Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-20-00124-CV

Billy STONE dba Stobil Enterprise and All Occupants,

Appellants

v.

K CLARK PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LLC,

Appellee

From the County Court at Law No. 10, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2020CV00366

Honorable J. Frank Davis, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 6, 2020

MOTION TO DISMISS GRANTED; DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION

This is an appeal in a forcible detainer action in which the county court awarded possession

of a premises to appellee K Clark Property Management LLC on February 7, 2020. After the 

Bexar County Sheriff’s Office executed the writ of possession, K Clark filed a motion to dismiss

this appeal for want of jurisdiction. Because it appeared appellants Billy Stone1 dba Stobil 

Enterprise and all occupants no longer had possession of the premises, we issued an order requiring 

Stone to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. Stone filed a timely 

1 It appears the correct name of the appellant is Billie Stone. 
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response. After reviewing the motion to dismiss and response, we conclude Stone’s appeal is 

moot, grant K Clark’s motion, and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

BACKGROUND

K Clark filed a forcible detainer action in a Bexar County Justice of the Peace Court seeking 

to evict Stone from a property it leased to him. The justice court entered a judgment of eviction 

awarding possession of the premises to K Clark and setting an appeal bond at $500. Stone posted 

the bond and appealed to the county court at law. 

After a bench trial at which both parties appeared, the county court signed a judgment of 

eviction on February 7, 2020, awarding K Clark possession of the premises and granting it a writ 

of possession. On February 12, 2020, Stone filed: an “Affidavit of Inability to Afford Payment of 

Bond” stating he could not post a supersedeas bond from the county court’s judgment; a motion 

for new trial alleging he was not properly served with notice of the trial setting; and an application 

for an emergency temporary restraining order and temporary injunction seeking to enjoin the 

execution of the writ of possession. That same day, the county court set a February 20, 2020

hearing on the motion for new trial and temporary restraining order. On February 20, 2020, the

county court heard the matter and denied Stone’s motion for new trial and request for an emergency 

temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. At no point did Stone request a hearing to 

set a supersedeas bond to stay the writ of possession. 

On February 25, 2020, Stone filed a notice of appeal and emergency motion requesting that 

we stay the execution of the writ of possession pending appeal. After confirming with the county 

clerk that Stone did not file a supersedeas bond in an amount set by the county court, we denied 

Stone’s request for a stay pursuant to section 24.007 of the Texas Property Code. On February 27, 

2020, the Bexar County Sheriff’s Department executed the writ of possession, evicting Stone. 
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After the sheriff executed the writ of possession, K Clark filed a motion to dismiss in this 

court. In its motion, K Clark argues that the only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to 

actual possession, and because Stone no longer possesses the premises, the appeal is moot. We 

issued an order requiring Stone to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed as moot. 

Stone filed a response alleging the county court judge committed a “judicial wrongdoing” by 

allowing the bench trial to proceed on February 7, 2020 even though he was not properly served 

with notice of that setting. Stone further asserts that “[d]uring the unfair trial hearing,” the judge 

retaliated by denying his appeal and granting a writ of possession in favor of K Clark. Stone 

admits the sheriff executed the writ of possession on February 27, 2020 and states this appeal is 

not moot because this is “not an appeal of a writ of possession, but, rather an appeal of an eviction 

that was wrongfully executed against [him].” His county court pleadings do not contain a wrongful 

eviction cause of action.

ANALYSIS

Applicable Law

The only issue in a forcible detainer action is the right to actual possession of the property. 

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.3(e); Marshall v. Hous. Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198 S.W.3d 782, 

785 (Tex. 2006); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 24.001–.002. A judgment of possession in 

such an action determines only the right to immediate possession and is not a final determination 

of whether an eviction is wrongful. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. When an appellant fails to file 

a supersedeas bond in the amount set by the county court, the judgment may be enforced and a 

writ of possession may be executed, evicting the defendant from the property. See TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. § 24.007; TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.13; Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786. Failure to supersede 

the judgment does not automatically divest a defendant of his right to appeal. Marshall, 198 

S.W.3d at 786–87. However, the Texas Supreme Court has held that if a defendant in a forcible 
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detainer action is no longer in possession of the premises, then an appeal from a forcible detainer 

action is moot unless the defendant asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right to current, 

actual possession of the [premises].” Id. at 787. 

Application

Stone admits the sheriff executed the writ of possession on February 27, 2020, but claims 

this is “not an appeal of a writ of possession but, rather an appeal of an eviction that was wrongfully 

executed against [him].” He argues that he was wrongfully evicted out of retaliation and therefore 

seeks to appeal the judgment of eviction. Stone’s arguments lose sight of the fact that his appeal 

arises out of a forcible detainer action, an action that is intended to be a simple, speedy, and 

inexpensive way for a landlord to obtain immediate possession of property. See id. As pointed 

out above, the judgment in such an action is not a final determination as to whether the eviction is 

wrongful. Id. (emphasis added). It is a determination only of the right to immediate possession. 

Id. “No other issues, controversies or rights of the parties related to the property. . . can be 

adjudicated in a detainer suit.” AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC v. OIS Invs., Inc., 419 S.W.3d 

522, 526 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. denied). That judgment, however, does not bar a 

tenant from later filing a suit against the landlord for wrongful eviction.2

 See Marshall, 198 

S.W.3d at 787; AAA Free Move Ministorage, LLC, 419 S.W.3d at 529. 

To determine whether this appeal is moot, we must decide whether Stone has asserted “a 

potentially meritorious claim of right to current, actual possession of the [premises].” See 

Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 786–87. Stone’s assertions that he was wrongfully evicted are not 

arguments that would, if successful, entitle him to immediate possession. Because Stone is no 

2 Because the county court’s February 7, 2020 judgment of eviction was not a final determination as to whether Stone’s

eviction was wrongful, his assertions that the eviction was wrongful are not before us and may later be raised in a 

subsequent suit by Stone against K Clark for wrongful eviction. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787; AAA Free Move 

Ministorage, LLC, 419 S.W.3d at 529. 
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longer in possession of the property and because he does not assert a potentially meritorious claim 

of right to current, actual possession of the premises, we conclude Stone’s appeal is moot. See id. 

We therefore grant K Clark’s motion to dismiss and dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 

We also order no costs be assessed against Stone because they qualify as indigent. 

PER CURIAM