area handbook series

Cambodia

a country study



Cambodia

a country study

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Edited by Russell R. Ross

Research Completed

December 1987
On the cover: Detail from a tower of the Bayon Temple, circa

A.D. 1200

Third Edition, First Printing, 1990.

Copyright ®1990 United States Government as represented by

the Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Cambodia: A Country Study.

Area handbook series, DA pam 550-50

Research completed December 1987. Bibliography: pp. 323-44.

Includes index.

1. Cambodia. I. Ross, Russell R., 1935- . II. Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. Series: Area handbook series. DS554.3.C34 1989 959.6 89-600150

Headquarters, Department of the Army

DA Pam 550-50

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402
Foreword

This volume is one in a continuing series of books now being

prepared by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies—Area Handbook Program. The

last page of this book lists the other published studies.

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country,

describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national

security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural

factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social

scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of

the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make

up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature

and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their

attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and

political order.

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not

be construed as an expression of an official United States government position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections,

additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be welcomed for use in future editions.

Louis R. Mortimer

Acting Chief

Federal Research Division

Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

iii

Acknowledgments

The authors are indebted to a number of individuals in government agencies and at private institutions who shared their time and

specialized knowledge to provide research data and perspective to the production of this book. Among them were Bill Herod and

Patricia D. Norland of the Indochina Project, Ok Soeum of the

Cambodian Buddhist Association, and Rath Chhim of the MRM

Language Research Center. Bill Herod, Frank Tatu, and Mr. and

Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist generously shared their personal and,

in many cases, unique photographs of Cambodia for use in this book.

The authors also wish to express their appreciation to members

of the Library of Congress staff who contributed to the preparation of this volume. These included Richard F. Nyrop who reviewed

and coordinated all chapters; Robert L. Worden who reviewed all draft chapters; and Martha E. Hopkins, who, in addition to edit- ing a chapter, managed editing and production of the entire book.

Andrea Matles Savada was responsible for seeing the book through

to its completion after the departure of the editor of the book. Other

Library of Congress staff members who contributed substantial efforts were David P. Cabitto, Sandra K. Cotugno, and

Kimberly A. Lord, who prepared and arranged all graphic material;

Teresa E. Kamp, who drew the cover and chapter heading illus- trations; Harriett R. Blood, who drew the topography map;

Susan M. Lender, who reviewed the maps; Tracy Henry Coleman

and Meridel Jackson, who performed word processing for all chapters; editorial assistants Barbara Edgerton, Izella Watson, and

Monica Shimmin, who helped prepared the manuscript in final form; and Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit, who prepared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy F. Pixley.

Others who contributed to the book were Richard Kollodge,

Marilyn L. Majeska, Michael Pleasants, and Catherine Schwartzstein, who edited chapters, and Shirley Kessel, who prepared the

index.

v

Contents

Page Foreword iii Acknowledgments v Preface xiii Country Profile XV Introduction XXV

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 Donald M. Seekins

PREHISTORY AND EARLY KINGDOMS 6 Early Indianized Kingdom of Funan 6

The Successor State of Chenla 9

THE ANGKORIAN PERIOD 9 CAMBODIA'S STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1432-1887 . . 12 Domination by Thailand and by Vietnam 14 The French Protectorate 16 THE FRENCH COLONIAL PERIOD, 1887-1953 18 The Colonial Economy 19 The Emergence of Nationalism 20

The Struggle for Independence 22 CAMBODIA UNDER SIHANOUK, 1954-70 26

The Geneva Conference 27

Domestic Developments 28

Nonaligned Foreign Policy 30

The Cambodian Left: The Early Phases 35

The Paris Student Group 38

The KPRP Second Congress 40

INTO THE MAELSTROM: INSURRECTION

AND WAR, 1967-75 41 The March 1970 Coup d'Etat 43

The Widening War 44

Early Khmer Rouge Atrocities 46

The Fall of Phnom Penh 47

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA, 1975-78 48

Revolutionary Terror 51 Society under the Angkar 51

Politics under the Khmer Rouge 59

Establishing Democratic Kampuchea 60

vii
An Elusive Party 61 The Fall of Democratic Kampuchea 66

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment .... 73

Robert K. Headley, Jr. ENVIRONMENT 76

Topography 76

Climate 79

Drainage 80

Regional Divisions 81 POPULATION 83

Dynamics 83

Distribution 83

Migration and Refugees 85

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION 87

The Khmer 88

Other Ethnic Groups 99

LANGUAGES 110

Austroasiatic-Mon-Khmer 110

Austronesian 112

RELIGION 112

Buddhism 112

Chinese Religion 122

Islam 122

Other Religions 124

EDUCATION 125

Public School System 125

Buddhist Education 130

Private Education 131 HEALTH AND WELFARE 132

Public Health 132

Welfare Programs 135

Chapter 3. The Economy 139

Tuyet L. Cosslett ECONOMIC SETTING 142

Natural Resources 143

Labor Force 144

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

AFTER INDEPENDENCE 145

Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy, 1953-70 146

The Wartime Economy, 1970-75 149

The Economy under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 .... 151

vin
ECONOMIC ROLE OF THE KAMPUCHEAN PEOPLE'S

REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 155

New Economic Policy and System 156

First Plan, 1986-90 158

AGRICULTURE 159

Collectivization and Solidarity Groups 160

Rice Production and Cultivation 162

Other Food and Commercial Crops 164

INDUSTRY 165

Major Manufacturing Industries 166

Handicrafts 167

DOMESTIC COMMERCE 167

FOREIGN TRADE AND AID 168

Composition of Trade 169

Major Trading Partners 169

Illicit Trade with Thailand and with Singapore 173

Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance 173

FINANCE 176

Banking 176

Currency 176

Taxes 177 TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS 177

Roads and Highways 178

Railroads 178

Water Transportation 178

Ports 181 Airports 181 Telecommunications 182

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 185

Rinn-Sup Shinn

MAJOR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1977-81 190

Background 190

Cambodia in Turmoil 190

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC

KAMPUCHEA 195

Origins of the Coalition 195

Coalition Structure 201

Democratic Kampuchea 203

The Khmer People's National Liberation Front 206

National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful,

Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia 207

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA 208

The Constitution 209

Government Structure 210

ix
THE MEDIA 214

THE KAMPUCHEAN (OR KHMER) PEOPLE'S

REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 215

THE KAMPUCHEAN (OR KHMER) UNITED FRONT

FOR NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION AND DEFENSE ... 220

FOREIGN AFFAIRS 222

The Coalition's Strategy 222

Phnom Penh and Its Allies 224

The Search for Peace 224

Chapter 5. National Security 239

Frank Tatu

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 242

The Time of Greatness, A.D. 802-1431 242

Period of Decline, 1431-1863 243

The French Protectorate, 1863-1954 243

The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45 245

The First Indochina War, 1945-54 247

The Second Indochina War, 1954-75 250

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE

KHMER ROUGE 261

Khmer Rouge Armed Forces 261

Khmer-Vietnamese Border Tensions 262

The Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia 264

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN POSTWAR

CAMBODIA 267

Tenuous Security 267

Coalition Government Resistance Forces 268

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea 269

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces . . 272

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste 275

Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary

Armed Forces 276

Foreign Troops and Advisers 295

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTERSUBVERSION . . 298

People's Security Service 298

Protection under the Law 299

Penal System 302

Appendix A. Tables 305

Appendix B. Major Political and Military

Organizations 315

Bibliography 321

X
Glossary 341

Index 343

List of Figures

1 Administrative Divisions of Cambodia, 1986 xxiv

2 Early States of Indochina 8

3 Khmer Rouge Administrative Zones for Democratic

Kampuchea, 1975-78 56

4 Topography and Drainage 78

5 Annual Rainfall and Monsoon Airflow, 1985 82

6 Annual Flooding Around Tonle Sap, 1985 84

7 Ethnolinguistic Groups of Cambodia, 1983 102

8 Transportation System, 1987 180

9 Successive Governments in Cambodia (since

Independence) 188

10 Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 1987 . . . 202

11 Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1987 . 212

12 Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party, 1987 216

13 Armed Forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic

Kampuchea, 1987 270

14 Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1986-87 282

15 Military Regions, 1987 288

XI

Preface

The previous edition of Cambodia: A Country Study was compiled

in 1972 when the ill-fated Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) was

fighting for its life against the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B). In the one and one-half decades since that time, profound upheavals

have wrought substantial political changes in the country. These

changes, and the regimes that sought to impose them, are only now

beginning to be studied with objectivity. In addition, the quickening pace of negotiations concerning the future of the country suggests that a watershed period in its modern history may be

approaching. It is, accordingly, time for a new country study, not

only to catch up with the momentous developments of the past

fifteen years, but also to establish some point of departure, some

bench mark by which to interpret future events. This is a completely new book, and, unlike the previous edition,

it follows the standard, revised format of the entire country study

series. It presents its narrative under five major concomitants of

the Cambodian experience: historical setting, society and environment, economy, government and politics, and national security.

Sources of information for this study included both monographs

and serials, especially material published since 1975. Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book, and a brief, annotated

bibliographic note on sources recommended for further reading is included at the end of each chapter. Measurements are given in

the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist readers

who are unfamiliar with metric measurements (see table 1 , Appendix A). A glossary is included.

It should be noted that, as a result of the Khmer Rouge policy

of eradicating the traces of its predecessor and of establishing a ruthlessly self-sufficient, anti-modernistic regime, after mid- 1975,

statistical and quantitative data for Democratic Kampuchea are contradictory and virtually nonexistent. As for its successor, the

People's Republic of Kampuchea, such data are only now becoming available, and they remain fragmentary and contradictory.

Cambodia continues to be a desperately poor country, its infras- tructure ravaged by war, and its thin stratum of educated citizens

either in exile or nearly wiped out during the Khmer Rouge years;

it is thus scarcely able to compile data that one has come to expect

of other nations. Nevertheless, the country is making an effort to bind its wounds and to reestablish sovereignty over its territory,

without enduring either a suffocating Vietnamese presence or a

xiii
chilling reimposition of Khmer Rouge authority. More and better

data should become available as Cambodia slowly rehabilitates itself and resumes its place in the Asian family of nations.

A word of explanation is needed concerning the use of ' 'Cambodia" instead of "Kampuchea" to designate the country. According to historian David P. Chandler, both terms are derived from

"Kambuja," a Sanskrit word thought to have been applied originally to a north Indian tribe. The selection of "Cambodia," therefore, was without ideological connotation. It is more recognizable

to the English-speaking reader, and it adheres to the standard practice of the United States Board on Geographic Names (BGN), which

also has been followed in the spelling of all place names. In April

1989, after the cut-off date of research for this book, Prime Minister

Hun Sen of the People's Republic of Kampuchea announced that

the name of the country had been changed to the State of Cambodia. In recent years some provinces have been combined, renamed,

and then divided again several times. The most recent case is that

of Bantay Meanchey, the formation of which—from parts of Bat- dambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and Pouthisat—was an- nounced in late 1987 to take effect in 1988. For the geographic terms

occurring most frequently, such as names of provinces, the BGN

designations together with the more common, journalistic equivalents are as follows:

BGN Name Common Name

Batdambang Battambang

Kampong Cham Kompong Cham

Kampong Chhnang Kompong Chnang

Kampong Saom Kompong Som

Kampong Spoe Kompong Speu

Kampong Thum Kompong Thorn

Kaoh Kong Koh Kong

Kracheh Kratie

Mondol Kiri Mondolkiri

Otdar Meanchey Oddar Meanchey

Pouthisat Pursat

Rotanokiri Ratanakiri

Stoeng Treng Stung Treng

Takev Takeo

xiv
Country Profile

Country

Formal Name: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

(CGDK) (insurgent coalition)

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) (government in Phnom

Penh)

Short Form: Cambodia

Term for Citizens: Cambodians

Capital: Phnom Penh

Date of Independence: November 9, 1953

Geography

Size: Total area 181,040 square kilometers, about size of Missouri;

country shares 800-kilometer border with Thailand on north and

west, 541 -kilometer border with Laos on northeast, 1 ,2 28-kilometer

border with Vietnam on east and southeast; coastline along Gulf

of Thailand about 443 kilometers.

xv
Topography: Most salient topographical feature lacustrine plain

formed by inundations of Tonle Sap (Great Lake), measuring about

2,590 square kilometers during dry season to about 24,605 square

kilometers during rainy season. This densely populated plain devoted to wet rice cultivation constitutes heartland of Cambodia.

Most (about 75 percent) of country lies at elevations of less than

100 meters above sea level, except for Cardamom Mountains

(highest elevation 1,771 meters), their north-south extension to the

east, Elephant Range (elevation range 500-1,000 meters) and steep

escarpment of Dangrek Mountains (average elevation 500 meters)

along northern border with Thailand.

Climate: Temperatures range from 10°C to 38°C. Tropical monsoons: southwest monsoon blowing inland in northeasterly direction brings moisture-laden winds from Gulf of Thailand/Indian

Ocean from May to October with period of heaviest precipitation

September-October; northeast monsoon blowing in southwesterly

direction toward coast ushers in dry season, November to March,

with period of least rainfall January-February.

Society

Population: In 1987 estimates vary from 6.3 to 7.3 million with

possibly more than 500,000 Cambodians scattered in Thailand and

abroad as refugees; average annual growth targeted at 2.3 percent;

estimated urban population of more than 10 percent; estimated

population density averages about 36 per square kilometer.

Ethnic Groups: Ethnically homogeneous, more than 90 percent

Khmer; national minorities comprise about 3 percent of total population; Cham (see Glossary), of Islamic faith, most significant

minority group, other scattered tribal minorities in upland and

forested areas. Reportedly some Vietnamese immigration since

1981-82. Some Chinese in urban areas, numbers unknown.

Languages: National language Khmer, a member of Mon-Khmer

subfamily of Austroasiatic language group. Russian and Vietnamese

taught in Phnom Penh and other urban areas. Religion: Theravada Buddhism, suppressed by Khmer Rouge (see

Appendix B), revived but controlled under successor regime; wats

(temples) and monks privately supported; wats administered by

lay committees; Buddhist clergy or sangha (see Glossary); chairman (pratheari) heads ecclesiastical hierarchy.

Education: Rate of literacy about 48 percent. In late 1980s total estimated school enrollment 1.3 million (primary), 369,500

xvi
(secondary). Schooling follows Vietnamese model with three levels: primary grades 1-4; lower secondary education, grades 5-7; upper

secondary education, grades 8-10; education at all levels hampered

by lack of facilities, teachers, and instructional materials. Post- secondary education consists of twenty teacher-training schools,

plus institutions offering professional or technical instruction. Soviet

and Vietnamese instructors heavily represented in educational insti- tutions. Admission to higher education based on political reliability.

Health: Average life expectancy 48.5 years (male 47 years, female

49.9 years) for the period 1985-90; some prevalent diseases are

tuberculosis, malaria, infectious and parasitical illnesses; infant mortality 160 per thousand live births (1986); nonspecific gastro-enteritis

accounts for disproportionate number of infant deaths; localized

malnutrition and poor hygienic conditions exacerbate debility of

population and susceptibility to illness. Total of 34 hospitals and

1,349 rural dispensaries nationwide; in countryside, network of

primary care facilities being established with international help;

hospitals planned or already established in provincial capitals, dis- pensaries at district (srok) level, first aid stations at village (khurri) level; extension of health care greatly impeded by lack of trained

personnel and inadequately developed infrastructure (especially

clean water, and distribution or availability of medical supplies/equipment .

Economy

General—Statistical economic data, including gross national

product (GNP—see Glossary), gross domestic product (GDP

see Glossary) and balance of payments generally unavailable, lack- ing, or unreliable in late 1980s. Nation evolving toward socialistic central planning, but more than 50 percent of economy, especially

retail trade and small scale manufacturing, remains in private sector. First Five-Year Program for Socioeconomic Restoration and

Development (1986-90), hereafter called First Plan, inaugurated,

with priority on increased cultivation of rice and rubber, increased

exploitation of forest and aquatic resources; economically active

population about 2.5 to 3 million. Collectivization of agriculture

undertaken through organization of from seven to fifteen-families

in solidarity groups {krom samaki) as basic production units.

Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing: About 80 percent of labor force

engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishing. Main crop is paddy rice; output 2 million tons in 1986; area under cultivation 1.2 million

hectares in 1987. Under First Plan, output expected to increase xvn
7 percent annually to 350 kilograms per person by 1990. Production impeded by neglected irrigation systems during Pol Pot years,

localized insecurity caused by forays of anti-Vietnamese Khmer in- surgents, and lack of phosphate fertilizers. In 1986 principal food

crops were maize, cassavas, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, beans, and

sesame seeds. Principal commercial crop is rubber. Forests cover approximately 70 percent of land area; first reforestation project ini- tiated in northeastern and southwestern regions of country. Fishing conducted in Tonle Sap, rivers, and offshore in Gulf of Thailand.

Industry: Industrial sector developing slowly because of lack of

power and raw materials; accounts for less than 10 percent of labor

force. In countryside, unknown number of rice-processing mills and

sawmills reportedly back into operation by 1986; in urban areas about

sixty state-owned factories produce light consumer goods such as

plastic items, hand tools, soft drinks, cigarettes, textiles, nails, jute

bags, soap, and basic pharmaceuticals; phosphate fertilizer plant,

distillery, and brick tile plant reportedly operating; in 1987 smallscale artisans being collectivized in Phnom Penh, development plans

call for opening of brewery, plywood, and cement factories. Services: Total public sector employment (including state employees, industrial workers, artisans, party cadres, teachers, and

armed forces personnel) amounts to about 8 percent of economically active population.

Resources: Limited: gemstones, gold, silver, phosphate, limestone,

clay; possible deposits of salt and coal; unexploited deposits of iron

and manganese ore, bauxite, and silicon reported; hydroelectric

potential from Mekong and Basak rivers.

Exports: Approximately US$3 million in 1986; principal exports

natural rubber (latex), timber, resin, maize, tobacco, and soybeans.

Rubber and forest products offer best hope for expansion in near

term; main export partners Vietnam, Soviet Union (purchases

nearly entire Cambodian output of latex), and other countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA,

CEMA, or Comecon—Glossary).

Imports: Approximately US$17 million in 1986; principal imports

foodstuffs, fuels, machinery, textiles, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Main import partners Vietnam, Soviet Union, and other

Comecon countries, especially Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Balance of Payments: Negative trade balance from 1979 until

1987. In 1984 extended public debt US$503 million; debt service

payments US$4 million.

xvin
Exchange Rate: Official rate 100 Cambodian riels per United States

dollar; unofficial rate about 123 riels per dollar; Cambodian riel not negotiable in international money markets.

Transportation and Communications

Railroads: Two routes of one-meter-gauge-track: Phnom PenhKampong Saom route, 260 kilometers long; Phnom PenhBatdambang-Sisophon route, 352 kilometers long; railroads dis- rupted during regime of Democratic Kampuchea but restored to service early 1980s. Both routes remain insecure and subject to sporadic guerrilla attacks. Roads: Total 13,350 kilometers; about 2,600 kilometers paved

(bituminous), 7,150 kilometers improved (crushed stone, gravel,

earth), 3,600 kilometers unimproved; main roads paved but in vary- ing states of disrepair.

Ports: Main seaport Kampong Saom, (Gulf of Thailand). Main

riverine port Phnom Penh, at junction of Tonle Sab, Mekong, and

Basak rivers; minor ports (Gulf of Thailand) Ream and Kampot.

National merchant marine consists of three vessels with total dis- placement of 3,800 deadweight tons. Inland Waterways: Total length about 3,982 kilometers; principal

arteries are middle Mekong River (runs from Laos through Cambodia and Vietnam to South China Sea), and Tonle Sab and Basak

rivers from Tonle Sap (Great Lake) to Cambodian-Vietnamese

border; both wide (up to two kilometers) and navigable, with fer- ries at Kampong Cham, Tonle Bet, Sre Ambel, StoengTreng, and

Phumi Prek Khsay (Neak Luong); precipitous falls and rapids occur near Laotian border and in vicinity of Kracheh city.

Civil Airports: Thirteen usable airfields, including 8 with permanent surface runways, 2 with runways 2,400 to 3,600 meters, 5 with runways 1,200 to 2,400 meters; main international airport

Pochentong near Phnom Penh; secondary airports at Kang Keng

at Ream, at Siemreab and Batdambang. National airline Air Kampuchea, inventory three Antonov-24s; scheduled air service to Bat- dambang and Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam).

Telecommunications: In late 1980s, one earth satellite station,

part of Intersputnik communications network; radio telephone

link (via Intersputnik) between Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh

City (Vietnam); about 7,300 telephones countrywide. One radio

broadcasting station ("Voice of the Kampuchean People") with

medium and short wave capability; about 171,000 radio receivers

xix
countrywide, television service inaugurated with broadcasts twice a week in late 1980s.

Government and Politics

Two governments compete for internal legitimacy and for in- ternational recognition: Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—see Appendix B) and People's Republic of

Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B).

CGDK: Tripartite coalition consisting of Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK—see Appendix B, or Khmer Rouge—see Appendix B), and two noncommunist movements, Khmer People's

National Liberation Front (KPNLF—see Appendix B) and National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and

Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge

Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif—FUNCINPEC—

see Appendix B). CGDK recognized internationally by the United

Nations and a few non-communist states; controls little territory

except inaccessible guerrilla areas in northeastern and southwestern

Cambodia; administers some camps along Thai border.

Government: A president and a prime minister; vice-president in

charge of foreign affairs, and at next subordinate echelon, six coor- dinating committees established: culture and education, national

defense, economy and finance, public health and social affairs, mili- tary affairs, and press and information affairs. Politics: Coalition partners exist in uneasy alliance, united only

by opposition to Vietnamese occupation forces and government

in Phnom Penh; coordinating committees staffed by one member

from each movement comprising CGDK.

Major International Memberships: United Nations and many

of its specialized agencies; Asian Development Bank, Group of 77,

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, World Bank (see Glossary), International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), Interpol, In- ternational Red Cross, International Telecommunications Union,

and Nonaligned Movement.

PRK: Constitutes the government in Phnom Penh which exercises

de facto control over most of Cambodian territory; recognized in- ternationally by about three dozen Marxist and nonaligned states and revolutionary movements.

Government: Marxist government evolving toward socialism, sus- tained by large Vietnamese military presence. National Assembly,

xx
117 members defined constitutionally as "supreme organ of state power," and body in which legislative authority vested; assembly

selects members of Council of State that promulgates and interprets

laws, the chairman of which serves as head of state; Council of State

acts as secretariat for National Assembly and performs some assembly

functions between parliamentary sessions. Council of Ministers, also responsible to National Assembly, exercises direct executive authority

for administering government of the PRK down to local levels. Politics: Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party

(KPRP—see Appendix B) only political party permitted in late 1987

in areas under Phnomh Penh's control; functions at national level through Political Bureau (nine full and two candidate members) and

Central Committee (thirty-one full and fourteen candidate members); mass auxiliary organizations foster patriotism and nurture

party activism among population; most prominent of organization

Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National Construction

and Defense (KUFNCD—see Appendix B); both KPRP and

KUFNCD active down to local level and maintain nationwide net- work of committees at all provincial and district echelons. Other mass organizations include Kampuchean Federation of Trade

Unions, Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Youth Union, Kampuchean Revolutionary Women's Association, and Kampuchean

Revolutionary Youth Association.

Administrative Divisions: Two municipalities (Phnom Penh and

Kampong Saom); eighteen provinces, subdivided into about 122

districts. Legal System: Ministry of Justice, Office of Public Prosecutor,

and People's Supreme Court exist at national level; at subordinate

echelons, people's revolutionary courts established at provincial and

municipal levels; court officials include president, vice-president

and people's councillors. Separate system of military tribunals exist for armed forces, but in 1987 functions remained unknown.

Major International Memberships: None; nevertheless, government in Phnom Penh receives assistance from a number of communist and nonaligned states and from private international

humanitarian organizations. Close bilateral relationship exists with

Vietnam as result of Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation signed in February 1979.

National Security

Armed Forces of CGDK: In 1987 coalition forces remained

unintegrated, with total numbers unknown. National Army of

xxi
Democratic Kampuchea (NADK—see Appendix B, also known

as Khmer Rouge)—roughly 40,000 to 50,000 combatants in three

to six divisions, distributed in four autonomous military regions.

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF

see Appendix B)—strength waning; but conjecturally had 8,000

to 14,000 combatants organized into battalions and regiments,

grouped administratively into 9 military regions. Sihanouk National

Army (Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste—ANS—see Appendix B),

strength increasing; has 7,000 to 11,000 combatants organized into a command structure and maneuver battalions grouped under 6

brigade headquarters.

Armed Forces of PRK: In 1987 military establishment comprised

regular/main forces, provincial/regional forces, and village militia/ local forces; embryonic coastal/riverine navy and air force existed;

total military strength for all components unknown, but estimated

to surpass 40,000 personnel; armed forces organized administratively into four military regions under Ministry of National Defense

and General Staff in Phnom Penh.

Major Tactical Units of CGDK: Tactical units deployed usually

comprise platoons or companies, occasionally single battalions.

(People's Republic of Kampuchea) : Seven understrength regular/

main force divisions, with at least three deployed in border provinces

of western Cambodia; several independent brigades and regiments;

as many as four tank battalions, and combat support formations;

naval forces one battalion; air force possibly two to four understrength squadrons; provincial/regional forces organized into battalions, generally deployed one per province, with greater number

in border provinces; village militia/local forces organized into pla- toons and squads, generally deployed at subdistrict and village level; women heavily represented in militia/local forces. Major Weapons/Equipment of CGDK: Small arms, light crewserved weapons, and equipment originating from China and possibly from Singapore.

Major Weapons/Equipment of PRK: Obsolescent tanks of Soviet or Chinese origin; armored personnel carriers of Soviet or United

States origin; light to medium artillery pieces; small arms of Soviet

origin; naval forces, small patrol and amphibious craft; air force,

possibly MiG-2 1 /FISHBED fighter aircraft, and Mi-8 (HIP) trans- port helicopters.

Security Expenditures of CGDK: Unknown; all military materiel

assumed to be grant aid from China and from members of the

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

xxn
Security Expenditures of PRK: Unknown; all military materiel

assumed to be grant aid from Soviet Union and Vietnam; estimated

value of imported armaments US$150 million in 1986.

Foreign Troops and Advisers: (People's Republic of Kampuchea):

Vietnamese expeditionary force numbering possibly 100,000 to 200,00 troops organized into 10 to 12 divisions under 4 Military

Fronts; Vietnamese force to be withdrawn by 1990. Vietnamese

military advisers with Cambodian units at least to battalion level; Warsaw Pact advisers at armed forces training institutions and possibly at upper defense echelons.

Internal Security: In 1987 insurgents of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, backed by China and ASEAN

nations, engaged in guerrilla warfare against People's Republic of

Kampuchea government in Phnom Penh, and Vietnamese forces

in Cambodia; some of country insecure because of sporadic guerrilla raids and ambushes, but guerrillas possessed insufficient

strength or armaments to take and hold any urban area or to topple government.

xxm
Gulf of Thailand

International boundary

Province boundary

® National capital m Province capital 25 50 Kilometers 25 50 Miles

South China Sea

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Cambodia, 1986

xxiv
Introduction

ALTHOUGH THE LAND occupied by Cambodia has been

populated for millennia, the area's history was unrecorded until

the Chinese chronicles of the early Christian era. In the fewer than

2,000 years of its imperfectly documented existence, the Cambodian state has evolved along the lines of ascension, dominance, and

retrogression inherent in all civilizations.

Historians surmise that by the first century A.D. a small number of Khmer (or Cambodian) states already existed on the fringes

of the earliest recorded state in the region, the empire of Funan.

Centered in the Mekong Delta of present-day Vietnam, Funan derived its power from commerce. With its port of Oc Eo on the Gulf

of Thailand, Funan was well-placed to control maritime traffic between India and China. According to Chinese annals, Funan was

a highly developed and prosperous state with an extensive canal

system for transportation and irrigation, a fleet of naval vessels, a capital city with brick buildings, and a writing system based on

Sanskrit. The inhabitants, whose adherence to Indian cultural in- stitutions apparently coexisted with Mahayana Buddhism, were

organized into a highly stratified society.

When the small Khmer states to the northwest of the Mekong

Delta emerged into recorded history, it was to make war upon

the declining empire of Funan. Between A.D. 550-650, these

Khmer states overran their adversary, which fell apart, losing its tributary states on the Kra Isthmus and along the Gulf of Thailand.

Chaos and economic decline followed the fall of Funan, but the

sequence of events over the next 500 years led to the ascension of

the Cambodian state and its evolution into an increasingly powerful and dynamic entity. The first unified and distinctiy Khmer polity to emerge after Funan was Chenla. It absorbed the Indianized cul- tural legacy of its predecessor and established its capital near the

Tonle Sap (Great Lake), the heartland of Cambodia, then as now. Under expansionist rulers, its authority was pushed into the terri- tories of present-day Thailand and Laos. The development of

Chenla was not marked by an unrelieved accretion of power,

however. Divisive forces quickly resulted in a split into Land (or

Upper) Chenla and Water (or Lower) Chenla. Land Chenla

demonstrated the greater vitality, controlled some thirty provincial cities, and sent emissaries to China under the Tang dynasty.

Water Chenla slipped into vassalage to Java. xxv
The historical ascension of the Khmer polity began during the

early 800s. The initiator of the period was the first empire builder,

Jayavarman II (A.D. 802-50), who carved out a feudal state generally encompassing modern Cambodia. Jayavarman revived the cult of Devaraja, an Indianized cultural institution that was intended

to confer, through elaborate rituals and symbols, heavenly approbation or even divine status upon the ruler. Following the reign

ofJayavarman II, the two Chenlas were reunited peacefully, and

the Khmer polity continued to develop, establishing over time a

priestly hierarchy, an armed force and police, a provincial administration of subordinate officials, a system of courts, corvee labor by

the peasants, and a capital on the site of Angkor near the Tonle Sap.

The Khmer state reached its apogee in the Angkorian period

also called the empire of Angkor—during the period from the

eleventh century to the thirteenth century, when it was ruled by

a succession of able monarchs. The last great monarch of the Angkorian period was Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218). He reversed

the Cham encroachments that had taken place after the death of

Suryavarman II (1 1 13-50) and carried the war to the enemy, con- quering Champa itself and briefly reducing it to a Khmer vassal

state. At its greatest extent, the Angkorian empire ofJayavarman

VII encompassed not only Champa on the coast of southern Vietnam but also extended north to the vicinity of Vientiane in presentday Laos and south to include the small trading city-states of the

Malay Peninsula. Jayavarman continued the public works program

of his predecessors, uniting his realm by elevated military cause- ways with resthouses at intervals. He also built hospitals for the

aged and the infirm and sponsored the construction of Angkor

Thorn and the Bayon, the last major temples of Angkorian times

and splendid edifices in their own right, but presaging the decadence that shortly set in (see The Angkorian Period, ch. 1). Jayavarman VII' s wars and public works exacted a heavy toll on the finances and the human labor force of the Angkorian empire. The drain of resources coincided with the gradual intrusion

of Theravada Buddhism, with its egalitarian focus, at the expense

of the Indianized cults that stressed a hierarchical, stratified soci- ety (see Buddhism, ch. 2). Whether it was this development or the

inability of the Khmer monarchs to command the fealty of their

subjects that led to a societal breakdown remains open to conjecture. Also coupled with these internal developments was the ac- celerated southward migration of the Thai, who, dislodged from

their state in southwestern China by the Mongols in the mid- 1200s,

flooded into the Menam Chao Phraya Valley. Subject to internal

and external pressures, the Khmer state became unable to defend

xxvi
itself at the very time its enemies were growing stronger. Thai at- tacks were stepped up around 1350, and they continued until Angkor itself was captured and sacked in 1430-31 . The fall of Angkor

ended the dominant period of the Khmer state. Thereafter, its borders shrank, and it controlled little more than the area around the

Tonle Sap, the alluvial plain to the southeast, and some territory

west of the Mekong River. To the east, the collapse of the kingdom of Champa in 1471 opened the Khmer lands of the Mekong

Delta to the steady Vietnamese expansion southward.

The long waning of the Cambodian empire after the fall of Angkor is not well documented. The transfer of the capital from the

Angkorian region around the Tonle Sap to the vicinity of Phnom

Penh may have heralded the shift of emphasis from an agricultural

to a trading society. Even with this change, the Khmer state re- tained some of its vitality into the seventeenth century, alternately

trading and warring with its neighbors. By the eighteenth century,

however, it had become a backwater buffer state, existing solely on the sufferance of its increasingly powerful neighbors, Thailand

and Vietnam. The imposition of the French protectorate upon Cambodia prevented its neighbors from swallowing it completely.

Cambodia's status declined further under the French, however,

when the last vestiges of its sovereignty were lost, especially after 1884, when Paris imposed another unequal treaty that went beyond the original protectorate of 1863. The newer pact limited the

authority of the king, abolished slavery, stationed colonial officials in the countryside, and codified land ownership. Reaction to the

1884 treaty produced the only sustained rebellion during colonial

times. Unrest persisted until 1886 and was put down with troops

from Vietnam (see The French Protectorate, ch. 1). Thereafter,

the French consolidated their grasp on the country, and Cambodia became merely a heavily taxed, efficient rice-producing colony,

the inhabitants of which were known for their passivity.

As the Southeast Asian colonies of the European powers stood on the brink of World War II in 1940 and 1941, the utter powerlessness of Cambodia was illustrated by the fact that it was compelled to surrender its provinces of Siemreab and Batdambang

(Battambang), which included some of the country's most fertile agricultural area, to Thailand, as a result of the brief FrancoSiamese War. In addition, some months later it was the French,

not the Cambodians, who selected the candidate who would sit on

the throne in Phnom Penh. Their choice was the young Prince

Norodom Sihanouk, because French officials considered him more

manipulable than the heir apparent. (Sihanouk was then a shy

youth, well-disposed toward his role as figurehead monarch, and xxvn
totally inexperienced in governing. His formidable international

reputation lay far in the future.)

In March 1945, the Japanese swept aside the Vichy French administration in Cambodia (as elsewhere in Indochina), and they

induced the young king to proclaim independence. The event

offered little occasion for euphoria, however. The Japanese re- mained in control, and then, after the Japanese surrender, the

French returned to reimpose their authority, granting the Cambodians, as consolation prizes in early 1946, the right to have a

constitution and the right to form political parties.

In the late 1940s and the early 1950s, the struggle for independence in Cambodia took place on several levels. Two political parties were formed under princes of the royal house. The Liberal Party,

the more conservative of the two, advocated an evolutionary approach to independence. The Democratic Party, the more radical one, favored the rapid attainment of independence and the for- mation of whatever political alliances might be necessary. Underground, Cambodian guerrillas took to the jungles to fight the

returning French. The Khmer Issarak (see Appendix B), as these

guerrillas were called, encompassed disaffected Cambodians from

across the entire political spectrum. Meanwhile, the French

managed to secure the return of Cambodia's two provinces lost to Thailand in 1941. In 1949, under increasing military pressure

from the Viet Minh (see Appendix B) in neighboring Vietnam,

the French granted Cambodia qualified self-government in certain areas and an autonomous zone in Batdambang and Siemreab.

Sihanouk continued the political struggle above ground, embarking upon a campaign for independence. Using a combination of

private and public initiatives and grandiose gestures, he exacted

grudging concessions from a French government increasingly hardpressed in Indochina by its war against the Viet Minh. In November

1953, Sihanouk announced dramatically that independence had

been gained, and he returned triumphantly from Paris to Phnom

Penh.

Sihanouk quickly emerged as a leader of stature in his newly

independent country. In an effort to gain a freer hand in the politics of his nation, a role he was not permitted to play as the ruler

in a constitutional monarchy, he abdicated the throne in 1955 and

formed a political movement, the Popular Socialist Community

(Sangkum Riastre Niyum, or Sangkum). With control of the Sangkum, Sihanouk succeeded in having himself named both chief of

state and head of government. For nearly sixteen years, from 1954

to 1970, he dominated Cambodian politics and ruled at the head

of a highly authoritarian and centralized government.

xxvin
In the countryside, Sihanouk kept the support of the people

through his charismatic personality, his highly visible personal

forays among the rural peasantry, and his adherence to the traditional symbols and institutions of the Khmer monarchy, such as public audiences and participation in time-honored ceremonies.

Among the politicized urban elite, Sihanouk maintained power and

kept his opponents off-balance through a range of manipulative

stratagems, pitting them against one another when he could and

co-opting them with government positions when he could not. In spite of Sihanouk's efforts, the situation in Cambodia began

to go awry in the mid- to late 1960s. Internally, the country had

been savaged by economic reverses. The budget was chronically

in deficit; United States aid had been terminated; and state social- ism had stifled development (see Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy

1953-70, ch. 3). Prices for Cambodia's export commodities—rice

and rubber—were declining. Numerous members of the youthful,

educated elite were underemployed and dissatisfied. Among the

politicized middle class, the military leadership, the intellectuals,

and the students, opposition was developing to Sihanouk's

authoritarianism. In the countryside, heavy taxation had ignited

the shortlived Samlot Rebellion in Batdambang Province. Although

suppressed ruthlessly, it refused to die out, and smoldered on in

remote corners of Cambodia. Disaffected elements still were at large,

and some of the country remained insecure. The radical wing of

the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party, (KCP—see Appendix B), led by Saloth Sar (later to be known as Pol Pot),

had gone underground and had taken up arms, unleashing its own

insurgency against the Sihanouk regime. In the northeast, minority

ethnic groups were alienated from the government in Phnom Penh

because of its corvee labor, forced resettlement, and assimilationist

policies (see Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954-70, ch. 1). Internationally, the picture was not much better. Sihanouk tried to maintain a nonaligned course in the country's foreign policy.

During its first decade of independence, Cambodia had received

aid from East and from West, and it was respected internationally.

In the mid- to late 1960s, however, this neutrality was fast eroding, and Cambodia was about to be engulfed by the war in neighboring Vietnam. The country rapidly was becoming a logistical rear area and a safe haven for North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

(see Appendix B) forces fighting the Saigon government. Cambodia was exposed to cross-border forays and airstrikes from South

Vietnam to neutralize these enemy installations. The Cambodian

port of Kampong Saom also was becoming the terminus for Chinese

weapons and supplies that were then trucked, sometimes in

xxix
Cambodian army vehicles, overland to North Vietnamese and Viet

Cong supply depots.

Sihanouk sought to adjust to the prevailing trends in Indochina.

He sought to distance Cambodia from South Vietnam and accepted

accommodation with North Vietnam and with the National Front

for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN—see Appendix

B), the political arm of the Viet Cong. He broke relations with

Washington, looked for support to Beijing—which was then dis- tracted by its Cultural Revolution, and then resumed ties with

Washington.

Events in Cambodia were moving out of control, however. When

Sihanouk went abroad for a lengthy sojourn in January 1970 to

solicit Soviet and Chinese assistance in curbing the presence of

North Vietnamese sanctuaries on Cambodian territory, domestic

opposition to his regime became more outspoken and soon acquired

a momentum of its own. The entire Cambodian National Assembly, led by a rightist cabinet under Premier Lon Nol, voted on March 22 to bar the return of Sihanouk to the country. Cambodia's first post-independence era thus ended, and the country soon was plunged into a period of war, chaos, and human suffering

perhaps unparalleled in its history.

The Lon Nol government that succeeded the fall of Sihanouk

quickly abolished the monarchy and proclaimed itself the Khmer

Republic (see Appendix B). It initially enjoyed wide support among

the urban population, but it soon proved itself unequal to the tasks

of governing and defending the country and capturing the allegiance

of the Cambodian masses. The new government in Phnom Penh

began by fanning anti-Vietnamese sentiment among the Khmer

population, as a result of which countless numbers of civilian Viet- namese migrants in Cambodia were massacred. The government

then turned against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong by

calling publicly for their ouster from Cambodia and by initiating

ineffectual military operations against them. Shortly thereafter, an

offensive military thrust of the United States and South Vietnam

into Cambodia dislodged North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units

from their border sanctuaries; instead of driving them away from

Cambodian territory, however, it pushed them deeper into the

country, where they soon swept before them the ill-trained, ill- armed, and totally inexperienced Cambodian republican forces. At the same time, two concurrent developments conspired to erode further the shaky position of the Khmer Republic. The first was that Sihanouk established a government-in-exile in Beijing,

where he had fled following his ouster. There, he raised the stan- dard of revolt against the republican regime in Phnom Penh, and

xxx
he united in a common front with the armed Khmer communist

rebels. Both sides saw the advantages to such an alliance of convenience. The Cambodian communists, dubbed the Khmer Rouge

(see Appendix B) by Sihanouk, had ignited a small-scale insurgency

in early 1968, but they had not been able to move beyond their

redoubts in remote corners of Cambodia or to gain mass support

in their first two years. Their alliance with Sihanouk, in a broad

resistance front called the National United Front of Kampuchea

(Front Uni National du Kampuchea—FUNK—see Appendix B),

transformed their forlorn rebellion, which was aided by Washington, into a war of national liberation against a puppet regime in

Phnom Penh. At the same time, Sihanouk's name attracted to the

FUNK cause Cambodians of every political persuasion, including many people without communist antecedents.

The second development, one with equally serious consequences

for the Khmer Republic, was that the North Vietnamese quickly

undertook the training of the Khmer Rouge guerrillas to trans- form them into a conventional fighting force. While this training

program was underway, North Vietnamese units temporarily as- sumed the burden of keeping the Khmer republican forces at bay, an effort that did not tax them unduly. By 1973 the Khmer Rouge

were conducting most combat operations against the Phnom Penh

government by themselves.

The ill-fated Khmer Republic was unable to defend itself. By

1971 it was on the defensive, and it was losing ground steadily.

Fleeing the fighting in the countryside, peasant refugees crowded

into the government's shrinking strongholds around Phnom Penh

and the provincial centers. Lon Nol's inept and corrupt regime

went from one military defeat to another. By early 1975, the situ- ation of the Khmer Republic was so precarious that Phnom Penh

itself was invaded, and government control was limited to the

provincial centers and to a patch of territory in western Cambodia

around the Tonle Sap. In the following months, the Khmer Rouge

steadily tightened the noose around the capital until all escape routes were cut off, and resistance collapsed. The fall of Phnom Penh in

April 1975 marked the end of the Khmer Republic (see The Fall of Phnom Penh, ch. 1). For the Cambodian people, the entry of the Khmer Rouge into

the capital began the grimmest period in Cambodia's long history.

The Khmer Rouge rulers of Democratic Kampuchea, as the regime

that supplanted the Khmer Republic was called, envisioned a totally self-sufficient Cambodia. This self-sufficiency was to be achieved

by accelerated agricultural production, which in turn would pro- vide the wherewithal to develop the other sectors of the economy.

xxxi
Self-sufficiency, however, was pursued with such single-minded

ruthlessness that between 1 million and 3 million persons died be- cause of purges, beatings, malnourishment, and overwork. To head

off opposition to economic and social restructuring, the new re- gime hunted down and executed virtually anyone who had served

the former government. The regime emptied the cities of inhabitants and forced the entire population into rudimentary, badly or- ganized collectives in the countryside; untold numbers died, worked

to death under slave labor conditions or executed for minor infractions of camp discipline. At the same time, the regime nurtured an acute paranoia that brooked no potential opposition but that

prompted it to eradicate the educated middle class of Cambodia.

When this eradication was accomplished, it turned on its own cadres

at every echelon, torturing and executing thousands (see Revolutionary Terror, ch. 1). The regime's ruthless extermination of opponents, however, could not ensure its security; ultimately its own

paranoia brought it down.

Regionally, the Khmer Rouge paranoia manifested itself in the

exacerbation of tensions with Vietnam. During the war against the

United States and its allies, commonalities of enemy and of ideology had enabled the Vietnamese and the Cambodians to bridge

their mutual distrust. After April 1975, however, with the xenophobic Pol Pot factions of the KCP in control in Phnom Penh, the

traditional Cambodian antipathy for the Vietnamese reemerged.

The source of the friction was the recurrent cross-border forays

by combatants from both sides into the Mekong Delta and the

Parrot's Beak area. The Khmer Rouge regime viewed itself as threatened, its territory violated by Vietnam. Hanoi in turn felt compelled to deploy substantial military assets along the border, as fighting continued to erupt on both sides of the frontier. By

mid- 1978 Hanoi's patience was rapidly running out, as it became

obliged to commit division-sized units to pacification missions along

the Cambodian border.

Sometime in the fall of 1978, the leadership in Hanoi decided

to mount a multi-division punitive expedition into Cambodia. To

lend a veneer of political legitimacy to this military undertaking,

Hanoi sponsored the establishment of an anti-Pol Pot movement

called the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS—see Appendix B), made up of fugitive Cambodians who had fled the Khmer Rouge. Accompanied

by token KNUFNS units, the Vietnamese launched their military

campaign into Cambodia in late December 1978 (see Vietnamese

Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). The Khmer Rouge proved surprisingly vulnerable to the onslaught, and Phnom Penh fell to Hanoi's xxxn
forces in early January 1979. The Khmer Rouge, defeated militarily for the time being, but not destroyed, ignited a persistent insurgency in the remote regions of Cambodia. The country then embarked upon a decade-long period of fitful rehabilitation, made more

precarious by the lack of resources, the enduring guerilla war, and

the military occupation by Vietnam.

It was evident that the institutions of the new Cambodian re- gime, which called itself the People's Republic of Kampuchea

(PRK—see Appendix B), were virtually identical to those of Viet- nam. In the PRK, only a single, pro-Vietnamese political party was permitted. This party, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B), was headed by

a political bureau with a secretariat and a general secretary in

charge. It also had a central committee with a control commission

to handle day-by-day affairs (see The Kampuchean, or Khmer,

People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). The party was backed by

a mass movement—the successor to KNUFNS, the Kampuchean

(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense

(KUFNCD—see Appendix B) and by a number of front organizations such as labor, women's, and youth groups. As in Vietnam,

party and government were intertwined: the same individuals held

concurrent leadership positions in both sectors. The Council of State was the highest government body; it reserved to itself the major

decision-making authority. A Council of Ministers exercised cabinet

functions and was responsible to a National Assembly elected from

KPRP members. The National Assembly heard reports from

ministers and from the rest of national leadership, but appeared

to exercise little legislative authority (see Government Structure,

ch. 4).

Cambodian rehabilitation and development were hampered by

the civil war that plagued the country after the ouster of the Khmer

Rouge. When the Vietnamese drove Pol Pot from power in their

December 1978 invasion, they failed to administer the coup de grace

to their adversaries, who regrouped their forces and initiated a guerrilla war against Hanoi's occupation forces. Despite their odious

reputation and their abominable human rights record, the Khmer

Rouge were able to attract guerrilla recruits to their ranks. The

Khmer Rouge applied the same coercive measures in the remote

areas of Cambodia under their control as those they had used when

they ruled all of Cambodia, and they cast themselves as the sole nationalistic force opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. In terms of the number of combatants they could muster,

the Khmer Rouge, throughout the decade-long civil war, continued

to be the largest single guerrilla force in the field. xxxm
For many Cambodians, however, the option of joining either

the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese-installed regime was a Hobson's choice. Consequently, soon after Hanoi's invasion, two

additional insurgent movements arose among the Khmer refugees

who had fled both Hanoi's and Pol Pot's forces. One of these movements coalesced around the elderly nationalistic figure of Son Sann,

a cabinet minister under Sihanouk. Son Sann's movement took

the name Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF

see Appendix B), and its armed wing was called the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF—see Appendix B). In the meantime, a third insurgent force rallied under

Sihanouk and his son Prince Norodom Ranariddh. Sihanouk's

political movement was called for the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

(Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independent, Neutre,

Pacifique, et Cooperatif—FUNCINPEC—see Appendix B), and

his armed wing, the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale

Sihanoukiste—ANS—see Appendix B).

The three insurgent forces maintained their own separate structures; they initiated their own guerrilla campaigns against the PRK

regime in Phnom Penh and its Vietnamese mentors. After several

years of sustained pressure from the Association of Southeast Asian

Nations (ASEAN) to form a unified front against the Vietnamese

occupiers, the Khmer insurgent movements came together in an

uneasy union, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—see Appendix B), in mid- 1982. Sihanouk was

chosen president of the CGDK; during the succeeding years, he

launched an unending series of attempts to bring reconciliation to

his divided country and to achieve some power- sharing arrangement agreeable to all four warring Khmer factions. Although the

methods for achieving peace in Cambodia remained in dispute,

there was agreement that the Vietnamese occupation forces must

depart and that the Khmer Rouge must never again reimpose its brutal rule over Cambodia.

Cambodia's civil war had an international dimension as well. Arrayed on one side were the PRK, its Vietnamese allies who did

much of the fighting, and, by proxy, the Soviet Union. Arrayed on the other side were the CGDK, its ASEAN supporters, and

China. Vietnam was involved because it had placed the PRK in

power and because it feared being caught between a hostile China

and a pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime. The Soviet Union was

involved because of its treaty relationship with Hanoi and because

it provided much of the military hardware used by the PRK and

by the Vietnamese. ASEAN was involved because it feared a heavily

xxxiv
armed, expansionist Vietnamese state, which might not stop at con- quest of the Indochinese Peninsula. China was involved and be- came the chief supporter of the Khmer Rouge faction in the CGDK

because it saw the PRK and Vietnam as two more links in the chain

of Soviet client states being forged around it. As the 1980s closed, there were hopeful signs that the situation

in Cambodia might not be as intractable as it had seemed in previ- ous years. For example, the international environment had changed

considerably. Soviet withdrawals from Afghanistan and Mongolia, as well as the renewed dialogue between Moscow and Beijing,

culminating in a Sino-Soviet summit in May 1989, allayed to some

extent Beijing's fears of encirclement by client states of Moscow.

China itself stepped back from its support of the Khmer Rouge

regime of Democratic Kampuchea as the sole legitimate government

of Cambodia, and seemingly accepted the Vietnamese-installed

Phnom Penh regime as a partner in any postwar government. The

United States continued to oppose the return of the Khmer Rouge

to a position of dominance in a future government, but appeared

to acquiesce in a power- sharing arrangement between the Phnom

Penh regime and the non-communist resistance. Vietnam stepped

up the pace of its troop withdrawal from Cambodia, ending its decade of occupation in September 1989—a year ahead of time.

Among the four competing Khmer factions who remained at an

impasse over power-sharing in a post-occupation Cambodia, in- formal meetings in Jakarta in February and May 1989 produced

a useful dialogue, but little agreement on matters of substance. The

PRK, in an effort to attract the support of Prince Sihanouk and

the non-communist resistance and to isolate the Khmer Rouge,

amended the Constitution and changed the name of the country,

the flag, and the national anthem in April 1989. The amended Constitution, however, upheld the dominant position of the incumbent

Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's Revolutionary Party, and made

no provision for the establishment of a multi-party system in the

newly named State of Cambodia. As a result of these cosmetic

gestures, plus a series of meetings between Prince Sihanouk and

Prime Minister Hun Sen, as well as conciliatory utterances by

Khmer Rouge leaders, the differences among all sides seem to have

narrowed, and the hopes for a successful resolution of the Cambodian situation seemed to have progressed sufficientiy for the French

government to convene the Paris International Conference on Cambodia from July 30 to August 30, 1989.

The optimism on the eve of the conference—attended by nineteen

countries including the United States, as well as the UN Secretary

General and the four rival Cambodian factions, proved to be

XXXV
ill-founded. The forum expired amid the intransigence of the Khmer

factions on five basic issues: verification of the Vietnamese troop

withdrawal; establishment of provisions for a ceasefire in the fighting; determination of the status of Vietnamese residents in Cambodia; official characterization of the Khmer Rouge period as a

genocide; and the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement

among the four factions. The latter issue proved to be the major

stumbling block. The non-communist resistance headed by Prince

Sihanouk lobbied for the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge on the

grounds that they already exercised a decisive presence in Cambodian affairs and that their exclusion from a future government

would lead inevitably to a civil war between them and the coalition that opposed them. The Phnom Penh regime countered that

to include the Khmer Rouge in a postwar government would lead

to a repetition of the cruelty and repression they wrought during

the Democratic Kampuchea period. Thus, the impasse continued,

and the failure of the Paris conference brought negotiations to an end for the time being. The State of Cambodia, in a preliminary

fashion, however, cast about for a renewal of the dialogue by recon- vening informal talks in Jakarta.

In the meantime, pessimistic forecasts of a civil war in Cambodia following the Paris conference, the Vietnamese troop withdrawal, and the end of the dry season, seemed to be borne out. On the western frontier with Thailand, Khmer resistance forces

took to the field with renewed aggressiveness, capturing in succes- sion a number of border towns. The single-minded purposefulness

of the Khmer Rouge in the rebel offensive came as no surprise.

What astonished foreign observers, however, was the unexpected

combativeness of the Khmer People's National Liberation Armed

Forces, which in previous years had been reduced to ineffectuality

by the bickering of its leaders. As this book goes to press, the ThaiCambodian border remains in turmoil, with the Phnom Penh re- gime in a defensive posture—increasingly hard-pressed to contain

rebel actions and confronting increased speculation from foreign

observers as to whether it can hold its own or indeed survive without

outside help.

December 28, 1989 Russell R. Ross

Andrea Maties Savada

xxxvi
Chapter 1. Historical Setting
gate of the Angkor Thorn temple complex, circa A D. 1200
THE KHMER PEOPLE were among the first in Southeast Asia

to adopt religious ideas and political institutions from India and

to establish centralized kingdoms encompassing large territories. The earliest known kingdom in the area, Funan, flourished from

around the first century to the sixth century A.D. It was succeeded

by Chenla, which controlled large areas of modern Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand (known as Siam until 1939). The golden

age of Khmer civilization, however, was the period from the ninth

to the thirteenth century, when the kingdom of Kambuja, which

gave Kampuchea, or Cambodia, its name, ruled large territories

from its capital in the region of Angkor in western Cambodia.

Under Jayavarman VII (1181-ca. 1218), Kambuja reached its zenith of political power and cultural creativity. FollowingJayavar- man VII's death, Kambuja experienced gradual decline. Important

factors were the aggressiveness of neighboring peoples (especially

the Thai, or Siamese), chronic interdynastic strife, and the gradual

deterioration of the complex irrigation system that had ensured rice surpluses. The Angkorian monarchy survived until 1431, when the

Thai captured Angkor Thorn and the Cambodian king fled to the

southern part of his country.

The fifteenth century to the nineteenth century was a period of

continued decline and territorial loss. Cambodia enjoyed a brief

period of prosperity during the sixteenth century because its kings,

who built their capitals in the region southeast of the Tonle Sap

(Great Lake) along the Mekong River, promoted trade with other

parts of Asia. This was the period when Spanish and Portuguese

adventurers and missionaries first visited the country. But the Thai

conquest of the new capital at Lovek in 1 594 marked a downturn

in the country's fortunes, and Cambodia became a pawn in power

struggles between its two increasingly powerful neighbors, Siam

and Vietnam. Vietnam's settlement of the Mekong Delta led to

its annexation of that area at the end of the seventeenth century.

Cambodia thereby lost some of its richest territory and was cut off from the sea. Such foreign encroachments continued through the

first half of the nineteenth century because Vietnam was determined

to absorb Khmer land and to force the inhabitants to accept Viet- namese culture. Such imperialistic policies created in the Khmer

an abiding suspicion of their eastern neighbors that flared into

violent confrontation after the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B)

established its regime in 1975.

3
Cambodia: A Country Study

In 1863 King Norodom signed an agreement with the French

to establish a protectorate over his kingdom. The country gradually came under French colonial domination. During World War

II, the Japanese allowed the French government (based at Vichy)

that collaborated with the Nazis to continue administering Cambodia and the other Indochinese territories, but they also fostered

Khmer nationalism. Cambodia enjoyed a brief period of independence in 1945 before Allied troops restored French control. King

Norodom Sihanouk, who had been chosen by France to succeed

King Monivong in 1941, rapidly assumed a central political role as he sought to neutralize leftist and republican opponents and

attempted to negotiate acceptable terms for independence from the

French. Sihanouk's 4 'royal crusade for independence" resulted in

grudging French acquiescence to his demands for a transfer of

sovereignty. A partial agreement was struck in October 1953.

Sihanouk then declared that independence had been achieved and

returned in triumph to Phnom Penh. The following year, as a result of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, Cambodia was able to bring about the withdrawal of the Viet Minh (see Appendix B)

troops from its territory and to withstand any residual impingement upon its sovereignty by external powers.

In order to play a more active role in national politics, Sihanouk

abdicated in 1955 and placed his father, Norodom Suramarit, on

the throne. Now only a prince, Sihanouk organized his own political movement, the Popular Socialist Community, (Sangkum Reastr

Niyum, or Sangkum), which won all the seats in the National

Assembly in the 1955 election. The Sangkum dominated the

political scene until the late 1960s. Sihanouk's highly personal ruling

style made him immensely popular with the people, especially in

rural villages. Although the Sangkum was backed by conservative

interests, Sihanouk included leftists in his government, three of

whom—Khieu Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim—later became

leaders of the Khmer Rouge. In 1963 he announced the nationalization of banking, foreign trade, and insurance in a socialist experiment that dried up foreign investment and alienated the right

wing. In foreign relations, Sihanouk pursued a policy of neutrality and nonalignment. He accepted United States economic and

military aid, but he also promoted close relations with China and

attempted to keep on good terms with the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam (North Vietnam). The principal objectives of his for- eign policy were to preserve Cambodia's independence and to keep

the country out of the widening conflict in neighboring Vietnam.

Relations with Washington grew stormy in the early 1960s. In 1963
Historical Setting

the prince rejected further United States aid, and, two years later,

he severed diplomatic relations.

Both the domestic and the international situations had deteriorated by the late 1960s. The increasingly powerful right wing

challenged Sihanouk's control of the political system. Peasant resent- ment over harsh tax collection measures and the expropriation of

land to build a sugar refinery led to a violent revolt in 1967 in the

northwestern province of Batdambang (Battambang). The armed

forces, commanded by General Lon Nol (who was also prime

minister), quelled the revolt, but a communist-led insurgency spread

throughout the country. The spillover of the Second Indochina War

(or Vietnam War) into the Cambodian border areas also was becoming a serious problem. Apparently one factor in Sihanouk's

decision to reestablish relations with Washington in 1969 was his

fear of further incursions by the North Vietnamese and the Viet

Cong (see Appendix B). In March 1970, however, he was over- thrown by General Lon Nol and other right-wing leaders, who seven months later abolished the monarchy and established the Khmer

Republic (see Appendix B).

The Khmer Republic faced not only North Vietnamese and Viet

Cong combat units but also an effective, homegrown communist

movement that grew more lethal as time went on. The Cambodian communists, whom Sihanouk had labeled Khmer Rouge,

traced their movement back to the struggle for independence and

the creation in 1951, under Vietnamese auspices, of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B). During the early 1960s, however, a group of Paristrained communist intellectuals, of whom the most important were

Saloth Sar (known as Pol Pot after 1976), Khieu Samphan, and

Ieng Sary, seized control of the party. They gradually purged or

neutralized rivals whom they considered too subservient to Viet- nam. After the March 1970 coup d'etat that toppled Sihanouk,

the Khmer Rouge formed a united front with the ousted leader, a move that won them the goodwill of peasants who were still loyal to the prince.

Despite massive United States aid to the newly proclaimed

Khmer Republic and the bombing of North Vietnamese and Khmer

Rouge installations and troop concentrations in the countryside,

the Phnom Penh regime rapidly lost most of the country's terri- tory to the communists. In January 1975 communist forces laid

siege to Phnom Penh, and in succeeding months they tightened

the noose around the capital. On April 1, 1975, President Lon Nol

left the country. Sixteen days later Khmer Rouge troops entered

the city.

5
Cambodia: A Country Study

The forty-four months the Khmer Rouge were in power was a period of unmitigated suffering for the Khmer people. Although

the severity of revolutionary policies varied from region to region

because of ideological differences and the personal inclinations of

local leaders, hundreds of thousands of people starved, died from

disease, or were executed. "New people" (the intelligentsia and

those from the cities—those new to the rural areas), being considered politically unreliable, were special targets of terror and of a

harsh, unremitting regime of forced labor. In 1977 Pol Pot launched

a bloody purge within the communist ranks that accounted for many

deaths. The slaughter of the Vietnamese minority living in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge's aggressive incursions into Vietnam

led to fighting with Vietnam in 1977 and 1978. In December 1978,

Vietnamese forces invaded the country. OnJanuary 7, 1979, they

captured Phnom Penh and began to establish the People's Republic

of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B; fig. 1). The Khmer Rouge

fled to isolated corners of the country and resumed their guerrilla

struggle, which continued in the late 1980s.

Prehistory and Early Kingdoms

Archaeological evidence indicates that parts of the region now

called Cambodia were inhabited during the first and second millennia B.C. by peoples having a Neolithic culture. By the first century A.D., the inhabitants had developed relatively stable, organized

societies, which had far surpassed the primitive stage in culture

and technical skills. The most advanced groups lived along the coast and in the lower Mekong River valley and delta regions, where

they cultivated irrigated rice and kept domesticated animals.

Scholars believe that these people may have been Austroasiatic

in origin and related to the ancestors of the groups who now inhabit

insular Southeast Asia and many of the islands of the Pacific Ocean.

They worked metals, including both iron and bronze, and possessed

navigational skills. Mon-Khmer people, who arrived at a later date,

probably intermarried with them. The Khmer who now populate

Cambodia may have migrated from southeastern China to the

Indochinese Peninsula before the first century A.D. They are believed to have arrived before their present Vietnamese, Thai,

and Lao neighbors (see fig. 2). Early Indianized Kingdom of Funan

At about the time that the ancient peoples of Western Europe

were absorbing the classical culture and institutions of the Mediterranean, the peoples of mainland and insular Southeast Asia were

responding to the stimulus of a civilization that had arisen in

6
Historical Setting

northern India during the previous millennium. The Britons, Gauls,

and Iberians experienced Mediterranean influences directly,

through conquest by and incorporation into the Roman Empire.

In contrast, the Indianization of Southeast Asia was a slower process than the Romanization of Europe because there was no period of

direct Indian rule and because land and sea barriers that separated

the region from the Indian subcontinent are considerable. Nevertheless, Indian religion, political thought, literature, mythology, and

artistic motifs gradually became integral elements in local Southeast

Asian cultures. The caste system never was adopted, but Indianization stimulated the rise of highly-organized, centralized states. Funan, the earliest of the Indianized states, generally is considered by Cambodians to have been the first Khmer kingdom in the

area. Founded in the first century A.D., Funan was located on

the lower reaches of the Mekong River in the delta area. Its capital, Vyadhapura, probably was located near the present-day town

of Phumi Banam in Prey Veng Province. The earliest historical

reference to Funan is a Chinese description of a mission that

visited the country in the third century A.D. The name Funan

derives from the Chinese rendition of the old Khmer word bnam

(mountain). What the Funanese called themselves, however, is not

known.

During this early period in Funan's history, the population was

probably concentrated in villages along the Mekong River and along

the Tonle Sab River below the Tonle Sap. Traffic and communications were mostly waterborne on the rivers and their delta tributaries. The area was a natural region for the development of an economy based on fishing and rice cultivation. There is considerable evidence that the Funanese economy depended on rice sur- pluses produced by an extensive inland irrigation system. Maritime

trade also played an extremely important role in the development

of Funan. The remains of what is believed to have been the kingdom's main port, Oc Eo (now part of Vietnam), contain Roman

as well as Persian, Indian, and Greek artifacts. By the fifth century A.D., the state exercised control over the

lower Mekong River area and the lands around the Tonle Sap.

It also commanded tribute from smaller states in the area now comprising northern Cambodia, southern Laos, southern Thailand,

and the northern portion of the Malay Peninsula.

Indianization was fostered by increasing contact with the subcontinent through the travels of merchants, diplomats, and learned

Brahmans (Hindus of the highest caste traditionally assigned to the priesthood). Indian immigrants, believed to have arrived in

the fourth and the fifth centuries, accelerated the process. By the

7
Cambodia: A Country Study

Gulf of Thailand

Modern international boundary

50 100 Kilo meters 50 100 Miles

Source: Based on information from John F. Cady, Southeast Asia: Its Historical Development, New York, 1964.

Figure 2. Early States of Indochina

8
Historical Setting

fifth century, the elite culture was thoroughly Indianized. Court

ceremony and the structure of political institutions were based on

Indian models. The Sanskrit language was widely used; the laws

of Manu, the Indian legal code, were adopted; and an alphabet

based on Indian writing systems was introduced.

Funan reached its zenith in the fifth century A.D. Beginning

in the early sixth century, civil wars and dynastic strife undermined

Funan' s stability, making it relatively easy prey to incursions by

hostile neighbors. By the end of the seventh century, a northern

neighbor, the kingdom of Chenla, had reduced Funan to a vassal

state. The Successor State of Chenla

The people of Chenla also were Khmer. Once they established

control over Funan, they embarked on a course of conquest that

continued for three centuries. They subjugated central and upper

Laos, annexed portions of the Mekong Delta, and brought what

are now western Cambodia and southern Thailand under their

direct control.

The royal families of Chenla intermarried with their Funanese

counterparts and generally preserved the earlier political, social,

and religious institutions of Funan. In the eighth century A.D.,

however, factional disputes at the Chenla court resulted in the splitting of the kingdom into rival northern and southern halves. According to Chinese chronicles, the two parts were known as Land (or

Upper) Chenla and Water (or Lower) Chenla. Land Chenla maintained a relatively stable existence, but Water Chenla underwent

a period of constant turbulence.

Late in the eighth century A.D., Water Chenla was subjected

to attacks by pirates from Java, Sumatra, and the Malay Peninsula. By the beginning of the ninth century, it had apparently be- come a vassal of the Sailendra dynasty ofJava. The last of the Water

Chenla kings allegedly was killed around A.D. 790 by a Javanese

monarch whom he had offended. The ultimate victor in the strife that followed was the ruler of a small Khmer state located north

of the Mekong Delta. His assumption of the throne as Jayavarman II (ca. A.D. 802-50) marked the liberation of the Khmer people from Javanese suzerainty and the beginning of a unified Khmer

nation.

The Angkorian Period

The Angkorian period lasted from the early ninth century to the

early fifteenth century A.D. In terms of cultural accomplishments

and political power, this was the golden age of Khmer civilization.

9
Cambodia: A Country Study

The great temple cities of the Angkorian region, located near the

modern town of Siemreab, are a lasting monument to the great- ness ofJayavarman IPs successors. (Even the Khmer Rouge, who

looked on most of their country's past history and traditions with

hostility, adopted a stylized Angkorian temple for the flag of

Democratic Kampuchea. A similar motif is found in the flag of

the PRK). The kingdom founded by Jayavarman II also gave

modern-day Cambodia, or Kampuchea, its name. During the early

ninth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, it was known as Kambuja,

originally the name of an early north Indian state, from which the

current forms of the name have been derived.

Possibly to put distance between himself and the seaborne

Javanese, Jayavarman II settled north of the Tonle Sap. He built

several capitals before establishing one, Hariharalaya, near the site where the Angkorian complexes were built. Indravarman I (A.D.

877-89) extended Khmer control as far west as the Korat Plateau

in Thailand, and he ordered the construction of a huge reservoir

north of the capital to provide irrigation for wet rice cultivation.

His son, Yasovarman I (A.D. 889-900), built the Eastern Baray

(reservoir or tank), evidence of which remains to the present time.

Its dikes, which may be seen today, are more than 6 kilometers

long and 1 .6 kilometers wide. The elaborate system of canals and

reservoirs built under Indravarman I and his successors were the

key to Kambuja' s prosperity for half a millennium. By freeing cul- tivators from dependence on unreliable seasonal monsoons, they

made possible an early "green revolution" that provided the country with large surpluses of rice. Kambuja' s decline during the thir- teenth and fourteenth centuries probably was hastened by the

deterioration of the irrigation system. Attacks by Thai and other

foreign peoples and the internal discord caused by dynastic rivalries diverted human resources from the system's upkeep, and it gradually fell into disrepair.

Suryavarman II (1113-50), one of the greatest Angkorian

monarchs, expanded his kingdom's territory in a series of successful wars against the kingdom of Champa in central Vietnam, the

kingdom of Nam Viet in northern Vietnam, and the small Mon

polities as far west as the Irrawaddy River of Burma. He reduced

to vassalage the Thai peoples who had migrated into Southeast Asia

from the Yunnan region of southern China and established his

suzerainty over the northern part of the Malay Peninsula. His

greatest achievement was the construction of the temple city complex of Angkor Wat. The largest religious edifice in the world,

Angkor Wat is considered the greatest single architectural work

in Southeast Asia. Suryavarman IPs reign was followed, however,

10
Historical Setting

by thirty years of dynastic upheaval and an invasion by the neighboring Cham (see Glossary), who destroyed the city of Angkor in

1177.

The Cham ultimately were driven out and conquered by Jayavarman VII, whose reign (1181-ca. 1218) marked the apogee of Kambuja's power. Unlike his predecessors, who had adopted the cult of the Hindu god-king, Jayavarman VII was a fervent patron of

Mahayana Buddhism. Casting himself as a bodhisattva (see Glossary), he embarked on a frenzy of building activity that included

the Angkor Thorn complex and the Bayon, a remarkable temple

whose stone towers depict 216 faces of buddhas, gods, and kings.

He also built over 200 rest houses and hospitals throughout his kingdom. Like the Roman emperors, he maintained a system of roads

between his capital and provincial towns. According to historian

George Coedes, "No other Cambodian king can claim to have

moved so much stone." Often, quality suffered for the sake of size and rapid construction, as is revealed in the intriguing but poorly

constructed Bayon.

Carvings show that everyday Angkorian buildings were wooden

structures not much different from those found in Cambodia today.

The impressive stone buildings were not used as residences by members of the royal family. Rather, they were the focus of Hindu or Buddhist cults that celebrated the divinity, or buddhahood, of the

monarch and his family. Coedes suggests that they had the dual

function of both temple and tomb. Typically, their dimensions

reflected the structure of the Hindu mythological universe. For

example, five towers at the center of the Angkor Wat complex

represent the peaks of Mount Meru, the center of the universe; an outer wall represents the mountains that ring the world's edge;

and a moat depicts the cosmic ocean. Like many other ancient

edifices, the monuments of the Angkorian region absorbed vast reserves of resources and human labor and their purpose remains

shrouded in mystery.

Angkorian society was strictly hierarchical. The king, regarded

as divine, owned both the land and his subjects. Immediately below

the monarch and the royal family were the Brahman priesthood

and a small class of officials, who numbered about 4,000 in the

tenth century. Next were the commoners, who were burdened with

heavy corvee (forced labor) duties. There was also a large slave

class that, like the nameless multitudes of ancient Egypt, built the

enduring monuments.

After Jayavarman VII' s death, Kambuja entered a long period

of decline that led to its eventual disintegration. The Thai were

a growing menace on the empire's western borders. The spread

11
Cambodia: A Country Study

of Theravada Buddhism, which came to Kambuja from Sri Lanka

by way of the Mon kingdoms, challenged the royal Hindu and

Mahayana Buddhist cults. Preaching austerity and the salvation

of the individual through his or her own efforts, Theravada Buddhism did not lend doctrinal support to a society ruled by an opulent royal establishment maintained through the virtual slavery of

the masses. In 1353 a Thai army captured Angkor. It was recaptured by

the Khmer, but wars continued and the capital was looted several

times. During the same period, Khmer territory north of the present

Laotian border was lost to the Lao kingdom of Lan Xang. In 1431

the Thai captured Angkor Thorn. Thereafter, the Angkorian region

did not again encompass a royal capital, except for a brief period

in the third quarter of the sixteenth century.

Cambodia's Struggle for Survival, 1432-1887

The more than four centuries that passed from the abandonment

of Angkor around the mid-fifteenth century to the establishment

of a protectorate under the French in 1863 are considered by histori- ans to be Cambodia's "dark ages," a period of economic, social,

and cultural stagnation when the kingdom's internal affairs came

increasingly under the control of its aggressive neighbors, the Thai

and the Vietnamese. By the mid-nineteenth century, Cambodia

had become an almost helpless pawn in the power struggles between Thailand and Vietnam and probably would have been completely absorbed by one or the other if France had not intervened,

giving Cambodia a colonially dominated "lease on life." Fear of

racial and cultural extinction has persisted as a major theme in

modern Cambodian thought and helps to explain the intense nationalism and xenophobia of the Khmer Rouge during the 1970s.

Establishment in 1979 of the People's Republic of Kampuchea,

a Vietnamese-dominated satellite state, can be seen as the culmination of a process of Vietnamese encroachment that was already

well under way by the seventeenth century.

The process of internal decay and foreign encroachment was

gradual rather than precipitous and was hardly evident in the

fifteenth century when the Khmer were still powerful. Following

the fall of Angkor Thorn, the Cambodian court abandoned the

region north of the Tonle Sap, never to return except for a brief

interlude in the late sixteenth century. By this time however, the

Khmer penchant for monument building had ceased. Older faiths

such as Mahayana Buddhism and the Hindu cult of the god-king

had been supplanted by Theravada Buddhism, and the Cambodians had become part of the same religious and cultural cosmos

12
Historical Setting

as the Thai. This similarity did not prevent intermittent warfare

between the two kingdoms, however. During the sixteenth cen- tury Cambodian armies, taking advantage of Thai troubles with

the Burmese, invaded the Thai kingdom several times.

In the meantime, following the abandonment of the Angkorian

sites, the Khmer established a new capital several hundred kilo- meters to the southeast on the site of what is now Phnom Penh.

This new center of power was located at the confluence of the

Mekong and the Tonle Sab rivers. Thus, it controlled the river commerce of the Khmer heartland and the Laotian kingdoms and

had access, by way of the Mekong Delta, to the international trade routes that linked the China coast, the South China Sea, and the

Indian Ocean. A new kind of state and society emerged, more open

to the outside world and more dependent on commerce as a source

of wealth than its inland predecessor. The growth of maritime trade

with China during the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) provided lucrative opportunities for members of the Cambodian elite who controlled royal trading monopolies. The appearance of Europeans

in the region in the sixteenth century also stimulated commerce. King Ang Chan (1516-66), one of the few great Khmer monarchs

of the post-Angkorian period, moved the capital from Phnom Penh

to Lovek. Portuguese and Spanish travelers who visited the city,

located on the banks of the Tonle Sab, a river north of Phnom Penh,

described it as a place of fabulous wealth. The products traded there

included precious stones, metals, silk and cotton, incense, ivory,

lacquer, livestock (including elephants), and rhinoceros horn (prized

by the Chinese as a rare and potent medicine). By the late sixteenth

and early seventeenth centuries, Lovek contained flourishing for- eign trading communities of Chinese, Indonesians, Malays,

Japanese, Arabs, Spanish, and Portuguese. They were joined later in the century by the English and the Dutch.

Because the representatives of practically all these nationalities were pirates, adventurers, or traders, this was an era of stormy

cosmopolitanism. Hard-pressed by the Thai, King Sattha (1576-94)

surrounded himself with a personal guard of Spanish and Portuguese mercenaries, and in 1593 asked the Spanish governor of

the Philippines for aid. Attracted by the prospects of establishing a Spanish protectorate in Cambodia and of converting the monarch

to Christianity, the governor sent a force of 120 men, but Lovek

had already fallen to the Thai when they arrived the following year. The Spanish took advantage of the extremely confused situation

to place one of Sattha' s sons on the throne in 1597. Hopes of making the country a Spanish dependency were dashed, however, when

13
Cambodia: A Country Study

the Spaniards were massacred two years later by an equally

belligerent contingent of Malay mercenaries.

The Thai, however, had dealt a fatal blow to Cambodian in- dependence by capturing Lovek in 1594. With the posting of a Thai

military governor in the city, a degree of foreign political control was established over the kingdom for the first time. Cambodian

chronicles describe the fall of Lovek as a catastrophe from which

the nation never fully recovered.

Domination by Thailand and by Vietnam

More than their conquest of Angkor a century and a half earlier,

the Thai capture of Lovek marked the beginning of a decline in

Cambodia's fortunes. One possible reason for the decline was the

labor drain imposed by the Thai conquerors as they marched thousands of Khmer peasants, skilled artisans, scholars, and members

of the Buddhist clergy back to their capital of Ayutthaya. This practice, common in the history of Southeast Asia, crippled Cambodia's ability to recover a semblance of its former greatness. A new

Khmer capital was established at Odongk (Udong), south of Lovek,

but its monarchs could survive only by entering into what amounted

to vassal relationships with the Thai and with the Vietnamese. In

common parlance, Thailand became Cambodia's "father" and

Vietnam its "mother."

By the late fifteenth century, the Vietnamese—who, unlike other

Southeast Asian peoples, had patterned their culture and their civili- zation on those of China—had defeated the once-powerful kingdom of Champa in central Vietnam. Thousands of Chams fled into

Khmer territory. By the early seventeenth century, the Vietnamese

had reached the Mekong Delta, which was inhabited by Khmer

people. In 1620 the Khmer king Chey Chettha II (1618-28) married a daughter of Sai Vuong, one of the Nguyen lords (1558-1778),

who ruled southern Vietnam for most of the period of the restored

Le dynasty (1428-1788). Three years later, Chey Chettha allowed

the Vietnamese to establish a custom-house at Prey Nokor, near what is now Ho Chi Minh City (until 1975, Saigon). By the end

of the seventeenth century, the region was under Vietnamese

administrative control, and Cambodia was cut off from access to the sea. Trade with the outside world was possible only with Viet- namese permission.

There were periods in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, when Cambodia's neighbors were preoccupied with internal or external strife, that afforded the beleaguered country a breathing spell. The Vietnamese were involved in a lengthy civil war until 1674, but upon its conclusion they promptly annexed

14
Historical Setting

sizable areas of contiguous Cambodian territory in the region of

the Mekong Delta. For the next one hundred years they used the

alleged mistreatment of Vietnamese colonists in the delta as a pretext

for their continued expansion. By the end of the eighteenth century, they had extended their control to include the area encompassed in the late 1980s by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

(Vietnam).

Thailand, which might otherwise have been courted as an ally

against Vietnamese incursions in the eighteenth century, was it- self involved in a new conflict with Burma. In 1767 the Thai capital of Ayutthaya was besieged and destroyed. The Thai quickly

recovered, however, and soon reasserted their dominion over Cambodia. The youthful Khmer king, Ang Eng (1779-96), a refugee

at the Thai court, was installed as monarch at Odongk by Thai

troops. At the same time, Thailand quietly annexed Cambodia's

three northernmost provinces. In addition, the local rulers of the

northwestern provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab (Siemreap)

became vassals of the Thai king, and these areas came under the

Thai sphere of influence.

A renewed struggle between Thailand and Vietnam for control

of Cambodia in the nineteenth century resulted in a period when

Vietnamese officials, working through a puppet Cambodian king,

ruled the central part of the country and attempted to force Cambodians to adopt Vietnamese customs. Several rebellions against

Vietnamese rule ensued. The most important of these occurred in

1840 to 1841 and spread through much of the country. After two

years of fighting, Cambodia and its two neighbors reached an ac- cord that placed the country under the joint suzerainty of Thailand

and Vietnam. At the behest of both countries, a new monarch,

Ang Duong (1848-59), ascended the throne and brought a decade

of peace and relative independence to Cambodia.

In their arbitrary treatment of the Khmer population, the Thai

and the Vietnamese were virtually indistinguishable. The suffer- ing and the dislocation caused by war were comparable in many

ways to similar Cambodian experiences in the 1970s. But the Thai

and the Vietnamese had fundamentally different attitudes concern- ing their relationships with Cambodia. The Thai shared with the

Khmer a common religion, mythology, literature, and culture. The

Chakri kings at Bangkok wanted Cambodia's loyalty and tribute,

but they had no intention of challenging or changing its people's

values or way of life. The Vietnamese viewed the Khmer people

as barbarians to be civilized through exposure to Vietnamese

culture, and they regarded the fertile Khmer lands as legitimate

sites for colonization by settlers from Vietnam.

15
Cambodia: A Country Study

The French Protectorate

France's interest in Indochina in the nineteenth century grew

out of its rivalry with Britain, which had excluded it from India

and had effectively shut it out of other pans of mainland Southeast Asia. The French also desired to establish commerce in a region

that promised so much untapped wealth and to redress the Viet- namese state's persecution of Catholic converts, whose welfare was

a stated aim of French overseas policy. The Nguyen dynasty's

repeated refusal to establish diplomatic relations and the violently

anti-Christian policies of the emperors Minh Mang (1820-41),

Thieu Tri (1841-47). and Tu Due (1848-83) impelled the French

to engage in gunboat diplomacy that resulted, in 1862, in the es- tablishment of French dominion over Saigon and over the three eastern provinces of the Cochinchina (Mekong Delta) region. In the view of the government in Paris, Cambodia was a promising backwater. Persuaded by a missionary envoy to seek French

protection against both the Thai and the Vietnamese, King Ang

Duong invited a French diplomatic mission to visit his court. The

Thai, however, pressured him to refuse to meet with the French

when they finally arrived at Odongk in 1856. The much-publicized

travels of the naturalist Henri Mouhot, who visited the Cambodian court, rediscovered the ruins at Angkor, and journeyed up

the Mekong River to the Laotian kingdom of Luang Prabang from

1859 to 1861, piqued French interest in the kingdom's alleged vast

riches and in the value of the Mekong as a gateway to China's southwestern provinces. In August 1863, the French concluded a treaty

with Ang Duong's successor, Norodom (1859-1904). This agreement afforded the Cambodian monarch French protection (in the

form of a French official called a resident—in French resident) in

exchange for giving the French rights to explore and to exploit the

kingdom's mineral and forest resources. Norodom's coronation,

in 1864. was an awkward affair at which both French and Thai

representatives officiated. Although the Thai attempted to thwart

the expansion of French influence, their own influence over the

monarch steadily dwindled. In 1867 the French concluded a treaty

with the Thai that gave the latter control of Batdambang Province

and of Siemreab Province in exchange for their renunciation of

all claims of suzerainty over other parts of Cambodia. Loss of the

northwestern provinces deeply upset Norodom, but he was beholden

to the French for sending military aid to suppress a rebellion by

a royal pretender. In June 1884, the French governor of Cochinchina went to Phnom Penh, Norodom's capital, and demanded approval of a

16
Gate of the Dead,

Angkor Thorn, twelfth century

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs.

Robert E. Hammerquist

Villager resting near pre-Angkorian ruins Courtesy Bill Herod

17
Cambodia: A Country Study

treaty with Paris that promised far-reaching changes such as the

abolition of slavery, the institution of private land ownership, and

the establishment of French residents in provincial cities. Mindful of a French gunboat anchored in the river, the king reluctantly

signed the agreement. Local elites opposed its provisions, however, especially the one dealing with slavery, and they fomented

rebellions throughout the country during the following year. Though the rebellions were suppressed, and the treaty was rati- fied, passive resistance on the part of the Cambodians postponed

implementation of the reforms it embodied until after Norodom's

death.

The French Colonial Period, 1887-1953

In October 1887, the French proclaimed the Union Indochinoise, or Indochina Union, comprising Cambodia and the three constituent regions of Vietnam: Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. (Laos was added to the Indochina Union after being separated from Thai

suzerainty in 1893.) Cambodia's chief colonial official, responsible to the Union's governor general and appointed by the Ministry of Marine and Colonies in Paris, was a resident general {resident

superieur). Residents, or local governors, were posted in all the principal provincial centers. In 1897 the incumbent resident general

complained to Paris that Norodom was no longer capable of rul- ing and received permission to assume the king's authority to issue

decrees, collect taxes, and appoint royal officials. Norodom and

his successors were left with hollow, figurehead roles as head of

state and as patron of the Buddhist religion. The colonial bureaucracy expanded rapidly. French nationals naturally held the highest

positions, but even on the lower rungs of the bureaucracy Cambodians found few opportunities because the colonial government

preferred to hire Vietnamese.

When Norodom died in 1904, the French passed over his sons and set his brother Sisowath (1904-27) on the throne. Sisowath's

branch of the royal family was considered more cooperative than

that of Norodom because the latter was viewed as partly responsible for the revolts of the 1880s and because Norodom's favorite son, Prince Yukanthor, had stirred up publicity abroad about

French colonial injustices. During their generally peaceful reigns,

Sisowath and his son Monivong (1927-41) were pliant instruments

of French rule. A measure of the monarchs' status was the will- ingness of the French to provide them annually with complimentary rations of opium. One of the few highlights of Sisowath's reign was French success in getting Thailand's King Chulalongkorn to

18
Historical Setting

sign a new treaty in 1907 returning the northwestern provinces of

Batdambang and Siemreab to Cambodia.

The Colonial Economy

Soon after establishing their protectorate in 1863, the French

realized that Cambodia's hidden wealth was an illusion and that

Phnom Penh would never become the Singapore of Indochina.

Aside from collecting taxes more efficiently, the French did little to transform Cambodia's village-based economy. Cambodians paid

the highest taxes per capita in Indochina, and in 1916 a nonviolent tax revolt brought tens of thousands of peasants into Phnom

Penh to petition the king for a reduction. The incident shocked

the French, who had lulled themselves into believing that the Cambodians were too indolent and individualistic to organize a mass

protest. Taxes continued to be sorely resented by the Cambodians.

In 1925 villagers killed a French resident after he threatened to arrest tax delinquents (see The French Protectorate, 1863-1954,

ch. 5). For poor peasants, the corvee service—a tax substitute—of

as many as ninety days a year on public works projects, was an

onerous duty.

According to Hou Yuon (a veteran of the communist movement

who was murdered by the Khmer Rouge after they seized power

in 1975), usury vied with taxes as the chief burden upon the peasantry. Hou's 1955 doctoral thesis at the University of Paris was one

of the earliest and most thorough studies of conditions in the rural areas during the French colonial era. He argued that although most

landholdings were small (one to five hectares), poor and middleclass peasants were victims of flagrantly usurious practices that in- cluded effective interest rates of 100 to 200 percent. Foreclosure

reduced them to the status of sharecroppers or landless laborers.

Although debt slavery and feudal landholding patterns had been

abolished by the French, the old elites still controlled the countryside. According to Hou, "the great feudal farms, because of their

precapitalist character, are disguised as small and medium-sized

farms, in the form of tenancies and share-farms, and materially

are indistinguishable from other small and medium-seized farms."

Whether or not the countryside was as polarized in terms of class (or property) as Hou argues is open to debate, but it is clear that

great tension and conflict existed despite the smiles and the easygoing manner of Khmer villagers.

To develop the economic infrastructure, the French built a limited

number of roads and a railroad that extended from Phnom Penh

through Batdambang to the Thai border. The cultivation of rubber and of corn were economically important, and the fertile

19
Cambodia: A Country Study

provinces of Batdambang and Siemreab became the rice baskets

of Indochina. The prosperous 1920s, when rubber, rice, and corn were in demand overseas, were years of considerable economic

growth, but the world depression after 1929 caused great suffer- ing, especially among rice cultivators whose falling incomes made

them more than ever the victims of moneylenders.

Industry was rudimentary and was designed primarily to process raw materials such as rubber for local use or export. There was

considerable immigration, which created a plural society similar

to those of other Southeast Asian countries. As in British Burma

and Malaya, foreigners dominated the developed sectors of the econ- omy. Vietnamese came to serve as laborers on rubber plantations

and as clerical workers in the government. As their numbers in- creased, Vietnamese immigrants also began to play important roles in the economy as fishermen and as operators of small businesses.

The Chinese had been in Cambodia for several centuries before

the imposition of French rule, and they had dominated precolonial commerce. This arrangement continued under the French,

because the colonial government placed no restrictions on the oc- cupations in which they could engage. Chinese merchants and

bankers in Cambodia developed commercial networks that extended

throughout Indochina as well as overseas to other parts of Southeast

Asia and to mainland China.

The Emergence of Nationalism

In stark contrast to neighboring Cochinchina and to the other

Vietnamese-populated territories of Indochina, Cambodia was rela- tively quiescent politically during the first four decades of the twentieth century. The carefully maintained fiction of royal rule was

probably the major factor. Khmer villagers, long inured to abuses

of power, believed that as long as a monarch occupied the throne

"all was right with the world. ' ' Low literacy rates, which the French were extremely reluctant to improve, also insulated the great majority of the population from the nationalist currents that were sweeping other parts of Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, national consciousness was emerging among the

handful of educated Khmer who composed the urban-based elite. Restoration of the monuments at Angkor, which the historian

David P. Chandler suggests was France's most valuable legacy to the colony, awakened Cambodians' pride in their culture and in

their past achievements. Many of the new elite were graduates of

the Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh, where resentment of the

favored treatment given Vietnamese students resulted in a petition to King Monivong during the 1930s. Significantly, the most

20
Historical Setting

articulate of the early nationalists, were Khmer Krom (see Appendix B)—members of the Cambodian minority who lived in Cochinchina. In 1936 Son Ngoc Thanh and another Khmer Krom named

Pach Chhoeun, began publishing Nagaravatta (Angkor Wat), the

first Khmer-language newspaper. In its editorials, Nagaravatta mildly

condemned French colonial policies, the prevalence of usury in the

rural areas, foreign domination of the economy, and the lack of

opportunities for educated Khmer. Much of the paper's journalistic

wrath was directed toward the Vietnamese for their past exploitation of Cambodia and for their contemporary monopolization of

civil service and of professional positions.

The Khmer were fortunate in escaping the suffering endured

by most other Southeast Asian peoples during World War II. After

the establishment of the Vichy regime in France in 1940, Japanese

forces moved into Vietnam and displaced French authority. In

mid- 1941 , they entered Cambodia but allowed Vichy French colonial officials to remain at their administrative posts. The proJapanese regime in Thailand, headed by Prime Minister Field

Marshal Luang Plaek Phibunsonggram, requested assurances from

the Vichy regime that, in the event of an interruption of French

sovereignty, Cambodian and Laotian territories formerly belonging to Thailand would be returned to Bangkok's authority. The

request was rejected. In January 1941 , a Thai force invaded Cambodia. The land fighting was indecisive, but the Vichy French

defeated the Thai navy in an engagement in the Gulf of Thailand

(see The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45, ch. 5). At this point,

Tokyo intervened and compelled the French authorities to agree

to a treaty ceding the province of Batdambang and part of the

province of Siemreab to Thailand in exchange for a small compensation. The Cambodians were allowed to retain Angkor. Thai

aggression, however, had minimal impact on the lives of most Cambodians outside the northwestern region.

King Monivong died in April 1941. Although his son, Prince

Monireth, had been considered the heir apparent, the French chose

instead Norodom Sihanouk, the great grandson of King Norodom.

Sihanouk was an ideal candidate from their point of view because

of his youth (he was nineteen years old), his lack of experience,

and his pliability.

Japanese calls of "Asia for the Asiatics" found a receptive

audience among Cambodian nationalists, although Tokyo's

policy in Indochina was to leave the colonial government nominally in charge. When a prominent, politically active Buddhist

monk, Hem Chieu, was arrested and unceremoniously defrocked

by the French authorities in July 1942, the editors of Nagaravatta

21
Cambodia: A Country Study

led a demonstration demanding his release. They as well as other

nationalists apparently overestimated the Japanese willingness to back them, for the Vichy authorities quickly arrested the demonstrators and gave Pach Chhoeun, one of the Nagaravatta editors, a life sentence (see The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45, ch. 5). The

other editor, Son Ngoc Thanh, escaped from Phnom Penh and

turned up the following year in Tokyo.

In a desperate effort to enlist local support in the final months

of the war, the Japanese dissolved the French colonial administration on March 9, 1945, and urged Cambodia to declare its independence within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Four

days later, King Sihanouk decreed an independent Kampuchea

(the original Khmer pronunciation of Cambodia). Son Ngoc Thanh

returned from Tokyo in May, and he was appointed foreign

minister. On August 15, 1945, the day Japan surrendered, a new

government was established with Son Ngoc Thanh acting as prime

minister. When an Allied force occupied Phnom Penh in October,

Thanh was arrested for collaboration with the Japanese and was

sent into exile in France to remain under house arrest. Some of

his supporters went to northwestern Cambodia, then still under

Thai control, where they banded together as one faction in the

Khmer Issarak (see Appendix B) movement, originally formed with

Thai encouragement in the 1940s.

The Struggle for Independence

Cambodia's situation at the end of the war was chaotic. The Free

French, under General Charles de Gaulle, were determined to recover Indochina, though they offered Cambodia and the other

Indochinese protectorates a carefully circumscribed measure of self- government. Convinced that they had a "civilizing mission," they

envisioned Indochina' s participation in a French Union of former

colonies that shared the common experience of French culture.

Neither the urban professional elites nor the common people,

however, were attracted by this arrangement. For Cambodians of

practically all walks of life, the brief period of independence, from

March to October of 1945, was an invigorating breath of fresh air. The lassitude of the Khmer was a thing of the past.

In Phnom Penh, Sihanouk, acting as head of state, was placed

in the extremely delicate position of negotiating with the French

for full independence while trying to neutralize party politicians

and supporters of the Khmer Issarak and Viet Minh who considered him a French collaborator. During the tumultuous period between 1946 and 1953, Sihanouk displayed the remarkable aptitude

for political survival that sustained him before and after his fall

22
Angkor Wat from the causeway

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist

from power in March 1970. The Khmer Issarak was an extremely

heterogeneous guerrilla movement, operating in the border areas. The group included indigenous leftists, Vietnamese leftists, antimonarchical nationalists (Khmer Serei—see Appendix B) loyal to Son Ngoc Thanh, and plain bandits taking advantage of the chaos

to terrorize villagers. Though their fortunes rose and fell during

the immediate postwar period (a major blow was the overthrow

of a friendly leftist government in Bangkok in 1947), by 1954 the

Khmer Issarak operating with the Viet Minh by some estimates

controlled as much as 50 percent of Cambodia's territory.

In 1946 the French allowed the Cambodians to form political

parties and to hold elections for a Consultative Assembly that would

advise the monarch on drafting the country's constitution. The two

major parties were both headed by royal princes. The Democratic

Party, led by Prince Sisowath Yuthevong, espoused immediate in- dependence, democratic reforms, and parliamentary government.

Its supporters were teachers, civil servants, politically active members of the Buddhist priesthood, and others whose opinions had

been greatly influenced by the nationalistic appeals of Nagaravatta

before it was closed down by the French in 1942. Many Democrats

sympathized with the violent methods of the Khmer Issarak. The

Liberal Party, led by Prince Norodom Norindeth, represented the

interests of the old rural elites, including large landowners. They

23
Cambodia: A Country Study

preferred continuing some form of the colonial relationship with

France, and advocated gradual democratic reform. In the Consultative Assembly election held in September 1946, the Democrats

won fifty out of sixty-seven seats. With a solid majority in the assembly, the Democrats drafted a constitution modeled on that of the French Fourth Republic.

Power was concentrated in the hands of a popularly elected National Assembly. The king reluctantly proclaimed the new constitution on May 6, 1947. While it recognized him as the ''spiritual

head of the state," it reduced him to the status of a constitutional

monarch, and it left unclear the extent to which he could play an

active role in the politics of the nation. Sihanouk would turn this ambiguity to his advantage in later years, however.

In the December 1947 elections for the National Assembly, the

Democrats again won a large majority. Despite this, dissension

within the party was rampant. Its founder, Prince Yuthevong, had

died and no clear leader had emerged to succeed him. During the

period 1948 to 1949, the Democrats appeared united only in their

opposition to legislation sponsored by the king or his appointees.

A major issue was the king's receptivity to independence within

the French Union, proposed in a draft treaty offered by the French

in late 1948. Following dissolution of the National Assembly in September 1949, agreement on the pact was reached through an

exchange of letters between King Sihanouk and the French government. It went into effect two months later, though National Assembly ratification of the treaty was never secured.

The treaty granted Cambodia what Sihanouk called "fifty per- cent independence": by it, the colonial relationship was formally

ended, and the Cambodians were given control of most administrative functions. Cambodian armed forces were granted freedom

of action within a self-governing autonomous zone comprising

Batdambang and Siemreab provinces, which had been recovered

from Thailand after World War II, but which the French, hardpressed elsewhere, did not have the resources to control. Cambodia was still required to coordinate foreign policy matters with the

High Council of the French Union, however, and France retained a significant measure of control over the judicial system, finances,

and customs. Control of wartime military operations outside the

autonomous zone remained in French hands. France was also per- mitted to maintain military bases on Cambodian territory. In 1950

Cambodia was accorded diplomatic recognition by the United States and by most noncommunist powers, but in Asia only Thailand and

the Republic of Korea (South Korea) extended recognition.

24
Historical Setting

The Democrats won a majority in the second National Assembly election in September 1951, and they continued their policy

of opposing the king on practically all fronts. In an effort to win

greater popular approval, Sihanouk asked the French to release

nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh from exile and to allow him to return

to his country. He made a triumphant entry into Phnom Penh on

October 29, 1951. It was not long, however, before he began

demanding withdrawal of French troops from Cambodia. He reiter- ated this demand in early 1952 in Khmer Krok (Khmer Awake) a weekly newspaper that he had founded. The newspaper was forced

to cease publication in March, and Son Ngoc Thanh fled the capital with a few armed followers to join the Khmer Issarak. Branded

alternately a communist and an agent of the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) by Sihanouk, he remained in exile

until Lon Nol established the Khmer Republic in 1970.

In June 1952, Sihanouk announced the dismissal of his cabinet,

suspended the constitution, and assumed control of the government as prime minister. Then, without clear constitutional sanction, he dissolved the National Assembly and proclaimed martial

law in January 1953. Sihanouk exercised direct rule for almost three

years, from June 1952 until February 1955. After dissolution of

the assembly, he created an Advisory Council to supplant the legislature and appointed his father, Norodom Suramarit, as regent.

In March 1953, Sihanouk went to France. Ostensibly, he was

traveling for his health; actually, he was mounting an intensive

campaign to persuade the French to grant complete independence.

The climate of opinion in Cambodia at the time was such that if he did not achieve full independence quickly, the people were likely to turn to Son Ngoc Thanh and the Khmer Issarak, who were fully

committed to attaining that goal. At meetings with the French president and with other high officials, the French suggested that Sihanouk was unduly "alarmist" about internal political conditions.

The French also made the thinly veiled threat that, if he continued

to be uncooperative, they might replace him. The trip appeared

to be a failure, but on his way home by way of the United States,

Canada, and Japan, Sihanouk publicized Cambodia's plight in the

media.

To further dramatize his "royal crusade for independence,"

Sihanouk, declaring that he would not return until the French gave

assurances that full independence would be granted, left Phnom

Penh in June to go into self-imposed exile in Thailand. Unwelcome in Bangkok, he moved to his royal villa near the ruins of

Angkor in Siemreab Province. Siemreab, part of the autonomous

military zone established in 1949, was commanded by Lieutenant

25
Cambodia: A Country Study

Colonel Lon Nol, formerly a right-wing politician who was becoming a prominent, and in time would be an indispensable, Sihanouk

ally within the military. From his Siemreab base, the king and Lon

Nol contemplated plans for resistance if the French did not meet

their terms. Sihanouk was making a high- stakes gamble, for the French could

easily have replaced him with a more pliable monarch; however,

the military situation was deteriorating throughout Indochina, and

the French government, on July 3, 1953, declared itself ready to grant full independence to the three states of Cambodia, Vietnam,

and Laos. Sihanouk insisted on his own terms, which included full control of national defense, the police, the courts, and financial matters. The French yielded: the police and the judiciary were trans- ferred to Cambodian control at the end of August, and in October

the country assumed full command of its military forces. King

Sihanouk, now a hero in the eyes of his people, returned to Phnom

Penh in triumph, and independence day was celebrated on November 9, 1953. Control of residual matters affecting sovereignty, such

as financial and budgetary affairs, passed to the new Cambodian

state in 1954.

Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954-70

Sihanouk continues to be one of the most controversial figures

in Southeast Asia's turbulent, and often tragic, postwar history.

Admirers view him as one of the country's great patriots, whose

insistence on strict neutrality kept Cambodia out of the maelstrom

of war and out of the revolution in neighboring Vietnam for more

than fifteen years before he was betrayed by his close associate,

Lon Nol. Critics attack him for his vanity, eccentricities, and in- tolerance of any political views different from his own. One such

critic, Michael Vickery, asserts that beneath the neutralist rhetoric

Sihanouk presided over a regime that was oppressively reactionary and, in some instances, as violent in its suppression of politi- cal opposition as the Khmer Rouge. According to Vickery, the royal

armed forces under Lon Nol slaughtered women and children in

pro-Khmer Issarak regions of Batdambang in 1954 using methods

that were later to become routine under Pol Pot. Another critical observer, Milton E. Osborne, writing as an Australian expatriate

in Phnom Penh during the late 1960s, describes the Sihanouk years

in terms of unbridled greed and corruption, of a foreign policy

inspired more by opportunism than by the desire to preserve national independence, of an economy and a political system that were

rapidly coming apart, and of the prince's obsession with making

outrageously mediocre films—one of which starred himself and his

wife, Princess Monique.

26
Historical Setting

Sihanouk was all of these things—patriot, neutralist, embodiment of the nation's destiny, eccentric, rigid defender of the sta- tus quo, and promoter of the worst sort of patron-client politics.

He believed that he single-handedly had won Cambodia's independence from the French. The contributions of other nationalists, such

as Son Ngoc Thanh and the Viet Minh, were conveniently forgotten. Sihanouk also believed he had the right to run the state in a manner not very different from that of the ancient Khmer kings

that is, as an extension of his household. Unlike the ancient "godkings," however, he established genuine rapport with ordinary

Cambodians. He made frequent, often impromptu, trips throughout the country, visiting isolated villages, chatting with peasants,

receiving petitions, passing out gifts, and scolding officials for mismanagement. According to British author and journalist William

Shawcross, Sihanouk was able to create a "unique brand of personal populism." To ordinary Cambodians, his eccentricities, volatility, short temper, sexual escapades, and artistic flights of fancy were an expression of royal charisma rather than an occasion for scandal. Sihanouk's delight in making life difficult for foreign diplomats and journalists, moreover, amused his subjects. Ultimately,

the eccentric humanity of Sihanouk was to contrast poignantly with

the random brutality of his Khmer Rouge successors. The Geneva Conference

Although Cambodia had achieved independence by late 1953,

its military situation remained unsettled. Noncommunist factions

of the Khmer Issarak had joined the government, but communist

Viet Minh activities increased at the very time French Union forces were stretched thin elsewhere. In April 1954, several Viet Minh

battalions crossed the border into Cambodia. Royalist forces en- gaged them but could not force their complete withdrawal. In part,

the communists were attempting to strengthen their bargaining

position at the Geneva Conference that had been scheduled to begin

in late April.

The Geneva Conference was attended by representatives of Cambodia, North Vietnam, the Associated State of Vietnam (the

predecessor of the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam), Laos,

the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, and the United States. One goal of the conference was to restore a lasting peace in Indochina. The discussions on Indochina began on May 8, 1954. The North Vietnamese attempted to get representation for the resistance government that had been established in

the south, but failed. On July 21, 1954, the conference reached an agreement calling for a cessation of hostilities in Indochina. With

27
Cambodia: A Country Study

respect to Cambodia, the agreement stipulated that all Viet Minh

military forces be withdrawn within ninety days and that Cambodian resistance forces be demobilized within thirty days. In a

separate agreement signed by the Cambodian representative, the

French and the Viet Minh agreed to withdraw all forces from Cambodian soil by October 1954.

In exchange for the withdrawal of Viet Minh forces, the communist representatives in Geneva wanted full neutrality for Cambodia and for Laos that would prevent the basing of United States military forces in these countries. On the eve of the conference's

conclusion, however, the Cambodian representative, Sam Sary,

insisted that, if Cambodia were to be genuinely independent, it must not be prohibited from seeking whatever military assistance

it desired (Cambodia had earlier appealed to Washington for military aid). The conference accepted this point over North Vietnam's

strenuous objections. In the final agreement, Cambodia accepted a watered-down neutrality, vowing not to join any military alli- ance "not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the

United Nations" or to allow the basing of foreign military forces on its territory "as long as its security is not threatened."

The conference agreement established the International Control Commission (officially called the International Commission

for Supervision and Control) in all the Indochinese countries. Made

up of representatives from Canada, Poland, and India, it supervised the cease-fire, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the release

of prisoners of war, and overall compliance with the terms of the

agreement. The French and most of the Viet Minh forces were withdrawn on schedule in October 1954.

Domestic Developments

The Geneva agreement also stipulated that general elections

should be held in Cambodia during 1955 and that the International

Control Commission should monitor them to ensure fairness.

Sihanouk was more determined than ever to defeat the Democrats

(who, on the basis of their past record, were expected to win the

election). The king attempted unsuccessfully to have the constitution amended. On March 2, 1955, he announced his abdication

in favor of his father, Norodom Suramarit. Assuming the title of

samdech (prince), Sihanouk explained that this action was neces- sary in order to give him a free hand to engage in politics.

To challenge the Democrats, Prince Sihanouk established his own

political machine, the oddly named Sangkum Reastr Niyum (Popular Socialist Community), commonly referred to as the Sangkum.

The name is odd because its most important components were

28
Historical Setting

right-wing parties that were virulently anticommunist. The Sangkum's emergence in early 1955 unified most right-wing groups

under the prince's auspices. In the September election, Sihanouk's

new party decisively defeated the Democrats, the Khmer Independence Party of Son Ngoc Thanh, and the leftist Pracheachon

(Citizens') Party, winning 83 percent of the vote and all of the seats in the National Assembly.

Khmer nationalism, loyalty to the monarch, struggle against in- justice and corruption, and protection of the Buddhist religion were major themes in Sangkum ideology. The party adopted a particularly conservative interpretation of Buddhism, common in the Theravada countries of Southeast Asia, that the social and economic

inequalities among people were legitimate because of the workings

of karma (see Buddhism, ch. 2). For the poorer classes, virtuous

and obedient conduct opened up the possibility of being born into a higher station in a future life. The appeal to religion won the

allegiance of the country's many Buddhist priests, who were a particularly influential group in rural villages.

As the 1960s began, organized political opposition to Sihanouk

and the Sangkum virtually had disappeared. According to Vickery, the Democratic Party disbanded in 1957 after its leaders

who had been beaten by soldiers—requested the privilege of joining the Sangkum.

Despite its defense of the status quo, especially the interests of

rural elites, the Sangkum was not an exclusively right-wing organization. Sihanouk included a number of leftists in his party and

government. Among these were future leaders of the Khmer Rouge.

Hu Nim and Hou Yuon served in several ministries between 1958

and 1963, and Khieu Samphan served briefly as secretary of state for commerce in 1963.

Sihanouk's attitude toward the left was paradoxical. He often

declared that if he had not been a prince, he would have become

a revolutionary. Sihanouk's chronic suspicion of United States in- tentions in the region, his perception of revolutionary China as Cambodia's most valuable ally, his respect for such prominent and

capable leftists as Hou, Hu, and Khieu, and his vague notions of

"royal socialism" all impelled him to experiment with socialist policies. In 1963 the prince announced the nationalization of banking, foreign trade, and insurance as a means of reducing foreign

control of the economy. In 1964 a state trading company, the National Export-Import Corporation, was established to handle for- eign commerce. The declared purposes of nationalization were to give Khmer nationals, rather than Chinese or Vietnamese, a greater

role in the nation's trade, to eliminate middlemen and to conserve

29
Cambodia: A Country Study

foreign exchange through the limiting of unnecessary luxury imports. As a result of this policy, foreign investment quickly disappeared, and a kind of "crony socialism" emerged somewhat similar

to the "crony capitalism" that evolved in the Philippines under

President Ferdinand Marcos. Lucrative state monopolies were par- celed out to Sihanouk's most loyal retainers, who "milked" them

for cash.

Sihanouk was headed steadily for a collision with the right. To

counter charges of one-man rule, the prince declared that he would

relinquish control of candidate selection and would permit more

than one Sangkum candidate to run for each seat in the September 1966 National Assembly election. The returns showed a sur- prising upsurge in the conservative vote at the expense of more

moderate and left-wing elements, although Hou, Hu, and Khieu

were reelected by their constituencies. General Lon Nol became

prime minister.

Out of concern that the right wing might cause an irreparable

split within the Sangkum and might challenge his domination of

the political system, Sihanouk set up a "counter government" (like

the British "shadow cabinet") packed with his most loyal personal

followers and with leading leftists, hoping that it would exert a re- straining influence on Lon Nol. Leftists accused the general of being

groomed by Western intelligence agencies to lead a bloody anticommunist coup d'etat similar to that of General Soeharto in Indonesia. Injured in an automobile accident, Lon Nol resigned in April

1967. Sihanouk replaced him with a trusted centrist, Son Sann.

This was the twenty-third successive Sangkum cabinet and government to have been appointed by Sihanouk since the party was

formed in 1955.

Nonaligned Foreign Policy

Sihanouk's nonaligned foreign policy, which emerged in the

months following the Geneva Conference, cannot be understood

without reference to Cambodia's past history of foreign subjugation and its very uncertain prospects for survival as the war between North Vietnam and South Vietnam intensified. Soon after the 1954 Geneva Conference, Sihanouk expressed some interest

in integrating Cambodia into the framework of the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO), which included Cambodia, Laos,

and South Vietnam within the "treaty area," although none of

these states was a signatory. But meetings in late 1954 with India's

Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma's Premier U Nu

made him receptive to the appeal of nonalignment. Moreover, the

prince was somewhat uneasy about a United States-dominated

30
Angkor Wat and its galleries

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist

alliance that included one old enemy, Thailand, and encompassed

another, South Vietnam, each of which offered sanctuary to antiSihanouk dissidents.

At the Bandung Conference in April 1955, Sihanouk held pri- vate meetings with Premier Zhou Enlai of China and Foreign

Minister Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam. Both assured him

that their countries would respect Cambodia's independence and

territorial integrity. His experience with the French, first as a client,

then as the self-proclaimed leader of the "royal crusade for independence," apparently led him to conclude that the United States,

like France, would eventually be forced to leave Southeast Asia.

From this perspective, the Western presence in Indochina was only

a temporary interruption of the dynamics of the region—continued

Vietnamese (and perhaps even Thai) expansion at Cambodia's ex- pense. Accommodation with North Vietnam and friendly ties with

China during the late 1950s and the 1960s were tactics designed

to counteract these dynamics. China accepted Sihanouk's overtures and became a valuable counterweight to growing Vietnamese and

Thai pressure on Cambodia.

Cambodia's relations with China were based on mutual interests. Sihanouk hoped that China would restrain the Vietnamese and the

Thai from acting to Cambodia's detriment. The Chinese, in turn,

viewed Cambodia's nonalignment as vital in order to prevent the

31
Cambodia: A Country Study

encirclement of their country by the United States and its allies. When Premier Zhou Enlai visited Phnom Penh in 1956, he asked

the country's Chinese minority, numbering about 300,000, to cooperate in Cambodia's development, to stay out of politics, and

to consider adopting Cambodian citizenship. This gesture helped

to resolve a sensitive issue—the loyalty of Cambodian Chinese

that had troubled the relationship between Phnom Penh and Beijing. In 1960 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and

Nonaggression. After the Sino-Soviet rift Sihanouk's ardent friendship with China contributed to generally cooler ties with Moscow.

China was not the only large power to which Sihanouk looked

for patronage, however. Cambodia's quest for security and nationbuilding assistance impelled the prince to search beyond Asia and

to accept help from all donors as long as there was no impingement upon his country's sovereignty. With this end in mind,

Sihanouk turned to the United States in 1955 and negotiated a mili- tary aid agreement that secured funds and equipment for the Royal

Khmer Armed Forces (Forces Armees Royales Khmeres

FARK—see Appendix B). A United States Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG) was established in Phnom Penh to supervise the delivery and the use of equipment that began to arrive from

the United States. By the early 1960s, aid from Washington constituted 30 percent of Cambodia's defense budget and 14 percent

of total budget inflows (see The First Indochina War, 1945-54,

ch. 5). Relations with the United States, however, proved to be stormy.

United States officials both in Washington and in Phnom Penh

frequently underestimated the prince and considered him to be an

erratic figure with minimal understanding of the threat posed by

Asian communism. Sihanouk easily reciprocated this mistrust be- cause several developments aroused his suspicion of United States intentions toward his country.

One of these developments was the growing United States in- fluence within the Cambodian armed forces. The processing of

equipment deliveries and the training of Cambodian personnel had

forged close ties between United States military advisers and their

Cambodian counterparts. Military officers of both nations also

shared apprehensions about the spread of communism in Southeast

Asia. Sihanouk considered FARK to be Washington's most powerful constituency in his country. The prince also feared that a number

of high-ranking, rightist FARK officers led by Lon Nol were becoming too powerful and that, by association with these officers,

United States influence in Cambodia was becoming too deeply

rooted.

32
Historical Setting

A second development included the repetition of overflights by

United States and South Vietnamese military aircraft within Cambodian airspace and border incursions by South Vietnamese troops

in hot pursuit of Viet Cong insurgents who crossed into Cambodian territory when military pressure upon them became too sus- tained. As the early 1960s wore on, this increasingly sensitive issue

contributed to the deterioration of relations between Phnom Penh

and Washington.

A third development was Sihanouk's own belief that he had been

targeted by United States intelligence agencies for replacement by

a more pro-Western leader. Evidence to support this suspicion came

to light in 1959 when the government discovered a plot to over- throw Sihanouk. The conspiracy involved several Khmer leaders

suspected of American connections. Among them were Sam Sary, a leader of right-wing Khmer Serei troops in South Vietnam; Son

Ngoc Thanh, the early nationalist leader once exiled into Thailand;

and Dap Chhuon, the military governor of Siemreab Province.

Another alleged plot involved Dap Chhuon' s establishment of a

"free" state that would have included Siemreab Province and Kampong Thum (Kampong Thorn) Province and the southern areas of Laos that were controlled by the rightist Laotian prince, Boun

Oum.

These developments, magnified by Sihanouk's abiding suspicions, eventually undermined Phnom Penh's relations with Washington. In November 1963, the prince charged that the United

States was continuing to support the subversive activities of the

Khmer Serei in Thailand and in South Vietnam, and he announced

the immediate termination of Washington's aid program to Cambodia. Relations continued to deteriorate, and the final break came

in May 1965 amid increasing indications of airspace violations by

South Vietnamese and by United States aircraft and of ground fighting between Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops and

Viet Cong insurgents in the Cambodian border areas. In the meantime, Cambodia's relations with North Vietnam and

with South Vietnam, as well as the rupture with Washington,

reflected Sihanouk's efforts to adjust to geopolitical realities in

Southeast Asia and to keep his country out of the escalating conflict in neighboring South Vietnam. In the early to mid-1960s, this effort required a tilt toward Hanoi because the government in

Saigon tottered on the brink of anarchy. In the cities, the administration of Ngo Dinh Diem and the military regimes that succeeded

it had become increasingly ineffectual and unstable, while in the

countryside the government forces were steadily losing ground to the Hanoi-backed insurgents. To observers in Phnom Penh, South

33
Cambodia: A Country Study

Vietnam's short-term viability was seriously in doubt, and this compelled a new tack in Cambodian foreign policy. First, Cambodia

severed diplomatic ties with Saigon in August 1963. The following March, Sihanouk announced plans to establish diplomatic re- lations with North Vietnam and to negotiate a border settlement

directly with Hanoi. These plans were not implemented quickly,

however, because the North Vietnamese told the prince that any

problem concerning Cambodia's border with South Vietnam would

have to be negotiated directly with the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN—see Appendix B). Cambodia

opened border talks with the front in mid- 1966, and the latter recog- nized the inviolability of Cambodia's borders a year later. North

Vietnam quickly followed suit. Cambodia was the first foreign

government to recognize the NFLSVN's Provisional Revolutionary Government after it was established in June 1969. Sihanouk was the only foreign head of state to attend the funeral of Ho Chi

Minh, North Vietnam's deceased leader, in Hanoi three months

later. In the late 1960s, while preserving relations with China and with

North Vietnam, Sihanouk sought to restore a measure of equilibrium by improving Cambodia's ties with the West. This shift in course by the prince represented another adjustment to prevailing

conditions in Southeast Asia. North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

forces were increasing their use of sanctuaries in Cambodia, which

also served as the southern terminus of the Ho Chi Minh Trail,

their logistical resupply route originating in North Vietnam. Cambodian neutrality in the conflict thus was eroding, and China, preoccupied with its Cultural Revolution, did not intercede with Hanoi.

On Cambodia's eastern border, South Vietnam, surprisingly, had

not collapsed, even in the face of the communist Tet Offensive in

1968, and President Nguyen Van Thieu's government was bringing a measure of stability to the war-ravaged country. As the government in Phnom Penh began to feel keenly the loss of economic and

military aid from the United States, which had totaled about

US$400 million between 1955 and 1963, it began to have second

thoughts about the rupture with Washington. The unavailability

of American equipment and spare parts was exacerbated by the

poor quality and the small numbers of Soviet, Chinese, and French

substitutes.

In late 1967 and in early 1968, Sihanouk signaled that he would

raise no objection to hot pursuit of communist forces by South Viet- namese or by United States troops into Cambodian territory.

Washington, in the meantime, accepted the recommendation of

the United States Military Assistance Command—Vietnam

34
Historical Setting

(MACV) and, beginning in March 1969, ordered a series of air- strikes (dubbed the Menu series) against Cambodian sanctuaries

used by the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Whether or not

these bombing missions were authorized aroused considerable controversy, and assertions by the Nixon administration that Sihanouk

had "allowed" or even "encouraged" them were disputed by critics such as British journalist William Shawcross. On a diplomatic level,

however, the Menu airstrikes did not impede bilateral relations from

moving forward. In April 1969, Nixon sent a note to the prince

affirming that the United States recognized and respected "the

sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of

Cambodia with its present frontiers." Shortly thereafter, in June

1969, full diplomatic relations were restored between Phnom Penh

and Washington.

The Cambodian Left: The Early Phases

The history of the communist movement in Cambodia can be

divided into six phases: the emergence of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP —see Appendix B), whose members were almost

exclusively Vietnamese, before World War II; the ten-year struggle for independence from the French, when a separate Cambodian communist party, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B), was established

under Vietnamese auspices; the period following the Second Party

Congress of the KPRP in 1960, when Saloth Sar (Pol Pot after 1976) and other future Khmer Rouge leaders gained control of its apparatus; the revolutionary struggle from the initiation of the

Khmer Rouge insurgency in 1967-68 to the fall of the Lon Nol

government in April 1975; the Democratic Kampuchea regime,

from April 1975 to January 1979; and the period following the Third

Party Congress of the KPRP in January 1979, when Hanoi effec- tively assumed control over Cambodia's government and communist party.

Much of the movement's history has been shrouded in mystery,

largely because successive purges, especially during the Democratic

Kampuchea period, have left so few survivors to recount their

experiences. One thing is evident, however; the tension between

Khmer and Vietnamese was a major theme in the movement's

development. In the three decades between the end of World War

II and the Khmer Rouge victory, the appeal of communism to Western-educated intellectuals (and to a lesser extent its more

inchoate attraction for poor peasants) was tempered by the apprehension that the much stronger Vietnamese movement was using

communism as an ideological rationale for dominating the Khmer.

35
Cambodia: A Country Study

The analogy between the Vietnamese communists and the Nguyen

dynasty, which had legitimized its encroachments in the nineteenth

century in terms of the 4 'civilizing mission" of Confucianism, was

persuasive. Thus, the new brand of indigenous communism that

emerged after 1960 combined nationalist and revolutionary appeals

and, when it could afford to, exploited the virulent anti-Vietnamese

sentiments of the Khmers. Khmer Rouge literature in the 1970s

frequently referred to the Vietnamese asyuon (barbarian), a term

dating from the Angkorian period. In 1930 Ho Chi Minh founded the Vietnamese Communist Party

by unifying three smaller communist movements that had emerged

in Tonkin, in Annam, and in Cochinchina during the late 1920s.

The name was changed almost immediately to the ICP, ostensibly to include revolutionaries from Cambodia and Laos. Almost

without exception, however, all the earliest party members were

Vietnamese. By the end of World War II, a handful of Cambodians had joined its ranks, but their influence on the Indochinese

communist movement and on developments within Cambodia was

negligible.

Viet Minh units occasionally made forays into Cambodia bases

during their war against the French, and, in conjunction with the

leftist government that ruled Thailand until 1947, the Viet Minh

encouraged the formation of armed, left-wing Khmer Issarak bands.

On April 17, 1950 (twenty-five years to the day before the Khmer

Rouge captured Phnom Penh), the first nationwide congress of the

Khmer Issarak groups convened, and the United Issarak Front was

established. Its leader was Son Ngoc Minh (possibly a brother of

the nationalist Son Ngoc Thanh), and a third of its leadership consisted of members of the ICP. According to the historian David P. Chandler, the leftist Issarak groups, aided by the Viet Minh, oc- cupied a sixth of Cambodia's territory by 1952; and, on the eve

of the Geneva Conference, they controlled as much as one half of

the country.

In 1951 the ICP was reorganized into three national units—the

Vietnam Workers' Party, the Lao Itsala, and the KPRP. According to a document issued after the reorganization, the Vietnam

Workers' Party would continue to "supervise" the smaller Laotian

and Cambodian movements. Most KPRP leaders and rank-andfile seem to have been either Khmer Krom, or ethnic Vietnamese

living in Cambodia. The party's appeal to indigenous Khmers

appears to have been minimal.

According to Democratic Kampuchea's version of party history,

the Viet Minh's failure to negotiate a political role for the KPRP

at the 1954 Geneva Conference represented a betrayal of the

36
Ruins of the Bayon Temple, thirteenth century

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs. Robert E. Hammerquist

Cambodian movement, which still controlled large areas of the

countryside and which commanded at least 5,000 armed men. Following the conference, about 1,000 members of the KPRP, including Son Ngoc Minh, made a "Long March" into North Vietnam,

where they remained in exile. In late 1954, those who stayed in

Cambodia founded a legal political party, the Pracheachon Party,

which participated in the 1955 and the 1958 National Assembly

elections. In the September 1955 election, it won about 4 percent

of the vote but did not secure a seat in the legislature. Members

of the Pracheachon were subject to constant harassment and to arrests because the party remained outside Sihanouk's Sangkum.

Government attacks prevented it from participating in the 1962

election and drove it underground. Sihanouk habitually labeled

local leftists the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B), a term that later came to signify the party and the state headed by Pol Pot, Ieng

Sary, Khieu Samphan, and their associates.

During the mid-1950s, KPRP factions, the "urban committee"

(headed by Tou Samouth), and the "rural committee" (headed

by Sieu Heng), emerged. In very general terms, these groups es- poused divergent revolutionary lines. The prevalent "urban" line,

endorsed by North Vietnam, recognized that Sihanouk, by virtue

of his success in winning independence from the French, was a genuine national leader whose neutralism and deep distrust of the

37
Cambodia: A Country Study

United States made him a valuable asset in Hanoi's struggle to "liberate" South Vietnam. Champions of this line hoped that the

prince could be persuaded to distance himself from the right wing

and to adopt leftist policies. The other line, supported for the most

part by rural cadres who were familiar with the harsh realities of

the countryside, advocated an immediate struggle to overthrow the

"feudalist" Sihanouk. In 1959 Sieu Heng defected to the government and provided the security forces with information that enabled

them to destroy as much as 90 percent of the party's rural apparatus. Although communist networks in Phnom Penh and in other

towns under Tou Samouth's jurisdiction fared better, only a few

hundred communists remained active in the country by 1960.

The Paris Student Group

During the 1950s, Khmer students in Paris organized their own

communist movement, which had little, if any, connection to the

hard-pressed party in their homeland. From their ranks came the

men and women who returned home and took command of the

party apparatus during the 1960s, led an effective insurgency against

Sihanouk and Lon Nol from 1968 until 1975, and established the

regime of Democratic Kampuchea.

Pol Pot, who rose to the leadership of the communist movement

in the 1960s, was born in 1928 (some sources say in 1925) in Kampong Thum Province, north of Phnom Penh. He attended a technical high school in the capital and then went to Paris in 1949 to study radio electronics (other sources say he attended a school for printers and typesetters and also studied civil engineering).

Described by one source as a "determined, rather plodding or- ganizer," he failed to obtain a degree, but, according to the Jesuit

priest, Father Francois Ponchaud, he acquired a taste for the classics of French literature as well as for the writings of Marx.

Another member of the Paris student group was Ieng Sary. He

was a Chinese-Khmer born in 1930 in South Vietnam. He attended

the elite Lycee Sisowath in Phnom Penh before beginning courses

in commerce and politics at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques in

France. Khieu Samphan, considered "one of the most brilliant intellects of his generation," was born in 1931 and specialized in eco- nomics and politics during his time in Paris. In talent he was rivaled

by Hou Yuon, born in 1930, who was described as being "of truly

astounding physical and intellectual strength," and who studied

economics and law. Son Sen, born in 1930, studied education and

literature; Hu Nim, born in 1932, studied law.

These men were perhaps the most educated leaders in the his- tory of Asian communism. Two of them, Khieu Samphan and Hou

38
Historical Setting

Yuon, earned doctorates from the University of Paris; Hu Nim

obtained his degree from the University of Phnom Penh in 1965.

In retrospect, it seems enigmatic that these talented members of

the elite, sent to France on government scholarships, could launch

the bloodiest and most radical revolution in modern Asian history.

Most came from landowner or civil servant families. Pol Pot and

Hou Yuon may have been related to the royal family. An older

sister of Pol Pot had been a concubine at the court of King

Monivong. Three of the Paris group forged a bond that survived

years of revolutionary struggle and intraparty strife, Pol Pot and

Ieng Sary married Khieu Ponnary and Khieu Thirith (also known

as Ieng Thirith), purportedly relatives of Khieu Samphan. These

two well-educated women also played a central role in the regime

of Democratic Kampuchea.

The intellectual ferment of Paris must have been a dizzying ex- perience for young Khmers fresh from Phnom Penh or the

provinces. A number sought refuge in the dogma of orthodox

Marxism-Leninism. At some time between 1949 and 1951, Pol Pot

and Ieng Sary joined the French Communist Party, the most tightiy

disciplined and Stalinist of Western Europe's communist movements. In 1951 the two men went to East Berlin to participate in a youth festival. This experience is considered to have been a turning

point in their ideological development. Meeting with Khmers who

were fighting with the Viet Minn (and whom they subsequently

judged to be too subservient to the Vietnamese), they became con- vinced that only a tighdy disciplined party organization and a readiness for armed struggle could achieve revolution. They transformed

the Khmer Students' Association (KSA), to which most of the 200

or so Khmer students in Paris belonged, into a platform for nationalist and leftist ideas. In 1952 Pol Pot, Hou Yuon, Ieng Sary,

and other leftists gained notoriety by sending an open letter to Sihanouk calling him the "strangler of infant democracy." A year

later, the French authorities closed down the KSA. In 1956,

however, Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan helped to establish a new

Marxist-oriented group, the Khmer Students' Union.

The doctoral dissertations written by Hou Yuon and Khieu Samphan express basic themes that were later to become the cornerstones of the policy adopted by Democratic Kampuchea. The central

role of the peasants in national development was espoused by Hou

Yuon in his 1955 thesis, "The Cambodian Peasants and Their

Prospects for Modernization," which challenged the conventional

view that urbanization and industrialization are necessary precursors of development. The major argument in Khieu Samphan's 1959 thesis, "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development,"

39
Cambodia: A Country Study

was that the country had to become self-reliant and had to end its economic dependency on the developed world. In its general contours, Khieu's work reflected the influence of a branch of the "dependency theory" school, which blamed lack of development in

the Third World on the economic domination of the industrialized nations.

The KPRP Second Congress

After returning to Cambodia in 1953, Pol Pot threw himself into

party work first in Kampong Cham Province (Kompong Cham)

and then in Phnom Penh under Tou Samouth's "urban committee." His comrades, Ieng Sary and Hou Yuon, became teachers

at a new private high school, the Lycee Kambuboth, which Hou

Yuon helped to establish. Khieu Samphan returned from Paris in

1959, taught as a member of the law faculty of the University of

Phnom Penh, and started a left-wing, French-language publication, L'Observateur. The paper soon acquired a reputation in Phnom

Penh's small academic circle. The following year, the government

closed the paper, and Sihanouk's police publicly humiliated Khieu

by undressing and photographing him in public—as Shawcross

notes, "not the sort of humiliation that men forgive or forget."

Yet the experience did not prevent Khieu from advocating cooperation with Sihanouk in order to promote a united front against

United States activities in South Vietnam. As mentioned, Khieu

Samphan, Hou Yuon, and Hu Nim tried to "work through the

system" by joining the Sangkum and by accepting posts in the

prince's government. Hardliners like Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Son

Sen advocated resistance.

In late September 1960, twenty-one leaders of the KPRP held a secret congress in a vacant room of the Phnom Penh railroad

station. This pivotal event remains shrouded in mystery because

its outcome has become an object of contention (and considerable

historical rewriting) between pro-Vietnamese and anti-Vietnamese

Khmer communist factions. The question of cooperation with, or

resistance to, Sihanouk was thoroughly discussed. Tou Samouth,

who advocated a policy of cooperation, was elected general secre- tary of the KPRP that was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK—see Appendix B). His ally, Nuon Chea (also known

as Long Reth), became deputy general secretary; however, Pol Pot

and Ieng Sary were named to the Political Bureau to occupy the

third and the fifth highest positions in the renamed party's hierarchy. The name change is significant. By calling itself a workers'

party, the Cambodian movement claimed equal status with the

Vietnam Workers' Party. The pro-Vietnamese regime of the

40
Historical Setting

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B) implied

in the 1980s that the September 1960 meeting was nothing more

than the second congress of the KPRP.

OnJuly 20, 1962, Tou Samouth disappeared. He may have been

the victim of Sihanouk's police, but some observers suggest that

Pol Pot, who had built up a strong faction within the party, had

him eliminated. In February 1963, at the WPK's second congress,

Pol Pot was chosen to succeed Tou Samouth as the party's general secretary. Tou's allies, Nuon Chea and Keo Meas, were re- moved from the Central Committee and replaced by Son Sen and

Vorn Vet. From then on, Pol Pot and loyal comrades from his Paris

student days controlled the party center, edging out older veterans whom they considered excessively pro-Vietnamese.

In July 1963, Pol Pot and most of the central committee left Phnom Penh to establish an insurgent base in Rotanokiri

(Ratanakiri) Province in the northeast. This is a region inhabited

by tribal minorities, the Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B), whose

rough treatment (including resettlement and forced assimilation)

at the hands of the central government made them willing recruits

for a guerrilla struggle. In 1965 Pol Pot made a visit of several

months duration to North Vietnam and China. He probably

received some training in China, which must have enhanced his

prestige when he returned to the WPK's liberated areas. Despite

friendly relations between Sihanouk and the Chinese, the latter kept

Pol Pot's visit a secret from Sihanouk. In September 1966, the party

changed its name a second time, to the Kampuchean (or Khmer)

Communist Party (KCP—see Appendix B). Adopting the label

4 'communist" suggested that the Cambodian movement was more

advanced than Vietnam's (which was merely a "workers' party"),

and was on the same level as China's.

Into the Maelstrom: Insurrection and War, 1967-75

By the mid-1960s, Sihanouk's delicate balancing act was beginning to go awry. Regionally, the presence of large-scale North Viet- namese and Viet Cong logistical bases on Cambodian territory and

the use of Kampong Saom (then Sihanoukville) as a port of dis- embarkation for supplies being sent to communist troops, as well

as the covert intelligence-gathering, sabotage missions, and overflights by South Vietnamese and United States teams had made

a sham of Cambodian neutrality. Domestically, Sihanouk's sporadic

harassment of the leftists and the withdrawal of his endorsement

from all candidates in the 1966 elections cost the radicals their

chance for victory and alienated them from the prince as well. Sihanouk also lost the support of the rightists by his failure to come

41
Cambodia: A Country Study

to grips with the deteriorating economic situation in the country

and with the growing North Vietnamese and Viet Cong military

presence in Cambodia. In addition to these regional developments and the clash of interests among Phnom Penh's politicized

elite, social tensions also were creating a favorable environment

for the growth of a domestic communist insurgency in the rural

areas. In early 1967, an insurrection broke out in the area around

Samlot in Batdambang, a province long noted for the presence of

large landowners and great disparities of wealth. Local resentment

focused on tax collections and on the decision of the revenue-starved

government to expropriate land to build a sugar refinery near

Samlot. In January 1967, irate villagers attacked a tax collection

brigade—an incident that recalled the 1925 murder of the French

resident in the area. With the probable encouragement of local communist cadres, the insurrection quickly spread through the whole

region. Sihanouk was on one of his frequent sojourns in France,

and Lon Nol, the prime minister, responded harshly. After return- ing home in March 1967, Sihanouk personally supervised counter- insurgency measures. He later mentioned, in an offhand way, that

the effectiveness of the royal armed forces had restored the peace

but that approximately 10,000 people had died.

The insurgency was not suppressed completely. It spread rapidly

from Batdambang to the southern and to the southwestern provinces

of Pouthisat (Pursat), Kampong Chhnang (Kompong Chang),

Kampong Cham, Kampong Spoe (Kompong Speu), Kampot, and

the central province of Kampong Thum. By the end of 1968, unrest was reported in eleven of the country's eighteen provinces.

The Khmer Loeu regions of Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) Province

and Rotanokiri Province fell almost entirely under KCP control

by the end of the decade.

In January 1968, the communists established the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK—see Appendix B; The Second

Indochina War, 1954-75, ch. 5). During Sihanouk's last two years

in power, the RAK obtained minimal assistance from the North

Vietnamese, the Viet Cong, and the Chinese. Although North Vietnam had established a special unit in 1966 to train the Cambodian communists, it was extremely reluctant to alienate Sihanouk

at a time when vital supplies were passing through the port of

Kampong Saom and along the Ho Chi Minh Trail to the Viet Cong

bases along the Cambodia-Vietnam border. Beijing and Moscow

also were providing Sihanouk with arms, many of which were being

used against the insurgents. The indifference of the world communist movement to the Cambodian struggle from 1967 to 1969

42
Historical Setting

made a permanent impression on Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge

leaders.

The March 1970 Coup d'Etat

Sihanouk was away on a trip to Moscow and Beijing when General Lon Nol launched a successful coup d'etat. On the morning

of March 18, 1970, the National Assembly was hastily convened,

and voted unanimously to depose Sihanouk as head of state. Lon

Nol, who had been serving as prime minister, was granted emergency powers. Sirik Matak, an ultraconservative royal prince who

in 1941 had been passed over by the French in favor of his cousin

Norodom Sihanouk as king, retained his post as deputy prime

minister. The new government emphasized that the transfer of

power had been totally legal and constitutional, and it received the

recognition of most foreign governments.

Most middle-class and educated Khmers in Phnom Penh had

grown weary of Sihanouk and apparently welcomed the change

of government. But he was still popular in the villages. Days after the coup, the prince, now in Beijing, broadcast an appeal to the

people to resist the usurpers. Demonstrations and riots occurred

throughout the country. In one incident on March 29, an estimated

40,000 peasants began a march on the capital to demand Sihanouk's

reinstatement. They were dispersed, with many casualties, by contingents of the armed forces and the Khmer Serei.

From Beijing, Sihanouk proclaimed his intention to create a National United Front of Kampuchea (Front Uni National du

Kampuchea—FUNK—see Appendix B). In the prince's words,

this front would embrace 4 'all Khmer both inside and outside the

country—including the faithful, religious people, military men,

civilians, and men and women who cherish the ideals of independence, democracy, neutrality, progressivism, socialism, Buddhism,

nationalism, territorial integrity, and anti-imperialism." A coali- tion, brokered by the Chinese, was hastily formed between the

prince and the KCP. On May 5, 1970, the actual establishment

of FUNK and of the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement Royal d' Union Nationale du Kampuchea

GRUNK—see Appendix B), were announced. Sihanouk assumed

the post of GRUNK head of state, appointing Penn Nouth, one

of his most loyal supporters, as prime minister. Khieu Samphan

was designated deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and

commander in chief of the GRUNK armed forces (though ac- tual military operations were directed by Pol Pot). Hu Nim be- came minister of information, and Hou Yuon assumed multiple

responsibilities as minister of interior, communal reforms, and

43
Cambodia: A Country Study

cooperatives. GRUNK claimed that it was not a government-inexile because Khieu Samphan and the insurgents remained inside

Cambodia.

For Sihanouk and the KCP, this was an extremely useful marriage of convenience. Peasants, motivated by loyalty to the monarchy, rallied to the FUNK cause. The appeal of the Sihanouk-KCP

coalition grew immensely after October 9, 1970, when Lon Nol

abolished the monarchy and redesignated Cambodia as the Khmer

Republic. The concept of a republic was not popular with most

villagers, who had grown up with the idea that something was seri- ously awry in a Cambodia without a monarch.

GRUNK operated on two tiers. Sihanouk and his loyalists re- mained in Beijing, although the prince did make a visit to the "liberated areas" of Cambodia, including Angkor Wat, in March 1973.

The KCP commanded the insurgency within the country. Gradually, the prince was deprived of everything but a passive, figurehead role in the coalition. The KCP told people inside Cambodia

that expressions of support for Sihanouk would result in their liquidation, and when the prince appeared in public overseas to publicize the GRUNK cause, he was treated with almost open contempt

by Ieng Sary and Khieu Samphan. In June 1973, the prince told

the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci that when "they [the Khmer

Rouge] no longer need me, they will spit me out like a cherry pit!

By the end of that year, Sihanouk loyalists had been purged from

all of GRUNK's ministries.

The Widening War

The 1970 coup d'etat that toppled Sihanouk dragged Cambodia into the vortex of a wider war. The escalating conflict pitted

government troops, now renamed the Khmer National Armed

Forces (Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres—FANK—see Appendix B), initially against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong,

and subsequently against the old RAK, now revitalized and re- named the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces

(CPNLAF—see Appendix B).

As combat operations quickly disclosed, the two sides were mismatched. The inequality lay not so much in sheer numbers. Thousands of young urban Cambodians flocked to join FANK in the

months following the coup and, throughout its five-year life, the

republican government forces held a numerical edge over their opponents, the padded payrolls and the phantom units reported in

the press notwithstanding. Instead, FANK was outclassed in training and leadership. With the surge of recruits, the government forces expanded beyond their capacity to absorb the new inductees. Later,

44
Historical Setting

given the press of tactical operations and the need to replace combat casualties, there was insufficient time to impart needed skills to individuals or to units, and lack of training remained the bane

of FANK's existence until its collapse. While individual soldiers

and some government units fought bravely, their leaders—with

notable exceptions—were both corrupt and incompetent. Arrayed

against an armed force of such limited capability was arguably the

best light infantry in the world at the time—the North Vietnamese

and the Viet Cong. And when these forces were supplanted, it was by the tough, rigidly indoctrinated peasant army of the CPNLAF

with its core of Khmer Rouge leaders.

With the fall of Sihanouk, the North Vietnamese and the Viet

Cong became alarmed at the prospect of a pro-Western regime that

might allow the United States to establish a military presence on

their western flank. To prevent this from happening, they began

transferring their military installations away from the border area

to locations deeper within Cambodian territory. A new command

center was established at the city of Kracheh (Kratie). On April

29, 1970, South Vietnamese and United States units unleashed a multi-pronged offensive into Cambodia to destroy the Central Office

for South Vietnam (COSVN), the headquarters for North Viet- namese and Viet Cong combat operations in South Vietnam. Extensive logistical installations and large amounts of supplies were

found and destroyed, but as reporting from the United States MACV subsequently disclosed, still larger amounts of material

already had been moved deeper into Cambodia.

The North Vietnamese army turned on the republican government forces, and by June 1970, three months after the coup, they

and the CPNLAF had swept FANK from the entire northeastern

third of the country. After defeating the government forces, they

turned newly won territories over to the local insurgents. The

Khmer Rouge also established "liberated areas" in the south and

the southwestern parts of the country, where they operated independendy of the Vietnamese. The KCP's debt to the North Vietnamese

after March 1970 was one that Pol Pot was loath to acknowledge;

however, it is clear that without North Vietnamese and Viet Cong

assistance, the revolutionary struggle would have dragged on much

longer than it did.

United States bombing of enemy troop dispositions in

Cambodia—particularly in the summer of 1973, when intense aerial bombardment (known as Arclight) was used to halt a Khmer Rouge

assault on Phnom Penh—bought time for the Lon Nol government,

but did not stem the momentum of the communist forces. United

States official documents give a figure of 79,959 sorties by B-52

45
Cambodia: A Country Study

and F— 1 1 1 aircraft over the country, during which a total of 539, 129

tons of ordnance were dropped, about 350 percent of the tonnage

(153,000 tons) dropped on Japan during World War II. Many of

the bombs that fell in Cambodia struck relatively uninhabited

mountain or forest regions; however, as declassified United States Air Force maps show, others fell over some of the most densely

inhabited areas of the country, such as Siemreab Province, Kampong Chhnang Province, and the countryside around Phnom Penh.

Deaths from the bombing are extremely difficult to estimate, and

figures range from a low of 30,000 to a high of 500,000. Whatever

the real extent of the casualties, the Arclight missions over Cambodia, which were halted in August 15, 1973, by the United States Congress, delivered shattering blows to the structure of life in many

of the country's villages, and, according to some critics, drove the

Cambodian people into the arms of the Khmer Rouge.

The bombing was by far the most controversial aspect of the

United States presence in Cambodia. In his book Sideshow, William

Shawcross provides a vivid image of the hellish conditions, especially in the months ofJanuary to August 1973, when the Arclight

sorties were most intense. He claims that the bombing contributed

to the forging of a brutal and singlemindedly fanatical Khmer Rouge

movement. However, his arguments have been disputed by several

United States officials—including the former ambassador to Cambodia, Emory C. Swank, and the former Air Force commander

in Thailand, General John W. Vogt—in an appendix to the second

volume of the memoirs of then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

From the Khmer Rouge perspective, however, the severity of

the bombings was matched by the treachery of the North Viet- namese. The Cambodian communists had refused to take part in

the Paris peace talks. When North Vietnam and the United States signed the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, bombing missions over Vietnam and Laos were terminated. The fighter bombers and other aircraft thus released were diverted to strike Khmer

Rouge positions in Cambodia.

Early Khmer Rouge Atrocities

One of the earliest accounts of life under the Khmer Rouge was

written in 1973 by a school administrator, Ith Sarin, who had joined

the movement after becoming disillusioned with Lon Nol and the

Khmer Republic, then rose to the status of candidate member of

the KCP, but left the party and returned to Phnom Penh after nine

months in the underground. His work, Regrets for the Khmer Soul

(in Khmer, Sranaoh Pralung Khmer), revealed the secrecy with which

the Khmer Rouge concealed the existence of the communist party,

46
Historical Setting

which they referred to by the sinister term Angkar Loeu (High

Organization), or simply, Angkar. The KCP Central Committee

was referred to as the Kena Mocchhim (or Committee Machine,

mocchhim being derived from the Western term, "machine").

Territories under Angkar control were well organized. Ith Sarin

described a five-level hierarchy of Angkar-controlled bodies reaching

from the six areas, or phumphaek (see Glossary) into which the country was divided down to the hamlet, or phum level. The Angkar

imposed a grim regime in which hatred for Lon Nol, the Americans, and, at times, the North Vietnamese "allies" was assiduously cultivated. Expressions of support for Sihanouk were firmly

discouraged and people were encouraged to spy on each other. Discipline was unremittingly harsh. Ith Sarin concluded from his

experience that the great majority of the people did not like the

Angkar and the collective way of life it imposed, that they despaired

that Sihanouk would ever return to power, and that they would

support the Khmer Republic if it carried out genuine reforms.

Oddly, Lon Nol's security forces banned the book for a time on

the grounds that it was "pro-communist." Although this was not

true, it did provide a foretaste of what the entire Cambodian population would endure after April 1975.

Disturbing stories of Khmer Rouge atrocities began to surface

as the communists prepared to deal the coup de grace to the Khmer

Republic. In March 1974, they captured the old capital city of

Odongk north of Phnom Penh, destroyed it, dispersed its 20,000

inhabitants into the countryside, and executed the teachers and civil servants. The same year, they brutally murdered sixty people, in- cluding women and children, in a small village called Sar Sarsdam

in Siemreab Province. A similar incident was reported at Ang Snuol, a town west of the capital. Other instances of what one observer,

Donald Kirk, described as a "sweeping, almost cosmic policy" of

^discriminate terror, were recounted by refugees who fled to Phnom

Penh or across the Thai border. Kirk contrasted this behavior with

the Viet Cong's use of "a modicum of care and precision" in ap- plying terror in South Vietnam (for instance, assassination of landlords or of South Vietnamese officials). Atrocity stories, however, were considered to be anticommunist propaganda by many, if not

most, Western journalists and other observers; nevertheless, Phnom

Penh's population swelled to as many as 2.5 million people as terri- fied refugees sought to escape not only the United States bombing

and the ground fighting, but the harshness of life under the Angkar.

The Fall of Phnom Penh

The Khmer Rouge initiated their dry- season offensive to capture the beleaguered Cambodian capital on January 1, 1975. Their

47
Cambodia: A Country Study

troops controlled the banks of the Mekong River, and they were

able to rig ingenious mines to sink convoys bringing relief supplies

of food, fuel, and ammunition to the slowly starving city. After

the river was effectively blocked in early February, the United States began airlifts of supplies. This was extremely risky because of

Khmer Rouge rockets. The communists also fired rockets and shells into the city, causing many civilian deaths. Doomed units of republican soldiers dug in around the capital; many of them had run

out of ammunition, and they were overrun as the Khmer Rouge

advanced. American observers, who generally had little esteem for FANK officer corps, were impressed by the determination of the

Khmer enlisted men to fight to the end.

On April 1 , 1975, President Lon Nol resigned and left the country. His exit was prompted by fear of certain death if he fell into

Khmer Rouge hands. The communists had included him among

"seven traitors" who were marked for execution. (The others were

non-communist, nationalist leaders Sirik Matak, Son Ngoc Thanh,

In Tarn, Prime Minister Long Boret, Cheng Heng, who became

head of state after Sihanouk's ouster, and Sosthene Fernandez, the

FANK commander in chief) . Saukham Khoy became acting president of a government that had less than three weeks to live. Last- minute efforts on the part of the United States to arrange a peace

agreement involving Sihanouk ended in failure. On April 12,

United States embassy personnel were evacuated by helicopter. The

ambassador, John Gunther Dean, invited high officials of the

Khmer Republic to join them. But Sirik Matak, Long Boret, Lon

Non (Lon Nol's brother), and most members of Lon Nol's cabi- net declined. They chose to share the fate of their people. All were

executed soon after Khmer Rouge units entered Phnom Penh on

April 17, 1975.

Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78

Mid-April is the beginning of the Cambodian new year, the

year's most festive celebration. For many Cambodians, the fall of

Phnom Penh promised both a new year and a new era of peace.

The people of Phnom Penh and of other cities waited in anticipation for the appearance of their new rulers. The troops who entered the capital on April 1 7 were mostly grim-faced youths clad

in black with the checkered scarves that had become the uniform

of the movement. Their unsmiling demeanor quickly dispelled

popular enthusiasm. People began to realize that, in the eyes of

the victors, the war was not over; it was just beginning, and the

people were the new enemy. According to Father Ponchaud, as

48
Historical Setting

the sense of consternation and dread grew, it seemed that "a slab

of lead had fallen on the city."

Evacuation of Phnom Penh began immediately. The black-clad

troops told the residents that they would move only about "two

or three kilometers" outside the city and would return in "two

or three days. ' ' Other witnesses report being told that the evacuation was because of the threat of an American bombing and that

they did not have to lock their houses since the Khmer Rouge would

"take care of everything" until they returned. The roads out of

the city were clogged with evacuees. Phnom Penh—the population of which, numbering 2.5 million people, included as many

as 1 . 5 million wartime refugees living with relatives or in shantytowns around the urban center—was soon emptied. Similar evacuations occurred at Batdambang, Kampong Cham, Siemreab,

Kampong Thum, and the country's other towns and cities. There were no exceptions to the evacuation. Even Phnom Penh's

hospitals were emptied of their patients. The Khmer Rouge provided transportation for some of the aged and the disabled, and

they set up stockpiles of food outside the city for the refugees;

however, the supplies were inadequate to sustain the hundreds of

thousands of people on the road. Even seriously injured hospital

patients, many without any means of conveyance, were summarily

forced to leave regardless of their condition. According to Khieu

Samphan, the evacuation of Phnom Penh's famished and diseaseracked population resulted in 2,000 to 3,000 deaths, which is probably an understatement. The foreign community, about 800 persons, was quarantined in the French embassy compound, and by

the end of the month the foreigners were taken by truck to the Thai

border. Khmer women who were married to foreigners were allowed

to accompany their husbands, but Khmer men were not permitted to leave with their foreign wives.

Promises that urban residents forced into the countryside would

be allowed to return home were never kept. Instead, the town

dwellers, regarded as politically unreliable "new people," were put

to work in forced labor battalions throughout the country. One refu- gee, for example, recalled that her family was sent to the region

around Moung Roessei in Batdambang Province to clear land and

grow rice. Aside from the alleged threat of United States air strikes, the

Khmer Rouge justified the evacuations in terms of the impossibility of transporting sufficient food to feed an urban population of

between 2 and 3 million people. Lack of adequate transportation

meant that, instead of bringing food to the people (tons of it lay

in storehouses in the port city of Kampong Saom, according to

49
Cambodia: A Country Study

Father Ponchaud), the people had to be brought to (and had to grow) the food. But there were other, more basic motivations. The

Khmer Rouge was determined to turn the country into a nation

of peasants in which the corruption and parasitism of city life would

be completely uprooted. In addition, Pol Pot wanted to break up

the "enemy spy organizations" that allegedly were based in the

urban areas. Finally, it seems that Pol Pot and his hard-line associates on the KCP Political Bureau used the forced evacuations

to gain control of the city's population and to weaken the position

of their factional rivals within the communist party. Had Phnom

Penh been controlled by one of the more moderate communist leaders, the exodus might not have taken place when it did.

The regime immediately seized and executed as many Khmer

Republic civil servants, police, and military officers as it could find. Evacuees who had been associated with the Lon Nol government

had to feign peasant or working-class backgrounds to avoid cer- tain death. One refugee wrote that she and her family, who came

from the middle or upper middle class, dyed their city clothes black

(like those of peasants) to help them escape detection. In one inci- dent, soon after the fall of Phnom Penh, more than 300 former

military officers were told to put on their dress uniforms in order

to "meet Sihanouk." Instead, they were taken to a jungle clear- ing in Batdambang Province and were machine-gunned or clubbed

to death. The wives and the children of people with government

backgrounds were also killed, apparently to eliminate people who

might harbor feelings of revenge toward the regime.

According to refugee accounts, the rate of killing had decreased

by the summer of 1975. Some civil servants and educated people were sent to "reeducation centers" and, if they showed "genuine"

contrition, were put in forced labor battalions. There were new

killings, however, in late 1975 and in early 1976. Many of the victims were educated people, such as schoolteachers. During the entire

Democratic Kampuchea period from 1975 to 1978, cadres exercised the power of life and death, especially over "new people,"

for whom threats of being struck with a pickax or an ax handle

and of being "put in a plastic bag" were a part of everyday life. In order to save ammunition, firearms were rarely used. People were murdered for not working hard, for complaining about liv- ing conditions, for collecting or stealing food for their own use,

for wearing jewelry, for having sexual relations, for grieving over

the loss of relatives or friends, or for expressing religious sentiments.

Sick people were often eliminated. The killings often, if not usually,

occurred without any kind of trial, and they continued, uninterrupted, until the 1979 Vietnamese invasion. People who displeased

50
Historical Setting

the Angkar, or its local representatives, customarily received a for- mal warning (kosang) to mend their ways. More than two warnings resulted in being given an "invitation," which meant certain

death. In 1977 and 1978 the violence reached a climax as the revolutionaries turned against each other in bloody purges.

Revolutionary Terror

Estimates of the number of people who perished under the Khmer

Rouge vary tremendously. A figure of three million deaths between

1975 and 1979 was given by the Vietnamese-sponsored Phnom

Penh regime, the PRK. Father Ponchaud suggested 2.3 million.

Amnesty International estimated 1 .4 million dead; the United States Department of State, 1.2 million. Khieu Samphan and Pol Pot,

who could be expected to give underestimations, cited figures of

1 million and 800,000, respectively. In 1962 the year of the last census taken before Cambodia was engulfed by war, the population of the country was cited at 5.7 million. Ten years later, in

1972, the population was estimated to have reached 7.1 million.

Using Pol Pot's rather modest figure of 800,000 deaths, about 11 percent of the population would have died from unnatural causes between 1975 and 1978. By contrast, Amnesty International's figure

would yield a death rate of almost 20 percent of the population;

Father Ponchaud' s, of approximately 32 percent. The revolution was easily, in proportion to the size of the country's population,

the bloodiest in modern Asian history.

As is evident from the accounts of refugees, the greatest causes

of death were hunger, disease, and exposure. Many city people

could not survive the rigors of life in the countryside, the forced

marches, and the hard physical labor. People died from the bites

of venomous snakes, drowned in flooded areas during the rainy

season, and were killed by wild beasts in jungle areas. Many fell victim to malaria. Others died in the fighting between Vietnam

and Cambodia in 1978 and in 1979. Nonetheless, executions ac- counted for hundreds of thousands of victims and perhaps for as many as 1 million. Western journalists have been shown "killing

fields" containing as many as 16,000 bodies.

Society under the Angkar

The social transformation wrought by the Khmer Rouge, first, in the areas that they occupied during the war with Lon Nol and,

then, in varying degrees, throughout the country, was far more

radical than anything attempted by the Russian, Chinese, or Viet- namese revolutions. According to Pol Pot, five classes existed in

prerevolutionary Cambodia—peasants, workers, bourgeoisie,

51
Cambodia: A Country Study

capitalists, and feudalists. Postrevolutionary society, as defined by

the 1976 Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea, consisted of

workers, peasants, and "all other Kampuchean working people."

No allowance was made for a transitional stage such as China's

"New Democracy" in which "patriotic" landlord or bourgeois ele- ments were permitted to play a role in socialist construction. Sihanouk writes that in 1975 he, Khieu Samphan, and Khieu Thirith

went to visit Zhou Enlai, who was gravely ill. Zhou warned them

not to attempt to achieve communism suddenly by one

'

' great leap

forward" without intermediate steps, as China had done with dis- astrous results in the late 1950s. Khieu Samphan and Khieu Thirith

"just smiled an incredulous and superior smile." Khieu Samphan

and Son Sen later boasted to Sihanouk that "we will be the first nation to create a completely communist society without wasting

time on intermediate steps."

Although conditions varied from region to region, a situation

that was, in part, a reflection of factional divisions that still existed

within the KCP during the 1970s, the testimony of refugees reveals

that the most salient social division was between the politically sus- pect "new people," those driven out of the towns after the communist victory, and the more reliable "old people," the poor and

lower middle-class peasants who had remained in the countryside.

Despite the ideological commitment to radical equality, KCP members and the armed forces constituted a clearly recognizable elite. The working class was a negligible factor because of the evacuation of the urban areas and the idling of most of the country's few

factories. The one important working class group in prerevolutionary Cambodia—laborers on large rubber plantations—traditionally

had consisted mostly of Vietnamese emigrants and thus was politically suspect.

The number of people, including refugees, living in the urban

areas, on the eve of the communist victory probably was some- what more than 3 million, in a wartime population that has been

estimated at between 5.7 and 7.3 million. As mentioned, despite

their rural origins, the refugees were considered "new people"

that is, people unsympathetic to Democratic Kampuchea. Some

doubtless passed as "old people" after returning to their native

villages, but the Khmer Rouge seem to have been extremely vigilant

in recording and keeping track of the movements of families and

of individuals. The lowest unit of social control, the krom (group),

consisted of ten to fifteen nuclear families whose activities were close- ly supervised by a three-person committee. The committee chairman was selected by the KCP. This grass roots leadership was

required to note the social origin of each family under its jurisdiction

52
Historical Setting

and to report it to persons higher up in the Angkar hierarchy. The

number of "new people" may initially have been as high as 2.5

million.

The "new people" were treated as slave laborers. They were

constantly moved, were forced to do the hardest physical labor,

and worked in the most inhospitable, fever-ridden parts of the country, such as forests, upland areas, and swamps. "New people" were

segregated from "old people," enjoyed little or no privacy, and

received the smallest rice rations. When the country experienced

food shortages in 1977, the "new people" suffered the most. The

medical care available to them was primitive or nonexistent. Families often were separated because people were divided into work

brigades according to age and sex and sent to different parts of

the country. "New people" were subjected to unending political

indoctrination and could be executed without trial. The creation

of what amounted to a slave class suggests continuity between the

Cambodian revolution and the country's ancient history. Like the

Khmer Rouge leadership, the god-kings of Angkor had commanded

armies of slaves. Pol Pot boasted in 1977 that "if our people can make Angkor, they can make anything."

The situation of the "old people" under Khmer Rouge rule was more ambiguous. Refugee interviews reveal cases in which villagers were treated as harshly as the "new people," enduring forced labor,

indoctrination, the separation of children from parents, and executions; however, they were generally allowed to remain in their

native villages. Because of their age-old resentment of the urban

and rural elites, many of the poorest peasants probably were sympathetic to Khmer Rouge goals. In the early 1980s, visiting Western

journalists found that the issue of peasant support for the Khmer

Rouge was an extremely sensitive subject that officials of the People's Republic of Kampuchea had little inclination to discuss.

On the basis of interviews with refugees from different parts of

the country as well as other sources, Vickery has argued that there was a wide regional variation in the severity of policies adopted

by local Khmer Rouge authorities. Ideology had something to do

with the differences, but the availability of food, the level of local development, and the personal qualities of cadres also were important factors. The greatest number of deaths occurred in undeveloped districts, where "new people" were sent to clear land. While

conditions were hellish in some localities, they apparentiy were toler- able in others. Vickery describes the Eastern Zone, which was dominated by pro-Vietnamese cadres, as one in which the extreme

policies of the Pol Pot leadership were not adopted (at least until

1978, when the Eastern leadership was liquidated in a bloody

53
Cambodia: A Country Study

purge). Executions were few, "old people" and "new people" were

treated largely the same, and food was made available to the entire population. Although the Southwestern Zone was an original center of power of the Khmer Rouge, and cadres administered it with strict discipline, random executions were relatively rare, and

"new people" were not persecuted if they had a cooperative atti- tude. In the Western Zone and in the Northwestern Zone, conditions were harsh. Starvation was widespread in the latter zone

because cadres sent rice to Phnom Penh rather than distributed

it to the local population. In the Northern Zone and in the Central Zone, there seem to have been more executions than there were

victims of starvation. Little reliable information emerged on conditions in the Northeastern Zone, one of the most isolated parts

of Cambodia (see fig. 3).

On the surface, society in Democratic Kampuchea was strictly

egalitarian. The Khmer language, like many in Southeast Asia,

has a complex system of usages to define speakers' rank and social

status. These usages were abandoned. People were encouraged to

call each other "friend," or "comrade" (in Khmer, mit or met),

and to avoid traditional signs of deference such as bowing or fold- ing the hands in salutation. Language was transformed in other

ways. The Khmer Rouge invented new terms. People were told

they must "forge" {lot dam) a new revolutionary character, that

they were the "instruments" (opokar) of the Angkar, and that nostal- gia for prerevolutionary times (cchoeu sttak aram, or "memory sick- ness") could result in their receiving Angkar's "invitation."

As in other revolutionary states, however, some people were "more equal" than others. Members and candidate members of

the KCP, local-level leaders of poor peasant background who col- laborated with the Angkar, and members of the armed forces had

a higher standard of living than the rest of the population. Refugees agree that, even during times of severe food shortage, members of the grass-roots elite had adequate, if not luxurious, supplies

of food. One refugee wrote that "pretty new bamboo houses" were

built for Khmer Rouge cadres along the river in Phnom Penh.

According to Craig Etcheson, an authority on Democratic Kampuchea, members of the revolutionary army lived in self-contained

colonies, and they had a "distinctive warrior-caste ethos." Armed

forces units personally loyal to Pol Pot, known as the "Unconditional Divisions," were a privileged group within the military.

Given the severity of their revolutionary ideology, it is surprising that the highest ranks of the Khmer Rouge leadership exhibited a talent for cronyism that matched that of the Sihanouk-era

elite. Pol Pot's wife, Khieu Ponnary, was head of the Association

54
Historical Setting

of Democratic Khmer Women and her younger sister, Khieu

Thirith, served as minister of social action. These two women are considered among the half-dozen most powerful personalities in

Democratic Kampuchea. Son Sen's wife, Yun Yat, served as minister for culture, education and learning. Several of Pol Pot's nephews and nieces were given jobs in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. One of Ieng Sary's daughters was appointed head of the

Calmette Hospital although she had not graduated from secondary

school. A niece of Ieng Sary was given a job as English translator

for Radio Phnom Penh although her fluency in the language was

extremely limited. Family ties were important, both because of the

culture and because of the leadership's intense secretiveness and

distrust of outsiders, especially of pro-Vietnamese communists.

Greed was also a motive. Different ministries, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Industry, were controlled

and exploited by powerful Khmer Rouge families. Administering

the diplomatic corps was regarded as an especially profitable

fiefdom.

Religious and Minority Communities

Article 20 of the 1976 Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea

guaranteed religious freedom, but it also declared that "all reac- tionary religions that are detrimental to Democratic Kampuchea

and the Kampuchean People are strictly forbidden." About 85 per- cent of the population follows the Theravada school of Buddhism

(see Buddhism, ch. 2). Before 1975 the Khmer Rouge tolerated

the activities of the community of Buddhist monks, or sangha (see

Glossary), in the liberated areas in order to win popular support.

This changed abruptly after the fall of Phnom Penh. The country's 40,000 to 60,000 Buddhist monks, regarded by the regime

as social parasites, were defrocked and forced into labor brigades.

Many monks were executed; temples and pagodas were destroyed

or turned into storehouses or jails. Images of the Buddha were

defaced and dumped into rivers and lakes. People who were dis- covered praying or expressing religious sentiments in other ways

were often killed. The Christian and Muslim communities also were

persecuted. The Roman Catholic cathedral of Phnom Penh was

completely razed. The Khmer Rouge forced Muslims to eat pork,

which they regard as an abomination. Many of those who refused were killed. Christian clergy and Muslim leaders were executed.

The Khmer Rouge's treatment of minorities seems to have varied

from group to group. The Vietnamese endured the greatest suffer- ing. Tens of thousands were murdered in regime-organized massacres. Most of the survivors fled to Vietnam. The Cham, a Muslim

55
Cambodia: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery. Cambodia: 1975-82, Boston. 1984. and Elizabeth Becker. Wkn :ht \\'c r Was 0:-r. New York. 1986.

Figure 3. Khmer Rouge Administrative Zones for Democratic Kampuchea.

1975-78

minority who are the descendants of migrants from the old state of Champa, were forced to adopt the Khmer language and cus- toms. Their communities, which traditionally had existed apart

from Khmer villages, were broken up. Forty thousand Cham were

killed in two districts of Kampong Cham Province alone. Thai

minorities living near the Thai border also were persecuted.

Despite the fact that Chinese and Sino-Khmers had dominated

the Cambodian economy for centuries and could be considered exploiters of the peasantry, the Khmer Rouge apparently did not sin- gle them out for harsh treatment. The war drove most rural Chmese

into the cities, and after the forced evacuations they and their urban

56
Historical Setting

compatriots were regarded as "new people." They shared the same

hardships as Khmers, however. Phnom Penh's close relationship

with China was probably a factor in the regime's reluctance to perse- cute them openly.

In the late 1980s, little was known of Khmer Rouge policies

toward the tribal peoples of the northeast, the Khmer Loeu. Pol

Pot established an insurgent base in the tribal areas of Rotanokiri

Province in the early 1960s, and he may have had a substantial

Khmer Loeu following (see The Cambodian Left: The Early

Phases, this ch.). Predominately animist peoples with few ties to the Buddhist culture of the lowland Khmers, the Khmer Loeu had

resented Sihanouk's attempts to "civilize" them. Cambodia ex- pert Serge Thion notes that marriage to a tribal person was considered "final proof of unconditional loyalty to the party." Khieu

Samphan may have been married to a tribal woman.

Education and Health

Like the radical exponents of the Cultural Revolution in China

during the 1960s, the Khmer Rouge regarded traditional education with unalloyed hostility. After the fall of Phnom Penh, they

executed thousands of teachers. Those who had been educators prior

to 1975 survived by hiding their identities. Aside from teaching

basic mathematical skills and literacy, the major goal of the new

educational system was to instill revolutionary values in the young.

For a regime at war with most of Cambodia's traditional values,

this meant that it was necessary to create a gap between the values

of the young and the values of the nonrevolutionary old. In a manner reminiscent of George Orwell's 1984, the regime

recruited children to spy on adults. The pliancy of the younger

generation made them, in the Angkar's words, the "dictatorial in- strument of the party." In 1962 the communists had created a special secret organization, the Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth,

that, in the early 1970s, changed its name to the Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea. Pol Pot considered Alliance alumni

as his most loyal and reliable supporters, and used them to gain

control of the central and of the regional KCP apparatus. The

powerful Khieu Thirith, minister of social action, was responsible

for directing the youth movement.

Hardened young cadres, many little more than twelve years of

age, were enthusiastic accomplices in some of the regime's worst

atrocities. Sihanouk, who was kept under virtual house arrest in

Phnom Penh between 1976 and 1978, wrote in War and Hope that

his youthful guards, having been separated from their families and

given a thorough indoctrination, were encouraged to play cruel

57
Cambodia: A Country Study

games involving the torture of animals. Having lost parents, sib- lings, and friends in the war and lacking the Buddhist values of

their elders, the Khmer Rouge youth also lacked the inhibitions

that would have dampened their zeal for revolutionary terror. Health facilities in the years 1975 to 1978 were abysmally poor.

Many physicians either were executed or were prohibited from practicing. It appears that the party and the armed forces elite had access

to Western medicine and to a system of hospitals that offered

reasonable treatment but ordinary people, especially ' 'new people," were expected to use traditional plant and herbal remedies

that usually were ineffective. Some bartered their rice rations and

personal possessions to obtain aspirin and other simple drugs.

The Economy

In its general contours, Democratic Kampuchea's economic policy was similar to, and possibly inspired by, China's radical Great

Leap Forward that carried out immediate collectivization of the

Chinese countryside in 1958. During the early 1970s, the Khmer

Rouge established "mutual assistance groups" in the areas they

occupied. After 1973 these were organized into "low-level cooperatives" in which land and agricultural implements were lent by

peasants to the community but remained their private property.

"High-level cooperatives," in which private property was abolished

and the harvest became the collective property of the peasants,

appeared in 1974. "Communities," introduced in early 1976, were

a more advanced form of high-level cooperative in which communal

dining was instituted. State-owned farms also were established.

Far more than had the Chinese communists, the Khmer Rouge

relentlessly pursued the ideal of economic self-sufficiency, in their case the version that Khieu Samphan had outlined in his 1959 doctoral dissertation. Extreme measures were taken. Currency was

abolished, and domestic trade or commerce could be conducted

only through barter. Rice, measured in tins, became the most important medium of exchange, although people also bartered gold,

jewelry, and other personal possessions. Foreign trade was almost

completely halted, though there was a limited revival in late 1976

and early 1977. China was the most important trading partner,

but commerce amounting to a few million dollars was also con- ducted with France, with Britain,' and with the United States through a Hong Kong intermediary.

From the Khmer Rouge perspective, the country was free of for- eign economic domination for the first time in its 2,000-year his- tory. By mobilizing the people into work brigades organized in a

military fashion, the Khmer Rouge hoped to unleash the masses'

58
Historical Setting

productive forces. There was an "Angkorian" component to eco- nomic policy. That ancient kingdom had grown rich and powerful because it controlled extensive irrigation systems that produced

surpluses of rice. Agriculture in modern Cambodia depended, for the most part, on seasonal rains. By building a nationwide system

of irrigation canals, dams, and reservoirs, the leadership believed

it would be possible to produce rice on a year-round basis. It was

the ''new people" who suffered and sacrificed the most to complete these ambitious projects.

Although the Khmer Rouge implemented an "agriculture first" policy in order to achieve self-sufficiency, they were not, as some

observers have argued, "back-to-nature" primitivists. Although

the 1970-75 war and the evacuation of the cities had destroyed or

idled most industry, small contingents of workers were allowed to return to the urban areas to reopen some plants. Like their Chinese

counterparts, the Cambodian communists had great faith in the

inventive power and the technical aptitude of the masses, and they

constantly published reports of peasants' adapting old mechanical

parts to new uses. Much as the Chinese had attempted unsuccessfully to build a new steel industry based on backyard furnaces during

the Great Leap Forward, the Khmer Rouge sought to move in- dustry to the countryside. Significantly, the seal of Democratic

Kampuchea displayed not only sheaves of rice and irrigation sluices,

but also a factory with smokestacks.

Politics under the Khmer Rouge

By the April 1975 communist victory, Pol Pot and his close as- sociates occupied the most important positions in the KCP and in

the state hierarchies. He had been KCP general secretary since

February 1963. His associates functioned as the party's Political

Bureau, and they controlled a majority of the seats on the Central

Committee. Khieu Thirith's management of youth groups meant

that Pol Pot had ample reserves of zealous young cadres, "the

nucleus and wick of the struggle," committed to imposing the party

center's will throughout the country. But his domination of the

revolutionary movement was not complete. In different areas of

the country, especially in the Eastern Zone, pro-Vietnamese and

veteran Khmer Issarak commanders were jealous of their independence. They questioned, and at times openly defied, his policies

of revolutionary terror and hostility toward Vietnam. The highest

ranks of the party were not free of dissension.

Like Joseph Stalin in the late 1920s and in the 1930s, Pol Pot

initiated a purge of his opponents, both imagined and real. In terms

of the number of people liquidated in relation to the total population,

59
Cambodia: A Country Study

the Khmer Rouge terror was far bloodier than Stalin's. Through

the 1970s, and especially after mid- 1975, the party was shaken by

factional struggles. There were even armed attempts to topple Pol

Pot. The resultant purges reached a crest in 1977 and 1978 when

hundreds of thousands of people, including some of the most important KCP leaders, were executed.

Establishing Democratic Kampuchea

The communists had exercised real power behind the facade,

since its establishment in 1970, of the Royal Government of

National Union of Kampuchea, (Governement Royal d'Union

Nationale du Kampuchea—GRUNK—see Appendix B). It re- mained formally in control of the country until the proclamation

of the Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea on January 5, 1976.

Three months later, on April 2, Sihanouk resigned as head of state. Sihanouk remained under comfortable, but insecure, house arrest

in Phnom Penh, until he departed for China on the last flight before

Vietnamese forces captured the city on January 7, 1979.

Khieu Samphan described the 1976 Constitution as "not the

result of any research on foreign documents, nor . . . the fruit of

any research by scholars. In fact the people—workers, peasants,

and Revolutionary Army—wrote the Constitution with their own

hands." It was a brief document of sixteen chapters and twenty- one articles that defined the character of the state; the goals of eco- nomic, social and cultural policies; and the basic tenets of foreign

policy. The "rights and duties of the individual" were briefly defined in Article 12. They included none of what are commonly

regarded as guarantees of political human rights except the state- ment that "men and women are equal in every respect." The document declared, however, that "all workers" and "all peasants" were "masters" of their factories and fields. An assertion that "there

is absolutely no unemployment in Democratic Kampuchea" rings true in light of the regime's massive use of forced labor.

The Constitution defined Democratic Kampuchea's foreign policy principles in Article 21, the document's longest, in terms of

"independence, peace, neutrality, and nonalignment." It pledged

the country's support to anti-imperialist struggles in the Third

World. In light of the regime's aggressive attacks against Vietnamese, Thai, and Lao territory during 1977 and 1978, the promise

to "maintain close and friendly relations with all countries sharing a common border" bore little resemblance to reality.

Governmental institutions were outiined very briefly in the Constitution. The legislature, the Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly (KPRA), contained 250 members "representing

60
Historical Setting

workers, peasants, and other working people and the Kampuchean

Revolutionary army." One hundred and fifty KPRA seats were

allocated for peasant representatives; fifty, for the armed forces; and fifty, for worker and other representatives. The legislature was

to be popularly elected for a five-year term. Its first and only elec- tion was held on March 20, 1976. ' 'New people" apparently were

not allowed to participate.

The executive branch of government also was chosen by the

KPRA. It consisted of a state presidium " responsible for representing the state of Democratic Kampuchea inside and outside the country." It served for a five-year term, and its president was head of

state. Khieu Samphan was the first and only person to serve in

this office, which he assumed after Sihanouk's resignation. The

judicial system was composed of "people's courts," the judges for which were appointed by the KPRA, as was the executive branch.

The Constitution did not mention regional or local government

institutions. After assuming power, the Khmer Rouge abolished

the old provinces (khet) and replaced them with seven zones; the

Northern Zone, Northeastern Zone, Northwestern Zone, Central

Zone, Eastern Zone, Western Zone, and Southwestern Zone. There

were also two other regional-level units: the Kracheh Special Region

Number 505 and, until 1977, the Siemreab Special Region Number 106. The zones were divided into damban (regions) that were

given numbers. Number One, appropriately, encompassed the

Samlot region of the Northwestern Zone (including Batdambang

Province), where the insurrection against Sihanouk had erupted

in early 1967. With this exception, the damban appear to have been

numbered arbitrarily.

The damban were divided into srok (districts), khum (subdistricts),

and phum (villages), the latter usually containing several hundred

people. This pattern was roughly similar to that which existed under

Sihanouk and the Khmer Republic, but inhabitants of the villages were organized into krom (groups) composed of ten to fifteen families. On each level, administration was directed by a three-person

committee (kanak, or kena). KCP members occupied committee posts

at the higher levels. Subdistrict and village committees were often

staffed by local poor peasants, and, very rarely, by "new people."

Cooperatives (sahakor), similar in jurisdictional area to the khum,

assumed local government responsibilities in some areas. An Elusive Party

To most people inside and outside Democratic Kampuchea, the

communist party was known simply as the Angkar Loeu. The

party's commitment to revolution was expressed in the terminology

61
Cambodia: A Country Study

of the 1976 Constitution, but no mention was made of a specifically Marxist-Leninist ideology. The KCP's real leaders and identity were kept closely guarded secrets from non-members until 1977.

Head of state Khieu Samphan was a front—Sihanouk describes

him as a

' 'bit player" —for the most important leader, Saloth Sar,

whose appearances and speeches were not publicized in the offi- cial media. Under the name Pol Pot, Saloth Sar was elected to a

seat in the KPRA in March 1976 as a representative of rubber plantation workers, and he became Democratic Kampuchea's prime

minister the following month.

The histories of most revolutionary movements contain a clandestine theme, but rarely have any approached the near-paranoia

of the Cambodian communists. In part, this reflected the profound

distrust with which Pol Pot and his associates regarded people outside their small, closed circle that had begun its association in Paris

in the 1950s. Also, there may have been an unwillingness to risk

the support of a still-conservative peasantry by publicly embracing Marxism-Leninism. The most important reason for the obsession with secrecy, however, was intraparty strife —the KCP's

continuing failure to resolve factional differences and to achieve consensus on its mission and policies. Even more than the future,

however, the past was a focus of bitter controversy: how much

should the KCP acknowledge its debt to the Vietnamese communists?

On September 18, in a speech mourning the death of Mao

Zedong, Pol Pot announced that the Angkar was "MarxistLeninist" and that it enjoyed "fraternal relations" with the Chinese

Communist Party. But it was not until a year later, in September

1977, that Pol Pot revealed the existence of the KCP and its his- tory in a five-hour recorded radio speech. He stated that the KCP

was seventeen years old and that its founding date had been September 30, 1960. He noted that the KCP's decision to disclose its real identity had been encouraged by "foreign friends" (the

Chinese) who wanted the KCP to take credit for the revolutionary

victory.

Pol Pot's mention of the September 1960 founding date was ex- tremely significant. Within the party ranks, September 30, 1951,

traditionally had been recognized as its founding date. This was

the day when the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B) was established following the

reorganization of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP—see Appendix B). The September 1960 meeting had been considered

the KPRP's second congress, but in the September-October 1976

edition of the party's official journal, Tung Padevat (Revolutionary

62
Historical Setting

Flag), the date of birth of the KPRP was given as September 30,

1960. Tung Padevat declared that the new founding date was adopted

because 4 'we must arrange the history of the party into something

clean and perfect, in line with our policies of independence and

self-mastery." Pol Pot's speech a year later gave official sanction

to this view.

Another party journal, Tung Kraham (Red Flag), mentioned the

traditional founding date, September 30, 1951, in its September

1976 issue. The argument over the birth date reflected deep fac- tional divisions within the KCP. Backers of the 1951 birth date,

if not pro-Vietnamese, were at least willing to recognize their movement's past dependence on Vietnamese support. Pol Pot and his

associates adopted the 1960 birthday to emphasize the party's Cambodian identity and to distance it from any association with the

Vietnamese communists. The party's official history, or "Black

Booh, " published in 1978 after pro-Vietnamese elements had been

liquidated, stated that the KCP had severed fraternal party rela- tions with the Vietnam Workers' Party as early as 1973.

Intraparty Conflict

On the eve of its 1975 victory against the Lon Nol forces, the

KCP was, in terms of personnel, ideological viewpoints, and fac- tional loyalties, quite heterogeneous. Etcheson, in The Rise and

Demise of Democratic Kampuchea, identifies six factions: the Pol Pot

group (members of which he labels "Stalinists"); internationalists

(pro-Vietnamese elements who were based in Hanoi after 1954,

and who returned to the country when the FUNK united front was

declared in 1970); veterans of the leftist Khmer Issarak (who re- mained in the country after 1954, mostly in the southern and in

western parts of the country); veterans of the Pracheachon Party

founded in 1954 (which had contested Sihanouk's Sangkum openly

until being driven underground in the 1960s); pro-Chinese or Maoist elements (including Paris-group intellectuals Hou Yuon and

Hu Nim); and the pro-Sihanouk Khmer Rumdo (see Appendix

B). Ben Kiernan, another analyst of Cambodia, identifies three

factions: the Pol Pot faction, the pro-Vietnamese communists, and

the adherents of the Chinese Cultural Revolution model. The roles of ideology and of conflicting party lines in factional struggles,

however, should not be overemphasized. Behind doctrinal differ- ences lay the dynamics of personal rivalry and the strong sense of

patron-client loyalty that has always characterized Cambodian

politics.

Although the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK) was

"reestablished" in July 1975 to bring all Khmer Rouge units

63
Cambodia: A Country Study

formally under central authority, real control of regional armed

forces remained in the hands of the zone party committee heads.

The most important center of regional resistance to the Pol Pot- dominated party center was the Eastern Zone, comprising part or

all of the old provinces of Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, Kandal, and

Kampong Cham that adjoined Vietnam. Its leader was So Phim,

a pro-Vietnamese internationalist.

Differences between the Eastern Zone revolutionaries and the

other Khmer Rouge were readily apparent by 1975. While the uniforms of Pol Pot loyalists and their allies were black, the uniforms

of the Eastern Zone were a distinctive green. In addition, cadre

behavior toward the civilian population in the Eastern Zone was

generally exemplary. It seems that some of the Eastern cadres were

sympathetic to Sihanouk; refugee Molyda Szymusiak wrote that

during the evacuation of Phnom Penh, a "Sihanouk Khmer" sol- dier advised her relatives (who were distantly related to the royal

family) to accompany him to Prey Veng Province on Cambodia's

southern border.

At least two coups d'etat against the center were attempted—in

July and in September, 1975. The latter incident involved Eastern

Zone troops. After April 1975, Hou Yuon, one of the original Paris

group, disappeared. His colleague, Hu Nim, who was tortured and

killed in the Tuol Sleng detention center in 1977, indicated in his

confession that Hou Yuon had been liquidated for opposing the

extremism of the center's policies.

Pol Pot loyalists occupied most of the important positions in the

new government that was formed after the March 20, 1976, elections; however, Vorn Vet, a pro-Vietnamese leader, was appointed

second vice premier with responsibility over six ministry-level eco- nomic committees, and he also headed the special Phnom Penh

capital zone. So Phim, a longtime rival of Pol Pot within the communist movement, was first vice president of the presidium and

a member of the KCP Political Bureau. (The second vice president, Nhim Ros, was a Pol Pot loyalist who commanded the Northwestern Zone.) The year 1976 appears to have been a time initially

of retreat for the faction led by Pol Pot. Many communists were

alienated by his authoritarian behavior. Article 4 of the Constitution, "Democratic Kampuchea applies the collective principle in

leadership and in work," apparently reflects this opinion. In rela- tion to what had gone before and what was to come, policies during 1976 were moderate. The terror eased. Relations with Hanoi

were placed on a friendlier footing. Trade and diplomatic relations were expanded.

64
Historical Setting

On September 27, 1976, Pol Pot resigned as premier "for rea- sons of health.

'

' Nuon Chea, the pro-Vietnamese deputy premier,

became acting premier. Little is known of the intense factional

maneuvering that was occurring at this time, but by late October

1976, Pol Pot had regained his post. On October 22, his comeback was confirmed with his issuance of a statement in his capacity as prime minister condemning China's "counterrevolutionary

Gang of Four," who had been arrested in Beijing on October 6. The influence of China on Democratic Kampuchea's internal

politics apparently was a crucial, though little understood, factor

in Pol Pot's defeat of his pro-Vietnamese rivals. Etcheson and Kier- nan have suggested, in separate articles, that radicals in the Chinese

Communist Party may have backed pro-Vietnamese Internationalist elements in the KCP in 1976 because they were interested in

preserving good relations with Hanoi. The fall of the radicals in

October 1976, a month after Mao Zedong's death, brought in the

moderates, led by Deng Xiaoping. As the subsequent break between Beijing and Hanoi shows, Deng was inclined to regard Vietnam as an agent of Soviet ' 'hegemonism. '

' Chinese support of the

Pol Pot faction may have been a crucial element in its ability to triumph over the pro-Vietnamese communists in the fall of 1976.

From an ideological standpoint, the pragmatic Deng Xiaoping and

the ultra-radical Pol Pot were polar opposites, but from the geopolitical perspective, the post-Mao Zedong leadership recognized

the value of having a well-armed Cambodian thorn in the side of

Vietnam. Immediately after making his September 27, 1977, speech

revealing the KCP's existence, Pol Pot, accompanied by Ieng Sary

and Vorn Vet, visited Beijing, where he acknowledged the importance of Maoist thought to the Cambodian revolution. In early

1978, the Chinese sent substantial military aid, which included

armor, artillery, and antitank guns.

The Purge

In 1975 Pol Pot concluded an alliance with the party head of

the Southwestern Zone, Ta Mok, who was a Khmer Issarak veter- an and, like Pol Pot, was strongly anti-Vietnamese. During 1977

and 1978, Ta Mok provided the backing that enabled Pol Pot to liquidate the opposition within the KCP and to initiate new ter- rorism against the local population. In February 1977, Southwestern

cadres went into the Eastern, Northern, and Western zones to purge

local Khmer Rouge. Four months later, the same process was begun

in the Northwestern Zone. The purges intensified following an abortive coup d'etat in August.

65
Cambodia: A Country Study

After the fall of the capital, Ta Mok's lieutenant, a former high

school teacher who assumed the name Mit (Comrade) Deuch, became head of the secret police, and established the Tuol Sleng in- terrogation and detention center on the site of a former Phnom

Penh high school. In the 1975 to 1976 period, Tuol Sleng'

s

meticulous records show that 2,404 "antiparty elements" were tor- tured and executed. The terror escalated in 1977, when the number of victims rose to 6,330. In the first six months of 1978, records

show that 5,765 people were killed; records for the latter half of

that year have not been discovered. The victims who passed through

Tuol Sleng from mid- 1975 to January 1979 numbered about

20,000. Among those who met death in the infamous prison were

Paris alumni Hu Nim and (presumably) Hou Yuon. Similar centers were set up throughout the country (Tuol Sleng' s code designation, S-21 , suggests that at least twenty other similar sites had been

established). Molyda Szymusiak writes that a new wave of terror began in the Batdambang region after cadres arrived from the south.

The Sala Som Niat, a school for political education was converted

into an extermination center where local communists were tortured

and executed. The pattern in these centers was much the same:

victims were tortured, forced to write often absurd confessions, and

then killed. A young British teacher, captured in a yacht off the

Cambodian coast, confessed at Tuol Sleng that he had been

recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United

States when he was twelve years old; he was subsequently murdered. Hu Nim was forced to confess that he had become a CIA

agent in 1957.

The Eastern Zone apparently remained largely unaffected by

the purge until May 1978, when So Phim led a revolt that provoked massive retaliation by Pol Pot and his Southwestern hench- men. In the bloodiest purge of the entire 1975 to 1978 period, as many as 100,000 people in the Eastern Zone—labeled people with

"Khmer bodies but Vietnamese minds" —were liquidated or were

deported to face certain death in other parts of the country. Most

of the victims were political cadres, "new people," and Vietnamese

or part-Vietnamese residents. So Phim reportedly committed sui- cide as he faced capture. Some of his subordinates, including Heng

Samrin, the leader of the PRK after 1979, fled to Vietnam.

The Fall of Democratic Kampuchea

Immediately following the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, there were skirmishes between their troops and Vietnamese forces. A

number of incidents occurred in May 1975. The Cambodians

launched attacks on the Vietnamese islands of Phu Quoc and Tho

66
67
Cambodia: A Country Study

Chu and intruded into Vietnamese border provinces. In late May,

at about the same time that the United States launched an air strike against the oil refinery at Kampong Saom, following the Mayaguez

incident, Vietnamese forces seized the Cambodian island of Poulo

Wai. The following month, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary visited Hanoi.

They proposed a friendship treaty between the two countries, an

idea that met with a cool reception from Vietnam's leaders.

Although the Vietnamese evacuated Poulo Wai in August, inci- dents continued along Cambodian's northeastern border. At the

instigation of the Phnom Penh regime, thousands of Vietnamese

also were driven out of Cambodia.

Relations between Cambodia and Vietnam improved in 1976,

in part because of Pol Pot's preoccupation with intraparty

challenges. In May Cambodian and Vietnamese representatives

met in Phnom Penh in order to establish a commission to resolve

border disagreements. The Vietnamese, however, refused to recog- nize the Brevie Line—the colonial-era demarcation of maritime

borders between the two countries—and the negotiations broke

down. In late September, however, a few days before Pol Pot was

forced to resign as prime minister, air links were established between Phnom Penh and Hanoi.

With Pol Pot back in the forefront of the regime in 1977, the

situation rapidly deteriorated. Incidents escalated along all of Cambodia's borders. Khmer Rouge forces attacked villages in the border

areas of Thailand near Aranyaprathet. Brutal murders of Thai vil- lagers, including women and children, were the first widely reported

concrete evidence of Khmer Rouge atrocities. There were also in- cidents along the Laotian border. At approximately the same time,

villages in Vietnam's border areas underwent renewed attacks. In

turn, Vietnam launched air strikes against Cambodia. In September, border fighting resulted in as many as 1,000 Vietnamese

civilian casualties. The following month, the Vietnamese counterattacked in a campaign involving a force of 20,000 personnel. Viet- namese defense minister General Vo Nguyen Giap underestimated

the tenacity of the Khmer Rouge, however, and was obliged to commit an additional 58,000 reinforcements in December. On

January 6, 1978, Giap's forces began an orderly withdrawal from

Cambodian territory. The Vietnamese apparently believed they

had ''taught a lesson" to the Cambodians, but Pol Pot proclaimed

this a "victory" even greater than that of April 17, 1975.

Faced with growing Khmer Rouge belligerence, the Vietnamese

leadership decided in early 1978 to support internal resistance to the Pol Pot regime, with the result that the Eastern Zone became

a focus of insurrection. War hysteria reached bizarre levels within

68
Historical Setting

Democratic Kampuchea. In May 1978, on the eve of So Phim's

Eastern Zone uprising, Radio Phnom Penh declared that if each

Cambodian soldier killed thirty Vietnamese, only 2 million troops

would be needed to eliminate the entire Vietnamese population

of 50 million. It appears that the leadership in Phnom Penh was

seized with immense territorial ambitions, i.e., to recover the

Mekong Delta region, which they regarded as Khmer territory.

Massacres of ethnic Vietnamese and of their sympathizers by

the Khmer Rouge intensified in the Eastern Zone after the May

revolt. In November, Vorn Vet led an unsuccessful coup d'etat. There were now tens of thousands of Cambodian and Vietnamese

exiles on Vietnamese territory. On December 3, 1978, Radio Hanoi

announced the formation of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National

United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS—see Appendix B).

This was a heterogeneous group of communist and noncommunist

exiles who shared an antipathy to the Pol Pot regime and a virtually total dependence on Vietnamese backing and protection. The

KNUFNS provided the semblance, if not the reality, of legitimacy

for Vietnam's invasion of Democratic Kampuchea and for its subsequent establishment of a satellite regime in Phnom Penh (see The

Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). In the meantime, as 1978 wore on, Cambodian bellicosity in

the border areas surpassed Hanoi's threshold of tolerance. Viet- namese policy makers opted for a military solution and, on December 22, Vietnam launched its offensive with the intent of

overthrowing Democratic Kampuchea. An invasion force of

120,000, consisting of combined armor and infantry units with

strong artillery support, drove west into the level countryside of

Cambodia's southeastern provinces. After a seventeen-day blitz- krieg, Phnom Penh fell to the advancing Vietnamese on January

7, 1979. From new redoubts in the mountain and jungle fastness

of Cambodia's periphery, Pol Pot and other Khmer Rouge leaders regrouped their units, issued a new call to arms, and reignited a stubborn insurgency against the regime in power as they had done

in the late 1960s. For the moment, however, the Vietnamese in- vasion had accomplished its purpose of deposing an unlamented

and particularly loathsome dictatorship. A new administration

under the mentorship of Hanoi was quickly established, and it set about competing, both domestically and internationally, with the

Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia. Peace

still eluded the war-ravaged nation, however, and although the in- surgency set in motion by the Khmer Rouge proved unable to topple

the new Vietnamese-backed regime in Phnom Penh, it did nonetheless keep the country in a permanent state of insecurity. The

69
Cambodia: A Country Study

fledgling Khmer administration, weak and lacking in manpower

and in resources, was propped up by a substantial Vietnamese mili- tary force and civilian advisory effort. As events in the 1980s

progressed, the main preoccupations of the new regime were survival, restoring the economy, and combating the Khmer Rouge

insurgency by military and by political means. The fostering of

activity to meet these imperatives and the building of institutions are described in subsequent chapters (see The People's Republic

of Kampuchea, ch. 4; The Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia,

ch. 5).

* * *

Probably the most definitive account of Cambodian history in

English is David P. Chandler's^ History of Cambodia, which covers

this subject from the earliest centuries to the attainment of independence. An earlier work, Martin Herz's A Short History of Cambodia

from the Days ofAngkor to the Present, is somewhat dated but contains

highly specific material on the early Sihanouk years. The sections on Cambodia in D.G.E. Hall's classic, A History ofSouth-East Asia, are also useful. Hall's parallel treatments of Vietnamese and Thai

history provide interesting perspective. George Coedes' Angkor: An

Introduction and The Making of South East Asia are informative on

the ancient kingdoms. The former provides good descriptions of

the monuments of Angkor, their architectural motifs, and their re- ligious significance. For an understanding of the rise of communism

in Cambodia an essential source is Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came

to Power,

William Shawcross's Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia is a critical account of United States involvement

in the country before and during the years, 1970 to 1975, when

Lon Nol was in power. Another perspective is provided by Henry

Kissinger in White House Years and in Years of Upheaval.

A large number of books have been written on the horrors of

the Democratic Kampuchea period. Molyda Szymusiak's The Stones Cry Out is one of the most gripping. Others include Francois Ponchaud's Cambodia: Year Zero and Sydney Schanberg's The Death and

Life of Dith Pran. The film "The Killing Fields" is also based on

the experiences in Cambodia during and after the war of Dith

Pran—journalist Schanberg's cameraman in wartime Phnom Penh.

Norodom Sihanouk's War and Hope provides another close-up.

Useful scholarly treatments of the period include Craig Etcheson's

perspective on the Khmer Rouge, The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea; two collections of essays, Peasants and Politics in

70
Historical Setting

Kampuchea, 1942-81, edited by Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua;

and Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea, edited by David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan. One well-reviewed account of life in

Democratic Kampuchea and the transition to its successor regime

is Elizabeth Becker's When the War Was Over; another account,

equally well-regarded by critics, addressing the abiding enmity between Cambodia and Vietnam is Nayan Chanda's Brother Enemy.

Familiarity with both sources is essential for an understanding of

what occurred in Cambodia after 1975. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

71

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment
Members of the ethnic Cham minority near Kampong Cham
SINCE 1975 CAMBODIA has suffered through one of the most

catastrophic periods in its long history. The takeover of the country by the communist Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B) in 1975,

its violent aftermath, and the constant warfare between communist

and noncommunist factions has resulted in widespread and major

changes in the Cambodian social fabric. The country was plunged

into a dark age from which it was slowly emerging in the late 1980s.

Under the Khmer Rouge, the entire social structure of the country suffered radical and massive changes. An estimated 1 million

to 2 million Cambodians died during the first three-and-one-half

years of communist rule. Traditional family life was violently dis- rupted and virtually abolished between 1975 and 1979. Nuclear

families—the most important units of Cambodian society—were

broken up and were replaced with communal groupings. About

97 percent of the population was forced into communal economic

programs. Urban dwellers were driven into the countryside in mass marches that caused great suffering and many deaths. Rural soci- ety was reorganized into interfamilial units known as krom (groups).

Urban Cambodians, ethnic minorities, and educated people suffered

especially harsh treatment. The ethnic Chinese, because they were engaged extensively in small businesses and were mainly urban

dwellers, were targets for communist persecution, as were the Cham

(see Glossary), a prominent ethnic minority group. Educated people were special targets for extermination, and most of the teachers

and physicians fled the country or were massacred. Those who

showed evidence of Western influence, such as using the English

language, were suspect. Although freedom of religion was guaranteed in theory under the Khmer Rouge, in fact Buddhism and other

religions were repressed ruthlessly. Temples were destroyed or put

to secular uses, and monks were defrocked and forced do manual

labor.

The Vietnamese invasion in December 1978 ameliorated the sit- uation somewhat. As a result of the invasion, the Khmer Rouge

government of Democratic Kampuchea was overthrown, and the

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B) under

Heng Samrin was installed in 1979. The PRK allowed considerably more freedom than had its predecessor. In the late 1980s,

Marxist-Leninist socialism as it existed in Vietnam was the goal

of the PRK government in Phnom Penh. The regime was not

pushing hard to convert the country, but was planning a gradual

75
Cambodia: A Country Study

conversion instead. Religions were allowed to function. The government allowed Buddhist monks to return to their temples, although narrow limits were placed on those who could become monks and

on aspects of ritual. The education system, which had suffered

almost total destruction under the Khmer Rouge, was reconstituted,

and the number of students attending formal classes rose dramatically in the early 1980s. The public health service was functioning

again in the mid-1980s, and modern medical services were available although trained medical personnel and some medicines con- tinued to be in short supply. The shortage of medical personnel was partially filled by foreign doctors and technicians. The PRK

did not neglect to court ethnic minorities. Members of one of the

Khmer Loeu (or highland Khmer) tribal minorities were made lead- ers in several northeastern provinces, and members of the Cham

minority served in the central government.

Environment

Cambodia covers 181,040 square kilometers in the southwestern

part of the Indochina peninsula. It lies completely within the tropics;

its southernmost points are only slightly more than 10° above the

equator. Roughly square in shape, the country is bounded on the

north by Thailand and by Laos, on the east and southeast by Vietnam, and on the west by the Gulf of Thailand and by Thailand.

Much of the country's area consists of rolling plains. Dominant

features are the large, almost centrally located, Tonle Sap (Great

Lake) and the Mekong River, which traverses the country from

north to south.

The climate is monsoonal and has marked wet and dry seasons

of relatively equal length. Both temperature and humidity generally are high throughout the year. Forest covers about two-thirds

of the country, but it has been somewhat degraded in the more

readily accessible areas by a method called slash-and-burn agriculture.

Topography

Cambodia falls within several well-defined geographic regions.

The largest part of the country—about 75 percent of the total

consists of the Tonle Sap Basin and the Mekong Lowlands. To

the southeast of this great basin is the Mekong Delta, which ex- tends through Vietnam to the South China Sea. The basin and

delta regions are rimmed with mountain ranges to the southwest

(the Cardamom Mountains, the Elephant Range) and to the north

(Dangrek Mountains). Higher land to the northeast and to the east merges into the Central Highlands of southern Vietnam (see fig. 4).

76


The Society and Its Environment

The Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands region consists chiefly

of plains with elevations generally of less than 100 meters. As the

elevation increases, the terrain becomes more rolling and dissected.

The Cardamom Mountains in the southwest, oriented generally

in a northwest-southeast direction, rise to more than 1 ,500 meters. The highest mountain in Cambodia—Phnom Aural, at 1,771

meters—is in the eastern part of this range. The Elephant Range,

an extension running toward the south and the southeast from the

Cardamom Mountains, rises to elevations of between 500 and 1,000 meters. These two ranges are bordered on the west by a narrow

coastal plain that contains Kampong Saom Bay, which faces the

Gulf of Thailand. This area was largely isolated until the opening

of the port of Kampong Saom (formerly called Sihanoukville) and

the construction of a road and railroad connecting Kampong Saom,

Kampot, Takev, and Phnom Penh in the 1960s.

The Dangrek Mountains at the northern rim of the Tonle Sap

Basin consist of a steep escarpment with an average elevation of

about 500 meters, the highest points of which reach more than 700

meters. The escarpment faces southward and is the southern edge

of the Korat Plateau in Thailand. The watershed along the escarp- ment marks the boundary between Thailand and Cambodia. The

main road through a pass in the Dangrek Mountains at O Smach

connects northwestern Cambodia with Thailand. Despite this road

and those running through a few other passes, in general the escarp- ment impedes easy communication between the two countries. Between the western part of the Dangrek and the northern part of

the Cardamom ranges, however, lies an extension of the Tonle Sap

Basin that merges into lowlands in Thailand, which allows easy

access from the border to Bangkok.

The Mekong Valley, which offers a communication route between Cambodia and Laos, separates the eastern end of the Dangrek Mountains and the northeastern highlands. To the southeast,

the basin joins the Mekong Delta, which, extending into Vietnam,

provides both water and land communications between the two

countries.

Climate

Cambodia's climate—like that of the rest of Southeast Asia—is dominated by the monsoons, which are known as tropical wet and

dry because of the distinctiy marked seasonal differences. The monsoonal airflows are caused by annual alternating high pressure and

low pressure over the Central Asian landmass. In summer,

moisture-laden air—the southwest monsoon—is drawn landward

from the Indian Ocean. The flow is reversed during the winter,

79


Cambodia: A Country Study

and the northeast monsoon sends back dry air. The southwest monsoon brings the rainy season from mid-May to mid-September or

to early October, and the northeast monsoon flow of drier and cooler

air lasts from early November to March. The southern third of

the country has a two-month dry season; the northern two-thirds, a four-month one. Short transitional periods, which are marked

by some difference in humidity but by little change in temperature, intervene between the alternating seasons. Temperatures are

fairly uniform throughout the Tonle Sap Basin area, with only small

variations from the average annual mean of around 25°C. The

maximum mean is about 28°C; the minimum mean, about 22°C.

Maximum temperatures of higher than 32 °C, however, are com- mon and, just before the start of the rainy season, they may rise to more than 38°C. Minimum temperatures rarely fall below

10°C. January is the coldest month, and April is the warmest.

Typhoons—tropical cyclones—that often devastate coastal Vietnam rarely cause damage in Cambodia (see fig. 5). The total annual rainfall average is between 100 and 150 centimeters, and the heaviest amounts fall in the southeast. Rainfall

from April to September in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands

area averages 130 to 190 centimeters annually, but the amount

varies considerably from year to year. Rainfall around the basin

increases with elevation. It is heaviest in the mountains along the

coast in the southwest, which receive from 250 to more than 500

centimeters of precipitation annually as the southwest monsoon

reaches the coast. This area of greatest rainfall, however, drains

mostly to the sea; only a small quantity goes into the rivers flowing into the basin. The relative humidity is high at night throughout the year; usually it exceeds 90 percent. During the daytime

in the dry season, humidity averages about 50 percent or slightly

lower, but it may remain about 60 percent in the rainy period.

Drainage

Except for the smaller rivers in the southeast, most of the major

rivers and river systems in Cambodia drain into the Tonle Sap or

into the Mekong River. The Cardamom Mountains and Elephant

Range form a separate drainage divide. To the east the rivers flow

into the Tonle Sap, while on the west they flow into the Gulf of

Thailand. Toward the southern end of the Elephant Mountains,

however, because of the topography, some small rivers flow southward on the eastern side of the divide.

The Mekong River in Cambodia flows southward from the

Cambodia-Laos border to a point below Kracheh city, where it turns west for about 50 kilometers and then turns southwest to

80
The Society and Its Environment

Phnom Penh. Extensive rapids run above Kracheh city. From Kampong Cham the gradient slopes very gently, and inundation of areas along the river occurs at flood stage—June through November

through breaks in the natural levees that have built up along its course. At Phnom Penh four major water courses meet at a point

called the Chattomukh (Four Faces). The Mekong River flows in

from the northeast and the Tonle Sab—a river emanating from

the Tonle Sap—flows in from the northwest. They divide into two

parallel channels, the Mekong River proper and the Basak River,

and flow independently through the delta areas of Cambodia and

Vietnam to the South China Sea. The flow of water into the Tonle Sab is seasonal. In September

or in October, the flow of the Mekong River, fed by monsoon rains,

increases to a point where its outlets through the delta cannot handle

the enormous volume of water. At this point, the water pushes

northward up the Tonle Sab and empties into the Tonle Sap,

thereby increasing the size of the lake from about 2,590 square

kilometers to about 24,605 square kilometers at the height of the

flooding (see fig. 6). After the Mekong's waters crest—when its downstream channels can handle the volume of water—the flow

reverses, and water flows out of the engorged lake. As the level of the Tonle Sap retreats, it deposits a new layer

of sediment. The annual flooding, combined with poor drainage

immediately around the lake, transforms the surrounding area into

marshlands unusable for agricultural purposes during the dry sea- son. The sediment deposited into the lake during the Mekong's

flood stage appears to be greater than the quantity carried away

later by the Tonle Sab River. Gradual silting of the lake would

seem to be occurring; during low-water level, it is only about 1.5

meters deep, while at flood stage it is between 10 and 15 meters

deep.

Regional Divisions

Cambodia's boundaries in 1987 were for the most part based

upon those recognized by France and by neighboring countries during the colonial period. The 800-kilometer boundary with Thailand,

coincides with a natural feature, the watershed of the Dangrek

Mountains, only in its northern sector. The 541 -kilometer border

with Laos and the 1,228-kilometer border with Vietnam result largely from French administrative decisions and do not follow

major natural features. Border disputes have broken out in the past

between Cambodia and Thailand as well as between, Cambodia

and Vietnam.

81
Cambodia: A Country Study

106°

National Capital

50 100 KILOMETERS

I

i i L_

50 n100 MILES

Figures represent annual rainfall in centimeters.

106°

Figure 5. Annual Rainfall and Monsoon Airflow

82
The Society and Its Environment

Population

Between 1874 and 1921, the total population increased from

about 946,000 to 2.4 million. By 1950 it had increased to between

3,710,107 and 4,073,967, and in 1962 it had reached 5.7 million.

From the 1960s until 1975, the population of Cambodia increased

by about 2.2 percent yearly, the lowest increase in Southeast Asia.

By 1975 when the Khmer Rouge took power, it was estimated at 7.3 million. Of this total an estimated one million to two million

reportedly died between 1975 and 1978. In 1981 the PRK gave

the official population figure as nearly 6.7 million, although approximately 6.3 million to 6.4 million is probably a more accurate one. The average annual rate of population growth from 1978 to 1985 was 2.3 percent (see table 2, Appendix A). Life expectancy at birth was 44.2 years for males and 43.3 years for females in 1959. By

1970 life expectancy had increased by about 2.5 years since 1945.

The greater longevity for females apparentiy reflected improved

health practices during maternity and childbirth.

In 1959 about 45 percent of the population was under 15 years

of age; by 1962 this figure had increased slightly to 46 percent.

In 1962 an estimated 52 percent of the population was between

15 and 64 years of age, while 2 percent was older than 65. The

percentage of males and females in the three groups was almost

the same. The population of Cambodia has been fairly homogeneous. In

1962 about 80 percent of the population was ethnic Khmer. The

remaining 20 percent included Chinese, Vietnamese, Cham,

Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B), Europeans. By 1981 as a result of the Vietnamese repatriation in 1970 to 1971 and the deaths and

emigration of large numbers of Cham and Chinese, ethnic Khmer

accounted for about 90 percent or more of the population.

Dynamics

Rapid and drastic population movements occurred in the early

1970s, when large numbers of rural Cambodians fled to the cities to escape the fighting in the countryside, and between 1975 and

1979, when the government forcibly relocated urban dwellers to rural sites throughout the country. Large scale emigration also occurred between 1975 and 1979.

Distribution

Population density varies throughout Cambodia. The national

average in 1972 was about 22 persons per square kilometer. At

one end of the density scale were the provinces around Phnom Penh,

83
Cambodia: A Country Study

Batdambang;

PHNOM PENH

Kampong Saom "9

Gulf of Thailand

International boundary

® National capital

• Populated place Area of generalized

flooding

25 50 Kilo meters 6 "25 50 Miles

V

South

China Sea

Boundary representation not necessarily authoritative

Figure 6. Annual Flooding Around Tonle Sap, 1985

84
The Society and Its Environment

where the number of inhabitants per square kilometer could reach

as many as 500, but more generally varied between 200 and 500.

At the lower end of the scale were outlying provinces, like Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri) and Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) in the northeast and Kaoh Kong in the southwest, where the density was as low as zero to five persons per square kilometer. For almost twothirds of the country, the density was approximately five persons

per square kilometer (see table 3, Appendix A).

Ethnic Khmer were concentrated in central and in southeastern

Cambodia. The Cham lived in their own towns and sections in

larger cities. The Chinese lived mainly in urban centers; in Phnom

Penh they were concentrated around the markets. The Vietnamese

tended to live in their own villages and in certain sections of Phnom

Penh. The Khmer Loeu were concentrated in the northeastern and

southwestern areas of Cambodia.

Migration and Refugees

Over the decades, some movement of the rural population in

Cambodia—either to urban areas in quest of employment or to other villages in search of more favorable agricultural sites—has

been customary. Many highland tribal groups practice slash-andburn agriculture that requires movement to a new area once the

soil is exhausted in a given location. Warfare in the early 1970s

drove large numbers of rural people to the cities in search of safety.

The population of Phnom Penh, for example, increased from

393,995 in 1962 to about 1.2 miUion in 1971, but had decreased

to about 500,000 by 1985. With their takeover in April 1975, the

Khmer Rouge forced most of the population out of Phnom Penh

into the countryside, where large numbers either died because of

hardship or were executed. Many such population movements were

forced upon the populace under the Khmer Rouge regime. Many

Cambodians who had left the country to study abroad became de

facto emigrants when the communists took over. Thousands more

fled into neighboring Thailand and Vietnam in 1975 and at the

time of the Vietnamese invasion in late 1978. Cham, Vietnamese,

and Chinese communities alike were persecuted, and their members were killed, under the Khmer Rouge. Forced repatriation in

1970 and deaths during the Khmer Rouge era reduced the Viet- namese population in Cambodia from between 250,000 and 300,000

in 1969 to a reported 56,000 in 1984. Postwar emigration of Viet- namese civilians to Cambodia remained a subject of controversy.

Some social scientists believed that the number of Vietnamese in

Cambodia in 1988 had reached at least the prewar level, and,

85
Cambodia: A Country Study

indeed, many Khmer feared that even more Vietnamese immigrants would inundate their population.

During the Khmer Rouge era, about 50,000 Cambodians fled to Thailand, and an estimated 150,000 fled to Vietnam. As soon

as the Khmer Rouge regime began to crumble under the onslaught

of the Vietnamese in late 1978, a massive exodus of Cambodians

began. About 630,000—braving hostile fire, minefields, bandits,

and border guards—left the country between 1979 and 1981. In

subsequent years, about 208,000 resettled in other countries; these

included 136,000 in the United States, 32,000 in France, and 13,000

each in Australia and in Canada.

In late 1987, about 265,000 Cambodians—about 150,000 of them

below the age of 15 —remained in Thailand. The Khmer refugees were supported by the United Nations Border Relief Operation

(which assumed the task from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in the early 1980s) and private agencies at an

annual cost of US$36 million in 1986. The refugees were grouped

in nine camps on the Thailand side of that country's common

border with Cambodia. Of the nine installations, the most prominent was Khao-I-Dang, located near Aranyaprathet, Prachin Buri

Province, Thailand. It was controlled by the Thai military, and

its inhabitants were the only ones to be regarded legally as refugees by the Thai government. In 1987 Khao-I-Dang had a population of about 21,000 to 25,000 (down from a peak of 130,000

at its founding in 1979), of whom about 12,000 to 15,000 were

eligible for resettlement.

The other eight camps were under the control of the three Khmer

resistance factions (see Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 4; Coalition Government Resistance Forces, ch. 5). These camps were considered reception centers rather than bona

fide refugee facilities by the Thai government, and their inmates,

unlike the residents of Khao-I-Dang, were considered displaced

persons rather than refugees. Of these eight installations, five were

controlled by the Khmer Rouge; two, by the Khmer People's

National Liberation Front (KPNLF—see Appendix B); and one, by the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste

ANS—see Appendix B). Khmer insurgents freely visited the camps

controlled by their own resistance factions and used them as rest and recuperation centers. The Khmer Rouge camps sheltered between 50,000 and 60,000

inhabitants. Access to them was granted grudgingly, if at all, even

to United Nations officials. Occasional visiting journalists reported

in the 1980s that an atmosphere of repression and fear prevailed

at these facilities. The largest Khmer Rouge installation, located

86
The Society and Its Environment

on the southwestern part of the border between Cambodia and

Thailand, was known as Site 8 and held about 30,000 persons.

Smaller installations, inhabited by 20,000 or more people altogether, were reported at Na Trao and Huay Chan, in Sisaket Province,

Thailand, and at the seldom-visited encampments of Borai and in

Ta Luen, Trat Province, Thailand.

The KPNLF controlled two camps containing a total of about

160,000 persons. The principal installation was Site 2, with a population of between 145,000 and 150,000 and an environment noted

for its rampant lawlessness. Site 2 was located in the vicinity of

Ta Phraya, Prachin Buri Province, Thailand, and, at one time in

the early 1980s, held the largest concentration Cambodians outside of Phnom Penh.

The lone camp controlled by the ANS was Site B, also known

as "Green Hill," which was located about 50 kilometers north of

Ta Phraya and had a population of between 40,000 and 50,000.

Site B was considered by observers to be the most orderly and well- managed of the refugee camps; it offered more living space, in- cluding room for personal gardens, than did the others.

Social Structure and Organization

The ethnic groups that constitute Cambodian society possess a number of economic and demographic commonalities—for example, Chinese merchants play middlemen in many economic cycles,

but they also preserve differences in their social and cultural insti- tutions. The major differences among these groups lie in social

organization, language, and religion. The majority of the inhabitants of Cambodia are settled in fairly permanent villages near the

major bodies of water in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands

region. The contemporary locations of major Khmer population

centers date back to antiquity according to geographer Jacques

Nepote. He points out that contemporary Khmer Krom (see

Appendix B) settlements are located in the same areas as the ancient site of Funan, and that the Khmer setdements extending from

Phnom Penh in a southeastern direction are located where pre- Angkorian archaeological sites are clustered (see Prehistory and

Early Kingdoms, ch. 1). The Khmer Loeu live in widely scattered

villages that are abandoned when the cultivated land in the vicinity is exhausted.

The permanently settled Khmer and Cham villages usually are

located on or near the banks of a river or other bodies of water. Cham villages usually are made up almost entirely of Cham, but

Khmer villages, especially in central and in southeastern Cambodia, typically include sizable Chinese communities. In his study

87
Cambodia: A Country Study

of the coastal Chinese in Kampot Province and in Kaoh Kong

Province, French geographer Roland Pourtier points out that the

Chinese dwellings and shops—usually in the same structures

are located at the center of the town or village, while the Khmer

houses are scattered at some distance from the center. He also finds

that there are some villages made up almost entirely of Chinese.

The Khmer

Household and Family Structure

In the late 1980s, the nuclear family, consisting of a husband

and a wife and their unmarried children, probably continued to be the most important kin group within Khmer society. The family is the major unit of both production and consumption. Within

this unit are the strongest emotional ties, the assurance of aid in

the event of trouble, economic cooperation in labor, sharing of

produce and income, and contribution as a unit to ceremonial

obligations. A larger grouping, the personal kindred that includes a nuclear family with the children, grandchildren, grandparents,

uncles, aunts, first cousins, nephews, and nieces, may be included

in the household. Family organization is weak, and ties between

related families beyond the kindred are loosely defined at best. There

is no tradition of family names, although the French tried to legis- late their use in the early twentieth century. Most Khmer genealogies extend back only two or three generations, which contrasts with the veneration of ancestors by the Vietnamese and by the

Chinese. Noble families and royal families, some of which can trace

their descent for several generations, are exceptions.

The individual Khmer is surrounded by a small inner circle of

family and friends who constitute his or her closest associates, those

he would approach first for help. In rural communities, neighbors—who are often also kin—may be important, too, and much

of housebuilding and other heavy labor intensive tasks are per- formed by groups of neighbors. Beyond this close circle are more

distant relatives and casual friends. In rural Cambodia, the strongest ties a Khmer may develop—besides those to the nuclear family

and to close friends—are those to other members of the local community. A strong feeling of pride—for the village, for the district,

and province—usually characterizes Cambodian community life. There is much sharing of religious life through the local Buddhist

temple, and there are many cross-cutting kin relations within the

community. Formerly, the Buddhist priesthood, the national armed

forces, and, to a lesser extent, the civil service all served to connect the Khmer to the wider national community. The priesthood

88
The Society and Its Environment

served only males, however, while membership in some components of the armed forces and in the civil service was open to women

as well. Two fictive relationships in Cambodia transcend kinship boundaries and serve to strengthen interpersonal and interfamily ties. A Khmer may establish a fictive child-parent or sibling relationship called thoa (roughly translating as adoptive parent or sibling).

The person desiring to establish the thoa relationship will ask the

other person for permission to enter into the relationship. The thoa relationship may become as close as the participants desire. The

second fictive relationship is that of kloeu (close male friend). This

is similar, in many ways, to becoming a blood brother. A person

from one place may ask a go-between in another place to help him

establish a kloeu relationship with someone in that place. Once the

participants agree, a ceremony is held that includes ritual drinking of water into which small amounts of the participants' blood

have been mixed and bullets and knives have been dipped; prayers are also recited by an achar (or ceremonial leader) before wit- nesses. The kloeu relationship is much stronger than the thoa. One

kloeu will use the same kinship terms when addressing his kloeu 's parents and siblings as he would when addressing his own. The

two friends can call upon each other for any kind of help at any

time. The kloeu relationship apparently is limited to some rural parts

of Cambodia and to Khmer-speaking areas in Thailand. As of the

late 1980s, it may have become obsolete. The female equivalent

of kloeu is mreak. Legally, the husband is the head of the Khmer family, but the

wife has considerable authority, especially in family economics. The

husband is responsible for providing shelter and food for his family; the wife is generally in charge of the family budget, and she

serves as the major ethical and religious model for the children,

especially the daughters. In rural areas, the male is mainly responsible for such activities as plowing and harrowing the rice paddies,

threshing rice, collecting sugar palm juice, caring for cattle, car- pentry, and buying and selling cows and chickens. Women are mainly responsible for pulling and transplanting rice seedlings, harvesting and winnowing rice, tending gardens, making sugar, weaving, and caring for the household money. Both males and females

may work at preparing the rice paddies for planting, tending the

paddies, and buying and selling land.

Ownership of property among the rural Khmer was vested in

the nuclear family. Descent and inheritance is bilateral. Legal chil- dren might inherit equally from their parents. The division of

property was theoretically equal among siblings, but in practice

89
Cambodia: A Country Study

the oldest child might inherit more. Each of the spouses might bring

inherited land into the family, and the family might acquire joint

land during the married life of the couple. Each spouse was free

to dispose of his or her land as he or she chose. A will was usually

oral, although a written one was preferred.

Private ownership of land was abolished by the Khmer Rouge

in the 1970s. Such ownership is also not recognized by the PRK

government, which for example, refused to support former owners when they returned and found others living on and working their

land. Some peasants were able to remain on their own land during the Khmer Rouge era, however, and generally they were al- lowed to continue to work the land as if it were their own property.

In 1987 the future of private ownership of land remained in doubt.

According to Cambodia.scholar Michael Vickery, the PRK government planned to collectivize in three stages. The first stage involved

allotting land to families at the beginning of the season and allowing the cultivators to keep the harvest. The second stage involved

allotting land to each family according to the number of members.

The families in the interfamily units known as solidarity groups

(krom samaki) were to work to prepare the fields, but subsequently

each family was responsible for the upkeep of its own parcel of land.

At this stage, each family could dispose of its own produce. In the

final stage, all labor was to be performed in common, and at the

end of the season any remuneration was distributed according to a work point system. Livestock at this stage would still belong to the family. By 1984 the first stage groups accounted for 35 per- cent of the rural population, but the third level accounted for only

10 percent of the farms (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Housing

The nuclear family, in rural Cambodia, typically lives in a rect- angular house that may vary in size from four by six meters to

six by ten meters. It is constructed of a wooden frame with gabled

thatch roof and walls of woven bamboo. Khmer houses typically are raised on stilts as much as three meters for protection from an- nual floods. Two ladders or wooden staircases provide access to the house. The steep thatch roof overhanging the house walls protects the interior from rain. Typically a house contains three rooms

separated by partitions of woven bamboo. The front room serves

as a living room used to receive visitors, the next room is the parents' bedroom, and the third is for unmarried daughters. Sons sleep

anywhere they can find space. Family members and neighbors work

together to build the house, and a house-raising ceremony is held

upon its completion. The houses of poorer persons may contain

90
The Society and Its Environment

only a single large room. Food is prepared in a separate kitchen

located near the house but usually behind it. Toilet facilities consist of simple pits in the ground, located away from the house, that are covered up when filled. Any livestock is kept below the house.

Chinese and Vietnamese houses in Cambodian town and vil- lages typically are built directly on the ground and have earthen,

cement, or tile floors, depending upon the economic status of the owner. Urban housing and commercial buildings may be of brick,

masonry, or wood.

Diet

Dietary habits appear to be basically the same among the Khmer

and other ethnic groups, although the Muslim Cham do not eat pork. The basic foods are rice—in several varieties, fish, and vegetables, especially trakuon (water convolvulus). Rice may be less thoroughly milled than it is in many other rice-eating countries,

and consequently it contains more vitamins and roughage. The

average rice consumption per person per day before 1970 was almost

one-half kilogram. Fermented fish in the form of sauce or of paste

are important protein supplements to the diet. Hot peppers, lemon

grass, mint, and ginger add flavor to many Khmer dishes; sugar

is added to many foods. Several kinds of noodles are eaten. The

basic diet is supplemented by vegetables and by fruits—bananas,

mangoes, papayas, rambutan, and palm fruit—both wild and cultivated, which grow abundandy throughout the country. Beef, pork,

poultry, and eggs are added to meals on special occasions, or, if the family can afford it, daily. In the cities, the diet has been af- fected by many Western items of food. French, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Indian cuisine were available in Phnom Penh in

pre-Khmer Rouge days.

Rural Khmer typically eat several times a day; the first meal

consists of a piece of fruit or cake, which workers eat after arriving

at the fields. The first full meal is at about 9:00 or 10:00 in the

morning; it is prepared by the wife or daughter and brought to the man in the field. Workers eat a large meal at about noon in

the field and then have supper with their families after returning

home around 5:00 P.M. Before the early 1970s, the Cambodian people produced a food

supply that provided an adequate diet, although children gave evi- dence of caloric underconsumption and of a deficiency in B vitamins. During the Khmer Rouge era, malnutrition increased,

especially among the people who were identified as "new people"

by the authorities (see Society under the Angkar, ch. 1). Collective meals were introduced by 1977. Food rations for the new people

91
Cambodia: A Country Study

were meager. Refugees' statements contain the following descriptions: '

1 [daily rations of] a tin of boiled rice a day mixed with . . . sauce"; "we ate twice a day, boiled soup and rice only"; "one

tin of rice a day shared between three people. Never any meat or

fruit"; "Ration was two tins of rice between four persons per day

with fish sauce. " People were reduced to eating anything they could

find—insects, small mammals, arachnids, crabs, and plants.

The food situation improved under the PRK, although in the

regime's early years there were still serious food shortages. Inter- national food donations improved the situation somewhat. In 1980

monthly rice rations distributed by the government averaged only one to two kilograms per person. People supplemented the ration

by growing secondary crops such as corn and potatoes, by fishing,

by gathering fruit and vegetables, and by collecting crabs and other

edible animals. A 1984 estimate reported that as many as 50 per- cent of all young people in Cambodia were undernourished.

Dress

The traditional Khmer costume consisted of a shirt or blouse

and a skirt-like lower garmentsampot for women and sarong for

men, a tube-shaped garment about a meter wide and as much as three meters in circumference. Made of cotton or of silk in many

different styles and patterns, it is pulled on over the legs and fastened

around the waist. On ceremonial occasions, elegant sampot and

sarong, embroidered with gold or silver threads, may be worn with

a long piece of material gathered at the waist, passed between the

legs, and tucked into the waistband in back. Members of the urban

middle and upper classes may wear Western-style clothing at work

and more traditional clothing at home.

At home both sexes wear the sampot and the sarong. In rural

areas, working men and women may wear loose-fitting pants and

shirts or blouses. Many men wear Western-style pants or shorts. A third essential part of Khmer dress is the krama, or long scarf,

that is worn around the neck, over the shoulders, or wrapped

turban-style around the head. School children wear Western-style

clothing to school. The boys wear shirts and shorts; the girls wear

skirts and blouses.

The Khmer Rouge were noted for their unisex black "pajamas."

Their typical garb was the peasant outfit of collarless black shirt

baggy trousers and checkered krama (a scarf knotted loosely about

the neck). French anthropologist Marie Alexandrine Martin re- ported that the wearing of brightly colored clothing was prohibited

under the Khmer Rouge and that women, young and old, wore

black, dark blue, or maroon sampot with short-sleeved plain blouses.

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93
Cambodia: A Country Study

Women were forbidden to wear Western-style pants at any time.

The conical hat characteristic of the Vietnamese has been adopted

to a certain extent by Khmer in the provinces adjacent to Vietnam.

Families

The birth of a child is a happy event for the family. According

to traditional beliefs, however, confinement and childbirth expose

the family, and especially the mother and the child to harm from

the spirit world. A woman who dies in childbirth—crosses the river

(chhlong tonle) in Khmer—is believed to become an evil spirit. In

traditional Khmer society, a pregnant woman respects a number

of food taboos and avoids certain situations. These traditions remain

in practice in rural Cambodia, but they have become weakened

in urban areas. No extensive information exists on birth control or on the use

of contraceptives in Cambodia. Before the Khmer Rouge takeover, no organizations in Cambodia were known to be concerned with

family planning. Traditional Khmer families were normally smaller

than Chinese or Vietnamese families; the desired number of chil- dren was five. Reports suggest that several methods of contraception are currently available in Cambodia and that these are practiced

in the PRK (see Public Health, this ch.). A recent study of Cambodian women in France reported that 91 percent of the sample

wished to use some method of birth control and that 74 percent

knew of at least one method. The most common methods used in

that group were the oral contraceptive pill and some form of sterili- zation. It is not known to what extent the attitudes of this group

reflect those of Cambodian women in general.

A Cambodian child may be nursed until he or she is between

two and four years of age. Up to the age of three or four, the child

is given considerable physical affection and freedom. There is lit- tle corporal punishment. After reaching the age of about four, chil- dren are expected to feed and bathe themselves and to control their

bowel functions. Children around five years of age also may be

expected to help look after younger siblings. Children's games emphasize socialization or skill rather than winning and losing.

Most children begin school when they are seven or eight. By

the time they reach this age, they are familiar with the society's norms of politeness, obedience, and respect toward their elders and

toward Buddhist monks. The father at this time begins his permanent retreat into a relatively remote, authoritarian role. By age ten, a girl is expected to help her mother in basic household tasks; a boy knows how to care for the family's livestock and can do farm

work under the supervision of older males.

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The Society and Its Environment

In precommunist days, parents exerted complete authority over

their children until the children were married, and the parents con- tinued to maintain some control well into the marriage. Punishment was meted out sparingly, but it might have involved physical

contact. Age difference was strictly recognized. The proper polite

vocabulary was used in the precommunist period, and special

generational terms for "you" continued to be used in the late 1980s.

Younger speakers had to show respect to older people, including

siblings, even if their ages differed by only a few minutes.

Between the ages of seven and nineteen, but most commonly

between the ages of eleven and nineteen, a boy may become a temple servant and go on to serve a time as a novice monk. Having

a son chosen for such a position is a great honor for the parents,

and earns the individual son much merit (see Religion, this ch.).

Formerly, and perhaps still in some rural areas, a ceremony

marked the entrance of a girl into puberty. Upon the onset of menstruation, a girl would participate in a ritual called chol mlup (entering the shadow). Certain foods were taboo at this time, and she

would be isolated from her family for a period of a few days to

six months. After the period of seclusion, she was considered marriageable.

Adolescent children usually play with members of the same sex. The main exception to this occurs during festivals, especially happy ones such as the New Year Festival, when boys and girls take

part in group games. Young people then have the opportunity to begin looking for future mates. Virginity is highly valued in brides,

and premarital sex is deplored. The girl who becomes pregnant

out of wedlock brings shame to her family.

The choice of a spouse is a complex one for the young male,

and it may involve not only his parents and his friends, as well

as those of the young woman, but also a matchmaker. A young

man can decide on a likely spouse on his own and then ask his

parents to arrange the marriage negotiations, or the young per- son's parents may make the choice of spouse, giving the child lit- tle to say in the selection. In theory, a girl may veto the spouse

her parents have chosen.

Courtship patterns differ between rural and urban Khmer. Attitudes in the larger cities have been influenced by Western ideas

of romantic love that do not apply in the countryside. A man usually

marries between the ages of nineteen and twenty-five, a girl between the ages of sixteen and twenty-two. Marriage between close

blood relatives is forbidden. After a spouse has been selected, a go-between meets with the parents and broaches the subject of marriage. Then each family investigates the other to make sure its child

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Cambodia: A Country Study

is marrying into a good family. When both sides agree to the marriage and presents have been exchanged and accepted, the families consult an achar to set the wedding date. In rural areas, there

is a form of bride- service; that is, the young man may take a vow

to serve his prospective father-in-law for a period of time.

The traditional wedding is a long and colorful affair. Formerly

it lasted three days, but in the 1980s it more commonly lasted a day and a half. The ceremony begins in the morning at the home

of the bride and is directed by the achar. Buddhist priests offer a

short sermon and recite prayers of blessing. Parts of the ceremony

involve ritual hair cutting, tying cotton threads soaked in holy water

around the bride's and groom's wrists, and passing a candle around

a circle of happily married and respected couples to bless the union.

After the wedding, a banquet is held. In the city, the banquet is held at a restaurant; in the country, it is held in a temporary shelter and is prepared by the two families. Newlyweds traditionally move

in with the wife's parents and may live with them up to a year,

until they can build a new house nearby. These patterns changed

drastically under the communists. The Khmer Rouge divided families and separated the men from the women. The father, mother,

and children frequently were separated for many months. A man

and woman often did not have time to consummate a marriage,

and sexual relations were limited by long separations. Extramarital relations and even flirtations between young people were heavily punished.

Divorce is legal, relatively easy to obtain, but not common.

Divorced persons are viewed with some disapproval, and they are not invited to take part in the blessing of a newlywed couple. Some

of the grounds for divorce are incompatibility, prolonged absence

without good reason, abandonment by either partner, refusal of

the husband to provide for the family, adultery, immoral conduct,

and refusal, for more than a year, to permit sexual intercourse.

A magistrate may legalize the divorce. Each spouse retains whatever

property he or she brought into the marriage. Property acquired

jointly is divided equally. Divorced persons may remarry, but the

woman must wait ten months. Custody of minor children is usually

given to the mother. Both parents continue to have an obligation

to contribute financially toward the rearing and education of the

child.

In theory a man may have multiple wives if he can afford them,

but this is rare in practice; the first wife may veto the taking of a second wife. Concubinage also exists, although it is more fre- quent in the cities. While second wives have certain legal rights,

concubines have none.

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The Society and Its Environment

As the married couple moves through life they have children,

nurture and train them, educate them, and marry them off. When

they become too old to support themselves, they may invite the

youngest child's family to move in and to take over running the

household. At this stage in their lives, they enjoy a position of high

status, they help care for grandchildren, and they devote more time

in service to the wat (temple).

Death is not viewed with the great outpouring of grief common

to Western society; it is viewed as the end of one life and as the

beginning of another life that one hopes will be better. Buddhist

Khmer usually are cremated, and their ashes are deposited in a stupa in the temple compound. A corpse is washed, dressed, and

placed in a coffin, which may be decorated with flowers and with

a photograph of the deceased. White pennant-shaped flags, called

"white crocodile flags," outside a house indicate that someone in

that household has died. A funeral procession consisting of an achar,

Buddhist monks, members of the family, and other mourners ac- companies the coffin to the crematorium. The spouse and the chil- dren show mourning by shaving their heads and by wearing white

clothing. Relics such as teeth or pieces of bone are prized by the

survivors, and they are often worn on gold chains as amulets.

Social Stratification and Social Mobility

Social strata in precommunist Cambodia may be viewed as constituting a spectrum, with an elite group or upper class at one end

and a lower class consisting of rural peasants and unskilled urban

workers at the other end. The elite group was composed of highranking government, military, and religious leaders, characterized

by high prestige, wealth, and education or by members one of the

royal or noble families. Each one of the subgroups had its own

internal ranking system. Before the ouster of Sihanouk in 1970,

the highest ranks of the elite group were filled largely by those born

into them. The republican regime in the early 1970s invalidated

all royal and noble tides, and the only titles of social significance

legally in use in connection with the elite group were those gained

through achievement. Military and government titles tended to replace royal and noble titles. In spite of the legislated loss of titles, however, wide public recognition of the royalty and the nobility

continued. The deferential linguistic usages and the behavior styles

directed toward members of these groups persisted through the

1970s and, to a limited extent, were still present in the late 1980s.

In the early 1970s, the senior military officers, some of whom

were also members of the aristocracy, replaced the hereditary

aristocracy as the most influential group in the country. To some

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Cambodia: A Country Study

extent, this upper stratum of the upper class was closed, and it was

extremely difficult to move into it and to attain positions of high

power. The closed nature of the group frustrated many members

of the small intellectual elite. This group, positioned at the lower

end of the elite group, consisted of civil servants, professional people, university students, and some members of the Buddhist hierarchy. It had become large enough to be politically influential by

the 1970s, for example, student strikes were serious enough in 1972

to force the government to close some schools.

Somewhere in the middle of this social spectrum was a small middle class, which included both Khmer and non-Khmer of medium

prestige. Members of this class included businessmen, white-collar

workers, teachers, physicians, most of the Buddhist clergy, shopkeepers, clerks, and military officers of lower and middle rank.

Many Chinese, Vietnamese, and members of other ethnic minorities belonged to the middle class. The Khmer were a majority only

among the military and among the civil servants. The lower class consisted of rural small farmers, fishermen, crafts- men, and blue-collar urban workers. The majority of Cambodians belonged to this group. Most of the members of the lower class were Khmer, but other ethnic groups, including most of the Cham,

Khmer Loeu, some Vietnamese, and a few Chinese, were included.

This class was virtually isolated from, and was uninterested in, the

activities of the much smaller urban middle and upper classes. Within the lower class, fewer status distinctions existed; those

that did depended upon attributes such as age, sex, moral behavior,

and religious piety. Traditional Buddhist values were important on the village level. Old age was respected, and older men and

women received deferential treatment in terms of language and

behavior. All else being equal, males generally were accorded a higher social status than females. Good character—honesty,

generosity, compassion, avoidance of quarrels, chastity, warmth

and personal religious piety also increased status. Generosity toward

others and to the wat was important. Villagers accorded respect

and honor to those whom they perceived as having authority or

prestige. Buddhist monks and nuns, teachers, high-ranking government officials, and members of the hereditary aristocracy made up

this category. Persons associated with those who possessed prestige tended to derive prestige and to be accorded respect therefrom.

The Khmer language reflects a somewhat different classification

of Khmer society based on a more traditional model and characterized by differing linguistic usages (see Languages, this ch.). This

classification divided Cambodian society into three broad categories: royalty and nobility, clergy, and laity. The Khmer language

98
The Society and Its Environment

had—and to a lesser extent still has—partially different lexicons

for each of these groups. For example, nham (to eat) was used when

speaking of oneself or to those on a lower social level; pisa (to eat) was used when speaking politely of someone else; chhan (to eat) was

used of Buddhist clergy, and saoy (to eat) was used of royalty. The

Khmer Rouge attempted to do away with the different lexicons

and to establish a single one for all; for example, they tried to substitute a single, rural word, hop (to eat), for all of the above words.

Social mobility was played out on an urban stage. There was

little opportunity among the majority of the rural Cambodians to change social status; this absence of opportunity was a reflection

of traditional Buddhist fatalism. A man could achieve higher sta- tus by entering the monkhood or by acquiring an education and

then entering the military or the civil service. Opportunities in

government service, especially for white-collar positions, were highly

prized by Cambodian youths. The availability of such positions

did not keep pace with the number of educated youths, however,

and in the late 1960s and the early 1970s this lag began to cause widespread dissatisfaction.

The Khmer Rouge characterized Cambodians as being in one

of several classes: the feudal class (members of the royal family and

high government or military officials); the capitalist class (business

people); the petite bourgeoisie (civil servants, professionals, small

business people, teachers, servants, and clerics); peasant class (the

rich, the mid-level, and the poor, based on whether or not they

could hire people to work their land and on whether or not they

had enough food); the worker class (the independent worker, the

industrial worker, and the party members); and the "special"

classes (revolutionary intellectuals, military and police officials, and

Buddhist monks).

Other Ethnic Groups

The Cham

The Cham people in Cambodia descend from refugees of the

kingdom of Champa, which once ruled much of Vietnam between

Cao Ha in the north and Bien Hoa in the south. In 1471 Champa

was conquered joy the Vietnamese, and many Cham fled to Cambodia. Cham scholar Po Dharma points out that the Cham have

lived in Cambodia since at least 1456. They settled along the Tonle

Sap and Mekong rivers and in Batdambang, Pouthisat, Takev,

Kampot, Kampong Cham, Kampong Thum, and Kampong

Chhnang provinces. At some time before the seventeenth century,

the Cambodian Cham and some of those in adjacent Vietnam

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Cambodia: A Country Study

converted to Islam, probably as a result of contacts with their Malay

kin who had embraced that religion centuries earlier (see Religion,

this ch.).

Friendly relations prevailed between the Cham and the Khmer

for centuries even though, because of the Cham religion, little inter- marriage occurred. Under the Khmer Republic (see Appendix B)

of 1970 to 1975, one of the elite military units was made up of members of the Cham and other ethnic minorities. The Khmer Rouge

tried, without much success, to recruit the Cham during the struggle

with the Khmer Republic. The Cham were singled out for particularly brutal repression under the Khmer Rouge regime, and large

numbers were killed. The PRK actively courted the Cham, and

in 1987 a Cham was a member of the party Central Committee

and minister of agriculture. Cham sources estimate that in the 1980,

in addition to the Cham in Cambodia and in Vietnam, there were

3,000 Cham in Malaysia, 2,000 in the United States, 1,000 in

Western Europe, 500 in Canada, and several hundred in Indonesia.

Po Dharma divides the Cambodian Cham into two groups

the orthodox and the traditional —based on their religious practices. The orthodox group, which makes up about one-third of the

total number of Cham in the country, were located mainly in the

Phnom Penh-Odongk area and in the provinces of Takev and Kampot. The traditional Cham were scattered throughout the midsection of the country in the provinces of Batdambang, Kampong

Thum, Kampong Cham, and Pouthisat.

The Cham of both groups typically live in villages inhabited only

by other Cham; the villages may be along the shores of water

courses, or they may be inland. The Cham refer to the former as play krong (river villages) and to the latter as play ngok (upper vil- lages). The inhabitants of the river villages engage in fishing, in

raising rice, and in growing vegetables, especially onions. They

trade fish to local Khmer for rice. The women in these villages earn money by weaving. The Cham who live inland support themselves

by various means, depending on the village. Some villages specialize

in metal working; others raise fruit trees or vegetables. The Cham

also often serve as butchers of catde for their Khmer Buddhist neighbors and are, in some areas, regarded as skillful water buffalo

breeders.

Cham dress is distinctive. The main item of clothing for both

sexes is a sarong-like garment called a batik, which is worn knotted at the waist. Men wear shirts over the batik, and women wear

close-fitting blouses that are open at the throat and have tight

sleeves. The characteristic headdress is a turban or scarf.

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The Society and Its Environment

Cham society is matriarchal with matrilineal descent. There is some trace of an earlier clan system. Parents permit their daughters a considerable amount of freedom of choice in marriage. The

parents of the girl usually make the marriage overtures to the boy.

A Cham marriage involves little ceremony. Among the Muslim

Cham, the girl's parents ask the groom if he accepts their daughter in marriage, and he is expected to answer yes. The imam acts as a witness. This simple ceremony is followed by a feast. Residence is matrilocal; the young man goes to live with his wife's

family. Females inherit the family property.

The Khmer Loeu

The Khmer Loeu are the non-Khmer highland tribes in Cambodia. Although the origins of this group are not clear, some believe that the Mon-Khmer-speaking tribes were part of the long

migration of these people from the northwest. The Austronesianspeaking groups, Rade and Jarai, apparently came to coastal Vietnam and then moved west, forming wedges among some of the

Mon-Khmer groups. The Khmer Loeu are found mainly in the

northeastern provinces of Rotanokiri, Stoeng Treng, and Mondol

Kiri. The Cambodian government coined the word Khmer Loeu

literally "Highland Khmer"—in the 1960s in order to create a feel- ing of unity between the highland tribal groups and the ruling

lowland ethnic Khmer. Traditionally the Khmer have referred to these groups as phnong and samre, both of which have pejorative

meanings. Some of the highland groups, in fact, are related in language to the Khmer, but others are from a very different linguistic and cultural background (see Languages, this ch.).

Khmer Loeu form the majority population in Rotanokiri and

Mondol Kiri provinces, and they also are present in substantial

numbers in Kracheh and Stoeng Treng provinces (see fig. 7). Their

total population in 1969 was estimated at 90,000 persons. In 1971

the number of Khmer Loeu was estimated variously between 40,000

and 100,000 persons. Population figures were unavailable in 1987,

but the total probably was nearly 100,000 persons.

Most Khmer Loeu live in scattered temporary villages that have

only a few hundred inhabitants. These villages usually are governed

by a council of local elders or by a village headman.

The Khmer Loeu cultivate a wide variety of plants, but the main

crop is dry or upland rice grown by the slash-and-burn method.

Hunting, fishing, and gathering supplement the cultivated vegetable

foods in the Khmer Loeu diet. Houses vary from huge multifamily

longhouses to small single-family structures. They may be built close to the ground or on stilts.

101
Cambodia: A Country Study

CZH Khmer

Cham

I* * r\ Pearic groups ^

Kuy

l-^-^l Mon-Khmer groups

miHUU Austronesian groups

25 50 Kil ometers 25 50 Miles

i ; l

Figure 7. Ethno-Linquistic Groups of Cambodia, 1983

102
The Society and Its Environment

During the period of the French Protectorate, the French did

not interfere in the affairs of the Khmer Loeu (see The French Protectorate, ch. 1). Reportedly, French army commanders considered

the Khmer Loeu as an excellent source of personnel for army outposts, and they recruited large numbers to serve with the French

forces. Many Khmer Loeu continued this tradition by enlisting

in the Cambodian army.

In the 1960s, the Cambodian government carried out a broad

civic action program—for which the army had responsibility

among the Khmer Loeu in Mondol Kiri, Rotanokiri, Stoeng Treng,

and Kaoh Kong provinces. The goals of this program were to educate the Khmer Loeu, to teach them Khmer, and eventually to assimilate them into the mainstream of Cambodian society. There was some effort at resettlement; in other cases, civil servants went

out to live with individual Khmer Loeu groups to teach their members Khmer ways. Schools were provided for some Khmer Loeu

communities, and in each large village a resident government

representative disseminated information and encouraged the Khmer

Loeu to learn the lowland Khmer way of life. Civil servants sent

to work among the Khmer Loeu often viewed the assignment as a kind of punishment.

In the late 1960s, an estimated 5,000 Khmer Loeu in eastern Cambodia rose in rebellion against the government and demanded

self-determination and independence. The government press re- ported that local leaders loyal to the government had been as- sassinated. Following the rebellion, the hill people's widespread

resentment of ethnic Khmer settlers caused them to refuse to cooperate with the Cambodian army in its suppression of rural unrest. Both the Khmer and the Vietnamese communists took advantage

of this disaffection, and they actively recruited Khmer Loeu into

their ranks. In late 1970, the government forces withdrew from

Rotanokiri and Mondol Kiri provinces and abandoned the area

to the rapidly growing Khmer communist insurgent force, the

Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK—see Appendix B), and

to its Vietnamese mentors (see Into the Maelstrom: ch. 1; Insurrection and War, 1967-75, ch. 1; National Army of Democratic

Kampuchea, ch. 5). There is some evidence that in the 1960s and

in the 1970s the Front Uni pour la Liberation des Races Opprimes

(FULRO—United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races)

united tribes in the mountainous areas of southern Vietnam and

had members from Khmer Loeu groups as well as from the Cham

in Cambodia.

In the early 1980s, Khmer Rouge propaganda teams infiltrated

the northeastern provinces and encouraged rebellion against the

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Cambodia: A Country Study

central government. In 1981 the government structure included

four Khmer Loeu province chiefs, all reportedly from the Brao

group, in the northeastern provinces of Mondol Kiri, Rotanokiri,

Stoeng Treng, and Preah Vihear. According to a 1984 resolution

of the PRK National Cadres Conference entitled "Policy Toward

Ethnic Minorities," the minorities were considered an integral part

of the Cambodian nation, and they were to be encouraged to participate in collectivization. Government policy aimed to transform

minority groups into modern Cambodians. The same resolution

called for the elimination of illiteracy, with the stipulations that

minority languages be respected and that each tribe be allowed to write, speak, and teach in its own language.

The major Khmer Loeu groups in Cambodia are the Kuy,

Mnong, Stieng, Brao, Pear, Jarai, and Rade. All but the last two

speak Mon-Khmer languages (see Language, this ch.).

In the late 1980s, about 160,000 Kuy lived in the northern Cambodian provinces of Kampong Thum, Preah Vihear, and Stoeng

Treng as well as in adjacent Thailand. (Approximately 70,000 Kuy

had been reported in Cambodia itself in 1978.) Most of the Kuy

have been assimilated into the predominant culture of the country

in which they live. Many are Buddhists, and the majority practice

wet-rice cultivation. They have the reputation of being skilled blacksmiths.

The Brao, including the Tampuon subgroup, inhabit northeastern Cambodia and adjacent Laos. In 1962 the Brao population in Laos was estimated at about 9,000 persons. In 1984 it was

reported that the total Brao population was between 10,000 and

15,000 persons. About 3,000 Brao reportedly moved into Cambodia from Laos in the 1920s. The Brao live in large villages cen- tered on a communal house. They cultivate dry-rice and produce some pottery. They appear to have a bilateral kinship system.

A total of 23,000 Mnong were thought to be living in Cambodia and in Vietnam in the early 1980s. In Cambodia the Mnong

are found in Mondol Kiri, Kracheh, and Kampong Cham provinces

in villages consisting of several longhouses each of which is divided

into compartments that house nuclear families. The Mnong practice dry-rice farming, and some also cultivate a wide variety of

vegetables, fruits, and other useful plants as secondary crops. Some

subgroups weave cloth. At least two of the Mnong subgroups

have matrilineal descent. Monogamy is the predominant form of

marriage, and residence is usually matrilocal. Wealth distinctions are measured by the number of buffalo that a notable person

sacrifices on a funereal or ceremonial occasion as a mark of status and as a means of eliciting social approval. Slavery is known to

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The Society and Its Environment

have existed in the past, but the system allowed a slave to gain

freedom. The Stieng are closely related to the Mnong. Both groups

straddle the Cambodian-Vietnamese border, and their languages

belong to the same subfamily of Mon-Khmer. In 1978 the Cambodian Stieng numbered about 20,000 persons in all. The Stieng

cultivate dry-field rice. Their society is apparently patriarchal; resi- dence after marriage is patrilocal if a bride-price was paid. The

groups have a very loose political organization; each village has

its own leaders and tribunals.

Several small groups, perhaps totalling no more than 10,000 people in Cambodia and southeastern Thailand, make up the Pearic

group. The main members are the Pear in Batdambang, Pouthisat,

and Kampong Thum provinces; the Chong in Thailand and Bat- dambang Province; the Saoch in Kampot Province; the Samre in

what was formerly Siemreab Province (now part of Siemreab-Otdar

Meanchey Province); and the Suoi in Kampong Chhnang Province.

Some believe that this group constitutes the remnant of the pre- Khmer population of Cambodia. Many members of the Pearic

group grow dry-field rice, which they supplement by hunting and

by gathering. They have totemic clans, each headed by a chief who

inherited his office patrilineally. Marriage occurs at an early age;

there is a small bride-price. Residence may be matrilocal until the

birth of the first child, or it may be patrilocal as it is among the

Saoch. The village headman is the highest political leader. The

Saoch have a council of elders who judge infractions of traditional

law. Two chief sorcerers, whose main function is to control the

weather, play a major role in Pearic religion. Among the Saoch,

a corpse is buried instead of being burned as among the Khmer.

The Austronesian groups ofJarai and Rade form two of the largest ethnic minorities in Vietnam. Both groups spill over into north- eastern Cambodia, and they share many cultural similarities. The

total Jarai population stands at about 200,000; the Rade number

about 120,000. According to 1978 population figures, there were

10,000 Jarai and 15,000 Rade in Cambodia in the late 1970s. They

live in longhouses containing several compartments occupied by

matrilineally linked nuclear families. There may be twenty to sixty

longhouses in one village. The Rade and Jarai cultivate dry-field

rice and secondary crops such as maize. Both groups have exogamous matrilineal descent groups (consanguineous kin groups that

acknowledge a traditional bond of common descent in the maternal line and within which they do not marry). Women initiate marriage negotiations, and residence is matrilocal. Each village has

its own political hierarchy and is governed by an oligarchy of the

leading families. In the past, sorcerers known as the "kings of fire

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Cambodia: A Country Study

and water" exerted political power that extended beyond an in- dividual village. The Rade and the Jarai have been involved inti- mately in the FULRO movement, and many of the leaders in the

movement are from these two groups.

The Chinese

The Chinese in Cambodia formed the country's largest ethnic

minority in the late 1960s and in the early 1970s. In the late 1960s, an estimated 425,000 ethnic Chinese lived in Cambodia, but by

1984, as a result of warfare, Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese perse- cution, and emigration, only about 61,400 Chinese remained in

the country. Sixty percent of the Chinese were urban dwellers en- gaged mainly in commerce; the other 40 percent were rural resi- dents working as shopkeepers, as buyers and processors of rice,

palm sugar, fruit, and fish, and as moneylenders. In 1963 William

Willmott, an expert on overseas Chinese communities, estimated

that 90 percent of the Chinese in Cambodia were involved in commerce and that 92 percent of those involved in commerce in Cambodia were Chinese. The Chinese in Kampot Province and in parts

of Kaoh Kong Province also cultivated black pepper and fruit (especially rambutans, durians, and coconuts), and they engaged in

salt-water fishing. In rural Cambodia, the Chinese were moneylenders, and they wielded considerable economic power over the

ethnic Khmer peasants through usury. Studies in the 1950s dis- closed that Chinese shopkeepers would sell to peasants on credit

at interest rates of from 10 to 20 percent a month. In 1952 according to Australian political analyst Ben Kiernan, the Colonial Credit

Office found in a survey that 75 percent of the peasants in Cambodia were in debt. There seemed to be little distinction between

Chinese and Sino-Khmer (offspring of mixed Chinese and Khmer

marriages) in the moneylending and shopkeeping enterprises.

The Chinese in Cambodia represented five major linguistic

groups, the largest of which was the Teochiu (accounting for about

60 percent), followed by the Cantonese (accounting for about 20

percent), the Hokkien (accounting for about 7 percent), and the

Hakka and the Hainanese (each accounting for about 4 percent).

Those belonging to certain Chinese linguistic groups in Cambodia tended to gravitate to certain occupations. The Teochiu, who

made up about 90 percent of the rural Chinese population, ran

village stores, controlled rural credit and rice-marketing facilities,

and grew vegetables. In urban areas they were often engaged in

such enterprises as the import-export business, the sale of pharmaceuticals, and street peddling. The Cantonese, who were the

majority Chinese group before the Teochiu migrations began in

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The Society and Its Environment

the late 1930s, lived mainly in the city. Typically, the Cantonese

engaged in transportation and in construction, for the most part

as mechanics or carpenters. The Hokkien community was involved

in import-export and in banking, and it included some of the country 's richest Chinese. The Hainanese started out as pepper growers in Kampot Province, where they continued to dominate that

business. Many moved to Phnom Penh, where, in the late 1960s,

they reportedly had a virtual monopoly on the hotel and restau- rant business. They also often operated tailor shops and haberdasheries. In Phnom Penh, the newly-arrived Hakka were typically folk dentists, sellers of traditional Chinese medicines, and shoemakers.

Distinction by dialect group also has been important historically

in the administrative treatment of the Chinese in Cambodia. The

French brought with them a system devised by the Vietnamese Emperor Gia Long (1802-20) to classify the local Chinese according

to areas of origin and dialect. These groups were called bang (or

congregations by the French) and had their own leaders for law,

order, and tax-collecting. In Cambodia every Chinese was required

to belong to a bang. The head of a bang, known as the ong bang, was elected by popular vote; he functioned as an intermediary between the members of his bang and the government. Individual

Chinese who were not accepted for membership in a bang were

deported by the French authorities.

The French system of administering the Chinese community was

terminated in 1958. During the 1960s, Chinese community affairs tended to be handled, at least in Phnom Penh, by the Chinese

Hospital Committee, an organization set up to fund and to administer a hospital established earlier for the Chinese community.

This committee was the largest association of Chinese merchants

in the country, and it was required by the organization's constitution to include on its fifteen-member board six from the Teochiu

dialect group, three from the Cantonese, two from the Hokkien,

two from the Hakka, and two from the Hainanese. The hospital

board constituted the recognized leadership of Phnom Penh's

Chinese community. Local Chinese school boards in the smaller

cities and towns often served a similar function.

In 1971 the government authorized the formation of a new body,

the Federated Association of Chinese of Cambodia, which was the

first organization to embrace all of Cambodia's resident Chinese.

According to its statutes, the federation was designed to "aid

Chinese nationals in the social, cultural, public health, and medical fields," to administer the property owned joindy by the Chinese

community in Phnom Penh and elsewhere, and to promote friendly

relations between Cambodians and Chinese. With leadership that

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Cambodia: A Country Study

could be expected to include the recognized leaders of the national

Chinese community, the federation was believed likely to continue

the trend, evident since the early 1960s, to transcend dialect group

allegiance in many aspects of its social, political, and economic

programs.

Generally, relations between the Chinese and the ethnic Khmer

were good. There was some intermarriage, and a sizable proportion of the population in Cambodia was part Sino-Khmer, who

were assimilated easily into either the Chinese or the Khmer community. Willmott assumes that a Sino-Khmer elite dominated com- merce in Cambodia from the time of independence well into the era of the Khmer Republic.

The Khmer Rouge takeover was catastrophic for the Chinese

community for several reasons. When the Khmer Rouge took over a town, they immediately disrupted the local market. According

to Willmott, this disruption virtually eliminated retail trade "and

the traders (almost all Chinese) became indistinguishable from the

unpropertied urban classes." The Chinese, in addition to having

their major livelihood eradicated, also suffered because of their class membership. They were mainly well-educated urban merchants,

thus possessing three characteristics that were anathema to the

Khmer Rouge. Chinese refugees have reported that they shared

the same brutal treatment as other urban Cambodians under the

Khmer Rouge regime and that they were not especially singled out

as an ethnic group until after the Vietnamese invasion. Observers

believe that the anti-Chinese stance, of the Vietnamese government and of its officials in Phnom Penh, makes it unlikely that a Chinese community on the earlier scale will reappear in Cambodia in the near future.

The Vietnamese

Enmity has existed between the Khmer and the Vietnamese for centuries, but this antagonism did not hinder the growth of a siza- ble Vietnamese community scattered throughout southeastern and

central Cambodia. According to an American scholar on Southeast

Asia, Donald J. Steinberg, an estimated 291,596 Vietnamese, constituting more than 7 percent at the total population, resided in

Cambodia in 1950. They were concentrated in Phnom Penh, and

in Kandal, Prey Veng, and Kampong Cham provinces.

The Khmer have shown more antipathy toward the Vietnamese

than toward the Chinese or toward their other neighbors, the Thai.

Several factors explain this attitude. The expansion of Vietnamese

power has resulted historically in the loss of Khmer territory. The

Khmer, in contrast, have lost no territory to the Chinese and little

108
An oxcart driver wears the checkered scarf

that distinguishes Cambodians

from their Thai or Vietnamese neighbors.

Courtesy Bill Herod

Mother and child symbolize a renascent nation. Courtesy Bill Herod

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Cambodia: A Country Study

to the Thai. No close cultural or religious ties exist between Cambodia and Vietnam. The Vietnamese fall within the Chinese cul- ture sphere, rather than within the Indian, where the Thai and

the Khmer belong. The Vietnamese differ from the Khmer in mode

of dress, in kinship organization, and in many other ways—for

example the Vietnamese are Mahayana Buddhists. Although Viet- namese lived in urban centers such as Phnom Penh, a substantial

number lived along the lower Mekong and Basak rivers as well

as on the shores of the Tonle Sap, where they engaged in fishing.

Much of the manpower on French-owned rubber plantations was

provided by the Vietnamese, who also were employed by the French

as lower level civil servants and as white collar workers in private

businesses.

Other Groups

The Europeans and the Indians constituted the smallest ethnic

minorities in Cambodia prior to 1975. In 1950 there were about

4,500 Europeans and about 2,500 Indians in addition to small numbers of other Asians in that country. More than 90 percent of the

Europeans lived in Phnom Penh, and the next largest number lived

in Kampong Cham. A small Burmese minority, the Kola, was

found in unspecified numbers in the gem-mining areas of Batdambang and Rotanokiri provinces in prewar days. Many of the Europeans served as technical advisers to the Cambodian government,

or they worked for Western businesses. The Indians often were

involved in moneylending and in small businesses, such as those

that sold books and cloth. In the 1980s, Soviet and East European

advisers supported the PRK government, but no accurate estimate

of their numbers was available.

Languages

The majority of Cambodians, even those who are not ethnic

Khmer, speak Khmer, the official language of the country. Ethnic Khmer living in Thailand, in Vietnam, and in Laos speak dialects of Khmer that are more or less intelligible to Khmer speakers

from Cambodia. Minority languages include Vietnamese, Cham,

several dialects of Chinese, and the languages of the various hill tribes (see Other Ethnic Groups, this ch.).

Austroasiatic-Mon-Khmer

Khmer belongs to the Mon-Khmer family of the Austroasiatic

phylum of languages. American linguists David Thomas and

Robert Headley have divided the Mon-Khmer family into nine

branches: Pearic in western Cambodia and eastern Thailand;

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The Society and Its Environment

Khmer in Cambodia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos; Bahnaric in

Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; Katuic in Vietnam, Laos, and

Cambodia; Khmuic in Laos, Thailand, and China; Monic in

Burma and Thailand; Palaungic in Burma, China, and Thailand;

Khasi in Assam (India); and Viet-Muong in Vietnam. Of the languages in the Mon-Khmer family, Vietnamese has the largest number of speakers (about 47 million); Khmer, has the next largest

(about 8 million).

Khmer, in contrast to Vietnamese, Thai, Lao, and Chinese, is nontonal. Native Khmer words may be composed of one or two

syllables. Khmer is uninflected, but it has a rich system of affixes,

including infixes, for derivation. Generally speaking, Khmer has nouns (including pronouns as a special subcategory), verbs (including stative verbs or adjectives), adverbs, and various kinds of words

called particles (including verbal auxiliaries, prepositions, conjunctions, final particles, and interjections). Many Khmer words

change, chameleon-like, from one part of speech to another, depending on the context. The normal word order is subject-verbobject. Adjectival modifiers follow the nouns they modify.

Khmer, like its neighbors, Thai, Lao, and Burmese, has borrowed extensively from other languages, especially the Indie languages of Sanskrit and Pali. Khmer uses Sanskrit and Pali roots much as English and other West European languages use Latin

and Greek roots to derive new, especially scientific, words. Khmer

has also borrowed terms—especially financial, commercial, and

cooking terms—from Chinese. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Khmer borrowed from French as well. These latter borrowings have been in the realm of material culture, especially the names

for items of modern Western technology, such as buuzii (spark plug)

from the French bougie.

Khmer is written in a script derived from a south Indian alphabet.

The language has symbols for thirty-three consonants, twenty-four

dependent vowels, twelve independent vowels, and several diacritics. Most consonants have reduced or modified forms, called

subscripts, when they occur as the second member of a consonant

cluster. Vowels may be written before, after, over, or under a con- sonant symbol.

Some efforts to standardize Khmer spelling have been attempted,

but inconsistencies persist, and many words have more than one

accepted spelling. A two-volume dictionary prepared under the

direction of the Venerable Chuon Nath of the Buddhist Institute

in Phnom Penh is the standard work on Khmer lexicography.

Khmer is divided into three stages—Old Khmer (seventh to twelfth century A.D.), Middle Khmer (twelfth to seventeenth

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Cambodia: A Country Study

century A.D.), and Modern Khmer (seventeenth century to the

present). It is likely that Old Khmer was the language of Chenla.

What the language of Funan was is not at all certain, but it was

probably a Mon-Khmer language. The earliest inscription in

Khmer, found at Angkor Borei in Takev Province south of Phnom

Penh, dates from A.D. 611 (see Prehistory and Early Kingdoms,

ch. 1). Austronesian

The Austronesian languages are spread over vast areas of Asia

and the Pacific, from Madagascar to Easter Island and from Taiwan to Malaysia. Four Austronesian languages—Cham, Jarai,

Rade, and Malay—are spoken in Cambodia. Cham is spoken by

the largest number of people. Before 1975, there were about 100,000

speakers of Western Cham. Western Cham is the term used to dis- tinguish (at least two mutually related dialects of) the Cham spoken

in Cambodia and that used in adjacent inland Vietnam from

Eastern Cham spoken in the coastal areas of central Vietnam.

Western Cham is written in Arabic script, or, since the late 1960s

and the early 1970s, in a romanized script devised by Protestant

missionaries. The traditional Cham script, based on an Indian

script, is still known and used by the Eastern Cham in Vietnam,

but it has been lost by the Western Cham.

The Cham language is also nontonal. Words may contain one, two, or three syllables. Cham contains much linguistic borrowing

from Arabic, Malay, and Khmer. The normal word order is subjectverb-object, and, as in Khmer, modifying adjectives follow the nouns that they modify. Most Cham in Cambodia are bilingual

in Cham and in Khmer and many also know Arabic and Malay.

Rade and Jarai, close relatives of Cham, are spoken by several thousand members of both ethnic groups in northeastern Cambodia.

Both languages are written in romanized scripts based on the Viet- namese alphabet. Rade and Jarai have rich oral literatures, and

the former has two epic tales that have been transcribed and published.

Religion

Buddhism

Origins of Buddhism on the Indian Subcontinent

Theravada Buddhism is the religion of virtually all of the ethnic

Khmer, who constitute about 90 percent or more of the Cambodian

population. Buddhism originated in what are now north India and

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The Society and Its Environment

Nepal during the sixth century B.C. It was founded by a Sakya

prince, Siddhartha Gautama (563-483 B.C.; his traditional dates

are 623-543 B.C., also called the Gautama Buddha), who, at the

age of twenty-nine, after witnessing old age, sickness, death, and

meditation, renounced his high status and left his wife and infant son for a life of asceticism. After years of seeking truth, he is said

to have attained enlightenment while sitting alone under a bo tree. He became the Buddha—"the enlightened" —and formed an order

of monks, the sangha (see Glossary), and later an order of nuns. He spent the remainder of his life as a wandering preacher, dying

at the age of eighty.

Buddhism began as a reaction to Hindu doctrines and as an ef- fort to reform them. Nevertheless, the two faiths share many basic

assumptions. Both view the universe and all life therein as parts

of a cycle of eternal flux. In each religion, the present life of an

individual is a phase in an endless chain of events. Life and death

are merely alternate aspects of individual existence marked by the

transition points of birth and death. An individual is thus continually

reborn, perhaps in human form, perhaps in some non-human form,

depending upon his or her actions in the previous life. The endless cycle of rebirth is known as samsara (wheel of life). Theravada

Buddhism is a tolerant, non prescriptive religion that does not re- quire belief in a supreme being. Its precepts require that each in- dividual take full responsibility for his own actions and omissions.

Buddhism is based on three concepts: dharma (the doctrine of the

Buddha, his guide to right actions and belief); karma (the belief

that one's life now and in future lives depends upon one's own deeds

and misdeeds and that as an individual one is responsible for, and

rewarded on the basis of, the sum total of one's acts and omissions

in all one's incarnations past and present); and sangha, the ascetic

community within which man can improve his karma.

The Buddha added the hope of escape—a way to get out of the

endless cycle of pain and sorrow—to the Brahmanic idea of samsara. The Buddhist salvation is nirvana, a final extinction of one's

self. Nirvana may be attained by achieving good karma through

earning much merit and avoiding misdeeds. A Buddhist's pilgrimage through existence is a constant attempt to distance himself or herself from the world and finally to achieve complete

detachment, or nirvana.

The fundamentals of Buddhist doctrine are the Four Noble

Truths: suffering exists; craving (or desire) is the cause of suffer- ing; release from suffering can be achieved by stopping all desire;

and enlightenment—buddhahood—can be attained by following

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Cambodia: A Country Study

the Noble Eightfold Path (right views, right intention, right speech,

right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and

right concentration), which constitutes a middle way between sensuality and ascetism. Enlightenment consists of knowing these

truths. The average layperson cannot hope for nirvana after the

end of this life, but can—by complying, as best he or she is able

to, with the doctrine's rules of moral conduct—hope to improve

his or her karma and thereby better his condition in the next in- carnation.

The doctrine of karma holds that, through the working of a just,

automatic, and impersonal cosmic law, one's actions in this incarnation and in all previous ones will determine which position in

the hierarchy of living things one will occupy in the next incarnation. An individual's karma can be improved through certain acts and omissions. By following the five precepts or commandments,

a Buddhist can better his or her karma. These commandments are: do not kill, do not steal, do not indulge in forbidden sexual pleasures, do not tell lies, and do not take intoxicants or stupefying

drugs or liquors.

The most effective way to work actively to improve one's karma

is to earn merit. Any act of benevolence or generosity can gain

merit for the doer. Cambodian Buddhists tend to regard opportunities for earning merit as primarily connected with interaction with

the sangha, contributing to its support through money, goods, and

labor, and participating in its activities. Some of the favorite ways

for a male to earn merit are to enter the sangha as a monk (after

the age of twenty) or as a novice, or to live in the wat as a temple

servant; in the case of a female (usually the elderly), the favorite

way is to become a nun. Other activities that gain merit include

sponsoring a monk or novice, contributing to a wat, feeding members of the sangha at a public meal, and providing food for either

of the two daily meals of the sangha. In his first sermon to his followers, the Buddha described a moral

code, the dharma, which the sangha was to teach after him. He left no designated successor. Indian emperor Asoka (273-232 B.C.)

patronized the sangha and encouraged the teaching of the Buddha's

philosophy throughout his vast empire; by 246 B.C., the new

religion had reached Sri Lanka. The Tripitaka, the collection of

basic Buddhist texts, was written down for the first time in Sri Lanka

during a major Buddhist conference in the second or first century

B.C. By the time of the conference, a schism had developed separating Mahayana (Greater Path) Buddhism from more conservative

Theravada (Way of the Elders, or Hinayana—Lesser Path) fac- tion or Buddhism. The Mahayana faction reinterpreted the original

114
Young Buddhist monks pause at a temple entrance. Courtesy Bill Herod

teachings of the Buddha and added a type of deity called a bodhisattva (see Glossary) to large numbers of other buddhas. The

Mahayana adherents believe that nirvana is available to everyone,

not just to select holy men. Mahayana Buddhism quickly spread

throughout India, China, Korea, Japan, Central Asia, and to some

parts of Southeast Asia. According to the Venerable Pang Khat,

Theravada Buddhism reached Southeast Asia as early as the sec- ond or third century A.D., while Mahayana Buddhism did not

arrive in Cambodia until about A.D. 791. In Southeast Asia,

Mahayana Buddhism carried many Brahman beliefs with it to the

royal courts of Funan, of Champa, and of other states. At this time,

Sanskrit words were added to the Khmer and to the Cham languages. Theravada Buddhism (with its scriptures in the Pali language), remained influential in Sri Lanka, and by the thirteenth

century it had spread into Burma, Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, where it supplanted Mahayana Buddhism.

Cambodian Adaptations

Cambodian Buddhism has no formal administrative ties with

other Buddhist bodies, although Theravada monks from other countries, especially Thailand, Laos, Burma, and Sri Lanka, may participate in religious ceremonies in order to make up the requisite

number of clergy. Cambodian Buddhism is organized nationally

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Cambodia: A Country Study

in accordance with regulations formulated in 1943 and modified

in 1948. During the monarchical period, the king led the Buddhist

clergy. Prince Sihanouk continued in this role even after he had

abdicated and was governing as head of state. He appointed both

the heads of the monastic orders and other high-ranking clergy.

After the overthrow of Sihanouk in 1970, the new head of state, Lon Nol, appointed these leaders.

Two monastic orders constituted the clergy in Cambodia. The

larger group, to which more than 90 percent of the clergy belonged, was the Mohanikay. The Thommayut order was far smaller. The

Thommayut was introduced into the ruling circles of Cambodia

from Thailand in 1864; it gained prestige because of its adoption

by royalty and by the aristocracy, but its adherents were confined

geographically to the Phnom Penh area. Among the few differences

between the two orders is stricter observance by the Thommayut

bonzes (monks) of the rules governing the clergy. In 1961 the

Mohanikay had more than 52,000 ordained monks in some 2,700

wat, whereas the Thommayut order had 1,460 monks in just over

100 wat. In 1967 more than 2,800 Mohanikay wat and 320 Thommayut wat were in existence in Cambodia. After Phnom Penh,

the largest number of Thommayut wat were found in Batdambang, Stoeng Treng, Prey Veng, Kampot, and Kampong Thum

provinces.

Each order has its own superior and is organized into a hierarchy of eleven levels. The seven lower levels are known collectively

as the thananukram; the four higher levels together are called the

rajagana. The Mohanikay order has thirty-five monks in the rajagana;

the Thommayut has twenty-one. Each monk must serve for at least twenty years to be named to these highest levels. The cornerstones of Cambodian Buddhism are the Buddhist

bonze and the wat. Traditionally, each village has a spiritual center—a wat—where from five to more than seventy bonzes reside. A typical wat in rural Cambodia consists of a walled enclosure

containing a sanctuary, several residences for bonzes, a hall, a kit- chen, quarters for nuns, and a pond. The number of monks varies

according to the size of the local population. The sanctuary, which

contains an altar with statues of the Buddha and, in rare cases, a religious relic, is reserved for major ceremonies and usually only

for the use of bonzes. Other ceremonies, classes for monks and for

laity, and meals take place in the hall. Stupas containing the ashes

of extended family members are constructed near the sanctuary.

Fruit trees and vegetable gardens tended by local children are also part of the local wat. The main entrance, usually only for ceremonial

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The Society and Its Environment

use, faces east; other entrances are located at other points around

the wall. There are no gates.

Steinberg notes the striking ratio of bonzes to the total population of Cambodia. In the late 1950s, an estimated 100,000 bonzes

(including about 40,000 novices) served a population of about 5

million. This high proportion undoubtedly was caused in large part

by the ease with which one could enter and leave the sangha. Becoming a bonze and leaving the sangha are matters of individual

choice although, in theory, nearly all Cambodian males over six- teen serve terms as bonzes. Most young men do not intend to be- come fully ordained bonzes (bhikkhu), and they remain as monks

for less than a year. Even a son's temporary ordination as a bonze

brings great merit to his parents, however, and is considered so important that arrangements are made at a parent's funeral if the son has not undergone the process while the parent was living.

There are two classes of bonzes at a wat—the novices (samani or

nen) and the bhikkhu. Ordination is held from mid-April to midJuly, during the rainy season. Buddhist monks do not take perpetual vows to remain monks,

although, in fact, some become monks permanentiy. Traditionally,

they became monks early in life. It is possible to become a novice

at as young an age as seven, but in practice thirteen is the earliest age for novices. A bhikkhu must be at least twenty. The monk's

life is regulated by Buddhist law, and life in the wat adheres to a rigid routine. A bhikkhu follows 227 rules of monastic discipline

as well as the 10 basic precepts. These include the five precepts

that all Buddhists should follow. The five precepts for monastic

asceticism prohibit eating after noon, participating in any enter- tainment (singing, dancing, and watching movies or television),

using any personal adornments, sleeping on a luxurious bed, and

handling money. In addition, a monk also is expected to be celi- bate. Furthermore, monks supposedly avoid all involvement in

political affairs. They are not eligible to vote or to hold any politi- cal office, and they may not witness a legal document or give tes- timony in court. Since the person of a monk is considered sacred,

he is considered to be outside the normal civil laws and public duties

that affect lay people. Some of these practices have changed in the

modern period, however, and in the 1980s Buddhist monks have

been active even in the PRK government.

Women are not ordained, but older women, especially widows,

can become nuns. They live in wat and play an important role in

the everyday life of the temple. Nuns shave their heads and eyebrows and generally follow the same precepts as monks. They may

prepare the altars and do some of the housekeeping chores.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Role of Buddhism in Cambodian Life

Buddhist monks traditionally were called upon to perform a number of functions in Cambodian life. They participated in all for- mal village festivals, ceremonies, marriages, and funerals. They

also might have participated in ceremonies to name infants and

in other minor ceremonies or rites of passage. Monks did not lead

the ceremonies, however, because that role was given to the achar, or master of ceremonies; the monk's major function was to say

prayers of blessing. They were often healers and, in traditional

Khmer culture, they were the practitioners whose role was closest to that of modern psychiatrists. They might also have been skilled in astrology. The monk traditionally occupied a unique position

in the transmission of Khmer culture and values. By his way of

life, he provided a living model of the most meritorious behavior

a Buddhist could follow. He also provided the laity with many

opportunities for gaining merit. For centuries monks were the only

literate people residing in rural communities; they acted as teachers

to temple servants, to novices, and to newly ordained monks. Until

the 1970s, most literate Cambodian males gained literacy solely

through the instruction of the sangha.

After independence from France, young Cambodian intellectuals changed their attitude toward the clergy. In describing a general

shift away from Buddhism in the late 1950s and the early 1960s,

Vickery cites the early work of anthropologist May Mayko Ebihara

and his own observations. He suggests that the Khmer Rouge was

able to instill antireligious feelings in younger males because the

latter were losing interest in becoming monks even during their

teenage years, the traditional temporary period of service. The

monks themselves had abandoned some of their traditional restric- tions and had become involved in politics. At intervals during the

colonial period, some monks had demonstrated or had rebelled

against French rule, and in the 1970s monks joined pro- government

demonstrations against the communists. Anticlerical feelings

reached their highest point among the Khmer Rouge, who at first attempted to indoctrinate monks and to force them to pass anticlerical ideas on to the laity. Under the Khmer Rouge regime,

monks were expelled forcibly from the wat and were compelled

to do manual labor. Article 20 of the 1976 Constitution of Democratic Kampuchea permitted freedom of religion but banned all reactionary religions, that were "detrimental to the country." The

minister of culture stated that Buddhism was incompatible with

the revolution and was an instrument of exploitation. Under this regime, to quote the Finnish Inquiry Commission, "The practice

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The Society and Its Environment

of religion was forbidden and the pagodas were systematically destroyed." Observers estimated that 50,000 monks died during the

Khmer Rouge regime. The status of Buddhism and of religion in

general after the Vietnamese invasion was at least partially similar to its status in pre-Khmer Rouge times.

According to Michael Vickery, who has written positively about

the PRK, public observance of Buddhism and of Islam has been

reestablished, and government policies allow Cambodians freedom

to believe or not to believe in Buddhism. Vickery cites some differ- ences in this reestablished Buddhism. Religious affairs are over- seen by the PRK's Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense (KUFNCD—see Appendix B),

the mass organization that supports the state by organizing women,

youths, workers, and religious groups (see The Kampuchean, or Khmer, United Front for National Construction and Defense,

ch. 4). In 1987 there was only a single Buddhist order because the

Thommayut order had not been revived. The organization of the

clergy also had been simplified. The sangharaja (primate of the Buddhist clergy) had been replaced by aprathean (chairman). Communities that wanted a wat had to apply to a local front committee

for permission. The wat were administered by a committee of the

local laity. Private funds paid for the restoration of the wat damaged

during the war and the Khmer Rouge era, and they supported the

restored wat. Monks were ordained by a hierarchy that has been

reconstituted since an initial ordination in September 1979 by a

delegation from the Buddhist community in Vietnam. The validity

of this ordination continues to be questioned. In general, there are only two to four monks per wat, which is fewer than before 1975. In 1981 about 4,930 monks served in 740 wat in Cambodia. The

Buddhist General Assembly reported 7,000 monks in 1,821 active

wat a year later. In 1969 by contrast, observers estimated that

53,400 monks and 40,000 novice monks served in more than 3,000

wat. Vickery sums up his observations on the subject by noting

that, "The government has kept its promise to allow freedom for traditional Buddhism, but does not actively encourage it." Martin offers another, more pessimistic, view of the religious

situation in the late 1980s. In a 1986 study, she asserts that the

PRK showed outsiders only certain aspects of religious freedom;

she also states that the few wat that were restored had only two

or three old monks in residence and that public attendance was

low. The monks were allowed to leave the wat only for an hour

in the mornings, to collect their food, or during holy days. Lay

people who practiced their faith were about the same ages as the

monks, and they were allowed to visit the wat only in the evenings.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

A government circular had also instructed civil servants to stop

celebrating the traditional New Year Festival. Some traditional Buddhist festivals still were tolerated, but the state collected a 50 per- cent tithe on donations. Martin believes that Buddhism was

threatened externally by state repression and by nonsupport and

internally by invalid clergy. She noted that the two Buddhist su- periors, Venerable Long Chhim and Venerable Tep Vong, were

both believed to be from Vietnam. Venerable Tep Vong was concurrently the superior of the Buddhist clergy, vice president of the

PRK's Khmer National Assembly, and vice president of the

KUFNCD National Council. She quoted a refugee from Batdambang as having said, ' ' During the meetings, the Khmer administrative authorities, accompanied by the Vietnamese experts, tell you, 'Religion is like poison, it's like opium; it's better to give the

money to the military, so they can fight'."

Buddhism is still strong among the various Cambodian refugee

groups throughout the world, although some younger monks, faced

with the distractions of a foreign culture, have chosen to leave the

clergy and have become laicized. In the United States in 1984, there were twelve Cambodian wat with about twenty-one monks. In the

1980s, a Cambodian Buddhist wat was constructed near Washington, D.C., financed by a massive outpouring of donations from

Cambodian Buddhists throughout North America. This wat is one

of the few outside Southeast Asia that has the consecrated boundary within which ordinations may be performed.

Most of the major Cambodian annual festivals are connected

with Buddhist observances. The cholchnam (New Year Festival) takes

place in mid-April; it was one of the few festivals allowed under

the Khmer Rouge regime. The phchun ben, celebrated in September or in October, is a memorial day for deceased ancestors and

for close friends. Meak bochea, in January or February, com- memorates the last sermon of the Buddha. Vissakh bochea, in April

or in May, is the triple anniversary of the birth, death, and en- lightenment of the Buddha. The chol vossa takes place in June or

in July; it marks the beginning of a penitential season during which

the monks must remain within the temple compounds. The kathen marks the end of this season; celebrated in September, it features

offerings, especially of robes, to the monks. The kathen was still celebrated in the PRK in the late 1980s.

Cambodian Buddhism exists side-by-side with, and to some

extent intermingles with, pre-Buddhist animism and Brahman practices. Most Cambodians, whether or not they profess to be Buddhists (or Muslims), believe in a rich supernatural world. When ill, or at other times of crisis, or to seek supernatural help, Cambodians

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The Society and Its Environment

may enlist the aid of a practitioner who is believed to be able to propitiate or obtain help from various spirits. Local spirits are believed to inhabit a variety of objects, and shrines to them may be

found in houses, in Buddhist temples, along roads, and in forests. Several types of supernatural entities are believed to exist; they

make themselves known by means of inexplicable sounds or happenings. Among these phenomena are khmoc (ghosts), pret and besach (particularly nasty demons, the spirits of people who have died violent, untimely, or unnatural deaths), arak (evil spirits, usually fe- male), neak ta (tutelary spirits residing in inanimate objects), mneang

phteah (guardians of the house), meba (ancestral spirits), and mrenh

kongveal (elf-like guardians of animals) . All spirits must be shown

proper respect, and, with the exception of the mneang phteah and

mrenh kongveal, they can cause trouble ranging from mischief to seri- ous life-threatening illnesses. An important way for living people

to show respect for the spirits of the dead is to provide food for the spirits. If this food is not provided, the spirit can cause trouble

for the offending person. For example, if a child does not provide

food for the spirit of its dead mother, that spirit can cause misfortunes to happen to the child.

Aid in dealing with the spirit world may be obtained from a km

(shaman or spirit practitioner), an achar (ritualist), thmup (witch, sorcerer or sorceress), or a rup arak (medium, usually male). The

km is a kind of sorcerer who prepares charms and amulets to protect the wearer from harm. He can cure illnesses, find lost objects,

and prepare magic potions. Traditionally, Cambodians have held

strong beliefs about protective charms. Amulets are worn routinely

by soldiers to ward off bullets, for example. The km are believed

to have the power to prepare an amulet and to establish a supernatural link between it and the owner. A km may acquire considerable local prestige and power. Many km are former Buddhist monks.

Another kind of magical practitioner is the achar, a specialist in

ritual. He may function as a kind of master of ceremonies at a wat

and as a specialist in conducting spirit worship rituals connected

with life-cycle ceremonies. Rup arak are mediums who can be possessed by supernatural beings and communicate with the spirit

world. The thmup are sorcerers who cause illnesses. Fortunetellers and astrologers

haor teay—are important in Cambodian life. They are consulted about important decisions such as marriages, building a new house, or going on a long journey. They

are believed to be able to foretell future events and to determine

lucky or unlucky days for various activities. Villagers are sensitive to the power and to the needs of the spirit

world. According to observations by an American missionary in

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Cambodia: A Country Study

the early 1970s, villagers consulted the local guardian spirit to find

out what the coming year would bring, a new province chief held

a ceremony to ask the protection of the spirits over the province,

and soldiers obtained magic cloths and amulets from mediums and

shamans to protect them from the bullets of the enemy. Before embarking on a mission against enemy forces, a province chief might

burn incense and call on a spirit for aid in defeating the enemy.

Examples of Brahman influences were various rituals concerned

with the well-being of the nation carried out by the ruler and the

baku (a Brahman priesdy group attached to the royal court). These

rituals were reportedly stopped after Sihanouk's ouster in 1970 (see

The March 1970 Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). Chinese Religion

Mahayana Buddhism is the religion of the majority of Chinese

and Vietnamese in Cambodia. Elements of other religious practices, such as veneration of folk heros and ancestors, Confucianism, and Taoism mix with Chinese and Vietnamese Buddhism.

In the Chinese home, ancestors and household gods are honored

during prescribed times to help unite the extended family and to gain help from the dead, who can intercede for the living. Taoism

teaches meditation and the use of magic to gain happiness, wealth,

health, and immortality. Confucianism, part social philosophy and

part religion, stresses religious ritual and pays great attention to the veneration of ancestors and of great figures of the past.

Chinese Mahayana Buddhism has become intertwined with

Taoist and with Confucian beliefs. Adherents honor many buddhas, including the Gautama Buddha, and they believe in a paradise after death. They also believe in bodhisattvas—people who

have nearly attained nirvana, but who stay back to help save others. Islam

Islam is the religion of the Cham (also called Khmer Islam) and

Malay minorities. According to Po Dharma, there were 150,000

to 200,000 Muslims in Cambodia as late as 1975. Persecution under

the Khmer Rouge eroded their numbers, however, and by the late 1980s they probably had not regained their former strength. All

of the Cham Muslims are Sunnis of the Shafii school. Po Dharma

divides the Muslim Cham in Cambodia into a traditionalist branch

and an orthodox branch.

The Cham have their own mosques. In 1962 there were about

100 mosques in the country. At the end of the nineteenth century,

the Muslims in Cambodia formed a unified community under the

authority of four religious dignitaries

mupti, tuk kalih, raja kalik,

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The Society and Its Environment

and tvan pake. A council of notables in Cham villages consisted of one hakem and several katip, bilal, and labi. The four high dignitaries and the hakem were exempt from personal taxes, and they were

invited to take part in major national ceremonies at the royal court. When Cambodia became independent, the Islamic community was

placed under the control of a five-member council that represented

the community in official functions and in contacts with other

Islamic communities. Each Muslim community has a hakem who

leads the community and the mosque, an imam who leads the

prayers, and a bilal who calls the faithful to the daily prayers. The

peninsula of Chrouy Changvar near Phnom Penh is considered

the spiritual center of the Cham, and several high Muslim offi- cials reside there. Each year some of the Cham go to study the

Quran at Kelantan in Malaysia, and some go on to study in, or make a pilgrimage to, Mecca. According to figures from the late 1950s, about 7 percent of the Cham had completed the pilgrimage

and could wear the fez or turban as a sign of their accomplishment.

The traditional Cham retain many ancient Muslim or pre- Muslim traditions and rites. They consider Allah as the all-powerful

God, but they also recognize other non-Islamic deities. They are

closer, in many respects, to the Cham of coastal Vietnam than they

are to other Muslims. The religious dignitaries of the traditional

Cham (and of the Cham in Vietnam) dress completely in white,

and they shave their heads and faces. These Cham believe in the

power of magic and sorcery, and they attach great importance to magical practices in order to avoid sickness or slow or violent death.

They believe in many supernatural powers. Although they show

little interest in the pilgrimage to Mecca and in the five daily

prayers, the traditional Cham do celebrate many Muslim festivals and rituals. The orthodox Cham have adopted a more orthodox religion

largely because of their close contacts with, and intermarriages with,

the Malay community. In fact, the orthodox Cham have adopted

Malay customs and family organization, and many speak the Malay

language. They send pilgrims to Mecca, and they attend international Islamic conferences. Conflicts between the traditional and

the orthodox Cham increased between 1954 and 1975. For example, the two groups polarized the population of one village, and

each group eventually had its own mosque and separate religious

organization.

According to Cham sources, 132 mosques were destroyed during the Khmer Rouge era, many others were desecrated, and Muslims were not allowed to worship. In the PRK, Islam has been given

the same freedom as Buddhism. Vickery believes that about 185,000

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Cham lived in Cambodia in the mid-1980s and that the number

of mosques was about the same then as it was before 1975. In late 1987, there were six mosques in the Phnom Penh area and a "good

number" in the provinces, but Muslim dignitaries were thinly

stretched; only 20 of the previous 113 most prominent Cham clergy

in Cambodia survived the Khmer Rouge period.

Other Religions

Christianity, introduced into Cambodia by Roman Catholic missionaries in 1660, made little headway, at least among the Buddhists. In 1972 there were probably about 20,000 Christians in

Cambodia, most of whom were Roman Catholics. Before the

repatriation of the Vietnamese in 1970 and 1971, possibly as many

as 62,000 Christians lived in Cambodia. According to Vatican

statistics, in 1953, members of the Roman Catholic Church in Cambodia numbered 120,000, making it, at the time, the second largest religion in the country. In April 1970, just before repatriation,

estimates indicate that about 50,000 Catholics were Vietnamese.

Many of the Catholics remaining in Cambodia in 1972 were Europeans—chiefly French. Steinberg reported, also in 1953, that an American Unitarian mission maintained a teacher-training

school in Phnom Penh, and Baptist missions functioned in Bat- dambang and Siemreab provinces. A Christian and Missionary

Alliance mission was founded in Cambodia in 1923; by 1962 the

mission had converted about 2,000 people.

American Protestant missionary activity increased in Cambodia, especially among some of the hill tribes and among the Cham,

after the establishment of the Khmer Republic. The 1962 census, which reported 2,000 Protestants in Cambodia, remains the most

recent statistic for the group. In 1982 French geographer Jean Delvert reported that three Christian villages existed in Cambodia,

but he gave no indication of the size, location, or type of any of

them. Observers reported that in 1980 there were more registered

Khmer Christians among the refugees in camps in Thailand than

in all of Cambodia before 1970. Kiernan notes that, until June 1980,

five weekly Protestant services were held in Phnom Penh by a Khmer pastor, but that they had been reduced to a single weekly

service after police harassment. His estimates suggest that in 1987

the Christian community in Cambodia had shrunk to only a few

thousand members.

Highland tribal groups, most with their own local religious sys- tems, probably number fewer than 100,000 persons. The Khmer

Loeu have been loosely described as animists, but most tribal groups

have their own pantheon of local spirits. In general they see their

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The Society and Its Environment

world filled with various invisible spirits (often called yang), some

benevolent, others malevolent. They associate spirits with rice, soil, water, fire, stones, paths, and so forth. Sorcerers or specialists in

each village contact these spirits and prescribe ways to appease them.

In times of crisis or change, animal sacrifices may be made to pla- cate the anger of the spirits. Illness is often believed to be caused

by evil spirits or sorcerers. Some tribes have special medicine men

or shamans who treat the sick. In addition to belief in spirits, vil- lagers believe in taboos on many objects or practices. Among the

Khmer Loeu, the Rade and Jarai groups have a well developed

hierarchy of spirits with a supreme ruler at its head.

Education

Public School System

Traditional education in Cambodia was handled by the local wat,

and the bonzes were the teachers. The students were almost entirely young boys, and the education was limited to memorizing

Buddhist chants in Pali. During the period of the French protectorate, an educational system based on the French model was in- augurated alongside the traditional system. Initially, the French

neglected education in Cambodia. Only seven high school students

graduated in 1931, and only 50,000 to 60,000 children were enrolled in primary school in 1936. In the years immediately following independence, the number of students rapidly increased.

Vickery suggests that education of any kind was considered an

"absolute good" by all Cambodians and that this attitude eventually created a large group of unemployed or underemployed graduates by the late 1960s.

From the early twentieth century until 1975, the system of mass

education operated on the French model. The educational system was divided into primary, secondary, higher, and specialized levels. Public education was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education, which exercised full control over the entire system; it es- tablished syllabi, hired and paid teachers, provided supplies, and

inspected schools. An inspector of primary education, who had considerable authority, was assigned to each province. Cultural committees under the Ministry of Education were responsible for "enriching the Cambodian language."

Primary education, divided into two cycles of three years each, was carried out in state-run and temple-run schools. Successful completion of a final state examination led to the award of a certificate after each cycle. The primary education curriculum consisted of

arithmetic, history, ethics, civics, drafting, geography, hygiene,

125
Vong Dantrey percussion ensemble

accompanies classical ballet rehearsal. Courtesy Bill Herod

language, and science. In addition, the curriculum included physical education and manual work. French language instruction

began in the second year. Khmer was the language of instruction in the first cycle, but French was used in the second cycle

and thereafter. By the early 1970s, Khmer was used more widely

in primary education. In the 1980s, primary school ran from the

first to the fourth grade. Theoretically one primary school served

each village. Secondary education also was divided into two

cycles, one of four years taught at a college, followed by one of

three years taught at a lycee. Upon completion of the first cycle,

students could take a state examination. Successful candidates

received a secondary diploma. Upon completion of the first two

years of the second cycle, students could take a state examination for the first baccalaureate, and, following their final year,

they could take a similar examination for the second baccalaureate. The Cambodian secondary curriculum was similar to that

found in France. Beginning in 1967, the last three years of secondary school were split up into three sections according to major

subjects—letters, mathematics and technology; agriculture; and

biology. In the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the country emphasized a technical education. In the PRK, secondary education was reduced to six years (see table 4, Appendix A).

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Students at rehearsal during a revival of classical ballet Courtesy Bill Herod

Higher education lagged well behind primary and secondary education, until the late 1950s. The only facility in the country for higher education before the 1960s was the National Institute of

Legal, Political, and Economic Studies, which trained civil servants. In the late 1950s, it had about 250 students. Wealthy Cambodians and those who had government scholarships sought universitylevel education abroad. Students attended schools in France, but

after independence increasing numbers enrolled at universities in

the United States, Canada, China, the Soviet Union, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). By 1970 six universities with a total enrollment of nearly 9,000 students served

Cambodia. The largest, the University of Phnom Penh, had nearly

4,570 male students and more than 730 female students in eight

departments—letters and humanities, science and technology, law

and economics, medicine, pharmacy, commercial science, teacher

training, and higher teacher training. Universities operated in the

provinces of Kampong Cham, Takev, Batdambang; and in Phnom

Penh, the University of Agricultural Sciences and the University

of Fine Arts offered training. The increased fighting following the

1970 coup closed the three provincial universities.

During the Khmer Rouge regime, education was dealt a severe

setback, and the great strides made in literacy and in education

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Cambodia: A Country Study

during the two decades following independence were obliterated

systematically. Schools were closed, and educated people and

teachers were subjected to, at the least, suspicion and harsh treat- ment and, at the worst, execution. At the beginning of the 1970s, more than 20,000 teachers lived in Cambodia; only about 5,000

of the teachers remained 10 years later. Soviet sources report that

90 percent of all teachers were killed under the Khmer Rouge re- gime. Only 50 of the 725 university instructors, 207 of the 2,300

secondary school teachers, and 2,717 of the 21,311 primary school

teachers survived. The meager educational fare was centered on

precepts of the Khmer revolution; young people were rigidly in- doctrinated, but literacy was neglected, and an entire generation

of Cambodian children grew up illiterate. After the Khmer Rouge

were driven from power, the educational system had to be re-created

from almost nothing. Illiteracy had climbed to more than 40 percent, and most young people under the age of 14 lacked any basic

education.

Education began making a slow comeback, following the establishment of the PRK. In 1986 the following main institutions of

higher education were reported in the PRK: the Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy (reopened in 1980 with a six-year course of

study); the Chamcar Daung Faculty of Agriculture (opened in

1985); the Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Technical Institute (which

includes technical and engineering curricula), the Institute of Languages (Vietnamese, German, Russian, and Spanish are taught);

the Institute of Commerce, the Center for Pedagogical Education

(formed in 1979); the Normal Advanced School; and the School

of Fine Arts. Writing about the educational system under the PRK,

Vickery states, "Both the government and the people have demonstrated enthusiasm for education .... The list of subjects covered

is little different from that of prewar years. There is perhaps more

time devoted to Khmer language and literature than before the war

and, until the 1984-85 school year, at least, no foreign language

instruction." He notes that the secondary school syllabus calls for

four hours of foreign language instruction per week in either Russian, German, or Vietnamese but that there were no teachers

available

.

Martin describes the educational system in the PRK as based

very closely on the Vietnamese model, pointing out that even the

terms for primary and secondary education have been changed into

direct translations of the Vietnamese terms. Under the PRK re- gime, according to Martin, the primary cycle had four instead of

six classes, the first level of secondary education had three instead

of four classes, and the second level of secondary education had

128
129
Cambodia: A Country Study

three classes. Martin writes that not every young person could go

to school because schooling both in towns and in the countryside

required enrollment fees. Civil servants pay 25 riels (for value of

the riel—see Glossary) per month to send a child to school, and

others pay up to 150 riels per month. Once again, according to Martin, "Access to tertiary studies is reserved for children whose

parents work for the regime and have demonstrated proof of their

loyalty to the regime. '' She writes that, from the primary level on,

the contents of all textbooks except for alphabet books was politically oriented and dealt "more specifically with Vietnam." From

the beginning of the secondary cycle, Vietnamese language study was compulsory.

Buddhist Education

Before the French organized a Western-style educational system,

the Buddhist wat, with monks as teachers, provided the only for- mal education in Cambodia. The monks traditionally regarded their

main educational function as the teaching of Buddhist doctrine and

history and the importance of gaining merit. Other subjects were

regarded as secondary. At the wat schools, young boys—girls were

not allowed to study in these institutions—were taught to read and

to write Khmer, and they were instructed in the rudiments of

Buddhism.

In 1933 a secondary school system for novice monks was created

within the Buddhist religious system. Many wat schools had so- called Pali schools that provided three years of elementary education from which the student could compete for entrance into the

Buddhist lycees. Graduates of these lycees could sit for the entrance

examination to the Buddhist University in Phnom Penh. The cur- riculum of the Buddhist schools consisted of the study of Pali, of

Buddhist doctrine, and of Khmer, along with mathematics, Cambodian history and geography, science, hygiene, civics, and agriculture. Buddhist instruction was under the authority of the Ministry

of Religion.

Nearly 600 Buddhist primary schools, with an enrollment of more

than 10,000 novices and with 800 monks as instructors, existed

in 1962. The Preah Suramarit Buddhist Lycee—a four-year insti- tution in Phnom Penh founded in 1955—included courses in Pali,

in Sanskrit, and in Khmer, as well as in many modern disciplines.

In 1962 the student body numbered 680. The school's graduates

could continue their studies in the Preah Sihanouk Raj Buddhist

University created in 1959. The university offered three cycles of

instruction; the doctoral degree was awarded after successful completion of the third cycle. In 1962 there were 107 students enrolled

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The Society and Its Environment

in the Buddhist University. By the 1969-70 academic year, more

than 27,000 students were attending Buddhist religious elementary schools, 1,328 students were at Buddhist lycees, and 176 stu- dents were enrolled at the Buddhist University.

The Buddhist Institute was a research institution formed in 1930

from the Royal Library. The institute contained a library, record

and photograph collections, and a museum. Several commissions were part of the institute. A folklore commission published collec- tions of Cambodian folktales, a Tripitaka Commission completed

a translation of the Buddhist canon into Khmer, and a dictionary

commission produced a definitive two-volume dictionary of Khmer.

No information was available in 1987 regarding the fate of the temple schools, but it is doubtful that they were revived after the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime.

Private Education

For a portion of the urban population in Cambodia, private education was important in the years before the communist takeover.

Some private schools were operated by ethnic or religious minorities—Chinese, Vietnamese, European, Roman Catholic, and Muslim—so that children could study their own language, culture, or

religion. Other schools provided education to indigenous children

who could not gain admission to a public school. Attendance at some of the private schools, especially those in Phnom Penh, conferred a certain amount of prestige on the student and on the stu- dent's family.

The private educational system included Chinese-language

schools, Vietnamese-language (often Roman Catholic) schools,

French-language schools, English-language schools, and Khmerlanguage schools. Enrollment in private primary schools rose from

32,000 in the early 1960s to about 53,500 in 1970, although en- rollment in private secondary schools dropped from about 19,000

to fewer than 8,700 for the same period. In 1962 there were 195

Chinese schools, 40 Khmer schools, 15 Vietnamese schools, and

14 French schools operating in Cambodia. Private secondary education was represented by several high schools, notably the Lycee

Descartes in Phnom Penh.

All of the Vietnamese schools in Phnom Penh and some of the

Chinese schools there were closed by government decree in 1970.

There was no information available in 1987 that would have in- dicated the presence of any private schools in the PRK, although

there was some private instruction, especially in foreign languages.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Health and Welfare

The government made a great effort to train new medical per- sonnel, especially nurses and midwives, following independence

in 1953. By the late 1950s, however, infant mortality reportedly was as high as 50 percent. Dysentery, malaria, yaws, tuberculosis, trachoma, various skin diseases, and parasitic diseases were common. Inadequate nutrition, poor sanitary conditions, poor

hygiene practices, and a general lack of adequate medical treat- ment combined to give the average Cambodian a life expectancy

of about forty- six years by the late 1960s. This figure represented a significant increase from the thirty-year life expectancy reported a decade earlier. The catastrophic effects of the war and Khmer

Rouge rule reversed this positive trend. During the unrest, many

Western-trained physicians were killed or fled the country. Modern

medicines were in short supply, and traditional herbal remedies were used.

Public Health

According to traditional Cambodian beliefs, disease may be

caused by some underlying spiritual cause. Evil spirits or "bad air" are believed to cause many diseases and can be expelled from the

body of a sick person by trained practitioners, who may be traditional healers—bonzes, former bonzes, herbalists, folk healers

or Western-trained doctors and nurses. Aside from a wide variety

of herbal remedies, traditional healing practices include scrap- ing the skin with a coin, ring, or other small object; sprinkling or spraying water on the sick person; and prayer. The use of cupping glasses (in French, ventouse) continued in widespread use in

the late 1980s.

Sanitation practices in rural Cambodia are often primitive. The

water supply is the main problem; rivers and streams are common

sources of drinking water and of water for cooking. These water

sources are often the same ones used for bathing, washing clothes,

and disposing of waste products. Adequate sewage disposal is nonexistent in most rural and suburban areas. Sanitary conditions in

the largest urban areas—Phnom Penh, Batdambang city, and Kampong Cham city—were much improved over the conditions in the

rural areas, however. By the early 1970s, Phnom Penh had three

water purification plants, which were adequate for the peacetime

population but could not provide safe water when the city's population increased significantly in the mid-1970s. The city had regular garbage collection, and sewage was usually disposed of in septic

tanks.

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The Society and Its Environment

The medical situation in Cambodia faced its first crisis at the

time of independence in 1953. Many French medical personnel

departed, and few trained Cambodians were left to replace them.

In addition to a lack of personnel, a shortage of medical supplies

and facilities threatened health care. To correct the first problem,

in 1953 the government established a school of medicine and a

school of nursing, the Royal Faculty of Medicine of Cambodia

(which became the Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and Paramedical Science in 1972, and probably the Faculty of Medicine and

Pharmacy which reopened in 1980). The first class of candidates

for the degree of doctor of medicine was enrolled in 1958. In 1962

this school became part of the University of Phnom Penh, and in

1967 it expanded its teaching program to include training for dentists and for medical specialists (see Public School System, this ch.).

By the late 1960s, trained Cambodian instructors began replacing

foreign personnel at the Faculty of Medicine, and by 1971 thirtythree Cambodian medical instructors represented sixteen specialized branches of medical study.

A school for training nurses and midwives was operating before

1970. This institution also trained sanitation agents, who received

four years of medical training with emphasis on sanitation and on

preventive medicine. These agents provided medical services for areas where there were no doctors or clinics. The number of nurses

trained almost quintupled between 1955 and 1970. In Cambodia,

nursing careers had been primarily reserved for men, but the number of women entering the field greatly increased after 1955. Midwives delivered almost half of the babies in the early 1970s. In

March 1970, eighty-one pharmacists practiced in governmentcontrolled areas. By 1971 the number had dropped to sixty three.

Cambodia never has had an adequate number of hospitals or

clinics. In 1930 there was only a single 450-bed hospital serving

Phnom Penh. By 1953 however, 122 public medical establishments

operated in Cambodia, and, between 1955 and 1970, many improvements were made by the royal government. Old hospital buildings were replaced or repaired, and new ones were constructed.

In 1962 provincial hospitals, along with many infirmaries, operated in all but three provincial capitals. By March 1970, 29 hospitals, with a total of 6,186 beds, were in operation; by September

1971, however, only 13 still functioned.

Phnom Penh had greater hospital resources than other parts of

the country. In the late 1960s, hospitals served inhabitants in the

surrounding area as well as residents of the city. At that time, seven

hospitals (including five teaching institutions), several private clinics,

twenty-two public dispensaries or infirmaries, and six military

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Cambodia: A Country Study

infirmaries operated as well. The major hospitals in Phnom Penh

were the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital, the largest in the country

with 1 ,000 beds, which was built in 1893; the 500-bed Soviet-Khmer

Friendship Hospital, built in 1960; the Preah Monivong military

hospital complexes; the French-operated Calmette Hospital; a Buddhist monks' hospital; and a Chinese hospital. Eight of the

eighteen operating theaters in Cambodia in the late 1960s were

in Phnom Penh.

A leprosarium in Kampong Cham Province provided care for

about 2,000 patients, and the Sonn Mann Mental Hospital at Ta

Khmau provided care for 300 patients. In 1971 Sonn Mann had

about 1 , 100 patients and a staff of six doctors, twenty-two nurses, one midwife, fifty-four administrative employees, and eighty-nine

guards.

Modern medical practices and pharmaceuticals have been scarce

in Cambodia since the early 1970s. The situation deteriorated so badly between 1975 and 1979 that the population had to resort to traditional remedies. A Cambodian refugee described a hospital

in Batdambang Province in the early days of the Khmer Rouge

regime: "... the sick were thrown into a big room baptized 'Angkar Hospital,' where conditions were miserable. Phnom Srok had

one, where there were 300 to 600 sick people 'nursed' by Red

Khmer, who used traditional medicines produced from all sorts of tree rooths [sic]. Only few stayed alive. The Red Khmer ex- plained to us that the healing methods of our ancestors must be

used and that nothing should be taken from the Western medicine." International aid produced more medicine after 1979, and

there was a flourishing black market in medicines, especially antibiotics, at exorbitant prices. Three small pharmaceutical factories

in Phnom Penh in 1 983 produced about ten tons of pharmaceuticals. Tetracycline and ampicillin were being produced in limited

amounts in Phnom Penh, according to 1985 reports. The PRK

government emphasized traditional medicine to cover the gap in

its knowledge of modern medical technologies. Each health center on the province, district, and subdistrict level had a kru (teacher),

specializing in traditional herbal remedies, attached to it. An in- ventory of medicinal plants was being conducted in each province

in the late 1980s.

In 1979 according to observer Andrea Panaritis, of the more than

500 physicians practicing in Cambodia before 1975, only 45 re- mained. In the same year, 728 students returned to the Faculty

of Medicine. The faculty, with practically no trained Cambodian

instructors available, relied heavily on teachers, advisers, and

material aid from Vietnam. Classes were being conducted in both

134
The Society and Its Environment

Khmer and French; sophisticated Western techniques and surgical methods were taught alongside traditional Khmer healing

methods. After some early resistance, the medical faculty and stu- dents seemed to have accepted the importance of preventive medicine and public health. The improvement in health care under the

PRK was illustrated by a Soviet report about the hospital in Kampong Spoe. In 1979 it had a staff of three nurses and no doctor.

By 1985 the hospital had a thirty-three-member professional staff that included a physician from Vietnam and two doctors and three nurses from Hungary. The Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital re- opened with sixty beds in mid- 1982. By 1983 six adequate civilian

hospitals in Phnom Penh and nineteen dispensaries scattered around

the capital provided increasing numbers of medical services. Wellorganized provincial hospitals also were reported in Batdambang,

Takev, Kampong Thum, and Kandal provinces. Panaritis reports

that rudimentary family planning existed in the PRK in the mid1980s, and that obstetrics stressed prenatal and nutritional care. The government did not actively promote birth control, but re- quests for abortions and tubal ligations have been noted in some

reports. Condoms and birth control pills were available, although

the pills had to be brought in from Bangkok or Singapore.

As of late 1987, the government in Phnom Penh had disseminated no information on the spread of the Acquired ImmunoDeficiency Syndrome (AIDS or HIV virus) in Cambodia. In addition, the list of common illnesses in Cambodia, as reported by

international organizations, does not mention Karposi's sarcoma and pneumo-cystic pneumonia (PCP), the most common complications resulting from infection by the HIV virus. The risk to the

Cambodian population of contamination by carriers of the HIV

virus carriers comes from two sources. The more likely of the two

consists of infected, illegal border-crossers, including insurgents,

from Thailand, where authorities identified a hundred cases of

AIDS in 1987 (triple the number in 1986). Less likely is the risk

of infection from legal travelers. Cambodia remains a closed country, and access by foreigners (except for Vietnamese, Soviet, and

East European visitors) is limited to a few scholars and to members of international and private aid organizations.

Welfare Programs

Steinberg cites twelfth-century King Jayavarman VII as having begun a public welfare system in Cambodia. Jayavarman built

public rest houses along the roads, distributed rice to the needy,

and banned tax collectors from places where the sick were cared

for.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Beginning in 1936, the French colonial authorities passed legislation affecting the hours of work, the wages, and the worker's compensation for foreign employees. Later, Cambodians were covered.

A system of family allotments was instituted in 1955. Under this system, employers were required to contribute a monthly sum for

the welfare of the worker's family.

A few welfare organizations were established in Cambodia under

the Sihanouk regime. In 1949 the National Mutual Help Association was founded to provide money, food, and clothing to the needy.

In 1951 the Cambodian Red Cross was organized to provide aid

to disaster victims, especially those suffering from floods. The

Women's Mutual Health Association was formed in 1953. It was

associated with the Preah Ket Mealea Hospital in Phnom Penh,

where it provided prenatal and child care. During the 1950s, the

Association of Vietnamese in Cambodia opened a dispensary in

Phnom Penh. The most ubiquitous source of assistance for the aver- age Cambodian, however, was the network of Buddhist wats that

extended down to the grass roots level. Also, relatives and, in the case of the Chinese, extended families and business associations

provided assistance to needy members.

In the PRK under the government's gradual evolution toward

Marxist-Leninist socialism, the ability of the wat to extend charitable

aid was seriously impaired because these institutions existed in conditions of near penury, following their active suppression under

the Khmer Rouge, and they were barely tolerated by the PRK re- gime. Instead, fragmentary evidence suggests that public welfare was decentralized and, because of the paucity of resources, received

only small amounts in funds from the central government. According to available literature, the care of needy persons was entrusted

to local party and government committees and, at the lowest echelon, to krom samaki (solidarity groups). Leaders at these grass-roots

levels thus were able to evaluate true need and to extend aid varying from in-kind assistance to informal job placement. Such decentralization avoided the bureaucratization of welfare but, at the same time, it carried its own potential for abuse because aid could

be apportioned on the basis of fidelity to regime and to party, or even to enforce loyalty to local leaders. The extension to the local

level of such social services, however, indicated that the PRK was

slowly extending its presence in the countryside, thus reinforcing

its claim of nationhood, and its control over its territory and over Cambodian society at large.

* * *

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The Society and Its Environment

The most important published sources on the geography of Cambodia are Ashok K. Dutt's collection of articles in Southeast Asia:

Realm of Contrasts and David J. Steinberg's chapters in Cambodia,

Its People, Its Society, Its Culture. Among the major resources on Cambodian society are Jean Delvert's Le Cambodge, a major study of

Cambodian peasants; May Mayko Ebihara's dissertation, "Svay:

A Khmer Village in Cambodia"; and Gabrielle Martel's Lovea,

village des environs d

}Angkor. Frank M. Le Bar, Gerald C. Hickey,

and John K. Musgrave's Ethnic Groups of Mainland Southeast Asia

provides useful but somewhat dated sketches of the Khmer and

several of the ethnic minorities in Cambodia. Cambodge: Faits et Problemes de Population by Jacques Migozzi and "Kampuchea: A

Country Adrift" by Ea Meng Try are useful studies of the population of Cambodia before and after the Khmer Rouge takeover.

The various works of Michael Vickery, Ben Kiernan, and Marie

Martin provide data on Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and

PRK regimes. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

137

Chapter 3. The Economy
Economic activity in Cambodia: Collecting palm sugar

a bamboo ampong, net fishing on the Mekong River,

selling in a village market.
THE ECONOMY OF CAMBODIA in the late 1980s was dominated by subsistence agriculture; the industrial sector was still in

its infancy. After it came to power in 1979, the new, Vietnameseinstalled government in Phnom Penh set restoration of the nation's

self-sufficiency in food, a situation that the country had enjoyed

throughout prewar times, as a major goal. A persistent guerrilla war and a ravaged infrastructure impeded the achievement of this goal and of economic recovery in general, however. At the Fifth

Party Congress of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B), held in Phnom Penh from

October 13 to October 16, 1985, General Secretary Heng Samrin

laid claim to some "important successes in agricultural production" in his political report. At the same time, he acknowledged

that the country's "backward and unbalanced" economy still faced

tremendous difficulties, including shortages of fuel, spare parts, raw materials, skilled labor, and a cadre of professionals possess- ing technical expertise and economic management skills. In short,

the country's material and technical bases had not been restored

to prewar levels. Prior to its adjournment, the KPRP Congress

adopted the First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and Development (1986-90), hereafter referred to as the First

Plan.

In 1987 there were signs that reforms legalizing private enterprise were revitalizing the country's economy. Small industrial enterprises reopened, and transportation and telecommunication

systems were partially restored. As private market activities re- sumed, the population of Phnom Penh grew from 50,000 in

1978—the last year of the Pol Pot regime—to 700,000. Economic

revitalization also occurred at Kampong Saom (formerly known

as Sihanoukville), Cambodia's only seaport and its second largest

city, which resumed its pre- 1975 industrial and shipping activities. Economic rehabilitation has been precarious and has been

plagued by uncontrollable factors, such as adverse weather and seri- ous security problems. In 1987 a severe drought in Southeast Asia

reduced Cambodia's rice production. According to a senior offi- cial of the Ministry of Agriculture, estimated production of milled

rice fell that year to approximately 1 million tons, about 300,000

tons below the level of fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1986. (Cambodia needs at least 1.9 million tons of rice annually for a population of 6.5 million).

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Cambodia: A Country Study

The prospects for Cambodia's economic revitalization were poor

in the late 1980s. The country's infrastructure was both weak and

unstable. Factories and workshops, lacking electricity and supplies,

operated only intermittently and at low capacity. The economy re- lied heavily—and almost completely after 1980—on foreign aid from

communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam); Western nations, Japan,

and China had terminated economic assistance to Cambodia in

1980 to protest the presence of Vietnamese troops in that country.

According to General Secretary Samrin, Cambodia would require

"dozens of years" to restore its economy and to accomplish "a

gradual passage toward socialism." Internationally, Cambodia in

the future may have the option of joining the Council for Mutual

Economic Assistance (CMEA, CEMA, or Comecon—see Glossary). If the Vietnamese troops leave, the country also may be

offered some form of economic cooperation by other Asian and

Western nations. In either case, however, Cambodia is very poor,

produces littie, and is not likely to prove an enticing economic part- ner. For this reason, in the forging of new economic links with the

East and with the West, the country is likely to be relegated to a

passive role, and the initiative will probably belong to the larger

states, who will decide on what terms to share their largesse with

Cambodia.

Because of insufficient and inconsistent—and therefore unreliable—data, analysis of Cambodia's war-torn economy can only

be tentative. In the late 1980s, key economic indicators were missing

or were difficult to reconcile, particularly for the Pol Pot period

(1975-78). Since 1979 government economic publications have been

scarce, and official statistics represent targets and estimates spelled

out in the country's economic development plans rather than ac- tual figures.

Economic Setting

Seasonal monsoons and diverse topography significantiy influence

Cambodia's economy (see Environment, ch. 2). The southwest

monsoon brings the rainy season (May to October), which is suit- able for planting and growing the rice seedlings, and the northeast

monsoon sends back dry air (November to March), which makes

possible the paddy harvest.

The country's lakes and rivers also affect the economy. They

are an abundant source of fish, a mainstay of the Cambodian diet,

and they make possible irrigated agriculture, on which the country depends for its livelihood (see Climate, ch. 2). The principal

waterway, the Mekong River, is an important trade route and

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The Economy

avenue of communication. Since ancient times, the Tonle Sap

(Great Lake), the Tonle Sab and the Mekong rivers, and their tributaries have been centers of economic and political power. Phnom

Penh—the site of the royal residence, the administrative capital,

and, in general, the locus of power, of culture, and of business—is situated at the junction of the Tonle Sab and the Mekong.

Natural Resources

Metals and Minerals

In general, Cambodia's mineral resources appear to be limited.

In the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, however, exploration

by Chinese experts in Kampong Thum Province disclosed commercially exploitable deposits of iron ore amounting to about 5.2

million tons. Western sources indicated possible reserves of highgrade iron ore, ranging from 2.5 million to 4.8 million tons, in

the northern part of the country. Chinese explorations also revealed

manganese ore reserves, estimated at about 120,000 tons, in Kampong Thum Province.

Deposits of phosphate, limestone, and clay of exploitable quality and quantity have also been reported. A few thousand tons of

phosphate are extracted annually in Kampot Province and are processed locally or at a small plant in Batdambang Province. In

addition, salt and coal also may be present in Cambodia's geological strata. Rubies, sapphires, and zircons have been mined since

at least the late 1800s, mostly at Ba Kev, Stoeng Treng Province,

and at Pailin, Batdambang Province. Limited gold and silver deposits have been reported in several parts of the country.

Hydroelectric Power

The country's hydroelectric generating potential is considerable, especially from the swift current of the middle Mekong River

where it flows through Stoeng Treng and Kracheh provinces. Other

sites of minor importance are on rivers in the highlands of the north- eastern and north-central parts of the country. Although the Tonle

Sap is Cambodia's dominant hydraulic feature, the rivers flowing

into this great lake have littie or no exploitable potential. In general,

development of the country's water potential appears to be more

important for the expansion of irrigation than for the production

of electricity.

Petroleum

In late 1969, the Cambodian government granted a permit to a French company to explore for petroleum in the Gulf of Thailand.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

By 1972 none had been located, and exploration ceased when the

Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) fell in 1975. Subsequent oil and

gas discoveries in the Gulf of Thailand and in the South China

Sea, however, could spark renewed interest in Cambodia's offshore

area, especially because the country is on the same continental shelf as its Southeast Asian oil-producing neighbors.

Forestry

Another natural resource is the forests, which cover approximately 70 percent of the country and which potentially constitute a second pillar of the economy in addition to the primary one,

agriculture (see table 5). A survey in the 1960s disclosed that Cambodia had more than 13 million hectares of forests that contained

many species of tropical growth and trees but not teak or other

valuable sources of hardwood. Some destruction of the forest en- vironment undoubtedly occurred in the war that followed in the

1970s, but its extent has not been determined. Most of the heavy

fighting took place in areas uncovered by dense tropical jungle.

As of late 1987, forest resources had not yet been fully exploited

because of poor security in the countryside and a lack of electrical

and mechanical equipment, such as power tools and lumber trucks. Nevertheless, the Cambodian government reportedly has discussed

with Vietnam the possibility of coordinated reforestation programs.

Timber and firewood are the main forest products. Timber is considered one of the four economic initiatives of the government's

First Plan. Timber production was projected to reach a peak of

200,000 cubic meters in 1990.

Labor Force

Cambodia ranks among the least populated Asian nations with an estimated 1987 population of only about 6.3 million to 6.4 million. Its density of approximately 36 persons per square kilometer

is about one-fifth of Vietnam's population density of 187 persons

per square kilometer. The First Plan set the population growth rate

at 2.8 percent per year, up from the average annual growth rate of 2.3 percent for the 1978 to 1985 period (see Population, ch. 2).

In 1987 observers estimated that about 34.5 percent of the population was under 15 years of age and that 3 percent was 62.5 or

older. An estimated 63 percent of the population (or about 4 million people) were between the ages of 15 and 64. The economically active segment of the population, the work force, was probably

around 3 million people, or 46 percent of the total population. This

estimated percentage of the labor force remained relatively constant from 1962 —when the census showed a work force of 2.5

144
The Economy

million people out of a total population of 5.73 million—until the

1980s.

In 1983 all public-sector employees, including state employees,

armed forces personnel, industrial workers, artisans, teachers, and

party cadres, accounted for approximately 8 percent of an economically active population of between 2.5 million and 3 million. Approximately 80 percent of the work force was engaged in agriculture,

in forestry, and in fishing.

A critical shortage of qualified and professional personnel

emerged as technicians, engineers, skilled workers, and trained

managers either fled the country or fell victim to executions under

the Pol Pot regime. In 1980 the Ministry of Agriculture had only

200 technicians, down from a total of 1,600 in 1975.

Moreover, the continuing conflict diverted part of the work force

to combat zones or to security-related projects (see Military Developments in Postwar Cambodia, ch. 5). In March 1984, the

government initiated a forced-labor program, employing civilians

in ''national defense work" to seal the 830 kilometers of frontier

with Thailand. This project, code-named K-5, diverted from the

labor force a number of conscripts (aged 18 to 45) ranging from

25,000 to 30,000 for each province, or as high as 3,000 for each

district of Cambodia. The labor shortage constituted a major impediment to economic progress, a point stressed by Heng Samrin

at the Fifth Party Congress when he said that "Labor ... is scat- tered at present in order to face the needs of the struggle," adding

that the "lack of qualified labor and specialized cadres . . . has

prevented us from ensuring that current works satisfy the requirements for development."

Economic Developments after Independence

The predominance of agriculture and the lack—or neglect—of

real industrial development have characterized Cambodia's modern

economy since independence in 1953. Wet rice cultivation traditionally has played a key role in peasant subsistence, in national

self-sufficiency in food production, in trade relations with other

states, and in governmental revenues for national development.

Conversely, the government has made few attempts to industrialize the nation.

After Cambodia became independent in 1953, the country's eco- nomic policies were shaped by the succession of governments that

followed. Prince Sihanouk opted for unconditional aid from the

East and from the West, and the nation made modest strides. The

Lon Nol government would have adhered to a laissez-faire doctrine, but it was overwhelmed by the war around it. The Khmer

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Rouge (see Appendix B) adopted a fanatical and doctrinaire self- reliance, and the Cambodian people and nation were ravaged by

it. The post- 1979 government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B), with its Vietnamese mentors, ac- quiesced to a pragmatic combination of socialism and small-scale

capitalism, and the country achieved some limited rehabilitative

goals. In the late 1980s, government policies fundamentally relied

upon the nation's own sparse resources—chiefly agriculture, a nascent industrial base, and modest foreign aid from Comecon countries and non- governmental international organizations.

Sihanouk's Peacetime Economy, 1953-70

Sihanouk's political neutrality, which formed the cornerstone of

his foreign policy, had a significant effect on Cambodia's economic

development. Sihanouk insisted that the economic dimension of

neutrality meant either total rejection of international aid (as practiced by Burma under Ne Win) or acceptance of foreign economic

assistance from all countries without strings attached. Indeed, during the first decade that he was in power in newly independent Cambodia (1953-63), the prince carefully practiced his "purer form

of neutrality between East and West" in seeking foreign economic

assistance for development (see Cambodia under Sihanouk, 1954-

70, ch. 1). In 1963 however, Cambodia's economy started to stagnate when

Sihanouk decided to link his economic neutrality policy to the country 's territorial integrity and border security. He rejected further

assistance from the United States, because Washington supported

the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), and from Thailand,

with which Cambodia had continuous frontier disputes. In a related

move, Sihanouk nationalized trading companies, banks, insurance,

and major industries, thereby causing economic deterioration between 1963 and 1969. The 1967 Samlot (Batdambang) revolt and

the February 1970 government decision to demonetize (or exchange)

the old 500 riel (for value of the riel—see Glossary) banknotes were

crucial events contributing to the end of the Sihanouk era (see Into

the Maelstrom: Insurrection and War, 1967-75, ch. 1; The Sec- ond Indochina War, 1954-75, ch. 5). During his tenure after independence, Sihanouk used the country's ill-defined constitution to monitor all government activities of any consequence and to bend the government's decision-making

process to his advantage. During the course of nation building,

political aims often prevailed over strictly economic objectives. For

example, prior to 1967, the government assigned higher priority

to social improvements, such as health and education, than it did

146
Young peasant woman

pauses during the rice harvest Courtesy Bill Herod

A fruit vendor

awaits customers in a Phnom Penh marketplace

Courtesy Bill Herod

147
Cambodia: A Country Study

to national economic growth. The government later gave higher

priority to the productive sectors of agriculture and industry in eco- nomic plans for the 1968-72 periods; however, because of war,

the government did not implement these plans.

Nonetheless, between 1952 and 1969, Cambodia's gross national

product (GNP—see Glossary) grew an average of 5 percent a year

in real terms, with growth higher during the 1950s than during

the 1960s. In addition, the service sector played an important role

in Sihanouk's mixed economic system in contrast to its position

under the regimes of Pol Pot and of Heng Samrin, who considered

the service sector insignificant and "unproductive." In 1968 the

service sector accounted for more than 1 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary), agriculture accounted for 36 percent, and manufacturing for 12 percent.

Agriculture developed under a degree of paternalism from Si- hanouk, who donated farm equipment to various villages and, in

return, received respect and affection from the peasants. In general,

however, Cambodian agriculture subsisted without much help from

the government. In 1969 approximately 80 percent of rice farmers owned the land they cultivated, and the landholding for each

family averaged slightly more than two hectares. The farmers used

simple and rudimentary implements that were well suited to their

needs and to the light weight of their draft animals. Overall, the

peasants were remarkably self-sufficient. Farmers began to cultivate more land, causing rice production

to increase from an average of 1 .4 million tons in 1955 to 2.4 million tons in 1960. Production remained at that level throughout

the 1960s. Rice yield per hectare, however, remained low—less than 1.2 tons per hectare—during the 1952-69 period. Little was

done to increase yield through the use of irrigation, chemical fertilizers, or improved seeds and implements. Average yields in Bat- dambang and Kampong Cham provinces, however, were 50 percent

higher than the national average because of better soil fertility and,

in the case of Batdambang, larger average landholdings and greater use of machines in cultivation.

Industrial and infrastructural development benefited from for- eign economic assistance. In general, the government avoided ambitious plans and focused on small enterprises to meet local needs

and to reduce foreign imports. In June 1956, the Chinese provided

Phnom Penh with US$22.4 million in equipment as part of an on- going program of industrial economic assistance. In addition, they

helped build a textile mill and a glass plant in the 1960s. During

this period, other nations contributed through aid programs of their own. Czechoslovakia granted loans for the construction of tractor

148
The Economy

assembly plants, tire-production facilities, and a sugar refinery.

Other aid donors were the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, France, the

Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), Japan, and Australia. United States economic assistance to Cambodia amounted

to more than US$350 million for the 1955 to 1962 period, and it was invested mostly in the areas of public health, education, and

agricultural development. To avoid the appearance of undue dependence upon foreign aid, Cambodia insisted upon "project sharing," that is, participation of its own in specific enterprises, such

as the French-sponsored oil refinery and truck assembly plant at Sihanoukville. This stipulation imposed by Phnom Penh also had

the effect of holding down the scale of many aid projects and the

amounts of loans extended to the Cambodian government.

The government also used foreign assistance to expand the country's transportation and communication networks. France helped

to develop Sihanoukville, Cambodia's second largest port, which

opened in 1960, and the United States constructed a highway link- ing the port to Phnom Penh. In addition, the Cambodians, with

French and West German assistance, built a railway from Sihanoukville to the capital.

Despite Sihanouk's claims of economic progress, Cambodia's

industrial output in 1968 amounted to only 12 percent of GNP,

or only one-third of agricultural production. Rice and rubber were

the country's two principal commodity exports and foreignexchange earners during the Sihanouk era. The Wartime Economy, 1970-75

The war that engulfed the rest of Indochina spread to Cambodia in April 1970, shortly after the coup that deposed Prince Sihanouk. Wartime conditions had a major impact on the country's

economy, especially on the export sector. Production and export

of virtually all commodities dropped sharply, as insecurity spread

throughout the countryside. Intense combat in the nation's most

densely populated farming areas caused a large segment of the

peasant population to flee to cities and to towns. By 1975 the population of Phnom Penh had swollen to 2 million, from just 50,000

in 1955. Moreover, the war seriously dislocated the economic sys- tem. Food shortages arose as insurgents interrupted the transportation of crops from the countryside to the main marketing centers. Increasing budgetary expenditures, skyrocketing inflation, shrinking

export earnings, and a rising balance-of-payments deficit plagued

the war-torn economy.

The war's most damaging effect was on rice production. In 1972

Cambodia needed to import rice (from Japan and from Thailand)

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Cambodia: A Country Study

for the first time since independence. Fighting reduced the amount

of land under rice cultivation to fewer than 800,000 hectares in

1972, far less than the approximately 3 million hectares that had

been under cultivation in 1969. The 1972 rice harvest amounted

to only 26.8 percent of the 1969 harvest. Exports of natural rubber, the country's second leading foreign-exchange earner, ceased

shortly after hostilities began in 1970. The war destroyed extensive rubber plantations and damaged rubber-processing facilities. In late 1970, Lon Nol, who succeeded Sihanouk, continued to liberalize the economy in an effort to save the country from eco- nomic disaster. This endeavor was a continuation of the policies

he had enacted as head of the government of " national salvation"

in August 1969. Under Lon Nol's direction, Phnom Penh limited

the control and the authority of the state export-import agency

(Societe nationale d'exportation et d'importation—SONEXIM),

which had been established in 1964 to administer foreign trade,

to denationalize banks and industries, to encourage private for- eign investments, and to allow greater private participation in the

economy. The new economic policies of the Khmer Republic gradually reversed the pattern of state socialism that had formed the

keystone of Sihanouk's domestic policies.

On October 29, 1971, the government implemented a comprehensive program of reforms to stabilize the economy. These

reforms included increased import taxes on all nonessential commodities; increased interest rates on bank deposits and on commercial loans; elimination of credit to state enterprises and to public

utilities; introduction of a flexible currency exchange system; and

simplification of the import system to facilitate the movement of

goods. The emphasis of the program was to restore monetary stability in the face of rising inflation, financial speculation, black markets, and other economic problems caused by the war. In a change

of policy, the government also moved toward greater involvement

with international and with regional organizations and sought support from the World Bank (see Glossary), the International Monetary Fund (see Glossary), and the Asian Development Bank.

As the war progressed, Lon Nol's government aimed major eco- nomic measures mainly at improving the overall food supply situ- ation and at maintaining public confidence in the continued

availability of essential consumer items. To ensure adequate domestic supplies, in November 1971 Phnom Penh suspended grants of

export licenses for major export commodities, such as rice, corn, and cattle. Although the move helped maintain stocks of essential

commodities in the capital and in provincial centers, supplies were

small relative to demand.

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The Economy

The Lon Nol government had earlier declared in principle that

it maintained a policy of "strict neutrality" and would accept for- eign assistance from "all countries which love peace and justice."

As early as April 20, 1970, Cambodia formally requested military

and economic aid from Washington to help cope with growing war

expenditures and with an increasing budgetary deficit. As military

activity in the country intensified, the United States became Cambodia's largest donor and supplier. Moscow, however, sent medical equipment and, in October 1971, the Soviets renewed a financial

agreement with the republican regime. The Economic Support

Fund, to which the United Nations (UN), the United States, Britain, Japan, New Zealand, Thailand, and Malaysia pledged their

contributions, provided US$21 million in auxiliary relief. Other

nations, including Italy, Israel, West Germany, and Switzerland,

provided funds mostly to assist war victims. France earmarked its aid for the maintenance of French educational programs and cul- tural institutions. Nevertheless, these palliative measures fell far short of what was needed. By 1975 the economy had collapsed,

and the country was surviving mainly on imported food financed

by the United States government.

The Economy under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79

Under the leadership of the Khmer Rouge, Cambodia underwent a brutal and radical revolution. When the communist forces

took power in Phnom Penh in April 1975, their immediate goals were to overhaul the social system and to revitalize the national

economy. The economic development strategy of the Khmer Rouge

was to build a strong agricultural base supported by local small

industries and handicrafts. As explained by Deputy Premier Ieng

Sary, the regime was "pursuing radical transformation of the country, with agriculture as the base. With revenues from agriculture

we are building industry which is to serve the development of

agriculture." This strategy was also the focus of a doctoral thesis

written by future Khmer Rouge leader Khieu Samphan at the

University of Paris in 1959. Samphan argued that Cambodia could

only achieve economic and industrial development by increasing

and expanding agricultural production. The new communist

government implemented the tenets of this thesis; it called for a

total collectivization of agriculture and for a complete nationalization of all sectors of the economy.

Strict adherence to the principle of self-reliance constituted the

central goal of the Khmer Rouge regime. A Phnom Penh radio

broadcast in early May (about a month after the Khmer Rouge

arrived in the capital) underscored the importance of Cambodian

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Cambodia: A Country Study

self-reliance and boasted that during the war the Khmer Rouge

had used scrap iron and wrecked military vehicles to manufacture

their own bullets and mines. The statement made it clear that the

policy of self-reliance would continue in peacetime. In another move

aimed at reducing foreign influence on the country, the regime

announced on May 10 that it would not allow foreigners to remain

in Cambodia but that the measure was only temporary; and it added, "We shall reconsider the question [of allowing foreigners

to enter the country] after the re-establishment of diplomatic, eco- nomic and commercial relations with other countries." Although

Cambodia resumed diplomatic relations with a number of nations,

the new government informed the UN General Assembly on

October 6, 1975, that it was neutral and economically self-sufficient and would not ask for aid from any country. On September 9,

however, the Chinese ambassador arrived in Cambodia, and there were soon reports that China was providing aid to the Khmer

Rouge. Estimates of the number of Chinese experts in Cambodia

after that time ranged from 500 to 2,000. The policy of self-reliance

also meant that the government organized the entire population

into forced-labor groups to work in paddies and on other land to help the country reach its goal of food self-sufficiency.

The Khmer Rouge, as soon as it took power on April 17, 1975,

emptied Phnom Penh (of its approximately 2 million residents) as well as other cities and towns, and forced the people into the countryside. This overnight evacuation was motivated by the urgent

need to rebuild the country's war-torn economy and by the Khmer

Rouge peasantry's hostility toward the cities. According to a Khmer

Rouge spokesman at the French embassy on May 10, the evacuation was necessary to "revolutionize" and to "purify" the urban

residents and to annihilate Phnom Penh, which "Cambodian

peasants regarded as a satellite of foreigners, first French, and then

American, and which has been built with their sweat without bringing them anything in exchange." The only people who were not

ordered to leave the city were those who operated essential public

services, such as water and electricity.

Other Khmer Rouge leaders rationalized the evacuation as a matter of self-reliance. They told the Swedish ambassador in early 1976

that "they didn't have any transportation facilities to bring food

to the people, and so the logical thing was to bring the people to the food, i.e., to evacuate them all and make them get out into

the ricefields." Indeed, when the evacuees reached their destinations, they were immediately mobilized to clear land, to harvest

rice crops, to dig and restore irrigation canals, and to build and

repair dikes in preparation for the further expansion of agriculture.

152
Oxcarts remain a primary conveyance in rural Cambodia.

(Upturned wagon tongue characterizes Cambodian oxcarts.)

Courtesy Bill Herod

The rice crop in November 1976 was reported to be good in rela- tion to earlier years. At the same time, plantations producing cot- ton, rubber, and bananas were established or rehabilitated.

While the Khmer Rouge gave high priority to agriculture, it neglected industry. Pol Pot sought "to consolidate and perfect

[existing] factories," rather than to build new ones. About 100

factories and workshops were put back into production; most of

them (except a Chinese-built cement plant, a gunnysack factory,

and textile mills in Phnom Penh and in Batdambang) were repair

and handicraft shops revived to facilitate agricultural development.

Cambodia's economic revolution was much more radical and

ambitious than that in any other communist country. In fact,

Khmer Rouge leader Premier Ieng Sary explained that Cambodia wanted "to create something that never was before in history.

No model exists for what we are building. We are not imitating

either the Chinese or the Vietnamese model. " The state or cooperatives owned all land; there were no private plots as in China or

in the Soviet Union. The constitution, adopted in December 1975

and proclaimed in January 1976, specifically stated that the means

of production were the collective property of the state (see Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78, ch. 1).

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Cambodia: A Country Study

The Cambodian economic system was unique in at least two

respects. First, the government abolished private ownership of land.

The Khmer Rouge believed that, under the new government, Cambodia should be a classless society of "perfect harmony" and that

private ownership was "the source of egoist feelings and conse- quently social injustices." Second, Cambodia was a cashless nation; the government confiscated all republican era currency. Shops

closed, and workers received their pay in the form of food rations,

because there was no money in circulation.

On August 12, 1975, fewer than four months after the Khmer

Rouge had taken power, Khieu Samphan claimed that, within a year or two, Cambodia would have sufficient food supplies and

would be able to export some of its products. To achieve this goal

in record time, large communes comprising several villages replaced

village cooperatives, which had formed in the areas controlled by

the Khmer Rouge in 1973 and which had spread throughout the

country by 1975. Unlike China and Vietnam, which had introduced

collectivization gradually over several years, Cambodia imposed

the system hastily and without preparation.

The Khmer Rouge, in line with the slogan, "If we have dikes,

we will have water; if we have water, we will have rice; if we have

rice, we can have absolutely everything," organized the workers

into three "forces." The first force comprised unmarried men (ages

fifteen to forty) who were assigned to construct canals, dikes, and

dams. The second force consisted of married men and women who

were responsible for growing rice near villages. The third force was made up of people forty years of age and older who were assigned

to less arduous tasks, such as weaving, basket-making, or watching over the children. Children under the age of fifteen grew vegetables or raised poultry. Everyone had to work between ten and twelve

hours a day, and some worked even more, often under adverse,

unhealthy conditions.

On September 27, 1977, in a major speech celebrating the an- niversary of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party

(KCP—see Appendix B), Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot asserted

that, "Our entire people, our entire revolutionary army and all our cadres live under a collective regime through a communal support system." He then listed the government's achievements in

rebuilding the economy and concluded that, "Though not yet to the point of affluence, our people's standard of living has reached

a level at which people are basically assured of all needs in all fields.

'

Measuring the economic performance of the Khmer Rouge

regime was impossible because statistics were not available, and

no monetary transactions or bookkeeping were carried out. The

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The Economy

economic life described by foreign diplomats, by Western visitors,

and by Cambodian refugees in Thai camps ranged from spartan

to dismal. Phnom Penh became a ghost town of only about 10,000

people. There were no shops, post offices, telephones, or telegraph

services. Frequent shortages of water and of electricity occurred

in all urban areas, and the government prohibited movement across provincial borders, except for that of trucks distributing rice and

fuel.Conditions in the cooperatives varied considerably from place

to place. In some areas, cooperative members had permission to cultivate private plots of land and to keep livestock. In others, all property was held communally. Conditions were most primitive

in the new economic zones, where city dwellers had been sent to farm virgin soil and where thousands of families lived in improvised barracks (see Democratic Kampuchea, 1975-78, ch. 1). Cambodia made progress in improving the country's irrigation

network and in expanding its rice cultivation area. Phnom Penh

radio claimed that a network of ditches, canals, and reservoirs had

been constructed throughout the country "like giant checkerboards,

a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of our Cambodia."

Still, rice production and distribution were reported to be unsatisfactory. Rice harvests were poor in 1975 and 1978, when the worst

floods in seventy years struck the Mekong Valley. Even after the

better harvests of 1976 and 1977, however, rice distribution was

unequal, and the government failed to reach the daily ration of

570 grams per person. (The daily ration of rice per person actually

varied by region from 250 to 500 grams.) Party leaders, cadres,

soldiers, and factory workers ate well, but children, the sick, and

the elderly suffered from malnutrition and starvation. There also were reports that the government was stockpiling rice in preparation for war with Vietnam and exporting it to China in exchange

for military supplies. This diverted rice could have been one ex- planation for the people's meager rice ration.

At the end of 1978, when Vietnamese troops invaded Cambodia, the ensuing turbulence completely disrupted the nation's eco- nomic activity, particularly in the countryside, which once again

became a war theater traversed by a massive population movement.

Agricultural production was again a major casualty, with the result that there was a severe food crisis in 1979.

Economic Role of the Kampuchean People's

Revolutionary Party

After the fall of Pol Pot and the establishment of the People's

Republic of Kampuchea in January 1979, the Kampuchean (or

155
Cambodia: A Country Study

Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B),

led by General Secretary Heng Samrin, set Cambodia's economic

development policies. Party congresses adopted these policies at meetings in January 1979, May 1981, and October 1985. A new

Constitution, which the National Assembly approved in June 1981,

defined Cambodia's new socialist direction and the role of the state in economic affairs. Then, after six more years of struggling with an economy of survival and subsistence, KPRP leaders presented

their First Plan, which represented a systematic and rational party

effort at centrally planning and improving the economy.

New Economic Policy and System

In contrast to Pol Pot's radical, doctrinaire approach to eco- nomic development, Heng Samrin and the leaders of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation

(KNUFNS—see Appendix B), the umbrella group of anti-Pol Pot

forces sponsored by Hanoi, sought to rally public support by for- mulating a policy that would be pragmatic, realistic, and flexible. In an eleven-point program promulgated shortly before the Viet- namese invasion of Cambodia, the front articulated the economic

guidelines that would mark its tenure in power. These guidelines

advocated a gradual transformation to socialism; a "planned econ- omy with markets"; the restoration of banks, of currency, and of

trade; the abolition of forced labor; the introduction of an eighthour workday; and pay based on work performed.

The KPRP socialist economy accepted the private sector. At a May 1980 agriculture conference, Samrin reviewed the effective- ness of the solidarity groups {krom samaki), production units of seven

to fifteen families, united in a common endeavor to raise food or

to produce goods. These production units had been organized in

line with the policy of moving toward socialism. He affirmed that

each member of these groups would receive at least one hectare

of land to cultivate for communal purposes, plus a private plot not

exceeding a quarter of a hectare on which to grow vegetables or

to graze livestock. Also, a July 1980 planning conference called

for a policy of '

' simultaneous development of family (private) econ- omy and national (socialized) economy." The conference also decided that the state should buy agricultural products from the

peasants and should sell them manufactured goods at free-market

prices.

The KPRP further clarified its economic policy at its Fourth Party

Congress (its first since taking power in Phnom Penh) from May 26

to May 29, 1981. It declared that the nation's economic system

had three main parts—the state economy, the collective economy,

156
Lunchtime in Phnom Penh

Courtesy Bill Herod

and the family economy, and that each of these parts "had its own

significant role."

The state economy covered large-scale agricultural production,

all industrial production, the communications and transportation

networks, finance, and domestic and foreign trade. To facilitate economic transactions nationwide, the state restored the banking

system in November 1979, and it reintroduced currency in March

1980. The KPRP acknowledged that the state economy was small

and said that it should be expanded. The party leaders, however, aware of the pitfalls of central planning, warned against "overexpansion and disregard for real needs, production conditions,

management ability, and economic capability."

The collective economy—the largest of the three elements—was

assigned an important role in agricultural rehabilitation and development. It consisted of solidarity groups in agriculture, fishing,

forestry, and handicrafts. These groups also assumed the task of

collective purchase and sale. The family-run economy included the home economies of the

peasants, most retail businesses, individual artisans, handicrafts,

repair shops, and small trade. Although the 1981 Constitution stated that the land and other natural resources were state property, it gave the citizens usufruct rights to land allotted for a house and

garden by the state. In some cases, agricultural workers were also

157
Cambodia: A Country Study

allowed to borrow an extra plot of land from the state, to produce

food on it, and to keep the harvest for their own consumption.

Private enterprise also made a modest beginning under Cambodia's hybrid economic system. Citizens were allowed to buy and

to sell agricultural produce and handicrafts. The law guaranteed

workers the right to keep their wages, their other income and their

property. Encouraged and protected by the state, hundreds of small

shops and factories, each employing a few workers, opened for business in Phnom Penh and in other urban areas. This inchoate private sector played such an important role in

the national economic recovery that party leaders urged its official recognition, at the Fifth Congress in October 1985, as a means

of mitigating the weaknesses of the state-run economy. Thus, the

government added a fourth component—private economy—to the

economic system and legitimized it with a constitutional amendment in February 1986.

First Plan, 1986-90

The First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and

Development (1986-90), or First Plan, originated in February 1984,

when the heads of the state planning commissions of Vietnam, Laos,

and Cambodia met in Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) and

agreed to coordinate their 1986 to 1990 economic plans. Heng Samrin formally announced Cambodia's plan in his political report to the congress.

The plan was intended to open a new phase of the Cambodian

revolution; it gave highest priority to agricultural production, calling

it "the first front line," and focused on the four sectors of food,

rubber, fishing, and timber (see table 6). It set production targets

for each sector. During the plan period, food production was to increase 7 percent a year to keep up with a targeted 2.8 percent

annual population growth rate, which did not seem to have been

reached by 1987. The plan projected that by 1990, rubber farming would expand to 50,000 hectares in order to produce 50,000

tons of latex; timber production would reach 200,000 cubic meters;

jute production would increase to 15,000 tons; and fish production would amount to 130,000 tons. As in the past, the plan

labeled agriculture and forestry as the real force of the national

economy.

The plan was less specific for the industrial sector. It did not

set industrial production targets, except that for electrical output,

which was projected to reach 300 million kilowatt hours per year

in 1990. The plan called attention to the need for selective restora- tion of existing industrial production capabilities and for proposed

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The Economy

progressive construction of a small to medium industrial base, which

would be more appropriate to the country's situation.

The plan placed increased emphasis on the distribution of goods.

Trade organizations were to be perfected at all levels, and socialist trading networks were to be expanded in all localities. In particular, the trade relationship between the state and the peasantry was

to be improved and consolidated in accordance with the motto,

"For the peasantry, selling rice and agricultural products to the

state is patriotism; for the state, selling goods and delivering them

directly to the people is being responsible to the people."

The plan also required that investment be directed toward the

improvement of the infrastructure, particularly toward the reconstruction of communication lines and waterworks. Road, inland

waterways, and railroad networks had to be restored to serve the

national economy and defense.

Last, but not least, the plan cited "export and thrift" (without

elaboration), as the two primary policies to be followed in order

to solve the national budget deficit. The plan implied that, into

the 1990s, exports would have to consist principally of agricultural

and forestry products, to which some value might be added by lowtechnology processing. "Thrift," although undefined, could, in

the future, include some kind of government savings plan, with

incentives for small depositors, to absorb surplus riels generated

by Cambodia's considerable free-market and black-market sectors. Heng Samrin, like his predecessors, Sihanouk and Pol Pot, urged

Cambodians to undertake the task of economic restoration "in the

spirit of mainly relying on one's own forces." Unlike Sihanouk

and Pol Pot, however, the KPRP leader stressed economic and tech- nical cooperation with Vietnam. He believed such cooperation

would be "an indispensable factor" in the development of agricul- ture and of forestry in Cambodia. Heng Samrin also advocated

better economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and with other

socialist countries.

Agriculture

Agriculture, accounting for 90 percent of GDP in 1985 and employing approximately 80 percent of the work force, is the traditional mainstay of the economy. Rice, the staple food, continued

to be the principal commodity in this sector. Rice production, a

vital economic indicator in Cambodia's agrarian society, frequentiy

fell far short of targets, causing severe food shortages in 1979, 1981,

1984, and 1987. The plan's 1987 target for the total area to be devoted to rice cultivation was 1.77 million hectares, but the actual area under cultivation in 1987 amounted to only 1.15 million

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Cambodia: A Country Study

hectares (see table 7, Appendix A). After 1979 and through the

late 1980s, the agricultural sector performed poorly. Adverse

weather conditions, insufficient numbers of farm implements and

of draft animals, inexperienced and incompetent personnel, security problems, and government collectivization policies all contributed to low productivity.

Collectivization and Solidarity Groups

Collectivization of the agricultural sector under the Heng Samrin regime included the formation of solidarity groups. As small

aggregates of people living in the same locality, known to one

another, and able to a certain extent to profit collectively from their

work, they were an improvement over the dehumanized, forcedlabor camps and communal life of the Pol Pot era. The organization of individuals and families into solidarity groups also made

sense in the environment of resources-poor, postwar Cambodia.

People working together in this way were able to offset somewhat

the shortages of manpower, draft animals, and farm implements

(see New Economic and Policy System, this ch.).

In 1986 more than 97 percent of the rural population belonged

to the country's more than 100,000 solidarity groups. Unlike the

large communes of the Khmer Rouge, the solidarity groups were

relatively small. They consisted initially of between twenty and fifty

families and were later reduced to between seven and fifteen families. The groups were a form of " peasants' labor association," the

members of which continued to be owners of the land and of the

fruits of their labor. According to a Soviet analyst, the solidarity

groups "organically united" three forms of property—the land,

which remained state property; the collectively owned farm implements and the harvest; and the individual peasant's holding, each

the private property of a peasant family.

In theory, each solidarity group received between ten and fifteen hectares of common land, depending upon the region and land

availability. This land had to be cultivated collectively, and the harvest had to be divided among member families according to the

amount of work each family had contributed as determined by a work point system. In dividing the harvest, allowance was made

first for those who were unable to contribute their labor, such as the elderly and the sick, as well as nurses, teachers, and administrators. Some of the harvest was set aside as seed for the following

season, and the rest was distributed to the workers. Those who per- formed heavy tasks and who consequently earned more work points

received a greater share of the harvest than those who worked on

light tasks. Women without husbands, however, received enough

160
The Economy

to live on even if they did little work and earned few work points.

Work points also were awarded, beyond personal labor, to individuals or to families who tended group-owned livestock or who lent their own animals or tools for solidarity group use. Each member family of a solidarity group was entitled to a pri- vate plot of between 1,500 and 2,000 square meters (depending

upon the availability of land) in addition to land it held in com- mon with other members. Individual shares of the group harvest

and of the produce from private plots were the exclusive property

of the producers, who were free to consume, store, barter, or sell them.

The solidarity groups evolved into three categories, each distinct

in its level of collectivization and in its provisions for land tenure. The first category represented the highest level of collective labor.

Member families of each solidarity group in this category undertook all tasks from plowing to harvesting. Privately owned farm

implements and draft animals continued to be individual personal

property, and the owners received remuneration for making them

available to the solidarity group during the planting and the harvesting seasons. Each group also had collectively owned farm implements, acquired through state subsidy.

The second category was described as " a transitional form from

individual to collective form" at the KPRP National Conference

in November 1984. This category of group was different from the

first because it distributed land to member families at the beginning of the season according to family size. In this second category,

group members worked collectively only on heavy tasks, such as plowing paddy fields and transplanting rice seedlings. Otherwise,

each family was responsible for the cultivation of its own land

allotment and continued to be owner of its farm implements and

animals, which could be traded by private agreement among members. Some groups owned a common pool of rice seeds, contributed

by member families, and of farm implements, contributed by the

state. The size of the pool indicated the level of the group's collec- tivization. The larger the pool, the greater the collective work. In

groups that did not have a common pool of rice and tools, productive labor was directed primarily to meeting the family's needs,

and the relationship between the agricultural producers and the

market or state organizations was very weak.

The third category was classified as the family economy. As in

the second category, the group allocated land to families at the beginning of the season, and farm implements continued to be their

private property. In this third category, however, the family culti- vated its own assigned lot, owned the entire harvest, and sold its

161
Cambodia: A Country Study

surplus directly to state purchasing organizations. In the solidarity

groups of this category, there was no collective effort, except in

administrative and sociocultural matters. The government credited the solidarity group system with re- habilitating the agricultural sector and increasing food production.

The system's contribution to socialism, however, was less visible

and significant. According to Chhea Song, deputy minister of

agriculture, a mere 10 percent of the solidarity groups really worked

collectively in the mid-1980s (seven years after solidarity groups

had come into operation). Seventy percent of the solidarity groups

performed only some tasks in common, such as preparing the fields and planting seeds. Finally, 20 percent of the agricultural workers

farmed their land as individuals and participated in the category

of the family economy.

Rice Production and Cultivation

In 1987 statistics on rice production were sparse, and they varied

depending upon sources. Cambodian government figures were

generally lower than those provided by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for the period from 1979 to 1985 (see

table 8, Appendix A).

Political and technical factors account for the discrepancies. Data

collection in the war-torn nation is difficult because of the lack of

trained personnel. Moreover, representatives of international and

of foreign relief organizations are not permitted to travel beyond

Phnom Penh, except with special permission, because of security

and logistics problems. In addition, international and Cambodian

sources use different benchmarks in calculating rice production.

FAO computes the harvest by calendar year; Cambodian officials and private observers base their calculations on the harvest sea- son, which runs from November to February and thus extends over two calendar years. Last of all, a substantial statistical difference

exists between milled rice and paddy (unmilled rice) production,

compounding problems in compiling accurate estimates. In terms

of weight, milled rice averages only 62 percent of the original unmilled paddy. Estimates sometimes refer to these two kinds of rice

interchangeably

.

Despite statistical discrepancies, there is consensus that annual

unmilled rice production during the 1979 to 1987 period did not

reach the 1966 level of 2.5 million tons. Nevertheless, since 1979,

Cambodian rice production has increased gradually (except during the disastrous 1984 to 1985 season), and the nation in the late 1980s had just begun to achieve a precarious self-sufficiency, if es- timates were borne out (see table 9, Appendix A).

162
A woman cuts and

wraps cakes of soap

Courtesy Bill Herod

A machinist plies her trade Courtesy Bill Herod

Cambodia's cultivated rice land can be divided into three areas. The first and richest (producing more than one ton of rice per hectare) covers the area of the Tonle Sap Basin and the provinces of

Batdambang, Kampong Thum, Kampong Cham, Kandal, Prey

Veng, and Svay Rieng. The second area, which yields an average

of four-fifths of a ton of rice per hectare, consists of Kampot and

Kaoh Kong provinces along the Gulf of Thailand, and some less

fertile areas of the central provinces. The third area, with rice yields

of less than three-fifths of a ton per hectare, is comprised of the

highlands and the mountainous provinces of Preah Vihear, Stoeng

Treng, Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri), and Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri)

Cambodia has two rice crops each year, a monsoon-season crop

(long-cycle) and a dry-season crop. The major monsoon crop is planted in late May through July, when the first rains of the monsoon season begin to inundate and soften the land. Rice shoots are transplanted from late June through September. The main harvest is usually gathered six months later, in December. The dry- season crop is smaller, and it takes less time to grow (three months

from planting to harvest). It is planted in November in areas that

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Cambodia: A Country Study

have trapped or retained part of the monsoon rains, and it is harvested in January or February. The dry-season crop seldom ex- ceeds 15 percent of the total annual production.

In addition to these two regular crops, peasants plant floating

rice in April and in May in the areas around the Tonle Sap (Great

Lake), which floods and expands its banks in September or early

October (see Environment, ch. 2). Before the flooding occurs, the

seed is spread on the ground without any preparation of the soil, and the floating rice is harvested nine months later, when the stems

have grown to three or four meters in response to the peak of the

flood (the floating rice has the property of adjusting its rate of growth

to the rise of the flood waters so that its grain heads remain above

water). It has a low yield, probably less than half that of most other

rice types, but it can be grown inexpensively on land for which

there is no other use. The per-hectare rice yield in Cambodia is among the lowest in

Asia. The average yield for the wet crop is about 0.95 ton of unmilled rice per hectare. The dry-season crop yield is traditionally

higher—1.8 tons of unmilled rice per hectare. New rice varieties

(IR36 and IR42) have much higher yields—between five and six tons of unmilled rice per hectare under good conditions. Unlike

local strains, however, these varieties require a fair amount of urea and phosphate fertilizer (25,000 tons for 5,000 tons of seed), which

the government could not afford to import in the late 1980s.

Other Food and Commercial Crops

The main secondary crops in the late 1980s were maize, cassava, sweet potatoes, groundnuts, soybeans, sesame seeds, dry beans,

and rubber (see table 10, Appendix A). According to Phnom Penh,

the country produced 92,000 tons of corn (maize), as well as 100,000

tons of cassava, about 34,000 tons of sweet potatoes, and 37,000

tons of dry beans in 1986. In 1987 local officials urged residents

of the different agricultural regions of the country to step up the

cultivation of subsidiary food crops, particularly of starchy crops,

to make up for the rice deficit caused by a severe drought.

The principal commercial crop is rubber. In the 1980s, it was

an important primary commodity, second only to rice, and one

of the country's few sources of foreign exchange. Rubber plantations were damaged extensively during the war (as much as 20,000

hectares was destroyed), and recovery was very slow. In 1986 rubber

production totaled about 24,500 tons (from an area of 36,000 hectares, mostly in Kampong Cham Province), far below the 1969

prewar output of 50,000 tons (produced from an area of 50,000

hectares).

164
The Economy

The government began exporting rubber and rubber products

in 1985. A major customer was the Soviet Union, which imported

slightiy more than 10,000 tons of Cambodian natural rubber annually in 1985 and in 1986. In the late 1980s, Vietnam helped Cambodia restore rubber-processing plants. The First Plan made rubber

the second economic priority, with production targeted at 50,000

tons—from an expanded cultivated area of 50,000 hectares—by 1990.

Other commercial crops included sugarcane, cotton, and tobacco.

Among these secondary crops, the First Plan emphasized the

production of jute, which was to reach the target of 15,000 tons

in 1990 (see table 11, Appendix A).

Livestock

Animal husbandry has been an essential part of Cambodian eco- nomic life, but a part that farmers have carried on mostly as a sideline. Traditionally, draft animals—water buffalo and oxen—have

played a crucial role in the preparation of rice fields for cultivation. In 1979 the decreasing number of draft animals hampered

agricultural expansion. In 1967 there were 1 .2 million head of draft

animals; in 1979 there were only 768,000.

In 1987 Quan Dot Nhan Dan (People's Armed Forces, the Viet- namese army newspaper) reported a considerable growth in the

raising of draft animals in Cambodia. Between 1979 and 1987, the

number of cattle and water buffalo tripled, raising the total to 2.2

million head in 1987. In the same year, there were 1.3 million hogs

and 10 million domestic fowl.

Fisheries

Cambodia's preferred source of protein is freshwater fish, caught

mainly from the Tonle Sap and from the Tonle Sab, the Mekong,

and the Basak rivers. Cambodians eat it fresh, salted, smoked, or made into fish sauce and paste. A fishing program, developed with

Western assistance, was very successful in that it more than quadrupled the output of inland freshwater fish in three years, from

15,000 tons in 1979 to 68,700 tons in 1982, a peak year. After level- ing off, output declined somewhat, dipping to 62,000 tons in 1986.

The 1986 total was less than half the prewar figure of some 125,000

tons a year. Saltwater fishing was less developed, and the output was insignificant—less than 10 percent of the total catch (see table

12, Appendix A). According to the First Plan, fisheries were projected to increase their annual output to 130,000 metric tons by 1990.

Industry

Industry accounted for only 5 percent of Cambodia's GDP in

1985, down from 19 percent in 1969. Industrial activity continued

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Cambodia: A Country Study

to be concentrated in the processing of agricultural commodities,

mostly rice, fish, wood, and rubber. Manufacturing plants were

small, and they employed an average of fewer than 200 workers.

These plants aimed to produce enough consumer goods (soft drinks,

cigarettes, and food items) and household products (soap, paper,

and utensils) to satisfy local demand.

The extent of Cambodia's industrial rehabilitation could be

gauged by a comparison of enterprises in prewar and in postwar

times. In 1969 the last year before the country was engulfed in the war sweeping Indochina, a census disclosed 18 large industries coun- trywide (13 public and 5 mixed public-private sector) and 33,000

small and medium privately owned enterprises. About half the fac- tories operating in 1969 were rice mills, or were otherwise engaged

in rice processing. In 1985 the government news agency (Sarpodamean Kampuchea) announced that fifty- six factories had been reno- vated and had been put back into operation. In the capital itself, about half of Phnom Penh's prewar plants had reopened by 1985.

Most industries were producing at far below capacity because of

frequent power cuts, shortages of spare parts and of raw materials,

and the lack of both skilled workers and experienced managers.

Industrial revival continued to be difficult and extremely slow be- cause it was based mainly on the use of limited local resources. Major Manufacturing Industries

In early 1986, the major industrial plants in Phnom Penh in- cluded the Tuol Kok textile factory, the largest of six textile factories in the city (the factory was idle three days a week, however,

because of power shortages). There were also four power plants, a soft drink plant, a tobacco factory, a ferro-concrete factory, and some other enterprises that produced consumer goods.

In the municipality of Kampong Saom and in neighboring Kampot Province, rice mills, lumber mills, small brick and tile factories, power plants, an oil refinery, a tractor-assembly plant, cement

and phosphate factories, and a refrigeration plant for storing fish were reported to be in operation. In the important industrial center of Ta Khmau, Kampot Province, were a tire factory (possessing

its own generator, but lacking rubber and spare parts), several

mechanical workshops, and warehouses. Batdambang Province had

shops for repairing farm implements, a cotton gin and textile mill, a jute-bag factory, an automobile and tractor repair plant, and a

phosphate-fertilizer plant. In Kampong Cham Province, the former

center for tobacco growing and for cotton garment making, there were a cotton-spinning textile factory, some silk-weaving operations, and an automobile tire and tube plant.

166
Village woman weaving

Courtesy Bill Herod

Handicrafts

Small family-run businesses and private enterprises specializing

in weaving, tailoring (silk sampot and sarongs, the Cambodian

national dress), and small manufactured products grew more rapidly

than public industries, and they contributed significantly to eco- nomic recovery. According to official estimates, the output value

of local and of handicraft industries together amounted to 50 per- cent of the value of production in state industries in 1984. In Phnom

Penh alone, there were 1,840 handicraft shops whose output value

rose from 14 million riels in 1981 to 50 million riels in 1984.

Domestic Commerce

No information was available in 1987 on the volume of the

domestic trade of locally manufactured products or of imported

goods. Domestic commerce consisted essentially of contracts between agricultural producers and the state on the one hand, and

the private free market on the other hand. Rice was the principal

commodity sold to state purchasing agencies in exchange for farm

implements, consumer goods, or cash. The state increasingly found

itself in competition with private merchants for the procurement

of rice. In order to force the peasants to sell rice to the state, the

government prohibited private rice traders from transporting rice

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Cambodia: A Country Study

across provincial borders, a measure that had only limited success. In 1986 state rice procurement amounted to only 154,000 tons, or to just over half of the government's goal of 300,000 tons. Farmers believed that the state purchase price of 2 . 5 riels per kilogram

of unmilled rice was less than the cost of production. In addition,

because the government had insufficient supplies of goods such as

fertilizer, cloth, and soap to be traded as payment, farmers had

little incentive to sell their crops to state buyers. Consequentiy, in

August 1987, the government raised the amount paid to farmers

for monsoon-season (long-cycle) unmilled rice from 2.5 to 5.5 riels in an effort to narrow the gap between the official and the free- market prices. At the end of 1987, peasants still complained that

the price paid by the state was too low. For example, one kilogram

of improved IR rice was priced at between ten and fifteen riels on

the free market, but it cost only six riels on the official market.

In contrast to shrinking state domestic trade, private trade con- tinued to grow and to prosper with governmental approval and

encouragement. Spouses of high party officials and cadres were

actively engaged in petty trade to bring additional incomes to their

families. Government workers also moonlighted by working in the

private sector to augment low salaries and to make ends meet.

Thousands of retail shops, private markets, and restaurants proliferated in Phnom Penh and in other cities. Shops and markets offered a variety of consumer goods, from gold and silver to bicycles and

illegally imported consumer items, such as Seiko watches and

Heineken beer.

Foreign Trade and Aid

The government controlled all official foreign trade. In July 1979,

the Ministry of Local and Foreign Trade set up the Kampuchean

Export and Import Corporation (KAMPEXIM, the state trading

agency) to handle exports, imports, and foreign aid. In addition,

the National Trade Commission was created to be in charge of both

internal and external economic coordination. In March 1980, the

Foreign Trade Bank was formed to deal with international payments, to expand trade, to provide international loans, and to control foreign exchange. There were reports of special clearing

arrangements for trade among the Indochinese countries and with some members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assstance

(CMEA, CEMA, or Comecon—see Glossary).

Beginning in 1982, the government made serious efforts to promote foreign trade as a means of accelerating national reconstruction and development. The First Plan emphasized exports as a way

168
The Economy

to correct imbalances in the national economy, but it did not provide any commodity export target figures. In the late 1980s, Cambodian officials released information revealing the direction and

the patterns of trade rather than specific numbers. Most official trade was being conducted with Comecon countries in the form

of exchanges of commercial goods. In the absence of authoritative

data, unofficial Western sources placed Cambodia's trade deficit at US$100 million to US$200 million annually from 1981 to 1987.

According to the Asian Development Bank, the country's total external debt in 1984 was US$491 million, up from US$426 million

in 1983, and US$368 million in 1982 (see table 13, Appendix A).

In an attempt to increase foreign exchange earnings, the Heng

Samrin regime in 1987 encouraged expatriate Cambodians to remit

money to relatives and to friends remaining in the country. Cambodia's Foreign Trade Bank provided the names of sixteen banks

in Western Europe, Canada, and Australia that were authorized

to handle such transactions. The list included the Moscow Narodny

Bank in London and several capitalistic financial institutions, such

as the Societe Generale in France and the Union des Banques

Suisses in Switzerland.

Composition of Trade

Since 1979 Cambodia's major imports have consisted of

machinery, tractors, vehicles, fuels and raw materials for light in- dustry, consumer goods, clothing, cement, and chemical fertilizers. According to government information, imports during the first 10

months of 1987 amounted to 97 percent of the plan target, an in- crease of about 130 percent over the 1986 figure.

The principal exports included natural rubber (latex), resin,

maize, tobacco, soybeans, and timber. Private Western sources es- timated Cambodia's 1985 export earnings at US$10 million. Other

sources reported that they were US$3.2 million just one year later. In 1987 the government news agency reported that the volume of

exports handled by the Kampuchean Export and Import Corporation in the first ten months of 1987 had increased tenfold over

the corresponding period in 1979.

Major Trading Partners

Cambodia's major trading partners in the 1980s were Vietnam,

the Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe, particularly the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Cambodia also claimed

to have trade relations with Japan, one of several countries that

had recognized Sihanouk's Coalition Government of Democratic

169
Cambodia: A Country Study

Table A. Cambodian and Vietnamese Twin Provinces and Cities, 1986-87

Cambodian

Province/City Vietnamese

Province/City Batdambang

Kampot

Kandal Kaoh Kong

Kampong Cham

Kampong Chhnang

Kampong Saom (C) Kampong Spoe

Kampong Thum

Kracheh Mondol Kiri Phnom Penh (C) Preah Vihear

Prey Veng

Pouthisat Rotanokiri Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey

Stoeng Treng

Svay Rieng

Takev

Quang Nam-Da Nang

Kien Giang Ben Tre Minh Hai

Tay Ninh

Hau Giang

Haiphong (C) Cuu Long

Dong Nai Song Be Dac Lac Ho Chi Minh City/Hanoi (C) Thuan Hai

Dong Thap

Tien Giang

Nghia Binh, Gia Lai-Kontum

Binh Tri Thien Phu Khanh

Long An

An Giang

(C) = City or independent municipality Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and

Society, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1986, 149-50. Kampuchea (CGDK—see Appendix B) and had imposed a trade

embargo on the Phnom Penh government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B; Foreign Affairs, ch. 4). Vietnam

In February 1979, Cambodia signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam that formally strengthened

"solidarity and cooperation" between the two countries. As part

of the Vietnamese aid program to Cambodia, a joint scheme of

pairing Cambodian provinces with Vietnamese "sister provinces" was inaugurated in the same year for the purposes of economic

cooperation and of technical, educational and cultural exchange.

Cambodia's Rotanokiri Province, however, was linked with two

neighboring Vietnamese provinces—Nghia Binh and Gia Lai-Cong

Turn. In addition, the municipality of Phnom Penh was paired

with two Vietnamese cities—Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi. Except for the municipalities of Hanoi and Haiphong, all of the Viet- namese participants in the scheme were located in former South

Vietnam near their Cambodian counterparts (see fig. 1; table A).

The paired provinces were engaged mostly in barter trade the

volume and value of which were unpublicized. Some observers

170
The Economy

argued that the system facilitated the integration of Cambodia's

economy into Vietnam's. They pointed to the case of Batdambang

Province, which sent tons of rice to its overpopulated and underfed

Vietnamese sister province, Quang Nam-Da Nang, in exchange

for bicycles and cement. In another case, Cambodia's SiemreabOtdar Meanchey Province, supplied Vietnamese counterparts in

Binh Tri Thien Province with unmilled rice and other agricultural

products; in return, Vietnam supplied workers from Hue and its suburbs to help run the building industry in Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey. This exchange came at the expense of Cambodian workers,

who were assigned to find clay, while the new Vietnamese settlers produced bricks and tiles and made a good living. In Siemreab

city, the Vietnamese also assumed control of the biggest fish- sauce

factory.

According to a Cambodian official's evaluation of foreign cooperation, the pairing system worked successfully. The exchange of

goods between the sister provinces and cities helped "meet the needs

of the people promptly." Reportedly, the system also helped Cambodia fulfill all of its development targets for 1986. In February

1986, Cambodia and Vietnam signed an agreement to double their

trade for that year.

Soviet Union

The first important trade agreement between Cambodia and the

Soviet Union was signed in February 1983 and covered three years, 1983 through 1985. According to a Soviet source, Moscow's trade

turnover with Cambodia during this period increased from 71.8

to 100.3 million rubles (for value of the ruble, see Glossary). Cambodian exports were mainly rubber, while imports from the Soviet

Union consisted of refined petroleum products, textiles, and chemical fertilizers (see table 14, Appendix A).

In July 1984, Cambodia—following the examples of Vietnam,

Laos, and the East European countries—set up an Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation to manage its bilateral trade with the Soviet

Union. The first session of the commission was held in January

1985. At its fourth meeting, in December 1987, protocols were

signed regarding the restoration of rubber plantations and the

development of some joint state enterprises.

On March 28, 1986, the two countries signed a five-year trade

and aid agreement for the period 1986 to 1990 that would double

the level of trade over that of the previous five-year period. The

Soviet export package included tractors, fertilizer, petroleum

products, machines, and raw materials. In exchange, Cambodia

171
Cambodia: A Country Study

was to export raw rubber, timber, and plant-based industrial

products such as lacquer. According to the Phnom Penh Domestic News Service, by the end of 1986 Cambodia had shipped 91

percent of its planned exports to the Soviet Union and had received

104 percent of its planned imports in return. During Cambodian

Prime Minister Hun Sen's visit to Moscow in July 1987, the Soviet

press reported that the volume of goods sold by the Soviet Union

to Cambodia in the 1986 to 1990 period would increase one-andone-half times over the previous five-year period, whereas goods

sold by Cambodia would increase more than four times. In November 1987, the two countries concluded a trade-payments agreement

for 1988. Under the terms of this agreement, the Soviet Union was

to ship vehicles, tractor equipment, and fertilizer and would receive

in exchange "traditional export goods" from Cambodia. Trade

turnover between the two countries was projected to reach nearly

80 million rubles in 1988.

East Germany

In 1986 the total trade between Cambodia and East Germany

reached about 14 million rubles, a 17 percent increase over the 1985

total of 12 million rubles. Cambodia exported more than 12 million rubles worth of rubber to East Germany and an additional

million rubles worth of other goods. Cambodia's imports from East

Germany amounted in value to more than 965,000 rubles.

Czechoslovakia

Trade between Cambodia and Czechoslovakia totaled 4.4 million rubles in 1985. In 1986 Cambodia exported 800 tons of rubber, more than 400 cubic meters of timber, and 700 tons of soybeans

to Czechoslovakia. Cambodian imports from Czechoslovakia consisted chiefly of medicine and cloth. The two countries signed a

protocol in Prague on October 29, 1987, on the exchange of goods

planned for 1988. Under the terms of the protocol, total trade would

increase by 19 percent over the 1987 level. Cambodia was to ex- port rubber, beans, and timber to Czechoslovakia and was to import tractors, diesel engines, and pharmaceuticals.

Poland

Cambodia's trade with Poland between 1982 and 1985 was es- timated at 4.4 million rubles. Cambodia exported rubber, timber,

and soybeans and imported Polish textiles, ship engines, and glass- ware. The two countries set a trade target for 1986 to 1990 amounting to 14.3 million rubles.

172
The Economy

In 1986 the trade between Cambodia and Poland amounted to 2.1 million rubles. On February 18, 1987, the two countries

negotiated a trade agreement for the year stipulating that Cambodia would export crepe rubber, timber, furniture, soybeans, se- same seeds, and farm products; it would import, in return, antirust

paint, soldering rods, sewing machines, boat engines, raw materials

for medicine, and consumer goods.

Illicit Trade with Thailand and with Singapore

In addition to official trade with communist states, undeclared,

uncontrolled, but government-tolerated trade with Thailand and

with Singapore took place among private merchants, despite the

trade embargo these two countries had imposed on Cambodia.

Prime Minister Hun Sen reportedly declared that, "If the government can't carry out this trade and the people can, we allow them

to do it." Most of Cambodia's trade with Thailand took place in border

and in coastal areas, particularly at the southwestern island of Kaoh

Kong in the Gulf of Thailand. The illicit barter consisted of ex- changing Cambodian dried fish, fresh crabs, shrimp, lobster, animal

hides, elephant tusks, baby crocodiles, and gemstones for Thai

clothing, sandals, toothpaste and toothbrushes, food, and bicycles.

The total value of this growing illicit trade is not known, but some

private sources estimated that it amounted to more than US$1 million a month.

Cambodia's illicit trade with Singapore was more visible. Ships

registered in Singapore arrived regularly in Phnom Penh to deliver

supplies to international relief organizations, operating in the country, as well as to private companies. International agencies esti- mated the value of undeclared trade with Singapore at US$2 million

in 1985.

Foreign Economic and Technical Assistance

In the 1980s, Cambodia's economy relied heavily on multilateral

aid and on bilateral economic assistance from Comecon countries.

The largest donor was the Soviet Union, followed by Vietnam. East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria sent mostly humanitarian aid, and they offered scientific and cultural

assistance. Many Cambodian students received scholarships to study in these countries.

Western countries channeled aid through international organizations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross,

the UN Children's Fund, and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the UN High

173
Cambodia

Commissioner for Refugees. Private agencies that contributed to the rehabilitation of the Cambodian economy included Oxfam, the

American Catholic Relief Services, the American Friends Service

Committee, the Church World Service, the World Council of

Churches, the Lutheran World Service, CARE, and the Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite (a

European Roman Catholic group).

Soviet Aid

Soviet economic assistance to Cambodia was projected to reach

284 million rubles for the 1979 to 1990 period, according to figures

made public in November 1987. During the years 1979 to 1980,

when the new Cambodian government clung precariously to power,

Moscow provided Phnom Penh with a 200 million ruble grant to help fight famine and to restore the Cambodian economy. From

1980 to 1985, Soviet aid, amounting to 44 million rubles, supported

the restoration of medical and educational centers and included

the provision of tractors, trucks, and road-repair equipment. For

Cambodia's First Plan, the Soviet Union provided Phnom Penh

with aid worth 40 million rubles, an amount that represented approximately a 1 percent decrease over that given during the previ- ous five years. During the 1980s, Soviet credits helped to restore thirty facili- ties in various sectors, including electricity, agriculture, health, education, transport, and communications. Major Soviet-assisted

projects included two power plants, one in Phnom Penh (completed

in 1984) and the other in Kampong Saom (completed in 1985);

the renovation and servicing of the 500-bed Kampuchea-USSR

Friendship Hospital (a 200-bed military hospital), the KampucheaUSSR Friendship Technical Institute, the Pushkin Russian Language Institute, the Institute of Agronomy at Chamka Dong (all established in 1985-86); a seed development center; and a ferroconcrete factory. To assist the rehabilitation of the rubber industry,

the Soviet Union helped Cambodia to plant rubber trees on 20,000

hectares of land and to restart a crepe-processing plant that could

generate 20,000 tons of natural rubber annually. On April 26, 1986,

the Soviet Union signed an agreement to provide assistance for several projects, including the construction of an Intersputnik

ground satellite station, a circus, a veterinary center, three tractor- repair workshops, and printers for the semiweekly newspaper

Pracheachon (The People). Moscow also supplied credits for agricultural and marine projects. Finally, the Soviets provided 1,285

scholarships to Cambodian students for the period 1986 to 1990,

174
The Economy

many fewer than the 2,364 scholarships that they had awarded from

1980 to 1986.

Vietnamese Aid

Vietnam's economic and technical assistance to Cambodia were

difficult to evaluate because neither side chose to disclose the precise monetary value of such aid. For example, the Cambodian

Domestic News Service acknowledged that in 1986 the Vietnamese

had given Cambodia 4 'some aid with no strings attached" for the

construction of work sites in Kampong Chhnang and for the Phnom

Penh-Hanoi Friendship Kindergarten but did not disclose the

amount of money involved in these projects.

Vietnamese officials have indicated vaguely that their friendship

treaty with Cambodia committed them to an annual aid package

of at least US$25 million. During the first years of the emergency

period, Vietnam's aid was estimated by outside sources at US$56

million in 1979 and at US$62 million in 1980.

A large part of Vietnamese aid was assistance in kind, particularly food, medical and school supplies, household commodities,

and commercial vehicles, such as passenger buses for Phnom Penh.

One important and lasting form of Vietnamese aid consisted of a technical assistance package that included the services of Viet- namese advisers and technical experts as well as training for Cambodian cadres and personnel. According to the Cambodian official news agency, a total of 431 cadres and other personnel received

technical training in Vietnam in 1986. In addition, through bilateral agreements, Vietnamese experts conducted short-term, on-the-job

training at several Cambodian ministries, general directorates, and

offices. The Cambodians reportedly preferred this form of on-site

training.

It was reported officially that Cambodian-Vietnamese cooperation had led to the completion of sixty-five projects. Other projects

scheduled for the First Plan included consumer-goods enterprises,

small industrial and handicraft workshops, animal breeding, and

the building of a greenbelt around Phnom Penh.

International and Western Aid

UN relief organizations (the UN Children's Fund, the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees, FAO, and WFP) and the International Committee of the Red Cross put together a disaster relief program in 1979 to help the Cambodian people and refugees over- come famine and disease. The cost of the program amounted to US$633.9 million from October 1979 through December 1981 . The

United States contributed approximately one-third of this total

175
Cambodia: A Country Study

emergency aid. Officials in charge of the program channeled about

one-half of the total US$633.9 million (US$334.6 million) to areas under government control. They allocated the other half to relief efforts in border areas and to Cambodian refugees living outside

the country. During the same period, private volunteer agencies

provided emergency aid amounting to approximately US$100

million.

After the emergency period, the UN aid program to the Heng

Samrin government declined drastically. In 1983 an estimated US$4

million was raised against a planned budget of US$16 million;

however, the UN Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) continued

its aid programs for Cambodian refugees in camps along the ThaiCambodian border. According to the United States Department

of State, UNBRO spent nearly US$35 million on relief efforts in

1985, of which the United States contributed US$12 million. The

same year, the United States gave US$800,000 in commodities to the WFP and another US$2 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross for their border relief activities. Finance

Reliable information on the national budget, on banking, and on the money supply in 1987, was unavailable. However, Cambodia was known to have raised revenues through rental and utility

fees, taxes, business registrations, sales of goods by state organizations, and exports. Budgetary financing came largely from the

Soviet Union, Vietnam and, to a much smaller extent, from other

Comecon members. The government allocated most of the budget

to current expenditures, such as those for defense and for state employees' salaries, the latter of which were augmented by allowances

of rice, cloth, cigarettes, soap, sugar and other consumer goods

(see table 15, Appendix A).

Banking

The creation of the People's National Bank of Kampuchea in

1980 reestablished Cambodia's banking system, which Pol Pot had

abolished immediately after the fall of Phnom Penh in 1975. The

bank's chairman held ministerial rank in the government (see

Government Structure, ch. 4). By 1984 more than thirty branch

banks were in operation. The main functions of the bank were to provide funds for state commerce and credits for agriculture.

Currency

The Heng Samrin government reintroduced the country's cur- rency, the riel, in March 1980, at which time the value of one riel

176
The Economy

equaled the value of one kilogram of rice. The state controlled all foreign exchange, and the official exchange rate for visitors was 4

riels to US$1 in 1980. After five years of relative stability, the government devalued the currency to 30 riels per US$1 in January 1986.

A subsequent devaluation, reducing the rate to 100 riels per US$1

took place in October 1987. The move was intended to curb infla- tion, to stop the growing black market, and to bring in more for- eign currency. The free-market rate in Phnom Penh at the time was

125 to 130 riels per US$1. In December 1987, the People's National Bank of Kampuchea issued new five- and ten-riel notes in

blue and green and invalidated the country's old red bank notes,

in an effort to eliminate the problem of counterfeit currency.

Taxes

The government approved the country's first tax laws in November 1982 and implemented them in 1983. There were three

categories of taxes—business, import, and agricultural. In theory,

the tax laws stipulated that all private economic enterprises should

pay taxes, while tax schedules varied according to income, goods

imported, and agricultural productivity. The Ministry of Finance was responsible for tax assessments and for collections on a national level. At subordinate government echelons, provincial and

district committees were charged with this duty.

In practice, the government faced many difficulties in collect- ing taxes. Eventually, it revised assessments to make taxation ac- ceptable to the business community and to the peasantry. For

example, the agricultural tax (also called the "patriotic contribution"), introduced during the 1983 to 1984 harvest season, reportedly was suspended in 1985, but was reimposed a year later. Agricultural tax assessments were based on yields and plots, such

as lowland paddy, river banks, garden, hillside fields, plantation

crop, or highland cropland. The government, however, granted

new concessions to some agricultural cooperatives, which previously had been taxed heavily on high-yielding rice harvests, without

regard to the high costs of production and the high risks in testing

new varieties of rice. Cultivators who grew rice in both the rainy

and the dry seasons were subject to tax assessments on each crop.

Partial and full tax exemptions were granted to peasants who

brought vacant land into production, to families of soldiers, to the war handicapped, and to victims of natural calamities.

Transportation and Communications

War and continuing fighting severely damaged Cambodia's

transportation system—a system that had been inadequately

177
Cambodia: A Country Study

developed in peacetime. The country's weak infrastructure hindered emergency relief efforts and created tremendous problems

of procurement of supplies in general and of distribution. Cambodia received Soviet technical assistance and equipment to support

the maintenance of the transportation network.

Roads and Highways

In the late 1980s, Cambodia had about 13,350 kilometers of

roads, compared with 19,480 kilometers in 1969. Of the current

total, only about 20 percent of the roads and highways were cov- ered with asphalt and were in passable condition; about 50 per- cent of the roads were made of crushed stone, gravel, or improved

earth; and the remaining approximately 30 percent were unimproved earth or were little more than tracks. In 1981 Cambodia

opened a newly repaired section of National Route 1 , which runs

southeast from Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese border. The road,

which suffered damage during the war years, was restored most

probably by Vietnamese army engineers. In the late 1980s, Cambodia's road network was both underutilized and unable to meet

even the modest demands placed upon it by an unindustrialized

and agrarian society (see fig. 8). Commercial vehicles, such as trucks

and buses, were insufficient in number and lacked spare parts neces- sary to keep them running. Road construction and maintenance were ignored by a financially hard-pressed government, while in- surgents regularly destroyed bridges and rendered some routes unsafe for travel. Railroads

Cambodia had two rail lines, both originating in Phnom Penh,

totaling about 612 kilometers of single, one-meter-gauge track. The

French built the first line, which runs from Phnom Penh to Paoy

Pet on the Thai border, between 1930 and 1940. Assistance from

France, West Germany, and China, between 1960 and 1969, supported the construction of the second line, which runs from Phnom

Penh to Kampong Saom. Rail service ceased during the war, but

resumed in the early 1980s. Guerrilla activities, however, continued

to disrupt service.

Water Transportation

The nation's extensive inland waterways were important historically in domestic trade. The Mekong and the Tonle Sab rivers,

their numerous tributaries, and the Tonle Sap provided avenues

of considerable length, including 3 , 700 kilometers navigable all year

by craft drawing 0.6 meters and another 282 kilometers navigable

178
I

i

The Economy

to craft drawing 1.8 meters. In some areas, especially west of the

Mekong River and north of the Tonle Sab River, the villages were

completely dependent on waterways for communications. Launches,

junks, or barges transported passengers, rice, and other food in

the absence of roads and railways.

According to the Ministry of Communications, Transport, and

Posts, Cambodia's main ferry services crossing the Basak River

and the middle Mekong River at Neak Luong (Phumi Prek Khsay),

Tonle Bet, Sre Ambel, Kampong Cham, and Stoeng Treng were

restored in 1985. The major Mekong River navigation routes also were cleared for traffic. Ports

Cambodia has two major ports, Phnom Penh and Kampong

Saom, and five minor ones. Phnom Penh, located at the junction

of the Basak, the Mekong, and the Tonle Sab rivers, is the only

river port capable of receiving 8, 000-ton ships during the wet sea- son and 5, 000-ton ships during the dry season. It remains an important port for international commerce as well as for domestic

communications.

Kampong Saom, Cambodia's only seaport, reopened in late 1979. It had been built in 1960 with French assistance. In 1980 some 180 Soviet dockworkers, having brought with them forklifts and trucks, were reportedly working at Kampong Saom as longshoremen or as instructors of unskilled Cambodian port workers.

By 1984 approximately 1,500 Cambodian port workers were handling 2.5 tons of cargo per day. According to official statistics, Kampong Saom had handled only 769,500 tons in the four prior years

(1979 to 1983), a level that contrasted sharply with the port's peacetime capacity of about 1 million tons of cargo per year. Airports

The country possesses twenty- six airfields, of which only thir- teen were usable in the mid-1980s. Eight airfields had permanentsurface runways. Pochentong International Airport near Phnom

Penh is the largest airport; it also serves as the main base for the renascent Cambodian Air Force (see Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, ch. 5). Cambodia opened a new

Soviet-built airfield at Ream near Kampong Saom in late 1983.

There are additional secondary airports in Siemreab and in Bat- dambang.

Air Kampuchea was established in 1982 and flew only one

route—from Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. In

1984 commercial air service was inaugurated between Phnom Penh

181
180

Cambodia: A Country Study

and Hanoi with the arrival at Hanoi International Airport of the

Kampuchean Civil Aviation Company's (AKASCHOR) first flight.

Since then, there has been regular air service from Phnom Penh

to Hanoi, Vientiane, and Moscow.

Telecommunications

Postal, telegraph, and telegram services under the Ministry of

Communications, Transport, and Posts were restored throughout

most of the country in the early 1980s. Radio communications were

frequent; the Voice of the Kampuchean People broadcasted ten hours daily from Phnom Penh in the late 1980s. An estimated

171,000 radio sets existed in the country in 1984 (the last year for which data were available). Cambodia's only television station

began broadcasting, with Vietnamese assistance, in December 1984.

Color transmissions began in July 1986. In January 1987, the Soviet-aided Intersputnik space communications station began operation in Phnom Penh and established

two-way telecommunication links between the Cambodian capital

and the cities of Moscow, Hanoi, Vientiane, and Paris. The completion of the earth satellite station (built on the grounds of Phnom

Penh's old Roman Catholic cathedral), restored the telephone and

telex links among Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and other socialist countries for the first time since 1975. Although telecommunications

services were limited to the government, these advances in communications helped break down the country's isolation, both in- ternally and internationally.

* * * The major publications on statistical data and key indicators of

Cambodia's economy are the UN Statistical Yearbookfor Asia and the

Pacific, the FAO Production Yearbook, the ADB Key Indicators, the EIU

Quarterly Economic Review of Indochina, the Far East and Australasia,

and the Asian Economic Handbook.

First-hand observations and field reports from Cambodia are found in various issues of the Far Eastern Economic Review and Keesing's Records of World Events. Cambodian official statements, news,

and radio broadcasts are monitored and translated into English in

the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily Report: East Asia

and the Joint Publications Research Service's Southeast Asia Report,

two important sources of information.

Scholarly studies and analytical essays on the Cambodian econ- omy are scarce. Among the most useful is Khieu Samphan's doctoral dissertation, Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development, a

182
The Economy

helpful guide to understanding the Pol Pot regime's economic policy

and thinking. Ben Kiernan's ''Kampuchea 1979-81: National

Rehabilitation in the Eye of an International Storm" and Michael

Vickery's Kampuchea offer good analyses of the economic system

and its problems, particularly in agriculture and in industry. Two

studies on the serious food problem in Cambodia are The Quality

ofMercy by William Shawcross, who focused his study on the Emergency Food Aid Program to Cambodia during the critical 1979-83

period, and D. Mosyakov's "Solving the Food Problem in Kampuchea." (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

183

Chapter 4. Government and Politics
The Independence Monument in Phnom Penh
THE 1970S WERE cruel years for the Khmer people, and their

impact was still being felt in the late 1980s. The decade opened

turbulently, with the deposition of ruler Prince Norodom Sihanouk,

who had been in power from 1941, during the period when the war in Vietnam boiled over into Cambodia. The country, militarily feeble and putatively neutral, soon plunged into a succes- sion of upheavals, punctuated by foreign incursions, civil war, and

famine. The Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B), under Pol Pot (also

known as Saloth Sar) and aided initially by the Democratic Republic

of Vietnam (North Vietnam), overran in 1975 the pro-Western

Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) led by the president, General

Lon Nol. At least 1 million Cambodians either were murdered or

starved to death under the Pol Pot regime. In 1979, however, Vietnam ousted the Khmer Rouge regime and installed a puppet re- gime headed by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge military

commander (see fig. 9). The Vietnamese set out to tighten their grip on the country by

occupying and colonizing it. Meanwhile, the deposed Khmer Rouge

regime regrouped in remote enclaves near the Thai border to give

armed resistance to Vietnamese forces and the puppet government

in Phnom Penh, the nation's capital.

At the end of the 1970s, Cambodia was divided politically and

territorially under two regimes, each claiming to be the sole legitimate government of the nation. Since then, the competing regimes

have been locked in an armed struggle in Cambodia, as one side

contested the Vietnamese presence and the other acquiesced more

or less grudgingly to its role as Hanoi's surrogate.

Vietnam promised repeatedly to leave Cambodia by 1990, and

by the end of 1987, Hanoi had staged six partial troop withdrawals.

Officials in Hanoi indicated, however, that phased withdrawals

would end and that Vietnamese forces would return to Cambodia

if there were a threat to Vietnam's national security. Members of

the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and most

Western nations were skeptical of the moves and viewed them as merely disguised troop rotations. Among Cambodia's noncommunist neighbors, Thailand especially was concerned about the

threat posed to its own security by a large, well-armed Vietnamese

army just to the east of its borders. On the diplomatic front, the

United Nations (UN) routinely condemned the Vietnamese military presence in Cambodia on an annual basis, and most countries

187
Cambodia: A Country Study

KINGDOM OF CAMBODIA

(1953-70)

I KHMER REPUBLIC

(1970-75)

i zz:

DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

(DK) (1975-79)

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA (PRK) (1979- ) DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

(DK) (1979-82)

COALITION GOVERNMENT OF 2 DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

(CGDK) (1982- )

DEMOCRATIC 3 KAMPUCHEA

(DK) KHMER PEOPLE'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (KPNLF)

NATIONAL UNITED FRONT

FOR AN INDEPENDENT,

NEUTRAL, PEACEFUL, & COOPERATIVE CAMBODIA

(FUNCINPEC)

Recognized by United Nations as de jure Cambodian state _ De facto control of Cambodia since 1979

Partners in the CGDK

1 Retained de jure status even after fall of Phnom Penh in January 1979.

2 Supplanted Democratic Kampuchea as de jure Cambodian representative in United Nations since June 1982.

3

If CDGK proves unworkable, Democratic Kampuchea will resume its status as sole, legitimate Cambodian representative in the United Nations.

Figure 9. Successive Governments in Cambodia (since Independence)

withheld diplomatic recognition from the pro-Vietnamese Heng

Samrin regime in Phnom Penh.

In 1987 uncertain prospects for peace continued to vex Cambodian nationalists. Differences—among warring Cambodian factions

and their respective foreign sponsors over the projected terms of

a possible settlement—were likely to remain unresolved in the fore- seeable future. Meanwhile, the Cambodian people continued to suffer from the war between anti-Vietnamese guerrillas on the one

side and the Vietnamese and the Heng Samrin forces on the other

side. The Cambodian search for reconciliation among contending

188
Government and Politics

parties can be understood only when the perspectives of foreign

powers are taken into account.

In the late 1980s, the ruling political organization in Phnom Penh

was the Marxist-Leninist Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B), a political offshoot

of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP—see Appendix B),

founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. Heng Samrin headed both the

state bureaucracy and the party apparatus in late 1987. Hun Sen,

prime minister since January 1985, chaired the single-party, KPRPrun government, that was administered by the Council of Ministers. In seeking to enlist mass support for its regime, the KPRP depended on an umbrella popular front organization, affiliated with numerous social and political groups, that was called the Kampuchean

(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense

(KUFNCD—see Appendix B). The KPRP, in exercising power

in Phnom Penh under Vietnamese mentorship, pursued three main

objectives: to combat the enemy (anti-Vietnamese resistance

groups); to intensify production for the fulfillment of targets set in the First Five-Year Program of Socioeconomic Restoration and

Development (1986-90), hereafter known as the First Plan; and

to build up the party's revolutionary forces by strengthening the

regime's political and administrative infrastructure and its national

security establishment. The party's foreign policy goals were to rein- force solidarity with Vietnam and to develop cooperation with the

Soviet Union, the principal source of economic assistance to the

government in Phnom Penh.

The other regime competing for legitimacy in the 1980s was an

unlikely partnership of feuding communist and noncommunist

factions, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

(CGDK—see Appendix B). The coalition government, with

Sihanouk serving on and off as president, was formed in 1982 under

the sponsorship of China and the ASEAN states. The coalition comprised the Khmer Rouge and two noncommunist groups led by

Sihanouk and Son Sann. Son Sann, a former prime minister under

Sihanouk, was known for his dislike of Sihanouk and of the Khmer

Rouge.

Despite its claim that it was based inside Cambodia, the CGDK

was a government in exile. It operated out of Beijing, Pyongyang,

or Bangkok, or wherever its three leaders—Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sann—happened to be, whether or not they were

together. In the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive, the

coalition lost nearly all of its fixed guerrilla bases along the Thai

border. Nonetheless, its fighters continued to operate in small bands

in many Cambodian provinces. The CGDK's forces sought to drive

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Cambodia: A Country Study

the Vietnamese out of the country, to win over the Cambodians

who were resentful of the Vietnamese, to destabilize the Heng

Samrin regime, and to seek international aid for continued

resistance. The coalition government had a distinct asset that its rival lacked—it was recognized by the United Nations as the lawful representative of the state of Cambodia.

Major Political Developments, 1977-81

Background

The communist conquest of Phnom Penh and of Saigon (renamed Ho Chi Minh City) in April 1975 seemed to presage reali- zation of Ho Chi Minh's long-cherished political dream—stated

in a 1935 resolution of the ICP—an Indochinese federation comprising Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Many observers believed

because of Vietnam's efforts to nurture a Cambodian communist

party that was tied closely to Hanoi—that the Indochinese federation that emerged would be controlled by Hanoi. The Khmer Rouge

victory of 1975, however, won by Pol Pot's chauvinistic and hardline party faction with its abiding distrust of Vietnam, doomed this prospect for the time being.

In mid-1975, a series of border clashes erupted between Cambodian and Vietnamese forces. Each side blamed the other for in- itiating the conflicts, which occurred even as Hanoi defended the

Pol Pot regime against international criticism of atrocities inside

Cambodia. Border fighting increased in 1977, according to some

reports. In June of that year, Vietnam proposed negotiations to

settle the border dispute, but the Khmer Rouge said negotiations

would be premature. In December, Cambodia accused Vietnam

of aggression, demanded withdrawal of its troops from the country, and severed diplomatic ties. In February 1978, Hanoi called

for an immediate end to all hostile military activities in the border

region and for the conclusion of a peace treaty. At the same time,

Hanoi denied the allegations that it had been trying to incorporate

Cambodia into an Indochinese federation, adding that Vietnam

had not entertained the idea of federation since the ICP was dis- solved in 1951. The Pol Pot regime continued to claim, however,

that Vietnam had never abandoned the idea of a federation, and

the regime called on Hanoi to cease activities aimed at overthrowing the Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Cambodia in Turmoil

On December 25, 1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion

of Cambodia (see Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia, ch. 5). Phnom

Penh fell, after minimal resistance, on January 7, 1979, and on

190
Government and Politics

the following day an anti-Khmer Rouge faction announced the for- mation of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council

(KPRC), with Heng Samrin as president of the new ruling body.

On January 10, the KPRC proclaimed that the new official name

of Cambodia was the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK

see Appendix B). Within a week, the PRK notified the United

Nations Security Council that it was the sole legitimate government of the Cambodian people.

Vietnam was the first country to recognize the new regime, and

Phnom Penh lost no time in restoring diplomatic relations with

Hanoi. From February 16 to February 19, the PRK and Vietnam

held their first summit meeting in Phnom Penh and cemented their

relationship by signing a twenty-five-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty declared that the "peace and

security of the two countries are closely interrelated and that the

two Parties are duty-bound to help each other. ..." Article 2 of

the treaty dealt specifically with mutual security assistance to help

each defend against "all schemes and acts of sabotage by the imperialist and international reactionary forces." The two governments also signed agreements for cooperation on economic, cultural,

educational, public health, and scientific and technological issues. In rapid succession, the Soviet Union, other Marxist-Leninist

states, and a number of pro-Moscow developing countries had also recognized the new regime. By January 1980, twenty-nine countries had recognized the PRK, yet nearly eighty countries continued

to recognize the Khmer Rouge.

More countries voiced opposition to Vietnam's involvement in

Cambodia. Most vocal was Thailand, the security of which was

threatened directly by the turn of events in Cambodia. (Thailand

shares an 800-kilometer border with Cambodia, and historically

it has regarded the country as a buffer against Vietnamese

expansion—see Regional Divisions, ch. 2.) The Thai government

demanded Vietnam's immediate withdrawal from Cambodia so that the Cambodians would be able to choose their own government without foreign interference. Thailand's allies in ASEAN

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore—agreed with

Bangkok's position.

The United States also agreed with Thailand's position. Although

it had never recognized Democratic Kampuchea and disapproved

of the human rights violations perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge,

the United States nonetheless supported Democratic Kampuchea's

request for an emergency session of the UN Security Council.

China expressed its support for the Khmer Rouge and even ac- cused Vietnam of attempting to force Cambodia into an Indochinese

191
Cambodia: A Country Study

federation and of serving as an "Asian Cuba" —a surrogate for

the Soviet policy of global hegemony.

Soviet leaders hailed the PRK's "remarkable victory" and ex- pressed their full support for a peaceful, independent, democratic,

and nonaligned Cambodia that would advance toward socialism.

Moscow also accused Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime of genocide

and implied that China had imposed the regime on Cambodia.

Despite objections from the Soviet Union and from Czechoslovakia, the UN Security Council allowed Prince Sihanouk to argue

the case for Democratic Kampuchea in early January 1979.

Sihanouk—who had distanced himself from Khmer Rouge brutality, charged that Vietnam had committed flagrant acts of ag- gression against Cambodia, and he asked the council to demand

an end to Hanoi's interference in Cambodian affairs. He also urged

that the council not recognize the puppet regime in Phnom Penh,

and he appealed to all nations to suspend aid to Vietnam.

In the UN Security Council debate, Vietnam unsuccessfully

challenged Sihanouk's claim to represent Cambodia, asserting that

he spoke for a regime that no longer existed. Vietnam also charged

that the Pol Pot regime had provoked the border war and that

Hanoi's presence in Cambodia was necessary and was strictly an

issue between Vietnam and the PRK. Hanoi argued, moreover,

that the Cambodian crisis was a matter of internal strife among

rival groups that was brought on by Pol Pot's atrocities against

his own countrymen. Hanoi actually asserted that there was no "Cambodian problem" that warranted a debate in the UN or anywhere else in the international political arena. The fifteen-member UN Security Council, however, failed to adopt a resolution on Cambodia. Seven nonaligned members on

the council had submitted a draft resolution, which was endorsed

by Britain, China, France, Norway, Portugal, and the United

States. But the draft, which called for a cease-fire in Cambodia

and for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from that country, was

not approved because of objections from the Soviet Union and from

Czechoslovakia.

The fate of Cambodia was interwoven with the security interests

of its Asian neighbors. For example, on February 17, 1979, China

attacked Vietnam, apparently to ease Vietnamese pressure against

Thailand and against Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge guerrillas. The Cambodian question surfaced again in the UN Security

Council session that was convened on February 23 to consider ending the hostilities along the Vietnamese-Chinese border and in Cambodia. This time the focus was on regional power politics; China

demanded that the UN Security Council censure Vietnam for its

192
Government and Politics

invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet Union asked that the council condemn China for its "aggression" against Vietnam. The

United States called for the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Vietnam and of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia.

In late 1979, the stage was set for an international political showdown over Cambodia. In September of that year, the UN General Assembly rejected the efforts of the Soviet Union, the Congo,

and Panama to challenge the legality of Democratic Kampuchea

and decided that it should continue to be represented at the United

Nations. The vote was seventy-one to thirty-five in support of the

decision, with thirty-four abstentions. (Sihanouk, who no longer

represented the Khmer Rouge regime, argued that the Cambodian seat should be left vacant because neither of the two Cambodian claimants had the mandate of the Cambodian people.) In November, the UN General Assembly adopted an ASEANsponsored resolution by a vote of eighty-one to twenty-one, with

twenty-nine abstentions, calling for immediate Vietnamese disengagement from Cambodia. The resolution also called on all states to refrain from interference in, and acts of aggression against, Cambodia and its Southeast Asian neighbors. The assembly mandated

the UN secretary general to explore the possibility of an international conference on Cambodia and appealed for international

humanitarian aid for the country's population and for its refugees

who had fled to neighboring countries.

Cambodia's PRK regime, under the leadership of Heng Samrin,

set out to restore the country's social and economic life, which had

been racked by a decade of political turmoil. During 1979 the country was still reeling from the horrors of the Khmer Rouge, and

the lack of educated and qualified personnel to staff administrative posts was hampering efforts to reestablish a civil government.

Most of the country's educated elite had been murdered during

the Pol Pot era, while others had fled to safety in Vietnam. (In

August 1979, a Phnom Penh "people's revolutionary tribunal"

tried Pol Pot and his closest confidant, Foreign Minister Ieng Sary,

in absentia, on charges of genocidal crimes and then sentenced them

to death.) Another complication for the Heng Samrin regime was

the growing Khmer Rouge guerrilla resistance in the western and

the northwestern border areas. By mid- 1980, life in villages and in towns had stabilized somewhat, and relief aid from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and some

Western countries had helped to prevent mass starvation. Meanwhile, the regime had managed gradually to extend its administrative control to outlying areas close to the Thai border and had

initiated the drafting of a constitution in January 1980. The

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Cambodia: A Country Study

National Assembly, which had been elected in May 1981, formally

adopted and promulgated the Constitution in June.

But opposition to the Heng Samrin regime had been growing

since 1979. The most prominent opposition group was the Khmer

Rouge, which sought to reestablish its political legitimacy and to mobilize the Cambodian people against the Vietnamese. In January 1979, Khmer Rouge leaders announced the formation of the

Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of

Kampuchea (PDFGNUK—see Appendix B), a popular front

organization in which the Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist

Party (KCP—see Appendix B), under Pol Pot planned to play a dominant role. As part of an image-rebuilding effort, the Khmer Rouge an- nounced the replacement, in December 1979, of Prime Minister

Pol Pot with the politically moderate Khieu Samphan. The replacement did not affect Pol Pot's position as leader of the KCP or his

control of the Khmer Rouge armed forces, officially called the

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK—see Appendix B; National Army of Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 5). Khieu

Samphan retained his position as president of the State Presidium

of Democratic Kampuchea, a post equivalent to head of state under

the 1975 constitution of Democratic Kampuchea. At about the same

time, it also was disclosed that the political program of the

PDFGNUK, adopted in December, would serve as the provisional fundamental law of Democratic Kampuchea until free elec- tions could be held. Sihanouk described the episode as a ploy

designed to give the Khmer Rouge's "odious face" a mask of

respectability.

The first and principal noncommunist resistance group was the

Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF—see Appendix B) led by Son Sann. The front's military arm was the Khmer

People's National Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF—see Appendix B). It was originally formed, in March 1979, by General Dien Del, a former army officer under Lon Non's Khmer

Republic (see Coalition Government Resistance Forces, ch. 5). Son

Sann's formation of the KPNLF on October 9, 1979, coincided

with the ninth anniversary of the founding of the Khmer Republic and therefore symbolized rejection of "Sihanoukism." After 1979

Son Sann and Sihanouk often clashed over the issue of coalitionbuilding and national reconciliation, despite their common distaste

for the Khmer Rouge and for the Vietnamese occupation. After

1985 the KPNLF fell into disarray as a result of leadership dis- putes in the movement's top echelon. By late 1987, it still had not

regained its former stature or fighting strength.

194
Government and Politics The second noncommunist, nationalist resistance faction was the

Sihanouk group called initially the Movement for the National

Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale du Kampuchea—MOULINAKA—see Appendix B), formed

in August 1979 by Kong Sileah after his split with General Dien

Del. In September, Sihanouk set up the Confederation of Khmer

Nationalists from his base in Pyongyang, Democratic People's

Republic of Korea (North Korea). The confederation lacked support because key actors in the Cambodian situation perceived it to be merely a forum, and that only for "committed Sihanoukists."

Around March 1981 , the MOULINAKA group joined with other

small pro-Sihanouk factions to establish a political organization

called the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral,

Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif

FUNCINPEC—see Appendix B). The movement soon formed its own armed wing, the Sihanouk National Army (Armee Nationale

Sihanoukiste—ANS—see Appendix B), which began minor incursions into Cambodia (see Coalition Government Resistance Forces,

ch. 5). As a political movement, FUNCINPEC quickly acquired

a legitimacy beyond its numbers, because of the impeccable nationalist credentials of its head, Sihanouk. Moreover, although it remained the smallest of the Khmer resistance groups until 1985,

its quest for stature was abetted by its having neither the opprobrious

human rights record of the Khmer Rouge to live down, nor the

debilitating leadership disputes of the KPNLF with which to contend.

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

The establishment of the tripartite Coalition Government of

Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—see Appendix B) in June 1982 was a significant achievement for the resistance groups, which had

quarreled bitterly throughout the negotiations that led to unity.

Following its founding, the CGDK became the center of the antiVietnamese cause, served as the country's lawful spokesman in in- ternational forums, and demonstrated a credible capacity for bringing the Cambodian conflict to a political and military stalemate.

In the late 1980s, this stalemate renewed multilateral interest in a settlement of the Cambodian question.

Origins of the Coalition

In the aftermath of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion, many Cambodians clamored for national unity, but only a few responded to the Khmer Rouge's appeal for unity under the PDFGNUK (see

195
Cambodia: A Country Study

Major Political Developments, 1977-81, this ch.). Their reluctance

to rally behind the Khmer Rouge was understandable because they

envisioned a new Cambodia that was neither ruled by the Khmer

Rouge nor controlled by the Vietnamese. Many Cambodians believed that an essential condition of any movement aimed at restor- ing national freedom should be opposition to the Khmer Rouge

and the Vietnamese. Sihanouk and Son Sann were both uneasy

about reconciliation with the Khmer Rouge. Still, Cambodian

solidarity against Hanoi would be fragile at best without the participation of the Khmer Rouge, the strongest of all the resistance

groups.

Then in January 1979, Sihanouk, charged by the Democratic

Kampuchea leadership with presenting Cambodia's case before the

United Nations, broke with his sponsors and demanded that the

Khmer Rouge be expelled from the United Nations for their mass

murders. And in early 1980, he deplored ASEAN's continued

recognition of Democratic Kampuchea, criticized China's military

aid to the Khmer Rouge, and accused Thai authorities of closing

their eyes to Chinese arm shipments through Thailand to Khmer

Rouge rebels. In June 1980, Sihanouk, frustrated, announced his

permanent retirement from all political activities. Meanwhile, Son Sann, who had been indirectly in touch with

Pol Pot since November 1979, announced in January 1980 that

he would form an anti-Vietnamese united front with the Khmer

Rouge if the group's leaders agreed to step down and to relinquish

their power to his new organization. He also raised the possibility

of forming his own provisional government to rival the Khmer

Rouge. Cooperation with Sihanouk seemed unlikely.

Khieu Samphan, president of the State Presidium of the defunct

regime of Democratic Kampuchea, proposed that Son Sann join

forces with the Khmer Rouge on a common political platform. In

1979 and in 1980, the Khmer Rouge reportedly came under pres- sure from China to forge a united front under Sihanouk or Son

Sann. The ASEAN countries also urged the Khmer Rouge to put

its blood-stained image behind it and to mend its political fences

with the noncommunist resistance groups. The United Nations

informed the Khmer Rouge that a new mode of behavior would

be necessary if its deposed regime were to retain its seat in the

organization.

The united front idea got off to a slow start in 1981. In February Sihanouk, reversing his retirement from politics, indicated his

willingness to lead the front if China and the Khmer Rouge supported his preconditions of Chinese military and financial assistance

to all Cambodian resistance factions, not just the Khmer Rouge,

196
(Top) Prince Norodom Sihanouk,

President of the Coalition Government of Democratic

Kampuchea, addresses a

session of the General

Assembly of the United Nations.

Courtesy

United Nations Photo

(Bottom) Prince Norodom

Ranariddh reviews combatants of

the Armee Nationale

Sihanoukiste on ThaiCambodian border. Courtesy Frank Tatu

197
Cambodia: A Country Study

and of the disarming of all resistance groups after the Vietnamese

disengagement from Cambodia. The disarming was essential, he

asserted, to prevent the Khmer Rouge from inaugurating a new

round of terror and a new civil war. As a safeguard, Sihanouk also wanted an international peace-keeping force after the Vietnamese

departure, an internationally guaranteed neutralization of Cambodia, and a trusteeship under which the country would be a ward

of the United Nations for five to ten years. Furthermore, he re- quested that the country's official name be Cambodia instead of

Democratic Kampuchea. The name change was a bid to undermine the legal status of the Pol Pot regime as de jure representative of Democratic Kampuchea because the latter designation had

been that of the Khmer Rouge exclusively.

Son Sann was indifferent to Sihanouk's willingness to lead the

front. Khieu Samphan, on the other hand, was conciliatory and

stated that the KCP would be disbanded if necessary. He ac- knowledged at the same time that Democratic Kampuchea had

blundered by trying to develop the country "much too fast," adding

that this haste had "affected the health of people" and had cost the lives of nearly 1 million Cambodians. He also blamed Vietnam's "special warfare of genocide" for the deaths of "2.5 million" Cambodians. In addition, he claimed that a new Cambodia

would not be socialist, would honor private property, and would

cooperate on a "large-scale" with the West. He even said that

Democratic Kampuchea was ready to join ASEAN as a member

"at any time."

Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan held their first exploratory unity

talks in Pyongyang on March 10 and 11, 1981 , without Son Sann,

who claimed that neither of the two spoke for the Cambodian people. The talks foundered because Khieu Samphan objected to Sihanouk's demand that all resistance factions be disarmed in the

future.

Sihanouk sought to enlist the cooperation of Son Sann, especially in securing arms from China and from the United States. Sihanouk realized, however, that China would not back his

2,000-strong force unless he collaborated with the Khmer Rouge

on its terms. Then in April, Sihanouk said he was willing to drop

his demand for the disarmament of Khmer Rouge forces in ex- change for Chinese aid to the ANS.

Son Sann reacted cautiously to the Sihanouk-Khieu Samphan

talks, distrusting collaboration with the Khmer Rouge at least until

after the KPNLF's military strength matched that of the communist

faction. However, he left open the possibility of future cooperation, citing a KPNLF-Khmer Rouge cease-fire accord in early 1980.

198
Government and Politics

Son Sann also disclosed that he had ignored Sihanouk's four

attempts at tactical cooperation since 1979.

By August 1981, unity talks seemed to have collapsed because

of unacceptable preconditions advanced by the KPNLF and by the

Khmer Rouge. Son Sann was adamant that Khmer Rouge leaders "most compromised" by their atrocities be exiled to China and

that the proposed united front be led by the KPNLF. Meanwhile,

Khieu Samphan urged his rivals not to undermine the autonomy

of the Khmer Rouge or to undo the legal status of Democratic Kampuchea.

The three leaders broke their deadlock, with encouragement from

ASEAN, and held their first summit in Singapore from September 2 to 4. They reached a four-point accord that included the cre- ation of "a coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea' '

; the

establishment of an ad hoc committee to draw up a blueprint for the coalition government; an expression of support for the resolution of the first International Conference on Kampuchea (held in

New York, July 13 to July 17, 1981) as well as for other relevant

UN General Assembly resolutions on Cambodia; and an appeal

for international support of their common cause. They also decided

not to air their internal differences publicly "during the whole

period of the agreement" and not to attack one another on the

battlefield. Most observers regarded the agreement as a breakthrough that would enable the Khmer Rouge regime to hold onto

its seat in the United Nations and that would enhance the prospect

of increased access to foreign military assistance for the KPNLF

and FUNCINPEC.

At a joint press conference on September 4, all sides sought to paper over their differences. Son Sann muted his demand for the

removal of the Khmer Rouge leadership, and Khieu Samphan por- trayed Democratic Kampuchea in a new, moderate light, maintaining that it would respect individual rights and private ownership

of property. Sihanouk noted that the three resistance groups would

maintain their separate military units, but under a joint general

staff and a military council that soon would be established.

But in a separate press interview the following day, Sihanouk

provided a glimpse of those differences that persisted among the

resistance leaders. He revealed his reluctance to join what he called "war-mongering" leaders, possibly alluding to Khieu Samphan

or to Son Sann. Sihanouk held out little hope for a military solu- tion to the unrest in Cambodia and emphasized that China, the

Soviet Union, and the United States would have to lend assistance

if the crisis were to be solved peacefully. Sihanouk also struck a prophetic note, saying that Cambodians must not only reach "an

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Cambodia: A Country Study

honorable compromise" with the Vietnamese, but they should also work out a comprehensive reconciliation among themselves and

should include the Vietnamese-installed puppet regime in Phnom

Penh.

Between September 13 and November 14, 1981 , the ad hoc committee established under the accord met nine times in Bangkok and

agreed on principles of equal power sharing among the three fac- tions, on decision making by consensus, and on use of Democratic

Kampuchea's legal framework as the basis for the proposed coali- tion government. To no one's surprise, these principles were subject to conflicting self-serving interpretations. Sihanouk and Son

Sann feared that the Khmer Rouge group would somehow exploit

the coalition scheme at their expense. Their fear was well-founded

in that Khieu Samphan wanted the coalition government to be an

integral part of Democratic Kampuchea. In an apparent effort to

offset the perceived Khmer Rouge advantage, Son Sann resurrected

his demand that Khmer Rouge leaders be excluded from the coalition government and that the KPNLF be guaranteed control of a majority of key ministerial posts. The Khmer Rouge called Son

Sann's demands "unreasonable." By mid-November, Son Sann

had announced his dissociation from the coalition scheme.

On November 22 and 23, Singapore intervened, with backing

from Thailand and the other ASEAN countries, and proposed the

formation of "a loose coalition government" in which Democratic

Kampuchea would become one of three equal partners of the alli- ance, not the all-important constitutional anchor for the tripartite

government. Sihanouk praised the Singapore formula as "a much

better deal" for the noncommunist groups. The Khmer Rouge re- jected the formula, asserted that the loose coalition arrangement

would not have any legal status as "the Democratic Kampuchean

Government," and, on December 7, criticized Sihanouk and Son

Sann for attempting to "isolate and weaken" the Khmer Rouge,

which was the only force both fighting and stalemating the Viet- namese.

In February 1982, Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan met in Beijing without Son Sann to clarify several ambiguities. One notable

result of the meeting was a shift in the Khmer Rouge insistence on constitutional linkage between Democratic Kampuchea and the

proposed coalition government. In what was described as "another

concession," Khieu Samphan elaborated the position that his side

would not attempt to integrate the other resistance groups into "the

Democratic Kampuchean institutions." He emphasized, however,

that the others must accept and defend the "legal status" of

Democratic Kampuchea as a UN member state. Sihanouk asked

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Government and Politics

Son Sann to resolve his differences with Khieu Samphan and to join the coalition. By May, Son Sann had softened his anti-Khmer

Rouge posture and had expressed readiness to cooperate with the

others under a Thai-proposed plan that would have Sihanouk as head of state, Son Sann as prime minister, and Khieu Samphan

as deputy prime minister. In talks with Khieu Samphan in midJune, Son Sann agreed on the principle of tripartite rule. Coalition Structure

The three leaders finally signed an agreement on the long-sought

coalition on June 22, 1982, in Kuala Lumpur. Sihanouk pledged

to be "a loyal partner" and to respect the accord; Son Sann praised

the CGDK as "an authentic and legal government"; and Khieu

Samphan voiced hope that the CGDK would last a long time, even

after the eventual Vietnamese departure. The three signed the coalition agreement without identifying their organizations because

Son Sann had refused to recognize Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC.

The June agreement failed to mitigate substantially suspicion of

the Khmer Rouge. Sihanouk and Son Sann, for instance, refused

to allow CGDK headquarters to be located on Khmer Rougecontrolled territory. Within only a few days of the signing, Sihanouk proposed—at the urging of Singapore and Malaysia—that the

two noncommunist groups merge in an effort to improve their standing vis-a-vis the Khmer Rouge. But Son Sann, wanting to maintain a separate identity, rejected the idea. In addition, Sihanouk

had planned to announce, in Bangkok on July 12, that the agree- ment had been signed, but the Voice of Democratic Kampuchea

the Khmer Rouge's clandestine radio station, aired the text of the

accord on July 11 and upstaged Sihanouk. Animosity between

Sihanouk and Khieu Samphan grew because of the incident.

The purpose of the CGDK, as stated in the June accord, was

"to mobilize all efforts in the common struggle to liberate Kampuchea from the Vietnamese aggressors" and "to bring about the

implementation of the declaration of the International Conference on Kampuchea and other relevant UN General Assembly resolutions." After the Vietnamese withdrawal, the Cambodians were

to determine their own future through a general, free, and secret election under UN supervision.

The CGDK was to function within the "legitimacy and framework of the State of Democratic Kampuchea, '

' and its three part- ners were to share power equally and to make decisions by

consensus. Each partner would have a certain degree of freedom

and would maintain organizational and political autonomy. The

autonomy would be needed should the CGDK prove unworkable,

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Cambodia: A Country Study

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

(INNER CABINET) PRESIDENT PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK

(FUNCINPEC)

VICE PRESIDENT IN CHARGE KHIEU SAMPHAN (DK/PDK) 2 OF FORIEGN AFFAIRS

PRIME MINISTER SON SANN (KPNLF) 3 I

COORDINATING COMMITTEES ECONOMY

AND FINANCE NATIONAL DEFENSE CULTURE AND

EDUCATION

PUBLIC HEALTH AND

SOCIAL

AFFAIRS

MILITARY AFFAIRS PRESS AND

INFORMATION

AFFAIRS

PARTNERS IN THE CGDK 4

1 1 DK/PDK KPNLF FUNCINPEC

PRIME MINISTER: KHIEU SAMPHAN

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER (FOREIGN AFFAIRS): IENG SARY

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

(DEFENSE): SON SEN

PRESIDENT: SON SANN

VICE PRESIDENTS SECRETARY GENERAL

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

PRESIDENT: PRINCE NORODOM

SIHANOUK SECRETARY GENERAL

REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE PRINCE IN CAMBODIA AND ASIA - NORODOM RANARIDDH

French acronym for the National United Front for an

Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia

Democratic Kampuchea/Party of Democratic Kampuchea

Khmer National Liberation Front

Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

Source: Based on information from Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Who's Who in Cambodia: A Reference Aid, CR 85-10626, March 1985 (Chart, no pagi- nation).

Figure 10. Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, 1987

in which case the right to represent Cambodia would revert to the

Khmer Rouge "in order to ensure the continuity of the state of

Democratic Kampuchea" as a member of the United Nations.

The coalition's top governing body was the "inner cabinet," for- mally called the Council of Ministers (see fig. 10). The three-member

202
Government and Politics

inner cabinet consisted of Sihanouk as president of Democratic

Kampuchea, Khieu Samphan as vice president in charge of for- eign affairs, and Son Sann as prime minister. The cabinet was to meet regularly inside Cambodia—to demonstrate the viability of

the CGDK—for the purposes of discussing domestic and foreign

policy matters and of resolving differences within the coalition.

Below the inner cabinet were six coordinating committees, each

with one representative from each of the coalition's three factions.

The six committees, or ministries, were in charge of economy and

finance; national defense; culture and education; public health and

social affairs; military affairs, and press and information affairs. In the late 1980s, the CGDK claimed to have held an inner cabi- net session inside Cambodia at least once a year since its formation. According to unconfirmed reports, much of the time in these

sessions was devoted to charges made by Sihanouk that Khmer

Rouge soldiers had attacked his troops. The Khmer Rouge denied

the charges, blaming ' 'Vietnamese agents" for such incidents if, indeed, they had occurred at all. In 1987 Sihanouk engaged in considerable maneuvering as he

sought to restore some momentum to the search for a negotiated

solution to the situation in Cambodia. Adopting the tactic of temporary abdication of responsibility that he had employed before

in his long political career, he began a one-year leave of absence

from his duties as president of the CGDK in May 1987. Sihanouk

cited several reasons for his decision. The first was his displeasure

with continued Khmer Rouge attacks on his troops and the human

rights violations by the Khmer Rouge and by the KPNLF against

displaced persons in refugee camps controlled by these groups (see

Migration and Refugees, ch. 2). The second reason was the al- leged "duplicity" of unnamed foreign governments, which, Sihanouk said, were exploiting Cambodia as a pawn in their power

struggle. He also claimed that an unidentified foreign sponsor

probably an allusion to China—was deliberately holding back "the

rebirth of Sihanoukism" for the benefit of the Khmer Rouge.

Finally, Sihanouk added that he was leaving to explore the prospect

of reconciliation with leaders of Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Sihanouk's temporary dissociation from the CGDK, some observers

believed, would free him from the burden of consulting with Son

Sann and Khieu Samphan.

Democratic Kampuchea

In 1987 the United Nations continued to recognize Democratic

Kampuchea as the legal representative of Cambodia in the General

Assembly, in spite of objections by the People's Republic of

203
Cambodia: A Country Study

Kampuchea (PRK), the Vietnamese-installed regime in Phnom

Penh; thus, under international law, Democratic Kampuchea con- tinued to exist as an entity with full sovereignty even though it did

not possess all four of the conventional criteria of statehood: people, territory, government, and supreme authority within the borders of a given country. Under the 1982 tripartite agreement, the

CGDK had replaced the Khmer Rouge regime as de jure representative of Democratic Kampuchea. Nevertheless, the Khmer Rouge

continued to identify itself as Democratic Kampuchea even after the accord was signed. As a result, the terms Democratic Kampuchea and the Khmer Rouge became virtually synonymous and

in fact were used interchangeably (see fig. 10).

In late 1987 Democratic Kampuchea was being governed under

the political program of the PDFGNUK that had been adopted

formally in December 1979 as "the provisional fundamental

law ... at the current stage of our people's war against the Viet- namese aggressors" (see Major Political Developments, 1977-81,

this ch.). It guaranteed "democratic freedoms" in political, reli- gious, and economic life; a parliamentary system based on a popularly elected national assembly under UN supervision; a national

army; and a national economy respecting "individual or family

productive activity." The program reflected the Khmer Rouge's

attempt to create a new image attuned to moderation, nationalism, and patriotism.

The KCP, synonymous with the Khmer Rouge, was the largest

and strongest component of the CGDK in 1987. In December 1981

,

however, the party had announced its dissolution, citing the in- compatibility of communism with Democratic Kampuchea's antiVietnamese united front line. It is difficult to ascertain whether

the KCP was indeed disbanded because the Khmer Rouge always were secretive. The change of name to the Party of Democratic

Kampuchea (PDK—see Appendix B) probably was a cosmetic

gesture aimed at regaining international respectability following

the party's imposition of a brutal regime on Cambodia from 1975

to 1978. The party's essential continuity was probable because the

PDK leadership remained identical to that of its predecessor, the

KCP, and the most important party leader—Pol Pot—exercised

a shadowy, but powerful, influence behind the scenes in 1987 just

as he had in the 1970s. Fragmentary accounts that reached the outside world hinted that, despite the name change, the party con- tinued to treat refugees and peasants under its control with a

arshness and an arbitrariness that showed little more concern for human rights than that of the former communist government of

Cambodia.

204
Government and Politics

In the name of Democratic Kampuchea, the Khmer Rouge issued a comprehensive conciliatory policy statement on July 6, 1985. It noted that the "Democratic Kampuchea side" expressed readiness

to hold peace talks with Vietnam—but only after Vietnam's complete withdrawal from Cambodia—and indicated willingness to wel- come "other Cambodians, including Heng Samrin and his group"

as long as they no longer served the Vietnamese. Referring to the

future of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge side hinted for the first time

that it might accept exclusion from a postwar government that might

include the Heng Samrin regime. The Khmer Rouge also expressed

greater openness to the establishment of a new Cambodia with a parliamentary and liberal capitalist system.

The Khmer Rouge's principal leaders, from July 1985, were Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and Son Sen, in addition to Pol Pot

who operated behind the scenes. Khieu Samphan was concurrently

chairman of the State Presidium, prime minister of Democratic

Kampuchea, provisional chairman of the PDFGNUK, and vice

president in charge of foreign affairs of the CGDK. Son Sen served

as commander in chief of the National Army of Democratic

Kampuchea (NADK) and, in that capacity, as the Khmer Rouge

chairman on the Coordinating Committee for National Defense.

Ieng Sary served as Democratic Kampuchea's deputy prime

minister in charge of foreign affairs and as its chairman on the Coordinating Committee for Economy and Finance. Other key figures

included Ieng Thirith (also known as Khieu Thirith, reportedly

related to Khieu Samphan), wife of Ieng Sary and head of

Democratic Kampuchea's Red Cross Society; Ta Mok (also known

as Chhet Choeun), vice chairman and chief of the general staff of

the NADK and reportedly Pol Pot's right-hand man; and Nuon

Chea (also known as Long Reth)—a political hardliner loyal to Pol

Pot—chairman of the Standing Committee of the People's Representative Assembly of Democratic Kampuchea. Pol Pot, formerly

prime minister, the KCP's general secretary, and commander in

chief of the NADK, headed the Higher Institute for National

Defense from September 1985 onward. Although reportedly in fail- ing health and in Beijing-induced retirement in China in 1987, Pol

Pot was still the power behind the scenes, according to some observers. Ieng Sary's status in 1987 was unclear because he had not been

seen in public since August 1985. For years Ieng Sary and Pol Pot were named by their adversaries as the two figures most responsible for mass murders in Cambodia, and Hanoi and the Heng

Samrin regime insisted on their exclusion from any future politi- cal accommodation with the CGDK.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

The Khmer People's National Liberation Front

From its inception in October 1979, the right-wing, pro-Western,

former prime minister Son Sann, noted for his integrity and for

his unyielding personality, led the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF—see Appendix B). The organization was the

strongest of the country's noncommunist resistance forces. Its key

figures were formerly prominent in the administrations of Sihanouk and of republican leader Lon Nol. A number of displaced

Cambodians sheltered in temporary camps on Thai soil near the

Thai-Cambodian border backed the KPNLF, which had originated

in the anti-Khmer Rouge movement of the 1960s. It controlled

about 160,000 civilians confined at "Site 2," a camp in Thailand

barely a kilometer from the Cambodian border. Most of the people in the camp were toughened survivors of the Pol Pot era, and

they were therefore a potential pool from which to recruit armed

rebels for the KPNLF.

In the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry-season offensive, the KPNLF

reportedly lost nearly a third of its 12,000 to 15,000 troops in battle and through desertions (see Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces, ch. 5). This setback, which was blamed on Son

Sann for his alleged meddling in military matters, aggravated the

long-standing personality conflicts within the KPNLF. Some

KPNLF members criticized Son Sann's alleged tendency toward

being dictatorial and unbending, and they questioned his lukewarm

attitude toward the idea of a unified military command that in- cluded Sihanouk's ANS. Criticism mounted after reports that some

of the organization's field commanders were involved in the black

market and in other forms of corruption. Charges of human rights

violations in the KPNLF-run camps for displaced persons further

fueled internal dissension.

In December 1985, a dissident faction, wanting to limit Son

Sann's role to ceremonial duties, announced the formation of a

Provisional Central Committee of Salvation, which would be the

new executive body of the KPNLF. The new group asserted that

it had seized power from Son Sann in order to put an end to the

internal problems of the KPNLF. Key members of the group in- cluded two KPNLF vice presidents: General Sak Sutsakhan, for- merly Lon Nol's chief of staff; and General Dien Del, commander

in chief and chief of staff of the KPNLF armed forces. Other notables were Abdul Gaffar Peangmeth and Hing Kunthon, two ex- ecutive committee members whom Son Sann had dismissed earlier,

and Huy Kanthoul, a former prime minister.

Son Sann countered with the formation of a new military com- mand committee under General Prum Vith. He said, however,

206
Government and Politics

that General Sak would remain as commander in chief of the Joint

Military Command (that now included the ANS), which was

launched in January 1986, reportedly as a concession to the dissi- dent group. Under a compromise worked out through a third party,

General Sak regained his control of the armed forces in March 1986.

Son Sann, then seventy-four years old, withdrew a previous threat

to resign as CGDK prime minister. By early 1987, unity in the

KPNLF had been restored, and Son Sann retained his presidency,

while General Sak remained in full control of the military. In a major reshuffle of the military high command in March,

General Sak placed his deputy, Dien Del, in charge of anticorruption measures. The need for sweeping internal reform already had

become a pressing issue in January 1987, when morale was so low

that several hundred KPNLF soldiers defected to Sihanouk's ANS.

National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral,

and Cooperative Cambodia

Sihanouk's political organization, the National United Front for an Independent, Peaceful, Neutral, and Cooperative Cambodia

(Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif—FUNCINPEC—see Appendix B), emerged

in 1987 as an increasingly popular resistance group, that drew sup- port from a broad range of Cambodians. FUNCINPEC 's in- dispensable asset was Sihanouk himself. He maintained residences

in Pyongyang, in Mougins (located in southern France), and in

Beijing. His son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, was Sihanouk's sole authorized spokesman and was the head of FUNCINPEC 's office in Bangkok. Among his confidants were Nhek Tioulong, a former

cabinet minister under Sihanouk; Buor Hel, a cousin of Sihanouk's;

and Chak Saroeun, FUNCINPEC secretary general. As vice president of the organization's Executive Committee and commander

in chief of the ANS, former prime minister In Tarn was also a key

FUNCINPEC loyalist, but he resigned in March 1985 as the result of a feud with Prince Ranariddh.

FUNCINPEC had its share of internal problems. After In Tarn's

departure, Ranariddh, to the dismay of In Tarn's supporters, be- came the ANS's temporary commander in chief. In January 1986,

Sihanouk reshuffled the ANS high command, formally appointing his son commander in chief and, in addition, ANS chief of staff. Sihanouk also dismissed General Teap Ben, who had been chief

of staff since 1981, for alleged embezzlement of refugee funds and

for disloyalty; Teap Ben was relegated to the nominal post of deputy

commander in chief of the Joint Military Command. In May 1986,

Sihanouk, citing Ranariddh's heavy workload, was reported to be

207
Cambodia: A Country Study

considering the appointment of General Toal Chay as the new ANS

chief of staff. At the end of 1987, however, Sihanouk's son con- tinued to hold the two key military posts.

The People's Republic of Kampuchea

The People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK—see Appendix B)

has ''its ultimate origin," according to Cambodia expert Michael

Vickery, "in the same revolutionary victory of 17 April 1975 as does the rival Pol Pot [Democratic Kampuchea] group." The

PRK's patron since 1979 has been Vietnam, and in late 1987, many

observers believed that the survival of the Phnom Penh regime depended on Vietnam's continued occupation of the country.

The PRK was established in January 1979 in line with the broad

revolutionary program set forth by the Kampuchean (or Khmer)

National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS—see Appendix B), which was formed on December 2, 1978, in a zone liber- ated from the Khmer Rouge. Of the front's fourteen central

committee members, the top two leaders—Heng Samrin, president, and Chea Sim, vice president—were identified as "former"

KCP officials. Ros Samay, secretary general of the KNUFNS, was

a former KCP "staff assistant" in a military unit. The government of Democratic Kampuchea denounced the KNUFNS, as "a

Vietnamese political organization with a Khmer name," because

several of its key members had been affiliated with the KCP.

The initial objectives of the KNUFNS were to rally the people

under its banner, to topple the Pol Pot regime, to adopt a new constitution for a "democratic state advancing toward socialism," to build mass organizations, and to develop a revolutionary army.

Its foreign policy objectives included pursuing nonalignment,

settling disputes with neighbors through negotiations, putting an end to "the border war with Vietnam" provoked by the Pol Pot

regime, and opposing foreign military bases on Cambodian soil. On December 26, 1978, the day after the Vietnamese invasion,

the KNUFNS reiterated its opposition to foreign military bases.

On January 1, 1979, the front's central committee proclaimed

a set of "immediate policies" to be applied in the ' 'liberated areas.

'

One of these policies was to establish "people's self-management

committees" in all localities. These committees would form the basic

administrative structure for the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council (KPRC), decreed on January 8, 1979, as the central

administrative body for the PRK. The KPRC served as the rul- ing body of the Heng Samrin regime until June 27, 1981, when

a new Constitution required that it be replaced by a newly elected

Council of Ministers. Pen Sovan became the new prime minister.

208
Government and Politics He was assisted by three deputy prime ministers—Hun Sen, Chan

Si, and Chea Soth.

The Constitution

The Constitution of the PRK, promulgated on June 27, 1981,

defines Cambodia as "a democratic state . . . gradually advancing toward socialism. " The transition to socialism was to take place

under the leadership of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B), a Marxist-Leninist

party founded in June 1951 (see The Emergence of Nationalism,

ch. 1). The Constitution explicitly defines the country's position

in international relations. It places Cambodia within the Soviet

Union's orbit. The country's primary enemies, according to the

Constitution, are "the Chinese expansionists and hegemonists in

Beijing, acting in collusion with United States imperialism and other

powers."

The Constitution guarantees a broad range of civil liberties and

fundamental rights. Citizens are to be equal before the law and

are entitled to enjoy the same rights and duties regardless of sex, religion, or race. They have the right to participate in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country and to be paid

according to the amount and quality of work they perform. Men

and women are entitled to equal pay for equal work. All

individuals—including monks and soldiers—over the age of eigh- teen may vote, and citizens over twenty-one may run for election.

The Constitution also guarantees the inviolability of people and

of their homes; privacy of correspondence; freedom from illegal

search and arrest; the right to claim reparation for damages caused

by illegal actions of the state, social organizations, and their per- sonnel; and freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. The

exercise of fundamental rights, however, is subject to certain restrictions. For example, an act may not injure the honor of other

persons, nor should it adversely affect the mores and customs of

society, or public order, or national security. In line with the principle of socialist collectivism, citizens are obligated to carry out "the

state's political line and defend collective property."

The Constitution also addresses principles governing culture,

education, social welfare, and public health. Development of language, literature, the arts, and science and technology is stressed,

along with the need for cultural preservation, tourist promotion,

and cultural cooperation with foreign countries.

Provisions for state organs are in the constitutional chapters deal- ing with the National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council

of Ministers, the local people's revolutionary committees, and the

209
Cambodia: A Country Study

judiciary. Fundamental to the operation of all public bodies is the

principle that the KPRP serves as the most important political in- stitution of the state. Intermediary linkages between the state bureaucracy and grass-roots activities are provided by numerous

organizations affiliated with the KUFNCD (see The Kampuchean

(or Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense,

this ch.).

Government Structure

An administrative infrastructure, functioning under the KPRC,

was more or less in place between 1979 and 1980. With the promulgation of the Constitution in June 1981, new organs, such as the

National Assembly, the Council of State, and the Council of

Ministers, assumed KPRC functions (see fig. 11). These new bodies

evolved slowly. It was not until February 1982 that the National

Assembly enacted specific laws for these bodies.

The National Assembly

The "supreme organ of state power" is the National Assembly, whose deputies are directly elected for five-year terms. The

assembly's 117 seats were filled on May 1, 1981, the date of the

PRK's first elections. (The KNUFNS had nominated 148 candidates.) The voter turnout was reported as 99. 1 7 percent of the elec- torate, which was divided into 20 electoral districts. During its first session, held from June 24 to June 27, the as- sembly adopted the new Constitution and elected members of the

state organs set up under the Constitution. The assembly had been

empowered to adopt or to amend the Constitution and the laws

and to oversee their implementation; to determine domestic and

foreign policies; to adopt economic and cultural programs and the

state budget; and to elect or to remove its own officers and members of the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers. The

assembly also was authorized to levy, revise, or abolish taxes; to decide on amnesties; and to ratify or to abrogate international

treaties. As in other socialist states, the assembly's real function

is to endorse the legislative and administrative measures initiated

by the Council of State and by the Council of Ministers, both of

which serve as agents of the ruling KPRP.

The National Assembly meets twice a year and may hold additional sessions if needed. During the periods between its sessions,

legislative functions are handled by the Council of State. Bills are introduced by the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, the

assembly's several commissions (legislative committees), chairman

210
Government and Politics

of the KUFNCD, and heads of other organizations. Individual

deputies are not entitled to introduce bills. Once bills, state plans and budgets, and other measures are in- troduced, they are studied first by the assembly's commissions,

which deal with legislation, economic planning, budgetary matters, and cultural and social affairs. Then they go to the assembly

for adoption. Ordinary bills are passed by a simple majority (by

a show of hands). Constitutional amendments require a two-thirds

majority. The Council of State must promulgate an adopted bill within thirty days of its passage. Another function of the assembly

is to oversee the affairs of the Council of Ministers, which functions as the cabinet. Assembly members may make inquiries of cabi- net officials, but they are not entided to call for votes of confidence

in the cabinet. Conversely, the Council of Ministers is not empowered to dissolve the National Assembly.

The Constitution states that in case of war or under "other ex- ceptional circumstances," the five-year life of the Assembly may

be extended by decree. In 1986 the assembly's term was extended

for another five years, until 1991.

The Council of State The National Assembly elects seven of its members to the Council

of State. After the assembly's five-year term, council members re- main in office until a new assembly elects a new council. The chairman of the council serves as the head of state, but the power to serve as ex officio supreme commander of the armed forces was

deleted from the final draft of the Constitution.

The council's seven members are among the most influential

leaders of the PRK. Between sessions of the National Assembly,

the Council of State carries out the assembly's duties. It may ap- point or remove—on the recommendation of the Council of

Ministers—cabinet ministers, ambassadors, and envoys accredited to foreign governments. In addition, the Council of State or- ganizes elections to the National Assembly, convenes regular and

special sessions of the assembly, promulgates and interprets the

Constitution and the laws, reviews judicial decisions, rules on

pardons and on commutations of sentences, and ratifies or abrogates

treaties. Foreign diplomatic envoys present their letters of accreditation to the Council of State. The Council of Ministers

The government's top executive organ is the Council of

Ministers, or cabinet, which in late 1987 was headed by Hun Sen

(as it had been since January 1985). Apart from the prime minister

211
Cambodia: A Country Study

CONSTITUTION OF 1981

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

COUNCIL OF

MINISTERS

PEOPLE'S SUPREME COURT

PUBLIC

I PROSECUTOR

PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY COURTS

MINISTRIES AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY COMMUNICATIONS, INFORMATION TRANSPORT, POSTS AND CULTURE

EDUCATION INTERIOR FINANCE JUSTICE FOREIGN AFFAIRS NATIONAL DEFENSE

HEALTH PLANNING HOME AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS FOREIGN TRADE AND INVALIDS

PROVINCIAL/MUNICIPAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

DISTRICTS/CITY WARDS

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES

Figure 11. Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1987

(formally called chairman), the Council of Ministers has two deputy

prime ministers (vice chairmen) and twenty ministers. The National

Assembly elects the council's ministers for five-year terms. They

are responsible collectively to the assembly. When the assembly is not in session, they are responsible to the Council of State. The prime

minister must be a member of the assembly; other council members, however, need not be. The council's five-year term continues

without hiatus until a new cabinet is formed after general elections.

The Council of Ministers meets weekly in an executive session,

which is attended by the prime minister, the deputy prime ministers,

212
Government and Politics

and a chief of staff who is called the Minister in Charge of the Office

of the Council of Ministers. The executive group prepares an agenda for deliberation and adoption by the council's monthly plenary session. (A secretary general of the Council of Ministers provides administrative support for the cabinet.) The executive group

also addresses measures for implementing the plenary session's deci- sions, and it reviews and coordinates the work of government agencies at all levels. Decisions made in the executive sessions are

' 'collective," whereas those in the plenary sessions are by a majority. Representatives of KUFNCD and other mass organizations,

to which all citizens may belong, may be invited to attend plenary

sessions of the council "when [it is] discussing important issues."

These representatives may express their views but they are not

allowed to vote. Government ministries are in charge of agriculture; communications, transport, and posts; education; finance; foreign affairs; health; home and foreign trade; industry; information and culture;

interior; justice; national defense; planning; and social affairs and

invalids. In addition, the cabinet includes a minister for agricultural affairs and rubber plantations, who is attached to the Office

of the Council of Ministers; a minister in charge of the Office of

the Council of Ministers; a secretary general of the Office of the

Council of Ministers, who is also in charge of transport and of

Khmer-Thai border defense networks; a director of the State Affairs

Inspectorate; and the president-director general of the People's

National Bank of Kampuchea.

The Office of the Council of Ministers serves as the administrative nerve center of the government. Directed by its cabinet-rank

minister, this office is supposed "to prepare, facilitate, coordinate,

unify, and guide all activities of individual ministries and locali- ties." Fiscal inspection of public institutions is the responsibility

of the State Affairs Inspectorate, which has branch offices in all provinces.

The Judiciary

The restoration of law and order has been one of the more press- ing tasks of the Heng Samrin regime. Since 1979 the administration ofjustice has been in the hands of people's revolutionary courts

that were set up hastily in Phnom Penh and in other major provincial cities. A new law dealing with the organization of courts and

with the Office of Public Prosecutor was promulgated in February

1982. Under this law, the People's Supreme Court became the

highest court of the land.

213
Cambodia: A Country Study

The judicial system comprises the people's revolutionary courts,

the military tribunals, and the public prosecutors' offices. The

Council of State may establish additional courts to deal with special cases. The Council of Ministers, on the recommendations of

local administrative bodies called people's revolutionary committees, appoints judges and public prosecutors. Two or three people's councillors (the equivalents ofjurors or of assessors) assist the

judges, and they have the same power as the judges in passing sen- tence (see Protection Under the Law, ch. 5). Local People's Revolutionary Committees

In late 1987, the country was divided into eighteen provinces

(khet) and two special municipalities (krong), Phnom Penh and Kampong Saom, which are under direct central government control.

The provinces were subdivided into about 122 districts (srok), 1,325

communes (khum), and 9,386 villages (phum). The subdivisions of

the municipalities were wards (sangkat).

An elective body, consisting of a chairman (president), one or more vice chairmen, and a number of committee members, runs each people's revolutionary committee. These elective bodies are chosen by representatives of the next lower level people's revolutionary committees at the provincial and district levels. At the

provincial and district levels, where the term of office is five years, committee members need the additional endorsement of officials representing the KUFNCD and other affiliated mass organizations.

At the commune and ward level, the members of the people's

revolutionary committees are elected directly by local inhabitants

for a three-year term.

Before the first local elections, which were held in February and

March 1981, the central government appointed local committee

officials. In late 1987, it was unclear whether the chairpersons of

the local revolutionary committees reported to the Office of the

Council of Ministers or to the Ministry of Interior.

The Media

The state controls printed and electronic communications media

and regulates their content. The most authoritative print medium

in 1987 was the ruling KPRP's biweekly journal, Pracheachon (The

People), which was inaugurated in October 1985 to express the

party's stand on domestic and international affairs. Almost as important, however, was the weekly of the KUFNCD, Kampuchea.

The principal publication of the armed forces was the weekly Kangtap

Padevat (Revolutionary Army). As of late 1987, Cambodia still had

no daily newspaper.

214
Government and Politics

Radio and television were under the direction of the Kampuchean

Radio and Television Commission, created in 1983. In 1986 there were about 200,000 radio receivers in the country. The Voice of

the Kampuchean People (VOKP) radio programs were broadcast

in Khmer, Vietnamese, French, English, Lao, and Thai. With Viet- namese assistance, television broadcasting was instituted on a trial basis in December 1983 and then regularly at the end of 1984. As

of March 1986, Television Kampuchea (TVK) operated two hours an evening, four days a week in the Phnom Penh area only. There

were an estimated 52,000 television sets as of early 1986. In

December 1986, Vietnam agreed to train Cambodian television

technicians. The following month, the Soviet Union agreed to cooperate with Phnom Penh in the development of electronic media.

Cambodian viewers began to receive Soviet television programs

after March 1987, through a satellite ground station that the Soviet

Union had built in Phnom Penh (see Telecommunications, ch. 3). Beginning in 1979, the Heng Samrin regime encouraged people to read official journals and to listen to the radio every day.

Widespread illiteracy and a scarcity of both print media and radio

receivers, however, meant that few Cambodians could follow the

government's suggestion. But even when these media were available, "cadres and combatants" in the armed forces, for example, were more interested in listening to music programs than in reading about "the situation and developments in the country and the

world or articles on good models of good people."

The Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary

Party

In late 1987, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B) continued to be the ruling

Marxist-Leninist party of the PRK (see fig. 12). It is an offshoot

of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP—see Appendix B),

which played a dominant role in Cambodian resistance against the

French and the Japanese (see The French Colonial Period, ch. 1). Some leaders of the anticolonial Cambodian resistance, or Khmer

Issarak (see Appendix B), had been members of the ICP, and they

had helped found the KPRP in 1951 . The party was formed after the decision by the ICP's Second Party Congress in February 1951

to dissolve itself and to establish three independent parties for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. On September 30, 1960, the KPRP

party was renamed the Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK

see Appendix B). Pol Pot emerged as the key figure. In 1966, shortly

after Pol Pot returned from talks with Chinese leaders in Beijing,

the party's name was changed to the KCP.

215
Cambodia: A Country Study

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216
Government and Politics The communist party in Cambodia has a history of bitter fac- tional feuds. After the Second Party Congress in 1960 and the dis- appearance of party General Secretary Tou Samouth in 1 962 , the

party split into pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions. The dominant

faction, led by Pol Pot, adopted a position that was pro-Chinese

and anti-Soviet. In January 1979, the split became irreversible as the pro-Vietnamese/pro-Soviet faction under Pen Sovan replaced

the Pol Pot faction as the de facto ruler in Phnom Penh. The rival factions even disagreed on the founding date of the communist party

in Cambodia: the Pol Pot faction, under Khieu Samphan, in late 1987, claimed September 30, 1960; however, the other group, the

mainstream KPRP under Heng Samrin, continued to honor 1951

as the founding year. The Heng Samrin faction held the Third Party Congress of what

would later become the KPRP between January 5 and 8, 1979.

Heng Samrin 's faction claimed that it alone was the legitimate

descendant of the communist party founded in 1951. Very little

is known about the Third Party Congress (also known as the Congress for Party Reconstruction) except that Pen Sovan was elected

first secretary of the Central Committee and that the party then

had between sixty-two and sixty-six regular members.

Some key figures in the Pen Sovan leadership were former col- laborators with Pol Pot, but this information, and the communist

ideological convictions of the new leadership were not publicized

because the leadership feared backlash from people who had been

brutalized by the Pol Pot regime. Such concern was implicit in Pen

Sovan's political report to the Fourth Party Congress held from

May 26 to May 29, 1981 . In the report, he was careful to distance

the KPRP from Pol Pot's KCP, and he denounced the KCP as a traitor to the party and to the nation.

The KPRP decided at the Fourth Party Congress to operate

' 'openly." This move seemed to reflect the leadership's growing

confidence in its ability to stay in power. The move may have had

a practical dimension as well because it involved the people more

actively in the regime's effort to build the country's political and

administrative infrastructure.

The Fourth Party Congress reviewed Pen Sovan's political report

and defined the party's strategy for the next several years. The Congress adopted five

*

' basic principles of the party line," which were

to uphold the banners of patriotism and of international proletarian

solidarity; to defend the country (the primary and sacred task of

all people); to restore and to develop the economy and the culture

in the course of gradual transition toward socialism; to strengthen

military solidarity with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other

217
Cambodia: A Country Study

socialist nations; and to develop "a firm Marxist-Leninist party."

At the Congress it was decided that henceforth the party would

be known as the KPRP, in order to distinguish it from "the reac- tionary Pol Pot party and to underline and reassert the community of the party's best traditions." The Fourth Party Congress also

proclaimed its resolve to stamp out the "reactionary ultra-nationalist

doctrine of Pol Pot," to emphasize a centralized government and

collective leadership, and to reject personality cults. The "ultranationalist doctrine" issue was an allusion to Pol Pot's racist, antiVietnamese stance. The Congress, attended by 162 delegates,

elected twenty-one members of the party Central Committee, who

in turn elected Pen Sovan as general secretary and the seven members of the party inner circle to the Political Bureau. It also adopted

a new statute for the party, but did not release the text. According to Michael Vickery, veterans of the independence

struggle of the 1946 to 1954 period dominated the party Central

Committee. A majority of the Central Committee members had

spent all or part of the years 1954 to 1970 in exile in Vietnam or

in the performance of "duties abroad."

The KPRP's pro-Vietnamese position did not change when Heng

Samrin suddenly replaced Pen Sovan as party leader on December 4, 1981 . Pen Sovan, who was reportedly flown to Hanoi under

Vietnamese guard, was "permitted to take a long rest," but observers believed that he was purged for not being sufficiently proVietnamese. In any case, the new general secretary won Hanoi's

endorsement by acknowledging Vietnam's role as senior partner

in the Cambodian-Vietnamese relationship. The party recognized

the change in leadership symbolically by changing the official founding date of the KPRP from February 19, 1951, to June 28, 1951,

in deference to the Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet

Nam), which was established in March 1951.

In mid- 1981, the KPRP was essentially a skeletal organization.

It had few party branches except for those in Phnom Penh, in Kampong Saom, and in the eighteen provincial capitals. Party membership was estimated at between 600 and 1,000, a considerable

increase over 1979 but still only a fraction of the number of cadres

needed to run the party and the government. In 1981 several of

the 18 provinces had only 1 party member each, and Kampong

Cham, the largest province with a population of more than 1 million, had only 30 regular members, according to Cambodia

specialist Ben Kiernan.

The party held its Fifth Party Congress from October 13 to October 16, 1985, to reflect on the previous five years and to chart a new course for the next several years. The party's membership

218
Government and Politics

had increased to 7,500 regulars (4,000 new members joined in 1985

alone). The party had an additional pool of 37,000 "core" members from which it could recruit tested party regulars. There were

only 4,000 core members in mid- 1981 . According to General Secre- tary Heng Samrin's political report, the KPRP had twenty-two

regional committees and an undisclosed number of branches, cir- cles, and cells in government agencies, armed forces units, internal security organs, mass organizations, enterprises, factories, and

farms. The report expressed satisfaction with party reconstruction

since 1981, especially with the removal of the "danger of authoritarianism" and the restoration of the principles of democratic centralism

and of collective leadership. It pointed out "some weaknesses" that

had to be overcome, however. For example, the party was "still too thin and weak" at the district and the grass-roots levels. Ideological work lagged and lacked depth and consistency; party policies were implemented very slowly, if at all, with few, if any, timely

steps to rectify failings; and party cadres, because of their propensities for narrow-mindedness, arrogance, and bureaucratism, were

unable to win popular trust and support. Another major problem was the serious shortage of political cadres, economic and managerial cadres, and technical cadres. Still another problem that had

to be addressed "in the years to come' ' was the lack of a documented

history of the KPRP. Heng Samrin's political report stressed the

importance of party history for understanding "the good traditions

of the party."

The report to the Fifth Congress noted that Heng Samrin's administration, in coordination with "Vietnamese volunteers," had

destroyed "all types" of resistance guerrilla bases. The report also struck a sobering note: the economy remained backward and unbalanced, with its material and technical bases still below pre-war

levels, and the country's industries were languishing from lack of

fuel, spare parts, and raw materials. Transition toward socialism,

the report warned, would take "dozens of years."

To hasten the transition to socialism, the Fifth Congress unveiled

the PRK's First Plan, covering the years 1986 to 1990 (see Economic Role of the KPRP, ch. 3). The program included the addition of the "private economy" to the three sectors of the economy

mentioned in the Constitution (the state sector, collective sector,

and the family sector). Including the private economy was necessary because of the "very heavy and very complex task" that lay

ahead in order to transform the "nonsocialist components" of the

economy to an advanced stage. According to the political report

submitted to the congress, mass mobilization of the population was

considered crucial to the successful outcome of the First Plan. The

219
Cambodia: A Country Study

report also noted the need to cultivate "new socialist men" if Cambodia were to succeed in its nation-building. These men were supposed to be loyal to the fatherland and to socialism; to respect

manual labor, production, public property, and discipline; and to possess "scientific knowledge."

Heng Samrin's political report also focused on foreign affairs. He recommended that Phnom Penh strengthen its policy of alliance

with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries. He stressed—as Pen Sovan had in May 1981 —that such an

alliance was, in effect, "a law" that guaranteed the success of the

Cambodian revolution. At the same time, he urged the congress

and the Cambodian people to spurn "narrow-minded chauvinism,

every opportunistic tendency, and every act and attitude infringing on the friendship" between Cambodia and its Indochinese

neighbors. (He was apparently alluding to the continued Cambodian sensitivity to the presence of Vietnamese troops and of about

60,000 Vietnamese settlers in Cambodia. CGDK sources maintained that there were really about 700,000 Vietnamese settlers in

the country.) The KPRP's three objectives for the period 1986 to 1990 were to demonstrate military superiority "along the border

and inside the country" for complete elimination of all anti-PRK

activities; to develop political, military, and economic capabilities;

and to strengthen special relations with Vietnam as well as mutual

cooperation with other fraternal countries. Before Heng Samrin's

closing address on October 16, the 250 party delegates to the congress elected a new Central Committee of 45 members (31 full members and 14 alternates). The Central Committee in turn elected

Heng Samrin as general secretary, a new Political Bureau (nine

full members and two alternates), a five-member Secretariat, and

seven members of the Central Committee Control Commission.

After the Fifth Congress, the party's organizational work was

intensified substantially. The KPRP claimed that by the end of

1986 it had more than 10,000 regular members and 40,000 candidate members who were being groomed for regular status. The Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National

Construction and Defense

The ruling KPRP grew slowly in membership over the years

and was supported by a mass organization from which it drew its applicants and support. This organization, known as the KNUFNS,

had been formed in late 1978 with Vietnamese backing, as a com- mon front against the Pol Pot regime in Phnom Penh. The organization underwent various name changes, emerging eventually in

220
Government and Politics

late 1981 as the Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National

Construction and Defense (KUFNCD—see Appendix B). In the

meantime, its role in the political life of the nation had been offi- cially established in the Constitution, which states in Article 3 that

"The Kampuchean Front for National Construction and the revolutionary mass organizations constitute a solid support base of the

state, encouraging the people to fulfill their revolutionary tasks."

The KUFNCD's specific missions were to transmit party poli- cies to the masses, to act as an ombudsman, and to mobilize the

people around the regime's efforts to consolidate the so-called

"worker-peasant alliance." The front's cadres were required to stay in close touch with the people, to report their needs and

problems to authorities, and to conduct mass campaigns to generate support for the regime, or to lead "emulation" drives to spur

the population to greater efforts in pursuit of specific goals. The

cadres were also responsible for organizing networks of KUFNCD

activists in villages and in communes and for coordinating their

functions with cadres of various mass organizations.

The KUFNCD also was responsible for conducting "activities

of friendship," which were aimed at improving the climate for close cooperation with "the Vietnamese people and the Vietnamese army

and experts." Another major function of the front was to reeducate Buddhist monks so that they would "discard the narrow- minded views of dividing themselves into groups and factions" and

would participate more actively in the revolutionary endeavors of

the KUFNCD.

Among the more important mass organizations affiliated with

the KUFNCD were the Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions

(KFTU—62,000 members in December 1983), officially described

as "the training school of the working class for economic and administrative management"; and the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Youth Union (KPRYU), an important reservoir of

candidate members for the KPRP and "a school of Marxism" for people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-six. As of March

1987, when the Youth Union held its Second National Congress,

there were more than 50,000 members in villages, factories, enterprises, hospitals, schools, public offices, and the armed forces. Other mass organizations included the Kampuchean Revolutionary Youth Association (KRYA), an 800,000-member group for chil- dren (aged 9 to 16); the Kampuchean Young Pioneers Organization

(KYPO), a 450,000-member group for pre-schoolers under the

general guidance of the KPRYU and the KRYA; and the

Kampuchean Revolutionary Women's Association (KRWA),

which claimed 923,000 members as of October 1983. All these

221
Cambodia: A Country Study

organizations held rallies to arouse public awareness on national

commemorative occasions such as the Kampuchea-Vietnam

Solidarity Day on February 18, the Day of Hatred ("against the

genocidal Pol Pot-Ieng Sary-Khieu Samphan clique and the

Sihanouk-Son Sann reactionary groups") observed on May 20,

and the day of solidarity between the people and the army on June 19. Foreign Affairs

In 1987 the two Cambodian regimes continued to compete for respect and for legitimacy, and they both continued to proclaim

a foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence, neutrality, and

nonalignment. The CGDK, however, had the major share of inter- national recognition as de jure representative of Cambodia, even though it did not possess supreme authority within the borders of

Cambodia. De facto control of national territory was in the hands

of the PRK, but, because the PRK had originated during the Viet- namese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, it was unable to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the United Nations. The United

Nations would not validate an illegal act consummated by force

of arms (see Cambodia in Turmoil, this ch.). Recognizing the PRK

regime would be contrary to the UN Charter, which calls for peaceful settlement of all conflicts and for nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign and independent nations. In July 1982, the

Phnom Penh regime, recognizing the futility of challenging the

legality of the CGDK, announced that "in the immediate future"

it would not seek "to reclaim the Kampuchean seat at the United

Nations."

The Coalition's Strategy

The CGDK had formal diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial

level with Bangladesh, China, Egypt, Malaysia, North Korea,

Pakistan, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, and Yugoslavia (as of late 1987). Chinese and North Korean relations with the coalition occasionally were in the limelight in the 1980s—Chinese relations be- cause of China's role as the principal donor of material and military

assistance to the CGDK, and North Korean relations because

Sihanouk maintained his "private" residence in Pyongyang (a

palace built for him by the president of North Korea, Kim II Sung,

in the early 1970s). Bangkok also was mentioned frequentiy in Cambodian foreign affairs because it had hosted meetings of CGDK

leaders with Chinese and Thai officials regarding events in Indochina. Bangkok was also the site for the Office of Samdech Norodom

Sihanouk's Personal Representative for Cambodia and Asia, which

222
Former royal palace, Phnom Penh

Courtesy Bill Herod

was headed by Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh. This

office was Sihanouk's informal embassy.

The CGDK had a permanent mission—consisting of representatives from all three of the CGDK partners—to the United Nations in New York. In formal debates in the UN General Assembly,

however, the chief delegate of the Khmer Rouge group represented

the CGDK because the coalition's June 1982 agreement said that

the diplomatic envoys of Democratic Kampuchea who were in office at that time would remain in their posts. The permanent mission

became active each September during the UN General Assembly's

opening session. Mission representatives sought to obtain reaffir- mation of the General Assembly's September 1979 resolution calling for an unconditional withdrawal of "foreign' ' (Vietnamese) troops

from Cambodia and for Cambodian self-determination free of ex- ternal constraints. In 1979 ninety-one nations backed the resolution, twenty-one nations opposed it, and twenty-nine abstained. In 1987, although 117 nations reaffirmed the same resolution, the

number of countries which opposed it remained essentially unchanged. Some countries, such as the United States, supported reso- lutions but did not recognize Democratic Kampuchea, the CGDK,

or the PRK. Britain and Australia withdrew recognition of Democratic Kampuchea in December 1979, and in October 1980, respectively, but both supported the CGDK's effort to get the Vietnamese

223
Cambodia: A Country Study

troops out of Cambodia and to determine its future freely under

UN supervision.

Phnom Penh and Its Allies

Following its establishment, the primary foreign relationships

of the PRK were those with Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and

the countries of Eastern Europe. The PRK had only one resident

mission in a noncommunist state, the one in India. The PRK also

maintained diplomatic relations with about twenty other Third

World nations, including Afghanistan, Angola, the Congo, Ethiopia, Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Panama.

In 1980 about thirty countries recognized the PRK; seven years

later, that number had not changed. In 1987 nearly eighty countries recognized Democratic Kampuchea.

The Search for Peace

The most intractable foreign policy question facing the rival Cambodian regimes in the 1980s was that of how to establish an in- dependent, neutral, and nonaligned Cambodia under a set of terms

agreeable to all those, both at home and abroad, who were interested. Despite differing perceptions of potential gains and losses,

all parties to the Cambodian dispute were striving for reconciliation. This was a positive sign, especially because in 1979 and in

1980, no one, except perhaps Sihanouk, believed that reconciliation was possible.

In the first two years of the Cambodian crisis, the rival Cambodian regimes had different priorities. The Heng Samrin regime's

overriding concern was to consolidate its political and its territorial gains, while relying on the Vietnamese to take the lead in foreign

affairs and in national security. The political price of this external

dependence was high because it contributed to Phnom Penh's image

as a Vietnamese puppet. Vietnam also paid a price for its asser- tion that it had intervened only "at the invitation" of Heng Samrin

"to defend the gains of the revolution they have won . . . at a time

when the Beijing expansionists are colluding with the United

States." Phnom Penh and Hanoi also asserted speciously that

political turmoil inside Cambodia constituted a civil war and was,

therefore, of no concern to outsiders. Vietnam's attempts to shield

the Cambodian crisis from external scrutiny led its noncommunist

neighbors to suspect that Hanoi was finally moving to fulfill its historical ambition of dominating all of Indochina.

Anti-Heng Samrin resistance groups pursued an opposite course. Their strategy was to internationalize the Cambodian question

with political support from China and from the ASEAN nations—as

224
Government and Politics

a case of unprovoked Vietnamese aggression, in order to put pres- sure on Vietnam and to undermine the legitimacy of the Heng

Samrin administration. At the same time, the resistance groups

sought to destabilize the Heng Samrin regime by challenging the

Vietnamese occupation forces. The regime in Phnom Penh, with

support from Vietnam and from the Soviet Union, nevertheless

continued to consolidate its gains. In 1981 the rival camps pressed on with their confrontational

tactics. The anti-Vietnamese resistance factions, despite their longstanding, internal feuds, began to negotiate among themselves for unity against their common enemy. On the diplomatic front, they

worked closely with ASEAN to convene the UN-sponsored Inter- national Conference on Kampuchea, which took place from July 13

to July 17, 1981, in New York. The conference, attended by

representatives from seventy-nine countries and by observers from

fifteen countries, adopted a declaration of principles for settling

the Cambodian crisis. The central elements of the declaration were

those contained in the UN General Assembly resolution of 1979

and in the proposals for Cambodian peace announced by the

ASEAN countries in October 1980. The declaration called for the

withdrawal of all foreign forces in the shortest possible time under

the supervision and the verification of a UN peacekeeping-observer

group; for arrangements to ensure that armed Cambodian factions

would not prevent or disrupt free elections; for measures to maintain law and order during the interim before free elections could

be held and a new government established; for free elections under

UN auspices; for the continuation of Cambodia's status as a neutral and nonaligned state; and for a declaration by the future elected

government that Cambodia would not pose a threat to other countries, especially to neighboring states. The declaration also called on the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China,

France, the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States) and on

all other states to pledge to respect Cambodia's independence, its territorial integrity, and its neutral status and to declare that they

would neither draw Cambodia into any military alliance, nor in- troduce foreign troops into the country, nor establish any military

bases there. The declaration's principles were reaffirmed in successive UN General Assembly resolutions, and they formed the

basis of the ASEAN-sponsored framework for resolving the Cambodian question in the 1980s.

Since 1979 the ASEAN countries have played a significant role on behalf of the Cambodian resistance factions. Individually and

collectively, through the annual conferences of their foreign

ministers, these countries consistently have stressed the importance

225
Cambodia: A Country Study

of Vietnam's withdrawal as a precondition for a comprehensive

political settlement of the Cambodian question. They have rejected

all moves by Hanoi and Phnom Penh that were aimed at legitimizing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and the Heng Samrin

regime. Together with China, they also were architects of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea.

Phnom Penh's principal foreign policy spokesman has been Vietnam, and its major diplomatic moves have been coordinated by

and proclaimed by the annual conference of foreign ministers of

the three Indochinese states meeting consecutively in Hanoi (or

Ho Chi Minh City), in Phnom Penh, and in Vientiane. Hanoi's

position on Cambodia has been that the "so-called Kampuchean

problem is but the consequence of Chinese expansionism and

hegemonism," that Vietnam's military presence in Cambodia was

defensive because it was meeting the Chinese threat to Cambodia

and to Vietnam, and that Hanoi would withdraw from Cambodia

when the Chinese threat no longer existed.

Thailand's stance on the Cambodian issue has been of particular concern to Phnom Penh and to Hanoi. ASEAN initially maintained the position that Thailand was not a party to the Cambodian

conflict but an "affected bystander" entitled to adopt a policy of

neutrality. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced that posture as "sham neutrality" and accused Thailand of colluding with China;

they alleged that Thailand allowed shipment of Chinese arms

through its territory to the "remnants of [the] Pol Pot-Ieng Sary

clique," which was operating inside the Thai border. They also

claimed that Bangkok sheltered and armed Pol Pot's guerrillas and

other Cambodian "reactionaries."

Nevertheless, the Heng Samrin regime made friendly overtures

to Bangkok. In June 1980, for example, it proposed a meeting to discuss resuming "normal relations" and turning their common

border into "a border of friendship and peace. " The Heng Samrin

regime stated that its primary concern was the elimination of "all

hostile acts" between the two countries and that it was willing to forget the past and "all the provocations launched by Thailand

against Cambodia." Thailand replied that talks with the Heng

Samrin regime would solve nothing. Besides, Thai officials said,

such talks would lend an inappropriate appearance of recognition

to the Phnom Penh regime. They also stressed that Vietnam had

to withdraw from Cambodia before constructive talks could take

place.

In July 1980, the three Indochinese states proposed the signing

of multilateral or bilateral treaties of peaceful coexistence, nonaggression, and noninterference among themselves and Thailand.

226
Independence monument

in Phnom Penh

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs.

Robert E. Hammerquist

They added that the treaties should also be signed by "other

Southeast Asian countries." The proposal also called for the crea- tion of a Southeast Asian zone of peace and stability and for a

demilitarized border zone between Cambodia and Thailand. Bangkok, however, viewed the proposal as an attempt to divert international attention from the fundamental question of Vietnamese

occupation and as a gambit to get indirect or "back-door" recognition for the Heng Samrin regime.

The Indochinese states sought to open a dialogue with the

ASEAN countries in 1981 by proposing a regional conference,

which was to be attended also by observers such as the UN secre- tary general and by representatives from several countries. The

proposal was Hanoi's way of internationalizing the Cambodian

issue: Vietnam would be able to link its role in Cambodia to the

roles of Thailand and of China in aiding the anti-Vietnamese

resistance groups. To highlight the linkage, Hanoi made two suggestions: first, the regional conference could address "the Cambodian question" if the Thai and Chinese connections also were

discussed; and second, Vietnam would immediately withdraw some

of its troops if and when Thailand stopped aiding the resistance

groups and if the UN withdrew its recognition of Democratic Kampuchea.

In July 1982, Hanoi, aware that no one was taking it seriously,

departed from its previous position. It announced that it had gone

227
Cambodia: A Country Study

ahead with a partial withdrawal and now demanded only that

Thailand promise to stop aiding Khmer insurgents. At that time,

the Indochinese foreign ministers revealed that "in the immediate

future," the PRK would not plan to reclaim the Cambodian seat

at the United Nations if the Pol Pot clique were expelled from that

organization. The Thai government dismissed Hanoi's statement

as a rhetorical concession designed only to mislead the world and

characterized the partial withdrawal as nothing more than a dis- guised troop rotation.

At the first Indochinese summit held on February 22 and February 23, 1983, in Vientiane, the participants declared that all Viet- namese "volunteers" would be withdrawn when external threats

to Cambodia no longer existed, but that Hanoi, would reassess its option to return to Cambodia if a new threat emerged after it had

withdrawn from the country.

Hanoi contended that its partial withdrawal was a positive first step toward eventual restoration of peace in Cambodia, but some

observers felt that the real reason for the withdrawal was Hanoi's

realization that a deadlock over the Cambodian issue would cre- ate too much of a drain on its limited resources. Another likely reason for the withdrawal was the growing Cambodian irritation

with the movement of Vietnamese nationals into Cambodia's fertile lands around the Tonle Sap (see Migration and Refugees,

ch. 2). This population migration was a potential source of renewed

ethnic conflict. In July 1983, the Indochinese foreign ministers denied "the slan- derous allegation of China, the United States, and a number of

reactionary circles within the ASEAN countries" that Vietnam was

aiding and abetting Vietnamese emigration to Cambodia. (Khmer

Rouge sources claimed that as of 1987, between 600,000 and

700,000 Vietnamese immigrants were in Cambodia; the Heng

Samrin regime put the number at about 60,000.)

In September 1983, ASEAN foreign ministers issued a joint

"Appeal for Kampuchean Independence," proposing a phased

Vietnamese withdrawal, coupled with an international peacekeeping

force and with assistance in rebuilding areas vacated by the Viet- namese. Hanoi rejected the appeal, however, seeking instead a position of strength from which it could dictate terms for a settlement.

Vietnam launched a major dry-season offensive in 1984 in an

attempt to crush all resistance forces permanently. The offensive

destroyed most, if not all, resistance bases.

In January 1985, the Indochinese foreign ministers claimed that

the Cambodian situation was unfolding to their advantage and that

the Cambodian question would be settled in five to ten years with

228
Government and Politics

or without negotiations. At that time, PRK Prime Minister Hun

Sen revealed Phnom Penh's readiness to hold peace talks with

Sihanouk and with Son Sann, but only if they agreed to dissociate

themselves from Pol Pot. On March 12, Hun Sen proposed a dialogue with rival factions under a six-point plan. The proposal called for the removal of the Pol Pot clique from all political and military

activities; for a complete Vietnamese withdrawal; for national reconciliation and for free elections under UN supervision; for peaceful

coexistence in Southeast Asia; for cessation of external interfer- ence in Cambodian affairs; and for the establishment of an inter- national supervisory and control commission to oversee the

implementation of agreements. Shortly afterward, Hanoi stressed

that the question of foreign military bases in Cambodia was an issue

that could be negotiated only between Vietnam and Cambodia.

Hanoi also signaled that the Khmer Rouge regime could participate in the process of Cambodian self-determination only if it dis- armed itself and broke away from the Pol Pot clique.

From "Proximity Talks" to a "Cocktail Party"

The conciliatory gestures of Hanoi and of Phnom Penh were

part of a spate of proposals and counterproposals made in 1985.

On April 9, Malaysia suggested "proximity," or indirect, talks between the CGDK and the Heng Samrin regime. Vietnam, the

PRK, and the Soviet Union reacted favorably. Sihanouk voiced

"personal" support for indirect negotiations. He was, however,

uncertain whether his CGDK partners and unnamed foreign powers

would go along with the Malaysian proposal because such talks,

indirect as they might be, not only would imply de facto recognition of the Phnom Penh regime but also would obscure the question of Vietnamese occupation. ASEAN's deputy foreign ministers

met in Bangkok in May, nevertheless; they endorsed the Malaysian plan and referred the matter to CGDK's representatives in

Bangkok. At the time of the ASEAN meeting, Sihanouk released a memorandum that called for unconditional peace talks among

all Cambodian factions and for the formation of a reconciliation

government comprising both the CGDK and the Heng Samrin

regime.

During the ensuing diplomatic exchanges, the Malaysian plan was discarded. The ASEAN foreign ministers, who met in Kuala

Lumpur from July 8 to July 9, 1985, adopted a Thai compromise

proposal that called for "a form of indirect or proximity talks" between the CGDK and Vietnam. The proposal noted that the Heng

Samrin regime could attend the talks only as part of the Vietnamese

delegation. The CGDK, China, and the United States backed the

229
Cambodia: A Country Study

Thai proposal, but Phnom Penh and Hanoi rejected it as a scheme

to restore the Pol Pot faction to power.

In yet another attempt to break the Cambodian impasse, In- donesia offered in November 1985 to host an informal "cocktail

party" for all warring Cambodian factions. (At that time Indonesia served as ASEAN's official "interlocutor" with Vietnam.) Indonesia apparently had concluded that such an informal gathering was timely in view of two recent developments: the Khmer Rouge

announcement in July that it would acquiesce, if necessary, to being

excluded from a future Cambodian coalition government; and

Hanoi's disclosure in August that it would complete its withdrawal

from Cambodia by 1990 (five years sooner than had been indicated in its April 1985 announcement), even in the absence of a

political settlement on the Cambodian issue at that time. Another

notable development was the Khmer Rouge disclosure in September that Pol Pot had stepped down from his post as commander

in chief of the armed forces to take up a lesser military post. On

December 30, Khieu Samphan stated that Pol Pot's politicalmilitary role would cease permanently upon Hanoi's consenting

to complete its withdrawal by the end of 1990. Hanoi, in an apparent departure from its previous stand, pledged that its pullout

would be completed as soon as the Khmer Rouge forces disarmed.

In 1986 the Cambodian stalemate continued amid further

recriminations and new conciliatory gestures. On March 17, the

CGDK issued an eight-point peace plan that included the Heng

Samrin regime in a projected four-party Cambodian government.

The plan called for a two-phase Vietnamese withdrawal; for a ceasefire to allow an orderly withdrawal—both the cease-fire and the

withdrawal to be supervised by a UN observer group, for the in- itiation of negotiations, following the first phase of the withdrawal,

and for the formation of an interim four-party coalition government with Sihanouk as president and Son Sann as prime minister.

According to the plan, the coalition government would then hold

free elections under UN supervision to set up a liberal, democratic,

and nonaligned Cambodia, the neutrality of which would be

guaranteed by the UN for the first two or three years. The new

Cambodia would welcome aid from all countries for economic

reconstruction and would sign a nonaggression and peaceful coexistence treaty with Vietnam. Hanoi and Phnom Penh denounced

the plan and labeled it as a vain attempt by China to counter the

PRK's "rapid advance." Sihanouk shared some of the misgivings

about the plan, fearing that, without sufficient safeguards, the

Khmer Rouge would dominate the quadripartite government that

emerged. Perhaps to allay such misgivings, China signaled the

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Government and Politics

possibility of ending its aid to the Khmer Rouge if Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia.

In late October 1986, Hanoi, through an Austrian intermediary, suggested two-stage peace negotiations to Sihanouk. In the

first stage, there were to be preliminary talks in Vienna among

all Cambodian parties, including the Khmer Rouge (Pol Pot,

however, was to be excluded). The second phase was to be an inter- national conference that included the contending Cambodian factions, as well as Vietnam, and other interested countries. Sihanouk

responded with a counterproposal that called for his meeting with

a top-level Vietnamese leader. This meeting was to be followed

by an all-Cambodian session and then by an international confer- ence. According to unconfirmed reports, Pol Pot, now gravely ill, had been transferred to Beijing shortly after Hanoi's offer to Sihanouk. If these reports were true, Pol Pot's role within the Khmer

Rouge camp may have ended with his illness. A new phase in the Cambodian peace strategies began in 1987.

At the beginning of the year Hanoi renewed its October bid to Sihanouk. Hanoi appeared eager to seek a way out of the Cambodian imbroglio, but continued to argue that Vietnam had "security interests" in Cambodia and that China was the main threat

to Southeast Asia. It also was evident that Hanoi was attempting

to split ASEAN's consensus on Cambodia by claiming that Indonesia and Malaysia had a correct view of the Chinese threat while

rejecting the view of Thailand and Singapore that Vietnam was ASEAN's principal nemesis in the region.

In addition, as Soviet interest in Cambodia grew, there was

speculation among observers that Moscow might involve itself in

the quest for a negotiated settlement. A visit to Phnom Penh in

March 1987 by Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze signaled a departure from Moscow's long-standing position that it was only "a third party" to the Cambodian conflict. It also constituted tacit acknowledgment that the Soviet Union had been

supporting—at least indirectly—Vietnam's presence in Cambodia

through economic and military aid, which totaled the equivalent

of US$2 billion per year (see Foreign Trade and Aid, ch. 3; Military Developments in Postwar Cambodia, ch. 5). The Heng Samrin regime became more assertive in articulating its policy options than it had been before. It became known

in early April that Hun Sen had sent word to Sihanouk suggesting

a meeting in Canberra, or Paris, or Stockholm at the prince's convenience. (It was Hun Sen's second effort to initiate such a dialogue. In 1984 he had proposed a similar meeting, but Sihanouk

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Cambodia: A Country Study

had declined because of objections by China and by his CGDK

partners.)

Sihanouk's one-year leave of absence from the CGDK, effec- tive May 7, 1987, was a good sign for Cambodia because he could

now freely explore possibilities for a settlement without squabbling

with his coalition partners. On June 23, Sihanouk agreed to see Hun Sen in Pyongyang, but two days later, hours after Chinese

acting premier Wan Li had met with Sihanouk's wife, Princess

Monique, Sihanouk abruptly canceled the meeting. China apparently objected to any negotiations as long as Vietnam kept troops

in Cambodia. Sihanouk said in July that he preferred to talk first with a Vietnamese leader because the Cambodian conflict was between the Khmer and the Vietnamese and not among the Cambodian factions. He said that he would not mind meeting with Hun

Sen, however, as long as the initiative for such a meeting came

from Hun Sen or his regime and not from Hanoi.

Events occurred rapidly in the summer of 1987. In June UN

secretary general Javier Perez de Cuellar issued a compromise plan

that called for a phased Vietnamese withdrawal; for national reconciliation leading to the formation of a new coalition government

with Sihanouk as president; for a complete Vietnamese pullout and

for free elections; and for special provisions to deal with the armed

Cambodian factions. On July 1, while ostensibly on vacation in

the Soviet Union, Hun Sen had talks with Foreign Minister Eduard

Shevardnadze. The two agreed that "the realities which prevail

in the region" must not be ignored in any plan for Cambodian

settlement. On July 25, the Khmer Rouge faction publicly dis- avowed any intention to return to power at the expense of other

factions and stated that to do so would jeopardize its national union

policy and would alienate "friends in the world."

Hanoi, meanwhile, continued to put off discussions about its presence in Cambodia, thereby forcing the resistance to deal direcdy

with the Heng Samrin regime. Between July 27 and July 29, Vietnam's foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach, conferred with his

Indonesian counterpart in Ho Chi Minh City and called for "an

informal meeting" or cocktail party of all Cambodian factions

without any preconditions. The cocktail party, to be held in Jakarta, was to be followed by a conference of all concerned countries, in- cluding Vietnam. OnJuly 30, Heng Samrin journeyed to Moscow

to consult with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Then in an

interview published in the Italian Communist Party daily L 'Unita on August 1 2 , Hun Sen sought to exonerate the Soviet Union from

blame for Cambodia's plight and instead blamed China for the

country's difficulties. Referring to the proposed meeting with

232
Phnom Penh Hill

Courtesy Mr. and Mrs.

Robert E. Hammerquist

Sihanouk, Hun Sen insinuated that Sihanouk had "bosses" who

would not let him engage freely in a dialogue. On August 13, the

Indochinese governments endorsed "the Ho Chi Minh formula"

(Hanoi's term for Indonesia's original cocktail party idea) as a significant "breakthrough" toward a peaceful setdement in Cambodia.

The ASEAN foreign ministers met informally on August 16 to discuss the cocktail party idea, and they forged a compromise that

papered over some of the differences among the six member states concerning the Cambodia situation. Even this attempt to achieve

unanimity proved fruitless, however, as Hanoi rejected the ASEAN

suggestion.

The Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting

Hun Sen's April 1987 proposal for a talk with Sihanouk was

resurrected in August when the prince sent a message to Hun Sen

through the Palestine Liberation Organization's ambassador in

Pyongyang. Sihanouk was hopeful that his encounter with Hun

Sen would lead to another UN-sponsored Geneva conference on

Indochina, which, he believed, would assure a political settlement

that would allow Vietnam and the Soviet Union to save face. Such

a conference, Sihanouk maintained, should include the UN secre- tary general, representatives of the five permanent members of the

UN Security Council, Laos, Vietnam, and the four Cambodian

factions. He also suggested the inclusion of ASEAN countries,

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Cambodia: A Country Study

members of the defunct International Control Commission (India,

Canada, and Poland), and other concerned parties.

The Heng Samrin regime had apparently envisioned a meeting

between Sihanouk and Hun Sen when it announced on August 27 a "policy on national reconciliation." While artfully avoiding the

mention of Vietnam, the policy statement called for talks with the

three resistance leaders but not with "Pol Pot and his close associ- ates." An appeal to overseas Cambodians to support Phnom Penh's

economic and national defense efforts and assurances that Cambodians who had served the insurgent factions would be welcomed

home and would be assisted in resuming a normal life and in participating in the political process were key features of the policy.

The regime also expressed for the first time its readiness to negotiate the issue of Cambodian refugees in Thailand. The offer to negotiate undercut the resistance factions, which, Phnom Penh con- tended, were exploiting displaced Cambodians by using them

against the Heng Samrin regime for military and political purposes.

Resistance leaders questioned Phnom Penh's sincerity in promulgating its policy of reconciliation and were uncertain how to respond. At their annual consultation in Beijing, they and their

Chinese hosts predictably called for a Vietnamese pullout as a

precondition to a negotiated settlement. Sihanouk, however, launching a gambit of his own through Cambodian emigres in Paris, called

for reconciliation among all Khmer factions. The initiative met with

a favorable, but qualified, response from PRK Prime Minister Hun

Sen and, in early October, the Phnom Penh government unveiled

its own five-point plan for a political settlement. The PRK proposals

envisioned peace talks between the rival Cambodian camps and

"a high position [for Sihanouk] in the leading state organ" of the

PRK, Vietnamese withdrawal in conjunction with the cutoff of outside aid to the resistance, general elections (organized by the Heng

Samrin regime) held after the Vietnamese withdrawal, and the for- mation of a new four-party coalition. The October 8 plan also proposed negotiations with Thailand for the creation of a zone of peace

and friendship along the Cambodian-Thai border, for discussions on an "orderly repatriation" of Cambodian refugees from

Thailand, and for the convening of an international conference.

The conference was to be attended by the rival Cambodian camps,

the Indochinese states, the ASEAN states, the Soviet Union, China,

India, France, Britain, the United States, and other interested countries. The CGDK, however, rejected the plan as an attempt to control the dynamics of national reconciliation while Cambodia was

still occupied by Vietnam.

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Government and Politics

Sihanouk and the PRK continued their exploratory moves. On

October 19, Hun Sen agreed to meet with Sihanouk, even though

Sihanouk had cancelled similar meetings scheduled for late 1984

and for June 1987. At the end of October, Hun Sen flew to Moscow

for diplomatic coordination. The CGDK announced on October 31

that a "clarification on national reconciliation policy" had been

signed by all three resistance leaders. It was likely that the two main

goals of the clarification, which was dated October 1 , were to restate the CGDK's position on peace talks and to underline the unity

among the resistance leaders. The statement said that "the first phase" of Vietnamese withdrawal must be completed before a fourparty coalition government could be set up, not within the framework of the PRK but under the premises of a "neutral and non- communist" Cambodia.

Sihanouk was clearly in the spotlight at this point. It was possible that his personal diplomacy would stir suspicion among his coalition partners, as well as among Chinese and ASEAN leaders. It was also possible that he might strike a deal with Phnom Penh and

Hanoi and exclude the Khmer Rouge faction and its patron, China.

Mindful of such potential misgivings, Sihanouk went to great

lengths to clarify his own stand. He said that he would not accept

any "high position" in the illegal PRK regime, that he would

disclose fully the minutes of his talks with Hun Sen, and that he

would not waver from his commitment to a "neutral and noncommunist" Cambodia free of Vietnamese troops.

Sihanouk and Hun Sen met at Fere-en-Tardenois, a village

northeast of Paris, from December 2 to December 4, 1987. The

communique they issued at the end of their talks mentioned their

agreement to work for a political solution to the nine-year-old conflict and to call for an international conference. The conference,

to be convened only after all Cambodian factions reached an agree- ment on a coalition arrangement, would support the new coali- tion accord and would guarantee the country's independence,

neutrality, and nonalignment. The two leaders also agreed to meet

again at Fere-en-Tardenois in January 1988 and in Pyongyang at a later date. The communique ended with a plea to the other Cambodian parties—Sihanouk's coalition partners—to join the next

rounds of talks. The communique offered no practical solution. In fact, it did

not mention Vietnam, despite Sihanouk's demand that the com- munique include a clause on Vietnamese withdrawal. At a December 4 press conference, Hun Sen disclosed an understanding with

Sihanouk that "concrete questions" would be discussed at later meetings. Included in the concrete questions were "the withdrawal

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Cambodia: A Country Study

of Vietnamese troops, Cambodia's future government, and Norodom Sihanouk's position." Hun Sen also revealed that during the

meeting Sihanouk had told him that 4 'the future political regime

of Cambodia" should be a French-style democracy with a multiparty system and free radio and television. In an official commentary the following day, Hanoi was deliberately vague on Hun Sen's

concrete questions, which, it said, would be dealt with 4 'at the next

meetings."

In foreign capitals, there were mixed reactions to what Hun Sen

called the "historic meeting." Officials in Phnom Penh, Hanoi,

Vientiane, and Moscow were enthusiastic. Thai officials, however, were cautious, if not disappointed, and they stressed the need for

Vietnamese withdrawal and for Thailand's participation in peace

talks with the Cambodians. Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta both welcomed the unofficial, or indirect, talks as a promising start toward

a political solution. They agreed with Bangkok on the necessity

of Vietnamese withdrawal. Officials in Pyongyang said the meeting was "a good thing," but declined to accept the suggestion of

Hun Sen and Sihanouk that they mediate between China and the

Soviet Union on the Cambodian issue. China stressed that it supported Sihanouk's efforts to seek "a fair and reasonable political

settlement of the Kampuchean question." Such a settlement was

said to be possible only when Vietnam withdrew all its troops from

Cambodia.

On December 10, Sihanouk abruptly announced the cancellation of the second meeting with Hun Sen. He said that such a meeting would be useless because Son Sann and Khieu Samphan refused

to participate in it and because they also refused to support the

joint communique. He added that—out of fear that the governments in Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and Moscow might realize an un- warranted propaganda advantage from the meeting—he would not

meet Hun Sen. But on December 15, Sihanouk announced abrupdy

that he would resume talks with Hun Sen because ASEAN members saw the cancellation as "a new complication" in their efforts to pressure the Vietnamese into leaving Cambodia. By December 20, Sihanouk and Hun Sen had agreed to resume talks on January 27, 1988. On December 21, Son Sann expressed his readiness

to join the talks in a personal capacity, provided that Vietnam

agreed to attend the talks or, if this was not possible, provided that

Vietnam informed the UN secretary general and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council of its plan to vacate

Cambodia as quickly as possible after all Cambodian factions had

embarked on the process of internal reconciliation.

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Government and Politics

As 1987 drew to a close, talking and fighting continued amid

hopes and uncertainties about the future of Cambodia. It was

equally clear that progress toward a political settlement hinged

chiefly on the credibility of Vietnam's announced intention to withdraw from Cambodia by 1990 and that this withdrawal alone was

insufficient to guarantee a peaceful solution to Cambodia's problems. At least three more critical issues were at stake: an equitable

power-sharing arrangement among these four warring factions, an agreement among the factions to disarm in order to ensure that

civil war would not recur, and an effective international guarantee of supervision for the implementation of any agreements reached

by the Cambodian factions. Still another critical question was

whether or not an eventual political settlement was sufficient to assure a new Cambodia that was neutral, nonaligned, and non- communist.

Cambodia: 1975-1982 by Michael Vickery provides an instructive discussion on the throes of transition from Pol Pot's Democratic

Kampuchea to Heng Samrin's People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society, also by Michael Vickery,

presents a wide-ranging treatment of the People's Republic of

Kampuchea. Other studies include Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came

to Power; Craig Etcheson's The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea; Revolution and Its Aftermath in Kampuchea: Eight Essays, edit- ed by David P. Chandler and Ben Kiernan; Milton Osborne's Before Kampuchea: Preludes to Tragedy; and Kampuchea: Decade of the Genocide—Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, edited by Kimmo

Kiljunen.

External factors impinging on Cambodia in the 1970s and the

1980s are analyzed from various perspectives in William Shawcross's Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia; The

Third Indochina Conflict, a collection of essays edited by David Elliot; Chang Pao-min's Kampuchea Between China and Vietnam, which

describes Cambodia as a pawn in Sino-Vietnamese rivalry for in- fluence in Southeast Asia in general and Indochina in particular;

and Henry Kissinger's White House Years and Years of Upheaval.

Kishore Mahbubani's "The Kampuchean Problem: A Southeast

Asian Perspective," in the Winter 1983-84 issue of Foreign Affairs,

analyzes the complexity of the Cambodian problem, a topic also

covered in Justus van der Kroef's " 'Proximity Cocktails' and

'Provisional Salvation': Cambodia's Tortuous Course," in the

April 1986 issue of Issues & Studies. The Fall 1986 issue of the

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Cambodia: A Country Study

InternationalJournal ofPolitics is a special edition of six essays devoted entirely to the subject of "Cambodia: Politics and International Relations."

Further insights into the politics of warring Cambodian factions are offered in the following publications: Indochina Chronology, a

quarterly publication of the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, which contains a section on Kampuchea; Southeast Asian Affairs, an annual publication of the Institute

of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore; the Far Eastern Economic

Review's annual Asia Yearbook; "Kampuchea" in the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; and the occasional "Kampuchea Diary" columns

by Jacques Bekaert, in the Bangkok Post. (For further information

and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

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Chapter 5. National Security
(Top) Male officers andfemale militia member ofthe Kampuchean (or Khmer)

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (Bottom) Guerrillas of the Khmer People 's National Liberation Front
HISTORY ATTESTS TO CAMBODIA'S martial origins. In

antiquity Cambodia, having conquered Laos, parts of Thailand,

and the Malay Peninsula, held sway over a vast area of Southeast

Asia. Khmer martial prowess waned in the early fifteenth century,

however, and Cambodia subsequently endured periods of colonization, occupation, and vassalage by its more militarily powerful

neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam. This long period of decline

reached its nadir in the early nineteenth century, when Cambodia

nearly ceased to exist as a sovereign state as the result of encroachments by its neighbors. In 1863 the Cambodian king acquiesced

in the establishment of a French protectorate over his nation, in

order to preserve it from extinction. The protectorate's authority was extended often by force of arms, and ultimately Cambodia be- came a de facto colony that eventually gave birth to a modern state with its own armed forces and military doctrine.

Since World War II, Cambodia has enjoyed few strife-free periods. Its people have suffered colonization, prolonged civil war, and

occupation by a foreign power almost continuously. During this time, it has been ruled by three authoritarian governments of differ- ing ideological orientations and varying degrees of repression.

American military aid to Cambodia began indirectly in 1950 in

the form of a security assistance program for the French forces in

Indochina, that enabled them to expand a recently created in- digenous army. In 1955 the United States agreed to continue this aid to the independent kingdom of Cambodia. The program, which

included military training and a resident Military Assistance

Advisory Group (MAAG), lasted until terminated by the Cambodian government. Security assistance was again extended to the

Khmer Republic (see Appendix B) from 1970 until that government fell in 1975 to the Khmer Rouge (see Appendix B). After

1975 the United States extended humanitarian assistance through

United Nations (UN) agencies to Cambodian refugees on the Thai

border and gave nonlethal aid, only, to the two noncommunist components of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea

(CGDK—see Appendix).

In 1987 Cambodia was the reluctant host to a substantial Viet- namese military presence, reinforced by its Cambodian surrogate

army. History thus appeared to be repeating itself, and foreign

observers and Cambodian nationalists feared that the country

eventually might become part of a Hanoi-dominated Indochinese

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Cambodia: A Country Study

federation. The UN recognized the tripartite CGDK as the legitimate government of Cambodia. The insurgent forces of the coali- tion were capable only of conducting guerrilla raids and sabotage

missions within Cambodian territory, against the Vietnamese

occupation forces and the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF—see Appendix B) of the

Phnom Penh government, the People's Republic of Kampuchea

(PRK—see Appendix B). A number of foreign observers assessed

the military situation as a stalemate and doubted that Hanoi would,

or could, fulfill its public commitment to withdraw its forces by

1990 from a Cambodia that was becoming a "strategic appendage" of the "indivisible strategic unit of Indochina" claimed by

Vietnamese military doctrine.

Historical Background

The Time of Greatness, A.D. 802-1431

Bas-relief friezes in galleries of the vast Angkor Wat complex

in Siemreab depict Cambodia's land and naval conquests during

its "time of greatness," the Angkorian Period, which spanned the

years from A.D. 802 to 1431 (see The Angkorian Period, ch. 1). During this time, the Khmer Empire, by force of arms, extended

its dominions to encompass much of Southeast Asia. The warrior

kings, who actually led troops in battle, did not customarily maintain standing armies but raised troops as necessity required. Historian David P. Chandler has described the relationship between

the monarch and the military:

Though the king, who led his country into batde, sometimes engaged his chief enemy in single combat, Khmer

military strength rested on the junior officers, the captains of militia. These men commanded the loyalty of

peasant groups in their particular locality. If the king con- quered a region, a new captain of militia would be enrolled and put under an oath of allegiance. The captains were simply headmen of the outlying regions, but their

connection with the king enhanced their status. In time

of war they were expected to conscript the peasants in

their district and to lead them to Angkor to join the Khmer

army. If the captains disobeyed the king they were put

to death. The vast majority of the Khmer population were

of the farmer-builder-soldier class. Little is known conclusively about warfare in early Cambodia,

but much can be assumed from the environment or deduced from

epigraphic and sculptural evidence. The army was made up of

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National Security

peasant levies, and because the society relied on rice cultivation,

Khmer military campaigns were probably confined to the dry season when peasant- soldiers could be spared from the rice fields. Battles were fought on hard-baked plains from which the padi (or rice)

had been harvested. Tactics were uncomplicated. The Khmer

engaged their foes in pitched frontal assaults, while trying to keep

the sun at their backs. War elephants were widely employed, for both tactical and logistical purposes. Late in the Khmer Empire,

the ballista (a kind of catapult, often shaped like a giant crossbow)

took its place in regional warfare. It probably was introduced to the Cambodians by Cham (see Glossary) mercenaries, who had

copied it earlier from Chinese models.

The Khmer Empire's principal adversaries were the Thai, the

Vietnamese, and the Cham from the powerful kingdom of Champa

in central Vietnam. Warfare, seemingly, was endemic, and military campaigns occurred continuously. The Cham—attacking by

land in 1177 and again by water in 1178—sacked Angkor twice.

In 1181 a young nobleman who was shortly to become Jayavar- man VII, and to emerge as one of the greatest of the ancient Khmer

kings, raised an army and defeated the Cham in a naval battle. After his death, ca. 1218, Kambuja entered a long decline, result- ing in eventual disintegration.

Period of Decline, 1431-1863

Scholars frequently assert that the decline of the Khmer Empire

was precipitated by the drain on its economy, and on the morale

and energy of its people, caused by the continual and monumental construction program at Angkor. Dynastic rivalries took their

toll, and slave rebellions are also thought to have hastened the

demise of the empire.

Over the centuries, the Khmer kings never completely pacified

the countryside. Khmer martial spirit survived, as was demonstrated by uprisings and rebellions, either spontaneous or contrived,

throughout periods of foreign encroachment and domination.

Among the significant rebellions was one that occurred beginning

in 1840 which resulted in Cambodia's being placed under the joint

suzerainty of Thailand and Vietnam (see Domination by Thailand

and Vietnam, ch. 1). The French Protectorate, 1863-1954

Following entreaties that had been made a decade earlier by Cambodian King Ang Duong to Napoleon III for protection from the

Vietnamese, his "traditional enemies," a delegation of French naval

officers in 1863 proceeded to Phnom Penh from Saigon to conclude a treaty with Duong's son, now King Norodom (1859-1904),

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Cambodia: A Country Study

that created a French protectorate (see The French Protectorate,

ch. 1). It is generally accepted by historians that only the intervention of the French prevented the extinction of Cambodia.

Heavy taxation as well as resentment against foreign domination and the puppet rulers who sat on the throne in Phnom Penh

were the causes of the intermittent rebellions that marked the colonial period. Revolts erupted in 1866 and in 1870 that attracted considerable support in the countryside. They were quelled by the

French, assisted by Norodom's half brother (the future king),

Sisowath, who led his troops alongside the French in the suppression of both rebellions.

Another serious rebellion occurred in 1884, when the French

forced upon King Norodom a new treaty that tightened their control over Cambodia. The reforms stipulated in the new accord, such

as the abolition of slavery and the institutionalization of land ownership, struck at the very heart of the privileged status enjoyed by

the Cambodian elite in the countryside. The result was a widespread

insurrection evoking such support that a local French official in

Kampong Cham noted in 1886 that "... the entire Cambodian

population acquiesces in the revolt." Quelling the rebellion took one and one-half years, and it tied down some 4,000 French and

Vietnamese troops that had been brought in from Cochinchina (the

southern part of Vietnam).

Unrest surfaced periodically before World War II, and various

episodes of Cambodians' defying colonial rule were recorded.

Reports by French officials also hinted at widespread insecurity

in the countryside, where peasants frequently were at the mercy

of bandit gangs. The colonial military forces in Cambodia, which

were available to quell potential insurrections during this period,

consisted of a light infantry battalion (Bataillon Tirailleurs Cambodgiens) and a national or native constabulary (Garde Nationale, also called Garde Indigene).

The light infantry battalion, a Khmer unit with French officers, was part of a larger force, the third brigade, which had responsibility for Cambodia and for Cochinchina. In addition to the Cambodian battalion, the brigade was composed of French colonial and

Vietnamese light infantry regiments and support elements. The

brigade, headquartered in Saigon, was ultimately responsible to a supreme military command for Indochina located in Hanoi.

Under the French pre-World War II colonial regime, the constabulary consisted of a force of about 2,500 men and a mixed

Franco-Khmer headquarters element of about forty to fifty officers,

technicians, and support personnel. The force was divided into

about fifteen companies deployed in the provinces. Control of the

constabulary was vested in the colonial civil administration, but

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National Security

in times of crisis, command could pass quickly to military authorities

in Saigon or in Hanoi. Service in the constabulary theoretically was voluntary, and personnel received a cash salary. Enlistments,

however, were rarely sufficient to keep pace with personnel requirements, and villages occasionally were tasked to provide recruits.

The Japanese Occupation, 1941-45

In 1940 the Japanese government, after negotiating a treaty of

friendship with Thailand, sought special concessions in Indochina

from the French colonial authorities. The Vichy administration in

Hanoi, under pressure from the German government, signed an agreement with Tokyo that permitted the movement of Japanese

troops through the transportation hubs of Indochina.

Thailand subsequentiy sought to take advantage of both its friendship with Tokyo and French military weakness in the region by

launching an invasion of Cambodia's western provinces. Although

the French suffered a series of land defeats in the skirmishes that

followed, a unique twist in the confrontation came from a naval

batde that ensued near the Thai island of Ko Chang. A small French

naval force intercepted a Thai battle fleet, en route to attack Saigon,

and sank two battleships and other light craft. The Japanese then

intervened and arranged a treaty, signed in Tokyo in March 1941

compelling the French to concede to Thailand the provinces of Bat- dambang, Siemreab, and parts of Kampong Thum and Stoeng

Treng. Cambodia thus lost one-third of its territory and nearly half a million citizens. The Japanese, while leaving the Vichy colonial government

nominally in charge throughout Indochina, established in Cambodia a garrison that numbered 8,000 troops by August 1941.

Preservation of order on a day-to-day basis, however, continued

to be the responsibility of the colonial authorities, who were per- mitted to retain the constabulary and the light infantry battalion.

These forces were sufficient to quell the first stirrings of nationalistic unrest in 1941 and in 1942.

Anti-French agitation assumed a more overt form, in July 1942,

when early nationalist leaders Pach Chhoeun and Son Ngoc Thanh

organized a demonstration in Phnom Penh over an obscure inci- dent involving Cambodian military personnel. In this occurrence, a monk named Hem Chieu attempted to subvert some Khmer mili- tary personnel by involving them in vague coup plotting against

the colonial administration. The plot was discovered, and the monk

was arrested; Chhoeun and Thanh, believing they had tacit Japanese support, staged a march on the French residency by some

2,000 people, many of them monks. The repressive reaction by

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Cambodia: A Country Study

the colonial authorities resulted in many injuries and in mass arrests. Although the Japanese failed to support Thanh as he had expected,

they spirited him away to Japan, where he was trained for the next

three years and was commissioned a captain in the Japanese army.

Chhoeun was arrested and sentenced to life imprisonment.

On March 9, 1945, Japanese forces in Indochina, including those

in Cambodia, overthrew the French colonial administration; and,

in a bid to revive the flagging support of local populations for

Tokyo's war effort, they encouraged indigenous rulers to proclaim

independence (see The Emergence of Nationalism, ch. 1). During this period ofJapanese-sponsored independence, the fate of the

constabulary and of the light infantry battalion remained uncertain. The battalion apparently was demobilized for the most part,

while the constabulary remained in place but was reduced to in- effectuality. Presumably both forces were leaderless because their

French officers were interned by the Japanese for the remainder

of the war. Tokyo, however, did not plan to leave the Indochinese countries without a military force following the March 9 coup. Plans

had been prepared for the creation of 5 volunteer units of 1,000

troops each. There was no thought that such a native force would

fight alongside Japanese troops, but rather that it would be used

to preserve public order and internal security. It was intended that

recruitment of indigenous personnel for the volunteer units would

be through physical and written exams. Before the plan could be

implemented in Cambodia, however, the war ended, and the concept died without further action.

The conclusion of World War II caused considerable turmoil

in Cambodia: a defeated Japanese military contingent waited to be disarmed and repatriated; French nationals newly released from

internment sought to resume their prewar existence; diverse Allied

military units returned to Phnom Penh to reimpose a colonial administration. In the countryside there were two sources of unrest. On the western fringes of the country, the Khmer Issarak (see

Appendix B), nationalist insurgents with Thai backing, declared

their opposition to a French return to power in Cambodia,

proclaimed a government-in-exile, and established a base in

Batdambang Province (see fig. 1). On the eastern frontier, the Viet- namese communist forces, or Viet Minh (see Appendix B) infil- trated the Cambodian border provinces, organized a "Khmer

People's Liberation Army" (not to be confused with the later Cambodian force, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's National Liberation Armed Forces [KPNLAF—see Appendix B], which is

246
A sub-lieutenant of the Cambodian national army,

ca. 1952

Courtesy National Archives

sometimes called the Khmer People's National Liberation Army),

and began seeking a united front with the Khmer Issarak.

The First Indochina War, 1945-54

It was under such exigencies that a Cambodian army was created,

primarily by Prince Monireth, the heir to the throne, who earlier

had been passed over by the French in favor of Prince Norodom

Sihanouk, who was considered more pliable. In the fall of 1945,

Monireth gained the concurrence of returning French authorities

in his plan to raise an indigenous military force to fill the vacuum

left by the defeated Japanese and to counter mounting internal dis- order. On November 23, in his capacity as defense minister, he

made public two decisions concerning this issue. The first was to form the first battalion of a nascent Cambodian army, and he in- vited former noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the demobilized

colonial light infantry battalion to join the new unit. The second was to open an officer-candidate school, and he extended an invitation to young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five

with a junior high-school education to apply for admission. The

school duly opened on January 1 , 1946, and part of it was reserved

for NCO training.

Two important agreements between Phnom Penh and Paris gave

the Cambodian military forces a firmer official footing in 1946.

The first, the Franco-Cambodian Modus Vivendi of January 7,

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Cambodia: A Country Study

1946, for the most part concerned political matters. In military

affairs, however, it gave official recognition to the existence of a Cambodian army, although it placed French advisers in the Cambodian Ministry of Defense and declared that French authorities

had responsibility for maintaining order in Cambodia.

The second agreement, the Franco-Khmer Military Convention

of November 20, 1946, was more significant in Cambodian military history because it established the organization and the mission of the nation's armed forces. The pact affirmed that Cambodia,

as an autonomous state within the French Union, would have at

its disposal indigenous forces, the missions of which were to uphold the sovereignty of the king, to preserve internal security, and

to defend the frontiers of the country. The accord also noted that

Cambodia participated in the defense of the French Union by placing its military units at the disposal of the French High Commissioner for Indochina, and that, reciprocally, other French Union

forces helped to defend Cambodia. The Cambodian forces were

to be composed of units with a territorial responsibility and a mobile reserve. The supreme commander would be the king, who

would exercise his powers through a Ministry of Defense assisted

by a Franco-Khmer general staff. The Cambodians also were

granted the responsibilities of recruiting, of determining obligatory military service, of designating unit tables of organization and

equipment, and of deploying troops internally. The stationing of

Cambodian units outside the country, however, was to be based on mutual understanding between the king and the French High

Commissioner for Indochina (see The Struggle for Independence,

ch. 1). In 1947 the Cambodian government faced a mounting threat

from several thousand Khmer Issarak combatants, whose numbers

would swell to around 10,000 by 1949. In an effort to keep pace

with their domestic adversaries, the Cambodian military forces

slowly but inexorably grew in numbers as the months and years

passed. In January 1947, the effective strength of the Cambodian

military stood at about 4,000 personnel, of which 3,000 served in

the constabulary. The remainder were in a mobile reserve of two

battalion- sized units (one of them newly formed) named, respectively, the First Cambodian Rifle Battalion and the Second Cambodian Rifle Battalion (Bataillon de Chasseurs Cambodgiens).

These first Cambodian military units went into action in 1947

against the Khmer Issarak. During the next two years, two more

rifle battalions were added, bringing total strength up to 6,000 per- sonnel, with about half serving in the Garde Nationale and half

in the mobile reserve. The latter at this time comprised three rifle

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battalions (one battalion had been allocated to French Union forces

elsewhere in Indochina).

In July 1949, in another military agreement with France, Cambodian forces were granted autonomy within operational sectors

in the provinces of Siemreab and Kampong Thum, which had been

part of the territory returned to Cambodia by Thailand in early

1947. Under an additional protocol signed in June 1950, provincial governors were assigned the responsibility for the pacification

of the territories under their jurisdictions; to accomplish this mission they were each given a counterinsurgency force consisting of one independent infantry company.

The early 1950s were marked by further milestones in the development of the Cambodian military forces. In the fall of 1950, a military assistance agreement between the United States and

France provided for an expansion of indigenous forces in Indochina, and by 1952 Cambodian troop strength had reached 13,000

personnel, greater than that of French forces in the country. In

the meantime, more rifle battalions were formed, combat-support

units were established, and a framework for logistical support was

set up. Cambodian units were given wider responsibility: protection of the rubber plantations in the area of the middle Mekong,

and, to prevent infiltration by the Viet Minh, surveillance of the

coastal areas of the southern provinces and of the eastern frontier

with Cochinchina.

In June 1952, Prince Sihanouk—determined to transcend his

figurehead role—seized power, staging what was termed a

' 'royal

coup d'etat." He suspended the constitution "to restore . . . order

and security throughout the country." Taking command of army

operations, he led his troops against Son Ngoc Thanh's Khmer

Issarak forces in Siemreab Province, where he announced that he

had driven "700 red guerrillas" across the border into Thailand.

As the year wore on, the French returned to Cambodian control

the battalion that had been assigned to the French Union forces

since the late 1940s. The unit returned ceremoniously to Phnom

Penh in October. In December the Cambodian operational sector of Siemreab was enlarged by the addition of Batdambang Province,

and the subsector of Batdambang City came under the command

of a previously obscure lieutenant colonel, Lon Nol. The operational sector of Kampong Thum was given its own combat element,

the Third Cambodian Rifle Battalion, an elite unit that was subject to the direct orders of the monarch.

In early 1953, Sihanouk embarked on a world tour to publicize

his campaign for independence, contending that he could "checkmate communism by opposing it with the force of nationalism."

249
Cambodia: A Country Study

Following his tour, he "retired" to Batdambang Province, which was declared a "free zone of independence" and where he was

joined by 30,000 Cambodian troops and police in a show of support and strength. Elsewhere, Cambodian troops under French

officers staged slowdowns or refused the commands of their superiors, as a demonstration of solidarity with Sihanouk. Full independence was granted by France in November 1953, and Sihanouk,

returning to Phnom Penh, took command of the army of 17,000

troops, which had been renamed the Royal Khmer Armed Forces

(Forces Armees Royales Khmeres—FARK—see Appendix B).

In March 1954, combined Viet Minh and Khmer Issarak forces

launched attacks from Vietnam into northeastern Cambodia.

Sihanouk personally directed a sustained counterattack. Conscription was instituted for men between fifteen and thirty-five years

of age, and national mobilization was declared. Following the conclusion of the Geneva Conference on Indochina in July, Viet Minh

representatives agreed to withdraw their troops from Cambodia.

After a brief rebellion by the Khmer Issarak in late 1954, one of

its principal leaders, Son Ngoc Thanh, surrendered in response

to an amnesty decree, but, upon denial of an audience with Sihanouk, he departed for Thailand. FARK force levels were 47,000,

but, with demobilization after Geneva, this dropped to 36,000, the

approximate level at which it was to be maintained for the next

fifteen years except during periods of emergency.

The Second Indochina War, 1954-75

In May 1955, the United States and Cambodia signed an agreement providing for security assistance and for the establishment

of a thirty-person MAAG. During the next eight years, until the

assistance program was discontinued at Cambodian request in

November 1963, FARK received from the United States supplies

and equipment worth approximately US$83.7 million, in addition

to military budget support. In the meantime, the French also re- tained a military training mission in Cambodia that was to remain

until 1971. FARK traditions and doctrine remained French, and

there was some incompatibility with United States military doctrine and outlook.

Although the United States undertook a substantial securityassistance program in Cambodia, and the kingdom was included

as a "protocol state" in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization

(SEATO), failure to obtain more concrete assurances of defense

assistance motivated Cambodia to adopt a neutralist foreign policy. Subsequently adopted as law, this policy declared that Cambodia would "abstain from military or ideological alliances" but

250
King Norodom Suramarit troops the line of

FARK military units at his coronation in March 1955.

Courtesy National Archives

would retain the right to self-defense. Cambodia continued to be aware of the serious threat to its independence posed by the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam).

FARK's mission thus became a defensive one, that is, to insure

Cambodia's territorial integrity within the framework of neutrality. The FARK high command remained fairly stable, staffed by

a limited number of well-trained personnel, many of whom had

been educated abroad. Ranking officers, however, became highly

politicized, if not subservient, because they were more or less compelled by Sihanouk at his whim to perform active roles in national

political life. Throughout the years that followed the Geneva Conference, Sihanouk, supreme commander of FARK, controlled

national policies affecting the military establishment, and FARK's

operational parameters were circumscribed by his frequent policy

vacillations. Because of this, FARK never developed as an effec- tive or viable military organization.

In addition to the Vietnamese threat, the Cambodian government perceived a menace to internal stability from Son Ngoc

Thanh's resurgent antimonarchist Khmer Serei (see Appendix B).

Although contemporary observers suggested that the Khmer Serei

seemed "to be more of a nuisance . . . than a genuine threat,"

the group's insurgent activities and subversive efforts were viewed

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Cambodia: A Country Study

with increasing alarm by Phnom Penh. In March 1959, for example, the provincial governor of Siemreab, General Dap Chhuon,

a former Khmer Issarak leader who once had fought alongside

Sihanouk, was implicated in an attempted Khmer Serei uprising

(known at the time as the Bangkok Plot) and was executed. Sihanouk believed the United States had been behind the plot, and his

proclivity for assuming complicity between Washington and the

Khmer Serei became a particularly significant factor a few years

later. In approximately 1965 to 1966, the United States Military

Assistance Command—Vietnam (MACV) began recruitment for

the Studies and Operations Group and civilian irregular defense

groups of Khmer Krom (see Appendix B) living in the Mekong

Delta, many of whom were Khmer Serei members. In his public

pronouncements regarding Khmer Serei activity, Sihanouk charged

that the group had originated in South Vietnam and Thailand,

and had the backing of both governments. Over the years, there were coundess Khmer Serei incidents, followed by amnesties, sur- renders, executions, and acrimonious Cambodian charges against

South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States. After Sihanouk was deposed in 1970, the Lon Nol government pardoned some

500 political prisoners, the majority of whom were Khmer Serei.

Charges surfaced in 1987 that during his rule Sihanouk had

executed as many as 1,000 Khmer Serei suspects.

In the uneasy peace between the First Indochina War and the

Second Indochina War, a number of incidents occurred on Cambodia's border with South Vietnam. In June 1958, two South Viet- namese battalions briefly occupied a village in Stoeng Treng

Province, and Sihanouk appealed for United States intervention.

Receiving no response that satisfied him, Sihanouk established

diplomatic relations with China and announced that this action was

a direct consequence of South Vietnam's violation of Cambodian

territory. Cambodia was also not silent during the early stages of

border violations by North Vietnam. In 1959 Phnom Penh complained that North Vietnamese regulars were using northeastern

Cambodia to infiltrate South Vietnam. Cambodia made concerted

efforts to demonstrate that it was policing its eastern borders, but,

although the incursions were publicly admitted, the existence of

base areas was not. By the mid-1960s, sites along Cambodia's

eastern borders were serving as bases for North Vietnamese and

for South Vietnamese communist, or Viet Cong (see Appendix B)

forces fighting the South Vietnamese government. FARK, re- strained by Sihanouk's policies, which, in effect, constituted a modus vivendi with the intruders, could do little more than monitor these activities. The continuation of border incidents, and

252
Armored cars pass in review during coronation parade of King Norodom Suramarit in March 1955

Courtesy National Archives

Sihanouk's repeated charges of United States complicity with the

Khmer Serei, led to a steady deterioration in Cambodian-American

relations.

In November 1963, after the clandestine Khmer Serei radio

resumed anti-Sihanouk broadcasts that the Cambodian government

alleged were beamed from Thailand and from South Vietnam with

transmitters supplied by the United States, Sihanouk terminated

the economic and security assistance agreements with Washington. He also demanded the departure from Cambodia of all nondiplomatic United States government personnel. The final rupture

in diplomatic relations came two years later, after Cambodia

filed a complaint in the UN Security Council against the United

States and South Vietnam for their "repeated acts of aggression

against Cambodia." Relations were formally terminated May 3,

1965.

Although still receiving French military assistance and training

(a program that was to continue until 1972), Cambodia began

soliciting and accepting military assistance from communist countries as well, after the termination of United States aid. In 1963

FARK received four Soviet MiG aircraft at the beginning of a program in which China also joined. The inevitable results of a variety

of suppliers were mixed equipment inventories.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

In 1966 Sihanouk secretly granted access to the deep-water port

of Sihanoukville (later called Kampong Saom), in western Kampot Province, to the North Vietnamese. With the complicity of ranking FARK officers, Sihanoukville became a main entrepot for North

Vietnamese military supplies from China and from the Soviet

Union. Armaments were then transported to North Vietnamese

and Viet Cong sanctuaries on the border with South Vietnam, ironically over the "Friendship Highway" built with United States aid

and sometimes in FARK trucks supplied as part of the United States security-assistance program. This effective supply route enabled

the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong to stockpile substantial

amounts of armaments and equipment for the 1968 Tet Offensive

against the Saigon government. FARK profited from armaments

pilfered from the Vietnamese shipments, and suborned FARK

officers derived personal advantage from the Sihanoukville traffic through fees, bribes, and other special arrangements.

In 1967 a peasant uprising broke out in the Samlot district of

Batdambang Province. Its significance was not appreciated immediately. At the time, Sihanouk attributed the attacks, which first occurred in about January, to "the Khmer Viet Minh" (see Appendix B), whom he also labeled "Khmer Rouge" (see Appendix B)

to distinguish them from the "Khmer Bleu" (see Appendix B).

Sihanouk vacillated in placing the blame for the unrest, however,

and later charged the "Thai patriotic front" with being its insti- gators. Acting on his orders, FARK harshly suppressed the Bat- dambang insurgents, who had acted spontaneously, and not at Khmer Rouge direction. Although Sihanouk announced two

months later that the Batdambang rebellion was "completely at an end," there were subsequent references to continuing Khmer

Rouge activity in the countryside.

The uprising convinced the Khmer communists (including a former school teacher named Saloth Sar, later to emerge under the

alias Pol Pot) who earlier had gone underground, that the time was at hand to escalate the armed struggle against the Phnom Penh

government. Shortly thereafter, the Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK—see Appendix B) came into being. The Khmer

Rouge dated its own founding from January 17, 1968. RAK leaders, including Pol Pot, who had just returned from a prolonged

visit to China, retreated to the jungle and mountains of Rotanokiri

Province (Ratanakiri) in northeastern Cambodia. There they hoped

to exploit the disaffection of the Khmer Loeu (see Appendix B) over the policies of the Phnom Penh government concerning taxation, forced labor, and the resettlement of lowland Khmers in the

Khmer Loeu areas. For the next two and one-half years, the newly

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formed RAK remained small (estimates varied from 400 to 2,000

personnel), and poorly equipped with captured weapons. The

Khmer Rouge found that, in spite of the Samlot rebellion, discontent against the government in Phnom Penh was then insuffi- cient to attract large numbers of people to the rigors of an armed

insurgency. As for external support, there was no move on the part

of Hanoi to provide military assistance to the Khmer Rouge be- cause such action would have alienated Sihanouk's government

and would have imperiled continued North Vietnamese and Viet

Cong access to Cambodian territory as well as their use of the port

of Sihanoukville.

In 1969 the United States undertook the first of two bombing

campaigns against enemy targets in Cambodian territory. Codenamed the Menu series, these air operations consisted of tactical strikes against North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas on the

Cambodian-Vietnamese border. They partially dislodged the North

Vietnamese and the Viet Cong and drove them more deeply into

Cambodia in quest of safer havens. This brought FARK elements

into more frequent hostile contact with the communists, and there were reports of FARK forces' being involved in joint operations

with South Vietnamese forces against the North Vietnamese and

the Viet Cong. Sihanouk became increasingly distressed with these

developments; his attitude toward the communist Vietnamese

changed, and authorization for continued use of Sihanoukville was

terminated. In April, speaking in Rotanokiri Province, Sihanouk

stated that "to deal with the Viet Cong and Viet Minh," he had

ordered General Lon Nol "to give up the defensive spirit and adopt an offensive spirit." Sihanouk announced during a press confer- ence on June 11, 1969 that "... at present there is war in

Rotanokiri [province] between Cambodia and Vietnam."

Sihanouk left Cambodia for medical treatment in France in January 1970. Citing disagreement over economic and administrative

matters, after week-long anticommunist rioting in Phnom Penh,

the Cambodian National Assembly on March 18 passed a unanimous vote of nonconfidence in Sihanouk and replaced him as chief

of state (see The March 1970 Coup d'Etat, ch. 1). Although Sihanouk's deposition was nominally a parliamentary action, the leaders

of the participants consisted primarily of FARK officers, headed

by Lon Nol, who had been the prime minister since the previous

August (and who, Sihanouk had once suggested, would be his likeliest successor). The coup was bloodless, although FARK contingents were on the alert in Phnom Penh and took control of key

installations, such as the airport and the radio station.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

At the time Sihanouk was deposed, FARK, soon to be renamed

the Khmer National Armed Forces (Forces Armees Nationales

Khmeres—FANK—see Appendix B), had 35,000 to 40,000 personnel, organized for the most part as ground forces. The Lon Nol

government repeatedly sought negotiations for a peaceful withdrawal of the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong forces from

its territory. These overtures were rejected, and in April the Viet- namese communists began moving out of their sanctuaries and

deeper into Cambodia, in efforts to preserve their lines of communication and to maintain the corridor to the port of Sihanoukville. President Richard M. Nixon spoke on April 30, 1970 to the

American nation, and said that "thousands of their [North Viet- namese and Viet Cong] soldiers are invading the country from the

sanctuaries and they are encircling the capital." Lon Nol, in the

meantime, had called up military reserves, had requested UN in- tervention, and, while reiterating Cambodia's position of neutrality, had issued a call for international assistance.

Between April 29 and May 1, 1970, South Vietnamese and

United States ground forces drove into Cambodia's border areas

in a determined bid to overrun and to destroy North Vietnamese

and Viet Cong logistical depots and sanctuaries. There also was

hope at United States MACV headquarters that the offensive would

result in the capture of the Central Office for South Vietnam, the

Viet Cong headquarters for directing the war against the Saigon

government. The operation resulted in the capture of vast quantities of enemy materiel and it bought time for Washington and Saigon to proceed with ' 1 Vietnamization, ' ' the process of turning over

the conduct of the war to the South Vietnamese government. For

the shaky Lon Nol government in Phnom Penh, however, the

results of the incursion were destabilizing and far-reaching. In

retreating before United States and South Vietnamese troops, North

Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces penetrated farther west into Cambodian territory, overrunning government outposts as they went.

Soon all of northeastern Cambodia had fallen to the North Viet- namese or to the Viet Cong, who then proceeded to turn the captured areas over to the Khmer insurgents and to forge them into a full-fledged revolutionary army.

To help hard-pressed FANK, Nixon laid down guidelines for

United States assistance to Cambodia, promising, among other

things, to turn over to the government in Phnom Penh equipment

captured during the incursion, and to "provide military assis- tance ... in the form of small arms and relatively unsophisticated

equipment in types and quantities suitable for their army." Thus

began a structured military assistance program, supplementing the

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ad hoc support begun shortly before the incursion, that was to total US$1.18 billion by the fall of the Lon Nol government in April

1975. Although all United States troops were withdrawn from Cambodian territory, South Vietnamese forces were accorded "automatic authority" to operate in Cambodia in a sixteen-kilometer

corridor along the frontier.

The Lon Nol government very shortly afterwards declared martial law and total mobilization, and it began expansion of its army.

United States government studies conducted shortly before Sihanouk's deposition had expressed serious reservations about the capabilities of the government forces, noting the "lack of combat

experience, equipment deficiencies, .... lack of mobility," and

citing "incompetent and corrupt officers" as the "greatest shortcoming."

The same officers were, however, retained by FANK and their

inadequacy rapidly became apparent as military rosters were padded with non-existent "phantom troops." United States advisers

attempting to keep track of FANK's development were constantly

hampered by the difficulty of accurately estimating the number of

Cambodian troops. (Accurate numbers were important because

the United States was then providing assistance for FANK's military pay and allowances.) United States Senate staff investigators

reported that United States officials acknowledged in January 1972

that the Khmer Republic's military strength figures were "grossly exaggerated" by at least 10 percent. The Senate report concluded

there was "no greater mystery in Cambodia than the size of the

Cambodian Government's armed forces." In December 1972, the

information minister of the newly proclaimed Khmer Republic an- nounced that 100,000 troops were found to be "nonexistent."

According to the United States secretary of state's report to the

Congress for the years 1969 and 1970, FANK grew "from under

40,000 in March 1970 to some 200,000 in January 1971." In reality, FANK levels probably never reached such a high number, and

many of its new soldiers were youthful and inexperienced.

Limited basic training of the inductees, some of it in Thailand

and in South Vietnam, began almost immediately after the in- troduction of martial law. Such training, however, could not satisfy

FANK's pressing need to teach peasant farmers to man the equipment provided by the United States, to fight effectively in sizable

units, and to comprehend modern military doctrine.

In spite of a steady infusion of United States security assistance

and the influx of new FANK personnel, the government forces were

unable to hold their own against their adversaries. Because much

of the country remained under North Vietnamese control after the

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Cambodia: A Country Study

withdrawal of United States and South Vietnamese troops, initial FANK strategy focused on holding the heartland of Cambodia south

of a line of demarcation dubbed the "Lon Nol Line." This strat- egy conceded about half the country to the enemy, but it was the

heavily forested, sparsely populated, northern half. If the Lon Nol

Line could be held, the government would control the southern

half with most of the population and all of the rich, rice- growing

areas. To defend this territory, FANK unleashed its two most ambitious offensives: Chenla I, in August 1970, and Chenla II, in August 1971. Both had as their objectives the reopening of Route 6

to Kampong Thum and the reassertion of government control over

this fertile agricultural area. Both operations failed. Chenla I stalled short of its objective in the face of fierce resistance from the North

Vietnamese Ninth Division. FANK units were then withdrawn to protect the capital from enemy commando teams. Chenla II was

successful in securing its initial goals, and FANK columns from

north and south met jubilantly on Route 6 along the way to Kampong Thum. As the government forces celebrated, however, their

old nemesis, the North Vietnamese Ninth Division, tore into the

extended FANK lines with ferocity, slaughtering many of them

and leaving the rest cut off and compelled to fight their way back

to their own lines as best they could. Former FANK commander

General Sat Sutsakhan noted ruefully about Chenla II after the war that, "In this operation FANK lost some of its best units of

infantry as well as a good part of its armor and a great deal of trans- port, both military and civil."

The North Vietnamese, however, were neither the only, nor the

most determined adversary with whom FANK had to deal. A far more lethal threat was soon posed by a revitalized Khmer Rougedominated force that had evolved considerably since its days as the

ragtag, poorly armed band of irregulars known then as the RAK.

The development of the RAK had owed much to the opportunism

of the Khmer Rouge leaders, who had been able to transform a

forlorn communist insurgency with no chance of succeeding in the

late 1960s, into a war of national liberation headed by the country's most eminent nationalist, Sihanouk.

From Beijing, where he had been stranded by the coup that deposed him, Sihanouk in 1970 announced the formation of a Royal

Government of National Union of Kampuchea (Gouvernement

Royal d' Union Nationale du Kampuchea—GRUNK—see Appendix B). This government, he said, would be under the leadership

of a broad umbrella organization, the National United Front of

Kampuchea (Front Uni National du Kampuchea—FUNK—see

258
Insurgents of the KPNLAF on patrol near the Thai-Cambodian border Courtesy Frank Tatu

Appendix B). The prestige of Sihanouk's name thus helped the

Khmer Rouge in their recruitment effort. Rural peasant volunteers believed they were joining a broad-based national resistance

movement, headed by the prince, against an ineffectual puppet

regime in Phnom Penh. Several groups also rallied to the broad

appeal of the GRUNK/FUNK. Such groups included the proSihanouk Khmer Rumdo (see Appendix B), the Khmer Viet Minh,

and the Khmer Loeu.

To accommodate the disparate elements that were rallying to the resistance cause, the RAK was renamed the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF—see Appendix B). As this force grew in size and in proficiency, it was able

to relieve North Vietnamese units of their combat burden in Cambodia. By 1973 there were reportedly no more than 5,000 North

Vietnamese combat troops in Cambodia, and of this number only

2,000 to 3,000 were deployed against FANK units.

After the Chenla campaigns, FANK was unable to regain the

offensive, and its operations became a series of hard-fought defensive actions against an enemy whose momentum could not be

stayed. Individual unit valor and fleeting tactical successes did lit- tle to relieve the unbroken string of FANK setbacks—overrun outposts, annihilated battalions, cut-off columns, plummeting morale,

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Cambodia: A Country Study

exhausted supplies, steadily shrinking government territory, and

enemy units that were drawing ever closer around Phnom Penh.

A harbinger of future trends was discernible as early as November 1972, two-and-one-half years before the final defeat. FANK

strategists at that time acknowledged the waning capability of their

armed forces and redrew the Lon Nol Line. The new line of demarcation signified a profound strategic realignment because it con- ceded most of the country, including the rich rice- growing areas around the Tonle Sap, to the enemy. In accordance with the

redrawn Lon Nol line, FANK was committed to defend no more

than the triangular corner of southeastern Cambodia, which held

a majority of the population and was bounded generally by Route

4 from Phnom Penh to Kampong Saom on the west, and by Route

1 from Phnom Penh to the Vietnamese border on the east. The

apex of the triangle passed just north of Odongk, the former royal

capital that was to be the scene of heavy fighting later in the war. Even this retrenchment, however, turned out to be impractical,

as successive engagements failed to dislodge the enemy troops south

of the new defense line, and FANK increasingly found itself hard

pressed from that direction as well. By 1973 United States Department of State sources, possibly underestimating, noted that the Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF

controlled about 60 percent of Cambodia's territory and 25 per- cent of the population. Despite a sustained United States bombing campaign that year to blunt the steady advance of the CPNLAF

and to relieve pressure on FANK, the Khmer Rouge insurgent

forces were able to absorb their losses, to maintain the initiative,

and to subject an increasingly demoralized and cornered FANK

to unremitting pressure.

The denouement for FANK and for the Khmer Republic began on New Year's Day 1975 when the CPNLAF unleashed its final offensive. As winter turned into spring, the enemy battered the

defenses of Phnom Penh from every direction. Routes into the city were cut, reopened, and cut again; river convoys were forced to run a gauntlet of hostile fire to reach the beleaguered capital and

finally could no longer break through; United States aircraft, in a forlorn attempt to maintain a lifeline into the city, set up an airlift from bases in Thailand. The effort worked briefly, until the air- port itself was interdicted by hostile rocket fire. By early April,

Phnom Penh was surrounded on all sides, and its defenses were

crumbling. FANK attempts to break out of the encircled city stalled in the face of intense Khmer Rouge firepower. Government units were decimated, exhausted, and out of supplies; finally, they were

unable to hold out any longer. The fall of the capital on April 17

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marked the demise of the Khmer Republic and the total defeat of

FANK, which in the end had been totally outclassed and outfought,

not by an army of guerrillas—that phenomenon so intensively

studied during the period, but by a tough, disciplined, regular force

in a conventional war of movement, by fire and by maneuver. Military Developments under the Khmer Rouge

Khmer Rouge Armed Forces

The 68,000-member Khmer Rouge-dominated CPNLAF force

that completed its conquest of Cambodia in April 1975 was a highly

dedicated and disciplined peasant army, trained in the rigors of

guerrilla warfare as well as in full-scale combat. Its shadowy in- tellectual leaders, adhering to the Maoist principles of guerrilla

warfare, had taken their core "fish" from only three scattered companies, when optimum conditions had been presented to them in

1970, and had propelled them through the "water" of the people

in the countryside, while collecting thousands of proselytes on the

way. These leaders were fiercely independent, at first grudgingly

accepting training and arms from the Vietnamese—the hated tradi- tional enemy—while on occasion violently turning on these nominal allies, behavior that presaged the fatal conflict that was to come. When most North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combat divisions

had withdrawn from the field in Cambodia at the end of 1972, the

RAK had experienced phenomenal growth, reaching an estimated

50,000. Its personnel continued to arm themselves by capturing

or purchasing weaponry from FANK. The insurgents marched

under the banners of nationalism, of legitimacy, and of national

preservation—the escutcheon of Sihanouk. In the end, they defeated an army which had a strength on paper of 230,000, but which possibly numbered as few as 150,000. FANK had been armed by the

United States with military weaponry and equipment worth

US$1.18 billion, an abundance of materiel that now fell into the

hands of the CPNLAF.

At the beginning of the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, the

CPNLAF—now renamed the RAK once again, under its long-time

commander and then Minister of Defense Son Sen, had 230 battalions in 35 to 40 regiments and in 12 to 14 brigades. The com- mand structure in units was based on three-person committees in

which the political commissar ranked higher than the military com- mander and his deputy. The country was divided into zones and

special sectors, the boundaries of which changed slighdy over the

years. Within these areas, the RAK's first task upon "liberation,"

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Cambodia: A Country Study

as a calculated policy, was the peremptory execution of former

FANK officers and of their families, without trial or fanfare.

The next priority was to consolidate into a national army the

separate forces that were operating more or less autonomously in

the various zones. The Khmer Rouge units were commanded by

zonal secretaries who were simultaneously party and military

officers, some of whom were said to have manifested "warlord

characteristics." Troops from one zone frequently were sent to another zone to enforce discipline. It was such efforts to discipline

zonal secretaries and their dissident or ideologically impure cadres

that gave rise to the purges that were to decimate RAK ranks, to undermine the morale of the victorious army, and to generate the

seeds of rebellion. As journalist Elizabeth Becker noted, "in the

end paranoia, not enemies, was responsible for bringing down the

regime."

Khmer-Vietnamese Border Tensions

Border tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam (aside from

traditional Khmer fear and hatred of the Vietnamese) goes back

to the controversy over the Brevie Line, drawn in 1939 by French

colonial administrators and considered by Vietnam to be the offi- cial international boundary between the two countries. For years

after the French departure, various Cambodian governments

attempted to negotiate the return of Cochinchina—known in Cambodia as Kampuchea Krom, which they maintained was a French

colony, not a protectorate, that had been promised to Cambodia

by early French colonial authorities. Negotiations to solve the border

dispute were held between 1975 and 1977, but they made no

progress and were suspended. The Khmer Rouge also felt an abiding distrust of the Vietnamese, who, they believed, had never renounced their determination to incorporate Cambodia into a

larger, Hanoi-dominated Indochina federation.

Clashes between the RAK and Vietnamese communist forces

began in Cambodia as early as 1970, when there were reported

incidents of Khmer Rouge units firing on North Vietnamese.

Reports continued of engagements of growing intensity, particularly after 1973. The North Vietnamese, because they urgently

needed sanctuaries in Cambodia in order to pursue their war in

South Vietnam, chose to ignore the incidents and were still pre- pared, at the end of Cambodia's long civil war, to send sapper and

artillery groups to help the CPNLAF take Phnom Penh. After the

communist victories of April and May 1975, clashes between Viet- namese and Khmer Rouge units centered on the border. Skirmishing began about a month after the fall of Phnom Penh, when Hanoi

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National Security

accused the Khmer Rouge of trying to seize Phu Quoc Island and

of making forays into several Vietnamese border provinces.

Ironically, some analysts believe that the Khmer Rouge would

have made more noise about their offshore claims had it not been

for the destruction by the United States of their air force and much

of their navy during the Mayaguez incident. On May 12, 1975, a Khmer Rouge sector commander, zealously asserting Cambodia's

territorial rights in the Gulf of Thailand, boarded and captured

the American container ship S.S. Mayaguez, which carried a crew

of forty, near the island of Wai (which later fell under Vietnamese

jurisdiction). Failing to receive a timely response to demands for

return of the ship, Washington notified the UN and invoked the

right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. The en- suing four-day engagement involved U.S. bombing raids on the

airfield at Ream and on the port of Kampong Saom, as well as naval barrages and a Marine assault on the nearby island of Kaoh

Tang. On orders from the Khmer Rouge leadership, the Mayaguez crew was released unharmed and was returned to United States custody.

Deteriorating relations between Cambodia and Vietnam reached

a crescendo of recrimination when, on December 31 , 1977, Radio

Phnom Penh, citing "ferocious and barbarous aggression launched

by the Vietnamese aggressor forces against Democratic Kampuchea," denounced the "so-called Socialist Republic of Vietnam"

and announced the "temporary severance" of diplomatic relations. Rhetorical exchanges between the two sides became more acrimonious, and border skirmishes involving Cambodian and Vietnamese

units erupted into pitched battles in the summer and the fall of

1978. Major engagements were reported in the Parrot's Beak (part

of Svay Rieng Province), in the Fishhook (part of Kampong Cham

Province), and in Rotanokiri Province. In an effort to court world

public opinion, in September 1978 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

of Democratic Kampuchea published its so-called "Black Book,"

the Black Paper: Facts and Evidence ofAggression and Annexation Against

Kampuchea. The tract denounced Vietnam's "true nature" as that

of "aggressor, annexationist and swallower of other countries'

territories."

In November 1978, rhetoric was succeeded by full-scale action:

Vietnamese forces launched a sustained operation on Cambodian

soil in the area of Snuol and Memot (both in Kracheh Province).

This action cleared a liberated zone where anti-Khmer Rouge Cambodians could launch a broad-based political movement that would

offer an alternative to the odious Pol Pot regime. Proclamation of

this movement, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS—see Appendix B), took

place in a rubber-plantation clearing on December 2, 1978, amid

rigid security provided by heavily armed Vietnamese units reinforced with air-defense weapons.

Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia

The public unveiling of the KNUFNS dashed any remaining

expectations that Cambodian-Vietnamese disagreements could be

solved without further armed conflict, because the Hanoi-backed

front openly called for the ouster of the "reactionary Pol Pot-Ieng

Sary clique." Because the KNUFNS was far too weak to topple

the regime of Democratic Kampuchea, virtually the entire combat burden would fall on Vietnamese forces, which, for this purpose, had been steadily building up troop strength on the border

during the preceding months.

Nervous Khmer Rouge leaders in Phnom Penh did not have long

to wait after the KNUFNS announcement, for, on December 25,

1978, Hanoi launched its offensive with twelve to fourteen divisions and three Khmer regiments (that later would form the nucleus

of the KPRAF), a total invasion force comprising some 100,000

people. Vietnamese units struck across the Cambodian frontier in

five spearheads that thrust initially into northeastern Cambodia.

One task force drove west from Buon Me Thuot (in Dac Lac

Province, Vietnam) along Route 13 and Route 14 to capture

Kracheh City (the capital of Kracheh Province). A second column

attacked west from Pleiku (in Gia Lai-Cong Turn Province, Vietnam), and followed the circuitous Route 19 to capture Stoeng Treng

City (the capital of Stoeng Treng Province). In thus concentrat- ing its initial thrusts in the northeast, Hanoi may have had several

objectives. One of these may have been to capture quickly substantial expanses of the Cambodian territory that had been an early

spawning ground for the Khmer Rouge and its fledgling RAK in

the late 1960s. The remoteness of this region would have rendered

it difficult to dislodge Vietnamese forces, no matter what the out- come of the war. An early occupation also would have preempted

Khmer Rouge units, if they were pressed harder elsewhere, from

falling back to this area where they might have enjoyed a measure

of public support. The attacks in the northeast also may have been

intended to confuse the leadership of Democratic Kampuchea about

where the full brunt of the Vietnamese offensive would fall. Khmer Rouge commanders were not deceived by the Vietnamese

thrusts toward Kracheh and Stoeng Treng, however, and made

no attempt to reinforce the northeast. Instead, they erected their

main defense line in an arc across the flat, rice-growing plains of

264
KPNLAF insurgents cross a stream in northwestern Cambodia

Courtesy Frank Tatu

southeastern Cambodia, astride the most probable Vietnamese

axes of advance. Their calculation of Vietnamese intentions

proved correct, as Hanoi's forces unleashed the full weight of

their offensive in this area. From Vietnam's Tay Ninh Province,

heavily armed Vietnamese units drove along the axis of Route 7 toward their objective, the river port of Kampong Cham. Farther south, Vietnamese units with air support attacked along

Route 1 , in the direction of Phumi Prek Khsay (also known as Neak Luong), the Mekong River gateway to Phnom Penh. The

fifth and final Vietnamese spearhead drove west from Ha Tien,

Vietnam, to capture the ports of Kampot and Kampong Saom,

and thus to prevent the resupply by sea of retreating Khmer

Rouge forces.

Resistance to the invading Vietnamese units by the RAK could

have been suicidal, given the disregard for human life previously

displayed by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea. Instead, heavy

fighting was localized. Major engagements were fought before Kampong Cham and Phumi Prek Khsay and at Tani, inland from the

coast of Kampot Province. RAK units, already deprived of ex- perienced commanders by party purges, withered under sustained

pounding by Vietnamese artillery and airstrikes, and many of them

simply scattered before the Vietnamese offensive, some to regroup

later in western Cambodia.

265
Cambodia: A Country Study

By January 5, 1979, the main Vietnamese spearheads had driven

to the eastern banks of the Mekong River. Incomplete evidence

hints that the Vietnamese offensive originally may have intended

to go no farther. The way to Phnom Penh lay open, however, because the Khmer

Rouge units were falling back. Vietnamese forces paused briefly,

perhaps to wait for bridging and ferrying equipment and the latest orders from Hanoi, then proceeded to carry out the final assault on Phnom Penh. Khmer Rouge leaders elected not to defend the

city, and it fell on January 7. After the fall of the capital, Vietnamese units continued their

advance in two columns into western Cambodia, capturing Bat- dambang and Siemreab. The columns met at Sisophon and drove on to the Thai border, where there was heavy fighting in March

and in April. In the meantime, some remaining Khmer Rouge units

offered scattered resistance before they melted away into less accessible areas. There the Khmer Rouge leaders soon rekindled an in- surgency against the new government in power, just as they had

in the late 1960s, and insecurity persisted in the countryside in spite

of the continued Vietnamese presence.

On the diplomatic front, Vietnam, maintaining it had no troops

in Cambodia and attributing the lightning-like victory to the

KNUFNS, at first denied responsibility for the invasion. When

called before the UN Security Council, however, Hanoi's representative, tacidy admitting the presence of Vietnam and citing numerous Western press reports of Pol Pot's genocidal actions, implied

that his country had overthrown the Pol Pot regime in the name

of humanitarian and human rights.

The Vietnamese sweep through Cambodia produced an unprecedented level of turmoil on the Thai border, as disorganized

and bypassed Khmer Rouge units and civilian refugees fled before their advancing enemy. Amid this chaos, in 1979, two antiVietnamese insurgent movements, besides the Khmer Rouge, came

into being. The first of these was the Khmer People's National

Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF—see Appendix B), the armed

wing of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF

see Appendix B), which gave allegiance to Son Sann, a noncommunist, perennial cabinet minister in successive Sihanouk administrations. The other was the Sihanouk National Army (Armee

Nationale Sihanoukiste—ANS—see Appendix B), the armed wing

of the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (Front Uni National pour un

Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif

FUNCINPEC—see Appendix B), which owed allegiance to

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Sihanouk. Fighting independently, these noncommunist guerrilla

movements and the Khmer Rouge fomented continuous rebellion

in the early 1980s that could not be quelled, despite a substantial

Vietnamese military commitment to this purpose. Operating from

refugee camps on the Thai frontier, the insurgents made forays

into the Cambodian border provinces and kept the countryside in a permanent state of insecurity.

In the 1984 to 1985 dry season, the Vietnamese military com- mand in Cambodia, frustrated because of depredations by the guerrillas, undertook a sustained offensive to dislodge them from their

sanctuaries in the refugee camps. These installations were pounded

by artillery and were overrun by Vietnamese tactical units. The

operation, which was intended to cripple the Khmer guerrillas, had

the opposite effect, however. It drove them away from the border,

and they undertook prolonged forays deeper into the Cambodian

interior.

To restrict guerrilla activity, the Vietnamese erected a physical

barrier on the Thai-Cambodian border. Code-named Project K-5,

the effort consisted of clearing jungle growth; of erecting obstacles, such as ditches, barbed wire, and minefields; and of building

a road parallel to the border. Construction of the project, which

began in 1985, was performed by forced labor. All districts in Cambodia were tasked to provide able-bodied males for tours of duty on the project that ranged from three to six months. Living conditions were primitive in the construction camps, and the diet was

inadequate; the area was malarial, and unexploded ordnance from

past conflicts was a constant threat. The barrier was completed in

1987 at an unrecorded cost in Cambodian lives. Preliminary indications shortly thereafter revealed that it was having little effect on guerrilla movements to and from the Cambodian interior.

Military Developments in Postwar Cambodia

Tenuous Security

In the late 1980s, a Vietnamese military contingent of 140,000

troops, and a Khmer force—a surrogate for the Vietnamese—of

30,000 to 35,000 troops, which comprised the KPRAF of the new

government in Phnom Penh, maintained tenuous control over the

heartland of Cambodia. This territory included the population

centers, the fertile rice- growing area around the Tonle Sap, and

the main arteries of communication (see Population, ch. 2; Agriculture, and Transportation and Communications, ch. 3). The combined Vietnamese-KPRAF military effort was opposed by disunited

and factious but persistent insurgent forces belonging to each of

267
Cambodia: A Country Study

the three components of the tripartite Coalition Government of

Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK—see Coalition Government of

Democratic Kampuchea, ch. 4). The insurgents had the capability to conduct long-range combat or reconnaissance patrols with

as many as 100 troops. They could engage in small-scale propaganda missions, raids, and ambushes against poorly armed tar- gets, such as militia outposts, and in sabotage against stationary,

infrastructural objectives, such as bridges and railroad tracks. They

lacked sufficient troop strength, heavy weapons, trained leadership, and dependable logistical support, however, for sustained combat operations. From their jungle havens deep within the country

and from their bases near the Thai border, the insurgents were

reputed to range widely throughout Cambodia. Verifiable guerrilla actions, however, were confined to the northwestern provinces

of Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey (the two provinces were combined into one by the government of the People's Republic

of Kampuchea prior to 1980), which continued to be the centers of insurgent activity. Most foreign observers in the late 1980s

assessed the military situation as being at a stalemate. The rebels

lacked the capability, actual or potential, to drive out the Viet- namese occupation force, while the combined Vietnamese-KPRAF

armies, at foreseeable force and equipment levels, were incapable

of destroying the CGDK guerrilla units.

Coalition Government Resistance Forces

The tripartite CGDK opposed both the Vietnamese military

presence in Cambodia and the government of the People's Republic

of Kampuchea that had been installed in Phnom Penh by Hanoi.

Each component of the coalition maintained its own force of armed

combatants (see fig. 13). Divided by deep-seated animosities among

their leaders, these three distinctive and autonomous military forces were brought into a reluctant and uneasy coalition as a result of

diplomatic activity by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

(ASEAN). The common goal of contesting the Vietnamese oc- cupation, however, could not bridge the noncommunist coalition

partners' deep suspicion toward the renascent Khmer Rouge.

Throughout the 1980s, the three combatant forces remained unintegrated, and each maintained separate bases, command structures,

and operational planning. An effort by ASEAN to unite the three

resistance forces on the Thai border resulted, in May 1984, in the

creation on paper of the Permanent Military Coordinating Committee, which apparently never functioned.

Limited tactical cooperation, however, occasionally was reported

among the various coalition partners. In one rare example, the three

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National Security

forces participated jointly in a major operation in Batdambang

Province in early 1986. Usually, Khmer Rouge units, under their

shadowy zonal commanders, remained aloof from their coalition

partners and, on occasion, even attacked their military forces and

inflicted casualties. Such interfactional clashes were the subject of

several complaints by Sihanouk, who charged over the years that

Khmer Rouge guerrillas had "repeatedly ambushed and killed [his] troops." These allegations were the principal reason why he chose

to step down from the presidency of the CGDK on a leave of ab- sence in May 1987.

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea

The National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK—see Appendix B) was the successor to the RAK of the Khmer Rouge,

the name change having gone into effect in December 1979, in an

apparent public relations effort that later saw the dissolution of the

Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party (KCP—see Appendix B), (replaced by the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, or PDK—see Appendix B) and the purported retirement of Pol Pot

to an advisory role in 1985. NADK forces consisted of former RAK

troops—large numbers of whom had escaped the 1978 to 1979 Viet- namese invasion of Cambodia—as well as conscripts coerced into

submission during the Khmer Rouge retreat and new volunteers or recruits either pressed into service during in-country raids or drawn from among refugee groups. The New York Times reported

in June 1987 that "the Khmer Rouge army is believed to be having some success in its recruitment, not only among the refugees

in its camps but within Vietnamese-controlled Cambodia." The

NADK did not make personnel figures public, but estimates by

military observers and by journalists generally ranged between

40,000 and 50,000 combatants.

In 1987 the opinion that the NADK was "the only effective fighting force" opposing the Vietnamese was more often expressed by

foreign observers. In an interview published in the United States

in May 1987, Sihanouk reportedly said, "without the Khmer

Rouge, we have no credibility on the batdefield . . . [they are] . . . the only credible military force."

During the 1980s, the Khmer Rouge leadership, composed of

party cadres who doubled as military commanders, remained fairly constant. Pol Pot retained an ambiguous but presumably prominent position in the hierarchy, although he was nominally replaced

as commander in chief of the NADK by Son Sen, who had also

been a student in Paris, and who had gone underground with him

in 1963. There were reports of factions in the NADK, such as one

269
Cambodia: A Country Study

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270
National Security

loyal to Khieu Samphan, prime minister of the defunct regime of

Democratic Kampuchea, and his deputy Ieng Sary, and another

identified with Pol Pot and Ta Mok (the Southwestern Zone com- mander who conducted extensive purges of party ranks in Cambodia in 1977 to 1978). Although led by party and military veterans,

the NADK combatants were reportedly "less experienced, less motivated, and younger" than those the Vietnamese had faced in previ- ous encounters. Nevertheless, the new Khmer Rouge recruits still were ' * hardy and lower class,

'

' and tougher than the noncommunist

combatants.

During forays into Cambodia, NADK units employed terror tactics against Khmer civilians, including murder and destruction of

economic resources. Such success as they achieved in recruiting was apparently owed to traditional Cambodian hatred of the Viet- namese invader, although there were reports that some of the

peasantry would have preferred to endure a continued Vietnamese

occupation rather than to suffer a return to Khmer Rouge rule. The Khmer Rouge divided the country into four military zones

that functioned virtually autonomously under their respective commanders. Within these four zones, three areas—the provinces

around the Tonle Sap, the western border of Cambodia, and the

remainder of the country—were sites of NADK tactical operations.

It was the first area, the heartland of Cambodia, that the NADK

viewed as the "Achilles' heel of the Vietnamese enemy," where

NADK military efforts were concentrated.

NADK units managed to keep the main routes linking Phnom

Penh to western Cambodia "in a permanent state of insecurity,"

according to a senior Vietnamese military observer; traffic to and

from the seaport of Kampong Saom was obliged to move in convoys. Both highways and railroads from the capital were interdicted

intermittently because of guerrilla activity. Officials in Phnom Penh

told a Western correspondent in 1987 that the Khmer Rouge were

then operating in small insurgent groups inside Cambodia in a battle for the villages, rather than fighting from the Thai border area,

as had been the case prior to the 1984 to 1985 Vietnamese dry- season offensive. In carrying the war to the countryside, the NADK

demonstrated that it had gone on the strategic defensive, that is, that it would adhere to a doctrine of guerrilla warfare until the

balance of forces was about equal. If this parity were to be achieved,

NADK strategists presumably would then switch to offensive operations.

In carrying on its protracted insurgency, the NADK received

the bulk of its military equipment and financing from China, which

had supported the previous regime of Democratic Kampuchea. One

271
Cambodia: A Country Study

pro-Beijing source put the level of Chinese aid to the NADK at US$1 million a month. Another source, although it did not give a breakdown, set the total level of Chinese assistance, to all the

resistance factions, at somewhere between US$60 million and

US$100 million a year. The Chinese weaponry observed in the possession of NADK

combatants included AK-47 (Automatic Kalashnikov) assault rifles, RPD light machine guns, RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) launchers, recoilless rifles, and antipersonnel mines. NADK guerrillas

usually were seen garbed in dark green Chinese fatigues and soft "Mao caps" without insignia. No markings or patches were evident on guerrilla uniforms, although the NADK had promulgated

a hierarchy of ranks with distinctive insignias in 1981.

To keep troops and supplies moving into the combat zone, the

NADK, according to Vietnamese sources, followed two infiltra- tion routes. One of them ran south from Thailand through the Dangrek Escarpment into Cambodia. The second ran north from Tra,

a minor Thai seaport that may have been an unloading point for Chinese supplies for the Khmer Rouge. In spite of substantial

Chinese material assistance, however, the NADK could not maintain the logistical supply line needed to conduct a sustained military campaign.

Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces

The Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces

(KPNLAF), the military component of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), was formed in March 1979 from

various anticommunist groups concentrated near the Thai border

with Cambodia, which were opposed to Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. Many had become essentially warlord bands, engaging more in trade and in internecine fighting than in combat operations. They were brought together by General Dien Del, a former

career officer of the Khmer Republic, who became chief of the

KPNLAF General Staff. The KPNLAF was loyal to Son Sann, a former Sihanouk

minister and the founder of the KPNLF political movement. Because of Son Sann's noncommunist credentials, the KPNLAF

offered an alternative to those Cambodians who could support

neither Hanoi nor the Khmer Rouge, and it quickly became the

second largest guerrilla force in the country. By mid- 1981, with

about 7,000 personnel under arms, it was able to protect its refugee camps and occasionally to conduct forays into Cambodia.

Two developments in the mid-1980s, however, greatly diminished KPNLAF capabilities as a fighting force. The first of these

272
273
Cambodia: A Country Study

was the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985, which

dislodged these guerrillas from their havens on the Thai-Cambodian

border. All three insurgent forces were affected by this setback,

but the KPNLAF proved less able than the others to sustain the

reversal and less flexible in adapting to new conditions. Critical sources noted that the KPNLAF had "made no significant contribution to the [1984-85] dry season fighting against the Vietnamese"

and that its combatants had been "virtually immobilized by the

loss of their camps." The second development, equally harmful

to the KPNLAF cause, was the dispute that broke out among the

top leaders. Following the loss of the border camps, contemporary

reports noted that "open revolt" had broken out among guerrilla

commanders over the "dictatorial ways" of Son Sann, who had

continued as president of the KPNLF, and his "interference in

military matters." The crisis resulted in the virtual paralysis of the

KPNLAF, and the Thai military, presumably on a temporary ad

hoc basis, took over the overall management of the insurgent force. Observers also reported that, as a result of the KPNLAF leadership dispute, members of guerrilla units had returned to the Thai

border from the Cambodian interior to await the outcome of the

controversy. There were desertions, and discipline became an in- creasingly serious problem. KPNLAF soldiers became suspect when

it was reported that gangs of Khmer bandits had attacked Thai

vehicles and buses, and had sometimes abducted or abused passengers. There had long been allegations that Khmer insurgents on the border engaged in black marketing and in other criminal

activity.

In 1987 estimates of KPNLAF strength varied widely. At the

upper limit, a widely quoted total was 14,000 personnel. In view

of the leadership dispute that debilitated the movement in 1985

and in 1986 and prevented its subsequent growth, this figure probably was a considerable exaggeration. A more realistic total was

about 8,000 combatants, and KPNLAF leaders expressed the hope

that an earnest recruitment drive then beginning might increase

the movement's strength to 18,000 by the end of the year. In accordance with its recruitment and reorganization plans, the

KPNLAF divided Cambodia into nine military regions, or operational zones. The force's chain of command was headed by a general

officer (in 1987, by General Sak Sutsakhan) who functioned as com- mander in chief. Reporting to him was a chief of staff, who exercised responsibility over four deputy chiefs of staff. Each of these

latter officers was in charge of one of four sections dealing respectively with military operations, general administration, logistical affairs, and planning/psychological operations. At the next

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National Security

subordinate echelon were two or three assistant chiefs of staff, whose

functions were undefined. Military units of the KPNLAF were

described as battalions, regiments, and brigades, operating

presumably from semi-permanent camps in inaccessible areas. Combat elements reportedly, were operating in three provinces of

western Cambodia: Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey, and

Pouthisat. Actual deployment in the latter province, long a Khmer

Rouge stronghold, however, was in question.

The KPNLAF, like the NADK, received most of its military

assistance from China. Some aid and training was granted by

ASEAN nations, however, especially by Singapore and by Malaysia. In late 1986, the Chinese reportedly delivered a shipment of

rocket launchers; this was the first time the KPNLAF was equipped

with effective antitank weapons.

KPNLAF combatants sometimes were garbed in camouflage

fatigues and combat boots, both probably of noncommunist ori- gin. At other times, they were observed, while on operations, to be wearing merely odds and ends of clothing, gleaned in refugee

camps, rather than uniforms. No rank or branch insignia were dis- cernible, but KPNLAF troops frequently wore plastic-laminated

chest pocket badges with a photo of Son Sann and the noncommunist Cambodian flag.

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste

The smaller of the two noncommunist resistance groups, the

Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste (ANS) owed allegiance to Sihanouk.

It was the armed adjunct of FUNCINPEC, which rallied Sihanouk

supporters clustered on the Thai border. The force was formed in

June 1981 , by consolidating the Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale

du Kampuchea—MOULINAKA—see Appendix B) and at least two other armed groups of Sihanouk supporters grouped on the

Thai border. These groups existed at first in conditions of near

penury, their members poorly armed and equipped as well as half

starved. Following the proclamation of the Coalition Government

of Democratic Kampuchea, international support consisting of

armaments, supplies, and other nonlethal aid, principally from the

ASEAN countries and from China, began to transform the ANS

into a more effective movement. In about 1986 to 1987, it became

the principal noncommunist insurgent force by default when the

KPNLAF slipped from that position because of its internal leadership dispute.

No authoritative figures for the personnel strength of the ANS

were available in the late 1980s. The most frequently cited totals

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Cambodia: A Country Study

ranged from a low of 7,000 to a high of 1 1,000 combatants. The

former figure was quoted by Sihanouk, the latter by Sihanouk's

son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, some time afterward. In late 1987, Sihanouk also declared that the ANS maintained "8,500

fighters permanently inside Cambodia." (This number would not

necessarily include headquarters, staff, and support elements on

the Thai border.)

The ANS was organized into a command structure and maneuver elements. The command structure was headed by the com- mander in chief of the ANS, who was assisted by both a chief and

a deputy chief of staff. In 1987 the positions of commander and

of chief of staff were held concurrently by Prince Norodom

Ranariddh, and that of deputy chief of staff by Major General

Prince Norodom Chakrapong, both middle-aged sons of Sihanouk.

Maneuver elements consisted of battalions, grouped under the first through the sixth brigades. There were, in addition, four independent regiments, at least one reportedly composed of Khmer Rouge

deserters who had rallied to Sihanouk's cause, and five independent commando groups, each composed of about seventy personnel.

Following the Vietnamese dry-season offensive of 1984 to 1985,

the ANS made a major effort to deploy its fighters away from the

border camps and more deeply into Cambodia. In 1987 according to Sihanouk, ANS combatants were deployed in five Cambodian provinces, including Batdambang and Siemreab-Otdar

Meanchey on the western border with Thailand. Limited deployments also were reported as far east as Kampong Thum.

Photographic evidence indicated that the ANS, like the

KPNLAF, was equipped principally with Chinese weapons. This

included AK assault rifles, light machine guns, RPG (rocketpropelled grenade) launchers, and recoilless rifles. ANS combatants were dressed in a panoply of uniforms, some of them of

ASEAN origin. These included camouflage fatigues and (T-shirts),

visored caps, and combat boots. Indications of rank were not evident on uniforms; however, ANS members sometimes wore plasticlaminated chest pocket badges bearing a photograph of Sihanouk

and a noncommunist Cambodian flag.

Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces

The Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed

Forces (KPRAF) constituted the regular forces of the pro-Hanoi

People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). Soon after the downfall

of the Khmer Rouge, two reasons for the necessity of such forces

became apparent to the PRK's Vietnamese mentors when they in- stalled the new Cambodian government in early 1979. First, if the

276
KPNLAF insurgents assist peasants with their

rice planting along the Thai-Cambodian border Courtesy Frank Tatu

new administration in Phnom Penh was to project internationally

the image of being a legitimate sovereign state, it would need a national army of its own apart from the Vietnamese forces. Second, if the Vietnamese army was not to have to shoulder indefinitely

its internal security mission in Cambodia, it would need to develop a Khmer military force that could be put in place as a surrogate

for Vietnamese troops. Raising such an indigenous force presented no insurmountable obstacle for Hanoi at the time because several

precedents already had been established. In Laos, the Vietnamese

armed forces maintained a close training and coordinating rela- tionship with their Laotian counterparts as a result of Hanoi's mili- tary presence in the country. In Cambodia, Vietnam had been a mainstay for Khmer communist factions since 1954. The Viet- namese army also had helped train Pol Pot's RAK and its successor, the CPNLAF, following the coup that deposed Sihanouk in

1970. More recendy, Hanoi had helped raise and train a few, probably battalion- sized, regiments of Khmer troops that had fought

alongside the Vietnamese during the invasion of Cambodia. With

further Vietnamese tutelage, these Khmer units became the nucleus

of a national army. From such ad hoc beginnings, the KPRAF

grew as a military force and eventually gained its position as an

instrument of both the party and the state. This development,

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Cambodia: A Country Study

however, was carefully shielded from the scrutiny of outsiders, and

much that could be concluded about the armed forces of the PRK

was based on analysis rather than incontrovertible hard data.

Threats and Capabilities

The major impetus for the establishment of the KPRAF was the

security threat faced by the government in Phnom Penh. Inter- nally this threat consisted of the armed insurgents belonging to the

three CGDK components. The total strength of the three forces was impossible to gauge with any precision; it may possibly have

reached between 55,000 and 75,000 combatants, but it could have

been considerably less than that figure. The insurgent forces were

incapable of mounting a sustained offensive and of massing for any

tactical operation beyond sporadic patrols in companies, because

they could not overcome their destructive factional rivalries. Least

of all were they able to bring down the Phnom Penh government.

They were capable, however, of keeping Cambodia in a permanent state of insecurity; they raised the cost to Hanoi of its large

military presence in the country; and, backed by China, they offered a persistent obstacle to the coalescence of an Hanoi-dominated

Indochinese federation.

In addition to the Khmer insurgents in Cambodia itself, the

KPRAF and the Phnom Penh government felt that they faced a

substantial external menace as well that consisted of the numerically superior Royal Thai Army, supplied by China, the United

States, and Thailand, which played host to legions of Khmer guerrillas who crossed the border to prey on KPRAF units and on PRK

assets at will. To what extent this perception was realistic was a

disputable point. Bangkok did acquiesce to the presence on Thai

soil of Khmer refugee camps, which the insurgents used for rest and recuperation. The Thai Army, however, was neither massed

nor deployed in an especially threatening posture along the border

with Cambodia; moreover, the resistance that the Thai could have

offered to a hypothetical Vietnamese offensive into Thailand was

the subject of legitimate speculation. Phnom Penh's denunciations

of alleged Thai bellicosity were made with such regularity, however,

that it was possible that the KPRAF (and the PRK) stood in some

danger of being the victims of their own propaganda concerning

Bangkok's aggressive intentions.

A lesser, but nevertheless real, threat was posed by the possibility of unauthorized landings along Cambodia's irregular and unprotected coastline. Chinese vessels could exploit this vulnerability

by putting in at secluded coves and inlets uncontrolled by the

KPRAF, and there they could unload arms and supplies for the

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insurgents. In 1987 this threat was not decisive, but it had the potential to become so, if the network of obstacles and minefields emplaced on the Cambodian border proved to be an unexpectedly

effective barrier in impeding the flow of Chinese supplies to the

Khmer guerrillas.

Along its northeastern and eastern borders with Laos and with

Vietnam, Cambodia faced no noteworthy external security threat. As long as friendly communist governments remained in power

in Vientiane, Phnom Penh, and Hanoi, their interests in protecting the inviolability of their common frontiers converged. In spite

of this, however, government control in the upland border areas of all three states probably was tenuous, and insurgent (or bandit)

groups, if not too large, could pass back and forth unhindered. The

security threat posed by such bands was vexatious but minor, and,

in the case of Cambodia, it could probably be contained by the

provincial units without requiring the intervention of the KPRAF

or of Vietnamese main forces. The capability of the KPRAF to meet the threats, real or per- ceived, arrayed against it in 1987 was open to question. Western

observers, in consensus, rated the forces of the Phnom Penh government as generally ineffectual, possessed of only a limited capability

for any combat mission. In their view, the KPRAF was overstretched and understaffed and could neither cope with the sus- tained guerrilla activity of the CGDK insurgents, nor prevent their

infiltration into Cambodia from Thailand, nor patrol the country's

extended coastline. In the face of such limitations, it was necessary to acknowledge, nevertheless, that the KPRAF had been built

literally from nothing in a war-torn and devastated country, the

population of which had been decimated previously by a brutal

dictatorship. The establishment, in the space of a few years, of a

credible force under such circumstances would have been a daunting

task for any government, let alone one so deprived of resources and of leadership and so dependent upon external support. The

most conclusive analysis that could be made about the KPRAF

was that Hanoi had laid the foundation for an indigenous Cambodian military force and, by its recurrent insistence that Vietnamese

units would be withdrawn by 1990, may have imparted to its clients in the Phnom Penh government a certain degree of urgency in

regard to developing an effective force. Organization and Control

The establishment of a legal and a bureaucratic structure for the

armed forces was concurrent with the founding of the KPRAF.

The legal basis was found in the Constitution of the PRK, which

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Cambodia: A Country Study

went through several versions before being adopted by the National

Assembly in 1981 (see The Constitution, ch. 4). Article 9 of the

Constitution acknowledges the existence of the KPRAF and notes

that its obligation is "to defend the fatherland and the revolutionary power, safeguard the revolutionary gains and the peaceful life of the people and join with the latter in national construction."

The Constitution also imposes a reciprocal obligation on the people, declaring that it is their "supreme duty and honor" to "build

and defend the fatherland," and that all citizens without respect

to gender "must serve in the armed forces as prescribed by law."

In an early draft, the Constitution had specified that the chairman of the Council of State was concurrently the supreme com- mander of the armed forces and the chairman of the National

Defense Council. In a curious deviation from the initial draft,

however, the definitive version of the Constitution omitted this key

passage. Its omission provoked speculation about the true locus

of authority over the KPRAF and fueled suspicions that the deletion could have been related to the relief, under murky circumstances, of then-chairman and armed forces head Pen Sovan. In

1987, however, supreme command of the KPRAF was vested once

again in the chairmanship of the Council of State (see Government

Structure, ch. 4).

The KPRAF was answerable to two organizations below the

Council of State, namely, the Ministry of National Defense and

the General Staff. The minister of national defense, a position es- tablished sometime in 1979, was a member of the Council of

Ministers, the executive body empowered by the Constitution "to

consolidate and develop the national defense forces; to carry out

the mobilization of the armed forces; to order curfews and take

other necessary measures for national defense." To carry out his

duties, the minister of national defense was assisted by four deputies

who oversaw, in 1987, the work of at least nine departments (see

fig. 14). The incomplete evidence available in 1987 suggested that

functions such as administration, operations, and logistics, nor- mally reserved for general staff sections in some armed forces, were

carried out at the Ministry of National Defense level. Below the Ministry of National Defense, the General Staff was

the second echelon concerned with defense and security matters

in the PRK. It was one of the earliest KPRAF organs to be established and was already in place by mid- 1979. In 1986 it was headed

by a chief of general staff, with a secretariat and four deputies, all of whose responsibilities remained obscure. The General Staff ex- ercised jurisdiction over the three components of the KPRAF: the

ground force (army), the embryonic coastal/riverine naval force,

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and the air force. It probably oversaw administratively the country's military regions and certain specialized commands, such as the Signals and Special Warfare Command. It may have exercised

operational control over some KPRAF tactical formations as well,

especially those operating autonomously, apart from Vietnamese

forces. The lines of authority delimiting General Staff responsibilities from Ministry of National Defense responsibilities appeared

to be more blurred than in some contemporary armies. This may

not have caused jurisdictional disputes, however, because, with the

paucity of military leadership, key officers sometimes served concurrently in both bodies.

Control of the KPRAF military establishment and its adherence

to the political orthodoxy of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's

Revolutionary Party (KPRP—see Appendix B) were ensured by

a party network, superimposed upon the national defense struc- ture, that extended downward to units at all echelons. Party control of the armed forces also was exercised by the assignment of

senior officers to top-echelon military and party positions with, for example, key Ministry of National Defense or General Staff officers also serving on the KPRP Central Committee. At the national level,

supervision of party work in the armed forces was entrusted to the

General Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense.

Incomplete evidence suggested the presence, among the country's

regional military commands, of political officers with small staffs or commissions at their disposal. Logically, such officers would have

kept in close contact and would have coordinated party activities in their military jurisdictions with their counterparts in KPRAF

tactical units and on party provincial committees.

During the 1980s, party activity in the KPRAF focused on building support for the "socialist revolution" in Cambodia, and on

increasing membership in all military units. In late 1984, party

goals were to establish a committee in each regiment of the provincial forces, as well as a party cell or chapter in each battalion and

in each company at the district level. This endeavor reportedly had

achieved partial success by mid- 1985. In a relentless effort to build

party membership in the KPRAF, cadres at all echelons over the

years have been urged to spot capable military personnel with potential and to induct them quickly into the party. Such appeals hinted,

that for KPRAF members, the trial or waiting period for party

acceptance was waived, and that even the act of joining may not

have been completely voluntary. KPRP officials also sought to ex- pand membership by junior officers and by KPRAF rank and file in the People's Revolutionary Youth Union of Kampuchea

(PRYUK—see Appendix B). As the party's mass organization to

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Cambodia: A Country Study

KPRAF 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

CABINET

FOUR DEPUTY

MINISTERS

GENERAL DEPARTMENTS

POLITICAL LOGISTICAL OTHER

DEPARTMENTS

ADMINISTRATION CADRE

ORGANIZATION COMBAT PLANNING FOREIGN RELATIONS PROPAGANDA

AND EDUCATION

TRAINING TECHNICAL

CHIEF OF STAFF

GENERAL STAFF

PRINCIPAL TACTICAL UNITS

DIVISIONS/ BRIGADES

179th 196th 286th

640th 688th

689th

691st

FOUR

MILITARY REGIONS

TRAINING SCHOOLS/ CENTERSPROVINCIAL/ REGIONAL FORCES (?)

Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces

Figure 14. Organization of the Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1986-87

which all young people could belong, the PRYUK was in a strong

institutional position to accept all applicants, and it could make

deeper inroads into the KPRAF than the more elitist party. In an

exhortatory message in early 1987, defense officials proudly noted

the existence of PRYUK "structures" in more than 80 percent

of the armed forces, and they acknowledged a debt of gratitude

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to the mass organization for occupying the forefront of a national

effort to induce Khmer youth to serve in the KPRAF.

When considering the dynamics of the KPRAF, the possibility

of factionalism should at least be considered. In some armies,

this factionalism may take the form of interservice rivalry, of the

coalescence of groups around certain leaders, or of shared commonalities, such as military schooling, unit affiliation, or combat

experience. In the case of the KPRAF, it is unlikely that such fac- tionalism existed. Vietnamese advisers, for example, present at all KPRAF echelons, would have detected such activity at an early

stage and would have suppressed it promptly, because it would have

detracted from the building of an effective Khmer fighting force,

which it was the Vietnamese army's mission to develop.

Interservice rivalry also could be dismissed as a cause of factionalism in the KPRAF for the time being. The ground forces clearly were the dominant service both by size and by seniority. The

coastal/riverine naval force and the air force were newly established;

very small in numbers, they were not in a position to challenge

the primacy of the larger service, despite the possibility of some

elitism engendered by their more technical orientation.

The composition of the KPRAF officer corps also militated

against the rise of factionalism. As members of a comparatively

small armed force, the officers were relatively few in number and

were subject to a system of rotational assignments, which bred

familiarity with a variety duties. The consequent personnel interchangeability presumably prevented the creation of warlord fiefs and the development of inordinate personal loyalties within the mili- tary establishment. As is true of the military elite in other small,

undeveloped countries, KPRAF officers were personally known to one another, and they were thoroughly acquainted with one

another's family and political antecedents. This network of per- sonal and family relationships, always important in Asia, may have

fostered a spirit of cooperation rather than competitiveness;

moreover, the ubiquity—the perhaps even suffocating presence—of

Vietnamese military advisers also may have been sufficient inducement for Khmer personnel to submerge whatever differences existed

among them.

The final factor that may have inhibited the rise of factions within

the KPRAF was the range of options available to its dissident officers and to its enlisted troops. Unlike the armed forces in other Third

World countries, where disaffected military personnel had little choice but to plot coups or to swallow their resentments, KPRAF

personnel could (and many did) simply walk away from their military commitments and join the anti-Vietnamese insurgents, which

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Cambodia: A Country Study

had policies of welcoming KPRAF defectors. If they exercised this option, they had an additional choice: they could join the communist NADK, the nationalist KPNLAF, or the royalist ANS. For

the armed forces of the Phnom Penh government, this range of

options meant that those personnel who remained in the KPRAF

did so voluntarily because of common purpose and loyalty to the

institution or the regime. Although in the short term this dynamic

may have had a purgative effect on the KPRAF, ensuring its ideological purity, it was based on Khmer acquiescence to the continued

Vietnamese domination of the PRK and of its armed forces. Whether or not continued acceptance of this domination would long

prevail in the face of Khmer nationalism among military personnel remained debatable.

Although logic might argue against the existence of factions in

the KPRAF, the case is not entirely one-sided. It could be noted,

after all, that Cambodia since 1970 has been subjected to cataclysmic

events that have produced deep cleavages within Khmer society

and that may well have been reflected in the armed forces themselves. In the KPRAF, even among personnel who had chosen not

to join the insurgents, it was possible to note a variety of backgrounds; there were ex-Khmer Rouge turncoats, Vietnamese supporters, former royalists, and a younger generation ofjunior officers and of men without political antecedents. Although it could not

be proved by outside observers, it could be inferred that factions

in the KPRAF might have coalesced around such shared former

political loyalties, affiliations, or backgrounds. If this were the case, such coalescence could take several forms in the future: either there

could be a hardening of factional lines as the KPRAF itself becomes

more entrenched as an institution of the PRK, or as stated at the

outset, Vietnam, in its role of mentor to the armed forces of the

Phnom Penh government, could keep a tight rein on the KPRAF

and could forcibly prevent its polarization around internal factions.

Mission and Doctrine

In the late 1980s, the KPRAF had several missions. Some were

implicit in Cambodia's situation; others were prescribed in the Constitution. Foremost were the duties to defend the nation from for- eign aggression, to safeguard the gains of the Marxist revolution

in Cambodia, and to ensure domestic security by engaging in combat against insurgents and against domestic foes as determined by

the government and the party. In addition to the combat role that was part of their internal security responsibilities, the KPRAF also

engaged in propaganda activity on behalf of the government, performed various civic action tasks, and participated in economic

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production. Because of the poverty of the country, and because

the defense budget was not sufficient to meet KPRAF's needs, the

KPRAF had to help pay its own way by generating income. In

the 1980s, its efforts were limited to growing vegetables and rais- ing poultry and livestock for military use, but, in the future, they

could include manufacturing commodities and processing raw

materials in military-owned factories.

To accomplish its combat missions, the KPRAF developed its own military doctrine. Although not available in written form to Western observers, this doctrine could be inferred from the Constitution, from the circumstances in Cambodia, and from the dynamics of the Vietnamese military establishment which had acted

as mentor and as role model for the KPRAF from its inception.

In both the KPRAF and the Vietnamese army there was no doctrinal dichotomy between civilian society and the military establishment as there is in most Western nations. Everyone was

potentially a member of the armed forces; in Cambodia as in Vietnam, there were total mobilization of the population and total dedication of whatever resources the nation could muster in order to achieve the military goals the government or the party wished to formulate. The total involvement of the Cambodian population

in warfare was enshrined doctrinally in the constitutional statement

that "the people as a whole participate in national defense." Because of the security imperatives faced by the Phnom Penh government in fighting a persistent insurgency, virtually the entire

able-bodied population was organized into various military and

paramilitary bodies. This doctrinal concept worked well defensively

when patriotism could be invoked to rally a population against a

foreign invader or against a real or fancied, but easily understood,

external threat. It worked less well when used to rally indigenous

support for a foreign occupier, as the Phnom Penh regime had to do for Vietnam. Hanoi, therefore, incessantly evoked the specter

of the return of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge to induce the Cambodian population to join the KPRAF, and through active per- sonal involvement, to render unflinching support to the PRK.

The KPRAF probably was also subject to other doctrinal in- fluences from the military establishments of Vietnam and, ulti- mately, the Soviet Union, which maintained a substantial advisory

presence with the Vietnamese armed forces and a smaller one with

the KPRAF. The relevance of the military doctrine of the large

armies of the Soviet Union and of Vietnam to the small, questionably trained and equipped KPRAF remained speculative, however,

especially in the counterinsurgency environment of Cambodia.

Soviet advisers, directly or through Vietnamese counterparts, may

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Cambodia: A Country Study

have relayed their experiences in Afghanistan and they may have

advised on measures for countering Chinese or Western equipment

and weapons, on methods of controlling or suborning the population, and on means of employing weapons and weapons systems

such as artillery, helicopters, and land mines. Vietnamese advisers,

focusing on their army's neutralization of insurgent base camps

on the Thai border—through large-scale operations supported by

indirect fire—in the dry season offensive of 1984 and 1985, may

have unwittingly imparted to their Cambodian understudies a

predilection for this tactical doctrine.

Composition and Deployment

Cambodia was divided geographically into four KPRAF military regions (see fig. 15). These regions originally bore numbers

assigned by the Vietnamese to conform to the system used by the

People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN—see Appendix B). In the

mid-1980s they were renumbered to present, at least, the illusion,

of their autonomy from the Vietnamese armed forces. Little was known conclusively about the functions of the military regions, especially about the operational control exercised by their headquarters over KPRAF tactical units and missions. It was possible that

their responsibilities were restricted to administrative tasks, such

as conscription, training, economic production, and coordination

with Vietnamese military units and advisers.

Below the level of military region headquarters, the KPRAF was composed of three types of units: main or regular forces, provincial or regional forces, and village militia or local forces. Official

strength figures were lacking in 1987, but the main and provincial

forces together may have numbered more than 40,000 troops. It was the intention of the KPRAF's Vietnamese mentors to build a reliable Khmer force of between 30,000 and 50,000 personnel,

presumably by about 1990, by which date Vietnamese units were

to be withdrawn.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, KPRAF regular or main force units

consisted of seven understrength infantry divisions, several independent infantry brigades and regiments, as many as four tank battalions, and combat support formations, such as engineer battalions.

The forerunners of all these units were several Khmer battalions

raised by Hanoi in 1978 as it prepared for the invasion of Cambodia. In approximately 1980, the battalions were reorganized

into four brigades, each one posted to one of the four Cambodian provinces of Batdambang, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey,

Kampong Spoe, and Kampong Cham. In these areas, the brigades

performed static defense tasks, and they occasionally participated

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with Vietnamese forces in joint operations against the insurgents.

As conscription and voluntary enlistments brought more personnel into the KPRAF, the four brigades were upgraded to infantry

divisions, and two additional divisions were founded.. In spite of

such apparent progress in force development, however, all units

remained chronically understrength, according to Western observers. In the mid-to-late- 1980s, KPRAF authorities deployed

much of their main force strength semipermanently in western

Cambodia, and division headquarters were reported to have been

established in Batdambang City, in Treng, and in Sisophon in Bat- dambang Province. There was little agreement among observers on unit designations or on the movements of main force units below

division level within Cambodia, or on the extent to which such

Khmer units were able to operate independently of Vietnamese

forces. Equipment for the main force units was furnished by Vietnam

and by the Soviet Union. Armaments consisted of small arms of

Soviet origin, including the AKM (updated version of the AK-47)

assault rifle and various crew-served weapons, including towed

medium howitzers, and air-defense weapons in several calibers.

Tanks in the KPRAF armored battalions included the T-54/55, an old, but capable, main battle tank of Soviet origin; the obsoles- cent PT-76 light amphibious tank; and the Type-59, an older

Chinese main battie tank, probably handed down from Vietnamese

stocks. Armored fighting vehicles in the main force inventory consisted of the Soviet BTR series of wheeled vehicles, and some aging

American equipment—such as V-100 armored cars and M-113

armored personnel carriers—either bequeathed by Vietnam or left behind from the days of the Khmer Republic (see table 16,

Appendix A).

The provincial/regional forces were second echelon troops, ranked

below main force regulars in capability, in sustainability, and in

equipment. The forerunners of the provincial forces were Khmer

units that were raised hastily in 1979. They were composed of defectors or refugees who were pressed into service by the Vietnamese

in their invasion of Cambodia. The units numbered perhaps 100

personnel each, and they were allocated, one per province, to accompany officials of the newly proclaimed government in Phnom

Penh as they filled the places left vacant by the Khmer Rouge and

set up provincial administrations. To extend the government

presence to the districts, some provincial units were broken down

into platoons or squads and were dispatched to accompany newly

appointed district officials. At this time, the provincial forces were

merely adjuncts of the Vietnamese occupation forces; they were

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Cambodia: A Country Study

Source: Based on information from "The Military Occupation of Kampuchea," Indochina

Report, Singapore, No. 3, July-September 1985.

Figure 15. Military Regions, 1987

untrained, and they had few capabilities beyond those needed to provide rudimentary passive defense to their provincial or district administrations.

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National Security

In 1987 little authoritative information was available on the

deployment and the total strength of the Cambodian provincial

forces. If the KPRAF followed the examples of its Vietnamese and

Laotian counterparts, however, troops for provincial units were

raised from among local residents and were deployed exclusively

in their home provinces. Such practices may have given these forces an edge, in recruitment and in morale, over their main force counterparts because village youths generally preferred to serve their

military obligation closer to home. In a counterinsurgency like the one in Cambodia, provincial forces also could have had an advantage because of their greater knowledge of the area of operations

and of local conditions, both friendly and hostile. An early goal of the government in Phnom Penh was to raise

two battalions of provincial forces per province. Given the manpower limitations of the nation, a more realistic goal would have

been a single battalion per province. In 1987 Western analysts believed that the latter goal had been achieved and had even been

exceeded in some provinces on the Thai border, where the insurgent threat was greatest. It continued to be impossible to gauge

the overall strength of the provincial forces with any accuracy, but

based on an estimate of 1 battalion per province in general, with

2 to 4 battalions per border province, a figure of 10,000 personnel

may have been realistic. The connections among the provincial forces and the Ministry

of National Defense and the KPRAF General Staff were unclear.

At subordinate echelons, however, provincial units were responsible to a local military committee. This committee was composed

of the chairman, the military commander and his deputy, and a

small staff headed by a chief of staff. The military committee re- ported to the provincial committee of the mass organization of the

KPRP, the Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National

Construction and Defense (KUFNCD—see Appendix B). The

KUFNCD coordinated military affairs with the corresponding party

and government committees at each organizational level. It was

assumed, although unproved, that the provincial forces, irrespective of intervening committees, kept in close touch with KPRAF

main force units and headquarters, and with Vietnamese military

garrisons in the vicinity.

The provincial forces had two missions, military and political.

In the performance of the former, some Western analysts hypothesized that the provincial units at last might have broken their dependency on their Vietnamese military mentors and have learned

to operate by themselves. This premise might hold true if the provincial forces were deployed only in their home provinces, as suspected,

and if the insurgents continued to be unable to mass large units.

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Cambodia: A Country Study

In the performance of their political mission, the provincial forces were expected by the government to play an important role be- cause they were closer to the people than were the regular forces. This role included both propaganda work and psychological

warfare. Propaganda work involved building the loyalty of provincial residents both to government and to party as well as indoctrination in KPRP orthodoxy and in Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Psychological warfare involved measures taken against the enemy,

such as inducements to defect, arousal of hatred against them, and

neutralization of their propaganda appeals.

The third echelon in the KPRAF consisted of the village militia, or local forces. This armed force originated in the 1979 to 1980

period, when directives by the party and the newly proclaimed

government mandated the raising of a militia in each village and

subdistrict. This objective coincided with the desire of the Viet- namese military authorities to create small local force units in the

rural communities along the Thai-Cambodian border, thereby

transforming these frontier settlements into combat hamlets that

would help to keep the insurgents at bay. According to instructions relayed to village authorities, former officials and soldiers of

the defunct Democratic Kampuchea regime were to be excluded

from the militia, and preference was to be given to recruiting former

Khmer Rouge victims. This recruitment policy initially was quite

successful, as there was no dearth of Cambodians who had either

grievances against the previous regime or the simple desire to protect their homes and their villages from attack by Khmer Rouge

guerrillas. In some localities, former soldiers of the Khmer Republic

who had escaped the purges of Democratic Kampuchea were able

to dominate the militia. In others, local peasants without political

antecedents were in the majority. Villages were able eventually to raise militia forces of ten to twenty personnel each, while subdistricts mustered fifteen to thirty personnel. In virtually all cases, militia members were ill-trained and ill-equipped, possessing only

Soviet small arms from Vietnam, or hand-me-down United States weapons provided years before to the Khmer Republic.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, party and military authorities were at- tempting to consolidate the militia. Indirect evidence suggested that,

among the Cambodian citizenry, enthusiasm for joining the local forces had waned considerably since the early years of the decade.

Militia units were formed throughout the country, nevertheless, even in the hamlets, in the individual factories, and in the solidarity groups working in the rice fields, in some cases. Some units

had offensive missions to search out guerrilla bands in their localities and to destroy them, or at least to report their movement

to higher military authorities. On the Thai border, the militia

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participated in Project K-5. The militia also had the duties of

patrolling and protecting this barrier. Away from the frontier,

however, the local forces generally were oriented defensively and,

according to official Cambodian sources, were "entrusted with the

duty of defending production, communication lines, production

sites, rubber plantations, fishing grounds, forest exploitation areas, and so on." In all of their duties, the militia units reported to local party and government committees, which in turn were responsible for the recruitment, indoctrination, and training of militia members. Some financial support from the central government, however,

may have been available to local authorities to raise militia units

within their jurisdictions. In addition to their military and security duties, militia members were expected to participate in economically productive activities and to make their units as self-sufficient as possible.

Aside from the three levels of the KPRAF that were essentially

ground forces, the military establishment included a small riverine and coastal navy. This latter force consisted of one battalion,

of undisclosed strength, which had the mission of patrolling the

Tonle Sap (Great Lake) and the Tonle Sab—a river emanating

from the Tonle Sap—between the lake and Phnom Penh. To ac- complish its mission, the riverine navy was equipped with at least three patrol craft, each armed with turret-mounted 75mm guns

and with twin open-mounted 20mm guns. The force possessed at least one landing craft with a modest lift capability of about one

platoon at a time. The commander of the riverine navy served concurrently on the KPRAF General Staff, where he may have per- formed the functions of a naval chief of staff. An embryonic air defense corps or air force was being reconstituted in the mid-to-late 1980s, after having been defunct since

the days of the Khmer Republic. Cambodian pilots and technicians were in training in the Soviet Union; some already had

returned home. Thai sources reported that about forty

MiG-21/FISHBED fighter aircraft were either on order or already

in the inventory. The delivery or order of Mi-8/HIP transport

helicopters was also reported, but not verified, as of late 1987.

Conditions of Service

Military service was compulsory in the People's Republic of

Kampuchea. Cambodian males between the ages of eighteen and

thirty-five faced an obligation to serve in the armed forces for five years, an increase from three years was made in 1985 because of

personnel shortages in the country. Recruitment councils made up

of party and government officials existed at all administrative levels;

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Cambodia: A Country Study

they may have performed functions, principally the selection of eligible youths to be inducted into the military services, similar to those

of local United States Selective Service Boards. The establishment

of these recruitment councils may have supplanted the earlier press- gang tactics of KPRAF units who, according to refugee accounts,

had forcibly rounded up Khmer youths and had inducted them

en masse into the armed forces. In spite of this bureaucratic innovation, however, draft dodging was reported to be widespread, a

situation that was acknowledged obliquely by the government and

party media in their unrelenting emphasis on recruitment and on

the patriotic duty of serving in the armed forces. It was not known

whether or not Khmer youths themselves could elect to serve in

the main, provincial, or local force, or whether or not a quota sys- tem prevailed.

Women as well as men were eligible for military service. A party

organ reported authoritatively in the early 1980s that the KPRAF

was composed of "cadres and male and female combatants," and

"our people's sons and daughters." Women were heavily represented in the local forces, according to official disclosures, which

stated that in 1987 more than 28,000 were enrolled in militia units

and that more than 1 , 200 had participated in the construction of

frontier fortifications on the Thai-Cambodian border. The presence

of women in the provincial and in the main forces, however, could

not be verified.

The KPRAF, with the aid of its Vietnamese and Soviet advisers,

made a considerable effort to establish a network of military schools

and training centers for its personnel. In the early 1980s, about

thirteen such institutions were reported to be already in existence.

Two of the better known schools in Phnom Penh were the Engineering School and the Technical School. Each of these schools enrolled

about 300 students, in curricula lasting one year. The Engineering School, located in the former Cambodian military academy,

offered courses in radio, telecommunications, topography, map

reading, mechanics, and civil and military engineering. Successful completion of courses at the Engineering School qualified graduates for the Technical School (not to be confused with the civilian

Kampuchean—USSR Friendship Technical Institute). The Technical School offered military science subjects, such as weapons and

tactics, a higher level than those given by the Engineering School.

Both institutions offered language instruction in Vietnamese

and in Russian as well as heavy doses of ideology. In Phnom Penh,

there also was an Infantry School, presumably for junior offi- cers in the KPRAF; a Political School to train party cadre for the

armed forces; a military medical school; and a school for logistics.

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Promising graduates of the KPRAF school system had the chance

to go abroad for further military education. In the mid-1980s, about

1,000 KPRAF officers had been sent to schools and to training

centers in Vietnam, and an additional 500 were being trained in

the Soviet Union. This international military education and training

program, as well as the entire network of service schools, was believed to be administered by the Training Department of the

KPRAF General Staff, which issued specialized training directives

in the name of the Ministry of National Defense to subordinate

echelons down to the local force level. Below national level, each KPRAF military region had its own

training schools, and Cambodian youths who joined the armed

forces were believed to receive their initial military training in such

institutions. Instruction reportedly covered political, military, tactical, and vocational subjects. According to a training directive is- sued in 1984, provincial and local forces were ordered to stress unit

training and to vary these instructions with actual combat patrols

and operations. Local commanders also were directed to conduct

drills for cadres and combatants, to arrange for training areas and

materials, to select qualified training officers, to develop training

schedules, and to select personnel for course enrollment.

Recent data on pay and allowances in the KPRAF were lacking. In the early 1980s, military salaries for common soldiers

amounted to the riel (for the value of the riel—see Glossary) equivalent of three to four dollars a month. This was supplemented by

a rice ration of sixteen to twenty-two kilograms a month, supplied

at the concessionary rate of one riel per kilogram. Local com- manders at all echelons were enjoined to ensure the timely distri- bution of pay and of rations to all personnel under their jurisdiction.

Soldiers in permanent garrisons were expected to supplement their

meager salaries by planting individual or unit vegetable gardens

and by raising poultry or livestock wherever possible. On the home

front, the care of veterans and of military dependents whose sponsors were away on active service was decentralized and entrusted

to the solidarity groups (krom samaki) and to various party and

government committees at the local level. A system of military justice existed in the KPRAF, but its functional details were unknown. The Constitution provides for military tribunals, and the KPRAF maintained a network of military

prisons. At the national level, the principal military prison was T-l

located in the Tuol Sleng area of Phnom Penh. Administrators of

T-l reported to the Ministry of National Defense. Other military

prisons existed in the four military regions of the KPRAF, and

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Table B. Branch Insignia of the Kampuchean, or Khmer,

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987

Branch Insignia

A • T? Air Force Wing on a star Armored Tank

Artillery Crossed cannon barrels Lmemical Chemistry sign (retort?) Cultural Musical notes

XJllclllCvl T-Tali licui iaex g^ai crparprl wKf^l wiittij prrwQpH u uoo^u qKiovpI oiiuvti aiiu q nrl rnpk u i >x Infantry AK assault rifle on a star Judge Advocate Shield with stars and crossed swords Medical Red cross on a white disk Military Band Trumpet

Navy Anchor

Quartermaster AK assault rifle with star and rice sheaves Radar Radar mounted on a truck Transportation Steering wheel over spring shock absorber

Source: Based on information from Kangtap Padevat (Revolutionary Army), 1 July 1987.

possibly at the provincial level as well. Military police of the KPRAF

served as guards and as administrators of the military penal system.

Military uniforms in the KPRAF were worn by the main and

by the provincial forces, although apparently not by the militia.

In general, these uniforms resembled those of Vietnam and the

Soviet Union. Battle dress for the soldiers consisted of green or khaki fatigues, with Soviet- style soft campaign hats (such as the

Soviet Army wore in Afghanistan), or visored caps with a cloth

chin strap. Although not part of the uniform, soldiers on an operation widely wore the krama, a checkered scarf knotted loosely about

the neck. Junior officers serving on staff duty or attending service

schools in Phnom Penh wore khaki shirts with ties, brown trousers, and the round service cap. The cap device for all ranks consisted of a five-towered, stylized rendition of Angkor Wat on a red

field, surrounded by a wreath. The device for senior ranks showed more elaborate gold ornamentation around the wreath. The

KPRAF owned a garment factory in Phnom Penh, and it may have

produced at least some of the uniforms it needed at this facility.

The KPRAF also authorized a system of rank and branch insignia in July 1987. Although photographic evidence was lacking, these

insignia were believed to resemble closely those of the Vietnamese

army; they were worn on collar tabs of varying colors: scarlet for

the army, dark blue for the navy, and sky blue for the air force

(see table B). These branch insignia were worn by personnel up

to the rank of deputy platoon commander. Platoon commanders

to deputy regimental commanders wore rank insignia on collar tabs

with silver borders; regimental commanders to deputy chiefs of

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military regions wore similar insignia with golden borders. Senior

officers from military region commander to deputy defense minister wore collar tabs with a golden dragon surrounded by an ornate

border on a maroon background.

After coming to power, the PRK instituted an array of awards

and decorations for individuals, military units, and other organizations which performed noteworthy services for the party and the

state. Identified awards or decorations included the Order of Angkor, the Fatherland Defense Order (first and second class), the Victory Medal (first, second, and third class), the National Defense

Medal (first, second, and third class), and the Labor Medal. In

addition to these medals, a number of citations, banners, and

streamers were awarded by various government ministries, including the Ministry of National Defense, to both individuals and

organizations for meritorious or distinguished performance of duty.

Foreign Troops and Advisers

In the late 1980s, Vietnamese units stationed in Cambodia

represented a military force that had broken away from its revolutionary tradition and had become an army of occupation, a dramatic role change in view of the fact that its most formidable

adversaries, the Khmer Rouge, were fellow communists and former

allies. Consistendy designated by Hanoi as "the Vietnamese volunteer army in Kampuchea," the Vietnamese force, comprising some

ten to twelve divisions, was made up of conscripts who supported

a "regime of military administration."

Military units totalling as many as 200,000 troops invaded Cambodia at the end of 1978 to eradicate the Khmer Rouge regime

of Democratic Kampuchea and to install a more pliant government

in Phnom Penh. After several years, Vietnam ostensibly began to decrease the size of its military contingent in Cambodia. The first recorded, but unannounced, withdrawal occurred in June 1981,

when Vietnam's 137th Division returned home. In July 1982,

Hanoi announced publicly that as an "act of goodwill" it would

withdraw an unspecified number of troops from Cambodia. These

withdrawals became annual occurrences. In 1986 Vietnamese

sources announced a pullout of 12,000 troops. In November 1987, an additional 20,000 Vietnamese military personnel were withdrawn. These retrenchments were conducted with considerable publicity and fanfare, including departure ceremonies in Phnom Penh

and featuring medals for commanders and citations for units. Skeptics, however, contended that these movements were merely troop

rotations. A 1987 study conducted by Chulalongkorn University

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in Bangkok reached the same conclusion, after its researchers in- terviewed groups of Vietnamese defectors.

Hanoi publicly committed itself to withdraw its occupation forces

by 1990. It first announced this decision following an August 1985

meeting of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian foreign ministers.

The commitment to a pullout engendered continuing discussion,

both by foreign observers and by Indochinese participants. What

emerged was the clarifying qualification that a total Vietnamese

military withdrawal was contingent upon the progress of pacification in Cambodia and upon the ability of the KPRAF to contain

the insurgent threat without Vietnamese assistance. Prime Minister

Hun Sen declared in a May 1987 interview that "if the situation

evolves as is, we are hopeful that by 1990 all Vietnamese troops

will be withdrawn . . . [but] if the troop withdrawal will be taken

advantage of, we will have to negotiate to take appropriate measures. . . Shortly thereafter, a KPRAF battalion commander

told a Phnom Penh press conference that "Vietnamese forces could

remain in Cambodia beyond 1990, if the Khmer Rouge resistance

continues to pose a threat." In an interview with a Western cor- respondent, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach

repeated the 1990 withdrawal pledge, insisting that only foreign

military intervention could convince Hanoi to change its plans.

Some ASEAN and Western observers greeted declarations of a total pullout by 1990 with incredulity. Departing Vietnamese units

reportedly left equipment behind in Cambodia, and it was suggested

that they easily could return if it looked as though a province might

be lost. As Hanoi's military presence in Cambodia approached its ninth

year, it appeared that the Vietnamese troops stationed there were

not frontline veterans. Most of Vietnam's main force units and

its best troops were deployed in the Red River Delta or on Vietnam's northern border to contain any armed threat from China.

Units in Cambodia were composed of conscripts from the southern

provinces of Vietnam, or, according to refugee accounts, of military misfits and "troublemakers." Some Vietnamese defectors in

Thailand declared that they had volunteered for military service

to get out of Vietnam and to have an opportunity for resettlement

in third countries.

Vietnam's presence in Cambodia reportedly consumed 40 to 50

percent of Hanoi's military budget. Although substantial portions

of the cost had been underwritten by Soviet grant aid, Vietnamese

troops in Cambodia apparendy were on short rations. Radio Hanoi

reportedly commented on troops "dressed in rags, puritanically

fed, and mostly disease ridden." The parlous state of Vietnamese

296
International solidarity: a Cambodian repairman fixes the motorbike of a Vietnamese soldier at a Phnom Penh curbside. Courtesy Bill Herod

forces in Cambodia also was the subject of a report by the director

of an Hanoi military medical institute. According to media ac- counts, the report acknowledged that Vietnamese troops in the

country suffered from widespread and serious malnutrition and that

beriberi occurred in epidemic proportions.

The Vietnamese military headquarters in Cambodia was located

at Chamka Morn in Phnom Penh. In the mid-1980s, it was responsible to the Vietnamese Fourth Corps commander, at that time

General Le Due Anh (subsequentiy promoted to minister of national defense). Vietnamese military authorities divided Cambodia into four military regions. These areas probably coincided with

KPRAF regions. Each of these regions, in turn, corresponded to a Vietnamese military front that exercised tactical responsibility over it. The four Vietnamese military fronts were Front 479, headquartered at Barai Toek Thla Airport, Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey

Province; Front 579, at Stoeng Treng City, Stoeng Treng Province;

Front 779, at the Chhupp rubber plantation, Kampong Cham

Province; and Front 979, at Somrong Tong, Kampong Spoe

Province. Front 479 was considered the most critical because of

heavy insurgent activity in the area. A Special Military Administrative Zone was also created, comprising the vital heartland of

the country around the Tonle Sap and the alluvial plain to the

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southeast. The relationship of the zone to the military regions and

to the fronts was undetermined. Along the Cambodian coast, the

Vietnamese established another type of military jurisdiction. Naval

Zone Five comprised the shore lines of Kaoh Kong and Kampot

provinces and their contiguous territorial waters. The headquarters of the naval zone was at Kampong Saom.

Vietnamese military advisers also were detached to serve with

KPRAF main and provincial forces down to the battalion, and

perhaps even the company, level. The functions and the chain of

command of these advisers remained unknown, except that it could

be assumed that they reported to the Vietnamese military region

or front headquarters.

Law Enforcement and Countersubversion

People's Security Service

Law enforcement was the responsibility of the minister of interior, who, as a member of the Council of Ministers, was charged

by the Constitution "to protect the interests of the people, preserve

security and public order and protect the legal rights and interests

of the citizens." To carry out these functions, the ministry exercised control over its own corps of plainclothes police and over the

People's Security Service. In the late 1980s, nothing was known

publicly about the ministry's agents, except that they fulfilled countersubversion responsibilities and that they may have been advised

by Vietnamese and by German Democratic Republic (East German) personnel. In 1987 the People's Security Service consisted

of a plainclothes branch and a uniformed police force called the

Nokorbal (civil police). Total personnel strength was undisclosed.

Day-to-day administration of the entire organization was carried

out by the deputy minister of interior, under whom People's Security Service staff functions were carried out by fifteen departments

or bureaus. Some of these subministerial offices, such as the traffic and the criminal police bureaus, performed routine law-enforcement

functions. Others rendered support services, such as internal administration and supply, and still others fulfilled countersubversion responsibilities. Among the latter were the political ideologybureau, which performed loyalty checks on party cadres; the political security bureau, which arrested persons suspected of politi- cal offenses: and an internal defense bureau, or unit, which

investigated government ministries and offices. In Phnom Penh itself, police were organized into seven precinct

or ward offices, with an additional thirteen precincts in the greater

capital area. In the mid-1980s, the chief of the Phnom Penh police

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served concurrently as the deputy minister of interior. The organizational functions of the capital police staff approximately replicated

those of the Ministry of Interior at the national level. Observers

identified fourteen different bureaus, dealing with political security,

interrogation, political ideology, internal defense, clandestine in- vestigations, case analysis, organization/appointments, supply,

forensics/polytechnics, administration, statistical, defense police

(embassy and government building security guards), firefighting,

and traffic control. A defecting police official estimated that arrests in the capital for both political and criminal offenses averaged about

100 per month in the 1980s.

At the provincial level, police authority was vested in a chief of

the People's Security Service who was responsible to the KUFNCD

provincial committee and, through channels, to the Ministry of

Interior. The police sought to maintain a physical presence at least as far down as the district level and, where possible, as far down

as the commune level. Police officials in the countryside were

responsible both to their local party and government committees

and to law-enforcement authorities at the next higher echelon. In

areas without a police presence, law-enforcement responsibilities

devolved upon local party or government officials. Police control of the population outside the cities was assisted

by a pass system. Such passes were issued by local committees and

were required for travel among villages, districts, and provinces.

Frequent checkpoints by police and by military personnel along

principal routes ensured compliance by travelers. Violators of the

pass system were subjected to brief incarceration upon being ap- prehended and to heightened surveillance upon returning home.

According to defectors, however, checkpoint personnel were sus- ceptible to bribery.

Protection under the Law

The protection of all Cambodians by the law is guaranteed by

the 1981 Constitution, which declares that the state "recognizes

and respects human rights" and that it protects "the honor, dignity and life of its citizens" (see The Constitution, ch. 4). In the

mid-1980s, lawyers in the Ministry ofJustice had published some

legal texts and statutes, but by late 1987, it was not possible to verify

the existence of a comprehensive criminal and civil code. Decreelaws promulgated in 1980 paid considerable attention to political

offenses, and they prescribed five levels of punishment for such

crimes. A first-level offense, such as aiding or abetting an individual

known to be "a traitor to the revolution," was punishable by two

to seven years' imprisonment. A second-level offense, such as

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Cambodia: A Country Study

subversion or economic sabotage, was punishable by imprisonment

for between five and ten years. Third-level offenses, which included

the crime of taking up arms against the state, were punishable by

five to fifteen years' imprisonment. A fourth-level offense, defined

as plotting to overthrow the state or committing " treason against

the revolution," and punishable by ten to twenty years' imprisonment. Fifth-level offenses, which included compounded acts of se- dition by individuals in positions of authority, acts of rebellion by

insurgent leaders, and acts of spying by operatives who maintained

espionage networks carried sentences of twenty years to life imprisonment and even the death penalty. A further decree-law,

promulgated around 1983, also addressed crimes against the state, such as treason, but included common-law offenses, such as murder,

rape, and theft. Penalties for political crimes generally remained

the same as they were in the earlier law. For common-law crimes

such as murder, however, offenders were subject to ten to twenty

years' imprisonment; for aggravated assault, six months to ten

years; for rape, two to five years; for rape followed by murder,

twenty years to life with the possibility of a death sentence. People

convicted of theft were subject to confinement for a period of six months to fifteen years. Former Khmer Rouge cadres who were

convicted of outrageous crimes against humanity faced the death

sentence. Such sentences, however, had to be approved by the

Council of State (see Government Structure, ch. 4).

The first courts in the PRK were the people's revolutionary courts

set up almost on an ad hoc basis by the Kampuchean People's

Revolutionary Council in 1979. Establishment of a more institu- tionalized system took place in approximately 1983. At this time, a network of courts was extended to each province and municipality. Officers of each court included a president, one or two vice

presidents, and a judge. A reporting channel presumably connected

these local courts to the Ministry of Justice, but, as of late 1987,

its existence had not been confirmed. Similarly, a People's Supreme

Court, evidently under the Ministry ofJustice, was established in

the early 1980s, but its functions continued to be obscure.

The independence of the judiciary at all levels remained in question. According to a 1982 decree-law, the purpose of the courts was to uphold the policies of the government. Officers of the court were appointed by local party and government committees with

the apparent concurrence of the Ministry of Justice. Court offi- cials thus were responsible to the committees that recruited them.

The power to arrest and to detain for political or for criminal

offenses was quite widespread among government bodies. It ex- tended from the agents of the Ministry of Interior to the People's

300
Divided loyalties:

A Phnom Penh policeman

minds his child while

guarding a hotel. Courtesy Bill Herod

Security Service and to the military units of the main, provincial,

and local forces. Refugee and defector accounts indicate that sus- picion rather than evidence frequently sufficed to cause the arrest of a suspect. A 1987 Amnesty International report stated that ar- rested individuals were denied information about the charges against

them and were frequendy imprisoned without trial. Detention routinely was followed by interrogation, accompanied by repeated beatings and by torture. In an effort to correct the most flagrant of these

abuses, the government promulgated its decree-law of March 12,

1986. According to Amnesty International, this statute "codifies

and modifies non-legislative instructions against torture, rules on

search procedures and regulations concerning powers of arrest and

length of detention for interrogation." Amnesty International fur- ther observed that this was "the first PRK law to address issues

directly related to human rights in these areas."

Accused persons were accorded relatively few constitutional

safeguards. They had the right to a defense counsel, but they could

represent themselves. Fragmentary information reaching Amnesty

International demonstrated that individual guilt or innocence

especially that relating to political crimes—was not decided on the

basis of judicial proceedings, but was determined beforehand by

the arresting authorities following interrogation. Guilty persons then were sentenced administratively without due process. In the few

cases brought to trial, the court confined itself to ratifying the

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Cambodia: A Country Study

sentence already decided upon behind the scenes. Defendants who

were dissatisfied with a court ruling theoretically had the right to appeal, but the procedures remained unclarified, and the role of

the People's Supreme Court as the final arbiter of judicial decisions was unknown.

Penal System

Individuals sentenced to imprisonment, as a result of administrative or judicial proceedings, were incarcerated in one of a na- tionwide network of about 200 prisons. These installations were

administered by the Prison Directorate of the Ministry of Interior

and by the People's Security Service. They constituted a manytiered system extending from the national level to the local level. At the national level, the principal prison was T-3, located in

Phnom Penh. This institution was built in the early twentieth century, and it has served as a prison for every successive regime to hold power in Cambodia. The facilities were enlarged when the

present government was installed in 1979. In the mid-1980s, it held

about 1,000 prisoners. Administration of T-3 was shared by the

Ministry of Interior and by the Phnom Penh People's Security Service, which used the facility to confine some its own prisoners apprehended in the capital area. In addition to the T-3 central prison,

two other national penal institutions, code-named T-4 and T-5,

were reported. Both functioned as labor camps, and they appeared

not to be maximum security prisons. T-4, located on the outskirts

of the capital, was administered by the Phnom Penh People's Security Service; T-5, in Kampong Cham, administered by the provincial People's Security Service. Overall responsibility for T-4 and

for T-5 may have rested with the Bureau of Reform Offices of the

Prison Directorate.

Each of Phnom Penh's twenty wards or precincts had its own

short-term confinement facility. The precincts, however, had to transfer their prisoners after three days to the central People's Security Service headquarters for confinement in T-3 . Away from the

capital, independent municipalities (such as Kampong Saom),

provinces, and districts all had their own jails and prisons. These

facilities usually were administered by the People's Security Service at the provincial level, and at lower lower echelons. One of

the better known provincial prisons was TK-1 in Batdambang city;

the installation was taxed to the utmost in its role as a detention

facility for captured guerrillas, smugglers, border-crossers, and in- surgent sympathizers, because of its location in an area of heavy

resistance activity. The capacity and status of other provincial pri- sons could not be verified. Given the regime's lack of resources,

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conditions in all of them must have been spartan, if not appalling. In some of them, inmates were taken out on work details to per- form manual labor, such as brush-clearing, ditchdigging, or dikeconstruction; however, this may have been on an ad hoc, rather

than on an institutionalized, basis. Prisoners who had served their sentences were freed by a release order signed by People's Security

Service or Ministry of Interior officials and were permitted to return

to their home areas. Former detainees kept their release papers on

their persons or near at hand, as a safeguard against rearrest. The law-enforcement apparatus in the PRK, like the armed

forces, became more institutionalized as the decade of the 1980s

progressed, but how well the two establishments coordinated to in- sure national security at all levels remained open to question. These

establishments did represent, however, the institutional foundations laid down by the regime and by the ruling party in order to retain power, ensure ideological orthodoxy, and impart a measure

of internal stability. In the turmoil of a war-ravaged country, the

fact that these institutions had been created represented an

accomplishment—human rights issues aside—for the government

and for its Vietnamese mentors. In a broader sense, these institu- tions were part of the sovereign nationhood that Cambodia was

striving to regain while deferring uneasily, but pragmatically, to Vietnam.

* * * No published monographs address, either comprehensively or

specifically, the armed forces or law-enforcement bodies of Cambodia. Fragmentary accounts are given in the works described

below. The reference for Khmer warfare in ancient times is Horace

Geoffrey Quaritch Wales's, Ancient South-east Asian Warfare. The

Japanese occupation period is briefly covered in Joyce C. Lebra's

Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia. For the French colonial

period and for the early part of the Sihanouk era, up to 1953, useful information is found in Maurice Laurent's L 'Armee au Cambodge

et dans les pays en voie de developpement du Sud-est asiatique. The most

concise reference on the Cambodian armed forces of the Khmer

Republic is Sak Sutsakhan's The Khmer Republic at War and the Final

Collapse. For information on United States security assistance to the Cambodian armed forces and on its associated problems, an

authoritative source is by the General Accounting Office of the

United States, U.S. Assistance to the Khmer Republic (Cambodia), Report

to the Congress. The armed forces under the Khmer Rouge are dis- cussed in two essential sources: Craig Etcheson's, The Rise and Demise

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of Democratic Kampuchea and Ben Kiernan's How Pol Pot Came to Power. Authoritative accounts of the Vietnamese invasion and of

the reconstitution of the Cambodian armed forces, are given in

Nayan Chanda's Brother Enemy, The War After the War and in

Elizabeth Becker's When the War Was Over. Timothy Carney's

"Heng Samrin's Armed Forces and the Military Balance in Cambodia," International Journal of Politics, Fall 1986, continues to be

a seminal piece indispensable to a discussion of the KPRAF,

although by the late 1980s some of the information was dated. Other

treatments of the KPRAF and the insurgency in Cambodia are given in Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook. This publication is issued annually, and its discussion of Cambodian affairs from a defense point of view has become more comprehensive over the

years. Personnel and military equipment figures for Cambodia are given in The Military Balance. Law-enforcement and security agencies, discussed from a human

rights perspective rather than as government institutions, are dealt

with in Floyd Abram's and Diane Orentlicher's Kampuchea: After

the Worst and Kampuchea: Political Imprisonment and Torture by Amnesty

International. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography).

304
Appendix A

Table

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

2 Population, Selected Years

3 Population Distribution, 1987

4 Growth of Schools and of Student Enrollment in the People's

Republic of Kampuchea, 1979-84

5 Land Use, 1980-85

6 Production of Wood and Lumber, Selected Years

7 Area under Principal Food Crops, Selected Years

8 Rice Production by Harvest Season, Selected Years

9 Rice Production, Selected Years

10 Production of Principal Secondary Crops, Selected Years

11 Index Number of Agricultural Production, Selected Years

12 Seafood Catch, Selected Years

13 Long-term External Debt, 1980-84

14 Trade with the Soviet Union, 1982-87

15 Net Flows of Resources of Cambodia, Selected Years

16 Major Weapons of the Kampuchean, or Khmer, People's

Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987

305

Appendix A

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors When you know Multiply by To find

0.04 inches 0.39 inches

feet 0.62 miles Hectares (10,000 m2 ) 2.47 acres Square kilometers . . 0.39 square miles 35.3 cubic feet 0.26 gallons

2.2 pounds

0.98 long tons

1.1 short tons 2,204 pounds

9 degrees Fahrenheit

(Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32

Table 2. Population, Selected Years

Province 1950 1968 (est.) 1981 1

371,000 685,000 719,000

570,711 977,000 1,070,000 Kampong Chhnang 196,000 331,000 221,000

176,469 361,000 340,000

211,500 379,000 379,000

252,968 414,000 354,000

527,993 805,000 720,000

45,000 25,000

79,439 162,000 157,000

17,000 16,000 50,000 Siemreab 2 129,653 223,000 175,000 45,000 70,000 361,029 558,000 672,000

56,000 45,000 215,000 371,000 477,000

207,050 346,000 292,000

47,000 44,000 39,000

364,295 541,000 531,000

TOTAL 3,710,107 6,410,000 6,302,000

1 The last census taken by the People's Republic of Kampuchea was in 1981.

2 Indicates population included in the province the name of which follows. Source: Based on information from David J. Steinberg, Cambodia: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, 1959, 291 ; Jacques Migozzi, Cambodge: faits et problemes de population, Paris, 1973, np; and Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., Kampuchea: Decade ofthe Genocide—

Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, London, 1984, 31.

307
Cambodia: A Country Study

Table 3. Population Distribution, 1987

(in thousands)

Percent of Categories Population total population Male 3,231,000 50.0 Female 3,232,000 50.0 TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0 Urban 724,000 11.2 Rural 5,739,000 88.8 TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0 Age 0-14 2,227,000 34.5 Age 15-64 4,040,000 62.5 Age 65+ 196,000 3.0 TOTAL 6,463,000 100.0

Source: Based on information from United States, Bureau of the Census, unpublished computerized data on world population, Washington, 1987.

Table 4. Growth ofSchools and ofStudent Enrollment in the People's Republic

of Kampuchea, 1979-84

Grade 1979-80 1980-81 1981-82 1983-84 Grades 1-4 (Level I) Schools 5,290 4,334 1 3,521 1 3,005 1 Pupils 947,317 1,328,053 1,508,985 1,542,825 Teachers 21,605 30,316 37,000 2 33,479 Grades 5-7 (Level II) Schools 14 62 108 200

Pupils 5,104 17,331 39,434 146,865 Teachers 206 671 1,600 2 4,329 Grades 8-10 (Level III) Schools 1 2 5 13 Pupils 301 555 1,521 6,969 Teachers 20 28 78 2 277

1 Reflects regrouping and consolidation of schools.

2 Planned figures. Source: Based on information from Michael Vickery, Kampuchea: Politics, Economics, and

Society, London and Boulder, Colorado, 1986, 155; and Kimmo Kiljunen, ed., KamDecade of the Genocide—Report of a Finnish Inquiry Commission, London, 1984, 40.

308
Appendix A

Table 5. Land Use, 1980-85

(in thousands of hectares)

Land Use 1980 1985

3,046 3,056 89 90

2,957 2,966 580 580

13,372 13,372 654 644

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok,

1987, 107.

Table 6. Production of Wood and Lumber, Selected Years

(in thousands of cubic meters)

Type 1979 1981 1983 1985

Fuel wood

(including charcoal) 4,189 4,271 4,498 4,736

Industrial wood

(sawn logs, veneer, etc.) 567 567 567 567 TOTAL 4,756 4,838 5,065 5,303

Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok,

1987, 108.

Table 7. Area under Principal Food Crops, Selected Years

(in thousands of hectares)

Crop 1980 1982 1984 1986 Rice 1,356 1,680 1,700 1,700 Maize 99 30 33 31 Cassavas 25 10 13 15 Sweet potatoes 2 2 3 3 Groundnuts 5 5 9 10 Soybeans 1 1 1 1 Sesame seeds 8 10 12 13 Dry beans 28 3 7 40 41 Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok,

1987, 108.

309
Cambodia: A Country Study

Table 8. Rice Production, Selected Years (in thousands of tons)

1980 1982 1984 1986 Paddy rice 1,470 1,400 1,970 2,140

911 868 1,221 1,327

* Milled rice is computed as 62 percent of the paddy crop Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok,

1987, 108, and Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York, 1987, 15.

Table 9. Rice Production by Harvest Season, Selected Years (in thousands of tons)

1980-81 1982-83 1984-85 1986-87 Paddy rice 1,300 1,563 1,113 2,000 1 806 969 690 1,240 2

1 Estimate.

2 Milled rice is computed as 62 percent of the paddy crop. Source: Based on information from Peter Schier, "Kampuchea in 1985 —Between Crocodiles and Tigers," in Southeast Asian Affairs, 1986, Singapore, 1987, 157, and

Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, 1987-88, Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, London, December 1987, 46.

Table 10. Production of Principal Secondary Crops, Selected Years (in thousands of tons)

Crops 1980 1982 1984 1986 Maize 100 46 90 92 Cassavas 150 61 95 100 Sweet potatoes 15 17 30 34 Groundnuts 3 5 8 10 Soybeans 1 1 1 2 Sesame seeds 3 3 6 6 Dry beans 17 26 30 37 Rubber 6 8 13 24.5

310
Appendix A

Table 11. Index Number of Agricultural Production, Selected Years*

1980 1982 1984 1986

All commodities 113 117 154 165 Food 113 118 154 163

Cereals 130 117 173 176 Per capita food production 115 113 140 142 Per capita cereal production 132 112 157 152

•1979-81 = 100 ' Source: Based on information from United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical Yearbookfor Asia and the Pacific, 1986-87, Bangkok,

1987, 107.

Table 12. Seafood Catch, Selected Years (in thousands of tons)

Source 1980 1982 1984 1986

20.0 68.7 57.0 62.2 Deep sea/Coastal waters 7.0 5.5 5.5 n.a. TOTAL 27.0 74.2 62.5 62.2

n.a. —not available

Table 13. Long-Term External Debt, 1980-84

(in millions of United States dollars)

Year Amount

1980 251

1981 244

1982 368

1983 426

1984 491

Source: Based on information from Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York,

1987, 55.

311
Cambodia: A Country Study

Table 14. Trade with the Soviet Union, 1982-87

(in millions of rubles *)

1982 2 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 Imports (from the 53.4 67.8 76.2 91.2 114.0 112.0 Exports (to the Soviet Union) 2.3 4.0 5.2 9.1 8.7 11.2 TOTAL 55.7 71.8 81.4 100.3 122.7 123.2

1 For value of the ruble—see Glossary.

2 No trade is recorded prior to 1982. Source: Based on information from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ministry of Foreign Trade, Vneshniaia Torgovlia (Foreign Trade) Moscow, various issues, 1983-87.

Table 15. Net Flows of Resources of Cambodia, Selected Years (in millions of United States dollars)

1979 1981 1983 1985

108.1 130.0 36.7 12.9 108.2 130.0 36.7 12.9

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Source: Based on information from Asian Development Bank, Economic Office, Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries of the Asian Development Bank, xviii, New York,

1987, 66-69.

312
Appendix A

Table 16. Major Weapons of the Kampuchean, or Khmer,

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces, 1987

Equipment Quantity Model Origin Ground Forces Main battle tanks 60 T-54/55 Soviet Union

Type-59 China

Light amphibious tanks 10 PT-76 China

Armored personnel carriers .... 150-175 BTR-40/BTR-60 Soviet Union

BTR-152/M-113 United States, pre-1975

Artillery 350-380 76mm gun (towed) M-1942 Soviet Union

122mm gun (towed) M-1938 -do- 130mm gun (towed) Type-59 China

122mm howitzer (towed) .... D-30 Soviet Union

105mm howitzer (SP l ) M-108 United States, pre-1975

155mm howitzer (SP l ) M-109 -do- 107mm MRL 2 Type-63 China

132mm MRL 2 BM 13-16 Soviet Union

140mm MRL 2 BM 14-16 -do- 14.7mm AA/AD 3 gun ZPU-1/-2/-4 -do- 37mm AA/AD 3 gun M-1939 -do- 57mm AA/AD. 3 gun S-60 -do- Mortars 82mm mortar M-37 -do- 120mm mortar M-43 -doAntitank weapons 82mm recoilless gun B-10 -do- 107mm recoilless gun B-ll -doPortable rocket launcher .... RPG-2 Soviet Union

and China

RPG-7 -doSmall arms 7.62mm assault rifle AK-47 -do- 7.62mm assault rifle AKM -do- 5.56mm rifle M-16 United States, pre-1975

7.62mm light machine gun . . . RPD Soviet Union

Naval Forces

Patrol craft 82 4 SWIFT/PBR classes United States, pre-1975

Landing craft 6

4 LCU -doAir Forces

Tactical fighters 12 4 MiG-21/FISHBED Soviet Union

Transport helicopter 6

4 Mi-8 HIP -do1 SP = Self propelled.

2 MRL = Multiple rocket launcher.

3 AA/AD = Anti-aircraft air-defense.

4 Estimated. Source: Based on information from Pacific Defense Reporter 1988 Annual Reference Edition, Kunyung, Australia, 14, 6-7, December 1987-January 1988, 156, and The Military Balance, 1987-1988, xii, London, 1987, 161-62.

313

Appendix B

Major Political and Military Organizations

ANS—Armee Nationale Sihanoukiste, or Sihanouk National Army:

Umbrella organization of the military forces (including

MOULINAKA (q.v.) loyal to Sihanouk, founded in 1981 as armed wing of FUNCINPEC (q.v.).

CGDK—Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (See

also KPRP). Recognized by the United Nations as the official government of Cambodia, the ruling coalition in Democratic

Kampuchea, a loose political and military coalition of the three

resistance groups—Democratic Kampuchea, the KPNLF (q.v.),

and FUNCINPEC (q.v.).

CPNLAF—Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed

Forces. New name given to the RAK (q.v.) in the early 1970s.

FANK (formerly FARK)—Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres,

or Khmer National Armed Forces. Military component of Lon

Nol's Khmer Republic (q.v.).

FARK—Forces Armees Royales Khmeres, or Royal Khmer Armed

Forces. Armed forces in the newly independent Cambodia in

1953, replaced by FANK (q.v.).

FUNCINPEC—Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique, et Cooperatif, or National United

Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia. Sihanouk's main political organization, formed

in 1981. An autonomous part of the CGDK (q.v.).

FUNK—Front Uni National du Kampuchea, or National United

Front of Kampuchea. Established by Sihanouk in Beijing in

1970, shortly after the Lon Nol coup ousted him from power;

a political and military coalition committed to destroying the

Lon Nol regime.

GRUNK—Gouvernement Royal d' Union Nationale du Kampuchea or Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea. Government-in-exile formed by Sihanouk after his ouster in 1970.

ICP—Indochinese Communist Party; founded by Ho Chi Minh

in 1930 and dismantled in 1951 into its component parties, i.e., the Vietnam Workers' Party, the KPRP (q.v.), and the Lao

Itsala. KCP—Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party. Formerly

called the WPK (q. v.); renamed in 1966. The CPK dominated

315
Cambodia: A Country Study

the Khmer Republic (q.v.) resisting forces from 1970 to 1975

and ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1978. Succeeded by the

KPRP (q.v.).

Khmer Bleu (Blue Khmer)—Sihanouk's domestic opponents on

the right, whom he so named to distinguish them from his

domestic opponents on the left, the Khmer Rouge (q.v.).

Khmer Issarak (Free Khmer)—Anti-French, nationalist movement

organized with Thai backing in 1945 from elements spanning

the political spectrum; within a year split into factions, and by

independence all but one of them were incorporated into

Sihanouk's political structure. Located in western Cambodia,

they were on the wane after 1954. The only dissident group,

under Son Ngoc Thanh, they became known as the Khn*er

Serei (q.v.), a heterogeneous left-wing guerrilla movement operating in border areas, in the 1970s.

Khmer Krom—Members of a Cambodian minority who lived in

Cochinchina; early nationalists. Several major nationalist leaders came from this group.

Khmer Loeu (Highland Khmer)—Hill tribes comprising several

ethnolinguistically diverse groups living in Cambodia, mainly

along the northeastern and the eastern frontiers; upland- and

forest-dwelling ethnic minorities, especially from Rotanokiri

Province, an early RAK (q.v.) stronghold.

Khmer Republic—Established in 1970 by Lon Nol.

Khmer Rouge (Red Khmer)—The name given to the Cambodian

communists by Sihanouk in the 1960s. Later (although a misnomer) it was applied to the insurgents of varying ideological

backgrounds who opposed the Khmer Republic (q. v. ) regime

of Lon Nol. Between 1975 and 1978 it denoted the Democratic

Kampuchea regime led by the radical Pol Pot faction of the

Kampuchean (or Khmer) Communist Party. After being driven

from Phnom Penh by Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in

December 1978, the Khmer Rouge went back to guerrilla

warfare, and it joined forces with two noncommunist insurgent movements to form the CGDK (q.v.). Also known as the

NADK (q.v.).

Khmer Rumdo (Liberation Khmer)—Sihanoukists; pro- Sihanouk

Cambodians recruited from the country's eastern provinces,

trained and armed by Hanoi.

Khmer Serei—(Free Khmer). An anti-Sihanouk group under Son

Ngoc Thanh's leadership emanating from the anti-French

resistance movement called the Khmer Issarak (q.v.), located

in southeastern Cambodia; in armed opposition to the Sihanouk regime from 1959 on, but dissolved itself shortly after

316
Appendix B

the deposition of Sihanouk in March 1970. Right wing, antimonarchical nationalists.

Khmer Viet Minh—Cambodian communists; the 3,000 to 5,000

Cambodian communist cadres who had repatriated to North

Vietnam after the Geneva Conference; derogatory term used

by Sihanouk to refer to Cambodian leftists organizing proindependence agitation in alliance with the Vietnamese.

KNUFNS—Kampuchean (or Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation; also known as the Kampuchean United

Front for National Salvation and the Salvation Front. It was

founded in 1978 by anti-Khmer Rouge (q. v.) Cambodians in

Vietnam as an alternative to the Pol Pot regime, as a Cambodian structure to help legitimize the Vietnamese invasion and

the ouster of Democratic Kampuchea. As the first incarnation

of what has remained the main political organization in the

PRK (q.v.) besides the KPRP (q.v.), the front had numerous

noncommunists, including Buddhist clergy, in its leadership,

although it was largely controlled by communists. Name

changed in 1981 to KUFNCD (q.v.).

KPNLAF—Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces,

also known as the Khmer People's National Liberation Army

(not to be confused with the Khmer People's Liberation Army,

the opposition forces organized by the Vietnamese Viet Minh

at the end of World War II). Military component of KPNLF

(q.v.), formed in March 1979 under Son Sann.

KPNLF—Khmer People's National Liberation Front. An autonomous part of the CGDK (q.v.), the KPNLF is a political and

military organization, founded and led by former prime

minister Son Sann, for the purpose of resisting the Vietnamese.

KPRAF—Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed

Forces. Military component of PRK (q.v.).

KPRP—Kampuchean (or Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party.

The original party was founded in September 1951, when the

ICP (q.v.) dissolved into three national parties (the leadership

and policies of which were aligned with the Vietnamese communist movement) . The name of the party was changed to the

WPK (q. v. ) in 1960 and then to the KCP (q. v. ) in 1966. Today

this designation applies to the communist party that functions

in the PRK (q.v.). In one sense it is a new organization; in

another sense it is the continuation of the communist parties

that preceded it. The date of its founding is uncertain, although

the First Party Congress held publicly was convened in May

1981; the party may have come into existence after mid1978.

317
Cambodia: A Country Study

KUFNCD—Kampuchean (or Khmer) United Front for National

Construction and Defense. Umbrella organization of the KPRP

(q.v.). (Formerly KNUFNS (q.v.).

MOULINAKA—Mouvement pour la Liberation Nationale du

Kampuchea, or Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea; a pro-Sihanouk group formed in August 1979 by Kong

Sileah after he broke ranks with General Dien Del; military organization based among the civilian camps on the

Cambodian-Thai border.

NADK—National Army of Democratic Kampuchea. The successor to the RAK (q.v. —name change effective December 1979),

as the armed forces of the Khmer Rouge (q.v.).

NFLSVN—National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam.

Called the Viet Cong by opponents, it led the struggle against

the United States. PAVN—People's Army of Vietnam. The military forces of North

Vietnam (until 1976) and, after unification, of the Socialist

Republic of Vietnam. During the Second Indochina War

(1954-75), PAVN bore the brunt of the fighting against United

States military forces in Vietnam.

PDFGNUK—Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National

Union of Kampuchea. A mass organization established by the

exiled KCP (q.v.) in September 1979 and headed by Khieu

Samphan with the aim of ousting the Vietnamese from

Cambodia.

PDK—Party of Democratic Kampuchea. New name given to the

communist party in Cambodia in December 1981, when the

party allegedly dissolved itself, probably to distance itself from

the brutality of Pol Pot's regime.

PRK—People's Republic of Kampuchea. The Vietnamesesponsored Phnom Penh regime established in 1979.

PRYUK—People's Revolutionary Youth Union of Kampuchea.

Mass organization for young people that was less elitist than

the communist party.

RAK—Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea. Founded by Pol Pot

in 1968, this force was renamed the Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF (q. v.)) in the early

1970s. Also known as the People's National Liberation Armed

Forces of Kampuchea (PNLAFK). In 1979 it became the

NADK (q.v.).

Viet Cong—Contraction of the term Viet Nam Cong San (Viet- namese Communists), the name applied by the governments

of the United States and of South Vietnam to the communist

insurgents in rebellion against the latter government, beginning

318
Appendix B

around 1957. As used in the Khmer Republic (q.v.) the term

applied to South Vietnamese communist troops operating in

South Vietnam and in Cambodian territory as well. Viet Minh—Contraction of the term Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong

Minh Hoi (League for the Independence of Vietnam), a coalition of nationalist elements dominated by the communists and

led by veteran Vietnamese revolutionary Ho Chi Minh. Originally a broadly based Vietnamese nationalist organization in

armed opposition to both the French and the Japanese; by 1951

taken over by communists. As used in the Khmer Republic

(q.v.), the term applies to Vietnamese communists, North Viet- namese in particular.

319

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Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Demise ofDemocratic Kampuchea. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984.

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335
Cambodia: A Country Study

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339

Glossary

bodhisattva—One destined to become a buddha (enlightened one); a person who has achieved enlightenment, but who defers

achieving nirvana in order to help others achieve it. Cham—Also known as Chams, as Khmer Islam, and as ChamMalay; a Muslim minority people.

fiscal year (FY)—Calendar year. Gross domestic product (GDP)—The value of domestic goods and

services produced by an economy over a certain period, such

as a year. Only output of goods for final consumption and for

investment are included because the values of primary and of

intermediate production are assumed to be included in final prices. GDP sometimes is aggregated and shown in market

prices, meaning that indirect taxes and subsidies are included;

when these have been eliminated, the reductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been made. See also gross national product.

Gross national product (GNP)—gross domestic product (GDP)

adjusted by net income (such as return on investments), or loss (such as debt service payments), arising from transactions with

foreign countries. GNP is the broadest measure of the output

of goods and of services by an economy. It can be calculated

at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies.

GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies because these are only transfer payments. See also gross domestic product.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established along with the

World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency

affiliated with the United Nations; it is responsible for stabilizing

international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members

(including industrialized and developing countries) when they

experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans fre- quently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are developing countries.

Phumphaek—Six areas into which Cambodia was divided in 1973.

riel—The Khmer Republic's currency unit, divided into 100 sen. Since October 29, 1971, its exchange rate has been adjusted

by the National Bank of Cambodia according to market fluc- tuations; the initial rate, set on October 29, 1971, was 140 riels

341
Cambodia: A Country Study

to US$1 . Past exchange rates have been 35 riels to US$1 (January 1955 to August 1969) and 55.4 riels to US$1 (August 1969

to October 1971, following devaluation).

ruble—The Soviet Union's currency unit. In June 1987, its value was approximately 0.64 rubles to US$1.

sangha—Ascetic community within which a man can improve his

karma; brotherhood of Buddhist monks; the Theravada Buddhist clergy.

World Bank—Informal name used to designate a group of three

affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International

Development Association (IDA), and the International Finance

Corporation (IFC). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the

primary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund,

administered, however, by the staff of the IBRD, was set up

in 1960 to furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier terms than those of conventional IBRD loans.

The IFC, founded in 1956, supplements the activities of the

IBRD through loans and through assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of productive private enterprises

in the less developed countries. The president and certain senior

officers of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC . The

three institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World

Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (q-v.).

342
Index

Abdul Gaffar Peangmeth, 206

achar (ritualist), 96, 97, 121 Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome

(AIDS), 135

administrative divisions {see also Naval Zone Five; provincial divisions; Special

Military Administrative Zone), 81; Khmer Rouge, 60-61; PRK, xxi, 214, 261-62

agriculture sector {see also irrigation sys- tem), 141, 145, 148; collectivization of, xvii, xxxii, 90, 151, 153-54, 157, 160-62; commercial crops of, 164-65; development under Vietnamesedirected regime, 158; under Khmer

Rouge regime, 58-59, 152-53;

livestock production of, 165; principal food crops of, xvii-xviii, 162-64; slash- and-burn, 76, 85, 101; taxation of, 177

air force: KPRAF, 181, 267, 291, 292

Air Kampuchea, xix, 181-82

airlifts, 48, 260

airports/airfields, xix, 181-82

airspace violations, 33, 41 {see also Menu

series) air strikes {see also Arclight missions; Menu series), connected with Second

Indochina War, xxix; against North Vietnam and Khmer Rouge, 5, 45; by

United States, 45-46, 68, 255, 260,

263; by Vietnam, 68

Alliance of Communist Youth of Kampuchea, 57

Alliance of Democratic Khmer Youth, 57 American Catholic Relief Services, 174 American Friends Service Committee,

174 Amnesty International, 51, 301, 302 Ang Chan (Khmer king), 13 Ang Duong (Khmer king), 15, 16, 243 Ang Eng (Khmer king), 15 Angkar (Angkar Loeu), 47, 51-55, 61-62 Angkor, xxvi-xxvii, 3, 12, 16, 25 Angkorian period, xxvi, 9, 11, 36, 87, 242 Angkor Thorn, xxvi, 3, 11, 12 Angkor Wat, 10-11, 44, 242 Ang Snuol, 47 animism, 57, 124-25

Annam, 18, 36 ANS. See Sihanouk National Army (ANS)

arak (spirits), 121 Aranyaprathet (Thailand), 68, 86

Arclight missions, 45-46 armed forces: of CGDK, xxi; develop- ment and expansion of, 247, 257; of Vietnam occupation, 276-95; of PRK,

xxii Army of the Republic of Vietnam

(ARVN), 33 ASEAN. See Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Asian Development Bank, xx, 150, 169

assimilation, xxix, 103, 104, 108 Association of Democratic Khmer

Women, 54-55

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 187, 224-25; assistance to and support for CGDK by, xxiii, xxxiv-xxxv; position on PRK of, 191,

196; role in coalition government

(CGDK) creation, 268, 275; role in

conflict resolution in Cambodia of, xxxiv, 225

Association of Vietnamese in Cambodia,

136

atrocities: by Khmer Rouge, 47, 68, 190-92

Australia, 149

Austroasiatic origin, 6, 110 Austronesian languages/groups {see also Cham; Jarai; Rade; Malay), 14, 15, 101, 112 autonomous zone, xxviii, 25 Ayutthaya, 105

Bahnaric language (Mon-Khmer), 111 Ba Kev, 143

balance of payments {see also trade deficit), xvii, xviii Bandung Conference (1955), 31 bang classification, 107 Bangkok, 25, 79 Bangkok Plot, 252 banking system, 176 Bantay Meanchey province, xiv 343
Cambodia: A Country Study

Baptists, 124

barter system: under Khmer Rouge, 58, 154; under PRK, 154; with Soviet Union, 172; with Vietnamese sister provinces, 170-71 Basak River, 81, 110 Batdambang airport, xix Batdambang City, 249 Batdambang (Battambang) province, xiv,

5, 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 26, 42, 49, 50, 61, 66, 99, 100, 105, 110, 143, 148,

166, 268

the Bayon, xxvi, 11 Becker, Elizabeth, 262

Beijing, 200

besach (demons), 121 BGN. See United States Board of Geographic Names (BGN)

Bien Hoa, 99

birth control. See family planning

Black Book, 63, 263

black market, 134, 150, 177

bodhisattva, 11, 115 bombing raids. See air strikes bonzes, 116-17, 125 Borai refuge camp, 87

boundaries/borders. See France; Laos; Thailand; Vietnam

Boun Oum, 33 Brao group (Khmer Loeu), 104

Brevie Line, 68, 262

Britain, 27, 223 bronze use, 6

the Buddha, 113 Buddhism (see also Mahayana Buddhism;

Theravada Buddhism), 11, 12, 112-22, 130-31

Buddhist education, 130-31 Buddhist Institute, 131 Buddhist monks' hospital, 134

Buddhists: Cambodian, 115-22; persecution of, 55 Buddhist University, 130-31 budget deficit, 159

Bulgaria, 173 Buor Hel, 207 Burma, 10, 15, 20, 30 Burmese in Cambodia, 110

Calmette Hospital, 55, 135 Cambodia (see also Kambuja; State of Cambodia), xiv, xv, 3

Cambodian Buddhism. See Buddhists Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF), 44-45, 317, 320; renamed RAK(1975), 261; U.S.

air strikes against, 260 Cambodian Red Cross, 136 Cambodia-Vietnam border: Viet Cong

bases at, 42 Cantonese linguistic group, 106-7 Cao Ha, 99 Cardamom Mountains, xvi, 76, 79, 80 CARE, 174

cassava, 164

Catholicism, 124 CEMA. See Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; Comecon)

Center for Pedagogical Education, 128 Central Office for South Vietnam

(COSVN), 45

Central Zone, 54, 61 CGDK. See Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)

Chakri kings, 15 Chak Saroeun, 207 Chamcar Daung Faculty of Agriculture, 128 Champa kingdom, xxvi, xxvii, 10, 14, 99, 243 Cham people, xvi, 11, 14, 75, 76, 83, 84, 87, 91, 99-101, 243; language of, 112, 115; persecution in Democratic Kampuchea of, 55-56, 122-24; religion of, 122-24; society of, 99-101

Chandler, David P., xiv, 20, 36, 242 Chan Si, 209 Chattomukh (Four Faces), 81 Chea Sim, 208 Chea Soth, 209 Cheng Heng, 48 Chenla I, 258, 259 Chenla II, 258, 259 Chenla kingdom, xxv, xxvi, 3; Land

(Upper) Chenla and Water (Lower)

Chenla, 9 Chey Chetta II (Khmer king), 14 Chhea Song, 162 Chhet Chuen. See Ta Mok

children, 94-95, 97 China, People's Republic of, 10, 13, 27,

29, 41, 42, 43-44, 52, 57, 65, 244; aid to/support of Khmer Rouge by, 191-92, 196, 271-72; aid to Royal Thai

Army by, 278; assistance to CGDK by,

344
Index

xxiii, xxxiv-xxxv, 222; economic as- sistance from, 148, 152; influence on

Democratic Kampuchea of, 65; invades Vietnam, 192-93, 209; position on PRK of, 191-93; relations with, 4, 30-35, 252; trade with Khmer Rouge

regime, 58

Chinese: in Cambodia, xvi, 20, 83, 84, 87-88, 106-8, 152; as refugees, 48-49,

86, 91; religion of Cambodian, 122; treatment in Democratic Kampuchea

of, 56-57

Chinese hospital, 134 Chinese Hospital Committee, 107

chol chnam (New Year Festival), 120

chol vossa, 120 Chong subgroup (Pearic), 105

Christian and Missionary Alliance, 124

Christianity, 124-25

Christians, 55 Chulalongkorn (king of Thailand), 18-19 Chuon, Nath, 111 Church World Service, 174 CIA. See U.S. Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA)

civil war in Cambodia: international impact of, xxxiv-xxxv

class structure, 97-99

climate (see also weather), xvi, 76, 79-

80

clothing: of Cham people, 100; of Khmer

people, 92, 94 CMEA. See Council for Mutual Economic

Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; Comecon)

Coalition Government of Democratic

Kampuchea (CGDK), xv, xx, 195,

205, 317, 318; activity of, xxxiv-xxxv,

189-90, 275; armed forces of, xxixxii; assistance to, 225; Chinese aid

for, 278; competes for power, 189, 222; effect of insurgent forces of, 267-68, 278; formation and structure

of, 199-203, 204, 225-26; relations with and recognition by other countries of, 222-23; United Nations representatives of, 223 Cochinchina (see also Kampuchea Krom),

16, 18, 20, 21, 36, 262 Coedes, George, 11

collectivization. See agriculture sector Comecon. See Council for Mutual Eco- nomic Assistance (CMEA; CEMA;

Comecon)

communist intellectuals. See Ieng Sary; Khieu Samphan; Pol Pot communist movement in Cambodia (see also Indochinese Communist Party

(ICP); Khmer Rouge; Khmer Viet Minh), 5, 35-41, 42, 60, 217; alliance with Sihanouk in exile, xxxi; Paris stu- dent group role in, 38-40 Communist Party, France, 39

concubinage, 96

Confederation of Khmer Nationalists, 195 Confucianism, 36, 122

conscription: KPRAF, 287, 291-92

constabulary, 244-45, 246

constitutions: of Cambodia: 1946, xxviii, 24; of People's Republic of Kampuchea: 1976, 52, 55, 60-61, 61-62,

153; of People's Republic of Kampuchea: 1980, 193-94; of People's

Republic of Kampuchea: 1981, xxxv,

156-58, 209-11, 299-300; as rationale

for armed force in PRK, 279

Consultative Assembly, 23, 24 Cooperation Internationale pour le Developpement et la Solidarite, 174

corn, 19-20, 164 COSVN. See Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN)

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA; CEMA; Comecon), xviii, 142, 146, 168; economic assistance from, 173; trade with Cambodia of, 168, 169 Council of Ministers (CGDK), 202-3

Council of Ministers (PRK), xxi, 210, 211-14, 280

Council of State (PRK), xxi, 210, 211

counterinsurgency, 284, 285, 289 coup d'etat (1970), 5, 43, 44, 127, 255 coup d'etats, attempted, 64, 65, 69

court system: PRK, xxi, 213-14, 300-

302 CPNLAF. See Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF)

criminal offenses: PRK, 299-300

currency (see also foreign exchange; riel); abolition under Khmer Rouge of, 58, 154; change in value of riel, 146; nonnegotiability of, xix; recall and return

to use of, 154, 157 Czechoslovakia: economic assistance from, 148-49, 173; trade with, 172 345
Cambodia: A Country Study

damban (regions), 61 Dangrek Mountains, xvi, 76, 79, 81 Dap Chhuon, 33, 252 Dean, John Gunther, 48

death, 97

debt, external, 169

deGaulle, Charles, 22

Delvert, Jean, 124 Democratic Kampuchea. See constitutions; People's Republic of Kampuchea

(PRK); Khmer Rouge

Democratic Party, xxviii, 23, 24, 25, 28-29 Deng Xiaoping, 65 Devaraja cult, xxvi Dien Del: KPNLAF, 194, 206-7, 272, 320

diet, 91-92

disease, 132

divorce, 96

drainage, 80-81

dress. See clothing

drought, 141, 164 dry beans, 164

earth satellite station, xix, 182 Eastern Baray, 10 Eastern Zone, 53-54, 61, 64, 65, 66, 68-69

East Germany: trade with, 172 Ebihara, May Mayko, 118 economic assistance (see also humanitari- an assistance; military assistance), 4, 5, 142, 146, 148-49, 151, 170, 189; from ASEAN and China to ANS/FUNCINPEC, 275; from Comecon countries, 173; from international organizations,

173; from Soviet Union, 193; from

Vietnam, 170-71, 193 economic decline, xxix economic growth, 148 economic planning (see also First Plan: 1986-90), 141 Economic Support Fund, 151 educational system (see also schools), xvixvii, 125-31; in Buddhist tradition, 130-31; divisions in, 125, 128; higher

education in, 127; under Khmer Rouge

regime, 57; primary education in, 125-26, 128, 130; private, 131; secon- dary education in, 126, 128, 130

elections: for Consultative Assembly, 23,

24; for National Assembly, 24, 25, 30, 37 Elephant Range, xvi, 76, 79, 80

emigration, 83, 85; of Chinese, 106 Engineering School, 292

enlistment: KPRAF, 287

Etcheson, Craig, 54, 63, 65

ethnic groups (see also Khmer people;

Cham; Khmer Loeu; Chinese; Viet- namese; Europeans; Indians), xvi Europeans, 13, 83, 110

evacuees. See refugees

exchange rate system, xix, 150

executions: by Khmer Rouge, 50-51, 56;

at Tuol Sleng, 66

executive branch: PRK, 61 export-import agency: SONEXIM, 150

export license suspension, 150

export partners. See trading partners

exports, xviii, 149, 159, 168-69

factories. See industrial sector Faculty of Medicine, Pharmacy, and

Paramedical Science, 133 Faculty of Medicine and Pharmacy, 128, 133, 134-35

Fallaci, Oriana, 44

family planning, 94, 135

family structure, 75, 94, 95-97; of Khmer

people, 88-89 FANK. See Khmer National Armed

Forces (FANK)

FAO. See United Nations Food and

Agriculture Organization (FAO)

FARK. See Royal Khmer Armed Forces

(Forces Armees Royales Khmeres,

FARK)

Federated Association of Chinese of Cambodia, 107-8

female role, 89, 94, 98, 101, 114, 133

First Five-Year Program of Socioeco- nomic Restoration and Development.

See First Plan (1986-90)

First Plan (1986-90), xvii-xviii, 141, 144, 156, 158-59, 165, 189, 219; emphasis on exports of, 168-69

fiscal policy, 150, 177

fishing and fisheries, xvii-xxviii, 7, 158, 165 Fishhook engagement, 263

flooding, 81, 90, 164 346
Index

food, 91-92; production of, 158; short- ages, 155, 159

food aid, 151

forced-labor, xxvi, xxix, xxxii, 11, 19, 53, 145, 152, 154, 160

foreign aid. See economic assistance; hu- manitarian assistance; military as- sistance foreign exchange, 169, 177

foreign policy, nonaligned. See Sihanouk

(as prince)

Foreign Trade Bank, 168, 169

forestry, xvii-xviii, 144 France (see also Franco-Cambodian

Modus Vivendi; Franco-Khmer Mili- tary Convention; Free French; Vichy

government), Cambodia as protectorate of, xxvii, 4, 12, 16, 18, 103, 241, 243-44; colonial domination by,

xxvii, 4, 12, 18; colonial military

forces of, 244; concession of Cambodian provinces by, 245; dissolution of

colonial administration, 22; economic

assistance by, 149; established in In- dochina, 16; influence in Cambodia

of, 125; military assistance agreement

with United States of, 249, 253; military force agreement with

Cambodia of, 247-48, 249; representation at Geneva Conference by, 27-28; role during and after World

War II, 20-26

Franco-Cambodian Modus Vivendi, 247-48 Franco-Khmer Military Convention, 248 Franco-Siamese War, xxvii Free French, 22 French Protectorate. See France French Union, 22, 24, 27, 248, 249

Friendship Highway, 254 FULRO. See United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (FULRO)

Funan kingdom, xxv, 3, 6-7, 9, 87, 112, 115 FUNCINPEC. See National United Front

for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC)

FUNK. See National United Front of Kampuchea (FUNK)

Gang of Four, 65

GATT. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Gautama Buddha, 113, 122 gem mining, 143 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

(GATT), xx

General Staff: PRK, 280-81 Geneva Conference on Indochina (1954),

4, 27-28, 30, 36, 251 geography, xv-xvi, 76, 78 Germany, Democratic Republic of (East Germany), 173 Germany, Federal Republic of (West

Germany), 149 Gia Long (emperor of Vietnam), 107 GNP. See gross national product (GNP)

government, xx-xxi government administration. See administrative divisions government class, 97 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 22

gross domestic product (GDP), xvii, 148, 165

gross national product (GNP), xvii, 148 Group of 77, xx GRUNK. See Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK)

guerrilla activity: Cambodian, xxviii, 23, 178; of CGDK forces, 242, 268; of Khmer Rouge, xxxiii, 6, 188, 193, 261, 267, 271,318;ofKPNLAF/ANS non- communist force, xxxiv, 272-73; non- communist, 266-67; of Pol Pot forces, 41 Gulf of Thailand, 76, 79, 80, 143-44

Hainanese linguistic group, 106-7 Hakka linguistic group, 106-7

handicraft industry, 167 Hariharalaya, 10 Headley, Robert, 110

health. See disease; forced-labor; health

care; herbal remedies; hospitals; mortality rates; public health health care, xvii, 132-35; in Democratic

Kampuchea, 58 Hem Chieu, 21, 245 Heng Samrin, 66, 141, 142, 145, 156,

158, 159; leader of faction of KCP, 217; president of KPRC, 191 ; PRK regime

of, 75-76, 160-62, 187-89, 193, 205, 347
Cambodia: A Country Study

213, 215, 219, 220, 224-26; replaces Pen Sovan, 218; role in KNUFNS, 208

herbal remedies, 133-34

highways, 149, 178 Hindu cults, 11, 12 Hing Kunthon, 206 Ho Chi Minh, 34, 36, 189, 317, 321 Ho Chi Minh City (Saigon), 14, 158 Ho Chi Minh Trail, 34, 42 Hokkien linguistic group, 106-7

hospitals, xvii, 133-35

housing: of Khmer Loeu people, 101; of Khmer people, 90-91 Hou Yuon, 4, 19, 29, 30, 38-39, 40, 43,

63, 64, 66 Huay Chan refugee camp, 87 humanitarian assistance, 173, 241 Hungary, 173 Hu Nim, 4, 29, 30, 38-39, 40, 43, 63,

64, 66 Hun Sen, xiv, 209; on KPRAF troop withdrawal, 296; in KPRP puppet

government, 189; in PRK government,

211, 231, 232-36 Huy Kanthoul, 206

hydroelectric power, xviii, 143

ICP. See Indochinese Communist Party

(ICP)

Ieng Sary, 5, 37, 38-39, 40, 44, 55, 65,

68, 151, 153; as leader of Khmer

Rouge, 205; role in NADK of, 269, 271 Ieng Thirith. See Khieu Thirith

illiteracy, 128, 215

immigration: from India, 7; of Viet- namese, 85-86

imports, xviii, 149-51, 169 independence, xv, xxviii, 4, 22, 24, 25-26, 27, 37, 133, 249-50

India, 30; religious and political influence

of, 3, 7, 9 Indian Ocean, 13 Indians (East) in Cambodia, 110 Indochina Union (Union Indochinoise), 18 Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), 35, 36, 62, 189-90, 215, 317, 319

Indochinese Peninsula, 6

Indonesia, 30, 230 Indravarman I, 10

industrial sector, xviii, 141, 145, 153, 165-66; under Khmer Rouge regime,

59, 153; manufacturing industries in, 166; under First Plan, 158-59

Infantry School, 292

inflation, 150

infrastructure, xvii, 19, 142, 159, 177-83

Institute of Commerce, 128

Institute of Languages, 128

insurgent forces, 42; anti-Vietnamese,

266-68, 274, 279; base of, 57; of coali- tion government (CGDK), xxiii, 278-79; communist-led, 5; of Khmer

Rouge against Vietnam (North)

government, 260, Son Sann-led

KPNLF/KPNLAF, xxxiv In Tam, 48, 207

intellectual elite, 98

interest rates, 150 Intergovernmental Commission for Trade, Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, 171

International Commission for Supervision

and Control. See International Control Commission

International Committee of the Red

Cross, 173, 175-76

International Conference on Kampuchea

(1981), 199, 201; declaration of principles of, 225

International Control Commission, 28

International Monetary Fund, xx, 150

international organizations, 173-74, 175-76

International Red Cross, xx

International Telecommunications

Union, xx

Interpol, xx

Intersputnik space communications, 182

iron ore, 6, 143 Irrawaddy River, 10

irrigation systems, xviii, 3, 7, 59, 142

Islam, 99-100, 122-24

Ith Sarin, 46-47

Japan: dissolves French colonial administration, xxviii, 22, 246; economic as- sistance by, 149; occupation of Vietnam

and Cambodia by, xxviii, 21, 245; role

in Vichy government administration of, 4; terminates aid, 142

Jarai group (Khmer Loeu), 101, 104, 105, 125

Jarai people: language of, 112 348
Index

Java, 9 Jayavarman II, xxvi, 9, 10 Jayavarman VII, xxvi, 3, 11, 135, 243

journals, printed, 214

judiciary: PRK {see also court system; law; power to arrest), 213-14, 302

jute production, 158, 165

Kambuja, xiv, 3, 10, 11-12, 243 KAMPEXIM. See Kampuchean Ex- port and Import Corporation

(KAMPEXIM)

Kampong Cham (Kompong Cham)

province, xiv, 40, 42, 49, 56, 64, 81,

99, 100, 104, 108, 134, 148, 164, 166 Kampong Chhnang (Kompong Chnang)

province, xiv, 42, 46, 99, 105 Kampong Saom Bay, 79 Kampong Saom (Sihanoukville), 41, 42, 49, 68, 79, 141, 149, 254; as entrepot, 254-55; as major seaport, 141, 181 Kampong Spoe (Kompong Speu)

province, xiv, 42, 135 Kampong Thum (Kompong Thorn)

province, xiv, 33, 38, 42, 49, 99, 100, 104, 105, 143, 166 Kampot province, 42, 79, 88, 99, 100, 105, 106, 143, 166 Kampuchea, 3, 22 Kampuchea Krom, 262 Kampuchean Civil Aviation Company

(AKASCHOR), 182 Kampuchean Export and Import Corporation (KAMPEXIM), 168, 169 Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions

(KFTU), xxi, 221 Kampuchean (Khmer) Communist

Party: KCP {see also Angkar (Angkar

Loeu)), 41, 42, 43-44, 45, 46-47, 49, 52, 57, 62, 63, 154, 215, 317-18; be- comes Party of Democratic Kampuchea

(PDK), 269; conflicting factions in, 63-65; Heng Samrin faction of, 217; Pol Pot (pro-Chinese) faction of, 65, 217; pro-Soviet/pro-Vietnamese fac- tion, 217; role in coalition government

(CGDK) of, 204; role in Democratic

Kampuchea of, 61 ; role in PDFGNUK

popular front of, 194 Kampuchean (Khmer) National United Front for National Salvation: KNUFNS, 69, 156, 189, 208, 210,

220-21, 319; anti-Khmer Rouge political action, 263-64 Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces: KPRAF, 319; composition of, 283, 284; doctrine of, 285; importance of provincial forces of, 287-90; military assistance to, 287; opposition to, 242; organization of, 280-81, 286-91; responsibilities of, 284-85; Vietnam occupying forces in Cambodia of, 267, 276-95 Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), xxi, 5, 35, 36,

37, 40, 62-63, 189, 210, 215, 318, 319;

control of armed forces by, 281-83, eco- nomic structure under, 156-58; evolution, structure and activities of, 217-20;

Fifth Party Congress of, 141, 158, 218-20; Fourth Party Congress of, 156-57, 217-18; Marxist-Leninist

foundation for, 209; Third Party Congress of, 217 Kampuchean (Khmer) United Front for National Construction and Defense: KUFNCD, xxi, 119-21, 210-11, 221,

289, 319, 320 Kampuchean People's Representative

Assembly (KPRA), 60-61, 62 Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council (KPRC), 191, 208, 210 Kampuchean People's Revolutionary

Youth Union (KPRYU), xxi, 221 Kampuchean Radio and Television Commission, 215 Kampuchean Revolutionary Women's

Association (KRWA), xxi, 221 Kampuchean Revolutionary Youth Association (KRYA), xxi, 221 Kampuchean Young Pioneers Organization (KYPO), 221 Kampuchea-USSR Friendship Technical

Institute, 128

kanak or kena (committee), 61 Kandal province, 64, 108 Kang Keng airport, xix Kaoh Kong province, xiv, 85, 88, 103, 106

kathen, 120 Katuic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 KCP. See Kampuchean Communist Party (KCP)

Kena Mocchhim (Committee Machine),

47 349
Cambodia: A Country Study

Keo Meas, 41 KFTU. See Kampuchean Federation of Trade Unions (KFTU)

Khao-I-Dang, 86 Khasi language (Mon-Khmer), 111

khet (provinces), 61 Khieu Ponnary, 39, 53 Khieu Samphan, 4, 5, 29, 30, 37, 38-40,

43-44, 49, 51, 52, 57, 60, 151, 154, 198, 199; as leader of anti-KCP coali- tion (PDFGNUK), 189; as leader of Khmer Rouge, 200, 205; replaces Pol

Pot, 194; role in coalition government,

201, 203; role in Democratic Kampuchea of, 62; role in National Army

of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK) of, 269, 271 Khieu Thirith, 39, 52, 55, 57, 59, 205 Khmer Bleu, 254, 318 Khmer civilization, 3, 9 Khmer Empire, 242-43 Khmer Independence Party, 29 Khmer insurgents, 86 Khmer Issarak, xxviii, 22-23, 25, 26, 36, 59, 63, 65, 215, 246-47, 248, 249, 318

(see also Khmer Serei); combines with

Viet Minh, 250 Khmer Krok, 25 Khmer Krom, 252, 318 Khmer Krom people, 21, 36, 87 Khmer language, xvi, 54, 56, 98-99,

110-12; use of Sanskrit and Pali roots

in, 111, 115 Khmer Loeu people, 41, 42, 57, 76, 83,

85, 87, 254, 318, 259; groups composing, 104; religion of, 124-25; society of, 101, 103-4 Khmer National Armed Forces: FANK,

317; Chenla I and II offensives of, 258, 259; defeat of, 260-61; government

troops, 44-45, 48, 256-58, 260, 317; U.S. military assistance to, 261 Khmer nationalism, 4 Khmer people, 3, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 35, 49, 83, 85, 87-88, 100; family and social structure of, 88-99;

relations with Chinese in Cambodia,

108; religion of, 112-13 Khmer People's National Liberation Armed Forces: KPNLAF, xxii, xxxvi,

194-95, 206, 266, 319; formation and

role of, xxxiv, 272-75 Khmer People's National Liberation

Front: KPNLF, xx, 317, 319; Cambodian support for, 206; noncommunist

resistance by, xxxiv, 194, 266; refugee

camp management by, 86-87; role in coalition government of, 198-203 Khmer Republic (see also Lon Nol), 25,

43, 46, 47, 50, 100, 108; end of, xxxi, 260-61; establishment of (1970), xxx,

5, 318; factors weakening government

of, xxx-xxxi; massacres of Vietnamese

in Cambodia by, xxx Khmer Rouge (see also Angkar Loeu; Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces: CPNLAF;

National Army of Democratic Kampuchea: NADK; revolutionaries, Eastern Zone; Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea: RAK), 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, 19, 26, 27, 35, 36, 37, 43, 45, 318; armed forces: NADK, 194, 269; atrocities of, xxxii, 47-48, 50-51, 55-57, 60,

68, 69, 75, 100; attacks Thai border vil- lages, 68; domination of CPNLAF by, 260; forced evacuation of Phnom Penh

by, xxxii, 49-50, 152; founding and de- velopment of, 254-55; goal for self- sufficient economy of, xxxi-xxxii, 58-59; insurgency of, xxxi; killings by,

51, 69, 75; leaders of, 205; opposition

to PRK regime by, 194; Pol Pot as leader of, 190; recognition internationally, 191; refugee camp management

by, 86-87; replacement by CGDK of, 204; role on coalition government by, 198-203; in Samlot revolt, 254 Khmer Rouge regime, 5-6, 85-86, 90,

91, 96, 99, 100, 108, 118-19, 132; after rout by North Vietnam, 187; economic

policy of, 58-59, 151-55; economic self- reliance of, 145-46; education under,

128; social structure under, xiii, 51-55 Khmer Rumdo (pro- Sihanouk), 63, 259, 318 Khmer Serei, 23, 33, 43, 251-52, 253, 318-19 Khmer state, xxv-xxvii Khmer students, 38 Khmer Students' Association (KSA), 39 Khmer Students' Union, 39 Khmer Viet Minh, 254, 259, 319

khmoc (ghosts), 121 Khmuic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 khum (subdistricts), 61 350
Index

Kiernan, Ben, 63, 65, 106, 124, 218

killings. See atrocities; executions Kingdoms, centralized, 3 kinship, 88-89

Kirk, Donald, 47

Kissinger, Henry, 46

kloeu relationship, 89 KNUFNS. See Kampuchean (Khmer)

National United Front for National Sal- vation (KNUFNS)

Ko Chang, 245 Kola group (Burmese), 110 Kong Sileah, 195, 320 Korat Plateau, 10, 79 Korea, North, 222

Korea, South. See Republic of Korea

(South Korea)

KPNLAF. See Khmer People's National

Liberation Armed Forces (KPNLAF)

KPNLF. See Khmer People's National

Liberation Front (KPNLF)

KPRA. See Kampuchean People's Representative Assembly (KPRA)

KPRAF. See Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (KPRAF)

KPRC. See Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council (KPRC)

KPRP. See Kampuchean (Khmer) People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP);

Kampuchean People's Revolutionary

Council: KPRC

Kracheh (Kratie) province, xiv, 45, 80-81, 101, 104, 143 Kracheh Special Region Number 505, 61 krama, 92

krom (groups), 61, 75 km (shaman), 121, 134 KRWA. See Kampuchean Revolutionary

Women's Association (KRWA)

KSA. See Khmer Students' Association (KSA)

Kuala Lumpur, 201 KUFNCD. See Kampuchean (Khmer)

United Front for National Construction and Defense: KUFNCD

Kuy group (Khmer Loeu), 104

labor force (see also forced labor), 144-45 Land Chenla kingdom, xxv, 9 land ownership. See ownership; property

language lexicons, 99

languages, xvi, 110-12; linguistic groups,

110; linguistic groups among Chinese, 106-7 Lan Xang kingdom, 12 Lao Itsala, 36, 317

Laos, xxvi, 3, 6, 9, 18, 30, 33, 16; bor- der with Cambodia of, 76, 81, 279; Cambodian minority groups in, 104; representation at Geneva Conference

by, 27-28; Vietnamese forces in, 277

law: due process: PRK, 301-2; enforce- ment: PRK, 298 Le Due Anh, 297 Le dynasty, 14

legal code, India, 9

legislature, PRK, 60-61

leprosarium, 134

Liberal Party, xxviii, 23-24

light infantry battallion, 244, 246, 247

linguistic groups. See languages

livestock production, 165 Long Boret, 48 Long Chhim, 120 Long Reth. See Nuon Chea

Lon Nol, 5, 25, 26, 30, 32, 38, 42, 45, 46-48, 116; as commander of Cambodian armed forces, 5; coup against

Sihanouk by, xxx, 43-44; economic

policy of regime of, 1 50-5 1 ; emergence

of, 249, 255; establishes Khmer Republic, 318; fall of regime of, 257; regime

of, 35, 145, 252, 256 Lon Nol Line, 258, 260 Lon Non, 48 Lovek, 3, 13, 14 lower class, 97-98 Luang Prabang, 16 Lutheran World Service, 174 Lycee Kambuboth, 40

lycees, Buddhist, 130-31 Lycee Sisowath, 20, 38

MAAG. See United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)

MACV. See United States Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV)

Mahayana Buddhism, xxv, 11, 12, 110, 114-15, 122 Malay Peninsula, xxvi, 9, 10, 20 Malay people: language of, 112; religion

of, 122 Malaysia, 201, 229 351
Cambodia: A Country Study

male role, 89, 94-95, 98-99, 101, 114, 133

malnutrition, 155 manganese ore, 143 Manu laws, 9 Mao Zedong, 62, 65 Marcos, Ferdinand, 30

marriage, 95-96; among Cham, 101 martial law: 1953, 25 Martin, Marie A., 92, 119-20, 128-29 Marx, Karl, 38 Marxism-Leninism, 39, 62, 75, 136, 191 Mayaguez incident, 68, 263

meak bochea, 120 meba (spirits), 121 media, 214-15

medical supplies and personnel, 132-33 Mekong Delta, xxxii, 3, 9, 13, 14, 69, 76, 79 Mekong River, 3, 7, 13, 16, 48, 76, 80-81, 99, 110, 142-43, 178, 181 Mekong River valley, 6, 79 Memot, 263 Menu series, 35, 255 middle class, 98

migration, 83, 85, 155

military assistance, 4, 5, 151, 241, 250; from ASEAN and China to Sihanoukled (ANS) forces, 275; from China, 42, 253, 271-72, 278-79; from France,

253; from North Vietnam to Khmer

Rouge, 261; of North Vietnam to RAK/CPNLAF, 277; from Soviet Union, 42, 253, 291; from United

States, 32, 33

Military Assistance Advisory Group

(MAAG): United States, 241, 250

military awards and decorations: KPRAF, 295

military class, 97-98

military forces: development of, 248-49;

indigenous, 247-48; of Khmer Rouge

during Vietnam occupation (NADK),

269-72; of KPNLAF (noncommunist,

anti-Vietnam), 272-75; of noncommunist resistance (ANS/FUNCINPEC), 275-76; of Vietnam and

KNUFNS in Cambodia, 263-67; of Vietnam occupation (KPRAF), 267-68

military fronts, Vietnam in Cambodia,

297

military logistics school, 293

military medical school, 292

military pay: KPRAF, 293

military prisons, 293-94

military regions: under KPRAF rule, 286; of Vietnam in Cambodia, 297

military schools, 292-93

military service: PRK {see also conscription; enlistment), 291-95

military schools and training centers, 292, 293

military tribunals, xxi, 293

military uniforms and insignia: KPRAF,

294-95

mineral resources, xviii, 143 Ming dynasty (China), 13 Minh Mang (emperor), 16 Ministry of Agriculture, 141, 145 Ministry of Communications, Transport, and Posts, 181, 182 Ministry of Education, 125 Ministry of Finance, 177 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Angkar, 55 Ministry of Industry: Angkar, 55 Ministry of Interior, 298, 299, 300, 302; Prison Directorate of, 303, 304

Ministry of Justice, xxi, 300, 302

Ministry of Local and Foreign Trade, 168 Ministry of National Defense: PRK, xxii, 280, 281, 295

Ministry of Religion, 130

minorities, xvi, 104-5; treatment in Democratic Kampuchea of, 55, 75; under Vietnamese, 76 Mit Deuch, 66 mneang phteah (house guardians), 121 Mnong group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5 Mohanikay monastic group, 116, 119 Mondol Kiri (Mondolkiri) province, xiv, 42, 85, 101, 103, 104 monetary policy, 150

monetization, 177 Monic language (Mon-Khmer), 111 Monireth (prince), 21, 247 Monivong (king), 4, 18, 20-21, 39 Mon-Khmer language, 104, 110 Mon-Khmer languages: divisions within, 110-111 Mon-Khmer people, 6, 101 Mon kingdoms, 10, 12 monks, Buddhist, 116-19 monsoons, xvi, 10, 76, 79-81, 142, 163-64 Monivong (king of Cambodia), 18, 20

mortality rates, xvii, 83, 132 352
Index

Mouhot, Henri, 16 MOULINAKA. See Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea

(MOULINAKA)

Moung Roessei, 49 Mount Meru, 11 Movement for the National Liberation of Kampuchea (MOULINAKA), 195, 275, 317, 320

mrenh kongveal (animal guardians), 121 Muslims {see also Sunni Muslims); perse- cution of, 55, 122

NADK. See National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)

Nagaravatta, 21, 22, 23 Nam Viet kingdom, 10 National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK), xxi-xxii, 194, 205,

269, 318, 320; factions of Khmer

Rouge in, 269, 271; infiltration routes

of, 272; insurgent and guerrilla activity of, 271; military assistance from China for, 271-72; succeeds RAK,

269; terror tactics of, 271 National Assembly, xx-xxi, 24, 25, 43

National Assembly (PRK), 210-11

National Cadres Conference, 104

National Export-Import Corporation, 29-30

National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN), xxx, 34, 320

National Institute of Legal, Political, and

Economic Studies, 127

nationalism, 4, 20-22, 29

nationalization; under Khmer Rouge,

151; under Sihanouk: 1963, 29-30, 146 National Mutual Help Association, 136

National Route 1, 178

National Trade Commission, 168

National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), xx, xxxiv, 195, 275-76, 317 {see also Siha- nouk National Army: ANS); role in coalition government of, 199-203, 207-8

National United Front of Kampuchea

(FUNK), xxxi, 43-44, 63, 258-59, 317 Na Trao refugee camp, 87 Naval Zone Five, 298

navy: KPRAF, 291

neak ta (spirits), 121 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 30

Neolithic culture, 6 Nepote, Jacques, 87 NFLSVN. See National Front for the Lib- eration of South Vietnam (NFLSVN)

Ngo Dinh Diem, 33 Nguyen Co Thach, 296 Nguyen dynasty, 16, 36 Nguyen Van Thieu, 34 Nhek Tioulong, 207 Nhim Ros, 64

Nixon, Richard M., 35, 256

nobility, 97 Nokorbal (civil police), 298 Nonaligned Movement, xx noncommunist activity: of ANS and

FUNCINPEC, 275-76; OF KPNLAF,

272-73 Normal Advanced School, 128 Norodom Chakrapong (prince), 276 Norodom (king), xxvii-xxviii, 4, 16, 18, 243-44 Norodom Norindeth (prince), 23 Norodom Ranariddh (prince), xxxiv, 207, 222-23, 276 Norodom Sihanouk (king of Cambodia).

See Sihanouk (as prince); Sihanouk (as king)

Norodom Suramarit (king), 4, 25, 28

Northeastern Zone, 54, 61 Northern Zone, 54, 61, 65 Northwestern Zone, 54, 61, 65 Nu, U, 30

nuns, Buddhist, 117 Nuon Chea (Long Reth), 40, 41, 65, 205

occupation force withdrawals. See troop withdrawals Oc Eo, xxv, 7 Odongk (Udong), 14, 15, 16, 47, 100

Office of Public Prosecutor, xxi

officer corps: in KPRAF, 283 Osborne, Milton E., 26 O Smach, 79 Otdar Meanchey province, xiv ownership: collective, 153, 160-61; of

land, 89-90, 148, 153-54, 160-61; pri- vate, 160-62; of property, 89-90 Oxfam, 174 353
Cambodia: A Country Study

Pach Chhoeun, 21, 22

Pacific Ocean, 6

Pailin, 143 Palaguic language (Mon-Khmer), 111

Panaritis, Andrea, 134, 135 Pang Khat, 115

Paris, 38-39, 40, 62, 151

Paris International Conference on Cambodia: 1989, xxxv-xxxvi

Paris Peace Accords, 46

Parrot's Beak engagement, xxxii, 263

Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK),

204, 320, 269

Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea

(PDFGNUK), 194, 195-96, 204, 205, 320 PAVN. See People's Army of Vietnam

(PAVN)

PDFGNUK. Patriotic and Democratic

Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea (PDFGNUK)

PDK. See Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK)

Pearic group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5; lan- guage of, 110-11

peasant class, 97

penal system, 303-4 Pen Sovan, 208-9, 217-18 Penn Nouth, 43

People's Army of Vietnam: PAVN, 286, 320

People's National Bank of Kampuchea,

176-77 People's Republic of Kampuchea

(PRK), xiii, xv, xx, 6, 10, 12, 35, 39, 40-41, 50, 75, 90, 100, 146, 208,

319, 320; centralization of power of, xxxiii; coalition government (CGDK)

resistance to, 268; competes with CGDK for power, 222; economic policy of, 58-59; education under regime

of, 128; establishment of (1979), 155-56, 191; increasing influence of, 136; international recognition of, 191-93; question of United Nations

representation, 192-93; relations with and recognition by other countries of, 224; religion under regime of, 119;

role of Vietnam's military (KPRAF)

in, 276-95

people's revolutionary committees

(PRK), 214

People's Revolutionary Youth Union of Kampuchea (PRYUK), 281-83, 320

People's Security Service (PRK), 298-99,

302, 303, 304

People's Supreme Court, xxi, 213, 300, 302-3 Permanent Military Coordinating Committee, 268

petroleum, 143-44 Pham Van Dong, 31 pharmaceuticals, 134

phchun ben, 120

Philippines, 13, 30 Phnom Penh, 4, 6, 13, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 32, 38-40, 41, 45, 54, 60, 79, 81, 83, 85, 100, 107, 108, 149, 155; evacuation of, 152; fall to Khmer Rouge

CPNLAF of, xxxi, 47-49, 260-61; fall to Vietnamese of, xxxii-xxxiii, 69, 190, 266; hospital resources of, 133-34; as river port, 181 Phnom Penh Domestic News Service, 172 Phumi Banam, 7 phumphaek, 47 phum (villages), 47, 61 Phu Quoc island, 66, 263 Pochentong airport, xix, 181 Po Dharma, 99, 100, 122 Poland, 172-73

police (see also power to arrest); PRK,

298-91

political activity, xx-xxi

political crimes. See criminal offenses

political institutions: adoption of Indian, 3

political parties: formation of, xxviii, 23

Political School, 292

Pol Pot, 5, 26, 37, 38-41, 43, 45, 50-54,

57, 68, 154; emergence of, 215, 231,

254; insurgency by forces of, 69-70; in Kampuchean Communist Party

(KCP), 59-60, 65, 318; opposition by

KNUFNS, 69; opposition to Sihanouk

by, xxix; purge by Khmer Rouge re- gime and, 6, 47-48, 50-51; replaced as leader of Khmer Rouge, 194; role in Khmer Rouge NADK of, 269, 271;

role in PDK and Khmer Rouge of, 204-5; trial in absentia of, 193

Pol Pot regime, 142; cruelty of, 187;

defeat by Vietnam of, 266; fall of, xxxii-xxxiii, 155 Ponchaud, Francois, 38, 48-50, 51 354
Index

Popular Socialist Community. See Sangkum

population, xvi, 83, 144-45; density of, 83, 85, 144; of Khmer Loeu people,

101; of Phnom Penh, 141; rural, 87-88,

160; urban, 85, 149

population movement, forced, 85

port cities: Kampong Cham, 263, 265; Kampong Saom, 141, 254; Kampot, 265

ports, xix, 181; as entrepots, xxix-xxx

Portugese explorers, 3 Poulo Wai island, 68

Pourtier, Roland, 88

Pouthisat (Pursat) province, xiv, 42, 99, 100, 105, 275 power to arrest, 300-302

Pracheachon (Citizens') Party, 29, 37, 63 Prachin Buri province (Thailand), 86-87 Preah Ket Mealea Hospital, 134, 136 Preah Monivong military hospital, 134 Preah Sihanouk Raj Buddhist University, 130-31 Preah Suramarit Buddhist Lycee, 130 Preah Vihear, 104

pret (demons), 121 Prey Nokor, 14 Prey Veng province, 7, 64, 108

prisons {see also military prisons), 303-4

private sector economy, xvii; enterprise

in, 141,. 158, 167-68; under KPRP

government, 156 PRK. See People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK)

Project K-5, 145, 267, 291 propaganda role: of Khmer Rouge,

103-4; of KPRAF, 284, 289-90

property (see also ownership), 89-90

protectorate: of France, 4

Protestants, 124

provinces (see also sister provinces);

replacement in Democratic Kampuchea

of, 61

provincial divisions: PRK, xiv psychological warfare tactics: of KPRAF,

289-90

public health, 132-35

purges (see also atrocities; executions; Khmer Rouge), 6, 59-60, 65-66 Pyongyang, 195, 198

Rade group (Khmer Loeu), 101, 104,

105, 112, 125

Radio Hanoi, 69 Radio Phnom Penh, 55, 69

radio sets, 182

radio station, xix, 215

radio station, Khmer Rouge, 201

radio telephone link, xix

railroads, xix, 159, 178

rainfall, 80 RA.K. See Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK)

Ream airport, xix, 181

refugee camps: Cambodian insurgents in, 267; in Thailand, xx, 86-87, 124, 278; UNBRO aid to people in, 176

refugees (see also emigration; migration); from Cambodia, 85-87, 120, 266; social problems of, 52-54

regional divisions. See administrative di- visions

relief aid. See economic assistance; food

aid; humanitarian assistance

religion, xvi, 55, 75, 76, 112-25

religious leader class, 97

repression: of Cham people, 100; of Chinese, 106, 108; of religion, 120; of

teachers and educated people, 128; of

wats, 136 Republic of Korea (South Korea), 24

resettlement policy, xxix, 103

resistance groups (see also guerrilla activity; insurgent forces); Khmer refugee camps, 86; noncommunist, 194-95,

199, 201, 207, 224-26, 317; pro- Sihanouk, xxxi, 259

resources. See hydroelectric power; mineral resources revenues, government, 176

revolutionaries, Eastern Zone, 64 Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea

(RAK) (see also Cambodian People's National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF); National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK)), 44,

61, 63-64, 103, 254-55, 317, 320; communists establish, 42; conflict with Vietnamese forces of, 262-65; develop- ment of, 258, 261; organization after 1975 conquest, 261-62

revolutionary committees, 214

rice: competition between state and pri- vate production for, 167-68; cultivation

of, xvii, 3, 6, 7, 10, 20, 145, 148, 150,

155, 159-64; export of, 149; production

355
Cambodia: A Country Study

of, 141, 148, 149-50, 152-53, 155, 159, 162-64

riel, xix, 130, 146, 176-77

rifle battalions, 249; First and Second Cambodian Rifle Battiions, 248; Third

Cambodian Rifle Battalion, 249

rivers, 80-81, 142-43

roads, xix, 159, 178 Ros Samay, 208

Rotanokiri (Ratanakiri) province, xiv, 41, 42, 85, 101, 103, 104, 110, 318 Royal Faculty of Medicine of Cambodia,

133 Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK), 43-44, 60, 258, 317 Royal Khmer Armed Forces (FARK) (see also Khmer National Armed Forces (FANK)), 32, 250-51, 252, 253-55,

261, 317 Royal Library, 131 Royal Thai Army: threat to Vietnambacked government by, 278

royalty, 97

rubber: cultivation and production of, xvii, 19-20, 110, 158, 164-65, 174; ex- port of, 149-50, 165

ruble, 171

rup arak (medium), 121

sahakor (cooperatives), 61 Sailendra dynasty, 9 Sai Vuong, 14 Sak Sutsakhan, 206-7; commander of KPNLAF, 274

Sala Som Niat, 66

Saloth Sar, 5, 35; role in Democratic

Kampuchea of, 62; (see also Pol Pot) Samlot, 42 Samlot region, 61 Samlot revolt, xxix, 5, 42, 146, 254

sampot, 92 Samre subgroup (Pearic), 105

samsara, 113 Sam Sary, 28, 33

sangha, 55, 113, 114, 117, 118 Sangkum (Popular Socialist Community),

xxviii, 4, 28-30, 37

sanitation, 132

Sanskrit language, 9, 111 Saoch subgroup (Pearic), 105

sarong, 92

Sar Sarsdam, 47

Sattha (Khmer king), 13 Saukham Khoy, 48

school, officer-candidate, 247

School of Fine Arts, 128

school of medicine, 133

school of nursing, 133

schools, Buddhist, 130-31

schools, Chinese, 131

schools, military. See military schools

schools, private, 131

schools, public, xvii, 125-30

schools, Vietnamese, 131 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)

Second Indochina War, 5, 30, 149, 320

service sector, xviii, 148 Shawcross, William, 27, 35, 40, 46

shortages in economy, 160 Siddhartha Gautama. See Gautama

Buddha

Siemreab airport, xixl, 181 Siemreab-Otdar Meanchey province,

105, 268 Siemreab (Siemreap) province, 10, 15,

16, 19, 20, 24, 25-26, 33, 46, 47, 49, 105 Siemreab Special Region Number 106, 61 Sieu Heng, 37-38 Sihanouk (as king), 4, 21, 22-23, 24, 25, 116, 247; crusade for independence of Cambodia, 24-26; strategy to gain in- dependence of, 25-26 Sihanouk (as prince), 41-43, 44, 47, 52, 97, 116, 249-50, 317; after Khmer

Rouge victory, 57, 60; Beijing govern- ment in exile, xxx-xxxi; commander of FARK, 250-51, 252, 254, 255; creates GRUNK and FUNK, 258-59, 317; de- posed (1970), 5, 252, 255; economic

policy of, 146-49; foreign policy of, xxx, 30-35, 145-46; government of, xxviii-xxix, 4, 5, 26-27, 29-30, 37, 38;

as leader of anti-KPRP coalition, 189;

as leader of RAK, 258; link with Khmer Rouge of, 5 ; nonalignment and

neutrality policy of, 4, 26, 30-33,

37-38, 41-42, 146; position on Khmer

Rouge, 196; position on Vietnam

presence in Cambodia, 192; recom- mendations for Cambodian govern- ment by, 198-200; role in ANS/

FUNCINPEC of, xxxiv, 207-8,

356
Index

275-76; role in coalition government

(CGDK) of, 201, 203, 232, 233-36,

268; role in KPNLF of, 194; role in noncommunist resistance of, 194-95;

suspicion of United States by, 32-33,

37-38, 146, 252 Sihanouk National Army (ANS), xxii, xxxiv, 195, 207-8, 266, 275-76, 317; organization and activity of, 275-76;

refugee camp management by, 86

Sihanoukville. See Kampong Saom

(Sihanoukville)

Singapore, 173, 200, 201 Sino-Khmer group, 106, 108

Sirik Matak, 43, 48

Sisaket province (Thailand), 87

Sisowath (king), 18, 244

Sisowath Yuthevong (prince), 23

sister provinces: in trade with Vietnam,

170-71

Site B refugee camp (Green Hill), 87

Site 2 refugee camp, 87, 206

Site 8 refugee camp, 87

slaves, 11 Snuol, 263

social stratification, 97-99

Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 15

social mobility, 99

social structure: under Khmer Rouge,

51-55, 75

society, Angkorian, 11 Soeharto, 30

solidarity groups, 160-62 SONEXIM. See export-import agency (SONEXIM)

Son Ngoc Minh, 36, 37 Son Ngoc Thanh, 21, 22, 23, 25, 27, 29, 33; leader of Khmer Issarak, 48, 245, 249-50, 318; as leader of Khmer Serai, 251, 318; nationalist, 22, 23, 25, 27, 36 Sonn Mann Mental Hospital, 134 Son Sann, 30; as leader of anti-KPRP

coalition, 189; as leader of KPNLF/

KPNLAF, xxxiv, 194, 198, 199, 206-7,

266, 272-73; position on Khmer Rouge

of, 196, 200-01, and coalition govern- ment, 201, 203, 236 Son Sen, 38, 40-41, 52, 55; as leader of Khmer Rouge and RAK/NADK, 205, 261, 269 So Phim, 64, 66, 69

Sosthene Fernandez, 48 South China Sea, 13, 76, 81, 144

Southeast Asian Treaty Organization

(SEATO), 30, 250

Southwestern Zone, 54, 61, 65

Soviet citizens in Cambodia, 110 Soviet-Khmer Friendship Hospital, 134, 135

Soviet Union, 27, 32, 42, 142, 149, 151; economic assistance to KPRP govern- ment by, 173-75, 189; influence in Cambodia of, 209, 215; as major trad- ing partner, 169, 171-72; military as- sistance to Vietnam in Cambodia by,

xxxiv-xxxv, 287; position on PRK and Khmer Rouge of, 192; recognition of PRK by, 191 ; relations with China of, 209; training assistance to KPRAF by, 291, 292

Spanish: in Cambodia, 3, 13-14

Special Military Administrative Zone, 297-98

spirit world, 94, 121-22

Sri Lanka, 12

srok (districts), 61

Stalinism, 39

starvation, 155

state enterprises, 150

State of Cambodia, xiv, xxxv-xxxvi

Steinberg, DonaldJ., 108, 117, 124, 135

Stieng group (Khmer Loeu), 104-5 Stoeng Treng province, xiv, 101, 103,

104, 143 Sumatra, 9 Sunni Muslims, 122 Suoi subgroup (Pearic), 105 Suryavarman II, xxvi, 10 Svay Rieng province, 64 Swank, Emory C, 46

sweet potatoes, 164 Szymusiak, Molyda, 64, 66

Takev province, xiv, 79, 99, 100 Ta Khmau, 134, 166 Ta Luen refugee camp, 87 Ta Mok, 65, 66; role in NADK of, 269, 271 Tampuon subgroup (Brao), 104 Taoism, 122 Ta Phraya (Thailand), 87

taxation, 177 Teap Ben, 207

Technical School, 292

telecommunications, xix, 182 357
Cambodia: A Country Study

Television Kampuchea (TVK), 215

television service, xix, 182, 215 Teochiu linguistic group, 106-7 Tep Vong, 120

terror tactics {see also atrocities), 23; of NADK, 271; by Viet Cong, 47 Tet offensive, 34

Thailand, 3, 6, 10, 12, 14, 15, 25; annexation and return of Cambodian terri- tory by, xxvii-xxviii, 15, 16, 18-19,

245; assumes command of insurgent

anti-Vietnamese force, 274; border with Cambodia of, xxxvi, 76, 79, 81, 86-87,

145, 191; Cambodian insurgents in, 267; Cambodian minority groups in, 104-5; Cambodians in, 86; effect of Vietnamese troops at border of, 266-67; position on Cambodian

governmental crisis of, 226-27; Project

K-5 at border with Cambodia, 267; recognition of Cambodia by, 24; rela- tions with Cambodia of: 1954-1969,

30-35; relations with CGDK of, 222-23; relations with Japan of, 245;

security concerns of, 191; trade with, 173 Thai people, 10-14, 243; persecution by

Khmer Rouge of, 56; refugees from Mongols of, xxvi Theravada Buddhism, xvi, xxvi, 12, 29,

55, 112-14 Thieu Tri (emperor), 16 Thion, Serge, 57 thmup (witch), 121

thoa relationship, 89 Tho Chu island, 66, 68 Thomas, David, 110 Thommayut monastic group, 116, 119

timber: production of, 158 Toal Chay, 208 Tokyo, 21, 22 Tonkin, 18, 36 Tonle Sab River, 7, 13, 81, 143 , 178 Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands

region, 76, 79-80, 87 Tonle Sap (Great Lake), xvi, xxv, 3, 7, 10, 12, 76, 81, 99, 110, 143, 164, 178

topography, xvi, 76, 78, 142 Tou Samouth, 37-38, 40-41, 217

trade, foreign {see also barter system); with Comecon countries, 168, 169; PRK

government focus on, 168-73

trade, historical, 7, 13

trade, illicit: with Thailand and Singapore, 173

trade deficit, 169

trade policy, 150

trade routes, international, 13 trading partners, xviii, 169-73 Training Department: KRAF General

Staff, 293

transportation system, 177-82

Trat province (Thailand), 87 Treaty of Friendship and Nonaggression

(1960), 32 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation (1979), xxi, 170, 191

tripartite coalition {see also Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK))

tripartite coalition (1982), 201-4

Tripitaka, 114

Tripitaka Commission, 131 troop withdrawals, Vietnam, xxxv, 187, 295, 296 Tu Due (emperor), 16 Tung Kraham, 63 Tung Padevat, 62-63 Tuol Sleng detention center, 64, 66

typhoons, 80

United Front for the Liberation of Oppressed Races (Front Uni pour la Liberation des Races Opprimes (FULRO)), 103, 106 United Issarak Front, 36 United Nations (UN), 151, 187; recognition of Democratic Kampuchea

(CGDK) government, 190, 203-4, 242, 317; Security Council deliberation of Cambodian question (1979), 191-93 United Nations Border Relief Operation

(UNBRO), 86 United Nations Children's Fund, 173, 175 United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 162, 173, 175 United Nations General Assembly; delib- erations on Cambodia (1979), 193;

resolution; resolution for principles of

International Conference, 225; resolu- tion for withdrawal of Vietnamese

troops, 225, 223 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 86, 173-74, 175 358
Index

United Nations World Food Program

(WFP), 173, 175-76

United States, 29, 30; aid to Royal Thai

Army by, 278; airlifts during CPNLAF

offensive, 260; airlifts of supplies by, 48; bombing raids of, 45-46, 255, 263; eco- nomic assistance by, 149, 151; economic

assistance through international organizations, 173, 175-76; end of diplomatic relations with Cambodia (1965), 253;

at Geneva Conference, 27-28; hu- manitarian assistance to refugees, 241;

influence in Cambodian armed forces, 32; military assistance agreement of, 250, 256-57; military assistance agree- ment with France of, 249; military as- sistance by, 32, 33, 261; offensive against North Vietnamese in Cambodia

by, xxx, 45; position on Khmer Rouge

return to power, xxxv; position on PRK

of, 191 ; recognition of Cambodia by, 24; relations with, 4-5, 30-35 United States Board of Geographic

Names (BGN), xiv United States Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), 32 United States Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV), 34-35,

45, 252

universities, provincial, 127

University of Agricultural Sciences, 127

University of Fine Arts, 127

University of Paris, 39

University of Phnom Penh, 39, 40, 127, 133

university system {see also Buddhist

University), 127

uprising, peasant (Samlot). See Samlot

revolt U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 66

Vichy government, xxviii, 4, 21, 245

Vickery, Michael, 26, 29, 53, 90, 118, 119, 123-24, 125, 128, 208, 218

Viet Cong, xxx, 5, 33, 34, 42, 44-45, 47, 252, 255, 320-21 {see also National Front for the Liberation of South Viet- nam (NFLSVN))

Viet Minh, xxviii, 4, 22, 27-28, 36, 39, 246, 321; combines with Khmer Is- sarak, 250

Viet-Muong language (Mon-Khmer),

111 Vietnam, 3, 6, 12, 14, 15, 18, 64, 80-81,

142; annexation of Cambodian terri- tory by, 3, 14-15; attacks and incursions by Cambodians, 66, 68; border

dispute with Cambodia, 190, 262; border with Cambodia, 76, 81, 279; Cambodian minority groups in, 104-5;

cost of Cambodian occupation for, 296-97; economic and technical as- sistance to Cambodia by, 173, 175; in- vasion of Cambodia by, xxxii, 6, 69-70, 75, 155, 241; as major trading partner of, 169, 170-71; military as- sistance to Cambodia by, 287, 293;

military operations in Cambodia of, 297; military presence in Cambodia by, 295, 296-97; offensive (1978) against

Khmer Rouge (RAK), 264-66; offensive in Cambodia: 1984-85, 273, 276; opposition to military forces in Cambodia of, 266-67, 269; position on re- lations with PRK government of, 191, 192, 208, 224-35, 226; role in Cambodian civil war of, xxxiv-xxxv; role in KNUFNS of, 263-64; seizes Cambodian island, 68; withdrawal of troops

in Cambodia by, xxxv, 187,228, 295-96

Vietnam, North, xxx, 27, 30, 41, 42, 44-45; border clashes with Khmer

Rouge, 262; Cambodian offensive

against, 256-58; focus on Sihanouk by, 37-38; incursions into Cambodia by,

5; relations with Cambodia of, 4, 30-38, 251; representation at Geneva

Conference by, 27-28 Vietnam, South, xxx, 27, 30, 33-34,

37-38; border dispute with Cambodia,

252; offensive to destroy North Viet- nam forces in Cambodia, 45 Vietnamese: military forces, 187-88;

operations against Cambodian guerrillas, 267 Vietnamese Communist Party, 36 Vietnamese in Cambodia, 20, 55, 83, 85-86, 108, 110, 122 Vietnamese people, 12, 14, 243 Vietnam War. See Second Indochina War

Vietnam Workers' Party, 36, 40, 63, 317, 218

village militia: of KPRAF, 290-91 359
Cambodia: A Country Study

villages: of Cham people, 100; of Khmer

Loeu, 101

vissakh bochea, 120 Vogt, John W., 46

Voice of Democratic Kampuchea (Khmer

Rouge radio station), 201 Voice of the Kampuchean People

(VOKP), xix, 182, 215 Vo Nguyen Giap, 68 Vorn Vet, 41, 64, 65, 69 Vyadhapura, 7

Wai island, 263

warfare, historical, 242-43 Warsaw Pact advisors: PRK, xxiii Water Chenla kingdom, xxv, 9 water supply, 132 water transportation, 178, 181 waterways, inland, xix, 159

wat, 116-17, 119-20, 125, 136; schools

in, 130 weapons and equipment: of CGDK, xxii; from China, xxix, 272, 276; of KPRAF: PRK, xxii, 287; of KPRAF

village militia, 290; of NADK: coali- tion government, xxii weather (see also drought; flooding; monsoons; typhoons), 10, 79-81, 141, 142, 160

welfare programs and organizations, 135-36 Western Zone, 54, 61, 65

Willmott, William, 106, 108 Women. See female role women in KPRAF, 292 Women's Mutual Health Association, 136 Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK),

(see also Kampuchean (Khmer) Workers' Party of Kampuchea (WPK)),

40-41, 215, 317 World Bank, xx, 150 World Council of Churches, 174 WPK. ^Workers' Party of Kampuchea

(WPK)

Yasovarman I, 10 Yugoslavia, 149 Yukanthor, 18 Yunnan region, 10 Yun Yat, 55 Yuthevong. See Sisowath Yuthevong

(prince)

Zhou Enlai, 31, 52 zones (see also administrative divisions); established by Khmer Rouge (NADK),

271; replacement of provinces by, 61

360
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