United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony

For the Subcommittee on National 

Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations; House 

Committee on Government Reform 

STABILIZING IRAQ For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT 

Monday, September 11, 2006

An Assessment of the 

Security Situation 

Statement for the Record by 

David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

GAO-06-1094T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

September 11, 2006

STABILIZING IRAQ

An Assessment of the Security Situation 

Highlights of GAO-06-1094T, a statement 

for the record to the Subcommittee on 

National Security, Emerging Threats and 

International Relations; Committee on 

Government Reform; House of 

Representatives 

From fiscal years 2003 through 

2006, U.S. government agencies 

have reported significant costs for 

U.S. stabilization and 

reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In

addition, the United States

currently has committed about

138,000 military personnel to the 

U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq 

(MNF-I). Over the past 3 years, 

worsening security conditions have 

made it difficult for the United 

States to achieve its goals in Iraq. 

In this statement, we discuss 

(1) the trends in the security 

environment in Iraq, and 

(2) progress in developing Iraqi 

security forces, as reported by the 

Departments of Defense (DOD) 

and State. We also present key 

questions for congressional

oversight, including: 

• What political, economic, and 

security conditions must be

achieved before the United States 

can draw down and withdraw? 

• Why have security conditions 

continued to deteriorate even as

Iraq has met political milestones, 

increased the number of trained 

and equipped forces, and

increasingly assumed the lead for

security? 

• If existing U.S. political,

economic, and security measures 

are not reducing violence in Iraq, 

what additional measures, if any, 

will the administration propose 

for stemming the violence? 

Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and 

grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and 

Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife, which has grown since the February 2006 

bombing in Samarra. As shown in the figure below, attacks against the 

coalition and its Iraqi partners reached an all time high during July 2006. The 

deteriorating conditions threaten the progress of U.S. and international 

efforts to assist Iraq in the political and economic areas. In July 2006, the 

State Department reported that the recent upturn in violence has hindered 

efforts to engage with Iraqi partners and noted that a certain level of security 

was a prerequisite to accomplishing the political and economic conditions 

necessary for U.S. withdrawal. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a 

militias have contributed to growing sectarian strife that has resulted in 

increased numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals. 

DOD uses three factors to measure progress in developing capable Iraqi 

security forces and transferring security responsibilities to the Iraqi 

government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the number 

of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed 

responsibility for security in specific geographic areas, and (3) the 

capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate 

Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). Although the State Department 

reported that the number of trained and equipped Iraqi security forces has 

increased, these numbers do not address their capabilities. As of August 

2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency 

operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed control for 

security. Unit-level TRA reports provide insight into the Iraqi army units’ 

training, equipment, and logistical capabilities. GAO is working with DOD to 

obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform the 

Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq’s security forces.

Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, as of July 2006 

2003 2004 2005 2006

Number of attacks

Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Attack(s) on Iraqi security forces and civilians

Attack(s) on coalition

Nov

Jan.

Mar.

.

S

Mar

May

July

ept.

July

.

Nov.

Jan.

S

Nov.

Jan.

Mar.

May

July

ept.

May

S

May

July

ept.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1094T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Joseph A. 

Christoff, (202) 512-8979, christoffj@gao.gov. 
Page 1 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

September 11, 2006

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to assist the Subcommittee in its oversight 

of U.S. efforts to improve the security situation in Iraq. The November 2005 

U.S. strategy for Iraq states that victory in Iraq is a vital U.S. interest. Since 

May 2003, the United States has employed political, economic, and military 

measures to stabilize Iraq and help the country achieve the desired endstate: a constitutional, representative Iraqi government that respects civil 

rights and has security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and 

keep Iraq from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. To support these goals, 

the United States initially led, and later assisted, Iraq’s political transition 

from a dictatorship to a democratically elected government. The United 

States currently has committed about 138,000 military personnel to the 

U.S.-led Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I). The Department of Defense 

(DOD) has reported obligations of about $227 billion for U.S. military 

operations in Iraq for fiscal years 2003 through June 2006. U.S. assistance 

appropriated for Iraqi security forces and law enforcement has grown from 

$3.24 billion in January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006.1

 Over the 

past 3 years, worsening security conditions have made it difficult for the 

United States to achieve its goals in Iraq. 

In this statement, we discuss (1) the trends in the security environment in 

Iraq, and (2) progress in developing Iraqi security forces, as reported by 

DOD and the State Department. We also present questions for 

congressional oversight. To examine trends in Iraq’s security situation, we 

reviewed reports by DOD, State, the United Nations (UN), and 

nongovernmental organizations, as well as transcripts of MNF-I and U.S. 

embassy Baghdad press conferences and interviews. Although we 

reviewed classified documents during our completed and ongoing Iraqrelated engagements, the information in this statement is based on 

unclassified documents only. We also obtained and assessed MNF-I data on 

enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners from the 

1

This figure includes $5 billion from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund II (IRRF) funds 

appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the 

Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-106, $5.7 billion to support 

Iraqi security forces appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Act for Defense, the 

Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, and $3 billion to support 

Iraqi security forces appropriated in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 

Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-234. 
Page 2 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Defense Intelligence Agency. We determined that the data were sufficiently 

reliable for establishing general trends in the number of attacks. To assess 

progress in developing Iraqi security forces, we reviewed DOD and State 

reports, as well as MNF-I guidance on Iraqi readiness assessments. Because 

of the broad congressional interest in this issue, we performed this work 

under my authority as the Comptroller General of the United States to 

conduct reviews on my initiative. The work was performed in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Summary Since June 2003, the overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated 

and grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks 

and, more recently, the growing Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife, which has 

grown since the February 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra. 

Enemy-initiated attacks generally have increased around major religious or 

political events, including Ramadan and elections. Attack levels also follow 

a seasonal pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and 

decreasing in the winter months. According to MNF-I data, attack levels in 

July 2006 were the highest to date. Despite coalition efforts and the efforts 

of the newly formed Iraqi government, insurgents continue to demonstrate 

the ability to recruit new fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition 

and Iraqi security forces. The deteriorating conditions threaten continued 

progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in the political 

and economic areas. In July 2006, the State Department reported to 

Congress that the recent upturn in violence had hindered efforts to engage 

fully with Iraqi partners. State noted that a baseline of security was a 

prerequisite for moving forward on the political and economic tasks 

essential to achieving the conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces. 

Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias have contributed to an 

increase in sectarian strife that has resulted in large numbers of Iraqi 

civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

DOD uses three key factors to measure progress in developing capable 

Iraqi security forces and transferring security responsibilities to them and 

the Iraqi government: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) 

the number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have 

assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) 

the assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and 

aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. From July 2005 

to August 2006, the State Department reported that the number of trained 

and equipped Iraqi security forces had increased from about 174,000 to 

294,000. However, these numbers do not provide a complete picture of the 
Page 3 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

units’ capabilities because they do not give detailed information on the 

status of their equipment, personnel, training, and leadership. They may 

also overstate the number of forces on duty. As of August 2006, 115 Iraqi 

army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in 

specific areas, and one province, Muthanna, had assumed control for 

security responsibilities. Information on the readiness levels for Iraqi 

security forces is classified. Unit-level readiness reports provide important 

insight into the status of Iraqi army units’ personnel, training, equipment, 

leadership, and sustainment/logistical capabilities. DOD has provided GAO 

with classified, aggregate information on overall readiness levels and more 

detailed information on Iraqi units in the lead. GAO has been working with 

DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. Such information would inform 

both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq’s security 

forces. 

We present key questions for congressional oversight, including:

• What political, economic and security conditions must be achieved 

before the United States can draw down and withdraw military forces 

from Iraq? 

• Why have security conditions continued to worsen even as Iraq has met 

political milestones, increased the number of trained and equipped 

forces, and increasingly assumed the lead for security?

• If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not 

reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the 

administration propose for stemming the violence?

Background In May 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)2

 dissolved the 

military organizations of the former regime and began the process of 

reestablishing or creating new Iraqi security forces, including the police 

and a new Iraqi army. Over time, multinational force commanders assumed 

responsibility in their areas for recruiting and training some Iraqi defense 

and police forces. In October 2003, the multinational force outlined a 

2

The CPA, established in May 2003, was the U.N.-recognized coalition authority led by the 

United States and the United Kingdom that was responsible for the temporary governance 

of Iraq. Specifically, the CPA was responsible for overseeing, directing, and coordinating the 

reconstruction effort.
Page 4 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

multistep plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces. 

The plan had the objective of gradually decreasing the number of coalition 

forces in conjunction with neutralizing Iraq’s insurgency and developing 

Iraqi forces capable of securing their country. 

Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, coalition forces in 

Iraq began to shift responsibilities to Iraqi security forces in February 2004, 

earlier than planned. According to the President, senior DOD officials, and 

multinational force commanders, Iraqi forces were unprepared to assume 

security responsibilities and responded poorly to a series of anti-coalition 

attacks in April 2004. In western and central Iraq, insurgents attacked the 

multinational force in Fallujah, Baghdad, Ar Ramadi, Samarra, and Tikrit, 

while a radical Shi’a militia, the Mahdi Army, launched operations to 

dislodge multinational forces and occupy cities from Baghdad to Basra in 

the south. Although some Iraqi forces fought alongside coalition forces, 

other units abandoned their posts and responsibilities and, in some cases, 

assisted the insurgency. MNF-I identified a number of problems that 

contributed to the collapse of Iraqi security forces, including problems in 

training and equipping them.

In May 2004, the President issued a National Security Presidential 

Directive, which stated that, after the transition of power to the Iraqi 

government, DOD would be responsible for U.S. activities relating to 

security and military operations. The Presidential directive established that 

the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) would direct all U.S. government 

efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi security forces. In the summer of 

2004, MNF-I developed and began implementing a comprehensive 

campaign plan, which elaborated and refined the original strategy for 

transferring security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. In April 2006, MNF-I 

revised the campaign plan and, in conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in 

Baghdad, issued a new Joint Campaign Plan that contains the goal of 

transitioning security responsibility from MNF-I to the Iraqi security forces 

and government. Further details on the campaign plan are classified.3

 In 

late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the United 

States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current security threats 

of international terrorism and insurgency. He noted, however, that the Iraqi 

3

GAO, DOD Reports Should Link Economic, Governance, and Security Indicators to 

Conditions for Stabilizing Iraq, GAO-06-152C (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 18, 2005) for 

classified information on MNF-I’s original campaign plan, and Plans for Stabilizing Iraq, 

GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) for classified information on the new Joint 

MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Baghdad Campaign Plan.
Page 5 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

government is developing a long-term security plan to shape the type of 

armed forces that the country will need 5 to 10 years from now.

Trends in Security 

Conditions

Since June 2003, overall security conditions in Iraq have deteriorated and 

grown more complex, as evidenced by increased numbers of attacks and 

more recent Sunni/Shi’a sectarian strife after the February 2006 bombing of 

the Golden Mosque in Samarra.4

 The deteriorating conditions threaten 

continued progress in U.S. and other international efforts to assist Iraq in 

the political and economic areas. Moreover, the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a 

militias have contributed to an increase in sectarian strife and large 

numbers of Iraqi civilian deaths and displaced individuals.

Deteriorating Security 

Threatens U.S. and 

International Efforts to 

Assist Iraqi Political and 

Economic Development

Enemy-initiated attacks against the coalition and its Iraqi partners have 

continued to increase through July 2006 (see fig. 1). Since 2003, enemyinitiated attacks have increased around major religious or political events, 

including Ramadan5

 and elections. Attack levels also follow a seasonal 

pattern, increasing through the spring and summer and decreasing in the 

fall and winter months. Overall, attacks increased by 23 percent from 2004 

to 2005. After declining in the fall of 2005, the number of attacks rose to the 

highest level ever in July 2006. Total attacks reported from January 2006 

through July 2006 were about 57 percent higher than the total reported 

during the same period in 2005. These data show significant increases in 

attacks against coalition forces, who remain the primary targets, as well as 

civilians and Iraqi security forces. According to a June 2006 UN report,6

 an 

increasingly complex armed opposition continues to be capable of 

maintaining a consistently high level of violent activity across Iraq. 

Baghdad, Ninewa, Salahuddin, Anbar, and Diyala have been experiencing 

the worst of the violence. Other areas, particularly Basra and Kirkuk, have 

witnessed increased tension and a growing number of violent

4

GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) contains a classified assessment of recent 

security trends. 

5

Ramadan is the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. Over the past 3 years, Ramadan began 

about October 27, 2003; October 16, 2004; and October 5, 2005. In 2006, Ramadan is 

expected to begin about September 24. 

6

UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of 

Resolution 1546 (New York, N.Y.: Jun. 2006).
Page 6 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

incidents. In August 2006,7 DOD reported that breaking the cycle of 

violence is the most pressing immediate goal of coalition and Iraqi 

operations.

Figure 1: Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 2003 through July 2006

The security situation has deteriorated even as Iraq has made progress in 

meeting key political milestones and in developing its security forces. Since 

the CPA transferred power to the Iraqi interim government in June 2004, 

Iraq has held an election for a transitional government in January 2005, a 

referendum on the constitution in October 2005, and an election for a 

Council of Representatives in December 2005 that led to the formation of a 

new government in May 2006 (see fig. 2). However, according to the 

Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the December 2005 

7

DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2006).

2003 2004 2005 2006

Number of attacks

Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Attack(s) on Iraqi security forces

Attack(s) on civilians

Attack(s) on coalition

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

.

Oct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

May

June
Page 7 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

elections appeared to heighten sectarian tensions and polarize sectarian 

divides. According to a U.S. Institute of Peace report,8

 the focus on ethnic 

and sectarian identity has sharpened as a result of Iraq’s political process, 

while nationalism and a sense of Iraqi identity have weakened. 

Figure 2: Political Milestones in Iraq Compared with Enemy-initiated Attacks Against the Coalition and Its Iraqi Partners, May 

2003 through July 2006

Moreover, according to the Director of National Intelligence’s February 

2006 report, Iraqi security forces are experiencing difficulty in managing 

ethnic and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. In addition, 

the DIA Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces 

are loyal to sectarian and party interests. According to DOD’s August 2006 

8

Phebe Marr, U.S. Institute of Peace, Who are Iraq’s New Leaders? What Do They Want?

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2006).

Number of attacks

Source: Multi-National Force-Iraq, July 2006.

2004 2005 2006

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

Elections for 

Transitional 

National 

Assembly

Election for 

Council of 

Representatives

Constitutional 

Referendum

Certification 

of Dec. 05 

Election

Transfer of power 

from CPA to 

Interim Iraqi 

Government

Coalition 

Provisional 

Authority 

(CPA) 

established

Announcement 

of National 

Reconciliation 

Plan

Completion 

of 

government 

formation 

process

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

.

Oct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Jan.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

May

June

Nov

Dec.

Jan.

.

Oct.

Au

Sept.

g.

July

May

June

2003
Page 8 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

report, sectarian lines among Iraqi security forces are drawn along 

geographic lines, with Sunni, Shi’a, or Kurdish soldiers mostly serving in 

units located in geographic areas familiar to their group. Moreover, 

according to the report, commanders at the battalion level tend to 

command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional background. 

On August 7, 2006, MNF-I and Iraqi security forces began phase II of 

Operation Together Forward. The operation is an effort to reduce the level 

of murders, kidnappings, assassinations, terrorism, and sectarian violence 

in Baghdad and to reinforce the Iraqi government’s control of the city. On 

August 30, 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that he was pleased 

with the operation’s progress, but that there was a long way to go in 

bringing security to the neighborhoods of Baghdad. U.S. intelligence 

assessments of this operation’s impact are classified.

The State Department reported in July 2006 that the recent upturn in 

violence has hindered the U.S. government’s efforts to engage fully with its 

Iraqi partners and to move forward on political and economic fronts. State 

noted that a baseline of security was a prerequisite for moving forward on 

these fronts, which are essential to achieving the right conditions for 

withdrawing U.S. forces. For example, Iraqi government efforts to foster 

reconciliation have become more difficult with the increase in sectarian 

divisions and violence during the spring and summer of 2006. According to 

DOD’s August 2006 report, security issues—such as the attempted 

kidnapping of a deputy minister and threats to personnel who work with 

embassy teams—have made some ministers reluctant to have U.S. 

personnel visit them. The report also noted that the security situation in 

some provinces has hampered interaction between U.S.-led Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams9

 and provincial leaders. Moreover, the UN reported 

that the lack of security has hampered reconstruction efforts. The UN 

reported that the diplomatic community remains under serious threat as 

embassy staff have been abducted and killed and facilities attacked. The 

UN noted that improved security is central to the normal ability of 

international agencies to provide assistance to the government and people 

of Iraq. 

9

Provincial Reconstruction Teams are intended to work with provincial governors and 

elected councils to improve execution of provincial government responsibilities and to 

increase citizen participation in governmental decision-making processes, according to 

DOD’s report. As of August 2006, four U.S.–led Provincial Reconstruction Teams were fully 

operational in the provinces of Tamim (Kirkuk), Ninewa (Mosul), Babil (Hillah), and 

Baghdad.
Page 9 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

As we reported in July 2006, the poor security conditions have also 

hindered U.S. and Iraqi government efforts to revitalize Iraq’s economy and 

restore essential services in the oil and electricity sectors. According to a 

State Department report,10 during the week of August 16-22, 2006, Iraq was 

producing 2.17 million barrels of oil per day. This figure is below the Iraqi 

Oil Ministry’s goal of 2.5 million barrels of oil per day and the pre-war level 

of 2.6 million barrels per day. Over the same time period, electricity 

availability averaged 5.9 hours per day in Baghdad and 10.7 hours 

nationwide. Electricity output for the week was about 9 percent above the 

same period in 2005. U.S. officials report that major oil pipelines continue 

to be sabotaged, shutting down oil exports and resulting in lost revenues. 

Current U.S. assistance is focused on strengthening the Strategic 

Infrastructure Battalions, which are Ministry of Defense forces that protect 

oil fields and pipelines. Major electrical transmission lines have also been 

repeatedly sabotaged, cutting power to parts of the country. Security 

conditions in Iraq have, in part, led to project delays and increased costs for 

security services. Although it is difficult to quantify the costs and delays 

resulting from poor security conditions, both agency and contractor 

officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a considerable 

amount of reconstruction resources and have led to canceling or reducing 

the scope of some reconstruction projects. 

Sunni Insurgency and Shi’a 

Militias Contribute to 

Increased Sectarian 

Violence

Although the Sunni insurgency has remained strong and resilient, the 

presence and influence of Shi’a militias have grown and led to increased 

sectarian violence. According to a July 2006 State Department report, the 

Sunni insurgency remains a pressing problem in Iraq. However, in recent 

months, Shi’a militia groups have grown more prominent and threaten 

Iraq’s stability.11 The increase in sectarian violence has led to an increasing 

number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. According to the U.S. Ambassador to 

Iraq, the demobilization of Shi’a militias requires a corresponding reduction 

in the Sunni insurgency.12 

10Department of State, Iraq Weekly Status Report (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2006).

11The Kurdish Peshmerga serve as the primary security force for the Kurdish regional 

government in the northern region of Iraq. Although some Peshmerga forces have joined the 

Iraqi security forces, other units remain intact as the de facto security force for the Kurdish 

region. The presence of the Peshmerga is a source of contention with both Sunni and Shi’a 

leaders.

12Transcript: Ambassador Khalilzad Outlines New Security Plan for Iraq, Aug. 7, 2006.
Page 10 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Sunni Insurgency Remains 

Strong and Resilient

Despite coalition efforts and the efforts of the newly formed Iraqi 

government, insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit new 

fighters, supply themselves, and attack coalition and Iraqi security forces. 

According to a July 2006 State Department report, the Sunni insurgency 

remains a pressing problem in Iraq, even after the death of Abu Musab al 

Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, in early June 2006. As DOD recently 

reported, al-Qaeda in Iraq remains able to conduct operations due to its 

resilient, semi-autonomous cellular structure of command and control. The 

Sunni insurgency consists of former Baathists, whose goal is to return to 

power; terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda in Iraq, its affiliates in the 

Mujahadeen Shura Council, and Ansar al Sunna; and various other groups 

that rely on violence to achieve their objectives. 

Sunni insurgents have no distinct leader but share the goal of destabilizing 

the Iraqi government to pursue their individual and, at times, conflicting 

goals. Although these groups have divergent goals, some collaborate at the 

tactical and operational levels. DOD has reported that the relationships 

among insurgents, terrorists, and criminal opportunists are blurred at times 

but that the ideological rifts between terrorists and other resistance groups 

remain. DOD also reports that many insurgent groups employ a dual-track 

political and military strategy to subvert emerging institutions and to 

infiltrate and co-opt security and political organizations. These groups 

attempt to leverage the political process to address their core concerns and 

demands while attacking coalition and Iraqi security forces. 

Presence and Influence of Shi’a 

Militias Have Grown

The presence and influence of Shi’a militia groups have grown in recent 

months, as they have become more prominent and acted in ways that 

threaten Iraq’s stability. According to the CENTCOM Commander, as of 

early August 2006, these militias are the largest contributors to sectarian 

violence in Iraq. As DOD reported in August 2006, the threat posed by Shi’a 

militias is growing and represents a significant challenge for the Iraqi 

government. The Shi’a militias that are affecting the security situation the 

most are the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organization. 

• Mahdi Army: Led by radical Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, this group 

was responsible for attacks against the coalition and two uprisings in 

April 2004 and August 2004. The militia committed abuses against Sunni 

civilians, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions, and were 

implicated in unrest following the February bombing in Samarra. 

Evidence exists that the Mahdi Army are supplied by sources outside 

Iraq, most notably Iran. As of June 2006, Sadr followers headed four of 

Iraq’s 40 ministries—the ministries of health, transportation, agriculture, 
Page 11 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

and tourism and antiquities. As DOD recently reported, this militia has 

popular support in Baghdad and Iraq’s southern provinces and is 

tolerated by elements in the Iraqi government. 

• Badr Organization: This Shi’a militia group is the paramilitary wing of 

the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a prominent 

political party in the new government. The party was founded in Iran 

during the Iran-Iraq war and retains strong ties to Iran. According to 

DOD, the Badr Organization received financial and material support 

from Iran, and individuals from Badr have been implicated in death 

squads. The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq is one of 

the two largest Shi’a parties in parliament. One of Iraq’s two deputy 

presidents and the Minister of Finance are party members.

According to the CENTCOM Commander, Shi’a militias must be controlled 

because they are nonstate actors that have the attributes of the state, yet 

bear no responsibility for their actions. In many cases, according to DOD, 

militias provide protection for people and religious sites, sometimes 

operating in conjunction with the Iraqi police in areas where the Iraqi 

police are perceived to provide inadequate support. According to a May 

2006 DOD report,13 Shi’a militias seek to place members into army and 

police units as a way to serve their interests. This is particularly evident in 

the Shi’a dominated south where militia members have hindered the 

implementation of law enforcement. Militia leaders also influence the 

political process through intimidation and hope to gain influence with the 

Iraqi people through politically based social welfare programs. In areas 

where they provide social services and contribute to local security, they 

operate openly and with popular support. 

According to the Director of National Intelligence, Iran provides guidance 

and training to select Iraqi Shi’a political groups and provides weapons and 

training to Shi’a militant groups to enable anticoalition attacks. Iran also 

has contributed to the increasing lethality and effectiveness of anticoalition 

attacks by enabling Shi’a militants to build improvised explosive devices 

with explosively formed projectiles, similar to those developed by 

Lebanese Hezbollah. Iranian support for Shi’a militias reinforces Sunni 

fears of Iranian domination, further elevating sectarian violence. 

13DOD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 
Page 12 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

According to the August 2006 DOD report, Sunni Arabs do not have 

formally organized militias. Instead, they rely on neighborhood watches, 

Sunni insurgents, and increasingly, al-Qaeda in Iraq. The rise of sectarian 

attacks is driving some Sunni and Shi’a civilians in Baghdad and in 

ethnically mixed provinces to support militias. Such support is likely to 

continue, according to DOD’s report, in areas where the population 

perceives Iraqi institutions and forces as unable to provide essential 

services or meet security requirements.

Growing Sectarian Violence Has 

Led to Increased Civilian Deaths 

and Displacement

According to DOD’s August 2006 report, rising sectarian strife defines the 

emerging nature of violence in mid-2006, with the core conflict in Iraq now 

a struggle between Sunni and Shi’a extremists seeking to control key areas 

in Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic 

resources, and impose their own respective political and religious agendas. 

The UN reported in March 2006 that the deteriorating security situation is 

evidenced by increased levels of sectarian strife and the sectarian nature of 

the violence, particularly in ethnically mixed areas. Figure 3 shows the 

ethnic distribution of the population in Iraq. Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and 

southwest of Basra are key ethnically mixed areas.
Page 13 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Figure 3: Ethnic Distribution in Iraq

In June 2006, the UN reported that much of the sectarian violence has been 

committed by both sides of the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian divide and has 

resulted in increased civilian deaths. The UN reported that the number of 

Iraqi civilian casualties continues to increase, with a total of about 14,300 

civilians killed in Iraq from January to June 2006. The overwhelming 

majority of casualties were reported in Baghdad, according to the report. 

Specifically targeted groups included prominent Sunni and Shi’a Iraqis, 

government workers and their families, members of the middle class (such 

as merchants and academics), people working for or associated with MNFI, and Christians. According to the UN, daily reports of intercommunal 

intimidation and murder include regular incidents of bodies of Sunni and 

Shi’a men found to be tortured and summarily executed in Baghdad and its 

surrounding areas. Violence against Kurds and Arabs has also been 
Page 14 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

reported in Kirkuk, while the abduction and intimidation of ordinary Iraqis 

is a growing problem. According to the report, repeated bombings against 

civilians, mosques, and more recently against churches are creating fear, 

animosity, and feelings of revenge within Iraq’s sectarian communities. 

Moreover, according to a July 2006 UN report,14 the increase in sectarian 

violence has resulted in a growing number of Iraqis fleeing their homes. 

The UN estimated that about 150,000 individuals had been displaced as of 

June 30, 2006. The UN reported that people left their community of origin 

primarily because of direct or indirect threats against them or attacks on 

family members and their community. According to the report, displaced 

persons are vulnerable, lack many basic rights, and compete for limited 

services. This in turn can increase intercommunal animosities and can 

generate further displacement.

Shi’a Militia Demobilization 

Depends on Reduction in Sunni 

Insurgency

Although U.S. and UN officials recognize the importance of demobilizing 

the militias, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq has stated that the demobilization 

of the Shi’a militias depends on a reduction in the Sunni insurgency. 

According to the Ambassador, a comprehensive plan for demobilizing all 

the militias and reintegrating them into Iraqi society is needed to ensure 

Iraq’s stability and success. However, the Sunni insurgent groups now see 

themselves as protectors of the Sunni community, and the Shi’a militias see 

themselves as protectors of the Shi’a community. As DOD reported in 

August 2006, Sunni and Shi’a extremists are locked in mutually reinforcing 

cycles of sectarian strife, with each portraying themselves as the defenders 

of their respective sectarian groups.

DOD and State 

Progress Reports 

Provide Limited 

Information on the 

Development of Iraqi 

Security Forces

DOD and State report progress in developing capable Iraqi security forces 

and transferring security responsibilities to them and the Iraqi government 

in three key areas: (1) the number of trained and equipped forces, (2) the 

number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed 

responsibility for security of specific geographic areas, and (3) the 

assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in aggregate 

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) reports. While all three provide 

some information on the development of Iraqi security forces, they do not 

provide detailed information on specific capabilities that affect individual 

units’ readiness levels. Unit-level TRA reports provide that information. We 

14UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, May 1- June 30, 2006.
Page 15 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

are currently working with DOD to obtain these reports because they 

would more fully inform both GAO and the Congress on the capabilities 

and needs of Iraq’s security forces. 

Increases in Training and 

Equipping Iraqi Security 

Forces and Transferring 

Security Responsibilities to 

Them and the Iraqi 

Government

DOD and State have reported progress toward the current goal of training 

and equipping about 325,000 Iraqi security forces by December 2006. As 

shown in table 1, the State Department reports that the number of trained 

army and police forces has increased from about 174,000 in July 2005 to 

about 294,000 as of August 2006. According to State, the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior are on track to complete the initial training and 

equipping of all their authorized end-strength forces by the end of 2006. 

The authorized end-strength is 137,000 military personnel in the Ministry of 

Defense and about 188,000 in Ministry of Interior police and other forces. 

However, as we previously reported,15 the number of trained and equipped 

security forces does not provide a complete picture of their capabilities and 

may overstate the number of forces on duty. For example, Ministry of 

Interior data include police who are absent without leave. Ministry of 

Defense data exclude absent military personnel. 

15GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Preliminary Observations on Challenges in Transferring 

Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Military and Police, GAO-05-431T, (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 14, 2005).
Page 16 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Table 1: Reported Number of Trained and Equipped Ministry of Defense and Ministry 

of Interior Forces, July 2005, January 2006, and August 2006

Source: State Department Iraq Weekly Status Reports

Note: Ministry of Defense forces are defined as operational. Ministry of Interior Forces are defined as

trained and equipped.

a

Army number includes Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.

b

Unauthorized absence personnel are not included in these numbers.

c

Unauthorized absence personnel are included in these numbers.

In spring 2005, MNF-I recognized that the number of trained and equipped 

forces did not reflect their capability to assume responsibility for security. 

MNF-I began to develop and refine the TRA system as a means of assessing 

the capabilities of Iraqi security forces.16 It also started a program to place 

transition teams with Iraqi army and special police units. 

DOD also assesses progress in the number of Iraqi army units and 

provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for the security of 

specific geographic areas in Iraq. The joint MNF-I/U.S. Embassy Campaign 

Plan calls for the Iraqi army to assume the lead for counterinsurgency 

operations in specific geographic areas and Iraqi civil authorities to assume 

security responsibility for their provinces. The transition of security 

responsibilities concludes when the Iraq government assumes 

responsibility for security throughout Iraq.17

Ministry and Component July 2005 January 2006 August 2006

Ministry of 

Defense Forces

Army 78,200 105,600 127,200a

Air Force 200 500 700

Navy 700 800 1,100

Subtotalb 79,100 106,900 129,000

Ministry of 

Interior Forces

Police 64,100 82,400 115,500

Other forces 30,700 38,000 49,600

Subtotalc 94,800 120,400 165,100

Total 173,900 227,300 294,100

16The basic format for the TRA is used for the Iraqi army, National Police, Department of 

Border Enforcement, and the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, although minor 

differences in their reports may exist. Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) is in the process of 

finalizing the TRA for Iraqi police.
Page 17 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

As shown in table 2, DOD reports that an increasing number of Iraqi army 

units are capable of leading counterinsurgency operations in specific 

geographic areas. DOD reports more detailed information on this transition 

in a classified format. However, when an Iraqi army unit assumes the lead, 

it does not mean that the unit is capable of conducting independent 

operations since it may need to develop additional capabilities and may 

require the support of coalition forces. According to DOD’s May 2006 

report, it will take time before a substantial number of Iraqi units are 

assessed as fully independent and requiring no assistance considering the 

need for further development of Iraqi logistical elements, ministry capacity 

and capability, intelligence structures, and command and control.

Table 2: Reported Progress in Transferring Security Responsibilities to Iraqi Army 

Combat Units and Provincial Governments, January 2006 and August 2006

Sources: DOD and State Department reports.

a

Includes Iraqi army and special operations battalions.

Table 2 also shows that one provincial government—Muthanna—had 

assumed responsibility for security operations, as of August 2006. 

According to a July 2006 State Department report, when a provincial 

government can assume security responsibilities depends on the (1) threat 

level in the province, (2) capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, (3) 

capabilities of the provincial government, and (4) posture of MNF-I forces, 

that is, MNF-I’s ability to respond to major threats, if needed. Once the 

provincial government assumes security responsibilities, the provincial 

governor and police are in charge of domestic security. According to an 

MNF-I official, MNF-I forces will then move out of all urban areas and 

assume a supporting role. In August 2006, DOD reported that security 

17GAO-06-673C (Washington, D.C.: Jul. 27, 2006) provides classified information on the April 

2006 joint campaign plan.

Type of Security Transition January 2006 August 2006 Goal

Iraqi army units leading 

counterinsurgency 

operations in specific 

areas

Divisions 2 5 10

Brigades 8 25 36

Battalions 37 85 114a

Number of provinces that have 

assumed security responsibilities 0 1 18
Page 18 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

responsibility for as many as nine of Iraq’s provinces could transition to 

Iraqi government authority by the end of 2006.

Unit-level TRA Reports 

Provide More Insight into 

Iraqi Capabilities and 

Development Needs Than 

Do Aggregate Data on 

Overall TRA Ratings 

DOD has provided GAO with aggregate information on the overall TRA 

levels for Iraqi security forces and the number of Iraqi units in the lead for 

counterinsurgency operations. DOD’s aggregate data on the capabilities 

and readiness of Iraqi security forces do not provide information on 

shortfalls in personnel, command and control, equipment, and leadership. 

Unit-level TRA reports provide more insight into Iraqi army capabilities and 

development needs in personnel, leadership, and logistics than do the 

overall TRA levels that DOD reports in classified format.18 The TRA rating 

for individual Iraqi army units is a key factor in determining the ability of 

the unit to conduct and assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. 

According to Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) guidance,19 the TRA is 

intended to provide commanders with a method to consistently evaluate 

Iraqi units, as well as to identify factors hindering progress, determine 

resource issues, make resource allocation decisions, and determine when 

Iraqi army units are prepared to assume the lead for security 

responsibilities. The TRA is prepared jointly on a monthly basis by the 

unit’s military transition team chief and Iraqi security forces commander. 

In completing TRA reports, commanders assess the unit’s capabilities in six 

subcategories—personnel, command and control, training, 

sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership (see app. 1). After 

considering the unit’s subcategory ratings, commanders then give each 

Iraqi army unit an overall TRA rating that describes the unit’s overall 

readiness to assume the lead for counterinsurgency operations. The overall 

ratings go from TRA level 1 through TRA level 4. To be able to assume the 

lead for counterinsurgency operations, Iraqi army units are required to 

obtain an overall rating of TRA level 2 as assessed by their commanders. 

Commanders also provide a narrative assessment that describes key 

shortfalls and impediments to the unit’s ability to assume the lead for 

counterinsurgency operations and estimate the number of months needed 

18The Iraqi army readiness assessment system has similarities with the U.S. Army’s readiness 

assessment system. Both systems measure some of the same categories but use different 

criteria for achieving each readiness level.

19MNC-I, MNC-I Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) Report Implementing 

Instructions Update (Mar. 22, 2006).
Page 19 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

for the unit to assume the lead. The purpose of the narrative is to clarify 

and provide additional support for the overall TRA rating. The aggregate 

data on overall TRA ratings for Iraqi security forces are classified. 

DOD has provided us with classified data on the aggregate number of Iraqi 

units at each TRA level and more detailed information on which Iraqi army 

units have assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations. We are 

currently working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports. These 

unit-level reports would provide GAO and Congress with more complete 

information on the status of developing effective Iraqi security forces. 

Specifically, unit-level TRA reports would allow us to (1) determine if the 

TRA reports are useful and if changes are needed; (2) verify if aggregate 

data on overall TRA ratings reflect unit-level TRA reports; and (3) 

determine if shortfalls exist in key areas, such as personnel, equipment, 

logistics, training, and leadership. 

Questions for 

Congressional 

Oversight

1. What are the key political, economic, and security conditions that must 

be achieved before U.S. forces can draw down and ultimately withdraw 

from Iraq? What target dates, if any, has the administration established 

for drawing down U.S. forces?

2. The continued deterioration of security conditions in Iraq has hindered 

U.S. political and economic efforts in Iraq. According to the State 

Department, a baseline of security is a prerequisite for moving forward 

on the political and economic tasks essential to achieving the right 

conditions for withdrawing U.S. forces. 

• Why have security conditions continued to deteriorate in Iraq even as 

the country has met political milestones, increased the number of 

trained and equipped security forces, and increasingly assumed the lead 

for security?

• What is the baseline of security that is required for moving forward on 

political and economic tasks? What progress, if any, can be made in the 

political and economic areas without a significant improvement in 

current security conditions?

• If existing U.S. political, economic, and security measures are not 

reducing violence in Iraq, what additional measures, if any, will the 

administration propose for stemming the violence?
Page 20 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

3. In February 2006, the Director of National Intelligence reported that 

Iraqi security forces were experiencing difficulty in managing ethnic 

and sectarian divisions among their units and personnel. The DIA 

Director reported that many elements of the Iraqi security forces are 

loyal to sectarian and party interests.

• How does the U.S. government assess the extent to which personnel in 

the Iraqi security forces are loyal to groups other than the Iraqi 

government or are operating along sectarian lines, rather than as unified 

national forces? What do these assessments show?

• How would DOD modify its program to train and equip Iraqi security 

forces if evidence emerges that Iraqi military and police are supporting 

sectarian rather than national interests?

4. MNF-I established the TRA system to assess the capabilities and 

readiness of Iraqi security forces.

• How does DOD assess the reliability of TRAs and ensure that they 

present an accurate picture of Iraq security forces’ capabilities and 

readiness? 

• At what TRA rating level would Iraqi army units not require any U.S. 

military support? What U.S. military support would Iraqi units still 

require at TRA levels 1 and 2? 

• How does DOD use unit-level TRAs to assess shortfalls in Iraqi 

capabilities? What do DOD assessments show about the developmental 

needs of Iraqi security forces?

5. In late August 2006, the MNF-I Commanding General said that the 

United States is helping Iraq build a force to deal with its current 

security threats of international terrorism and insurgency. However, he 

noted that the Iraqi government is developing a long-term security plan 

to shape the type of armed forces the country will need 5 to 10 years 

from now.

• What are the current resource requirements for developing Iraqi 

security forces capable of dealing with international terrorism and 

insurgency? What have been the U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions to 

this effort thus far? What U.S. and Iraqi contributions will be needed 

over the next several years?
Page 21 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

• What are the projected resource requirements for the future Iraqi force? 

What are the projected U.S. and Iraqi financial contributions for this 

effort? 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

For further information, please contact Joseph A. Christoff on (202) 512-

8979. Key contributors to this testimony were Nanette J. Barton, Lynn 

Cothern, Tracey Cross, Martin De Alteriis, Whitney Havens, Brent Helt, 

Rhonda Horried, Judith McCloskey, Mary Moutsos, Jason Pogacnik, and 

Jena Sinkfield. 
Page 22 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Appendix I

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) 

Report ApendxiI

This appendix provides information on the TRA reports used to assess the 

capabilities of Iraqi army units. Commanders provide ratings in each of 6 

subcategories (see fig. 4). For each subcategory, a green rating corresponds 

to TRA level 1, yellow to TRA level 2, orange to TRA level 3, and red to TRA 

level 4. The commanders consider the subcategory ratings in deciding the 

overall TRA rating for each unit.
Appendix I

Transition Readiness Assessment (TRA) 

Report

Page 23 GAO-06-1094T Iraq Security Assessment

Figure 4: Transition Readiness Assessment Form for Iraqi Army Combat Units

5. Equipment OVERALL ASSESSMENT

EQUIPMENT

ON HAND 

6. Leadership

Weapons

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

This Unit is Currently Assessed at Level and will

be ready to assume IAL in _____ months. 

Transition Readiness Assessment

Unit: Location: Report Date: TRANSITION READINESS ASSESSMENT 

4. Sustainment/Logistics OVERALL ASSESSMENT

2. Command & Control OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Intelligence

Operations

Communications

1. Personnel OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Overall Manning

(assigned-On Hand) 

Staff Manning

Pay

3. Training OVERALL ASSESSMENT

METL

7. Subjective Assessment:

Annotate total number of pages attached to this report. See supplemental instructions for

required categories. Pages attached

Vehicles

Commo

OPERATIONAL

READINESS

Weapons

Vehicles

Commo

Source: MNC-I FORM DATED 15 MAR 06.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Officer/NCO 

Manning

Unable to pay 

troops

< 50% of auth 

manning

< 50% of auth 

manning

50-69% of 

auth manning

70-84% of 

auth manning < 50% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

50-69% of OR 

50-69% of leaders

50-69% of OR 

50-69% of OR 70-84% OR 

70-84% OR 

70-84% OR 

70-84% of leaders

> 85% OR 

> 85% of leaders 

> 85% OR 

> 85% OR 

< 50% OR 

< 50% of leaders

< 50% OR 

< 50% OR 

70-84% of 

authorization 

70-84% of 

authorization 

70-84% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

< 50% of 

authorization 

50-69% of 

auth manning

70-84% of 

auth manning

Pay System 

Established

No Intelligence 

capability 

No operational 

capability 

Leaders are 

rated as 

“capable” by 

supervisor

BN/BDE able to 

process, analyze, 

disseminate info

Participates in 

decision-making 

develops enemy 

COAs

BN/BDE able to 

implement R& S Plan; 

conduct Intel based ops

Secure/Store 

supplies

Supply

(I, III, V, IX)

Infrastructure

Maintenance

Temporary 

Billeting

Statement of 

Work/Construction 

has begun

Minimal billeting, 

administrative and 

perimeter security 

infrastucture

No Maint. 

conducted

Account/Issue 

items

Forecast/Requisition 

supplies

Maintain Stockage 

level (UBL)

BN/BDE able to 

establish TOC; 

Maintains situational 

awareness

Achieves proficiency 

in <50% of all METL 

tasks

Achieves proficiency 

in 50%-69% of all 

METL tasks

Achieves proficiency 

in 70-84% of all 

METL tasks

Achieves proficiency 

in > 85% of all METL 

tasks

BN/BDE able to 

send and receive 

reports/orders 

from higher/lower 

echelons

BN/BDE able to 

establish/maintain 

internal 

communications

BN/BDE able to 

maintain external 

communications 

with higher 

BN/BDE Staff able 

to conduct Troop 

Leading Procedures

•BN/BDE able to 

sustain ext commo for 

7 days

•Has capable and 

sustained ALT commo

Adequate billeting, 

adminstrative, mess, 

motor pool and 

perimeter security 

infrastructure

•Establish 

maintenance program 

and reporting 

procedures.

•50% maintenance 

personnel MOS 

qualified

•Conducts 1st 

echelon repair.

•Requests repair 

parts.

•30% maintenance 

personnel MOS 

qualified

•Conducts PMCS

•Reports 

equipment status

No ability to 

communicate 

Personnel paid 

according to pay 

grade

Personnel 

consistently paid 

for 3 months

50-69% of 

Staff manned

70-84% of 

Staff manned

< 50% of Staff 

manned

> 85% of auth 

manning

> 85% of auth 

manning

> 85% of Staff 

manned

A Level 1 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations. 

A Level 2 unit is capable of planning, executing, and sustaining 

counterinsurgency operations with ISF or coalition support. 

A Level 3 unit is partially capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations 

in conjunction with coalition units.

A Level 4 unit is forming and/or incapable of conducting counterinsurgency 

operations.

(320366)
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