IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 17

- 0323 Filed June 7, 2017

IN THE INTEREST OF C.C. and C.C., Minor Children,

K.C., Mother, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, William S.

Owens

, Associate Juvenile Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s permanency review order and

grant of con current jurisdiction to the district court

. AFFIRMED.

Amanda M. Demichelis of Demichelis Law Firm, P.C., Chariton, for

appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Monte M. McCoy of McCoy Legal Services , Centerville, for father.

Debra A. George of Griffing & George Law Firm P.L.C. , Centerville, for

m inor children.

Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.2

DANILSON, Chief Judge.

A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s permanency review order and

grant of concurrent jurisdiction to the district court. Finding no reason to disturb

the court’s rulings, we affirm.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

The children at issue are Co

. C ., born in February 2008 , and C l

. C ., born in

August 2003

. This family came to the attention of the department of human

services (DHS) when the district court provided a copy of the parent s ’ September

2014 dissolution decree. The decree outlined the court’s concerns regardin g

domestic violence

, 1 the parents’ use of methamphetamine, the adequacy of the

supervision of the children

, and the well

- being of the children while in the care of

their parents. The re was an existing protective order prohibiting the father from

contact in g the mother. The dissolution decree placed the children in the

mother’s legal custody and physical care. 2 A child

- abuse assessment was

subsequently conducted by DHS, and th e family began p articipating voluntarily

with services in late 2014

.
On March 20, 2015, the children were removed from the mother’s physical

care by ex parte order due to the mother’s arrest on felony drug and theft

charges. A subsequent removal hearing placed the children in the father’s

1 According to the dissolution decree, the father was convicted of assault against the mother in June 2014, and of third

- degree burglary and possession of a firearm in August 2014. A criminal no

- contact order was set to expire in June 2019.
2 The decree st ates, in part: The parties agree that joint legal custody is not appropriate in this case, and that one party o r the other should be awarded sole legal custody and primary physical care of the children. Each party very much wants to be the parent awarded sole legal custody and primary physical care.3

temporary legal custody and care

, and the parents were ordered to participate in

random drug testing. The m other was ordered to obtain a substance

- abuse

assessment and comply with all recommendations for treatment

. On April 9, following an uncontested hearing, the children were

adjudicat ed children in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code section

232.2(6)(c)(2) and (n) (2015). The maternal grandparents’ motion to intervene

was granted as they had provided substantial care for the children in the past. 3

Temporary legal custody and placement of the children remained with father.

A May 28 dispositional order continued legal custody of the children with

the father

, with the goal that the children would re turn to the mother’s custody. 4

The family was receiving numerous s ervices to address the substance

- abuse

and domestic

- violence c oncerns , including F amily S afety, R isk, and P ermanency

(FSRP) services ; substance

- abuse screening ; domestic

- violence services ; and

parent partner s

. The father had completed a parenting program (“24/7 dads”)

and was participating in a batterers’ education program (BEP) . The children

were engaged in individual counseling to deal with their emotional issues arising

from the parents’ discord and drug use.

An Aug ust 2015 review hearing was held

. A n Augus t DHS report to the

court noted , in part: “This case may be safely closed when [the mother]

successfully completes substance abuse treatment

, follows all professional

3 A case plan notes, “Although their mother had legal custody of [the children] per the divorce decree prior to DHS involvement, she allowed the boys to stay with their grandparents the majority of the time.”

4 The mother appealed the adjudication and disposition but voluntarily dismissed that appeal.4

recommendations

, and resolves her criminal cha rges. [The mother and father]

need to continue to cooperate with DHS and FSRP services.” The juvenile

court’s review order noted that the court had been informed the mother had been

arrested r ecently, was in jail awaiting a hearing , and had a plea procee d ing

scheduled t hat m ight result in her being placed at a halfway house facility.

The court also had before it the father’s motion for concurrent jurisdiction.

With regard to that motion, t he court concluded:

Although [the mother] has incurred additional criminal charges the department believes the permanency goal of returning the boys to her care and custody can still be achieved. The boys are indeed fortunate to have a father who is both capable and willing to serve as their primary care give r while [the mother] works toward regaining custody. If after a period of several more months it appears [the mother] will not be able to secure the boys’ return to her home, this c ourt would likely then make more permanent orders regarding the boys’ plac ement with their father. However, until those decisions are made it would not be appropriate for this c ourt to relinquish its authority to make a custody determination.

The juvenile court ruled the children were to remain in the father’s care.

Another review hearing was held on December 3, 2015 , and the court

adopted the November case plan submitted by DHS. In the case plan it was

noted that the mother needed to “continue to cooperate with DHS and FSRP

providers”; the father had “successfully completed BEP, Children in the Middle,

and attended Anger Management Counseling”; and the children were having

supervised visits with their mother at the jail and semi

- weekly visits with the

maternal grandparents

. The December review order noted the mother had

“re solved her criminal charges and will be, or is in the half

- way house.” The court

ordered the children to remain with their father, found the children’s best interests5

would not be served by granting the district court concurrent jurisdiction, and

ordered a further review hearing “in the next six months.”

A permanency hearing was scheduled for March 10, 2016. 5 The March

2016 case plan update submitted by DHS recommended the children remain in

the father’s care and custody, concurrent jurisdiction be granted, and the

permanency goal be changed to guardianship with other parent. It was also

noted the mother had completed a substance

- abuse evaluation but had jus t

begun substance

- abuse treatment ; t he mother had completed orientation into

Family Treatment Court and was participating in substance

- abuse meetings and

seeing a counselor. I t was recommended the mother successfully complete

treatment and follow all professional recommendations and resolve her legal

issues

.
Due to continuances, t he permanency hearing was held o ver several days

in April and June 2016 . The mother sought additional time to seek reunific ation.

She reported she was living with her parents and working at a jewelry store.

DHS and the children’s guardian ad litem (GAL) argued the children deserved

permanency in the care of their father.

The GAL strenuously objected to returning the childr en to the mother. In

her permanency brief, the GAL wrote:

1. Whether Mother’s substance abuse poses a risk to the children. Mother testified on June 9, 2016, that at the time of her March 2015 arrest, that she was using methamphetamine daily at a rate of about half a gram per day. Mother further testified that she was in denial of her drug abuse, despite several positive drug

5 The code requires an initial permanency hearing within twelve months of removal. See Iowa Code § 232.104(1)(a)(1).6

screens, until she was again arrested and jailed for a duration, on or about September 1, 2015. Mother also testified on June 9 , 2016 that she has been over 280 days clean from substances, has completed treatment and is “recovered

. ” She testified that in the past she was unable to quit because she used due to withdrawal symptoms but that being incarcerated kept her from using. S he testified that she attends one meeting per week, but not always. Her mother testifies that she has often returned home late from the meeting, even close to midnight. Her testimony showed no knowledge of how to stay clean, what the 12 steps were, how t o work the steps or the role of a sponsor in a recovering addict’s recovery. While there is, at time of conclusion of evidence, no information that Mother has used since her release from incarceration in late February 2016, there is also no indication tha t Mother has internalized any tools that would cause her to stay clean. Mother testified that she plans to stay clean by staying away from people with whom she used, although she testified that she lives in the same home, engages in the same employment, a nd socially meets with people with whom she has used in their home. Relapse is a process, not necessarily an event. Mother is in a precarious position with her recovery. 2. Whether Mother’s mental health poses a risk to the children. Mother testified that she was a victim of domestic abuse. Social Worker Weldon testified that in conversations with mother about the effects of domestic abuse, that she believed that Mother should seek counseling for the after effects. Mother admitted a report on June 9, 2016, that was an evaluation for mental health therapy that stated that she was suffering from post

- traumatic stress disorder due to the domestic violence, but that no therapy would be scheduled at this time. As with any evaluation for services, the repo rt is consistent with the information provided by the subject and it appears that Mother is in denial about the effect of her mental health trauma upon her current mental health status, as Mother gives several inconsistent statements to the evaluator, incl uding that she used methamphetamines only during her marriage and that Mother has court Monday “to determine whether her children are going to remain in the CINA system.” Evidence

. . . t hat Mother had not moved past the emotional trauma or enmity from th e marriage was introduced several times including, Mother’s attempt to have admitted an unintelligible audio tape kept on a cellular phone what mother purported was domestic abuse and evidence that Mother had followed [the father] and [ Cl

. C. ] with her vehi cle and sped away at a high rate of speed. Mother clearly shows enmity toward [the father] and has regularly put the children in the middle of that toxic r elationship. While [the father] has in the past also put the children in the middle, he shows aware ness of this7

and a recent reduction in this action. In finding for a change in permanency from Mother to Father’s custody, the Court in In re N.M. and M.M. , noted “Rather than thinking first of the children’s need for a stable and secure home, [Mother] co ntinues to use visitation as an opportunity to disrupt and undermine the children’s relationship with [Father] and [Father’s] family. [ 528 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Iowa 1995). ] Social Worker Weldon and FSRP Provider Gail both testified as to a recent event where [ the mother] used visitation as an opportunity to question a child as to whether a step

- sibling in Father’s home was using drugs, and then to report that as a concern that came from the child to Social Worker Weldon. Such manipulation for legal advantage i s confusing to the child, who is put in the middle, and undermines the child’s trust both in Father, the safety of their current home, and the juvenile court system. Mother’s desire to “get” [ back at the father] is interfering with her ability to put the children first and shows that she is not ready to parent them full time. 3. Whether Mother’s criminal activity and/or incarceration poses a risk to children. Mother was incarcerated from approximately September 1, 2015 until February 24, 2016 [,] and was incapable of providing care during that time. Mother was incarcerated for criminal activity, which, while it may be categorized under incarceration or under [232. 2( 6 ) ] (c)(2), was a material factor in why Mother could not parent the children. Mother testified that she had sold drugs. Mother testified that [she] was convicted of drug charges and an offense related to untruthfulness. Mother testified that she was in denial of her criminal activity for many months

. Mother testified that she was in denial of her substance abuse for many months. Mother testified that she was now “recovered

. ” Mother testified that she did not need mental health therapy, although she admitted to Social Worker Weldon that she did. M other is out late at night. Mother is driving erratically. There was a traffic stop of Mother during the time that she was actively using and engaging in criminal activity in which Mother was stopped in the wee hours of the night driving almost 100 miles per hour. Mother is prohibited from having weapons in the home. Mother has guns in the home. Mother is prohibited from having contact with offenders. Mother was written up in the halfway house for unauthorized contact. Mother owns property with [T.W. ] , a known drug user and violent partner with whom she and he had to be consequenced for communications in violation of their corrections agreement. Mother again, did not stop until it was brought to the court’s attention on April 14, 2016, when she was “caught

. ” After she had been consequenced, she resorted to lying, using her mother’s name to send letters and photographs that Mother admitted she sent at [ T .W.] ’s request. Mother said she did not need verifiable employment for her corrections officer, a nd8

he testified she did. Mother is exhibiting some of the same indications of lying and denial as when she was actively using and engaging in criminal activities. Whether this is mental health, or engaging in criminal activity or preparation to engage in criminal activity, Mother is engaged in the same deception and denial as created adjudicatory harms. These children cannot be returned to her care now. 4. Whether Mother is capable of exercising a reasonable degree of care

. Finally, Mother’s substanc e abuse, criminal activity, history of domestic abuse, history of poor relationship choices, and emotional issues due to those life choices led her to come to the conclusion that the children would be better off in her parents’ care much of the time.

. . . The dental care which she provided those children caused them unnecessary pain and refusing pain medication from the hospital for clearly rotten teeth. Their Father has now met their dental needs, as well as physical and mental health needs. Also, the record showed that the children’s grades have significantly improved since the children were placed with the Father. Neglect of the children’s health and educational needs meets the definitions of adjudicatory harm under [232.2(6)] (c)(2). While Mother s tates that she is free from substances, has ceased criminal activities, is not in an abusive relationship, does not need mental health therapy, and can have the children return to her care, the record does not so reflect. Mother is out late at night. Mot her has a relationship with a new man with a history of use. Mother is not in recovery for her emotional trauma from the marriage. Time will tell if Mother continues in recovery. I hope she does. But taking a snapshot at June 9, 2016, the boys are not able to return home. Mother has not progressed beyond supervised visits. She only has three months of sobriety outside incarceration. She claims she is recovered. She continued to engage in

m anipulation and de ception. She continues to have relationships with persons with whom she had toxic and criminal relationships. She stays out until midnight. She has not shown that she is considering the children first and that she can meet their needs.

The GAL asserted additional time was not warranted.

On July 18, the juvenile court entered its permanency order noting , in part:

The professionals who have been involved with the family since September 2014 acknowledge that both parents have a strong bond with the childr en, but there is a history of [the father] and [the mother] placing the children in the middle of their domestic discord. According to the testimony [the father] has taken steps to identify9

when those situations begin to arise and is moderating his behavi or. There continue to be concerns, however, with [the mother’s] ability to set aside her animus toward [the father] when interacting with the boys. In fact, the FSRP providers testified their focus with [the mother] during visits is not in providing pare nting instruction or protecting the boys’ physical safety, but rather to intercede if [the mother] begins inappropriate conversations with the boys. All of the professionals currently working with the family testified that while there are no risks to the boys’ physical safety there continue to be concerns regarding their mental and emotional safety. That being said, [ the current DHS social worker and FSRP worker] both acknowledge that those issues could be resolved or at least diminished to a safer level with another six months of services.

The court allowed the mother “ additional time to work toward reunification with

the children

, ” and specifically adopted

the steps sections and recommendations sections of the case plan filed March 8, 2016 [,] as the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of a six

- month period. Specifically, [the moth er] shall continue participation in any after

care recommended as a result of her completed substance abuse treatment, continue participation in FSRP services, continue participation in family therapy, refrain from adult conversation with and around the ch ildren, participate in individual therapy as recommended, abstain from the use of illegal drugs and alcohol, and participate in random drug testing.

A permanency review hearing was set for October 2016.

In the interim, the children’s relationship with the mother deteriorated. The

children became reluctant to attend visits with their mother. The older child

expressed frustration with and distrust of his mother. The mother sought

permission from DHS to introduce the children to J.R., who the older chil d

understood to be involved with the local drug culture. J.R. was arrested in

September 2016 . The car J.R. was driving on the date he was arrested

belonged to the mother. Police learned from J.R. that the m other had spent the10

night at J.R.’s home the ni ght before he was arrested. 6 Searches of J.R.’s house

and the car J.R. was driving turned up drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a firearm.

T he mother claimed she did not know about J.R.’s involvement with drugs or

weapons before his arrest, and she informed DHS and her children she was no

longer involved with J.R. after his arrest. However, the older child reported

seeing her with J.R. thereafter.

The permanency review hearing was held on October 13 and December

1, 2016. On February 17, 2017, the juvenile court entered its order. We set forth

some of the juvenile court’s findings:

9. None of the professionals working with the family see that there would be any risks to the boys’ physical safety were they returned to [the mother] ’s home (though the fact th at [she] was spending time

— including overnight

— with [J. R .] and that he was found to have syringes, methamphetamine residue and a loaded handgun are certainly concerning); however, there continue to be concerns regarding the emotional well

- being of the boys should they be returned [the mother]

. 10. As recently as early October [ Cl

. C. ] refused to attend a visit with [the mother] because he felt she had lied to him about her relationship with [J.R.] [ Co

. C. ] has expressed he will not attend a visit with his m other unless [ Cl

. C. ] is also present because he does not feel “safe

. ” ( [ Co

. C. ] is unable to articulate what he means by “safe

, ” but is adamant in not attending visits without his brother). [The mother] has at times had difficulty dealing with the boys’ f eelings regarding visits, but she did appropriately channel her disappointment over missing the visit in early October. This may reflect that [the mother] is beginning to make the sorts of changes the professionals believe [the father] has already achieved. 11. [The social worker] reports the boys are settled at their father’s home, enjoy living there, and are doing well. [ Cl

. C. ] has certainly made it quite clear he has made a life for himself . . . with his father and has no desire t o return to his mother’ s home. Though he is five years [Cl. C. ]’s junior, [Co. C. ] also expresses that

6 Even t hough one condition of her proba tion was to have the prior consent from her probation officer to sleep somewhere other than the home of her parents, the mother had not obtained the necessary permission.11

he does not want to return to his mother’s home. The [GAL] is vigorous in her support of the boys remaining with their father.

. . . . 13. It cannot be disputed that [the mother] has engaged in, and continues to participate in services directed for her by the juvenile court; however, on balance considering the recent circumstances surrounding [ J.R. ’s] arrest, [the mother] ’s response to the arrest, her de cision to continue her relationship with [ J.R.]

, the obvious progress and stability the boys have achieved in their father’s home, the lack of any concerns with placement with their father, the boys’ desire to remain with their father, and the recommendati on of the guardian ad litem the evidence fails to establish that it would

. . . [sic] [ 7 ] be appropriate to allow the children to return to the custody of their mother at this time pursuant to Iowa Code Section 232.104(2)(a).

The juvenile court concluded that in light of the “ length of time the boys

have been removed, the possibility they would suffer emotional harm if returned

to [the mother] , and the boys’ credibly expressed preference that they want to

remain with their father

, ” “ the long

- term needs of the boys will best be met by

allowing them to remain with their father. ” The court changed the permanency

goal to “placement with other parent,” placed the children in the father’s legal

custody, and granted concurrent jurisdiction to the district court.

The mother appeals.

II. Scope and Standard of Review.

We review permanency orders de novo. In re A.A.G.

, 708 N.W.2d 85, 90

(Iowa Ct. App. 2005). We review both the facts and the law and adjudicate rights

anew on the issues properly presented. In re K .C.

, 660 N.W.2d 29, 32 (Iowa

2003). We give weight to the juven ile court’ s findings, but we are not bound by

them. Id. O ur primary concern is the child ren ’ s best interests. Id.

7 This sentence contained a double negative, which in light of the ruling indicates t his typographical error.12

III. Discussion.

The mother argues the State has failed to meet its burden to show the

permanency goal should be changed from reunification with the mother. 8 She

contends the children could be returned to her at the time of the permanency

hearing and the risk of emotional harm was not a re cognized adjudicatory harm.

She maintains the children’s “[n]ot wanting to be removed from a current

placement is not a valid argument” and the State failed to establish the children

were in need of permanency. In response, t he GAL and the State assert t he

State met its burden to transfer custody f rom one parent to the other under

section 232.104(2)(d)(2). We agree.

Section 232.104(2) states the juvenile court’s authority “[a]fter a

permanency hearing” and allows these alternatives:

( a ) Enter an orde r pursuant to section 232.102 to return the child to the child ’ s home. ( b ) Enter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall enumerat e the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for remo val of the child from the child’ s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six

- month period. ( c ) Direct t he county attorney or the attorney for the child to institute proceedings to terminate the parent

- child relationship. (d) Enter an order, pursuant to findings required by subsection 4, to do one of the following:

. . . . (2) Transfer sole custody of the child from one parent to another parent.

8 Iowa Code section 2 32.104(1)(a)

, cited by the mother

, sets the “time for the initial permanency hearing,” which is to be held “within twelve months of the date the child was removed from the home.” It is inapplicable to this ca se.13

Pursuant to its authority under section 232.104(2)(d), the juvenile court

determined the custody of the children would be transferred to the father.

W e must determine whether that transfer was proper pursuant to the

additional requirements of the section:

Prior to entering a permanency order pursuant to subsection 2, paragraph “d”, convincing evidence must exist showing that all of the following apply: ( a ) A termination of the parent

- child relationship would not be in the best interest of the child. ( b ) Ser vices were offered to the child’ s family to correct the

s ituation which led to the child’ s removal from the home. ( c ) The child cannot be returned to the child’ s home.

Iowa Code § 232.104(4).

“The State on a permanency hearing needs only show the children cannot

be returned by convincing evidence, not by both clear and convincing evidence.”

In re A.D.

, 489 N.W.2d 50, 52 (Iowa Ct. App.1992) . We bear in mind always that

the children’s best interests are p aramount. See Iowa Code § 232.1.

Here, convincing evidence establishes

— and all parties agree

— that

termination of the mother’s parental right would not be in the children’s best

interests and that numerous and relevant services have been offered to this

family since 2014 , yet the same concerns noted by the GAL and workers

expressed at the initial permanency hearing remain

. The mother did not acknowledge her active use of methamphetamine until

her second arrest in September 2015. She failed to inform h er workers of a June

2016 drug screen that tested positive until forced to do so. While we

acknowledge the screen was disposed of before the mother could have it

independently checked, we are more concerned with the continuation of the14

mother’s mindset th at undermines continued sobriety. The same concerns

expressed by DHS and the GAL at the initial permanency hearing

— that the

mother had not been able to set aside her animus toward the father and put the

children’s needs first, and had not “internalized an y tools that would cause her to

stay clean ”

— remained at the time of the permanency review hearing. T he

mother’s lack of candor and her a ssociation with and defense of J.R. a month

before the permanency review hearing are particularly troubling. See In re A.B.

, 815 N.W.2d 764, 776 (Iowa 2012) (recognizing risk of unresolved drug

dependency); In re D.W. , 791 N.W.2d 703, 709 (Iowa 2010) (“ [ W ] e gain insight

into the child’ s prospects by reviewing evidence of the parent ’ s past

performance

— for it may be indicative of the parent ’ s future capabilities.” ( citation

omitted ) )

. The mother contends there is no evidence to support the State’s assertion

that the children “need permanency.” Chapter 232 itself declares children need

permanency within a specified time frame. Section 2 32.104(1)(a) sets the time

for the initial permanency hearing “ within twelve months of the date the child was

removed from the home.” Under section 232.104(2)(b), the court may continue

placement “for an additional six months,” but to do so the court must “enumerate

the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise

the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six

- mo nth period.” Thus,

the legislature has determined children need permanency within eighteen

months. Cf. In re C.B. , 611 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Iowa 2000) (stating in context of

termination proceedings, “ Iowa has built this patience into the statutory scheme15

of Iowa Code chapter 232 ”). While we acknowledge that the mother has made

progress, a t the time of the permanency review hearing the children had been

out of their mother’s custody for more than nineteen months. The children were

doing well in their father’ s care and custody , and both informed the GAL they

wished to stay with their father.

The mother argues the children can be returned home at this time and the

State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence any adjudicatory harm

. She relies upon Iowa code section 232.102(5)(a)

, which states , in part, that

custody should not be transferred unless there is clear and convincing evidence

that: “ (2) The child cannot be protected from some harm which would justify the

adjudication of the child as a chil d in need of assistance and an adequate

placement is available. ” But we note the supreme court has recently illuminated

the terms of “ harm” and “harmful effects” :

Although chapter 232 does not contain a definition of “harmful effects,” we have noted it “pertains to the physical, mental or social welfare of a child.” In re Wall

, 295 N.W.2d 455, 458 (Iowa 1980). Because of this broad definition, we have found such effects established when there was harm to a child ’ s physical, mental, or social well

- being or such harm was imminently likely to

occur. See In re B.B.

, 440 N.W.2d at 597

– 98 (findi ng the State proved the parents’ failure to exercise a reasona ble degree of care when a child’ s lack of attendance at school “ adversely affected his educational, social, and emotional development”); In re J.S.

, 427 N.W.2d 162, 165 (Iowa 1988) (finding harmful effects as a result of a failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising children given that a child was pl aying outside on the street while the parents ’ home was locked and a child was “very aggressive and uncontrollable”).

In re J.S. , 846 N.W.2d 36, 41

– 42 (Iowa 2014)

.
Here, t he social worker testified the children would be at risk of emotional

harm if returned to their mother. The children have been put into the middle of16

the parents’ conflict for many years, and the mother has not made much

progress in recognizing its emotional impact on the children. Nor does she seem

to recognize the impact her con tinued association with persons such as J.R. ha s

on the children. We acknowledge the mother has been the victim of abuse in the

past

, but her transgression into the use of illegal drugs, involvement with J.R.

, and lack of honesty on occasion have slowed h er progress. The oldest child

especially had lost trust in his mother. The mother’s claim that she could offer

the children stability is not convincing where she testified she lived with her

parents who were contemplating selling their house and leaving their business at

which the mother was employed. Continued therapy between the children and

the mother will help their relationship

, but the time has come to change custody.

We conclude the State has met its burden.

Moreover, in this case we also have t he GAL’s objection to a return of the

children to the parent. Section 232.104(7) states:

Subsequent to the entry of a permanency order pursuant to this section, the child shall not be returned to the care, custody, or control of the child’ s parent or pa rents, over a form al objection filed by the child’ s attorney or guardian ad litem, unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, that returning the child to such custody would be in the best interest of the child.

The GAL objected to returnin g the children to the mother at the initial

permanency hearing and continued to argue strenuously against returning the

children to the mother at the permanency review. The juvenile court found that

returning the children to the mother would not be in the ir best interest. We affirm

the juvenile court’s rulings in their entirety.

AFFIRMED.