alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Subpart 1546.7 - Warranties

**Parent topic:**PART 1546 - QUALITY ASSURANCE

## 1546.704 Authority for use of warranties.

The Contracting Officer shall ensure that the use of a warranty clause in a contract has the concurrence of the Project Officer.
Opinion issued February 13, 2014

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 13
- 00638
- CV

——————————— MOHAN TANWA R D/B/A STAR FOOD MA RT , Appellant V. DIXIE FARM TEXACO, I NC. D/B/A CITYWIDE A TM , Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 2

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 1015589

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant , Mohan Tanwar d/b/a Star Food Mart, ha s failed to timely file a brief. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.6( a ) ( governing time to file brief ), 38.8(a) (governing failure of appellant to file brief). After being notified that this appeal was subject to dismissal, appellant did not adequately respond. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 42.3(b)2

(allowing involuntary dismissal of case). We dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution for failure to timely file a brief. We dismiss any pending motions as moot

. PER CURIAM Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Mas sengale and Huddle.
§ 1013.26 Form, filing and service of papers. ( a ) *Form.* ( 1 ) Documents filed with the ALJ shall include an original and two copies.
( 2 ) Every pleading and paper filed in the proceeding shall contain a caption setting forth the title of the action, the case number assigned by the ALJ, and a designation of the paper (*e.g.,* motion to quash subpoena).
( 3 ) Every pleading and paper shall be signed by, and shall contain the address and telephone number of the party or the person on whose behalf the paper was filed, or his or her representative.
( 4 ) Papers are considered filed when they are mailed. Date of mailing may be established by a certificate from the party or its representative or by proof that the document was sent by certified or registered mail.
( b ) *Service.* A party filing a document with the ALJ shall, at the time of filing, serve a copy of such document on every other party. Service upon any party of any document other than those required to be served as prescribed in § 1013.8 of this part shall be made by delivering a copy or by placing a copy of the document in the United States mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to the party's last known address. When a party is represented by a representative, service shall be made upon such representative in lieu of the actual party.
( c ) *Proof of service.* A certificate by the individual serving the document by personal delivery or by mail, setting forth the manner of service, shall be proof of service.
**UN PUBLISHED** 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 09**  **- 2395** 

WALTER D. HAYES , Plaintiff

– Appellant ,
v. W. WARE MORRISON, Attorney & Counselor at Law; PROVIDENT LIF E & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY; EDWARD E. ROLLINS, JR.; GLAD YS HAYES

- OWENS; CHARLES EVERETT MALONE, Attorney at Law , Defendants

– Appellees
.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia , at Norfolk
. Jerome B. Friedman , District Judge. ( 2:09

- cv - 00431

- JBF

- FBS )

Submitt ed : April 22, 2010 Decided: April 26, 2010

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and AGEE , Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. Walter D. Hayes, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Walter D. Hayes appeals the district court ’ s order denying reconsideration of the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of Hayes’ civil complaint . We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny Hayes’ mo tion to overturn the district court’s decision and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. Hayes v. Morrison , No. 2:09

- cv - 00431

- JBF

- FBS (E.D. Va. Nov. 24, 2009). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adeq uately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
#### In re EQUITABLE TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

June 26, 1914.)

In the matter of the Equitable Trust Company of New York, as executor, etc., of Josephine B. Chambers, deceased.

No opinion. Decree reversed, on authority of Matter of Osborne, 209 N. Y. 450, 103 N. E. 723, 823, and proceedings remitted to surrogate for final decree in accordance with that opinion, with costs to appellant payable out of the estate.
Subpart 645.1—General

Parent topic: PART 645—GOVERNMENT PROPERTY

645.107 Contract clauses.

645.107-70 DOSAR contract clause and solicitation

provision.

(a) The contracting officer shall insert the provision at 652.245–70, Status of Property Management

System, in solicitations when any of the following conditions apply:

(1) Highway motor vehicles or aircraft, regardless of cost, are provided by the Government or

acquired by the contractor for the account of the Government;

(2) Software exceeding $500,000 in value, including labor costs to develop, is provided by the

Government or acquired by the contractor for the account of the Government; or

(3) Personal property greater than $25,000 (and not in paragraph (a)(1) of this subsection) is

provided by the Government or acquired by the contractor for the account of the Government. The

personal property must be complete within itself; does not lose its identity or become a component

part of other property when put into use; and is of a durable nature with an estimated useful life

expectancy to exceed two years.

(b) The contracting officer shall insert the clause at 652.245–71, Special Reports of Government

Property, in all solicitations and contracts that contain the provision at 652.245–70.
#### § 900.40 Written testimony and USDA data request requirements.

In addition to the provisions of § 900.8(b)(4), witnesses at an amendatory fruit, vegetable or nut formal rulemaking hearing shall make, to the extent practicable, at least 8 copies of their testimony, if prepared as an exhibit, and any other exhibits available to USDA before testimony is given on the day of appearance at the hearing. Industry requests for preparation of USDA data for a rulemaking hearing should be made at least 10 days prior to the beginning of the hearing.
#### Beal Savings Bank, Appellant, v Viola Sommer et al., Respondents.

[815 NYS2d 63]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Bernard J. Fried, J.), entered December 16, 2005, which, in an action for breach of contract, granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint on the basis of documentary evidence, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

Plaintiff alleges that it was the owner of an interest in a $460 million credit facility governed by a credit agreement between a nonparty developer, as borrower, and various financial institutions, including plaintiff, as lenders. Defendants were part of a group of “sponsors” who provided undertakings designed to maintain set financial ratios and other attributes of the borrower. The credit facility was administered by an administrative agent for the lenders. Under the subject keep-well agreement, *389each sponsor guaranteed payment, to the administrative agent for the benefit of the lenders, of the borrower’s accelerated obligations under the credit agreement. The borrower’s obligations were accelerated and plaintiff seeks to enforce defendants’ guarantee thereof.

The motion court correctly dismissed the action on the basis of clear and unambiguous language in the loan documents preventing lenders from individually suing sponsors under the keep-well agreement *(see 150 Broadway N.Y. Assoc., L.P. v Bodner,*14 AD3d 1, 5 [2004]). Paragraph 18 (a) of the keep-well agreement provides that it is “a Loan Document executed pursuant to the Credit Agreement and shall (unless otherwise expressly indicated herein) be construed, administered and applied in accordance with the terms and conditions thereof.” It is the credit agreement, not the keep-well agreement, that sets forth the events of default and the procedures for recovering a judgment upon such defaults, including a judgment on the keep-well agreement. Further, the credit agreement authorizes the administrative agent to exercise all rights and remedies at law or in equity at the direction of the “required lenders,” defined as a supermajority vote by lenders collectively holding two thirds of the borrower’s outstanding debt. This broad grant of authority upon the administrative agent conditioned upon a supermajority vote evinces a clear intention that enforcement of the loan documents, including the keep-well agreement, be collective, and that a minority lender, such as plaintiff, be prohibited from acting unilaterally to recover a judgment. Section 18 (b) of the keep-well agreement, which provides that such agreement “shall inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the Administrative Agent and each Lender,” was properly held by the motion court to be too general to override the express enforcement procedures contained in the credit agreement and the overall scheme of collective enforcement manifested therein *(cf. Credit Francais Intl. v Sociedad Fin. de Comercio,*128 Misc 2d 564, 580-581 [1985]).

We have considered plaintiffs other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Saxe, J.P., Marlow, Sullivan, Gonzalez and Malone, JJ. *(See*10 Misc 3d 1062(A), 2005 NY Slip Op 52075(U) (2005).]
#### Abraham *v.*Alford.

*Trover for Conversion of Mule.*

1. *Appeal from justice’s judgment; liow triable.*— On appeal from a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, although the defendant fails to appear, it is error to render judgment final by default; without the intervention of a jury, for the amount oí the justice’s judgment: that judgment is vacated by the appeal, and the statute (Code, § 3121) requires that the trial shall be *de novo*on the merits.

2. *Trover; judgment final by default.*— In an action of trover, it is error to render judgment final by deiault, without the intervention of a jury to assess the damages.

Appeal from the City Court of Montgomery.

Tried before the Hon. John A. MiNNis.

*282R. M. Williamson, for appellant.

Geo. E. Moore, *contra.*

BRICKELL, C. J.

This was an action of trover for the conversion of a mule, commenced before a justice of the peace, in which the appellee was plaintiff, and the appellant was defendant. The defendant failing to appear before the justice, judgment by default was taken against him; and after hearing evidence, the justice rendered a final judgment for fifty dollars damages, and four dollars and eighty cents, eostsof suit. From that judgment, the defendant appealed’ to the City Court; and not appearing in that court, a final judgment by default was rendered against him, without the intervention of a jury, for the amount of the judgment rendered by the justice. This was error. Appeals from judgments of a justice of the peace are triable *de novo,*upon their merits, without regal’d to the judgment of the justice. By the appeal, that judgment is vacated, and ceases to have any force or effect, either as an estoppel, or as matter of evidence. Freeman on Judgments, § 828. The judgment of the justice is not reversed, or affirmed; but a new, distinct, and independent judgment, as may be required by the merits shown on the trial, is rendered by the City or Circuit Court. The rendition of a final judgment by default, in an action of trover, without the intervention of a jury to assess the damages, is unwarranted.

Reversed and remanded.
SUBCHAPTER H - Buy Indian Act

PART 1480 - ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE BUY INDIAN ACT

PARTS 1481-1499 [RESERVED]

PART 1480 - ACQUISITIONS UNDER THE BUY INDIAN ACT

Subpart 1480.1 - General

1480.101 Scope of part.

1480.102 Buy Indian Act acquisition regulations.

Subpart 1480.2 - Definitions

1480.201 Definitions.

Subpart 1480.3 - Applicability

1480.301 Scope of part.

1480.302 Restrictions on the use of the Buy Indian Act.

Subpart 1480.4 - Policy

1480.401 Requirement to give preference to Indian Economic Enterprises.

1480.402 Delegations and responsibility.

1480.403 Deviations.

Subpart 1480.5 - Procedures

1480.501 General.

1480.502 [Reserved]

1480.503 Procedures for acquisitions under the Buy Indian Act.

1480.504 Other circumstances for use of other than full and open competition.

1480.505 Debarment and suspension.

Subpart 1480.6 - Contract Requirements

1480.601 Subcontracting limitations.

1480.602 Performance and payment bonds.

Subpart 1480.7 - [Reserved]

Subpart 1480.8 - Representation by an Indian Economic Enterprise Offeror

1480.801 General.

1480.802 Representation provision.

1480.803 Representation process.

Subpart 1480.9 - Challenges to Representation

1480.901 General.

1480.902 Receipt of challenge.

1480.903 Award in the face of challenge.

1480.904 Challenge not timely.

PARTS 1481-1499 [RESERVED]
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Robert Pearson, Appellant.

[813 NYS2d 680]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Spires, J.), rendered May 10, 2004, convicting him of manslaughter in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree, reckless endangerment in the second degree (two counts), and aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s contention that the prosecutor’s statements in summation deprived him of a fair trial is unpreserved for appellate review *(see*GPL 470.05 [2]; *People v Tonge,*93 NY2d 838 [1999]; *People v Almonte,*23 AD3d 392 [2005], *lv denied*6 NY3d 831 [2006]), and in any event, is without merit. Although some of the prosecutor’s statements in summation raised improper arguments that the defendant had a propensity to drive stolen cars in a reckless manner *(see People v Collins,*12 AD3d 33, *71239-40 [2004]; *People v Hill,*193 AD2d 619 [1993]), these statements were harmless error, as the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming *(see People v Crimmins,*36 NY2d 230 [1975]; *People v Liriano,*27 AD3d 578 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was not excessive *(see People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80, 85 [1982]). Miller, J.P., Ritter, Goldstein and Lunn, JJ., concur.
#### Maria Sulca, Appellant, v Barry Hers Realty, Inc., et al., Respondents.

[815 NYS2d 204]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Bayne, J.), dated January 3, 2005, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The plaintiff alleges that she tripped and fell on a metal strip on the stairway of the apartment building where she resided. The plaintiff testified at her deposition that the portion of the metal strip on the edge of the stair, which caused her to trip, was raised upward one quarter of an inch. The defendants, based upon the plaintiffs testimony and the photographs which indisputably reflected the condition of the stairway at the time of the accident, established their entitlement to judgment as a *780matter of law as the alleged defect, which did not have any of the characteristics of a trap or snare, was too trivial to be actionable *(see Trincere v County of Suffolk,*90 NY2d 976 [1997]; *Pancella v County of Suffolk,*16 AD3d 566 [2005]; *Morris v Greenburgh Cent. School Dist. No. 7,*5 AD3d 567 [2004]; *Torres v City of New York,*300 AD2d 391 [2002]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact *(see Pancella v County of Suffolk, supra; Morris v Greenburgh Cent. School Dist. No. 7, supra).*Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Schmidt, J.P., Crane, Spolzino and Covello, JJ., concur.
§ 1015.401 Scope and application. ( a ) The standards set forth in this subpart apply to the suspension or termination of collection activity pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3711 on debts that do not exceed $100,000, or such other amount as the Attorney General may direct, exclusive of interest, penalties, and administrative costs, after deducting the amount of partial payments or collections, if any. Prior to referring a debt to the DOJ for litigation, DOE may suspend or terminate collection under this part with respect to debts arising out of activities of, or referred to, DOE.
( b ) If, after deducting the amount of any partial payments or collections, the principal amount of a debt exceeds $100,000, or such other amount as the Attorney General may direct, exclusive of interest, penalties, and administrative costs, the authority to suspend or terminate rests solely with the DOJ. If DOE believes that suspension or termination of any debt in excess of $100,000 may be appropriate, DOE shall refer the debt to the Civil Division or other appropriate litigating division in the DOJ, using the CCLR. The referral should specify the reasons for DOE's recommendation. If, prior to referral to the DOJ, DOE determines that a debt is plainly erroneous or clearly without legal merit, DOE may terminate collection activity regardless of the amount involved without obtaining DOJ concurrence.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

PROGRESSIVE AMERICAN INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Civil Action No. 2:06cv717-ID

v. )

)

)

CAROL THORN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Upon CONSIDERATION of Plaintiff Progressive American Insurance Co.’s motion

to dismiss interpleader defendants, filed September 11, 2007 (Doc. No. 82), and for good

cause shown, it is ORDERED that said motion be and the same is hereby GRANTED and

that, pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants State

Farm Health Insurance, GEMS, Inc., and Baton Rouge Orthopaedic Clinic be and the same

are hereby DISMISSED as Defendants in this lawsuit. 

Done this 11 day of September, 2007. th

/s/ Ira DeMent 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-00717-ID-SRW Document 84 Filed 09/11/2007 Page 1 of 2
Case 2:06-cv-00717-ID-SRW Document 84 Filed 09/11/2007 Page 2 of 2
PART 727—PATENTS, DATA, AND

COPYRIGHTS

Authority: Sec. 621, Pub. L. 87–195, 75 Stat. 445, (22 U.S.C. 2381) as amended; E.O. 12163, Sept.

29, 1979, 44 FR 56673; 3 CFR 1979 Comp., p. 435.

Source: 72 FR 53163, Sept. 18, 2007, unless otherwise noted.

Subpart 727.3—Patent Rights under Government Contracts

727.303 Contract clause.

Subpart 727.4—Rights in Data and Copyrights

727.404 Basic rights in data clause.

727.409 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.

Parent topic: SUBCHAPTER E—GENERAL CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS

Subpart 727.3—Patent Rights under Government Contracts

727.303 Contract clause.

Contracting officers must insert the clause at 752.227–70, Patent Reporting Procedures, in all

solicitations and contracts that contain the clause at (48 CFR) FAR 52.227–11, Patent

Rights—Ownership by the Contractor.

Subpart 727.4—Rights in Data and Copyrights

727.404 Basic rights in data clause.

(a) through (f) [Reserved]

(g) When the contract includes a requirement for the contractor to assign copyright to the

Government or another party, the contracting officer must insert (48 CFR) 752.227–14 and/or

include an express limitation or restriction in the contract. USAID contracting officers will assert

such a right in limited circumstances in accordance with the principles as stated in (48 CFR) 27.402.

727.409 Solicitation provisions and contract clauses.

(a) When the contracting officer inserts (48 CFR) FAR 52.227–14, and if the release or publication of

data first produced in the performance of the contract may be sensitive to U.S. Government relations

with the cooperating country, the contracting officer must use the clause at (48 CFR) AIDAR
752.227–14.

(b) through (m) [Reserved]

(n) The prescriptions for provisions and clauses in (48 CFR) FAR 27.409 apply to all USAID contracts

regardless of place of performance.
#### ADAMS v. LEARY.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

July 10, 1914.)

Action by Harry Adams against George Leary.

No opinion. Application denied, with $10 costs. Order signed.
#### In the Matter of Ronald Andre, Respondent, v New York State Board of Parole, Appellant. In the Matter of Anthony Coschigano, Respondent, v New York State Board of Parole, Appellant. In the Matter of Bruce Langston, Respondent, v New York State Board of Parole, Appellant. In the Matter of W. J. Mickell, Respondent, v New York State Board of Parole, Appellant. In the Matter of Carlos Martinez, Respondent, v New York State Board of Parole, Appellant.

In five proceedings pursuant to CPLR article 78, *inter alia,*to review determinations of the New York Board of Parole establishing the petitioners’ minimum period of imprisonment at a length greater than one third of their maximum sentences, the appeals are from five judgments (one as to each petitioner) of the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, two dated November 26, 1979 and three *679dated February 8, 1980, which granted the petitions to the extent of setting aside the minimum periods of imprisonment and directing that hearings be held to establish new minimum periods, not to exceed one third of the maximum sentences. All judgments, except as to petitioner Coschigano, reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, and matters remanded to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for further proceedings consistent herewith. Judgment as to petitioner Coschigano reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, determination confirmed and proceeding dismissed on the merits. At the time the New York Board of Parole fixed each petitioner’s minimum period' of imprisonment, it was empowered, under the Executive Law, to fix a period in excess of one third of the maximum period *(Matter of Russo v New York State Bd. of Parole,*50 NY2d 69). With respect to petitioners Mickell, Langston, Andre and Martinez, each of the proceedings must be remanded to the Supreme Court, Dutchess County, for the purpose of passing upon each petitioner’s other contentions which were not passed upon in the prior decisions *(Matter of Surat v New York State Bd. of Parole,*77 AD2d 963). Hopkins, J. P., Titone, Margett and Weinstein, JJ., concur.