J-A16001-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM COATES, III, 

 Appellant No. 247 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 13, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012614-2013 

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016 

 Appellant, William Coates, III, appeals the judgment of sentence 

entered on January 13, 2015, in the Allegheny County Court of Common 

Pleas. We affirm. 

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history of 

this matter as follows: 

Briefly, the evidence presented at trial established that, 

beginning when she was 8 or 9 years old, [Appellant] (who was 

her mother’s boyfriend), began touching the breasts and 

buttocks of [C.L.] on a daily basis. The touching progressed to 

[Appellant] showing her his penis, having her touch his penis 

and eventually to ejaculating in her hands. [C.L.] also testified 

that on one occasion, [Appellant] forced her to perform oral sex 

on him and once he climbed on top of her and attempted to have 

sex with her, but he stopped when she screamed for her mother. 

____________________________________________ 

*

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 
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Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/16, at 2. 

[Appellant] was charged with Involuntary Deviate Sexual 

Intercourse,1 Criminal Solicitation,2 Criminal Attempt,3 Unlawful 

Contact with a Minor,4 Sexual Assault,5 Endangering the Welfare 

of a Child,6 Indecent Exposure,7 Corruption of Minors,8 Indecent 

Assault of a Person Under 139 and Indecent Assault.10 Following 

a jury trial held before this Court, [Appellant] was convicted of 

the Unlawful Contact, Endangering the Welfare of a Child, 

Indecent Exposure, Corruption of Minors and both counts of 

Indecent Assault. He appeared before this Court on January 13, 

2015 and was found to be a Sexually Violent Predator. He was 

subsequently sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 

three and one half (31⁄2) to seven (7) years at the Unlawful 

Contact charge, two and one half (21⁄2) to five (5) years at the 

Endangering the Welfare of a Child[,] [(21⁄2) to five (5) years at 

the] Indecent Exposure charge[,] and two (2) to four (4) years 

at the Indecent Assault of a Person Under 13 charge, for an 

aggregate term of imprisonment of 101⁄2 to 21 years. This timely 

appeal followed. 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3123(a)(7) 

2

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §902(a) - 2 counts 

3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §901(a) 

4

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6318.1 

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3124.1 

6

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §4304(a) 

7

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3127(a) 

8

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §6301(a)(1)(i) 

9

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3126(a)(7) 

10 18 Pa.C.S.A. §3126(a)(5) 

Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/16, at 1-2. 

In his brief, Appellant presents the following issues: 

I. WAS THE SENTENCE IMPOSED MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND 

AN ABUSE OF THE SENTENCING COURT’S DISCRETION IN THAT: 

 Three of the four sentences received were for the 

maximum penalty, and all were ordered to be served 

consecutively; 
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 Three sentences were above the aggravated range 

in the sentencing guidelines, the remaining sentence 

was in the aggravated range, yet the only 

recognition by the sentencing court of these facts 

was a single throw away comment that the 

aggregate sentence was “way outside” of the 

guidelines; and 

 The court focused almost exclusively on the 

gravity of the offense and the impact on the victim, 

and ignored any reference to the defendant’s 

rehabilitative needs? 

II. WAS THE GUILTY VERDICT AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THAT THE JURY’S SPLIT VERDICT

INDICATED THAT IT FOUND THE COMPLAINANT TO BE 

INCREDIBLE; AS THE COMPLAINANT’S TESTIMONY WAS THE 

ONLY EVIDENCE PRESENTED AGAINST MR. COATES, SHOULD 

THE GUILTY VERDICT HAVE SHOCKED THE CONSCIENCE OF THE 

COURT SUCH THAT A NEW TRIAL IS REQUIRED? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7. 

In his first issue, Appellant presents a challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. It is well settled that a challenge to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence is a petition for permission to appeal, as 

the right to pursue such a claim is not absolute. Commonwealth v. 

Treadway, 104 A.3d 597, 599 (Pa. Super. 2014). Before this Court may 

review the merits of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, 

we must engage in the following four-pronged analysis: 

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 

and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at 

sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, 

see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial 
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question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b). 

Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citing

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006)). 

While Appellant filed a timely appeal and included a statement 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) in his brief, we are constrained to agree with 

the Commonwealth’s argument that Appellant failed to preserve his 

challenge in a timely-filed post sentence motion. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

12. The record reveals that Appellant was sentenced on January 13, 2015. 

Counsel filed a motion to withdraw on January 20, 2015. This motion 

reiterated his original request to withdraw, which was memorialized in the 

notes of testimony. N.T., 1/13/15, at 30, 33. The notes of testimony from 

the sentencing hearing also reflect that the trial court stated it would appoint 

counsel. Id. Accordingly, following the January 13, 2015 sentencing 

hearing, the trial court appointed the office of the Public Defender to 

represent Appellant in an order dated January 15, 2015. The order 

appointing the Public Defender however, was not entered on the docket until 

January 20, 2015, and the order granting the motion to withdraw was not 

filed until January 26, 2015. 

On January 28, 2015, five days beyond the ten-day period in which 

post-sentence motions may be filed pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720, Appellant, 

pro se, filed a motion to reconsider his sentence and a motion for a new trial 

challenging the weight of the evidence. These motions are undated, and 
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therefore, a prisoner mailbox rule1 analysis is impossible as there are no 

dates, pay slips, or even an envelope from which we can determine when 

these motions were placed in the hands of prison officials. 

The Public Defender now argues on appeal that it did not receive the 

appointment order until a week after the order was filed. Appellant’s Brief at 

9. Even if we accept the Public Defender’s representation that it was 

unaware of the appointment, the record reflects that Appellant was 

represented by counsel at all times, and there is no basis upon which the 

untimely nature of the post-sentence motions can be excused. 

Nevertheless, Appellant avers that the pro se motions should not be deemed 

hybrid representation,2 as this case is akin to Commonwealth v. 

Leatherby, 116 A.3d 73 (Pa. Super. 2015). Appellant’s Brief at 9, n.2. We 

disagree. 

In Leatherby, the appellant was abandoned by counsel, and the trial 

court did not appoint new counsel until after the time to file post sentence 

motions had expired. Thus, this Court allowed the trial court to consider the 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The prisoner mailbox rule provides that, in the interest of fairness, a pro se 

prisoner’s document will be considered filed on the date it is delivered to 

prison authorities for mailing. Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 

1146 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

2

 Hybrid representation is not permitted. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 

A.2d 1137, 1139 (Pa. 1993). 
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appellant’s timely pro se motions without deeming them hybrid because the 

appellant had no counsel during the post-sentence motion period. 

Here, however, the trial court appointed counsel before the time in 

which to file post-sentence motions expired. Thus, as noted, Appellant had 

counsel throughout the proceedings. The Public Defender, however, did not 

file post-sentence motions, and Appellant filed them pro se. Even if we 

excused the hybrid nature of the motions pursuant to Leatherby, the 

motions were untimely, and we discern no mechanism by which this 

tardiness may be exempted. The five-day delay between the date the postsentence motions were due, January 23, 2015, and the date the motions 

were filed, January 28, 2015, cannot be excused based on the record before 

us. Moreover, because there is nothing upon which this Court can conduct a 

mailbox-rule analysis, we conclude Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence is waived for failing to preserve it in a timely-filed 

post-sentence motion. Moury, 992 A.2d at 170. 

For these same reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s challenge to the 

weight of the evidence is waived. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure require that a “claim that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in a motion for a new trial: (1) 

orally, on the record, at any time before sentencing; (2) by written motion 

at any time before sentencing; or (3) in a post-sentence motion.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607. A challenge to the weight of the evidence “must be 
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presented to the trial court while it exercises jurisdiction over the matter 

because appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of 

discretion, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 830 A.2d 1034, 

1037 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Appellant failed to preserve his challenge to the weight of the evidence claim 

orally or in writing prior to sentencing, and as discussed above, his postsentence motion was untimely. As such, Appellant failed to properly present 

his post-sentence motions resulting in waiver of his challenge to the weight 

of the evidence. Id. 

For the reasons discussed above, Appellant failed to properly preserve 

either of his issues on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of 

sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

 Judge Olson Concurs in the Result. 

 Judge Strassburger files a Dissenting Memorandum. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/28/2016 
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