training programs tailored to our particular needs. The principal components have been shared with

participating governments and the UN.

In the face of tours that vary in our three

infantry battalions from 6 to 12 months, and

given the diverse levels of prior training and

experience, MFO training must begin prior to

deployment to be effective.

❚ Predeployment

We have developed a predeployment training

package designed for the three light infantry battalions, with practical skills and suggested drills

to ensure retention and understanding. The training at this stage remains a national responsibility.

The package we provide, aimed at the trainers,

provides basic guides and information, and a

series of lessons. The lessons cover running a

field site, patrolling, observation and recognition

skills, reporting procedures, communications,

survival skills and first aid, explosive ordnance

disposal, cooking, and operation and operatorlevel maintenance of small generators of the type

we have at our remote sites. We encourage units

in predeployment training to put together mock

check points and observation posts, and simulate

situations that cover on-site incident observation

and reporting, and also communication and coordination of response actions staffed through

higher echelons. The transition in thinking and
Chapter 3 Case Study: The Multilateral Force in The Sinai | 37

approach from a defense to a peacekeeping force

begins here, including our rules of engagement,

limitations on our response to situations arising

outside our facilities, and emphasis of the MFO

mission focus: “Observe and Report.” This

entails emphasis as well of the unique elements

of the MFO, as opposed to other peacekeeping

missions, going from the fact that we work

directly for the two interested Parties with their

full support under a definitive Treaty of Peace.

We have to remind soldiers that we have our own

practices, regulations and management philosophy. What works “back home” or in the UN is

not necessarily the way we do it at the MFO.

As part of the package, we provide color posters to assist in recognition of military grades and

ranks, military, police and other license plates,

and aircraft of both Treaty Parties. The posters

are also intended for day-to-day use at remote

sites. More comprehensive picture-book recognition guides are produced for company level use

and above.

The predeployment training package is critiqued by those who have used it, and we intend

to update the package biennially. In time we will

likely make better use of videotaped training

courses.

❚ Deployment

Arrival at the MFO triggers our programs of

basic orientation and hand over. A Newcomer’s

Brief is presented as early as possible to all new

arrivals. It is conducted by the Force Commander

and key staff with briefings on the mission, the

human and natural mission environment, key

functional sections of the staff, unexploded ordnance hazards, and energy and water conservation, followed by a remote site orientation for

staff personnel.

We have a formal hand-over program for each

key staff position, based on a hand-over book,

updated by each incumbent. The hand-over book

provides both general orientation information,

and specific information relevant to the staff job

and function to be assumed, including daily routines, established MFO procedures, required

coordination, and key MFO regulations and

Force orders. The book is intended to lend structure and discipline to personal hand-over and

provide a substitute for that personal contact

when there is no overlap between the departing

member and replacement. Quality over time

frankly varies with the degree of attention given

to updating the materials by the incumbent, and

with command emphasis and review placed on

maintaining and improving these tools. The orientation and hand-over programs apply to military and civilian personnel alike.

All new arrivals receive driver training and

testing. This and other training discussed below

are conducted or coordinated by a small but critical staff element called the Training and Advisory Team provided by New Zealand (NZTAT);

they reflect the MFO commitment to systemic

training, and they do their job superbly.

Driver training and testing for an MFO

driver’s license are required to ensure a common

standard of driving skills among all the contingents, and to sensitize personnel to the rules and

many hazards of the road in the desert. In our

non-hostile situation, our losses of personnel

stem from accidents and carelessness in coping

with a demanding physical environment in particular from not driving safely and at appropriate

speed. The desert is not empty, hazards abound,

and we periodically have fatalities and serious

injuries from avoidable accidents. These are a

tragic waste of young life. We therefore take our

safety training very seriously. We want all our

soldiers to return home safe and sound, enriched

by a rewarding professional experience and having seen at least some of the major tourist destinations in our host countries.

NZTAT trains the trainers; contingent trainers

are prepared by NZTAT to conduct the actual

training in a four-day course. To qualify, trainees

must pass a written test, a practical driving

assessment, and an in-cab test of instructional

skills. Once qualified, trainers conduct both initial training leading to the MFO license test, and

continuation training. When they determine that

drivers are ready for MFO license testing, for

reasons of standardization, NZTAT conducts the
38 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

test and decides if a license will be issued. For

persons who will be designated contingent drivers, there is a special 2-day defensive driver’s

course emphasizing driver attitudes, car control,

and road hazard prediction and identification.

There is also a special course for, and assessment

of, drivers who will be assigned to drive MFO

buses. Follow-up by NZTAT includes driver

components of the semiannual Force Skills Competition, quarterly snap driver tests, snap vehicle

inspections, technical advice when accidents

occur, and collaboration with the Force Safety

Officer.

NZTAT also conducts a critical remote Site

Commander’s Course, a four-day preparation of

site commanders for duty at our observation

posts and checkpoints. The course reviews operations, observation and recognition responsibilities, and site maintenance. Other specialized

courses address training for the range officers,

duty investigators who assist the Force Commander in on-site investigation of possible

Treaty incidents, and quick reaction units at each

camp.

❚ Ongoing Training

Continuing training is provided throughout tours

of duty with the MFO. Battalion training in MFO

skills, primarily a contingent responsibility, is

ongoing. Validation of the success of this training is a NZTAT responsibility, conducted by

means of quarterly operational readiness checks

of each infantry battalion to review standards of

remote site personnel in key skills areas. The

Force Commander also has a site inspection program that semiannually evaluates performance

and conditions at each of the remote sites. Afteraction analysis with relevant personnel of what

went right and what went wrong in actual Treaty

incident cases, in terms of observation, reporting,

and follow-up, is a standard feature. There are

periodic training exercises such as mass casualty

and medevac (medical evacuation) drills,

assisted by NZTAT, and, as noted, reinforcement

of driver safety. We seek feedback from contingents on the successful and weak points of all of

our training efforts.

National training is not interrupted during the

period of MFO deployment. Except for missionimposed operational limitations (for example, no

parachute jump training or large unit exercises),

basic skills are maintained. The MFO experience

provides many positive adjuncts. Infantry battalion operations, with the emphasis on remote site

missions, allow the consolidation of small unit

skills, and development of junior officer and

non-commissioned officer leadership proficiency. Valuable peacekeeping skills, learned in

a model, “textbook” environment, are taken

home. While many militaries face doctrinal,

manpower and financial challenges in integrating

peacekeeping business, it is a reality that the

business is growing. The inventory of peacekeeping skills to which the MFO contributes is

one of the pay-backs of MFO service.

❚ Civilian Observer Unit Training

Specialized training for the 15-person Civilian

Observer Unit (COU) is provided by the Unit

itself. Approximately one-half of the complement of this Unit consists of officers seconded

from U.S. foreign affairs agencies, most of them

serving on one year tours. The other half of the

Unit, recruited directly by the MFO, consists of

seasoned ex-military veterans who typically stay

in the COU far longer. Just as these observers are

the continuing institutional memory of the COU,

they also train the new class of seconded foreign

affairs agency personnel as quickly as possible to

conduct MFO missions. The COU program

emphasizes recognition and observation skills,

knowledge of the Treaty and the operations area,

map reading and navigation skills, radio procedures, COU practice and conventions, and

awareness of environmental hazards. Each new

observer is assigned a more senior observer as

mentor reinforcing classroom training in the

field, to instruct new personnel on detailed characteristics of each of the COU mission areas, and

to participate in evaluation and eventual “team

leader” qualification of new personnel.
Chapter 3 Case Study: The Multilateral Force in The Sinai | 39

In the face of a revolving work force, the

MFO emphasizes its hand-over and training program to promote standardized required skills

across our diverse contingents, and to communicate effectively who we are, what we do, and

how we do it. At the heart of the program is the

use of our own resources to train the trainers,

provide key materials and technical assistance,

and perform systemic evaluations to validate the

results of MFO and contingent training. We

believe we have been successful in developing

and standardizing the core skills required for the

mission, but the challenge recurs with touchdown of each new rotation.
| 41

4

Extended Peacekeeping:

Planning and Technical

Requirements: Lessons

from Recent Operations

INTRODUCTION

apidly losing interest in their global confrontation, in

the late 1980s the two superpowers handed over a number

of old regional conflicts to the United Nations for management or resolution. In cases such as Namibia-Angola, Cambodia, the Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the world

organization appeared up to that expanded role and in fact created

increasing expectations about its ability to deal with important crises

whenever they would appear. Free from their relationship with two

competing global subsystems, most such conflicts—and new ones,

such as Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda—revealed the underlying

and hard-to-deal-with nature of civil and ethnic strife.

Responding to the new pressure for intervention, the dimension and functions of the UN peacekeeping forces expanded

enormously. The number of UN personnel (mostly military)

brought into Cambodia starting in 1991, was close to 20,000. In

1993 the UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) included more

than 30,000 people. Even larger was the total force deployed in

three republics of former Yugoslavia—Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia—beginning in 1992.1

The UN operations became increasingly multidimensional in

character and came to be carried out in ever more complex operational environments (compared with past peacekeeping operations). The list of tasks performed expanded to include, besides

the most traditional one of separation of forces, also electoral

support, humanitarian assistance and movement of refugees and

displaced persons; mine clearance; observation and verification

of cease-fire agreements; foreign troop withdrawal; preventive

deployments; demobilization of forces; collection, custody and

by

Mario Zucconi

Center for International 

Political Studies, CESPI, 

Rome, and University of 

Urbino, Urbino, Italy

R
42 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

destruction1 of weapons; and disarming paramilitary forces, private, and irregular units.2

 As indicated in the following pages the lists of tasks

further expanded with the international interventions in former Yugoslavia and in Somalia.

Responding to the pressure that the United

Nations must manage or solve complex crises,

the UN Security Council has increasingly authorized, in recent operations, the use of military

force to achieve different humanitarian or political goals. Depending on the environments, the

results are different. However, most notably in

former Yugoslavia, the difficulty of mixing the

humanitarian operation on the ground with limited elements of peace-enforcement has come

dramatically to the surface.

The expanded role of the UN has also produced a wealth of analyses and proposals that

argue for the international community to be

given broader rights to intervene in the internal

affairs of troubled states. Many analyses suggest

ways to enhance the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping missions, and ways to adapt the organizational structure of the UN—and of the

Secretariat in particular—to the new demand. A

sort of taxonomy has been adopted in the writings of UN staff and scholars classifying the different peace-support operations of the UN on the

basis of its broader objectives. Successes and

failures of different UN operations were then

explained on the basis of such typology.

Much of the analyses contributed importantly

to clarify the conditions and the environment for

UN peace-support operations. And of course

1 The deployment figures given here for recent operations are approximate figures of actual forces deployment. The strength of the force

deployed changes in long–lasting operations. Authorized strength was different in most cases. And in cases such as UNOSOM II, the large

UN contingent had some U.S. military personnel in it and was closely supported by other U.S. forces. In comparison with those recent operations, older ones required much smaller peacekeeping contingents. The Cyprus UN operation, started in 1964, included about 2,200 people,

and 1,100 military personnel were deployed in the Golan Heights after the Golan Agreement of 1974. In the 1980s there was a UN force of

5,600 people in Lebanon, and one of about 6,000 people in Namibia. An exceptional case during the Cold War was the Congo UN operation

in the early 1960s, involving almost 20,000 people. See The Blue Helmets (New York, United Nations, 1990); Joseph Preston Baratta, International Peacekeeping: History and Strengthening (Washington, D.C., Center for U.N. Reform Education, November 1989); UNDPI,

“Background Note: United Nations Peace–Keeping Operations” (January 1993); Bo Huldt, “Working Multilaterally: The Old Peacekeepers’

Viewpoint," in Donald C.F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1995). 2 See Mats R. Berdal, Adelphi paper 281: Whither UN Peacekeeping? (Brassey’s for The International Institute for Strategic Studies,

London, October 1993), pp. 11–ff; Paul F. Diehl, International Peacekeeping (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), especially Ch. 6.

improvements in the organizational structures

and organizational capabilities of the UN were

and are very much needed. However, those analyses and proposals also risk feeding the illusion

that the issue is essentially technical in character,

that there existed the analytic and doctrinal capability to define the path to the achievement of

most objectives. They contribute to legitimize a

political conception of the United Nations as an

organization responsible for and capable of—

beyond its establishing the legitimacy of a given

position—“policing” the world.

By looking at the international interventions

in Somalia and in former Yugoslavia, the present

essay focuses on the genesis of and conditioning

present in recent UN operations. Its aim is to

clarify the reasons for the difficulties in which

the United Nations has found itself in such operations.

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE–

ENFORCEMENT

As further clarified in another chapter of the

present volume, the first thing the commanders

of UN forces need is a clear and achievable mandate for their mission.3 The mandate determines

the appropriate military doctrine. The doctrine

employed is essential for the operation on the

ground: it shapes the organization, training and

force equipment. Those leading UN peace operations know precisely what they can achieve with

the kind of forces at their disposal. However, the

mandate for the forces is what has become

increasingly confused in recent UN operations.

3 See paper by John O.B. Sewall in this report.
Chapter 4 Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations | 43

The then UN Under Secretary General for

Special Political Affairs, Sir Brian Urquhart,

warned in early 1990 about the need to maintain

the classical conditions for peacekeeping missions:

■ impartiality, and consent of all parties

involved,

■ a clear and practicable mandate,

■ and the non-use of force except for selfdefense.4

These were the classical conditions of UN

“holding operations,” carried out by UN troops

interposed between the combatants while a solution to the conflict was negotiated.

Inevitably, in the context of the enormously

expanded responsibilities of the UN, those criteria were bound to be eroded. Boutros BoutrosGhali’s Agenda for Peace (early 1992) first

blurred important definitions. While recommending a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations, and

separating the role of the UN Military Staff

Committee from peacekeeping, he still came to

the conclusion that “there may not be a dividing

line between peacemaking (a concept in which

he included peace-enforcement) and peacekeeping.”

We are clearly, with “An Agenda for Peace,”

in the post-“Gulf operation” era. And in fact

Boutros-Ghali went on defining the requirements

for peace-enforcement missions (to respond to

acts of “outright aggression”) and advocating the

implementation of Article 43 of the UN Charter,

that is the creation of UN permanent armed

forces available to “dete[r] breaches of the

peace.” On the same line of thinking, in 1993 he

began to promote and articulate the idea of a

standby force structurse for the United Nations,

“able to be deployed ... anywhere in the world, at

the Secretary General’s request.”5

Important, recent analyses are critical of that

stretching of the confines of the peacekeeping

4 “Beyond The Sheriff’s Posse,” Survival, May–June 1990. 5 Briefing by Colonel Gerard Gambiez, at the United Nations, April 14, 1994.

operations. To former UN Assistant SecretaryGeneral Giandomenico Picco the intrusion of the

Secretary-General into the peace-enforcement

domain has compromised the most important and

successful functions of that institution—based,

as they need to be on absolute impartiality.6

 The

author of the British Army Peacekeeping manual, Charles Dobbie, concludes, in a recent article, that “peacekeeping and peace-enforcement

are... separate and mutually exclusive activities

that cannot be mixed.”7 While it is easy to share

such criticism, it is also important to find out the

reasons for the more ambitious, present disposition of the UN and of its Secretary General. The

Somali and Yugoslav experiences may be particularly illustrative in this respect.

INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION IN 

SOMALIA

Starting with the first deployment of UN military

observers, there were three phases of the UN and

multinational military intervention in Somalia.

After a small contingent of military observers

had been deployed in Somalia (decided upon in

March, carried out in July 1992), with its Resolution 751 (April 24, 1992) the UN Security Council decided to establish a UN Operation in

Somalia (UNOSOM). In August the UN Secretary General proposed the deployment of 500

more security personnel in the capital Mogadishu. Eventually this first phase of the UNOSOM

will include over 4,200 individuals in different

capacities.

When the UN Secretary General, BoutrosGhali, asked for the deployment of the 500

peacekeepers in the capital, he clarified that such

deployment had the consent of the main faction

leaders. Already in this phase, however, the mandate of the UN forces begun to expand. In July,

the Secretary General suggested that the UN

needed to “adapt” its involvement in Somalia.

Besides charging the UNOSOM with the task of

6 “The UN and the Use of Force. Leave the Secretary–General Out of It,” Foreign Affairs, September–October 1994. 7 “A Concept for Post–Cold War Peacekeeping”, Survival, Autumn 1994.
44 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

protecting the humanitarian convoys and distribution centers, Boutros-Ghali in August was also

asking that the UN forces establish a “preventive

zone” on the Kenya-Somali border.8

The second phase was brought about by the

worsening situation in Somalia and was characterized by the decision of the United States to

intervene in the region. The offer made by then

Acting Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, to the UN Secretary General on November

25, 1992 brought the creation of a Unified Task

Force (UNITAF), the first elements of which

reached Mogadishu on 9 December.9

Led by a United States commander, General

Robert Johnston, UNITAF’s main objective was

to establish a secure environment for the delivery

of humanitarian assistance. Once this task was

accomplished, the military command of the international force was to be turned over to the United

Nations. There was an open and rather noisy disagreement about the scope of the mission UNITAF was to carry out, with Washington wishing

to keep it well defined and limited. The UN Secretary General, in contrast, maintained that

Washington had committed itself originally to

disarm the warring factions.10 When fully

deployed, UNITAF was composed of about

37,000 troops from 24 countries, deployed in the

capital and Southern and Central Somalia. The

United States contingent was over 20,000 strong.

The next phase began on May 4, 1993 with the

transfer of the military command. On March 3

the UN Secretary General had advised the Security Council (SC) that such steps be taken.11 In

the same letter the Secretary General defined the

mandate for UNOSOM II in a never-seen-before

long list of tasks. The SC acted on those propos8 UN documents S/24343, S/24480.

9 UNSC Resolution 794, December 3, 1992. The Resolution, “[w]elcomes the offer by a Member State... concerning the establishment of

an operation to create [a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia], and, [a]cting under Chapter VII of the Charter of

the United Nations, authorizes the Secretary–General and Member States cooperating to implement the [above mentioned] offer... to use all

necessary means” to assure the conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid. 10 The UN Secretary General recommended, in a report presented to the Security Council in late December (S/24992), that the Council

defer its decision on the transition from the United States to the UNOSOM II, and wait for the establishment of a cease–fire, the control of

heavy weapons, the disarming of the gang and the formation of a new police force. Washington wanted the UN to take over on January 22,

1993. 11 UN document S/25354.

als and adopted Resolution 814 on March 26,

1993.

Subsequently, the Secretary General appointed

a United States retired admiral, with good connections in Washington, Jonathan T. Howe, as his

new Special Representative for Somalia, and a

Turkish general, Cevik Bir as Force Commander

of UNOSOM II.

The originally authorized strength of UNOSOM II was approximately 28,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilian staff. In addition, there

were about 17,700 troops in the U.S. Joint Task

Force in Somalia, including the Quick Reaction

Force deployed in support of UNOSOM II. The

total number of countries participating in the

force was 29. An important feature of this phase

of the intervention is that the U.S. forces were

not under the operational command of General

Bir. However, the commander of the U.S. forces,

General Thomas Montgomery, was also the deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM.

❚ Too Little and Too Much Force, and the 

Expectations Created by the U.S. 

Intervention

A specific feature of the international operation

in Somalia is the high level of force employed

almost from the beginning. The rule of consent

of the contending parties was applied only at the

very beginning, in phase one. Unquestionably

there was a problem of general anarchy and of

lack of interlocutors. However the high level of

force used has also to do with the conditioning

created by the participation of individual countries, beginning with the United States, and with

the pressure on the United Nations to stretch its

capabilities.
Chapter 4 Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations | 45

Moreover, the character of the operation and

the level of risk for all international forces

appears to have changed dramatically with the

decision to single out General Aidid (Mohammed Farah Assan) as the enemy. While force

before had been used mostly against independent

armed bands, such decision made UNSOM side

with one and against the other of the two main

factions fighting for the control of the capital.

How deeply such a decision affected the environment in which the international forces operated was shown by the ambushes in which first a

group of Pakistani peacekeepers fell on June 5,

and the resulting 25 killed with more than 50

wounded. The response authorized by the Security Council only further characterized the UN

operation as a war against General Aidid.12

If the commanding officers of the Italian contingent had hoped to escape the difficulties of

this phase, especially in Mogadishu, because of

the dialogue they had established with the different parties, their hope was shattered on July 2,

when three Italian peacekeepers were killed in

another large–scale battle, and the Italian contingent had to abandon an important checkpoint in

the city it had manned for some time. Then came

the turn of the U.S. forces. When U.S. Rangers

(in coordination with the UN command), on

October 3 and 4, launched an operation in Southern Mogadishu aimed at capturing some of

Aidid’s men, they encountered a fierce resistance

that resulted in the downing of five United States

helicopters and the deaths of 18 men. The hatred

treatment to which the dead bodies were subjected reached the American homes through the

TV screen and was decisive in bringing President

Clinton to set a deadline for the withdrawal of

the U.S. troops. In the remaining months of its

presence there, the American contingent drastically lowered its profile in the attempt to contain

the number of possible casualties.

12 UNSC Resolution 837, June 6, 1993.

Expectedly the increased level of danger

brought to the fore conflicting viewpoints and

controversy about the chain of command. Most

acutely the controversy flared between the UN

command and that of the Italian force (ITALFOR). ITALFOR leaders vented out their frustration by accusing the Americans of using needless

force.13 Aidid on his part made clear, after the

killing of the Italian soldiers, that he had intentionally punished the Italians for their increased

alignment with Admiral Howe’s policies.14 The

incident grew worse out of the demand by the

UN command that the Italians reconquer the

checkpoint they had abandoned—and out of the

explicit invitation of Italian Defense Minister

Fabio Fabbri telling ITALFOR Commander,

General Bruno Loi, to disregard the UN demand.

When the Italian command instead negotiated

a return of the UN troops to the checkpoint, that

negotiation was harshly criticized by the UNOSOM commanders. And when the U.S. Quick

Reaction Force unleashed its Cobra helicopters

against militia men and leaders of Aidid faction

(killing 70 people), and the enraged population in

South Mogadishu stoned and clubbed to death 4

journalists and photographers who were covering

the incident. The Italian Council of Ministers

went as far as to issue a declaration of disassociation from the UNOSOM operation.

These harsh exchanges often found extra fuel

in stories and second hand information run by

some newspapers and magazines. On the other

side, in an article aptly titled “Machiavelli vs.

Rambo” the New York Times suggested that the

policy of dialogue and compromise attempted by

the Italians seemed in the end more productive

than the offensive tactics of the American forces

and of the UN command.15 After the first American casualties, at the end of September, United

States President Bill Clinton abandoned the

aggressive policy supported up to that point.

And, notwithstanding the strong reaction by the

13 See, for instance, General Loi’s interview in La Stampa, June 17, 1993. 14 See his interview with Famiglia Cristiana, July 14, 1993. 15 July 20, 1994.
46 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

UN Secretary General, after the incidents of

October 3 and 4, the President set the deadline

for the withdrawal of the American contingent

and announced that the U.S. forces were no

longer going to wage a “personal” war directed

at General Aidid.

In retrospect, it appears that force employed in

Somalia was too little and too much at the same

time.16 It was too little for the task set out by the

UN Security Council of disarming the warring

factions and of disposing of General Aidid.

Therefore it was too much, and somewhat counterproductive, for an operation supporting

humanitarian objectives, or if a strategy of negotiation and compromise was the necessary way to

approach the situation in Somalia.

There have been attempts to precisely characterize the international intervention in Somalia.

Some observers have pointed out that it was

“peace-making,” rather than “peace-keeping....”

UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros–Ghali

chose to qualify it as “peace-enforcing.” But,

more than the category in which to box the

Somali operation, it is important to explain the

ineffective—and in the end counterproductive—

use that was made of military force there.

The American administration’s decision to

intervene in Somalia is central to such explanation. Washington had its political reasons (both

domestic and international), in late November

1992, for staging a large-scale operation to support humanitarian relief in that country. And the

offer made by Eagleburger was hard to pass up

for the UN Secretary General due to the pressure

he felt to deal effectively with the issue. From a

UN perspective, the UNITAF operation initiated

a phase of “subcontracting” UN operations to

individual powers or multinational forces. (There

were parallel talks with NATO, at the time, about

possible forms of military intervention by the

Atlantic allies in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)

In his letter to the Security Council of 29

November 1992, Boutros-Ghali outlined, for the

16 Such observation was offered, in an interview with me, by a senior Italian foreign service official who had been involved with the Italian operation in Somalia.

Council consideration, five options for creating

conditions for the delivery of humanitarian aid

inside Somalia. If a country-wide show of force

(rather than an operation limited to the capital)

was the preferred option, it was impossible for

the United Nations to carry out such missions

because, the Secretary General noticed, the UN

did not have the capability of command and control for an operation of the size required. The last

option, that, based on Washington’s offer, the

UN authorizes a group of member states to carry

out such operation, was the one that BoutrosGhali advised the Council to choose.17

Most relevant, once more, was that it was a

United States-led operation. It was, in other

words, a small-scale “Gulf” operation, with other

countries joining the United States. The fact that

the American commander, General Robert

Johnston, had been the deputy commander in the

Gulf war, further enhanced his authority and the

willingness of other national contingents to be

led. Like in the Gulf, there was a main actor on

the stage and a number of minor interpreters

around him. And the expectations with regards to

the solution of the ugly Somali problems grew

accordingly—results here expected to be Gulfstyle, decisive.

However, in contrast with the Gulf crisis

(where the United States took early action and

then obtained UN authorization), in Somalia the

United States took over an operation already initiated by the UN. And the United States intervention suggested to the UN Secretary General the

possibility of setting more ambitious objectives.

The option he advised the Security Council to

choose, was also the one containing the most

ambitious objectives. Indeed, rather than the executer being the variable and the objectives the

constant, it was the other way around, that is to

say the objectives were defined on the basis of

the United States being the executer. Only the

United States could achieve those goals. And, as

I have already indicated, the UN Secretary General kept putting pressure on the United States

17 UN document S/24868. As a consequence, the SC adopted Resolution 794, on December 3, quoted in footnote 9, above.
Chapter 4 Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations | 47

for acting more forcefully and moving to disarm

the warring factions.

If phase two (UNITAF) of the international

intervention in Somalia had been a small “Gulf”

operation, phase three (UNOSOM II) did not

have one of the positive features of such operation—especially tight command and control, and

the weight that carried the United States leadership—while it received a lot of negative conditioning from it. The attempt by the UN Secretary

General to maintain much of the same character

to the operation by putting Admiral Howe at its

head, made some foreseeable, emerging problems only sharper.

In his report to the Security Council concerning the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II,

Boutros-Ghalialso laid out in detail the possible

mandate for the new UN operation.18 UNOSOM

II would attempt to bring to completion, through

disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun

by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. Among specific military tasks,

UNOSOM was to monitor the cessation of hostilities, preventing the resumption of violence

also by taking action, when necessary, against

factions violating the cessation of the hostilities,

seizing small arms and maintaining control of

heavy weapons, securing and maintaining the

security of ports, airports, and lines of communications needed for the delivery of humanitarian

assistance.

The report also contained overambitious goals

of nation-building: UNOSOM II would help the

Somali people to rebuild their economy and

social and political life, to restore the country’s

institutions and the Somali State. It was more

than UNITAF had set out to achieve. At the same

time the individuals under the UN commander

were fewer and less well coordinated than in the

previous phase.

THE UNITED NATIONS IN FORMER 

YUGOSLAVIA

The United Nations first entered former Yugoslavia under what could be considered classical

UN-peacekeeping conditions. UNSC Resolu18 UN document S/25354, March 3, 1993.

tions 743 and 749 (February 21 and April 7,

1992) established and authorized full deployment of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

to consolidate the cease-fire in Croatia and

assure the demilitarization of a number of designated UN “protected areas” there (areas with

large Serb population).

Already envisioned by UNSC Resolution 721

of November 27, 1991, the peacekeeping operation was made conditional to the compliance by

all warring parties of the Geneva cease-fire

agreement earlier negotiated by the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance.

Before he finally recommended to the Security

Council the establishment of the force in midFebruary, the Secretary General had reported on

a number of occasions that the necessary conditions for its establishment did not exist.

The original mandate was then enlarged a

number of times (UNSC Resolutions 762, 769

and 779)—both to expand the areas under UN

control and to solidify the control of those areas.

However those tasks were established and carried out always in a context of consent at least by

the main contending parties. The same applies to

UNSC Resolution 758, of June 8, 1992, that

enlarged the UNPROFOR’s mandate to BosniaHerzegovina. The Resolution was adopted after

the Secretary General reported that UN personnel had negotiated an agreement for the handing

over to the UN of the airport in Sarajevo.

In the context of the Yugoslav conflict it is

impossible to precisely define the conditions for

consent. The “consent” to open the Sarajevo airport to humanitarian flights in mid-1992 was

obtained through strong pressures by different

Western capitals, the European Community (EC)

and other international organizations. Different

means of influence were brought to bear on the

Bosnian Serbs. And in the following years, that

airport would stay open only intermittently.

Moreover, the consent was not always negotiated
48 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

with the individual armed groups controlling a

specific territory.19

Finally, even if the intervention is clearly

defined as a humanitarian mission, the limits of

such a mission are very difficult to establish. In

Bosnia-Herzegovina, the early mandate of protecting the humanitarian convoys organized by

the UN High Commissioner of Refugees and

other organizations broadened with time to

include a multiplicity of tasks related to such an

objective and to the need to protect civilians:

silencing of sniper fire, taking control of heavy

weapons to stop the shelling of cities, and protecting six Security Council-designated “safe

areas.”20 However, when it decided on the specific measures to make possible delivery of

humanitarian aid or took initiatives such as the

creation of the “safe areas” to protect the Muslim

population against “ethnic cleansing,” the Security Council necessarily entered the fray, challenging and resisting the policies of one or more

of the contending parties.

If keeping a humanitarian mission within the

consent confines is already difficult, the character of the intervention changes profoundly when

the Security Council decides to authorize the

use—however selective—of force to reach its

goals. In the case of former Yugoslavia it was the

pressure from the Western European and American publics—in the face of ineffective international action and terribly upsetting news

reports—that kept pushing those already hard-todefine boundaries of the humanitarian mission

toward an increasingly assertive use of military

force and the attempt to redress the balance of

forces on the ground.

Because of that pressure of the public and

because Washington, after a long period of

abstention, decided to participate in the international response to the crisis, NATO first made

19 Henry Wynaendts in L’engranage. Croniques yougoslaves. Juillet 1991–août 1992 (Paris, Editions Donoel, 1993) chronicles the

painstaking negotiations carried out as representative of the EC Presidency with individual military commanders in Croatia to obtain their

agreement to the terms of different cease–fires. 20 On the broad range of tasks connected with “humanitarian” operations in the recent UN experience see Larry Minear and Thomas G.

Weiss, Mercy Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community (Boulder, Westview Press, 1995).

itself available in support of CSCE and UN operations in June 1992. Washington selected NATO

as the most suitable channel for its positions and

objectives. And in the following years, Washington would be the main thrust behind the escalatory intervention of the Western alliance, in

particular from August 1993 (when NATO intervened to stop the strangulation of Sarajevo) on.

NATO participation in the international

response necessarily changed the character of

that response and of the UN operations in particular. In fact the environment for the UN humanitarian operation always remained very uncertain

despite commitments undertaken by all the parties at the London Conference of August 1992.

Moreover, even when considered in isolation, the

very availability of NATO tended to lower the

threshold of the conditions considered necessary

for successful implementation of peacekeeping

and humanitarian operations. Thus, for instance,

in March 1994, after the show of international

resolve that followed the Sarajevo market-place

massacre, UN officers promised a more “muscular” approach and the decision was taken to send

a relief convoy to the Muslim enclave of Maglaj

in central Bosnia, with the assistance of NATO

aircraft circling overhead. The town had been

under Serb siege and shelling for months and

subsisting on supplies dropped from the air.21

In general, the availability of NATO air power

afforded the international intervention the possibility of pursuing broader objectives and thus

responding to the increasing pressures of the

Western publics on governments. It offered the

only possibility for enforcing a tangle of Security

Council’s decisions poorly coordinated and in

most cases unenforceable. NATO took over

operations that the UN by itself could not carry

out. The enforcement of the “no-fly-zone” is a

case in point.

21 For a chronicle of the Western intervention see Mario Zucconi, “The former Yugoslavia: Lessons of war and diplomacy,” SIRPI Yearbook 1995 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995).
Chapter 4 Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations | 49

UNSC Resolutions 781 and 786 (October 9

and November 10, 1992) established a ban on

military flight in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina and mandated the monitoring of the ban

to UNPROFOR. NATO took over the enforcement of the ban after a report of the UN Secretariat listing 465 violations (including planes that

bombed Bosnian villages) prompted UNSC Resolution 816 (March 31, 1993). The Resolution

called on member states to take “all necessary

measures... in the event of further violation.”

NATO’s “Deny Flight” operation started April

12, 1993. The Serb planes downed on February

28, 1994 were the first fixed-wing aircraft to violate the ban since the start of the allied operation.

The same can be said of the “safe areas.”

When established by the Security Council (Resolutions 819 and 824 of April 16 and May 6,

1993), the UN Secretary General estimated that

34,000 troops were necessary to enforce the decision. Later the UN commander of the time lowered the requirement to some 900 peacekeeper

for each of five such areas, and a larger number

for Sarajevo. However, such force—possibly

capable of preventing a Serb attempt to take over

those areas—was never deployed (in Gorazde, at

the beginning of the April 1994 Serb attack, the

UN had only four observers). And the continued

Serb pressure on those areas put the few UN

troops there in danger.

Therefore, with Resolution 836 of June 4,

1993 the UNSC greatly expanded the mandate of

UNPROFOR—authorized now to reply to the

bombardment and to respond to the obstruction

to the freedom of movement of its personnel or

of the humanitarian convoys. In that context, it

also decided that “Member States...may take,

under the authority of the Security Council and

subject to close coordination with the SecretaryGeneral and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power... to support

UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate.”

On that basis, NATO’s “Close air support” operation was decided at the Athens Atlantic Council

of June 10, 1993 and launched beginning in late

July.

The character of the international response

changed most sharply when the Atlantic alliance

was itself the proponent of specific operations.

Such was the case of threats of air strikes in

August 1993, of the ultimata and the establishment of “exclusion zones” around Sarajevo and

Gorazde, and finally of the air strikes conducted

in response to the attack against Bihac in late

1994. Such initiatives followed requests of the

UN Secretary General or authorization by the

Security Council. However, even more clearly

than when NATO played a supporting role of

UN operations, in these cases the allied intervention was directed against one of the parties in

conflict and weighted in the balance of forces

among them.

PEACEKEEPING ON THE GROUND, 

PEACE-ENFORCEMENT FROM THE AIR

More than in other multilateral interventions in

regional crises, the response to the conflict in

Bosnia-Herzegovina has brought to the fore the

possible contrast between UN-managed operations on the ground and concurrent broader initiatives of the Security Council—between the

attempt to carry out a humanitarian operation on

the ground while peace-enforcement comes from

the air. And, more generally, the fundamental

lesson of former Yugoslavia may reside in the

outright contradiction that emerges in complex

operations carried out under the UN banner and

implying the application of increasing—but still

limited—levels of force.

Consent and coercion cannot be mixed. The

humanitarian operation on the ground needs the

consent of the warring parties to be carried out,

and that consent tends to be taken away by the

party that becomes the target of other initiatives

of the Security Council or of NATO itself.

Indeed the operation on the ground may

become—as it became in Bosnia-Herzegovina—

a hostage in the hands of those trying to defend

themselves from attacks from outside.

To the UN authorities in charge of the operation on the ground, threatening or resorting to the

air strikes was, at most, one of the instruments
50 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

they had at their disposal in a difficult, unceasing

negotiation mostly with the Bosnian Serbs aimed

at gaining their assent, case by case, to specific

humanitarian initiatives (the general reference

framework of the London Conference was never

effective).

To those using coercive force, that is to the

NATO authorities, basic conditions for their

involvement were consistency and credibility.

That was stressed on a number of occasions by

NATO Secretary General Woerner. Credibility

needed to be maintained if the Alliance’s participation in the Bosnian operations was to be effective.22 And force, as already mentioned, in many

cases was used in the attempt to influence the

evolution of the conflict itself, or as a way to

control the violence. The two positions were

moving from different premises. The quarrel that

in fact ensued between the UN and NATO about

when to intervene (and the consequent blaming

of each other for ineffective action) was, to a

large extent, unavoidable.

Significantly, there were fewer problems in

those operations in which the implementation—

and the decision on when to act—was left

entirely in the hands of NATO. Both “Deny

Flight” and the Adriatic Sea operations could be

considered cases of UN “subcontracting” to the

Atlantic allies. Much more complex, instead, and

beset with the difficulties indicated above, were

those combined operations where NATO air

power was used both to protect UNPROFOR

personnel and to respond to violations of UN

decisions and NATO ultimata. The problems

here were threefold: who gives the order to

attack, how and how expeditiously the order

reaches those who carry it out, and the problem

of consistency and credibility, that is of consistently carrying out punishment in case of violation. Leaving aside some technical problems

related to the transmission of information and

command, those problems were in fact all related

to one: the decision of when to strike. This is the

22 Nouvelles Atlantiques, vol. 28, no. 2602, 2 March 1994, pp. 1–2).

issue on which the two organizations tended to

diverge.

CONCLUSIONS

The international interventions in Somalia and in

former Yugoslavia differ in many respects—but

also point to the same problem related to the

decision to use considerable amounts of force,

but still not overwhelming force. The mix of

operations under conditions of consent and of

coercion is simply impossible.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the use of force—and

NATO’s participation—introduced its own logic

and requirements in the international response to

the conflict, while, as already noted, the United

Nations strived to keep the use of force subordinated to the operation and needs on the ground.

The UN authorities in Bosnia were abundantly

criticized for their reluctance to make use of

NATO’s might. It is hard however not to be sensitive to their plight. “Bombing is a last resort—

declared UNPROFOR commander General Rose

in an interview in the New York Times at the end

of September—because then you cross the Mogadishu line.... If somebody wants to fight a war

here on moral or political grounds, fine, great—

but count us out. Hitting one tank is peacekeeping. Hitting infrastructure, command and control,

logistics, that is war, and I am not going to fight a

war in white painted tanks.”23

After the European Community failed to find

a contextual solution to the different and interconnected aspects of the Yugoslav conflict in

late 1991, the international community has never

had an overall strategy for dealing with the

issue—a strategy that would go beyond the

humanitarian operation and a stopgap response

to some particular developments there. In this

condition the use of force tended to become a

substitute for policy. In addition, among other

effects, the coercive use of military power establishes its own standards for assessing effective23 Roger Cohen, “U.N. General Opposes More Bosnia Force,” New York Times, 29 September 1994.
Chapter 4 Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations | 51

ness and raises expectations concerning the

possibility of solving the conflict.

In former Yugoslavia, the UN built the most

complex operation and suffered the heaviest

casualties of its history. It also came increasingly

under criticism for what many saw as indecision

and the limited results of its action. Still, NATO

can only be used as what it is: an instrument to a

policy. The UN cannot pacify Bosnia-Herzegovina. It cannot even adequately perform its limited

mission if other capabilities—especially political

and economic—are not brought back in large

scale to deal with this extremely complex crisis.

Despite frequent changes by columnists, academics and politicians, the issue is not a technical one—of incompetence of the United Nations

or of other international organizations. Rather, it

is a problem of tasks—too broad for their capabilities—we have laid on the steps of those organizations. The Western influential countries are

counting on international organizations as never

before in the postwar history. However, unfortunately, they are treating those organizations as

independent international actors, as if they had a

political will of their own, as if they had capabilities and resources independent of them.

The point is that, for all the improvement we

have introduced in the working of those organizations, there remains an enormous gap between

the power structures that regulated the international system during the Cold War and those

multilateral mechanisms we are relying on today

for dealing with issues of international stability.

Thus, most important is to realize that the main

problem we have facing us today in dealing with

sources on international instability, is a political

problem—not a technical one. Because of that

political problem that they cannot possibly control, international organizations often find themselves in serious difficulties. The history of the

Western response to the Somali and Yugoslav

crises—and in particular of the combined use of

the United Nations’ and others’ capabilities—is

most indicative in this respect.
| 53

5

Lessons from

Cambodia:

Strengthening

United States

Intervention

THE CHALLENGE FOR PEACEKEEPING

❚ Learning the Lessons

hank you for the opportunity to present this paper on

behalf of Lieutenant General Sanderson. Since completion of the mandate of the United Nations Transitional

Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), I have had the good

fortune to accompany him while he has participated in many

such conferences, seminars, and workshops on United Nations

issues and peacekeeping in particular. The success of that operation has aroused considerable interest in various parts of the

world especially in view of the complexity, its precedent-setting

nature, and its intrusiveness into the affairs of a failed sovereign

state.

The interest has been heightened in view of the increased

scope and frequency of United Nations operations and the crisis

image that many convey. I hasten to add that in no way is this

intended as criticism of commanders, staff, and contingents in

those other operations. Each operation is unique and each has its

own successes and failures. Cambodia was certainly no exception in this regard. However, if we are to strengthen the capacity

of the United Nations to intervene in pursuit of the high morality

of its Charter, we need to build on the successes and learn from

the failures.

Involvement in the international debate has enabled General

Sanderson to discuss his views with a diverse range of observers, practitioners, analysts, and authorities. The reception he has

received has been excellent and has helped him refine his position over the last 12 to 18 months. I have tabled a paper: Peaceby

Lieutenant Colonel J.D. 

Healy, International 

Policy Division, 

Department of Defence, 

Australia, on behalf of

Lieutenant General J.M. 

Sanderson, Commander 

Joint Forces Australia 

and Force Commander, 

United Nations 

Transitional Authority 

in Cambodia, 1992 to 

1993

T
54 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

keeping or Peace Enforcement? Global Flux and

the Dilemmas of United Nations Intervention,

which reflects this position. The title of this

paper recognizes that, confronted with increasing

turmoil of a cultural and racial nature following

the end of the Cold War, the critical issue for the

World is to make the United Nations Charter

work in a way that can preempt or resolve these

crises effectively and lawfully. The difficulties

faced in this regard by the United Nations Organization have been all too manifest in recent missions, in Somalia, in Rwanda and in the former

Yugoslavia.

Also, there is little question that the United

Nations Charter continues to provide the best

available mechanism for the resolution of international conflict. It draws its authority from the

185 sovereign Member states that have ratified

its provisions and are bound by them. The Charter is a document with highly moral foundations,

which obliges settlement of disputes by peaceful

means, respect for fundamental human rights,

conformity with international law, and social

progress. How to translate these high ideals into

action is the question challenging the international community.

In analyzing United Nations operations, one is

often surprised to find that many problems manifest in UNTAC have been experienced elsewhere. In view of the awesome responsibilities

of the United Nations, lessons should not have to

be relearned in this way. Also, the keys to success in UNTAC do not yet seem to have been

fully comprehended. Several measures have been

proposed to address the difficulties experienced

there and elsewhere, but regrettably, these are

all-too-often peripheral. None really comes to

grips with the key issues.

A close analysis of the UNTAC and other

operations suggests that many difficulties are due

to deficiencies in the philosophical approach to

the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Moreover, there are serious problems in the way the

United Nations plans for, mounts and directs

peacekeeping operations, and also issues of an

ethical nature. The first requirement is to address

these in a fundamental way. Once this has been

done, the benefits accruing from measures such

as improved readiness, doctrine, training, tactics,

and technology can increase the effectiveness of

peacekeeping. But it is important to make the

point that these measures can never be solutions

in themselves. The main focus of General Sanderson’s paper, therefore, is the more fundamental

issues, from which broad areas can be identified

for specific programs of interest to the Bellagio

Workshop.

THE USE OF FORCE

Among the most vexing of the matters which

have damaged the United Nations’ credibility is

the issue of the use of force. United Nations personnel often seem confused over whether and

when to use force, and how much is too much.

The problem is that any use of force can create

its own dynamic of escalating violence. The

established peacekeeping ethos recognizes three

fundamental principles: consent, impartiality,

and the use of force only in self-defense. These

principles are interdependent and any use of

force beyond self-defense would be inconsistent

with impartiality and would be likely to undermine consent.

Peacekeeping operations are authorized under

Chapter VI of the Charter. While peace enforcement is an option under Chapter VII, it represents

a totally different ethos to peacekeeping, being

more akin to war. It is critical that a clear line is

drawn between the two to avoid confusion over

objectives and commitments by participating

nations. Peacekeepers are instruments of diplomacy, not of war.

❚ Strategic Objectivity

At the political level, it is important for the

United Nations to be seen to be working for the

interests of all Member states. Through their

accession to the Charter, Member States have

given their consent to the exercise of authority

according to its provisions by the organs of the

United Nations Organization. Inevitably, in exercising that authority, compromises are needed

between the disparate interests involved to gen-
Chapter 5 Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United States Intervention | 55

erate consensus. However, objectivity in United

Nations resolutions must not be sacrificed to

achieve this consensus. Mandates must draw

their moral authority from the Charter. There has

to be a clear and objective moral foundation in

United Nations mandates to develop and sustain

international consent.

It is also essential that political objectives are

passed to those who must implement them in the

field in a way that focuses and inspires action.

Most military structures identify three levels of

command for this purpose: strategic, operational,

and tactical (these will be covered in more detail

shortly). In the United Nations Transitional

Authority in Cambodia, for example, these were

respectively: the Security Council in New York,

the United Nations Headquarters in Phnom Penh,

and the units and various agencies in the field.

The success in Cambodia was due to the operational level in Phnom Penh binding the others

into harmony through horizontal and vertical collaborative structures established for the purpose.

These provide a ready model for other United

Nations operations.

Regrettably, under existing arrangements, a

major weakness exists at the strategic level,

where the United Nations Secretariat is unable to

function as an effective strategic headquarters,

one capable of providing comprehensive advice

to the Security Council and giving strategic

direction to operations. The United Nations

Charter never envisaged such a role for the Secretariat, which is neither structured nor equipped

to run complex military operations. Instead, the

Charter provides for a Military Staff Committee

to assist the Security Council; this serves to

underline the need for the structures envisaged in

the Charter for very necessary purposes and

based on sound precedent in wartime to be put in

place.

General Sanderson’s paper urges the empowerment of the Military Staff Committee, provided

for in the United Nations Charter, to fulfil the

essential functions identified for it. This is the

key issue and the priority area for reform of the

way the United Nations does business. Once this

is done, the multiplier effect of supporting measures can be brought to bear to strengthen United

Nations peacekeeping. What I propose to discuss

here are issues very important in supporting

operations that are strategically well planned and

directed.

SUPPORTING ENHANCED UNITED 

NATIONS INTERVENTION

❚ Strategic Context-Operational Focus

When seeking ways to improve United Nations

peacekeeping, it is unfortunate that a great deal

of energy seems to be expended on the secondary

issues. For example, one of the more recent

responses from the United Nations Secretariat to

react quickly to crises has been to seek solutions

that place forces more readily at its disposal.

While international consensus supports a more

rapid or preemptive response to crises, employment of forces in a way that could lead to failure

is likely to be counterproductive. Similarly, there

seems to have been considerable effort over the

years directed at the tactical level. Examples

include tactical training in rules of engagement

(ROE), laws of armed conflict (LOAC) and

international humanitarian law (IHL) generally,

as well as training in specific peacekeeping

activities in the field such as the conduct of

check points, negotiating skills and the like.

These important initiatives need to continue.

But they also need to be able to be placed in their

proper strategic context without which they can

have no meaningful purpose. Their development

needs to occur while contributing to an effectively functioning strategic framework. It is their

link to the collective strategic objectives of the

Member states of the United Nations, which

gives any conflict resolution measures their relevance and therefore defines what they might be

and the form they should take. Besides ensuring

effective strategic planning and direction, the

central role of the operational level in linking

tactics to strategy needs to be recognized. In

peacekeeping, as in war, it is at the operational

level that political objectives are won or lost.

This suggests that the operational level should be
56 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

the main focus of priority efforts to support

enhanced United Nations intervention.

It is critical for the operational level to establish the bona fides of the mission as early as possible and to maintain it until the operational

objective is secured. This involves relationships

with the international supporters of and contributors to the operation, the parties in conflict, and

the population in the mission area. Operations

have to be conducted in a way that fosters their

cooperation. In particular, if the support of the

people is lacking, the continued viability of the

presence of the United Nations peacekeepers will

be placed in doubt. Discrimination in the conduct

of operations is the key issue here.

❚ Doctrine

The issue of doctrine is central to effectiveness at

the operational level. Peacekeepers from diverse

Member states need to have their unity of purpose reflected in the adherence to common principles and procedures. Regrettably, much of the

operational doctrinal focus in recent times has

been directed at reconciling the dilemmas confronting the United Nations in places such as

Bosnia. However, preoccupation with problems

in Europe, many of which are the result of disunited strategic decision-making, risks distorting

the approach to United Nations peacekeeping in

a way that might make it irrelevant for other missions in other parts of the World.

Peacekeeping operations in Africa, Asia, and

the Americas and also the United States-led

Chapter VII operation in Haiti, have led the way

in a new age of successful United Nations intervention supported by focused diplomacy. The

successes there must not be held hostage to problems elsewhere. In this regard, it is important for

peacekeeping doctrine to be based on proven

success.

The central doctrinal lessons that can be

drawn from the Cambodian experience are in the

two related areas that have already been touched

on, namely, command and control, and the use of

force. To conduct operations in pursuit of the

strategic purpose, peacekeepers, both military

and civilians, need to be able to operate in a

secure environment. Security is normally guaranteed by the parties in conflict when they agree to

the United Nations presence. However, general

political protection might not always ensure tactical security and defensive measures by military

peacekeepers might be necessary. With this

focus, it is possible to approach issues such as

the use of force and other acts by peacekeepers in

a more rational and comprehensive way. Force

defends the agreement, it does not impose it.

In his paper, General Sanderson emphasizes

that force carries enormous political implications. It must therefore, simultaneously be constrained and used with discrimination to ensure

consistency with the political objective. To do

this, it has to be directed by effective structures.

Sustainment of coalitions is the issue that will

drive those considerations.

❚ Command and Control Doctrine

An important first step in our doctrinal work is to

define the command and control framework

within which United Nations operations will be

executed. Doctrine needs to identify the three

different command levels noted earlier, their different roles and their complementary nature. In

brief, these are as follows:

■ Strategic level. In the case of the United

Nations intervention, the focus of the strategic

level must be especially broad, involving

issues of ongoing harmony between member

states, groupings, and international bodies. It

is at the strategic level that the ambiguities of

the political nuances have to be absorbed and

focused into directives to the next level, which

are at once designed to provide clarity, flexibility, and inspiration to action. This is a

hugely demanding task. Decisions made by

member states are collective, but the purposes

of pursuing and balancing the objectives of the

Charter must be paramount. While the Security Council is in a position to provide a lead,

its capacity for action will be limited without

broad international commitment. The central

task lies in determining the international will
Chapter 5 Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United States Intervention | 57

on issues raised within the context of the Charter.

■ Operational level. The operational level of

command is that level at which field elements

are orchestrated to achieve the objectives of

command strategy. The key determinant of

success at this level of command is the military principle of the selection and maintenance

of the aim. This is the principle that connects

the strategic level to the operational level of

command and should therefore emerge from

strategic level analysis to which the operational level commander must be a contributor.

A combination of insight and superior knowledge is most conducive to the achievement of

the desired psychological effects. At the operational level, it is unity of command that provides strength and cohesion. While the

complexity of many post Cold War peacekeeping operations usually means that they are

civil-military affairs, it nevertheless remains

critical that all elements engaged come under

one common authority.

■ Tactical level. The tactical level is more

finite, with objectives being defined in the

more material terms of boundaries, time, numbers, and resources. In peacekeeping operations, the tactical level involves much more

than military units and, in some circumstances, military forces might only be in a supporting role. It could, for example, involve

electoral teams, human rights monitors, police,

and monitors of the Parties’ administrations,

as it did in Cambodia. It is very important

within this complex framework that tactical

units do not respond to national or other chains

of command on operational matters. Nor can

they be allowed to develop their own interpretations, outside the operational level commander’s intent, especially on critical issues

such as the use of force.

If one of these levels is deficient, or their roles

become merged, the capacity of the others to

function effectively is severely limited. If the

strategic level becomes involved with tactics, it

is likely to lose its broad perspective and diminish the power of commanders on the ground. At

the same time, tactical actions that are not

focused can impact adversely on the strategic

plan. Each level collects and analyzes information to define tasks, then empowers subordinate

commanders to accomplish them. The operational level both separates and binds the strategic

and tactical levels, ensuring that tactical actions

are coordinated to achieve strategic objectives.

In Cambodia, the strategic level objective of

the Paris Agreements was the creation of a

unique legitimate government that could be recognized by the international community as the

sovereign authority for Cambodia and the formal

international actor with whom they could conduct their relations. The electoral process was the

only way that this could be achieved which

would be acceptable to all concerned. The conduct of the election was the operational level

objective and tactical level elements were

orchestrated to this end.

The first strategic level task was to generate

and maintain diplomatic support for the operation. The second task was to develop a plan for

the overall operation and to obtain troops and

civilian elements according to it, deploy them to

Cambodia, and put in place arrangements to support them there. It is fair to say that the first of

these was only done up to the signing of the Paris

Agreements and also, it had largely been effected

by interested member states. After their signing,

the same member states continued to do so in

concert with the operational level. With the second task, it was not done well, nor was it done in

a timely manner sufficient to maintain the

momentum for peace.

The operational level of UNTAC largely

worked with the Security Council through the

diplomatic missions. In effect, it functioned

without a strategic headquarters. Interventions

from the United Nations Secretariat were frequently on tactical or operational level issues in

response to media reports, and reflected an

almost complete lack of comprehension of the

realities on the ground. In particular, when a

change to the operational level plan was required

by political developments, the operational level
58 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

had to generate its own diplomatic support. It

would appear that much of the difficulties experienced on other missions have been due to similar incapacities. It is critical for the United

Nations Organization and deployed United

Nations missions to comprehend these different

levels, their different roles and their complementary nature, and to function accordingly.

❚ Self-Defense and Offensive Force

At a Workshop in Stockholm in mid-April, the

issue of the use of force in peacekeeping operations was examined. The Workshop was jointly

sponsored by the Swedish and Australian foreign

ministries and was attended by personnel from

the United States, Australia, and Europe, (mainly

Nordic countries), and included many former

Force Commanders. Although no formal outcomes were sought, a consensus seemed to

emerge on the need for a clear separation

between operations conducted under Chapter VI,

on the one hand, and Chapter VII, on the other.

This would classify operations as follows:

■ Chapter VI. These are characterized by consent, impartiality, and the use of force only in

self-defense. They include:

— traditional peacekeeping (i.e., observer

and) separation of forces missions, such as

UNTSO and UNDOF respectively); and

— wider or expanded peacekeeping (i.e., the

more complex post-Cold War missions

such as UNTAG and UNTAC).

■ Chapter VII. These operations involve the

use of force beyond self-defense and could

include:

— “peace-enforcement,” meaning low-level

pacification operations, such as in Haiti,

which might include activities resembling

those used in peacekeeping; and

— war-fighting operations such as Korea and

the Gulf War.

It should be noted that wider or expanded

peacekeeping provides considerable flexibility

for the defensive use of force. But if offensive

force is to be used, then, in the prevailing view of

the Stockholm Workshop, it is not peacekeeping

and Chapter VII authorization is required. However, Chapter VII operations do not necessarily

mean all-out force. It might be possible to conclude operations with little or no force. The

essential point is that consent is lacking and the

necessary political protection cannot be afforded

to peacekeepers. Force levels must be sufficient

to defeat the threats posed.

Following the difficulties in places such as

Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the Security

Council might have reservations about mandating further multinational United Nations peace

enforcement operations (as opposed to a coalition-led one). The point that emerged from the

Stockholm Workshop is that the United Nations

has more options than simply traditional peacekeeping, war-fighting or doing nothing, as the

conceptual framework above shows. Resources

are always a major constraint, but it nevertheless

needs to be borne in mind that under-resourced

missions have reduced prospects for success, and

normally end up either costing more or failing.

The precise definitions might require some

further development before being accepted as

agreed doctrine, but the distinctly separate

frameworks established by the two Chapters are

germane.

❚ Training and Tactics

With the rapid increase in the size and complexity of peacekeeping operations in recent years,

there has been much discussion on the need for

training of military peacekeepers to improve

their effectiveness. It is important to make the

point that even with the best trained troops available, a campaign can be lost if command or planning is deficient. These must be included in

training for peacekeeping.

It is particularly important to develop skills in

the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations at the operational level. I repeat that it is at

the operational level that peacekeeping operations are won or lost. It seems that the problem

with many missions is due to a disconnect

between the strategic and tactical levels. This is
Chapter 5 Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United States Intervention | 59

almost inevitable if the operational art bringing

the capabilities of diverse elements into harmony

working toward the common objective is not

exploited to its fullest extent. Despite enormous

difficulties, in UNTAC we established this

essential link, which is clearly explained in General Sanderson’s paper.

The UNTAC operation also showed that

peacekeepers are often obliged to deal with people without honor. This requires considerable

self-control, and the steadfastness and forbearance of the military profession is the key to success under these circumstances. Only the military

has the organizational characteristics and the

ethos to operate under the conditions generally

prevailing in a peacekeeping mission. This is an

important issue because it is suggested from

time-to-time that civilians might better perform

peacekeeping tasks. This view is normally

accompanied by some account of failure in military behavior, which is destructive of the United

Nations’ credibility as a compassionate and reliable organization. Failures do occur, but clearly

the military peacekeepers’ task cannot be performed by anything less than a trained professional.

It is true that the quality of troops involved in

peacekeeping varies widely and some units are

better prepared than others. To correct this, there

are good grounds for some form of an inspector

general’s office within the United Nations structure, preferably as part of a secretariat attached to

the Military Staff Committee. The purpose of

this office would be to identify potential contingents that meet minimum standards and advising

on the needs of those that do not. The varying

capacities would be known, but rather than being

exclusive, the objective should be to find ways to

bring those with deficiencies up to the minimum

in a way that enhances broad international participation in peacekeeping.

With 34 nations contributing military contingents to UNTAC, it was possible to make comparisons of the preparedness of military units to

participate in a formation of the Cambodian type.

Cambodia demonstrated that nothing substitutes

for sound and solid military training. The idea of

throwing together a group of untrained reservists

and shipping them into an environment like

Cambodia, Somalia or Yugoslavia does not make

sense. In Cambodia, the deeper the training, the

more able units were to respond to changes in the

operational environment.

The Cambodian operation showed that circumstances can also arise where peacekeepers

have to take a firm stand in defense of the mandate. In peacekeeping, combat skills are still

essential for self-defense. Specific training for

peacekeepers should involve combat training to

instil confidence and familiarity with their weapons. The nature of the mandate will define the

tasks, which in turn will identify the extent of

defensive force to be used. Many of the tactical

techniques used in low-level pacification or

internal security operations are similar, such as

defense of key posts, selective engagement of

targets, patrolling, road blocks, and the development of relations with the civilian community.

Training can therefore readily cover both. However, for peacekeeping, the international nature

and the different ethical and jurisdictional foundations need to be emphasized.

Supporting units including logistics, engineering, and medical units must also have the capacity to secure and defend themselves. Otherwise

they can make excessive demands on the rest of

the force if the tactical situation changes. Some

nations might take the view that to deploy a completely passive logistic unit into a peacekeeping

environment somehow reinforces their humanitarian intent. This might be all that is politically

acceptable at home, but it is not really humanitarian to place soldiers in a dangerous environment

for which they are not mentally and physically

prepared. It is also not really fair to charge a

United Nations force commander with the

responsibility for this deficiency.

While some units were better equipped for

operations in Cambodia than others, and also had

the benefits of deeper and more costly training,

this was not necessarily a measure of their ability

to create a successful peacekeeping environment

around them. This is a very difficult thing to

measure. On the one hand, United Nations civil-
60 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

ians might feel more secure with a certain unit.

On the other hand, some units had a greater affinity with the Cambodians and could generate confidence by at least being perceived to share the

daily experiences of the people in a way that generates understanding. This is one demonstration

of the advantage to be drawn from international

diversity. It is important from a training point of

view for contingents to understand the culture as

much as possible. It is also important to have a

number of linguists who can communicate with

the people from the very beginning of an operation and explain why they are there.

Of critical importance from the perspective of

a Cambodian type operation is the ability to be

able to operate in small groups across large areas,

while remaining secure. This demands junior

leadership of a very high order. Young officers

and non-commissioned leaders have to be confident of their ability to take the initiative, communicate and command soldiers. This demands a

form of directive control, where mission objectives are clearly understood to a deep level and

junior leaders are expected to get on with the job.

Standing operating procedures have to be clear,

but not too prescriptive, and the staff has to work

hard to reinforce the confidence of the soldier in

the field.

Training is important for civilians also. The

increasing size and scope of peacekeeping operations have brought many deficiencies in this area

into stark relief. The reluctance of some civilians

to work with the military in an integrated environment is an established fact with missions. It is

not simply the linguistic and cultural barriers that

have to be broken down, but sociological ones as

well. United Nations civilians are generally individuals rather than team members. Very few of

them have any leadership training, and not many

have previous experience working with the military. Some, particularly those coming straight

out of academia, have a positive aversion to the

military.

In Cambodia, several civilians denigrated the

Military Component and made decisions that

were destructive to morale and effectiveness.

Many were reluctant to take military advice and

were prone to make demands about their own

security without being prepared to sacrifice any

of their own freedom of action to achieve it. In

the end, absolute necessity forced the civilians

into a closer working relationship in UNTAC,

but this required great patience by commanders

at all levels and, for most commanders, this

would have been one of the great learning experiences of the mission.

The question of integrated training is an issue

of great concern because in the past, the United

Nations has more often than not relied on the

international amateur rather than the trained professional when it comes to civilian recruitment.

This is not to say that there are no gifted professionals in the United Nations; there are many

dedicated and talented people. It is simply that

there are not enough, given the scope of these

types of operations. Many people were selected

for UNTAC and appointed to positions for which

they were not equipped by either training or

experience. When doing something as serious as

attempting to run a conflict-ridden country, this

is really not good enough. UN member states are

either going to have to make people of the right

quality available, or accept and be honest about

the inability of the organization to fulfil responsibilities of the magnitude given in the Paris

Agreements.

Some serious operational level deficiencies

were the result of the procedural approach to

financing peacekeeping missions. This delayed

initial deployment and impeded adjustments to

plans in the light of emerging dynamics. It is

quite reasonable to have control of finances in

the hands of experts, provided they follow operational priorities and are flexible enough to

respond to changing circumstances. Civilian staff

in such positions must have a comprehensive

understanding of the potential cost of their decisions in lives, infrastructure, and wasted effort.

An important area for integrated civil-military

training is in civic action. In an environment such

as Cambodia, hearts and minds activities form a

central part of military operations. The purpose is

to establish the critical link with the people to

convince them of the United Nations commit-
Chapter 5 Lessons from Cambodia: Strengthening United States Intervention | 61

ment. The military of many nations have deep

experience in nation-building and a close relationship with humanitarian agencies and those

non-governmental organizations that perceive

benefits from integration can be mutually supporting.

All staff need to focus on their raison d’être,

with an integrated approach to timely planning—

across the components and involved agencies—

from the Secretariat to the forward area. Personnel need to be trained to plan and operate in an

integrated environment. Civilian peacekeepers

need to understand the obligations to mission

outcomes and their broader responsibilities to the

international community. They also need to comprehend the need to work within a functioning

command and control system designed to ease

coordination and foster unity. In particular, they

must understand the objectives of peacekeeping

and the implications and necessary constraints on

military operations.

❚ Technology in Support of Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is not part of the conflict spectrum

and the demands it imposes are quite different to

those of combat. The protection afforded to

peacekeepers is political and the openness of

their operations is an overt political act. The

philosophical approach to technology support to

peacekeeping achieves its best effect if it

enhances the peacekeepers’ capacity to affect

their political purpose.

Experience suggests that, generally, the systems needed for effective peacekeeping are

readily available commercially. Military systems

are usually more than adequate, but of course the

redundancy leads to some unnecessary additional

expense. For example, peacekeeping operations

are unlikely to require the full capacities of the

observation, combat support systems, or the

armored protection and firepower used during

the Gulf War. Peacekeepers normally do not

need these levels of sophistication since, by their

nature, they do not use offensive force and the

presence of such systems could prove provocative.

On the other hand, there could be much more

focus on methods of weapons destruction in a

non-conflict environment. For example, the

requirement for de-mining is often more extensive in peacekeeping than in combat. But the

existing military technology and methods are

equally inadequate. Any technologies that could

increase the rate at which areas can be cleared of

the polluting effect of mines should command a

high priority.

In many cases, the most efficient de-mining is

achieved through training numerous local personnel. Consequently, improved training technology can help. The de-mining equipment used

in these circumstances should be robust and simple, so that it can be used by local personnel with

little technical background. The safety of the deminers remains a key issue in enhancing their

confidence and the pace of their work. Active

support to provisions in the Inhumane Weapons

Conventions that help detection and destruction,

and limit proliferation, is also important. This

would form a critically important complement at

the political level to the development of detection and destruction technology in the field.

Similarly, where the confidence building process requires disarmament of forces, ready and

safe means of weapons destruction might be the

key ingredient in developing a peaceful environment that can foster conflict resolution. This

involves destruction of armaments ranging from

pistols to tanks and aircraft, and the disposal of

all types of ammunition, much of which is likely

to be unstable.

With peacekeeping equipment generally, the

development of non-lethal technologies that provide options for greater discrimination in the use

of defensive force could form a priority area. The

risks of these making force easier to use would

need to be overcome by doctrine, training and

clear orders. Warning technologies would also be

useful.

In addition, the increasing complexity of

peacekeeping operations requires a higher degree

of sophistication than is presently evident in two

particular areas:
62 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

■ First, command, control, and communications

systems are required for the strategic level,

and for dispersed forces over a large area for

both the operational and tactical levels. Cohesion between levels remains a central need.

■ Second, systems are required for information

gathering and analysis for strategic and operational decision-making, including surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.

Access to national systems could provide a

cost efficient way of achieving these ends, however, there are political risks in this. Using several sources could help overcome this, but in any

case, independent analysis is critical.

In training for peacekeeping, the use of simulation for planning and analytical exercises,

including command training, is an important area

for focus.

Ultimately, as the United Nations Charter

indicates, peacekeeping is about people. A critical area for technology focus is in areas that help

United Nations peacekeepers establish their bona

fides with the population in the mission area. In

Cambodia, the civic action campaign was key in

forging alliances with the Cambodian people in a

way that convinced them of our commitment and

allowed us to bypass the power struggles

between and within the factions. Simple systems

to support civic action, such as agricultural and

road-building equipment, and management packages could prove helpful.

A closely related instrument for transmitting

UNTAC’s message was its own radio station.

This used established technology. However, initially this was opposed by the United Nations

Secretariat on the grounds of expense, although

its utility and cost-effectiveness have been recognized since the successful conclusion of the operation.

Also required was a more effective means of

getting the UNTAC message to the broader international community in a way that could overcome the distortions inherent in contemporary

journalism. Media reports influenced the international support to UNTAC and at times came

close to undermining a mission that was ultimately shown to be achievable. Advancement of

the broader message of the United Nations Charter is a highly desirable general international

objective. Development of effective public communications systems, such as an area broadcast

facility for peacekeeping operations would be a

particularly useful area of focus. Adaptation of

existing satellite communications might achieve

this.

It is perhaps in the area of communications

and information technology that enhance effectiveness at both the strategic and operational levels that a most significant impact can be made on

the success of peacekeeping operations.
| 63

6

New

Zealand and

Collective

Security

INTRODUCTION

t is said that in a court case in the mid-south a railway company was being charged with responsibility for a grievous

accident. A key witness was a local employee of the railroad

who came across the evidence that his friend Jim had been

run over by a train. He described how he had seen the victim’s

head on one side of the track, his torso and limbs scattered

about. “And what did you think” the defense attorney asked

“when you saw these grisly remains?” “Well,” he said, “I

thought something serious has happened to Jim.”

For our purposes something serious has happened to peace

operations. A good, but limited idea has been run down,

because—in the cases of Bosnia and Somalia—the collective

mind was not focused on where we were going and how we

were going to get there. The politics were not synchronized with

the military realities. As a result the soldiers were asked, like

Alice in Wonderland, to believe 25 impossible things before

breakfast. The implications of this serious accident spread

beyond the fate of any one particular peace operation. They raise

a question about the future, not so much of peace operations, but

of collective action itself.

For the ball has been lost among the great collective institutions so painfully put together in the past 45 years. Between the

UN and NATO, the European Community and the European

Union, and between the Security Council and the central agencies of the United Nations, itself, we have seen a painful set of

disconnects open up. Now none of this is irreparable. Unlike

poor Jim, collective action can be put together again. But we

shall need the will and the leadership to do it.

by

Denis McLean

United States Institute 

of Peace; 

Former Ambassador of 

New Zealand to the 

United States

I
64 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

THOROUGH PREPARATION PAYS OFF

Many things have been done in the name of

peace operations and done well. To sum up:

those operations where there was sound and

fully-engaged diplomatic preparation, where the

combined civilian-military elements in a peace

operation have been fitted in as part of a wellconceived peace process, have worked well.

Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique

are shining examples. The element of consent,

but not the absence of violence (and the two are

sometimes thought to be the same thing), has

been a constant. Where things have gone badly

the constant factors have been: failure to conceive and articulate a political strategy and plan,

problems with liaison between the agencies

already mentioned, “ad hocery” (sometimes

inspired, mostly not), and failure to know how to

deal with violence (our famous Mogadishu line).

There may well be, as some of us heard Professor Michael Brenner say the other day in

Washington, “a flight from responsibility everywhere.” I am not sure that this is how I would put

it. I see, from the perspective of one of the

smaller—but nevertheless active—players in the

international system, little shrinking from

responsibility among the smaller and middlesized countries. But there is a near calamitous

lack of consensus, cohesion, and clear objectives

as to how to go about upholding the peace. The

major powers cannot stand aside from the search

for a solution. Indeed they must lead it. The

flight is not so much from responsibility as from

a sense of the collective.

FUTURE OPERATIONS REQUIRE 

SIMILAR COMMITMENT

In looking to the future, we must start with where

we came from. Of course we can all look back,

with some awe, now, at the singleness of purpose

and high resolve with which the West held to its

course under the leadership of the United States

for upwards of 40 years. Of course it was to be

expected that the eye would slip off the mark, the

grip slacken, after so major a victory. Equally, it

is easier to hold to a commitment to a large and

vastly compulsive cause than to find the way

through the web of problems associated with

civil strife and breakdown, which so enmeshes us

now. But that is the point. We must live in our

own times. The challenges we face are a great

deal less demanding than those we have been

through. They are to do with holding on to what

we have, by way of a collective commitment.

Ironically, the fact that the problems are less

immediate and of a much lower order of difficulty and responsibility exacerbates, rather than

eases, the challenge. As Samuel Johnson

reminded us, the mind is concentrated wonderfully by the thought that one might be hanged

next week.

Peace operations represent a collective commitment. Without a strong strand of collective

resolve they will soon be reduced to a very low

level of capability and effectiveness. We are told

that peace operations can only be effective when

there is peace to keep. This is trite and unhelpful.

For the evidence is everywhere, we live in a very

violent world, a world awash with high-powered

weaponry, much of it controlled by characters

with an only distant relationship with military

discipline and the regimental ethos. Plainly if we

are to take it that peace operations are worth

doing only when peace has broken out, the technique is not going to be much use to us for trying

to meet some of the challenges of the times in

which we live. The lion is not likely soon to learn

to lie down with the lamb, let alone the other way

around. The key is in making the level of military effectiveness commensurate with the particular problems on the ground. The willingness to

do that in turn is determined by the degree of

political resolution.

Some peace operations—in Somalia (under

UNITAF), Haiti and in Northern Ireland—have

plainly been very effective although there has

been no peace, as usually defined (i.e., the

absence of violence) to keep in these places. The

forces deployed were well-trained and equipped,

militarily more than capable of meeting any

opposition they encountered; they had the capacity to defend themselves and their mission. The

key lay in the commitment, the political will, of
Chapter 6 New Zealand and Collective Security | 65

the authorities responsible for those operations.

Without that, peace operations will always be

able to function only at the margins of our concerns. Of course, the UNITAF phase in Somalia,

like the initial deployment to Haiti and, of

course, the British commitment to maintaining

the peace in Northern Ireland, were not among

the usual run of multinational operations. In each

case these operations were carried along by an

unusual degree of national commitment and

engagement. There is the rub.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENT IS 

CONSTANTLY TESTED

This issue of commitment is about to be tested

again and in a different setting. The BritishFrench-Netherlands combined force now being

deployed to Bosnia represents a new approach to

what has become the central conundrum of

peace-keeping: how to add military punch to

enable a peace operation to carry out its mandate

and protect its people without becoming engaged

in the conflict? Will it work? Already the very

idea is being dismissed. As the Holy Roman

Empire was said to be neither holy, nor Roman,

nor an empire, so this idea of a rapid reaction

force is dismissed as nether rapid nor reactive

nor a force. Perhaps cynicism is at the heart of

our problems. There is argument about the command structure, who will pay and how much, the

lines of responsibility, whether it is a blue helmet

or a NATO operation or simply a series of conjoined national initiatives. All this is true to form.

For it is self-evident that without a clear consensus and a well-defined set of aims no coalition can hold together. There can never be an

effective coalition without agreement about the

key commitments and obligations of the partners.

What is it that we should be coalescing around?

On what do we have, or ought we to have, a consensus?

INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS EXISTS

Slowly, since the end of the 19th century, a corpus of international treaty commitments has been

built up on matters to do with offenses against

the laws of war. The nations have signaled support for definitions of war crimes that include the

murder, ill-treatment or deportation of civilian

populations. Crimes against humanity are generally held to include political, racial or religious

persecution of civilian populations. A United

Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide has been widely endorsed.

Few countries refuse to subscribe to the broad

principles relating to the conduct of war, the

treatment of prisoners of war and the protection

of civilians in time of war enshrined in the

Geneva Conventions; many have even endorsed

the two 1949 protocols extending protection

under the Conventions to guerrilla fighters in

wars of self-determination or participants in civil

wars able to claim control over significant territory.

All this is enough. In theory, at least, such

commitments should provide more than sufficient justification for international action. Most

of the principles upheld under this fragile framework of international agreement have in fact

been wilfully flouted in the aftermath of the collapse of former Yugoslavia. However, there has

been no sustained sense of outrage sufficient to

generate a forcible response. Equally, it could be

said that all members of the United Nations have,

in signing on, made commitments under Chapter

VII of the Charter to taking collective action (the

emphasis is on action) in response to threats to

the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of

aggression. Again it is not easy to relate that

commitment to the present disarray in the international community over what to do about Bosnia.

At this conference, I met with General Nambiar. He said this morning that peace operations

are here to stay. The occasional setback will not

remove the concept from the collective memory.

Beleaguered leaders in countries falling apart

will continue to want to turn for help to the international community just as the Security Council

will instinctively think in terms of fashioning

collective responses to crises. No doubt the Bosnian trauma will inspire caution. That may be no
66 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

bad thing. The need is to generate much new

thinking about how to do better.

As even a casual consideration makes clear,

peace operations come in many guises. The concept offers a great range of options for dealing

with a world, which in more than a few places, is

coming apart at the seams. We rehearsed those

options at this workshop in John Sewall’s development of the Gerry Yonas model. But all the

way through from peacemaking; peacekeeping;

expanded peacekeeping; peacebuilding (reconstruction); protective engagement (which General Rupert Smith calls containment); deterrence;

to peace enforcement, there are options galore

for the policy makers. There is scope for all-comers—the great and the small. What is needed is

the effort, the will, and—dare I say it— the leadership to draw it all together to make the pattern

cohere. Then all things are possible, a more

effective and fair division of peacekeeping labor,

more clear-cut directives to the force commanders, coupled with the military means to allow

them to use force to defend their people and their

mandate.

SMALLER COUNTRIES ALSO PLAY A 

VITAL ROLE

Now I know all too well from my years in Washington that Americans have trouble looking

through the wrong end of the telescope, to see the

world of the smaller actors. Smaller countries

can usually be expected to support collective

action. Perhaps I might be forgiven for observing

that New Zealand has done so cum laude through

all the wars of our terrible century. I like to think

of this role as a model of collective security in

action. For by all the standards of realpolitik

where was the direct threat to New Zealand?

Indeed, by whatever standards we are applying to

Bosnia—of realpolitik or otherwise—where is

the New Zealand interest in sending troops there,

other than as a mark of a commitment to collective security? Of course there aren’t many of

them—a company of well-trained, professional

infantry, 260 soldiers. If we think about it, that

number gives an index of what could be done in

this untidy world if we all accepted an equivalency of contribution. I’m not going to get into

the old question of whether one New Zealander

is worth three Englishmen—or at least five Australians! But New Zealand is a country of only

3.6 million people. There are about 72 times as

many Americans. I simply point out that 260

New Zealanders represent the same level of collective commitment as 18,200 Americans.

Involvement in Bosnia has not caused a revolution in New Zealand. Polling, in fact, suggests

that New Zealand support for United Nations

collective security has gone up several percentage points to 75 percent, since the commitment

was made. Support for maintaining effective

armed forces has equally increased to 69 percent.

The arguments heard in Washington against

United States involvement on the ground in

former Yugoslavia have nevertheless also been

made in New Zealand—and of course, quite

shrilly. Plenty of New Zealanders have urged on

the government that we too should let this one

pass: Bosnia is a long way away, no direct

national interests of ours are at stake, New

Zealand should stop getting entangled in other

people’s wars, the Balkans is a quagmire and the

people obsessed by ancient hatreds etc., etc. The

UN is a mess, couldn’t fight it’s way out of a

paper bag. We too have heard all that. No doubt

the same noises are made in Ottawa, London,

and Paris.

Clearly collective security will wither away if

such arguments prosper. As I said, smaller countries have an instinct for the collective approach;

that way, there is scope for covering more of the

security imperatives and for maximizing their

own, necessarily limited, military capabilities.

They gain a seat at the table; a lesser known

member of the international community—or one

seeking to reposition itself—can claim credit as a

constructive player, and so on. The collective

principle can, however, obviously work only if

the commitment is broadly shared. What is

needed is coherence among all interested parties

and an ability to interact until the whole process

is mutually supportive. This calls for the major

players to drive a collective security concept
Chapter 6 New Zealand and Collective Security | 67

along. This has always been how alliances have

worked. Now it is necessary to apply some of the

same impetus to developing the concept of peace

operations.

There is a leadership role here, of the highest

potential, for the United States. In the broadest

sense it would call for articulation of a new collective approach to peace operations. In practical

terms it would involve taking the initiative to

arrange comprehensive collective military training for peace operations, working with partners

and the United Nations to put together a new military doctrine, devising appropriate rules of

engagement and ensuring that whatever force is

put into the field is backed with the capabilities,

so it is not militarily ineffectual when challenged.

I have the feeling—which may be unfair—that

over the past five or six years, the liberal international community has suffered from something

of a collective rush of blood to the head. In our

enthusiasm to believe in a new world order we

neglected the importance of the tough old military nuts and bolts needed to make even the palest of collective systems work. The American wit

and coiner of aphorisms, Josh Billings, wrote: 

If you want a good crop and a sure yield, sow

wild oats.

For the plain fact is that, in respect of former

Yugoslavia, the international community—or

more accurately the Security Council—handed

the United Nations what in rugby football is

known as a “hospital pass.” This means that you

are given the ball in hopeless circumstances and

at the very moment when the opposition is best

able to do you serious bodily harm. Did UNPROFOR (the UN Protection Force in the former

Yugoslavia) ever have much of a chance of

reacting firmly and decisively to harassment and

obstruction when the military provisions had not

been made? In almost all of its dealings on the

Gulf War, the Security Council acted with firmness and cohesion. No Fly Zones, Weapons

Exclusion Areas, a solid peacekeeping effort in

relation to Kuwait, a major intrusion in Northern

Iraq, and an extraordinarily intrusive process of

weapons inspection and destruction were all

pushed through and backed by the necessary

shows of force.

What made the difference? Of course, major

strategic interests were engaged in the Gulf; considerations of high security interest were at stake.

And then there was the decisive role played by

the United States . . . .

This raises the question, can comparable will

be summoned up where the direct interests may

be less pressing, where the issues are to do not

with power and grand strategy, but with humanitarian relief and violations of international law?

What degree of effectiveness can we hope to

attach to peace operations if the major powers

are not fully engaged in making the concept

work?

At the San Francisco Conference 50 years

ago, New Zealand strenuously opposed inclusion

in the United Nations Charter of the right of veto

to be held by the Permanent Members of the

Security Council. Smaller countries, which were

not going to get on the Council very often,

clearly did not appreciate a concentration of

power in the hands of the Permanent five. The

rationale for this authority was, of course, the

responsibility accorded to the major powers for

the maintenance of international peace and security. Decisions of the Council to do with peace

and security issues that are not backed by the

provision of the necessary military capabilities

by the major powers, are clearly not going to

increase respect either for the Council or for the

powers concerned.

The issues are urgent on several counts: unless

it is possible to inspire a certain respect for the

will of the international community as expressed,

however imperfectly, through the Security Council the broad peace keeping concept will unravel.

Without the demonstration of some firmness and

resolve to back the commitments states have

made to international law, what is sure to be a

very untidy opening to the 21st century could

become disastrously unstable.
68 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

THE PEACEKEEPING PROCESS NEEDS 

REEXAMINATION

In thinking again about what is needed to

improve the future for peace operations—the

subject of our conference—I suggest that we

must focus on the point that so called “first generation” peace keeping cannot simply be

expanded, as we have tended to do in the past

few years. Rather it is necessary to rethink ways

and means. If the central problem is to control

violence to promote peace processes, it will no

longer be sufficient simply to deploy lightly

armed peacekeepers, entirely subject to the whim

of every local warlord. If war is the continuation

of politics by other means, peace operations are

perhaps the continuation of diplomacy by other

means. However, where violence is a fundamental part of the equation, the pursuit of peace is

compromised, unless the peacekeepers can, at

least, defend themselves. This makes at least

some parts of the peace operations spectrum a

form of diplomacy by military means.

It is properly said that good soldiers make

good peacekeepers. The reference, however, is

not to military aggressiveness but to the key soldierly qualities of discipline, restraint in the use

of force, the ability to communicate and manage

what is going on. Effective command and control

are also fundamental. Dag Hammarskjold’s oftquoted remark still holds true, “It’s not a job for

soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.” This does

not mean that the good soldiers must always turn

the other cheek. Humiliation of the kind meted

out by the Bosnian Serbs in the past few days is

plainly unacceptable.

Effective capabilities for self-defense seem to

be a minimum requirement for future deployments in areas where violence is endemic. This

includes close fire support and close air cover.

Can such capabilities be used without crossing

the so called “Mogadishu line” and involving the

United Nations itself in war? I suggest that they

can, if we make a sufficient distinction between

upholding the mandate and taking war to an

enemy. A reality check makes it quite clear that

the world community cannot entertain the notion

of putting together comprehensive capabilities

actually to “enforce peace” very often; the Gulf

and Korea are the only clear-cut examples. This

is not the same issue as the provision of sufficient military capabilities to allow a peace operation to defend itself and to carry out the mandate

it has been given. That can be done and the Great

Powers can rally a great deal of support from the

rest of the international community to do it, if

they can themselves summon up the will.

PUT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN 

PERSPECTIVE

I sense that peace operations are in tune with the

temper of our times. Only a fool would pretend

that war is going out of fashion. But equally it is

plain that the liberal democracies’ distaste for

war is now a major factor in political life. How

things have changed from the early years of this

century: a headlong charge at the guns yielded

60,000 casualties in a morning on the opening

day of the First Battle of the Somme; today there

is concern that even a single American casualty

could compromise a, so far, very successful

peace operation in Haiti! Whatever their faults,

peace operations stand for prudence and restraint

in military matters. Perhaps things do get better

after all. Immediately before the First World War

there was an all-in Balkans War of extreme

ferocity and with much bloodletting. The major

countries of the West paid little attention. Now a

similar event shames us all. Hopefully we can

now move on to finding effective techniques for

making the modest, but useful tool of peacekeeping more useful. It will not end war or solve the

grand strategic issues, but to adjust peace operations to the modern realities must offer new

hope. That way the collective principle will be

given new life. The military establishments are

responding to this new challenge. The political

establishments must follow.
| 69

7

Peace Enforcement

Organizational

Planning and

Technical

Requirements

LESSONS FROM RECENT OPERATIONS

“Their (the UN Security Council’s) work must be based on

the (UN) Charter.”

Mr. Makins, Australia, first President of the Security Council, on

its first meeting, London, January 17, 1946.

“The world has failed, and is continuing to fail to help me

with support to get the job done.”

Shaharyar Mohammed Khan, UN Secretary-General’s Special

Representative in Rwanda, March 1995.

The above two statements are repeated to provide a theme for

this paper. The statements were written at a time when the willingness and ability of the world to provide the resources

required for the execution of an operation were being questioned

around the world. In this case, it relates to the UNPROFOR (UN

Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia) operations being carried out under the mandate of the UN Charter. In its preparation,

the author read again an article by Australian Senator Gareth

Evans, in the Fall 1994 issue of Foreign Policy, in which he

wrote:

Although many of the criticisms are justified, most responsibility rests not with the UN as an institution so much as with the

failure of member states to provide the commitment and

resources necessary to enact the needed reforms. It is hardly reasonable for states to deny the UN desperately needed funds, then

blame it for the failures that lack of resources inevitably generate. Nor is it reasonable to blame the UN as an institution for the

by

General Sir David 

Ramsbotham, (ret.)

GCB, CBE

Former Adjutant

General, U.K. Land Army
70 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

failures of member states in the Security Council to provide the decisive leadership.

This paragraph contains three words on which

the author intends to concentrate, conscious that

this may duplicate what others have already contributed, or will contribute: reform, resources and

leadership.

Requirements in organization, planning, and

operations are examined as they relate to the UN

and its capacity for organizing and planning such

operations, because it is from there that all else

stems. These requirements are also examined

where the application of technologies could have

significantly improved the prospects for success,

based on lessons learned from examples of

“Extended Peacekeeping” and “Peace Enforcement.” Several technological essentials, rather

than desirables, will be mentioned and a suggestion as to what the UN must do if reforms and

requirements are to be satisfied. However, the

UN’s bible, the Charter, must be looked at first.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT LESSONS

In strict UN Charter terms, only Korea, the

Congo, Somalia and Kuwait qualify as true

Chapter VII Peace Enforcement operations.

Somalia is being covered as a special case by

Admiral Jonathan Howe, and it would be impertinent of me to tiptoe into his territory. Korea and

the Congo, both hardly recent, were special cases

of a different nature; furthermore military technology has moved on since then, making many

of their lessons less than currently relevant.

Desert Storm also could be said to have been

special because, in the field, it was essentially

United States and not UN led. It has been evaluated often, and in many different ways, the inevitability of its outcome being explained as much

by the differing standards of technology available to each side as by the ability of their soldiers

to exploit it. So what are the relevant lessons

from recent operations, that can help to improve

the prospects for future peace operations?

PEACEKEEPING DEFINITIONS

Before attempting to identify those, and in order

to eliminate confusion, the definitions of Traditional Peacekeeping, “Extended” Peacekeeping

and Peace Enforcement that will be used are

those contained in the recently published U.K.

Army Field Manual Volume 5, Operations Other

Than War, Part 2, “Wider Peacekeeping” (the

term the United Kingdom prefers to

“Extended”).

■ Traditional Peacekeeping is: “Operations carried out with the consent of belligerent parties,

in support of efforts to achieve or maintain

peace, in order to promote security and sustain

life in areas of potential or actual conflict.” ■ Wider Peacekeeping: “The wider aspects of

peacekeeping operations carried out with the

general consent of the belligerent parties but in

an environment that may be highly volatile.” ■ Peace Enforcement: “Operations carried out to

restore peace between belligerent parties who

do not all consent to intervention and who may

be engaged in combat activities.”

THE UN CHARTER

The action that the UN may take “with respect to

Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and

Acts of Aggression,” called Peace Enforcement,

is mandated by Articles 41 and 42 of the UN

Charter. Article 41 says:

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to

be employed to give effect to its decisions, and

it may call upon the Members of the United

Nations to apply such measures. These may

include complete interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic,

radio and other means of communication, and

the severance of diplomatic relations.

and Article 42:

Should the Security Council consider that

measures provided for in Article 41 would be

inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it

may take such action by air, sea, or land forces

as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such actions may
Chapter 7 Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and Technical Requirements | 71

include demonstrations, blockade, and other

operations by air, sea or land force of Members

of the United Nations.

Any examination of potential improvements

to the execution of such operations must look at

whether conditions will allow the various

demands to be satisfied, and suggest what needs

to be done to ensure that they can. But, referring

back to Mr Makins, it must also include an

examination of the Charter to see whether it too

is adequate for its task, on the assumption that all

action must be based upon it.

So far this Workshop has concentrated on Traditional and Wider Peacekeeping, usually conducted by ad hoc contributions from Member

Nations. There has been much criticism of such

ad hoc grouping, because of the problems present

from trying to integrate many individual elements with widely differing capability and

equipment. The one overarching lesson from all

Peace Enforcement operations, including Desert

Storm, is that any ad hoc grouping will not do in

what is essentially war fighting, which must be

conducted by a commander and staff trained and

equipped for war fighting. The UN does not possess such a capability, although the pressure for it

to maintain some form of standing force is again

mounting, and a proposal will be mentioned

later. Therefore, it has to fall back on Articles 43,

48 and 52. Article 43 states that:

1. All Members of the United Nations, to contribute to the maintenance of international

peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council on its call and

according to a special agreement or agreements assistance, and facilities, including

rights of passage, necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern

the numbers and types of forces, their degree

of readiness and general location, and the

nature of the facilities and assistance to be

provided.

Article 48 allows particular forces to be

employed in particular circumstances:

The action required to carry out the decisions

of the Security Council for the maintenance of

international peace and security shall be taken

by all the Members of the United Nations or by

some of them, as the Security Council may

determine.

Article 52 says that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the

existence of regional arrangements or agencies

for dealing with such matters relating to the

maintenance of international peace and security

as are appropriate for regional action, provided

that such arrangements of agencies and their

activities are consistent with the Purposes and

Principles of the United Nations.

Because Peace Enforcement amounts to little

less than war fighting, many suggest that all that

is required is the deployment of national contingents trained and equipped for high intensity

conflict acting in the name of the UN. NATO

nations will suggest that the most effective Peace

Enforcement grouping can only come from

NATO itself, using NATO procedures designed

to deal with such a demand, employed under the

Charter Articles quoted above. The Partnership

for Peace countries involved in the current

Enlargement of NATO, have been quick to recognize that the imperative of being able to take

part in a NATO led Peace Enforcement operation

provides a very valid reason for mastering and

adopting those operational techniques and procedures that will enable them to do so effectively.

In fact Desert Storm could be described as a

NATO deployment in the name of the UN, to

which non-NATO forces were added. However,

because these forces were not familiar with operational procedures (which is not to say that they

were not combat capable) they were given discrete missions, which contributed to the overall

concept. NATO troops operated together on one

part of the front, and non-NATO on another. In

essence that is true, and suggests one way for the

future, which has already been advocated by

Kofi Annan, the Under Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping Operations. Namely, that a lead

nation should always be appointed in such circumstances, responsible not just for providing a

command Headquarters, but for laying down
72 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

interoperability requirements and procedures to

enable the force to operate coherently.

But when looking to the future, the political

implications of NATO involvement cannot be

ignored, because of its limited geographical area

of interest. There are no similar politico/military

structures in other regions such as the OAS or

OAU. Therefore, unless NATO is to act “out of

area,” this important operational lesson can only

be “noted” elsewhere, hopefully encouraging the

UN to find out how Peace Enforcement operations might be conducted outside the NATO

area. Cambodia, as we have heard, was not a

Peace Enforcement operation. Somalia contains

several examples of how not to do it, with the

whole U.S. contingent not being under the command of the Force Commander and some elements being commanded and controlled from

Florida rather than Mogadishu. This is an organizational and planning point rather than a technological one, but is has implications for the

employment of technology.

To revert to the employment of an agent such

as NATO as military force provider, one particular benefit of current operations in the former

Yugoslavia is that the UN and it have had to

hammer out “dual-key” arrangements. These

arrangements concern the use of air power in

Bosnia and Herzegovina, in support of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. NATO as

an agent of the UN under the authority of the

Security Council responds to requests made following violations of those resolutions. This is a

pattern familiar to those who have been involved

in internal security operations, as the British call

them. To take Northern Ireland as an example,

should the Police find that a situation is beyond

their capacity to deal, such as a riot or a cordon

and search, they hand it over to the Army, who

use military means to solve the problem, and

then hand back command to the Police. Translated into Peace Enforcement terms it should be

possible for the UN to hand a situation over to a

lead nation or an organization such as NATO,

invite them to enforce a solution by military

means, and then take over the post conflict

“Peace Building” or “Reconstruction” part of a

mandate. Problems should only arise if the agent

is tempted to take unilateral military action,

which may seem perfectly reasonable, and even

desirable, in military terms, but which conflicts

with the overall direction of the UN Mission.

The example that most readily comes to mind

is the NATO wish to take out air defense assets

before bombing airfields from which air attacks

had been mounted in Bosnia. Their removal, and

the technology to facilitate this, entirely normal

in war, could have made the UN look like a participant in, rather than a preventer of war. But the

example introduces the point that because the

UN does not own any high technology equipment, it must determine what is required and then

ask for it to be made available. Who is to make

that appreciation? After a brief look at the world

in which the UN must plan and organize, the

Organization itself must be examined to see

exactly what special provision for Peace

Enforcement is required.

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE SECURITY

There now exists a multiplicity of non-military

threats to the way of life, safety, and well-being

of the peoples of this planet, which deserve all

our attention. In the future the most serious risk

to the security of a nation may come from ethnic

and religious conflicts, border disputes, civil

wars (many of which could spill across international borders), the collapse of governmental

authority within a state or states, or many other

problems with a potential for regional destabilization. Among these must be included: international terrorism, international crime, drugs and

overpopulation in poorer and more troubled

countries, which could lead to a migratory flood

from them to the richer and more peaceful, bringing not only social chaos but rising racial antagonisms. This in turn could lead to resource wars

over diminishing stocks of water, grazing land,

timber and the like, nor should the effects of

environmental damage be excluded.

What all this adds up to is that national security is becoming increasingly inseparable from

international security. Threats to the security of a
Chapter 7 Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and Technical Requirements | 73

nation must include anything, anywhere on the

globe, which threatens the health, economic

well-being, social stability and political peace of

its people. Such threats can only be countered by

the peoples of the world, but this will require the

same kind of coordinated response as is afforded

to countering military threats.

THE UN RESPONSE

The Charter, and the United Nations Organization itself, are children of World War II, and

describe the world of the founding fathers, in

which it was presumed that the problems with

which it would have to deal were between nation

states. Similarly the League of Nations, and its

Charter, were the children of World War I. The

UN was an update of the League of Nations, but

there has been no such update since the end of

the Cold War, other than the two documents (An

Agenda for Peace and An Agenda for Development), on which member states have commented.

That is not to say that many member states, and

individuals, have not put forward many ideas

about what needs to be done, but, so far, without

any major result. The fact remains, that intervention in any of the circumstances described above

risks breaking a cardinal principle of the UN,

namely that it will not interfere with the internal

affairs of any state. That was all very well when

the world was made up of nation states, and it

was disputes between them that had to be

umpired, with their consent. The break up of

these states however, leading to situations where

any internal dispute is likely to spill across international borders, and where the only way to prevent this is to interfere, is changing the name of

the game.

It is not suggested that a new Charter or a new

United Nations is required, but rather a fundamental review of both, to ensure that they reflect

current needs, and satisfy member states that

their organization is both structured and mandated to cope with the problems thrown up by the

break up of the 1914-1989 World order, and the

emergence of its successor. But, to carry out that

revision, member states must have a vision of

what additions and alterations they would like to

be made, and why, so that they can instigate and

evaluate what is required and proposed.

It is suggested that such a revision should be

based on the premise that all UN activities are

interventions in one form or another. And, that

Peace Operations are a continuum of several

interrelated activities, designed to cater for many

different situations that may require action. Like

all revisions it will require compromise between

conflicting national views, but, if the end is

agreed, the means should be easier to achieve.

Describing how the UN should tackle its

tasks, Boutros-Ghali, in An Agenda for Peace,

lists six “instruments for peace and security”:

■ preventive diplomacy and peace making,

■ peacekeeping,

■ post-conflict peace-rebuilding,

■ disarmament,

■ sanctions, and

■ enforcement action.

In a recent article in Survival, Shashi Tharoor,

Special Assistant to Kofi Annan in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, lists five “different, though sometimes overlapping” kinds of

activity in which UN peacekeepers are currently

engaged in Europe:

■ traditional peacekeeping—in Central Bosnia

and Croatia,

■ preventive deployment—in Macedonia,

■ observation of a non-UN peacekeeping forceUNOMIG (in the nation of Georgia), and

■ humanitarian relief—in Bosnia and Herzegovina

■ conflict mitigation—in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Shashi Tharoor describes humanitarian relief

as:

deploying UN peacekeepers tasked to mitigate an ongoing conflict by limiting the parties’

recourse to certain military means (in this case,

maintaining an interdiction on the use of aircraft

for combat purposes) or to attacks upon certain

cities (protection of ‘safe areas’), in both cases

backed up by the threat of military force pro-
74 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

vided by a regional security organization (the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)).

The Secretary-General’s six, and Tharoor’s

five can be compressed into three instruments:

1. preventive action,

2. conflict or chaos resolution, and

3. post-conflict rebuilding.

These instruments are not mutually exclusive

and all of which are being implemented now in

UNPROFOR. The deployment of peacekeepers

in Macedonia is to deter rather than resolve conflict, therefore preventive; traditional peacekeeping and conflict mitigation are being used to

attempt to resolve; humanitarian relief is

attempting to do all three. But they represent the

application of military and humanitarian means

to political direction, if not a political aim, the

lack of which has been so cruelly and starkly

exposed in recent weeks. Those who preach that

it is now time to switch to Peace Enforcement

should bear in mind that Enforcement is the

extreme method of Resolution. Its introduction

must be weighed against the effect that it would

have on all the other UN-related activities that

are being conducted in the area.

Peace Enforcement will only be undertaken

when Preventive Action has failed, and should be

followed by planned and structured Reconstruction. Any intervention against or within a country

without its consent, is nothing short of war,

declared by the world community, for a particular purpose, and, hopefully, for a limited time.

Therefore, unlike contributions to Traditional or

Wider Peacekeeping, the major lesson for all

contributors to Peace Enforcement operations is

that, besides being under conflict capable command, all committed forces must be conflict

capable, anything less being wholly inappropriate in circumstances in which all the modern

technologies of war will be employed. It simply

is not acceptable to send anyone naked on to the

modern battlefield, which means being ill-trained

or ill-equipped to fight and survive. This is seen

very starkly in Yugoslavia, where some contingents lack any form of personal protection

against the wide range of weaponry that can be

brought to bear against them. Only the British,

French, Canadians, and Danes can be said to be

satisfactorily equipped, which limits the deployment options of the Force Commander. The UN

must establish a mechanism for evaluating contingent capability, which will now be considered.

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING 

IN THE UN

The organizational and planning shortcomings of

the UN, and such essentials as unity of command, with full and common operational control

of all assigned and contributed assets being

vested in the force commander, will have been

discussed already in the workshop, and therefore

only a check list of points will be made here.

None of them are new, but all arise from lessons

learned. They are in no order of priority, but are

based on an appreciation that it is the task of the

UN to plan, mount and sustain, not command,

operations.

The role of the Secretary General will remain

the same. Every Mission mandate must be

endorsed by the Security Council.

One has only to look through the bewildering

number of Security Council resolutions on the

former Yugoslavia to realize how unsatisfactory

this process is in military terms. This state of

affairs is understandable, given that resolutions

reflect the political and diplomatic compromise

possible among current members of the Security

Council. But incredible and undeliverable mandates reflect on the credibility of the organization

as a whole. This may not matter too much when

more general activities are at stake, but it must

not be so when Peace Enforcement is involved.

By its very nature it implies military action, and

that needs clear and unambiguous direction, particularly if it is being effected in the name of the

world community. This highlights the need for

such clear direction, from the UN, and again it is

worth looking back at what the founding fathers

intended for that purpose.

All military operations must have a clear aim.

The problem of Security Council resolutions is

that they translate into neither an aim, nor a clear

military directive. The founding fathers, foresee-
Chapter 7 Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and Technical Requirements | 75

ing this problem, intended there to be a Military

Staff Committee under Article 47 of the Charter,

whose responsibility and role would be to guide

the Security Council. This was to consist of the

Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Five members

of the Security Council, and the Committee is

now a vital missing link that could provide the

solution to many of the problems mentioned. It

should be reinstated now, not as the Chiefs of

Staff of the Permanent Five, but separately for

each Mission, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of

all nations contributing to a Mission. Its Chairman desirably, but not essentially, an ex-UN

Force Commander should also be Military Advisor to the Security Council, and Secretary-General. This committee should be served by a small

International Military Staff that would act as a

military judgement panel on all Security Council

resolutions with a military content.

The Committee should convene to confirm

such essentials as force structures, the command

status of national contingents and the powers of

force commanders over them, rules of engagement, interoperability guidelines, intercommunication, staff procedures, equipment scales and

technology requirements. All these are looked at

in an ad hoc way, by inexperienced and limited

staffs, at present. This is one of the principal reasons why there are so many shortcomings in the

conduct of UN operations. Whether or not a

nation has been invited to take the lead, ideally

Force Commanders should be appointed early

enough for them to take part in all this work, as

well as having a say in the composition of their

own Headquarters. This is an organization and

planning essential, and a lesson from every single UN operation.

The role and responsibility of the Department

of Peacekeeping Operations will not change, but

its staffing must be enhanced. A key element in

this is the expansion of the role of the recently

appointed Assistant Secretary General for Planning and Support, who is, in effect, Inspector

General for Doctrine and Training, whose

responsibilities should include:

■ The preparation, issue and supervision of a

common UN Peacekeeping doctrine.

■ Identifying which nations can provide operational force multipliers such as Intelligence,

Communications, Air, Logistics and Special

Forces.

■ Ensuring commonality of training standards.

■ Laying down minimum interoperability standards for both battlefield procedures and logistics, and inspecting Member Nations to ensure

compliance.

■ Staff College training, to ensure that common

procedures are understood.

He is the natural candidate for the task of contingent capability evaluation. Other organizational support to the UN points include:

■ On the subject of a standing force, something

much advocated to enable the Secretary-General to be able to undertake more effective Preventive Action, whether or not it is to be

followed by Peace Enforcement deployment,

it is suggested that the Allied Mobile Force

(Land) (AMF(L)) be adopted as a model.

Nations contribute troops, who live and train

in their own countries, coming together only

for exercises. It has a Headquarters, Communications, Fire Coordination Center and Logistics Headquarters, into which all contributing

nations can plug. It is a model not just for the

UN but for regional organizations such as the

OAS and OAU, to enable them to act quickly

in their own region.

■ Field Operations Division, is increasing in

capacity and competence. The Stand By

Forces and Logistics studies have provided a

much better data base of what resources are

available among member nations.

■ The newly appointed Under Secretaries General for Administration and Management and

Internal Oversight Services have introduced a

new spirit of realism into the commercial and

procurement side of the UN which has long

been needed. New personnel staffs are tackling the problem of identifying suitable people

to serve on UN staffs, at all levels.

■ Contingency planning remains the province of

the Department of Political Affairs, as does the

obtaining of political and strategic intelligence

from member nations.
76 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

■ The Department of Peacekeeping Operations

remains responsible for maintaining 24 hr contact with an operational Headquarters, and for

the provision of operational intelligence if this

is required.

■ On the subject of intelligence, although equipment is discussed later, a plea is made for the

adoption of the Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirements (CCIR) procedures.

Under this a commander is required to assess

what intelligence is critical to him in the execution of his mission. His staff, and his superiors, will assess from where that information

can be obtained, and then ask for it, on the

grounds that it is “Mission critical.” That

obtaining includes the tasking of sources, technical or otherwise. When introduced within

NATO, this procedure was designed to help

staffs filter the increasing amount of information that was becoming available to them. If

introduced within the UN, from the Security

Council downwards, it could help to overcome

the inhibitions of nations who, for entirely

understandable reasons, are concerned that

intelligence that they regard as a national asset

might get into the hands of some who might

use it against them. The reputation of the UN

as a leaking sieve as far as information is concerned needs to be rectified if full advantage

of the procedure is to be taken.

ORGANIZATION AND PLANNING IN THE 

FIELD

The principal command and control lesson from

Desert Storm has been mentioned already,

namely that it is essential that only properly

trained operational headquarters should be used

to command Peace Enforcement operations, particularly if they are in the high-intensity conflict

spectrum. That stricture applies to sea, land, and

air operations, over which it may be tactful and

sensible to appoint a Joint Force Commander, as

was done on that occasion. At the tactical level it

will always be better to leave national force contingents together, rather than be tempted to break

them up. They have trained together, understand

their own battle procedures and techniques that

apply at the level at which they will be fighting,

and will make a far more effective contribution if

allowed to operate in that way.

Within the assigned operational Headquarters,

some branches must be internationalized, to

enhance cohesion and understanding. This

applies to four branches in particular—intelligence, personnel, logistics and public affairs,

based on the premise that nations tend to be

much more ready to cooperate if they are dealing

with one of their own. The sensitivities of intelligence operations have already been mentioned.

Personnel issues, particularly if casualties are

suffered, are a major cause of political sensitivity, and disciplinary issues also have national

overtones. Catering for logistic special needs and

interoperability shortcomings is a major factor to

be considered. Finally, there is the matter of public affairs. Nations also prefer to hear the story

from their own people, told in their own way.

The numbers of correspondents, and the ease of

communicating, make censorship a practical

impossibility, but control of operational information is an essential, particularly in Peace Enforcement, where secrecy is as much a need on

occasions as in any other form of warfare. There

are many other roles for the media, in the country

of operations, and national media also have a

most important role to play in the vital activity of

encouraging governments and people to stay the

course. Therefore, they must be handled with

care, and coordinated direction of this process

directed from the top.

TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS

All this is spelled out to suggest that the overriding organizational, planning and technical

requirements of Peace Enforcement operations

match those required in war, some of which are

inherent in national armed forces and some of

which must be ensured by the UN if such a Mission is to be conducted in its name. Weaponry

requirements will have to be worked out in relation to the needs of a particular operation and the

capability of the opponent. Desert Storm is an
Chapter 7 Peace Enforcement Organizational Planning and Technical Requirements | 77

admirable example of high technology contributing to the speedy execution of a Mission, something that the world community will always be

anxious to achieve.

But the technology that is essential to the conduct, let alone the success, of a Mission is in the

command and control area, particularly for communications and intelligence collection, collation, and dissemination. The lunacy of not

having secure communications was most

recently illustrated in Bosnia, where the Bosnian Serb artillery fire was corrected onto

Tuzla airfield by Bosnian Serbs listening in to

the Norwegian contingent deployed at the airfield reporting on the artillery fire. Thankfully,

Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System

(JDISS) has been made available by the United

States and so there is a degree of security

between the UN Headquarters and Mission

Headquarters. But it needs to go further than this,

as operations in Somalia proved with secure

communications down to sub-unit level, and

even UN monitor level, must be the procurement

aim.

But if communications are an essential for

successful command and control, and only the

best systems, such as the British Ptarmigan, will

do. The UN attitude to intelligence, for far too

long regarded as a dirty word, is another subject

deserving at least a paper on its own. To quote

from the report of the Commission of Enquiry

established by the Security Council to investigate

armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel:

The need to satisfy the UN’s requirement for

reliable information and intelligence gathering

capability is important if peace enforcement

operations are to be successfully carried out.

Peace Enforcement intelligence requirements

are the same as in war, namely:

■ Strategic intelligence, obviously required to

understand the political situation between the

parties to a conflict before UN involvement,

and, once peacemakers are deployed, to anticipate the political moves of governments or

factions, especially if there is a risk of violence.

■ Political intelligence.

■ Information about the economy and society of

the country concerned.

■ Operational intelligence, required to plan the

most effective deployment of resources and to

carry out the UN mandate. It will be particularly important in fluid and political situations.

■ Tactical intelligence, needed by troops on the

ground, to support Peacekeeping activities,

such as monitoring cease fires in border areas,

and to alert personnel to potential dangers. The

management of intelligence at the tactical

level can be influential in maintaining or losing the UN’s credibility among the parties to a

conflict.

■ Counter intelligence against the parties hostile

to the UN.

The UN cannot provide for all these, nor is it

suggested that it should obtain them. All its

needs can be met by member states, who own the

technology, and who should be asked to provide

it. This is where CCIR procedures come into

play. Traditionally, nations collect, analyze and

use intelligence for their own national purposes,

retaining it under national control, and sharing it

only with those whom they wish to share it. The

UN, which presumably qualifies as a friendly

government, requires intelligence for the good of

the international community, and in the spirit of

that integrity and impartiality that it seeks to

maintain, must be quite open about what it needs

and why. If, within a Peace Enforcement command and control structure, a commander

assesses a piece of information as “Mission critical,” then he should be able to ask for it, confident that it will be provided under that tag. That

may require the tasking of collection means, such

as satellites, information from which has just

been offered by the United States in Bosnia. To

divert to Wider Peacekeeping for a moment, the

author is firmly of the opinion that lack of intelligence gathering, analyzing and disseminating

capability is one of the most severe limitations

on the capability of the Force Commanders,

which is why the offer of U.S. assistance in Bosnia is to be applauded. But, in Peace Enforcement it would be sensible if one nation were
78 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

asked to provide a C3I system, which limits

those nations with the necessary technology as

the only viable providers.

There are two other high technology issues

that must be mentioned, both associated with

Peace Enforcement, but both relating to other

instruments as well. The first, connected to Arms

Control, a key ingredient of Preventive Action,

which impacts on Conflict resolution and Postconflict Reconstruction, is battlefield Explosive

Ordnance Disposal. There is not enough space to

cover this vast subject either in this paper, but the

conference to review the 1980 Convention on

Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be

Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have

Indiscriminate Effects is an important one for the

world community. Land mines, for example, are

all too accessible, and, without demining, there

can be no development. Therefore any UN Peace

Mission must be equipped not just to take action

to enable armed forces to move around a battlefield, but also to begin the task of clearing up

afterwards so that normal life can be resumed.

The second is the burgeoning problem of nonlethal weaponry. The point is that the possession

of these multiplies the effectiveness of any

potential opponent, and defensive techniques

against them are not only expensive in terms of

men, money and machines, but also risk crossing

the dividing line of impartiality and consent, that

takes Wider Peacekeeping into Peace Enforcement. This is a subject that must not be ignored

in the future, either in terms of what it may be

appropriate to employ, or whose availability

must be monitored.

CONCLUSION

So where does this leave us? Two major conclusions can be drawn, within each of which are a

multiplicity of implications.

■ First, as far as Peace Enforcement is concerned, every recent and current operation

confirms that there is an urgent requirement

for the UN to be reorganized so that it is capable of organizing and planning operations of

that complexity. The lessons suggest that this

reorganization must include all parts of the

UN, for which the foundations are there for

this to be done without a major upheaval, but

without which command and control will continue to be flawed, and the credibility of the

Organization diminished.

■ Second, and arising from that, unless the best

communications and intelligence handling

technologies are employed, the UN will be

unable to conduct such operations. It should

not be tempted to try to establish these for

itself, but rather to employ them, and those

who can operate them, from those nations who

own them. This may infuriate the Fifth Committee, who will seek a more international

involvement in the process. But their involvement is that of a user, not a provider, of a force

multiplier that they would be foolish to jeopardize. It may be that use in Peace Operations

encourages more nations to procure such

equipment, which is all to the good, provided

the UN lays down the interoperability standards, because that should ensure swifter

cohesion in any global force structure needed

to enforce peace.
| 79

8

UNOSOM II:

Could

Technology

Have Made a

Difference?

OPERATION WAS FAR FROM A FAILURE

t is commonly believed that the UN effort in Somalia was a

failure of policy or simply too hard a problem given the

unwillingness of nations to sacrifice more to get that failed

country back on its feet. In fact, much was accomplished in

Somalia. Thousands were saved from starvation and disease.

Time was bought for various Somali elements to reconcile or,

failing that, to better protect themselves in semi-autonomous

clan regions. Clearly, however, the costs to the UN and participating nations were too high. The ambitious Security Council

objectives of restoring some sort of transitional government,

basic services, a nearly sustainable economy, and law and order

in the hands of legitimate Somali authorities were not achieved.

In reviewing the UN experience in Somalia, it is often overlooked that the means available to the UN mission were not

equal to the tasks assigned by the Security Council. The UN was

so unready for that complex peace enforcement and nation

building operation that it is difficult to make a valid judgment

about what might have been possible with proper preparation,

resources, and technology.

A frustrating UN attempt to use a small force (UNOSOM 1)

under Chapter VI (of the UN Charter) limitations was one of the

reasons that a large coalition spearheaded by the United States

(UNITAF) was authorized in December 1993. But in relieving

UNITAF in May 1994, UNOSOM II clearly was not ready for

the stresses of a Chapter VII operation. Such a mandate recognizes the potential need to use force to achieve its goals and

implies that there may be armed opposition. Two years later the

UN is still not ready for similar operations.

by

Admiral Jonathan T. 

Howe, USN (ret.)

Associate Director, 

Arthur Vining Davis 

Foundation and former 

Special Representative of 

the UN Secretary 

I
80 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

The post-Cold War period has unleashed a

number of instabilities, many of which are ethnically based and internally centered. These very

complex situations require a skillfully applied

mix of political, humanitarian, and military

resources. Whether under Chapter VI or VII, a

peacekeeping mission needs to minimize the use

of force whenever possible and to take extra precautions to avoid collateral damage. It is important to maintain the support of the majority of the

population, whose good will is essential to any

recovery, even if force must be used against troublemakers.

However, in many situations ahead this new

world disorder will require determination, commitment, and readiness to use force. Often the

UN will face obstructionists who have no interest

in reasonable solutions to conflicts. Coercion or

the recognition that force could be used will be

necessary to convince them to cooperate with

international authorities. This has been true in the

case of external aggression (e.g., Iraq’s invasion

of Kuwait), and the internal disintegration of

countries with growing anarchy and humanitarian catastrophes (e.g., ethnic cleansing in Bosnia,

genocide in Rwanda, and manmade starvation in

Somalia).

CAN PEACEKEEPING BE 

ACCOMPLISHED BY THE UN?

Some veteran peacekeepers believe it is impossible for the UN to use force without seeming to be

taking sides among disputing groups. Others

would oppose the use of a technological advantage if it gave the appearance of being “unfair.” It

is argued by some that peacekeepers should be

unarmed or only lightly armed and that any fighting should be on a near even playing field. These

arguments may have some merit in unusual circumstances, but generally technology should be

exploited to its full advantage to prevent casualties to peacekeepers, to minimize damage to

opponents, and to convey a clear message to

those who would oppose a UN operation that

cooperation is the only sensible alternative.

Technology can help minimize forces required as

well make an emphatic point.

The similarity of recent problems faced by

peacekeepers in differing situations around the

world is striking. Many of the problems encountered by the UN mission in Somalia, for example, were similar to those experienced by other

missions in Cambodia and Bosnia.

In Somalia, the challenges were more political

than technical, more dependent on commitment

and perseverance of nations than on technique

and technology. Nonetheless, it is likely that with

better technical capabilities the story would have

been different. This paper briefly examines the

problems associated with a hastily organized

international military force in Somalia, and then

considers where technology might have made a

difference given the tasks that needed to be

accomplished.

THE CHALLENGE OF A CHAPTER VII UN 

FORCE

In its first Chapter VII operation in a failed

nation, the UN developed a force along the

familiar lines of Chapter VI. However in conducting an operation in which consent from various contesting factions might not be obtainable

(nor was it a prerequisite for entry of the UN),

the force needed a high degree of political and

military cohesion. Organized opposition quickly

exposes weaknesses and requires greater mutual

protection, cooperation, integration and unity.

In preparing for this peacemaking force, the

UN solicited countries from a wide range of

backgrounds and capabilities. Nations that normally are rivals (e.g., Pakistan and India) were

thrown together and expected to cooperate. By

way of contrast, the NATO alliance has many

political and military weaknesses, but it has prepared for potential combat through forty years of

training exercises and has developed political

and military procedures for coordinating and unifying the policy interests of nations. In addition,

it is an alliance of nations with shared values and

is designed to defend the territory of its nations,

not for intervention in other parts of the world.
Chapter 8 UNOSOM II: Could Technology Have Made a Difference? | 81

❚ Participating Units and Equipment 

Varied Significantly

For UNOSOM II, some thirty nations were

brought together in small units. Desert Storm and

the UNITAF part of the Somalia operation were

benefited by a single dominant unifying force.

The United States provided the overwhelming

bulk of the military strength. When UNITAF left

Somalia, responsibilities shifted from a superpower to a weak and diverse international organization.

Almost all of the nations involved limited

what their troops could do, where they could

work (e.g., some refused to be located in Mogadishu), and how they would react to various situations. Nations frequently rotated their units,

delayed for months in sending promised troops

and arbitrarily pulled them out on short notice.

The UN military commander was frequently

unable to move ahead with strategic plans

because of the need to cover gaps of departing

units or readjust the disposition of forces.

The state of training and quality of equipment

of various units varied significantly. In trying to

find replacements, UN headquarters in New York

tended to simply count numbers of troops. But

one is not equal to one when evaluating soldiers.

Some units simply did not have the training to do

what the Force Commander required. For example, they were uncomfortable patrolling at night

or expanding the perimeters around compounds

to help prevent short range mortar attacks.

When heavier or more capable equipment was

urgently requested by the commander, the UN

was dependent on nations for immediate results.

It had no reserve of its own to draw on in emergencies. After the attacks of June 5, l993 against

the Pakistani force, for example, the Security

Council called for member states urgently to

contribute “armored personnel carriers, tanks and

attack helicopters.” More than a month later

when eight old M-48 tanks finally arrived for the

Pakistanis, their breech blocks were inoperative.

From ammunition to maintenance to language, interoperability of this force assembled

from all over the world was a continuing challenge. Such problems are to be expected. But an

even more difficult problem is the inherent tendency of nations to micro-manage their units

from distant capitals. It is understandable that

nations would want to control their units facing

dangerous situations, but this inclination presents

a nearly insurmountable obstacle for a commander trying to marshal limited resources and

to implement a coherent strategy. On one occasion a unit was stopped by its capital from counterattacking in mid-battle. Instead of receiving an

important message, the “enemy” was emboldened. Some units were even suspected of colluding with opponents of the United Nations, at least

to the extent of providing them a de facto sanctuary.

Another problem was that each nation seemed

to have a different political threshold for casualties. No nation had an easy time justifying casualties in what is basically a humanitarian

situation, but some seemed to believe that Chapter VII still meant a relatively risk free operation.

When it did not, the result was often inaction,

accommodation, or departure. This series of

reactions produced a much less effective force.

Given how the force in Somalia had been assembled, expectations should not have been high that

it could accomplish much if tested. The UN demonstrated that it is not yet ready for Chapter VII

peace enforcement operations.

TASKS FOR TECHNOLOGY

With more effective technology, the tasks faced

by UN military forces could have been made easier and might have helped produce better outcomes. However, for the most part, the UN did

not face overwhelming, sustained, or even skillfully executed attacks. Somalia has a large land

area but a relatively small population. Although

there were different types of challenges throughout the country, most of the opposition was limited to part of the capital city. The tactics used

against the international force were typical of

guerrilla warfare in many areas of the world.

Nonetheless, in an urban setting such as Mogadishu these tactics can be difficult to combat
82 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

even with a well-trained force. The following are

some of the requirements of the UNOSOM II

forces that could have been met more effectively

with better technology.

❚ Good Intelligence

In order to do their jobs, military commanders

needed to be able to detect the movement of

opposing forces, determine the locations of hidden arms stockpiles, and anticipate the plans of

those who might attack the UN. In trying to control a city at night and to ensure that various

transportation routes remained open and were

not used for smuggling arms into the city or relocating militias, twenty-four-hour surveillance

was necessary. Helicopters were the best means

for active reconnaissance in the city, but these

were not always available. Commanders

requested the support of remotely piloted vehicles that could maintain good coverage over a

sustained period. These might have provided a

better picture around the clock, but were never

made available.

Intelligence, of course, was also critical to the

civilian effort to understand the political situation and to facilitate the complex reconciliation

process between multiple factions and clans.

❚ Frustrating Attacks

Related to good intelligence was the need to be a

step ahead of the opposition and to anticipate

their moves. When confronted with periodic random attacks such as ambushes and mortar

attacks, it is important to prepare for them by

taking proper defensive measures. Those in the

military compounds were subjected to frequent

mortar and rifle-propelled grenades (RPG) shelling, and had to sprint from soft Quonset huts and

tents to makeshift shelters. Civilians, as well as

military personnel, were equipped with flak jackets and helmets, but were constantly at risk.

Early warning helped, but it was often incorrect or unavailable. Warning also allows more

effective countermeasures and provides an

opportunity to disrupt attacks before they are

launched. This, however, requires good intelligence and the ability to evaluate, disseminate,

and react rapidly. In an unsophisticated society

very ancient means of collection need to be fused

with the most modern methods.

❚ Protecting People

A constant worry in Somalia was how to protect

UN civilians and international relief workers.

Protection from shelling was just one of the dangers they encountered. Civilian vulnerability was

the Achilles’ heel of the operation. Their safety

was paramount if the job of facilitating the

recovery of the country was to be accomplished.

Military units were organized, had the training

and means to protect themselves, and faced danger as part of their responsibilities. Civilians, on

the other hand, were often assigned to remote

areas where there were no nearby military forces

or lived in compounds that did not have military

protection. This made them vulnerable to criminals and to those trying to disrupt UN operations

for political reasons. Locally hired guards were

of uncertain reliability. There were frequent

accusations that guards hired by the non-govenmental organizations (NGOs) protected them by

day and robbed them by night.

In the case of civilians living outside the military compounds in Mogadishu, it was decided in

mid-May, before the attacks of June 5, l993, that

the best way to improve their security was to

deploy a Nepalese Gurkha battalion. Eventually

a civilian protection service, which could give

some assurance of the reliability of locally

trained Somalis, would be hired. In spite of the

urgency of this need, it was four months before

the first Gurkhas arrived and protection

improved for the civilians. This was typical of

the unresponsiveness of the UN system to pressing needs in the field.

Fortunately, only one UN civilian was lost.

Ironically, this came after the cessation of hostilities and resulted from a carjacking attempt by

common criminals. Clearly, there need to be

ways of reducing the individual risks to these

courageous men and women.
Chapter 8 UNOSOM II: Could Technology Have Made a Difference? | 83

❚ Protecting Fixed Installations

Fixed positions and facilities required sensors

that would give early warning of attacks or of the

nearly continuous criminal activity. Night vision

was essential, but very few UN units were

trained in it and very little equipment was provided. There was every reason for the UN to control the night, but it did not have the training or

equipment to do so.

Light mortars shelled UN facilities on many

evenings, wounding civilians and military alike,

damaging unprotected helicopters on the ground,

and contributing to a sense of vulnerability and

insecurity. Mortars would be pulled from vans

and quickly set up; after a few shells were fired

the attackers would speed away. Greater vigilance at check points and more active patrols outside the perimeter would have helped make it

more difficult to reach the compounds with short

ranged mortars and with other weapons such as

RPGs.

There was also concern that terrorist raids

would be initiated from inside. Large Somali

trucks visited the compounds daily to bring supplies or to pump water or fuel; workers entered

by the hundreds for construction or other services. Truck bombs could easily have been

brought into the compounds. Gate inspection

procedures were tightened, but this is not easy to

accomplish in a multi-cultural organization.

Technology would have improved detection possibilities.

❚ Crowd Control

A favorite opposition tactic was to stage a demonstration and attempt to provoke peacekeepers.

Women and children would be deliberately

mixed into organized crowds to complicate the

problem of control. A classic example was on

June 13, l993, when a demonstration was staged

in front of a Pakistani strong point. Not by accident, the site selected was next to the only press

center in the city. As the mob converged on the

Pakistani position, shots were fired at the soldiers

from on top of nearby buildings and from the

crowd. The beleaguered Pakistanis returned fire,

wounding some Somalis in the crowd. However,

there was evidence that some in the crowd were

also shot from behind by their own people to

present an image for the press of a UN out of

control. This incident was one of the reasons that

it was decided four days later to declare that faction leader Aidid had become a menace to public

safety who should be detained.

It would have been far preferable to have been

able to disperse this organized crowd with nonlethal means and thus have prevented a contrived

demonstration from becoming damaging in

terms of world opinion. Although the Pakistanis

were supposed to have riot control equipment

and training in how to use it, preparations were

inadequate. It was believed, however, that prevailing winds would have prevented the use of

tear gas if it had been available. Equipment was

flown in urgently and some training was subsequently conducted with the help of US forces.

Capabilities improved but crowds continued

to be a problem. There was a need for a nonlethal means for breaking up crowds under prevailing weather conditions and at least separating

out non-combatants. Women and children were

repeatedly mixed in with gunmen and used as

shields. On June 17 they were used to close a

Moroccan column to hand grenade range, resulting in serious casualties to perplexed soldiers.

Women and children were often used to construct roadblocks and were mixed into ambush

groups. Aidid reportedly boasted that these tactics would intimidate UN soldiers. If women and

children were hurt by UN peacekeepers, he could

count on a media propaganda victory.

In one incident, a combination of US engineers and Pakistani escorts trying to remove a

roadblock on a main artery was confronted by

several hundred Somalis. With women mixed in

their group, male shooters attacked from behind

walls and buildings. The resulting defense by

tanks and helicopters, in order to extract UN personnel from the ambush, resulted in heavy casualties to the Somali attackers. But the media

reports were much more damaging to the UN.

Not only Aidid used these tactics. During the

UNITAF period, Belgians watched helplessly in
84 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Kismayo while fighters from one faction (Morgan’s) infiltrated the town and a mixed gender

crowd chased out the supporters of another faction (Jess). The Belgians were accused by Jess

followers of deliberately allowing this to happen,

but the Belgian troops were actually at a loss as

to how to break up these mixed groups of combatants and non-combatants.

Swarming was also a difficult tactic to combat. It was evidently assumed that if enough people ran at a vehicle or a cordon protecting a

search operation, UN soldiers would face the difficult choice of either having to shoot unarmed

civilians or retreat.

In these situations, an effective means of

breaking up crowds and isolating shooters would

have been useful. At one point, a multi-purpose

anti-riot control vehicle was offered to the UN by

the French, but the price for this new technology

was extremely high and there was only one of

them available.

❚ Communications

For a widespread community of workers, both

UN and NGO, there was a glaring need for flexible communications, both within the cities and

towns and between isolated posts and regional or

national headquarters. In a country with no telephone system, the problem for the UN was to be

able to talk reliably with representatives in widespread and remote areas of the country. This was

necessary for safety and for timely reporting and

policy discussions. Portable phones and radios

were finally acquired in sufficient numbers to

help short range communications within cities,

but these were insecure. When phones were stolen or lost, Somalis were soon on the nets with

disruptive chatter.

❚ Movement

The ability to move throughout the city was

important to the resupply and reinforcement of

isolated positions and bases. Relief supplies

needed transporting within and outside the city

from the port. Personnel needed to move from

their quarters to their place of work or to do business or conduct meetings within the city. These

movements were countered by roadblocks sometimes combined with ambushes, buried mines,

and remotely detonated explosives. Bypass roads

were constructed and guarded, routes were swept

in advance and posted, times of convoys were

varied and routes were changed regularly, helicopter transportation was used as an alternative,

and escorts were provided. Nonetheless, there

was a need for better detection and protection to

reduce the dangers of ground movement. Work

was hampered by the need to move during daylight hours, and it was difficult to hold meetings

when people had to come from different locations. Heavy armored vehicles for breaking down

roadblocks were not available until after organized hostilities had been concluded. Technology

may have some answers for the safer movement

of people and vehicles in a dangerous city.

❚ Controlling Movement

The opposite of ensuring UN movement was to

deny it to potential attackers or those smuggling

arms and ammunition into the city. A system of

citywide strong points and check points manned

by UN military forces was developed, but these

were only partially effective. Inadequate

searches at check points and simple evasion techniques contributed to the inadequacies of this

system. An integrated network was needed to

spot and counter those moving with trucks and

other vehicles around checkpoints. More thorough inspections of vehicles were required to

detect arms and other illicit goods. Indiscriminately shooting from the air anything that moved

was not feasible given the potential for collateral

damage, misidentification, and hurting innocent

individuals.

Helicopters were of value, but eventually

became a target for massed gun fire when flying

low to the ground. There were rumors of shoulder fired surface-to-air missiles and precautions

had to be taken to reduce vulnerability, but no

missiles were actually detected. The “eyes over

Mogadishu” program of surveillance with helicopters had some deterrent effect on movement,
Chapter 8 UNOSOM II: Could Technology Have Made a Difference? | 85

but observations from the air needed to be better

integrated with effective monitoring and inspection on the ground. When AC-130 gunships were

available they had success in detecting and countering activities at night and were a respected

deterrent.

❚ Disarmament

There was a need to find, contain, and destroy

heavy weapons. Faction weapons were moved

out of central storage sites and hidden in various

clandestine sites around the city. While many

weapons were found and destroyed, an improved

capability was needed to detect their presence

and to destroy them from standoff distances

without causing a high degree of collateral damage.

❚ Tracking “Elvis”

Finding a few prominent individuals in a third

world city is not easy. Capturing them without

significant casualties on either side requires a

high degree of training and technology. Given a

number of unsuccessful experiences worldwide,

this is an area in which technology may one day

provide some better answers. Part of the problem

in Somalia was that specially trained forces did

not come for more than two months, losing valuable time and adding to the degree of difficulty.

It was also important to have the ability to

locate and rescue hostages and prisoners. In

Somalia, those who had been kidnapped or captured were only retrieved by negotiation. Human

intelligence is important, but technology may be

able to help. For example, people going into dangerous situations may need hidden devices that

could be tracked if they were captured.

❚ Security

Security of information and military/diplomatic

planning is essential. In a UN operation, individual units from different countries of a rapidly

assembled force bring a diversity of standards. In

Somalia, information protection over the telephone and other communications was nearly

nonexistent and classified information was

loosely handled. Surprise Ranger raids into Aidid

areas uncovered sensitive documents from various UN and military organizations.

On the civilian side, where there were many

sensitive strategy papers and other documents

that needed protection, the small UN staff came

from 80 different nations. With traditional peacekeeping operations, UN personnel have been

used to a wide-open system. The precautions

required during a dangerous peace enforcement

mission were not understood. It was not a case of

carelessness and occasional lapses; training and

good habits were nonexistent. Somalis, who

were not regular staff members, were constantly

around in significant numbers, hired as cleaners

and for other work requirements. Many came

from the local neighborhoods where Aidid’s clan

was predominant. Aidid bragged to the UN political division chief that he saw papers intended

for the Special Representative before the UN

chief did.

Some training and tightening resulted in security improvements. Safes and file cabinets with

locks were ordered. Documents were shredded

and burned and doors were locked when UN staff

left their offices. Nonetheless, the whole operation was very loose and undoubtedly too much

sensitive information was easily accessible.

Months went by before the mission could

communicate in a semi-secure fashion with the

UN in New York from a few phones. Secure

phones also were only available to a handful of

the officials in New York, meaning considerable

amounts of sensitive information undoubtedly

were passed in the clear. Secure fax helped with

the most sensitive written communications, but it

was a laborious procedure and many documents

did not have this modest degree of protection.

❚ Countering Criminality

Even in times when there was no organized

opposition to the UN, criminals were a constant

problem. In a society of 90 percent unemployed

and desperate human needs, this is not too surprising. Compounds would be infiltrated regularly by thieves. NGO facilities were regularly
86 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

robbed of cash, and even the UN payroll was stolen. Once the UN received vehicles, shipped

from the winding-down Cambodian operation,

vehicles began to disappear, even from the UN

compound. There were numerous attempts at

carjacking on the street. Simple anti-theft devices

and countermeasures were needed. For example,

a stolen car needed to shut down automatically,

etc.

❚ Civilian Needs

The civilian programs for providing humanitarian assistance, supporting the selection of District Councils in remote areas, and restoring the

legal system needed help in many ways. One

area recognized as critical from the beginning

was the ability to reach the Somali population

with information. The UNOSOM newspaper

helped, although there were constant distribution

problems, and it only reached a small percentage

of the population.

But Somalia is an oral society and one in

which destructive misinformation is often

believed. Somalis listen to the radio, and UNOSOM needed to be able to reach audiences

throughout the country. A broadcast system,

inherited from UNITAF, reached Mogadishu and

a little beyond, but a system was needed for the

whole country. This was not the result of a technological gap. Equipment existed on the shelf.

The challenge was to convince bureaucrats and

committees in New York that communicating

with the Somali people was an essential part of

the mission. After many budget battles, approval

was finally gained, but the equipment was never

installed. Regular communication was critical to

an operation dependent on the good will and

cooperation of the inhabitants.

CONCLUSIONS

Although many of UNOSOM II’s needs could

have been filled with better training, increased

resources, and a more responsive system, UN

experiences in Somalia demonstrated a number

of technological needs. As described above,

some of these include:

■ Better ways to prevent and counter short range

mortar attacks. Early warning of these and

other types of attacks is essential to protection

of personnel.

■ Improved capabilities to detect and prevent

intrusion, especially at night.

■ More effective riot control equipment. Noncombatants need to be discouraged from mixing with combatants or carrying out tasks on

behalf of shooters who use them for shields or

to accomplish other dangerous tasks.

■ Advanced capabilities in the detection of

mines, remotely operated explosives, and

ambushes.

■ Ways to reduce the dangers to civilians having

to operate alongside the military in a semihostile environment.

■ A system of overhead coverage with real time

feedback to ground forces to improve opportunities to disrupt hostile or illegal activities.

■ More effective methods for moving people in

a city with potential guerrilla/terrorist threats.

■ Better ways for inspecting personnel and vehicles legally entering guarded compounds.

■ Secure, flexible, reliable, and redundant means

for communicating to both short and long distance sites.

The types of challenges the UN forces faced

in Somalia are probably typical of what can be

expected in many other situations. Technological

advances and proper training can make the task

of a UN soldier and civilian in similar circumstances much easier to accomplish. Technology

has an important role to play if the UN is going

to develop a satisfactory Chapter VII capability.
| 87

9

UNPROFOR and UNTAC:

Lessons Learned as to

Requirements for

Planning, Training, and

Equipment

INTRODUCTION

his paper will attempt to extract the major lessons

learned from UN experiences related to UNPROFOR

(UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, i.e.,

Croatia, Bosnia, The Former Yugoslav Republic of

Macedonia) and UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia). The focus will be on:

■ the broad area of planning, with particular attention to the formulation of achievable mandates or United Nations Security

Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), and the command and control arrangements in the field; ■ training, as a means to operationalize and practice the relevant

military doctrine associated with a particular peace operation;

and ■ specific equipment items appropriate for peace operations.

❚ UNPROFOR

Analysis will focus largely on UNPROFOR as a continuing

peace operation laboratory, using UNTAC to supplement this

analysis with other unique lessons learned.

The formulation of clear and achievable mandates, usually

expressed in a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), is a

critical first step in any UN-directed peace operation. The mandate determines the appropriate military doctrine, whether it is

traditional peacekeeping or “multidimensional peace operations,” and doctrine, in turn, determines the training and equipment of the force.

by

John O. B. Sewall, M. Gen., 

USA (Ret.)

Vice Director of the 

Institute for National 

Strategic Studies,

National Defense 

University, 

Washington, D.C.

T
88 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Clear and achievable mandates depend, in

turn, on:

■ sufficient predeployment reconnaissance or

“technical surveys”;

■ professional force and logistic planning;

■ professional analysis of resource requirements; and

■ constant dialogue between military planners

and policy makers, both in national capitals

and UN Headquarters in New York.

There is a constant requirement for continuous

dialogue between military planners and policy

makers to avoid unintended “mission creep”

where requirements quickly outstrip capabilities

and resources. UNPROFOR’s mission change in

Bosnia, from facilitating humanitarian assistance

to protecting designated safe areas and enforcing

heavy weapons exclusion zones, had profound

doctrinal and resource implications.

Although in theory it may be possible to

employ traditional peacekeeping with elements

of peace enforcement in the same tactical context, in practice it is militarily difficult and politically sensitive. Peace enforcement is, by and

large, incompatible with impartial, consensual

peacekeeping.

In that units are organized and equipped differently for traditional peacekeeping and

enforcement actions, units are not interchangeable, nor can they transition back to traditional

peacekeeping once they cross the “Mogadishu

line” into peace enforcement and are consequently perceived as a co-belligerent.

In multidimensional peace operations, such as

those involving humanitarian and refugee assistance, electoral monitoring, developmental assistance, et al., planning must incorporate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as

UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, WHO, and ICRC into

the earliest stages of planning and ensure their

representation in field headquarters.

In all peace operations, well-trained, competent staffs are key to supporting the force commander. LTG Morillon was fortunate in

deploying to Bosnia with the NATO NORTHAG

Mobile Headquarters, a well-trained headquarters versed in NATO staff procedures. Unfortunately, this is an exception to most UN field

deployments, where ad hoc staffs are quickly

thrown together and operations are further constrained by incompatibilities in force equipment

and training status.

Adequate command and control arrangements

are essential to prosecuting effective, multinational peace operations. Because UN peace operations will never achieve true “unity of

command,” every nation will insist that its own

national sovereignty “unity of purpose” can be

achieved by full agreement on the mission (the

UNSCR mandate) and the relevant doctrine

(concept of operation). This understanding must

be supplemented by adequate communications

equipment and liaison parties.

Field headquarters need to be fully integrated

civil/military headquarters with full NGO representation, to include integration of all United

Nations Military Observers (UNMOs). UNMOs

in Bosnia need to be integrated at the BosniaHerzegovina (B-H) Command level, not at

UNPROFOR Headquarters, Zagreb.

In that a large part of UNPROFOR’s logistic

and other support is contracted, there is a requirement to better integrate Civil Affairs Officer support at the user command level (B-H Command

rather than Zagreb or New York at the Field

Operations Division).

Just as traditional peacekeeping and peace

enforcement are usually incompatible in the

same tactical context, use of NATO air (peace

enforcement) coupled with UN forces on the

ground (peacekeepers), incapable of defending

themselves, is a recipe for discrediting the entire

UN and NATO effort.

UN custody of Serb heavy weapons at UN

collection points in both Croatia and Bosnia has

proven to be a failure in that UN custody has

lacked enforcement and has been more appearance than substance.

❚ UNTAC

Most of the UNPROFOR planning lessons

learned apply equally to UNTAC, although the

“all means necessary” provision of Chapter VII

of the United Nations Charter used in Bosnia was

not invoked by the United Nations in its UN-
Chapter 9 UNPROFOR and UNTAC | 89

directed peace operation in Cambodia. The following are Cambodia-unique planning lessons:

Although UNTAC was the broadest, most

complex and expensive peace operation prior to

UNPROFOR, planning suffered at the outset

from a lack of coherent, synthesized intelligence

data for predeployment planning. Three separate

technical survey teams were dispatched with

minimal coordination and useful output.

“Unity of purpose” and coherence of the force

were greatly facilitated in the field by requiring

all contributing nations to coordinate all messages to home capitals with UNTAC.

Planning for one of the multidimensional

peace operation tasks election monitoring was

inadequate, resulting in using UNMOs to fill the

shortfall, hardly a preferred solution and one that

required ad hoc, catchup training.

Predeployment planning did not identify the

requirement for adequate headquarters and staff

support, resulting in weaknesses in logistic and

operational planning, as well as basic language

problems.

UNTAC’s experience in Cambodia illustrated

another key lesson for predeployment planning,

that of anticipating and relieving the economic

impact of a UN presence in a Third-World country. Black market activities and economic distortion of local economies with hyperinflation were

unanticipated legacies.

In spite of detailed planning related to disarming militia and demobilizing combatants, the

regroupment and cantonment regime based on

voluntary participation did not work, particularly

when basic ethnic/factional attitudes remained

unchanged, and one or more sides saw the balance of forces being altered to their disadvantage.

TRAINING

❚ UNPROFOR

As previously mentioned, training must be keyed

to the military doctrine relevant to the mandate

and peace operation at hand. Specific lessons

learned follow:

Predeployment training is essential on the role

of force and accompanying Rules of Engagement

(ROE), particularly in ambiguous situations of

partial or sporadic consent. Although the line is

inherently fuzzy, specific scenario-driven training must focus on those Chapter VII coercive

uses of military force that do not erode UN

impartiality or result in crossing the “Mogadishu

line.” As mentioned earlier, such use of coercive

force is both politically sensitive and militarily

difficult. This author remains convinced that

Chapter VII actions are incompatible with UNdirected, as opposed to UN-authorized, peace

operations.

Training related to indigenous culture, history

and religion, and expected UN conduct and discipline must be accomplished before deployment

to enhance the impartiality of the force and

ensure the highest standards of performance.

Such common training would have reduced difficulties UNPROFOR experienced with Russian,

Nigerian, and Ukrainian units.

Other mission-unique training, not routinely

covered in general purpose forces’ annual training schedules, includes:

■ arbitration/negotiation skills,

■ manning check points/road blocks,

■ planning/coordinating UNHCR convoys, and

■ international legal/human rights guidelines.

❚ UNTAC

In an extremely complex operation involving 32

national contingents, UNTAC clearly felt the

need for professional, well-trained staff officers

conversant in common military language and

procedures. Language training in such a diverse

environment was essential.

A common predeployment training program

based on UN/NATO/national guidance is badly

needed, particularly since UN force contributions

are solicited more on regional balance than military efficiency or effectiveness. UNTAC saw

wide disparities in training skills with training

shortfalls most apparent in units from Bulgaria,

Ghana, Tunisia, and Indonesia.
90 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Demining and mine clearance were specific

skills identified and required by UNTAC, given

the wide proliferation of mines throughout Cambodia. Such skills were fully incorporated into a

“Mine Clearance Training Unit” designed for

indigenous personnel.

EQUIPMENT

❚ UNPROFOR

Identified equipment requirements are as follows:

Intelligence capabilities are key to any military operation, and although the UN has historically viewed intelligence as incompatible with

the impartiality required in traditional peacekeeping, it has lately found greater support. In

this regard, airborne platforms are key (e.g.,

AWACs, JSTARs or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles

(UAVs)) to be confident that corralling or cantonment of heavy weapons is being accomplished, that separation criteria are being

observed, or that forces are complying with nofly zones.

Precision, rather than area, weapons are

required to ensure the selective engagement of

targets (the “smoking gun”) and to reduce collateral damage. A higher allocation of snipers per

ground unit is preferred to enhance this selective

engagement.

C4I equipment is always at a premium. In the

current case of NATO air being used in support

of UNPROFOR forces on the ground under

“dual-key arrangements,” ground-to-air communications and target designation equipment are

requirements not commonly found in most UN

peace operations.

In that the “smoking gun” is frequently a mortar or artillery piece, artillery or mortar directionfinding radars are essential for selective target

identification and engagement.

When first deployed to Croatia in 1992, lack

of vehicle stocks and spare parts inhibited

UNPROFOR’s achievement of full mission

effectiveness. Common equipment stocks and

other nonperishable items have been consistently

articulated as requirements for all UN peace

operations, most recently covered in Secretary

General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s An Agenda for

Peace.

Concerning other organizational/equipment

requirements, the following capabilities are enumerated to provide the required force flexibility:

■ engineer units/equipment for nation-building

and confidence restoration;

■ intelligence capabilities (C4I);

■ logistic units; and

■ multimedia public affairs (PA) and psychological operations (PSYOPS) units to communicate UN intentions and objectives, both to the

local nationals and to the warring factions

themselves.

❚ UNTAC

Three UNTAC-unique equipment requirements

follow:

■ As indicated earlier in the planning discussion,

mine detection and mine clearance equipment

were high-priority items, given the specific

environmental situation in Cambodia.

■ In that UNTAC was excluded from Khmer

Rouge areas, insufficient C4I capabilities hindered knowledge of Khmer Rouge heavy

weapons’ locations. In addition, there was little capability to assess Cambodian cheating on

cantonment of such weapons.

■ It took one year to establish Radio UNTAC.

An initial PSYOPS capability would have

greatly facilitated this important communications function.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Berdal, Mats R., “Whither UN Peacekeeping,” Adelphi Paper 281, London: IISS.

2. Bullock, Arthur M., A Comparison of Five

UN Peace Operations, Santa Monica:

RAND.

3. Durch, Reed, and Vaccaro; Handbook on

United Nations Peace Operations, The

Henry L. Stimson Center, Handbook No. 3,

April 1995, Washington: Stimson Center.
Chapter 9 UNPROFOR and UNTAC | 91

4. Discussions with LTG Michael Rose, previous Commander of B-H Command,

UNPROFOR, April 20, 1995.

5. Discussions with LTG John M. Sanderson,

previous Commander of UNTAC, Cambodia, May 20, 1994.

6. MacInnis, John A., “Peacekeeping and Postmodern Conflict,” Mediterranean Quarterly,

Spring 1995, Durham: Duke University

Press.
| 93

10

Technology and

Peacekeeping: Too

Good to Be True?

erhaps the best way for me to use the group’s time is to

offer the purely personal perspective of a National Security Council (NSC) staffer on some of the issues before

us. Nothing I say should be construed as reflecting the

Administration’s position on peacekeeping, or its foreign policy

in general.

This focus on my experience with United States intervention

decisions is, I think, appropriate. Since from the point of view of

the conference organizers our focus should be on the way U.S.

forces should be trained and equipped to wage peacekeeping (or

whatever precise term best describes the particular contingency

under discussion), it is also appropriate because much of what is

going to happen with respect to UN peacekeeping will be driven

by U.S. policy, or rather the way U.S. policy is implemented.

I will begin by making a couple of brief observations about

technology and peacekeeping, then describe where I think the

United States is as a government on peacekeeping. Finally, I will

explain why I think that it’s probably too early to celebrate the

widespread application of new, or even old technologies, to

peacekeeping and close by taking questions. What I will try not

to do is veer off into discussion of specific operations or dissect

the UN’s management of operations. My only objective is to set

the stage for talking about technologies and peacekeeping.

For the purpose of the rapporteur’s report, let me say at the

outset that I think the U.S. military should procure whatever

technologies it needs and can afford to fulfill the missions

assigned by national command authorities. These missions do

relate to peace operations. This is the answer of main concern of

the conference organizers, at least from my parochial standpoint.

P

by

Steven N. Simon

Staff Member, 

U.S. National 

Security Council
94 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

The United States in the future will certainly be

involved in small wars. These wars will involve

combat in urban terrain and against enemies

interspersed among civilians. It is under these

conditions that the United States is self-deterred

from using its firepower willy-nilly. The onscene commander, especially the junior leader,

needs as much information about his/her adversary as possible, to get inside his decision cycle

and disrupt his operations.

With respect to the broader issue of technology intended for use in military interventions in

peacekeeping or peace enforcement, the picture

is a bit more complicated.

I should note here that I am not an expert

about peacekeeping technologies. This is not just

modesty. There is a point here. After Tony

invited me to the conference, I attempted to read

up on the subject of technologies and peacekeeping. The White House library had nothing on the

shelf. In the Office of the Secretary of Defense,

in the planning shop, I was referred to an officer

who had contributed to the Army’s new doctrine

for operations-other-than-war, but who disclaimed any special knowledge of new technologies and peacekeeping. I called up RAND and

spoke to a physicist who had tried to do a study

of the subject, but could not get it published.

Attempts to contact Jan Morris, a visionary in

this area, failed. The most illuminating material I

found was from the pen of Dick Garwin. My

point is this: When a member of the NSC staff

went to seek advice on new technologies and

peacekeeping, the experts within the government

who I am confident exist were entombed so

deeply in the bureaucracy that their advice could

not be solicited.

From the material I could locate, I concluded

that technology for peacekeeping falls into two

broad categories: monitoring, surveillance, and

verification on the one hand, and tactical equipment on the other. Obviously there is some

overlap between these two categories.

The use of advanced surveillance technology

is valuable in the planning process before a

peacekeeping operation is undertaken, especially

where the theater of operations is not familiar.

How good is the infrastructure? What is port

capacity? What about road capacity and throughput? Communications? What is the terrain like?

Where are the principal cities and towns? Where

are masses of refugees concentrated? Do the

local combatants have strongholds, cantonments,

weapons storage areas, or important communications nodes?

At least some of these questions can be

answered with imagery, acquired by a variety of

platforms. The information obtained thereby can

help determine how large an intervention force is

needed, what its lift and sustainment requirements will be, and in consequence, how much

the intervention is likely to cost.

These sorts of capabilities also have obvious

uses in confidence building and by this I mean

instilling confidence in one party regarding the

actions and intentions of the other and instilling

confidence in each party regarding its respective

capabilities to cope with attack. Such capabilities

can also help determine the sources of violations

in highly confusing situations; mortar and artillery fire-finding radars can under some conditions enable observers to know who shot John,

especially where there are suspicions that John

himself has shot John to implicate a rival party.

Fire-finding radars are also good for force protection. Similar technologies are also indispensable in monitoring and verifying compliance

with disengagement or truce arrangements, as we

have heard regarding the Sinai and Golan disengagement, which are monitored by U-2 aircraft.

Virginia Gamba has already given us an exhaustive list of the various confidence building measures and verification schemes. This list is well

known from Helsinki and the work of the CSCE

in Vienna that benefited from these technologies,

so further elaboration is unnecessary.

As Admiral Howe points out in his paper,

intelligence collection is equally necessary for

protection of UN troops in the field. This kind of

tactical intelligence is indispensable for preventing the smuggling of weapons into vulnerable

areas and preventing ambushes. There are in

many types of sensors, descendants of the Vietnam-era sensors grabbed off the shelf by E-Sys-
Chapter 10 Technology and Peacekeeping: Too Good to Be True? | 95

tems for the Sinai Field Mission that would meet

this requirement quite well. Some of these are

now in development, due in part to the interest of

the special operations and low intensity conflict

specialists in the U.S. Department of Defense.

Nor is there much dispute about the potential

utility of less-than-lethal weapons, otherwise

known as pre-lethal weapons, since many were

conceived of as techniques to transfix prey

before the kill. Although at the last conference I

attended where this was an issue, one participant

advised the conferees that “anything worth

doing, was worth doing lethally.” I think we all

agree that there are times when this is not a useful ethos.

For example, Admiral Howe would probably

agree that if the Pakistani troops had had an alternative, non-lethal, means of coping with the

Aidid-inspired crowds in Mogadishu, events

might have played out differently for UNOSOM

II.

Having said this, I will turn to my real theme:

Constraints on the development and deployment

of these new and not so new technologies. I see

three related issues: money, feasibility, and the

scope of the actual requirement. Of these three,

funding is most important.

MONEY

Some new technologies are relatively cheap,

while others, especially in the area of surveillance and monitoring, are less so. However

someone must still buy them, maintain them, and

be in a position to lend them to those who need

them but cannot acquire them. Few countries

have the money to do this; even the United States

can play this role only in a limited way.

The mood in Congress toward anything

related to peacekeeping, or the UN in general, is

extremely negative. More broadly, the mood in

Congress does not favor spending on the entire

array of international programs at levels even

close to those we have seen over the past decade.

The relevant numbers are based on the one

appropriations bill and one authorization bill that

have thus far been reported out of their respective subcommittees in the House.

United States spending on foreign programs

will be cut by at least $2 billion in FY 96, from a

$2.1 billion level of effort, which also happens to

correspond to the Administration’s FY 96

request for these programs. The effect of a cut

this size is heavier than it would appear. One

fourth of the budget goes to Egypt and Israel,

which neither the Administration nor Congress

would wish to cut. One fourth goes to State

Department salaries and infrastructure, which

cannot, as a practical matter, be cut. The other

fourth goes to programs that are unassailable for

political or other programmatic reasons, such as

disaster relief or antiterrorism assistance. This

means that the $2 billion is necessarily going to

come out of an exceedingly small base. Competition among agencies responsible for implementing U.S. foreign policy will be sharp.

These deep cuts will pit those who want to

fund multilateral programs, such as international

financial institutions, against those who want to

fund bilateral aid programs. Peacekeeping advocates within the Administration are likely to get

caught in the crossfire.

By peacekeeping, I mean both assessed UN

peacekeeping and voluntary peacekeeping.

These are two separate accounts, the latter serving as a very flexible source of funds for use in

contingencies. Unfortunately, this is likely to be

cut back to a sum just large enough to pay for a

handful of operations, including MFO (Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai) and

UNFICYP (UN Force in Cyprus).

That this was going to happen was already

apparent in the preparation of the President’s FY

96 budget request, which did not fully fund anticipated costs of the assessed debt and current

operations. (This debt will grow by another $1

billion if an UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force

in the former Yugoslavia] withdrawal operation

is conducted on an assessed basis.) There was

simply not enough room under the top line permitted by the Administration’s budget overseers.

We now see that this restrictive top line was
96 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

unrealistically generous toward international

programs.

At the same time, the likely Republican nominee for the 1996 presidential race has cast peacekeeping as something fundamentally at odds

with America’s national interest. His colleague,

the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, has expressed himself even more

plainly. Both have sponsored legislation that

would severely limit the Administration’s flexibility in carrying out UN peacekeeping operations, both voluntary and assessed.

To make matters worse, negative public perceptions of UN involvement in the former Yugoslavia are increasing the political cost to the

Administration of pushing hard for peacekeeping

related programs as part of its legislative agenda.

Indeed, presidential rivals have seized on the situation in Bosnia to demonstrate the unreliability

of the UN and the infeasibility of its mandates.

This attitude has colored congressional views of

intervention in general, regardless of the institutional framework in which it is carried out. An

especially revealing example of this trend is the

opposition to staging a U.S. peacekeeping force

on the Golan Heights, like the MFO. One would

have thought that Congressional commitment to

Israeli security would have guaranteed direct

U.S. troop support for a peacekeeping arrangement that secured a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty.

Yet prominent members of the foreign policy

elite argue that the risks and costs to the United

States are too high to justify the deployment of

U.S. military personnel to the Golan.

I should add to this the fate of the Administration’s request for supplemental Fiscal Year 95

appropriations to cover its expenses related to

Haiti, the Cuban migrant problem, and Rwanda.

The State Department and AID got nothing,

although they had spent about $200 million. The

Defense Department received about $2 billion,

but had to take it on an offset basis, which

required reprogramming the funds from other

accounts. There was no new money. Since these

donor accounts were dedicated to force readiness, the reprogrammings were transformed into

a scandal by opponents of the Administration’s

policies, thereby creating a vicious circle. Peacekeeping is creating a hollow army, and a hollow

army cannot defend America’s real interests.

These facts serve as an important cautionary

tale. In the first instance, they mean that the UN

could be in danger of bankruptcy in the foreseeable future, which would prevent questions about

the availability and usefulness of new technologies. Second, they mean that agencies will be

extremely reluctant to pick up the cost of developing, acquiring, and distribution to the UN or

other countries these technologies for peacekeeping purposes. Third, they mean that Congress is

likely to see such technologies, especially the

less-than-lethal ones, as being attractive to the

Administration. Mainly, because it appears to

make intervention easier by removing the most

significant moral and political barrier to combat,

casualties. I think if we look at the situation honestly, we would ourselves conclude that this is

perhaps the most troubling aspect of less-thanlethal weapons.

FEASIBILITY

By raising feasibility as an issue, I am asking just

who is going to use this fancy stuff? Virginia

Gamba has distributed questionnaires in which

she polled peacekeeping countries on whether

they used any sort of advanced technology in

their participation in peacekeeping operations.

They seem to show that only the industrialized

countries made use of such technologies. Nor

should this come as a surprise.

The fact is that armies cannot make effective

use of advanced technologies unless they already

have relatively advanced skills and the basic

ability to cope with stressful and ambiguous situations. These are the kinds of situations that these

technologies are designed for. Employment strategies also presuppose good command and control.

These skills are acquired through training and

indoctrination; there can be no doubt that the differences between peacekeeping and combat

imply the need for different kinds of training. For

example, there are new tasks:
Chapter 10 Technology and Peacekeeping: Too Good to Be True? | 97

■ Crowd control; administering humanitarian

relief; validating compliance with accords;

negotiating with parties who may be only as

pure as the driven slush (as Dorothy Parker

used to say); preventing refugee flows; and

establishing or administering a code of justice.

Tasks that warrant greater emphasis:

■ Interaction with civilians; using loudspeakers;

applying rules of engagement safely and sensibly; guarding things; liaison with foreign

forces; counter-mine operations; applying

laws of war; and providing convoy security.

Then there are the things that need to be relearned:

■ Use of force, how to seize and control buildings, set up static defenses, use of marksmanship, interaction with NGOs, and disarming of

belligerents and civilians.

Some of this training is happening outside the

Nordic countries at long last. Austria, Italy, and

the United Kingdom are now doing it; Ireland,

Luxembourg, Germany, the Netherlands and

Spain are getting a good start. Poland and the

Czech Republic are seeking to do this in the context of the Partnership for Peace. By and large,

however, forces in Latin America, Asia and the

Pacific, Africa, and the Middle East, are not

doing specialized training. (The exceptions in

Latin America and the Pacific are Argentina,

Australia, and Fiji.) In Africa and the Middle

East, most armies simply do not train. They

either operate or maintain static positions (i.e.,

are assembled in barracks). There is neither the

tradition, nor cadre, nor money to conduct realistic training, which is fuel intensive and requires

the expenditure of consumable items that often

cannot be replaced.

The irony is that these countries represent the

largest untapped resource of peacekeeping personnel; they also include some of the most

heavily relied upon countries for peacekeeping

operations. Yet is it reasonable to think that they

are going to be able to absorb new technologies

or approaches to military/peacekeeping activity

when they do not train intensively for conventional missions, let alone specialized missions

that border on police work?

And if they are to be trained, who is going to

do the training? Early in the deliberation process

leading to the Administration’s policy on peacekeeping operations, members of the Administration floated the idea of using a deactivated

military base in the United States as a site for relatively large scale unit training for peacekeeping

operations. The idea did not catch on because it

was clear to the Defense Department that it

would wind up paying for the continuing operation of a military facility that it had already chosen to close down to save money. After all, there

was certainly going to be no money in the State

Department budget for this activity.

If the United States is not going to conduct

training necessary to exploit the utility of

advanced technologies for peacekeeping, who

will, especially given the cost not just of training

but of sustaining the foreign forces being

trained?

SCOPE OF THE REQUIREMENT

It is my impression that most peacekeeping operations work just fine without specialized equipment, although demining is probably an

exception to this rule. As long as troops are disciplined, well trained and well led, they will handle

themselves effectively. In Cambodia, for example, Bangladeshis fought company sized battles

with Khmer Rouge and held their own, while

Indian troops managed to quell election riots

effectively.

Setting aside surveillance equipment for troop

protection and truce monitoring, there is room to

doubt that introducing new tools, given shortfalls

in training, etc., will repay the cost and effort. In

some ways, it even might be counterproductive.

Susan Woodward alluded wisely to the possibility that the use of new technologies by peacekeepers might spur countermeasures that could

raise the level of violence and undermine the

operation in which the technology was introduced. New tools that peacekeeping troops

would use are subject to imitation or defeat.
98 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Under some conditions, the use of less-thanlethal weapons could signal a lack of resolve that

could embolden an adversary and invite an

increase in violence. The broader point here is

that the use of these devices does not somehow

make the issue, regarding the use of force by UN

troops, disappear. The decision whether or not

the UN is prepared to dominate the proverbial

ladder of escalation will still have to be faced.

Another point to remember is that soldiers

who are not extremely well trained, but who have

become reliant on these tools, could find themselves in an exceedingly awkward situation when

their gizmos do not work. Moreover, they may

not want to do their jobs unless they have such

tools. For example, Salvadoran troops trained by

U.S. special forces personnel reportedly refused

to patrol at night without night vision goggles

once they got used to wearing them. The inconvenient part of this arrangement was the frequency with which these devices failed to work.

On balance, the promise of technology for

peacekeeping is high. We know this is especially

true in the areas of verification, monitoring,

intelligence collection, and crowd control. The

latter activity needs special attention because, in

many instances, peacekeeping operations

devolve to police work. My conclusion, however, is that financial support for research, development and acquisition is lacking; troops drawn

from outside a small group of industrialized

countries would have a hard time making effective use of new technologies; and the need for

most such technologies in most peacekeeping

operations is probably limited.
| 99

11

Mine Problems

in Peacekeeping

Operations

INTRODUCTION

andmines were first used during the American Civil

War (Williamsburg Campaign 1862) but their use

started only in 1918 to face a new weapon: the tank.

Antipersonnel use of mines was introduced later during

World War II (WW II) to protect antitank mines from enemy

deminers. Since then, antipersonnel mines have become the

most common type of the 400 million laid since the beginning of

WW II. A great quantity of these mines have been used in conflicts.

WHAT IS A MINE?

Official definition (from the Convention on Inhumane Weapons,

1980):

■ Talking about mines, diplomats normally use the definition

given in the Convention on Inhumane Weapons for the second Protocol (in Art. 2 § 1): a mine means any munition

placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and

designed to be detonated or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle.

The above definition will be useful for future work on texts

(for example to reexamine the Convention). However, another

definition, found in a French Army manual, may be more useful

in understanding from the field point of view the vast and complex problem of mine laying and clearing. The manual states that

a mine is:

1. a firing device attached to

2. an explosive contained in

3. a casing

by

Gilles Courrègelongue

Chargé de Mission for 

International Relations, 

Conseil International et 

Développement, Défense 

Conseil International 

Group, Paris

L
100 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

❚ The Firing Device

The firing device is the most complex part of the

mine. It is detonated or exploded by the presence

of a person or vehicle. Thus, it transforms the

involuntary action of the target into a deadly

explosion. The firing device reacts:

Firing devices on antipersonnel (AP) mines

are detonated through:

■ pressure, trip wire: a person passing by; or

■ release of pressure or traction: from tampering.

A tank or vehicle detonates a mine through:

■ strong pressure: under its track;

■ tilt rod, seismic, magnetic triggers: from a tank

passing by; and

■ electronic sensors: placed beside or on top of

the mine.

❚ The Explosive

The explosive is the killing device. In some rare

cases it can be replaced by flare systems or even

chemicals. The explosive must be adapted to its

target both in quantity, from small charges to

maim people to heavy charges designed to

destroy a tank, and in quality, from simple

charges to charges capable of piercing tank

armor (hollow charges).

Almost all of the explosives in mines (TNT, B

Composition, RDX, Tetryl, etc.) contain a high

percentage of nitrogenous components.

❚ The Casing

The casing is what we see around the mine. Its

main purpose is to protect the explosives from

the outside world. In some cases, explosives are

formed into their own casing.

For the wide majority of mines, they are

encased in a very light box originally in metal,

but now are more often in plastic, bakelite, rubber or even made from crude wood or concrete.

These casings do not affect the explosion, which

will produce a simple (but still very dangerous)

blast effect. Blast effect has only a short lethal

range (around 1 m), and generally strikes a person in the lower part of the body or a tank on its

tracks (a vehicle on its wheels).

To increase the killing capacity of antipersonnel mines, the casing can be reinforced to produce shrapnel by fragmentation from the initial

blast effect. Fragmentation mines project deadly

shrapnel out to a range of 40 m for stake and

bounding mines, and even to 100 m with directed

effect mines.

❚ Unexploded Ordnance

Since a great quantity of fired ordnance fails to

detonate, a battlefield can be covered by unexploded:

■ air bombs,

■ artillery and mortar shells,

■ rockets and missiles, and

■ rifle and hand grenades, etc.

Clearly all of these items possess explosives

and casings. Unfortunately the characteristics of

their firing devices may be unknown. In all

cases, unexploded ordnance is highly dangerous

to handle and step on.

The most serious problem is posed by cluster

bomb submunitions. Cluster bomb munitions are

used in great quantity, with one U.S. Air Force

bomb carrying more than 4,000 bomblets. During the Gulf War, Allied forces scattered 24 million bomblets behind Iraqi lines. Cluster bomb

munitions are not reliable; from 10 to 15 percent

fail to detonate. Allied bomblets were responsible for many friendly troop casualties in the Gulf

war.

The condition of abandoned ordnance stocks

is generally unknown and can be easily booby

trapped or used in booby traps. Thus, unexploded

ordnance creates a problem very similar to mined

areas and any ordnance found should be treated

as a mine or booby trap.

❚ How Mines Are Laid

Normally, mines are buried under 7.5 to 10 cm (3

to 4 inches) of sand or earth for camouflage reasons. However, some mines are laid on the

ground because the earth would diminish their
Chapter 11 Mine Problems in Peacekeeping Operations | 101

killing power (fragmentation mines), and

because camouflage is less important than speed

(enemy attack).

Both burying and simple laying can be performed either by hand (normal case) or mechanically (engineer units of some regular armies).

Even mechanical rninelaying can take too long,

so automatic dispersal systems have been produced. They are not found in engineer units but

in tactical air forces (air cluster bombs, helicopter containers, etc.) or artillery units (155 mm or

larger shells and rockets).

❚ Mining Concepts

Regular armies use mines to restrict the enemy’s

freedom of movement. The maiming of enemy

soldiers is not as important as stopping their

progress and delaying the attack long enough to

strike the enemy with other much more deadly

weapon systems: artillery and tactical air forces.

Regular armies do not expect heavy casualties

to be created by mines. Normal firepower is

much more efficient in killing large numbers of

enemies. By their logic (see 1987 NATO

STANAG for Standard Agreement), a mine field

should not only be under the guard of friendly

troops but also controlled by their firepower.

Since restriction of movement can be implemented by the enemy’s simple observation that

mines are present, this doctrine does not normally rely on surprise effect (i.e., a mine exploding under a soldier’s legs). Under classical

military discipline, minelaying by regular forces

is supposed to respect safety regulations

(STANAG describes the decision process and

level, the organization of minefields, conventional markings and reports, etc.). To be sure to

stop and control an enemy’s movements without

limiting their own freedom of maneuver and

safety, many armies (like the French army)

decide to fence in their mine fields on all sides.

Unfortunately, in many countries where

peacekeeping and/or mine clearing operations

are underway, mines have neither been laid

according to military regulation nor to military

logic. Irregulars do not possess enough firepower

to strike their enemy with sufficient effect. For

these groups the expected effect of mines is not

to stop the enemy but to hurt him.

Terrorist use of mines should also be considered. This irrational use of such deadly weapons

may have left mines:

■ in unforeseen places: schools, hospitals, religious buildings, etc.;

■ in unforeseen quantities: 18 mines to protect

one doorstep; and

■ in unforeseen ways: up to 5 AT mines buried

one on top of the other.

❚ Demining

Four different demining concepts are employed

depending on the situation:

■ Mine field breaching (strictly military),

■ Route opening (military or civilian),

■ Area mine clearance (military or civilian), and

■ Proximity mine clearing (typically civilian,

sometimes uncontrolled).

In addition to identifying the demining concept to be employed, a demining method must

also be selected. Current demining methods

include:

■ manual detection,

■ pyrotechnical and mechanical demining,

■ and explosive sniffing dogs.

❚ Manual Detection

Manual detection remains the most effective

method. UN DPKO, providing mine clearance

expertise for DHA, currently requires a 99.6 percent success rate of mine clearing. Today, such a

result can only be achieved through manual work

by human beings (and maybe through dog detection). All manual detection methods are dangerous because the mine clearers have to walk and

expose themselves in infested areas.

Manual detection methods include:

■ Prodding (use of a nonmagnetic prod): The

mine clearers, protected only by special pants,

work in a kneeling position regularly prodding
102 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

the ground almost underneath themselves.

This is long and tiring work and the prodders

have to be replaced every 20 minutes to avoid

fatal lacks of concentration.

■ Metal detection by portable magnetometers: This has been very effective when all the

mines actually contain metallic components

(as in 90 percent of today’s mines). The number and size of metallic parts in mines has

been reduced, so detectors have been

improved to react to the smallest pieces. However, this has dangerously increased the rate of

false alarms. In Afghanistan, up to a thousand

harmless pieces of metal are found for one

mine.

■ Of course, metal detectors are unable to detect

non-metallic-mines (10 percent of today’s

mines) and are dangerous in the presence of

mines designed to detonate when receiving a

signal from the metal detector.

❚ Pyrotechnical and Mechanical Demining 

Without Previous Detection

Regular armies often possess rapid mine clearing

systems; not all are usable outside of high intensity combat situations.

Pyrotechnical systems are surely the quickest

mine clearing systems, but due to noise and collateral blast effects their use is difficult to imagine except for emergencies. They rely on a shock

wave effect (sympathetic explosions) created by

bangalore or pyrotechnic cords, or a gas pressure

effect (gas explosion) from Fuel Air Explosives

(FAE).

Mechanical systems can be classified in two

categories:

■ Those working on the ground itself and not on

mines (i.e., displacing a 10 cm slice of earth)

through ploughs and bulldozer blades.

■ Those working on mines (making the mines

react and explode), such as rolls and flails.

Only rolls and flails can be used in peacetime,

and flails have the advantage of working even

in deep vegetation.

❚ Use of Dogs

There are no casings that can completely prevent

vapors of nitrogen-bearing compounds (characteristic of military explosives) from escaping.

We believe that dogs are able to smell them; it

has been shown that they work efficiently in airport security and other antiterrorist activities.

The use of dogs has been apparently successful

in Afghanistan, but under favorable conditions:

uncovered air-dispersed butterfly mines laid

down on dry terrain.

Like human prodders, demining dogs are not

able to sustain their attention for more than 20

minutes. Also, they need much more time to

recover (up to five hours in hardship zones). In

such conditions, one British specialist with working dogs estimates their rate of demining at no

more than 60 percent.

The South African Demining Company

MECHEM has developed a new method to find a

compromise between a dog’s limits and capacities. One vehicle draws air through filters in

order to enhance the concentration of a large

number of air samples. These samples are

marked with the sampling location provided by a

GPS system. The samples are then put under the

dog’s nose and checked for a reaction. In this

way, deminers can analyze in a few minutes what

would normally take hours.

❚ Destruction of Detected Mines

A mine is normally destroyed by explosives, usually demolition charges or explosive foams.

When these are not available, fire can be used for

mines with plastic casings. New destruction systems have been successfully used to destroy the

mines without detonation. These systems include

corrosive foams and laser beams.

Sometimes, destroying the mines in their original location is not feasible. Destruction is not

suitable in populated areas and archaeological

sites, such as the Angkor temple in Cambodia.

In-place destruction presents many drawbacks,

even in deserted mined areas. Problems that may

occur include:
Chapter 11 Mine Problems in Peacekeeping Operations | 103

■ When destroyed by explosives, there will be

numerous projectiles from flying pieces of

metal. This method could disturb future demining operations. Remember, portable magnetometers will give off a false alarm from the

metal pieces.

■ When detonating by shock wave, there will be

possible damage or detonation of neighboring

mines, making future operations hazardous.

Neutralization, transport, and then destruction

in special sites is certainly the safest solution.

Neutralization requires a good knowledge of the

type of mines encountered; mines should be neutralized according to the manufacturer’s process.

It is estimated that about 360 models of mines

are produced in the world. Knowledge on neutralizing the mines is available by consulting an

explosives ordnance disposal (EOD) expert and/

or a data base. Even if minelayers try to use different types of mines, the number of types available in one given area is necessarily limited.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF TODAY’S 

DEMINING EFFORTS

Current statistics:

■ There are today over 110 million active mines

laid on the planet.

■ Every month, 800 people are killed by them.

■ Many more are maimed and mutilated.

■ Every year, two million new mines are laid.

Current demining efforts:

■ The rate of demining is one hundred thousand

mines per year.

■ Every year, the number of mines increase by

one million nine hundred thousand!

What this means:

■ At this rate—if the human race stops laying

new mines—it will take over 1,100 years to

clean the Earth of mines and over 300 years to

clean only existing roads, villages and houses.

The cost of demining today:

■ Financial cost is high, neutralizing one mine

(original mine cost is $3.00) costs $1,000.

■ Human cost is much higher. For every 2,000

mines neutralized, one deminer is badly

wounded. For every 5,000 mines neutralized,

one deminer is killed.

The conclusion: WE ARE LOSING THE

WAR AGAINST MINES!

WHAT CAN WE DO?

Positive changes to the world mine population

can occur by:

■ Developing mine awareness campaigns everywhere. These programs can be implemented

by NGO or UN Humanitarian Agencies.

■ Enforcing export control on mines (87 percent

of neutralized mines were imported ones). In

the last ten years, the biggest exporters have

been China, Italy, and the USSR. A voluntary

moratorium on mine exports has been

accepted by the United States, European

Union Countries, and Russia.

■ Enforcing controls on mine usage through the

Re-examination Conference of the 1980 Convention on Inhumane Weapons. On this occasion, Austria, Cambodia, Estonia, Ireland,

Mexico and Sweden will propose a general

ban on antipersonnel land mines. Belgium has

already adopted such a law for its own armed

forces.

■ Developing viable rapid detection systems

through the use of contemporary technology.

Presently, the cost of mine clearing at $1,000

per mine leaves a wide margin for improvement through research and development

(R&D). Meetings on mine clearing technology

are occurring through the NATO Industrial

Advisory Group (NIAG), European Union

Common Research Center at Ispra (Italy), and

the U.S. Congressional Office of Technology

Assessment.

❚ New Technologies for Demining

During the last 50 years, although mines have

been subject to attention from engineers, mine

clearing still relies on the same old principles:

those that allowed Allied troops to land in Nor-
104 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

mandy (June 1944). The improvement of mine

clearing technology requires looking at other

industrial sectors to adapt new systems to the

problem. Several potential technologies that

could be applied against:

■ Casing characteristics: infrared technology,

penetrating radars, etc.

■ Explosive characteristics: biological, chemical

and nuclear detections.

This last field of research is surely the most

attractive from a logical point of view. Explosives are the only mine components that will

never be replaced. Unfortunately (or fortunately)

infrared and penetrating radars are much more

advanced than the other technologies.

How the system works is a problem for the

scientists. Users will sort them between airborne

systems and vehicle-transported systems.

Until now, no really effective system has been

found, even through infrared and penetrating

radars. The tests (generally on specially prepared

test grounds) have revealed some common logical characteristics:

■ It is easier to find big metallic anti-tank mines

than little, plastic anti-personnel mines.

■ It is easier to find mines when they are in

groups (planted in line).

■ It is easier to find mines when the ground is

free from saline water. ■ It is easier to find mines when they have just

been laid.

In this field, the most successes have been

won through infrared technology. Employing

this technique relies on traces (anomalies) in the

ground from burying activities. Dozens of years

after minelaying, the infrared film may still

detect the impressions. Disturbances in the

ground notably affect heat circulation.

THE CORRECT USE OF TECHNOLOGY 

AND THE CORRECT USE OF HOPE

Positive results have been few but, nevertheless,

carry more hope than the current situation. Scientists, military researchers and industrialists must

be encouraged. They have good reasons to maintain hope.

Soon, even with the temporary technological

inefficiencies in detecting individual mines, airborne technologies will at least be able to locate

mine concentrations.

Technologies being tested are generally used

alone; in such conditions the detectors are easily

confused. In the field, they will certainly be used

together with other devices in a multidisciplinary

mine clearing system, including neutralization

and destruction devices.
| 105

12

Technologies

to Support

Peacekeeping

Operations

INTRODUCTION

The first task of a peacekeeping strategy and peace

enforcement is deterrence. The peacekeepers must be

able to deter aggression but not incite hostilities in a crisis between belligerent entities. While this suggests that

the introduction of peacekeeping troops in a crisis should be perceived as defensive in nature, it also suggests that the mere presence of ground forces neither provides new incentives for

politically motivated aggressive acts nor inhibits the use of other

military options. The introduction of Marines into Lebanon as a

peacekeeping force in 1983 was apparently perceived to be sufficient. Rather than deterring aggressive action, however, the

Marines became a target of opportunity for a militarily meaningless but politically valuable low-risk attack. The result was the

loss of 241 American lives.1

 In Somalia, the initial humanitarian

objectives were rather quickly accomplished due, it is argued, to

the introduction of a massive force clearly capable of quickly

and decisively accomplishing its objectives against any possible

opposition. Once the surprise and shock of the initial deployment wore off, U.S. forces were reduced, the warlords adjusted,

and the presence of United Nations forces became more of an

incentive for hostile action than a stabilizing influence for peace.

One paradox of peacekeeping operations is that peace keepers

often become the targets of retaliation (as for example, currently

in the former Yugoslavia).

1 The World Almanac and The Book of Facts (New York; Pharos Books, 1991) page

727.

by

Milton Finger

Deputy Associate 

Director, Joint 

Programs, Lawrence 

Livermore National 

Laboratory, June 1995.

(Work performed under 

the auspices of the U.S. 

Department of Energy 

by Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory 

under Contract W-740-

Eng-48).

T
106 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

A force deployed in a peacekeeping operation

must have the capability to avoid being provocative while possessing the strength to deter warlike actions and, if necessary, counter any retaliation with minimal non-lethal force. The attributes

needed by peacekeeping forces to provide deterrence are similar to those needed to fight, but the

emphasis should be on perceived capabilities. To

be successful requires quality troops and leaders

provided with the right equipment (technologies)

at the right time, used the right way (doctrine/tactics), and tactics.

BACKGROUND

The peace keepers must be clearly perceived as

having the unquestioned capability to accomplish their mission when and where employed.

The prerequisite is that these peacekeeping

troops, no matter how small in number, must be

able to protect themselves against any likely

opposition. It is not enough to rely on the belief

that a rational enemy will not attack for fear of

overwhelming retaliation. The peacekeeping

force must be capable of responding to random

or well-planned terrorist attacks and/or conventional force engagements. The deployed peacekeeping force must be trained and well equipped

to respond to any challenge and have exceptional

versatility. The force must be capable of providing intelligence and be equipped with affordable

and appropriate technologies to hold their own

and to offset numerical deficiencies. It needs to

be more than helpless troops “armed” with blue

berets, yet it cannot be perceived as hostile to any

or all. One possible approach to this is the application of “Non-Lethal Weapons” (NLW) to

defend themselves and achieve their mission.

These will be discussed in the section on NLWs.

First, as opposed to Kuwait, peacekeeping

land forces were sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina by

some nations prior to an air strike, with light

equipment and were dispersed widely, therefore

vulnerable to retaliatory actions on the ground,

They found themselves, therefore, in the worst

position for land combat, a situation that the

United States tended to underestimate since they

were not directly concerned. It remained possible, though, to provide these troops with close air

support or with air-to-air interdiction actions

against enemy aircraft; such a scenario was to

constitute the first military action in NATO’s

history, on 28 February 1994, nearly forty-five

years after its creation. But even assuming it is

always possible to send fighter bombers to support ground troops, there will always be a reluctance to do so just to neutralize a single mortar,

even one firing on the people of Sarajevo or

Bihac.

An architecture needs to be developed which

covers the many facets of peacekeeping operations: truce monitoring; cooperative military disengagement; confidence building; humanitarian

relief; refugee support; peace enforcement; and

early steps of post-conflict rehabilitation. The

structural elements of this architecture rely on:

intelligence situation awareness; survivability;

and a response capability of non-lethal force projection to threats. Some of the technologies

required to support this architecture are covered

in the sections on sensors, mine detection and

clearing, non-lethal weapons, and other issues

related to survivability. Clearly a peacekeeping

operation should not inflict losses nor suffer

losses.

SENSORS

There are a large number of specialized sensors

that can provide peace keepers current situational

awareness and intelligence. This real-time data

can allow for sufficient response time if counteraction is required. A brief description of the variety of sensors follows.

■ Micropower Impulse Radar (MIR): The

MIR is a new radar sensor that has numerous

applications in peacekeeping operations.

Based on emitting and detecting very low

amplitude voltage impulses, it is the first

active radar with continuous multi-year operation from small batteries. Its low power drain

and wide bandwidth also make it very covert,

eliminating both interference and interception.

The MIR motion sensor, for example, has a
Chapter 12 Technologies to Support Peacekeeping Operations | 107

sharply defined detection range, multi-year

continuous-use battery life, exceedingly low

emissions, broad area or omni coverage, and

very low cost. It can be used for short-range

intrusion detection or perimeter defense or

other security applications. Another use of the

radar is remote detection of human motion;

this could be to remotely detect breathing and

respiration rate or heart motion, making it an

excellent tool for hostage rescue operations

and for battlefield medicine. In addition, multiple MIR sensors can be combined for a wide

range of imaging applications. MIR arrays and

software for imaging people behind walls for

surreptitious entry, buried mines, and locating

thickness and composition of walls have been

developed. Its features include variable depth

(range) resolution, wideband pulse for fine

cross-range resolution, briefcase sized for

portability, and two-dimensional imaging in

less than 10 seconds.

■ Wavelength Tunable Video Camera

(WTVC): The WTVC is a compact framing

hyper-spectral imager with pointing and tracking capability designed for airborne spot survey applications in searches for stressed

foliage and waterborne effluents from covert

chemical plants and buried facilities. Stressed

foliage could indicate camouflaged facilities

or hidden armored vehicles and other items

concealed under foliage. The system is

extremely compact; the camera payload is

housed in a 14-inch diameter 4-axis gyro stabilized gimbal and is ready for airborne

deployment. The image handling system

incorporates a frame grabber that digitizes the

analog input. The framing architecture of this

imager supports data collection modes that are

consistent with real time hyper-spectral image

processing since, unlike conventional push

broom and whisk broom multi-spectral scanners, the camera does not require platform

motion to generate the image.

■ Hand and Air Deployed Sensors for Field

Intelligence: A family of intelligent unattended ground sensors has been developed

which could form the basis for a number of

peace violation indications and warning systems as well as active defense control. The

current family consists of seismic, IR, magnetic (2-axis), and nuclear sensors with

projects underway to include low power ultrawideband spread spectrum radar, and various

chemical sensors. Onboard multi-sensor data

fusion techniques reduce the incidence of false

identification and alerting. When suitably

reduced in size, these sensors would provide a

means for perimeter emplacement, and base

camp monitoring as well as the ability to

locate threat forces in a preestablished grid of

checkpoint sensors. Air delivered components

and systems have been developed.

■ Electronic Tags for Monitoring: Micro-miniature, high security, electronic tags have been

developed for uniquely identifying components. Recent advances in this technology

have added the capability to store information

in the tag in non-volatile memory over

extended periods of time. Remote interrogation via RF line of sight and satellite has been

demonstrated. Connection to assess local indicators of readiness to perform is possible.

■ Advanced Night Vision: The next generation

Night Vision System known as GENIV will

have more than two times greater resolution

over its predecessors and three times the gain

with 40 percent higher signal-to-noise ratio.

This will lead to a three-fold improvement in

target detection and identification ranges

under starlight conditions. It will also provide

higher contrast images, night vision with a

larger field of view, and operation in urban

environments eliminating the halo effect or

blooming when city lights are in the field of

view.

■ Laser Imaging Spectroscopy: An Imaging

Fourier Transform Spectrometer has been

developed. This instrument produces a complete infrared spectrum of every point in its

image. This spectrum is a fingerprint of the

materials or gases which are contained in that

pixel, and can be used to identify chemical

effluents and identify materials remotely using
108 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

only passive detection. It is currently a ground

based system and is being used for chemical

vapor detection studies, and for the detection

of buried mines. The concept can be extended

to airborne or space-borne systems. A new

generation of the instrument that will significantly improve performance is being developed.

■ Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV): For surveillance purposes there exist a wide spectrum

of RPVs that can act as scouts. These RPVs

can be as inexpensive as the largest model airplane equipped with a small video and a fiber

optic link to much larger systems. The larger

systems can carry tens to hundreds of pounds

of sensor systems. The U.S. Department of

Defense has a significant development program underway to develop RPVs and a whole

host of sensors. These RPVs will have long

endurance and can operate at low to very high

altitudes and in some cases are virtually undetectable. These RPVs will carry state-of-theart miniaturized imaging sensors in a variety

of wavelengths (visible, LWIR, UV, etc.), as

well as synthetic aperture radar for imaging.

They will be accompanied by sophisticated

computational capability to provide automatic

target recognition.

■ Robotic/Autonomous Systems: The United

States is developing a new system called the

Wide Area Mine (WAM). WAM can detect,

identify, and track targets. Although its original intent was to defeat these targets, it has the

sensors and computer power to emulate many

functions of peacekeeping troops acting as

sentries by using this backbone as a surveillance tool. In the section on non-lethal weapons we discuss the transformation of the

WAM lethal smart warhead with non-lethal

components. In the future we may see autonomous “sentries” the size of match box toys that

patrol with sophisticated sensors and networked communication systems.

MINE DETECTION/CLEARING

Mines present a serious deterrent to peacekeeping forces. Not only can they kill and injure, but

they also provide a large psychological barrier to

the conduct of operations. More over, they leave

a lethal legacy of death and dismemberment after

hostilities are over. It is estimated that there are

from 180 to 225 million unexploded items of

ordnance that are residual from previous hostilities. For example, 75 years after WWI France’s

Department du Déminage estimates there are 12

million unexploded shells remaining from conflicts near Verdun. In Angola, two decades of noholds-barred civil war may have left 20 million

land mines in the earth, which kill 120 Angolans

each month. In Cambodia 300 people are killed

or maimed each month. One mine remains in the

ground for every two people in that country. In

Afghanistan 12 million mines were laid during

the 1980s war with the former Soviet Union. In

the former Yugoslavia, 60,000 mines are laid

each week; and in northern Somalia and the

Mozambique highlands, millions of mines ring

native villages and water holes. Mines have

replaced human soldiers as sentries, stopping

humanitarian aid from flowing in and keeping

refugees from flowing out. Land mines are plentiful and cheap, costing as little as $3 each. The

U.S. State Department estimates upward of 85

million mines spread across 56 nations. The

United Nations, estimates 105 million mines or

more deployed in 62 nations, or one mine for

every 50 people on earth. Further, it is estimated

that about 350,000 mines and/or unexploded ordnance are cleared every year, but about 2.5 million mines are emplaced every year. One has to

find the mines, circumvent them and/or destroy

them, both in military operations and in peace.

Mines exist on land (buried or surface), in the

coastal region (surf zone) and at sea. In the

coastal region mines in the form of antipersonnel, anti-armor, tiltrod and small moored mines,

are also interspersed with obstacles such as con-
Chapter 12 Technologies to Support Peacekeeping Operations | 109

certina wire, hedgehogs, log posts and concrete

blocks.2

Mine warfare is very low tech but effective.

The countermine activity gets a lot of lip service,

but no effective, long duration-funded program

has been sustained to tackle the operational and

peace aspects of this problem. The best countermine/counter-obstacle strategy is to prevent their

use. Non-lethal or precision/intelligent technologies may provide a path for effective area denial

prior to an assault. An obvious example is the

preemptive mining of contested territory with

self-neutralizing mines, carrying non-lethal

weapons as in the case of a revised WAM system. An ideal approach is to have pre-surveyed

the site of interest constantly via overhead coverage to allow observation of mining operations as

they occur.

If preventive measures fail, a two-step process

is required. First, mines must be located. Secondly, once located, they must be removed or

destroyed. There are traditional and not very satisfactory methods used to locate these mines,

such as magnetometers and gradiometers, electromagnetic induction detectors, ground penetrating radar and others. The advent of plastic

mines has rendered most of these techniques useless.

While concepts are evolving, with various

rates of success, for handling different parts of

the land mine problem, there is still no solution

for finding buried or obscured mines. Because

they are buried, they offer no obvious signature

to conventional detection methods such as cameras, lasers, or conventional radar. Current studies have shown that the few signatures that these

targets offer are subtle and they may require multiple sensors to provide sufficient detectability.

To date, studies have focused on single or multiband IR signatures of mines or mine fields. Due

to the difference in thermal diffusivity of explosives in either plastic or metal cases, there would

normally be a slight change in temperature as the

area goes through a diurnal cycle. Unfortunately,

2 The New York Times Magazine, “One Leg One Life at a Time” by Donovan Webster, Jan. 23, 1994. Donovan Webster, Cleaning up a

Century of World War, to be published by Pantheon.

clutter and emissivity of shadowed regions cause

difficulty. In addition, ground penetrating radar

has met with some success, but it also can be

spoofed by clutter.

Because of the enormity of the problem and

its difficult nature, we suggest that the problem

of obscured and buried mines not be neglected.

Numerous technologies, including newer ground

penetrating radar systems, multi-spectral and

hyperspectral imaging systems in the visible and

infrared, or even acoustic techniques, should be

studied, particularly together as multisensor systems. Such work will provide a definitive answer

to the question of whether the problem is solvable, even in part.

Finally, it is important that studies limit their

scopes to specific, interesting scenarios. In the

past, workers in the field have been stalled by the

definition of the problem—find all mines in all

conditions. Progress in this field may be limited

to certain types of mines in certain environments.

Program planners should look to the world where

problems exist and ask for solutions that, though

they may not be perfectly general, do work in

those specific cases. Partial solutions are better

than none at all.

There are two new techniques that may offer

some promise: Micropower Impulse Radar

(MIR) and hyperspectral imaging. MIR has

recently been tested to evaluate its viability as a

mine detection sensor. These tests show that

MIR reliably detects both plastic and metallic

land mines and mine surrogates buried in both

moist and dry soils. The MIR sensor technology

provides several advantages over existing GPR

systems including: low cost, low power, lightweight and compact size, and the ability to

assemble into compact arrays. Coupled with 2-D

and 3-D imaging algorithms, MIR offers the

potential for a low cost, high performance mine

detector that will enhance the reliability and performance of multisensor mine detection systems.
110 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

In dry soil, the system can detect buried objects

to a depth of 30 cm and more.3

New techniques look at the characteristics of

disturbed earth. There are two different

approaches. When a mine is emplaced, the disturbed earth covering has a different thermal diffusivity than the undisturbed earth. Thus an IR

sensor may detect a small difference in temperature between the mine site and the surrounding

environment. Unfortunately, nearby clutter could

provide a false signal. Another approach has to

do with the crystalline conformation of the silica

that has been disturbed. Hyperspectral imaging

using certain IR bands provide a clear signal that

differs from the adjacent undisturbed environment.

Mine clearing, when mines have been located,

can be done in several ways. The traditional but

very hazardous approach is to use wooden

probes to uncover the mine and then either

remove it, or with additional explosives detonate

it in place. The U.S. military uses a line charge or

explosive (MATCHLOCK) fired out by a small

rocket that may clear a narrow path. However,

because of the new “bladder” mines it is not very

effective. Another approach known as Distributed Explosive Mine Neutralization System

(DEMNS) uses rockets to extend a large net of

primacord. At each node of this primacord net is

a small shaped charge that penetrates approximately 10 inches of soil. However, if the net is

dropped on some object above the ground’s surface, the shaped charge penetration power is

greatly diminished because of the longer stand

off. Attempts have been made to use various

fuel-air explosives to explode a large area of

mines. To date, however, these have not delivered sufficient overpressure to detonate the

mines.

There are several mechanical means for clearing mines. These involve heavily armored bulldozers with special digging or raking blades in

3 S.G. Azevedo, et al, “Micropower Impulse Radar (MIR) Technology Applied to Mine Detection and Imaging.” Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory, report UCID-ID-5366, March 1995.

front to clear mines. A variation of this is a helicopter sweeping system towed by a 1,000 foot

tow line and resembling a harrow with additional

patented digging units.

Yet another approach is biodegration. Assuming there is no time urgency, and the environmental conditions are right, bio-organisms can

degrade explosives to inert materials. Another

approach, depending on the availability of a large

water supply, is to conduct modern hydraulic

mining using very high pressure water jets to

sweep an area. Others have attempted to detonate

the mines in place with high power electromagnetic pulses with some success

The major issue still remains locating the

mines once they are emplaced.

NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

The issue of what constitutes a non-lethal

weapon is somewhat fuzzy. The definitions presented by Ing. Gen. Carayol of DRET (France) to

the AC1243-DS/62 working group will be useful

to set the stage.4

 These are:

■ Weapons that do not produce long-term aftereffects and are not fatal for 99 percent of combatants and civilians under normal physical

conditions.

■ Weapons that disrupt, destroy or otherwise

degrade the functioning of threat material or

personnel, without crossing the “death barrier.”

■ Instruments used in combat that are designed

to achieve the same tactical and strategic ends

as lethal weapons, but are not intended to kill

personnel or inflict catastrophic damage on

equipment.

■ Discriminate weapons that are explicitly

designed and employed to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities and

undesired damage to property and the environment.

4 Ing. Gen. Carayol, “Non-Lethal Weapons,” AC/243-DS/62, March 1995 meeting item.
Chapter 12 Technologies to Support Peacekeeping Operations | 111

NLWs are really a manifestation of the Sun

Tzu dictum, “The Sheathed Sword” from the Art

of War.

5 This refers to supreme excellence in

war defined as breaking the enemy’s resistance

without fighting. In most recent conflicts, such as

the Gulf War, it has come to mean achieving military goals with minimal collateral damage, specifically to innocent civilian population. It infers

that a non-lethal weapon is the preferred first

response in that it achieves the military goal of

subduing the enemy threat, and is both morally

and politically acceptable. Somehow, it is also

implied that avoidance of enemy casualties

would result in avoidance of peacekeeping

losses.

There are many forms of NLWs and there are

several ways to catalog them. In his summary of

“New Applications of Non-Lethal and Less

Lethal Technology,” Richard Garwin has followed a categorization used in the U.S. Army

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

publication, “Operations Concept for Disabling

Measures” (draft) of September 1992.6

 My

approach is somewhat different and hierarchical

and follows this outline:

■ Planning

■ Intimidate/Persuade

■ Perception/Reality of Invincibility

■ Immobilize Engines of War

■ Remove Infrastructure

■ Neutralize Personnel

PLANNING

This refers to conflict simulations carried out to

assess the effects of any of the proposed NLW

technologies before implementation, but also to

establish tactics and rehearse missions. The simulations rely heavily on intelligence data gathered from sensors. (See sensors section above.)

5 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Edited by James Clavell, Dell Publishing, 1983. 6 Richard L. Garwin, New Applications of Non-Lethal and ‘Less Lethal’ Technology, American Assembly Book/Conference on U.S.

Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: New Challenges and New Resources, April 7–10, 1994.

INTIMIDATE/PERSUADE

This has all the vestiges of psychological warfare

focused on lowering the determination to fight.

In the past this has included loud music and pamphlets. A modern approach might include holographic images keyed to loud speakers with a

message from a leader who encourages abandoning the fight.

PERCEPTION/REALITY OF INVINCIBILITY

These are generally technologies dealing with

survivability. They might include significantly

enhanced body armor and armored vehicles or

possess active defense capabilities. The latter

means sensing an attacking missile, projectile or

any other threat and countering it before it

strikes. Another approach is to make certain a

second shot is not fired. For example, in response

to concerns about sniper fire and territorials with

mortar tubes on the back of pickup trucks firing

on peacekeeping troops in Somalia, we developed a counter sniper detection technology

called Lifeguard. The key components are a sensor that identifies a speeding bullet or projectile

via its unique signals and a sophisticated computer that processes the signals into an image.

When a bullet/projectile is fired, Lifeguard’s sensor picks up the location of the projectile and

instantly re-creates its flight path, showing on a

video screen the path all the way back to its

source. The location of the gunman is quickly

determined for subsequent action/response.

Further evolution of this concept is to use this

technology to detect mortar and artillery shells in

flight and to fire a guided hyper-accurate munition to intercept and destroy the shell in flight

(hitting a bullet with a bullet). Another approach

is to develop a missile with a 5 cm circular error

of probability (CEP) at 2 km range so that it will

fly down the barrel of a tank gun or artillery

piece. Further, some of the RPVs discussed in

the sensor section could also carry hyper-accu-
112 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

rate new munitions. These latter concepts would

have low collateral damage.

IMMOBILIZING ENGINES OF WAR

There are a large number of possible “soft kill”

or “mission kill” approaches to stopping engines

of war such as tanks and armored personnel carriers. These include: high strength fibers as

entanglements; heat shrink plastic shrouds; submicron pyrophoric dust that would burn out the

filters and ignite the fuel, or encapsulated “popcorn” adhesive foam that would clog the heat

exchanger and cause the engine to blow; carbon

or metal fibers to short out electrical systems of

engines; lasers to blind electro-optical systems

and windows; high power microwaves to upset

or burn out electronic systems controlling the

engines; and anti-material chemicals that could

cause liquid metal embrittlement or cause elastomeric materials to decompose or lose their

mechanical properties.

REMOVE INFRASTRUCTURE

These include using fine-cut carbon or metal

fibers to short out electrical systems; trailing a

wire from an RPV to short out overhead electrical wires and disrupt communications; using

high power microwaves to similarly disrupt electrical power and communication systems including C3I facilities; and utilization of various

weapons to disrupt normal operation of airfields,

roads and bridges.

NEUTRALIZE PERSONNEL/TEMPORARY 

INCAPACITATION OF COMBATANTS

Technologies that can cause temporary dysfunction of combatants are numerous and each has a

special medical, political, or practical aspect.

For example, the use of a laser for dazzling or

blinding is generally regarded as inappropriate

and inhumane in that it can cause permanent

blindness. The use of calamatives/anesthetics,

such as fentanyls, is an issue due to the uncertainty of individual dose response and concerns

about chemical warfare, although it can be

argued that peacekeeping is like police actions

and not war. Low frequency, high amplitude

acoustics can cause a wide variety of human dysfunction that, it is said, clears up soon after the

acoustics are stopped. Various chemicals can be

used to provide an extremely sticky surface for

difficult movement or an extremely slick surface

causing loss of traction. More effective, rubber

bullets or “educated bean bags” that deliver the

same stopping momentum up close or at a distance have been demonstrated. The use of multicolor strobe lights can cause significant disorientation while peacekeeping troops are protected

with appropriate goggles.

SUMMARY OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

The advantage of NLWs is that they can more

readily be used in situations where use of traditional force would be ill-tolerated by public opinion. Their value is directly dependent on public

opinion. One may, therefore, expect that hostile

propaganda will endeavor to exploit any circumstance where their moral acceptability could be

faulted and, what is more, to use this to try to discredit the entire NLW concept.

Many of the most easily conceivable NLWs

are likely to draw on technologies similar to

those prohibited by international regulations or

likely to cause public reprobation. This applies to

chemical and biological agents and, to some

extent, lasers operating in the visible spectrum.

The legal issues raised are summarized below.

Biological anti-personnel agents are strictly

forbidden, however, anti-material biological

agents are authorized. Their use as NLWs is, of

course, likely to be the subject of hostile propaganda. It is not certain that there is a very high

risk of this, insofar as members of the public are

aware of cases where such agents have been used

without danger (e.g., to clear up oil pollution).

The treaty banning anti-personnel chemical

agents contains an ambiguity that leaves open the

possibility of considering them as NLWs.

According to the convention, riot control agents

are banned only as weapons of war. One possible

interpretation of the convention is that such

means (i.e., momentary physical incapacitators,
Chapter 12 Technologies to Support Peacekeeping Operations | 113

sensory irritants, tranquilizers and sedatives)

would be conceivable in peacekeeping operations.

International action is underway, at the instigation of Sweden and the Red Cross, to prohibit

or regulate the use of anti-personnel lasers. One

essential question that arises in this context is

that of the possibility of establishing a clear

boundary between lasers producing permanent

effects (blinding) and lasers producing only a

transient effect (dazzle).

The advantages of NLWs are clear enough, so

we do not need to dwell on them. We shall simply mention here that they are likely to have a

number of unwanted side effects.

■ Use of force becomes more acceptable.

■ Use may lack decisive action and be perceived

as failing to punish the aggressor.

■ Use may heighten the resolve of the enemy to

respond with lethal force. ■ Ease of proliferation.

■ May result in quickly developing countermeasures by the enemy. ■ May be used against peacekeeping forces and

therefore necessitates developing countercountermeasures.

The very virtue of NLWs may constitute an

argument against them, even from a moral point

of view, in a comparison with lethal weapons.

One can turn this around and say that lethal

weapons also derive certain virtues from their

inherent excess; they delay the moment of

recourse to force and, even in the eyes of the

public, may constitute a more appropriate

response than NLWs to particularly unpopular

criminal acts.7

Another concern is the risk of a rapid escalation toward a traditional lethal exchange simply

from the initial use of non-lethal means. It is easy

to conceive of such a process resulting either by

mistake from the adversary or deliberately

because he has no means of response other than

the traditional one. Incidentally, this leads to the

7 Harvey M. Sapolsky, “Non-Lethal Warfare Technologies: Opportunities and Problems,” Report based on a conference held June 2-3,

1993, in Lexington, MA, published by Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, MIT.

universally accepted conclusion that use of

NLWs must always be backed up by conventional superiority. But this essential precaution

does not resolve the difficulty raised, namely that

eminently humanitarian initial intentions may

lead to a distorted response. The need for protection and counter-countermeasures to NLWs is

self-evident.

Two categories of NLWs hold the most promise, the first is High Power Microwave (HPM)

systems that can be delivered in missiles or projectiles to the targets. These would be driven by

the new generation of capacitors and thus there

would be no blast or fragments causing collateral

damage from explosively driven magnetic flux

generators. These HPM systems may have the

greatest versatility in terms of upsetting a large

spectrum of targets.

These HPM weapons have also been the focus

of several studies. Their effects on material are

achieved by “front door” coupling of radar

antennae, countermeasure systems, communications systems and IFF systems, and also by “back

door” coupling via structural defects in the target

systems (openings, connections, drivers’ windows, etc.). Their effects may range from disruption (sometimes long-term) to destruction

essentially by thermal effects on electronic components.

The utility of HPM weapons has always been

limited by the confidentiality of information on

the vulnerability of the target systems and secondly by the scale of the development work

required on microwave emitter systems.

It is conceivable that these barriers might be

partly lifted in the specific context of weapons

for peacekeeping. In that case, the target systems

could be commercially available systems (cars

and communications equipment) with limited

hardening, and not subject to the confidentiality

constraints of defense equipment.

Reference has been made to the possibility of

microwave emissions acting directly on the auditory system, thereby permitting transmission of
114 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

messages. It is not clear that this effect can be

usefully exploited in practice. The open literature

also contains references to the possibility of disrupting the central nervous system at low energy

levels. This effect could obviously be important

for NLWs if it were confirmed.

Another area of fruitful application for peacekeeping is in the area of acoustics, specifically

infrasound. The possibility of causing various

incapacitating effects on man (e.g., nausea and

loss of balance) by means of frequencies in the

range of 100 Hz and below is mentioned in the

open literature.

Independent of the question of their effects,

two arguments against infrasound systems

should be mentioned; first the non-directionality

problem and secondly the inefficiency of coupling between the emitting elements and the

atmosphere. However, the advent of aerogels can

greatly enhance the efficiency of coupling.

Another area is that of anti-material warfare.

The following types of generic products have

appeared in various U.S. publications:

■ super-adhesives—high friction;

■ super-slippery products—low friction;

■ fast forming foams;

■ super acids and super caustics;

■ obscurants (smoke and opaque or diffusing

layers deposited on the windows of optical

systems);

■ liquid metal embrittlers;

■ combustion inhibitors;

■ tire/elastomer attacking products.

Creating many of these substances is not a problem, insofar as the basic technical information

about them is commonly known and as some of

them have already given rise to illustrative products. This category includes the adhesives,

foams, slippery substances, products attacking

tires and elastomers and, in the long term, obscurants.

Others are more problematic and may be the

subject of relatively advanced research even if

some information on them is widely known.

Super acids and super caustics are relatively well

known in the world of scientific research, but

essentially as a means of synthesizing extremely

unstable chemicals. Their properties as corrosive

agents (e.g., for use against the windows of optical systems, which are the most interesting targets in the NLW context) are not the subject of

direct research and cannot be considered to be

well known. Similarly, embrittlement of aluminum alloys by liquid metals is a known phenomenon in the scientific world. Mention has been

made of the possibility of embrittling an aircraft

so that it has time to land before its structures

collapse. Finally, inhibitions of combustion

engines must be considered a difficult problem

for which no solution is yet in sight. One of the

major issues affecting the utilization of these

anti-material chemicals is the design of delivery

devices.

Finally, the area of self-defense or active

defense is worthy of further explanation. The

ability to track a sniper bullet or territorial mortar

or a Bosnian Serb artillery round suggests that

there will be instant retribution for hostile acts.

CONCLUSION

There exists a wealth of technology to support

peacekeeping operations. An overall architecture

is required to effectively utilize these technologies that includes intelligence, situation awareness, reconnaissance, and surveillance;

survivability; and a non-lethal force projection to

respond to hostile acts.

Among the enabling technologies is a wide

spectrum of sensors; mine detection and clearing

technologies; and non-lethal weapons. Additional, enabling technologies might include automatic language translators; miniaturized robotic

vehicle sentries and scouts; electronic and information warfare; invulnerable mobility; and precision delivery of food, water, and fuel for

humanitarian aid.

Remembering the concept of “The Sheathed

Sword,” excellence of victory should not inflict

nor suffer losses.
| 115

13

Non-Lethal

Weapons: A

Synopsis

PURPOSE

here has been much publicity regarding the development of non-lethal technologies and the deployment and

use of non-lethal weapons (NLW). The purpose of this

paper therefore is to examine the concept and utility of

NLW in order to inform those involved with Force Development

or the sponsoring and directing of research into non-lethal technologies.

The paper will not consider low-level tactical procedures nor

the rules for the use of NLW. It will however discuss some of

the legal implications of their employment.

AIM

The aim of the paper is to examine the concept and utility of

NLW in order to determine their place in (Land Warfare) operations.

BACKGROUND

The ending of the Cold War has left a security environment that

is both dangerous and uncertain. The absence of the stability that

rested substantially on the nuclear balance has created conditions in which new and diverse threats to international peace and

order can flourish. Arms proliferation has reached the point

where the developing nations are increasingly acquiring sophisticated weapons, thus providing a new, lethal dimension to

by

Lt. Col. Alan RolandPrice

Directorate General, 

Development and 

Doctrine, Ministry of 

Defence, United 

Kingdom

T

Note: This paper has not yet been approved by the Ministry of Defence as a formal document, and should not be considered

an authorized statement of position by that body or by any of its components.
116 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

ancient conflicts and schisms. Ethnic and religious disputes coupled with population and

resource pressures will continue to generate tensions, but, without super-power restraint the

potential for hostilities seems set to grow. More

will be expected of the UN and other coalition

forces to resolve such conflicts, disputes and tensions.

While the security environment is such that

there is an increased likelihood of the measured

use of force, there is also a political and public

expectation, enhanced by the Gulf War, that

when force is used, it will no longer result in

high casualties and extensive collateral damage.

The view that force can now be used with few

casualties and little collateral damage is

enhanced by the increasing capability of modern

weapon systems. Not only can these systems

deliver a highly destructive capability at long

range and with great precision, but there is now

the possibility of denying the enemy many of his

goals without inflicting large numbers of casualties. These latter systems, known generically as

NLW, are designed either to temporarily immobilize or otherwise influence the enemy or to render his equipment useless for the tasks they were

designed to do.

The use of NLW is not new. Weapons such as

water cannons, rubber bullets, CS gas, stun grenades, and electronic jammers have been used

throughout the world for a number of years in situations where the use of lethal weapons would

be inappropriate. What is new and has enhanced

the importance of NLW, is not only the increasing number and type of military operations being

undertaken, many of which fall short of actual

warfighting, but also their high visibility. The

public, and hence political, concern for casualties

among the combatants and civilian population

have increased interest in the potential for NLW.

The potential lies in the expectation that NLW

can provide armed forces with a more appropriate, less than lethal response when required. The

public expectation has been fueled by the

increasingly high profile, some might say exotic,

non-lethal technologies considered in the media.

DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION

NLW will increase the military options available

to commanders, thereby allowing them to apply a

graduated measure of force. The options available will include, at the lower end of the lethality

scale, the use of NLW. Conflicts may involve

NLW, but armed forces will always deploy with

lethal force which may or may not be used. No

conflict will be limited to a specific level of

lethality and NLW will always contribute to the

application of military force as part of an already

existing spectrum of force. It is therefore wrong

to talk about NLW in isolation or to suggest that

they give rise to non-lethal wars. The term “nonlethal warfare” is therefore unspecific and is not

used further in this paper.

The purpose of NLW is to allow military or

political objectives to be achieved while causing

the minimum possible harm to personnel and the

environment. While this purpose is reasonably

noncontentious, there is no agreed definition

either within NATO or the United Kingdom. The

Defence Scientific Advisory Council (DSAC)

Sub-Committee established to examine the

potential of NLW defines them as, “Discriminate

weapons that are explicitly designed and

employed so as to incapacitate1

 personnel or

materiel, while minimizing fatalities and undesired damage to property and the environment.”

While there are other definitions,2

 this is felt

to be the most appropriate as it encapsulates the

view that such systems can be targeted against

individuals or equipment while minimizing, but

not excluding, fatalities and collateral damage.

1 To render incapable or unfit. Oxford English Dictionary. 2 Further definitions include: a. Weapons that disrupt, destroy or otherwise degrade functioning of threat materiel or personnel without

crossing the “death barrier,” John Alexander, 1993, Los Alamos National Laboratories; b. Instruments used in combat which are designed to

achieve the same tactical and strategic ends as lethal weapons but which are not intended to kill personnel or inflict catastrophic damage to

equipment. Office of Secretary for Defence, 1991.
Chapter 13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis | 117

The use of the term “non-lethal” is misleading. There is a risk that the employment of NLW

can be lethal, for example rubber bullets in

Northern Ireland. For this reason, there have

been suggestions that the term NLW should be

renamed to, reduced, low or limited lethality

weapons. Despite the terminology, NLW

enhance the ability of forces to conduct their

missions successfully with minimum casualties

and little collateral and environmental damage.

The categorization of NLW can be difficult,

depending upon the interpretation given to the

definition used. For example, the precision

offered by a cruise missile can limit collateral

damage and the bombing of a runway can prevent future attack from the air, therefore by definition, both weapon systems could be classed as

non-lethal. For simplicity, NLW can be categorized into those that are designed to impair or

immobilize people or equipment:

People. Systems Targeted against personnel

include:

1. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). PSYOPS aim to influence attitudes and behavior,

thereby affecting the achievement of military

objectives. They have the potential to damage

enemy C2 by lowering morale, instilling fear

and breeding distrust.

2. Acoustics. Sound, whether it be audible or

inaudible (infra- and ultra-sound) can be used

to immobilize individuals or disperse crowds

by causing discomfort, disorientation and nausea.

3. Visual stimulus and illusion (VSI). VSI uses

high-intensity strobe, lighting and holography

to cause temporary vertigo, disorientation, and

nausea.

4. Lasers, incapacitants and irritants. Low

energy (dazzle) lasers, incapacitants (i.e., stun

grenades) and irritants (i.e., CS gas) are used

to temporarily blind, dazzle, immobilize or

disorient individuals.

Equipment and Materiel. Systems targeted

against equipment and materiel include those

designed to impair or prevent mobility, neutralize weapons, exploit, or disrupt communications

or degrade the infrastructure. Such systems

include:

1. Sensor damage lasers targeted against weapon

system optics to prevent mobility and target

acquisition.

2. Metal embrittlement, polymer and super adhesive agents to disable mechanical linkages and

alter material properties causing general

equipment and weapon failure.

3. Radio frequency weapons (RFW) to cause

electronic disruption or failure ignition systems, communications, radars, computers and

navigation aids.

4. Conductive ribbons to short circuit power

lines, fuel additives to contaminate fuel supplies and the introduction of computer viruses

to disrupt communication and economic centers.

A list of the technologies associated with

NLW is in table 13-1 together with, as a result of

some technology wargaming, their possible uses

and disadvantages.

UTILITY

A major opportunity now exists to exploit the

potential offered by non-lethal technologies in

the development of affordable weaponry that can

disable, disrupt, or destroy an enemy’s capability

without causing excessive casualties, property

destruction or widespread environmental damage.

NLW will complement lethal weapons, especially in UN peacekeeping operations where a

military response with something less than lethal

force may be more appropriate. In such circumstances, proportionality is fundamental to maintaining consent. However, if the utility of NLW

weapons were limited to peacekeeping operations, their potential would be unlikely to warrant

the expense of their research, development, and

procurement. Ideally, NLW will therefore need

to be multi-roled, have utility across a wide spectrum of different operations and have the potential for dual (civil/military) use.

NLW will not replace other more lethal

weapon systems nor will they cause a shift in the
118 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

way wars are fought. If deployed in accordance

with the principles of proportionality and target

discrimination, they will complement other

weapon systems to give significant political, strategic, operational and tactical advantages in the

conduct of military operations. An example of

the utility of some NLW across the spectrum of

conflict and at each level of command is in table

13-2.

In order to maximize the potential of NLW,

these weapons must be employed in such a manner as to provide a gradual increase in capability.

This can be achieved either by using NLW on

their own provided there is recourse to lethal

weapons or by using them to complement more

lethal systems. Both cases enable land forces to

react to situations with a greater degree of credibility and flexibility than has hitherto been possible.

Additionally, NLW offer certain advantages

in their role as anti-mobility or anti-equipment

weapons—especially in reducing injuries to personnel. Potential applications are listed in table

13-3.

TYPES OF FORCES THAT MIGHT BE 

EQUIPPED

There are three fundamental approaches that

need to be examined when considering the types

of forces that might be equipped with NLW.

These are:

■ The formation of dedicated units.

■ The issue and use of NLW for specific operations only.

■ Full integration.

Formation of dedicated units. The first

approach would involve the formation of dedicated units trained in the whole spectrum of

TABLE 13-1: The Utility of Non-Lethal Weapon Technologies Across the Spectrum of Conflict

Spectrum

Level Peace

OOTW

(Bosnia) War

Strategic

(To deter or degrade the 

use of military power)

Psyops

Voice synthesis

Computer viruses

Conductive ribbons

Psyops

Voice synthesis

Computer viruses

Material embrittlement

Psyops

Voice synthesis

Computer viruses

Conductive ribbons

Biodeterioration

Operational

(To degrade or defeat 

military forces)

Psyops

Voice synthesis

Psyops

Super-corrosives

Super-adhesives

HPM

Material embrittlement

Soil destabilization

Combustion modifier

Psyops

Anti-friction agents

Super-adhesives

HPM

Material embrittlement

Soil destabilization

Combustion modifier

All lasers

EW

Fuel additives

Tactical

(To defeat or destroy the 

enemy’s warfighting 

capability)

Psyops

Infra & ultra-sound

Noise/odors/lights

Stun weapons

HPM

Low energy lasers

Enclosure filler & foams

Psyops

Infra & ultra-sound

Noise/odors/lights

Stun weapons

HPM

Low energy lasers

Tire attack

Psyops

All lasers

Anti-traction agents

Obscurants

Optical coatings

Tire attack

SOURCE: Alan Roland-Price, 1995.
Chapter 13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis | 119

TABLE 13-2: Uses and Disadvantages of Anti-Personnel Non-Lethal Weapon Technologies

Across the Spectrum of Conflict

No. Technology Description Uses Disadvantages

P1

(M18)

Infra/ultra sound Sonic generator that projects an acoustic 

pressure wave to cause discomfort to personnel; 

handheld or vehicle mounted

Crowds Fratricide, injury, 

seizures

P2 Noise Acoustic generator that produces sufficient 

sound to disorient or incapacitate personnel; 

vehicle mounted system

Crowds Fratricide

P3 Chemicals Family of chemical agents that incapacitate 

personnel; artillery, airborne, vehicle mounted or 

hand delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds

Fratricide, injuries, 

legality, environment

P4 Odors/nausea Family of agents with pungent odors that cause 

discomfort to personnel; airborne, vehicle 

mounted or handheld delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds

Fratricide, legality, 

environment

P5 Biologicals Family of biological agents with temporary 

effects; artillery, airborne, vehicle mounted or 

handheld delivery

Terrorists Fratricide, legality, 

environment

P6 Non-penetrating 

projectiles

Family of projectiles that stun personnel without 

penetrating; handheld delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds

Injury

P7 Strobe lights Large, high intensity stroboscope lights that 

disorient and confuse personnel

Crowds Fratricide, seizures

P8 Stun weapons Family of weapons that subdue or immobilize 

personnel; handheld weapon

Terrorists Injury

P9 Water cannon System that produces a high-pressure stream of 

water to disable or disperse crowds; vehicle 

mounted

Crowds Injury

P10

(M11)

High-power 

microwave

System that produces microwave radiation, 

disorienting personnel; airborne, vehicle 

mounted or artillery delivery

Terrorists, 

soldiers

Fratricide, injury

P11

(M13)

Low-energy lasers Laser device to flash blind personnel; vehicle 

mounted or handheld

Terrorists, 

soldiers

Injuries

P12 Optical munitions Family of explosive flash devises to stun, dazzle, 

temporarily blind; artillery or handheld delivery

Terrorists, 

soldiers

Injury

P13

(M2)

Super adhesives 

& binding coatings

Family of adhesives that prevent movement of 

personnel; artillery, airborne, or vehicle mounted 

delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

Injury, environment

P14 Anti-traction 

compounds

Family of substances that cause lack of traction 

for personnel; artillery, airborne, or vehicle 

mounted delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

Environment

P15

(M25)

Combustible 

dispersants

Family of substance that ignite when subject to 

pressure from personnel passing over; artillery 

or airborne delivery

Terrorists Injury, environment

(Continued)
120 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

NLW. While this option ensures NLW are kept in

the hands of the experts, there are disadvantages:

a. The formation of such units, unless achieved

at the expense of current manpower used as

compensating reductions, would require substantial enhancements. In the current financial

climate, this would be unlikely.

b. The formation of specialized units would

mean that NLW and their use would become a

“black art,” the skills being known to a few

specialists only.

P16 Containment 

devices

Family of nets, meshes and the like to ensnare; 

airborne, vehicle mounted or handheld delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P17

(M19)

Entanglers Family of nets, meshes and the like to ensnare; 

airborne, vehicle mounted or handheld delivery

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P18 Enclosure filters Substances that fills an enclosed space, leaving 

occupants alive, but incapable of movement; 

static system

Terrorists Fratricide

P19 Foams Family of foam that can impede mobility or 

create barriers; airborne or vehicle mounted

Terrorists, 

crowds

None

P20 Deceptions Techniques intended to persuade groups to act 

against their self-interests

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P21 Holograms Generators that produce holograms as decoys 

or deceptions; vehicle mounted

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P22 Indigenous 

vulnerabilities

Techniques for capitolizing on the ethnic or 

religious beliefs of a group or society

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P23

(M27)

Voice synthesis Device to synthesize the voice of a known figure, 

to deceive the public or to produce false orders

Terrorists, 

crowds, 

soldiers

None

P24 Markers Family of substances that can be used to 

covertly mark personnel for later identification; 

handheld delivery

Crowds Environment

P25

(M12)

Obscurants Family of smoke-like agents to obscure 

observation and disorient; vehicle mounted, 

airborne, or artillery delvered

Terrorists, 

crowds

None

KEY

1. Uses

Crowds: Dispersing crowds

Soldiers: Affecting soldiers in conventional wars

Terrorists: Subduing terrorists, rescuing hostages

Can also affect aircraft, computers, electronics, infrastructure, munitions, vehicle mobility, power generation and sensors

2. Disadvantages:

Environment: Possible permanent damage to environment

Fratricide: Possible effects on friendly forces, neutrals, or operator

Injury: Possible permanent injury of death

Legality: Possible treaty violation

Seizures: Possible seizures in epileptics

SOURCE: Alan Roland-Price, 1985.

TABLE 13-2: Uses and Disadvantages of Anti-Personnel Non-Lethal Weapon Technologies

Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Cont’d.)
Chapter 13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis | 121

TABLE 13-3: Uses and Disadvantages of Anti-Materiel Non-Lethal Weapon Technologies Across 

the Spectrum of Conflict

No. Technology Description Uses Disadvantages

M1 Electro-magnetic 

interference

Sonic generator that projects 

an acoustic pressure wave to 

cause discomfort to 

personnel; hand-held or 

vehicle mounted

Electronics, 

sensors, 

munitions

Fratricide

M2 (P13) Bindings coatings Family of adhesives that 

prevent movement of 

vehicles; artillery, airborne, or 

vehicle-mounted delivery

Mobility Environment

M3 High-voltage shock High-voltage generator to 

disrupt electronic systems; 

artillery, airborne, hand-held, 

or vehicle-mounted delivery

Electronics Injury

M4 Non-nuclear EMP Device that duplicates the 

effects of electro-magnetic 

pulses, disrupting electronics; 

artillery or vehicle-mounted 

delivery

Electronics, 

sensors, 

computers

Fratricide

M5 NOT USED

M6 Engine killer 

projectiles

Family of agents that disable 

or destroy engines; hand-held 

or airborne delivery

Mobility, power None

M7 Filter cloggers Family of airborne agents that 

clog air filters when ingested 

in engines; artillery or airborne 

delivery

Mobility, power Fratricide

M8 Conductive particles Family of particles that shortcircuit electronics when 

inserted; hand-held, artillery, 

or airborne delivery

Electronics, 

powers, 

computers

Fraticide, environment

M9 Conductive ribbons Family of ribbons that shortcircuit electronics when 

deployed over wires; handheld, artillery, or vehiclemounted delivery

Power, 

infrastructure

None

M10 Fuel additives/

viscosifier

Family of agents that cause a 

fuel to solidify; handheld or 

covert delivery

Mobility, power None

M11 

(P10)

High-power 

microwave

System that radiates a 

microwave burst, disabling 

electronics; airborne, artillery, 

or vehicle-mounted delivery

Electronics, 

sensors, aircraft

Fratricide

(Continued)
122 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

c. There are too many different types of NLW

for dedicated units to be trained in them all.

d. New weapon systems should be made to suit

the requirements of the user rather than the

user having to be specially trained to meet the

requirements of the weapon.

Use for specific operations only. The second

option is for NLW to be retained for specific

operations only, with units being trained in their

use before deployment. This option would limit

the utility of NLW to a specific role or purpose

(as is the case with baton rounds for Northern

Ireland) instead of using them to their maximum

M12 

(P25)

Obscurants Family of smoke-like agents to 

obscure visiual or electronic 

observation; airborne, 

artillery, or vehicle-mounted 

delivery

Sensors None

M13 

(P11)

High-energy lasers Laser device to destroy 

optical sensors and 

navigation devices; airborne 

or vehicle-mounted weapon

Sensors Injury

M14 Optical munition Explosive flash device to stun, 

dazzle, temporarily blind 

optical sensors; hand-held or 

artillery delivery

Sensors Fratricide

M15 Computer viruses Family of programs that will 

cause computers to 

malfunction; handheld or 

covert delivery

Computers None

M16 Materiel 

embrittlement

Family of substances that 

cause materials to quickly 

disintegrate; hand-held or 

artillery delivery

Mobility, 

infrastructure

Injury, environment

M17 Optical coatings Family of materials that can 

be deposited on optical 

sensors or viewing ports to 

obscure vision; hand-held 

delivery

Sensors None

M18

(P1)

Infra/ultra sound Sonic generator that projects 

a low/high frequency acoustic 

beam to damage electronics; 

vehicle-mounted system

Electronics Fratricide

M19 

(P17)

Entanglers Family of nets, meshes, and 

the like to ensnare vehicles; 

hand-held, airborne, or 

vehicle-mounted delivery

Mobility None

M20 Anti-traction Family of substances that 

cause a lack of traction; handheld, artillery, airborne, or 

vehicle-mounted delivery

Mobility Environment

SOURCE: Alan Roland-Price, 1995.

TABLE 13-3: Uses and Disadvantages of Anti-Materiel Non-Lethal Weapon Technologies Across 

the Spectrum of Conflict (Cont’d.)
Chapter 13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis | 123

potential across the spectrum of conflict. Their

procurement could therefore be less cost-effective.

Full integration. This third option involves

the full integration of NLW into the armories, of

land forces. As NLW have such a wide variety of

uses and capabilities across the spectrum of conflict, all forces will need to be equipped and

trained to use a number of them depending upon:

a. Corps, regiment, or specialty. For example,

signallers and communicators might use EW,

jammers and microwaves; engineers might

use anti-traction agents and agents to degrade

infrastructures; military police might use calmative agents; and armored personnel might

use laser adjuncts.

b. The role and task of the unit. Units,

involved in crowd control will use personnel

denial or disabling weapons; special forces in

high-jacking situations may use acoustics,

strobe or stunning agents; units deployed on

counterterrorism operations may use

PSYOPS; reconnaissance units may need to

disable enemy vehicles quickly and silently;

maneuver units may want to craze enemy

optics and sights with DEW.

Full integration would inevitably involve sortie minor organizational changes. It would, for

example, be necessary to integrate NLW into the

command and control warfare (C2W) cell within

the headquarters command staff. It may also be

necessary to enhance logistics units to cater for

the additional burden of transportation, handling,

storage, maintenance, and environmental control; medical units to treat specialized physiological and psychological effects; and gunnery units

to provide the essential means of delivery.

Selected Option. It is recommended that U.K.

land forces select the third option, full integration. Only by such integration will the full potential of NLW be realized, across the entire

spectrum of conflict.

AN APPROACH TO USING NLW

If NLW are to be fully integrated with lethal systems, then the procedures associated with their

use must be similar. There are four distinct

phases.

❚ Planning

■ Three key factors in the planning phase are the

need for Rules of Engagement (ROE), the

requirement for detailed real-time intelligence,

and the need for a carefully thought out media

plan, especially in Operations Other Than War

(OOTW). All three factors are necessary when

planning lethal operations, but with NLW

additional ROE are required to control their

use below the lethal threshold. In addition,

information/intelligence on the target may be

more difficult to acquire (susceptibilities and

vulnerabilities) so it will need careful management. A well rehearsed media plan is essential.

■ Planning the use of NLW can be more complex than for lethal weapons because, in some

situations, the enemy has to know that the

weapon being delivered is non-lethal. It is, for

example, pointless aiming a gun at the enemy

to fire a NLW if the enemy perceives you to be

firing a lethal weapon and responds accordingly. The dilemma therefore is whether or not

to inform the enemy of your intent.

❚ Means of Delivery

As with lethal systems, the means of delivery for

NLW will be dependent upon the threat and the

delivery assets available. However, as the purpose of NLW is to limit the number of casualties

and collateral damage, it is likely that the use of

robotics and unmanned vehicles (both air and

ground) as a means of delivery will play an

increasingly important role because—by separating the man from the weapons platform—they

protect him from enemy lethal and non-lethal

weapons.

❚ Method of Employment

Some NLW could become an important element

in C2

W, particularly PSYOPS to manipulate the

perceptions of adversaries, allies and the public;

to prevent the misinterpretation of NLW as lethal

operations and to prevent adversaries from esca-
124 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

lating the level of violence accidentally through

misunderstanding. While it is important for the

enemy to understand that NLW may be used

against him, such knowledge will inevitably

mean that operational surprise is sacrificed.

However, surprise at the tactical level can still be

retained provided the tactical commander is

given the authority and responsibility for determining the level of force and lethality to be used

in response to a given situation. In making his

choice, the commander will have to consider the

need to minimize casualties and collateral damage on the one hand with the need to be decisive

and persuasive on the other. However, the availability of NLW does not imply that such weapons must be used first, before the use of lethal

weapons nor does it negate the right of soldiers

to protect themselves or others with lethal force.

As with other weapon systems, NLW are most

effective when used in synergy with other NLW

or with more lethal systems. The synergistic use

of such weapons can also provide simultaneity to

overwhelm and confuse the enemy—an important function in the conduct of maneuver warfare.

Although NLW can facilitate maneuver and augment and intensify the synergistic effects of combined arms, there is an ever present need to

employ countermeasures. Many NLW use offthe-shelf technology, so their use by or proliferation to enemy forces must be expected.

❚ Verification

There is a need for high confidence levels in the

effectiveness of NLW when the consequences of

their use are not materially visible. Not only is

this important in order to assess their effectiveness, but also to counter enemy propaganda. This

may require new techniques in Battle Damage

Assessment.

FACTORS AND PRINCIPLES GOVERNING 

NLW USE

There are a number of factors that influence the

principles governing the use of NLW. These are:

a. Political. The perception that military force

can be used with few casualties may make the

future use of force more acceptable as an

instrument of government policy. It could

therefore be argued that force might be used

more frequently to resolve disputes and conflicts.

b. Ecological and military. Pressures to minimize damage to property and the environment

will place emphasis on the need to seek a

quick military solution, preferably before

mobilization although such pre-emptive action

may not be acceptable politically. The use of

PSYOPS, EW and systems that degrade the

infrastructure and prevent mobilization will

play a prominent role in seeking such a solution.

c. Media. The ability of the media to influence

public opinion emphasizes the importance of a

clear media plan relating to the use of NLW.

d. Legal

■ Current international conventions3 and treaties

could inhibit the use of some NLW. For example, the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the use of Riot Control Agents in war,

but permits their use in OOTW—including

peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and law

enforcement. If such weapons are permitted in

OOTW, then arguably they should be permitted in regional conflict and war; but clearly

caveats would need to be incorporated to limit

their use, toxicity and effect.

■ Another legal issue that will require careful

consideration before NLW are used is the matter of litigation resulting from the physical or

psychological effects of their use. Such litigation may take years to surface as the long term

effects of many non-lethal systems are

unknown.

e. Ethical. The development and employment of

NLW has an ethical dimension whose consequences must be carefully considered. This

will include the definition of acceptability

with regard to the extent to which a human

3 Article 23(e) 1907 Hague Convention IV; Article 1 1972 Convention on Bacteriological and Toxin Weapons; The Chemical Weapons

Convention 1993; Environmental Modification Treaty.
Chapter 13 Non-Lethal Weapons: A Synopsis | 125

being can be “Incapacitated” through the use

of NLW and the moral issue that arises from

any decision not to use NLW. Clearly the use

and effects of NLW must be acceptable

nationally, militarily, and individually.

PRINCIPLES

The following principles give guidance for the

employment of NLW:

a. NLW can either be used alone, provided they

are backed by the political will to deploy and

use lethal force, or as an adjunct to lethal

weapons. Their use must be controlled by

ROE and must not be allowed to jeopardize

the right of soldiers to defend themselves with

lethal force.

b. The employment of NLW must be consistent

with current Treaties, Conventions, international and domestic laws. Their use must also

be morally and ethically justifiable.

c. NLW must be used proportionately (the least

destructive way of defeating the enemy) and

discriminately (the protection of non-combatants from direct intentional attack).

d. NLW must be fully integrated with lethal

weapons in order to provide a graduated

response based upon the use of minimum

force.

e. NLW must not be deployed without consideration to countermeasures, including the hardening and protection of our own systems.

SELECTION OF NON-LETHAL 

TECHNOLOGIES

The principles that govern the use of NLW give

an indication as to which non-lethal technologies

have military potential. Criteria that will influence the future development of such technologies will include:

a. Acceptability. Non-lethal technologies that

contravene current legislation or whose use

may be morally or ethically unjustifiable will

have little military potential.

b. Doctrine. A maneuverist approach to warfighting dictates that future research into nonlethal technologies should be directed towards

seeking and disabling or disrupting the

enemy’s vulnerabilities. These will include his

C3 assets, logistic supplies, his cohesion and

will to fight. In OOTW, the use of all (both

lethal and non-lethal) weapons will be dictated by the constraints of either domestic law,

ethics or mandates. Those non-lethal technologies that permit operations to be conducted

within such constraints will have military

potential.

c. Utility. Unless cheap to procure, NLW will

need to be either multi-roled or have utility in

more than one specific scenario. Ideally, they

should have utility across the spectrum of conflict. Those NLW systems with specific or

limited utility are unlikely to have the military

potential for further development.

d. Affordability and technical risk. Non-lethal

technologies that attract low research and

development costs or are cheap to procure and

support will be more attractive and possibly

more, cost-effective than those that carry a

high degree of technological risk or are expensive to procure.

INTEROPERABILITY

The future use of force across the spectrum of

conflict is likely to be both joint and combined.

NLW should therefore be interoperable with

those of our major allies and, where appropriate,

with those of the other services and government

departments.

LOGISTICS AND TRAINING

Logistics. Logistic constraints are difficult to

identify until the various non-lethal technologies

have been further developed. However, many

NLW will require special handling, secure storage facilities and specialist transportation, One

key issue must be the nature and size of the

power-pack, which may be large and cumbersome. There will therefore need to be a

“tradeoff” with more conventional weapons for

strategic lift.

Training. Retaining a military capability

across the spectrum of conflict imposes a heavy
126 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

training load. The acquisition of new weapons

whose operation may be different from Conventional lethal weapons will add to this load. However, advances in training systems technology

including synthetic environments may increase

training efficiency and mitigate the problem.

Routine training in the use of NLW must be

based on doctrine and be fully integrated into

combined arms training. Such training is a prerequisite to the conduct on non-lethal operations.

SUMMARY

Recent conflicts, especially in OOTW, have

highlighted the limited capability of military

forces to respond to situations with anything

other than lethal force. Such a response is often

inappropriate.

Non-lethal technologies are being developed

that will offer a graduated response in the conduct of operations, across the full spectrum of

conflict. The use of weapon systems utilizing

such non-lethal technologies will enable some

wars to be fought with fewer casualties and less

collateral and environmental damage. This will

be more acceptable both politically and publicly.

NLW must be fully integrated with more conventional weapon systems and, although they

may be used alone or with other similar systems

to provide a synergistic effect, they must always

be underpinned by lethal force.

NLW provide a greater range of options to

commanders at all levels. Their full integration

and use as a weapon system will therefore

require more detailed planning than had lethal

weapons only been available. NLW could

become an important additional Component of

C2

W; it is therefore essential to integrate NLW

within the C2

W cell of the appropriate theater

headquarters.

The introduction of many NLW presents a

number of legal issues which must be satisfactorily resolved and ethical questions which, at

least, will need to be considered, before their use

in operations.

The selection of non-lethal technologies that

have military potential will be influenced by

legal and moral constraints, doctrine, utility, and

affordability.

CONCLUSIONS

The Army Policy and Resource Committee

(Doctrine) is invited to note the military potential

of NLW and accept that:

a. The proposed definition of “Discriminate

weapons that are explicitly designed and

employed so as to incapacitate4 personnel or

materiel, while minimizing fatalities and

undesired damage to property and the environment” is the most suitable.

b. NLW could provide military commanders

with an enhanced capability across the spectrum of conflict.

c. NLW should be fully integrated with conventional weapon systems to provide commanders with the flexibility of a graduated response

if required.

d. The principles governing the use of NLW provide a sound basis for further work in the

development of non-lethal technologies and

their associated weapon systems.

4 To render incapable or unfit. Oxford English Dictionary
| 127

14

The Role of

Technology in

Peace Operations

INTRODUCTION

he variety of possible military operations can be viewed

as a continuum. One end of the continuum may be

described as peace, characterized by diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and generally nonviolent forms of military activity. The other end is war. In the

middle region between these two antipodes are several categories of limited military operations that are less than war but that

require military activity to support or enforce peace.

All points on the continuum are influenced by the quality and

availability of information. As a general rule, the “peace” end of

the continuum tends to be information-rich, with much shared

knowledge regarding the parties’ interests, assets, and capabilities. The “war” end of the range tends to be information-poor,

requiring extraordinary measures to collect intelligence. It may

be inferred that abundant, shared information tends to increase

understanding and reduce the level of violence at which disagreements are resolved.

Toward the center of this continuum are military operations

falling between war and peace. In peacekeeping, a truce or treaty

may be in effect, and the former combatants may agree to permit

activities (perhaps conducted by a third party) to reduce suspicions and build confidence. In peace enforcement, one or more

of the combatants do not agree to cease hostilities, and a third

party endeavors to prevent the warring parties from continuing

their violence. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement may differ

significantly in the weapons and military systems employed and

in the lethality of their operations. Of the two, peace enforceby

Gerold Yonas

Vice President, 

Systems Applications

Sandia National 

Laboratories

T
128 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

ment presents the most difficulties, both from a

policy and a military perspective.

POLICY FRAMEWORK

Overcoming the policy difficulties is as important to a successful outcome as surmounting the

military challenges. It is essential that the intervening party or coalition agree on objectives that

are realistic with respect to the risks and costs

they are willing to accept. All participants should

understand and endorse the defined objectives of

the operation.

Once those objectives have been established,

it will also be necessary to negotiate rules of

engagement that will free the military command

from micro-management by political representatives. In conformity with those rules of engagement, a unitary command structure should

prosecute the objectives in the most expeditious

manner possible. Unnecessary levels of bureaucracy in the command structure should be eliminated, following principles similar to the quality

management techniques used by industry.

The exercise of establishing objectives, if

done properly, may reveal significant problems

in both policy and military feasibility. A policy

of neutrality may become untenable if significant

military loses are incurred. Countermeasures

against peace enforcers may be so facile and so

potent that effectual peace enforcement becomes

unfeasible. Military services treat peace enforcement missions as a form of combat, and combat

invariably produces unforeseen problems and

losses.

Nevertheless, peace enforcement may, in

some cases, be the least undesirable option for an

obdurate military/political disagreement that will

not yield to diplomacy. For those cases, it is

increasingly clear that information technology

can be an important tool providing a crucial

advantage to the peace enforcers. An information

advantage translates into a military advantage in

conflicts that tend toward the “war” half of the

spectrum and can be decisive if skillfully

exploited.

SENSOR SYSTEMS FOR PEACEKEEPING 

AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Data collected through sensor and surveillance

systems can help increase the confidence of the

parties to an agreement or it can provide operational intelligence for preventing violence. Sensor systems for peacekeeping should enhance

confidence that parties to an agreement, such as a

truce, are not violating the terms of the agreement. Such confidence reduces speculation and

unfounded suspicions and helps stabilize the

peace. Tensions are reduced when potential

adversaries have adequate information about

each other’s movements and intentions. Open

Skies, satellite reconnaissance, seismic monitoring stations, and cooperative inspection are

examples of information-gathering systems that

build confidence.

A cooperative monitoring center should continuously collect data relevant to the terms of the

truce. Data can be collected by various sensor

systems in space, on aircraft, or on the ground.

The data should be summarized and displayed in

near-real-time to all parties. Open knowledge of

potential adversaries’ movements, capabilities,

and intentions is a key element of successful crisis prevention.

Sensor systems for peace enforcement must be

integrated with battle management systems

appropriate for the situation. Space and airborne

imaging systems, including the new day/night,

all-weather synthetic aperture radar systems

under development, are valuable for monitoring

surface activity. During military operations,

detecting and identifying mobile or relocatable

assets could be assisted by small, smart, unattended ground sensors and longer-range sensors

using technology already available. Long-range,

high-resolution imaging radar with automatic

target recognition capability could detect mobile

targets as well as stationary targets in bad

weather, in daylight or at night. Unmanned aerial

vehicles and tele-robotic ground vehicles could

roam the battlefield and monitor the situation

without exposing peacekeepers to hostile action.
Chapter 14 The Role of Technology in Peace Operations | 129

Sensors can support both cooperative and

noncooperative measures to detect weapon

deployments and movements. But the capability

to exercise a quick response to an artillery or

missile attack by a combatant will require rapid

integration with battle systems. It will be necessary to develop standoff methods for precision

strike, offering high lethality and low collateral

damage. Some prototype hardware and test experience exist.

While many such sensor and strike capabilities are either in hand or on the technical horizon,

a daunting problem that will require a major

research effort is the conversion of sensor data

into useful knowledge. A sizable sensor system

will create an ocean of data. The problem is how

to distill that ocean into the droplets of vital

information that provide real-time, exquisite

awareness of the dynamic situation under surveillance.

This distillation will require the extraction of

knowledge from the high-bandwidth, high-volume data stream. Data prioritization will be

accomplished using pattern recognition principles (to extract features of interest from the data

stream) and model-based data fusion techniques.

Features identified in the sensor data stream will

be compared with feature data stored on the sensor platform, resulting in a prioritized cueing list

for the human observer. Data from multiple sensor systems will be fused at the feature level as

opposed to the image level. This prioritization

and subsequent data rate reduction will result in

more efficient use of communications bandwidth

and reduce operator overload. Once transmitted

back to the observation point, the merged knowledge extracted at the sensor platform can be

combined with situation awareness data and contextual information from multiple sources in a

human systems interface. The purpose of the

human systems interface is to efficiently present

data to the observer in a prioritized manner that

maximizes human effectiveness.

While sensor data fusion has been demonstrated in discrete and comparatively small applications, the ability to extract knowledge from a

system of systems in real-time has not been demonstrated. The ability to demonstrate this will

require advances in automatic target recognition

systems, including high-performance embedded

processors and advanced algorithmic approaches

such as neural networks and model-based vision.

This technology must be combined into a system

that properly cues and synthesizes the represented

features into a form that provides knowledge to

the observer instead of merged raw data. This task

is technically challenging but builds on strengths

and technologies currently under development at

Sandia National Laboratories and elsewhere in

the technical community.

LESS-THAN-LETHAL WEAPONS

Novel, less-than-lethal weapons are beginning to

provide new options for peace enforcement operations. Such weapons include foams and sprays,

entanglements, electromagnetics, and other

applications. They may be effective in stopping

civil offenders without killing them, controlling

violent crowds or prisoners, gently stopping fleeing cars, and improving response options in hostage situations. Sub-lethal kinetic projectiles

include such items as foam rubber bullets,

“doughnuts,” bean bags, and soft plastic pellets.

Entanglements such as nets and adhesive snares

can be lobbed over individuals or groups. Sticky

foam can be shot against individuals at a distance

of about ten meters and can be very effective in

frustrating an attacker.

Novel, non-lethal weapons might also provide

ingenious ways for denying use of military hardware. It may be possible to impound military

equipment with chemical locks that are reversible only with a unique chemical key. A hardening foam containing a unique organic molecule

could be used to temporarily render equipment

inoperative. A special solvent containing a complementary catalytic molecule would be the

unique key. Chemical tags and markers could be

designed in a similar way.

If a combatant uses military hardware in defiance of a cease-fire, credible warheads and delivery systems for novel, anti-hardware weapons

could make peace enforcers’ response options
130 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

more palatable. Trucks, tanks, artillery, and aircraft could be incapacitated by powerful adhesives. Optics could be permanently disabled with

indelible coatings. Frictionless powders could

render roads and airstrips unusable. Rubber-eating chemicals could destroy tires, insulation, and

hoses. Air-intakes on engines and electronics are

vulnerable to invasive particles that can gum-up

mechanical systems or short-out electrical wiring. Even common nontoxic substances such as

gum resins and sugars can incapacitate equipment if properly applied. If violators could be

located quickly using counter-battery radars or

fire-burst detectors, and if such novel warheads

could be delivered in rapid, precise counterstrikes (for example, with laser-guided rockets),

the authority of peace enforcers would be dramatically improved.

Anti-personnel applications of benign, nonlethal weapons would seek to temporarily frustrate combatants’ personal combat capacities. A

charge of sticky foam shot in a small, soft projectile could render an infantryman incapable of

using small arms (or his own arms) until the

foam is laboriously removed. Frictionless powders could make soldiers unable to walk, run,

stand, or manipulate equipment. Repugnant malodorous paints delivered in sprays (skunk shots)

could inhibit military teamwork and effective

command. Nontoxic aqueous foams could be

used to befuddle combatants’ senses and effectiveness. The ordnance and fuzing of such novel

projectiles will be a design and development

challenge for the near future.

Finally, it will be desirable to develop solvents, antidotes, and disposal techniques for

those substances that would pose a continuing

threat to civilians after hostilities are over.

MINE CLEARANCE

Detecting and safely removing abandoned antipersonnel mines is a major problem in peacekeeping and post-conflict situations. In several

countries, hundreds of civilians continue to be

killed or maimed by mines years after hostilities

have ended. Abandoned minefields also have a

severe economic impact due to lost farmland,

roads, and injured livestock.

In a current program involving the United

States Army, Sandia National Laboratories, and

the University of Florida, the capability of imaging buried mines using backscattered x-rays even

with surface clutter has been demonstrated.1 This

detection method could be adapted to civilian demining using off-the-shelf technology. Another

current project being developed by EG&G

employs ground-penetrating radar and metal

detectors.2 This project has demonstrated sensor

performance, sensor data fusion, and real-time

processing for countermine and combat support

applications. These concepts are modular and

could be expandable to larger platforms. Lockheed Martin3 and Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratories4 are doing research on the use of

infrared sensors for mine detection.

Shock waves propagating downward from a

fuel-air blast can detonate some mines within the

radius of the blast. For obvious reasons, this

technique is suitable only for wartime conditions.

In civilian de-mining, environmental and property considerations necessitate that mines be

removed by hand and detonated in a remote area.

Remote detonation also removes the possibility

of contaminating an area with debris that would

make additional mine detection more difficult.

Pulsed or continuous water jets could be used to

1 J.G. Campbell and A.M. Jacobs, Detection of Buried Land Mines by Compton Backscatter Imaging, Nuclear Science and Engineering,

110, 417424 (1992); C.M. Burchanowski, R.B. Moler, and S.L. Shope, Scanned Beam X-ray Source Technology for Photon Backscatter

Imaging Technique of Mine Detection: Advanced Technology Research, Proceedings of SPIE International Symposium on Aerospace/

Defense and Control Dual-Use Photonics, Orlando, Florida, April 1995 (to be published); and J.Wehlburg, S. Keshavmurthy, Y. Watanabe,

E. Dugan, and A. Jacobs, Image Restoration Using Compton Backscatter Imaging for the Detection of Buried Landmines, ibid. 2 Phil Johnson, EG&G MSI, Albuquerque Operations, Albuquerque, New Mexico (private communication). 3 P. Ngan, S. A. Garcia, E.L. Cloud, H.A. Duvoisin III, D.T. Long, and J.K. Hackett, Development of Automatic Target Recognition for

Infrared Sensor-based Close-range Land Mine Detector, SPIE Proceedings, op.cit. 4 N. Del Grande, Sensor Fusion Methodology for Remote Detection of Buried Land Mines, in Proceedings of the 3rd National Symposium on Sensor Fusion (Infrared Information Analysis Center. ERIM August 1990). vol. 1. p. 407.
Chapter 14 The Role of Technology in Peace Operations | 131

cut a mine into pieces, rendering it safe.5 Techniques with potential for nondestructively demining large tracts of land in reasonable periods

of time exist, but they will require considerable

research and development before this problem is

solved.

CONCLUSION

New technologies are rapidly emerging that can

help manage or enforce peace and inhibit the

deterioration of crises into war. The key to

employing these technologies effectively is

advanced information technology based on sensor systems, networks, and new software and

hardware.

A variety of novel, less-than-lethal weapons

can be developed and deployed to provide peacekeepers and peace enforcers with the means to

precisely deny the use of war fighting equipment

5 Christopher Cherry, Sandia National Laboratories (private communication).

to combatants. This can be accomplished with a

minimum of casualties to both aggressors and

noncombatants.

An implementation challenge will be training

troops to use these new systems in a peacekeeping mode. Peacekeeping operations are a cultural

challenge to traditional military operations and

thinking. Simulated environments for training

may be useful in helping military personnel

acquire new operational skills and techniques

appropriate for peacekeeping.

Information technology supports the entire

peace/war continuum: In peacetime it serves as a

mechanism to minimize fear and mistrust; during

war it provides an significant military advantage.

For those new-world-order situations that fall

between peace and war, information technology

can be the crucial factor that makes engagement

possible at acceptable levels of risk.
| 133

A

Appendix A:

Workshop

Agenda

WORKSHOP ON IMPROVING THE 

PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE PEACE 

OPERATIONS: TACTICS, TECHNOLOGY, 

TRAINING

Workshop was held at the Rockefeller Foundation Study and Conference Center, Bellagio,

Italy, June 12–16, 1995.

Chair: M.Gen. John O.B. Sewall, USA (ret.)

(National Defense University and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on Military Issues

and Bosnian Federation Affairs—US)

June 13—Tuesday

❚ SESSION I: Traditional Peacekeeping

9–10:30 AM: Panel One—Presentations

Organizational and Planning Requirements:

Lessons drawn from past operations

B.Gen. Tryggve Tellefsen (former Commander,

UN Preventive Deployment, Macedonia—

Norway)

Case Study: The Multilateral Force in the Sinai:

Experience with Training and the Uses of

Technology

Scott Gudgeon (Deputy Director General

MFO—US)

10:45 AM–12 NOON: Roundtable Discussion

Opening Commentary: Lt. Gen. Satish

Nambiar, Indian Army (ret.) (former Deputy

Chief of Army Staff and former Commander

UNPROFOR—India)

❚ SESSION II: Extended Peacekeeping

2:30–4:15 PM: Panel Two—Presentations

Planning and Technical Requirements: Lessons

from Recent Operations

Mario Zucconi (University of Urbino and Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale, Rome—

Italy)

Case Study: United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia: Doctrine, Training, Tactics, and

the Role of Technology

Lt. Col. Damien Healy (Australian Defence

Force, Staff Officer to former Commander,

UNTAC—Australia)

4:30–5:30 PM: Roundtable Discussion

Opening Commentary: Susan Woodward

(Brookings Institution—USA)

9 PM: Keynote Address

The Honorable Dennis McLean (U.S. Institute

of Peace, former Ambassador of New Zealand to

the U.S.—NZ)
134 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

June 14–Wednesday

❚ SESSION III: Peace Enforcement

9–10:45 AM: Panel Three: Presentations

Organizational, Planning, and Technical

Requirements: Lessons from Recent Operations

General Sir David Ramsbotham, British

Army (ret.) (former Adjutant General, U.K.

Army—UK)

Case Study: UNOSOM II: Doctrine, Training,

Tactics, Coordination, and the Role of Technology

Adm. Jonathan Howe, USN (ret.) (Special

Rep. of UN Secretary General, UNOSOM II—

USA)

11 AM–12 NOON: Roundtable Discussion

Opening Commentary: Virginia Gamba

(UNIDIR—Argentina)

❚ SESSION IV: A Look at the Future

4:15–6:00 PM: Panel Four—Presentations

UNPROFOR and UNTAC: Lessons Learned as

to Requirements for Planning, Training, and

Equipment

M.Gen. John O.B. Sewall, USA (ret.) (Chair—

US)

Tactics, Training, and Potential Roles for Technology: Recent Experience and Indications for

the Future

Steve Simon (National Security Council—US)

6:00–7:00 PM: Roundtable Discussion

June 15–Thursday

❚ SESSION V: The Roles of Technology in 

Peace Operations

9–12 NOON: Panel Five—Presentations

Mine Detection and Clearance—Context

Gilles Courregelongue (Defense Conseil International—France)

Technologies Appropriate for Peace Operations

Milton Finger (Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory—USA)

Less-than-Lethal Weapons

Lt. Col. Alan Roland-Price (Staff Officer,

Directorate of Land Warfare, Ministry of

Defence—UK)

Technologies Appropriate for Peace Operations

Gerald Yonas (Sandia National Laboratories—

USA)

2:30–3:00 PM: Roundtable Discussion

Opening Commentary: Juergen Altmann RuhrUniversitaet, Bochum—Germany)

❚ SESSION VI: Summary

3:30–5:30 PM

Rapporteur Summaries: Potential Roles for

Technology in Various Types of Peace

Operations

Anthony Fainberg, Alex Gliksman (Office of

Technology Assessment—USA)
| 135

B

Appendix B:

Advisory Panel

Richard Ullman

Chairman

Professor

Center for International Studies

Princeton University

Steve Aftergood

Senior Research Analyst

Federation of American Scientists

Robin Beard

Assistant Secretary General

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

William Durch

Senior Associate

The Henry L. Stimson Center

Milt Finger

Deputy Assistant Director

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Richard Garwin

IBM Fellow Emeritus

Thomas J. Watson Research Center

Dan Goure

Deputy Director

Center for Strategic and International Studies

Patricia Hutzler

Research Fellow

Logistics Management Institute

Lauren Landis Guzman

Program Officer

InterAction

Martin McCusker

Director

Defence and Security

North Atlantic Assembly

NOTE: This is the list of Advisory Panelists of the full project on International Peace Operations, of which this workshop background paper is

a part. Due to the shutdown of the Office of Technology Assessment on September 30, 1995, and the consequent time restrictions in releasing

this background paper, it has not been possible for the text to have been reviewed by the members of this panel. OTA appreciates and is grateful

for the valuable assistance and thoughtful critiques provided by the advisory panel members in the course of this truncated project. The panel

does not, however, necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse this report. OTA assumes full responsibility for the report and the accuracy of

its contents.
136 | Improving the Prospects for Future Peace Operations–Workshop Proceedings

Gen. Sir Jeremy MacKenzie

Deputy Supreme Allied Commander

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Alex Morrison

President

The Lester B. Pearson Canadian

International Peacekeeping Training Centre

Ambassador Robert Oakley

Visiting Senior Fellow

National Defense University

Arian Pregenzer

Manager

Sandia National Laboratories

Richard Seitz

Senior Associate

Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

Judith Snow

Program Development Manager

Los Alamos National Laboratory

Jeremiah Sullivan

Professor

University of Illinois

B. Gen. Nathan Vail, USA (ret.)

Consultant

Eric Wenaas

CEO

JAYCOR

Participant Observers

Stuart Johnson

Director

Institute for Strategic Studies

National Defense University

Lt. Col. Bob Killebrew

Professor

U.S. Army War College

Martin Libicki

Senior Fellow

National Defense University

Lynellyn Long

Project Officer

U.S. Agency for International Development

M. Gen. John O. B. Sewall, USA (ret.)

Deputy Director

Institute for Strategic Studies

National Defense University