IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ARTHUR JAMES TIGNER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Civil Action No. 3:06-cv-00713-MHT-SRW 

 ) 

OFFICER SELLER, et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

DEFENDANTS’ SPECIAL REPORT

COME NOW Jay Jones1

, Sheriff of Lee County, Alabama, Sergeant Timothy Jones2, 

Corrections Officer David Sellers3, and Corrections Officer Danny Tucker, the Defendants in the 

above-styled cause, and submit their Special Report to the Court.

INTRODUCTION 

On August 10, 2006, the Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Alabama against these Defendants. On August 18, 2006, this Court 

ordered the Defendants to file a Special Report and Answer. Pursuant to this Court’s Order 

dated September 26, 2006, their Special Report and Answer are on due November 6, 2006. 

The Plaintiff was arrested on June 22, 2006, on charges of parole violation. (Exhibit A, 

Inmate File of Arthur James Tigner4

, “Inmate File,” Booking Sheet dated June 22, 2004; Exhibit 

B, Inmate File, Release Sheet dated August 13, 2006, pp. 2-3.) He was booked into the Lee 

County Detention Center that same day. (Ex. A.) He was released from the Lee County 

Detention Center to Kilby Correctional Facility on August 13, 2006. (Ex. B.) 

 

1

 Sheriff Jay Jones is incorrectly designated in the Plaintiff’s Complaint as “Sheriff J. Jone.” 2

 Sergeant Timothy Jones is incorrectly designated in the Plaintiff’s Complaint as “Sgt. Jone.” 3

 Corrections Officer David Sellers is incorrectly designated in the Plaintiff’s Complaint as “Officer Seller.” 4

 See Exhibit G, Affidavit of Cary Torbert, Jr., “Torbert Aff.,” ¶ 30 for certification of Plaintiff’s Inmate File. 

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PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 

The Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges the following three violations of his constitutional 

rights with regard to his conditions of confinement at the Lee County Detention Center: 

(1) The Plaintiff first alleges that he was locked in a cell without a toilet that worked 

from July 4, 2006, to July 8 or 95

, 2006, during the night. (Doc. 1, Plaintiff’s Complaint, pp. 2-

3.) 

(2) The Plaintiff also alleges that his cell is infested with bugs. (Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, p. 2-3.) 

(3) The Plaintiff finally alleges that his cell had “old body fluid” in it before he came 

to the cell. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 3.) 

The Plaintiff requests the following relief: (1) honor his rights; (2) have the officers 

retake basic training; (3) “pain and suffer” [sic]; (4) “set [him] up to go to a psychiatry [sic] for 

the mental pain [he] had to go through and psychiatry treatment; (5) “emotionable [sic] pain and 

mentally stress”; (6) punitive damages; and (7) the court to give him relief and do what is right. 

(Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 5.) 

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 The Defendants deny the allegations made against them by the Plaintiff as being untrue 

and completely without basis in law or fact. The Defendants deny that they acted, or caused 

anyone to act, in such a manner as to deprive the Plaintiff of any right to which he was entitled. 

(Exhibit C, Affidavit of Sheriff Jay Jones6

, “Jones Aff.,” ¶ 4; Exhibit D, Affidavit of Sergeant 

 

5

 Defense Counsel is unable to conclusively discern whether the Plaintiff wrote “7-08-06” or “7-09-06” on line two 

of Part IV of his Complaint. 

6

 Jay Jones is the duly elected Sheriff of Lee County, Alabama, and has served in such capacity since 1999. (Jones 

Aff. ¶ 2.) 

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Timothy Jones7

, “T. Jones Aff.,” ¶ 4; Exhibit E, Affidavit of Corrections Officer David Sellers8, 

“Sellers Aff.,” ¶ 4; Exhibit F, Affidavit of Corrections Officer Danny Tucker9

, “Tucker Aff.,” ¶ 

4.) The Defendants raise the defenses of Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity, 

the Plaintiff’s failure to meet the exhaustion and physical injury requirements of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act, mootness, lack of standing, and additional defenses presented below. 

The Defendants reserve the right to add additional defenses upon a complete investigation of the 

Plaintiff’s claims, completion of any discovery allowed, and if any further pleading is required or 

allowed by the Court. 

I. FACTS 

A. Policies and Procedures of the Lee County Detention Center 

Sheriff Jay Jones has delegated the responsibility for the day-to-day functions of the Lee 

County Detention Center to Major Cary Torbert, Jr., the Chief Deputy of Corrections of the Lee 

County Detention Center. As Sheriff of Lee County, Jay Jones is responsible for promulgating 

the policies governing the Lee County Detention Center. (Jones Aff. ¶ 5.) 

It is the policy of the Lee County Sheriff’s Office that members of the Detention Center staff 

receive and answer any written grievances or requests made by inmates to the Sheriff, Chief Deputy 

Sheriff, or Detention Center personnel. All properly submitted nonmedical request forms are 

answered, and a copy is placed in the inmate’s inmate file. All medical request forms are 

forwarded to the medical staff to be answered, and a copy of the answered request form is filed 

 

7

 At the time of the allegations of the Plaintiff’s Complaint, Timothy Jones was serving as a Corrections Officer at 

the Lee County Detention Center and had served in that capacity since March of 1995. Timothy Jones has achieved 

the rank of Sergeant. Sergeant Jones is a graduate of the Alabama Jail Management School. Sergeant Jones is 

currently enrolled at the Alabama Police Academy in Anniston, Alabama. (T. Jones Aff. ¶ 2.) 8

 David Sellers has served as a corrections officer at the Lee County Detention Center since July 11, 2005. Officer 

Sellers is a graduate of the Alabama Jail Management School. 

 (Sellers Aff. ¶ 2.) 

9

 Danny Tucker has served as a corrections officer at the Lee County Detention Center since January of 2003. 

Officer Tucker is a graduate of the Alabama Jail Management School. (Tucker Aff. ¶ 2.)

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in that inmate’s medical file. (Jones Aff. ¶ 6; Exhibit G, Affidavit of Major Cary Torbert, Jr.10, 

“Torbert Aff.,” ¶ 4; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 5; Sellers Aff. ¶ 5; Tucker Aff. ¶ 5.) The Plaintiff was aware 

of the request procedure as evidenced by the request forms he has filed that were answered and 

are present in his inmate file. (Torbert Aff. ¶ 4; Exhibit H, Inmate File, Request Forms.) 

Requests for medical attention, telephone calls, or other matters must be made in writing on an 

Inmate Request Form. An exception exists for requests of an emergency nature which are handled 

immediately without a written request. Inmates housed in the Lee County Detention Center will be 

furnished with Inmate Request Forms for the purpose of stating their requests or grievances in 

writing. Detention Center personnel are charged with the responsibility of receiving and forwarding 

these forms to the proper authority at any time they are offered a completed form by an inmate. The 

officer receiving the request form is to answer the request if possible. If that officer is unable to 

answer the request, he is to forward it to the appropriate individual and/or up the chain of command 

until the request is answered. If the request form is directed to a particular officer, the officer 

receiving the request will forward the request to the officer to whom the request is directed. If the 

officer to whom the request is directed is not on duty that day, the request will be addressed on that 

officer’s next scheduled working day. (Jones Aff. ¶ 7; Torbert Aff. ¶ 5; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 6; Sellers 

Aff. ¶ 6; Tucker Aff. ¶ 6.) 

Internal grievance procedures at the Lee County Detention Center are available to all 

inmates. It is the policy of the Lee County Sheriff that inmates are permitted to submit 

grievances and that each grievance will be acted upon. (Jones Aff. ¶ 10; Torbert Aff. ¶ 6; T. 

Jones Aff. ¶ 8; Sellers Aff. ¶ 8; Tucker Aff. ¶ 8.) All inmates are provided access to a Lee 

County Detention Center Inmate Handbook. (Jones Aff. ¶ 11; Torbert Aff. ¶ 7; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 9; 

 

10 Cary Torbert, Jr. serves as Chief Deputy of Corrections of the Lee County Detention Center and has obtained the 

rank of Major. Major Torbert has worked with the Lee County Sheriff’s Office for over 34 years. (Torbert Aff. ¶ 

2.)

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Sellers Aff. ¶ 9; Tucker Aff. ¶ 9; Exhibit I, Inmate File, Lee County Sheriff’s Department 

Regulations Receipt.) A copy of this handbook is placed in each cellblock for inmates to review 

whenever they wish. The inmate handbook states that an inmate may report a grievance on an 

inmate request form. Grievances are first answered by the appropriate staff at the lowest level in 

the chain of command. The inmate handbook also states that if the inmate is not satisfied with the 

first answer to his grievance, the inmate may appeal all the way up the chain of command, up to the 

Sheriff, who will make the final decision. (Jones Aff. ¶ 11; Torbert Aff. ¶ 7; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 9; 

Sellers Aff. ¶ 9; Tucker Aff. ¶ 9.) The Plaintiff was familiar with the process for submitting inmate 

grievances as evidenced by the grievance that he filed on a matter unrelated to his Complaint that is 

answered and present in his inmate file. (Torbert Aff. ¶ 11; Exhibit J, Inmate File, Inmate 

Grievance.)

It is the policy of the Lee County Sheriff to maintain a healthy environment within the 

Lee County Detention Center for the benefit of both inmates and the Detention Center staff. 

(Jones Aff. ¶ 14; Torbert Aff. ¶ 11; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 12; Sellers Aff. ¶ 12; Tucker Aff. ¶ 12.) It is 

the policy of the Lee County Sheriff’s Office that the staff of the Lee County Detention Center 

maintain strict sanitation practices which will provide persons incarcerated in the Detention 

Center and members of the Detention Center staff with a healthy and sanitary living and working 

environment. (Jones Aff. ¶ 15; Torbert Aff. ¶ 12; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 13; Sellers Aff. ¶ 13; Tucker 

Aff. ¶ 13.) Inmate housing areas are cleaned by the inmates assigned to that cell at least two times 

daily. (Jones Aff. ¶ 16; Torbert Aff. ¶ 13; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 14; Sellers Aff. ¶ 14; Tucker Aff. ¶ 

14.) The first and second Shift Supervisors ensure that appropriate cleaning supplies and 

equipment are issued to inmates and ensure that inmates are properly instructed to clean their 

cells and common areas. (Jones Aff. ¶ 17; Torbert Aff. ¶ 14; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 15; Sellers Aff. ¶ 

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15; Tucker Aff. ¶ 15.) Each cleaning consists of the following: Floors are swept and mopped. 

Toilets are scrubbed with toilet cleanser and disinfectant. Sinks and showers are scrubbed with 

scouring cleanser and disinfectant. Tables and benches are washed. Bunks and sleeping areas are 

made clean and orderly. Trash receptacles are emptied and washed daily. (Jones Aff. ¶ 17; Torbert 

Aff. ¶ 15; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 16; Sellers Aff. ¶ 16; Tucker Aff. ¶ 16.) The Shift Supervisor on duty 

will require inmates to re-clean any areas which are not cleaned correctly the first time. (Jones 

Aff. ¶ 19; Torbert Aff. ¶ 16; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 17; Sellers Aff. ¶ 17; Tucker Aff. ¶ 17.) The Lee 

County Detention Center staff also uses a steam sanitizer on a regular basis to clean the shower 

areas of the Facility. (Jones Aff. ¶ 20; Torbert Aff. ¶ 17; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 18; Sellers Aff. ¶ 18; 

Tucker Aff. ¶ 18.) 

It is the policy of the Lee County Sheriff to maintain a high level of pest and vermin 

control within the Lee County Detention Center in order to ensure a minimum level of pest 

infestation. (Jones Aff. ¶ 21; Torbert Aff. ¶ 18; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 19; Sellers Aff. ¶ 19; Tucker Aff. 

¶ 19.) The Chief Deputy Sheriff ensures that all areas of the Lee County Detention Center are 

sprayed with insecticide at least once each month. A licensed pest control service is contracted 

to provide control for vermin and insects. Detention Center personnel utilize this service to the 

maximum extent allowed in order to prevent and control the infestation of pests and vermin. 

(Jones Aff. ¶ 22; Torbert Aff. ¶ 19; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 20; Sellers Aff. ¶ 20; Tucker Aff. ¶ 20.) Shift 

Supervisors ensure that all appropriate areas of the Detention Center are treated with any 

additional insecticides or powders necessary as directed by the Chief Deputy. (Jones Aff. ¶ 23; 

Torbert Aff. ¶ 20; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 21; Sellers Aff. ¶ 21; Tucker Aff. ¶ 21.) All Shift Supervisors, 

when conducting daily housekeeping inspections, look for possible or potential pest problems. 

(Jones Aff. ¶ 24; Torbert Aff. ¶ 21; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 22; Sellers Aff. ¶ 22; Tucker Aff. ¶ 22.) 

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It is the policy of the Lee County Sheriff that the Lee County Detention Center accomplish 

scheduled maintenance in order to ensure that the Detention Center facility and equipment are kept 

in good repair. (Jones Aff. ¶ 25; Torbert Aff. ¶ 22; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 23; Sellers Aff. ¶ 23; Tucker 

Aff. ¶ 23.) Plumbing should be maintained in a serviceable condition, be free from leakage, have 

enough pressure to accomplish the tasks intended, and water should be the appropriate temperature. 

(Jones Aff. ¶ 26; Torbert Aff. ¶ 23; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 24; Sellers Aff. ¶ 24; Tucker Aff. ¶ 24.) An 

inmate has the opportunity to notify any officer if any toilet is not in working order, and that 

officer will either fix the toilet or contact maintenance personnel to fix the toilet. (Jones Aff. ¶ 

27; Torbert Aff. ¶ 24; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 25; Sellers Aff. ¶ 25; Tucker Aff. ¶ 25.) The Lee County 

Sheriff’s Office employs full time maintenance personnel who are available to repair any toilet 

which is broken. (Jones Aff. ¶ 28; Torbert Aff. ¶ 25; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 26; Sellers Aff. ¶ 26; 

Tucker Aff. ¶ 26.) Inmates have access to three or four toilets within their cellblock. There is a 

toilet in each cell in the cellblock. There is also a toilet in the dayroom of each cellblock. (Jones 

Aff. ¶ 29; Torbert Aff. ¶ 26; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 27; Sellers Aff. ¶ 27; Tucker Aff. ¶ 27.) In the event 

that a toilet cannot be repaired before the inmates lock down in their cells at night, any inmate 

housed in the cell with the broken toilet is to be given the opportunity to use the toilet during any 

time that he needs to during the night. (Jones Aff. ¶ 30; Torbert Aff. ¶ 27; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 28; 

Sellers Aff. ¶ 28; Tucker Aff. ¶ 28.) It would be a direct violation of policy for an inmate to ever 

be denied access to a working toilet. (Jones Aff. ¶ 31; Torbert Aff. ¶ 28; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 34; 

Sellers Aff. ¶ 33; Tucker Aff. ¶ 31.) 

A member of the Detention Center staff must inspect the entire Detention Center facility at 

least once each hour. However, at least one Detention Center staff member is normally in each 

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inmate hall at least every 15 to 20 minutes. (Jones Aff. ¶ 32; Torbert Aff. ¶ 29; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 31; 

Sellers Aff. ¶ 31; Tucker Aff. ¶ 31.) 

The Defendants have complied with all policies and procedures of the Lee County 

Detention Facility. The Defendants are not aware of nor have they authorized or allowed any 

deviation from said policies and procedures. (Jones Aff. ¶ 33; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 35; Sellers Aff. ¶ 

35; Tucker Aff. ¶ 34.) 

B. Facts Regarding the Plaintiff’s Specific Allegations 

One night as the inmates were locking down, the Plaintiff complained to Sergeant Jones 

and Corrections Officer Sellers that his toilet was stopped up. Therefore, Sergeant Jones and 

Officer Sellers told the Plaintiff that they would move him to another cell with a working toilet. 

However, the Plaintiff told Sergeant Jones and Officer Sellers that he did not want to move. (T. 

Jones Aff. ¶ 29; Sellers Aff. ¶ 29.) Other than this conversation, the Plaintiff never made any 

complaints to Sergeant Jones and Officer Sellers, and they were unaware of any other alleged 

problems until they received the Plaintiff’s lawsuit. (T. Jones Aff. ¶ 30; Sellers Aff. ¶ 30.) 

The Plaintiff had the opportunity to ask any staff member to unlock his door and let him 

go to use another toilet during the night. (T. Jones Aff. ¶ 32; Sellers Aff. ¶ 32.) However, the 

Plaintiff did not ever ask the corrections officer Defendants to let him out of his cell during the 

night to use the restroom. (T. Jones Aff. ¶ 33; Sellers Aff. ¶ 33; Tucker Aff. ¶ 32.) Corrections 

Officer Tucker did not know of the problem with the Plaintiff’s toilet, and he did not hear the 

conversation that took place between the Plaintiff, Sergeant Jones, and Officer Sellers regarding 

the toilet issue. (Tucker Aff. ¶ 29.) Sheriff Jones and Officer Tucker were unaware of any 

alleged problems that are mentioned in his Complaint. (Jones Aff. ¶ 9; Tucker Aff. ¶ 7.) None 

of the Defendants have ever received a request form from the Plaintiff regarding any of the 

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allegations made the basis of his Complaint. (Jones Aff. ¶ 8; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 7; Sellers Aff. ¶ 7; 

Tucker Aff. ¶ 7.) Sheriff Jones has no personal knowledge of any of the specific allegations that 

form the basis of the Plaintiff’s Complaint. In fact, Sheriff Jones was not present at the Lee 

County Detention Center at night on the dates noted in the Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Jones Aff. ¶ 

3.) 

The Defendants are not aware that the Plaintiff was ever denied access to a working 

toilet. (Jones Aff. ¶ 31; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 34; Sellers Aff. ¶ 34; Tucker Aff. ¶ 30.) 

Neither any of the Defendants nor Major Torbert have never received a grievance from 

the Plaintiff concerning any of the allegations made the basis of his Complaint. (Jones Aff. ¶ 12; 

Torbert Aff. ¶ 9; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 10; Sellers Aff. ¶ 10; Tucker Aff. ¶ 10.) Per the policy of the 

Lee County Sheriff, an inmate has the opportunity to appeal any grievance up the chain of 

command to Major Torbert and then to Sheriff Jones if he is not satisfied with the response at the 

lower levels in the chain of command. (Jones Aff. ¶ 11 and 12; Torbert Aff. ¶ 7 and 9.) The 

Plaintiff has not appealed any grievance to either Major Torbert or Sheriff Jones. Accordingly, 

the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Lee County Detention 

Center. (Jones Aff. ¶ 12; Torbert Aff. ¶ 13.) All properly submitted nonmedical grievances are 

answered, and a copy is placed in the inmate’s inmate file. All properly submitted medical 

grievances are answered, and a copy is placed in the inmate’s medical file. (Jones Aff. ¶ 13; 

Torbert Aff. ¶ 10; T. Jones Aff. ¶ 11; Sellers Aff. ¶ 11; Tucker Aff. ¶ 11.) Upon Major Torbert’s 

review of the Plaintiff’s inmate file, there are no grievances concerning the allegations made the 

basis of his Complaint. (Torbert Aff. ¶ 10; Exhibit K, Inmate File11.) 

 

11 The remainder of the Plaintiff’s Inmate File, not referenced as a separate exhibit, is attached hereto as Exhibit K. 

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II. LAW 

A. All the Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their official capacities 

must fail based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and because they are not 

“persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 The Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants in their official capacities are due to be 

dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as such claims are barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1476 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (holding a sheriff sued in his official capacity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity); Carr v. City of Florence, Ala., 918 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding a 

deputy sheriff sued in his official capacity is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); 

Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1430-31 (11th Cir. 1997) (extending Eleventh 

Amendment immunity to include jailers employed by county sheriffs). 

In addition, the official capacities claims must fail because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prohibits a 

person, acting under color of law, from depriving another of his rights secured by the United 

States Constitution. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). The United States Supreme Court has 

held that state officials, in their official capacities, are not “persons” under § 1983. Will v. 

Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, any claims against the 

Defendants in their official capacities fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

because they are not “persons” under § 1983, and therefore these claims are due to be dismissed. 

Id.; Carr, 916 F.2d at 1525 n.3. 

B. The Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars 

the Complaint. 

1. The Plaintiff has failed to exhaust all Administrative Remedies. 

 Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), an inmate is required to exhaust all 

administrative remedies before instituting an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 

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1997e(a). The Plaintiff in this case has not utilized two separate and distinct administrative 

remedies available to him. First, the Plaintiff has not exhausted the grievance procedures 

provided at the Lee County Detention Center. Despite the availability of a grievance procedure 

at the Lee County Detention Center and the Plaintiff’s clear knowledge and understanding of this 

procedure, the Plaintiff failed to file a grievance concerning the allegations made the basis of the 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies 

at the Lee County Detention Center. 

Second, the Plaintiff has not alleged that he pursued any grievance through the State 

Board of Adjustment. See Brown v. Tombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1998) (requiring 

prisoners to affirmatively show that they have exhausted administrative remedies). In addition to 

the grievance procedure at the local level, Alabama law provides the opportunity to file a claim 

and proceed before the State of Alabama Board of Adjustment pursuant to Ala. Code § 41-9-60. 

The Sheriff of Lee County is a state officer, as are his alter egos, and therefore, they would be 

entitled to sovereign immunity. See Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429. Due to this immunity, the 

State of Alabama has provided an administrative remedy for the recovery of money damages 

through the State of Alabama Board of Adjustment. 

As a result of Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust these two remedies, he is barred from bringing 

this action under § 1997e(a). See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(affirming dismissal of prison action due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, stating 

that the judicially recognized futility and inadequacy exceptions that existed under former § 

1997e(a) are not applicable under the new mandatory exhaustion requirement of the PLRA); 

Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (concluding that the exhaustion of administrative 

remedies is now mandatory and courts cannot excuse exhaustion). 

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2. The Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

because he has not suffered any physical injury as a result of the 

allegations in his Complaint. 

“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or 

other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in 

custody without a prior showing of physical injury . . . . In order to avoid 

dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner’s claims for emotional or mental injury 

must be accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de 

minimis.” 

Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2002). Because the 

Plaintiff has not alleged any physical injury, but instead alleges only emotional and mental 

injuries, his Complaint is due to be dismissed. 

C. The Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified 

immunity because nothing in their conduct crossed a “bright line” contour of 

clearly established constitutional law. 

The Defendants were acting within their discretionary authority as Sheriff and corrections 

officers of Lee County during all times relevant to the Plaintiff’s Complaint because all their 

actions were taken in the furtherance of their job duties. See, e.g. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. 

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1267 (11th Cir. 2004). Once a defendant has asserted the defense of 

qualified immunity and shown that he was acting within his discretionary authority, the threshold 

inquiry a court must undertake is whether the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a 

constitutional violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). This initial inquiry is 

whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged 

show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Id. (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 

U.S. 226, 232 (1991)). The second inquiry is, if a constitutional violation is stated, were these 

rights “clearly established” to the degree that the Defendants had “fair warning” that their 

conduct violated the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights? Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 

1301 (11th Cir. 2003). 

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In making an assessment of whether the particular conduct of the Defendants was clearly 

established as being violative of constitutional dictates, the reviewing court must examine the state 

of law at the time the alleged deprivation occurred. See Rodgers v. Horsley, 39 F.3d 308, 311 (11th 

Cir. 1994). A constitutional right is clearly established only if its contours are “sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1424. “In this circuit, the law can be 

‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme 

Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.” 

Jenkins v. Talladega Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citations 

omitted). 

1. The Plaintiff’s Constitutional Rights were not violated. 

In order to establish a conditions of confinement claim Plaintiff “must prove three 

elements: (1) a condition of confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering constituting 

cruel and unusual punishment, (2) the defendants’ deliberate indifference to that condition, and 

(3) causation. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (first element); Wilson v. Seiter, 

502 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (second element); Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1389-90 (11th Cir. 

1982) (third element). Whether a particular condition of confinement constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment is an objective inquiry; whether jail officials were deliberately indifferent to 

that condition is a subjective inquiry. Wilson v. Seiter, 502 U.S. at 290. In the instant case, the 

Plaintiff cannot establish either the objective or subjective components of his conditions of 

confinement claims. 

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 (a) Objective Component 

With regard to the objective component, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “extreme

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim” under the Eighth 

Amendment.12 Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in original). 

“[A] constitutional violation occurs only where the deprivation alleged is, objectively, 

‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). “[T]he Constitution does 

not mandate comfortable prisons.” Chandler, 379 F.3d. at 1289. 

In the instant case, the Plaintiff cannot present evidence of any “extreme” deprivation that 

could be objectively considered “cruel and unusual.” It is clear that the condition alleged in the 

Plaintiff’s Complaint was not “extreme” as to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The 

Plaintiff merely alleges that the toilet in his cell was not working, that his cell contained other 

inmates’ “bodily fluids,” and that his cell had “bugs” in it for five or six nights. However, the 

Defendants have shown that the Plaintiff had the opportunity to move to a cell with a working toilet 

but declined. Further, the Plaintiff had the opportunity to request to use the restroom during the 

night but did not ask any of the corrections officer Defendants to let him out to do so. Accordingly, 

the clear evidence shows that the Plaintiff was not ever denied access to a working toilet. 

Further, the Defendants have presented evidence that the Plaintiff was given the opportunity as well 

as the supplies necessary to clean his cell twice each day. Finally, as to the “bug” problem, the 

Detention Center is professionally sprayed with insecticide every month. In addition, the Plaintiff 

had the opportunity to request that the Detention Center staff use additional insecticide or powders 

 

12 “Claims involving the mistreatment of . . . pretrial detainees in custody are governed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 

which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners. But it makes no difference whether [the plaintiff] was a 

pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner because ‘the applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving 

prison inmates applies equally to cases involving pretrial detainees.’” Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1271 (11th 

Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). 

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if he thought they were necessary. However, the Plaintiff never made any request to the 

Defendants. 

Conditions such as those alleged by the Plaintiff have been held to not be objectively serious 

enough to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Boland v. Coughlin, 622 F. Supp. 

736, 736-37 (D.C.N.Y. 1985) (granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint 

where the plaintiff alleged that for up to one month at a time he did not have bathroom facilities and 

had to summon a guard to let him out to use the restroom but was not denied the opportunity to use 

the bathroom); Lyons v. Papantoniou, 558 F. Supp. 4, 5 (E.D. Tenn. 1982) (granting summary 

judgment to defendants on eighth amendment claim where the plaintiff was deprived of “adequate 

bathroom facilities” for 24 hours and 24 minutes); Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 257 F.3d 

508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that begin temporarily deprived of a working toilet did not fall 

“beneath the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities as measured by a contemporary 

standard of decency”); Geder v. Godinez, 875 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that 

the plaintiff’s allegations of the “presence of defective pipes, sinks, and toilets, improperlycleaned showers, a broken intercom system, stained mattresses, accumulated dust and dirt, and 

infestation by roaches and rats” did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation). In the 

instant case, the Plaintiff was given the opportunity to move to a different cell with a working 

toilet but declined. Even so, in light of the above-referenced cases, it is clear that the Plaintiff’s 

claim does not rise to the level of an objectively serious deprivation that can form a 

constitutional violation. 

Further, the law is clear that deprivations that are short in nature do not rise to the level of 

a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Clark v. Spey, 2002 WL 31133198, *2 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 

(finding no constitutional violation where inmate was “placed in a cold and unlighted cell where 

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he was deprived of warm clothing, a functioning toilet, toilet paper, a mattress, sheets, and a 

blanket for a period of several hours” and stating that “when deprivations like these are relatively 

short in duration, they do not violate the Eighth Amendment.”); see also Hamilton v. Peters, 919 

F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that “denying a prisoner regular showers and ample 

supplies of toiletries for a finite period, such as twenty-eight days, does not demonstrate a 

deprivation of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’”); Jackson v. DeTella, 998 F. 

Supp. 901, 905 (N.D. Ill. 1998 (holding that an eight day deprivation of bedding and hygiene 

items to an inmate was not a constitutional violation); Martin v. Lane, 766 F. Supp. 641, 648 

(N.D. Ill.1991) (holding that a deprivation of hygienic supplies for between three to eighteen 

days is not a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights); Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665, 

685 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (“Short term deprivations of toilet paper, towels, sheets, blankets, 

mattresses, toothpaste, toothbrushes and the like do not rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation.”). The Plaintiff alleges that he was subject to subpar conditions during the nighttime 

hours for only five or six days. Therefore, even if the Plaintiff’s allegations were taken as true 

without consideration to the Defendants’ evidence, his allegations to not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation. 

 (b) Subjective Component 

Even if the Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement were objectively “cruel and unusual,” 

there must still be evidence of subjective deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant. 

“To be deliberately indifferent, a [jail] official must knowingly or recklessly disregard an 

inmate’s basic needs.” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993). “[A] plaintiff 

must prove that the official possessed knowledge both of the infirm condition and of the means 

to cure that condition, ‘so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be inferred 

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from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.’” Id. (quoting Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 

653 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 816 (1986). There must be evidence that the official 

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be 

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. The Court 

equates the level of culpable intent required to the standard employed in the context of criminal

recklessness prosecutions. Id. at 837-39. No liability can be attributed to “an official’s failure to 

alleviate a significant risk which he should have perceived but did not.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 

F.3d 1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996). 

In Smith v. Copeland13, the Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to an overflowed toilet 

in his cell for four days. 87 F. 3d. 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). However, the corrections officers 

presented undisputed evidence that the Plaintiff “was offered an opportunity to flush the toilet 

and to clean up the mess but he declined.” Id. The court stated: “To prevail on an Eighth 

Amendment claim in this context, an inmate must show that correctional officers were 

deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm posed by the raw sewage. Thus, not every overflowed 

toilet in a prison amounts to a constitutional violation.” Id. (citations omitted); see also

Masonoff v. DuBois, 853 F. Supp. 26, 28-30 (D. Mass. 1994) (denying the plaintiff’s motion for 

preliminary injunction because it was not likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on their claim 

that the defendants were deliberately indifferent where there was no evidence that the defendants 

knew that the order for inmates to be given full access to toilets that flush was not being 

followed); Galloway v. Whetsel, 124 Fed. Appx. 617, 618-19 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

where the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to “‘feces contaminated toilet and sewage line 

overflows’ and ‘unsanitary living and sleeping quarters,’ and [that officers] ‘refused to 

 

13 87 F.3d 265, 268 (8th Cir. 1996). 

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administer appropriate cleaning supplies, despite repeated requests” but did not allege that the 

defendant was aware that the officers did not give him “disinfectants or other sufficient supplies 

to clean feces from his cell floor and toilet,” no deliberate indifference was shown); Geder, 875 

F. Supp. at 1341, 1341-42 (granting summary judgment to defendants where the plaintiff failed 

to show deliberate indifference to “defective pipes, sinks, and toilets, improperly-cleaned 

showers, a broken intercom system, stained mattresses, accumulated dust and dirt, and 

infestation by roaches and rats”). 

In the instant case, even if there were an excessive risk to his health or safety, the 

Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants knew of or disregarded that risk. The 

Plaintiff does not allege that any of the Defendants was aware that his cell had “body fluids” in 

it. He further does not allege that Sheriff Jones was aware of the toilet or bug problem, and the 

evidence shows that Officer Tucker was unaware of these problems as well. As to Sergeant 

Jones and Officer Sellers, the evidence shows that they were not aware of a bug problem. 

Further, while the Plaintiff complained to Sergeant Jones and Officer Sellers about the toilet, 

they were not deliberately indifferent to his complaint. Instead, they offered to let the Plaintiff 

move to a different cell with a working toilet. However, the Plaintiff refused. Because Sergeant 

Jones and Officer Tucker attempted to remedy the complained of condition, they were not 

deliberately indifferent. LaMarca, 995 F.2d at 1536 (“[I]f an official attempts to remedy a 

constitutionally deficient prison condition, but fails in that endeavor, he cannot be deliberately 

indifferent unless he knows of, but disregards, an appropriate and sufficient alternative.”). None 

of the Defendants were aware that the Plaintiff was ever denied access to a working toilet. 

Because the Plaintiff cannot meet the objective or subjective tests as set forth in Farmer, supra, 

his claims are due to be dismissed. 

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Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has held that a significant injury is 

required in order to sustain a conditions of confinement claim. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 

528 (U.S.2002) (“[T]o sustain a [conditions of confinement] claim, “significant injury” must be 

shown; Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1111 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder our circuit precedent 

about the nature of actionable injuries under the Eighth Amendment, an injury can be 

‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ only if there is more than de minimis injury.”); see also Smith, 

87 F.3d at 268 (noting that the plaintiff “did not allege that he was exposed to disease or suffered 

any other consequences of the exposure [to raw sewage]” and finding a de minimus imposition 

that did not amount to a constitutional violation), citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 

(1979) (“There is, of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not 

concerned.”) The Plaintiff has not alleged that cannot show that he suffered any injury as a 

result of the alleged conditions of his confinement. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot sustain a 

conditions of confinement claim. 

2. No clearly established law provided the Defendants with fair warning 

that their conduct was unlawful. 

Assuming, arguendo, that the Plaintiff could demonstrate a constitutional violation, he must 

still show that clearly established law provided the Defendants with fair warning that their conduct 

was unlawful. He may do so by either (1) pointing to a case with materially similar facts holding 

that the conduct engaged in was illegal; or (2) demonstrating that a pertinent federal statute or 

federal constitutional provision are specific enough to demonstrate conduct was illegal, even in the 

total absence of case law. Storck v. City of Coral Springs, 354 F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citations omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has identified the latter method as an “obvious clarity” 

case. Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted). In order to 

show that the conduct of the Defendant was unconstitutional with “obvious clarity,” “the 

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unlawfulness must have been apparent.” Willingham, 321 F.3d at 1301. “Unless a government 

agent’s act is so obviously wrong, in the light of pre-existing law, that only a plainly incompetent 

officer or one who was knowingly violating the law would have done such a thing, the government 

actor has immunity from suit.” Storck, 354 F.3d at 1318 (quoting 28 F.3d at 1149). 

The Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation or 

showing that clearly established law provided the Defendants with fair warning that their 

conduct was unlawful in any of the areas of which the Plaintiff complains. Therefore, the 

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. 

D. The Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient personal involvement on each 

claim. 

The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal connection 

between the actions taken by the defendants and the constitutional deprivation. Swint v. City of 

Wadley, 51 F. 3d 988 (11th Cir. 1995). The requisite causal connection may be shown by the 

personal participation of the defendant, a policy established by the defendant resulting in deliberate 

indifference to constitutional rights or a breach of a duty imposed state of local law which results in 

constitutional injury. Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F. 2d 397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986). 

The Plaintiff has failed to make sufficient allegations demonstrating that any of the 

Defendants were involved with the alleged problem with “body fluids.” Further, the evidence 

shows that none of the Defendants were involved with the alleged problem with “bugs.” Finally, 

the evidence shows that Officer Tucker was not involved with the alleged toilet problem, and the 

Plaintiff has failed to make any allegations against Sheriff Jones. In fact, Sheriff Jones is not 

mentioned at all with regard to any factual allegations. The Plaintiff does not allege a breach of a 

duty imposed by state or local law or a policy that resulted in deliberate indifference. As to 

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Sergeant Jones, Officer Sellers, and Officer Tucker, the Plaintiff only alleges that they were 

“involved,” but does not allege how they were involved. 

The lack of factual allegations against the Defendants make it clear that the Plaintiff is 

attempting to hold the Defendants liable on the theory of respondeat superior. To the extent that 

the Plaintiff’s claims are an attempt to hold the Defendants liable under a respondeat superior

theory, his claim must similarly fail. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 

(1978). The Eleventh Circuit in Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 1999), established 

exactly what is required to state a claim (or prove) supervisory liability: 

Supervisory liability [under § 1983] occurs either when the supervisor personally 

participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal 

connection between actions of the supervising official and the alleged 

constitutional deprivation. The causal connection can be established when a 

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need 

to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to do so. The deprivations that 

constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be 

“obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated 

occurrences.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990) (citations 

omitted). 

193 F.3d at 1269. The causal connection may also be established where the supervisor’s 

improper “custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to constitutional rights.” 

Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d 1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 

397 (11th Cir. 1986)). In light of the applicable law, the Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to 

create liability on the part of the Defendants. As such, Plaintiff’s claims are due to be dismissed 

against all the Defendants. 

E. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiff’s claims for 

injunctive relief. 

Subject matter jurisdiction is a “threshold issue” which a Plaintiff must establish to the 

Court’s satisfaction before he may prevail on any of his claims. See generally, Rosado v. 

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Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 402 (1970); Ellis v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 160 F.3d 703, 706 

(11th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, the Plaintiff has been released from the Lee County 

Detention Center. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims for 

injunctive relief due to the mootness of these claims and the Plaintiff’s lack of standing to pursue 

these claims. 

 1. The Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief are moot. 

“[A] moot suit ‘cannot present an Article III case or controversy and the federal courts 

lack subject matter jurisdiction to entertain it.’” Nat’l Adver. Co. v. City of Miami, 402 F.3d 

1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiff has been released from the Lee County Detention 

Center, his claims for injunctive relief are moot. Zatler, 802 F.2d at 399 (“In view of [the 

plaintiff’s] subsequent release [from the correctional facility where claims arose], we find that 

his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are now moot.”); see also Wahl v. McIver, 773 

F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Absent class certification, an inmate’s claim for injunctive 

and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy once the 

inmate has been transferred. Past exposure to illegal conduct does not constitute a present case 

or controversy involving injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 

effects.”) (citations omitted); Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that 

prisoner’s claim for injunctive relief was moot and properly dismissed, where prisoner had been 

transferred from county jail in which unconstitutional conditions allegedly existed); McKinnon 

v. Talladega County, 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The general rule is that a prisoner’s 

transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.” 

(citation omitted)). Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s requests for injunctive relief are moot. 

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2. The Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue his claims for injunctive relief.

A plaintiff seeking the jurisdiction of the federal courts must show a personal stake in the 

outcome. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must have sustained, or be 

about to sustain, some direct injury. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1969). As 

stated above, “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or 

controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse 

effects.” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). 

In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, the plaintiff alleged that he had been subjected to a 

chokehold by arresting officers in violation of his federally protected rights. 461 U.S. 95, 97 

(1983). The plaintiff sought an injunction barring the future use of police chokeholds. Id. 461 

U.S. at 98. After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction, 

the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing. Id. 461 

U.S. at 99-100. The Court stated that the plaintiff’s standing rested solely on pure speculation 

that he might be stopped by the police, might be arrested, and might again create a disturbance 

in the jail and might be subjected to another chokehold. Id. 461 U.S. at 108. The court noted 

that five months elapsed between the choking incident and the filing of the complaint and the 

plaintiff was not subjected to another chokehold. Id.

Here, any injunctive relief is equally speculative. Because he is no longer incarcerated in 

the Lee County Detention Center, the Plaintiff’s claim is, in essence, that he might be released 

from the facility at which he is currently incarcerated, might be stopped by police, might be 

arrested by an officer with authority to incarcerate someone in the Lee County Detention Center, 

that he might be booked into the Lee County Detention Center, that he might be subjected to the 

alleged conditions made the basis of his Complaint. Such speculation into future conduct does 

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not grant the Plaintiff standing. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 108. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s 

requests for injunctive relief are due to be dismissed for lack of standing. 

F. Summary Judgment Standard

On a motion for summary judgment, the court should view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the nonmovant. Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 831 (11th Cir. 1990). However, a 

plaintiff “must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material 

facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Only 

reasonable inferences with a foundation in the record inure to the nonmovant’s benefit. See

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). “[T]he court should give 

credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that ‘evidence supporting the 

moving party that is uncontradicted or unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence 

comes from disinterested witnesses.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151, quoting 9A C. Wright & A. 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2529, p. 299.14 “A reviewing court need not ‘swallow 

plaintiff’s invective hook, line and sinker; bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, 

periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like need not be credited.’” Marsh v. Butler County, 268 

F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) quoting Massachusetts Sch. of Law v. American 

Bar, 142 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 1998). 

CONCLUSION 

 The Defendants deny each and every allegation made by the Plaintiff Arthur James 

Tigner in the Complaint. The Defendants have not acted in a manner so as to deprive the 

Plaintiff of any right to which he is entitled. 

 

14 Although Reeves was a review of a motion for judgment as a matter of law after the underlying matter had been 

tried, the Supreme Court, in determining the proper standard of review relied heavily on the standard for summary 

judgment stating, “the standard for granting summary judgment ‘mirrors’ the standard for judgment as a matter of 

law, such that ‘the inquiry under each is the same.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

 The Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court treat their Special Report 

as a Motion for Summary Judgment, and grant unto them the same. 

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of November, 2006. 

s/Amanda Kay Morgan 

AMANDA KAY MORGAN Bar No. ALL079 

Attorney for Defendants 

WEBB & ELEY, P.C. 

7475 Halcyon Pointe Drive 

Post Office Box 240909 

Montgomery, Alabama 36124 

Telephone: (334) 262-1850 

Fax: (334) 262-1889 

E-mail: amorgan@webbeley.com

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on this the 6th day of November, 2006, I have electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, and that I have mailed a true 

and correct copy of the foregoing by United States Mail, postage prepaid, to the following nonCM/ECF participant: 

Arthur James Tigner 

AIS 152184 

Bullock Correctional Facility 

PO Box 5107 

Union Springs, AL 36089-5107 

 s/Amanda Kay Morgan 

 OF COUNSEL 

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